AFRICA COMMAND: OPPORTUNITY FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT OR THE MILITARIZATION OF U.S.–AFRICA RELATIONS?

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BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH OF THE
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AFRICA COMMAND: OPPORTUNITY FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT OR THE MILITARIZATION OF U.S.–AFRICA RELATIONS?

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald Payne (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me begin by welcoming everyone here this afternoon. Today the subcommittee will explore the administration’s plan to establish a unified combatant command for the continent of Africa. At issue is how the administration intends to make sure that the new command enhances our relationship with African countries rather than becoming a source of tension and mistrust.

Up until now, three separate Department of Defense combatant commands have been responsible for covering Africa. Given the increased strategic and diplomatic importance of Africa to the United States, setting up a new command seems to make sense. Africa should not be a neglected stepchild in organizations with other global priorities. Had this been done in the past there would probably be less concerns.

However, the establishment of Africa is more than a simple bureaucratic reorganization. What little the administration has clearly communicated about Africa Command is that it will be different than other commands because of the development challenges within African countries.

The State Department and the Agency for International Development are to be an integral part of the command according to State Department and Department of Defense officials. I agree with the assessment that the administration has made in terms of the need to ensure that the new command is structured to address problems relevant to Africans. They are confronted with issues related not only to conflict, but to resource scarcity, food insecurity, HIV and AIDS, malaria and collapsed states.

I believe that we have a moral obligation to assist the region’s efforts to overcome these momentous challenges. To the extent that establishing a command where our relationship with Africa is the priority rather than an afterthought can help to eliminate some of these problems, a unified approach seems like a good approach and I support it.
However, I do have some very serious concerns. One is about the administration’s goal in setting up the command. On the one hand we have been told that the Department of Defense is not planning on taking on new tasks in Africa; that is, it is merely an organizational exercise. On the other hand we are told that State Department and USAID are being brought into the command so that they can inform the Department of Defense as it structures its program. This implies that the programs and perhaps even the tasks that DoD carries out will be significantly different in some respects.

My second concern is the way in which the initiative was announced and developed. To be truthful, I read about the administration’s plan to establish a new command in the newspaper. I have had more calls from the press than I have had from the Department of Defense; I got my information from the newspaper.

There has been no true consultation with this committee about the establishment or the structure of the command. The few briefings that we have had—which, by the way, are not consultations; they were briefings—have not been particularly informative, all of which makes me wonder how our African partners and allies were informed about the initiative and whether there has been genuine consultation with them.

Africans themselves seem somewhat skeptical and perhaps downright cynical about the intentions of this new command and so it appears as though we have started out on the wrong foot. There are some who think this effort is a reaction to the presence of the Chinese in Africa. There are others who believe that we are establishing forward locations from which to fight the global war on terror. Still others are convinced that the United States is intent on protecting oil resources on the continent.

I suspect that there is an element of truth to each of these rumors. DoD’s increasing involvement in foreign aid and foreign assistance is something that I am concerned about. Congress has granted the Department of Defense new authorities to implement security assistance programs in coordination with the State Department. However, as a February GAO report indicates, the degree of coordination has not been good at all. I am concerned that this could be the case with the activities run out of AFRICOM as well.

During the hearing I hope that the administration officials will address these three issues, as well as questions regarding the principal mission of the new command, the structure of the command and lines of communication that will govern it, where AFRICOM might be located and the level of resources that it may need to achieve these goals.

I appreciate you coming to testify, and I certainly look forward to your testimony. With that, I turn to the ranking member, Mr. Smith, for his comments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

Good afternoon and welcome. Today the subcommittee will explore the administration’s plans to establish a unified combatant command for the continent of Africa. At issue is how the administration plans to make sure that the new command en-
hances our relationship with African countries rather than becoming a source of tension and mistrust.

Up until now, three separate Department of Defense combatant commands have been responsible for covering Africa. Given the increasing strategic and diplomatic importance of Africa to the United States, setting up a new command makes sense. Africa should not be the neglected stepchild in organizations with other geographic priorities.

However, the establishment of this is more than a simple bureaucratic reorganization. What little the administration has clearly communicated about Africa command is that it will be different than other commands because of the development challenges within African countries. The State Department and the Agency for International Development are to be an integral part of the command, according to State and Defense Department officials. I agree with the assessment that the administration has made in terms of the need to ensure that the new command is structured to address problems many Africans face. They are confronted with issues related not only to conflict, but to resource scarcity, food insecurity, HIV/AIDS and collapsed states.

I believe that we have a moral obligation to assist the regions efforts to overcome these challenges. To the extent that establishing a command where our relationship with Africa is the priority rather than an afterthought can help do so, I support it. However, I do have some very serious concerns. One is about the administration's goals in setting up the command. On the one hand we have been told that the Department of Defense is not planning on taking on new tasks in Africa, that this is merely an organizational exercise. On the other hand we are told that the State Department and the USAID are being brought into the command so that they can inform the Department of Defense as it structures its programs. This implies that the programs, and perhaps even the tasks that DOD carries out will be significantly different in some respects.

My second concern is the way in which the initiative was announced and developed. I read about the administration's plans to establish a new command in the newspaper. I have had more calls from the press than I have had from the Department of Defense. There has been no consultation with this committee about the establishment or structure of the command. The few briefings that we have had—which by the way are not consultations—have not been particularly informative. All of which makes me wonder how our African partners and allies were informed about the initiative, and whether there has been genuine consultation with them.

Africans themselves seem somewhat skeptical, and perhaps downright cynical about the intentions of the United States. There are some who think this effort is a reaction to the presence of the Chinese. There are others who believe that the United States is intent on protecting oil resources on the continent. I suspect that there is an element of truth to each of those rumors.

Finally, I am concerned about DOD's increasing involvement in foreign aid and foreign assistance. Congress has granted the Department of Defense new authorities to implement security assistance programs in coordination with the State Department. However, as a February GAO report indicates, the degree of coordination has not been good at all. I am concerned that this could be the case with AFRICOM as well.

During the course of this hearing, I hope that administration officials will address those three issues, as well as questions regarding the principle mission of the new command, the structure of the command, where it might be located, and the level of resources such a command might need. I appreciate your coming and look forward to your testimony. With that I turn to the Ranking Member, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing and welcome to our very distinguished witnesses.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the creation of AFRICOM, the new unified combatant command for Africa, has significant potential for enhancing security, stability and preventing or mitigating violence, and I would say to that, it is about time.

I strongly commend and congratulate the Bush administration for its compelling vision and tangible commitment to the African people on so many levels, including this one, these people have endured and suffered so much for so long.
Whether it be President Bush’s highly effective PEPFAR program to combat the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, his Millennium Challenge Account, the high impact malaria campaign, expanding opportunities for trade or the steadfast commitment to end the wanton bloodshed in Darfur, this President and the many outstanding leaders vested with power to carry out these initiatives have truly made a remarkable difference.

The launch of AFRICOM continues and expands this robust United States engagement with Africa. One of my chief concerns, however, as AFRICOM comes on line is that it promotes human rights not some of the time, but all of the time. Whether the challenge is fighting the global war on terror, averting cross border conflict or civil war or even crowd control, human rights must be fully integrated at all levels of the command.

Both Chairman Payne and I have worked very hard to enact the Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007 believing, as we do, that elements of the Ethiopian Command, police, and army have been misused by the Milas regime to quell protests resulting in the loss of many, many lives.

We and many Members of Congress remain deeply concerned that military assets should never be employed by rogue leaders or dictators against their own civilian population or that of their neighbors. Military trading and cooperation that enables or facilitates the misuse of force needs to be avoided at all costs.

I am reminded, and there are so many examples, of the problems we had in Indonesia when the JASIS program was training members of the Kopasus military in Indonesia. I made several trips there, and I remember when the killing began at the end of the Suharto regime. Many of those who were engaging in urban guerrilla warfare—that is to say the Kopasus troops—may or may not have had training by the United States. I tried in vain—held hearings, got redacted copies—and could never figure out who it is that we trained and whether or not they were at least given a heavy dose of human rights training.

That remains an open question to this day. So we want that military training and that cooperation at all times to be absolutely centered on human rights.

Some of the African leaders do have some misgivings, and I think those misgivings may even grow in a crescendo as time goes on because there are unanswered questions, including where the command will be housed and what its overall mission will be, and I know that is in part what this hearing is about.

I thought that President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia summed it up quite well in June when she gave a positive take on it, and I quote her:

“AFRICOM should be seen for what it is: Recognition of the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security interests, as well as recognition that long-term African security lies in empowering African partners to develop a healthy security environment, to embracing good governance, building security capacity and developing good civil military relations.

“AFRICOM should be seen as the end product of a significant strategic realignment a long time in the making, one
where engagement in Africa nations is more than just a humanitarian cause.”

She went on to say that

“Liberians can only hope that the United States will use AFRICOM to raise standards for engagement and help change the way of doing business in Africa.”

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this very timely hearing.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Ms. Watson?

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I would like to thank our witnesses also for coming today and especially Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan for coming to testify before our committee.

I know that as a Department of Defense official you are not used to having our committee directly engaged in your work, but I hope you will see this as an opportunity to build a new relationship that can be helpful to you as you seek to build the African command.

I think you will find this new relationship valuable in part because the African command represents a brand new concept. For the first time in decades, America is taking seriously Africa’s strategic priorities. This is an exciting revolutionary development, but even more revolutionary is the change in thinking represented by the structure of this new command.

For the first time officials from key civilian U.S. Government agencies will be integrated into the command structure of AFRICOM. This subcommittee is of course first concerned with United States policy in Africa, but I hope we will spend some time discussing this revolutionary change in how our Government conducts foreign policy.

This is a new effort to bring all elements of African power—military, political, economic and informational—to bear on national security challenges in a coordinated manner. This is a grand experiment, and we don’t know for sure how well it will work, but the architects of this effort are to be commended for the effort, and I for one will be watching their progress closely and hoping for their success.

Mr. Chairman, I am very excited about the new African command, and I know some have expressed concern that this may lead to a creeping militarization of United States policies in Africa, but, as we have relearned the hard way in Iraq, security must precede development. Too many nations and societies in Africa suffer from a security deficit, and I think the new African command acknowledges this reality.

Just as importantly, the integrated civilian and military structure acknowledges that it is not enough to simply address the security deficit. We must also address the challenges African governments face to provide human security for their people, poverty, health and the rule of law.

So I support your efforts, and I wish you success. I look forward to working with you to keep AFRICOM focused on the big picture, and that is working to support Africans as they work to provide their people with complete human security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tancredo?
Mr. TANCREDO. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. PAYNE. All right. Mr. Royce?
Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate, by the way, you allowing me to participate in this hearing. It was years ago that you and I were making the argument that yes, America has a strategic interest in seeing Africa prosper.

As a matter of fact, I called for an Africa Command. I am glad to see the administration endorse this concept and move forward with a plan, but, Chairman, I remember the hearing that we held shortly after September 11 on Africa and on terrorism, and back then the staff of the European Command responsible for a large swath of Africa said to us that they spend nearly none of their time focused on the continent.

Now, today if you asked General James Jones, who formerly headed up the command, he says the figure has shot up to 70 percent. Part of this might be because of Don Payne because, Chairman, if you will recall you and I were quite engaged trying to get the focus on war torn Liberia, trying to get the Marines into Liberia to establish some order there.

We have both been to Darfur and both have taken news crews in to document the genocide. It was your bill on genocide that helped move a circumstance where the United States provided the heavy lift capability to get African Union troops on the ground in Darfur to stop the genocide there and so as we go forward the establishment of Africa Command is a realization to me of the growing challenges of our interests on the continent and the interests of Africans.

It is problematic that Islamist terrorism is going to continue to impact Africa. We have some of the aspects of jihadism in what we have seen in Sudan. We have got energy security and we have got the problems with jihadists potentially targeting energy in Africa.

We have got China’s explosion on the continent and the hope that we can be engaged enough to continue our efforts toward the rule of law and transparency and all that we would like to see in terms of incentives there.

So this hearing asks whether AFRICOM is an opportunity or a militarization of United States-Africa relations. In my view it clearly is an opportunity because what Africa Command looks to bring to Africa is capacity building for Africa militaries to deal with terrorism, to deal with maritime security, to deal with an issue we have looked at in terms of curbing piracy.

It brings an increased ability to respond and check human suffering on the continent. You and I only know too well from our trips into Congo just how deep that suffering can go. It also brings a hearts and minds campaign focused on health and infrastructure.

Of course, these are things the United States military is already doing on the continent, and over the years I have often heard calls for more attention and resources—not less—and the difference that AFRICOM brings is one commander with a holistic view of Africa allowing for comprehensive responses to Africa’s many challenges.
This needs to be done right, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to raising some concerns I have raised before during the question and answer session with the panel, and I thank you again for this hearing and my inclusion.

Thanks, Don.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. You are always welcome to this committee. It was a pleasure working with you when you chaired it, and your continued interest is appreciated.

Before I introduce our first panel, I would just like to acknowledge a visiting delegation that we have here from Liberia. They are part of the House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC) of which Mr. Boozman is a member. Mr. Boozman visited Liberia, as I did, with the commission. There are 12 countries in the commission, which is now headed by David Price.

We then bring our counterparts from those countries to Washington, so I just would like to ask the President pro tem, Isaac Nianabu, if he and his delegation would stand. The Liberian delegation.

[Applause.]

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. PAYNE. Yes?

Mr. BOOZMAN. We in Arkansas will be honored. They will be coming to Arkansas toward the end of the week. Like I say, we are really looking forward to having them in northwest Arkansas.

Mr. PAYNE. Are they really going to northwest Arkansas? That is great. I know there is a strong interest, as you have indicated before, in Arkansas in Liberia and so I know they are looking forward to that. We appreciate your hosting them also, Congressman.

We will now hear from our first panel. Our first witness is U.S. Army Colonel (Ret.) Michael Hess, the current Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Mr. Hess was appointed by President Bush and was sworn into office June 2005. Prior to joining USAID, Mr. Hess served in the United States military for 30 years, including serving in humanitarian operations in Turkey, Kosova, Iraq and Bosnia. He was recalled to active duty to serve as the humanitarian coordinator in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance during Operation Iraqi Freedom and later served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Let me say, Mr. Hess, that we thank you for your service to our country and your active role in U.S. military humanitarian efforts around the world and your new responsibilities.

Joining Mr. Hess, we will then hear from Acting Assistant Secretary Steve Mull. Ambassador Mull was appointed to his present position in January of this year after serving in this Bureau since 2006.

Ambassador Mull has served as a Foreign Service officer for over 25 years and served as U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania in the past. In Washington he has served as Deputy Executive Secretary for the Department of State and as the Deputy Director of the State Department’s Operations Center.
Our third administration witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Ms. Theresa Whelan. Ms. Whelan serves within the Office of the Secretary of Defense where she is responsible for Department of Defense's policy for sub-Saharan African policy.

Ms. Whelan has over 12 years of experience focusing on African issues, having served as the Director of the Office of African Affairs, as well as Countries Director for Southern African and West Africa.

We are pleased to have all three of you, and we look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. HESS. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID's involvement in the establishment of the United States African command.

I will briefly review USAID's history of cooperation with the military, explain our role both in the initial planning for AFRICOM and in our continued engagement with the command and detail the resources we expect to contribute to it.

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, USAID has been the principal U.S. Government agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disasters, trying to escape poverty and engaging in democratic reforms. With regard to our disaster assistance and development portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate with the military over the years.

Our most obvious collaborations are in the area of emergency humanitarian assistance in both natural disasters and complex emergencies. During Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, for example, our disaster assistance response teams worked closely with Coalition Forces to facilitate the safe return of Kurdish civilians to northern Iraq.

At the time I was serving as a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel in Civil Affairs and worked in northern Iraq. Provide Comfort was my first operational experience with USAID's humanitarian assistance work and was where I met Fred Cuny.

USAID also has experience collaborating with the military in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya has worked on educational projects with the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in which the military builds schools or refurbishes them, and USAID furnishes school books and supports teacher training.

This long record of collaboration with the military suggests that the cooperative relationship that is envisioned by AFRICOM is not entirely new, yet experience has also taught us that when we work with the military, maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID is vital. USAID coordination with DoD should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader foreign policy goals.
USAID has been involved in the operational planning for AFRICOM from the beginning. In November 2006 we sent staff to participate on the implementation planning team, which developed the initial conceptual framework for AFRICOM. We have also participated in the AFRICOM transition team since February 2007 when it was established at Headquarters European Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

USAID has two full-time people there representing both the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance and the Bureau for Africa. They are intimately involved in all the operational details required to help AFRICOM achieve its initial operating capability on time.

In addition to the collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington we are in close and continual consultations with our colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense who have responsibility for AFRICOM.

We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes operational. As a first step, we intend to send a senior development advisor to AFRICOM to help the commander make strategic choices with regard to development issues within his area of responsibility.

The SDA will be a senior Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in USAID development work. The person will likely have served as a mission director and will bring to the AFRICOM command group the invaluable perspective of an experienced development professional with significant African experience.

There are other opportunities for us to participate in the structure and operations of AFRICOM. There are a number of leadership positions within the proposed organizational structure which are currently under development. At the moment it is premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately staffed by USAID personnel. However, we will continue to work on the evolution of AFRICOM's structure to determine which positions might best be served by the expertise that USAID has to offer.

The most important resource that USAID will contribute to AFRICOM will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds of years of experience engaging in humanitarian and development work in Africa. This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting the interagency efforts of the U.S. Government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the continent.

We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department of Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance activities. We will work to ensure that USAID’s and AFRICOM’s programs are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and use our resources effectively.

USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues in the State Department and the Department of Defense in the creation of AFRICOM. As AFRICOM develops, we will continue to collaborate with our colleagues in the government and will work closely with our NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are addressed.
Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to keeping Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID’s involvement in the establishment of the United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. We believe that AFRICOM can significantly advance the “Three D” concept, and facilitate the coordination of defense, diplomacy and development to advance American foreign policy interests on the continent of Africa.

In the course of my testimony today, I will address USAID’s role in the development of AFRICOM by outlining four important issues:

• Summary of USAID’s cooperation with the U.S. military
• USAID’s participation in the initial planning for AFRICOM
• USAID’s intended role in AFRICOM after it reaches Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on October 1, 2007
• Resources that USAID will continue to contribute to AFRICOM after it achieves Full Operating Capability (FOC) on October 1, 2008.

USAID AND CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, USAID has been the principal U.S. government agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disasters, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. With regard to our disaster assistance and development portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate with the military over the years.

Our most obvious collaborations have been in the area of emergency humanitarian assistance. When the magnitude of a natural disaster overwhelms our normal response mechanisms, we have successfully enlisted the aid of our military partners to meet the needs of civilians at risk. During the 2004 Asian Tsunami crisis, for example, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (known as DARTs) worked closely with U.S. Navy units from Combined Support Force 536 to deliver relief supplies and potable water to affected areas. Similarly, DARTs collaborated with U.S. military units in 2005 in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake to identify isolated populations in stricken areas, evacuate victims for medical treatment, and set up emergency shelters to protect survivors against the harsh winter elements. As recently as December 2006, USAID worked with aviation assets from the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) in Djibouti to air drop supplies to the Somali refugee camps in northeastern Kenya which had been cut off from overland routes by extensive flooding.

USAID also has extensive experience working with the military to meet the humanitarian and economic needs of civilian populations affected by armed conflict. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991, our DARTs worked closely with the U.S. Army to facilitate the safe return of Kurdish civilians who had fled into the Zargos Mountains to escape attacks from Saddam Hussein’s genocidal forces. I should note that as a U.S. Army Civil Affairs Lieutenant Colonel working in northern Iraq at the time, PROVIDE COMFORT was my first operational experience with USAID’s humanitarian assistance work. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan and Iraq offer the most integrated model of USAID-U.S. military collaboration to date. In both countries, USAID staff work closely with personnel from the U.S. military and a variety of other U.S. government agencies to provide essential services to local populations in support of our national security objectives.

Beyond humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and armed conflicts, USAID also has experience collaborating with the military in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID missions have worked with U.S. military units performing medical, dental and veterinary missions for civilian populations in Latin America and Africa, most recently in Kenya and Uganda. In addition, USAID missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya have worked on educational projects with
CJTF–HOA in which the military builds or refurbishes school buildings and USAID furnishes school books and supports teacher training.

This long record of collaboration with the military across countries and across contexts suggests that the cooperative relationship that is envisioned by AFRICOM is not entirely new. USAID has learned that the military's logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in emergency humanitarian assistance. Likewise, we have demonstrated that USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of essential human needs for civilian populations in both peace and war is of substantial strategic benefit to the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's civic action programs can lead to important synergies of effort, resources and expertise for the benefit our beneficiaries and in support of our interests.

Yet experience has also taught us of the importance of maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID when we work with the military. While we represent the same government as our military colleagues, the methods by which we work and the sectors in which we work are quite different. Preserving the development and humanitarian role of USAID, even as we work closely with the military in the field, is vital to the successful operation of our programs, to the preservation of our partnerships with non-governmental organizations, and to our credibility in the eyes of our beneficiaries. In large part this will be ensured by AFRICOM's focus on the security sector, while supporting USAID in mutually agreed upon activities.

We remain ever mindful of our humanitarian principles and development principles as we contribute to the development of AFRICOM. We also remain mindful that the increasing presence and role of the Department of Defense in Africa provides opportunities and challenges. DOD can support national security objectives in ways that USAID cannot. DOD can help professionalize African militaries; strengthen the African regional security architecture, including African Standby Force; mitigate HIV/AIDS and other public health threats in the security sector; and provide disaster response capacity if others cannot. USAID participation in such efforts seeks to maximize effectiveness in ways that broadly support development and humanitarian objectives.

Although there has been increasing recognition of development as part of the national security strategy, growing DOD presence in Africa has the potential of blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense, and development. These lines were never perfect. Increasing levels of DOD programming in Africa puts it in closer proximity to USAID programs. Some of these DOD activities include wells, schools, clinics, and veterinarian services. The result can be confusion and misperceptions. USAID coordination with the DOD should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader foreign policy goals.

USAID AND INITIAL PLANNING FOR AFRICOM

USAID has been involved in the operational planning for AFRICOM from the beginning. In November 2006 we sent staff to participate in the Implementation Planning Team which developed the initial conceptual framework for AFRICOM. We have also participated in the AFRICOM Transition Team (TT) since February 2007 when it was established at the headquarters for U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. USAID has two full-time staff people there, representing both the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, which I lead, and the Bureau for Africa. They are intimately involved in all of the operational details required to help AFRICOM achieve IOC on time, including the shape of the command structure, outreach, staffing patterns, and legal authorities among others issues. In addition to the collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington we are in close and continual consultations with our colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense that have responsibility for AFRICOM.

USAID'S ROLE IN AFRICOM POST–IOC

We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes operational. USAID currently has over $3 billion of programs across the continent planned this fiscal year alone, making it a U.S. government agency with one of the largest financial commitment to Africa. Given AFRICOM's mission to support other agencies in implementing U.S. security policies and strategies on the continent, we expect that there will be many areas in which we might usefully collaborate.

As a first step, we intend to send a Senior Development Advisor (SDA) to AFRICOM to help the Commander make strategic choices with regard to development issues within his AOR. Modeled after Political Advisors, or POLADs, which the State Department sends to each of the geographic combatant commands, the
SDA will be a senior foreign service officer with extensive experience in USAID development work. The person will most likely have previously served as a mission director at least once, and will bring to the command group of AFRICOM the invaluable perspective of an experienced development professional with significant Africa experience. I should note that USAID already has SDAs at two combatant commands, EUCOM and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and we are committed to sending SDAs to each of the geographic combatant commands.

We believe that there may be other opportunities for us to participate in the structure and operations of AFRICOM. There are a number of leadership positions within the proposed organizational structure which are currently under development. At the moment, it is premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately staffed by USAID personnel. However, we will continue to observe the evolution of the AFRICOM’s structure to determine which positions might best be served by the expertise that USAID has to offer.

**USAID RESOURCES FOR AFRICOM**

The most important resource that USAID will contribute to AFRICOM will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds of years of experience engaging in humanitarian and development work in Africa. This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting the interagency efforts of the U.S. government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the continent. To this end, USAID is committed to providing staff for the position I mentioned above. We will also consider providing additional staff for the AFRICOM headquarters as requested. Finally, we will work to ensure that AFRICOM’s activities are closely coordinated with USAID programs managed by our missions across the continent.

We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department of Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance activities. We will, however, work to ensure that our programmatic expenditures are coordinated with those of AFRICOM to avoid needless overlap or mutually exclusive activities.

**CONCLUSION**

USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues in the State Department and the Pentagon in the creation of AFRICOM. It will be a substantial step in our effort to integrate further the elements of defense, diplomacy and development in the execution of our foreign policy. In my judgment, it will also represent an improvement in the delivery of services to our beneficiaries by greater synergies in the distribution of U.S. government resources across Africa.

As AFRICOM continues to develop, we will continue to collaborate with our colleagues in the government and will work closely with our NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are addressed.

Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to keeping Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Mull?

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN D. MULL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Ambassador MULL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith and all the members of the committee. It is a great honor to have the chance to appear before all of you today.

I provided formal testimony to your staff and would ask that you enter it into the record and would restrict myself to a few summary comments.

Last autumn, Deputy Assistant Secretary Whelan called me to say she would like to come over to meet with me, along with her team, to discuss an exciting, new idea for setting up a new military command in Africa. We met a few days later.
She talked about a truly exciting idea that I think has a real chance of transforming our strategic approach to this very important continent. This new command, AFRICOM, I think will include a number of exciting innovations, and she described these to me along with her team last fall, transforming the U.S. military strategic approach from its current division of dividing it among three different commands into one unified command that will be capable of sustained and integrated attention.

Also, it expanded attention to building, and integrating attention to building, the military capacity of our African partners so that they can better work with us in confronting the common threats we face such as terrorism, ungoverned areas and civil and international conflicts.

She described that the command would also offer a more coherent approach to important regional security concerns that affect America’s vital interests in the region. She described a more efficient way of providing emergency humanitarian response and managing military crisis response.

Also it offered in the plan an unprecedented new way of interagency cooperation that would feature opening the door to substantial civilian agency involvement in the command, including by putting senior civilians in leadership positions in the command, as Assistant Administrator Hess described.

