    [House Hearing, 110 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           ELECTION REFORM: H.R. 811

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS

                               COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
                                 ADMINISTRATION
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                 MEETING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 23, 2007

                                   __________

          Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration

                           Available on the Internet:
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                                     ______

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                       COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION

               JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, California, Chairwoman
    ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania        VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan,
    ZOE LOFGREN, California                Ranking Minority Member
    MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts    DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas           KEVIN McCARTHY, California
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
                                     ------

                           Subcommittee on Elections

                      ZOE LOFGREN, California, Chairwoman
    JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD,          KEVIN McCARTHY, California
        California                       VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

                           ELECTION REFORM: H.R. 811

                                  ----------

                             FRIDAY, MARCH 23, 2007

                      House of Representatives,
                              Subcommittee on Elections
                              Committee on House Administration
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:45 a.m., in
    room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Zoe Lofgren
    (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Lofgren, Millender-McDonald,
    Gonzalez, Davis of California, McCarthy, Ehlers.
        Staff Present: Tom Hicks, Election Counsel; Janelle Hu,
    Professional Staff Member; Matt Pinkus, Professional Staff/
    Parliamentarian; Kristin McCowan, Chief Legislative Clerk;
    Gineen Beach, Minority Counsel; and Peter Sloan, Minority
    Professional Staff.
        Ms. Lofgren. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to
    order. I would like to ask everyone in the room to please turn
    off your cell phones, if you have not done so yet.
        Today, we are going to discuss H.R. 811, Voter Confidence
    and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007, which would amend the
    HAVA Act of 2002 with respect to ballot verification and
    mandatory paper record audit capacity, and accessibility and
    ballot verification of results for individuals with
    disabilities. Mr. Holt's legislation also aims at increasing
    the security of voting of systems through prohibiting the use
    of undisclosed software and also banning any conflicts of
    interest between voting machine vendors and test labs. We know
    that our election process must be open and transparent, and we
    know that we need standards to modernize our voting system and
    to bring accountability into the system throughout America.
        Election reform is not a partisan issue. This is something
    we can all agree on, and this bill has bipartisan support. For
    this reason, I am delighted that Governor Crist of Florida has
    accepted our invitation to testify to the progress that he is
    making in his State.
        This hearing on the Voter Confidence and Increased
    Accessibility Act is just one step in the process for making
    elections--a fundamental tenet of our democracy--open, fair,
    accountable and correct.
        So I will now recognize the ranking member for any opening
    statement he may have.
        Mr. McCarthy. Well, I thank the chairwoman for calling this
    hearing on an opportunity to examine H.R. 811. I am excited
    about hearing from the individuals today.
        During the last election, we had more than 435 results
    certified by respective States, and we have quite a few State
    representatives here that were certified as well. So I look
    forward to the discussion.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        All the members are invited to submit their statements for
    the record.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.001

        Ms. Lofgren. As Governor Crist has another obligation, we
    are going to ask him to testify first and take questions only
    from myself and the ranking member.
        Governor Crist is here to speak about what he is doing in
    his State, where there were several contested elections in
    Florida. But he is not here about that. He is here about the
    future, and that is all that we are here to examine today.
        So we are just so honored that you are here, and we are
    honored that our colleagues, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Bob
    Wexler, are going to do the honors of introducing you.
        Mr. Wexler, shall we begin with your introduction?
        Mr. Wexler. Thank you very much, Madam Chair; and thank you
    for giving Congressman Diaz-Balart and I the honor of
    presenting and introducing to you and the committee our
    Governor in Florida.
        Governor Crist has served 3 months as Governor, and in that
    period of time he has reformed the way in which government does
    business in Florida. Governor Crist is a Republican, but
    Democrats, Independents and Republicans alike in Florida are
    very proud of the very inclusive fashion in which he has
    governed thus far.
        There is no better example of his inclusiveness than the
    election proposal that he put forth to the Florida Legislature
    in his budget, which I dare say has resolved a very divisive
    issue in Florida that has persisted for the last 6 years. In
    essence, what Governor Crist has done, he has proposed
    replacing electronic machines, which do not have any paper
    trail, which do not have a backup system, with an optical scan
    system that will be used in each of Florida's counties, both on
    election day and in early voting. In the process, I believe he
    has created what I hope will be a model for the Nation in
    ensuring that everyone's vote is cast and counted in the manner
    in which they choose.
        And it is with great pleasure that I ask my dear friend,
    Congressman Diaz-Balart, to continue.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, thank you. Thank you so much,
    Congressman Wexler.
        It is a privilege for me to join my good friend Robert
    Wexler, Madam Chairman, distinguished ranking member and
    members of the subcommittee, in welcoming our Governor here to
    the Capitol.
        Charlie Crist is a close personal friend of my brother's
    and of mine and indeed of my family's, and we have long been
    proud of him. As Congressman Wexler has made reference to, in
    the short time that he has been Governor, the people of Florida
    have been able to see what extraordinary judgment guides his
    actions day in and day out and his exceptional fairness. He is
    a man who everyone can know, and, as I say, the people of
    Florida are realizing, makes his decisions in an ultimately
    fair way. So as we have seen him in the short period of time
    that he has been Governor already tackling issues, dealing with
    issues that the people of Florida want to be dealt with.
    Obviously, we are even more proud of him.
        So it is a great privilege, and I thank you, Madam
    Chairwoman, for allowing Congressman Wexler and I to introduce
    our Governor to you because of the esteem, the respect and,
    indeed, the admiration that we have for Governor Crist. So
    thank you and all of you members for this great privilege.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, thanks to both of you.
        Governor Crist, I can't think of another time when I have
    heard such passionate praise on a bipartisan basis for a
    Governor. So I look forward, and we all do, for hearing your
    testimony at this point. Thank you very much.

          STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLIE CRIST, GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA

        Governor Crist. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the
    opportunity to be here, and I first want to thank you for your
    graciousness in allowing me to--and to all the members of the
    committee, I appreciate the chance to be here.
        And I want to thank my friends, and we are great friends. I
    have known Lincoln and Robert, the Members of the Congress, for
    many years. The words you just heard are incredibly kind and
    almost embarrassing, but I am very grateful for their
    friendship and for their leadership.
        On behalf of the people of Florida, they have been
    tremendous public servants, and we have a very proud
    delegation. I am very proud of all of our members of our
    delegation. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, along with Alcee Hastings,
    Chair it; and they do an extraordinary job for the people of
    our State. And I am just proud to be able to be here.
        Congressman Wexler, as you know, has been a passionate
    advocate on behalf of improving our voting system; and his
    passion is evident this morning again, as is Lincoln's, as it
    relates to voting and the importance of supporting our
    democracy.
        I also would like to recognize our Florida Secretary of
    State, Kurt Browning. He is here with us today as well, and he
    is doing a great job.
        I had the opportunity last evening to experience some of
    our national monuments. Standing at the feet of Lincoln and
    Jefferson, one can't help but be inspired by their words and
    their dedication to freedom. I was struck by Jefferson's words
    in which he said, and I will quote, ``Laws and institutions
    must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
    that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new
    discoveries are made, new truths are discovered and manners and
    opinions change. With the change of circumstances, institutions
    must advance also to keep pace with the times.''
        I want to speak to you this morning about the important
    issue of a paper trail and share with you the improvements that
    we have proposed in the State of Florida to our election
    process.
        As we all know, Florida has garnered much attention in past
    elections. However, I am pleased to report that our State has
    entered a new era. With the bipartisan efforts of the Florida
    State Legislature and our administration, we have moved beyond
    finger pointing and laying blame. Together, we have tackled the
    challenges facing our elections process and have made great
    progress towards implementing, I believe, a system that will
    allow every eligible voter to have their voice heard and ensure
    that their vote counts.
        I would like to share with you the proposal that I am
    presenting to our legislature during the current session in
    Florida. I would like to emphasize that every aspect of this
    proposal is aimed at a commitment to ensuring that every
    Floridian's vote will be counted and verifiable. This proposal
    will move Florida toward a comprehensive, streamlined election
    system that does use a paper ballot in every voting precinct in
    time for the primary election in the fall of 2008.
        Our proposal has three major components to it. First, we
    will replace all touch screen voting machines in polling places
    with optical scanners. Optical scan voting machines have a
    proven track record for accuracy and provide the paper trail
    that can be used for any recount if necessary.
        As you know, this system allows for the voter to use a
    pencil to fill in a designated space on a paper ballot for each
    race. The voter would then insert the completed ballot into an
    optical scanning machine which then records the vote on paper
    that can be used for verification purposes.
        Second, we will provide a system known as a ballot on
    demand that will produce an optical scan ballot for all early
    voting sites. Ballot on demand is a ballot production system
    that can be utilized by absentee as well as early voters.
    Ballot on demand allows for individual optical scan ballots to
    be printed when the voter arrives for the early voting, thus
    eliminating the need for touch screens with voter-verifiable
    paper trails to be used at early voting sites. The benefits of
    the ballot on demand system from an election management
    standpoint are numerous.
        In conclusion, Florida has worked in a bipartisan manner,
    actually, a nonpartisan manner, to effectively improve our
    election process. Our goal is to resolve voter confidence
    through new systems and restore voter confidence, procedures
    and implementation of both Federal and State legislation. We
    are pleased with the progress we have made in our State and
    continually look to enhance our elections system and streamline
    the voting process for millions of Floridians. When one of our
    citizens casts a ballot in an election at any level, be it
    local, State or Federal, they can leave the polling place with
    the confidence that their vote has been counted, recorded and
    can also be verified if necessary.
        As the grandson of an immigrant who came to this country
    when he was only 14 years old, I have a deep and abiding
    admiration and love for this Nation, as do you. The United
    States offers its citizens exceptional power through our
    democratic process. That democracy must be preserved and
    protected.
        I know your respect for our system of government is why
    each of you serve in this august body with great honor. We must
    work together to continue to ensure the integrity of that
    process. Our electoral process is the foundation of our
    democracy.
        As my friend Lincoln Diaz-Balart knows well, people just 90
    miles south of Florida shores are unable to freely exercise
    that right to vote. Every 2 years, millions of Americans
    express their opinion without fear of consequence. Sadly,
    people around the world yearn for this freedom and don't yet
    have it.
        We must work diligently to ensure our citizens' votes are
    validated and they are valued. The right to vote is the most
    fundamental of all American rights. There is no greater
    testament to our democracy than the ability of the people to
    choose their leaders.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Governor, for an impressive
    statement.
        [The statement of Governor Crist follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.093

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.094

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.095

        Ms. Lofgren. By unanimous consent, we will limit the
    questions to myself and the ranking member, because the
    governor's legislature is in session, and he needs to fly back
    there.
        I will just ask two quick questions. First, as we are
    looking at amendments to HAVA, concerns have been expressed by
    some elections officials as to the timing and whether changes
    can be made in time for the next election in 2008. So I am
    interested in how Florida is dealing with that.
        And the second question is, it is important to all of us
    and I know, sir, to you, that those who have disabilities have
    an opportunity to cast their vote freely and privately. And how
    are you addressing that?
        Governor Crist. Thank you very much for the opportunity.
        The timing issue first. As I indicated, we believe that if
    the legislature grants our wish and gives us the appropriate
    funding to be able to pay for these machines, that again, by
    the primary of 2008, they would be in place.
        Your other issue is extremely important to us as well. To
    make sure that the disabled have the opportunity to vote and
    that every one of their votes would count, we would employ
    touch screens with a printed ballot that would be produced next
    to it so that the opportunity and the ease of voting is
    accommodated there as well.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. McCarthy.
        Mr. McCarthy. I thank the Governor.
        I was reading the statement that you submitted. It was
    different than what you read.
        I want to congratulate Florida on the improvements they
    have made. You were saying, dropping down on the Presidential
    from 2000, the undervotes down to .4 percent. Tremendous
    improvement. I thank you for that.
        I come from a large State, California. We are moving our
    primary up. Are you moving your primary up?
        Governor Crist. We may be. And it is a very timely
    question. In fact, yesterday in our House of Representatives
    they passed an opportunity to move it up to either January 29
    or maybe even February 5. It is uncertain in its language at
    this point.
        Our State Senate, with a friend of the Congresswoman's, a
    new Senator, Jeremy Ring, has filed a bill that would address
    the same issue and also have the opportunity to move it up. But
    it is unclear at this point, but it may be moving in that
    direction.
        Mr. McCarthy. The other thing, knowing we are both from
    large States and we go out to make purchases, I just worry
    about the timeline. Is Florida willing to pay for all of your
    new optical machines if that is where you end up going? And by
    the purchase agreement, going out to bid and you move the
    primary up, will you have the time and the training to be able
    to do that?
        Governor Crist. We believe that we will. That is a very
    important issue to us. We are willing to pay for it. As the
    Congressman mentioned, we have recommended it in our budget
    from the Governor's Office to the legislature. We are pretty
    confident that they are going to honor their request.
        It is important to both our States. I have a sister who
    lives in the golden State, Laguna Beach. But I think it is very
    important that we have the appropriate funding, that we make
    sure the citizens can have faith in their voting system and
    that the election of the next President is one that is carried
    out with integrity and honor so that our country continues to
    move forward.
        Mr. McCarthy. I thank you for your time.
        Ms. Lofgren. With that, let me note that other members may
    submit questions to Governor Crist, and he has graciously
    offered to provide a written response.
        Governor, we were so delighted and pleased that you were
    able to join us here today. Thank you so very much for making
    the effort to share your experience.
        Governor Crist. Thank you, ma'am, very much for having me.
        Ms. Lofgren. Well, we now have our two colleagues,
    Congressman Rush Holt and Congressman Tom Petri, who are
    sponsors of the bill that is the subject of this hearing.
        We know them as well as friends and colleagues, but, for
    those in the audience, Congressman Holt is a Member of Congress
    from New Jersey. He has held positions as a teacher,
    congressional science fellow and arms control expert at the
    U.S. State Department; and he was the Assistant Director of the
    Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory prior to his election to
    the Congress.
        Tom Petri represents Wisconsin's Sixth Congressional
    District and is serving his 15th term in the House of
    Representatives. He is the ranking member on the Aviation
    Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
    Committee; and he is a former chairman of the House British
    American Parliamentary Group, an official organization formed
    to strengthen relations with the British Parliament and known
    as a foe of government waste.
        We are happy to have you both here and to present on the
    bill that is the subject of this conference.
        Mr. Holt, if you would begin.

