

**DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE STATE OF THE
TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP**

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DEAL OR NO DEAL: THE STATE OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Lantos (chairman of the committee) Presiding.

Chairman LANTOS. The committee will come to order.

For decades during the Cold War, the United States and Europe had a steadfast alliance with a palpable purpose. We stood shoulder to shoulder to stave off the menace of the Soviet Union. The relationship was seemingly unbreakable because communism represented an existential threat to the very foundations of human freedom. But now, without that unifying force, the trans-atlantic alliance has become tattered like a flag that has weathered one too many hurricanes.

The United States is partly to blame with our my-way-or-the-highway approach. But the Europeans are also at fault because often they leave us doing the heavy lifting. Young men and women from New York and San Francisco and Ames, Iowa, are daily giving their lives in defense of freedom while their counterparts in Bonn and Paris stroll the avenues admiring Europe's great prosperity.

The wealth and security enjoyed by Europe today is a direct result of the American security umbrella granted Europe after World War II. But instead of doing their part to keep this umbrella upright, Europe continues to rely on our shelter.

The military spending of all of its countries combined is dwarfed by U.S. military spending. And so the trans-atlantic relationship has gone off course, adrift in competing priorities and missed opportunities.

A case in point: Last week, at the close of the G-8 summit, leaders of the world's most powerful countries strolled confidently across a sprawling bucolic lawn in Germany to hold a press conference only to deliver the contents of a hollow script.

The G-8's tentative commitment to global warming had been watered down because the United States refused reasonable pollution targets offered by the Europeans. The G-8's commitment to renew our efforts to save Afghanistan did not bind European nations to any specific goals. The commitment to stop the horrendous regime in Iran from developing nuclear weapons was diluted beyond rec-

ognition, and there simply was no commitment to meaningful action to end the persecution and slaughter in Darfur.

All of these missed opportunities represent more than just items on a list. Between the risk to the environment and the risk to the freedom and security of people across the globe, the very health of the planet is at stake. The Europeans and the United States could not face a more dire and morally fraught agenda.

Americans and Europeans, working together, need to seize the opportunity to revitalize NATO, a revitalization process that begins in Afghanistan. A NATO victory there would be a lifeline for the future of the alliance, proof of NATO's continued relevance in the post-Cold War world.

Our friends in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have bravely let their troops be placed in harm's way for the sake of NATO's all-important mission in Afghanistan. But some other European nations must live up to their convictions by following suit rather than ducking the front lines.

If French and German soldiers aren't willing to serve on the front lines, Afghanistan could devolve once again into a state sponsored launching pad for terror. And so it symbolizes another opportunity for the trans-atlantic alliance to lead in wiping out the scourge of global terrorism.

Since the September 11th attacks, the United States and the European Union have embarked on a massive effort to crack down on terror groups. But if the collaboration is going to work, it is imperative that the EU and the U.S. solve our significant differences on extradition, information sharing, visa waivers and other things.

If we are serious about cracking down on rogue regimes, the Europeans need to do much more on Iran. Ahmadinejad's abhorrent reign represents the most destabilizing existential security threat on the globe today. The European Union and the United States must jointly enact powerful sanctions that prevent anyone from doing business with Iran's energy sector. But many individual European nations have clearly decided it is more important to make money by doing business with Iran than to recognize its threat to our society. Shame on them.

Our joint world leadership with the Europeans should not end with the battle against authoritarian state sponsors of terror. It must extend to regions where freedom itself is suppressed. That is why the EU must exert its influence on Russia not to block a U.N. Security Council resolution putting Kosova on a path to independence. The people of that war-torn region have lived a nightmare, and they deserve their freedom.

Freedoms are being suppressed to an alarming extent in the former Soviet domain under Russian President Putin. I am deeply concerned by Putin's pattern of abuse and suppression of dissidents, independent journalists and, in fact, anyone who opposes him.

Europe cannot shrink from this issue. They and we must seize the opportunity to confront Putin head on by condemning his more barbaric practices while working with him on issues like North Korea and Iran. It is in this spirit that, next week, our committee will meet with its counterparts in the Russian Duma in a first-ever open session, a groundbreaking opportunity to discuss the most

weighty matters of mutual interest in full view of the public, the issues that divide us and the areas of common ground.

Two days ago, I gave a speech at the dedication of a memorial just a few blocks from here to remember victims of communism and the role played in bringing the Cold War to an end. We can no more let a society such as Russia slip back into that repressive nightmare than permit others to force on the world their own brand of totalitarianism through terror.

In the last century, we bravely wiped out Nazism and communism. The challenges today are no less daunting. This is the time to right the ship of trans-atlantic relations and to give it new direction. All the opportunities we have missed in recent years yield new challenges in the years ahead.

In this century we must renew the great trans-atlantic alliance and more purposefully turn its efforts toward fighting terrorism, opposing oppression and halting global warming. We cannot afford to miss any more opportunities.

It is now my pleasure to turn to my colleague, the distinguished ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, to make any opening remarks she wishes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. As always, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing and I am also pleased to join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our distinguished panelist, former Secretary of State Eagleburger, to our committee this morning.

Since the end of the Cold War 15 years ago, and the removal of the threat of Soviet invasion that has bound us so closely together, we have been waiting and watching to see how the relationship between the United States and Europe might change. We can see that the European countries are undergoing significant changes. That is going to have a very significant and important impact on our relationship with the individual countries.

Right now, of course, we have a change in leadership taking place in France, with the election of the new President, and in Britain, where Tony Blair will soon be stepping down and be succeeded as prime minister by Gordon Brown. And this follows the rise of Angela Merkel to the office of chancellor in Germany as well as the change in leadership post in Italy. Also, in Poland, there have been changes in the foreign and domestic posts and the people who head those, the famous brothers in Poland.

These leadership changes in some of the most important states of Europe are taking place against the backdrop of more fundamental political economic and demographic changes. The rapid expansion of the European Union over the past decade has apparently led to a sort of "Euro fatigue" among many Western Europeans, as demonstrated by the refusal of the French and Dutch voters to approve the proposed Constitution for the EU.

And within the EU, there has long been a sense of concern among its many member states over the leading roles that France and Germany have played within that organization. The relationship of France and Germany within the EU is also undergoing change with Germany entering a new foreign policy phase, now more willing to take the political lead within Europe that it has long ceded to France.

As Germany now seeks to revive the drive to adopt an EU Constitution of some sort, critical questions for EU members remain. How much more of their sovereignty are they willing to cede to the EU? What greater role will the EU have in formulating foreign policy on behalf of all of its members? And in much of the EU, large minority communities have taken root and present Europe with a challenge of assimilation that it has not yet mastered.

And, finally, many of the leading European states are saddled with expensive social welfare programs that weigh down economic growth, despite the influence in Europe of some of the world's most advanced industries. With this and much more taking place within Europe, and with somewhat unpredictable political trends further to the east in Ukraine and perhaps Russia, with the question of the status of Kosova still unresolved and with the feeling of authoritarian movement alive and well in Belarus and Russia, the United States must find a way to maintain the strength of our trans-atlantic relationship in order to ensure European cooperation on issues that concern us mutually: Global security, stability and the future of democracy.

We continue, of course, to seek to underline a new mission for the NATO alliance that goes beyond Europe to support collective security in places like Afghanistan and perhaps in strife-torn African regions, but we are also searching for ways to ensure that the leading states of Europe see the necessity to vigorously stand up to specific challenges that now confront us. We have an Iran that is clearly seeking nuclear weapons. With such weapons, it might well achieve its goal of regional domination and drive other states to acquire their own nuclear capabilities to offset this aggression. The United States is moving forward with a program of defense against missiles that might be launched by rogue regimes such as Iran, but it is not yet clear where some of the leading European states stand on such efforts.

We have a peace process in the Middle East that can either move in a constructive way or end up supporting terrorist elements. And the U.S. and the EU need to work in coordination with each other to support those who are committed to peaceful coexistence, to security and to freedom.

These are but a few of the many issues that comprise the ever-evolving trans-atlantic relationship. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our esteemed witness, a good friend of our committee, on this and other issues that comprise this ever-evolving relationship with our friends across the Atlantic.

Thank you, as always, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee, would you like to make an opening statement?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I first want to thank the witness for his presence and certainly for his service, to acknowledge my chairman and ranking member for being kindly responsive to the ever-moving and ever-changing dynamics of the full world order. This question, I believe, is a prime and important question because the United States has always counted its alliance with Europe and the European, if you will, diplomatic entities, whether it is NATO,

it is the European Parliament or other bilateral organizations, as a strong component of her foreign policy.

I am reminded of a visit that a number of us as Members of Congress made in the 1990s to then Chancellor Kohl. We walked into the room and expected a greeting in the beginning of some long discussions, and he asked as we walked in without a moment to sit down, "Where have you been?" Meaning, where has the United States been in its attention to Europe?

So I believe the questions of Afghanistan, the Iraq war, the attitudes that have plagued us, as it relates to Europe, do we listen to them, are key to us moving forward. And if we are to have alliances that will be helpful, not only to us, Europe and the United States, but to the world, I think we have to understand whether we have a frayed relationship or whether or not we have one that is a little bit ill but can be repaired, and I think now is the time to address that question.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.

Mr. Miller?

Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Eagleburger, certainly welcome to the committee. I would be very interested in—before I say that, however, I want to give you a compliment because I watch you often on the news shows, and you bring a rather interesting and very thoughtful perspective. And I certainly enjoy your appearances.

I would be very interested in your observations and thoughts on just what the Russians are up to, especially in terms of Iran. Giving an example, no sooner than we sent our ships off the shores of Iran, somewhat saber rattling by the Bush administration, an interesting thing happened in Russia. They consummated a deal with \$750 million for air defense mechanisms for Iran. I would like to get your thoughts on that.

Also I would like to get your thoughts on the situation and the downward pressures being placed on NATO as a result of some of our NATO friends being concerned in their countries and wanting to pull out their participation in Afghanistan because of the United States' involvement in Iraq, and specifically Italy.

Back in February, if you remember, the Italian Government basically collapsed, and the reason they collapsed were two things involving the Americans. One, they opposed the extension of a military base up in northern Italy; and secondly, because they were concerned about getting their troops out of Afghanistan as a way of protesting against the United States' involvement in Iraq. I would be very interested in your comments on those situations.