From the start we at State were very excited by the idea, and we enthusiastically jumped at the opportunity to join with our DoD colleagues in designing the command. From the very beginning State was an integral partner, along with USAID and other participants, in the design of that command.

We assigned officers, both senior and mid level, to join the command design team here in Washington and later in Stuttgart, and many aspects of the new proposed command structure reflect substantial input by State and other civilian officials.

We collaborated in briefing important partners, including your staffs, important nongovernmental organizations, the press and other interested communities. We joined in officially briefing key African partners on a series of trips to the region earlier this year, and we joined in briefing other key allies with interests in Africa in Europe and Asia and other partners on our intentions.

The result of this collaboration is a plan for AFRICOM that we think will substantially improve the United States Government’s effectiveness in responding to Africa’s unique challenges and in creating an atmosphere that is favorable to America’s considerable interests there.

I am proud to say that the Department of State at its most senior levels welcomes AFRICOM and looks forward to working with our Defense Department colleagues to make it successful.

In describing AFRICOM, I think it is perhaps most important to start by describing what it is not. It will not take the place of the Department of State or USAID and United States Embassies in the field as the voice of American foreign policy in our relationships with African states and African international organizations.

It will not have any authorities beyond those that U.S. military commands already enjoy in other commands. It will not establish new military bases on the African continent. It will not have any
less responsibility to obtain appropriate chief of mission concurrence and coordinate with U.S. diplomats for all of its activities on the continent in individual countries, and its civilian officials will not exercise any authority on behalf of their parent agencies. They will be part of the command reporting to the commander.

Here is what the command will allow: It will allow a more strategically coherent focus on our military relationship with Africa and more effective support of important programs we fund and administer together with the Department of Defense with FMF, IMET, peacekeeping funds and Section 1206 funds such as the President's Global Peace Operations Initiative, which aims to train tens of thousands of new troops for peacekeeping operations.

The Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative, which aims to improve the capacities of North and West African states to respond to the terrorism threat there; the Maritime Security Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea, which aims to increase the ability of states in the region to provide for their own maritime security, as well as a number of other regional African coastal and border security programs.

It will help support and coordinate the East African Counterterrorism Initiative and support for African peacekeeping missions in Africa such as the upcoming U.N. mission in Sudan, and it will also be an important source of support for the State Department's programs in reforming the security sectors in such places as Liberia and in Southern Sudan.

Also, and importantly, it will allow civilian agencies like State and USAID to have a seat at the table in shaping the military support of these programs, working in close liaison with our Embassies and our chiefs of mission on the continent. We especially look forward to contributing one of the two command's deputies to the commander, as well as a number of other officers, to assist and guide the command in its work.

There are obviously substantial challenges to overcome as we stand up this command regarding the location or locations of the command, security and infrastructure concerns, winning political and diplomatic support for the command on the continent from our African partners and sorting out the status of AFRICOM's forces in the countries where they will reside, both with host governments and with resident United States Embassies.

We are confident, based on our extremely productive partnership with the Department of Defense thus far, that we are going to succeed in surmounting these challenges, and we are going to stand up a command that will score a real win for America's interests in Africa in the longer term.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering any questions or concerns you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mull follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN D. MULL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I would like thank the Chairman and the Committee for inviting me to testify here today about AFRICOM—a command we believe will be an important asset in our overall Africa policy. The State Department, and my bureau which is the State Department's principal link to the Department of Defense, strongly supports the creation of U.S. Africa Command. We join with the Bureau of African Affairs in our
appreciation for the positive effects that AFRICOM will have on conflict prevention, regional security, capacity-building, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and in other key areas. Employing a “whole of government approach,” AFRICOM is truly an unprecedented step forward in inter-agency cooperation and a new vehicle for addressing security issues in Africa. We welcome the Department of Defense’s greater interest, resources, and participation in African issues.

Currently, U.S. military responsibilities for activities in Africa are divided among three unified commands—the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific Commands. By assigning responsibility for the whole region, with the exception of Egypt, to one single command—AFRICOM, the U.S.’s military interface with Africa will be more efficient and more effective. And Egypt, while retaining its vital historical role in Middle Eastern affairs, will not be ignored, but will be considered as a country of special concern for AFRICOM. Finally, we are encouraged by the nomination of GEN Ward to be AFRICOM’s first commander. If confirmed, GEN Ward’s unique and invaluable experience with African security issues and his well-known reputation as an outstanding senior leader in multinational and interagency settings will almost certainly lead to important successes for AFRICOM from its inception.

The Department of Defense should be commended for the inclusive nature in which they have planned and coordinated the establishment of AFRICOM. The Department of State, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies were invited to temporarily assign full-time senior representatives to the AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team. This team was established in November 2006 and was the Department of Defense’s initial planning structure for the creation of AFRICOM. When the AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team completed its work in early 2007, the State Department and other U.S. government agencies were invited to join the AFRICOM Transition Team. The Transition Team began its work in Stuttgart in February 2007. The Department of Defense’s public diplomacy efforts were also laudable examples of interagency partnerships. The State Department and its senior leaders played a key role in public diplomacy outreach efforts to African states and regional organizations. In each of these endeavors, the sense of partnership between the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Bureau of African Affairs, and several other State Department bureaus grew markedly and has contributed to a coherent and highly effective involvement of the Department of State in this important effort. The result, to date, has been significantly enhanced cooperation and collaboration between the State and Defense Departments, and a framework that is supportive of both U.S. foreign policy interests and regional security objectives.

Throughout this process, both departments have been sensitive to the requirements and sensitivities of the other. Importantly, after thoughtful dialogue and careful study, each department has concluded that there is no need to alter the current authorities that govern State/Defense collaboration in the field or in Washington. The Department of State will continue to exercise full foreign policy authority in Africa and the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs will continue to be the lead policymaker in the U.S. Government on African issues, including regional security policy; The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs will continue its traditional responsibilities in bilateral political-military talks, security assistance funding, management of arms transfers, and defense trade controls. The Department of Defense understands these bureau roles and responsibilities and is unequivocally supportive. State will continue to provide leadership for, and exercise authority over, its 47 embassies in the AFRICOM area of responsibility, with personnel on assignments of two or three years, whose responsibility it is to understand the host country government and people, and to both influence and implement policy. Each Chief of Mission in the field in Africa will continue to act as the President’s personal representative in the country to which he/she is accredited, and to exercise full authority over all the U.S. Government’s peacetime activities.

The relationship between the State and Defense Departments in establishing AFRICOM is correctly characterized, in military parlance, as “supporting-to-supported.” The Department of Defense and the U.S. military will continue to support the Department of State in the pursuit of foreign policy goals, while we at the Department of State will continue to fully support the military in its efforts to promote the security and safety of the United States. In each circumstance it should be emphasized that we will work TOGETHER to promote security in Africa. The relationship between security and development is no longer an academic discussion. Africa cannot fully develop in an environment where conflict and other threats to state and individual security reign. We strongly endorse the positive role that AFRICOM can play in helping to eliminate these threats and in assisting in stability-oriented activities. AFRICOM’s focus on reducing conflict, improving security, defeating terrorists, and supporting crisis response are EXACTLY the right focal points and are synergistic complements to State Department efforts in the region. We expect the
largely civil-military activities of AFRICOM to help State strengthen regional security policies and their implementation. AFRICOM will draw upon our Embassies in the field for most of the information it will use to guide its security cooperation programs and its overall interaction with Africa.

Please allow me to elaborate on the public diplomacy efforts I alluded to earlier. An important element to be considered in the stand-up of AFRICOM is the reaction of our regional friends and those from outside the region who have significant interest in Africa. A delegation of Senior officials from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have already completed two extensive trips to Africa to consult with many key African states on AFRICOM and have found a generally positive reception. We expect to conduct additional consultations with African states and with allies who have strong interest in Africa in the near future. Consultations are also ongoing with various international organizations and non-governmental agencies on AFRICOM. As one would expect with a subject of this importance and scope, the reactions have been varied and diverse. An interagency team has briefed your staffs on the outcomes of these consultations, and we will continue the robust dialogue with Congress throughout this process.

The establishment of AFRICOM has understandably generated great interest. This interest has been generally helpful as it has allowed many ideas and perspectives from various fora to inform the discussions of the AFRICOM interagency establishment effort. Among the most frequent topics of discussion have been the speculations about where AFRICOM's headquarters might be located and how that "interagency-oriented" headquarters might be structured and manned. While current planning envisions an initial headquarters presence on the continent by October 2008, I want to make it clear that no final decision has been made about the location of the AFRICOM headquarters in Africa. There will almost certainly be subordinate offices in several other places on the African continent as well, but those locations have yet to be determined. State will also provide officers to work in AFRICOM. The Department will provide one of the two Deputies to the Commander working for the AFRICOM Commander. A senior State officer will be the Deputy to the Commander responsible for directing Command activities related to security cooperation and capacity building. The other Deputy to the Commander, a uniformed military officer, will be in charge of the purely military aspects of AFRICOM. The State Department will also provide another senior officer who will serve as the Political Advisor for the AFRICOM Commander, so we will be well-represented on the AFRICOM leadership team. In addition to traditional advisors, State and other civilian agencies will also provide a number of other personnel to work in leadership, management, and functional positions as AFRICOM staff officers; however, the exact number and their specific positions have not yet been determined. In addition, we expect to add staff in the Bureau of African Affairs who will assist in the interface with AFRICOM and its various elements.

The Department of State views the creation of AFRICOM as the beginning of a long and fruitful collaboration. And we are excited about it. I would be glad to take any questions that the committee might have.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Ms. Whelan?

STATEMENT OF MS. THERESA M. WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICA, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. WHELAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member Smith and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide DoD's perspective on the Africa Command.

Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved, a continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts and corrupt leadership. This image though is a far cry from the Africa of today. With the support of international partners, Africans are slowly, but surely, instituting democracy and good governance across the continent.

Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our collaboration, but it is a small part of our overall relationship. The United States spends approximately $9 billion a year in Africa, funding
programs in areas such as health, development, trade promotion and good governance.

In contrast, security-related programs receive only about $250 million a year. This security assistance includes such things as peacekeeping training programs, border and coastal security capacity development programs, logistics and airlift support to peacekeeping operations, and joint training exercises with African militaries throughout the continent.

A great deal of our training is focused on improving the level of professionalization and technical proficiency in African militaries. We do our best to convey through this training respect for human rights, the rule of law and the proper role of a civilian controlled military in a democracy.

We are now taking this relationship a step further. In February 2007, the President announced his decision to create a unified command for Africa, U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM.

Although this structure is new, the nature of our military engagement on the continent will not change. It will remain primarily focused on conducting theater security cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, counterterrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability.

For many years our military relationships on the continent have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. While these commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM represents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created by this organizational structure.

We hope that AFRICOM will allow DoD, civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa's multilateral institutions such as the African Union and the regional economic communities figure more prominently in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to better support the development of these important regional mechanisms and relationships.

AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, AFRICOM will include a significant number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

These interagency officers will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that AFRICOM will be more effective as it works to build peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and disaster response capacity in Africa. They will also help AFRICOM identify ways that DoD can support other United States Government departments' and agencies' initiatives in Africa.

Second, the commander will have both a military and civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil Military Affairs will be a senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. The civilian deputy will be responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM's security assistance work.
In particular, the DCMA will work with the State Department and the African Union on developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force.

State Department leadership at this senior level will also enhance AFRICOM’s ability to support such State Department-funded endeavors as the Africa Contingency Operation Training and Assistance Program, a mainstay of the United States effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa.

Third, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code organization structure. Recognizing that AFRICOM’s focus is on war prevention rather than war fighting, we are reorganizing the inner workings of the command to best position it for theater security cooperation activities and preventing problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming catastrophes or conflicts.

There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look like and what it will do. I would like to address a few of these misperceptions and concerns here. Some have raised the concern that AFRICOM will take control of security issues on the continent. Our intent is quite the contrary. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or discourage it.

United States security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emerging security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

There are also fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of United States foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead United States Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense matters. The creation of a single United States DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DoD to better coordinate its own efforts in support of State Department leadership to better build security capacity in Africa.

The intent is not for DoD generally or for AFRICOM at the operational level to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID have clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DoD will seek to provide support as appropriate and as necessary to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. THERESA M. WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICA, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

INTRODUCTION

Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved—a continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts, and corrupt leadership. This image is far cry from the Africa of today. This is a year in which we celebrate the half century of the historic independence of Ghana, and where the economic growth rate of the con-
The continent has averaged five percent for the past three years. In November 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was democratically elected to replace Charles Taylor, who is now at the Hague to stand trial for the brutality he unleashed in the region in the early 1990s. She is the second elected black woman head of state in the world.

The credit for this progress goes to the African people. With the support of international partners, Africans are slowly but surely instituting democracy and good governance across the continent, enabling more and more people to build their lives and pursue their livelihoods in a context of security and freedom, choice and opportunity.

Challenges do remain. Poverty, disease, and conflict persist. Corruption flourishes where the rule of law is weak. Gaps in infrastructure, technology and legal protections discourage local and foreign investment. We in the United States are in a position to help African nations develop the capacity to address these challenges.

The United States spends approximately $9 billion dollars a year in Africa, funding programs in support of a wide range of areas. The U.S. is helping to train health care professionals and provide desperately needed hospital equipment, train teachers and provide educational materials, prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS through various awareness programs, train prosecutors in support of the legal reforms and the promotion of independent judiciaries, train police forces consistent with important human rights norms, and to train customs and border control officers to increase capacities to thwart illicit trafficking of weapons, narcotics, and even children across national borders.

We are looking for ways to increase capital and trade flows, the means by which mutual prosperity is built. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, for example, grants African economies preferential access to our markets. The Millennium Challenge Account offers countries that have met standards of responsible and accountable governance to develop and propose extensive projects that target development goals that they themselves have identified.

All of these activities are undertaken in partnership with African governments, African institutions, and African organizations.

STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH AFRICANS

Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our collaboration with Africa—but it is a small part of our overall relationship.

This security assistance includes joint training exercises with African militaries throughout the continent. We provide a great deal of training to improve the level of professionalization and technical proficiency in African militaries. We do our best to convey through this training respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role of a civilian controlled military in a democracy. We provide equipment—in some cases granting the funds to do so—to meet African defense and security needs. We established the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC to promote a continuous dialogue between African military and civilian leaders and their U.S. counterparts on important security issues. In Nairobi, we instituted the Regional Disaster Management Center of Excellence. We engage on a daily basis with African military chains of command through our embassy-based Defense Attache’s and Defense Cooperation Chiefs. Every step of the way, we consult with our African partners and listen to what they have to say.

We are now taking this relationship a step further. In February 2007, the President announced his decision to create a Unified Command for Africa—U.S. Africa Command, or “AFRICOM.”

Although this structure is new, our military engagement on the African continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counter-terrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability. For many years our military relationships on the continent have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. While these commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM presents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created by this organizational structure. We hope that AFRICOM will allow DoD civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa’s multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, figure more prominently in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to better support the development of these important regional mechanisms and relationships.
RATIONALE FOR AFRICOM’S CREATION

Stability and prosperity in Africa are important to the long-term interests of the United States. A stable, healthy, and more prosperous Africa will contribute to global security and a stronger world economy.

Many of Africa’s security challenges are not limited by country boundaries but are transnational and regional in nature. African governments and institutions are using new approaches to address these challenges, and our engagement with Africa needs to reflect these African institutional innovations at the regional level.

In many ways, the creation of this command is an historic opportunity to “catch-up” Africa’s quickly evolving continental and regional security structures, and their increasing capacities to synergize African efforts in both the governmental and non-governmental spheres to address the significant security challenges on the continent. AFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand U.S. and African relationships in such a way that our combined efforts can help generate a more indigenous and, therefore, more sustainable peace and security on the continent. AFRICOM also is a manifestation of how DoD is innovating to transform its ability, institutionally, to meet the challenges of the new global security environment.

AFRICOM’S INNOVATIONS

AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, unlike a traditional Unified Command, it will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity. AFRICOM will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance our bi-lateral military relationships, and strengthen the capacities of Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations.

Second, AFRICOM will include a significant number of representatives from other US agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A variety of agencies have existing bilateral relationships with African governments—from collaborating to promote aviation safety to working with local NGOs to develop conflict mediation programs targeted at youth. These interagency officers will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that AFRICOM will be more effective as it works to build peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster response capacity in Africa. They will also help AFRICOM identify ways that DoD can support other U.S. Government departments and agencies’ initiatives in Africa.

Third, the Commander will have a both a military and civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) will be a Senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. This civilian deputy will be responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM’s security assistance work. In particular, the DCMA will work with the State Department and the African Union on developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. State Department leadership at this senior level will also enhance AFRICOM’s ability to support such State Department funded endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa.

Fourth, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code organization structure. Originating in the Napoleon age, this has proven to be an extremely effective method of organizing a command for war-fighting. Recognizing that AFRICOM’s focus is on war-prevention rather than war-fighting, we are reorganizing the inner-workings of the command to best position it for theatre security cooperation activities and preventing problems before they become crises and preventing crises before they become catastrophes.

AFRICOM MYTHS V REALITY

There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look like and what it will do. I would like to address these misperceptions and concerns here.

First, some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. This is not true. Violent extremism is cause for concern, and needs to be addressed, but this is not AFRICOM’s singular mission. Natural resources represent Africa’s current and future wealth, but in a fair market environment, many benefit. Ironically, the U.S., China and other countries share a common interest—that of a secure environment. AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security.
Second, some have raised the concern that AFRICOM will take control of security issues on the continent. Our intent is quite the contrary. DoD recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual African nations and multi-lateral African organizations are taking in the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent. For example, AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. This is exactly the type of initiative and leadership needed to address the diverse and unpredictable global security challenges the world currently faces. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support such African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or to discourage it. U.S. security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emergent security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

Finally, there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense and security matters. The creation of a single U.S. DoD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DoD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DoD generally, or for AFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID has clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DoD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed.

STANDING UP AFRICOM

We are moving quickly to stand up AFRICOM through a Transition Team, which includes officers from the Department of State and USAID, that is located in Stuttgart, Germany. It is coordinating the planning for the Command, including the location of the headquarters and organizational structure, with U.S. European Command to ensure an effective transition. AFRICOM will be stood up as a sub-unified command under European Command by October 1, 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational no later than October 1, 2008.

The establishment of AFRICOM—and the participation of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies—demonstrates the importance the U.S. Government places on strengthening ties with Africa. With AFRICOM, the United States will be working in partnership with Africans to foster an environment of security and peace—an environment that will enable Africans themselves to further strengthen their democracies, institutionalize respect for human rights, pursue economic prosperity, and build effective regional institutions. A more stable Africa serves the goal of helping to foster a more stable global environment.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, all three of you, for your testimony.

As I indicated once before and as Mr. Royce mentioned before he left, the fact that Africa was under three commands didn’t make too much sense to us, and we did talk about the fact that Africa, if it seemed like it was going to be effective, should certainly be under a single command. You could work out things a little bit better.

However, AFRICOM seems to have gone further than merely consolidating under one command and that is why there is skepticism in Africa and I have some problems with it also. Consolidating bifurcated commands would be one thing, but there has been some, it seems, substantial changes to me in the manner in which this new command will work.

And so there is a perception that the Department of Defense is going to be responsible for U.S. aid programs, programs that affect health, programs combining HIV and AIDS, that the Department of Defense is going to control programs in all areas, and that is where on the way to this unified command it seems that there have
been some changes made on the way that the three commands worked previously.

And so if you could just perhaps, Ms. Whelan, clarify to me that this is basically the way the three commands worked before and that all we are doing is putting them together, or if there is a departure from the basic concepts of what the three commands in Africa did because this is the whole crux of the matter.

It appears as though there is a militarization of foreign assistance, and that is not what—I certainly have commended the military in places where they have assisted in building the school. It is too bad that USAID doesn’t have enough money to build the school, but the Department of Defense seems to have an overabundance of money, so they could build the school or do things that need to be done.

That is good because they seem to have the wherewithal, but if USAID or other kinds of State Department programs were funded the way I would like to see them funded then we wouldn’t need the military to be doing aid programs.

I just wonder, is there a change in the manner in which the Department of Defense will function in Africa? Because I believe that that is the problem that countries in Africa have.

Secondly, you might or maybe Ambassador Mull might inform the committee what countries did the administration consult with? I would imagine it was the State Department. What kind of notice did you give about the reorganization? How long did you stay? Did you say we are going to be doing something in the next 6 months, and do you have any suggestions?

One of the problems, of course, with skepticism and that kind of thing is that many times things are not handled properly and things are just dropped on people. When that happens we get a lot of unreadiness. Perhaps if it were done in a collaborative way then there may have been some different kind of results.

Either one of you might handle that.

Ms. Whelan, Well, there are many aspects to your question, Mr. Chairman, which I will try to address.

Africa Command is meant to be something new and different. That was Secretary Rumsfeld’s intent, and Secretary Gates has re-affirmed that upon taking over the Department. Africa Command is meant to be a 21st century unified command organizational structure, part of DoD transformation.

And so yes, it is an amalgamation of three existing commands into one command, but those commands, and their structures, were established during a period in our history that was dominated by the Cold War and the requirements of the Cold War. Therefore their organizational structures and their mission statements are designed to meet those requirements.

Africa Command is being developed as the first unified command, the first regionally based unified command in the 21st century. Obviously NORTHCOM was established most recently, although it has a different focus.

So the intent was for the command to be different. The intent was for the command to capture the lessons learned over the last decade and a half in Africa, the Balkans and even more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, about the importance of coordination and
collaboration between DoD and its sister agencies within the United States Government when working on peace and security issues.

Unfortunately, despite all of our best intentions on a person-to-person level, our institutional structures do not currently lend themselves to coordination and collaboration. We are very hierarchically structured and stovepiped, so there was a desire on the part of DoD, recognizing that we will be more successful if we coordinate and collaborate with our State Department counterparts and USAID counterparts, to find ways to institutionalize that coordination and collaboration.

We took as an example some of the effective coordination and collaboration that is being done informally between CJTF–HOA (Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa) and USAID on the ground in the Horn of Africa. This is a bottom-up level of cooperation. There was no institution that forced them together, but they realized that coordinating, cooperating, planning together was actually a better way to do business, and it was more effective for both DoD and USAID.

So the intent in structuring the command was to establish an institutional basis for continued coordination and collaboration. We began this right at the very start of our planning by, as Ambassador Mull said, coming over and briefing State Department early on our ideas and bringing them into the planning process so that we could get their input in the planning process. The State Department and USAID have been joined at the hip with our planning teams from the very beginning last fall.

So yes, sir, it is intended for the command to be different in its institutional structure. Its mission set is also intended to be different, but not in the way many people seem to fear. Its mission set is to focus on theater security cooperation and capacity building in the defense context.

The Defense Department is not intending to move outside of its lane and attempt to do USAID’s job or the State Department’s job or Treasury’s job or Justice’s job or any other department in the U.S. Government who involves themselves in overseas activities in the development sphere. We intend to stay in our lane. However, we hope to do so in a more coordinated fashion.

The difference between the command’s mission now and other commands I think is probably best illustrated if I read for you the mission statements of European Command and the mission statements of Central Command, and then the draft mission state of U.S. Africa Command.

The current mission statement of U.S. European Command is as follows:

“U.S. EUCOM will maintain ready forces to conduct the full ranges of operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners; enhance transatlantic security through support of NATO; promote regional stability; counterterrorism; and advance U.S. interests in the area of responsibility.”

Central Command’s mission reads as follows:

“U.S. Central Command conducts operations to attack, disrupt and defeat terrorism, deter and defeat adversaries, deny access
to WMD, assure regional access, strengthen regional stability, build the self-reliance of partner nations’ security forces, and protect the vital interests of the United States within the area of responsibility.”

U.S. AFRICOM’s draft mission statement at present reads:


I think you will see by the contrast between those various mission statements that AFRICOM’s mission is primarily focused on war prevention, on capacity building, and on theater security cooperation. We have shifted it very much away from the Cold War unified command missions that were much more focused on the war fighting mission as the primary mission in the command.

So yes, the command’s mission is different, but it is not so different that it takes it out of DoD’s traditional lanes of operation. DoD has done theater security cooperation and capacity building in Africa and elsewhere in the world, but it has always done it as a matter of secondary or tertiary importance to its primary mission, which was considered to be preparing to fight and win the nation’s wars.

In this case what we are doing is we are elevating the importance of the theater security cooperation, security assistance, and capacity building mission so that that will be the bread and butter of the command. That is what is different about AFRICOM’s mission; not that it is going to go and take over USAID’s mission or State Department’s mission.

As to the question of the countries that we visited, we have visited 13 countries so far. We have also spoken with the African Union twice, and we have met with the Economic Community of West African States Chiefs of Defense Conference at their invitation. The 13 countries we visited include Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and I think that is it at present that we have visited.

As I said, we spoke with the African Union twice. We met with the permanent representatives at the African Union. We also met with the deputy chairperson, Patrick Mazimhaka, from the African Union, and with the head of the African Union Peace and Security Committee, Ambassador Djinnit.

Prior to all these meetings we sent cables to our Embassies with the information about what we were coming to talk about, which was the concept of having a single DoD command for Africa, and we also sent them a series of questions on issue areas that we
would like to discuss with them. Those were sent out to the Embas-
sies and provided to the countries prior to our arrival in the coun-
tries so that we could have these discussions.

No, sir, we did not blindside any of these countries. In fact, we
wanted to make sure that they would be prepared, that their rep-
resentatives would be prepared, to have a detailed discussion with
us and express their views to us on the issues of Africa Command.

Actually we made a number of decisions with regard to shaping
the Africa Command after those consultations based on those con-
sultations, so the consultations were truly consultations, not just
briefings. We felt the consultations were very productive for our-
selves and we hope that they were useful for the countries because
we were able to address some of the misconceptions that had al-
ready gotten out because of press reporting.

The other thing that we have done in terms of consultation with
the countries is we have held an off-site workshop. We recently
held it down in South Africa. We had a number of countries rep-
resented. It was a non-attribution environment. We also had NGOs
and think tanks present.

General Ward spent 2 1⁄2 full days simply listening to the African
participants and others at this off-site conference in South Africa.
It was very successful, and I think we are actually planning to
have a second such off-site conference here in the United States
prior to initial operating capability in October of this year.

