[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORIZATION:
=======================================================================
FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 20, 2007
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Serial No. 110-18
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Todd Gee, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 21
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylvania................................. 22
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of new York.......................................... 24
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 13
The Honorable David Davis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Tennessee............................................. 13
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 16
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolian.................................... 18
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 48
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Delegate in Congress From
the District of Columbia....................................... 46
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 26
Witnesses
Panel I
Mr. Robert A. Mocny, Acting Director, US-VISIT, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Joint Statement................................................ 5
Accompanied by,
Mr. Richard Robert Zitz, Deputy Under Secretary for Preparedness,
Department of Homeland Security................................
Oral Statement................................................... 9
Mr. Richard Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 7
Panel II
James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statements............................................ 35
Ms. Michele A. Flournoy, President and Co-Founder, Center for a
New American Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Mr. Asa Hutchinson, Founder Partner, Hutchinson Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Appendixes
Appendix A: For the Record:
The Honorable Tom Davis, a Representative in Congress, From the
State of Virginia, Prepared Statement........................ 55
Appendix B: Questions and Responses:
Mr. Robert A. Mocny Responses.................................. 57
Mr. Richard Stana Responses.................................... 62
Mr. Richard Robert Zitz Responses.............................. 65
POSITIONING US-VISIT FOR SUCCESS AND
ESTABLISHING A QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS
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Tuesday, March 20, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Harman, Norton, Jackson
Lee, Etheridge, Cuellar, Carney, Clarke, King, Shays, Dent,
Bilirakis, and Davis of Tennessee.
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
Organizational and Policy Proposals for the Fiscal Year 2008
Department of Homeland Security Authorization: Positioning US-
VISIT for Success and Establishing a Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Process.
I called this hearing today to look at two issues that are
extremely important the security of this country, US-VISIT and
the strategic planning for the Department of Homeland Security.
We welcome our witnesses and look forward to the productive
discussion.
For over 10 years, Congress has called for the development
and implementation of an entry-exit system to ensure that we
know who is entering and leaving the country. I have watched
with great interest the department's efforts to implement US-
VISIT.
While I applaud the department for its efforts, there is
still a long way to go. The exit piece of the system seems no
closer to being implemented than when it was first authorized
over 10 years ago.
We have a vested interest in seeing US-VISIT succeed. That
is why we have a lot of questions about the recent decision to
move US-VISIT to the National Protection and Programs
Directorate.
The skeptic in me wants to say that instead of fixing what
is wrong with the program, the department is redefining it and
moving it around. We have seen this before. It falls to Mr.
Mocny and Mr. Zitz to convince us that this move will bring
about the results that Congress is seeking.
I am inclined to believe that the right place for US-VISIT
may be at Customs and Border Protection, the agency that
actually does screening at the border. After all, SBInet and
the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative are both located
within CBP.
I am concerned that this move will create new stovepipes
between CBP and US-VISIT. Our security cannot wait for the
problems to make their way up the chain of command.
Additionally, we will be looking today at how to ensure a
clear and coherent strategy behind US-VISIT as well as the
department's other vital problems.
One of the ways to do this is to provide a way for the
department to better organize its strategic planning. Congress
has mandated that Department of Defense undertake quadrennial
reviews. We are here today to see if a similar process will
work for the department.
A clear vision for the department and a strong US-VISIT
program are key issues that will likely be considered in the
authorization bill that the committee expects to take up next
week.
So we have some important matters before us, and I look
forward to the witnesses' testimony.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the full
committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for an
opening statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the time.
And I also want you to know how I fully support the purpose
of this hearing. I think it is essential that we move US-VISIT
forward.
Where we may have a difference and we will wait until the
hearing is completed as to whether or not US-VISIT should be in
CBP, my own instinct and somewhat educated guess is that we
allow the Department of Homeland Security to go through with
the reorganization that both has been within the department and
which has been imposed on it, rather than having another
change.
On the other hand, obviously US-VISIT has not achieved what
it was supposed to. We still do not have the exit portion of
the program functioning. But I am right now reluctant to
support it being in CBP.
Having said that, I look forward to the hearing. I look
forward to reading the testimony and seeing how this process
goes forward.
As far as the quadrennial review, I do believe that that is
something that should be done. It is modeled on what is
happening at the Pentagon or what has gone on at the Pentagon,
and I believe this is something that we should have.
So with that, I will yield back the balance of my time and
look forward to the hearing as we go forward. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. Other members of
the committee are reminded that, under the committee rules,
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
Our first panel of witnesses will include Mr. Robert Mocny,
who is the acting director of the US-VISIT program. Our second
witness is Mr. Richard Stana, director of homeland security and
justice issues at the Government Accountability Office. And our
third witness is Mr. Robert Zitz, deputy undersecretary for
preparedness at the Department of Homeland Security.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for the record, beginning with Mr. Mocny, for his statement.
Mr. Mocny?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, ACTING DIRECTOR, US-VISIT,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mocny. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to explain
the rationale for placing US-VISIT under the proposed National
Protection and Programs Directorate.
Let me first say, Mr. Chairman, I have heard, and quite
frankly, I appreciate and share your concern for US-VISIT. Both
personally and as the program's strongest advocate, I am eager
for this change and confident in the future leadership.
I am honored to be joined by Deputy Undersecretary Zitz,
who is already a staunch supporter of the program.
As Mr. Zitz will address, establishment of the NPPD is the
department's response to Congress' demand for a collaborative
approach to homeland security that eliminates the short-sighted
effects of silos.
At the same time, the directorate will cultivate the
expertise, the skills and the risk reduction potential of each
program across the department and effectively utilize that
across federal, state and local levels to ensure that we can
identify, mitigate and, where possible, eliminate risks to our
security.
By positioning US-VISIT under NPPD, US-VISIT will fully
realize its congressional mandate and at the same time be
better equipped to meet our goals to enhance the security of
our citizens and visitors, protect the privacy and facilitate
legitimate travel and trade all while ensuring the integrity of
our immigration and border management system.
Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to argue that US-VISIT does
not provide critical support for the screening of foreign
travelers. It does.
Nor do I intend to argue that the program is not focused on
deploying biometric exit screening capabilities. We are
committed to doing this.
Nor will I deny US-VISIT's significant irreplaceable role
in our immigration and border management system. We clearly
play a crucial role in that system and take pride in that role.
Rest assured, though, I am here to argue that we would be
remiss to confine the program to such a narrow focus.
US-VISIT's biometric-based solutions for identity
management directly support agencies government-wide, not only
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, but also Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the
Coast Guard, other DHS components including TSA, and also the
Departments of Justice and State and the intelligence
community.
The biometric information that US-VISIT collects, stores
and manages is just one part of the service that we provide to
these entities. The other part is the analysis and vehicle for
delivery of this information.
It is this other part that makes us different from, though
very critical to, the work that our immigration and border
management programs do.
Mr. Chairman, your passionate commitment as well as this
entire committee to ensuring that our first lines of defense,
those decision-makers at the state and local level, have the
necessary tools when and where they need them to protect our
country that passion and commitment is simultaneously driving
US-VISIT's realignment with NPPD so that we can expand this
information-sharing across even more lines of defense, such as
critical infrastructure and cybersecurity.
Today, I wanted to share some real-life examples of what
US-VISIT has currently enabled agencies across federal, state
and local levels to do.
A person traveling under the Visa Waiver Program arrived at
a U.S. airport. Although the name did not hit against any
biographic watch list, the person's biometric matched those of
US-VISIT. CBP officers confirmed the person's true identity and
history of heroin smuggling and passport forgery. US-VISIT's
services helped CBP deny this known criminal entry.
Recently, sheriff officials submitted an assault suspect's
fingerprints during a routine booking procedure. Because of a
new process testing the interoperability of US-VISIT's and the
FBI's fingerprint databases, the fingerprints were checked
against criminal and immigration information.
In the past, biometrics confirmed the person's criminal and
immigration violation history. This new process notified law
enforcement and immigration officials of this information, and
now DHS will be able to remove this person after local
prosecution.
Recently, the Coast Guard arrested 22 migrants attempting
to enter the United States through the Mona Pass between Puerto
Rico and the Dominican Republic.
Because of the biometric matching to US-VISIT data, part of
the pilot program to use biometrics to establish and verify
true identities of persons at sea, three of these persons are
now being prosecuted.
And finally, even more recently, a smuggling and kidnaping
suspect was identified in our systems after our fingerprint
examiners removed latent prints from a crime scene that was
provided to us by ICE.
These cases are only a few of the many successes that US-
VISIT is facilitating. The very cross-cutting nature of this
program demands structure and leadership that will foster
intergovernmental collaboration to provide the nation with
imperative risk reduction capabilities. The NPPD provides such
a platform.
Mr. Chairman, it is a comfort to know that there are
advocates like you for this program. As an advocate myself, I
believe this move will enable US-VISIT to expand its value to a
breadth of agencies.
Our nation's security requires this of us. And thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Mocny and Mr. Zitz follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of Robert Zitz and Robert A. Mocny
March 20, 2007
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, Members of the Committee--
Good Morning. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) and the
movement of US-VISIT into this new Directorate.
Secretary Chertoff and the Department continue to make progress in
many areas. Our mission is straightforward and guided by four goals:
Goal 1. Protect our Nation from Dangerous People
Goal 2. Protect our Nation from Dangerous Goods Goal
Goal 3. Protect Critical Infrastructure
Goal 4. Build a Nimble, Effective Emergency Response System and
a Culture of Preparedness
In an interconnected and interdependent global economy, managing
risk requires adaptability to a wide range of individual scenarios.
These scenarios create a very complex risk environment when it comes to
protecting America. The risk environment is dynamic and our approach to
managing this risk environment must be equally dynamic.
Our approach is focused on the most significant risks; we apply
resources in the most practical way possible to prevent, protect
against, and respond to manmade and natural hazards. That means making
tough-minded assessments and recognizing that it is simply not possible
to eliminate every threat to every individual in every place at every
moment. Discipline is required to assess threats, review
vulnerabilities, and weigh consequences; we then have to balance and
prioritize our resources against those risks so that we can ensure that
our Nation is protected.
Decades of experience in dealing with natural disasters have
provided sufficient data to understand their risk. By contrast, there
have been far fewer terrorist events within the United States, making
our comprehension of risk less encompassing.
We must continue to guard against infiltration of this country by
international terrorists who have the capability and intent to cause
damage to our people and our economy. The most recent illustration of
this kind of a scenario is the plot in London that was uncovered last
summer. Had it been successful, it would have cost the lives of
hundreds of people and could have dealt a significant blow to the
functioning of our entire system of international trade and travel.
We have to recognize that there are individuals who sympathize with
terrorist organizations or embrace their ideology and who are prepared
to use violence as a means to promote a radical, violent agenda. To
minimize this potential emerging threat, we have to work across
Federal, State, and local jurisdictions to prevent domestic terrorism.
Risk is interdependent and interconnected and must be managed
accordingly. For example, a port closure will not only have an impact
on a given port area, but also on manufacturing facilities thousands of
miles away that depend on the timely delivery of materials. One of the
best examples of this interdependency is petroleum refinery capacity
along the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina. The day before
Hurricane Katrina, facilities in Houston, Texas, produced 25 percent of
the Nation's petroleum. The day after Hurricane Katrina, with the
facilities closed along the Gulf Coast, these same facilities were
producing 47 percent of the Nation's petroleum. This example
demonstrates how significant supply chain interdependencies are in
managing a full range of risk. So we understand that managing risk
requires us to look at a broad continuum across a wide geographical
area.
The National Protection and Programs Directorate is being created
so that the United States is better prepared to meet these challenges.
NPPD Mission and Overview
The main responsibility of the NPPD is to advance the Department's
risk-reduction mission. To achieve this goal, the NPPD protects
infrastructure through the identification of threats and
vulnerabilities. It develops risk-mitigation strategies and defines and
synchronizes Departmental doctrine for protection initiatives that
involve significant coordination and integration of efforts among our
Federal counterparts and partners in the State, local, tribal, and
private sector communities. The Department's ability to identify and
assess risks to the Nation depends to a significant degree on its
capacity to detect and evaluate threats to the United States.
Threats posed by individuals wishing to do the Nation harm
generally fall into two categories: physical and virtual. Reducing risk
requires an integrated approach that encompasses these physical and
virtual threats, as well as the human elements that pose those threats.
Currently, there are multiple components within DHS working
independently to reduce our comprehensive risk. Three of these are:
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), which
addresses physical risks;
The Office of Cyber Security and Communications
(CS&C), which addresses cyber risks; and
US-VISIT, which addresses human risks.
All three of these offices use the same approach to reduce risk by
utilizing data gathering, data analysis, and dissemination of
information to operators.
DHS believes that it can increase the synergies between, and
improve the output of, the aforementioned offices by not only
recognizing their commonalities, but also integrating their work more
closely.
All these programs are flexible, critical resources that can be
leveraged by any agency within DHS. This structure promotes information
sharing and integration, both of which are key to the Department's
long-term strategy for developing a unified immigration and border
management enterprise. Expanding access to US-VISIT's identity
management services supports three of the NPPD's critical missions:
Fostering stronger and better integrated national
approaches among key strategic homeland security activities;
Protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure, both
physical and virtual; and
Enhancing the security of our citizens and visitors by
facilitating legitimate travel with appropriate safeguards.
The US-VISIT Program
The US-VISIT program was created in response to a congressional
mandate for an entry/exit system. In the beginning, it expended
considerable effort to support the Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officers responsible for screening travelers applying for admission
into the United States, as well as the Department of State consular
officers who issue visas. However, US-VISIT has expanded its role and
now provides significant support to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Service (USCIS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG), and other DHS components; the Department of
Justice; and the intelligence community.
The US-VISIT program is leading one of the Department`s key
initiatives--the transition from 2-print to 10-print capture and
interoperability, an initiative that will include not only the
Department of Justice, but State and local law enforcement entities as
well.
US-VISIT is supporting DHS' goals of promoting international
information sharing and screening by working with other countries that
are currently developing, or interested in developing, their own
biometrics-based systems. Close ties with the Department of State and
its BioVisa Program are also extending the boundaries of the United
States beyond the country's physical borders, to the point where the
biometrics of all visa applicants are collected and used for risk and
threat assessment purposes long before those individuals enter our
country.
These myriad efforts do not divorce US-VISIT from its initial
purpose; rather, they allow the program to fulfill its potential as an
identity management services program. US-VISIT provides the capability
for agencies with immigration and border management responsibilities to
establish an individual's identity through the capture of biometric
information and its association with biographic information. US-VISIT
enables the enrollment and subsequent verification of an individual's
identity at any point within the immigration and border management
process. Through identity management, decision-makers will be able to
access information (appropriate to their business needs) that is
associated with any one individual, including results of watch list and
criminal background checks.
By increasing the number of individuals known to the United States
(and to our allies), we are allowing our governments to focus precious
time and resources on unknown individuals and those who may wish to do
us harm. Thus, the inclusion of US-VISIT with other risk-reduction
activities will increase the program's ability to serve as a risk-
reduction service provider across the Department as a whole.
Closing
When Congress passed legislation to create the Department of
Homeland Security, it sent a clear message that bureaucratic turf
battles and programmatic ``stove piping'' needed to stop. The solution
to the protection of the homeland was a single entity empowered with a
broad, cooperative outlook to address the challenges that face our
Nation. With its mission to support all DHS components and Executive
Branch agencies, the NPPD is exactly the kind of post-9/11 cooperative
thinking that Congress called for when it authorized the creation of
DHS.
Let me assure the Committee that all of the benefits to border
security which US-VISIT has brought to CBP and other agencies
responsible for protecting our Nation will continue to be delivered by
the new reporting structure. US-VISIT and its biometric identity
management capabilities will continue to be available to all DHS
components.
I would like to thank the Committee for its time today, and I
welcome your perspective on the themes I have articulated.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Stana to summarize his statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Stana. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and members of the
full committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the
status and direction of the US-VISIT program.
As you know, the program is designed to collect, maintain
and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and
leaving the country at air, sea and land ports of entry. Data
is captured to learn and verity visitors' identities, screen
information against watch lists, and record arrival and
departure.
My prepared statement summarizes our work over the last
several years on the status of the program, but for now I would
like to summarize three key points.
First, although US-VISIT has conducted exit demonstration
projects at a small number of ports, a biometric exit
capability is currently not available.
At land ports, implementing a biometrically based exit
recording system that mirrors entry would require more than $3
billion in new infrastructure and could produce major traffic
congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicle
upon exit for processing.
The RFID technology tested at five land ports was subject
to numerous performance and reliability problems in fact, it
had a success rate of only 14 percent in one test and provided
no assurance that the person recorded as leaving the country is
the same one who entered.
At air and sea ports, the exit environment could support a
biometric exit capability, although the exit alternative tested
was estimated to have a 24 percent compliance rate.
It is important to note that DHS has not yet provided to
Congress a statutorily mandated report which was due by June
2005 on plans to fully implement the entry-exit program.
Second, DHS deserves credit for installing the entry
portion of US-VISIT at nearly all of the air, sea and land
ports, and this was done with minimal new construction or
changes to existing facilities.
But officials at 12 of the 21 land ports we visited told us
about US-VISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes that
adversely affected processing times and could have compromised
security.
These problems were not routinely reported to headquarters
in part because of the lack of coordination between US-VISIT
and CBP.
The introduction of 10-fingerprint technology and e-
passports could help with the traveler identification process,
but they could also increase inspection times and crowding and
affect port operations at aging and space- constrained
facilities.
Lastly, US-VISIT continues to face longstanding management
challenges. Importantly, after spending 4 years and over $1
billion on the program, US-VISIT has not yet issued a strategic
plan that articulates how it will strategically fit with other
border security initiatives and mandates such as the Secure
Border Initiative and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
nor has it put in place selected management processes and
controls to better ensure effective program implementation and
to reduce program risks.