And, finally, the situation in Eastern Europe along the Russian border, particularly countries like Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia, these countries basically are living in a blackmail atmosphere with Russia pulling off their gas, pulling off their electricity or whatever. I would like to get your thoughts on that. And the situation in Belarus and the fear that especially in Lithuania they have because there are constrictions on how much military Lithuanians can have but not on what Belarus can have. I would be very interested in your comments on those.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

And, Mr. Chairman, let me just note that much of my own consciousness about what we should expect from our European friends has come from some of the statements that you have made and some of the indications when we have had meetings with our friends from Europe, some of the points that you have made to them and their response to those points.

Very quickly, there are reasons to, you know, be happy that people in Europe are our friends, and certainly there are some people, like the Poles and others in what was known as Eastern Europe who are now pulling their own weight. But generally, it is upsetting to me, and I think upsetting to the American people, that Europeans who criticize us so frequently are not pulling their own weight and making the contributions that would be commensurate with the amount of criticism they are willing to give us.

And I understand especially, again from questions that you have brought up in these hearings, that even the commitments that they have made, for example in rebuilding, much less trying to put their people in harm's way and using their military, they haven't even met their rebuilding commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Well, I would hope that our European friends get the message. And maybe they have. The people of France seem to have elected someone now who is not virulently anti-American, and maybe that is a good sign. And I would hope that that friendship that we have would be a true partnership instead of just a partnership where they get to criticize but not pull their own weight.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Tancredo?

Mr. TANCREDO. No comments.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Poe?

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, I, too, am concerned about the fact that the Europeans seem to be, in many cases, very self-righteous about their condemnation of the United States across the board in many areas, yet they don't provide answers to the problems. Iran is one of those; Darfur is another one of those. And hopefully we can find some common ground where the United States, being the superpower, constantly gets the criticism from the Europeans, but if we were to bail out of these issues, what would they do, if anything? And I think the time has come for Europeans, as my colleague Mr. Rohrabacher has said, to pull their own weight on world issues besides being the constant cynical critic of the United States and our foreign policy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you.

Mr. Royce?

Mr. ROYCE. No opening statement, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Boozman?

Mr. BOOZMAN. No, thank you.

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey?

Ms. WOOLSEY. No thank you.

Chairman LANTOS. I am particularly delighted to welcome today one of our most preeminent statesmen, diplomats and security experts, my good friend, Secretary Eagleburger.

Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger served the United States with great distinction as Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of State. He began his distinguished public service career almost five decades ago. He served in some of the most important diplomatic positions of our country. He shaped policy at some of the most crucial moments of the Cold War. He invariably presented his case with a degree of urbanity and wit and colorful language that has made him certainly my favorite witness and the favorite witness of many Members of Congress.

I have used your example, Secretary Eagleburger, every time we have a new Cabinet level officer appearing, and I told them that they have one of two options: Give us bureaucratese or testify the way Larry Eagleburger testifies. Because if we get bureaucratese, there won't be any audience. But if it is a Larry Eagleburger-type testimony, we will all be here with great attention.

I am grateful for your appearance. The floor is yours, and we are anxious to listen.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON HOLOCAUST ERA INSURANCE CLAIMS

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not sure I need to say much because I have heard enough just listening to all of you to say that most of what you said I agree with completely, and maybe I can just repeat some of it, and then we can all go home.

But, seriously, there is very little that I have heard here today that I disagree with, and I am not even sure there is anything much I disagree with.

But, Mr. Chairman, there is an apocryphal story about Machiavelli when he was dying.

Chairman LANTOS. I remember well that episode.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am one upped again.

But anyway, he was dying, and they got a priest of the church to come and give him the last rites. And the priest stood over the deathbed and said, "My son, my son, do you repent of your sins and renounce the devil?" And there was no answer. So he asked three or four more times. No answer. Finally, in great frustration, he said, "I ask you for the last time, do you repent of your sins and renounce the devil?" And Machiavelli looked up and said: "This is no time to make new enemies."

My point is, I hope I will not make any new enemies today, but I am going to say some things that I suspect will not go over well with everybody.

In my judgment, Mr. Chairman, we, the United States, are in a mess internationally. A mess that is to some degree at least of our own making. And it obviously relates at least to some degree to Iraq. I don't intend to spend a great deal of time talking about Iraq, but rather, the way in which we got there and what has happened since has, I think legitimately to some degree, at least given our European allies reason to be unhappy with us.

Now, that is not to say—and I agree with everything that was said here—this is not to say that the Europeans have done their duties. They have not. But we walked into Iraq in ways that could have used a good bit more in the way of consultation before we did it.

I don't recall any time in most of my sentient life that I think we have been in more trouble than we are now, not in a wartime sense of it but in terms of, if you think about it, Korea was difficult; Vietnam was difficult. In both cases, we came out of it after having gone into, in both cases, gone in without understanding what it was that we were doing or all of the permutations of what we were going to be facing when we went there. But that is frankly, I think that is in spades as far as Iraq is concerned.

I do not believe—I don't believe that we had any serious contingency planning in case what we attempted to do did not work. And I think we have found ourselves in a situation in Iraq that need not have happened quite the way it has, at a minimum.

And I spent some time on the Iraq Study Group recently, so I think I learned from things there that in fact upset me a good bit as I saw them revealed.

Now having said that, we now, I think, to a great degree find ourselves unable to do what clearly is going to be necessary for the United States in the course of the next few years with the instabilities that we see and the instabilities that are going to increase. One of the things that we clearly are going to need is an ability to bring our allies to face with us some of the most serious problems we face. And I am not sure we are in a position to do that now.

For example, and the one that I find most disturbing constantly and yet I find very little in the way of serious discussion about it, and that is the future of nuclear weapons. Okay, we all talk about it. We and our allies have concerted on it in many cases. And I think only the United States has really represented to anybody how serious we think that problem is, but we are not getting much support. But I would suggest to you that if we don't get this as a serious issue on our agenda soon, a generation from now at a minimum—maximum is going to look at us or at our history one of these days, and they are going to say, where the hell were you when this was all developing the way it has been, and when it is no longer containable at all because too many people, both countries and terrorist groups, will probably have possession of some of these weapons.

This is, as far as I am concerned, at least probably the most serious threat that faces us and the civilized world in the course of the next decade or two, and I do not find us doing much about it.

Now there are a number of people in the United States, including Secretary Schultz and others, who have spent a great deal of time talking about it and arguing about the need to eliminate all nuclear weapons. I respect him for this. It is not going to work. We are not going to be able to convince nuclear powers or nonnuclear powers that are aspiring to those weapons; we are not going to be able to convince them to give this up. The only way I think at least that this as an issue is going to be able to be contained is if the United States in the lead is able over time to convince the nuclear

states, including—I almost said the Soviet Union—including Russia and others, that there has to be an international consortium of these states to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to be able to face nuclear—potential nuclear states, such as Iran and North Korea, with the threat of the use of force if necessary. But it will have to be by concert. It will have to be a clear consensus on the part of all of those who want to prevent this from becoming the real danger that it is in the process of becoming. And that can only come about if the United States is in the lead in trying to convince other nations of the dangers of this. But we have to be in a position when we try to get others to agree with us to recognize that we are at the moment not terribly popular around the world, and part of it at least is our own making, not all of it by any means, and certainly the Europeans have not done their duty.

And by the way, I have to compliment you on your comments about the Germans and the French. If the Germans want to complain about you being uncivilized about all of this, you might suggest that they take a look at what their previous chancellor said about President Bush and about the United States. And I would not be upset about their being unhappy about what you said, because what you said was correct.

And it is about time that countries—I think, by the way, that the French elections are a real breath of fresh air. I think for the very first time in a long time, we are probably seeing a man as the President of the French Republic who will in fact be far more reasonable and far more balanced than Mr. Chirac was and will not be on the take as Mr. Chirac was, if I may say so. And I think he is going to be a breath of fresh air.

One of the good things we are seeing in Western Europe right now, the changes in leadership are moving in the right direction. Merkel in Germany; I think Brown will be a repeat more or less of Tony Blair. So I think, in those three countries at least, in Western Europe, we are seeing either a continuation of good support to us, as in the British case, or in the German and French cases, hopefully we are going to see a reversal of some of the less-than-friendly relationships developed with those two countries over the course of the last few years.

Chairman LANTOS. It has not escaped your attention, Mr. Secretary, that the new French President is of Hungarian origin.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I was going to comment on that, but then I decided I would leave it to you. And he is also handsome by the way. He is a very good-looking fellow.

One of the things that most impresses me out of the mess—and I think it is a mess that we are now in—is the degree to which we seem to fail too often to understand the culture of the countries we are dealing with. I am going to name two now because I lived in one of them, namely Yugoslavia. And you will notice that, in both cases, when Tito fell and when Saddam fell, the countries came apart. And I am not excusing either one; although the Tito dictatorship was a far more benign one in his last years than Saddam ever was. But the fact of the matter is, one of the things we have been, as we proceed in the course of trying to deal with some of these human rights issues, for example, is that while they have to be

dealt with, we have to be careful how we do it so that we don't create a greater instability in the process of trying to correct the problems that are there.

And I can only tell you that, in both cases, and the Yugoslav one is very close to me, that I thought I understood their culture. I did not ever expect the murderous events that took place. I am not saying it is easy to do, to understand these people. But on the other hand, it seems to me we should have been able to recognize that the Sunnis and the Shia do have some problems with each other and have had them for some centuries. And under those circumstances, I would have expected that we would not have been quite so off put, if I may say it, by trying now to sort out the relationship between those two sects.

That leads me, by the way, to another concern I have, and again, everything I am trying to talk about here this morning is in the context of issues that cannot be settled unilaterally. Every single one of them is going to require, in most cases, the leadership of the United States but in concert with our traditional European allies who have flunked the test over the course of the last few years.

But what does that require on our part? It requires more than anything else a little—a lot more patience and a lot more effort to consult with them and convince them of our beliefs and the things that are facing all of us. And certainly, for example the nuclear issues, they are not an issue that is only a threat to the United States. That ought to be able to be seen in Western Europe, and they talk about it, but I don't think they are prepared to do much. I think that this country and this President are in fact prepared to do more. But the fact of the matter is, he is talking to a bunch of allies who, for a number of reasons, have become relatively deaf. And some of those reasons are our cause, not their own.

There are some other issues, and some of these were raised. For example, where are we with the Russians? And what do we face with the Russians? Here, again, there is a need for concerted action on the part of a number of the countries of the West if we are going to succeed in dealing with what I think is potentially a serious increase in the evidence of Putin's desire to increasingly not only pursue a more independent course but a course that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States. We are coming back into that situation again. And his attempt to deal with us on the question of the missile defense issues, for example, in Eastern Europe, his suggestions, although they sound reasonable, every single one of them means that if we follow them, the missile defense program in Eastern Europe is useless. We can argue whether we should have a program in Eastern Europe or not; I think we should. But at the same time, we need to understand what Mr. Putin is doing when he tries to roadblock it.