We intend to invite in excess of 30 countries to send representa-
tives to that, as well as NGOs and think tanks and other distin-
guished Africans to sit down with us again in a non-attribution, off-
site environment here in the Washington area so that we can again
listen to them and address their concerns, and look to the future
of how AFRICOM can be helpful in addressing the security chal-
 lenges on the continent.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. My time has probably expired. I do appreciate that
detailed explanation.

Number one, I certainly agree that change has to come. You
know, we have a whole different security situation and the manner
in which we have to deal with it is different from the Cold War.
There is no question about that. I wonder why though the military
still makes the Seawolf submarine that is supposed to attack Rus-
sia under the ice.

Having said that though, Toffler, in Future Shock, said that the
institution agencies, if the rate of change internally is not commen-
surate with the external change become obsolete, so I couldn't
agree more that change has to come.

Let me just ask a quick question because my time has expired,
and then I will let my colleagues ask. Listening to what you said
then, you feel that a great job was done in introducing this concept
to Africa? Yes or no? I mean, it was done the right way? Just a
quick answer because I am taking the time of my colleagues.

Ms. WHELAN. We did the best we could, sir.

Mr. PAYNE. And what is that?

Ms. WHELAN. I won't judge whether it was a great job or whether
it wasn't a great job. We made I think a good faith effort to consult
and to do so without having preconceived a solution.
Mr. PAYNE. During your consultation you went to Africa to say what this plan was—because do you know what? I am a Member of Congress. This is the first time I have ever figured out what this thing was all about.

Now, I am not the Defense Committee, but the Defense Committee members asked me about it the other day. They asked me if I was having a hearing and said they didn't know anything about it either. So I wonder who in Congress knows something about it. No one in this House. The Defense Committee members know nothing about it. The Subcommittee on Africa knows very little about it.

I have heard more today than I have heard because this is actually the first real hearing about this. As Mr. Royce said, we thought it was a great idea years ago. Why don't you put Africa under one command? You know, Africa is always bifurcated. Africa has grown. Why don't you treat them like any other place?

Then we turn around and this thing is a whole—I hear from African countries, and maybe they tell you one thing and they tell me something else, but they tell me they are totally skeptical about it, that they think that USAID is now under the Department of Defense, that when USAID comes in they are going to have to salute somebody. NGOs are scared to death. They say I guess we are out of it.

And so for us to be blindsided, I guess it is above my pay. Maybe you told the Speaker about it, but this is all new. Like I said, I am not a defense expert, and all of this stuff that you all have thought out I am sure was well done. Like you said, you have done the best job that you all can do, and you are the best in the world.

But for us not to know anything about what is going on, and maybe it is that we are not supposed to know, but there is a lot of concern and a lot of things I think could be avoided if there was just some sort of conversation with people who have a strong interest in what is going on.

Like I said, all we hear is that the Department of Defense is going to run all foreign aid and that it is going to just be about who are our friends and where does money go for HIV and AIDS and where does money go for food assistance and where does money go for agricultural assistance. It is going to be the coalition of the willing. Where does the water assistance go because it is under Defense and we are fighting terrorism and that is the number one issue and that is the way we are doing it.

My time is way expired. I will yield to my ranking member.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me just ask a couple of questions.

Assistant Administrator Hess, you made mention of the Operation Provide Comfort. I traveled with a few other members, a bipartisan delegation, right as that was unfolding.

In all candor, I was enormously—the entire delegation was—impressed by the coordination, the staging that occurred in Incirlik, the fact that the men and women who were behind all of this, the Special Forces and those were packaging the food and medicine, had the most ultimate type of can-do attitude one could have imagined. They were proud to be working those 15- and 16-hour shifts.
to save the lives of the fleeing Kurds who were most unwelcomed by some at least on the Turkish side.

I saw the same thing when I traveled to Aceh and boarded the Abraham Lincoln. Had it not been for force protection concerns in Banda Aceh, I think the entire ship, the entire aircraft carrier, would have offloaded and went with the helicopters and would have been part of that effort.

I think the military has a capacity to do that which is second to none in the world to quickly and with a great deal of efficacy put together an operation where lives can be saved in a disaster or a crisis, manmade or nature made. I have seen it time and time again. Provide Comfort was a great example that you raised.

What I thought was so telling, and I think this will allay some of the fears of members and maybe some of the African countries and the NGOs, was that as soon as the baton could be passed off to the NGO community, as soon as the U.N., which did not have the capacity, capability, logistics and really a command and control apparatus to put this into practice overnight, as soon as that baton could be passed without loss of life, with any diminution of mission, it was done.

Our Special Forces guys just packed up and left and the NGO took over. It was as seamless as it could be. The same happened in Banda Aceh. The same has happened when the aircraft carrier, which obviously was not a sustainable presence to be out there in the water, but as soon as they were done with their mission they went off to their next port of call or wherever it is they were going.

I think there should be a real effort to remind people that as a staging area and as a humanitarian jumping off point in a crisis, and Africa has had more than its fair share of crises, this command offers a great opportunity to protect life, innocent life, especially women and children.

Secondly, on human rights, and this is just a motion to adjourn so I don’t know about the chairman, but I don’t mind missing that one.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Right.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Just to adjourn. Maybe if you could at the proper time just talk about that because it is an important point. The NGOs are not displaced. I think they are enhanced, and they are enhanced especially in a crisis.

Secondly, on human rights. I am the prime sponsor of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. I eat, sleep and breathe that issue every single day. I meet with delegations. I travel. I just got back from Russia, Bosnia and Ukraine meeting primarily on the issue of human trafficking.

I mention that because trafficking is a serious problem with militaries. We held two hearings here last year—I chaired them—on the problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the fact that the peacekeepers—only a small number, but enough to really sour that peacekeeping mission at least in the eyes of many, although others are doing noble work—were raping little girls, 13 and 14 years old. The U.N. has tried to stop that, to mitigate that.

Our own military had a problem with trafficking. Frankly, once that was discovered President Bush did his zero tolerance policy, and I know that in Bosnia and in the Balkans, as well as in South
Korea, there has been a major effort to monitor trafficking. We had General LaPort sit where you are sitting, who did a magnificent job in coming up with best practices.

So a question: This new AFRICOM, the command, what will it do vis-à-vis the trafficking issue? Will it be a robust effort on a military-to-military level? I know you said, Ms. Whelan, that you support, not shape, policy. This is already policy, so this is a matter of really supporting a policy to which Don Payne and Chris Smith and everybody in this Congress fully supports, ending modern day slavery.

It seems to me you are in a great position now military-to-military, working with the AU. When I went to Darfur on a trip I asked the AU people—fine people—what is your plan on trafficking? They had no plan, and so it seems to me that this is the chance to engage on that very, very aggressively.

Finally, and I have other questions, but I will ask these. Dr. Peter Pham makes the point in his testimony that the Global Peace Operations Initiative is training and equipping about 75,000 military troops, the majority of them African, for peacekeeping.

My question is: What role would AFRICOM play in the peacekeeping issue, training up Africans so that sufficient force is available and, again, will the component of human trafficking be very much a part of that?

Mr. HESS. I think I will start, sir. I will answer the question on humanitarian enhancing the NGOs.

You are absolutely right. The key point for us in humanitarian relief operations is to transition from a push to a pull where we can identify and target the specific resources that a population needs to survive and to save lives and alleviate suffering.

That timing is critical: When we arrived in northern Iraq in April 1991, we were losing 350 children a day. By a targeted effort and by use of the military logistical system, we were able to get the death rate down below the national average in less than a month.

It was a remarkable effort and the first major humanitarian effort where the military worked very closely with the NGO and the international community to make sure that that happened. Obviously your example in Banda Aceh; there are others even currently. The flooding recently in the Dadaab camp in eastern Kenya last December. During the flooding there was a great example again of where we can use the resources of the military and coordinate those and do those well.

The key, as you mentioned though, is to understand that transition. We work very closely, and that is why we have these senior development advisors so that they can advise the commander that now is the time to transition and let the professionals, who do these operations on a day-to-day basis, take over and transition. That transition to the end state for the military is very key in part of our planning.

Ambassador MUll. Congressman Smith, allow me to address your concerns about trafficking and also the role of the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

Thanks to your leadership for many years this is really at the top of the United States foreign policy agenda not only in Africa,
but throughout the world. An important goal of all of our security assistance, particularly in developing countries in Africa, is to use our IMET funds. There is a substantial component of every IMET program we have in developing countries around the world to train people and to sensitize them to human rights concerns such as trafficking, the proper role of the military in a democracy and to try and transform these militaries into agents for democracy, into agents that protect the human rights of the people that they are supposed to serve. AFRICOM will play an important role in being a partner to every single United States Embassy in Africa and together they will devise military training programs that address these requirements. If there is a particular trafficking concern in one country, where the military can help, you can bet that the Embassy will work with AFRICOM in developing a training program that addresses that need and improves it. If there is another human rights concern in another country, the U.S. Ambassador in that country will work with AFRICOM in developing a military program. GPOI. It is an important part of human rights also because of the very sorry experience of many international peacekeeping operations, not only in Congo, but elsewhere recently in Africa. In the money that we provide under the GPOI program for peacekeeping training we make sure to address those too, so we are on that, Congressman, and we will continue to be.

Mr. PAYNE. We are going to adjourn. There is going to be another vote coming up. We should adjourn for about 15 minutes. I think everything could be accomplished. Before we do adjourn I would like to acknowledge the former President of Ethiopia, who is Mr. Negaso Gidada, who is currently serving as an opposition member in the Ethiopian Parliament. Let me commend you for the work that you are doing. Why don't you stand so we can at least acknowledge you? The former President of Ethiopia.

[Applause.]

Mr. PAYNE. The meeting stands recessed for 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. PAYNE. We will reconvene the hearing. We didn't expect it would be that long, but that is the way it was. I thought it was important that if any of the members wanted to ask a question they would come back immediately, and if they do not then we will go to the second panel. I will just start with the second round. I had a number of concerns. Let me see here. I listened to the countries that were visited by the Department of Defense, and I notice that most of them or at least the majority were in North Africa. You mentioned four in sub-Saharan Africa, but the others in North Africa.

Ms. Whelan, is there an emphasis in the new command with the countries visited or was it done because countries in North Africa may have some other concerns?

Ms. WHelan. Congressman, actually the countries in sub-Saharan Africa were visited first because we considered their concerns to be primary. Maybe I missed a few, but just to recap, Senegal, Ghana, Nigeria, Botswana, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are all
sub-Saharan African countries that have been visited. We also have offered a visit to Angola, but they have been unable to arrange their schedules to accommodate to date, although we hope to do that in the coming weeks.

Sub-Saharan African nations were first on the consultation trip. They were done in April. The North African countries were not done until the June timeframe. Also, I would just like to clarify that the delegation included colleagues from the State Department and USAID, as well as of course Defense Department officials.

But we did have very good representation from both the Africa Bureau at State, our Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and also from Ambassador Mull’s office Ambassador Loftus was representing State. We had Mr. Walter North from the Africa Division head from USAID on the team.

Mr. PAYNE. Were the French or the British—they are in Africa, as we all know. Was there any consultation with them? Not that we need approval, but were they notified?

Ms. WHELAN. Yes. Actually we have had ongoing discussions with them. There was a brief visit in London in May. There was also a visit to Paris in June, and we have an upcoming planned trip, more comprehensive in nature, to talk with our European allies the week of 10–14 September during which we will be going to London, to Paris. We will also go to Brussels where we intend to talk to NATO and the EU, as well as to the Belgian Government.

We had also planned to go to The Hague, as the Dutch are important partners. However, scheduling conflicts will prevent that so we will reschedule them. We also are planning to go to Lisbon on that trip. There will be a subsequent trip to include other European nations with interests in the African continent that will take place at the end of October.

Mr. PAYNE. Just finally, Ambassador Mull, how many people from the State Department will be detailed to AFRICOM, more or less?

Ambassador MULL. Congressman, we are in the process of considering that right now. At a minimum, we have already created two positions to be part of the command. One would serve in the deputy to the commander function I mentioned in my opening remarks. We also have already created a position of a foreign policy advisor to the command.

We hope ultimately to supplement that with some political officers and other staff. The exact numbers will depend. As you may know, we are still in the process—DoD is still in the process—of determining the structure and location of the command, how many subcommands that there might be.

As those plans clarify, we will certainly look at our own resources to see what makes the best level, but I would anticipate in addition to the two we have created that we would certainly look at maybe five or six more, but that is a very preliminary guess.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ranking Member? All right. Yes. Mr. Boozman?

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was in Djibouti with Senator Inhofe a few months ago, and we were briefed very extensively then about the planning and what
was going on and stuff and so I think this is kind of an unusual situation.

You know, it is almost a pilot program, and because of that you have got overlap, with the Defense Department and then the State Department and so what I think we need to do, Mr. Chairman, is we need to do a better—and I am not criticizing anybody at all, but it is kind of a hybrid, and I think we probably need to do a better job of getting people over here, you know, to brief us because again, like I say, I got a very good briefing with him.

Senator Inhofe has been very involved with Africa. Sadly, he is one of the few, and again I am not being critical because everything else is going on, but he has shown a real interest in Africa and as a Senator is very involved. Again, those are few and far between. Not that that is critical. It is just a statement of fact.

Can you give us an example? They were talking and really kind of excited about the fact that, you know, they were able to do some of these things with USAID. You mentioned about this, which I like, is a project that has come from the ground up, you know, rather than reverse.

Can you give us examples of some of the projects maybe that happen that cause that to happen? I know they were talking about some well drilling projects, roads, things like that to me make sense that the military has the lift capability to get stuff in, you know, where other entities don't. They have the equipment that they use, you know, for their stuff that could be loaned or used in that.

Can you talk a little bit about maybe some specific type of projects that you envision and have done in the past?

Mr. Hess. Yes, sir. That is a great question, and I think you are right. We have had some great cooperation, as Secretary Whelan has mentioned, with the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

We were engaged in their train-up before they deployed under Admiral Hunt and Admiral Hart, both of them before they went out, and I think that paid big dividends because when the staffs got on the ground they knew about the projects we had in the area and we could coordinate better.

Specifically Admiral Hart told us. He said, “I can drill six wells a year in the Horn of Africa, but we don’t really understand where best to do that. For example, is the community involved? Will these be sustainable? You can drill a lot of bore holes, but if it is not sustainable and if the community doesn’t want it you can even create conflict because of communities fighting over the well.”

And so if they work in conjunction with us, we do the community development firsthand so that you design the best place to put the well. Then you get the community to support the well, i.e. maintain it. That does a lot of things while you are doing it. It is not just getting the well and getting the community involved, but you are building the grassroots organizations and so if we do that together it will be a sustainable project that the community wants to support for the long term, so those are just some examples.

We have done the same thing with schools and those have been successful, and in some health clinics as well. We have done some irrigation projects. I visited one in Godai when I was out there in
the Somali region of Ethiopia where the civil affairs teams that were out there on the ground were also coordinating with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other organizations like that, NGOs that were in the area, so that we could see how all of these fit together in a cohesive plan and could support each other, so it was a very good example of cooperation and where we get that synergy.

Mr. Boozman. Very good. We have had hearings about polling, that we could do a better job at being a little bit better well received, you know, in some of these areas and so I really see this, if it is done right, as a very positive thing where our American military is associated with being givers, you know, rather than takers as so many people are in that area of the world.

On the other hand, you know, I think we on this committee have the concern that this needs to be done right and there needs to be some accountability because nobody wants that facet of the State Department militarized and so again, after being briefed and stuff, I don’t really have a lot of concern about that, but I do think it is something that this committee, you know, has certainly the right and now has taken the opportunity to learn more about and then have some oversight of.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I should have gone to Djibouti. Then I would have known about this organization.

Okay. Let us see. Mr. Smith?

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Very quickly, just a few quick questions. Where is the AFRICOM likely to be located and when? The decision to keep Egypt out of it in CENTCOM; could you just take a moment or two to elaborate on that?

Have the Chinese been engaged in this in any way? We had a hearing last year and worked very closely with the chairman, and when I was chairman we did the same thing on this growing influence of the Chinese especially with their seemingly insatiable appetite for oil, precious metals and wood and also the ask no questions with regards to human rights policy that Beijing employs, that they are increasingly a force to be reckoned with.

We know what they have done in Darfur and the south of Sudan. You know, we are calling it the Genocide Olympics because of precisely what they have enabled in that killing field. So where are they, if at all, on this whole thing, and are there any countries or have any countries expressed explicit opposition like South Africa or any other country?

Just to add one last thing, on the maritime side, since they had serious problems protecting the waters particularly outside of Nigeria and elsewhere. Will AFRICOM be involved at all, as I expect they will be, with coordinating response to that?

Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Congressman. To answer your questions, as to the where we are actually beginning our dialogue right now with the State Department on the potential locations for a staff for the Africa Command: We will not have a traditional, large single command headquarters, but based on the consultations, and this is actually one of the results of the consultations in Africa, we will try to have a small presence in each of Africa’s regions. But we have come up with a list based on some objective criteria that
we had originally coordinated with the State Department, and now we will begin our internal dialogues over the pros and cons of the various places on the list and whether or not we should approach them.

Our intent is to not go anywhere where we are not invited or welcome, so this will be an issue of discussion of course with our colleagues at State, who will have the best visibility, particularly our Ambassadors in those countries, those potential countries, as to what the reception might be. There are some countries that have issued open invitations and so that might ease the way.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Is that a secret at this point which countries have tendered——

Ms. Whelan. Well, the one country who has been quite public about it, because there was an op-ed recently published, is Liberia and President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.

There are several other countries who have communicated to us privately that they would be interested, so since those communications were private I would probably best keep them that way at this time.

The answer to the Egypt question is one of practicality more than anything else. We have a rather unique relationship with Egypt on the security assistance side of the house, and this relationship has developed and has bureaucratic mechanisms set up that work through the Central Command. This would be quite difficult to shift into the Africa Command and in some ways potentially could overwhelm the Africa Command and its mission throughout the rest of Africa.

So for practical reasons we felt that it made most sense administratively to leave Egypt within the Central Command AOR and also, of course, Egypt has a very great role to play in that AOR in any case and always has.

They also, however, do have a role in Africa and have great interests on the continent, and during our consultations with them they expressed their interests in the continent and they expressed their interest in being part of the Africa Command.

Their desire was actually to be part of both commands. We explained to them that that was administratively impossible based on the way we did business, but what we did talk to them about was the fact that they in some ways would have the best of both worlds. They would be administratively a part of Central Command as they are today, and still deal with Central Command on the bilateral relationship and Middle East issues.

However, Africa Command would have the ability to talk with them, to work with them on Africa-related issues. They would be invited to all AFRICOM-related and Africa-related events and training exercises, and we hope to be able to work things out vis-à-vis CENTCOM and current rules governing the workings of combatant commanders or unified commanders across the seams so that there will be no prohibitions from AFRICOM working with Egypt.

As to the Chinese engagement, we have not engaged China directly on this topic. However, we have participated in several open fora in which we have spoken about AFRICOM. The most recent one was hosted by the University of Pretoria in South Africa in
which they invited the entire diplomatic community to a briefing that I ended up providing.

General Ward was going to provide it, but he literally was stuck in Ghana because of aircraft difficulties so I provided the briefing to the diplomatic community. The China Embassy and Defense Attachés were represented. They did not ask any questions at that briefing, but they were present.

As to countries opposed, flat out opposed, I think the only country that is opposed would be Libya. Interestingly enough, during our consultations with Libya they actually expressed support for the security capacity building agenda, but they expressed opposition to the idea of a United States command for Africa, so they support the agenda but oppose the organizational structure.

They also made it a point to tell us that they actually oppose any non-African military presence, staff or otherwise, on the continent so that they were not directing that at us specifically, but that’s a principal position that they took.

As for South Africa, I would not describe their position as fundamentally opposed in a hard core way, at least based on the dialogues that we have had with them privately. I would describe them as extremely skeptical and very concerned about the implications of AFRICOM for them and for the continent. So I am not aware that they have come out publicly and said that they were flat out opposed, but definitely they are very concerned.

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Did they suggest they prefer it be located further north or west?

Ms. Whelan. They have suggested that it not be located on the continent at all and that that was their position.

We have heard from others in our consultations that as long as we were not basing troops on the continent, that they found it valuable and useful that we might have our people on the continent. By having our staff on the continent, maybe we would begin to understand the continent and its challenges better than we understand them today in the Defense Department. That was the view. If you live with us and see what life is like here maybe you will understand it, you will get it, was sort of the view.

As to maritime programs, the President’s National Security Strategy for Africa, which was signed this year, NSPD–50, lists among its priorities an African Maritime Governance Initiative. This African Maritime Governance Initiative, which covers a range of items, is focused on building the capacity of African coastal nations to protect their economic exclusion zones and also their territorial waters.

The U.S. Navy in Naples has been very proactive in this area, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea. There has also been an effort started up, our Southwest Indian Ocean effort, which actually will be facilitated by the creation of Africa Command. We had a great deal of difficulty last summer when we opened up our Southwest Indian Ocean Conference because we had to deal with three different commands, and it was quite challenging to try and move monies and program authorities across those command boundaries in order to bring together the Indian Ocean states plus Kenya from a CENTCOM perspective and then Mozambique and Tanzania from a EUCOM perspective.
We anticipate that a maritime security piece will continue to be a significant component of the AFRICOM agenda in terms of building capacity. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank all of you. Once again we apologize for the interruption, but it is beyond our control.

As I indicated, I think this was something that we have talked about, having Africa handled in a more unified manner. However, I think some of the questions that we raise are certainly questions that hopefully we will have an opportunity to meet with your individual departments and get a little more clarification.

I know that some of the recent actions in Africa certainly have also kind of heightened suspicion with the intervention into Somalia with the encouragement of Ethiopia and actually firing from a United States destroyer onto the land in Somalia. I know we have strategic priorities, but when you have a destroyer or whatever type of ship it was firing from sea into a country, and then we talk about expanding a command, it changes the dynamic of the conversation. There is going to be a lot of skepticism, period.

We look forward to working with you, and hopefully we can move this forward in the first direction. Thank you very much. Appreciate your time.

We will now have our second panel. If you would come up? As they are coming up we will speed the introduction. Our second panel will consist of three witnesses.

We will have Mr. Kurt Shillinger, director of the Terrorism in Africa Research Project and the South African Institute of International Affairs. Mr. Shillinger's research focuses on a variety of elements that influence terror-related activities in Africa.

Before joining the Institute, Mr. Shillinger was a journalist for 17 years, traveling to 21 countries in Africa and writing for international news sources such as the Boston Globe and the Christian Science Monitor. He is also the author of two forthcoming books. Thank you so much, Mr. Shillinger, for flying in here to testify before our subcommittee today.

Our second witness via video link is Dr. Wafula Okumu, who heads the African Security Analysis Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which is based in South Africa. He has held teaching posts at Prescott College, Mississippi University for Women, Chapman University and the United Nations University.

Before joining the ISS, Dr. Okumu taught at McMaster University Center for Peace Studies. He also served as a conflict analyst for the Africa Union where he set up the Africa Union’s mission in Burundi and drafted the common African defense and security policy.

He has done consultancy work with a number of international organizations and research organizations on governance, peace, security and humanitarian matters in Africa. He is also co-author of Africa Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance.

Our final witness will be Dr. Peter Pham, director of the Nelson Institute for International & Public Affairs at James Madison University. He also holds the position as associate professor of justice studies, political science and African studies.

Dr. Pham is the author of over 200 essays and reviews on political science and African issues. In 2005, Dr. Pham served as a
member of the International Republican Institute's delegation to monitor the national elections in Liberia and also served as a monitor of the Nigerian elections.

We are certainly pleased to be joined by our three witnesses and we will begin with you, Mr. Shillinger.

STATEMENT OF MR. KURT SHILLINGER, RESEARCH FELLOW, SECURITY AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Shillinger. Thank you, Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Smith, for the opportunity for my institute to be here today. It is a great honor to be able to share some ideas about AFRICOM from our perspective in Southern Africa.

I want to start on the premise that AFRICOM is a smart and overdue reform. Rationalizing the Pentagon's response structure in Africa into one dedicated command will bring bureaucratic efficiency, military coherence and synchronicity with Africa's new and evolving security architecture.

It also reflects an elevated view of the geostrategic importance of the continent not as a chess board for proxy wars between external powers, but as a region with its own intrinsic value and aspirations. The attempt to unite security, development and governance strategies also underscores the important interrelationship of these three braided strands.

Without security, sustained development and growth in Africa will always remain elusive. Even so, AFRICOM arises within the context of new African security priorities, emerging "South-South" economic and security partnerships and widespread and deeply felt antipathies about Washington's post 9/11 global posture.

The initiative is predicated on risk assumptions that are contestable and interests that are not shared. Critical questions arise. Do Africans want this? Do Africa governments want this? What is the appropriate balance between security and development initiatives in Africa, and could the militarization or the perceived militarization of development in Africa accelerate processes of radicalization and political instability?

The transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union at the start of this century signaled an important shift in Africa's political, diplomatic and security orientation. Democratization, good governance, regional integration and collective stability have replaced liberation and noninterference as the accepted norms and common goals.

Although most African states are far from realizing these in practice, no state on the continent can avoid going through at least the pretense of electoral processes and peer review.

More and more states are enacting anticorruption legislation, and increasingly African states are taking the states in mediating conflicts both within their own borders and across borders. These efforts are nascent and fragile. There has been more emphasis on building the architecture of peace, security and development at the regional and continental level than on adhering to the many protocols and pledges made at so many summons of heads of state. Nonetheless, there has been an undeniable paradigm shift in Afri-
The conversation has changed, and so increasingly has the practice.

The critical points then are questions of ownership, self-determination and fairness. For the first time since the industrial revolution Africa is unshackled, no longer governed or exploited by foreign powers or racist minorities. This condition, coupled with an acute awareness of past injustices, is shaping not just Africa’s internal dynamics, but also its international engagement.

African states generally share strong affinities with entrenched struggles elsewhere in the world. They tend to identify, for example, with the Palestinians and the Iranians. They are highly aware of global trade imbalances and strongly resentful for what they regard as Western control of the international security agenda.

Thabo Mbeki has been particularly outspoken about this, the South African President, and said in 2004 in his opening address of the General Assembly that the most powerful states “make the determination that terrorism and war constitute the central and principal threat and challenge that human civilization faces. What they decide will translate into a set of obligatory injunctions issued by this organization, the U.N., which all member nations will have to accept and implement.”