     STATEMENT OF HON. RUSH D. HOLT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
                      FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Holt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I am delighted to be here with Mr. Petri, not only one of
    the couple hundred co-sponsors but one of the leading co-
    sponsors of H.R. 811.
        Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Ehlers, Mr. Gonzalez, Mrs. Davis, I am
    sure you will agree with me that a self-governing country works
    only if we believe it does. The faith in the process of
    democracy has been shaken, and I think we have to take
    immediate steps to restore that trust. Anything of value should
    be auditable, and it is central to this legislation that each
    voter's vote will be verifiable and the results of every
    election will be publicly auditable.
        As it is with nearly 40 percent of the voters around the
    country now, they are being asked to vote in ways that cannot
    be verified. In fact, a voter can leave the polling booth
    scratching her head or his head and wondering if the vote was
    recorded the way they intended. In fact, without a voter-
    verified paper ballot, no election official, no computer
    scientist, no vendor will be able to reconstruct what the voter
    intended. Only the voter can verify what she or he intended,
    and that is at the heart of this legislation.
        The legislation would require a voter-verified, durable
    paper ballot for every vote cast that would serve as the record
    for all recounts and audits. It would preserve and enhance the
    accessibility requirements of the Help America Vote Act and
    fund the development of new accessible ballot marking and
    ballot reading technologies.
        It would require random audits--and this is key--in every
    Federal election; and it would require that voters be given
    emergency paper ballots, emergency ballots immediately upon
    machine failure to prevent any disenfranchisement, as we saw,
    for example, this past year in Maryland. It would ban wireless
    devices, undisclosed software and Internet connections in order
    to make certain that the devices that are used are independent
    and unmodified.
        It is worth pointing out that a number of States, more than
    two dozen, have paper ballot-based voting now. Many of these
    requirements have recently been enacted.
        I think our legislation, which has been prepared with
    meticulous care and reviewed by many individuals and
    organizations, is somewhat better than many of those States. It
    is worth pointing out, for example, though 27 States have some
    sort of paper ballot-based voting, only 13 States conduct
    random audits.
        This would require, as I say, random audits in every
    election. We have seen too many elections in recent years where
    the winner was lack of evidence and the loser was the intent of
    the voters. This I think will correct that.
        I know there is some question about our ability to
    accomplish this in time. I am pleased that Governor Crist was
    able to speak this morning, because that gives an example that
    it is possible. As I understand what he plans to do, it would
    comply fully with this legislation, and they intend to have
    that in place before their primary in 2008.
        Certainly if we were able to spend billions of dollars and
    mount a national effort to comply with the Y2K imagined or
    maybe imaginary threat, we certainly should be able to mount
    this same kind of effort to deal with something that is central
    to the functioning of our democratic government.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much, Congressman Holt.
        [The statement of Mr. Holt follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.005

    STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS E. PETRI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
                      FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

        Mr. Petri. Well, thank you very much for having this
    hearing, and I have a statement that I appreciate you making--
    --
        Ms. Lofgren. We will make it part of the record.
        Mr. Petri. I will just summarize by saying the key
    responsibility we have is to do everything we can to assure
    public confidence in the integrity of the election process.
    That is, in my mind, accomplished by having a paper trail that
    can be checked; and if there is a recount, that people have
    confidence that they are getting an accurate count as a result
    of the recount.
        There are always going to be some gray areas and questions
    in any system. We are in the business. We have all been through
    or have known colleagues who have been through recounts, but it
    is very important to have that opportunity.
        People can challenge votes. They can look at it. They can
    look at each one and actually assure themselves that, as best
    can be determined, the voters' intention is being carried out.
    Some of these electronic systems don't provide that, and it
    seems to me that undermine confidence, and we all know the kind
    of conspiracy feelings that people have as a result.
        So I have confidence that this committee, with your
    expertise, will sift through the various ideas. Look at what
    Florida is doing and what many States have already done to
    assure their voters they do have a verifiable paper trail and
    get Federal law in line with that objective.
        Thank you very much.
        [The statement of Mr. Petri follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.007

        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you both very much. We know that this is
    a busy day for all of us, and we appreciate your taking the
    time to appear here and to be willing to answer some questions
    if we have some.
        In your written statement, Congressman Petri, you talk
    about some technical issues in the bill. Do you feel that we
    can deal with those technical issues as part of the hearing
    process and the amendment process?
        Mr. Petri. I think so. And I also think you have to be
    careful that--you have different vendors who are, obviously,
    looking for a little bit of an opportunity to have an edge when
    it comes to buying their equipment, and it seems to me the
    objective of the legislation should be not to favor one vendor
    over another but to make sure that there are standards that
    ensure an independently verifiable paper trail.
        There are some issues about whether you would permit, for
    example, kind of like a credit card receipt and then the voter
    is supposed to look at it and say, yeah, that is the way I
    voted. I am not sure that really meets the standard of
    separate, after the fact, independent audit. I would prefer
    that people could look at what the voter actually did and check
    it out in a recount.
        So there are issues like that that you need to look at very
    carefully, but it shouldn't be that complicated. Many States I
    think have got it right. The systems are in place where you
    cross--draw--as Governor Crist said, you draw a line through an
    arrow behind the name of the candidate you favor. The machine
    scans it and you see it drop into a bin. Those are there. They
    can be recounted or reprocessed and checked. It is a pretty
    confidence-inspiring system, I think.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Holt, I know that both of you actually are
    very concerned, as are we, that disabled voters be able to have
    full access to the democratic process by casting a private
    vote, and you are aware that some concern has been expressed in
    some sectors relative to the paper trail and the ability of the
    visually impaired to certify that. What is your answer to that?
    How do we make sure that all Americans, including the disabled,
    are accommodated?
        Mr. Holt. Well, not only is increased accessibility
    explicitly dealt with in the legislation, it is really central
    to the conception of the legislation, that it is intended to
    build on the Help America Vote Act and enhance the
    accessibility.
        I know there are some in the country--now you see it on the
    blogs--that are asking that we do away with all electronics and
    have paper ballots only. When confronted, they say, well, that
    is not quite what they mean, but it is, in fact, what they say.
    That would be a step backward, I think, as far as accessibility
    goes.
        Voters with physical limitations don't want a separate but
    equal system of voting. They want to be able to vote in secret,
    independently, just as every other citizen does; and this
    legislation I think certainly allows that.
        We have been careful not to get into the certification
    business, not pick and choose certain kinds of systems that
    should be used. Rather, we have chosen to establish principles
    that must be observed with a full recognition that there are
    systems available that meet those principles; and the
    principles are accessibility, auditability and voter
    verifiability.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
        Mr. McCarthy.
        Mr. McCarthy. Well, I thank both of you for coming.
        My first question is to Congressman Holt. Your bill talks
    about open source software. A lot of these machines run on also
    a Microsoft-based--and they have the intellectual property and
    protection and others, and they have to update regularly as
    they go through. How do you proceed to solve that problem? Or
    would you just keep it all publicly displayed or ask for that?
        Mr. Holt. The legislation as written was reviewed by a
    number of computer scientists and endorsed by them and by
    groups and organizations as well. I am certainly aware of that
    problem.
        Someone once said to me, why can't the software be publicly
    disclosed? It only counts. What is the proprietary secret that
    must be protected?
        Chairwoman Lofgren made reference to the legislative
    process that you are going through now. I am certainly willing
    to talk with you, and I am sure the computer scientists around
    the country who have shown such interest in this matter of
    verifiable voting would be willing to talk with you, to get the
    precise language that will give all voters the confidence that
    comes from transparency and, at the same time, protect
    legitimate trade secrets.
        Mr. McCarthy. Thank you.
        We have had quite a few hearings setting up to this one
    today, and you were able to participate in one we had the other
    day. The thing that struck me was the number of elected
    officials that run elections from the county to the Secretary
    of State that seem opposed to this bill and--I mean, we had the
    Executive Director of the National Association of Election
    Officials. I was just wondering if you could talk to that,
    explain to me why the majority of them would oppose your bill.
        Mr. Holt. I don't know to whom you are referring. I haven't
    taken a tally. But it was my sense that a large number of
    elected officials, the majority of elected officials, support
    this.
        I do, for example, have here the written testimony that was
    submitted to you from the Secretary of State of Minnesota,
    speaking in favor of this legislation and also making the point
    that it could be implemented within the time prescribed.
        I think some election officials have kind of the usual
    personal reluctance to have anybody tell them what to do. You
    know, several of them have said to me, what is the matter?
    Don't you trust us?
        You know, it seems to me that is like a CEO saying, well, I
    am not going to have the books audited because what is wrong?
    Don't you trust me?
        You want independent auditing in any case for anything of
    value.
        Mr. McCarthy. Can I ask you one question?
        Mr. Holt. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McCarthy. Do you have this letter that I got from NCSL
    and NACo, National Association of Counties opposing your bill?
        I mean, I don't assume that--and I come from the State
    legislature. I find elected officials, whether Republican or
    Democrat, want to have accountability and want to have honest
    elections.
        Then I guess if I could just follow up on another question
    with you. I appreciate your passion on this bill, and I
    appreciate your desire to make sure we have accurate elections.
    An interesting thing happened in one of the panels. A person
    said that their organization goes through all phases. And I
    agree with you. I want to make sure at the end of the day we
    have the most honest elections we can. And a unifying thing
    that most everybody says, the more people handle ``paper'', the
    more options you have to have problems.
        But, okay, we count at the end of the day auditing that
    those who voted make sure their votes counted. In your bill,
    you never addressed or would you address the people who vote--
    are we allowing people to vote who don't have a right to vote?
    Would that not be overall accountability when a person says
    "all phases" and did you think of that or would you bring that
    into your bill?
        Mr. Holt. There are, I think, a number of aspects of
    elections and voting in the United States that still need
    attention, that has to do with everything from the registration
    lists to whether felons or former felons should be allowed to
    vote to how provisional ballots are counted and what happens if
    you intentionally deceive voters.
        There are a number of things that are not dealt with in
    this legislation, including conflicts of interest, except in a
    limited way with regard to system vendors and so forth. There
    is a little language about conflict of interest, but I think
    many of those things are better dealt with in other pieces of
    legislation.
        Mr. McCarthy. Thank you for your time.
        Ms. Lofgren. I would note for the record that the testimony
    of the Secretary of State of Minnesota, Mr. Mark Ritchie, will
    be included in the record.
        [The statement of Mr. Ritchie follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.097