And I should say, in that regard, I think, by the way—and I don't think everybody here is going to agree with me—but given the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, I personally believe that the United States has a great interest in pursuing the question of a missile defense for itself. I don't think we can sit back and watch the development of these nuclear weapons on the part of others, North Korea and Iran certainly in the future, and not expect that one of the ways in which we can defend ourselves against

those developments is by building our own missile defense. I know there is a lot of argument about whether it can ever work or not. I think, from what I read at least, with some effort and with the expenditure of some money, yes, we can make it work.

I think there are just several I will briefly touch on, and then I will be happy to try to answer questions. But I think we have to face the fact, and I know nobody likes to talk about this, but I think we are in the process of seeing the development of an Islamic terrorist movement that is going to expand, that is going to build on the religion. That is not to say that I believe that every Muslim is a terrorist, but it is to say that they are becoming increasingly organized. They almost certainly are getting support in broad measure from Iran. And indeed, I am afraid that we are going to see, to some degree, increasing support on the part of the Russians for at least some of those terrorist groups.

And it seems to me relatively evident that this is another issue that cannot be dealt with unilaterally. We have an obligation, to put it mildly, to do what we can to reverse the trends of the last few years in which we were increasingly not listened to by our allies, and increasingly, we were, to some degree at least, at fault for that. That is again not to excuse the Europeans, but it is to say that it is not solely their fault.

I could go on with a long list. Every single one of these issues can only be dealt with multilaterally. The Middle East, Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah, any place you want to talk to about in the Middle East itself, China; they all are going to require, at least to some degree, concerted action if we are going to be prepared to maintain the kinds of security that has been the case in the past. But now in a far more immature, far more unstable world, it is going to be absolutely essential. And if we can't get it through our heads that we are going to spend the next several decades in a world that is increasingly unstable no matter what we do, we are going to miss the most—single most important historic fact that we face today and it cannot be dealt with unilaterally. And I will stop there, I guess.

Chairman LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your very perceptive and very important comments.

We begin with Ms. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for sharing your insights with us. As we know, when you were talking about the missile defense system, the President of Russia has put out a proposal to remove his opposition to our putting—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is a phony. It is a phony.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, I wanted to catch your impression, and I think you are giving it. Please continue.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think the whole proposal, if you take a look at it, it essentially moves the defense system away from where it now is, and when you look through, it may defend Kamchatka, but it will not defend much else. It is a totally phony approach.

I think there is a legitimate argument over whether we should build a missile defense to defend Western Europe or not. I personally think that we should. But I can see a legitimate argument

whether that is something that we should do. But for Mr. Putin to play this game and make it sound like he is being reasonable, he is not being reasonable at all. And I think everybody is going to see through it; I hope anyway.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

You talked this morning about the rise of radical Islam. Do you think that Europe is waking up to the realization that it is right within its borders that this movement being susceptible to radical propaganda and the Wahhabi school of radical thought, and preaching is slowly taking roots everywhere? Do you think that Europe is dealing with this issue?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, Ma'am, I don't. I think they are slowly waking up. That I will accept. When the—in the French case here 6 months or so ago, they were burning automobiles in the streets and so forth; you can't help but wake up a little bit to it. But what I have not seen in any case is any commitment to try to do anything about it.

And by the way, again, one of the failures in the European case, and the French are a classic case; they haven't given these younger Muslim men and women—particularly men—jobs. They haven't done anything to try to bring them into the society. Not that they often want to come into the society, but the French have largely tried to ignore the problem and put them off in a ghetto somewhere. That is, in fact, the case to some degree in the United Kingdom as well. So it breeds on itself. And I am afraid they have not yet really awakened to the threat that is increasingly going to be theirs.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, just one last question about Russia with its threatening behavior, with it trying to monopolize the gas supplies, the attempt to cut off the gas supplies to Ukraine, the intimidating tactic that it has used in Estonia and in Georgia, et cetera. What do you think that the response should be from the trans-atlantic community, from the U.S., from the EU? Should we work together in trying to mitigate this threat? And the refusal of Russian troops, for example, to leave Moldova, there is such a long list of the kind of aggressive in-your-face tactics of the President of Russia.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Of course, the answer is, we ought to try to work together to mitigate it. But the question then becomes, what does that mean? And more important—more important I think is, we need to understand something that I think we have kind of lost sight of. I at least am convinced that when the Soviet Union collapsed, there were a number of people sitting in what was the politburo and now is something else who from the very beginning saw the need—they thought—to begin to bring the fallen away republics back into what was the Soviet Union, into Russia proper.

Now I don't think that is or was an across-the-board idea, but I do think that there are still some in Moscow who have something of this view left. I think in fact, frankly, that Mr. Putin may. But under any circumstances, what he is demonstrating now is a classic Russian approach to dealing with people who don't agree with you. And what he is doing is using the economic levers he has to pressure the Baltic States and now Ukraine, the whole range, pres-

sure them to behave themselves, I guess, is the proper way to put it. The only way I could see to deal with that in any meaningful way is to make it clear through relationships we have with—for example, when the President went to Bulgaria or even to Albania where I think the whole population came out to cheer him because they had never seen a President before, but anyway by doing what we can to keep the relationship with the Eastern Europeans—which by the way, by and large, have a much better attitude toward the United States right now than do their Western European neighbors, and why? Because they know perfectly well who it is that brought the Iron Curtain down. And it seems to me that the way you deal with the Putin kind of blackmail, if you will, is, one, you maintain as close a relationship with these countries economically, by the way, not just politically, economically, as you can. And over time, it becomes obvious that he is not going to succeed.

But if we don't pay attention to the economic pressures he can put on and try where we can to ameliorate those pressures over time, he is going to succeed. So these Eastern European countries have to understand that we are ready to help them when we can.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Brad Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Secretary. You spoke in your opening remarks about what you saw as the need for a European missile defense system. That system appears to be—or our research appears to produce unreliable results at a very, very expensive cost.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You are talking about the missile?

Mr. MILLER. The missile defense system. I am the chair of the Investigative Oversight Subcommittee of the Committee on Science and Technology. And the Bush administration was preparing to close a laboratory that did radiation testing that had—the total cost was \$7 million or \$10 million a year. It already had the technology, not widely deployed, but already had the technology that could spot a dirty bomb in a truck and was developing technology to detect a nuclear weapon in the hull of a ship. And yet the Bush administration was prepared to close the laboratory. When I think of the likely threats against the United States, the likelihood of a missile launched from the soil of another nation seems unlikely. And in relationship to the likely cost of trying to develop anything remotely reliable and how far in the future that is versus the priority of trying to detect a dirty bomb or a nuclear weapon in the hull of a ship, how do you balance those priorities?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, and you have made some good points. And I did caution that this is assuming you can make the system work to begin with. And I know it will cost a lot of money if you can do that.

My point and it all focuses on back on this question of what happens over the course of the next decade or two on the development of nuclear weapons. And what concerns me is, unless you believe that the danger is going to be because somebody puts a nuclear weapon in the hull of a ship and sails it into New York harbor, which by the way is a possibility, but if you believe that there is at least a potential serious question of whether somebody may be able, over a period of time, to launch these weapons, and Korea

would be one example of someone who might—it is not going to take care of the terrorists either, by the way; I understand that. But unless you think that is not a very serious danger, I think it is worth investing the money.

Now the question then becomes, is there any way to prevent—back it up—I am not now talking about the danger of a terrorist group that gets a weapon somewhere and one way or another get its into the country. Missile systems certainly won't do any good there. But if you believe, as I do, that if we don't get serious about stopping the proliferation, that now we have walked away from North Korea—they clearly are going to do it. They have done it. They have lied to us for a decade over it at least. I have no doubt whatsoever that the Iranians are going to try to do the same thing and will probably succeed. My point is, I worry a lot about—ignoring is too strong a term—I worry a lot about putting this question of what happens to the development of nuclear weapons in countries sort of on the back burner and not doing everything we can do to prevent it. And under those circumstances, I think, since I am worried that a number of these countries are going to, over time, develop these weapons, then I think that the missile system, assuming it can be made to work—and I am not at all sure I care too much about how much it costs if it can be made to work—under those circumstances, then I think it would be a good idea.

I am cautious about how I put this forward, other than to say, it seems to me that the issue of the missile defense and the issue of the future of nuclear weapons development and how the world deals with that issue are in fact to some degree linked. And I don't argue with you at all. It will cost a lot of money. And the most serious beginning question is: Can it be made to work at all? And I think I suspect you and I have a different view. I think, over time, they can be. But I am not the expert on it. I am only parroting what I have heard from others.

Chairman LANTOS. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, nice to see you again.

Let me just note that I do have a disagreement with my colleague, who is my friend and colleague and my chairman of the oversight subcommittee there in Science. I just say that the fact that you have maniacs in charge of Iran and you have got nut cases in charge of North Korea, and there may be—you can never rule out that such radical folks will not come to power in Pakistan, it is very prudent for us to be developing a system that might be able to shoot down a missile that might be shot from one of those countries at either us or a country that would be friendly to us. That only seems to be a prudent course of action. Not to say that that has to eliminate the development of technology for chips that can determine if there is a dirty bomb in a ship or not. But that seems very prudent to me.

However, let me disagree with you, Mr. Secretary, about analyzing Mr. Putin's position. Let me just say that I disagree with many of my colleagues about the nature of Mr. Putin. I think that Putin is doing what he should be doing, and that is championing the interests of the people of Russia. We should not expect him to do anything else. I mean, that is what his job is; and I think that

he has done—frankly, I think he has done a good job in bringing some order to Russia, ending the looting that was going on, foreign looting of his company.

And Americans were involved in the looting of his country at a time when we had basically pushed them into the collapse of communism, which was the right thing to do, of course. But then I believe that we did not follow a moral course in preventing our own people from coming in there and exploiting the chaos that followed the fall of communism in a way that was very detrimental to the Russians.

Should we blame Putin for using his economic leverage in order to promote the interests of Russia? We do that. Countries around the world do that. They use their economic leverages for what they think is in the interest of their country.