It would be folly to underestimate the depth of this frustration. African states and, more importantly, the people of Africa share strong objections to the United States post 9/11 response, epitomized not just by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also what they regard as Western or United States bullying of Iran, Cuba, Burma, Pakistan, and this extends as well to what you were mentioning earlier about air strikes in Somalia, to visa denials of South African Muslim academics to the United States. All these get wrapped up in creating a perception of negativity.

The outlook is unlikely to break any time soon. While western states remain vital trading partners and potential markets to African states, India, China, Brazil, Russia and other lesser states hold growing attraction for African states looking to find partners in everything from pharmaceuticals and civilian nuclear technology.

AFRICOM therefore enters an environment of distrust and also one in which African states are wary of the domestic and international risks of appearing to be too closely attached to the United States.

AFRICOM is predicated on an assumption that instability in Africa poses direct threats to United States security. This is contestable. Somalia has not emerged as the next Afghanistan, as was the initial assumption after 9/11. It doesn’t function as a nursery for transnational terrorism, but for isolated cases.

No civil or interstate African war has resulted in direct harm to the United States. The collapse of Zimbabwe has resulted in floods of immigrants to South Africa, not Florida. Whereas terrorist elements linked to London and Madrid have African connections, these have been on a smaller scale than the domestic terror-related threats emerging from within Britain, France or Spain.

In the broader sense, yes, maritime insecurity off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea, illegal exploitation of African fisheries, timber and minerals, human trafficking, drug smuggling, money laundering and weak states are all seams of insecurity. Cer-
tainly weak intelligence and security structures opened the space in Kenya and Tanzania for the 1998 bombings of United States Embassies.

It is not a question of whether these problems should be addressed, but how and by whom. Is a military command the most appropriate vehicle? The Iraq War indicates the local and international consequences of preemptive United States engagement, whereas more optimistically in Afghanistan the provincial reconstruction teams provide a potential model for the kind of holistic approach envisioned by AFRICOM. The critical element is local buy-in. In building the case for AFRICOM among African states, Washington is its own predecessor and in some cases its own greatest obstacle.

Given the nature of the suspicion and the prevailing distrust of the United States, it is unlikely that any amount of public relations work will fully quench anti-imperialist concerns that AFRICOM is fundamentally an attempt to erect a bulwark in Africa against transnational terrorism or China’s appetite for Africa’s oil, minerals and timber.

In the current climate, I would also argue that any overt indications of synergy between military and developmental initiatives will seriously undermine the credibility and acceptance of the latter, particularly in those states with large Muslim populations.

That said, I suspect that the dust will settle. The proposed structure of AFRICOM, consisting of four or five relatively small bases with no force deployments, means that these will be largely invisible even in their host countries and societies. That bodes well for viability. So also does the relative permanence of these structures.

Building capacity among African militaries and governments in critical security sectors—border control, immigration, military readiness, policing, coastal patrol and civilian authority—is a long-term project. In this sense, AFRICOM approximates an approach the Australians call embedded support, which involves seconding Australian Government officials, development experts and legal authorities in relevant ministries of fragile and developing states within the South Pacific region.

Through sustained, behind-the-scenes engagement it may be possible for AFRICOM to nurture professionalism in African militaries and foster the civilian military tradition essential to democracies, but the more strictly it keeps to the military lane and the more it listens to Africa’s own concerns and adheres to Africa’s security and developmental agenda the more likely it is to be successful.

I will be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shillinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. KURT SHILLINGER, RESEARCH FELLOW, SECURITY AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

I want to start by thanking Chairman Payne for inviting my Institute to participate in this hearing, and also to acknowledge Congresswoman Woolsey, who represents my native district in California.

The invitation to appear before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health about African perceptions of the new US Africa Command called to mind a brief conversation I had with a young woman in Kenya 20 years ago. In 1984 a severe drought devastated East Africa, causing one of the worst humanitarian crises in living memory anywhere in the world. In response the United States provided massive quantities of food aid, both directly through the US Agency for International Devel-
opment and indirectly through nongovernmental and multilateral organisations. Three years later, sitting on the verandah overlooking her family corn fields in a small village on the western slopes of the Rift Valley, the woman recounted what it was like to live through that drought. And then she asked: ‘But when we were starving, why did you send us cattle feed?’

At the time that question struck me as a rather ungrateful one. After all, US humanitarian assistance helped prevent the starvation of millions of people. But with the benefit of many more years of study and exposure to diverse African societies and—perhaps more importantly—a more reflexive view of the United States gained from living abroad—I find lessons from that encounter that are apposite to our discussion of Africom today. The staple food of Kenya, as in many African countries, is ugali (sadza in Zimbabwe; pap in South Africa), a moist savory cake made from white maize meal. The woman assumed that white maize was a universal preference and was surprised to learn that Americans favour sweet yellow corn. She thought we had meant to treat Africans like livestock. Africom seeks to boost African security and development capacity through strategic partnerships. How might it do this without engendering resentment or suspicion—the manifestations of which today could be far worse and farther reaching than bruised dignity.

This paper rests on the premise that Africom is a smart and overdue reform. Rationing out the Pentagon’s response structure in Africa into one demands will bring bureaucratic efficiency, military coherence and synchronicity with Africa’s new and evolving security architecture. It also reflects an elevated view of the geo-strategic importance of the continent not as a chessboard for proxy wars between external powers but as a region with its own intrinsic value and aspirations. The attempt to unite security, development and governance strategies also underscores the important interrelationship of these three braided strands. Without security, sustained development and growth in Africa will always remain elusive.

Even so, Africom arises within the context of new African security priorities, emerging ‘South-South’ economic and security partnerships, and widespread and deeply felt antipathies about Washington’s post-9/11 global posture. The initiative is predicated on risk assumptions that are contestable and interests that are not shared. Critical questions arise: Do Africans want this? Do African governments want this? What is the appropriate balance between security and development initiatives in Africa, and could the militarisation of development—or, more accurately, the perceived militarisation of development—in Africa accelerate processes of radicalisation and political instability? As succinctly as possible, I will attempt to consider these assumptions and questions within the prevailing African milieu.

OUTLOOK AND ASPIRATIONS

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union at the start of this century signaled an important shift in Africa’s political, diplomatic and security orientation. Democratization, good governance, regional integration and collective stability have replaced liberation and non-interference as the accepted norms and common goals. Although most African states are far from realizing these goals, in practice, no state on the continent can avoid going through at least the pretense of electoral processes and peer review. More and more states are enacting anti-corruption legislation, and increasingly, African states are taking the lead in mediating conflicts intra- and inter-state conflicts. These efforts are nascent and fragile. There has been more emphasis on building the architecture of peace, security and development at the regional and continental level than on adhering to the many protocols and pledges made at so many ceremonious summits among heads of state. Nonetheless, there has been an undeniable paradigm shift in Africa.

The conversation has changed, and increasingly so has the practice.

The critical points here are questions of ownership, self-determination and fairness. For the first time since the industrial revolution, Africa is unshackled, no longer governed or exploited by foreign powers or racist minorities. This condition, coupled with an acute awareness of past injustices, is shaping not just Africa’s internal dynamics but also its international engagement. It goes without saying that on the continent with 54 countries, collective characterisations are highly fraught. African states do not rise and speak as one man. The political and international aspirations of the southern Africa states, most of which are ruled by former liberation movements, differ from those of states farther north. Hegemonic rivalries among Angola, South Africa and Nigeria fester. Anglophone and francophone Africa have different orientations. The notion of an ‘African bloc’ is more romantic than real.

Nonetheless, recent commonalities obtain. African states generally share strong affinities with entrenched struggles elsewhere in the world. They tend to identify, for example, with the Palestinians and Iranians. They are highly aware of
global trade imbalances and strongly resent what they regard as Western control of both the international security agenda. As South African President Thabo Mbeki lamented in his speech at the opening of the UN General Assembly in 2004, the most powerful states make the determination that terrorism and war constitute the central and principal threat and challenge that human civilization faces. . . . What they will decide will translate into a set of obligatory injunctions issued by this Organization [the UN], which all member nations will have to accept and implement.1 It would be folly to underestimate the depth of this frustration. African states and, more importantly, the peoples of Africa, share strong objections to the US post-9/11 response, epitomised not just by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq but also what they regard as Western (US) bullying of states like Iran, Cuba, Burma and Pakistan. Increasingly, the emerging middle powers in Africa are looking laterally toward their ‘Southern’ or non-aligned counterparts (which in some cases would include even states like Russia) for new economic and security partnerships. This trend is unlikely to break. While Western states remain vital trading partners and markets, India, China, Brazil, Russia and lesser states hold growing attraction for African states looking to find partners in everything from pharmaceuticals to civilian nuclear technology.

Africom therefore enters an environment of distrust, and also one in which African states are wary of the domestic and international risks of appearing to be too closely attached to the United States.

AFRICAN MILITARY READINESS

Regional reform of African peace and security structures began in earnest in the mid-1990s following South Africa’s transition to democracy. While such structures existed prior to then, the current emphasis on coordinated security was only kickstarted following South Africa’s integration into both the South African Development Community and the re-constitution of the OAU as the AU. Since then, the regional economic communities and the African Union have steadily built a security edifice consisting of protocols and mechanisms for conflict resolution. These structures are new and, as the crises in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, Sudan, indicate, relatively weak. The stubborness of these conflicts underscores two interrelated forms of capacity limitation—military readiness and diplomatic experience. As Jenny Brickhill notes, ‘The past decade has witnessed a major escalation in the number of third-party interventions supporting negotiation processes, peace support operations, and conflict and post-conflict recovery assistance in Africa. On the one hand, this development reflects increasing intra-state conflict on the continent; on the other, it reflects intensifying attention by African and international governments and multilateral organisations to addressing such conflict, and in particular to providing effective protection to civilians during conflict. The results of these interventions are mixed but on the whole poor, and currently Africa remains stirred up by emerging, continuing or recurring clashes in which civilian populations continue to be the major victims.’2

In July 2005 at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, the world’s most powerful nations reiterated their support for the AU’s goal of building its own peacekeeping forces. This remains a distant objective. Africa retains the highest concentration of peacekeeping missions—14 in total—reflecting not only Africa’s own capacity limitations but also the relative naivety of African security goals. When African leaders first mooted the idea of an African stand-by force comprising five brigade-size bases across the continent, they hoped it could be achieved within five years. Foreign military specialists countered that standing up such a force would take closer to 30. Little progress has been made toward that goal.

THE ASSUMPTION OF LINKED INSECURITY

The ground, therefore, is fertile for assistance. Africom is predicated on an assumption that instability in Africa poses direct threats to US security. This is contestable. Somalia has not emerged as the next Afghanistan, a nursery for trans-national terrorism. No civil or interstate African war has resulted in direct harm to the United States. The collapse of Zimbabwe has resulted in floods of immigrants to South Africa, not Florida. And whereas terrorist elements linked to attacks in London and Madrid have African connections, these

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have been on a smaller scale than the domestic terror-related threats emerging from within Britain, France or Spain. In the broader sense, yes, maritime insecurity off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea; illegal exploitation and African fisheries, timber, and minerals; human trafficking, drug smuggling, and money laundering; and weak states are all ‘seams’ of insecurity. Certainly weak intelligence and security structures opened the space in Kenya and Tanzania for the 1998 bombings of the US embassies.

It is not a question of whether these problems should be addressed, but how and by whom. Is a military command the most appropriate vehicle? The Iraq War indicates the local and international consequences of preemptive US military engagement, whereas the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) provide a potential model for the kind of holistic approach envisioned for Africom. The critical element is local buy-in. In building the case for Africom among African states, Washington is its own predecessor, and its greatest obstacle is itself. Asked why Islam is spreading in Africa, one prominent Muslim community leader in the South African city of Durban gave me a response that is typical across the continent: ‘There is a spiritual vacuum in the West. Here, you can thank George Bush for the rise of Islam. The Middle East crises are bringing people from outside the West to Islam. People want to identify with a just cause. They want to stand up to the bully. At the level of the masses, South African Muslims would not want the South African government to cooperate with the West in countering terrorism. That is an emotive position. But at the level of responsible government, they would say that countering terrorism is responsible.’

Given the nature of suspicion and the prevailing distrust of the United States, it is unlikely that any amount of public relations work will fully quench anti-imperialist concerns that Africom is fundamentally an attempt to erect a bulwark in Africa against trans-national terrorism and China’s appetite for Africa’s oil, minerals and timber. In the current climate, I would also argue that any overt indications of synergy between military and developmental initiatives will seriously undermine the credibility and acceptance of the latter, particularly in those states with large Muslim populations.

That said, I also suspect that the dust will settle. The proposed structure of Africom, consisting of four or five relatively small bases with no force deployments means that these will be largely invisible even in their host countries and societies. That bodes well for viability of this approach. So, also, does the relative permanence of these structures. Building capacity among African militaries and governments in critical security sectors—border control, immigration, military readiness, policing, coastal patrol, civilian authority—is a long-term project. In this sense, Africom approximates an approach the Australians call ‘embedded support’, which involves seconding Australian government officials, development experts and legal authorities in relevant ministries of fragile or developing states within the South Pacific region. Through sustained, behind-the-scenes engagement, it may be possible for Africom to nurture professionalism in African militaries and foster the civilian-military tradition essential to democracies. The more strictly it keeps to the military lane, the more likely Africom will be successful and accepted.

Security and development needs in Africa both point to the same problem: the lack of strong, effective governance. Without stability there is not growth. The important question, then, is how to build effective institutions and entrench best practices in order to establish a viable security framework internally. What forms of external engagement can support this process? How can states be encouraged to adopt economic strategies based on their comparative advantages that will enable them to realise the fruits of globalisation? Is security a necessary precondition or should it take a backseat to development? In examining the Pentagon’s two existing ‘holistic’ initiatives in Africa—namely, the East Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative and the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative—these are arguably disproportionately military in nature primarily because planning in the Department of Defense was far in advance of its multiagency counterparts. For Africom to avoid this problem, coordination among the relevant government departments must attain prior to the operational phase.

CONCLUSION

For more than 50 years, Western developmental assistance to Africa was hampered by insecurity. The end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa laid

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3 Interview with Rafik Hassan, 11 April 2007, Durban
the necessary pre-conditions for Africans to set their own integrated security and development agenda. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, meanwhile, precipitated a hard re-examination of international security assumptions in the West. What should emerge from these trends is engagement with Africa based on a convergence of interests. Africom essentially represents a re-packaging of current US military partnership initiatives with Africa under a coherent organisational structure. The skepticism it has raised among African states and societies indicates the need for Washington to reassure its prospective African partners that Africom acknowledges the lead role of Africans themselves in determining their own security, development and governance priorities. In the African context, this means at least a great emphasis on poverty alleviation as it does on military professionalism. US security assurances in Africa must therefore depend on quiet, sustained support for Africa’s own prescribed agenda for renewal.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
Dr. Okumu, can you hear me?
Mr. OKUMU. Yes, I can hear you, Congressman.
Mr. PAYNE. And you are coming over very clear. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF WAFULA OKUMU, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICAN SECURITY ANALYSIS PROGRAMME, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. OKUMU. Thank you, Chairman Payne and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, for giving me this opportunity to share with you prevailing views in Africa on the proposed Africa Command, AFRICOM. These views do not reflect those of my employer, the Institute for Security Studies.

Chairman Payne, in view of the time constraint I would like to request that my statement be placed on record so that I confine my presentation to the following questions: How is AFRICOM being perceived in Africa? Why are Africans reluctant to embrace the proposed command? What can be done to make AFRICOM acceptable in Africa?

Mr. PAYNE. Certainly. Without objection. Thank you.
Mr. OKUMU. Thank you, Congressman Payne.

First, how is AFRICOM perceived in Africa? You have already indicated in your opening statement that there is a lot of cynicism. This part is altruist sounding objectives. AFRICOM has yet to be warmly and widely embraced in Africa as the following statements indicate: “AFRICOM would destabilize an already fragile continent and region, which will be forced to engage with U.S. interests on military terms,” according to Michele Ruiters in Business Day of South Africa; “Ironically, AFRICOM was announced as Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring eight African nations to negotiate deals that will enable China to secure oil flows from Africa,” according to the editorial of Daily Nation of Kenya; AFRICOM is “aimed at influencing, threatening and warding off competitors by using force,” according to the Post editorial of Zambia; the Reporter of Algeria has warned that African countries “should wake up after seeing the scars of others.” “Others” means Afghanistan and Iraq; Mohamed Bedjiaoui, the Algerian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, has questioned why there was no proposal for an antiterror cooperation with Algeria when the country was experiencing high levels of terrorist violence in the 1990s; Abdullahi Alzubedi, a Libyan Ambassador to South Africa, has posed the following questions: “How can the U.S. divide the world up into its own military commands? Wasn’t that for the United Nations to do? What would hap-
pen if China also decided to create its Africa Command? Would this not lead to conflict on the continent?”; according to Dulue Mbachu, a Nigerian journalist: “Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friends to its interests, as was the case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into poverty.”; “People on the street,” in Africa, according to Professor Rachid Tlemchani, “assume their governments have already had too many dealings with the U.S. in the war on terror at the expense of the rule of law. The regimes realize the whole idea if very unpopular.”

These and many other similar comments expressed during the visits of United States officials and in newspaper editorials and meetings on African peace and security development have led a U.S. State Department official to conclude: “We have got a big image problem there. Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the U.S. They just don’t trust the U.S.”

As to the next question, why are Africans reluctant to embrace the proposed command, the coldness with which the Africans hold AFRICOM was displayed in July when General William Ward, the newly appointed first commander of AFRICOM, was denied a meeting with the South African Minister of Defense during his visit to the country to drum up support for the planned command.

There are a number of reasons why Africans are reluctant to embrace AFRICOM. One, any country hosting the command will be criticized for violating Africa’s common positions on African defense and security, which discourages the hosting of foreign troops on the African soil.

Secondly, Africans vividly remember that colonialism was preceded by philanthropic missionaries who came to fulfill God’s will of rescuing Africans from the clutches of barbarism. To paraphrase Jomo Kenyatta’s allegory, when the white man came to Africa he was holding a Bible in one hand and asked us to close our eyes and pray. When we opened our eyes after the prayer his other hand was holding a gun and all our land was gone. Africa’s colonial history was characterized by brutal military occupations, exploitation of its natural resources and suppression of its people. After testing decades of independence, these countries are now jealously guarding their sovereignty and are highly suspicious of foreigners, even those with good intentions.

The third reason is that when Africans reflect on the continent’s relations with the U.S. they see ambiguity, neglect and selective engagement. For instance, during the period of decolonization the U.S. did not openly support the U.N. decolonization initiatives, particularly when these were not aligned with its Cold War positions.

The fourth reason is that Africans are not comfortable dealing with the military in matters related to their development and sovereignty. Africans are concerned that the establishment of AFRICOM might do more harm than good. “The poised hammer that makes everything suddenly look like a nail,” in the words of Esquire magazine. They will be much more comfortable dealing with American diplomats, USAID and Peace Corps volunteers rather than the U.S. Marines. Africans are nervously concerned that AFRICOM will
sanction the militarization of diplomacy and severely undermine multilateralism on the continent.

Africans have consciously adopted multilateralism as a common approach to addressing the continent’s problems and confronting its challenges. AFRICOM seems to be a unilateral approach that would be counter to the current trend toward unity on the continent.

Consequently, the establishment of AFRICOM must secure an African consensus. Otherwise it will bring new and grave threats and challenges to the continent’s peace and security agenda. The issue of foreign military presence on African soil is a violation of this agenda.

The fifth reason is that the launching and promotion of AFRICOM are taking place at the same time that Africa is debating the Union government proposal. There are feelings around the continent that AFRICOM is an American attempt to ensure that the aspiration for African Unity is checked by a heavy United States military presence on the continent.

This concern is based on the track record of American military intervention in Africa. The image of United States military involvement in Africa becomes more confusing when one looks at the security concerns of Africa. Many Africans are asking why American troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwandan genocidaries?

Why the United States forces remained anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the nearest thing that American ever had as an African colony, faced brutal disintegration in 2003?

Why the United States has not supported the African Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, and instead supported the Ethiopian intervention through air power from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa stated in Djibouti?

Is Africa to become merely another theater of operations in which winning the hearts and minds forms an essential component of a security driven agenda? Why should ordinary Africans welcome an American presence that will create African targets for extremists where none exists and add an unwelcome dimension to already complex local conflicts?

Why is Washington not able to do something to address Africa’s needs by modifying its trade policy? If the United States is really committed to participating in Africa’s development, why not support the new African Partnership for Development, NEPAD? This would surely have a greater developmental impact if improving the livelihoods of the people is what the U.S. wants.

The sixth reason is that Africans were never consulted during the conceptualization of AFRICOM. Rather, AFRICOM was announced and has been presented as a fait accompli around the continent. Africans are presently experiencing an exuberance of self-importance and confidence to drive their own destiny. There is a prevailing mood on the continent to reassert African self-worth and self-determination. This is why consultation has become a common cliché on the continent.

Seventh, there is also a concern that AFRICOM will suffer from mission creep by being transformed from engagement in humani-
tarian missions to an interventionist force as was the case with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. The change of the humanitarian objectives could also come about due to the nexus of energy, poverty and terrorism.

The eighth reason is that AFRICOM will militarize United States-Africa relations. Africans are wary of the United States record in Iraq and concerned that the Pentagon is taking a lead role in the promotion of United States interests. Establishment of AFRICOM is being seen as a Bush approach of using military force to pursue U.S. strategic interests.

AFRICOM will not only militarize United States-African relations, but also those African countries in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences as the presence of American bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the U.S. and make Americans targets of violence.

The ninth reason is the mixed messages being relayed to Africa by the United States Government have compounded the confusion and heightened the suspicions Africans have of AFRICOM's objectives.

For example, in 1995 the DoD in its U.S. Security Strategy for sub-Saharan Africa stated that the United States had “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,” but Ms. Theresa Whelan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Africa, has recently argued that Africa is providing “tens of thousands of U.S. jobs . . . possesses 8 percent of the world’s petroleum; and it is a major source of critical minerals, precious metals and food commodities.”

Mr. Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Pentagon pointman on AFRICOM, has stated that its purpose is not to wage war but “to work in concert with the [U.S.] African partners for a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place.”

However, General Jack Wald minced no words when he stated, and I am quoting: “I would like to have some forward bases in Africa. The world has changed, and we are going to make our security. The Halcyon days are over.”

General Bantz Craddock, the EUCOM commander, told journalists in Washington in June that protecting energy assets, particularly in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, would guide the focus of AFRICOM. General Craddock added that AFRICOM will “enable countries [in West Africa] to improve their security of any type of production—oil, natural resources, minerals.”

These intentions are reflective of the bold recommendations made by Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development Group in 2001 that the Bush administration “makes[s] energy security a priority of [U.S.] trade and foreign policy.”

One year later, the Bush administration rolled out its West Point Doctrine that essentially stated that the U.S. would not allow a major economic, political or military competitor to emerge.

Although all African countries are reluctant to host AFRICOM, some have made it very clear that they do not want anything to do with AFRICOM, while others have even warned that it should not be stationed in any country neighboring them. These countries are aware that the generosity of providing military advisors can
easily turn into sending of conventional forces and a full-blown military intervention.

For instance, AFRICOM could provide Nigerian armed forces training to combat the Niger delta insurgence, which could later be upgraded to limited special operations to rescue American hostages and hunt down those who have attacked American economic interests.

The tenth and last reason is that African governments lack the political spine to accept a permanent United States presence. Egypt was mentioned early on as one of the closest American allies on the continent, but it is out of the picture because it is to remain in CENTCOM and is generally regarded in Africa as an Arab country.

Kenya would be reluctant, as it has previously been targeted by transnational terrorism because of its close proximity to the West and hosting Western interests, both military and businesses. Only President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has enthusiastically offered Liberian territory to be used for the establishment of AFRICOM headquarters, and this is quite telling.

Now let me turn to the last part of my presentation and share with you what can be done to make AFRICOM acceptable in Africa. The U.S. needs to pay keen attention to the following in order to overcome the serious concern that I have raised.

One is open a dialogue with the civil society on the rationale, mission objectives and specific benefits that AFRICOM will bring the African human security.

Second, it needs to demonstrate opportunities within the proposed structure that would guarantee links with the civil society to ensure participation and contextual relevance.

Additionally, AFRICOM needs to be reconceptualized to primarily complement the African Standby Force and the work of the African Union and regional mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa.

The next recommendation is they need to share the exit strategy and phase-out plans and the milestones of AFRICOM activities and encourage civil society to monitor them during the implementation phase with specific focus on the outcomes.

The next recommendation is that they need the definition, elaboration and clarification of AFRICOM’s relationship with the African Union, particularly the Peace and Security Council and African Union Commission, and regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

The next recommendation is that they should guarantee that the interests and sovereignty of African states will not be compromised or undermined by AFRICOM.

The next recommendation is that the United States should seek an African Union endorsement of AFRICOM by the AU Executive Council and the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

The next recommendation is that since AFRICOM is viewed within the wider context of the global war on terror and the likelihood of the theater of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Africa it may be wise to review the timing. It could be even much better to wait until a time when the world has changed some opinions about the U.S.
The next recommendation is that the U.S. should fully implement existing commitments, particularly the United States foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs in Africa. This includes AGOA, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President’s Malaria Initiative, USAID projects and similar others.

Last, but not least, the U.S. should seriously think of changing its international engagement and posture, which is increasingly espousing exceptionalism and unilateralism. The United States intervention in Iraq and its consequences have impacted very negatively on the U.S. prestige.

The refusal of the U.S. to countenance the involvement of its armed forces in the U.N. operations unless under United States command has not helped in Africa as are instances on exemptions of United States citizens from prosecution in the ICC, International Criminal Court, and other objectionable elements of the status of force agreements.

In conclusion, Chairman Payne, I would like to say that AFRICOM will not be accepted in Africa if it does not take into account the desires and aspirations of the African people for peace, security and development. The policy that AFRICOM aims to enhance should be reflective of the African realities, which are growing multipartism and democratic consolidation, the continuing quest for sustainable development, the need to enhance state capacity, the craving for good governance, promotion of human security and many others.

Any foreign assistance to Africa must incorporate these realities, as well as the desires and aspirations of African people. AFRICOM will have a win/win outcome if it is reflective of these facts and is presented in a mutually beneficial partnership.