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.098

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.099

        Ms. Lofgren. Now I invite Congressman Gonzalez to----
        Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
        If I am not here throughout the proceedings, it is because
    we have a mark-up in Energy, and I will be going back and
    forth.
        My second observation is that I don't think the sky is
    falling, but I think parts of the ceiling may be falling. So if
    I rush out of the way----
        Rush, thank you very much. Tom, thank you very much for
    your testimony today. You have been here for the testimony for
    other election officials, and it seems to me--and we have the
    Governor today, of course, with his proposed legislation in
    Florida. If you had your druthers, would you prefer to go the
    route that Governor Crist is proposing in Florida, as opposed
    to your bill? Because we deal with legislative realities. I
    understand that. But I am just talking about if you had
    choices, because I am going to ask the same question of Tom in
    a minute.
        Mr. Holt. I have only had a second-hand account of what
    precisely the Governor is going to do. It sounds to me as if it
    would be fully in compliance with this legislation.
        As I said, in drawing the legislation, we recognized that
    running elections has been, under the Constitution, the purview
    of the States and that there are many, many systems already in
    use. We chose not to specify election systems here. We didn't
    want to get into the certifying business of--that this system
    is good for physical accessibility for people with physical
    disabilities, this system is not, and so forth. So not knowing
    enough about the Florida system and in keeping with my general
    principle of this bill, I think I really can't answer that.
        Mr. Gonzalez. Tom, same question.
        Mr. Petri. Yeah. I think there is a danger of trying to
    overload what should be a pretty simple bill that has at its
    heart ensuring basically a paper trail so there can be an
    accurate recount. And issues of--as the Governor said and, of
    course, Florida, we are all aware of, has been in the
    crosshairs because of close Presidential elections and so on.
    But it has happened in every State, I suspect, in one election
    or another.
        I think we should allow a reasonable amount of initiative
    to the people that have to carry this out and what the States
    are doing to deal with this problem, frankly. And I think the
    Governor has indicated he has bipartisan support in his State,
    and that is important I think for public confidence, for
    members of both parties as well.
        There are a lot of other issues that might well be dealt
    with at one time or another, you know, who is qualified to
    vote, helping handicapped people vote with various types of
    disabilities and so on. But the key point, after what happened
    in Florida, is to attempt to upgrade or help States upgrade the
    election process, and to make sure that we have a system that
    people have confidence in at its core; and that is what I think
    the Governor was attempting to address.
        Mr. Gonzalez. And, believe me, I appreciate the effort that
    you are demonstrating regarding this piece of legislation. It
    seems to me--and we will have this debate--that if any State
    has had experiences that leads them to probably seek the most
    thorough of remedies, it has to be the State of Florida. So I
    really applaud the Governor.
        Let me tell you what I mean by that. It seems to me that I
    know we should have a paper trail. That is important. The voter
    can then verify to make sure that those are the votes, if in
    fact the voter takes his or her time and such. And then, for
    the purpose of a recount, obviously, without a paper trail, we
    know a recount means nothing in most instances; and I will tell
    you that from my experiences in the State of Texas.
        The remedy that Florida proposes, though, it appears to
    have something in the front end; and that is that I think at
    the time of casting the ballot you have a more informed,
    thorough process at that point, if you take the testimony of
    the Governor.
        It also addresses something else other than the
    verification, the audit, the recount, which is incredibly
    important, but, at the front end, we are talking about
    undervoting, undercount--people that believe they have cast a
    vote and somehow have not.
        I really believe that Florida may be onto something, and I
    think we need to be exploring that avenue, and there is so much
    more to discuss, and I need to go. But, Madam Chair, there are
    other aspects of the voting process regarding its integrity,
    who is allowed to vote and so on. I think that is a different
    issue that needs to be dealt with, just as voter intimidation
    and denial of the right to vote by those who are eligible to
    vote. That is an argument, that is a debate for a different
    day, I believe, and that we should expend some energy on it,
    but, today, I think we are really looking at the mechanics.
        Thank you very much.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Gonzalez.
        Let me note our colleague, Corrine Brown, is here also from
    Florida. And Mr. Ehlers.
        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        First of all, I would observe that the ceiling never fell
    in when the Republicans were in control. Maybe we have had a
    few tremors in the last year.
        First, for Dr. Holt, a very specific question that my staff
    was wondering about. Do you know of a DRE with a VVPAT that
    currently meets the accessibility standards described in your
    bill and that would be ready for deployment in 2008?
        Mr. Holt. Yes, I think there are several. In fact, there
    were several that were on display in this very room a week or
    so ago.
        Mr. Ehlers. Okay. I would just appreciate for the record if
    you could just give those to us later. I don't want to take
    your time here.
        Mr. Holt. All right.
        Mr. Ehlers. Next, I totally agree with you. You stated your
    objective at the beginning that every voter should have the
    assurance that the vote they cast is counted and, as you said,
    verifiable. That is a good goal. I have always added a second
    one, that they also have the assurance that their vote is not
    diluted by fraudulent votes being cast elsewhere. I think that
    is very important. We often forget that.
        For example, the reason that the voting machines were
    developed, the primary reason was because of all the fraud that
    occurred with the paper ballots of that day; and I find it
    interesting back then they went from paper to machines in order
    to avoid fraud and get reliability. Now we are talking about
    going from machines to paper to get better reliability.
        I am not against your bill, by the way. I have raised a lot
    of questions about the specifics of it, but the State of
    Michigan has had several elections already using equipment
    precisely the same as what Florida is planning to install.
    Frankly, I think optical scan is a good approach, but it is not
    just the equipment. We have to get away from the idea that
    establishing equipment answers it.
        The election in 2000 in Florida had a paper trail called
    punch card ballots. It is no different from the optical scan.
    You punched the ballot, the machine counted it and so forth.
    They did not maintain it properly, and that is what led to all
    the confusion.
        So it really, once again, comes down to the local level.
        I have some 35 years' experience at local elections and
    working with Secretaries of State. Some are absolutely superb.
    In a few elections it tends to go bad, but it is not always
    just the equipment.
        One other comment, your comment about some opposition to
    your bill, and indeed there is, but I think the real issue is
    that most--the counties, the States feel it is overly
    prescriptive and that it doesn't trust their judgment to handle
    local situations, particularly I think the detailed audit
    requirements. For years, States have had a lot of audit
    requirements. It is called the Board of Canvassers, and they
    each have developed their own methods to suit their particular
    localities and particular States. So, I think the prescriptive
    nature of your audit requirement is what has alienated the
    counties and the States. The Boards of Canvassers have a very
    good record of doing this.
        These are just comments on the bill. As I say, I don't
    oppose your intent, but I think we have to be very careful.
    First of all, not infringe on what the actual poll workers want
    to say and do, but, secondly, have a reasonable approach how
    that works and not define the market simply by being very
    prescriptive.
        I do have a question for you. You are a physicist, as I am,
    and you have used computers most of your life. How did you
    verify the results of the computers when you used them?
        Mr. Holt. Usually and, in fact, it is a principle of
    computer science that a computer program cannot verify itself.
    There must be an independent verification. In other words,
    whether the landing module actually touches down or whether the
    books balance separately. Some people compare this to ATM
    machines; and I say, really, it is quite different from ATM
    machines. Because at the end of the month, you and the bank
    compare notes. But that cannot happen in the case of voting and
    still maintain the secrecy. So whenever I have done computer
    programming and I think whenever anybody does, the verification
    must come through some independent path.
        Mr. Ehlers. But also verification can come through using
    the computer appropriately. I have verified programs by using
    the same computer but taking a different approach. My point is
    simply, being overly prescriptive and requiring a paper trail,
    couldn't we also just require that there be a verifiable
    redundant trail which could, in fact, include the computer with
    an additional CPU that observes the keystrokes?
        Again, you don't necessarily have to answer that and say,
    yes, that is okay. My point is simply, let's let the market and
    let's let the county clerks, the State, the Secretaries of
    State, and the State election officials decide which system is
    best for their State. We should just establish the principle
    that the result of the voters' actions has to be verifiable,
    has to be verifiable in your language by the voter, him or
    herself, but also by the canvassers, those who tally the votes
    and so forth. Would you accept that as a guiding principle?
        Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired, but you can
    answer that.
        Mr. Holt. I can answer that very quickly by saying there
    have been suggestions that you use a separate electronic method
    of verifying an electronic count. That would not give the
    voters confidence. Maybe someday, in which case we would want
    to rewrite and update this legislation. But I think all of the
    co-sponsors and the endorsers of this legislation believe that
    the only way we will have confidence in the voting system is
    with paper ballots that voters can independently verify.
        Mr. Ehlers. The only way I will----
        Mr. Holt. And as for fraudulent voters, there have been
    very few cases----
        Ms. Lofgren. We are going to ask----
        Mr. Holt [continuing]. Prosecuted around the country.
        Ms. Lofgren [continuing]. Congresswoman Davis be permitted
    to ask her questions.
        We are going to have I think a vote around noon, so I think
    we are going to have to ask people after this panel to stick a
    little bit closer to the 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I, too, will be in and
    out a little bit; and I am looking forward to the next panels
    as well.
        But I wonder if you could just comment--I think one of the
    criticisms perhaps in terms of this prescription has been for
    the durable and archival paper trail, and if you could just
    comment on that, whether that is something, you know, we have
    available to us so that it is not necessarily in a roll--and,
    again, how would those paper rolls--if that or something
    archival--be counted, be audited and then possibly be
    recounted?
        Mr. Holt. Is that to me?
        Mrs. Davis. Sure.
        Mr. Holt. When we wrote the bill, I didn't understand that
    archival paper has a generally understood meaning that
    archivists and book historians and others refer to. We
    definitely want, I believe, a durable paper ballot. It does not
    have to meet the standards of archival quality, and so that is
    a word that I would suggest changing in the legislation.
        I know some have said we are using thermal paper, thermal
    printer paper, and we would like to continue to use that. I had
    a good example last weekend where I got a receipt on thermal
    paper, and I just sent it to my staff yesterday. Because when I
    went to look at it again, I guess because it had been near a
    hot liquid or something, it was illegible just from last
    weekend. It is not durable. It is not the sort of thing that
    you want to count and recount weeks or even months later.
        Mrs. Davis. So this is an issue that you are still looking
    at? Just for the record.
        Mr. Holt. That is right.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that.
        I am going to ask this question to the next panel.
    Hopefully, I will be here at that time. Because what we are
    talking about really goes to the heart of voter confidence.
        One of the issues that was kind of facetiously mentioned at
    our hearing the other day, paper or plastic, as people come to
    vote, but the reality is that people choose absentee in many
    cases. They sometimes need a provisional ballot so there is an
    alternative to whatever system is in place at the precinct, and
    I am wondering if there is anything in your legislation here
    that precludes using both an electronic system and a paper
    system--well, I guess optical scans are electronic. But
    something that--where people were actually making those
    choices. Is there anything in your legislation that would
    preclude that----
        Mr. Holt. Well, I am not quite sure----
        Mrs. Davis [continuing]. As long as it has a verifiable
    paper ballot?
        Mr. Holt. Yes. What our legislation requires, that there be
    a voter-verified paper ballot. Now what goes along with that,
    we don't really specify. There are some accessibility issues
    that, you know, a purely paper system cannot help the voter
    with disabilities along with the process.
        Mrs. Davis. Exactly. And part of my question is----
        Mr. Holt. Ballot marking device certainly can, for example.
        Mrs. Davis. Right. And the issue is whether or not--and I
    didn't suspect that there was in your legislation. I just
    wanted to confirm that. Because I think that, as the Governor
    from Florida mentioned, they will have two types essentially.
    My sense would be that people, disabilities or not, might
    choose one system over another; and there may be a point at
    which we arrive at that. We are not there today, but that is
    something that we might want to do.
        Mr. Holt. The one issue on that subject that I would
    caution you on is, with all good intentions, coming up with a
    system that is separate but equal for people with disabilities,
    to the extent possible voters with disabilities should be
    permitted to vote as everyone does.
        Mrs. Davis. Right. As well. And anyone can vote on a system
    for the disabled as well. I think people could choose either
    system.
        I think that is all I am asking and just to be sure that
    that is nothing that would be in this legislation that would
    preclude that for the future.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
        We have been joined by the chairwoman of the full
    committee, Congresswoman Millender-McDonald, who will ask a few
    questions.
        The Chairwoman. Thank you so much, and good morning to you,
    members, the ranking member, good morning and good morning to
    all of you. It is great to see you here this morning.
        I am especially pleased to see my colleagues, Congressman
    Rush Holt and Congressman Petri.
        I can say unequivocally that Congressman Holt has given
    this everything he has. He has worked tirelessly to make sure
    that this bill came before the Committee, and that we recognize
    the important work that he put into it. I thank you so much for
    your tenacity and for ensuring that we try to look into
    something that is especially important to the American people.
    People want to know that when they vote, their vote is counted
    accurately. You have come up with what you perceive is a way to
    ensure that happens.
        I have just one question, and I don't know whether I can
    ask either of you. In December the Technical Guidelines
    Development Committee sent a recommendation to the Election
    Assistance Commission that said all voting systems meet
    requirements for an independent verification system that
    produces multiple independent records of ballot selections that
    can be audited to a high level of precision. Are there other
    methods for achieving voter confidence without using this
    paper? Is there anything, Mr. Holt or Mr. Petri, that you know
    about? Are you aware of that?
        Mr. Holt. Actually, I am not sure that I understood the
    question. I apologize.
        The Chairwoman. Well, that is okay. I am looking into that
    further.
        Mr. Holt. I will be happy to follow up on that.
        The Chairwoman. All right then. Is there any statistical
    data on the number of votes lost during the 2000 election
    because of overvotes and the number of votes lost in 2006 when
    DREs were used in elections?
        Mr. Holt. Well, following the 2000 election, there was a
    study done by a group of academics from MIT and Caltech that
    looked at what they call residuals, overvotes, undervotes for
    various kinds of systems.
        And that is partially out of date now because many States
    have changed their systems in the meantime. But still there are
    40 percent of Americans now who are voting in ways that are
    unverifiable on machines of the type that did not fare too well
    in those studies. So you might suspect that there are some
    problems that are going undetected because there are no paper
    ballots for the actual count.
        There have been other studies done by a variety of groups,
    more recently taking slightly different approaches. But, yes,
    there are data about overvotes and undervotes and the vendors,
    some of whom were here last week.
        The Chairwoman. Right.
        Mr. Holt. Who have changed their designs in many cases to
    try to address those issues so that they will catch overvotes,
    undervotes, intentional and unintentional.
        The Chairwoman. Okay. Well, Madam Chair, I will just stop
    there and I will resume questioning the witnesses when your
    next panel comes, because it appears to be someone that you and
    I both know.
        Ms. Lofgren [presiding]. Thank you both very much for your
    leadership on this issue.
        We are now pleased to have two secretaries of State testify
    before us: the Honorable Debra Bowen, Secretary of State of
    California; and the Honorable Chris Nelson, Secretary of State
    of South Dakota. Thank you both so much for taking the time to
    be here.
        And another friend from California. Hello, Delores.
        Our Secretary of State--and I say we are heavily
    Californian on this committee--Debra Bowen is the author of the
    first-in-the-world law to put all of California's legislative
    information on line and has required all audits to be conducted
    in public and to include absentee and early voter ballots.
        She was elected California Secretary of State last
    November. She has been a pioneer of open government, personnel
    privacy rights, and election integrity. After earning her law
    degree at the University of Virginia, she practiced corporate
    tax and ERISA law. And she was elected to the California
    Assembly in 1992, served for 8 years in the California State
    Assembly. And she became only the sixth woman in California
    history to be elected to statewide constitutional office. We
    are very proud of Debra Bowen in California.
        And the Honorable Chris Nelson, South Dakota Secretary of
    State, has been the State election supervisor in the Secretary
    of State's office for 13 years. He is currently serving, of
    course, as the Secretary of State, having been elected in 2002.
        Prior to becoming Secretary of State, he held the position
    of State election supervisor for 13 years and he received in
    2003 the 2003, Excellence in South Dakota Municipal Government
    Award from the South Dakota Municipal League. He has been
    appointed in 2005 as the National Governors Association
    representative on the United States Election Assistance
    Commission Board of Advisers. He graduated from White Lake High
    School and South Dakota State University in 1987 with highest
    honors. And we welcome you both.

         STATEMENTS OF HON. DEBRA BOWEN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF
    CALIFORNIA, AND HON. CHRIS NELSON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF SOUTH
                                 DAKOTA

        Ms. Lofgren. Debra, thank you so much for being here, and
    if you would start. We have this little machine, and we ask
    that the testimony try and be within 5 minutes. The written
    testimony will be a part of the official record. When the
    yellow light goes on it means you have about a minute left, but
    we are not too heavy on the gavel, as you have noticed. Welcome
    back, Debra.