And if he shuts off—if he says, we are going to shut off gas to you unless you are doing it, I do not understand the great upheaval, uproar about a leader of his country doing that. He is not a tyrant in the sense that—yes, there has been some retrogression, but nowhere near what has been going on in China and some of these other countries of the world in which we don't seem to have this same outrage.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. If I may, in the first place, you are absolutely correct that if he is doing what he thinks is best for Russia that is what he is paid to do. That doesn't mean, however, that we don't have a right and an obligation to point out where these activities of his threaten our interests and take steps to try to prevent them from threatening our interests; and I don't think you would argue with that either.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. He is, in fact, and has done a number of good things as far as Russia is concerned, particularly in the earlier years. I think he did, in fact, correct much of the—collapse is the wrong term—but the instabilities that came in the latter period of Yeltsin.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Chaos.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Absolutely, and very dangerous therefore. So, in fact, he deserves a good bit of credit for that. But, at the same time, I am afraid I think that what we have seen over the course of the last year or 2 is the beginnings of a more confrontational approach to the U.S.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me, Mr. Secretary, just note this.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Number one, first of all, Putin's position on missile defense may well be putting forward a negotiating position rather than a final position, which would just suggest that Russia wants to be included in missile defense rather than excluded, which is, by the way, what Ronald Reagan proposed originally. I was there in the White House. I remember talking to Ronald Reagan about it personally, and that was Ronald Reagan's idea. You know, we should have no fear of missile defense. Putin, by making his demand, wants to be included rather than excluded.

Plus what you are suggesting right now about maybe some retrenching going, maybe he is moving in the wrong direction, and I think we should hold his feet to the fire in terms of human rights.

But can we blame Mr. Putin and the Russian leadership for that when we haven't even granted most favored nation status to Russia?

After giving up its empire, after giving up communism, we haven't granted most favored nation status to Russia, but yet in China, who has all of these evils in terms of the way they are involved with—number one, external threats, there is threats from China externally, but their human rights abuses. They are the biggest human rights abuser on the planet. They are the ones who have an expansionary policy, or at least a threatening policy to their neighbors. We grant them most favored nation status, and we don't do it to Russia after they have gone through all of this reform and given up their empire. Can you blame Putin then for trying to get tough?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Congressman, I have clearly been away from Washington for too long, because I never thought I would hear you say anything nice about Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is right.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I know it. And I remember from an earlier time when you were—I wouldn't have heard those same words out of your mouth.

But, by the way, I have to believe that fundamentally you are correct. Certainly you can't blame him for it. You can't blame, you know—hell, you can't blame anybody that runs his country well, even if it is antagonistic to us. Blame is the wrong term.

But certainly you have to keep track of what it is they are doing. And if in their excellence, if you will, they also are threatening our security one way or another, or the security of the people we hope are going to be our allies again someday, then you have to at least be prepared to take steps about it.

And I don't think the people I heard here today were blaming him for it. They were in fact I suspect, if you would parse their thinking on it, they would also have been saying, yes, he has been too good. He has been too capable.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We need Russia on our side, and China is a greater threat today than Russia was even back then.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I would like both of them on our side. It may take a while, but we will get there.

Chairman LANTOS. Ms. Woolsey.

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Eagleburger, thank you so much for being here. Okay.

Let us say you are the Secretary of State again.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That will never happen again. Don't worry about it. I saw everybody's faces turn white here.

Ms. WOOLSEY. No, they didn't.

In your opinion, what does the United States need to do to earn international respect to be the leaders that we ought to be? I mean, not just—I mean, yes, indeed we have to be multilateral and reach out. What examples should we be setting on nuclear nonproliferation, et cetera, and what is our role in this world as the most powerful nation in trying to find a way for peaceful solutions instead of having to have solutions that relate to guns and bombs?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. The first thing we have to do—and you just said it. The first thing we have do is understand that just be-

cause we are the most powerful nation in the world doesn't necessarily mean much any more. Because our power, at least in the military sense, is not particularly useful against people who are hiding in the mountains and so forth.

So let us not be in fact, one—and I admit to being one of those who fell for it. I was convinced, to put it bluntly, that we would go into Iraq, and we would be through with it in about 2 months, and that would be the end of it. And if we had been fighting a normal war—well, we did. We got them out, got Saddam out of there in a hurry; and you may have noticed we are still there.

That is the whole point here is it is a different world, and power and U.S. power is now a different sort of a thing. At least it needs to be. And one of the things it needs to be, again, is an example to the rest of the world not only that we are powerful but that we listen to others.

And I am sorry, ladies and gentlemen, I know when I say this—and I have said it all myself—I get so frustrated with the Europeans particularly, because they don't snap to anymore, for one thing. Remember, in the old days when they had the Soviet Union sitting on their doorstep that tended to focus their minds a bit more than it does now.

But my point here again is the United States needs to understand—and I am sorry to say this, I can't tell you how sorry I am to say it—we have lost the respect not just of some of the leadership in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe, but amongst the people. All you have to do is travel there and watch it and see it sometimes.

And we made some mistakes. That is not to absolve others of having made mistakes. But we became too unilateral, if you will. And there are some—I am going to say this and I shouldn't I guess, but there are some very senior members of this administration who consciously didn't care. And I have to tell you if I voted Democrat my hand would wither. So I am not saying something that I pleasantly want to say, but it is true. And it is going to take us a long time, if we are not careful, at least, to reverse that trend. And I could go on.

But if there is any single thing this country needs to do, it is to show the rest of the world that—two things—that we respect their views, even if we don't agree with them; and, secondly, if we have to, after having examined their views, if we then have to act unilaterally in our own security interests, we will do it. And that is where it gets tougher.

For example, as I say, I was on the Iraq Study Group, so I am one of those who suggested some moderation of things. But, at the same time, I think we all have to understand that when and if we leave Iraq—

Ms. WOOLSEY. If?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. On less than satisfactory terms, the consequences for our position in the world, more this time than Vietnam by a long shot, the consequences are something we are going to have to think about and face.

I am not trying to argue with anybody here, except if you don't agree with me that if we leave Iraq under difficult or wrong circumstances—"wrong" is the wrong word, but you know what I

mean. If we leave clearly having been defeated from beginning to end, if we leave Iraq under those circumstances we will not make up for that in terms of the views of the world and in terms of the threats in that part of the world for some period of time.

What am I trying to say? That we have to be far more concerned about the views of others; and we also have to recognize that, because we are the most powerful country in the world, there may come a time when we have to use that power, whether anyone else agrees with us or not. But I do not happen to believe we are even close to that right now. And I am not sure any of that answers your question, but it is the best I can do.

Mr. MILLER [presiding]. Secretary Eagleburger, I think you meant if I vote Democratic my hand would wither.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am sorry. You are being too sensitive, Congressman.

Mr. MILLER. That is all right.

Mr. Tancredo.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It was not deliberate, believe me.

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Secretary, I just returned from a NATO PA meeting in Portugal, and we were talking—we talked a lot about, of course, NATO's commitment or lack thereof—over here, sir.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you. I was looking all over.

Mr. TANCREDO. That is all right.

We talked a lot about the fact that the NATO countries were not living up to their commitments in terms of building their own forces and the commitments that should be made to NATO and how much individual countries were spending on defense, as opposed to what they need to be spending on defense.

But one of the things that was peculiar that came out in this meeting was this drive for a European military of some sort, a military that would be under the direction of the European Parliament. This is I think a peculiar development, is—I guess what I would say in terms of here we are, on one hand, we can't get them to commit to a defense budget that would be satisfactory for the purpose of making their commitment to NATO; and, on the other hand, here they are talking about a European military that would certainly take away from resources available for NATO.

How serious do you think that is? And what do you think is the outcome of this European Parliament, the EU's attempts—I know that, of course, the Constitution failed. Germany is trying to get it started again, but we don't know how much—it doesn't look like they have got a lot of momentum behind it. But what do you think are the implications of the movement of European Union—the kind of evolution of a European Union from a purely economic organization to one that now has this political and maybe even military dimension in the European Parliament?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is not new, Congressman, in the sense that for many years, even during the worst days of the Cold War, and when I was involved in NATO, for example, there were certain Europeans who were always arguing that they ought to have a separate European military force committed to NATO, but separate. It never got anywhere for a number of reasons, not least of which was at that time they recognized the costs, and they also recognized that they got a much freer ride—

Mr. TANCREDO. On our coattails, yes.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. In the old system.

I think it is still there, and I think it is much more prevalent now in part because of the general feeling of dislike of the way we have gone of late.

But there is another much more fundamental thing, too, I think; and that is deep in their guts they have always resented to some degree or another—and when I say “they” that is much too broad a statement—some countries more than others, for example—but many have always regretted the fact that this upstart, the United States, is able to, because we are so powerful and they are not and because the Russians, the Soviets are such a threat that they have to toe the line and come along with us.

That certainly is the view in France, certainly going way back to de Gaulle and de Gaulle’s view that he was going to take them out of the military side of NATO, if for no other reason because of French glory. It was an emotional thing as well as maybe thought out.

The whole point is this is not new. It is much more prevalent today than I think it was. And, yes, it is contradictory, but they—once the Soviet Union collapsed, all sorts of things over time we should have expected, not least of which is increasingly the Russians, the Europeans, European side of NATO was going to want and has wanted more independence, less dependence on the United States until it gets tough. Then, believe me, it will change.

I mean, I happen to have the same view. We worry about the dollar because, you know, it is so overstrained and so forth and so on. I can assure you that the first time there is a serious threat to the economies of the West we will find all of those dollars coming back here. And that is because we are—even today, we are viewed as that safe house and—but they don’t like it, a lot of them don’t. And the more that the Soviet Union has drifted into the past, the more this view of a more independent Europe has become prevalent and given, as I have said, what I think we have done to our own reputation in Europe over the course of the last some years, is worse.

Now, will it ever take place? I don’t think so. Because it would be—I shouldn’t say “ever” take place, but not while I am around certainly. It is going to be a long time, because it would cost more, and because they don’t think the threat is there anymore.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary, thank you very much for being here. I really enjoy your comments, especially the levity of it.

I have a question about Kosova.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIRES. I have people in my office that this is not the right time for them to declare their independence. I have people in my office that this is the right time to do it. I am getting all sorts of visitors. Is there a right time or do you think it is going to make the situation worse in that part of Europe?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am going to give you two answers.

I think it is a lousy time, because I don't think—on the one hand, I don't think we or any other country or any international organization has a right to carve somebody else's country up.

Now, having said that, yes, they should do it. I mean, if you think about this in terms of the precedent it sets, you want the U.N. Running around deciding that someday they are going to take Xinjiang out of the People's Republic of China? I mean, it is unheard of in a sense.

But, at the same time, this has now—and I have spent 7 years in Yugoslavia, including I was there when Tito died. So I think I know the area. And there is no way it can be contained. It will be a bloody mess if they don't make it independent. And it is a terrible thing to do, but there is no choice. I am sorry. I think as a matter of principal it is the wrong thing to do. Someday someone is going to come and say—is there anybody here from the State of Maine? I think I can safely say somebody comes up and says we are going to take Maine away from you. Come on. It is not the sort of thing that countries do to each other except for after a war. But I see no way to do anything else with it because the Kosovars have beaten the Serbs badly already, and they will do it again.