I am afraid to say that AFRICOM will continue to draw hostility, and if it implemented under these circumstances it could turn out to be an expensive endeavor both in terms of resources and long-term United States-Africa relations.

Thank you for the honor and opportunity to share with you my views on this important issue. I would be more than glad to answer any question that the subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Okumu follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WAFULA OKUMU, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICAN SECURITY ANALYSIS PROGRAMME, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY STUDIES, SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Thank you Chairman Payne and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health for giving me this opportunity to share my views on the proposed Africa Command (Africom). These are personal views and do not reflect those of my employer, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). My name is Wafula Okumu and I presently head the African Security Analysis Programme at the ISS in Pretoria, South Africa. Our work is devoted to tracking, monitoring and analysing threats to human security in Africa. Among the many variables that we track are military matters, particularly those related to the African peace and security agenda and the various contributions being made by the international community to build the capacity of Africa to implement this agenda. I would like to start my presentation with a brief background on U.S.-Africa relations, then give you an overview of the objectives of Africom, as presented in Africa, and analyse why I think Africom was set up before sharing with you how it is perceived in Africa, and explain why Africans are reluctant to embrace the proposed command. I will then share with you the possible misconceptions behind Africom and what can be done to overcome them before concluding my remarks.
Untold recently, Africa has not been strategically attractive to the U.S. This is partly because U.S. interests in Africa had not been clearly defined and it had no bureaucratic structure to manage those almost nonexistent interests. For a long time, the strategic thinking has been that the U.S. has “no compelling interests in Africa” and “do not want anybody else to have any, either.” However, whenever a non-Western nation or idea made its way into Africa, the U.S. got very nervous. This is what happened from the 1960–1990, when the Soviet Union tried to spread its communist ideology to Africa. Today, many think the U.S. is very nervous of Chinese economic penetration into Africa. America’s concern is that the Chinese are trying to control the continent’s natural resources and gain influence over it. The U.S. is also worried that radical Islamism is a dangerous idea that could germinate in poorly and badly governed states of Africa. Africom is being sold as an answer to these threats. Until the enunciation of Africom, the continent had been haphazardly divided into three U.S. commands—European, Central and Pacific. In order to understand this state of affairs we need first to understand the basis of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa.

Basis for Understanding U.S. foreign policy towards Africa

U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been variously referred to as either “benign neglect” or “manifest destiny.” In other words, these postures have defined or driven U.S. relations with Africa. Despite changes of U.S. administrations since 1960, when most African countries started gaining independence, the substance has always remained the same. Only the styles of various administrations have changed. As we shall see later, when given a choice between supporting the liberation struggles of the African people or bolstering its NATO allies, the U.S. easily chose the latter. On the other hand, it has sent Peace Corps volunteers to remote villages to assist in improving agricultural production while at the same time erecting trade barriers against products of these local farmers. It is this principle of “manifest destiny” that seems to be embodied in Africom’s objectives and stated mission.

AFRICOM’S STATED MISSION

- Prevent conflict by promoting stability regionally and eventually ‘prevail over extremism’ by never letting its seeds germinate in Africa.
- Address underdevelopment and poverty, which are making Africa a fertile ground for breeding terrorists.
- “... view the people, the nations and the continent of Africa from the same perspective that they view themselves.”
- Build the capacity of African nations through training and equipping African militaries, conducting training and medical missions.
- Undertake any necessary military action in Africa, despite its non-kinetic nature such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

WHY THE U.S. REALLY WANTS TO SET UP AFRICOM

Despite the above stated objectives, there are many reasons why the U.S. wants to set up Africom. First, the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on Africa for its oil needs. Africa is currently the largest supplier of U.S. crude oil, with Nigeria being the fifth largest source. Instability, such as that in the Niger Delta, could significantly reduce this supply. The U.S. National Intelligence Council has projected that African imports will account for 25% of total U.S. imports by 2015. This oil will primarily come from Angola, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria. Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer, has now overtaken Saudi Arabia as the third largest oil exporter to the U.S. The importance of the African oil source can be gleaned from the fact that in 2006, the U.S. imported 22% of its crude oil from Africa compared to 15% in 2004. President Bush appeared to have African oil supplies in mind during his 2006 State of the Union Address, when he announced his intention “to replace more than 75% of (U.S.) oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.” Continuing unrest in the Middle East has increased the urgency for the U.S. to build a security alliance with Africa in order to achieve this goal.

Second, Africa is an unstable region with badly governed states that can only manage their affairs, particularly security-related, with outside assistance. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has heavily focused on preventing and combating global terrorist threats. The events of 9/11 changed the way the U.S. views and relates to the rest of the world. Likewise, the foreign policies of Western powers have increasingly been militarised to secure and defend Western interests. Terrorism has been identified as one of the biggest threats to these interests. Africom
is expected to stop terrorists being bred in Africa’s weak, failing and failed states from attacking these interests.

It is widely held in the West that failing and failed states in Africa create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Among the targets of these terrorists are Western interests such as oil sources and supply routes. Improvement of African security would inevitably promote U.S. national interests by making it less likely that the continent could be a source of terrorism against the United States.

Third, one of the critical challenges facing Africa and the UN is training, equipping and sustaining troops in peace missions. African armies need training in peacekeeping. It is proposed that through Africom, African troops will be trained and aided to keep the peace in African conflict zones. This should come in handy when it is considered that all African Union-led peacekeeping operations deployed so far have encountered monumental problems. The most recent deployment, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is on the verge of folding because of a lack of financial and logistical support, as well as trained troops to keep a peace that is not there. Furthermore, it is stated that the medical assistance given through Africom could reduce the high prevalence of HIV in African militaries.

All things considered, it could be seen that the whole idea is, to a large extent, a bureaucratic issue within the U.S. government (State Department vs the Pentagon) on the best way of promoting American interests in Africa—securing investments and oil sources, fighting off Chinese competition and waging the war against terrorism.

WHAT AFRICANS THINK OF AFRICOM

Despite its altruistic sounding objectives Africom is yet to be warmly and widely embraced in Africa; as the following comments indicate:

- “Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and region, which will be forced to engage with U.S. interests on military terms.”—Michele Ruiters, Business Day (Johannesburg)
- “Ironically, Africom was announced as Chinese President Hu Jintao was touring eight African nations to negotiate deals that will enable China to secure oil flows from Africa.” Editorial, Daily Nation (Nairobi), 8 February 2007
- African countries “should wake up after seeing the scars of others (Afghanistan and Iraq).” —Reporter (Algiers).
- Mohamed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Minister of State and Foreign Affairs, has questioned why there was no proposal for an anti-terror cooperation with Algeria when the country was experiencing high levels of terrorist violence in the 1990s.
- “How can the U.S. divide the world up into its own military commands? Wasn’t that for the United Nations to do? What would happen if China also decided to create its Africa command? Would this not lead to conflict on the Continent?” —Abdullahi Alzubedi, Libyan Ambassador to South Africa.
- “Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into poverty.” —Nigerian Journalist Dulue Mbachu.
- “People on the street (in Africa) assume their governments have already had too many dealings with the U.S. in the war on terror at the expense of the rule of law. The regimes realise the whole idea is very unpopular.” —Rachid Tlemchani, University of Algiers Professor.

These and many other similar comments expressed during the visits of U.S. officials, and in newspaper editorials and meeting on African peace and development have led a State Department Official to conclude that: “We’ve got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the U.S. They just don’t trust the U.S.”

WHY AFRICANS ARE RELUCTANT TO EMBRACE AFRICOM

The coldness with which Africans hold Africom was displayed in July when Gen Kip Ward, the newly appointed first commander of Africom, was denied a meeting with the South African minister of defence, Mosiuoa Lekota, during his visit to the country to drum up support for the planned command. There are a number of reasons why Africans are reluctant to embrace Africom.
First, any country hosting the command will be criticised for violating Africa's common positions on African defence and security, which discourages the hosting of foreign troops on the African soil. In particular, it is thought, such troops could be used to undermine the Continent’s Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on common African defence and security, and other positions on hosting foreign bases in Africa.

Second, Africans vividly remember that colonialism was preceded by philanthropic missionaries who came to fulfill God’s Will of rescuing Africans from the clutches of barbarism. To paraphrase Kenyatta’s allegation, “when the Whiteman came to Africa, he was holding a Bible in one hand and asked us to close our eyes and pray. When we opened our eyes after the prayer, his other hand was holding a gun and all our land was gone!” Africa’s colonial history was characterised by military occupations, exploitation of its natural resources and suppression of its people. After testing decades of independence, these countries are now jealously guarding their sovereignty and are highly suspicious of foreigners, even those with good intentions.

Third, Africans reflect on the continent’s relations with the U.S., they see ambiguity, neglect, and selective engagement. For instance, during the period of decolonization, the U.S. did not openly support the UN decolonization initiatives, particularly when those were not aligned with its Cold War positions. Often, the U.S. was reluctant to support anti-colonial and anti-apartheid liberation movements in Southern Africa and colonial Portugal, a member of NATO. U.S. forcefully reacted to African regimes that forged close relations with the Soviet Union and China, while aligning closer to anti-Communist African despots who were anti-democratic and had horrendous human rights records. With this historical background, Africom might be considered in Africa if its objectives did not appear to be based on the principle of “manifest destiny” of “saving Africa.” The proposal will be seriously considered if it primarily seeks to strengthen the capacity of the African Union and other African organizations to implement Africa’s development, peace and security agendas.

Fourth, Africans are not comfortable dealing with the military in matters related to their development and sovereignty. Africans are concerned that the establishment of Africom might do more harm than good—“the poised hammer that makes everything suddenly look like a nail,” in the words of Esquire magazine. They would be much more comfortable dealing with American diplomats, USAID and Peace Corp volunteers rather than the U.S. Marine. Africans are nervously concerned that Africom will sanction the militarization of diplomacy and severely undermine multilateralism on the continent. Africans have consciously adopted multilateralism as a common approach to addressing the continent’s problems and confronting its challenges. Africom seems to be a unilateral approach that would be counter to the current trend towards unity on the continent. Consequently, the establishment of Africom must secure an African consensus otherwise it would bring new and grave threats and challenges to the continent’s peace and security agenda. The issue of foreign military presence on the African soil is in violation of this agenda.

Additionally, the U.S. should bear in mind that following the emergence of other players in Africa; any initiative aimed at the whole continent cannot be unilaterally conceived and implemented. Although it is factually acknowledged that the U.S., as the most powerful global military and economic power, has the will and capacity to undertake unilateral actions, there are severe limitations and far-reaching consequences for the unconsidered use of power. The U.S. engagement in the Middle East has proved that the policy of consolidating democracy in the region, destroying al-Qaeda and removing abhorrent regimes from power can fail despite all its seemingly good intentions.

Fifth, the launching and the aggressive promotion of Africom are taking place at the same time that Africa is debating the “Union Government” proposal. There are feelings, as expressed in a recently held consultative meeting of the African Union PCRD in Lusaka, Zambia, that Africom is an American attempt to ensure that the aspiration for African Unity is checked by a heavy U.S. military presence on the continent. This concern is based on the track record of American military intervention in Africa. The image of U.S. military involvement in Africa becomes more confusing when one looks at the “hard” security concerns of Africa. Many Africans are asking why American troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwandan genocide. Why the U.S. forces remained anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the nearest thing America ever had to an African colony, faced brutal disintegration in 2003? Why the U.S. has not supported the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and instead supported the Ethiopian intervention through air-power from CJTF–HOA stationed in Djibouti? Is the U.S. really interested in addressing the felt security needs of Africans, or does its proposed military presence foreshadow the kind of destruction we have seen recently in Somalia? Is Africa to
become merely another theatre of operations in which winning the “hearts and minds” forms an essential component of a “security” driven agenda? Why should ordinary Africans welcome an American presence that will create African targets for extremists where none existed, and add an unwelcome dimension to already complex local conflicts? Why is Washington not able to do something to address Africa’s needs by modifying its trade policy? If the U.S. is really committed to participating in the continent’s development why not support the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)? This would surely have a greater developmental impact, if improving the livelihoods of the people is what the U.S. wants; maybe this has not been clearly stated as such in the previous definition of Africa’s needs.

Sixth, Africans were never consulted during the conceptualization of Africom. Rather Africom was announced and has been presented as a fait accompli. Africans are presently experiencing the exuberance of self-importance and confidence to drive their own destiny. There is a prevailing mood on the continent to reassert African self-worth and self-determination. This is why “consultation” has become a common cliché on the continent.

Seventh, there is also a concern that Africom will suffer from mission creep by being transformed from engagement in humanitarian missions to an interventionist force, as was the case with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. The change of the humanitarian objectives could also come about due to the nexus of energy, poverty, and terrorism. Despite the oil wealth of African countries, 23 West African nations are ranked bottom on the UN human development index on poverty. The test case for this mission would be the Niger Delta region where an insurgency has been taking place since 2004, when unemployed youths took up arms to demand an equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Besides using violence, sabotage and kidnapping tactics, these youths under the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have shut off approximately 711,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Nigeria’s output of 2.5 million bpd. There is a strong feeling that if such activities interfere with U.S. oil supplies in Africa, there is a high likelihood that Africom could be used to protect U.S. interests.

Eighth, militarization of U.S.-Africa relations—Africans are wary of the U.S. record in Iraq and concerned that the Pentagon is taking the lead role in the promotion of U.S. interests. Establishment of Africom could be seen as President Bush’s approach of using military force to pursue U.S. strategic interests. Africom will not only militarise U.S.-African relations but also those African countries in which it will be located. This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence of American bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the U.S. and make Americans targets of violence.

Ninth, the mixed messages being relayed to Africa by the U.S. government have compounded the confusion and heightened the suspicions Africans have of Africom’s objectives:

• In 1995, the DOD in its U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa stated that the U.S. had “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.” But Theresa Whelan, the Assistant Secretary for Defence, has recently argued that Africa is providing “tens of thousands of U.S. jobs, . . . possesses 8% of the world’s petroleum; and it is a major source of critical minerals, precious metals and food commodities.”

• Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Policy and Pentagon pointman on Africom, has stated that its purpose is not to wage war but “to work in concert with (U.S.) African partners for a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can take place.” However, Gen Wald minced no words when he stated that: “I’d like to have some forward bases in Africa. The world has changed and we are going to make our security. The Halcyon days are over.”

• General Bantz Craddock, the EUCOM Commander, told journalists in Washington in June that protecting energy assets, particularly in West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, would guide the focus of Africom. Gen Craddock added that Africom will “enable countries (in West Africa) to improve their security of any type of production—oil, natural gas, minerals.”

• These intentions are reflective of the bold recommendations made by Vice President Dick Cheney’s National Energy Policy Development Group, in 2001, that the Bush administration “make(s) energy security a priority of (U.S.) trade and foreign policy.” One year later, the Bush administration rolled out its “West Point Doctrine” that essentially stated that the U.S. would not allow a major economic, political or military competitor to emerge.
Almost all African countries are reluctant to host Africom; some have made it clear that they do not want anything to do with it while others have even warned that it should not be stationed in any country neighbouring them. These countries are aware that the generosity of providing military advisors can easily turn into sending of conventional forces and a full-blown military intervention. For instance, Africom could provide Nigerian armed forces training to combat the Niger delta insurgency, which could later be upgraded to limited special operations to rescue American hostages and hunt down those who have attacked American economic interests.

Different regions in Africa have their respective concerns. For instance, the states of North Africa fear that their sovereignty could be easily undermined, similar to what happened to Libya in 1987 when it was bombed in the aftermath of the Berlin disco attack in which it was implicated. Most North African countries are also unable to engage too closely with the U.S. because of the Middle East policy that is widely perceived as too pro-Israel.

Furthermore, as a result of the U.S. military estimate that about a quarter of all foreign fighters in Iraq are from Africa, mainly Algeria and Morocco, there is a likelihood that Africom could be used to block these terrorists from moving to the Middle East. Additionally, these countries are worried that Africom could open the door to military and intelligence presence in Africa.

African governments lack the political spine to accept a permanent U.S. presence. Egypt, one of the closest American allies, is out of the picture because it is to remain in CENTCOM and is generally considered as an Arab rather than African nation. Kenya would be reluctant, as it has previously been targeted by transnational terrorism and has been in the U.S. military estimate that about a quarter of all foreign fighters in Iraq are from Africa, mainly Algeria and Morocco. Only President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has enthusiastically offered Liberian territory to be used for the establishment of Africom headquarters on the basis that it “would undoubtedly have a most beneficial effect on the West Africa sub-region, as well as the entire continent.”

**MISCONCEPTIONS OF AMERICANS**

In view of the above, it is apparent that Americans have a number of misconceptions that need to be addressed before prescribing ways of how to address African concerns about Africom.

1. **Muslims in Africa are attracted to radical ideology promoting violence against Western interests.** This is not true, as Muslims are desperate to have education for their children so that they can compete in the globalized world. They want the basics of life such as water and electricity and there are many of them who would prefer to live in the U.S. rather than Saudi Arabia if given a choice.

2. **Terrorism is a threat to African interests.** Terrorism is not generally regarded in Africa as a major threat to the livelihoods of the people. Addressing it is not a top priority in security matters—compared to urban violence, pastoralist conflicts, proliferation arms and state violence. Africa is being terrorised by hunger, diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria, etc), lack of life basics, oppressive laws, bad leadership, poor governance, unfair terms of international trade, foreign debt, conditionalities of international financial institutions, etc. Africans are afraid that Africom, in the guise of development assistance and combating terrorism, could be used to destabilise African countries, whose leaders and governments the U.S. does not get along with.

3. **Africa is incapable of addressing its problems.** Africans have been trying since 2000 to come up with strategies to address its underdevelopment, violent conflicts, and many threats to human security. These efforts have seen the formation of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). The AU has adopted an ambitious conflict prevention, management and resolution agenda that it is implementing through structures such as the Peace and Security Council. Other relevant structures include an African Standby Force (ASF) that would be based on 5 regional brigades. This is where the U.S. should play a critical role in building the capacities of these structures to promote peace and security in Africa.

4. **Africom “will enhance (American) efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote (American and African) common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa,” according to President Bush.** Some Africans think Africom would instead bring to them “military development, military health, military education, military democracy and military economic growth.” U.S. military bases have produced a dependency culture in places such as the Philippines that increased poverty and disadvantaged women. U.S. military bases have brought unstable and uneven development to areas in which they were established.
In countries with high unemployment and where most of the unemployed are women, sex work flourished, as it became a common means for women to feed their families.

**WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ADDRESS AFRICAN MISCONCEPTIONS OF AFRICOM**

The U.S. needs to pay a keen attention to the following in order to overcome the serious concerns that Africans have of Africom.

- Open dialogue with civil society on the rationale, mission objectives and specific benefits that Africom would bring to the African human security agenda.
- Demonstrate opportunities within the proposed structure that would guarantee links with civil society to ensure participation and contextual relevance. Additionally, reconceptualize Africom to complement the African Standby Force and the work of the AU and Regional Mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolves conflicts in Africa.
- Share the exit strategy and phase-out plans and the milestones of Africom activities and encourage civil society to monitor them during the implementation phase, with specific focus on their outcomes.
- Define, elaborate and clarify Africom's relationships with the AU (Peace and Security Council, AU Commission) and Regional Mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution.
- Guarantee that the interests and sovereignty of African states will not be compromised or undermined by Africom.
- Seek AU endorsement of Africom by the Executive Council and the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government.
- Since Africom is viewed within the wider context of the Global War on Terror and the likelihood of the theatre of terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Africa, it may be wise to review the timing. It could be even much better to wait until a time when the U.S. has an administration that is not regarded as arrogant and uncaring about other countries’ interests.
- Fully implement existing commitments, particularly the U.S. foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs in Africa: AGOA, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI), USAID programs/projects, etc.
- Last but not least, the U.S. should seriously think of changing its international engagement and posture, which is increasingly espousing American exceptionalism and unilateralism. Whatever the virtues of the assault on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it, and its consequences, have impacted very negatively on U.S. prestige. Most African governments have expressed their deeply felt opposition to the enterprise. Those that have not are often seen to be seeking U.S. complicity in their own violations of human freedoms or hoping for some form of reward for their silence. The refusal of the U.S. to countenance the involvement of its armed forces in UN operations unless under U.S. command is also irksome, as are insistences on exemptions for U.S. citizens from prosecution in the ICC, and other objectionable elements of Status of Forces Agreements. This exceptionalism is also exhibited in the way US embassies are built to appear like barracks barricading American diplomats and making embassies no-go zones.

**CONCLUSION**

Africom will not be accepted in Africa if it does not take into account the desires and aspirations of the African people for peace, security and development. The policy that Africom aims to enhance should be reflective of the African realities: growing multipartism and democratic consolidation, the continuing quest for sustainable development, the need to enhance state capacity, the craving for good governance, promotion of human security, etc. Any foreign assistance to Africa must incorporate these realities, as well as the desires and aspirations of the African people. Africom will have a win/win outcome if it is reflective of these facts and is presented as a mutually beneficial partnership.

The hostility that it has faced so far points to the fact that Africom could turn out to be an expensive endeavor, both in terms of resources and long-term U.S.-Africa relations. It should not come as a surprise that Washington’s designs for Africa are now viewed with skepticism. Oil, China and terrorism are being seen to be the principal concerns of the U.S. initiative. If the coordination of a securitized development policy for Africa is part of the U.S. strategy, then it is seen by many local observers as essentially secondary and subordinate to the main aim.
Thank you for the honor and opportunity to share with you my views on this important issue. I would be more than glad to answer any question that the Subcommittee may have.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.
We will now hear from Dr. Pham.

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, NELSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time I would ask that my formal statement be entered into the record. It is much more comprehensive than the summary which I will present now.

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Smith, I am honored by the invitation to appear today before the subcommittee and am grateful for the opportunity to add my voice to those of my distinguished colleagues on a subject that I have studied, written about and advocated on behalf of for a number of years, a United States Department of Defense regional unified combatant command for Africa, a combatant command that offers the potential for sustained engagement of a region where America has some very real strategic interests.

Historically America has generally perceived Africa as secondary to its foreign policy and other strategic objectives. Thus, more often than not American perspectives on Africa were framed almost exclusively in terms of preoccupation over the humanitarian consequences of poverty, war and natural disaster.

Alas, as noble as these moral impulses may have been, they lacked the staying power needed to sustain a long term commitment. Rightfully, many of our African friends viewed us as well meaning, but unreliable.

I would argue, however, that three factors have providentially come together which cumulatively have the potential to significantly alter the course of the relationship between the United States and the African continent as a whole, as well as with its individual sovereign states.

First, in the wake of 9/11 analysts and policymakers have shifted to a more strategic view of Africa in terms of United States national interests.

Second, independent of our national interests and actions, Africans themselves have increasingly expressed the desire and, more importantly, demonstrated the political will to tackle the continent’s myriad challenges of disease, poverty, ethnic tension, religious extremism, bad governance, lack of security, et cetera, although they still need outside assistance.

Third, we have come to recognize a commonality between our strategic interests and the interests of Africans in enhanced security, stability and development.

One of the most heartening developments in recent years has been the growing trend of Africans stepping up to provide leadership in addressing their continent’s problems, recognizing that Afri-
ca cannot afford to wait for the rest of the world to rouse itself to respond to pressing crises.

Despite some painfully obvious failures—the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe and the overall unwillingness or inability to confront President Mugabe being perhaps the most blatant example—it would be churlish not to acknowledge the significant growth in African capacity in conflict resolution and governance assurance at the national, subregional and Pan African levels.

Thus, not surprisingly, the most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United States affirmed that Africa holds a growing geostrategic importance and is a higher priority for the United States. However, quite appropriately, it also went out of its way to state that our security depends on partnering with Africans.

I have already noted the significant achievements of the current administration with regard to assisting Africa, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, PEPFAR, the reorganization of United States foreign assistance. These initiatives build on the foundation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA, originally signed in the previous administration, which has created some significant openings for some African countries.

However, given the looming nature of the terrorist threat, as well as the newly recognized geostrategic importance of Africa, it is not surprising that the United States military has taken the lead in America’s new engagement across the continent.

Thus, the establishment of a unified combatant command for Africa offers many advantages not only for the advancement of the strategic interests of the United States, but for the needs of Africans as African leaders themselves have articulated them.

Allow me to illustrate by focusing on the African Union’s vision of an African Standby Force to deal with security crises affecting the continent. While the desire to assume responsibility is quite palpable, the effort has thus far been haphazard, to put it charitably, with focus and resources often diverted to more immediate concerns to the detriment of both proximate and long-term objectives.

The shortcomings of the African Union Mission in Sudan, especially those of the peacekeepers in Darfur, are well known to the members of the subcommittee. I myself have been rather unsparing in my criticism of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), where only Uganda has lived up to its commitment to dispatch peacekeepers, while other countries, some with significantly greater resources, have disgraced themselves with excuse after excuse for not deploying.

At the very least, AFRICOM would bring focused attention to the need to support Africans’ vision of a Standby Force, removing some of the institutional obstacles that previously hindered efforts to engage consistently with our African partners.

However, to achieve the objectives of AFRICOM several issues have to be addressed in addition to the obvious funding and other resource issues. First, there is the matter of how AFRICOM is perceived by Africans.

While the heyday of the type of Pan Africanism dreamed by African independence leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah have
come and gone, a continental perspective nonetheless does resonate in Africa, and African states do tend to see themselves, at least in interactions with non-African interlocutors, as Africans. Consequently, it behooves U.S. foreign policy to engage those same countries on the basis of that collective identity.

The case needs to be consistently made by both the political leaders and military personnel that a unified command focused on the entire continent will be better positioned to coherently address uniquely African challenges and support local efforts to bolster the operational capacity of African states, including those of the African Union and subregional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States.

Furthermore, unfortunately, post colonial African experience has been heavily scarred by the role that African militaries have played in their countries' politics, and that has to be taken into consideration.

While some African countries have welcomed the announcement of the new command—Liberia's President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf being a notable example—others have been demonstrably less enthusiastic, and we have to consider their concern, as well as perhaps some of the unspoken aspects such as the questions of how AFRICOM changes the balance of power between smaller states, which have tended to be supportive of a new command, and larger states, which view it as a hedge against their ambitions.

Also important is that we recall that Africa assesses the issue of transnational terrorism in its own security interest. Some Africans recall the colonial and/or apartheid eras when their own national liberation struggles were labeled “terrorist.” Other Africans fear the possibility that partnering with the United States will make them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Still others wonder whether we speak the same language when we address security concerns, and these have to be addressed.