                        STATEMENT OF DEBRA BOWEN

        Ms. Bowen. It is an enormous honor for me to be here with
    you today and I join you as a very proud American, proud of
    this country's history, of our spirit, our ability to create
    and to innovate. And I believe that the greatest innovation in
    this country's history is democracy itself. And when I work on
    these issues that involve the democratic process, I remind
    myself that in the history of civilization, there has been
    nothing obvious about self-governance.
        One of the wonderful things about democracy is it permits
    us to correct course. In fact, it demands we correct course.
    And in most of our country's early elections, voters had to be
    white, male, and own 50 acres of property in order to exercise
    the franchise. We have corrected course on that, of course, but
    we face another great challenge now, which is proving to
    skeptical citizenry that every vote counts.
        I would offer three key thoughts:
        First, at this point in our country's history, every
    State's elections affect every other State's citizens. We truly
    are interdependent.
        Second, our democracy, our self-governance has costs, but
    those costs are a small price to pay for the certainty of fair,
    open, and honest elections, with results that are beyond doubt.
        And third, we can and should accomplish the goals of having
    fair, open, and honest elections, without doubt, and we should
    do that now.
        That provision that we be able to prove that the results of
    an election are accurate is our greatest challenge. That
    verification must be publicly reviewable and verifiable. Which
    is what makes it unlike the verification of software used, for
    example, on a lunar landing module or a fly-by-wire system. It
    is not just those who are using the computer system who have to
    be able to verify its accuracy, it is every single citizen who
    relies on the accuracy of the system has to be able to do that.
        This issue, as has been discussed here today, is not
    partisan. We currently in Orange County, California have a
    situation where two Republicans, Janet Nguyen and Trung Nguyen,
    are locked in a recount with less than 10 votes separating
    them. And the e-voting experts have already been engaged.
        So what steps can States and local jurisdictions take? Our
    first step in California was to require that electronic voting
    machines have a paper trail. That has been the law in
    California since 2004, pursuant to a bill carried by Republican
    State Senator Ross Johnson, who was just appointed by Governor
    Schwarzenegger to chair our Fair Political Practices
    Commission. But having the paper trail proved to be
    insufficient and we subsequently revised our laws to require
    that that paper trail be used to conduct the mandatory 1
    percent recount that every county does before an election is
    certified.
        And even so, in California questions about voting equipment
    persist and that is why I have undertaken a top-to-bottom
    review of every voting system that we currently use. We will
    review security, accuracy, verifiability and usability not just
    for voters and disabled voters, but also for poll workers and
    elections officials. The more complicated you make a system,
    the more likely you are to make mistakes, and I think that is a
    useful principle for all of us to keep in mind.
        So while I know what I would do if I were a county
    registrar of voters--I am not; my task in California, my
    statutory mandate, is to review systems to determine whether
    they meet the basic criteria of security, accuracy,
    verifiability and usability. We have a very short time frame to
    complete this. As you all know, we have recently added a
    February 5th primary to our election schedule for next year and
    I do not want to put county elections officials in the position
    of having to purchase and deploy new election equipment 2
    months before an election or between the three elections we
    will hold next year. We will get this done and we will have
    public participation. And I would ask and hope that other
    States would do the same.
        We cannot afford another election in which the citizenry
    questions the results once the election is complete. Thank you.
        [The statement of Ms. Bowen follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.010

        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very, very much. Mr. Nelson.

                       STATEMENT OF CHRIS NELSON

        Mr. Nelson. Madam Chairwoman, members of the committee. It
    is truly a privilege for me to appear before this honorable
    committee. Just one additional bit of introduction of myself, I
    also serve as a cochair of the National Association of
    Secretaries of State Elections Committee.
        The key question that I would like to answer today is this:
    How can we improve the election system in America without
    damaging the things that are currently working?
        And my answer to that question is this: I ask you to allow
    State and local election officials the time and flexibility
    needed to perfect the HAVA mandates before we go on with
    additional mandates from the Federal level.
        I can assure you that after each election, election
    officials evaluate what worked, what needs to be improved and
    what new challenges may occur in the next election, and we work
    with a passion to get it right. You heard a powerful example
    from the Governor of Florida this morning about changes that
    they are making because of the issues that they have been
    involved with. They are making those changes at the State and
    local level.
        I ask who is best positioned to drive the change in the
    improvements that are needed in our election system in America?
    I believe it is State and local officials who understand the
    landscape. I also know that what might work in Los Angeles
    County may not work very well in Jones County, South Dakota,
    with 817 registered voters, and the perfect fit for Jones
    County may not work in San Diego or San Jose. One-size-fits-all
    mandates and requirements at the Federal level simply may cause
    unintended consequences and problems when implemented at the
    State and local level. As State and local officials, one of our
    first priorities when we work on change and improvement is to
    make sure we do no harm to the things that are already working.
        I just want to address briefly two of the principles in the
    whole bill, the first being the requirement for the individual
    verified paper ballot requirement. And I want to be clear. I am
    a paper ballot advocate. I am a paper component advocate. In
    South Dakota we have adopted the optical scan system with a
    touch-screen marking device for that system. It has worked very
    well.
        But I also understand that across America hundreds of
    millions of dollars have been spent in the last 3 and 4 years
    in faithful compliance with the requirements of the Help
    America Vote Act. That money was spent to procure equipment and
    train and implement and test that equipment. And now we are
    looking at a bill that may require much of that to be scrapped
    in the next 12 months and that is a shameful, shameful waste of
    taxpayer money and I hope we can find some way to work around
    that tremendous expenditure that has already been made to try
    to comply.
        I know the bill contains $300 million to help offset those
    costs. I don't think that is going to be enough for the
    retooling that will have to happen across America with the
    requirements of the bill.
        The section 5 audit requirement provision of this
    particular bill, I absolutely agree and understand that
    accountability is a mandatory and valuable part of an election
    system. States are adopting audit requirements. States have
    provisions that can deal with these issues and are moving in
    that direction. But those provisions that States are adopting
    work in harmony with their existing procedures as opposed to
    complicating processes that are already in place.
        The audit provisions of H.R. 811, I believe, may lead to
    unintended consequences. In visiting with my State auditor, he
    said this is going to put me in a position of conflict of
    interest that we work very hard never to be in. The logistics
    are a concern to me. The audit board, is this board going to
    travel from county to county to county in some sort of
    traveling show doing vote counts? Or are we going to be sending
    ballot boxes into the State capital with all the accompanying
    security concerns that would be involved in that? I have
    questions about that.
        I have concerns about the delay that this will cause in
    certifying Federal elections. In 2004, South Dakota's lone
    House seat was vacant. We held a special election. And our
    citizens were anxious to get that position filled. When they
    elected our Congresswoman, Stephanie Herseth, we were able to
    certify that in a day or two after the election. This bill
    would require that it take several weeks before an audit would
    be complete and we would be able to install a Congressperson
    when there is a vacancy. That is an unintended problem or
    consequence.
        As you are aware, there is a provision in this bill to
    reimburse States for that audit requirement. You are also aware
    that the original Help America Vote Act contained another $800
    million of authorization to reimburse States for their costs.
    That money has never been appropriated. And I will tell you, at
    the State and county level we are skeptical whether or not the
    funds will be appropriated to pay for this new mandate.
        The last thing that I would say--and I would just ask you,
    work with us to allow us to finish implementing the original
    HAVA requirements and work out those problems that might be
    there at the State and local level before we put new mandates
    and pressures on the system. Thank you.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
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        Ms. Lofgren. Now we will get into our questions. I just
    have a couple of questions. In California, you are doing a top-
    to-bottom review and--could this result in some machines or
    systems being decertified in this calendar year?
        Ms. Bowen. Yes.
        Ms. Lofgren. And then the counties would have to have
    another system in place by February of next year?
        Ms. Bowen. That is correct.
        Ms. Lofgren. Obviously, you wouldn't do that unless you
    felt it was possible for them to comply. How do you think this
    is going to work?
        Ms. Bowen. It is going to require a lot of teamwork with
    elections officials and the public. And one of the things that
    we can do in a primary election that we cannot do in the
    general is to lease equipment or to use equipment from other
    States. And that happened in the 2006 cycle in some places. We
    don't all go to the polls at same time.
        Ms. Lofgren. So your real deadline is November of 2008.
        Ms. Bowen. The big issue for the country is November of
    2008. And the other option, and it is one that has been used in
    California before, because we have to have an election and even
    if equipment is not what we would choose, we still have to have
    an election. But there are conditions that can be put in place
    that help make up for flaws in security, accuracy, and
    usability.
        So if we are in the situation where equipment does not meet
    the the standards, we will have some difficult choices to make
    about what conditions should be put into place. Just as an
    example, one of the difficulties we have had with some of the
    electronic voting machines is that they are in large counties.
    They are sent home with poll workers, sometimes as much as a
    week in advance, fully programmed, and stored in places that
    are not necessarily secure. One of the conditions we might
    think about is a much more secure means of delivery. That is
    available in the private sector.
        Ms. Lofgren. Correct. Let me just raise the issue of
    software. You have been a proponent, if I am correct, of open
    source. Why have you advocated that? And if you could also
    comment--I think California requires an exact copy of source
    code to be put in an escrow-type situation, and I am wondering
    has that been resisted by software companies. Could you address
    those two issues?
        Ms. Bowen. I have the software in my office, and when we do
    the top-to-bottom review we will engage experts to look at the
    software. But obviously I have fewer eyes and fewer experts to
    do that review, because some of that software is proprietary
    and I cannot release it.
        Using open source software has two advantages. One is that
    it allows everyone to review the software, and there are a very
    large number of computer programmers in this country who have
    not normally been highly active in political processes who are
    very engaged in issues around voting systems.
        And second, the ownership is in the public domain so that
    any State, any local jurisdiction, can use that software
    without paying a licensing fee; and also, then, if they are
    using open source software, can change vendors without having
    to scrap an entire system and buy everything over again.
        Having said that, an open source system that is certified
    does not currently exist. There is a system that is ready to be
    certified. I would particularly be interested in seeing open
    source software used in the tabulator, because even if we go
    back to paper ballots at the polling place, we are going to be
    tabulating, using a computer, and that counting is so critical
    and it is so important that that software be open.
        And the other place I would like to see a focus on that is
    with better disabled voting systems. We do not have, for all of
    the great innovation in this country and in Silicon Valley, we
    don't have a large number of choices in voting systems that
    meet the needs of some disabled voters.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you so much.
        Mr. McCarthy.
        Mr. McCarthy. Thank you both for coming. If I could follow
    up with Secretary Bowen, in listening to your statement and
    hearing you in these concerns you have, in the bill it says it
    wants this to be implemented by 2008. And it sounds like that
    would be a major concern to you. And also the only concern I
    thought I had, listening to you, was the $300 million would not
    be enough.
        Ms. Bowen. $300 million is not enough, particularly if
    States that currently have only touch-screen voting systems
    with no paper have to replace those systems. 2008 is doable for
    some parts of the bill and difficult for others. I am not going
    to ask my counties to procure something that does not exist, or
    to use it. So we have to be realistic about what exists. And
    then States need to get together and work towards creating
    systems that meet their needs.
        Mr. McCarthy. My other question to you, then, is would you
    propose to audit every Federal race, knowing some of these
    races, some are close and some are not close at all? Referring
    to our Speaker, she won with 80-some percent of the vote. I won
    with 71 percent of the vote. And you and I had a little
    discussion about time line. The Secretary talked about time
    line. Would it be feasible or would it be better to do random?
        Ms. Bowen. The best audit system, I think, is one that is
    random, but that in the randomly selected precincts does audit
    each vote, including early votes in that precinct and votes
    cast by absentee ballot or by mail ballot.
        One of the suggestions that I think has been the best is to
    then use that result to trigger a fuller review, depending on
    what the margin is. In a race in which there is only one
    candidate on the ballot, there is not a lot of need to go to a
    100 percent hand recount or hand audit. But in a race such as
    the one in Orange County right now, where they are very close,
    it is appropriate I think for elections systems to build in a
    trigger that automatically does that audit without the need for
    a candidate to post the funds to do that. It is public interest
    to have accuracy.
        Mr. McCarthy. What percent do you do in California when we
    do the random? Do we do 3 percent or 1 percent?
        Ms. Bowen. One percent.
        Mr. McCarthy. Do you feel that is sufficient?
        Ms. Bowen. It is not sufficient.
        Mr. McCarthy. What do you feel that number should be?
        Ms. Bowen. We need the guidance of statisticians. We want
    statistically significant audits and recounts. That is a
    stepped process. When I do the 1 percent count, if you get a
    result that is a significant difference you may decide that is
    not a place to recount. But this isn't a place where
    politicians should be making the calls; it is a place where--
    statistics is a well developed science. We don't need to
    reinvent it.
        Mr. McCarthy. Maybe we should not sit down and mandate in
    every congressional race in California you need to do 10
    percent of the vote. Would that be feasible?
        Ms. Bowen. Of course it is feasible, but I don't think it
    makes sense. It is not the best use of the resources that we
    have.
        Mr. McCarthy. Okay. I appreciate you coming all this way.
    And congratulations, by the way.
        Ms. Bowen. Thank you.
        Mr. McCarthy. To Secretary Nelson, you talked about one-
    size-fits-all does not work. If you could elaborate on that on
    some of the experiences you have had.
        Mr. Nelson. I have had a lot of years of experience working
    with the various laws--of election laws that we have to
    administer. In my written testimony I give a poignant example
    of a one-size-fits-all requirement that was in the Help America
    Vote Act. And it dealt with the requirement for putting
    minority languages on the voting machines in those areas that
    are covered by the minority language provisions of the Voting
    Rights Act.
        And in South Dakota that applies to Native Americans with
    the Lakota language. And we went to the leaders within that
    community and we said this is the new Federal requirement. And
    they said, that does not make any sense. Our people are not
    going to use that. And yet we said we have to do it. And so we
    did. And we spent $28,000 on that requirement, and 10 people
    statewide used it. It is $2,800 per voter that we spent on that
    particular requirement.
        In areas of our country where there is a heavy population
    of minority speakers, that might make sense. In other areas it
    does not, and yet that is one of the unintended consequences
    when we get Federal legislation that does not take that into
    account.
        Mr. McCarthy. Thank you both for your time.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
        The Chairwoman. It is very interesting to sit and hear the
    two of you who are the top guns, as election officials in your
    respective States, and yet as we sit here and talk to
    manufacturers and look at machines, it is disturbing to hear
    Secretary Bowen say that we do not have a lot of voting
    equipment that will work for the disabled. That seems to be a
    travesty in this country.
        Are we talking to manufacturers? Are they beginning to look
    into this? Where are we in this continuum?
        Ms. Bowen. We do have some systems that I think meet the
    needs of disabled voters quite well. There is one system that
    is a ballot-marking device that has sip-and-puff capability,
    has capability for voters who are visually challenged, and that
    ballot-marking device produces a ballot that can be optically
    scanned. That is important because it means that counties that
    use an optical scan system and that ballot-marking device for
    disabled voters only need one tabulating system, one auditing
    and review system, one place where everything is done.
        It is an enormous advantage to using optical scan ballots.
    It is a well-developed technology. You can, if you have a long
    line in a particular polling place, simply hand people the
    paper ballot and a marking device and they can shorten the line
    very quickly, if they choose to do so, by marking their ballot
    independently.
        But, again, I don't like being in a position where there
    are only one or two or three vendors. And that is a place
    where, if we don't have what we need, then I think it is our
    responsibility as election officials to get together. And
    States can do this together, and particularly with open source
    software. I think we will find that there will be foundations
    and groups who will work with us. I would expect if we come
    back with this issue in 2 years, that the landscape about what
    is available will be quite different than what it is currently.
        The Chairwoman. I had about six or seven manufacturers here
    last week with their machines, and one had a telephone-type
    machine that can be used by the disabled. How do you feel about
    that? Do you think that particular machine is good for our
    disabled voters?
        Ms. Bowen. For many disabled voters that system is
    terrific. The difficulty is that it requires a securitized
    telephone call. It depends on a call that is originating from a
    place that is known. Otherwise, an election official has no way
    of knowing that the voter who is using the code they have been
    given is actually that voter, or whether the code has been
    given to someone else, usurped by someone else, sold to someone
    else.
        In States that use that system, a disabled voter has to
    come to a polling place or to the registrar's office to be able
    to use it. We don't have a mechanism to vote over the Internet,
    not because the technology isn't there, but because we have no
    way to know who is casting that vote.
        So we will look at that system if counties in California
    want to use it. Vermont did use it. I believe it was quite
    expensive on a per-vote basis and it does not solve the single
    greatest challenge to exercising the franchise for disabled
    voters, which is transportation to the polling place.
        The Chairwoman. The vendor did state that this type of
    phone system could be used in a polling place and that would
    make it a little easier for you to track it.
        Ms. Bowen. In a polling place if you set up a secure
    connection, you can use that. But remember that polling places
    are often situated in locations that are challenged in terms of
    security. I have voted in a carpet store, I have voted in a
    garage, a living room, the fellowship room of a religious
    institution. Many of those places could not continue to be used
    with the advent of electronic voting, simply because they do
    not have the capacity to provide enough electricity to run all
    of the equipment that would be needed.
        The Chairwoman. Madam Secretary, you spoke of wanting to
    ensure that each vote is secure, accurate, and reliabe. How can
    we assure that, with everything we have just outlined, plus the
    myriad of other things that we know are taking place?
        Ms. Bowen. We have good lessons from the private sector on
    how to do this in two areas that I would suggest the committee
    review. One is in the casino industry where the standards for
    the auditing and the review of electronic slot machines are
    very stringent. They do things such as if there is a problem
    with an electronic slot, it is pulled off the floor
    immediately. We don't do that with voting machines. We reboot
    and keep the machine in service in many instances. And that is
    a matter of money. The machines are expensive. If you have to
    provide enough machines in each polling place to allow for
    difficulties in pulling a machine, you are going to spend more
    money. But the casino industry and their standards are a useful
    measuring point.
        Another place that I think it is useful to look is the
    computer game manufacturers. They have a great interest in
    keeping counterfeit software from being used, and they have
    some very clever ways of determining whether the software that
    is running on a particular game card is actually what was
    licensed by the manufacturer. Some of it is trade secret and
    proprietary. But I have been very impressed with some of the
    tools that could help us in a situation where we have to verify
    that the software that was certified is actually what is
    running on every single location, which is another challenge
    that we haven't talked about today.
        The Chairwoman. Both of those that have been cited in terms
    of looking into, in terms of helping us. And yet if it is
    proprietary, there we are back at square one.
        Will we have another round of questions, Madam Chair?
        Ms. Lofgren. No, but with unanimous consent, the Chairwoman
    has an additional minute.
        The Chairwoman. You are just a sweetheart, thank you. Just
    one more question. Some DRE touch-screen voting machines use a
    paper ballot printer. In the voting forum that I held last
    week, I witnessed a printer that used a reel-to-reel thermal
    paper roll. A version of this type of thermal ballot printer
    was also used in Cuyahoga County, Ohio in May of 2006.
        You are probably familiar with the analysis of that
    election done by the Election Science Institute. One of the
    findings of the analysis was that almost 10 percent of the
    paper ballots were missing, damaged, or blank. How does that
    compare with your experience with the thermal printer and the
    ballots printed? Either one of you can answer that.
        Ms. Bowen. I am extremely concerned about reliance on a
    paper trail that is printed either on thermal paper or on
    standard paper. The number of ways that that kind of system can
    go wrong mechanically is fairly--the list of problems,
    potential problems, is fairly long. Paper jams, overwrites. It
    is difficult, because the ballots are on a roll, to maintain
    secrecy if you only have a small number of voters voting.
        It is also difficult to audit. We do it in California
    pursuant to our law that requires that we use that paper trail,
    and it is a very cumbersome process as someone sits and goes
    through the paper and looks at the votes that were crossed out
    or unkept.
        The other issue that arises is what happens in a crowded
    polling place with long lines, where a voter may feel very
    pressured to vote because they know that there are several
    hours of people standing behind them, and the time that it
    takes to actually verify properly may mean that people spend as
    long as 20 minutes voting on a touch-screen machine.
        We also had basic problems in California in our recent
    elections, such as the county elections officials not providing
    a sufficient supply of paper. We had a poll worker in Santa
    Clara County, the home of our high-tech industry, who sent a
    poll worker to Kinko's with $40 to copy sample ballots, which,
    if marked by hand, are legally cast ballots in California.
    Otherwise the lack of paper was going to completely bring that
    polling place to a stop.
        The Chairwoman. Mr. Nelson did you want to expound on that
    a little bit?
        Mr. Nelson. We don't have any experience in South Dakota
    with that type of technology, but all of the reasons that
    Secretary Bowen laid out and the potential problems are one of
    the reasons that we chose to go with the optical scanner in
    response to the HAVA mandate as opposed to going that
    direction.
        The Chairwoman. Thank you for your courtesy, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Ehlers.
        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Madam Chair. I will try to be very
    brief because the time is wasting here.
        Secretary Bowen, I am very pleased with your last comment.
    One of the provisions of the bill I am very upset with is that
    it mandates that in case of dispute, the paper trail is the
    vote of record. I agree totally with you. I have very little
    confidence in the type of printers that you have described. I
    have seen some that I do have confidence in, but a number that
    I don't. I thank you for making that point. We simply should
    not, sitting here in the Congress, decide what is the matter of
    record. That should be up to the local election officials and
    State election officials. So I appreciate your comment.
        Also, Mr. Nelson, I thank you for your comments because it
    reinforces my observation that maybe it is because I have been
    at the local level. I have been at the State level. I have a
    lot of confidence in our people there who know how to run
    elections better than many Members of Congress do, and your
    statements certainly reinforce that.
        I yield back so that we can move on.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much. Congresswoman Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I just want to say,
    on a matter of personnel privilege, that I think the State of
    California is very fortunate actually to have such a diligent
    and attention-to-detail Secretary of State. And I appreciate
    that.
        And I wanted to just ask you very quickly if you could
    comment on the importance of a backup system at the polls. I
    mentioned the idea of people actually being able to choose one
    of two systems. One that would be available certainly to anyone
    who needed special assistance, but also to anybody who may be
    in line and need to vote in that way.
        Can you comment on that? And I guess for the future, what
    other issues ought we be looking at?
        Ms. Bowen. The California law already requires that a
    voter--gives the voter a right to ask for a paper ballot. The
    implementation of that has been difficult in some counties. But
    in a county that uses an optical scan system, again, that is a
    fairly simple matter because precisely the same ballot is
    created by the voter, just in a different manner.
        In a county that uses a touch screen or other electronic
    voting system, it means that the elections officers will need
    to find a different way to count hand-marked ballots. Either
    they need to have more than one voting system, they need to
    count optical scanned ballots if that is what the paper is, or
    they will be literally counting those ballots by hand as they
    do with write-in ballots and that, obviously, adds a
    significant amount of delay to the process.
        I think it is useful--backup, let me say, is a really
    critical issue that we have not addressed significantly as a
    country. We know from experience around the country that there
    will be problems at individual polling places and that you
    might have hurricanes, storms, various things, and you need to
    have a mechanism to allow people to vote. So the backup system
    is critical, and we have a lot to learn from what we did in Y2K
    and what is done in the private sector.
        When we look at our voting systems more generally and what
    issues we should be considering, we actually have very little
    academic research when it comes to usability by voters and what
    the experience of a voter--particularly one who is not
    accustomed to using ATM machines and does not have a credit
    card--what their experience is voting.
        Someone commented earlier that voting systems are only a
    small portion of the challenge that we face as election
    officials. Poll worker training and voter education are also
    very important and easier to accomplish using an optical scan
    system than using a touch-screen system. The whole audit
    procedure and the closing procedure is far simpler using the
    older technology that we have.
        So as we deal with what systems we should use, we need to
    ask for results. We need to ask for better measures of what we
    have done, and then we need to look at the overall costs; not
    just the cost of equipment, storage and all of the things we
    think of, but the costs of training, the cost of poll workers
    and the cost of educating voters. Every time we change voting
    systems, we have any number of voters who have a great deal of
    difficulty with the new system, and the same is true of poll
    workers who, as I am sure you know, are not getting younger as
    we go along.
        Mrs. Davis. Secretary Nelson, quickly.
        Mr. Nelson. One comment that I would make, when the Help
    America Vote Act was passed, one of the very first statements
    that I made in my State was that I did not want any of our
    polling places to be hostage to an electronic voting machine.
    So that if that machine went down, that things stopped and
    people could not vote. That is why we went with the optical
    scan device, with the voter assist device to mark that ballot.
    So I understand that concern.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much. Thank you to both
    Secretaries of State. We know that your days are busy ones and
    we very much appreciate that you were willing to take this time
    and spend it with us and share your expertise. Thank you so
    very much.
        Our next panel, if they could come forward, would be Tanya
    Clay House, George Gilbert, Dr. Felten and Dr. Norris.
        I would like to introduce Tanya Clay House who began her
    tenure with People for the American Way in April of 2002 as the
    senior legislative counsel. She now serves as director of
    public policy. Miss House also serves as the policy liaison for
    the the African American Ministers Leadership Council, a
    program of PFAW Foundation. She began her legislative career as
    counsel for our colleague, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee.
    And in 2003 she was awarded the Congressional Black Caucus
    Chair's Award for her dedication and leadership and commitment
    in advancing the cause of civil and human rights.
        George M. Gilbert, since 1988, has been director of
    elections to the Guilford County Board of Elections, a
    jurisdiction of more than 300,000 registered voters. During his
    19 years in this position he has administered 56 elections,
    using four different DRE voting systems.
        We have also Dr. Edward Felten, a professor of computer
    science at Princeton University. His research interests include
    computer security and privacy technology law and policy. He is
    the author of Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS
    Voting Machine Study, and his research on electronic voting has
    been covered extensively in the press. And we were fortunate to
    have him testify before this very committee in the last
    Congress.
        We also have Dr. Donald F. Norris, a professor of public
    policy at the University of Maryland, a specialist in public
    management, urban affairs, and application management and
    impacts of information technology in public organizations. He
    has consulted with local governments and State agencies for
    more than 25 years in the area of information technology and
    management.