In the limited time I have remaining, I would like to raise
three issues that members of this committee may wish to
consider in connection with the theme of today's hearing.
First, a clear mission statement and a strategic plan
provide the foundation for the expectations and results that
any organization seeks to achieve. With respect to US-VISIT,
the mission is both knowing who is entering and leaving the
country and managing identity information.
While the primary focus had been on deploying an entry-
exit system, more recently increased emphasis is being placed
on managing identity information under Unique Identity.
Without a strategic plan, we do not know how US-VISIT will
balance resources and levels of effort between the two
missions, and DHS stakeholders are less certain what to expect
in their areas of interest.
And if the primary focus shifts to Unique Identity, who
will take responsibility for implementing an exit capability?
Second, any organization's alignment needs to support its
mission and strategic goals. Where a component is placed on an
organization chart usually follows from an alignment of its
activities, core processes and resources with those of key
stakeholders.
If US-VISIT's primary mission is to be Unique Identity,
then alignment with NPPD could be appropriate. If the primary
mission is implementing entry-exit, then alignment with key
stakeholders, like CBP, SBI, Trusted Traveler programs and so
on, would seem appropriate.
Either way, the alignment decision should flow from the
mission and the plan, not the other way around. And appropriate
crosswalks need to be established to ensure effective
coordination with the other aligned components.
And third, what does Congress think the US-VISIT program
should accomplish and by when? By statute, the program is to
both implement an entry-exit system and manage identity
information.
But what is Congress' priority? At this point, is it more
important to roll out a unique identity program? Is it to shore
up the entry program at the ports? Or is it to implement an
exit capability?
Knowing this could help inform DHS where the US-VISIT
program should be located.
It is also important to note that there currently is no
statutory deadline for deploying an exit capability. Right now,
exit demonstration projects are planned or under way at 12 of
115 airports, two of 14 seaports, and none of the 170 land
ports.
DHS has not yet set a date for full implementation, nor has
it articulated what the biometric exit capability will
ultimately look like.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that members of the committee may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:] \1\
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\1\ GAO, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational,
Technological, and Management Challenges, GAO-07-632T (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).
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Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Zitz for any comments he may have,
recognizing that you submitted a joint statement with Mr.
Mocny.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD ZITZ, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
PREAPREDNESS, DEPARTMENT OF
Mr. Zitz. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King,
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for inviting
me today to appear before you and discuss the realignment of
US-VISIT into the department's newly established National
Protection and Programs Directorate, or NPPD.
I would like to begin this morning by noting I am pleased
to be joined by Bob Mocny, acting director of US-VISIT. The
many successes already demonstrated by US-VISIT are due in
large part to Bob's leadership and the talent and dedication of
the entire US-VISIT team.
Also by Rich Stana, director of homeland security and
justice issues of GAO. We appreciate the ongoing dialogue with
GAO.
The secretary has provided clear direction in the steps the
department needs to take to enhance our protection of America.
His goals are clear: One, protect the nation from dangerous
people. Two, protect the nation from dangerous things. Three,
counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Four,
protect the nation's critical infrastructure. Five, build a
culture of preparedness and strengthen our ability to respond.
It is with the congressional changes in response to Katrina
and with the secretary's goals in mind that NPPD was formed.
NPPD integrates the risk reduction activities of the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, the Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications and US-VISIT.
I can assure you that the department's decision to include
the US-VISIT program as part of NPPD was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. Rather, this decision is based on sound management
principles.
The main responsibility of NPPD is to advance the
department's risk reduction mission. Risk reduction is about
getting the right information into the right hands in time to
act.
The department's ability to identify and assess risk to the
nation depends to a significant degree on its capacity to
detect and evaluate threats to the United States.
Threats are posed by individuals wishing to do the nation
harm, and they naturally fall into two categories, physical and
virtual. Reducing risk requires an integrated approach that
encompasses human, physical and virtual aspects.
US-VISIT, infrastructure protection and cybersecurity and
communications all use the same approach for risk reduction
through data gathering, data analysis and electronic
dissemination of information to operators.
Further, all three offices engage in routine and extensive
coordination across every level of government and with the
private sector.
In addition, by specifically positioning the US-VISIT
program within NPPD, DHS is aligning the office with other
components that serve as a departmental-level resource for our
top decision makers.
US-VISIT has evolved. When US-VISIT was created in response
to a congressional mandate for an entry-exit system, it
expended considerable effort to support the customs and border
protection officers who are responsible for screening travelers
who apply for admission into the United States.
However, US-VISIT also provides significant support to U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Departments of State and
Justice, the intelligence community, and other DHS components.
The US-VISIT program will continue to fulfill its
critically important entry-exit identity management services.
Its inclusion in NPPD will not diminish this responsibility.
Rather, its inclusion in NPPD recognizes the far- reaching
impact of its innovative people, processes and technologies to
help break down stovepipes, enhance information sharing, and
further reduce risks to the nation.
The US-VISIT program in its innovative biometrics-based
technology solutions offers a range of opportunities for
information-sharing and risk-reduction activities beyond their
core mission.
We won't take our eye off the ball. US-VISIT has clear
deliverables that must be realized. But it would be an
opportunity lost to not take advantage of its additional
potential. Thank you for your time this morning, and I look
forward to answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much for your testimony,
each of you.
I now thank the witnesses for their testimony, and I yield
myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Mocny, US-VISIT in its inception was supposed to be an
entry-exit program. Do you have enough history to know why we
have shifted the emphasis of the original intent of the
program?
Mr. Mocny. I believe I do, Mr. Chairman. I was formerly
with the Immigration Service, and I was the director of the
entry-exit program prior to the DHS being stood up.
And then we moved into DHS and we became the US-VISIT
program through a series of name changes. So frankly, I have
been there from the very beginning.
And you are absolutely right. This was about the
establishment of several sections of law passed back as far as
1996 when Congress first became interested in the illegal
immigration population.
There were laws passed in 2000 that called for the Visa
Waiver Program having an automated entry-exit system. And then
9/11 occurred, and of course, we know the laws that are passed
since then.
And repeatedly, the Congress has said that we needed to
have a better way of managing our foreign nationals coming
into, staying in and leaving from the United States.
So where we were first stood up and if I can kind of
analogize it to a police case where you have to get the
perimeter secured first, that was certainly what it was its
initial job to do, get the ports of entry fixed, get the
Department of State biometric visa issuing process stood up, so
you stem the tide and have the perimeter secure.
We have always had, from the very beginning, a five-
process approach to this. There is pre-entry, which, of course,
is the State Department and anything we might gather from the
airlines via the Visa Waiver Program and Advance Passenger
Information Service.
There is entry, which is clearly a CBP role, which is when
that person arrives at a port of entry. Then there is status
management, what happens to that individual once they get here.
And then there is exit. Of course, we are talking about that.
And finally, analysis.
So between pre-entry, entry, status management, exit and
analysis the US-VISIT strategic plan and thinking has always
been around those five core business processes. We are focused
today, or have been, on the entry process as appropriate.
We need to focus on the exit part, which we will be able to
do. But I can tell you that, as the deputy undersecretary
states, we have evolved, and we have evolved as planned from
just entry to now a larger piece.
Chairman
So are you telling the committee today that we have both
the entry and exit components established and in place?
Mr. Mocny. Absolutely not, no. We have the entry
established, clearly, at the 119 airports and the seaports and
the 154 land-water ports of entry, that which was mandated by
Congress to be completed by 2003, 2004, 2005, every December
31st.
The exit portion is something that we have to work on.
There was no date as Mr. Stana indicated, no date given for
that particular piece of it, but we clearly are working on
exit. We have got some pilot programs that we are running. And
that is something we want to address this year at the air
locations.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. Well, I guess, then, there is
obviously two different schools of thought from the testimony.
You just referenced a strategic plan. Can you provide the
committee with a copy of your strategic plan for the US- VISIT
program?
Mr. Mocny. That is the goal that we are trying to get that
through the process here. It is certainly going to be part of
our appropriations. And we owe you a 7208 report as part of the
Intelligence Reform Act to get that to you.
And all I can say is we are working through the process,
through DHS, through OMB, but the plan is to get you that plan
so that you can see the broader aspect of the program.
Chairman Thompson. When was that plan due?
Mr. Mocny. It was due in 2005, sir.
Chairman Thompson. So you are 1.5 years behind.
Mr. Mocny. Yes, sir.
Chairman Thompson. When can we expect it?
Mr. Mocny. I was asked to predict this in another committee
before. I can't give you definitive. I can say soon. I would
say within weeks. And I hope to say between 30 days and 40
days. That was the date that I gave last time, and I would
hope--
Chairman Thompson. Well, you can understand where we are.
You tell us that we have a program, we have this, but we don't
have a plan by which we are operating. And that causes a little
concern on the part of the committee, because if you don't have
a plan, then you are saying, ``Trust us and we will do it.''
I guess the other thing, too is there any idea when the
department is going to move you away from being acting to being
the permanent person?
Mr. Mocny. I have no indication of that. I think there has
been a desire on some, but I haven't had--
Chairman Thompson. How long have you been acting?
Mr. Mocny. For about 10 months, 8 months, 10 months now.
Chairman Thompson. Yes. You know, one of our criticisms of
the department historically has been the turnover, the acting
people in very important positions.
And the committee has expressed on several occasions, from
a leadership as well as management perspective, you need
permanent people in place to get the job done.
I guess my last comment is to Mr. Stana. Ten years, over $1
billion, no strategic plan could you from GAO's perspective
give me your analysis of the program for the committee?
Mr. Stana. Well, in broad terms, we know that entry is
pretty much in place. There are a few managerial issues that
have to be attended to, one of which is making sure proper
evaluations and performance measures are in place and so on.
And of course, Mr. Mocny mentioned the 7208 report needed
to be there.
Exit is nowhere near completion. There have been some
pilots at both air--including air, sea and land, none of which
has been particularly effective. They continue to pilot. There
is no deadline for completion.
And although I am sure that the program office would like
to have it in better shape than that, the fact is exit is
likely a ways away.
There are other management issues, not the least of which
is the one you mentioned. And that is understanding where the
US-VISIT office is to fit strategically and operationally
within homeland security.
Without a strategic plan, not only do you not know exactly
what to expect of the program, and who is accountable for what,
and what the linkages are to other related programs, but
neither do other stakeholders in the department.
It is not that the unit absolutely has to be located in one
place or another. But understanding exactly what the program
is, what it has become, what its strengths, limitations are,
and how the crosswalks from that program are going to be linked
to other components is something that is just not known yet.
I might point out that something in my mind that adds to
the confusion--when I see paperwork that describes what US-
VISIT is in the NPPD, I see reference to managing identity
information. I see very few references to entry-exit. And so
that concerns me.
Although in the budget documents there is a pledge of sorts
to complete the entry-exit part of it, it just seems that that
has taken a secondary role. And I am not sure that that is
where or how they really want to portray that, or if that
really is the fact. But that does add to confusion.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
My time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to
follow up on the exit, that seems to be where the problem is
at. When do you foresee a solution to the exit?
Mr. Stana. Well, we have known for years that exit is the
tough part. The Department of Justice inspector general did a
report back in the late 1990s about the predecessor, the I-94
form that you are supposed to turn in, and what some of the
problems were getting a reliable count on people leaving using
that form.
DMIA task teams have done two reports on the exit process,
and both have pointed to problems with getting an effective
technology to help out so that you don't slow the lines,
particularly at land ports. And our own report last December
pointed it out.
Now, when is this going to happen? When is it going to be
completed? I don't know. And I haven't seen a date from the
department that would give me an indication of when that is
going to happen.
I also haven't seen yet from the department any information
showing exactly what the exit capability is going to look like.
In fact, it is still being piloted at the air and seaports, and
there are no pilots currently under way at land ports, so that
is a completely open question.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Do you have a number of how many
people are here what I would consider to be illegally if they
are beyond their visa expiration date? Do you know how many
people that would be in America?
Mr. Stana. I have seen estimates from 12 million to 20
million illegal aliens in the country, and estimates are that
about 40 percent of those are here as visa overstays. So if you
do the math, that is roughly five million people here as visa
overstays.
Mr. Davis of Tennessee. Thank you. That is all I have.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me talk about US-
VISIT on land ports. Being from a land port and lived all my
life, I can tell you that there are certain structural issues
that we have to deal with, which is mainly the facilities.
I understand technology is important, and I think we have
spent a lot of money on the technology part of it. But you have
still got to look at personnel to address it.
In my district--and I think I have got about 10 ports of
entry, two international airports, one international rail,
probably more crossings than any other congressman in the
nation we get about 12 million north-and southbound pedestrians
a year, roughly.
We talk about technology. We have to talk about the right
staffing. But the other thing, which is an expensive part of
it, is the infrastructure.
If I can just have you imagine having a bridge that got
built there in the late 1950s, the narrow streets that we have
there at the port of entries, and then thinking about trying to
get all those people in, and then if we have to do the exit out
and I am in agreement with the overall goals.
But if you don't have personnel and, of course, the
technologies where we spend most of our time on--but if you
don't have the right infrastructure, because of the crammed,
constrained facilities, you are going to have difficult times.
My area has complained, as you know--you have seen some of
those folks have complained when the US-VISIT was coming in,
and it was coming from the business people, because people were
concerned about the impact that it would have on trade and
business.
And one of the concerns that I always look at is I believe
in homeland security, but if it impedes your local economy
people in Washington, you know, have to make sure that they are
aware of the local impact on the economy.
So what I am looking at is what plans do we have for the
infrastructure investments that we need to have, because you
can talk about all the beautiful technology, and you can talk
about trying to get more staffing, but if you don't have the
infrastructure, because of the constrained spaces and I have
been to a lot of those bridges there.
And I have done that for years and years. I mean, port
entries the POEs. I mean, we are going to be behind the eight-
ball on this simply because of this.
So I have a responsibility to my constituents, including
the business community, because of the impact it would have.
What are your thoughts and this is to all three of you all.
What are your thoughts on the infrastructure?
Because there hasn't been an investment on infrastructure.
There has been little piecemeal--you know, put a little thing
here, put a little thing here. But if we are going to address
this issue, we have to look at infrastructure for the port
facilities.
Mr. Mocny. Well, Congressman, that is exactly one of the
reasons why we are looking at the land border differently than
the air and sea.
We are committed to getting an air and sea solution
beginning this year. We are going to be working with the
airlines so that you do have a viable biometric exit.
And I would like the committee to understand we do have
biographic exit today, so everybody who leaves from an airport,
from a seaport, has that information biographically recorded,
sent to us by the airlines and by the cruise industry, that
goes to DHS, and we record the entries and the exits on the
biographic side.
But you are right, the biometric side is a challenge. We
looked at that very issue we had five pilot tests that Mr.
Stana refers to where we looked at using radio frequency
technology to capture that data, because there is no
infrastructure.
I mean, the air and sea present their own infrastructure
issues in and of themselves, because we don't have, as many
nations have, departure control at the air, at the sea, or at
the land border ports of entry.
But the land is most critical, and of course that is where
80 percent of the people come and leave from the U.S. So that
is why we have taken what we believe to be a more intelligent
approach by saying air and sea exit we can do and we can
handle, and we have got that moving ahead as we speak right
now.
The land border we are going to have to make sure that we
have the correct infrastructure or, looking outside the box and
using perhaps an entry into Mexico as being an entry--an entry
into Mexico being an exit from the U.S. And not always do you
have--
Mr. Cuellar. I am sorry, say that again.
Mr. Mocny. An entry into Mexico or Canada would be an exit
from the U.S. And working with the various governments to use
their infrastructure I mean, you leave the U.S. and then 100
yards later you are in Mexico or Canada.
And can we not work with agreements with the countries to
say rather than us building ourselves just 100 yards north or
south why don't we utilize the infrastructure just south or
just north?
And so those are the kind of questions we are asking
ourselves. How can we do a recording of exits in a maybe
incremental approach?
And that is how we approach things at US-VISIT, is to do
things in, you know, kind of a slow, piecemeal fashion slow is
not the right word, but doing it in the appropriate time frame.
But you are absolutely right. The infrastructure is not
something why we wanted to impose a biometric exit on
travelers, because it would be untenable.
Mr. Stana. Yes. The only thing I would add to that is, you
know, what Bob Mocny says is exactly right. I mean, it is a
challenge mostly at land ports.
And you pointed out as you get into some of these--cities
San Ysidro or Laredo, El Paso the infrastructure that is
existing--it has been there for decades.
It was not built with security in mind. It was built for
passport control in mind. And now we have kind of piggybacked
another responsibility there.
It is not only US-VISIT that is complicating this issue.
When the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative kicks in, in the
next year or two, a similar issue is going to come up--and in
some respects, an issue that is going to affect many more
people.
Only about 1 percent or 2 percent of the people who cross
through land ports are subject to US-VISIT checks. Many, many
more are going to be subject to Western Hemisphere checks. And
that is why technology could play a role.
There are trusted traveler programs now that you probably
are familiar with, NEXIS and SENTRI. And they seem to work
quite well.
Finding a way to extend those kinds of programs to include
some kind of biometric identification--you know, with a smart
card of sorts--may be helpful that you keep traffic moving.
With respect to using Canada and Mexico using their entry
as our exit, I would want to make sure that the people in those
booths in other countries are fully vetted for security reasons
before I would go down that road too far.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Could I just ask
him to provide one information--
Chairman Thompson. Go ahead.
Mr. Cuellar. For all three of you all, could you give the
committee--and I personally want to see this--the list have you
all done a study on the space constrained areas that we have at
the port of entries?
Because I know you mentioned this in your report. I don't
know if you all have that, but I would like to get that as soon
as possible. I don't know how fast that would be, but that is a
big component that we have been missing, the space constrains,
because they were built years ago.
And like you said, they were done for another purpose. Now
we are talking about security, which is totally different.
Chairman Thompson. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Stana. Yes. The latest estimate from the department was
about $3 billion, and that estimate was made in 2003, to
correct many of those things.