Dialogue is going to be important in this process. I can’t emphasize enough the importance of engaging our partners. One factor, perhaps the factor that has the most influence on how AFRICOM will be initially received, is the decision concerning its basing.

The selection of the site will have both positive and negative impacts on the command’s strategic effect and will in turn dictate AFRICOM’s ability to influence and support the various elements of American national power in helping build a secure, stable and prosperous African continent.

Given the larger perspectives of the history of colonialization and its still deleterious consequences, including those imperceptions as well as practical questions of infrastructure and security, I would counsel against the basing of the structure in Africa and advise locating command headquarters in the United States with perhaps a forward mobile headquarters deployed as needed.

This option would afford maximum operational flexibility while voiding the negative consequences of opening ourselves to accusations of neocolonialism and militarization. In this scenario, subcomponents of AFRICOM may of course be based on the continent in support of African initiatives. For example, a training mission working in partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Center in Accra might well indeed be based in Ghana.
The mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a break with conventional military doctrine and doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services and within government agencies. The challenges that the new command will confront will be quite different from those its homologs face in other theaters, and it goes beyond resolving the always vexing interagency conundrum.

While we want the privilege of what the military might term a nonkinetic approach to achieving operational effects; that is, what those of us in the civilian sector would call knowledge based capabilities, AFRICOM would benefit immensely from finding the appropriate mechanisms to tap into the extraordinary wealth of knowledge that exists among academic and other experts who have invested lifetimes in understanding Africa and the vast pool of experience of those who have given years of service in religious, humanitarian and other nongovernmental organizations in Africa, as well as the cultural and personal knowledge of African diaspora communities in the United States.

While many of these individuals may be hesitant of becoming involved with military and other official institutions, this does not mean the constructive partnerships cannot be built with academia and other civil society institutions. It just means that the effort must be more than perfunctory.

Mr. Chairman, the new American security framework for Africa is still taking shape. This means we have a historic opportunity to partner with the region in a meaningful way if we get the terms of that engagement right.

However, it is already evident that the challenges that we, Americans and Africans, face together neither lend themselves to quick fixes nor promise all that many immediate results. Rather they demand a steady approach and a sustained commitment to the pursuit of long-time strategic objectives which will secure legitimate United States national interests, as well as advance the interests of our African partners irrespective of transitions in administration, shifts in economic indicators or changes to international or national perceptions of priorities. Given the high stakes involved, nothing less should be expected.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, NELSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY

AFRICA COMMAND
A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR ENHANCED ENGAGEMENT—IF DONE RIGHT

I am honored by the invitation to appear today before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health and am grateful for the opportunity to add my voice to those of my distinguished colleagues on a subject which I have studied, written about, and advocated on behalf of, for a number of years: a United States Department of Defense regional unified combatant command for Africa that offers the potential for sustained engagement of a region where America has very real strategic interests.

SETTING THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW ENGAGEMENT

I beg the Subcommittee’s indulgence to observe that we as a nation have indeed all come a very long way in recent years in our perceptions of Africa—some of us perhaps more than others. With the anniversary on March 6 of this year of the independence of Ghana, we also mark the fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the wave of national sovereignty that swept across Sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of
the Second World War. At that time, however, no part of the region was included in any U.S. military command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) except for several North African countries which five years earlier had been tacked onto the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). The rest of the continent was left unaccounted for the rest of the decade until 1960 when, following then-Vice President Richard Nixon's extensive tour of the continent, President Dwight D. Eisenhower put then-Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) in charge of security planning for Sub-Saharan Africa just as he had previously created the Africa Bureau within the State Department to coordinate diplomatic initiatives. Two years later, President John F. Kennedy transferred Sub-Saharan Africa into the Strike Command (STRICOM) AOR. From that time until the present, responsibility for defense planning affecting the continent has shifted a number of times as administrations came and went and geopolitical perceptions evolved over the course of the Cold War and its aftermath.

Just three years ago, when writing on the subject of a possible regional command for Africa, I was still being counseled by one editor to make sure that I couched the whole proposal as a hypothetical in the conditional tense. And going back a little further to 2000, I can recall that a number of Africa's friends—some of whom are in this room today—were quite disappointed when a certain Republican presidential candidate responded negatively to a question from PBS's Jim Lehrer about whether Africa fit into his definition of the strategic interests of the United States: "At some point in time the president's got to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them." Yet almost seven years to the day later, on February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush announced the establishment of a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), directing the Department of Defense to stand it up by October 2008 and entrusting the new structure with the mission to "enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, economic growth in Africa" by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities. I rehearse this history in order to lend some perspective to just how extraordinary the decision to set up AFRICOM as America's sixth regional command really is. As former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Princeton N. Lyman, who previously served as U.S. ambassador to South Africa and to Nigeria, has observed, the apparent strategic neglect of Africa nonetheless sadly reflects "what [has] in fact been the approach of both Democratic and Republican administrations for decades." Historically, with the exception of Cold War period when concerns about Soviet attempts to secure a foothold on the continent drove U.S. policy, America generally perceived Africa as secondary to its foreign policy and other strategic objectives. Thus, more often than not, American perspectives on Africa were framed almost exclusively in terms of preoccupation over the humanitarian consequences of poverty, war, and natural disaster. Alas, as noble as these moral impulses have been, they lacked the "staying power" needed to sustain a long-term commitment. Rightfully, many of our African friends viewed us as well-meaning, but unreliable.

I would argue, however, that three factors have providentially come together which cumulatively have the potential to significantly alter the course of the relationship between the United States and the African continent as a whole as well as with its individual sovereign states. First, in the wake of 9/11, analysts and policymakers have shifted to a more strategic view of Africa in terms of U.S. national interests. Second, independent of our interests and actions, Africans themselves have increasingly expressed the desire and, more importantly, demonstrated the political will, to tackle the continent's myriad challenges of disease, poverty, ethnic tension, religious extremism, bad governance, lack of security, etc., although they still need outside assistance. Third, we have come to recognize a commonality between our strategic interests and the interests of Africans in enhanced security, stability, and development.

3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa" (February 6, 2007).
RECOGNIZING OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS

Broadly conceived, there are three major areas in which Africa's significance for America—or at least the public recognition thereof—has been amplified in recent years. The first is Africa's role in the "Global War on Terror" and the potential of the poorly governed spaces of the continent to provide facilitating environments, recruitment, and eventual targets for Islamist terrorists who threaten Western interests in general and those of the United States in particular—and, in some regions like the Horn of Africa and Sahel, this has already become reality. The second important consideration is Africa's abundant natural resources, particularly those in its burgeoning energy sector. The third area of interest remains the humanitarian concern for the devastating toll which conflict, poverty, and disease, especially HIV/AIDS, continue to exact in Africa.

Concerns about Terrorism. There is no denying that U.S. security policy, both currently and for the foreseeable future will be heavily influenced by the "Global War on Terrorism," the "Long War," or whatever the designation du jour for the fight against the threat of transnational Islamist terrorism happens to be. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America rightly acknowledged that "weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." With the possible exception of the Greater Middle East, nowhere is this analysis truer than Africa where, as the document went on to acknowledge, regional conflicts arising from a variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, and ethnic and religious tensions all "lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists." While the terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998, and on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and, simultaneously, on an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002 have underscored the deadly reality of the terrorist threat in Africa, perhaps the most eloquent reminder of the particular vulnerability of the continent to terrorism comes from the terrorists themselves. In June 2006, a new online magazine for actual and aspiring jihadists appeared. Featuring an article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled "Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa," al-Ansari was remarkably frank:

There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.

With a rather commendable analytical rigor surprisingly free from ideological ran- cor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate and evaluate what he perceived to be significant advantages to al-Qaeda shifting terrorist operations to Africa, including: the fact that jihadi doctrines have already been spread within the Muslim communities of many African countries; the political and military weakness of African governments; the wide availability of weapons; the geographical position of Africa vis-à-vis international trade routes; the proximity to old conflicts against "Jews and Crusaders" in the Middle East as well as new ones like Darfur, where the author almost gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western intervention; the poverty of Africa which "will enable the holy warriors to provide some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives"; the technical and scientific skills that potential African recruits would bring to the jihadi cause; the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones already embroiled in conflict with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions; the links to Europe through North Africa "which facilitates the move from there to carry out attacks"; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which "are very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and long term." Abu Azzam concluded his assessment on an ominous note:

6 Ibid.
In general, this continent has an immense significance. Whoever looks at Africa can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and activity it deserves in the war against the Crusaders. This is a continent with many potential advantages and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the expected targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and the jihadi cause.

It would be a mistake to dismiss Abu Azzam’s analysis as devoid of operational effect. Shortly before the publication of the article, an Islamist movement whose leaders included a number of figures linked to al-Qaeda, the Islamic Courts Union, seized control of the sometime Somali capital of Mogadishu and subsequently overran most of the former state which—with the exception of the northern Republic of Somaliland where the inhabitants have tried to reassert the sovereignty they possessed before joining Somalia in a disastrous union and have, by and large, succeeded—has been without an effective government since 1991. While forceful intervention by neighboring Ethiopia in late December 2006 dislodged the Islamists, Somalia’s internationally-recognized but utterly ineffective “Transitional Federal Government” has yet to assert itself in the face of a growing insurgency which has adopted the same non-conventional tactics that foreign jihadi and Sunni Arab insurgents have used to great effect in Iraq. Considerable evidence has emerged of links between the Somali Islamists and fugitive al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, not least of which was the capture and subsequent transfer last June to the U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo of Abdullahi Sudi Arale, who was apparently dispatched from Pakistan to Somalia in September 2006 and who, according to a Pentagon statement, “played a significant role in the reemergence” of the militants after their initial rout. Another Al-Qaeda “franchise” has sought to reignite conflict in Algeria and spread it to the Sahel, the critical boundary region where Sub-Saharan Africa meets North Africa and where vast empty spaces and highly permeable borders are readily exploitable by local and international militants alike both as a base for recruitment and training and as a conduit for the movement of personnel and materiel. Last year members of the Algerian Islamist terrorist group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (usually known by its French acronym GSPC) formally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and began identifying themselves in communique’s as “Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.” The link to al-Qaeda was confirmed by bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri who, in the “commemorative video” the terrorist network issued on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, declared: “Our mujahid Sheikh and the Lion of Islam, Osama bin Laden, has instructed me to give the good news to Muslims in general and my mujahidin brothers everywhere that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined al-Qaeda organization.” The Egyptian terrorist hailed the “blessed union” between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, pledging that it would “be a source of chagrín, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the regime in Algeria], the treacherous sons of [former colonial power] France,” and urging the group to become “a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders” in the region and beyond. Last April, al-Qaeda’s new affiliate claimed credit for a pair of bomb blasts—one close to the prime minister’s office, the other near a police station—that rocked Algiers, killing two dozen people and wounding more than a hundred, shattering the calm that the Algerian capital had enjoyed since the conclusion of the civil war of the 1990s which claimed at least 150,000 lives.

Perhaps most menacing over the long term, however, is an increasingly apparent willingness on the part of transnational Islamist terror networks to not only exploit the grievances which might be nursed by some African Muslim communities, but also to reach out to non-Muslim militants to make common cause against their mutual enemies. While there is no shortage of violent non-Muslim groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region has long been plagued by a number of indigenous Islamist...
groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia, and the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU). More recently, evidence has emerged that outside forces have been providing these groups with strategic guidance, tactical assistance, and operational planning. For example, the ONLF has been battling successive Ethiopian governments for years with the goal of splitting the ethnic Somali region from the country. However, it was only within the last year that the group acquired from somewhere the wherewithal to mount the most spectacular attack within Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg dictatorship in 1991.

In addition to shelter, recruits, and opportunities to terrorists, terrorist groups have also profited from the weak governance capacities of African states not only to raise money by soliciting sympathizers, but also to trade in gemstones and other natural resources either as a means to launder and make money as al-Qaeda did with Sierra Leonean “conflict diamonds” through the good offices of then Liberian president Charles Taylor. Former Washington Post correspondent Douglas Farah, for example, has reported on how al-Qaeda procured somewhere between $30 million and $50 millions worth of diamonds through this channel in the month before the September 11 attacks, while I have documented how documented how Hezbollah has used the extensive Lebanese Shi'a communities in places like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea to make money in an illicit market estimated by the United Nations to worth between $170 million and $370 million.

Energy and Maritime Security. In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush said the United States to “replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025” and to “make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past.”

According to the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, America has already advanced significantly in its effort to wean itself from dependency on hydrocarbons originating in the volatile Persian Gulf, thanks in large measure to the abundant energy resources of Africa. This past March, Nigeria edged past Saudi Arabia to become America’s third largest supplier, delivering 41,717,000 barrels of oil that month compared to the desert kingdom’s 38,557,000. When one adds Angola’s 22,542,000 barrels to the former figure, the two African states alone now supply more of America’s energy needs than Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates combined. This milestone is all the more remarkable when one considers that the campaign of bombings and kidnappings carried out over the course of the last two years by the relatively small Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group fighting the Nigerian government over the oil-rich Delta region’s underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and political marginalization, has had the cumulative affect of cutting Nigeria’s total oil production by almost one-third.

This natural wealth makes Africa an inviting target for the attentions of the People’s Republic of China, whose dynamic economy, averaging 9 percent growth per annum over the last two decades, has an almost insatiable thirst for oil as well as a need for other natural resources to sustain it. China is currently importing approximately 2.6 million barrels of crude per day, about half of its consumption; more than 765,000 of those barrels—roughly a third of its imports—come from African sources, especially Sudan, Angola, and Congo (Brazzaville). Is it any wonder, then, that apart from the Central Eurasian region on its own northwestern frontier, perhaps no other foreign region rivals Africa as the object of Beijing’s sustained strategic interest in recent years. Last year the Chinese regime published the first ever official white paper elaborating the bases of its policy toward Africa. This year, ahead of his twelve-day, eight-nation tour of Africa—the third such journey since he took office in 2003—Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a three-year, $3 billion program in preferential loans and expanded aid for Africa. These funds come on top of the $37 billion in loans and $23 billion in export credits that Hu announced in October 2006 at the opening of the historic Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which brought nearly fifty African heads of state

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17 State of the Union Address by the President (January 31, 2006).
18 See Energy Information Administration, U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports (May 27, 2007).
and ministers to the Chinese capital. Intentionally or not, many analysts expect that Africa—especially the states along its oil-rich western coastline—will increasingly become a theatre for strategic competition between the United States and its only real near-peer competitor on the global stage, China, as both countries seek to expand their influence and secure access to resources. In connection with this, an additional security worry is China’s increasing arms exports to Africa, especially as weapons are flowing to despotic regimes and fueling simmering conflicts even as they diminish further what little leverage Western governments and international organizations—to say nothing of African ones—have with recalcitrant regimes.

Yet for all its global importance as well as strategic significance for U.S. national interests, Africa’s waters—especially the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia, and the “Swahili Coast” of East Africa—seen comparatively few resources poured into maritime security, a deficit which only worsens when one considers the scale of the area in question and the magnitude of the challenges faced. Depending on how one chooses to define the Gulf of Guinea region, the nearly 3,500 miles of coastline running in an arc from West Africa to Angola, for example, are highly susceptible to piracy, criminal enterprises, and poaching—in addition to the security challenge presented by the oil production facilities, both onshore and offshore, and the transport of the natural resources thus derived.

The International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report covering the first quarter of 2007, for instance, noted that while the number of reported attacks declined significantly compared to just one year before, the figure for incidents off the coast of Nigeria doubled. At the same time, the Gulf of Guinea’s oil-producing states have long been a plagued by “illegal bunkering,” the tapping of pipelines for oil which is eventually loaded on to tankers which sell the crude to refineries elsewhere at a considerable profit. This highly-organized and far-reaching activity—at one point, two Nigerian admirals were court-martialed for their involvement in one infamous 2004 incident involving the disappearance of a tanker with 11,000 barrels of oil—has grown increasingly deadly as energy prices surge upwards and the criminal syndicates involved have acquired ever more sophisticated arms. There is also an increasing drug trade through the subregion: Nigeria is the transshipment point for approximately one-third of the heroin seized by authorities in the United States and more than half of the cocaine seized by South African officials, while European law enforcement officials report that poorly-scrutinized West Africa has become the major conduit for drugs shipped to their countries by Latin American cartels.

In addition to their vast hydrocarbon reserves, the waters of the Gulf of Guinea contain some of the richest fisheries in the world. Yet, according to a 2005 report commissioned by the British Department for International Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), illegal, unreported, or unlicensed (IUU) fishing—often by large foreign commercial trawlers—cost countries in the Gulf of Guinea more than $375 million annually. In addition to the obvious economic impact of the loss of the value of the catches to the countries affected, IUU fishing also carries indirect costs in terms of losses to industries upstream and downstream from fishing itself—to say nothing of damage to the ecosystem.

In response to these challenges, the United States 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security declared that:

Assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their territorial seas and internal waters is a longstanding objective of the United States and contributes directly to the partners’ economic development as well as their ability to combat unlawful or hostile exploitation by a variety of threats. For example, as a result of our active discussions with African partners, the United States is now appropriating funding for the implementation of border and coastal security initiatives along the lines of the former Africa Coastal Security (ACS) Program. Preventing unlawful or hostile exploitation of the maritime do-

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25 Marine Resources Assessment Group, Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries (July 2005).
main requires that nations collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain, establish responsive decision-making architectures, enhance maritime interdiction capacity, develop effective policing protocols, and build intergovernmental cooperation. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level.26

**Humanitarian Challenges.** While concern over terrorism and other potential security threats as well as the growing importance of Africa's hydrocarbon and other natural resources has refocused America's perspective on the continent in recent years, the humanitarian impulses that motivated policy for so long have not been lost. If anything, they have acquired a new importance as the United States reassesses and reconfigures its strategic engagement with Africa. Consider the following data points:

- Africa boasts the world's fastest rate of population growth: by 2020, today's more than 900 million Africans will number more than 1.2 billion—more than the combined populations of Europe and North America. Nor do these absolute numbers tell the whole story: by then, the median age of Europeans will be 45, while nearly half of the African population will be under the age of 15.

- The dynamic potential implicit in the demographic figures just cited is, however, constrained, by the economic and epidemiological data. The United Nations Development Program's *Human Development Report 2006* determined that of the thirty-one countries found to have "low development," twenty-nine were African states—more than half of the membership of the African Union.27 While Sub-Saharan Africa is home to only 10 percent of the world's population, nearly two-thirds of the people infected with HIV—24.7 million—are Sub-Saharan Africans, with an estimated 2.8 million becoming infected in 2006, more than any other region in the world.28

Thus while the 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* correctly argued that terrorist organizations have little in common with the poor and destitute, it also acknowledged that terrorists can exploit these socio-economic conditions to their advantage. President Bush noted in his 2005 address on the occasion of the United Nations' sixtieth anniversary:

> We must defeat the terrorists on the battlefield, and we must also defeat them in the battle of ideas. We must change the conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit, by spreading the hope of freedom to millions who’ve never known it. We must help raise up the failing states and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for the terrorists. We must defend and extend a vision of human dignity, and opportunity, and prosperity—a vision far stronger than the dark appeal of resentment and murder. To spread a vision of hope, the United States is determined to help nations that are struggling with poverty.29

The administration, working with Congress, has consolidated the comprehensive trade and investment policy for Africa introduced by its predecessor in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, which substantially lowered commercial barriers with the United States and allowed Sub-Saharan African countries to qualify for trade benefits. It has also made combating HIV/AIDS on the continent a priority with twelve of the fifteen focus countries in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) being in Africa. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established in 2004, promotes and supports innovative foreign aid strategies which benefit states that qualify under objective benchmarks for assistance from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a program which provides assistance for "compact agreements" to fund specific programs targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth as well as "threshold programs" to improve performance with an eye toward achieving "compact" status. Of the forty-one coun-

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29 Address by the President to United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting (September 14, 2005).
tries worldwide currently eligible for some MCA funding, either through the “Threshold Program” or “Compact Assistance,” twenty are in Africa.30

One of the key advantages of the MCC approach is the recognition that generous grants of development aid are for naught if the recipients lacked a democratic polity and basic capacity for good governance. It should be recalled that until the 1990s, African states which had largely been characterized by various genre of authoritarian rule. Until then, only two, Botswana and Mauritius, had a record of remaining democratic continuously since gaining their independence. During the same period, only one African leader, Aden Abulle Osman of Somalia (1967), had ever peacefully relinquished his office following electoral defeat and only three had retired voluntarily: Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal (1980), Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon (1982), and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (1985)—and Ahidjo, apparently underwent a change of heart and subsequently tried (unsuccessfully) to shoot his way back into office a year later.31 A decade later, virtually all sub-Saharan African states had at least tentatively opened their political systems to some form of competition and while shenanigans are still common—witness the poor organization and massive fraud in this year’s Nigerian presidential election which was widely criticized by local as well as American and European observers32—one-party autocracies like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe are now the exception rather than the rule.33 Part of the reason for this progress is the recognition by both Africans and international donors like the United States that, as Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen has argued, “Developing and strengthening a democratic system is an essential component of the process of development.”34

ACKNOWLEDGING INCREASED AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

One of the most heartening developments in recent years has been the growing trend of Africans stepping up to provide leadership in addressing their continent’s problems, recognizing that they cannot afford to wait for the rest of world to rouse itself to respond to these pressing crises. Despite some painfully obvious failures—the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe and the overall unwillingness or inability to confront President Robert Mugabe being perhaps the most blatant example—it would be churlish not to acknowledge the significant growth in indigenous capacity in conflict resolution and governance assurance at the national, subregional, and pan-African levels.

Nation-Building. News from the African continent which—when it is covered at all in Western media—often comes across as an endless cycle of material poverty and disease, resource competition, environmental degradation, civil conflict, religious fanaticism, and, in recent years, Islamist terrorism. Consequently it is refreshing to be able to report such signs of progress as emerge, often without—or even despite—outside intervention.

One such case is the peace agreement signed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, on March 4, 2007, by President Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire and Guillaume Soro, Secretary-General of the “Forces Nouvelles” (FN) rebels who had seized control of the northern part of the country followed a failed coup attempt nearly five years ago. While peace accords in African civil conflicts have a notoriously short shelf life, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the Ouagadougou accord—and, should it hold, to derive some lessons from this experience applicable to other African conflicts.35

First, the peace agreement came out of direct negotiations between the two principal forces in the conflict, the government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, led by President Gbagbo, which controlled the southern part of the country, and the FN rebels which, protected behind the ill-named “zone of confidence” carved across the middle of the country by the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and the independent French military intervention, the “Force Licorne,” controlled the northern regions. Thus, unlike the long list of stillborn peace initiatives—

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Marcoussis, Accra I, Accra II, Accra III, Pretoria I, and Pretoria II, to name just the six major ones—and the batch of UN Security Council resolutions, the Ouagadougou accord was not an outside imposition on the parties. In January, President Gbagbo requested that President Blaise Compaore, the current chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), use his good offices to facilitate direct negotiations between the government and the rebels. As President Gbagbo noted in his March 9 address to the Ivorian nation, “conflicts in Africa can only be resolved through solutions found and proposed by Africans themselves.”

Second, the way forward was not found in the usual set piece international conferences which are little better than choreographed media circuses with little substance once the global luminaries who parachute in leave for the next stop on their itinerary. Instead the Ouagadougou accord came together out of painfully lengthy discussions in the Burkinafaso capital between the representatives of the Ivorian government, led by President Gbagbo’s special assistant, Desire Tagro, and the FN delegation led by Soro’s deputy, Louis-Andre Dacoury-Tabley. Hence, neither side can subsequently claim that outsiders imposed a deal upon them. As FN leader Soro underlined in an address on March 13 from the rebel capital of Bouake, the direct dialogue “diminished the distrust of the Forces Nouvelles and allowed them to progresively engage in discussions . . . with all the time necessary.”

Third, unlike peace deals where, in order to get signatures on paper—the perennial triumph of process over substance!—mediators have purposely avoided tackling touchy subjects, the Ouagadougou accord went into considerable detail on the issues that, once the failed putsch had been turned into a full-fledged civil conflict, had become the most divisive: national identity (the FN claims to represent northerners who allege systematic discrimination and disenfranchisement, although the government argues that many of them are not legally Ivorian at all), the composition of the military (many of the original rebels in 2002 were soldiers whose units were about to be demobilized, while many FN commanders have been self-promoted in the ranks as the conflict evolved), political power sharing (other than President Gbagbo, elected by a plurality in contested elections in 2000, the composition of the government has been repeatedly reshuffled and manipulated, sometimes by troubling international diktat, these last few years), and the holding of elections (now two years overdue). The Ouagadougou agreement, as FN leader Soro noted is “a good political compromise which neither anoints a winner nor designates a loser.” It even has annexed to it a detailed timetable for implementing the terms of the deal.

Fourth, the Ouagadougou accord is forward looking. While promising an amnesty for crimes relating to national security during the conflict—and, commendably, excluding war crimes and crimes against humanity from the amnesty—the agreement points to way towards future progress with unambiguous benchmarks. In April, an integrated command center, which according to the terms of the deal is “to unify the forces of the combatants” in view of “setting up a new defense and security forces committed to the values of integrity and republican morality,” was set up on schedule with accord’s timetable. Subsequently, the institutional framework for monitoring progress which will include not only include the two principal forces, but also civilian leaders like Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who was excluded from the 2000 presidential ballot, and former president Henri Konan Bedié. Likewise in April, a new unity government was sworn in with Soro taking the place of Charles Konan Banny, the UN-installed prime minister. After that, the “zone of confidence” was dismantled, clearing the way for the gradual reunification of the country as public administration, including the registration of citizens, gets underway again. Simultaneously, combatants will be demobilized, disarmed, and reintegrated. The process will culminate with national elections, organized by Ivorians themselves, by the beginning of 2008. Just three days ago, President Gbagbo visited Bouake, in the formerly rebel-held north, for the first time in five years to attend a “flame of peace” ceremony from which a torch will be borne to all nineteen regions of the country as a sign of national reconciliation. Together with Prime Minister Soro, the president set fire to pile of stockpiled weapons to signify the end of the conflict.