      STATEMENTS OF TANYA CLAY HOUSE, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC POLICY,
       PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY; GEORGE GILBERT, DIRECTOR OF
      ELECTIONS, GUILFORD COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA; EDWARD FELTEN,
       PH.D., PROFESSOR OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
       PRINCETON UNIVERSITY; AND DON NORRIS, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF
        PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE COUNTY

        Ms. Lofgren. We welcome all of you. And because we have a
    vote coming soon, I will actually ask people to stay within 5
    minutes, and your written testimony will be made part of the
    official record. And if we could begin with Tanya Clay House.

                     STATEMENT OF TANYA CLAY HOUSE

        Ms. House. Good morning and thank you, Madam Chair, and
    Ranking Member McCarthy and the committee members. On behalf of
    the civil rights community, I thank you for the opportunity to
    speak with you today regarding this important issue of election
    integrity and accessibility.
        I am the director of Public Policy at People For the
    American Way and the director of federal legislation for
    Democracy Campaign on Voter Rights and Election Reform. People
    For is a national nonprofit social justice organization with
    more than 1 million members and supporters and more than a
    quarter century of commitment to nonpartisan citizen
    participation efforts.
        Since our founding, People For has urged Americans to
    engage in civic participation and sought to empower those
    traditionally underrepresented at the polls, including young
    voters and people of color. At People For, election reform is
    our number one priority. And since the debacle of the 2000
    election, People For Foundation and its key allies, including
    the NAACP and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
    have led the well-known Election Protection Coalition to ensure
    that every citizen has the right to vote and to have that vote
    counted. This work, supplemented by litigation and People For's
    legislative efforts, has provided our two organizations with a
    depth of expertise on how we must continue to reform our
    election process and to protect this most fundamental right to
    vote.
        The use of nonsecure and unauditable voting technology is
    particularly troubling because it can and has resulted in the
    disenfranchisement of thousands of voters across the country.
    This problem was highlighted as a result of the implementation
    of the 2006 Help America Vote Act deadlines which precipitated
    the widespread replacement of older voting technology. Thus,
    more voters and poll workers throughout the country used new
    voting systems in 2006 than in any previous election.
        With so many counties using the new voting systems for the
    first time, the number of voting machine problems increased
    dramatically over 2004. In fact, complaints about voting
    machines outnumbered all other complaints to the Election
    Protection Hotline with voters in more than 35 states reporting
    various problems related to voting machines.
        People For supports H.R. 811 as a strong effort to change
    the status quo so that voters will have the confidence that
    their votes will be counted as cast. And we are grateful for
    your leadership, Madam Chair, on the issue of election reform,
    and in particular voting technology. We further thank the
    leadership of Congressman Rush Holt and Tom Petri and a
    multitude of others on both sides of the aisle for H.R. 811.
        This bill is notable for its efforts to accommodate not
    only the need for additional security in our elections, but
    also to demand appropriate accessibility for all voters. As a
    civil rights organization, and a close coalition partner of
    national organizations representing tens of thousands of voters
    with disabilities and minority language voters, including the
    National Disability Rights Network, MALDEF, the National
    Counsel of La Raza, and the Asian American Justice Center,
    People For is committed to ensuring that any new voting
    standards maintain the current accessibility protections
    afforded under HAVA, and all voting machines provide the
    necessary language translations in all steps of the voting
    process as required under section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.
        For this reason, People For supports the provisions of H.R.
    811 which allows States this flexibility to decide which types
    of election systems best meet the needs of its voting
    population, so long as that system is verifiable, auditable and
    secure. These provisions acknowledge that the best system in
    Utah may not be the best system in Los Angeles, and vice versa.
        H.R. 811's commitment to both security and accessibility is
    to be commended and has earned endorsements from a diverse set
    of civil rights and election integrity groups, including Common
    Cause, the Lawyers Committee, the Brennan Center, SEIU, and the
    NEA. While accessible systems that are not fully secure and
    auditable are unacceptable, secure election systems that are
    not accessible to all eligible voters likewise cannot be
    tolerated. American voters deserve and expect both security and
    accessibility. And while no language is perfect, H.R. 811 is to
    be commended for attempting to reach such a balance. My written
    testimony will expand further on our support for H.R. 811.
        Madam Chair, thank you again for your commitment to
    addressing this most pressing need of voting technology. As has
    been the case in the past three Federal elections, we expect
    that many of the races in 2008 will be very close and Americans
    deserve to know if their vote will be counted as cast and, if
    necessary, counted by fair and independent observers.
        As a member of the civil rights coalition that helped to
    draft the components of HAVA, I am vividly aware of the
    unfortunate problems that were caused by delayed financial
    support and oversight by Congress. Therefore, People For is
    committed to working with members to ensure that the proper
    funding is provided and that a reasonable implementation
    schedule is developed, so that election officials will have all
    necessary resources. And this must be done as soon as possible.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        [The statement of Ms. House follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Gilbert.