So it is not just a handful. It is many of them. Even on
the northern border and sparsely populated areas, there would
have to be reconfigurations.
The other thing to note is that that estimate doesn't
include all of the infrastructure that would have to change.
Interstate highways may have to be rerouted. I mean, it is not
just at the immediate port facility where changes would have to
be made.
Mr. Cuellar. Well, I appreciate that information. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. We now recognize
Mr. Dent of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, gentlemen.
According to DHS' Office of Immigration Statistics, in 2004 180
million foreign nationals entered the United States as a non-
immigrant status. In 2005, about 175 million people entered.
Do you know how many of these individuals overstayed their
visas or authorized stay in the United States?
Mr. Mocny. I can only quote the estimate that Mr. Stana
quotes as well, which is about 30 percent to 40 percent of the
people who come here under the Visa Waiver Program are
estimated to overstay their visas. But I don't have a hard
number.
Mr. Dent. So it is about 30 percent, then.
Mr. Mocny. That is about right. Mr. Dent.
Okay. And in 2005, about 2.2 million foreign nationals
entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program. How
many of those folks overstayed? Is it the same percentage for
the--
Mr. Mocny. We use the same percentage.
Mr. Dent. Same percentage. Okay. And then another issue,
too, that I am concerned about is that, you know, 13 of 17
terrorists--9/11--had overstayed their temporary visas. And I
guess the main question is how can the United States government
not be able to answer this fundamental question about border
security 5.5 years after 9/11. We have all these people
overstaying. You say it is 30 percent.
You know, the 9/11 terrorists came in, and they were on--
they came in here with visas and several overstayed. What are
the alternatives for gathering exit information, even if it is
just biographical data, you know, for now that could be
implemented in the short term?
So what do we do to make this better?
Mr. Mocny. Congressman, I appreciate the question, because
this--it goes to the heart of what US-VISIT has been able to
do.
Because we have been able to focus ourselves in not one
particular mission area, not in just CBP, not just in ICE, not
just in CIS, we are able to kind of look across the board,
because at the end of the day, what we are talking about is
DHS-wide and it is, frankly, U.S. government-wide.
The exit piece is--and the failure of people to exit needs
to be analyzed, and we have a unit within US-VISIT, the Data
Integrity Group, which every single day looks at those overstay
records, makes some general assumptions about whether or not
they have left.
They look at various databases. And at the end of the day,
they turn over a tranche of records to ICE, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, who are able then to develop portfolios
and go and find those individuals.
Now, in 290 cases to date--and that is not a lot, but it is
some where on just the data that the US-VISIT team was able to
cull, they were able to actually go out and make arrests and
deport those individuals who have overstayed their visa.
It might be surprising to some on this committee that we
have not had that ability to do that in the past. We just
haven't had the ability to look at the various data bits and
say this person is, in fact, an overstay. And it might be an
unconfirmed overstay or a confirmed overstay.
And so by expanding the capabilities of the US-VISIT
program department-wide, we are able to look across the board
at all the data to be able to make that very decision and work
toward an environment--and our third goal for the program is to
ensure the integrity of the immigration system.
And frankly, we need a unit that can focus on those various
cross-cutting issues.
Mr. Stana. Mr. Dent, if I might add to that, I think that
that question you raised has to be parsed. Are we talking
immigration control or are we talking terror control?
If we are talking immigration control, then the exit part
of entry-exit is extremely important, because that gives you
the idea of who has overstayed. If you are talking terror
control, entry becomes paramount, because once someone is in
the country, it doesn't matter when they leave.
There are some things that US-VISIT can do and, frankly,
there are some things that perhaps it can't, because it is
collecting biometric information and it matches it against
known terrorists on watch lists.
Somehow or other, this biometric identity unit that is
being enhanced here has to have the proper links to the
intelligence community to make sure that not only is
information on the watch list evaluated but any other leads
that may be there can be brought to bear on this issue.
There may be other ways to get to this other than the
strict entry system, and those ought to be explored. And
frankly, that is a component that ought to be linked in here
when we are talking about where organizationally US-VISIT
should fit in the structure of DHS.
Where is it linked to the intelligence unit or to the
national intelligence-gathering apparatus? Where is it linked
to the science and technology groups? That is an important
linkage.
Mr. Zitz. Mr. Dent, if I could add to that, that very
point--because NPPD is linked to the intelligence community
through the intelligence apparatus in DHS we have a joint
activity you are familiar with called High Track, which joint
intelligence, joint critical infrastructure.
That is a key linkage. And while I agree entry is paramount
when you are talking about the terrorism aspect, the fact of
overstaying a visa can be a correlation with other intelligence
data that could give us an indicator.
So again, what is paramount here is being able to marry up
all the various data streams.
Mr. Dent. I see my time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Etheridge.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I apologize for
being in and out, but we are doing budget work down the hall.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And again, Mr. Mocny, I believe Mr. Thompson asked this
question, but let me return to it for a little more specific
information, if I may. By redefining US-VISIT as an identity
management system, it seems as though we are slowly moving away
from Congress' call for an entry/exit system.
My question is this, and I would appreciate you addressing
them. Have the threats to the country changed so that there is
less concern about aliens overstaying their visas?
And two, what assurances can you give us that you will not
abandon the exit mission of the system?
And thirdly, how much money have you dedicated in 2007 for
exit feature? And is there anything in the 2008 allocation for
exit?
Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Congressman.
No, we haven't abandoned exit at all. And let me briefly
tell you about the other side of the move into NPPD. We are
talking about kind of from an operational standpoint how US-
VISIT and the data it gathers can assist across the department
and outside the department.
The other reason why that I am a strong advocate of being
moved into the NPPD is we are going to have an advocate now in
the undersecretary for the NPPD.
In the next panel, you are going to hear from Asa
Hutchinson, who was our undersecretary under the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate.
And we had this very debate back in 2003, where to put US-
VISIT, and to say, ``Well, should we be in CBP because it is
ports of entry?'' ``No, it should be in ICE because it is about
overstays.''
Well, maybe it should be somewhere above the mission space
of those two entities right there. And so that is why the
decision at that point was to put us into the BTS, the Border
and Transportation Security Directorate.
Our customer base has now grown. We now service the Coast
Guard. We now service the Transportation Security
Administration, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and now
state and local police officers and the intelligence community.
And by virtue of having our customer base grow and us
providing identity services to more and more operational
entities, we believe it is appropriate to be put into the NPPD.
I will say this, that as our commitment to exit we have $7
million appropriated and assigned in 2007, but we have $39.5
million in our 2006 spend plan which--or appropriations which
is yet to be extended on the exit piece.
So we believe we have sufficient funding with the 2006
remaining and the 2007 to begin the process of air and sea
exit, working with the airlines and the cruise industry, to
have an effective solution working with them as our partners,
while we work on the longer term issue of the land border
issue.
And I believe in subsequent years we would be coming back
to the Congress to finish the exit piece.
But I think, just to finish, the reason why we are going to
NPPD is because we are committed to getting the other pieces
done. We haven't completed exit.
And frankly, we need an advocate in an undersecretary who
has direct access to the secretary and the deputy secretary, so
that we can make sure that our commitments are made good.
Mr. Etheridge. Do I understand your statement, then, that
the threat of folks overstaying their visas is still a concern?
Mr. Mocny. Absolutely.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. Let me very quickly go to one other
question. It is my understanding that we have been testing
radio frequencies--RFID technology at our land borders.
GAO reports that these systems performed below their target
rates and did not even meet congressional mandates for a
biometric exit system.
Are we still investing in that technology? And what lessons
did you learn from the initial pilots that may be applicable to
the future?
Mr. Mocny. Again, thank you. One of the things that we do
at US-VISIT is work very closely with the business community.
Just a year ago, the new 10-fingerprint devices didn't
exist that we are going to be deploying this year and next, and
again, that is a close association working with industry to do
so.
We are also working on this bio-token, as you call the
biometric RFID. We have seen prototypes of several different
companies, frankly, that would allow for the capture of a
biometric and then that biometric being recorded remotely and
passively through some kind of RFID signal.
But the technology is not there yet. It is probably 3 years
to 5 years in the offing for any kind of robust and safe use of
a biometric RFID. And in fact, we tested--
Mr. Etheridge. How far out did you say?
Mr. Mocny. I would say my guess would be anywhere from 3
years to 5 years.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Mr. Mocny. But the idea of having biometrics as part of the
exit portion--which, again, is a mandate from the Congress--is
something that we are striving for.
And that is the complexity. We can have biometric exit at
the air and seaports of entry. But to ask someone to drive out
of the country and simultaneously put their finger on a device
while they are steering out of the country at 45 miles an
hour--frankly, it would be irresponsible on my part to mandate
that of anybody, let alone an elderly driver--whoever.
So we have to look at the ergonomics of it. We have to look
at the efficacy of it. And that is why we are going to continue
to pay attention to it, although--take some steps, perhaps, and
do things biographically, as I said, working with Canada and
work with Mexico, to get that done.
But we haven't abandoned the air or the sea exit. We are
not abandoning land border exit. We are just going to wait for
the technology to kind of catch up to us so that we can
implement this.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Stana. Can I add one thing to that, Mr. Etheridge? I
think Mr. Mocny is correct in that the technology that was
tested just wasn't up to doing the job. It neither read
correctly nor was it biometric.
If something comes available in 3 years, 5 years, 10 years,
that would be helpful. But let's not lose sight of the fact
that technology is just a tool, like any other tool.
I think another reason why US-VISIT needs to work very
closely with CBP on exit procedures and exit strategies is that
sometimes, in some cases, in some circumstances, people aren't
asked to stop very long at an entry booth at all.
If there is a long line, you could have a line flush. If
there is, you know, some other drug operation going on, they
might inspect people somewhat differently.
And if all of these inspection processes aren't put in
harmony with what US-VISIT expects, you might have a perfect
system that isn't implemented well.
And there are cases--and I am sure the department can come
up and brief you on them--at every port of entry where the
systems were just not followed by the port inspectors.
Mr. Zitz. Mr. Congressman, if I could also add, that same
threat you refer to is also a good reason to do this
realignment and to place US-VISIT with the offices that are
responsible for correlating data from the intelligence
community to critical infrastructure and understanding the risk
against these specific sites.
Overstays and the correlation of overstays to specific
threat data could be the key piece of information we need to
protect against a strike against part of our critical
infrastructure.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mocny, has the US-VISIT office established performance
measures to compare actual performance of US- VISIT to expected
results?
Mr. Mocny. We are in the process of developing those. They
are not as refined as we want them to be, but we are a new
program.
And so we do have performance measures--and the
effectiveness of the biometric, how many hits we get against
the biometric, what we do with an individual--so I would say
yes, that we do, and they are evolving.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. What promise do alternative
technologies hold in providing biometric verification of
persons exiting the country without major changes or additional
physical infrastructure changes?
Mr. Mocny. Well, if I understand the question correctly,
there is not a whole lot of infrastructure changes absent the
ones we talked about at the land border.
We believe with the air and sea portions we can actually
utilize existing infrastructure, because there is a known
process by which people exit the country. They go to a check-in
counter. They go through TSA. They enter via a gate.
The infrastructure changes that are going to be of most
critical need are going to be at the land border.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Stana, should Congress establish a firm deadline for
the implementation of a fully functioning biometric exit
system? Why or why not should we establish a deadline in
Congress?
Mr. Stana. Well, let me give you some pros and cons of a
deadline. The pros would be is it would prompt action from the
department, more considerable action, toward moving toward the
exit capability that we all want.
The con of it is in some cases the technology isn't there,
isn't mature enough, to make it, you know, a reality. And so if
you would impose a deadline, say, in 2 years or 3 years for
having an exit capability, it may not be possible.
On the other hand, imposing a deadline in air and sea, I
think, would be possible. And in fact, it may help the US-
VISIT office get more resources from the department to make it
happen.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Just to clear up a comment from a question Mr. Bilirakis
added in terms of performance measures, part of your answer,
Mr. Mocny, is you said US-VISIT was a new program.
You know, it is 10 years out. I understand we haven't
completed it. But I would love for you to provide the committee
some of those performance measures that you referenced to Mr.
Bilirakis that have been met and the ones that have to be met.
Mr. Mocny. I would be happy to do so, Mr. Chairman.
Absolutely.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We would like to recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stana, in a December 2006 report you indicated
instances where the US-VISIT program office was never made
aware of operational problems--malfunctioning equipment, things
like that--at ports of entry.
Some of these problems you said not only affect the
system's overall performance but may pose security risks. How
will moving US-VISIT away from its operational context resolve
these communications problems that you noted?
Mr. Stana. That is a very good question. In fact, that is
one of the key questions that comes to the table when one has
to consider where to site US-VISIT on the DHS organizational
structure.
The problem with the coordination in that report was--when
we got to it, is the people operating the system didn't know if
it was a US-VISIT system or whether it was a CBP system. They
weren't told who to go to to coordinate any problems.
And moving it to NPPD would not necessarily hurt that if
proper linkages were established. But it doesn't make it easier
to resolve those kind of communication and coordination issues.
This gets to a concern that I have with the information
that I have seen on some of the key purposes of US-VISIT as
mentioned in the National Protection and Programs Directorate
briefing charts.
They are located in that group with other non- immigration
components, and there are four goals listed here or objectives
listed here, not one of which seems to deal directly with entry
or exit. It deals tangentially with that.
Now, that is not to say that it is not a worthy goal to do
biometric identification or biometric identity management.
It is just to say that perhaps these kind of documents
ought to more clearly show the linkage of the program to the
entry-exit side, the entry-exit mission, and construct the
linkages that are going to make those coordination issues not
happen or be resolved quickly.
Mr. Mocny. Could I offer a response to that as well?
Mr. Carney. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Mocny. Thank you. One of the issues that we are seeing
post-9/11--information sharing causes its own challenges in
itself.
It is easier to have stovepipes, because you can treat that
system--as Mr. Stana says, that was definitely a CBP issue
versus, ``We now have five systems connected, one of which is
the Department of State's consolidated consular database.''
And so at any given point, it is where in this fishnet do
you have the issues. By moving us into a departmental
directorate, you do have a departmental look-see across the
board, and so whereas I think you have a known entity, but when
you have a particular operational mission, they are going to
take care of their own systems.
But when that system is now connected to three or four or
five other systems within the department, and even outside the
department, you do have to have a little bit higher elevated
look across the board to see where exactly is the problem.
So that is this coordinated kind of feature that US- VISIT
and NPPD would offer.
Mr. Zitz. May I also add, sir, that the NPPD's offices
include I.T.-heavy activities. If you think about the
cybersecurity activities, what we are doing with National
Communications System, and the myriad databases that make up
our Infrastructure Protection Office, we are very, very heavy
right now on information technology.
Also, placement as a headquarters-level activity has us in
very close proximity and daily interaction with the chief
information officer of the Department of Homeland Security.
So by virtue of that continual interaction and sitting on
myriad boards and panels with him, it enables us and will
enable us to advocate even more vigorously.
When there are problems, we will address them more quickly.
And we will also be able to, I think, better defend and justify
future activities of US-VISIT.
Mr. Stana. If I could just add a ``yeah, but,'' it probably
does help coordinate up, and it helps coordinate with the
vendor community.
Coordinating with the folks at the port of entry is going
to continue to be challenge if these linkages, these
coordination mechanisms, aren't in place and well known by the
people who have to use them.
Mr. Zitz. If I may respond, sir, the activities of our
National Cybersecurity Division, of our National Communications
System, and of our Infrastructure Protection Offices are all
continuously interacting with the federal enterprise, with
states, locals, tribal and the private sector.
And so it is not just a headquarters, not just a look up.
It is a look down as well. Thank you.
Mr. Carney. I appreciate that retort. But I, like most of
us on this committee, are very frustrated by the fact that, you
know, we are 1.5 years late on reports that we should be given
that are a glimpse into this whole process.
And you know, I guess the question is who is accountable
for that report and how do we get it.
Mr. Mocny. I am accountable for getting the report to the
department, and then it is our--going through the process,
going through OMB, and that is the process that we have, and
there is a clearance process for it.
I am not going to make any excuses for it being 1.5 years
late. Absolutely. I want you to look at this. Frankly, you
know, maybe this hearing wouldn't have to be held if we had
that here.
And it is going to be up here very shortly. And it is
nearing its end state. It is going to be to the department. And
I hope then everybody has a clear look at what we are
testifying here today.
The breadth of the program is importantly about entry and
exit, but it is also beyond that, and it talks about an entire
immigration and border management enterprise which includes not
only other entities within DHS but also entities without DHS,
including State Department, the Justice Department, and state
and local law enforcement.
Mr. Carney. Thank you very much.
Chairman Thompson. I have a question I want to kind of take
off from.
Mr. Zitz made the comment that intelligence and information
was already being shared with some of the other stakeholders.
Mr. Stana, what did your review of the department reflect
in that perspective?
Mr. Stana. The information is available for individuals
entering the country and--they come to the US-VISIT station.
The information is available on the computer screens that it
shows the results of checks against watch lists.
There is a different issue not related to US-VISIT with
intelligence information more generally about who is expected
to come to ports of entry, and is that information being shared
with inspectors. But that is not particularly related to US-
VISIT.
Chairman Thompson. Well, if it is not, just tell us what it
is related to.
Mr. Stana. I could tell you that in a separate session.
Chairman Thompson. Okay. Well, we will set it up.
Ms. Clarke, at the request of Mr. Shays, we want to go to
you first, and then we will go to him.
The gentlelady from New York?
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, too, Mr. Shays.
Gentlemen, good morning.
I am sitting here and I am, you know, really appreciating
the complexities of what we are dealing with here. At the same
time, I think it kind of goes to the core of, you know,
management and which is pretty obvious, and sort of setting
priorities.
Mr. Mocny, I want to get a sense from you of what you would
characterize as your priority for the full engagement of US-
VISIT. Is it an integration with the other entities, CBP and
others, that needs to take place in order to be effective?
What would you say is the priority right now to get this in
place and working?