Mr. SIREN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I also have a question regarding the recent G-8 Summit. It seems like the Chancellor of Germany has taken on the global greenhouse gas emissions issue and she wants to reduce it by 50 percent by the year 2050. I just wonder how we can work with the Europeans to come up with something regarding the greenhouse emissions, because the administration seems so against it.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This administration.

Mr. SIREN. This administration.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me—part of the problem I think is that—I am going to get in trouble again. But some of the greens in Europe are really totally unrealistic.

If you take a look at the Kyoto Protocol, which was 98 to 2 or 98 to nothing, I think it was, in the Senate, it was: Don't ever bring it here because we won't approve it. And the point is, because the demands were unrealistic and it would have cost—I once knew all these facts and figures. But the number of jobs it would lose in the United States was horrendous.

Now the point is, having said that, there is no question I think the administration—although I gather the administration is beginning to move. But there is no question that I think they have delayed longer than they should and that they are standing against any basic movement in this regard.

And I am going to get myself in trouble with somebody here either one way or the other, but my view is that the administration has not moved. But when the President declared that the Kyoto Protocol was dead and every European country and government had a snit fit, the fact of the matter is they had all known for years that the United States wasn't going to ratify it, nor should we have, I think. So it became a political football by the Europeans to be able to prove one more time that George Bush was a "you know what." The fact of the matter is he had no choice, if he had wanted to have, because the Senate had already made it clear.

Now, having said that, I think there is no question this administration or the future one is going to have to do more than we have been doing; and I think the pressures coming from Europe now are working in that direction. But it is going to take some time, I think, before the administration is ready to do anywhere near as much as the Europeans would like us to do.

Mr. SIREN. You don't want to clarify that "you know what" part, do you? I am only kidding.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, that is diplomatic talk. You understand, 30 years as a diplomat I know how to use those terms, and then you never know what I said.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Poe?

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Where are we now?

Mr. POE. We are over here.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh.

Mr. POE. I am going to follow up on your comments about Kosova and self-determination. And just so you know, I am from Texas, and there are probably a lot of folks here that would like to kick us out of the United States. You don't have to comment yet. I saw you say amen.

What is the national policy of the United States regarding that very issue you just talked about with my friend from New York about self-determination of peoples of different countries? I mean, we may face that in Iraq in the north with the Kurds and the south as well. What is our policy? What is our national policy?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I have to guess, from what the President has said, he would like to do it yesterday. So I guess his—I guess the national policy, to the degree the President sets it, is that we should do it.

Mr. POE. How will that play with other countries when the same situation may arise in Africa or the Middle East or with the Russian—former Russian countries?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Again, right now, the Europeans will have the same view we do, which is Kosova needs to be separate. And, look, to me—well, I think I have said it. The point is, I think, as a precedent it is awful. I really do. If you think about it for a while, if a bunch of countries or the U.N. Can gang up on a country and take a piece of it away, we ought to think about what that may do down the road somewhere.

But, having said that, there is no question that if we don't agree to have Kosova separated they are going to do it anyway. And the bloodshed is going to be awful. And it isn't as if the Serbs didn't ask for it a long time ago when they treated the Albanian nationality in Kosova as they did.

But, at the same time, and this is long history that I won't bore you with more than to say Kosova is the heart of old Serbia. It was once where the—the Serbs are the only people I know who celebrated defeat. They were defeated in the Battle of Kosova in 1300 something, and it is where the Serbs really started. And it is a thing for them, and I understand it. But they have now been swamped by the Albanian population, and there is no ending unto

it. Partly because the Serbs treated the Albanian minority, who are now a majority, so badly for so long.

But how can I answer other than to say someday it could jump up and bite somebody, you know, where—just simply because they haven't thought through the implications of this.

Mr. POE. One other question regarding homegrown terrorism in Europe, second generation young Muslims who have been radicalized, and the whole concept of visa waiver program with the United States. I have been recently in some of the Scandinavian countries. Every country seems to approach it a lot differently. How do you see us dealing with that issue of folks born in Europe and then working their way to the United States? How are we dealing with that, if anything?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Now you are getting me into the whole question of immigration, where I also am an unreconstructed right-wing nut, I guess. The answer basically, sir, has to be that you—unless we want to simply put up a wall and say these kinds of people can't come in, you have to do it the way we always do it, and that is you take a look at their background and let them in if they meet the standards. And I think it would be a terrible thing for us to all of a sudden decide we weren't going to let people in because they were Muslim.

So I think there is no easy answer to that one either.

Mr. POE. Do you think the Europeans and the Americans are working together well enough to, of course, filter out threats to either country?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No.

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. I am not "Mr. Chairman." Sorry. I forgot that. I will accept it.

Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

I think this morning's hearing has been insightful; and, Mr. Secretary, we do appreciate your comments I think collectively. I have several questions.

Reading through your statement, Deal or No Deal, and the transatlantic relationships that exist presently and what we can look forward to in the near term, and we talk about the trio that is emerging with the new leadership both in France and as well as in England and, of course, Merkel's new chancellorship—you know, it is easy to be critical, but I think on the whole, when you look at the last 40-plus years, there has been a tremendous amount of achievement of the EU. Who would think they would have a functioning Parliament that has achieved already a common currency and a level to assert itself or come together in ways that—

I mean, if we imagined it for a moment, to have 27 different countries today, the whole emergence of Eastern Europe to become part of the EU is really, I think, a level of success that would be hard to imagine 20 years ago.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is right. Excuse me, go ahead.

Mr. COSTA. So when you talk about this deal or no deal, could you rank where you think the opportunities are in the next 5 years to really make progress together as partners, realizing that we are

at the end of this President's term of office, we are near the end of it, and we will have a new President in 18 months or so, and where the opportunities might lie with a new administration with this partnership?

How would you prioritize, if you were going to be advising? Because you already told us you have no interest in going back to the Secretary of Stateship, but if you were advising the new administration, regardless of what party, where they would prioritize the next 5 years with this new trio?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This is going to sound like a typical diplomatic answer, but you know what I would tell him to do first? Him or her—I thought I better get that in fast. I think the President-Elect or the President ought to get on an airplane and go to Europe and spend a couple of weeks going around making it very clear that this is a new regime here now—and I don't—the party isn't important. But make it clear that the past is past, it is prologue, and now we have a President who is going to work hard to try to develop a different kind of a relationship with our closest allies.

Mr. COSTA. A new partnership.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes. And let me say—this is probably not going to be a very good example, but at the end of the Lyndon Johnson administration there had been a really fairly unpleasant relationship with a number of European countries, particularly including the French, where de Gaulle had kicked us out of NATO—or kicked NATO out of France. Richard Nixon, first thing he did when he became President was get on an airplane with some of his advisors, and off he went to Europe. And he visited Germany and France—he visited France last, because it was deliberate that he was going to go to see de Gaulle. And particularly the relationship with the French and with de Gaulle was really very acerbic. And he made this trip, and it turned an awful lot of things around.

Now I recognize talking about Nixon is not necessarily the greatest thing in the world, but it worked.

Mr. COSTA. So before establishing priorities you think we need to reframe the partnership.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is the first priority right there.

Mr. COSTA. Is to reframe frame the partnership.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COSTA. Let me move on here, because time is limited.

You spoke a moment ago about the situation of Iraq and your own epiphany of sorts—that is my words, not yours—but the fact is that if we do, and I hope not, leave under less than satisfactory terms, as you described—I know your involvement in the Baker-Hamilton Commission.

I was in Egypt with a congressional group 2 months ago; and Mubarak made the comment, I told your President not to go in there, not to go in there. I know those Iraqis. I know all the problems, blah, blah, blah, blah.

Then he concluded by saying, now that you are here you can't leave. Which I think is, unfortunately, the reaction of a lot of the folks in the Middle East. Give me a worst-case scenario if we leave under less than satisfactory circumstances.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Easy to describe.

Mr. COSTA. Because I think we are on a powder keg right now; and there are so many of those countries on a tripwire with Lebanon, Iran, not only Iraq, and, of course, the Palestinian-Israeli question.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You want a worst-case scenario?

Mr. COSTA. Yes.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. First of all, Iran moves into Iraq. Secondly, Iran and Syria take on Israel one way or another.

And is that enough to start with? Because I think—and maybe I am exaggerating. I don't think so. I don't think it is going to take place within 15 minutes of this collapse on our part. But I would say to you I think the chances of a—well, certainly the chances of Iran throwing off the limits is almost inevitable.

Now, how far that goes, I think almost certainly if they don't move into Iraq they have a—they put in a sympathetic government in place very soon. And, secondly, I don't think it is necessary—I don't think it is wise to take statements about Israel that have been made by the man who is President—and I can never pronounce his name—

Mr. COSTA. The Iranian President?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Ahmadinejad, or whatever it is, excuse me. And the fact of the matter is—and, in fact, Congressman—

Mr. COSTA. Rohrabacher.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Somebody recently said, you know, these crazy people in Korea and Iran—

Mr. COSTA. That was Rohrabacher.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER [continuing]. They are not crazy. You better get that through our heads. They don't think the way we do, but they are not crazy.

I sometimes think the little fellow in Korea comes close, but, believe me, they know what—they have a good idea what it is—certainly in Iran he does. And we make a mistake if we think they are crazy. They have a deliberate sense of what it is they are going to do; and when he says he is going to wipe Israel off the face of the map, he means it.

Mr. COSTA. You think we ought to take him seriously.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. He means it. Just like when Adolf Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* and nobody took it seriously, well, they realized later they should have. And I think you are facing that.

Mr. MILLER. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Royce.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. ROYCE. Secretary Eagleburger, I appreciate the opportunity to ask you—*Mein Kampf*, part of the difficulty is that *Mein Kampf* among German works is probably the best-known book being reprinted right now in the Middle East and has quite a following in Europe—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I know.

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. As well. And it is particularly that concern expressed by Europeans parliamentarians.

One I have talked to is Ayaan Hirsi Ali from the Netherlands. She was a Muslim woman serving, you know, in the Netherlands Parliament; and her problem was twofold.

One, for many of the younger generation of Muslims who subscribe to the more radical new version of the Wahhabist creed, not the old Wahhabi thinking, but there is a new variant that the Muslim Brotherhood has also had a hand in helping to shape, and part of the thesis is, to participate in democracy itself is an insult to God. Because either God makes the laws or a bunch of us around the table makes the laws. And if we are making the laws, then—and I have had Muslims in my district who subscribe to this explain this to me. What they want is, therefore, a separate canton or a separate area for their faith in which you do not impose European concepts, secular concepts on them.