Is all this too good to be true? Perhaps. I have been around Africa enough to take a skeptical view of most promises. On the other hand, during a visit to Abidjan in January, I had the opportunity to sit down with the leadership of the National Institute of Statistics (INS), the body which has been charged with carrying out the citizen identification and voter registration exercises on behalf of the relevant authorities. On a purely technical level, INS is better prepared than almost any other analogous African body. The “direct data capture” units used are, in fact, more sophisticated (and secure) than the voter registration processes of most county clerks in the U.S. The question, therefore, is not one of technical feasibility, but rather one of political will. I am encouraged that President Gbagbo reiterated in his March national
address the sentiments which he expressed as a hope at the time in a private meeting with me and two colleagues in January: “The international community has always had the initiative in the negotiations and [failed] peace agreements in Côte d’Ivoire. Now the discussions were initiated and undertaken by Ivorians themselves. . . . We must take ownership of this agreement and make it successful, because any failure in implementation would be catastrophic since no other opportunity of negotiations will be offered to us. All other ways and means of recourse have been exhausted.”

Subregional Guarantors. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is perhaps the best example of a subregional willingness to lead and accept greater responsibility for addressing conflict in one’s neighborhood and has a highly evolved institutional framework for this engagement.

ECOWAS was established in 1975 with the mandate of promoting cooperation between the member states and facilitating the integration of their economic, social, and cultural sectors in order to eventually form a monetary and economic union. This mandate was strengthened in the 1993 Treaty of Cotonou which updated the regional body’s structure and operations in order to accelerate the process of economic integration and strengthen political ties. The commitment to political coordination was preceded by the adoption of two defense-related protocols, the “Protocol on Non-Aggression” of 1978 and the “Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence” of 1981, as well as by the “Declaration of Political Principles” by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in 1991. The defense protocols envisioned the organization’s member states intervening militarily, even within the borders of another member, in cases of armed conflict threatening the peace and security of the region. Alongside the right of “humanitarian intervention,” the principle of collective regional security was first invoked to justify ECOWAS’s 1990–1997 intervention in the Liberian civil war. The Liberian intervention led to operations in Sierra Leone (1997–2000), which included acting on the request of the then-Organization of African Unity to employ force to reverse a coup against President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah—an event that “marked the first time a regional organization requested intervention in a member state to end human suffering and promote democracy,” thus “authoriz[ing] another regional organization to employ force on its behalf.” In the wake of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean interventions, the decision was made through another protocol to create a permanent structure for military cooperation through the establishment of the ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security’ in 1999. Subsequently, the regional body has been involved in peacekeeping operations in Guinea-Bissau (1999) and Côte d’Ivoire (ongoing since 2003).

It was with a view to addressing the root causes of the conflicts that had so vexed the region that the 25th Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, meeting in Dakar in December 2001, adopted the “Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance” supplementary to the “Mechanism” protocol. This latest document acknowledges that, for all their historical diversity and differences both of colonial histories and post-independence development paths, the respective constitutions of the member states of the regional organization have arrived at a set of “constitutional convergence principles” shared by all, including: separation of powers; independence of the judiciary; “every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections”; “zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means”; “popular participation in decision-making, strict adherence to democratic principles and decentralization of power at all levels of governance”; freedom from ethnic, religious, regional or racial discrimination; and freedom of association and of the press (Article 1).
The Protocol also stipulates that “all elections shall be organized on the dates or at periods fixed by the Constitution or the electoral laws” and “no substantial modification shall be made to the electoral laws in the last six months before the election” without a broad consensus of the political actors (Article 2). The document goes on to specify the modalities for the administration of transparent elections within member states (Articles 3–10) and ECOWAS’s role in assisting with and monitoring the polls (Articles 11–18). Other thematic sections of the document deal with the role of military and security forces in democracies (Articles 19–24); poverty reduction and social dialogue (Articles 25–28); education, culture, and religion (Articles 29–31); the rule of law, human rights and good governance (Arts 32–39); and women, children, and youth (Arts 40–43). In the event that democratic governance suffers a reversal in a member state or there is a “massive violation of human rights” therein, “ECOWAS may impose sanctions on the State concerned,” including suspension of the offending member state from decision-making bodies and processes of the organization (Article 45).

While the Protocol does not legally enter into force until at least nine signatories ratify it (Article 49), this did not prevent ECOWAS from putting its principles into practice in early 2005 at which time only eight countries had ratified the agreement. On February 5, 2005, President Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, then African leader with the longest tenure in office, died unexpectedly after a heart attack. Two days later, the late president’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, was installed as head of state by the military after Togo’s constitution was hastily amended to preclude the mandated succession of the National Assembly speaker to the interim presidency. The putschists even amended the document further to allow the 38-year-old son to remain in office until 2008, when the late father’s most recent term would have expired. While concerted pressure from ECOWAS did not succeed in restoring the displaced parliamentary speaker, Ouattara Fambare Natchaba, as interim head of state, Faure Gnassingbé did relinquish the presidency on February 25 and to allow the constitutionally-mandated presidential poll—which he subsequently won as the candidate of the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais—held on April 25. While the Togolese process was not perfect, that ECOWAS intervened as forcibly as it did and obtained, a respect for constitutional order constitutes remarkable progress that commends the Protocol as a model for supranational peer review and guarantees not only of security, but also of emergent democratic politics. Later this year, for example, Togo will hold legislative poll.

A particularly interesting manifestation of this ethic of co-responsibility in contained in the ECOWAS previously mentioned “Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security”—itself an elaborate framework encompassing the security sector and its relationship to peace in the region. In addition to the heads of state and government who, gathered together as the Mechanism’s “Authority,” constitute its highest decision making body (Article 6), and the “Mediation and Security Council,” comprised of nine member states, seven elected by the Authority as well as that body’s current and previous chairs (Article 8), the document provides for the establishment of a novel organ, the “Council of Elders” (Article 20).

Each year, the regional group’s executive secretary compiles a list of “eminent personalities”—who need not be Africans—who can “use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators,” including the representatives of various stakeholder groups in society like women, traditional rulers, religious and political personalities. Once the list is approved by the Mediation and Security Council, these some of these “elders” may be called upon when needed to constitute a “council” to undertake such missions as might be assigned to them by the ECOWAS secretary-general. While the council held its inaugural meeting in 2001, it has not yet been employed to prevent or manage conflicts. However, even its existence, predicated on the use of the power of personal relationship and moral authority held by its individual members, is not only a recognition of these individuals, but also a shows the promise of adapting an approach to conflict resolution that builds on the traditional African respect for such “elder” figures. In fact, it might well be that, rather than awaiting the crisis to occur, there might also be cases where these “elders” could be employed in preventive diplomatic missions where the Mechanism’s early warning systems indicate developments that may lead to troubles.

African Union. The very fact that the African Union (AU) exists at all is itself an acknowledgement by African leaders that their countries needed a stronger institutional framework for common action than the old OAU. The AU’s Peace and Secu-
While noting that “the impoverishment of the African continent was accentuated (originally as the ‘New Africa Initiative’) by the 37th summit of the OAU in July 2001 for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD) strategic framework which was formally adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. While, once again, the Panel has yet to have the occasion to prove its mettle, its very existence represents a considerable shift from the jealous sovereignty of the Africa’s immediate post-independence period to a paradigm in which the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and stability are responsibilities which transcend political boundaries.

The same dynamic transnational co-responsibility found in the ECOWAS Council of Elders and the AU Panel of the Wise is also present in the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD) strategic framework which was formally adopted (originally as the “New Africa Initiative”) by the 37th summit of the OAU in July 2001.45 While noting that “the impoverishment of the African continent was accentuated primarily by the legacy of colonialism, the Cold War, [and] the workings of the international economic system,” the document also acknowledged the part played by “the inadequacies of and shortcomings in the policies pursued by many countries in the post-independence era” (para. 18). Consequently, with the increased democratization on the continent, NEPAD envisions greater African ownership of development since “the hopes of Africa’s peoples for a better life can no longer rest on the magnanimity of others” (para. 44).

NEPAD is governed by a Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) which meets every four months and is composed twenty countries, to make for three representatives per AU region. The AU chair and the chair of the AU Commission are also ex officio members of the HSGIC. The HSGIC is tasked with “identifying strategic issues that need to be researched, planned and managed at the continental level; setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards; and reviewing progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays” (para. 201), reporting annually to the AU summit, NEPAD ultimate governing authority. It is assisted in its work by a Secretariat, based in Pretoria, South Africa (para. 199).

The first HSGIC meeting in October 2001, “agreed that African leaders should set up parameters for good governance to guide their activities at both the political and economic levels. In this regard, it decided that, at its next meeting, it would consider and adopt an appropriate peer review mechanism and a code of conduct.”46 The next meeting, in March 2002, adopted the “African Peer Review Mechanism” (APRM) “as an instrument voluntarily acceded to by African members of the African Union for the purpose of self-monitoring” which “will foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional integration of the African continent.”47

The APRM is a voluntary mechanism open to all member states of the AU who deposit a memorandum of understanding with the NEPAD Secretariat, based in Midrand, South Africa, pledging adherence to the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance48 and undertaking to submit to and facilitate periodic peer reviews. Currently, twenty-five countries—almost half of the membership of the African Union—have signed on to the APRM.49 Although

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47 Communiqué Issued at the End of the Meeting of the Implementation Committee of Heads of State and Government on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (March 26, 2002).
48 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance (adopted June 18, 2002).
49 The twenty-five states are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Sao Tome and Principe has also indicated its willingness to accede, but there has not been a HSGIC meeting since that declaration to accept its memorandum of understanding.
there have been a number of technical and political difficulties with fully implementing the mechanism, the APRM stipulates that eighteen months after accession, a state party must submit to a “base review” with subsequent “periodic reviews” taking place every two to three years. States may also ask for a ‘requested review’ for their own reasons as well as be subjected to a ‘crisis review’ if signs of impending political or economic difficulties warrant. In general, the review process begins with a “self-assessment” covering democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. The questions were formally adopted in February 2004 by the first meeting of the African Peer Review Forum of states who are party to the APRM. The entire process is consultative, rather than punitive in nature.

While the committee of the heads of state is the final authority in the process, central to it is African Peer Review Panel of seven “eminent persons” of “high moral stature and demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism” who have “expertise in the areas of political governance, macro-economic management, public financial management and corporate governance.” Each country to be reviewed is assigned to one of these individuals, who considers and reviews reports, and, in consultation with his or her colleagues, makes recommendations to the APR Forum. The goal of this involved process is to arrive at a “Programme of Action” to be undertaken by the government that has been reviewed.

NEPAD/APRM and other nascent institutions like the Peace and Security Council of the African Union are works in progress and their intricate institutional structures are rather confusing, even to their own architects. However, despite these handicaps, they represent significant advances in governance on the African continent, reflective of both a will to transcend the difficulties of the colonial and independence eras and to advance along mutually-supportive path to a better future.

FINDING COMMON GROUND WITH AFRICANS AND WITH OURSELVES

Given what I outlined earlier, it is not surprising that the most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, a document which identified the international counterterrorism effort as the country’s top national security priority, affirmed that “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration.” However, the 2006 National Security Strategy also, quite appropriately in my judgment, went out of its way to state that “our security depends on partnering with Africans.”

I have already noted the significant achievements of the current administration with regard to assistance toward Africa, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the union of position of Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance with that of Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the person with the rank of Deputy Secretary of State. These initiatives build upon the foundation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), originally signed in the previous administration, which has created some significant openings for some African countries.

However, given the looming nature of the terrorist threat as well as the newly-recognized geostrategic importance of Africa, it is not surprising that the U.S. military has also taken the lead in America’s new engagement across the continent. To date, the largest commitment has been the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), a unit created by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in late 2002 and based since May 2003 at a former French Foreign Legion outpost in Djibouti, Camp Lemonier. The approximately 1,500 personnel from each branch of the U.S. military, American civilian employees, and coalition forces, who make up CJTF–HOA have as their mission “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region” of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan (as well as Yemen across the Gulf of Aden). CJTF–HOA pursues its objective of enhancing the long-term stability of its area of responsibility (AOR) by a combination of civil-military operations and supporting international governmental and non-governmental organizations, including advisors who have assisted the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The task force also undertakes more traditional military-to-military training and other collaborative efforts, including some which certainly enabled Ethiopian forces to launch

50 In practice, only base reviews have been conducted thus far.
53 Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), Fact Sheet (December 2006).
their offensive against the Somali Islamists last year. In certain exceptional circumstances when actionable intelligence was available, the physical proximity of CJTF–HOA to the frontlines has enabled the U.S. to quickly and directly engage against high-value terrorist targets, as was the case last January when an Air Force AC–130 gunship launched a strike against what was described as “principal al-Qaeda leadership” in southern Somalia54 or in June when the guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee shelled an al-Qaeda cell in the northern part of the country, killing six foreign terrorists.

At the same time CENTCOM was developing its Djibouti-based task force, the State Department launched a similar multilateral program, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from U.S. Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). As a follow-up to PSI, the State Department-funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was launched in 2005 with support from the Department of Defense’s Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF–TS). TSCTI added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the original four PSI countries. In addition to the Pentagon-led efforts, the Sahel countries have also received support from State Department programs—especially the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)—and other U.S. government agencies, including USAID and the Department of the Treasury.

These efforts in the Sahelian subregion have already borne fruit. For example, Amari Saı¨fi, a former Algerian army officer-turned-GSPC leader better known by his nom de guerre Alderrezak al-Para (“the paratrooper”) who was responsible for the daring 2003 kidnapping of thirty-two European tourists (they were ransomed for $6 million), was himself captured after an unprecedented chase involving personnel from seven countries who pursued him across the open deserts of Mali, Niger, and Chad the hunt was directed by U.S. Navy P–3C Orion long range surveillance aircraft; Saı¨fi now serves a life sentence in far-less-open confines of an Algerian prison.55

While United States has historically deployed naval forces to Africa only to rescue stranded expatriates—Commander Matthew Calbraith Perry’s Cape Verde-based transatlantic slave trade—interdicting Africa Squadron in the 1840s being a notable exception—EUCOM’s naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), has taken the lead in maritime engagement in the Gulf of Guinea. In late 2005, the dock landing ship USS Gunston Hall and the catamaran HSV–2 Swift conducted five weeks of joint drills with forces from several West African nations, including Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. In early 2006, the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land deployed to the region with some 1,400 sailors and Marines to boost maritime security and strengthen partnerships, calling on ports from Senegal to Angola. And last November, the Department of State and the Department of Defense co-sponsored a ministerial-level conference in Cotonou, Benin, on “Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea” which included representatives from eleven Gulf of Guinea countries as well as delegates from the U.S., Europe, Senegal, South Africa, the African Union, and regional and international organizations. This fall the USS Fort McHenry will be in the Gulf of Guinea on an extended six-month deployment as part of a multinational maritime-security-and-safety initiative that partners with West African countries to train teams from eleven African countries along to gulf, helping them to build their security capabilities, especially maritime domain awareness. NAVEUR’s commander, Admiral Henry G. “Harry” Ulrich III, has described the Fort McHenry’s mission, which he characterized as within “the spirit of AFRICOM and the initial operating capacity of AFRICOM,” as “the tipping point for us [which will] move this whole initiative of maritime safety and security ahead.”56

Targeted grants from the State Department’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program have also been effective in building the capacities of America’s African partners. During the 2007 fiscal year alone, some 1,400 African military officers and personnel are expected to receive professional development at U.S. military schools and other training assistance at the cost of some $15.6 mil-

56 Gerry J. Gilmore, “U.S. Naval Forces Prepare for AFRICOM Stand Up,” American Forces Press Service (June 1, 2007).
lion.57 On a significantly broader scale, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which in 2004 subsumed the Clinton administration’s Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as well as the Bush administration’s earlier Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA), aims at training and equipping 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations on the continent by 2010.58 The five-year, $660 million GPOI program is especially important not only because of the general reluctance of the American public to deployment of troops to conflict situations in Africa absent explicit threats to U.S. interests, but also because it responds to Africans’ aspirations to capacity-build their own emergent continental and regional peace and security institutions.59

Despite these not insignificant achievements, until the February 6 announcement of the creation of AFRICOM, U.S. efforts in Africa was handicapped by an antiquated structural framework inherited from times when the continent was barely factored into America’s strategic calculus. For defense planning purposes, most of Africa—forty-two of the continent’s fifty-three countries60—fell under the aegis of the EUCOM, with the balance part of CENTCOM’s AOR.61 or even that of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).62 With new command slated to embrace all of Africa except Egypt, which will remain with CENTCOM, it is expected that, as EUCOM commander Army General Bantz Craddock noted in his Senate confirmation hearing last year, AFRICOM “would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement.”63

The progressive establishment of AFRICOM—a transition team currently operating out of EUCOM facilities in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany, and headed by Rear Admiral Robert Moeller (who was nominated last week for promotion to vice admiral and assignment as AFRICOM’s deputy for military operations) is turning the sub-unified command into a stand-alone command even as Defense Department officials continue to look for permanent headquarters as well as sub-component bases, some or all possibly in Africa—represents the latest step in the evolution of the delicately-balanced geopolitical framework that the United States has carefully constructed in the wake of 9/11 to achieve its national objectives on an African continent that is increasingly of great strategic importance.

On the other hand, just as the humanitarian-only approach to Africa was insufficient, so, too, will a purely military approach. The National Security Strategy of 2002 correctly observed that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing states.” It is the latter that have given rise to the “ungoverned spaces” where terrorists can find safe haven just as it will be the same which ultimately threaten the country’s energy security via the vulnerability of West African supplies, particularly those in volatile Nigeria.64 Thus the Pentagon has designated “stability operations”—defined as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions” with the short-term goal of providing the local populace with security, essential services, and meeting its humanitarian needs and the long-term objective of helping to “develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society”—as a “core U.S. military mission” which ought to “be given priority com-

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60 In Africa, EUCOM’s AOR embraced Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in addition some fifty Eurasian countries.
61 CENTCOM’s African AOR included Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the waters of the Red Sea and the western portions of the Indian Ocean not covered by U.S. PACOM.
62 U.S. PACOM’s African AOR included Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, as well as the waters of the Indian Ocean, excluding those north of 5° S and west of 68° E (which were in CENTCOM’s AOR) and those west of 42° E (which were part of EUCOM’s AOR).
63 Bantz J. Craddock, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services (September 19, 2006).
parable to combat operations." While traditional "hard power" operations remain a responsibility of the combatant command, the implication is clear that "soft power" instruments, including diplomatic outreach, political persuasion, and economic programs, are also part of the package alongside military preparedness and intelligence operations.

As a result, both policymakers and defense and regional experts expect that AFRICOM will pursue more extensive interagency cooperation with the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies, than other regional combatant commands. In addition to the military deputy commander in the chain of command, as I understand it, there will be a civilian deputy commander responsible for cooperation with the various agencies, with the first deputy commander will come from the State Department with the position rotating among the civilian agencies working with the command. As Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry has noted, AFRICOM will "be a Department of Defense organization . . . it would be compromised of members across the interagency," hence the "exact organizational structure would be probably be evolutionary and adapt over time."

Since this is the first time that the Defense Department has structured a unified command with an interagency perspective, he noted that it "would explore different ways to do the operating both within the U.S. government and perhaps participation from other governments." 66

**AVOIDING PITFALLS AND BUILDING A LONG-TERM PARTNERSHIP**

The establishment of a unified combatant command for Africa offers many advantages not only for the advancement of the strategic interests of the United States, but also for the needs of Africa as African leaders themselves have articulated them.

Allow me to illustrate by focusing on the African Union’s vision of an African Standby Force to deal with the myriad of security crises affecting the continent. While the desire to assume responsibility is quite palpable, the effort has thus far been haphazard to put it charitably, with focus and resources often diverted to more immediate concerns to the detriment of both the proximate and the long-term. The shortcomings of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), especially those of the peacekeepers in Darfur, are well-known to the members of this Subcommittee. I myself have been rather unsparing in my criticism of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), where only Uganda has lived up to its commitment to dispatch peacekeepers while other countries—some with significantly greater resources—have disgraced themselves with excuse after excuse for not deploying. 67 At the very least AFRICOM would bring focused attention to the need to support Africans’ vision of a Standby Force, removing some of the institutional obstacles that have previously hindered efforts to engage consistently with African partners. Hopefully, the new command would also bring greater financial resources to assist in African capacity-building and perhaps more uniformed personnel to collaborate in training missions and other similar activities.

No one—or at least no informed person whom I am aware of—is talking about any significant deployment of personnel, military or civilian, to Africa. Certainly combat troops are out of the question, even if the elements of our Total Force were not already considerably stretched by our commitments elsewhere. The vision, rather, is that of an integration, an employment of military capability to support other elements of national power to achieve the key policy objectives of enhancing U.S.-Africa strategic partnerships, encouraging democratic transitions and strengthening good governance institutions, supporting regional security capacity-building, and, where possible, providing humanitarian relief and development assistance. To achieve these objectives, however, several issues have to be addressed in addition to the obvious funding and other resource issues:

**Perceptions.** First, there is the matter of how AFRICOM is perceived by Africans. While the heyday of the type of pan-Africanism dreamed by African independence leaders like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah has come and gone, a continental perspective nonetheless does resonate with African states which do tend to see themselves, at least in interactions with non-African powers, as African. Consequently, it behooves U.S. foreign policy to engage those same countries on the basis of that collective identity. The case needs to be consistently made by both the political leaders and

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military personnel that a unified command focused on the entire continent will be better positioned to coherently address uniquely African challenges and support local efforts to bolster the operational capacities of African states, including those of the African Union and subregional organizations like ECOWAS.

Furthermore, unfortunately the post-colonial African experience has been heavily scarred by the role that African militaries have played in their countries politics. A few years ago, my colleague Professor Peter Schraeder tabulated a total of 257 coup attempts since the beginning of independence with an approximate success rate of 23 percent.68

While some African countries have welcomed the announcement of the new command—Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has even offered national territory to host the AFRICOM headquarters69—others have been demonstrably less enthusiastic. For example, South African Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota did not respond to a request from the U.S. Embassy to meet with General Ward when the latter was in Johannesburg recently to attend a seminar hosted by the Brenthurst Foundation, an African nongovernmental organization that works on policy and economic development.70 In these cases, the reasons for the welcome (or lack thereof) have to be subject to the same scrutiny whereby any question of international relations can be examined and the explanation can generally be found in the impact that the entrance of an outside power into the theatre has the relative position of the country in question: correctly or incorrectly, smaller countries will tend to view the new command as a potential hedge against the aspirations of their larger neighbors to regional hegemony, while larger nations may conversely come to view AFRICOM as a potential obstacle to those ambitions.

It is also important that we recall that “Africa assesses the issue of transnational terrorism in terms of its own security interests.”71 Some Africans recall the colonial and/or apartheid eras when their national liberation struggles were labeled “terrorist.” Other Africans fear the possibility that partnering with the United States will make them more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Still others wonder whether we speak the same language when we address these security concerns. The problem often begins with something as basic as the definition of terrorism. Most African states are parties to the former Organization of African Unity’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism which defines “terrorism” as:

Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or to abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create a general insurrection in a State.72

In contrast, American priorities in the war on terrorism are informed by Title 22, Section 2656 f (d), of the U.S. Code which defines “terrorism” as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually with the goal of influencing an audience, while “international terrorism” is defined as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country and a “terrorist group” is any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. That the U.S. has a different understanding of the definition of “terrorism” than many members of the African Union becomes evident when many incidents in Africa go unreported in official, semi-official, and other American documentation. The practical re-

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72 Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (adopted July 14, 1999), art. 1 §3 (a).
result of the divergence between the two definitions of terrorism is eloquently illustrated, for example, in the U.S. State Department’s Congressionally-mandated Patterns of Global Terrorism report. The 2003 report, published in April 2004, identified 190 terrorist attacks worldwide, only four of which were located in Africa. Ignored were the literally thousands of terrorist acts perpetrated against civilian targets by substate actors in Congo, Liberia, Sudan, and Uganda. Likewise the National Counterterrorism Center’s report of “significant” incidents the following year noted only nine terrorist episodes in Africa out a total of 651 worldwide during 2004. I need not belabor the point that there are very real consequences to these “legal” distinctions.

While some of the institutional realities of relations between states pursuing what their leaders perceive as their self-interests as well as some of the ideological currents present in Africa will mean that we can never hope to garner unanimous consent to the establishment of AFRICOM, a more thoughtful effort at strategic communications cannot but help influence public opinion favorably. The 2002 National Security Strategy very correctly emphasized that helping weak states achieve security and development—their own goals—indirectly served our interests. That document’s specific pledge to Africans needs to be emphasized:

Promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity.

Dialogue is thus very important. I know that Principal Deputy Undersecretary Henry and other Pentagon officials as well as their State Department counterparts have recently been to a number of pivotal African countries—including Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal—to explain AFRICOM. In addition to United States officials, it would behoove us to also consider using public diplomacy initiatives to send unofficial Americans who both know Africa and appreciate the contribution that AFRICOM can make to engage with their African counterparts who are the opinion leaders in their respective countries. Of course we would do well to let wise and experienced African voices like that of Liberia’s “Madam President” be heard:

U.S. and foreign skeptics of AFRICOM have pointed to concerns that previous military engagements on the continent have often led to the disproportionate development of the military over instruments of civilian rule, or they see AFRICOM as a naked American attempt to gain greater access to and control of regional resources. But we all must acknowledge that security and development are inextricably linked. There is no greater engine for development than a secure nation, and no better way build a secure nation than through building professional militaries and security forces that are responsible to civilian authorities who safeguard the rule of law and human rights . . . AFRICOM should be seen as the end-product of a significant strategic realignment a long time in the making—one where engagement with African nations is more than just a humanitarian cause . . . AFRICOM is undeniably about the projection of American interests—but this does not mean that it is to the exclusion of African ones.

Basing. In the end, I know of no other factor which may have as much influence on how AFRICOM is initially received as the decision concerning its basing. The selection of the site will have both positive and negative impacts on the new command’s strategic effect and will, in turn, dictate AFRICOM’s ability to influence and support the various elements of American national power in helping build a secure, stable, and prosperous African continent. Given the larger perspective of the history of colonialism and its still deleterious consequences, including those having to do with perceptions, as well as the practical question of infrastructure and security, I would counsel the basing of the command

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73 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (April 2004), 177.
74 National Counterterrorism Center, A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004 (April 27, 2005), 81.
headquarters in the United States, with a forward, mobile headquarters deployed as needed. This option would afford maximum operational flexibility, while avoiding the negative consequences of opening ourselves to accusations of neo-colonialism and militarization. In this scenario, sub-components may, of course, be based on the continent in support of African initiatives, for example, a training mission working in partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre in Accra might well indeed be based in Ghana.