Mr. Mocny. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The priority of the program is to make sure that we are
integrating across the department. When you look at the very
distinct mission, I go back to the discussion that we had when
we decided to put is in the BTS before.
There is a distinct mission that CBP plays, absolutely.
They have port of entry and in between the port of entry
jurisdiction. Outside of that, they are a partner. They are
participatory. They cooperate as best they can.
But their job is not to deal with the interior of the U.S.
and people who may be overstaying their visas. Their job is not
look at protection of critical infrastructure and people who
may be trying to get into those areas.
And frankly, their priority isn't to deal with those people
who would get a visa or not.
Similarly, ICE does, in fact, have a mission which is about
the interior. They don't have a focus on the actual port of
entry, although there is an association with that.
And I mean, to use your term, the complexity of it is such
that the Department of Homeland Security 22 federal agencies
all with a similar type of mission, and yet where are the
various touch points?
And with programs like US-VISIT, we look across the
department at those various touch points to make sure that they
are as coordinated as possible and that everybody gets the
information.
And I can tell you from personal experience and days before
DHS was stood up, and at INS, and we needed to get some
information from the Customs, Department of Treasury, and it
was tough. It really was.
And to say well, why not--well, because our priority is the
Department of Treasury's priority, it is not the Department of
Justice's priority.
Well, now that we have this great idea of bringing all
those people who make sense with one another under one umbrella
in the department, you then have a kind of subtext with that
whole piece, and we at US-VISIT do look across the board.
If you were to come to our offices, you would see at any
given point people from ICE, people from CBP, people from the
Department of State, from Justice, from Commerce, from
Transportation.
There is a complexity in dealing with people that come into
and leave the United States and some who don't stay--the
Department of Labor when they deal with labor certificates.
And so when you get this plan that you have been asking
for, you will see that we have outlined these complexities, and
we begin to hopefully start a dialogue that talks about how do
we across the board look at immigration and border management
writ large.
Our role is simply to be an honest broker among the various
operational units within DHS and without DHS--state and local,
justice--and be able to effectively do that.
I can say, I believe, that the association that we have
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in developing an
interoperable system would not have been possible were we not
in our own non-parochial space within the department that
allows us to look outside the box and work on these issues
while CBP does their distinct mission, ICE does their distinct
mission, and CIS grants benefit to the best of their ability.
So that is my kind of priority for making sure that we
don't lose that across-the-board departmental look.
Mr. Zitz. Congresswoman, may I add to that?
Prioritizing integration first is not at odds and is not in
conflict with the critical importance of sustaining entry and
to build out exit.
And indeed, the two programs of entry and exit are about
gaining information and then sharing that information with
those various stakeholders and operational elements not only
across DHS but across all echelons of government.
So it is complementary. It is not contradictory.
Mr. Stana. If I might just add to the discussion here, one
of the issues here is that the statutes--and there are four or
five of them in play here--have given two different roles to
the US-VISIT program, two different missions.
One is identity management, and the other one is entry-
exit. And that presents a dilemma. The two are aligned in some
ways and they are not in other ways.
So how do you deal with this? And there are some options to
deal with this. One is what we are discussing today, where do
you locate this one entity that is supposed to deal with both.
Do you put them in the NPPD? Do you put them in CBP? Do you
put them in a different--you know, how do you create the
linkages to make the programs deploy and effectively work?
Another option is to split the missions and locate the
missions where the related activity resides. That is another
option.
Another option is to reconvene a DMIA task force of all the
stakeholders to discuss this issue and figure out what works
best for all stakeholders. But there may not be one option here
or an either/or.
It may be a matter of thinking this through a little bit
more and deciding how best to get the missions accomplished--if
not one unit, then maybe two or three; if not one location or
two locations, maybe discussing this among stakeholders.
Mr. Zitz. Ma'am, if I may add just briefly, the leadership
of the department did think about this, did carefully consider
this, and did look at a variety of organizational constructs.
There are myriad constructs that could be undertaken. Our
view is that placement within NPPD as part of a directorate
that reports at the headquarters level to the secretary and the
deputy secretary and has daily interaction with those leaders
is the best approach for ensuring that we, one, sustain the
good work that is already going, and two, that we push forward
as quickly as we can on the needed improvements. Thank you.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Chair, I am over my time. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. Mr. Zitz, why would you think
it would be better to report to an undersecretary rather than a
deputy secretary?
Mr. Zitz. Sir, as I believe Deputy Secretary Jackson spoke
2 weeks back when he talked to the staffs, the intent here is
to enable and strengthen the US-VISIT's ability to interact at
the most senior levels.
Now, that may seem to be an anathema to having a direct
report on an organizational chart to a deputy secretary, but
Deputy Secretary Jackson has got a huge job that he has to
undertake on a daily basis. He has a few undersecretaries that
are direct reports to him and meet with him every morning and,
frankly, throughout the day.
Chairman Thompson. I am clear on that, but if I look at the
chart, and I see someone reporting to a deputy secretary, and
then I look below the chart to see someone reporting to an
undersecretary, just on its face it appears that you have
lowered the status with that change.
And I understand the workload, but to the eyes of someone
looking at the flow chart, the before and after, it is a hard
sell. But I just want to let you know that some of us see the
difference really fast.
We now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. As they say when you only have two people, a
generous 5 minutes, sir?
Thank you all for coming.
I got involved in the issue of terrorism when I took over
the Committee on National Security under the Government Reform
Committee, and we put our focus on terrorism. And we were
promoting the creation of a Department of Homeland Security or
something under the president, but there was a big debate.
And as you remember, the Hart-Rudman Commission had the
most at the time extreme position that we should establish the
Department of Homeland Security. And people would say to me,
``What are we, Great Britain?'' And then we had September 11th,
and people began to say, ``Well, we better have a strong
Department of Homeland Security.''
Criticism against it was that it would be a behemoth,
185,000 people, all these different places. Did any of you work
for government before we created the Department of Homeland
Security? All three.
So I want you to give me your assessment of how we are
doing. First, do you think that Congress did the right thing
creating the department? Secondly, do you think you are ahead
of schedule or behind schedule in trying to see integration?
And I could ask you to just speak in general terms outside
your own area. So who wants to go first?
Mr. Zitz. Sir, I will go first. I have spent 27 years as an
intelligence officer with Army intelligence, CIA, DOD, and now
within DHS in my current position. I believe--
Mr. Shays. And given that, let me just ask you to also
speak on the whole issue of creating a director of
intelligence. So speak to both of those issues.
Mr. Zitz. Sir, I believe that the department was absolutely
necessary. I believe that creating the Department of Homeland
Security and, frankly, even the microcosm of the issue that we
are discussing today, integrating US-VISIT into this NPPD, is
the best way to ensure that there is continuous flow of
information, continuous sharing, breakdown stovepipes, and
frankly--
Mr. Shays. Okay. Are we ahead of schedule or behind
schedule?
Mr. Zitz. Sir, I think that we are on schedule considering
the fact that this is an extremely complicated issue, bringing
together these myriad parts that make up the Department of
Homeland Security.
Mr. Shays. Okay. I just really want to just get your
assessment, because I do know it is complex and all of that,
and I appreciate it.
But let me just ask you one other point. When you look at
the other parts of the department, do you think it is working
in those areas as well?
Mr. Zitz. I think that information sharing across the
department is vastly superior to what it was even 2 years ago.
And that is having lived through the best of intelligence and
the worst of intelligence sharing over my career.
Mr. Shays. If I ask you to comment on the Coast Guard
coming from Transportation to Department of Homeland Security--
positive as well?
Mr. Zitz. I think that is a positive, sir.
Mr. Shays. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Mocny. I would only echo that. I have been almost 20
years with the government. A good portion of it was with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which no longer exists.
And I can tell you from the time I was at the INS to my
time now at DHS--a remarkable difference and I would say a 180-
degree turn from--the ability now to share data, the openness
with others within the Department of Justice, as I mentioned
earlier, the FBI--critical.
Where before we just were at odds with one another, we now
have teams that work--in fact, we have an employee, FBI agent,
who works at the facilities in Clarksburg, West Virginia
seconded to our offices to make sure that we continue the
collaboration.
So I would say overall, high marks across the board.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Stana?
Mr. Stana. Yes. I guess I am the oldest guy in the nursing
home here. I have been with the government for almost 31 years.
Mr. Shays. Okay.
Mr. Stana. And I think that there has been some positive
developments out of the Homeland Security Department. You know,
the coordination and cooperation across seemingly unrelated
lines that we see now that we didn't see before is a plus.
I have done an awful lot of work on the immigration and
border security areas and the former Customs and INS, and I see
it much better now than before.
I might point out, though, INS in the 1990s reorganized
three times, and by the end of the 1990s I am not sure they
were any better off through the reorganizations, which is in
connection with the theme of the hearing today.
Now, having said that, are they on schedule? Probably, but
it takes 5 years to 7 years for organizations to gel, and so it
is not perfect but it is certainly moving right along.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, in regards to the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, we clearly wanted to make sure,
given we needed to do a better job of protecting our borders--
what is happening in Canada, what is happening in Mexico, what
is happening in the Caribbean and so on.
And so we are requiring if you travel by plane to have a
passport, if you travel by car some identification and a birth
certificate, and so on a--huge surprise to a lot of my
constituents.
You know, they are panicked because, you know, they are
leaving in a week or two and they realize they need a passport,
and their child doesn't have--and so on.
Do you think there is merit in doing some pilot programs so
that you wouldn't need a passport--for instance, could we say
Canada if you have this tamper-proof driver's license or
something, that would suffice?
Is there merit because--we are having, you know,
suggestions from parliamentarians in Canada that we should do
this, for instance. Could you speak to that? And who should
speak to it, if not all of you?
Mr. Mocny. I will take the first part of it. The challenge
with us is the identity and citizenship issue. Most driver's
licenses don't denote citizenship or they have identity but not
the citizenship side.
So our--
Mr. Shays. So but if Canada were to even put a mark if
someone is a citizen on their driver's license--
Mr. Mocny. Well, we did look at alternative documents
through the security and prosperity partnership with Canada.
We looked at a whole series of what it would take to meet
the requirements that the Congress gave to us in the
Intelligence Reform Act.
And so where we can have those two met, identity and
citizenship, we are open to those discussions. We have already
indicated that the NEXIS card would be an applicable card to be
able to use.
And we are now talking about developing a pass card with
the State Department. It is not really a passport. So we are
open to other means of documents.
Mr. Shays. Just to follow up, do you have the capability to
do pilot programs without Congress authorizing you to?
Mr. Mocny. I don't know. I don't know if we have the
authority to do so.
Mr. Shays. It would be interesting, much, if we could
determine that, because it would be nice to see some I think it
would be nice to see some alternatives so that we could see the
system work well.
We have great neighbors in the north and south, and it
would be nice to make the flow work well.
Chairman Thompson. I agree with you.
We would like to thank the witnesses from the first panel
for their testimony and their excellent responses to the
questions.
At this point, we will take a short break for our second
panel of witnesses.
[Recess.]
Ms. Clarke. [Presiding.] Good morning. On behalf of
Chairman Thompson, I welcome the second panel of witnesses.
Our first witness, Ms. Michele Flournoy, is founder and
president of the Center for a New American Security, CNAS.
Prior to co-founding CNAS, she was a senior advisor at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she
worked on a broad range of defense policy and international
security issues.
Our second witness is Dr. James J. Carafano. He is a
leading defense analyst at the Heritage Foundation and has
written and spoken widely on the need of policy development in
the homeland security area. He also serves as a visiting
professor at the National Defense University and Georgetown
University.
Our third witness, Mr. Asa Hutchinson, was the first
undersecretary of homeland security in January 2003, shortly
after the department was created. Mr. Hutchinson also served as
a member of Congress from Arkansas from 1997 to 2001.
We would like to start with our first witness, Ms.
Flournoy.
STATEMENT OF MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT AND CO-FOUNDER,
CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Ms. Flournoy. Madam Chairman, it is a great honor to be
before this committee today to talk about what I think is a
very important subject, and that is whether something like a
Quadrennial Defense Review that kind of process could be useful
to the Department of Homeland Security in its own goal-setting
and strategic planning.
I think both the Department of Defense and DHS have
missions that are of such vital importance to the nation and
they are also dealing with a great deal of complexity in
implementing those missions.
So it is critical for both to have unifying visions, a
strategy for achieving their objectives, a clear set of
priorities for guiding risk and resource allocation.
So my starting premise is that a quadrennial review could
actually be very useful to the Department of Homeland Security.
As you know, every 4 years Congress requires the Department
of Defense to conduct a QDR that is really a comprehensive
examination of our national defense policies and programs.
The real purpose of the QDR, the defense review, is to
articulate a defense strategy and a clear and long-term defense
program for the United States.
I think the QDRs are, as the name suggests, required every
4 years. But I think one of the things I would like to
highlight for you is the question of timing.
The draft legislation I saw proposed starting a QDR in
2007, near the end of a second term administration.
I believe the real value of a QDR is to a first-term
administration, to come in, to get their arms around the
challenges facing a department, to set priorities and clear
strategic direction, and sort of infuse a new vision into the
workings of a department going forward.
I think second-term reviews tend to much less useful. They
require enormous staff time and effort. And yet in a second-
term review, by definition, an administration is essentially
grading its own homework, and those sorts of reviews don't tend
to produce the same level of change and innovation.
So just as one point, I would recommend, based on the QDR
experience, that you consider a quadrennial homeland security
review at the outset of a new administration coming in, because
that is when it is really most useful.
I would like to just summarize my written testimony
highlighting some key elements of success drawn from my
experience involved in three QDRs and observing the most recent
one as well, of what tends to distinguish successful reviews
from non-successful ones.
The first element is limited strategic focus and scope.
These quadrennial reviews should not be a soup-to-nuts review
of everything a department does. That should be left to the
regular program review and budget review cycle.
What you really want these reviews to do is be focused on
strategic direction, setting broad priorities that can then be
implemented over the subsequent 4 years, which raises an issue,
as you write legislation, of how specific do you want to be in
what you require the review to cover versus how much
flexibility you want to allow a secretary of homeland security
to define the agenda.
And I would submit to you that the critical focus of each
review is likely to change between now, 4 years from now, 8
years from now, 12 years from now.
So I would encourage you to be more general rather than
give a secretary a long laundry list of specific things that he
or she must cover.
The second key element of success is leadership involvement
and ownership of the process, making sure that the secretary
and deputy secretary really view this as their key vehicle for
setting priorities for the department and they reflect that
with their own engagement of time and effort and setting clear
guidance up front, making decisions throughout, and so forth.
The third key element is empowering an official within the
department to really be the point person on the review, to be
the honest broker, ensuring that disagreements between
different parts of the department on key issues are elevated to
appropriate levels for decision making, and also the key
integrator, making sure all the different moving parts come
together in a cohesive whole.
The last key elements are making surveillance that both
internal and external stakeholders are fully involved in the
process, and here I would suggest the rule that if someone has
implementation responsibility at the end of the review, they
need to have a seat at the table during the review.
And of course, that means consultation with you all and
with other external stakeholders, including state, local
government, and so forth.
So bottom line is I think if these elements of success are
taken into account, a QDR-type exercise could be very useful
for the Department of Homeland Security, particularly at the
outset of new administrations.
Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michele A. Flournoy
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me
to testify this afternoon before this distinguished Committee. I have
been asked, based on my experience with four Quadrennial Defense
Reviews or QDRs, to address the issue of whether and how a QDR-like
process would be useful to the Department of Homeland Security as part
of a larger strategic planning process.
Although the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security are different in many ways, they do share some common
challenges--challenges that underscore the need for and importance of
priority setting and strategic planning. Both departments are:
charged with missions that are vital to the health and
welfare of the nation--protecting the American people and our
way of life is a mission in which we cannot fail;
facing persistent and resourceful enemies;
large, complex bureaucracies comprised of a number of
diverse and (in some cases, previously independent)
organizations with their own cultures, traditions, and ways of
doing business;
responsible for spending billions of taxpayer dollars
as efficiently and effectively as possible;
perennially in the position of having more programs to
pay for than budget; and
trying to balance near-term demands against long-term
investments.
These challenges make it that much more important for each
department to have a unifying vision, a strategy for achieving its
objectives, and a clear set of priorities to guide resource allocation
and risk management. It is difficult, if not impossible, to create
these absent an effective strategic planning process. And a quadrennial
review conducted at the outset of a new administration can be a
critical first step in that process.
The QDR as a Model for a QHSR
As you know, every four years the Department of Defense is required
by law to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review--a ``comprehensive
examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of
the defense program and policies of the Unites States.''
The purpose of the QDR is to articulate a defense strategy and
define a long-term defense program for the United States. Although each
review has been conducted somewhat differently, all have sought to:
assess security challenges and opportunities for the United States; set
priorities and strategic direction for the Pentagon in an effort to
enable tough choices about where to place emphasis and where to accept
or manage a degree of risk; articulate a clear and compelling defense
strategy for the nation, connecting ends, ways, and means; and provide
a basis for determining what kinds of capabilities are needed and ``how
much is enough.'' Ideally, the QDR, which is conducted at the outset of
an administration's term, generates the strategic guidance for resource
allocation--that is, programming and budgeting--over multi-year period.
Every administration is required to conduct a QDR at the beginning
of a new term. I believe that QDR's are most useful at the outset of a
new administration, as a means of helping the new leadership to get
their arms around the challenges and opportunities they face, set
priorities, and provide strategic direction to the department. In the
DoD context, QDRs's have become a critical vehicle for infusing a new
team's priorities into a highly complex defense program and budget--a
way to begin to steer the proverbial aircraft carrier in a new
direction.
Absent paradigm-shifting events (like the September 11th attacks),
QDR's are generally far less useful in an administration's second term,
as by then strategic priorities and direction should have been well
established. While they can yield useful refinements to an
administration's approach, they are less likely to yield significant
changes or innovations. Given the significant amount of leadership,
staff time and energy these reviews require, a second term review may
not be highest best use of a Department's limited strategic planning
resources. I would, therefore, recommend that you consider changing the
proposed legislation to require a QHSR only in first term
administrations and begin in 2009 (not in 2007).