                      STATEMENT OF GEORGE GILBERT

        Mr. Gilbert. I would like to thank both the Chairwomen, the
    Ranking Member, and Mr. Ehlers for allowing at least one
    election official to speak to you today. I think I am the one
    that got selected because Conny McCormack couldn't come this
    time. You are used to seeing her. A new face.
        Elections officials feel like we are the target in all of
    this. I hope I can be considered a trusted source in regard to
    not only the 19 years of election experience I have had, but
    also the fact that I spent 6 years here on Capitol Hill working
    for Senator Culver and Senator Dodd.
        When I went to the Board of Elections in North Carolina in
    Guilford County, North Carolina, I was hired by a Republican
    Majority board, and throughout the 19 years I have served under
    both Democratic and Republican Majority boards. I left
    Washington with a very deep level of confidence and respect for
    our political system, and the last 19 years of my life have
    been dedicated to preserving that.
        That same attitude is held by the vast majority of
    elections officials in this country. It is our job to maintain
    the integrity and the accuracy and the openness of our
    elections system, and we are committed to that.
        I don't know of any local election official who does not
    fully support these goals of accuracy, integrity, and security
    in elections. Contrary to the bill's implications, our election
    process today contains substantial portions of these
    ingredients already. I would argue that it contains more than
    it ever has in the history of our democracy.
        Having said that, I will jump straight to my conclusions. I
    think the most effective thing that this Congress could do do
    improve all of these approaches to all of these goals is to
    promote rapid technological development to strengthen the areas
    of weakness in our current system. H.R. 811 not only fails to
    accomplish that, but it effectively forecloses that option. By
    mandating the manual counting of paper ballots as the ultimate
    official record, the bill effectively locks everyone into
    technology that became obsolete in the 19th century. Nothing
    has changed in the last hundred years that makes managing or
    counting paper any more secure or any more accurate than it was
    in the 1890s.
        The chief historical weakness of DRE voting systems has
    been the lack of a secure independent ballot record for each
    voter's vote. The chief weakness of the paper voting systems,
    be they punch cards, optical scan or just a plain piece of
    paper, is the fact that there are frequent ambiguous votes cast
    on those ballots.
        In North Carolina in 2006, we tried the paper solution of
    an independent backup for electronic ballot records. Attachment
    1 of my prepared testimony documents the rate--I would say not
    surprising--high rate of printer failure. We feel that we can
    reduce that rate, but no printer that I have ever heard of or
    anyone has ever conceived of is going to eliminate the failure
    of those printers to produce some of the ballot records. The
    experience in North Carolina in Attachment 2, I show that we
    lost roughly 2 percent of our audit records as a result of
    that. To make the paper record the official ballot would simply
    throw out those ballots which we know voters legitimately cast.
        This experience was not isolated in North Carolina. Roughly
    half or more of the States have already adopted some form of a
    paper trail, and in every case the chief impact was to
    introduce another point of failure into the voting system.
        My attachments 3 and 4 document the ballot-marking errors.
    When we talk about the ambiguous votes that are cast on optical
    scan systems, one of the mantras in our industry is there is no
    such thing as a perfect voting system. And it is true. It
    always will be true. So I want you--if you guys will look at
    that and see that we don't have a panacea that we can fall back
    on here.
        If you calculate the time it would take to count those
    ballots manually, which I have demonstrated also in my
    attachments, you basically see that what happened in Florida in
    2000 is that they were asked to do the impossible; and that is,
    to count millions of votes by hand in too short a period of
    time.
        Ms. Lofgren. We will make all those documents part of the
    record, thank you. Dr. Felten.
        Mr. Felten. Thank you Chairwoman Lofgren, Chairwoman
    Millender-McDonald, Ranking Member McCarthy, and Congressman
    Ehlers for the opportunity to testify today and give you my
    perspective on electronic voting and H.R. 811.
        Computers clearly have a role to play in our elections, but
    figuring out their appropriate and best use is a difficult
    question. We don't need to choose between an all electronic
    system and a paper system. Instead, we should use computers and
    paper together so that each one can do what it does best and
    each can compensate for the drawbacks of the other. Such a
    system combines paper and electronic elements and can be easier
    to use, more reliable, and more secure than either an all
    electronic or all paper system.
        The starting point for understanding what kind of system we
    should use is to ask which things computers do well and which
    things are better done on paper. Computers do several things
    well. They report election results quickly. They can be
    accessible to disabled people. And they can help voters find
    and fix errors before the ballot is cast. Though these promises
    are not always met in practice, they are reason enough to give
    computers a role in our elections.
        But the one thing that today's computers cannot do is
    provide a simple and transparent way to record and store votes.
    What happens inside an electronic voting machine is very
    complicated and cannot be inspected directly by the voter or in
    most cases, indeed, by independent experts.
        Because electronic records lack transparency, systems that
    rely on them are subject to security attacks that can modify
    votes undetectably, as with the the voting machine virus my
    colleagues and I demonstrated in Diebold touch-screen voting
    machines. Even in the absence of a security attack, problems in
    all electronic systems are very hard to diagnose.
        Our elections system must therefore be software
    independent, meaning that its accuracy does not rely on the
    correct functioning of any software system. Thus far, computer
    scientists haven't found any way to ensure the correctness of
    computer software programs, whether in a voting machine or in a
    personal computer. And instead of pretending that we are able
    to ensure the correctness of software, we need instead to have
    a system that records and counts the votes accurately even if
    the software malfunctions and the only practical way to do that
    today is to use paper ballots.
        By comparison to electronic records, paper ballots are much
    more transparent. A properly designed paper record conveys the
    voter's intent clearly and the voter can confirm this by
    inspecting the paper record. Blind voters can do this with the
    help of assistive technology. And unlike a volatile electronic
    record, a durable paper record will not change unexpectedly and
    mysteriously.
        So looking at the strengths and weaknesses of electronic
    and paper-based systems, we can draw two conclusions. First,
    the primary record of a vote should be paper, because paper
    recording is more transparent and voter verifiable.
        Second, computers can sensibly be used for other parts of
    the voting process, such as entering the votes, providing a
    quick count subject to auditing, and helping reduce voter
    error. This is the blueprint that H.R. 811 follows. It requires
    the use of a durable voter-verified, private paper ballot. But
    beyond this, it gives States and localities a choice of whether
    and how to use computers in their elections.
        Different jurisdictions will use computers differently.
    Some will use a DRE touch screen with a ballot under glass
    paper trail. Some may use optical scan. Some may use ballot-
    marking devices. There are different kinds of paper trail
    systems, even within each of these categories. As long as there
    is a suitable ballot and appropriate technical standards are
    met, each jurisdiction can use its own approach.
        Computers can count and tabulate ballots quickly, so many
    jurisdictions will want to get quick electronic counts when the
    polls close. But because the paper ballots are the primary
    records, we need to make sure that the paper records and the
    electronic records match. The solution to this is a random
    audit in which we count a large enough random subset of the
    paper ballots and compare the results to the corresponding
    electronic count. This, again, is the approach taken by H.R.
    811.
        There will be times, unfortunately, when the paper record
    is lost or corrupted. This will be very rare in a well-designed
    system, but we need to have a fallback in case that happens.
    That is why it is appropriate to say if there is a suitable
    showing with respect to problems or failures with the paper
    record, we can switch to the electronic and use it as the most
    accurate component.
        Improving our elections is going to cost some money, but I
    think this is a bargain if it brings our elections up to the
    level of security, reliability, accessibility, and privacy that
    all citizens deserve. Computers cannot only stop being a
    liability in election security, but they can become an asset if
    we use them correctly. And passing H.R. 811 would be an
    important step in realizing that promise. Thank you.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        [The statement of Mr. Gilbert follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. And, finally, Dr. Norris.

                        STATEMENT OF DON NORRIS

        Mr. Norris. Madam Chairperson, members of the committee,
    good morning. A very special good morning to Congressman Ehlers
    whom I haven't seen in about 30 years. How are you?
        I am very pleased to give testimony this morning on H.R.
    811. If I still lived in Grand Rapids, he would be my
    Congressman.
        In the available time I will address what I believe are
    serious limitations of the bill. My written testimony goes into
    greater detail. First let me say I think the intent of the bill
    to require voter verification of ballots cast is a noble and
    worthy one. Unfortunately, I think the methods set forth in the
    bill to achieve this is quite flawed--the paper trail
    requirement.
        In effect, as the bill is written it would require all the
    United States to return to using paper ballots in elections. It
    would put an end to electronic voting and it would
    significantly stifle or indeed kill innovation in voting
    technology. I have heard that from vendors.
        Paper ballots are notoriously susceptible to fraud. One of
    the main reasons we moved to machine voting in the 1900s was
    because of fraud with paper. Paper ballots can and frequently
    have been lost, stolen, or damaged. Entire ballot boxes lost,
    stolen, or stuffed. And I would expect that we would have other
    problems of a similar nature if we go back to paper again.
        As a political scientist--I am not a computer scientist but
    I have a long background in IT--I am far more concerned with
    the probability of election fraud with paper than with an
    electronic system, in part because it takes far less skill to
    steal a paper ballot, to counterfeit a paper ballot and stuff a
    ballot box than it does to diddle with a DRE.
        Ordinary people can tamper with paper. It takes specialized
    knowledge and skills about computer hardware and software to do
    that with electronic voting.
        One of the reasons that proponents give for wanting to
    return to paper ballots is that, quote, the people are
    demanding verification. In studies that I have done and studies
    that I have seen, the evidence does not support that claim.
    People--observable behavior, people go vote. They vote on the
    equipment that we are giving them. They do not indicate that
    they have a crisis of confidence in voting systems. And again
    there are surveys and observable voting behavior to demonstrate
    this.
        There is evidence, however, that voters do not want to and
    probably will not verify their votes when given the opportunity
    to do so, evidence from actual elections and from usability
    studies. Evidently people simply want to vote and get out of
    the voting booth.
        There are different ways to add paper to the election mix.
    One is the VVPAT and the another is the optical scan. Both have
    limitations. Indeed, as one of the speakers on this panel said,
    there is no perfect elections system, regardless of technology.
        Adding paper, whether VVPAT or optical scan, increases
    time, it increases complexity, it increases the difficulty of
    election administration and the probability of equipment
    malfunction and so on and so forth. It also requires more
    training for people in the field who are actually managing
    elections.
        Mr. Norris. Printers regularly jam and fail, optical ballot
    systems can fail due to calibration problems, can and have
    failed due to calibration problems.
        I am not against, by the way, any of these technologies. I
    am merely pointing out that they all have limitations.
        Another reason proponents give for paper ballots is the
    need to audit elections and recount and do recounts. In nearly
    every election where recounts have been undertaken with paper
    ballots, the voting tally that is completed manually by human
    beings--that is, by us--produces inconsistent and sometimes
    conflicting findings. Think of Florida 2000, think of
    Washington State 2004.
        Further, the claim that electronic systems are inherently
    insecure is based on a faulty assumption that goes something
    like this: Yes, computers can be diddled, but the assumption
    is, given the right tools, the right amount of time and
    unfettered access to an electronic voting machine, a
    knowledgeable person can insert malicious software and produce
    erroneous results or do other bad things. It is a far-fetched
    scenario, and it is not something that has happened in an
    actual election to date.
        Security around electronic systems is far from perfect, but
    it can be improved and made very, very robust.
        I guess I have got just a few seconds left, so let me just
    wrap up by saying that I don't believe there is a compelling
    technical reason to abandon electronic voting. I don't think
    there is a compelling policy reason to require paper. I think
    it would be far better for this bill to require independent
    voter verification, but to remove all references to any
    particular technology and let the State and local governments
    and the marketplace figure out how best to do this.
        Thank you very much.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you. We are going to limit ourselves to
    3 minutes on the questions, so we can get to the final panel;
    and I will start with my 3 minutes, which is to Dr. Felten.
        I still talk about the testimony you gave before this
    committee last September, about how easy it is to hack a
    computer and the key from the minibar. I remember it was
    Benedict Arnold who beat George Washington in your display.
        Can you describe what the concern is as a computer
    scientist on these computer systems?
        Mr. Felten. Sure. The concern is that these things, being
    computers, will do what they are programmed to do; that is,
    they will do what the person who created the program wants them
    to do.
        And what we were able to demonstrate is that with as little
    as 1 minute of access to a Diebold touch-screen voting machine
    and with this key which is for sale on the Internet, you can
    inject malicious software into a Diebold voting machine which
    causes it--that causes it to count the votes incorrectly. And I
    demonstrated this live, as you referred to, before the full
    committee at a hearing in the fall.
        So the concern is that these machines are vulnerable to
    tampering. And I would add that in every election since New
    Jersey has adopted electronic voting, I have had private access
    to the voting machines used in my precinct. I could not have
    lawfully opened them and tampered with them, but if I had I
    wanted to, I could have.
        Ms. Lofgren. And how hard would it be for--I mean, is this
    creation of a virus so difficult that only--you know, really is
    not something to worry about in your judgment? Could you
    students do it?
        Mr. Felten. Yes. Students did--our students did, in fact,
    create the virus that I demonstrated. Any skilled computer
    scientist, computer programmer, would be able to do that. It is
    no more difficult than making a virus for a PC. There are many
    thousands of people, especially in your district, that have all
    of the knowledge.
        Ms. Lofgren. I think I have heard from every one of them.
        With that, I am going to yield to Mr. McCarthy for his
    question.
        Mr. McCarthy. Well, I thank you very much.
        To Mr. Gilbert, if I may: You are an elections officer, and
    I raise this question to the author of the bill because I do
    have some letters I want to submit for the record.
        Ms. Lofgren. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