Novus modus operandi. The mission of AFRICOM will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies. The challenges that the new command will confront will be quite different from those its homologues face in other theatres. And this goes beyond resolving the always vexing "interagency" conundrum.

First, quite simply, given demands on personnel in other fronts in the war on terrorism, other than the modest Djibouti-based CJTF–HOA and perhaps some of the U.S. Army Special Forces elements from the Special Operations Command Europe who have been doing capacity-building work with Sahelian militaries as part of Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans Sahara, AFRICOM is likely to get few military personnel of its own to deploy.

Second, a lot of AFRICOM’s work will likely involve "stability operations." These involve skill sets and capabilities which are difficult enough to find in government in general, much less in a conventional military whose primary mission was and is to win wars. On the other hand, as African militaries themselves move away from defending undemocratic regimes against their own people and toward defending their country’s nascent democratic institutions, we need to both conceptualize anew the security sector on the continent and be open to encouraging new roles such as those in the military-development nexus, because without security Africa cannot develop.

Third, we will want to privilege what the military might term a “non-kinetic approach to achieving operational effects”—that is, what those of us in the civilian sector would call "knowledge-based capabilities." AFRICOM would benefit immensely from finding the appropriate mechanisms to tap into the extraordinary wealth of knowledge that exists among academic and other experts who have invested lifetimes in understanding Africa and the vast pool of experience of those who have given years of service in religious, humanitarian, and other nongovernmental organizations in Africa as well as the cultural and personal knowledge of African diaspora communities in the United States. While many of these individuals may be hesitant of becoming involved with military and other official institutions, this does not mean that constructive partnerships cannot be constructed with academia and other civil society institutions; it just means the effort must be more than perfunctory.

Consideration therefore needs to be given to the role that civilians and contractors—whom the Quadrennial Defense Review last year appropriately included in the calculus of America’s “Total Force”—will play in AFRICOM. While I fully appreciate the controversy which this suggestion may provoke, I am also convinced that if we are serious about creativity and innovation—that is, if we believe that the Africa Command will make a difference precisely because it will be different from our other unified combatant commands—then nothing should be off the table.

CONCLUSION

The new American security framework for Africa is still taking shape. This means we have a historical opportunity to partner with the region in a meaningful way—if we get the terms of the engagement right. However, it is already evident that the challenges we, Americans and Africans, face together neither lend themselves to quick fixes nor promise all that many immediate results. Rather, they demand for a steady approach and sustained commitment to the pursuit of long-term strategic objectives which will secure legitimate U.S. national interests as well as advance the interests of our African partners—irrespective of transitions in administration, shifts of economic indicators, or changes to international or national perceptions of priorities. Given the high stakes involved, nothing less should be expected.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you and all of the witnesses for the very thorough testimony that we have received.

Dr. Pham, in your testimony you state that AFRICOM would remove some of the institutional barriers that have obstructed efforts to engage with African partners on establishing the Africa Union’s proposal for a Standby Force.

Could you tell me what barriers you are referring to and how will the new command help to eliminate those barriers?

Mr. PHAM. If I can cite an example, as the African Peace and Security Council and the African Stability Force, most of those discussions take place, as you know, in Addis Ababa, the seat of the African Union, which to date has been under the area of responsibility of the Central Command, and we all know what Central Command’s primary fixation or responsibility is at the moment. It gets very short shift. Most of Africa has been under the AOR of the European Command, but they don’t go to Addis.

Then, of course, our efforts in the Southwest Indian Ocean have been led by PACOM. It is a matter of just organization, bringing it together and having a partner that can speak to the entire union as opposed to a partner located in Addis who might speak to the Africa Union, but really can only speak for nine countries here.

I participate in conferences, some sponsored by the Department of Defense, where often times it is not just our African partners who are present who haven’t encountered each other; it is U.S. personnel from separate commands with very similar briefs that would be better worked as one individual instead of the maritime person in maritime domain awareness for CENTCOM versus the same individual for EUCOM versus the same individual for PACOM.

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Let me ask this. As I indicated and you have just pointed out since you know these military commands very well, the separation of the three commands really was not in the best interest of the stated goals. But wouldn’t you think that if we were, the United States, the Bush administration, interested in having a better command wouldn’t it have been more prudent to leave everything the way it was until that command could—it might have taken a little more time, but we are talking about long term—unify it so that whatever you are doing currently could be done in a uniform fashion?

What is happening now is that you have the command changing its focus, as it says it is, because the Cold War is gone, so are unifying the command, which as a matter of fact I thought 10 years ago, 15 years ago would make sense to be under one command.

However, I didn’t mean USAID and everything else fall under the military, which is what appears to be the focus, so I think one big blunder in my opinion, although our representative said she thought they did a great job, it seems that they were doing two steps bringing them together, which I think makes sense, but bringing it together and changing the focus tremendously, making it appear to be everything is under the military. Which I think is a serious mistake.

I just wonder what you think about that being a one step phase rather than taking a little bit more time in Phase 1 bringing it together and then explaining this is our new mission that we would like to do.
Mr. PHAM. I think that although I have not seen it anywhere stated explicitly, and this will come out I suspect in September when the Senate meets on the confirmation of General Ward to head AFRICOM.

The idea is that AFRICOM will be stood up as a subordinate command the beginning of the new fiscal year and thus the military responsibilities that were with CENTCOM and PACOM would be transferred, so that is the first step as you mentioned.

And then in 1 year, and this is my personal opinion. One year is a very ambitious 1 year. I am not privy to the details that Ms. Whelan is privy to obviously. I find that a very ambitious timetable that in 1 year they will not only assume the responsibilities for those additional countries, but then engage in this transformative exercise.

I think we are going to encounter in reality, and this is an academic speculation, more of a works in progress. We will formally have an independent unified command October 1, 2008, but it will actually be sometime beyond that before we achieve what you described as the second step.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. I just will conclude with you in that in my opinion, and you have mentioned Somalia and the fact that only Ugandans have sent a small contingent of peacekeepers. The whole manner in which Somalia was handled was a disaster in the first place.

The United States had a policy that it supported in the U.N. that there could be no armament brought in to Somalia. Of course, there is nothing but arms in Somalia, but the U.N. said that there is an arms embargo, and the AU had an interest in sending in the AU forces to Somalia 2 years ago, but because the United States would not relinquish its hold in the Security Council about weapons being brought into Somalia the AU could not go into Somalia with a peacekeeping mission. That is a little point that the U.S. does not mention, but it was the main point that kept peacekeepers out.

Finally the U.S. did relinquish and allowed the sanctions to be withdrawn on weapons and that is when Uganda was invited to come in, but what happened in the meantime? The U.S. supported the warlords against the Islamic Courts Union. The Islamic Courts Union defeated the warlords.

Then the United States invited the Ethiopians to come in. They used AWACS to bring in the air force. They used gunboats from outside. The people of Somalia had no security for 15 years. The Islamic Courts Union came in and did only one thing, which was to get the warlords off the streets and therefore the schools could open up and the airport open up and the seaport open up and the piracy ended.

However, the U.S. decided that there were some al-Qaeda people in Somalia and that we should go after them. Now, we should go after them. But al-Qaeda didn't arrive in Somalia when the Islamic Courts Union took over. ICU was only in charge for 4 months. If al-Qaeda was there, it was there for the last 10 years. The same warlords were in charge. If we wanted to clean them out, we should have cleaned them out 10 years ago, but let's not blame the current Islamic Courts Union for being harborers of al-Qaeda.
The policy makes no sense and creates, in my opinion, the dilemma that we find ourselves in. Now Ethiopia is in an Iraq-type situation. They are having casualties. Uganda is in the middle. How are you going to be a peacekeeping force when you have an army of occupation there?

It is the most confused situation that we have ever seen and so it has really nothing to do necessarily, because I guess if there was AFRICOM if you have a messed up policy it would be messed up with AFRICOM or no AFRICOM, but there really has to be a review of some of the situations that are created unnecessarily.

Why have an arms embargo when everybody has arms and people want to go in to be peacekeepers, but they can’t go in because they can’t bring in weapons? You know, in Bermuda they don’t have guns, you know, but they wear Bermuda shorts in the police department. That is not Somalia. I mean, it is a big difference.

Some of these policies just make no sense. I will yield to Mr. Smith, but I do want to ask Dr. Okumu and also Mr. Shillinger some questions after my colleague has an opportunity to have a round.

Mr. S M I T H O F N E W J E R S E Y. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just a couple of things to put on the table.

America is sometimes accused of trying to be the world’s policeman, and we are damned if we do and damned if we don’t. We have seen this time and again. I was in Srebrenitza just a month ago. I had raised the issue of the U.N.’s lack of meaningful engagement first in Croatia, then in Bosnia, in Vukovar and other places that were under siege at the time and had raised the issue of what UNPROFOR was doing in Srebrenitza.

I raised this for a reason. I was there when they, just like I said, were remembering with great sadness the fact that 8,000 people were separated under the umbrella of UNPROFOR in a safe haven town called Srebrenitza and the men aged 16 and older were separated and killed. The international community kind of looked the other way.

You might recall, Mr. Chairman, when Elie Wiesel looked at President Clinton and said, “Do something, Mr. President.” We were standing by while the U.N. fiddled and people were slaughtered.

I mention it because Dr. Okumu mentions the slaughter that occurred in Rwanda, and I remember both you and I, Mr. Chairman, and I was chairman of the Human Rights Committee at the time, raised over and over again the fact that people were about to be—and we all recall the famous General DeLair fax that went to the U.N. headquarters of Kofi Annan, and his staff did not act on what looked like an impending mass murder, and it turned out to be a genocide in Rwanda.

The U.S. certainly shares some of that complicity. The U.N. I think shares a greater burden because when we act unilaterally we are cowboys. Why is America doing that? And yet we had contemporaneous information at the time and certainly shortly thereafter because the killing fields continued for quite a bit of time thereafter, that this was going on, and again very little, if nothing, was done.
My hearings were held looking at refugees. Why wouldn’t we allow any of these people at least the opportunity of a third country placement here in the United States? Why were we not providing assistance to these individuals that needed it so badly?

When I read your statement, Dr. Okumu, that many Africans are asking why American troops were not deployed to prevent or restrain the Rwanda genocide, we asked those same questions at the time, but we also had the U.N. saying we will handle it. We have a U.N. peacekeeping force deployed in Rwanda, as they said in the Balkans, particularly in this U.N. safe haven like Srebrenitza. Again, I was just there a couple of weeks ago.

So it does raise a question about us sharing or getting disproportionate blame. Again, when we are the policeman people complain about that. Many of my constituents, and I am sure Don Payne’s as well, sometimes send a confusing message about what they want us to do.

We are trying through many of the President’s initiatives to mitigate and hopefully alleviate this health crisis that is shared by not just the Africans, but other continents as well, but Africa disproportionately when it comes to AIDS. I think it is having a great impact.

In your testimony, Mr. Okumu, you say carry on with your commitments. We are trying. We are pouring money hand over fist because we care about the disadvantaged African or anyone else in any country or in our own individual districts who might be suffering from disease or from poverty. I mention all this because we get mixed signals sometimes and the record has been somewhat checkered.

When I look at your statement, Dr. Okumu, you mention that there needs to be an exit strategy. If I understand AFRICOM correctly, and correct me if I am wrong, it is all about war prevention as the Assistant Secretary for Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, said today, not war fighting.

I think, Dr. Pham, you have an interesting idea of where it gets cited, and maybe it should be cited here. It takes the contention out of it. This is not something that the Beijing Government would contemplate if they had CENTCOM and other regional commands.

I mean, the United States really does try. Maybe we fail and maybe we fail miserably, but we do try when we deploy our young men and women to preserve a peace, enforce one if one doesn’t exist and then get the hell out of there as soon as we can.

We did it in Japan, although we are still not completely out because of North Korea and other problems, and we have done it throughout Europe, including Germany, even though they face a threat and wanted us there, which is why NATO exists.

On the other hand we get blamed for not doing something. I don’t see this as a militarization of the United States-African relations at all, not if it is carried through as war prevention, not war fighting, with the humanitarian component as well, but I think your words are words of caution and we need to be looking at that.

Maybe you could, Doctor, just enlighten us because again, I think you ask a lot of provocative questions that should not be dismissed. They need to be discussed. When you mention how almost all Afri-
can countries are reluctant to host AFRICOM, maybe for the sake of clarity and transparency, what countries are you talking about?

I asked that question about South Africa earlier, you might have heard, to the administration witnesses because I want to know: Where are we wanted? Where are we not? How far should we go?

This is an effort that has good intentions behind it. I hope it is not all about oil. I hope it is all about democracy and human rights protection, but maybe I am mistaken there as well.

What countries? If you could maybe give us some elaboration on that?

Mr. OKUMU. Thank you, Congressman, for those comments. I don't know whether you want me to react to most of them or the last question, but, first of all, let me point out that I think policemen do a quite admirable job. The point is when and how they react to situations where their protection is needed. I think I personally am very highly respectful of the work that American troops are doing around the world to promote peace and security. I don't have any problem with that.

On the question of the countries that are reluctant, to give you an idea we have 54 countries in Africa, and only one has come out openly and consistently to welcome the idea that they will be willing to host AFRICOM, so that means that 53 of the 54 countries on the continent are reluctant.

I can't tell you exactly because the team that has been coming around the continent to dialogue on this issue might be more privy to the more sensitive issues that have been shared with them on why these countries have been reluctant to host AFRICOM.

But, as I pointed out in my statement, the prevailing mood on the continent that the new peace and security agenda that Africa wants to set up will entail making Africa free from foreign forces. It also entails issues like non-aggression. It entails issues like conflict prevention. It entails issues like post conflict reconstruction.

All these issues the Africans see as embracing the agenda that when they allow AFRICOM to come in the way it has been presented will undermine this agenda that Africa has.

Mr. PAYNE. Dr. Pham?

Mr. PHAM. If I may just briefly, Congressman, make two brief points?

One is there is this kind of mythic notion out there in the African press that AFRICOM means this massive infusion of U.S. forces which, as we have heard already today, is not likely to be the case. I see in that a sort of insidious double standard. The African Peace and Security Council, for example, has never once issued one resolution or even a sense asking that, for example, the 8,000 French troops that are deployed across the continent, including in countries where the government would like them to leave, leave the continent, so I think there is a double standard there at play that we should recognize. It does not give us carte blanche, but we should recognize that that is there.

The other interesting phenomena, again generalizing a bit, it is interesting that the opposition to AFRICOM as expressed in the print media has come largely from elite media in large countries rather than general media in small countries.
I find that interesting because who would most lose in the balance of power subregionally would be the larger countries which can now essentially aspire to regional homogenies, so it is very interesting that you find this is certain Nigerian press, certain Kenyan press, certain South African press.

You don't find it in press of other countries where you get a more cautious, maybe this might be helpful to have a balance in the region, so it is an interesting phenomenon and we have to be sensitive to the larger countries, but we also have to realize that they may have ulterior motives as well.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on that, I recall when the United States, when President Clinton, decided to start the African Crisis Response Initiative. He tried that, and I remember that the African countries wondered what the interest was.

As a matter of fact, even on the first trip that President Clinton took I was privileged to be on that trip. It was six countries, 12 days, to Rwanda. They forced him to go to Rwanda because all of the people around him said we can’t go to Rwanda. It is not safe. This is not safe. It wasn’t safe before. It is safe now.

Had we gone there when we should have it probably would even be a whole different picture, but it was those advisors who advised him not to go, the same ones that advised him not to pay homage to the tragedy that happened.

But anyway, my point was that the French were there. They had the French Foreign Legion. They would go into countries. The British would go in. When the United States that had no real interest in Africa decided all of a sudden that we are going to give attention to it there was a lot of skepticism of why now? Why are they to come in? What is the deal?

You are absolutely right. African countries sort of have not criticized or asked the French to leave Africa or Francophone Africa or the Brits when they came in, but that is because they have always done it.

The United States has actually, you know, until the Cold War ignored Africa. It did zero in Africa until we propped up the Mabutus and Savimbis and all of that and supported the apartheid government in South Africa because it was our strategic interest, but we were never there on the ground.

We were never there until President Bush did have the courage—Bush I—to go into Somalia to feed the children. That was how it began. I commend him. He didn’t ask anyone to go in like we are asking Bashir can we go into Sudan, into Darfur, and finally he says well, I guess we will let you come in around December.

It is ridiculous that we let a person who is killing his own people tell us what to do. When can we come in? Call next year. We will give you an answer. You can’t go in in 2006. Call in 2007.

I have never heard of anything like it. Either you are going in, and I am not a war person, but in instances where up to 400,000 people have been slaughtered, we are asking the killer if we can come in. That is like asking the bank robber can the police come in the bank to arrest them. They say no. No, not yet. We haven’t gotten all the money. I mean, it is absolutely insane some of the policies that happen.
I believe, and I have asked the Africans why they had no problem with the foreign people and it was because, like I said, they were there. We understood it. They have been there for 100 years. All of a sudden you are coming. What is the plan?

I would have been interested too in asking the assistant from the Defense Department what countries have said yes, you know. I thought it maybe was Las Vegas. She said what is said in a country stays in a country. She wasn’t going to tell us which one they said would be able to host us.

I think that we really have to rethink this. I wonder, Dr. Okumu. Could you once again tell us what do you think could be done to change the acceptability or at least have some real consideration for this AFRICOM?

Mr. OKUMU. That is a difficult question because it will need a little bit of technical savvy of our continent.

From my own understanding, the issues that I raised with you concern the perceptions that the Africans have over the U.S. Government. They don’t trust the present administration.

A lot of countries’ governments and media and civil society, they think they are reading some hidden agenda in this whole initiative so I think there is a need to conceptualize and maybe have a different salesperson selling the idea on the continent. Also, the kind of engagement that is taking place is not across the board. It is not broad enough to include people who are opinion leaders on the continent.

There are a number of other things that could be done. For example, the African Union engagement has been very limited to the bureaucrats in the African Commission, but, as you know, the African Union is composed of 18 organs. We have the Pan African Parliament, which is located here in South Africa. We also have the decision making body of the African Union like the Executive Council or the Parliamentary Representative Committee or the Assembly. These are bodies that make the decisions. They could be included. Even the Peace and Security Council.

I hope the next delegation when it comes to the ideas they will go to the African Union and request to make a presentation to the Peace and Security Council and sell this idea how it will complement the work that the Peace and Security Council hopes to undertake in terms of promoting peace and security on the continent.

Also the other players that are very important. For example, we have what we call regional economic communities who have also set up the various mechanisms to address the issues that AFRICOM hopes to achieve. These should also be engaged. Most importantly, the African civil society should also be brought on board and be encouraged to be stakeholders in this initiative.

These are some of the things that I would recommend besides the ones in my written statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shillinger, you pointed out that several of our counterterrorism programs are disproportionately military in nature and so I just wonder.

Do you have any recommendations about how the imbalance can be corrected, or given that AFRICOM is a military command is there any possible way that it can avoid the same imbalance? If
not, what steps can be taken by other agencies to mitigate this imbalance?

Mr. SHILLINGER. Thank you, Chairman. I think that that was primarily a condition of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative resulting from the fact that this was a first attempt to try to bring this holistic, multi-agency approach to a problem in North Africa and West Africa, and the Pentagon was so far out front on it that we could sort of watch the State Department and USAID and Justice kind of scrambling to get their footing there. I think that was primarily the reason for this imbalance.

We have more models now looking around the world in the last few years that attempt to bring more coherence between security and developmental initiatives. The Trans-Saharan Initiative is one. I mentioned earlier the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, which attempt to province-by-province provide an infrastructure for developmental programs with military protection and facilitation.

I am not altogether convinced, however, that that model is really appropriate for Africa and so with AFRICOM the best guarantee against a repeat of the imbalance that we have seen with the Trans-Saharan Initiative is that the other agencies really get involved now at the inception stages and clarify what their individual roles will be.

Listening to the previous panel, I am still left with uncertainties as to the direct relationship between the Pentagon and USAID and how it is that USAID can have one foot in the door and yet remain outside the ambit of a military command.

Those questions, if they are confusing to us here in this room, I think will be even more confusing to African societies that will receive these types of arrangements.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Unfortunately we have a few minutes before the vote I think. She will switch the clock so that we can see.

Mr. Smith, do you have any additional questions?

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. No, but I do think it needs to be made clear that AFRICOM is not a new USAID post. I mean, the work in each of the missions, I think they have tried—and I have read everything I can get my hands on—to ensure that the diplomatic posts, our missions abroad, will remain the preeminent formers of foreign policy. It will not be the military command. They will not shape policy.

I think where the military becomes crucial, if not indispensable, is when there is a disaster, manmade or war inflicted, where you need to get and deploy humanitarian medicines and the like quickly and you need logistical capability, and certainly a military command excels at that.

Then, like I said earlier, and I think you perhaps were here, Provide Comfort, when the Kurds were fleeing from Saddam Hussein, was a textbook example of how the military did it and then got out of the way so the NGOs could do the further work that they do so well.

I am not sure there is that much lack of clarity, but maybe there is and we need to stay attentive to it. It is lessons learned, and I think Ms. Whelan made that point earlier. They are gleaning les-
sons from virtually everything that has happened years to date and trying to incorporate it into this model. I think that is a good idea.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

I really appreciate everyone coming. I think that the military does have a role. There is no question about it, and I think that, as the ranking member said, they have capabilities where we don't have.

As a matter of fact, in the floods in Mozambique South Africa used its air capacity to fly up and assist in that. Even in the elections in the DRC they finally got the voting pads up and the ballots up to the remote parts of the eastern part of the Congo, but then after the vote was over they had a difficult time getting them back because it took a long time for them to get there and no one thought about how quickly can we get them back because the longer they stay in remote areas maybe they could be tampered with or get lost and so forth.

Once again, South Africa assisted the Democratic Republic of the Congo by flying up to remote areas and assisted in that election. That is another example of how a country can help with its military in a humanitarian issue.

But with this new phase that just appears to countries in Africa and also to me to some degree that it is a military phase that seems to be in this new AFRICOM, which, like I said, I supported the concept initially. However, I didn't know that there were changes on the way to this unification.

I am sure there will be some additional hearings on it. I really appreciate it. All three of you had excellent testimony, and I thank you all.

The meeting will stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 6:03 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this important hearing, and for your ongoing leadership on issues pertaining to Africa. I would also like to thank the Ranking Member, and to welcome our six distinguished witnesses: the Honorable Michael E. Hess, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development; the Honorable Stephen D. Mull, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Ms. Theresa M. Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense; Mr. Kurt Shillinger, Research Fellow, Security and Terrorism in Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs; Dr. Wafula Okumu, Director, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa; and Dr. J. Peter Pham, Director, Nelson Institute for International & Public Affairs, James Madison University. I look forward to your informative testimony.

For too long, Africa has been neglected by U.S. policymakers. For too long, we have turned a blind eye to important developments, both positive and negative, on the African continent. This lack of focus is seen in all aspects of U.S. policy, including defense calculations. Currently, the Department of Defense (DoD) splits command responsibilities for Africa between three different geographic commands, based in Germany, Florida, and Hawaii.

However, in February of this year, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a sixth geographic command. The new Africa Command (AFRICOM), will cover U.S. military responsibilities for the African continent. It is estimated that AFRICOM will have initial operating capacity in October 2007, and be fully operational the following year. Army General William E. “Kip” Ward has been nominated to serve as AFRICOM’s first commander. A wide range of operations responsibilities will fall under the new AFRICOM. These may include humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, sanctions enforcement, demining, non-combatant evacuations, and maritime interdiction operations.

Mr. Chairman, we have many years of inaction to make up for in Africa. In the past two decades alone, we have seen numerous tragedies unfold, in Rwanda, in Somalia, and now in Sudan, without taking decisive and concerted action. It is also hoped that, by centralizing the command for operations in Africa, we can better coordinate the efforts both within the Department of Defense, and with other agencies, including the Department of State, USAID, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and others, as well as with other governments, like those of Britain and France, which are also providing training and assistance for African security forces.

I am particularly pleased to see that one of AFRICOM’s main functions will be to build the indigenous capacity of African defense forces. As we are seeing in the current tragic situation in Darfur, African Union peacekeepers are bravely willing to risk their lives to solve serious problems on the African continent. However, they lack the capacity to do so effectively. I have spoken to the courageous AU peacekeepers in Chad and Sudan, and they are in desperate need of support. It would be my sincere hope that U.S. engagement, through AFRICOM, would help expand the capabilities of African troops.

However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that we must go about directing our attention to Africa in the best possible way. I am concerned about reports of regional apprehension, from Africans, about this new U.S. initiative. To address the concerns of the people in African nations, we must first be sure that we are truly listening to
these apprehensions. Our new presence in Africa must not be seen as another wave of colonialism, it must not be seen as an attempt to secure access to African oil, and it must be made clear that future U.S. involvement on the continent will be sustained, rather than sporadic. These are serious and very real concerns that must be thoroughly addressed.

Reactions from many African governments have been more positive. Many have cited the potential for increased resources, training, and assistance stemming from increased U.S. focus on Africa. Particular support has come from Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who has announced that the Liberian government would welcome the opportunity to host AFRICOM facilities. I am pleased to learn that the DOD and State Department officials involved in the creation of AFRICOM consulted with African nations, and I would strongly encourage an expansion of this dialogue as the Command is established. I believe that AFRICOM will be most effective if U.S. leaders can effectively engage with their counterparts in African nations.

Mr. Chairman, AFRICOM does have an immense potential to bring the increased resources, training, and assistance cited by African leaders, like President Sirleaf, as the possible benefits of this new initiative. But it also has the ability to degenerate into a U.S. colonial outpost, more interested in competing with China for oil interests in Africa than pursuing the broader security objectives, including humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, which fall under its purview. It is up to us in Washington, in Congress and in the Administration, to ensure that this does not happen.

I hope that this hearing is only the first in a series of Congressional efforts to exercise oversight over the process of establishing Africa Command. While I strongly welcome Africa becoming increasingly central to American policy and strategic objectives, I would like to emphasize that we will not make up for years of neglect by pushing only our own interests in the African continent. I look to AFRICOM as an opportunity that we must all work together to make the most of, for the people of the United States and of Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.