Another factor that should influence the timing of a QHSR is its
relationship to the development of the National Homeland Security
Strategy. Just as the National Defense Strategy keys off the National
Security Strategy, so should DHS' strategy key off the National
Homeland Security Strategy, as the legislation suggests. In practice,
however, this can be challenging, as both the national and departmental
reviews are usually launched at the outset of an administration and
overlap in time. More often than not in DoD's case, the NSS and the QDR
are not sequential but are developed in tandem and inform one another.
The same may ultimately be true for the National Homeland Security
Strategy and the DHS strategy.
Elements of Success
Having participated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, led the strategy
development process and report writing for the 1997 QDR, assisted the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparation for the 2001
review, and been a keen observer of the 2006 QDR, I'd like to offer
some observations about what determines the success (or failure) of
such reviews in practice.
Strategic focus and limited scope. The best reviews are not soup-
to-nuts assessments of everything a department does or buys. That
should be left to the annual program review process, assuming one
exists. Rather, quadrennial reviews should be focused on a handful of
issues or areas that the leadership deems most important. This raises
an important question for you as you craft this legislation: How
specific do you want to be in delineating the substantive areas the
review should cover? Should you err on the side of being exhaustive or
should you allow the Secretary of Homeland Security some flexibility to
determine which areas merit the most attention at a given point in
time? I would encourage you to favor the latter approach, as what is
critical will likely change over time--today's focus areas may not be
right ones 4 or 8 or 12 years hence.
Leadership involvement in and ownership of the process. In order to
have ``legs''--that is, to have a real chance of being implemented in
programs and budgets--the review process must be ``owned'' by the
Secretary and his or her team. That is, the Secretary and/or the Deputy
Secretary must be deeply engaged in providing front-end guidance to the
process and making key judgments and decisions along the way. He or she
must also make clear that the quadrennial review is the process for
setting the department's priorities and making critical resource
allocation decisions. Such ownership at the top is critical to creating
momentum, making tough trade-offs and ensuring that the review's
recommendations are actually implemented.
A senior official empowered to be an honest broker and integrator.
Successful reviews cannot be conducted by committee. The Secretary must
appoint a single official to be the day to day lead for the review. In
the DoD context, this is often the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with
assistance from the Undersecretaries and the Joint Staff. This person
should act as an honest broker, ensuring that key decisions are framed
for the Secretary and that dissenting views are fairly represented in
the process, as well as an integrator, ensuring that the various part
of the review are brought together in a cohesive whole (e.g.,
programmatic decisions reflect strategy priorities).
Ensuring the process is strategy-driven and resource-constrained.
The strategy that emerges from the review should drive all programmatic
and budgetary decisions. But these must be made in the context of real-
world resource constraints. A review that does not take resources into
account will fail to help decision makers to make tough choices about
where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk.
In order to be useful and relevant, the review process must consider
fiscal guidance as a critical input, though it should also be prepared
to highlight areas where resource constraints increase the level of
risk associated with achieving a given objective or mission and may
need to be revisited.
Engaging internal stakeholders. Any office responsible for
implementing the review's recommendations should have a seat at the
table at some point in the process. Key stakeholders can be engaged
individually or in working groups to solicit their input and ultimately
win their buy in to the review and its results. Such consultations are
generally iterative over time and are critical to gaining traction for
implementation.
Consultations with outside stakeholders before, during and after
the review. The department's leadership should consult regularly with
key committees and members of Congress, key partners in federal, state
and local government, experts in the field, and members of the media as
the review process unfolds. Although parts of the department's review
may need to be classified, the process should strive for as much
transparency as possible. This is crucial to preparing the ground for
the review to be well received.
Conclusion
The QDR can be an important and valuable element in the Department
of Defense's strategic planning process. Establishing a similar QHSR,
taking into account the elements of success I have described above,
would be extremely useful in helping DHS to set strategic priorities
and develop a strategy-driven program and budget. But a QHSR is only a
first step in what needs to be a more fulsome and ongoing strategic
planning process in the Department of Homeland Security.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Ms. Flournoy.
Let me just state that, without objection, the witnesses'
full statements will be inserted into the record.
I now recognize Mr. Carafano to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES JAY CARAFANO, Ph.D., SENIOR FELLOW, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Carafano. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I have
provided a statement for the record, and I will be brief.
Just a few quick points. The two reasons why you really,
really want to do this--I mean, one of the lessons learned in
the Quadrennial Defense Review is it is not a panacea. It is
not going to provide all the answers. It doesn't take politics
out of the process in any way, shape or form.
But what it does do is two incredibly important things. One
is it creates a systemic dialogue between the Congress and the
department.
And it also creates a trend analysis, if you do this every
4 years, so you get a--over the long term, you develop this
relationship, and that is incredibly important.
And the second thing, and equally important, is by
requiring the department to do this and by creating a long-
term requirement for this, it forces them within the department
to build the capabilities to do that.
I know Michelle can speak from being involved in the first
QDR that the Defense Department had very, very primitive
metrics of performance, very, very primitive analytical tools,
very, very primitive staffs.
And they are much, much more sophisticated now because they
know they have to do this every 4 years. So this is, I think,
an absolutely bedrock fundamental requirement for dealing with
a long-term strategic issue.
So I think it is an incredibly important part of the
legislation. I think it is an incredibly important issue.
The four key issues that I think Michelle and I--I agree
with Michelle on many of these points. The four key things that
have to be addressed in the legislation--one is timing. I
absolutely agree that a review at the end of an administration
has very marginal value. I proposed in my testimony having the
department doing something much more modest, perhaps a
preliminary report on observations and what potentially should
be in a QDR that they can hand up to the administration.
But I think that QDRs should come very early on in an
administration's term, probably no later than when they submit
their budget the following February from the first term.
The second issue is other agency involvement. I think this
is very critical and actually one of the flaws in the QDR.
I think the quadrennial security review should have a
specific requirement there for the department to reach out to
other relevant departments and not only bring in their input
but formally be required to assess the relationships with those
departments and their ability to act cooperatively together in
homeland security missions.
The third is the scope. And again, I totally agree with
Michelle. A long laundry list doesn't get you there. That was
done in the first QDR, and when the administration did the
review it simply ignored the long laundry list.
What I proposed--actually, I think it is much, much more
important--is the last thing that we want is do a QDR and
somebody walks in and they drop this QDR on your desk. What you
really want is to force a dialogue between the department and
the Congress.
And so what I propose instead would be, early on--I think
there is some general guidance in the legislation.
But early on, I think the department should have to come in
to the Congress and say this is what we think should be in the
QDR, and then create a dialogue, and then perhaps even some in-
progress reviews, so it is an ongoing dialogue over the year
and not just a debate over the report that comes at the end,
and where everybody has to kind of hold their breath to see
what is in there.
And then the fourth and I think a critical point that is
not in the draft legislation I saw is really the need for a
second opinion.
I think that the National Defense Panel which followed the
first Quadrennial Defense Review, the Hart-Rudman Commission,
which wasn't specifically tied to a QDR but also came out as
kind of--gave, you know, kind of a second look. And I think
that is very, very important.
Now, there is a lot of different ways that could be done.
It could be done by the Congress. It could be done by an
independent commission.
But I do think there a value in a second look, maybe not
potentially to every QHSR, but certainly when we do the first
QHSR there ought to be a second look.
And that second look ought to look not just at the QHSR but
also the Quadrennial Defense Review, and look at those in
tandem and draw broader assessments.
And then the last point is I also have lots of views on US-
VISIT and where it should be and what the priorities should be
on that, and I would be happy to share those with the committee
if you are interested.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano
THINKING FOR THE LONG WAR: STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REVIEW FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members, I am honored to
testify before you today.\1\ America must consider more deeply the
requirements for fighting and winning the long war.\2\ In my opening
statement, I want to make the case that Congress needs comprehensive
assessments of the nation's homeland security programs and an
independent review that evaluates how national defense and homeland
security programs fit within the context of the overall interagency
national security effort.
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\1\ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is
privately supported and receives no funds from any government at any
level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work.
The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in
the United States. During 2006, it had more than 283,000 individual,
foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the
U.S. Its 2006 incomecame from the following sources:
Individuals 65%
Foundations 19%
Corporations 3%
Investment Income 14%
Publication Sales and Other 0%
The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
1.3% of its 2006 income. The HeritageFoundation's books are audited
annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. A list
of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.
Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals
discussing their own independent research. The views expressed are
their own and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage
Foundation or its board of trustees.
\2\ For a discussion of the elements of good long war strategy, see
James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons
from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom
(Washington, D.C.:The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
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In my testimony, I would like to (1) review the lessons that can be
drawn from other government post--Cold War efforts to conduct strategic
assessments; (2) make recommendations for the next steps in conducting
national security assessments; and (3) offer specific proposals for the
homeland security component of these reviews.
Lessons from the Pentagon
Established in 1996, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) requires
the Pentagon every four years to provide to Congress a comprehensive
assessment of defense strategy and force structure; program and
policies; and modernization, infrastructure, and budget plans--
outlining future requirements for the following eight years.\3\ The QDR
has become a touchstone in the debates about restructuring the military
and identifying the capabilities that will be needed for the new
national security environment of the 21st century. This effort offers
lessons for considering how to establish a similar strategic review
process for homeland security.
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\3\ The Quadrennial Defense Review was first mandated in 1996 by
the Defense Authorization Act (Military Force Structure Review Act of
1996). Title 10, Section 118 of the United States Code specifies: ``The
Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a
year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to
be known as a `quadrennial defense review') of the national defense
strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure,
budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of
the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the
defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense
program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense review
shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.''
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Lesson #1: Understand what strategic assessments are and are not.
The QDR process is not a substitute for political decision-making. QDR
reports have been highly politicized documents used to justify force
structure choices, defend future investments, and promote changes in
policy. Indeed, strategy reviews have always been used to foster
political agendas. NSC-68, Project Solarium, and the Gaither Commission
Report, for example, were all early Cold War attempts not just to
assess force structure and strategic requirements, but also to serve
political agendas for shifting priorities or advocating action.\4\
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\4\ See, for example, Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War
Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993).
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The tradition of defense assessments after the Cold War changed
little. The first QDR was, in fact, the fifth major defense review
conducted following the fall of the Berlin Wall. In fundamental
respects, the QDR process differed little from other post--World War II
efforts to justify war military requirements. The QDR does not take
politics out of strategy and resource decision-making--either inside or
outside the Pentagon. Implementing the QDR, for example, resulted in
divisive political infighting among the services.\5\ After all the
analysis is done, hard choices still have to made and debated.
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\5\ See, for example, comments on the 1997 review in John Y.
Schrader et al., Quadrennial Defense Review: Lessons on Managing Change
in the Defense Department (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 2003), p. 6, at
www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/DB379.pdf.
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What the QDR accomplished, unlike previous Cold War strategic
assessments, was to add some transparency to the process and offer a
routine platform for dialogue between Congress and the Administration.
Creating an iterative process is the greatest virtue of the QDR.
Periodic reviews offer two advantages:
They encourage the armed forces to think deeply about
how to match strategy, requirements, and resources; justify
their judgments; and institutionalize the capability to make
these assessments.\6\
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\6\ One of the key findings of the first QDR in 1997 was that the
Pentagon lacked the analytical capabilities for examining all the
strategic issues that were required to be reported on to the Congress.
John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger Allen Brown, Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR): A Retrospective Look at Joint Staff Participation
(Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 1999), p. 49, at www.rand.org/pubs/
documented_briefings/DB236/DB236.sec5.pdf. For subsequent reviews, the
Defense Department, the Joint Staff, and the services developed more
sophisticated analytical assessments and staffed permanent offices to
prepare for and conduct strategic assessments.
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They provide an audit trail for Congressional and
other government leaders to assess long-term defense trends.
Most important, the QDR provides a means for government to conduct
and Congress to consider strategic assessments in a disciplined and
systematic manner.
Lesson #2: Timing is everything. There is no optimum time for a
strategic assessment. The QDR is scheduled to be conducted in the
initial year of a presidential term. The first QDR was required five
months after the Administration took office. The 2003 National Defense
Authorization Act shifted the due date to the year following the year
in which the review is conducted, but not later than the date on which
the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year to Congress.
This timing compels a new Administration to lay out a strategic
framework for how it plans to address future requirements. Congress can
also compare the QDR to the Administration's budget submission to
assess whether the Pentagon's programmatic decisions match the rhetoric
in the strategic assessment provided in the QDR report.
While having an Administration conduct a strategic assessment early
on offers the advantage of laying out a blueprint for future defense
needs, front-loading the QDR creates difficulties. The incoming
Administration is often forced to begin its review before key political
appointees have been nominated and confirmed by the Senate. For the
2001 review, for example, the Defense Department had no top management
officials in place until May 2001, and this significantly delayed the
issuance of leadership guidance for the review process.\7\ There is
also a tendency to rationalize strategic requirements to match short-
term budget priorities and push the most difficult choices into the out
years, creating an unrealistic bow wave of projected spending and
requirements. Another concern expressed with both the 1997 and 2001
reports was that reporting requirements were too tight to allow for
sufficient time for in-depth analysis.
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\7\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Quadrennial Defense Review:
Future Reviews Can Benefit from Changes in Timing and Scope, GAO 03-13,
November 2002, p. 20, at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0313.pdf.
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On the other hand, deferring the QDR assessment to later in a
presidential term when an Administration is more seasoned has
shortfalls as well. It leaves less time to institutionalize decisions
implied by the QDR by embedding them in the President's budget
submissions and Defense Department programs and policies. In addition,
if the QDR occurs closer to the end of a presidential term, it is more
likely to become embroiled in presidential election politics. Finally,
if the QDR comes very late in a presidential term and is passed off to
a new Administration for implementation, in all likelihood, it will be
largely ignored.
The notion of requiring more frequent periodic reports seems most
problematic of all. Long-term strategic needs rarely change
dramatically enough to justify recurring assessments in a single
presidential term. In addition, Congress should be sensitive to the
resources demanded to produce strategic assessments. The more reports,
the more frequently they occur, and the more time available to produce
them, the more government resources will have to be diverted to these
bureaucratic tasks. Excessive effort is both counterproductive and
wasteful.
The best option is to require that strategic assessments be
conducted in the first year of a presidential term in order to set the
direction for how an Administration plans to match meeting strategic
challenges with the resources required to address those challenges.
Assessments should be submitted well before the mid-term of an
Administration.
Lesson #3: Put requirements in context. From the outset, the
question of what to include in the QDR engendered significant debate.
For the first QDR, Congress mandated 12 specific requirements. Simply
listing topics to be covered, however, did not result in a report that
was comprehensive or ensure that the analysis of alternatives to meet
future requirements was sufficiently exhaustive. For example, one issue
required to be covered in the 1997 review, an assessment of the Reserve
Components, was simply deferred for follow-on study. Indeed, the most
significant criticism of the 1997 report was that, despite the
extensive reporting requirements mandated by Congress, the Pentagon
dodged almost completely the central task of the QDR: to explain how
future needs would be squared with anticipated declines in defense
spending.\8\
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\8\ Jim Courter and Alvin Bernstein, ``The QDR Process: An
Alternative View,'' Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1997, p. 21.
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In addition, from the outset, one recognized limitation of the QDR
process was that the reviews focused narrowly on defense needs. For
example, the Defense Department gave scant recognition to the demands
of homeland security before 9/11. The inclusion of a section on
homeland defense in the 2001 QDR came in response to the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington. In addition, no report has ever
adequately addressed the challenges involved in conducting interagency
operations.\9\
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\9\ James Jay Carafano, ``Not So Much About Homeland Security--
What's Missing from the Pentagon Vision for Its Future Role in
Safeguarding U.S. Soil,'' remarks presented at the National Defense
University, December 16, 2006, at www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/joint2006/
carafano.pdf.
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To address the inability of the QDR to assess broader issues, in
conjunction with the first report, Congress established a National
Defense Panel, an independent, bipartisan group of nationally
recognized defense experts, to review the QDR and offer an independent
appraisal longer-term of national security demands. The NDP made the
case for military transformation, restructuring the military from a
Cold War force to one more suited for the diverse dangers of the post-
Soviet security environment.\10\ The NDP was a one-time requirement. In
1998 Congress authorized another review--the National Security Study
Group, later known as the Hart--Rudman Commission.
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\10\ John Tedstrom and John G. McGinn, Planning America's Security:
Lessons from the National Defense Panel (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand,
1999), pp. 2--3.
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Both reviews highlighted the limitations of the QDR, which focused
almost exclusively on Pentagon priorities and did not adequately
address integration with other national security instruments or concern
for non-traditional threats. The Hart--Rudman Commission, for example,
in a report released eight months before the 9/11 attacks emphasized
the growing danger of transnational terrorism and proposed the
establishment of a National Homeland Security Agency.\11\ Both the NDP
and the Hart--Rudman Commission added new dimensions to the debate over
future national security needs.
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\11\ United States Commission on National Security/21st Century,
Road for National Security Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001, p.
viii, at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf.
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The QDR is not adequate for a post-9/11 assessment of all of the
nation's critical national security instruments. A separate systematic
review of homeland security would be a welcome addition but by itself
would be inadequate. An independent ``second opinion'' of both that
also provides an umbrella overarching analysis of long-term security
needs is required to give Congress a full and complete strategic
assessment of future security capabilities.
The Next Steps for National Security
Congress should address the shortfalls in the strategic assessments
it requires. Congress needs a comprehensive review of homeland security
programs and an independent analysis of how defense and homeland
security efforts fit within the overall national security effort. In
addition to defense and homeland security, attention should be given to
U.S. public diplomacy and foreign assistance programs, the defense
industrial base, the intelligence community, and the use of space for
national security purposes. Specifically, Congress should:
Establish a requirement for periodic reviews of
homeland security. Congress should require the Department of
Homeland Security to conduct quadrennial reviews of future DHS
capability requirements.