Now, her other problem was, in speaking out against the system of marrying off the daughter to the uncle and having honor killings if the girl picked her own beau, this then kind of marked her for death in that society; and she finally left because of the concerns she had that Europeans were saying to her, look, you are stirring up a problem.

Now *Der Stern* magazine, other magazines in Europe have figured out the demographics; and before the end of this century a majority of continental Europe will be Islamic. And I guess the question for me is, unless—given the birth rate and the migration rate into Europe, when this occurs in Belgium and in France and in Germany and such, unless younger Muslims are buying into the concepts of the French Enlightenment or European Enlightenment, unless they subscribe to that, if instead they subscribe to the more radical new version that 85 percent of the mosques now are disseminating, then we have got a very different relationship with Europe in the future.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Right.

Mr. ROYCE. And I was going to ask you for some of your thoughts on that.

Also, many professional Muslims in Europe have told me they don't feel they are getting any support. They are being encouraged just to be quiet. The BBC and nobody else wants to print or carry their message as they are trying to get into these communities and saying, look, we have a right to participate in the political process. Let's be moderates. That is not part of the equation for young Muslims or for professionals who are getting this enormous pressure within the society. And I would like your thoughts on that.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, I don't like to predict that sort of outcome, and I think we have to be careful about talking about it that way. But there is no question I think if you look at the demographics, and if it continues, there will be a major change in the cultural life of the Dutch community or whomever. And the issue really becomes one of whether the demographics really change that way in the course of the next 60 or so years or not. I can't answer that question.

But I do think it is at least a legitimate question to ask whether this process of increasing immigration into Western Europe does what you have described. And I guess I would have to say if it continues as it does it may well.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And I don't know what you do about that.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Eagleburger.

Mr. MILLER. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Ambassador Eagleburger, for being here.

One of the things that our chairperson, Tom Lantos, has done is to encourage all of us to travel. And we travel often, and I think that is a good thing. I have lived in France, I have lived in the Far East, and one thing I noticed about the French, they are the most nationalistic country you could ever be in. You know, the honor and glory of France.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yep.

Ms. WATSON. And I find in America we are kind of isolated. You know, English only. Well, in the European countries people speak the languages of their neighbors, and so they understand how they are thinking. You are absolutely right when you say don't call them crazy. Because they are outsmarting us at every turn.

I have got a couple of places I want to go with this, and I am going to do them in a hurry.

One of the things that I noticed, that the visa waiver program is a big issue. It seems like there is a feeling among the 27 nations in the European Union that we are dragging our feet; and I want to know, is the United States really running out of time with, you know, trying to improve our relations around the visa issue?

And the other thing I would like you to comment on at this time is you said that, you know, we can't leave Iraq or Iran will move in. Are we to commit our personnel and our dollars for as long as it takes? What do you see as a benchmark? Can you respond?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes, on the first question, ma'am, I am sorry, but I don't know enough about the visa program. I have been away from that for so long, and I don't know enough about it to give you an answer.

Ms. WATSON. Well, what is happening is that, you know, it requires a visa to go here or there. We have a common currency, but you still need a visa.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Right.

Ms. WATSON. And so some of the analysts suggest that certain EU member states may ultimately press for retaliation against the United States, against their citizens if there is no program in Washington extending the visa waiver so their people can travel here.

So it is all right if you can't respond to that. It is an issue that we have been dealing with, and particularly myself since I have all of Koreatown. I represent Los Angeles, and it is an issue all the time. We are trying to get waivers.

But the other issue that I wanted to raise was about—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is one, ma'am, that—you know, that question is the center of debate in the Congress I know. And I can tell you my view of it, but that and \$0.25 will get you a cup of coffee.

Ms. WATSON. Let's just hear it. It is another voice.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. My strong view is that, and on the Iraq Study Group, what we ended up saying was at a minimum give the administration time to withdraw over a period of time and give the Iraqi Government some period of time to get its house in order. So

the only answer I can give you is that the realities of the situation I know indicate that there is going to have to be a withdrawal at some point. If I had my druthers, which I don't, I would say to you if we leave under adverse circumstances we will deeply regret it sometime in the future.

But I am not—that is my personal view, and it is not—not only is it not popular, but it is perhaps not even true. I think leaving immediately is a serious mistake. Give it some time, and hopefully it can be done in a way that doesn't bring the roof down around our ears.

Ms. WATSON. Noticing that two very sacred mosques were destroyed in the last 24, 48 hours, and that indicates that there still is that clash between the various ethnic groups, and I think that goes on whether we are there or not. I don't know how we deal with that. Because, you know, you can go back 6,000, 7,000 years. I don't think we understand their culture and their beliefs and their principles well enough to deal with that. I just see us as putting our people in harm's way, too.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I can understand that.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And if I may just say, you know, I indicated to you I was in Yugoslavia for 7 years of my career, not all at once, but I got to know them pretty well, and I spoke the language. Again, it is the same thing that happened; and you have to ask yourself, coming from what we come from, how in the name of you know what could two people who had lived together or next to each other for 50 years and not shot each other up, the minute this—the minute Tito leaves, basically, they end up killing other as fast as they can? And I can't explain it. I can't explain it in the Iraqi case.

I guess what I have to say is that the one point I tried to make ahead of time is if we are going to get our troops involved in places like this we better understand the culture before we do it.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. The gentlelady's time is expired.

Secretary Eagleburger has been very gracious and patient to take as many of our questions and be part of this discussion with us. I want to be respectful of the Secretary's time, and I know that there have been many members who have been waiting patiently to have the opportunity to ask questions. What I would propose is that if any member uses less than their full 5 minutes, I am sure that Secretary Eagleburger, the chair pro tempore, and Mr. Lantos would view you as a patriotic American.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I—sir, having been corrected in my use of the language earlier, I am prepared to stay as long as it takes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very creative uses of you-know-whats.

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Eagleburger, you are forgiven that mild transgression—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. MILLER. And if anyone else arrives, I would propose that we can cut off the questioning with those members who are here now.

Mr. BOOZMAN?

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned in your testimony that our descendants would look back and say, basically, you know, what were you people

thinking as far as the nuclear proliferation. I remember with Jimmy Carter, you know, one of the really famous incidents during his campaign was that, you know, he was having breakfast with his daughter Amy and said, you know, that they discussed that that was the most—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yes.

Mr. BOOZMAN. And I know later on during—prior to the Super Bowl, Roger Staubach, you know, a great quarterback, said he was having breakfast with his daughter that morning, and she said to watch out for the bomb, you know, in discussing what was going to happen. So this has been going on—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You mean this kind?

Mr. BOOZMAN. Yes, that kind, a deep—but this thing I guess, you know, that was 30 years ago; and, you know, a generation has almost lapsed in that time period. So I guess what I would like to know from you is how do you get that done?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I don't know.

Mr. BOOZMAN. What mechanism, you know, would you propose? Or do we need an Iraq—do we need a Bomb Study Commission that is equivalent to the Iraq Study? I think it would be difficult to get that done through the U.N.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I think it is almost impossible to do it.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Do you have any ideas at all as to how you go about—I mean, right now, we can't even get economic sanctions against Iran.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Well, but my view of it is you can't—you are not going to be able to get any kind of sanctions against any individual builder of the bomb. You know, we let it happen with North Korea after having—the President having said several times that it was unacceptable.

My only view, and I think—this as an issue, if it ever can be successfully dealt with prior to somebody popping one off in Berlin or New York or wherever, it is going to be extremely difficult. My only sense of it is that the only way that maybe it can be handled is that if the United States—the President of the United States starts speaking about it every chance he gets and says—calls some sort of a conference of like-minded states and begins the process of talking about putting together some form of international organization—I don't mean the U.N. Or something like that, but like-minded countries who believe that it is dangerous as can be to let countries continue to build these weapons. If you can get enough people over a period of time to come to that conclusion and are prepared to commit troops if necessary to make sure that they don't do it anymore, that they don't build these things, that to me is the only solution.

And if you ask me is it likely to happen, no, I don't think so. Because, again, until one is blown up somewhere again, it is not going to—everybody worries about nuclear weapons, but since we haven't seen one take place since August 1945, why should we worry about it now? But I tell you there is going to come a time when somebody is going to blow one up, and God help us all when that begins to happen.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. Scott?

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

First, let me again thank you for your patience, and I know not only your patience but your discomfort as well. You are a great soldier on this battlefield this morning.

I would like to ask you about Iran. First of all, under what circumstances, and do you see those circumstances now, that we should go to war with Iran?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Now?

Mr. SCOTT. Or what would those circumstances be?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh.

Mr. SCOTT. But if you feel now, we would like to know that as well.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No. Number one, you know, even to contemplate that now is—number one, I don't believe anybody should go to war when the people of the country don't believe it is the thing to do; and I have to believe that nobody is going to think it is the thing to do. So we are already one war too many right now is the problem. I certainly couldn't argue for another one.

I will say this, though. I don't know how many years there are still before they have it in the armory, but it would be nice—and that is all I can say—if there were enough countries ready to commit forces to go to war with Iran to stop them from building one. But it is not going to happen.

So, no, I don't want to go to war with them now. But I will say to you that that is why, as one clear example, that is why this issue is so monstrous, because nobody wants to take it on.

But, as I tried to say, if someday Iran or somebody else blows one up somewhere and kills a hundred thousand people, which is what we—130,000 is what we killed in Hiroshima, and they are a lot more powerful now. At that point, somebody is going to say, why did you let this go on for as long as you did? And 150,000 people or whatever be slaughtered in one explosion?

I guess what I am saying is the first time that happens, and I think it may at some point in the future, it is going to be too late. But that is what the question will be. And, therefore, in the abstract, yes, I would go to war to prevent anybody from building one. But you and I both know that is not sustainable in the body politic in this country, much less anywhere else.

Mr. SCOTT. Very good response.

May I follow up on that for a moment? I certainly concur with you we are in one war too many. Hopefully, we hurry up and get out of Iraq in a meaningful way.

But going back to Iran, we have got a situation here where the head of the government in Iran has said two important things. First of all, that Israel should be wiped away from the face of the earth—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Yep.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. And then, secondly, they are aggressively going after a nuclear weapon. So my question is: Do you feel that in the back of their minds that their number one priority for getting this nuclear weapon is in fact to do just that, wipe Israel off the face of the earth?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I would suspect that it is probably broader than that, but this is a part of their list of things to do with this thing if they get it.