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        Mr. McCarthy. One is the National Conference of State
    Legislatures, the National Association of Counties. In
    opposition, we had the Executive Director of--the National
    Association of Election Officials are opposed to this bill, and
    I am just trying to get your feedback as to what would you
    think the rationale--why the majority would be opposed.
        Mr. Gilbert. I think the majority of them are opposed to it
    on two grounds. One is the feasibility of actually executing
    what it purports to do and the second is the cost.
        We are very concerned that implementation date of 2008
    would actually collapse the election system. We do not believe
    that it would be feasible nationwide to implement the kinds of
    changes, both procedural and technological, that this bill
    proposes by 2008.
        In terms of the paper trail, all you have to do is go out
    there and try to count paper ballots sometime, and you will see
    why we are opposed to it. We are the ones who do that. We have
    counted paper ballots by hand before, and we know how
    difficult--it is the most difficult aspect of conducting an
    election.
        You think we have complicated electronic technology; well,
    electronic technology actually simplifies things. It simplifies
    things at the precinct, it simplifies things for the
    administration of elections in the office. When you start
    throwing paper in, and particularly manual tabulation of paper,
    it becomes much, much more harder. And we know we can't do it
    accurately; I think that is the fundamental reason.
        Mr. McCarthy. Well, I thank the whole panel for their time.
        Ms. Lofgren. Madam Chairwoman.
        The Chairwoman. I, too, Madam Chair, have a letter from
    Conny McCormack. If I could please submit this for the record.
        Ms. Lofgren. That will be added, without objection.
        [The information follows:]

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        The Chairwoman. She too, has strong concerns about this
    bill and implementation.
        I also have a letter from Judy Duffy, the Chair of the
    Advocacy Committee of the League of Women Voters of the United
    States, raising her concerns as well.
        Ms. Lofgren. That also will be added to the record.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6023A.031

        The Chairwoman. And, Madam Chair, with so many questions to
    raise and so little time, I am just going to ask for unanimous
    consent that my statement be submitted for the record.
        Ms. Lofgren. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The statement of Ms. Millender-McDonald follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Ehlers.
        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Madam Chair. I spent only a minute
    in my last round. I am going to spend a few more this time.
        First of all, Mr. Gilbert, thank you very much for your
    comments. It is what I have been saying all along and perhaps
    because I have had much the same experience you have had.
        Dr. Felten, have you ever sat down and counted ballots?
    Have you ever served as an election official?
        Mr. Felten. I have not, no.
        Mr. Ehlers. Okay. Let me, just to shorten things, express
    concern.
        I totally agree with the comments of Mr. Gilbert and Mr.
    Norris that paper lends itself to fraud. That is the history of
    elections with paper, and that is why we developed mechanical
    voting machines.
        Now we are in a different era; we are trying to develop
    good electronic voting machines. I agree with you that we
    haven't done that yet, Dr. Felten, but I am confident we can do
    much better than we have, certainly with a mechanical lock, if
    nothing else. I am sure we can do a little better.
        I am surprised that you are willing to put much more faith
    in a mechanical system, such as a printer, unless voters are
    actually required to sit there and read through and verify. I
    would still put more confidence in the computer, on average,
    than I would on a mechanical printer. And I am just making that
    observation, and I am not trying to set up an argument here.
        I appreciate your comments, Mr. Norris. I do question your
    wisdom in leaving Michigan going to Maryland, but that is a
    separate issue.
        Mr. Norris. That alone should probably disqualify my
    testimony.
        Mr. Ehlers. You had a lot of common sense in your comments,
    and I appreciate it. I have no problem setting up the dual
    trail requirement. I do have a problem in seeing that the paper
    trail is the record for precisely the comments made by Mr.
    Gilbert.
        You know, I sat there and calculated--pardon me, counted
    ballots. It is a very unsure operation. Humans are not
    particularly good at that, and it is very, very difficult to
    get accurate results with any large number of ballots.
        So I am not--as I said before, I am not opposed to the
    bill, but I would like to make some changes in it, and I will
    propose those changes at some future time.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Ehlers.
        And thanks to this panel. It has been a long morning, but
    we appreciate your sticking with us to give us your advice.
        Now we will ask Noel Runyan, Dr. Harold Snider, Warren
    Stewart and Commissioner Gail Mahoney to join us. And we are
    going to ask--since we are going to be called to the floor for
    a considerable period of time in a very short period of time, I
    wonder if we could ask each of these witnesses to give their
    statement within 3 minutes, as we have limited ourselves. Then
    we will know that we will get to hear everyone, and your
    official statements will be made part of the record.
        I would just note that Warren Stewart is the Policy
    Director for Vote TrustUSA, which is a nonpartisan
    organization, and he has been published in the Harvard Law &
    Policy Review.
        Commissioner Gail Mahoney is from Jackson County, Michigan,
    the Chair of the National Association of Counties, an
    organization I once belonged to as a member of the Santa Clara
    County Board of Commissioners, and a distinguished leader in
    our Nation.
        And--I will now run through my cheat sheets here--Noel
    Runyan from my neck of the woods is an engineer, and he has
    designed and manufactured the Audapter speech synthesizer and
    has worked with the Santa Clara County Voter Access Advisory
    Committee; and Dr. Harold Snider, President of Access for the
    Handicapped.

     STATEMENTS OF NOEL RUNYAN, PRESIDENT, PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS;
      DR. HAROLD SNIDER, ACCESS FOR THE HANDICAPPED, INC.; WARREN
     STEWART, POLICY DIRECTOR, VoteTrustUSA; AND COMMISSIONER GAIL
         W. MAHONEY, JACKSON COUNTY, MICHIGAN, CHAIR, NATIONAL
                        ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

        Ms. Lofgren. We will call first on Noel Runyan for his
    abbreviated statement to be followed by Dr. Snider.

                        STATEMENT OF NOEL RUNYAN

        Mr. Runyan. Madam Chairman----
        Ms. Lofgren. Could someone turn on the mike, please? Thank
    you so much.
        Mr. Runyan. Madam Chairman and members of the board, I
    would like to sincerely thank you for inviting me to testify
    today on improving access to voting systems.
        As an electrical engineer and computer scientist, I have
    spent 36 years of working on human factors and access to
    systems for people with disabilities. I have also spent the
    last 4 years working on accessibility of voting systems.
        When the HAVA bill was introduced, I thought it was really
    exciting times for us because it would get rid of hanging-chads
    overvoting, and it would allow a lot of folks to have the kind
    of accessibility that we had learned to use on our own computer
    systems and other information systems. And they promised that
    the systems would be rigorously, federally tested to make sure
    that they were secure and accessible and accurate.
        So when I first went to vote in Santa Clara on the Sequoia
    electronic voting machines about 3 years ago, I was very
    disappointed when they--after 45 minutes of diligently working,
    calling tech support, poll workers were not able to get the
    system working with audio output so that I could use it, I had
    to have somebody else vote for me.
        Out of five elections now, in which I have used the Sequoia
    voting system, in three of those, the poll workers were never
    able to get the system working by themselves. And in fact, in
    one of them, my wife asked for and was loaned the manual so
    that she could read the manual and figure out how to get the
    system working with audio for me. It seems that we shouldn't
    all have to have a very brilliant wife that is a computer
    scientist to go along with us to vote.
        So I got very involved in studying the accessibility of
    these systems, and very concerned about both their access and
    security; and found that there were a lot of folks that weren't
    getting full access to these systems, in some cases because
    they were too complicated for poll workers and, in others,
    because of very limited design capabilities for providing
    accessibility--accessibility for people with physical
    disabilities, cognitive disabilities, or with special or
    alternative language needs.
        And, as an example, many of them did not even have
    simultaneous audio and visual or large print magnification, so
    important for so many elderly folks that need to use it.
        Ms. Lofgren. Right. Mr. Runyan, we are going to have to ask
    you to wrap up so we can hear all four of you.
        Mr. Runyan. I will try to wrap up very quickly here.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you.
        Mr. Runyan. But as we found, the systems needed to be made
    more secure, and so we ended up having to look at using paper
    which was not accessible.
        It turns out that over the years, now we have developed
    accessible ballot marking systems and that those are usable and
    I would like to submit both my report--my access report and a
    letter today, which we have had several people join onboard to
    say, we as people with disabilities do support accessible paper
    voting systems.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Runyan, we will make both those statements
    part of the official record. And now we will call on Dr.
    Snider.
        [The statement of Mr. Runyan follows:]

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                  STATEMENT OF HAROLD W. SNIDER, PH.D.

        Mr. Snider. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is a privilege
    and an honor to speak before the subcommittee, and I am very
    grateful for your invitation to do so.
        First of all, I want to repeat what I said to Congressman
    Holt outside this hearing, not since the passage of the
    Americans With Disabilities Act have we had a Member of this
    House reach out to the disability community to take input on an
    issue as we have had with Congressman Holt on H.R. 811.
        I said to him that I have substantial disagreements with
    him about H.R. 811, that are outlined in my testimony; and I
    will look forward to involving in engagement with his staff to
    try to work some of those out. We may be able to do it, we may
    not, but there is a good-faith effort certainly on my part and
    I am sure on his part to get that done. So I commend him
    strongly for his efforts.
        The real problem with H.R. 811 is, it unnecessarily slows
    down the process of enfranchisement of people with disabilities
    into the voting process by requiring that DRE, touch-screen,
    machines also generate a verifiable paper trail that can be
    verified by disabled and blind, visually impaired voters.
        In the 30 years that I voted in almost 30 elections, two
    every 2 years or so between 1972 and 2002, I met more
    illiterate and ignorant poll workers who couldn't accommodate
    my needs and who discriminated against me in the most horrible
    ways you could imagine. And HAVA changed the playing field for
    me and for other people with disabilities.
        While I was an employee of the Republican National
    Committee, I worked with disabled voters who were completely
    apathetic about the voting process because accessibility was
    denied.
        The problem with H.R. 811 is, it slows down the
    implementation of the provisions of HAVA to the extent that
    people with disabilities won't get accessible voting until
    perhaps the middle or end of the next decade of this century.
        Ms. Lofgren. Dr. Snider, you only have about 30 seconds
    left. I wanted to warn you.
        Mr. Snider. And what concerns me most, people don't have
    confidence in the technology that exists in the 21st century.
        I hope that the Congress will keep the promise of HAVA
    while fixing some of the problems which exist.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        [The statement of Mr. Snider follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Stewart.

                      STATEMENT OF WARREN STEWART

        Mr. Stewart. Madam Chairwoman, distinguished ranking
    member, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
    to address you on this very important hearing on H.R. 811.
        The most critical components of this bill are the
    requirement for a voter-verified paper ballot of every vote
    cast; the establishment of routine random hand-counted audits;
    the requirement that the audits be completed before the Federal
    race is certified; and the increased transparency and public
    oversight of the testing of voting machines that the bill
    promotes.
        Responding to widespread concern about the design of
    existing audit trail printers, H.R. 811 would require that the
    paper records be printed on durable paper capable of
    withstanding multiple counts and recounts; and the bill also
    would require a verification that the voter's selections on the
    paper record be accessible to voters with disabilities. All of
    these requirements are more--are desperately needed to restore,
    protect and preserve the integrity of our elections; and it is
    absolutely critical they be implemented in time for the 2008
    elections.
        It is essential that the authorization in this bill be
    sufficient to cover the cost to counties of implementation. I
    have developed a cost projection to determine the authorization
    necessary for States to meet the proposed requirements, section
    2 in H.R. 811; and I would be happy to discuss that with the
    members of the committee at any time. In preparing my cost
    projection, I organized the Nation's approximately 187,000
    voting precincts into three broad categories based on the
    voting system employed last November for in-precinct voting.
        In the first category were those precincts in which voters
    marked paper ballots by hand, or with ballot marking devices
    provided for compliance with the disability access requirements
    of HAVA. There were just over 46,000 such precincts in 35
    States, including every precinct in 17 States. These precincts
    would not be required to make any changes to comply with the
    requirements of 811.
        In the second category were those precincts where all
    voters voted on direct recording DRE voting systems, just over
    74,000 precincts in 27 States. I'm sorry about all the numbers.
    To meet the requirements of 811, these precincts would need to
    either replace their entire voting system with a paper-ballot
    ballot marker system or retrofit their DREs with compliant
    durable and accessible voter verified paper audit printers.
        Finally, there were precincts in which most voters used a
    paper ballot system and a DRE was provided merely for HAVA
    compliance, and that is about 50,000 precincts in 23 States.
        There would be basically three approaches for precincts in
    the second two categories to meet the durability and
    accessibility requirements of 811. One approach would be to
    replace DRE systems with paper ballot optical scan systems and
    ballot markers. In all DRE precincts, this would require the
    purchase of one paper-based optical scan scanner per precinct
    and one ballot marker. In mixed precincts, they would only
    require the purchase of a ballot marking device.
        The language of H.R. 811 allows the use of DREs, but only
    if they are equipped to provide every voter with the
    opportunity to review a software independent record of their
    votes. Technology required for such printer exists, but there
    are currently no add-on printers for DREs that meet these
    requirements.
        A third approach would be to take advantage of the
    accessible features allowed by the computer interfaces of DRE
    and attach printers that would generate durable paper ballots
    that could then be scanned for counting and also for the
    special needs verification for voters that need them.
        I am going to be very quick.
        I base my projection on a cost average--on an average cost
    of 5,000 per precinct optical scanner and $5,000 for ballot
    marking device. It is impossible to anticipate with certainty
    the cost of compliant add-on printers for existing DREs since
    they are not currently on the market, but each such printer
    would likely cost less than the cost of a precinct scanner.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Stewart----
        Mr. Stewart. I will be quick, sorry.
        However, DRE voting systems require multiple voting
    machines in each precinct, compared to only one scanner. So the
    costs are roughly the same.
        Let me just jump to the critical question here.
        Ms. Lofgren. The study would be very useful and we would
    like to make that a part of the record if we could.
        Mr. Stewart. Just quickly to conclude. Based on my
    research, the costs of bringing every precinct in the country
    into compliance with the requirements of 811 would be more than
    double the $3 million that is currently authorized in the bill;
    and in order to ensure that States have everything they need to
    meet the requirements, I urge the subcommittee to increase the
    bill's authorization to $1 billion.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        [The statement of Mr. Stewart follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. And now we are going to turn to our last
    witness. Commissioner Mahoney, thank you so much for being
    here.

               STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER GAIL W. MAHONEY

        Ms. Mahoney. Thank you and to both Chairwomen and to
    Ranking Member McCarthy, and certainly to Congressman Ehlers
    from the great State of Michigan where I come from.
        My name is Gail Mahoney, and I am representing the National
    Association of Counties today, all of your constituents back
    home; and it is my pleasure to be here and to have the
    opportunity to speak for NACo. To be the cleanup woman at the
    end, I really should be allowed just a couple extra minutes,
    but as long as----
        Ms. Lofgren. Until the bell rings.
        Ms. Mahoney. My testimony is in the record and all of the
    documents that we have asked to be entered into the record. I
    am just going to applaud, first of all, your leadership and
    concern for trying to ensure public confidence in our
    democracy.
        I do support the goals of H.R. 811. Every voter must have
    confidence that their vote counts, that the candidates that
    they have chose will be counted, and that those things can be
    audited. We do support it.
        But the main thing is that the intent is going to totally
    bring results that we don't want. I think voter confidence will
    totally be eroded, because this bill, being rushed at this
    point, will cause people to think less of the voter system if
    we rush this for 2008.
        There is no way the counties have the money; it is an
    unfunded mandate.
        I am from the great State of Michigan, like I said, and
    certainly the State of Michigan cannot fund again. We do use
    optical scan in Michigan, but right now there are counties that
    have the DREs. There is no way by 2008 that those systems can
    be changed to meet this deadline.
        So we certainly do not want a deja vu to occur. The
    deadlines that proceed the standards, the National Institute of
    Standards and Technology would be issuing guidelines for
    experimental new forms and ballot scanning technology 2 years
    after it reaches the polling places in America, which requires
    starting to use the equipment before it has even been mandated.
        So we just want to ensure public confidence in the next
    generation of voting equipment. We urge you to try to slow down
    this legislation and give us an opportunity to have HAVA to
    work as it was intended. And had HAVA had the support
    financially and the time frame that was originally intended, we
    would not be here today. We would not be attempting to scrap
    billions of dollars of equipment that cannot feed your
    constituents back home.
        So, certainly, the waste of tax dollars. We will not be
    ready.
        And so we would just like finally to urge you to--a uniform
    ballot and standard voting equipment would be impractical. It
    will stifle innovation for the future and greatly magnify the
    efforts of unintended consequences.
        Our Nation should not look for a single dramatic solution,
    but for a sustained effort to make improvements and eliminate
    sources of error.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before
    you today on behalf of NACo.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you so very much.
        [The statement of Ms. Mahoney follows:]

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        Ms. Lofgren. And we are going to limit ourselves again, if
    we could, to 3 minutes of questions; and I will ask Mr. Runyan,
    who is from my county, what you would recommend be deployed in
    those precincts that have paperless DREs currently deployed.
        Mr. Runyan. What would be deployed in terms of Holt or what
    would be----
        Ms. Lofgren. What do you recommend in terms of
    accessibility as well as accountability?
        Mr. Runyan. Well, I think, as Secretary of State Debra
    Bowen had pointed out, that one of the better solutions today
    is a blended solution with optical scan and accessible ballot
    marking systems; and that would be, as is in my report, my
    general recommendation for most areas.
        Ms. Lofgren. And do those systems already exist?
        Mr. Runyan. Yes. Right. There are systems like this. They
    have been tried. They are certified and they have been used in
    several different States.
        A good model is New Mexico, where they completely threw out
    the DRE machines and replaced them; and it was actually cheaper
    than what they were going to have to do to upgrade their
    systems.
        Ms. Lofgren. I am going to yield to Mr. McCarthy in view of
    the time.
        Mr. McCarthy. I just want to thank all the panelists for
    coming and testifying. I do want to thank the Chairwoman for
    holding this examination of H.R. 811 and for the panels that we
    had earlier this week and last week.
        I think something that I take from this, kind of from all
    the witnesses, whether they support or oppose, there is still
    work that needs to be done on this bill.
        Ms. Mahoney. Absolutely.
        Mr. McCarthy. For it to be more money, for it to be what
    you mandate. And it sounds like everybody wants to work towards
    it, that, yes, there is a place people want to get to, but it
    doesn't seem like this bill is done yet. And we have an
    election fast approaching.
        And what is an interesting point--and one of our first
    individuals that was testifying today was the Governor of
    Florida, and as he begins to move on the improvements he has
    made down there, regardless of where this bill goes, he is
    moving up his election. And to make a dramatic shift prior to
    an election, especially when you have a Presidential election--
    you have a lot of the States moving their primary up--I do
    think we have a goal of what to work towards.
        The bill has some concepts in there I think people want to
    work on, and I look forward to working with everyone, trying to
    produce a bipartisan bill and something that everybody can
    agree to.
        Ms. Lofgren. Madam Chairwoman.
        The Chairwoman. First of all, I would like to have everyone
    who is here today know that this panel has submitted a letter
    to the appropriators, asking for the remaining $800 million;
    and of course, as we have heard today, that may just be a drop
    in the bucket. But at least this committee has gone forward
    with the whole notion of trying to get the rest of the money
    from HAVA.
        Mr. Stewart, in your testimony, you stated that the
    jurisdictions would be able to implement these changes before
    2008. What are you basing that on? Whereas Conny McCormack, the
    Registrar Recorder/County Clerk in my County of Los Angeles,
    sent me a letter stating that mandating major changes to the
    2008 election cycle would invite significant problems.
        Mr. Stewart. I would point to the fact that Governor Crist
    is intending to make changes which are like the H.R. 811
    changes before his primary in February. The fact that New
    Mexico switched from DRE voting to optical scan in the course
    of about 2 months, it is not optimal. They received their
    scanners in August of 2006, and they were using them in early
    voting in October.
        I would point to--in my written testimony, I make reference
    to the former EAC Commissioner, Ray Martinez, who spoke to the
    Financial Services Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee
    a couple of weeks ago and described his experience. He was
    engaged as a consultant for the State of New Mexico in
    overseeing that implementation. It wasn't optimal time, but
    they did succeed and had a successful election in doing that.
        I would also look at other States that have made that
    change relatively quickly. I would say, moving to a less
    complicated system like an optical scan system, which is easier
    for poll workers to be trained to use, would also facilitate
    the implementation of this bill.
        The Chairwoman. Just a statement: Commissioner Mahoney did
    say that there would be challenges if this bill would come into
    play for 2008, especially for county election officers.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Ehlers.
        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        First of all, I want to apologize to the panel for rushing
    your testimony. We don't like it that way, but the floor rules
    around here. When we have to be down there to vote, we have to
    be down there to vote.
        I do appreciate the comments and the testimony offered. We
    had a couple of hearings on this bill last year. We have now
    had this hearing. I think we have heard ample testimony. It is
    pretty clear what the different individuals and groups think,
    and it is also very clear that this is something that is going
    to be very difficult to rush just because of the difficulty of
    implementing something like this very quickly, particularly
    since we haven't even ended paying for the last changes made.
        Given our current budget situation, it is going to be hard
    to scrape up a lot of money out of the Congress to rush this
    through. That doesn't mean it can't be done, but it is going to
    take State and local money to do it if you want it done by that
    date. The direction, I think, is pretty clear.
        As I mentioned earlier, I will be preparing some amendments
    or a substitute to try to include a number of the comments that
    have been made here. Thank you to all of you for being here.
    Thank you, especially, Commissioner Mahoney; we appreciate you
    being here and representing the great State of Michigan.
        Actually, I am amazed at how well we have done in Michigan
    under HAVA with the optical scan. The only problem I know of
    last year was caused by the incompetence of a certain city
    clerk who then proceeded to lose her own election. So
    incompetence has its own reward.
        So we appreciate the work you have done. We appreciate your
    comments and that applies to everyone who is here. Thank you
    very much.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much.
        The Chairwoman. Madam Chair, I have a point of personal
    privilege.
        Thank you so much for this hearing today. We had excellent
    panelists, and I agree with the Ranking Member of the full
    Committee in saying they had to rush through, but we got the
    idea. So thank you very much for this.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much. And I just appreciate
    everyone who has taken their time to share their expertise.
        And I would note, Mr. Stewart, the analysis that you have
    done will be enormously helpful. I am not aware of anyone else
    who has done that, and we don't actually have a hard copy of
    it, so if we could get that from you, that will be so useful.
        Mr. Stewart. Would you prefer it on disk or by e-mail?
    Anyway, I can work it out with your staff.
        Ms. Lofgren. Thank you very much and thanks to all of you.
        The subcommittee will hold the record open for 5 days for
    members andwitnesses who wish to submit additional materials in
    writing.
        And, again, thank you so much. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [The information follows:]
        Insert:
        I am writing to ask you to oppose the Holt Bill in its entirety. HR
    811 contains many dangerous provisions that, if implemented, will
    surbvert our democratic processes and our ability to have citizen
    oversight over our elections:
               It has a huge unfunded mandate (estimated $4 billion
            to pay for the text conversion device alone) that will send our
            cities and towns deeply into debt.
               It mandates nonexistent, untested and uncertified
            equipment (text conversion device) for use in the 2008
            elections.
               It makes permanent the EAC and thereby centralizes
            electoral regulation and control, giving unprecedented and
            undemocratic power to the White House over the nation's
            elections.
        The EAC as an entity composed of four presidential appointees, even
    in an officially non-regulatory role wields inappropriate power over
    our national elections through its voting equipment certification
    program and its ``voluntary'' voting system guidelines. According to a
    recent GAO report, up to 44 states require compliance with federal
    voting system guidelines, which effectively makes the EAC program
    regulatory. In addition to the affront this manifests to our concept of
    decentralized power, the EAC voting system guidelines and certification
    program place an emphasis on technology over democracy, proposing high
    tech, high cost, pie in the sky solutions that are unworkable and will
    destabilize our election systems nationwide. This is a national
    security threat we can not afford. The EAC must be abolished per the
    HAVA directive to sunset it in 2006. Any necessary and positive
    functions it serves can be reassigned as shown below.
        The untenable and unworkable nature of the Holt Bill proposals are
    evidenced in its universal rejection by all state and local election
    officials as represented by the National Association of Secretaries of
    State, the National Conference of State Legislators, and the National
    Association of Counties. They unilaterally understand the unfunded
    costs required to implement this bill, the unrealistic timelines, and
    the threat it represents to state sovereignty.
        One analysis indicates that in order for our state to comply with
    the EAC-recommended and Holt-mandated text conversion requirement, it
    would have to do some or all of the following in time for the 2008
    elections:
               Completely redesign its ballot, possibly in a
            technology-friendly but non-voter-friendly manner
               Revise its election laws to support the new ballot
            design and technology
               Purchase entirely new election equipment for the
            entire state
        The destabilizing effect these actions would have on the state of
    New Hampshire and the ability of its citizens to exercise their
    Constitutional right to vote in free, fair, and open elections would be
    multiplied as each state across the nation attempts to comply with
    these requirements according to its own particular election
    configurations.
        Although I am not your constituent, I am asking you to represent
    the nation by opposing this bill completely, to not offer any
    amendments, but rather to work with us on better and more realistic
    solutions that will further election integrity for our nation.
        Suggestions for alternate legislation may be found in the
    references below.
                Sincerely,
                                                            Nancy Tobi.
        The EAC's functions, as described on its website, are listed here
    in bulleted format, with suggested handover to other entities in ALL
    CAPS:
        * Generate technical guidance on the administration of federal
    elections.--HAND OVER TO NIST & STANDARDS BOARD
        * Produce voluntary voting systems guidelines.--HAND OVER TO NIST &
    STANDARDS BOARD
        * Research and report on matters that affect the administration of
    federal elections.--HAND OVER TO STANDARDS BOARD & CITIZENS GROUP
        * Otherwise provide information and guidance with respect to laws,
    procedures, and technologies affecting the administration of Federal
    elections.--HAND OVER TO STANDARDS BOARD & CITIZENS GROUP
        * Administer payments to States to meet HAVA requirements.--HAND
    OVER TO GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
        * Provide grants for election technology development and for pilot
    programs to test election technology.--ELIMINATE THIS FUNCTION
        * Manage funds targeted to certain programs designed to encourage
    youth participation in elections.--HAND OVER TO FEC
        * Develop a national program for the testing, certification, and
    decertification of voting systems.--HAND OVER TO NIST & STANDARDS BOARD
        * Maintain the national mail voter registration form that was
    developed in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act of
    1993 (NVRA), report to Congress every two years on the impact of the
    NVRA on the administration of federal elections, and provide
    information to States on their responsibilities under that law.--HAND
    OVER TO FEC
        * Audit persons who received federal funds authorized by HAVA from
    the General Services Administration or the Election Assistance
    Commission.--HAND OVER TO GAO
        * Submit an annual report to Congress describing EAC activities for
    previous fiscal year.--HAND OVER AS APPROPRIATE TO ENTITIES PICKING UP
    FUNCTIONS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE

        References:
              Request by Voters: Alternate legislative recommendation
            http://www.wethepatriots.org/HAVA/requestbyvoters.pdf
              Concept proposal for federal election reform legislation
            http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/EI-FedLegProposal-v2.pdf
              Nancy Tobi podcast interview with Bob Fitrakis of Ohio's
            FreePress.org: (Audio podcast: Why mandated equipment in Holt
            does not exist and will not exist in time for their mandated
            2008 timeline and what this means to the nation) http://
            www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3661
              Why the Election Assistance Commission must be abolished:
            Centralized executive power and bloodless coups http://
            www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3657
              What's wrong with the NEW Holt Bill (HR 811)? (13 bulleted
            points)
            http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/3572
              National Association of Counties and National Conference of
            State Legislatures urge Congress to oppose federal election
            reform (why state and local election officials and legislators
            oppose the bill) http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/
            view/3687
              NASS Approach to Federal Legislation (why top state election
            officials oppose Holt) http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/
            node/view/3687

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