Create a one-time National Security Review Panel. In
parallel with the first Quadrennial Security Review (QSR),
Congress should establish a nonpartisan National Security
Review Panel (NSRP). The NSRP should be charged with providing
an independent assessment of the QSR as well as providing an
overall assessment of national security programs and
strategies. The NSRP should place particular emphasis on
evaluating the compatibility of the QSR and QDR and the state
of other essential security instruments such as public
diplomacy, the defense industrial base, and the use of space
for national security purposes. Congress should determine the
most efficient and expedient method to conduct the NSRP's
review. This review could be conducted by Congress, or Congress
could authorize an independent commission to conduct the
review.
Homeland Security Assessments
Nowhere is the need for a detailed assessment on the scale of the
QDR more important than in the area of homeland security. ``DHS 2.0:
Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,'' a comprehensive
report by The Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, clearly established the need for Congress to
reevaluate DHS roles, missions, and resources and how these efforts fit
into the context of other federal domestic security efforts.\12\ Much
has been done through the department's Second State Review and by
Congress over the past year, but there is more still to be
accomplished. Specific recommendations for the QSR include:
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\12\ James Jay Carafano and David Heyman, ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the
Department of Homeland Security,'' Heritage Foundation Special Report
No. 2, December 13, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/
sr02.cfm.
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Require the first full QSR well before the mid-point
of the next Administration. At this point, there is little
utility in this Administration's conducting a ``full-blown''
review. Starting this process will demand significant resources
that could detract from other missions. In the end, there would
be scant time to implement its findings. Rather, Congress
should require the Administration to report back in six months
with a more modest preliminary assessment that should include
recommendations for how the QSR should be conducted and what
steps it has taken to establish the staff, analytic
capabilities, and processes necessary for a substantive QSR and
NSRP review.
Establish a dialogue between Congress and DHS.
Congress should not be overly specific in QSR requirements.
Rather than establishing a long laundry list of reporting
tasks, it would be more fruitful for Congress to issue a broad
generic mission statement including a review of management,
roles and missions, authorities, and resources. Congress should
then require the DHS early in the QSR process (no later than
May of the first year of the Administration) to report back to
Congress on what it intends to cover in the review. This report
would serve to initiate a dialogue between the Administration
and Congress. In addition, it would be useful for the
Administration to provide an in-progress review of its efforts
in the September--October period.
Require an interagency effort. In conducting the QSR,
the DHS should be required to solicit the input of other key
relevant agencies and access its ability to act with them in
the performance of homeland security missions, as well as
support other essential national security tasks.
Conclusion
I want to commend the committee for addressing this important
issue. In the long term, sound strategic thinking is perhaps the most
important tool that America can bring to bear for fighting and winning
the long war. Timely and comprehensive strategic assessments are an
important part of this process. I look forward to your questions.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Hutchinson to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, FOUNDING PARTNER, HUTCHINSON GROUP
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the
committee, Mr. Shays. It is good to appear before you today.
And I have submitted my written testimony.
And I want to make a couple of points that go back to the
previous panel, which is in reference to US-VISIT and what
placement of US-VISIT will help it to meet the objectives of
Congress in the future.
And by way of background, of course, while I was at the
Department of Homeland Security, I was undersecretary for
border and transportation security. And it was in that position
that US-VISIT was assigned to my directorate, border and
transportation security.
And I think that was a key placement in order to achieve
the initial objectives that Congress set and to meet the
deadlines.
The department was created in March of 2003. We had a
deadline by the end of that year to install the first phase of
US-VISIT. We met that goal.
Part of the reason is that you had an undersecretary that
was there, that would help with the decisions, the relationship
with Congress, the advocacy for US-VISIT, monitor its success
and its capability on, really, a day-by- day basis. And so that
was, I think, a key function of my service as undersecretary.
When I left, Secretary Chertoff naturally took his own
review and reorganization and actually abolished the
undersecretary for border and transportation security position.
And the result, you could argue, is that it elevated US-VISIT
because it reported directly to the secretary.
But I believe that what happened was that the secretary had
so many different direct reports, and he had Katrina to deal
with--he had all kinds of urgencies to deal with out there that
the secretary could not devote the day-to-day attention to this
type of program effort.
And so I think that it suffered as a result of that. And so
Secretary Chertoff, in his post-Katrina review, assigned US-
VISIT, in his most recent reorganization, to the National
Protection and Program Directorate.
And I applaud this decision. It once again places US- VISIT
where it has an advocate, where it has a decision maker, it has
continued oversight of the program as it continues to meet the
requirements of Congress.
And so sometimes it is counterintuitive, but I think it is
a very good move. I applaud it and support it.
There have always been questions whether US-VISIT should be
placed within one of the operational agencies such as Customs
and Border Protection. And I think there is a number of reasons
why that should not be done.
First of all, placing the program office within the
directorate, in contrast to an agency, minimizes the stovepipe
tendencies of the government agencies.
The US-VISIT program is not just a border security effort,
but it is an identification system that works with ICE in terms
of the enforcement side, works for the Coast Guard, cross-cuts
many of the agencies within homeland security.
Secondly, it is necessary for US-VISIT to have a good
relationship with the Department of State, with the Department
of Justice. This can be accomplished best not at the agency
level but at the directorate level, and so it works best there.
We had an oversight board for US-VISIT program that was
comprised of representatives from the Department of Commerce,
from the Department of Justice, from the Department of State,
that helped give guidance and recommend policy for US-VISIT.
This kind of oversight and partnership with the different
departments of government can best be accomplished at the
undersecretary level, and I chaired that oversight board.
Finally, the involvement of department leadership with US-
VISIT based upon decision making and active oversight makes it
easier for Congress to do its job, to get information on the
program, to support its goals and to find justifications for
its funding.
I was regularly called to testify to the Congress on US-
VISIT, and that high level of support gave a higher level of
confidence in the direction of the office.
It is my pleasure to be here today, and I am grateful for
the work of this committee in supporting the department and the
goals of homeland security.
[The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Asa Hutchinson
March 20, 2008
Chairman Bennie Thompson, Ranking Member Peter King and Members of
the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before this
Committee to discuss the history, management and future of the US-VISIT
program at the Department of Homeland Security.
While I had the privilege of serving as the first and only Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security within the Department,
I am now in the private sector serving as CEO of Hutchinson Group, a
homeland security consulting firm in Little Rock, Arkansas, and as a
senior litigation counselor at the Venable Law Firm in Washington, DC.
During the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, it was
my responsibility to oversee the creation of the US-VISIT program, to
meet the Congressional mandates on entry-exit, and to work with this
Committee on a regular basis. The leadership of this Committee has been
essential in supporting the security goals of US-VISIT and providing
necessary oversight in the spending of billions of dollars on this
program.
In my testimony this morning, I will provide some historical
perspective, emphasize the goals achieved thus far, address the need
for high level oversight within the Department and finally talk about
how the breadth of the US-VISIT mission impacts many different
departments within the government.
Prior to the attack on 9/11, Congress recognized the need to create
an entry-exit system to record and account for visitors to the United
States. Of the 12 million illegal aliens presently in the United
States, it is estimated that 40% are visa overstays. It is easy to
conclude that accounting for visitors through an entry-exit system is
critical to border security, the flow of lawful commerce and the
integrity of our immigration system. The mandate was given to the
former INS and was stalled because of the enormity of the challenge
and, perhaps, because of the inertia of INS as well. After the 9-11
attack, Congress accelerated the program, moved up the deadlines and
increased the requirements. At that point the new Department of
Homeland Security was created and assumed the responsibility of
implementing an entry-exit system. By December 31, 2003, the new
Department had created a US-VISIT program office, developed and had
approved its $340 million spend plan, and met the first deadline within
the budget provided by Congress. US-VISIT has continued to expand the
entry system to the land borders and now even to visa waiver travelers.
There is always more to do and gaps to close but even the 9-11
Commission Report recognized the singular success of US-VISIT and
applauded the security enhancements.
I left the Department as its first Under Secretary in March of 2005
and soon became the last Under Secretary for Border and Transportation
Security when the Department was reorganized. The BTS Under Secretary
position was abolished, and the US-VISIT program reported directly to
the Deputy Secretary and Secretary of the Department. This change would
appear to elevate the US-VISIT program, but in reality it left the
program without a strong advocate and active decision- maker. Secretary
Chertoff understandably made additional changes after the Hurricane
Katrina failures, and in the most recent reorganization, placed the US-
VISIT program within the newly created National Protection and Programs
Directorate. I applaud this move because it will increase the day-to-
day oversight and advocacy for the program, it will improve the
responsiveness to Congress and enhance the program's relationship with
other departments of government that are served by the biometric
identification system for international visitors.
There have always been some questions raised as to whether US-VISIT
should be placed within one of the operational agencies such as Customs
and Border Protection rather than at the headquarters level. I have
always disagreed with this idea and, there are a number of reasons the
US-VISIT program office should be a separate reporting unit outside of
CBP or any separate agency.
1. Placing the program office within the NPP directorate
minimizes the stove-pipe tendencies of government agencies.
Within the department it is essential that the biometric
identification system work with the enforcement arm of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the policy office of the
Department, the Coast Guard and a host of other offices within
the department. The working relationships are easier to
maintain when US-VISIT reports to an Under Secretary who can
serve as an arbiter, decision-maker and advocate for the
system.
2. It is also necessary for US-VISIT to have a close working
relationship with the Department of Justice and the Department
of State. The original charter for US-VISIT included
representatives from multiple departments on its oversight
board for . This board met to develop and recommend policy for
the program and to resolve differences. As Under Secretary, I
chaired that oversight board, and the high level participation
of other departments would not occur if the program was placed
at the agency level.
3. Finally, the involvement of department leadership with US-
VISIT based upon decision making and active oversight makes it
easier for Congress to get information on the program, support
its goals and justify its funding. I was regularly called to
testify to Congress on US-VISIT, and the high level of support
gave a higher level of confidence in the direction of the
office.
It is my pleasure to be here today, and I am happy to respond to
any questions.
Ms. Clarke. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
And I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of
questioning, and my initial questions go to Ms. Flournoy and
Dr. Carafano.
The Quadrennial Defense Review--we call it the QDR is said
to have helped focus policy development in the Department of
Defense. But some have complained that the three QDRs in 1997,
2001 and 2006 have not been directly relevant to the policy
development.
If we require a quadrennial homeland security review, how
can we assure that the exercise will help create an orderly
process for policy development?
Ms. Flournoy. Madam Chairman, I would submit that the QDRs
have been very central to the development of strategy in each
case and the development of policy.
In my view, where the disconnect has often occurred was in
translating that strategy into actual programmatic and
budgetary decisions. And I think that tends to break down in
the subsequent implementation processes the normal sort of
programming and budgeting processes.
Again, I think one of the ways--there are a couple of ways
to remedy that. One is to have senior-level involvement and
ownership of this. If this is just a staff exercise, it is
probably not worth doing.
It really has to have the buy-in and commitment of the
leadership that this is their exercise for setting priorities
and then they want to see those priorities actually executed in
the program.
The second is to ensure as, you know, Jim said, a
quadrennial review is only one part of a strategic planning and
budgeting process.
You have got to ensure that the other pieces of that
process are in place so that there is a good process in the
Department of Homeland Security for program review, budget
review, et cetera, not only based on fiscal requirements but
also based on policy priorities.
Is the policy actually getting implemented in the budget
and the program? That is where I would place the emphasis.
Mr. Carafano. Well, I think Michelle is exactly right.
Reviews are never going to solve those problems. Actually, you
know, we have a post-cold war tradition in the United States of
doing strategic reviews. It wasn't invented with the QDR.
There were the Gaither Commission, the Project Solarium,
NSC-68. There is a long tradition of these things.
What makes the QDR different and useful is two things. One,
it adds a degree of transparency to the process, so that you
know what is going on. Although parts of it may be secret, the
end product is published and released. The document is
released. People talk about it.
So it adds a degree of transparency to the process, and it
pulls everything together in one place, which quite simply is
impossible to get anyplace else.
It is even more difficult when you think about homeland
security than it is for defense, because, I mean, defense has a
pretty large portfolio, but it is still in a relatively narrow
sector.
But here in homeland security, you have things that affect
economic, and critical infrastructure, and immigration, and
there is--there is no way to really kind of grip your hands
about all that in one kind of single comprehensive assessment.
And so if you don't have that, you wind up being very
unstrategic and kind of looking at things in piecemeal and in a
stovepipe way.
So I think the answer to the question is there is no way
you can structure the process to solve all the complaints about
the QDR.
But if your expectation is the QDR is going to be a single
management document which is going to solve all your problems,
the answer is it isn't. What it is is an important, focused,
transparent, recurring, systemic dialogue opportunity between
the Congress and the administration.
And that is a useful piece of the larger management puzzle.
Ms. Clarke. Would you say, then, that it is necessary to
accompany a process like this with a realistic operating plan?
Mr. Carafano. Oh, absolutely. And the other piece which I
didn't mention in my testimony, which is I think it has to be
somehow synchronized with an intelligence assessment.
I didn't put threat in the QHSR because I just don't think
that that is really an appropriate place for it.
And what is interesting about homeland security is there is
no good integrated threat assessment, because national
intelligence estimates tend to be foreign-focused. And we don't
do something equivalent to a domestic intelligence assessment.
So what I actually would like to see is not threat be a
component of the QHSR, but I would like to see a synchronous
process where there was an intelligence estimate that combined
the NIE that was normally done by the intelligence community
with a domestic intelligence estimate which is a joint product
of justice and homeland security, and that that estimate be
done in conjunction with or preparatory to the QHSR, because I
would like to be able to sit down--whether that is a classified
document or not, I would like to be able to sit down with that
threat assessment, you know, as a staffer or as a member of
Congress, and be able to look at that next to the QHSR to
really see if our vision of the future threat is really
synchronized with our vision of our future investment.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
I would like to acknowledge the gentleman from Connecticut,
Mr. Shays, at this time.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
Do we have votes, Madam Chairman? Is that coming up? Okay,
good.
I would like to thank all of you for being here, and one of
the things that I found early on in my chairmanship is that
when you get folks from, say, The Heritage Foundation, or this
new center or bring in someone who has been focused on this
formerly for the government as you have, Asa, I learn a heck of
a lot more than I do, frankly, from anyone else. So I am
thrilled to have you here.
And I want to ask you, first off, as people who focus on
national security issues as they relate to terrorism, how would
you define what our national strategy is to deal with
terrorism? And I am not quizzing you. I am just trying to see
we all knew what it was against the Cold War, and we accepted
it on a bipartisan basis. We have had very little debate about
this, and so I am just curious how you would describe what our
strategy needs to be.
Who wants to start?
Mr. Carafano. I will go first, since I wrote a book on
this. The argument I make is you think about long wars
differently. And if it is a protracted conflict against--
whether it is a terrorist organization or against another
state, you think about long wars differently, because in a long
war you are as concerned about protecting the competitive power
of the state over the long term as you are with getting the
enemy, because it is like running marathon, but you don't know
where the end is, and victory is you are still running when the
other guy stops.
And so we talked about really four things--
Mr. Shays. That is a fascinating concept, you still keep
running when the other guy stops.
Mr. Carafano. I mean, there are four things you have to do
equally well.
I mean, you know, security--and that has both the offensive
and defensive component. The offensive component is getting the
leadership, breaking up the networks, interdicting the sources
of funding and recruiting. The defensive element is typically
when we think about the Department of Homeland Security, the
things you do to protect yourself, and respond, or mitigate--
Mr. Shays. What is two?
Mr. Carafano. --from an attack, so that is security.
Mr. Shays. Yes. What is two?
Mr. Carafano. That is the first element, actually. Security
has offense and defense.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Carafano. The second element is economic growth, not
just to pay for the security, but to pay for all the other
things in the society. So you have to have economic
competitiveness and growth.
The third piece of that is the protection of civil
liberties and privacies, because what enables a state to
compete best over the long term is the will of the governed.
And the glue that really holds that together, that really
cements that, is the civil liberties and privacies of the
society, the healthy civil society.
And the fourth component is winning the war of ideas,
because all--
Mr. Shays. It is what? I am sorry.
Mr. Carafano. Winning the war of ideas, because all wars
are an ideological struggle, particularly long conflicts.
And so the argument that I have made is the key to
successful protracted competition strategy is you have to do
all four of those things equally well security, economic
growth--
Mr. Shays. Have you written a book on this?
Mr. Carafano. Yes, sir. It is called ``Winning the Long
War.'' And you can't trade one off for the other. And that is
the notion, is you can't do things to say, ``Okay, I am going
to add to your security, but to do that I am going to undercut
your economic competitiveness.''
Mr. Shays. I am really happy I have asked this question.
How would you respond to this issue?
Ms. Flournoy. I would add to what Jim has said. I think a
lot of what he says is correct.
In addition to, you know, the offensive piece, defeating
the terrorists, the defensive piece of homeland security, I
think the biggest missing portion of our strategy is a real
strategy that tries to marginalize the terrorists from their
bases of support.
When you look at historically when terrorist organizations
have basically gone out of the business of terrorism, like the
IRA, it has been when governments have figured out how to
affect the social, economic, political conditions that were
creating fertile soil for the terrorists, either in the form of
recruits, or money, or public support and sympathy.
And maybe this is getting at the winning hearts and minds,
but it is more than that. It is really thinking through how do
we use our economic policies, our diplomatic policies, our
foreign assistance, and our informational tools to really
alienate the terrorists from the broader population that they
are trying to win over.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask, you said--
Ms. Flournoy. And that is really missing in a lot of what
we are doing today.
Mr. Shays. Okay. You said terrorists, but the 9/11
Commission said it is not terrorists, because it is like an
ethereal being. It is Islamist terrorists. That is what they
basically said.