I suspect that the basic reason they want it is because it puts them in a totally different position in the region and in the world. And it is a—what it becomes is a radical Muslim bomb. Iran is not just a Muslim state, it is a radical Muslim state, and I think that is what they want. A part of that is because I do believe they mean it when they say they want to wipe Israel off the face of the map. And maybe they are just saying it. But we have too many times—too often we have pooh-poohed what some vicious person who runs a country has to say, saying he doesn't really mean it; and, oh, all of a sudden, we find out he does. And I don't know how you can judge the Iranian situation any other way.

But, having said that, I am also saying to you we are not in a position to do anything about it.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is great to have you here today. I wanted to, because it has been raised a couple times, talk to you about the Iraq Study Group report. You remember—I thank you for your service on that—I was privileged to be one of the consultants; and the recommendations that came out in my view provided some very good advice, solutions potentially. It did recommend a military surge, but it also focused on a diplomatic surge and solution to the problem.

You as a diplomat, I know, were very involved with that. Some in the Congress seem to think that this will not be solved by diplomacy, we are wasting our time. I tend to disagree with that. But I want you to, if you wouldn't mind, just give you an opportunity to comment on these recommendations that I don't believe were—initially were not received as well as we had hoped by the administration. I think they are coming around to these recommendations. If you could comment on that and what more needs to be done to carry out these recommendations.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. First of all, I wasn't surprised that they weren't accepted right away. I think some of the others were. It didn't bother me that they weren't accepted right away, if in fact—because most of them I think the sooner the better. But, at the same time, there is some time that can run before it is too late.

And the issue of—and I was one of those that had to be convinced when I was on the panel about whether we should talk to Iran and Syria, for example, which were two of the suggestions. Basically, my view has always been on that kind of a question that unless the simple talking to somebody gives them a leg up in some significant way, we ought not worry about it. If we were to decide now we were going to go talk to Hamas—or better, say, to Hezbollah and not talk to Hamas, we would be doing something dumb I think, because we would be giving one group an advantage, at least in public terms. But in the case of Iran and Syria, I am not at all sure it would accomplish anything.

But I see no argument for not talking if you are confident that whoever you have going over there to talk to them isn't going to

give the shop away. And I don't really think that we would do that. But I don't see anything wrong with talking in circumstances like that.

I would be very surprised if it would make any difference in Iran. I think it might have an ability to succeed in Syria, because I have some sense that perhaps they can be pulled away from being so tightly bound to Iran, and it would at least be interesting to try.

Mr. McCAUL. I know we talked—and I am just as skeptical of Iran. I am very hawkish when it comes to Iran. But there are the other key stakeholders in the region that I believe a diplomatic surge would be very beneficial. I believe they need to step up to the plate more. I think it is in their best interests. They are the neighbors, the surrounding neighbors. And I just want to get your thoughts on that as well in terms of these recommendations and what more needs to be done.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. By the way, one thing you said that I really think is important. I have spent some time in the last few weeks talking to some of the diplomats from some of the smaller gulf states, and they won't say it this way, but they are scared to death. Because if this goes badly in Iraq, they have—

In fact, when you asked the question about what would be the bad outcome, the fact of the matter is not only would we I think see Iran making threats against Israel, and perhaps carrying them out, but I think certainly the gulf states would be handy targets, and an unconstrained Iran would have very little reason not to do it.

Mr. McCAUL. Sure.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Anyway—

Mr. McCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Other than that, I think the thing that I guess impressed me most of all was—because I came into it late. I replaced Bob Gates when he went off to be Secretary of Defense. One of the least intelligent things I have seen him do in a long time, by the way.

But, anyway, the point is one of the things that impressed me very much was the degree to which the people on that Commission were really trying to find common ground. And it wasn't easy for them on both sides, but it pretty well worked. That is why I am convinced that this is not an insoluble problem, but it is close to it.

Mr. McCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here this long. I also have back problems, so I feel for you, literally. I don't know if standing up or any other—if that would make you more comfortable, but anything—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is all right. This is fun.

Mr. SHERMAN. We will try to be fun.

As to Mr. Scott's comments, I would think that before we went to war with Iran we would consider putting some real sanctions on them. And this is an administration that is unwilling to turn to epicureans and say that they would have to live without southern Caspian caviar imports. This is an administration that acquiesces

in World Bank loans to Iran. This is an administration that has told me in no uncertain terms that we wouldn't even talk to the Russians about changing our policies toward Moldova in order to get Russia on our side with regard to Iran. So with such a pitiful prioritization of the effort to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons, it would be hard to tell our men and women in uniform to go die for a cause that epicureans cannot be asked to sacrifice for.

You had the Commission on Holocaust Asset Insurance, and that is where I want to direct my questions. Do you have any guess as to the total face value, perhaps adjusted for inflation, of the insurance policies sold in Europe prior to World War II, presumably to adults who would be 90 years old and 100 and 110 that have not been paid off?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. This is my brain, so will you give me—we don't have that figure. I don't know how much there is in total. I do know—at least I think I know—that we found—I am looking for my piece of paper here. I was prepared for some questions, but not that one. But I think we do know that we—let me just give you the figures I have.

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That will help a little bit.

We put out over \$306 million offered to more than 48,000 survivors and their heirs. Of this \$306 million, more than half was for policies that did not originally identify any particular company or did not identify the company that ultimately ended up paying the—making the offer.

ICHEIC, that is this commission that I was on, our research efforts and/or the research and matching work done by the companies involved on individuals and claimants on unnamed policies were matched to specific insurance companies, outstanding policies, and offers were made. What am I trying to say? We managed, from amongst other things, we did our own archive.

Mr. SHERMAN. So you were able to collect over \$300 million, but we don't really have an indication of how much remains—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Unpaid.

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Uncollected.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No.

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me put forward a few ideas first, that we also need to be concerned about World War I era insurance.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh, God, my friend. If you don't know the agony that I spent over 8 years finding it for this one. Excuse me a second.

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, let me—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I understand. But the Web site I don't have here with me.

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me put forward a proposal and get your—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. What are you trying to ask? That is my point.

Mr. SHERMAN. What if we required that any insurance company doing business in the United States could not do business in the United States unless they and all of their affiliated insurance companies worldwide were to post on the Web the name of anyone insured who the company had not been in contact with since 1945?

And then families could search that Web page and figure out whether a lost uncle or cousin was listed and they would know which company had sold them the insurance.

I view this as a consumer protection issue. I sit on the Insurance Subcommittee. I know Ms. Ros-Lehtinen has a bill on this, and I look forward to not only supporting her bill, but working with her on this, because I sit on the Insurance Subcommittee of the Financial Services Committee.

To me, this is a consumer protection issue. I don't want anybody in my district to rely on an insurance company that would hide behind the Holocaust as a way to enhance its profits, that would say to an Armenian family we can't pay the policy on that person who is now is 183 years old because you can't give us a death certificate. Those insurance companies that are part of affiliated groups of insurance companies that won't pay because there is no death certificate from a genocide or the Holocaust, would we want our constituents to rely on such companies?

So perhaps the Secretary could comment on whether we should insist as a condition of doing business in the United States that if a company was receiving premiums before 1945 and has lost contact after 1945, has never paid on the policy, that they would at least list those on a Web site.

Mr. MILLER. I think, Secretary Eagleburger, you can answer that now or for the record later.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, I would like to answer it now, because it is such nonsense, with all respect.

First of all, I have no idea why you think—first of all, I guess I have to back up. I don't understand how—I thought imperialism was gone in this country, but, of course, I think it is not gone when the Congress of the United States would suggest that an insurance company doing business in this country has to go through this record of yours that you have insisted on when we did it for 8 years in ICHEIC, and we went through more lists and more names than you are ever going to find anywhere else, and we paid 300-and-some million dollars over the course of that time. And now all—

And, by the way, where do you get this nonsense now that because they won't give a death certificate they won't get paid? There was a time when they did that. They haven't done it anytime that we did anything in ICHEIC. We wouldn't have tolerated an answer like that.

And, as a matter of fact, with everything that we accomplished—

Mr. SHERMAN. So you think you have done such—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Can I finish?

Mr. SHERMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. When you referred to my comments as nonsense, I do want to respond to it at some point.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You can respond, but can I finish first?

Mr. SHERMAN. Please proceed.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I knew that this was going to happen. And the fact of the matter—if we got this at all—and the fact of the matter is I have seldom seen anything that distorts the record quite like what you have just tried to do and with all respect the

legislation does. We have paid more money to more claimants, potential claimants than you would ever find anywhere else.

Why is it you think that if you were to force the companies to open up their books now some way or another, which they would never do, nor do they have an obligation, nor should they have an obligation to do in the way which you demand it, what makes you think that you are going to find anything we didn't already find?

Mr. SHERMAN. So you are here to tell us that every insurance company doing business—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Of course not.

Mr. SHERMAN. You haven't found everything, but you are not convinced that anybody can find everything that you have not found?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. For heaven's sake. I am not going to say that we have found every possible insurance—

Mr. SHERMAN. Why should we stop looking?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You shouldn't stop looking, but that is not the way to look.

Mr. SHERMAN. Why shouldn't we ask the insurance companies to give us a list of those policies that they have not paid?

Mr. MILLER [presiding]. Secretary Eagleburger, if you can answer that—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I will send you a letter.

Mr. MILLER. That is fine.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Because I am very upset by this distortion of 8 years of work on our part.

Mr. SHERMAN. Sir, I am—

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am not finished. I am not finished.

Mr. SHERMAN. I can't distort the facts if I don't know the facts.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. That is exactly what you are telling me, that we screwed up some way or another, and that we did not do something over the course of 8 years, a job that cannot possibly be done in the way in which you and this legislation argue that it could be done. And amongst everything else, since when—since when is it the obligation of the Congress of the United States to be as imperialist as this would be? When we did it with the insurance companies, we did it through voluntary efforts on their part. They had to be squeezed into it, but once they got started, they behaved themselves, and they gave us the information that we needed.

And what drives me bats on this subject is 8 years—8 years and 300-and-some million dollars, and does anybody say that was wonderful work, and that was \$300 million that they would never have gotten otherwise? Of course not. All we get is complaint because, in fact, we may have missed somebody.

I'm sorry, I give up. I will send you a letter.

Mr. SHERMAN. And I will look forward to doing something for the Armenian victims as well.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. It is great to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I remember working with you for so many years. I appreciated the hard work you poured into your job, especially during the very difficult time of the Balkan War. So I do want to welcome you and thank you for your many years of leadership.