Ms. Flournoy. Well, I would say that this--I would
characterize this as really a battle within Islam, so we are
trying to separate--marginalize the extremists--
Mr. Shays. The radicals.
Ms. Flournoy. --the violent extremists--
Mr. Shays. Let me get to Asa.
Ms. Flournoy. --from the larger Muslim population.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. That is very helpful.
Asa?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, of course, I remember my first
incident with terrorists in the 1980s was the extreme right-
wing variety of it that also took down the Murrah Building in
Oklahoma City.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Hutchinson. So I think in homeland security you have to
be concerned--obviously, the most current threat is the Islamic
jihadists, but you also have other traditional means of
terrorism that you have to focus on.
And I think in terms of the department, Congress set out
the first strategy for homeland defense through the Homeland
Security Act, which really set down some very wise criteria of
security balanced with commerce, security balanced with civil
liberties, as the hallmark of it.
Obviously, that has been supplemented with national
homeland security directives coming from the president, with a
strategy of homeland security, but it starts with that Homeland
Security Act, which is a very good statement that we should not
forget about.
Mr. Shays. Okay. Thank you.
I will just conclude by saying all of you have helped me,
because I basically believe it is it used to be contain, react,
then mutually assured destruction. That obviously goes out the
window.
And to me, it is detect, prevent, preempt, and maybe act
unilaterally. In other words, what we want to do is prevent
something from happening. And we have to be able to do that. We
have to be able to detect it.
But frankly, Jim, your comments helped me put that in some
perspective, in particular. Love to see your book, and I will
buy it. I am not asking for it. Okay.
Thank you, Madam Chairperson.
Ms. Clarke. The chair will now recognize the other members
for questions.
The chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlewoman from
Washington, D.C., Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I apologize that I wasn't here, because I I am interested
in, at least broadly conceived, of the whole notion of planning
for the next attack, as it were. I suppose that was the thrust
of the 9/11 Commission report.
One of you spoke about long wars. I kind of think of what
we have been doing as last war planning. Maybe we do that in
defense as well, although my sense is that the Defense
Department, perhaps because they have been in the business
since the creation of the republic, does think about emerging
threats in a wholly different way than people who have never
been in this business before, and that is us.
Homeland security is a new concept for the domestic side. I
say last war planning, because we devoted extraordinary
attention to the last war, the 9/11 plane attacks, and so we
shored that up.
I contrast that to the way we all spoke of the coming wars
in America, the whole notion for example, that nobody even
speaks of anymore because it can't happen, of being able to
fight two wars at once on two fronts, so that we were told, no
matter what we were in, we could do that.
Nobody thinks that that could happen. That is why we are at
some risk militarily, in my view.
On the other hand, the notion of emerging threats and
homeland security seems to me to be less baffling. And yet we
have not grappled--for example, we are just passing a rail
security bill.
You know, you could have planned for that the day after 9/
11, because it was clear that we were dealing with what can
only be regarded as professional terrorists.
We have had hearings here about carrying in a weapon of
mass destruction in a briefcase. I don't see what the
difficulty is in--indeed, I think it is--without knowing who
will do it, it seems to me to be less challenging than what the
military has to do, because the military knows that we are the
big guy.
They therefore can recognize that people probably aren't
going to come and bomb us. They then have to figure out where
the hot spots are.
One of the reasons you see some doubts here, perhaps, about
the whole notion of quadrennial reviews is that we--I suppose
we have to first recognize that there would be something to
review, and that once we reviewed it and said this is going to
be the threat, this is what we are going to do about it.
And nobody is going to put huge resources into a threat
that hasn't materialized yet, but the fact is that when a--
after a threat materializes, we certainly put huge resources--
we overkill it.
I want to know about--I want to know anything you can tell
me about planning in the homeland security area where there is
no history of planning, there is no given resource notions.
We are still trying to deal with things that aren't even--
covered how you would go about this so that it would give us
something realistically to review, as opposed to a paper review
that anybody can now tell you without much work from
professionals.
Mr. Carafano. The first thing I would like to say is I am
totally in favor of D.C. voting rights, as a city resident.
[Laughter.]
So I am with you there.
Well, the one comment--I think the first thing is I think
it is an enormous--strategically speaking, it is an enormous
mistake to focus on a specific terrorist tactic as a way of
building a strategy to fend against it.
So I would suggest that the wrong answer is to say, ``Well,
is it going to be a rail attack? Is it going to be an airplane
attack?'' Because, you know, when I first got in this business,
I did an assessment of how many ways, with a modest amount of
income and resources, could a terrorist attack the United
States, and I quit when my report was 300 pages long, because
you can think of a lot more ways to attack than you can think
to defend against it.
And the point is that 99 percent of a terrorist attack
looks exactly the same. And where it differs is in that last 1
percent or 2 percent--what is the delivery mechanism? Is it a
car bomb? Is it a plane?
But the back 97 percent of planning, the training, the
organization, the indoctrination, the ideology all that looks
pretty much the same, and it is that last little bit, the
choice, where it really differs.
And what we do, I think, is sometimes we tend to focus on
the last 2 percent, the delivery vehicle, and that is the wrong
answer.
What you need to focus on is the front 97 percent. So I
would say you do--there is an awful lot of important thinking
that needs to be done in terms of emerging threat, not in the
sense of is it a car bomb or is it a rail bomb, but in the
sense of the organization, the tactics, the methods of
recruiting.
And so I think there is a lot of work that can be done
there. Where a QHSR would add value to the process is it will
help force the department to do that in a regular and
systematic way.
You know, as I said in my opening statement, if you go back
and you look at the I mean, the Defense Department, of course,
hasn't been around since the beginning of the republic. You
know, it is a product after World War II.
But remarkably enough, if you look at the capacity of the
Defense Department to do things like metrics, and linkages, and
progressions, and strategic plans on these kind of programmatic
issues that are addressed in the QDR--when they did that first
QDR, they were pretty primitive and immature.
They didn't have a lot of analytic capability. They didn't
have a lot of staff to do that. Now, it is much more mature now
because they have had to develop that capability over time. And
when you deliver a QDR today, there is a lot of thinking and
maturity that goes behind to do that.
And I think having this process will help the Department of
Homeland Security grow a similar capability.
Ms. Norton. Madam Chair, could I just ask, you know, the
others to respond at least to the question?
Thank you.
Ms. Flournoy. Congresswoman, I would say that, you know,
the real value of a review is not so much to try to predict
threats, but to, in the face of a lot of uncertainty, plan
given that uncertainty.
So to force the department out of its posture of day-to-
day dealing with today's crisis, the in-box demands and so
forth, to kind of take a longer perspective over the horizon--
what are the full range of things that we might have to deal
with?--to make some very tough choices about prioritization and
really about risk allocation--where am I going to absolutely
not accept risk, and where am I going to have to manage that
risk because I can't afford to buy it down to zero?
And then to use those priorities and that challenge
assessment to really develop a series of planning scenarios
that you can constantly test yourself against in different
combinations and use to identify capability shortfalls that
then need to be, you know, remedied in the program.
And I would underscore what Jim had to say, that one of the
most important things is for the DHS to, over time, invest in
and develop real planning expertise and capacity, which does
take some time and some resources.
Mr. Hutchinson. I think, first of all, the strategy,
fighting terrorism within the United States, has to be
intelligence-driven. We are getting better at that. We need to
continue to improve it. It is an effective utilization of
resources.
Secondly, we should have targeted inspection based upon
that intelligence. I think that is an effective use of
resources.
Thirdly, it should be based upon partnerships, partnerships
between government and the private sector, partnerships between
the different agencies, partnerships internationally, Mexico
and Canada being important partners, the E.U., and it should be
based upon technology as well, technology-driven.
So that is, to me, the summary of what the department is
trying to do in terms of strategy.
In reference to the Quadrennial Defense Review, we ought to
change the name of it, help us out a little bit--the QDR--I
think one of the benefits from such a review is that it maybe
limits the review, focuses the review.
The Department of Homeland Security is not short of
reviews, and studies, and analysis, and oversight. In fact, we
have almost been worn out by it.
But I think the benefit of an organized systematic review
is when a new idea pops up, let's say, let's refer that to the
QDR, and we can look at it systematically and thoughtfully. So
I think there is some benefit to that.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Clarke. I would like to recognize for 5 minutes the
gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chair very much for her
interest and leadership on this issue, and she looks
distinguished as the chairwoman.
I quarrel with a lot of the burdens that fall upon us after
9/11 and truly believe that if, tragically, a terrorist attack
was to occur here in the United States, this committee, this
singular committee, would feel the enormous brunt and
sensitivity and sense of horror, because we are entrusted with
the responsibilities of securing the homeland.
And so I think as we sit here and talk about the planning
process that, frankly, one of the issues that we should be
discussing is developing a culture of urgency at the Homeland
Security Department, a sense that it is not good for it to be
tomorrow, but it should be fixed today or yesterday.
And frankly, I wonder whether or not we have been able to
reach that pinnacle or that point where I think we are needing
to go.
So my questions will be couched in the terms of how much
time we have to discuss policy and to think about proposals.
This department was formulated--at least we discussed it as a
select committee in this Congress right after 9/11.
We have had a 9/11 Commission. And I always wonder about
this whole idea of my defined concept of ever ready, ever
coordinated and ever able to act, that we should be forever
coordinated, forever able to act and forever prepared and
ready. And I don't see that.
So I am going to start, Mr. Hutchinson--and welcome back to
the Congress--with you and recite for you the GAO study that
indicated, after spending almost 4 years and more than $1
billion, DHS has not implemented a biometric exit capability or
a suitable alternative.
And so my question is you saw the US-VISIT stand up at the
very beginning. Are you surprised that 4 years after the
program was established we still do not have an exit system?
And how do you account for the delay? And what role does
consistent leadership play in delivering results on a program
of this scale?
And let me ask Ms. Flournoy you--have recommended or
suggested a number of DOD processes that might be utilized. How
do you see homeland security and DOD coordinating? Is it even
possible? Are we ready to stand up, period, with a sense of
urgency in the way this department is structured in terms of
homeland security?
Mr. Carafano, I want to take the planning concept to the
practical concept. We have ICE agents who are raiding various
employers. You know, I don't know if that is make work or busy
work.
Do we have a coordinated--you know, we are in the middle of
discussing how we reform--how we do comprehensive immigration
reform, and we have ICE raids. I don't know if they are doing
that because it is public relations.
We have the detainee centers needing great improvement. We
look like we are not coordinated. We are not a smooth- running
machine. I want a pithy response to where do we get to the
heart of making sure that we are functioning, coordinating,
securing the homeland.
I yield to Mr. Hutchinson.
Mr. Hutchinson. Excellent question, Congresswoman, and I
enjoyed the relationship we had both at homeland security--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Mr. Hutchinson. --and in Congress. And your sense of
urgency is right on target. I believe the department has the
right strategy, but you can certainly debate whether they are
implementing the strategy at the right speed.
And US-VISIT is a good example of it. You ask about whether
I am surprised that they have not implemented an exit
capability. I think US-VISIT has been one of the great
successes of the Department of Homeland Security. I believe the
exit capability is very important. Obviously, you have to have
pilots. You have to move in that direction, but you cannot
retreat from it.
I think my testimony really goes to that question and the
challenge that they face. I believe that US-VISIT got lost a
little bit when it was a direct report to the secretary of
homeland security, whenever he had Katrina to deal with and a
whole host of other emergencies.
You need the day-to-day oversight and decision-making
capability. That is why the placement within an undersecretary
directorate will be helpful to US-VISIT, to give US-VISIT an
advocate, a decision maker, a better relationship with
Congress.
And so I think that will help move exit forward, and I
certainly support that and applaud that effort. It is very
important to our country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
Ms. Flournoy?
Ms. Flournoy. I think you have hit on an absolutely
critical issue, this question of integration or coordination
between DOD and DHS, and it needs to happen in several ways.
First, interdepartmental. I think there is a lot of room
for cooperation on planning between the two departments in
terms of sharing scenarios, expertise, judgments, et cetera,
and actually even having DOD planners who have expertise that
you have detailed over to DHS to help develop more planning
expertise there.
Developing common or shared concepts of operations for how
they are going to deal with shared challenges and so forth--so
certainly, at the planning level.
Also, at the execution level, whether it is via NORTHCOM
and bringing them into coordination with counterparts in DHS--
but there is also a larger interagency piece that sometimes
happens, sometimes doesn't happen, that really needs to be
brought together by the homeland security committee staff of
the White House and, perhaps, some parts of the NCTC, where you
really need to have a much greater degree of coordination than
is sometimes happening.
And then finally, incentive structures. I mean, one of the
things that I have proposed in another study was the idea of
actually linking promotions within certain parts of key
elements of departments to interagency experience, so that you
incentivize people gaining interagency education, training,
experience and knowing how to better integrate the actions of
their department with those of others.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I yield to the gentleman to finish the question, Madam
Chairwoman.
Mr. Carafano. I think it is a great question. And the
simple answer is it is a leadership issue. I saw this in 25
years in the Army, and when things get done and when things
don't get done.
And leadership is a combination of the leader both setting
priorities and then making sure that people have the reasonable
resources to execute. And I think actually this US-VISIT is a
perfect example.
One of my concerns, for example, would be by US-VISIT, I
think, should be a national priority and should be a high
priority for the Department of Homeland Security.
If you put it in Customs and Border Protection, they have
got a lot of very important missions right now. They have got
to implement SBInet. They have got to basically reengineer the
border patrol.
And they have got a detention and removal process which is
decades to come to really be modern and be sufficient. And then
you have the issue of coordinating with ICE.
My concern is if you took this vital program and you put it
on CBP, I mean, in a sense you would be setting them up to fail
because you are giving them too many missions to really
moderate and execute.
So I would prefer that this US-VISIT be closer to the
flagpole. You know, I.T. programs are a classic example.
If you look at why I.T. programs fail in the federal
government, they always fail for the same four reasons: The
requirements aren't adequately defined, the deadlines aren't
realistic, the resource projections aren't realistic, and you
don't have on-hands leadership.
So those are the four things you have got to fix if you
want this to work. And so I think the closer to the flagpole at
the top it is, the better it is. And I think all the other
three things will follow that.
And I think there is a priority issue here, and I think
there is a really easy way to cut the Gordian knot on this U.S.
exit thing. It is very simple.
We have 11 major U.S. international airports that account
for 70 percent of the international air traffic. If we do that
first, that is an enormous boon to the exit process. That
covers an awful lot of people that are very that we are really
concerned about.
And then you have got some really on-hands expertise on how
to do exit that you can then move out to other sectors. And I
think that is a reasonable thing. I think it is a reasonable--
in a reasonable time frame.
And so I think if Congress wants to set a deadline, that is
a reasonable deadline. I think in 2 years, having U.S. exit at
the 11 major international airports that serve 70 percent of
traffic is a great goal.
And then you can do some really interesting things. For
example, if you want to--if you are concerned about visa waiver
countries and are they overstaying or not, you can say, ``Okay,
if you are from a visa waiver country, you have to use on of
those 11 airports.''
Then we will have a concrete, absolute measure on whether
people are actually complying with the rules or not. And if we
have countries that are of concern, we can make them use those
airports as well.
So I think that is an achievable goal that we could do
right now. But I do think it is really a serious leadership
issue, and leadership is setting priorities and then making
sure people have the resources to meet those needs.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, Madam Chairwoman, thank you very
much for the witnesses. I am trying to take shorthand here. I
think there have been some enormously provocative statements.
I just want to have on the record, Madam Chairwoman, for
this particular committee that I think having the principals
come in and respond to Mr. Capiano's I am not seeing the ``F'',
I am sorry--Carafano's words--we have a Capuano here in the
Congress, so please forgive me.
But in any event, to really challenge the Department of
Homeland Security about putting US-VISIT closer to the
flagpole, closer to priority, closer to urgency, and have them
respond on how soon they could get that reordered.
And my last point is I agree that Customs and Border
Protection is overworked--not overworked. Let me not say they
are overworked. They do a fine job. But they have a lot of
work--and ICE.
And my question about the raids was just that. Not that I
would want to ask where are you raiding next, but are you doing
work that is making sense.
Is there a need for an organizational restructure, or
should your urgency be directed somewhere else, or can we help
you, you know, be part of really getting some work done that
deals with securing America?
So I think this is an important hearing, and maybe we can
have some others on how we can make sure that the department is
organized and focused urgently on the needs of this nation.
I yield back. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Clarke. That is duly noted, and I know our chair, Mr.
Thompson is very focused on that, Ms. Jackson Lee. He was very
concerned about we heard here this morning and where we are in
this process.
For the panel, I have an additional question before we wrap
up for today. The new president elected in 2008 will have the
task of developing new homeland security policy together with
Congress.
Presently, there are quite a number of laws, strategic
documents, presidential directives and other policy documents
pertaining to homeland security.
How can we assure clarity and coherence in our national
homeland security policy as we consider the possibility of a
quadrennial homeland security review?
Mr. Hutchinson. Madam Chairman, may I take leave? I have an
appearance I have to get across town to.
But let me just, before I turn it over to my colleagues,
say that I think the QHSR is certainly a helpful start, and I
think the suggestion of the next administration is probably
timely.
I always like to quote the RAND Corporation study that
indicated even in the private sector, where it is a little bit
easier, even the private sector it takes 5 years for a merger
to be effective. And here, the 5-year anniversary of the
Department of Homeland Security will be next March. So I think
that is just a good reminder that in the government environment
it is even tougher.
But I think the focus of a QHSR would be helpful and a good
tool to use. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today
with you.
Ms. Clarke. And on behalf of our chairman and the members
of the committee, we want to thank you for your service and for
your testimony here today. Thank you.
Ms. Flournoy. Madam Chairwoman, I think you raise a very
important point. Over time, a number of planning requirements,
reporting requirements and other requirements have been put on
DHS.