Let me ask two brief questions. Late last week Congressman Eric Cantor led the delegation, and I was the co-chair, to an OSCE meeting on intolerance with a particular emphasis on anti-Semitism. Parenthetically the idea of the OSCE conferences on anti-Semitism was mine. Senator Voinovich and I had a meeting back in 2002. We recommended as much to the Bush administration after receiving significant evidence of a rising tide of anti-Semitic abuse from the diaspora, coming from the Middle East, bringing hate, with the left-wing and the right-wing also contributing to that.

Now after the fourth conference—the first one was in Vienna, the second in Berlin, the third in Cordoba, and this last one in Bucharest—a number of very important best practices have been worked out, including Holocaust remembrance, education; the prosecution of ethnically based hate crimes; training the trainers. And I was wondering, it seems to me that there are still—despite the fact that foreign ministers have participated, Presidents have participated—there are those who would like to marginalize the issue, and I wonder if you might have some thoughts on how to continue confronting this rising tide that can persist nevertheless, how to best confront it.

And secondly, if I could, Mr. Eagleburger, talking about trans-atlantic relationships, one area where there is a huge gulf between ourselves and our European friends is in the area of China. We have not had a stellar stand against the PRC's systematic abuse of human rights, and, as you know, human rights abuses in China are lethal, massive in scope, cold-hearted, calculated to accomplish the regime's designs, and show no signs whatsoever of abating, and the impunity is being exported to places like Darfur. And we wanted to lift the arms embargo. Thankfully they turned from that foolhardy path.

Any recommendations that you might have? We have come to understand the depths of the depravity of Beijing's abuse of human rights, religious freedom, one-child-per-couple policy, its work against the Dalai Lama. You are very aware of them, but it is not getting better, and it seems like we have human rights fatigue when it comes to China, and they get a pass. Anything you would recommend on that?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me start with the first one, because I absolutely agree with you. Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. There is no question in my mind about that at all. I saw it with this commission, and I have seen it reflected in comments by people who have come back from Europe. So there is no question it is coming back, and it is there. And I think the only thing—well, I learned one thing out of this benighted commission, and that is you can't stop talking about it. That is the first lesson. You can't stop talking about it.

And one of the things we did with some of the money that the commission had was we—for example, we began a program in the University of Miami that brought students from the university into contact with Holocaust survivors. There are a lot in and around Miami. And they were given credit for this program. But they went and talked to, worked with, helped out the survivors and then wrote reports on it afterward. And what they did was they got a

sense that they had never had before of what the Holocaust was all about. And interestingly enough, these were not all Jewish kids. They started out Jewish kids, but a number of Gentile students also came into this. We did it also in a couple of universities up north.

My point is, don't stop talking about it. Don't stop people who should know better what it was all about, and these kids had no idea what it was.

We also did another program where we set up what we called summer camps in the former Soviet Union and brought in Jewish families and—the children and the parents from a people who had never been permitted to learn about their own religion in the past, and we went through that with them, and again, the reaction was fantastic from these people.

And it cost money, and all I am saying about this is this is one way you do it. And the more that money can be put into finding ways to keep reminding people what was the Holocaust was all about—and it is amazing how many younger people, including Jewish kids who don't know about it. In Miami they were mostly Jewish kids in the beginning. And I can't give you any better way to deal with it than that, and that is the only way I know of to deal with it, because they have got—people have to understand what the Holocaust was. And when they understand what the Holocaust is or was, there is no way on God's green Earth that they can support it or that they can think it was simply some historic event.

Now, on the question of China, I don't know the answer to that, because the Chinese, as you know, they march to their own tune, and part of my problem from when I first started going to the PRC to later years, I haven't gone back for some time now, but the fact of the matter is that there is a fair amount of improvement. That is not to say it is satisfactory by any means. And what I am not sure of is whether the normal kinds of sanctions and so forth are going to make any difference to them. I just don't know the answer to it in that case.

Again, you can't avoid talking about it with them. You have to do that. The question becomes one of how much you are prepared to punish if they don't behave themselves?

Are we almost done?

Mr. MILLER. We are almost done.

Ms. Jackson Lee is the last member to ask questions.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. It is just I have a back that is beginning to feel like it was yesterday.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Secretary, if I had the ability to grant the Honor of Congress Medal, you have it, and I will try to be respectful of the rising back pain that all of us experience. So I know with your years of service—let me just quickly try to thank you for your service and throw three hot points out at you.

One, is Putin bluffing? Is Putin bluffing? One question.

Number two, have we expended the capital that I thought we gained in the whole Bosnia, Kosova and Albania when the United States stepped in? I think we did a pretty good job, and we were so out in front of NATO and others.

And finally, number three, what do we do to repair and encourage relationships, particularly focused on Afghanistan? I think I

am going to leave Iraq out. You might want to throw it in. I think we wasted our capital there. But the point is can we get Europeans to rally around us as to their own self-benefit as to Afghanistan?

Thank you so very much for your indulgence.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Let me take the last one first because it is the one that I remember. Afghanistan and Iraq are two different issues.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Yes, absolutely.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I thoroughly agree with that. And the tragedy of Afghanistan is that we were so successful, and it is beginning to slip away. And to the degree that the allies—to the degree that our friends and allies, I suppose, can be brought into the game, it is important. And how much more they are going to be willing to do, I am not sure.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Should we gather the new leaders like Brown and Merkel?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Absolutely.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And get with them separate from the E8?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Anything we can do to bring them into this one. And you may have to indicate to them that you are not asking them about Iraq right now. But I think Afghanistan is a separate issue. It is also difficult to isolate it as a country. And that is part of the problem, because these people slip in and out. But we really pretty well destroyed the Taliban infrastructure in Afghanistan, and I think, one, we have to stay there, we have to keep it going. And I think we can, if we work hard at it, get the allies to put in some more money. That is not Iraq.

Now, is Putin bluffing? No.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I talked over you. Is Putin bluffing?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, not really. Depends what you mean by bluffing. He is not—he is not just shaking his fist or puffing his chest. He is serious. He is serious. Now, he is smart, and he has not taken on the world, but he is not bluffing.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So he is not bluffing about missile defense?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. No, no.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can we stand down, or should we engage in diplomacy on this issue?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. You know, this is one I have to tell you if I had had my way, I am not sure I ever would have suggested it. But now that we have got it started, we can't, I think, let him get away with them. And more important than that, it would send all the wrong signals to the Poles, the Bulgarians and so forth in Eastern Europe if we walked away from it now.

You have to understand Putin a bit on this one. I mean, if they were to build one along the Mexican border, I don't think we would like it a lot. But anyway, the point is he is not bluffing.

But the point is he is never going to turn around and be a Stalin. That just is impossible in that country anymore. He can be and he has slowly, I think, come to capture a lot of the political power, but it is never going to be anything like it was under the Communists.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can we do anything to boost our numbers, and did we get any credit for Bosnia and Kosova and Albania to improve our numbers, to get back on track?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. I am not sure I understand the question.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Our numbers are low among the populations in Europe. Did we gain any capital when we leaned on Bosnia and Kosova and Albania, and does that help us gain any traction?

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. Oh, I see. Not much. This goes way back when I was still involved in government. I used to yell my head off at the allies because this was—it is an interesting case that we run into a lot, not so much now. But that was still in an era when “Let Uncle Sam do it.” And by the way, it got us in a vicious circle because if we did not do it, it did not get done. And if we did do it, it was another example of something the Europeans did not have to do.

So I think more than anything else this was a case of just we ended up doing it because the others wouldn’t.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you so very much, and thank you for your service, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. MILLER. Secretary Eagleburger, you are done. You may stand or do whatever it is that brings you relief.

Secretary EAGLEBURGER. And I have to apologize for blowing my stack.

Mr. MILLER. You showed better humor than I would have had I been in physical discomfort. Thank you very much for your testimony and for your patience. And this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD A. MANZULLO, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this important hearing to discuss our relationship with Europe. I look forward to hearing from former Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger about the status of the transatlantic relationship.

Mr. Chairman, America's relationship with the countries of Europe is as old as the founding of our nation. This bond was reaffirmed on the battlefields of World War I and then World War II when America's sons fought side by side with our European allies against the Axis armies of Germany and Japan.

Today, our diplomatic and trade relationship with Europe are strong. So, despite the media's intense focus on the negative side of the transatlantic relationship, I remind my colleagues, as a frequent participant in the U.S.-E.U. Inter-parliamentary Exchange, that our relationship with Europe remains strong. There is more that unites us than divides us. We have the largest economic relationship in the world. The United States exported over \$232 billion of goods and services to Europe in 2006. Illinois is the fourth largest exporting state to Europe, at \$10.5 billion, with machinery—the staple of the Congressional district I am proud to represent—as the state's top export.

Europe is also the largest source of foreign direct investment in Illinois—more than \$22 billion or 54 percent of total investment in Illinois. For example, Germany's Eisenmann Corporation has a subsidiary located in Crystal Lake that makes quality products for the automotive sector and supports good manufacturing jobs. Taken together, European trade and investment supports nearly 162,000 jobs in Illinois, mostly in highly skilled and well-paid sectors. We need to continue to work together to further the trade liberalization agenda. Hopefully the recent optimistic predictions of World Trade Organization Director-General Pascal Lamy come true and we reach an agreement with the G-4 nations on June 19 in Potsdam, Germany to cut barriers to trade in agricultural and industrial products to jumpstart the WTO talks.

America needs to continue working closely with Europe to tackle all the pressing issues of the day. We share a commitment to fighting terrorism. The United States commiserates with the residents of London and Madrid who suffered their own version of 9/11. We deeply appreciate the close cooperation between our intelligence and law enforcement agencies in stopping terrorist attacks.

I also believe we have an opportunity to work with our European friends to reduce environmental damage and improve access to clean air and water. Rather than arguing over whether climate change exists, let's press forward on the issue of combating all forms of pollution, which respects no borders and affects us all. That's why I was pleased with the President's recent announcement on climate change and the progress that he made at the recent G-8 Summit on environmental issues.

Finally, I am heartened by the European Union's eastward expansion to include countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. By including the transitioning democracies of Europe within the European Union, Europe stands only to benefit by encouraging the further development of democratic institutions in its new members. We need to get these nations into our visa waiver program.

Mr. Chairman, today's Europe consists of 27 nations and consists of 490 million people. It is hard to believe all this progress in the span of six decades and that we no longer have to fear another "Great War" in Europe. We should be extremely grateful to the architects of the post-World War II era in both the United States and Europe who had the wisdom and insight to establish the policies carried

through by 10 successive U.S. Administrations of both political parties that created and sustained a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