I think as we approach the 5-year anniversary, it is
actually a good opportunity for maybe members of this committee
to sit down with both key department officials and perhaps DHS
watchers like, certainly, Jim and maybe some DOD watchers like
me, and to kind of put it all on the table and say, ``Does this
really make sense when you pull it all together?''
It may be that there is some rationalization and
streamlining that could help to clarify that, you know, you
start with an overarching review, then you have a clear policy
guidance document, then that goes into a programming process
with some assessment, and then a budgeting process.
I mean, it may make sense to look at everything that has
been put on DHS in the spirit of trying to enhance strategic
planning and take a fresh look to say, ``Now that we have a
little experience, now that we can put all of this together,
does this really make sense, all of it together, or are there
ways that we can rationalize and streamline the process to
strengthen planning but also, you know, to increase the chances
of getting the desired result that we are all after?''
Mr. Carafano. Yes, I will just refer back to my testimony
that I do think it would be worthwhile as this administration
walks out the door to do a report that really would be a
precursor to a QHSR.
And I think the key is we don't need a report which
basically asks the department to grade itself. What we really
need is the department to say, ``You know, if you were staying
for four more years, you know, where would you go in the future
and why?'' And I think it would be a great rehearsal for the
Congress if we could do this like we would do a QSR, to do it
as a dialogue to say, ``We want you to do this report. Come in
and tell us what you think should be in the report. Then let's
talk about what should be in the report. Then come back in a
couple of months and tell us how the work is going. And then
let's talk about it when the report is done.''
Ms. Clarke. Well, I want to thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the members for their questions.
The members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond expeditiously
in writing to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]
Appendix A
----------
For the Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Tom Davis, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Virginia
Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King thank you for holding
today's hearing on the United States Visitor and Immigration Status
Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT). I have long emphasized that
protecting the United States does not rest solely with the physical
infrastructure at our borders. A properly functioning border means
information is collected at each point of contact and the correct
information is available at each point of decision--whether that point
is a consular window overseas or a car window at the border in
California. We must have a seamless approach--ensuring security at all
ports of entry. This is why US-VISIT is essential to the mission of
homeland security.
In addition to the security aspects of US-VISIT, the program is
particularly important to Virginia's 11th District. Approximately one
out of every six of my constituents was born outside of the United
States. Accordingly, there is a high volume of international travel to
and from the National Capital Region. Residents need US-VISIT to work
to protect the region. However, residents also need the assurance US-
VISIT will not clog ports of entry and impede and lengthen airport
security procedures at high volume times. I believe the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has struck an appropriate balance between these
two goals, but we still have additional ground to cover with the
program.
The President's budget proposal requested $462 million for US-VISIT
in 2008. This money should be used by DHS to establish a workable exit
phase of the program, which is critical to detecting significant visa
overstays. The money should also facilitate the implementation of a 10
fingerprint biometric. This new technology will be invaluable in
identifying previously unidentifiable partial fingerprints.
Since the creation of DHS and the subsequent announcement the
Department would be responsible for US-VISIT, I made it a priority for
the Committee on Government Reform to oversee the program's progress--
from conception to implementation. I am pleased to see the Committee on
Homeland Security takes oversight of the program as seriously as I do.
I am, however, concerned by the Majority's proposal to move US-VISIT
under Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Pursuant to Section 872 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296), the Secretary may
establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational units
within DHS. As such, Secretary Chertoff has elected to create a new
directorate named National Protection and Programs, under which US-
VISIT will fall starting March 31, 2007. Recently, Robert Mocny, Acting
Director of the US-VISIT program, told my staff the move to the new
Directorate is a positive one for the program. It provides the
flexibility for US-VISIT to meet its goals across the Department.
Unfortunately, the Committee on Homeland Security's Majority has
decided to micro-manage and undermine those within DHS who work on the
US-VISIT program. The Majority's view that US-VISIT should fall under
CBP is myopic, at best. US-VISIT is not simply a ``border initiative.''
The program does not interface solely with CBP, but also with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration
Services, and the Coast Guard. Additionally, US-VISIT partners with the
Department of Justice, State Department, and the intelligence
community. Placing US-VISIT under CBP inhibits a program that stretches
broadly through DHS.
I urge my Democratic colleagues to rethink their position on the
placement of US-VISIT. It is my hope they will take seriously the
testimony of those who work day in and day out on US-VISIT and consider
the Secretary's authority and desire to do what is best for the
implementation of the nation's security programs.
Appendix B
----------
Additional Questions and Responses
Questions from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
Responses from Robert A. Mocny
Question 1.: What is the statutory authority for US-VISIT's
``identity management'' mission?
Response: There is no single statute that authorizes identity
management. Instead, there is a variety of statutes which set the legal
framework for it. To perform the tasks mandated in statute, the U.S.
Government must have confidence in an individual alien's identity as a
precursor to providing that alien with visas, admission, or other
immigration benefits, or undertaking law enforcement actions.
The following summarizes the applicable legislative mandates:
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208, requires the development of an
automated entry and exit control system to collect records of departure
and to match them with records of arrival.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Public Law 106-215, amends IIRIRA to
require that the entry and exit data system integrate all ``authorized
or required'' alien arrival and departure data; use available data to
match an alien's arrival and departure; assist the Attorney General
(now the Secretary of Homeland Security) and the Secretary of State to
identify lawfully admitted non-immigrants who have overstayed their
period of admission; use available data to produce a report of arriving
and departing aliens by nationality, classification as an immigrant or
non-immigrant, and dates of arrival in, and departure from, the United
States; and be implemented at all air and sea ports of entry by
December 31, 2003; at all air and sea ports and the 50 land border
ports serving the highest numbers of aliens by December 31, 2004; and
at all ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000 (VWPPA), Public Law
106-396, requires that the entry and exit data system contain records
of arrival and departure of every alien admitted under the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) who arrives and departs by air or sea; contain sufficient
data to permit the Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland
Security), for each fiscal year, to calculate the percentage of each
VWP country(s nationals who are admitted under the VWP and for whom no
departure record exists; use available data to produce a detailed
annual report to Congress by December 31 of each year containing, among
other specific information, the number of successful arrival/departure
matches for departing aliens by nationality and by classification as
immigrant or non-immigrant, and the number of aliens who arrived
pursuant to a non-immigrant visa or the VWP and for whom no departure
data are available at the end of the authorized period of stay; and
record arrivals and departures of every VWP alien transiting through
air and sea ports by October 1, 2001.
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act,
Public Law 107-56, requires that the entry and exit data system be
implemented with all deliberate speed and as expeditiously as
practicable; focus particularly on using biometrics and tamper-
resistant documents; and be able to interface with law enforcement
databases for use by Federal law enforcement to identify and detain
individuals who are threats to national security.
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
(EBSVERA), Public Law 107-173, requires that the entry and exit data
system use technology and biometric standards to be developed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in consultation
with other agencies, for alien identification and other purposes; be
accessible at ports of entry and overseas consular posts; consist of
equipment and software to allow biometric comparison and authentication
of all U.S. visas, other travel and entry documents issued to aliens,
and the machine-readable, biometric passports required to be issued to
nationals of VWP countries at all ports of entry by October 26, 2004
(later extended to October 26, 2005); have database(s) containing alien
arrival and departure data from machine-readable visas, passports, and
other travel and entry documents; use technologies that facilitate
lawful and efficient cross-border movement of commerce and persons
without compromising the safety and security of the United States; and
be integrated into the new and broader Immigration and Naturalization
Data System that fully integrates all Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) databases and data systems that process or contain alien
information.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA), Public Law 108-458, Section 7208, specifically addresses
biometric entry and exit and calls for the Secretary of Homeland
Security to accelerate the full implementation of the US-VISIT program.
The statutes above either state or clearly presuppose that:
the comprehensive biometric entry and exit screening
system will be continuously updated and improved as technology
improves;
the system will be integrated and interoperable with
data systems that process or contain information on aliens and
that are maintained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) at the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of State;
the biometric entry-exit system will use a technology
standard to be applied in a cross-agency, cross-platform, fully
interoperable electronic system as a means to share the law
enforcement and intelligence information necessary to confirm
the identity of persons applying for a visa; and
the entry-exit data collected will be available for
authorized law enforecement purposes.
Question 2.: How will the ``identity management'' functions of US-
VISIT be leveraged to assist in the identification of visa overstays?
Response: Presently, US-VISIT provides analysis of both biographic
(name, date of birth) information and biometric (fingerprint)
information to identify aliens that may have overstayed their period of
admission. Information on confirmed overstays is forwarded to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for possible law enforcement
action. This information is also shared with Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and the State Department so that, if the individual is
subsequently encountered during the visa renewal/application process or
entry process, those agencies may then take appropriate action. US-
VISIT data and analysis enable enforcement components to arrest aliens
who have violated the terms of their visas by overstaying the
authorized period of admission. To date, US-VISIT identifications have
resulted in the arrest of more than 300 overstay violators by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; in addition, nearly 50 individuals
have been refused entry into the United States since October 2006
because of US-VISIT's identification of overstay violators.
Question 3.: How will the ``identity management'' functions of US-
VISIT be integrated into the Department's other border security
efforts, such as the Secure Border Initiative and the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is continually
reviewing ways to leverage existing programs and maximize
interoperability among its immigration and border management efforts.
DHS agrees that its major investment initiatives, such as US-VISIT, the
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), and the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), must be strategically aligned. DHS has established a
strong oversight effort to ensure that the alignment is implemented
through the lifecycle of these programs.
Essential components of this oversight include the requirement that
all these projects, as major investments, be approved at key stages by
the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB). This includes a review by the
DHS Enterprise Architecture Board and the involvement of the Screening
Coordination Office (SCO).
To ensure the success of these programs, there is ongoing
communication and cross-planning among the offices responsible for
designing and implementing these initiatives. For example, staff
members from US-VISIT have participated extensively in the WHTI
planning efforts and have taken part in the development of the
strategic plan for the SBI. CBP staff who are now working on SBI and
WHTI also participated in the development and implementation of US-
VISIT. This intra-agency cooperation provides opportunities for lessons
learned to be shared and facilitates retention and reuse of historical
knowledge and experience.
Question 4.: How does the immigration component of US-VISIT's
mission comport with the other entities that will be forming the
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)?
Response: Threats posed by individuals wishing to do the Nation
harm generally fall into two categories: physical and virtual. Reducing
risk requires an integrated approach that encompasses these physical
and virtual threats, as well as the human elements that pose the
threats. Currently, there are multiple components within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) working independently to reduce our
comprehensive risk. Three of these are:
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), which
addresses physical risks;
The Office of Cyber Security and Communications
(CS&T), which addresses cyber risks;
US-VISIT, which addresses human risks.
All three of these offices use the same approach to reduce risk by
utilizing data gathering, data analysis, and dissemination of
information to operators. DHS believes that it can increase the
synergies between, and improve the output of, the aforementioned
offices not only by recognizing their commonalities, but also by
integrating their work more closely under the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD).
In addition to the biographic data that can be used (e.g., name,
location), to enhance the security of our Nation(s critical
infrastructure (e.g., using fingerprint checks to verify identity and
control access ton sensitive facilities), the National Protection and
Programs Directorate continues to explore appropriate usage of
biometric information and analysis.
Question 5.: Given the lack of a biometric exit capability for US-
VISIT, why has the Department decided to move US-VISIT to NPPD and
place new emphasis on the ``identity management'' functions of the
system?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is still
committed to deploying biometric exit. US-VISIT's move into the
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) does not alter that
commitment. US-VISIT's identity management functions are a natural
evolution of the requirements of enrolling an alien's identity during a
first encounter (either at consulate offices or ports of entry) and
ensuring that the identity and related information can be accessed by
decision-makers in the border security and immigration management
enterprise in a timely manner. The move also recognizes the program's
management of the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) and
its focus on, experience with, and investment in biometric
identification, which can be leveraged in many official environments.
Question 6.: What are the major challenges or obstacles facing the
Department as it considers deploying exit capabilities at land, air,
and sea ports of entry?
Response: The primary challenge to deploying exit capabilities is
that our land, air, and sea ports were not designed or built for
security processing during exit. Thus, there are significant space and
facility challenges for deploying any type of exit screening at any
port. Additional major challenges include:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership must
collaborate with the airline/travel leadership to discuss the
possible integration of biometric exit at passenger check-in
and how, if possible, this process can mesh with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS) Quick Quary and the Transportation Security
Administration's Secure Flight program;
US-VISIT is in discussions with airlines about the
elements for a pilot for a planned biometric exit covering air.
Question 7.: To what extent has the Department involved the airline
or travel industry in facilitating a feasible exit solution at
airports?
Response: See answer above
Question 8.: What exit capabilities does the Department anticipate
piloting and implementing in FY 2007 and FY 2008?
Response: During the remaining months of FY 2007 and through the
first quarter of FY 2008, US-VISIT plans to collaborate with
stakeholders to plan, develop, and demonstrate a possible solution that
integrates biometric exit into the passenger check-in process for air.
Question 9.: What is the schedule for deploying 10-fingerprint
collection at land, air, and sea ports of entry?
Response: The current plan is to deploy 10-Print collection
capability to all land, air, and sea locations, which currently collect
two fingerprints, by December 31, 2008.
Question 10.: How has the Department evaluated major changes in
policy for US-VISIT, such as interoperating IDENT and IAFIS, piloting
RFID technology, and moving the Program Office to the NPPD, without the
comprehensive strategic plan mandated by 7208 of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 in place?
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has completed a
strategic plan for US-VISIT and submitted it to Appropriators on March
20, 2007, as part of the US-VISIT Fiscal Year 2007 expenditure plan. A
separate document that provides additional information specified in
section 7208(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act
of 2004 (IRTPA) is now in Departmental clearance and should be
delivered to Congress in the near future.
Question 11.: Mr. Thompson inquired into the status of US-VISIT(s
long-term strategic plan. Mr. Mocny said the Committee could expect a
final report within 30--40 days.
Response: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has completed a
strategic plan for US-VISIT and submitted it to Appropriators on March
20, 2007, as part of the US-VISIT Fiscal Year 2007 expenditure plan. A
separate document that provides additional information specified in
section 7208(c) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act
is now in Departmental clearance and should be delivered to Congress in
the near future.
Question 12.: Mr. Thompson (as referenced by Mr. Bilirakis)
requested examples of performance measures for US-VISIT. Mr. Mocny
agreed to provide.
Response: The relevant performance measures are arrayed in the
table below, aligned with US-VISIT goals and the two Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Goals that the program supports-
Prevention and Service.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Strategic Goal/Objective Strategic Goal 2: Prevention
Objective 2.1 Secure
borders against terrorists,
means of terrorism, illegal
drugs, other illegal
activity
US-VISIT Goals Enhance the security
of United States citizens
and visitors
Ensure the integrity
of our immigration system
Performance Measurements Ratio of adverse
actions to total biometric
watch list hits at ports of
entry
Number of biometric
watch list hits for
travelers processed at ports
of entry
Number of biometric
watch list hits for visa
applicants processed at
consular offices
Cumulative and
Annual Perventage Baseline
cost and Schedule Overrun on
US-VISIT Increment
Development and Deployment
(Formerly: Adherence to
program cost and schedule
objectives)
Percentage of Exit
Records Matched to Entry
records (New)
Number of
Individuals Biometrically
Verified Based on 10-Print
Enrollment (Under
development for Unique
Identity)
Percentage of
Biometric Identity
verification Based on 10-
Print Enrollment (Under
development for Unique
Identity)
Number of Travelers
with Adverse Information
Identified During the
Biometric Verification
Process (Under development
for Unique Identity)
Number of Travelers
with Adverse Informaiton
Identified During the
Biometric Verication Process
(Under development for
Unique Identity)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategic Goal 6: Service
DHS Strategic Goal/Objective Objective 6.4 Facilitate the
efficient movement of cargo
and people
US-VISIT Goals Facilitate
legitimate travel and trade
Protect the privacy
of our visitors
Performance Measurements Number of privacy
redress requests received
Average processing
times of redress requests
Adherence to DHS IT
Security requirements
Average Biometric
Watch List query and
identity verification
information delivery times
at consular offices
Average Biometric
Watch List query and
identity verification
information delivery times
to ports of entry
Data Integrity Group
Average Cost to Vet and
Review Records in
Determining a Recommended
Lead (Under development)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 13.: Mr. Cuellar requested a list of space constraints and
related logistical issues at land ports of entry. Mr. Mocny agreed to
provide.
Response: Starting in 2002 with the legacy Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) ``Entry/Exit'' program, US-VISIT has been
collecting and analyzing the data on Land Ports of Entry (LPOE) to meet
Congressional mandates. This effort includes the studies and data
points outlined in the attached table. Each of these data points has
provided additional information and understanding of what it would take
to provide an Entry/Exit system at our LPOE. The basic space
constraints and logistical issues continually point to the following
issues:
1. LPOE were not designed for exit. The LPOE have the
infrastructure in place to stop and inspect each vehicle and
person wishing to enter the United States; however, such
infrastructure is absent for exit at land ports, with the
exception of a few test locations.
2. Many LPOE are land-locked within urban settings that do not
allow for expansion without significant cost, and potential
social and environmental impacts. An exit solution would place
these same challenges upon the Canadian and Mexican communities
surrounding our ports of entry.
3. The building configuration and circulation (internally/
externally) have not been designed to accommodate an
inspection/check-point at exit. Major modification of these
facilities would be required to allow for the additional
manpower, visibility of exit lanes, processing space, work
stations, parking, and other related support activities
associated with exit.
4. Any solution that slows down the current processing time on
entry and/or exit has the potential to cause significant
impacts to the local environment. Additional wait time for exit
will causes long lines at the ports, possible congestion in
communities, and pollution. The additional required parking
and/or queuing lanes will push the boundaries of the port
beyond current limits and could potentially trigger NEPA
studies. Changes to historic ports require consultation and
approval from State Historical Preservation Offices.
5. Many LPOE are old, with antiquated infrastructure and
limited capacity to take on increased demands for internal
power and support systems. These ports can also be very
isolated, with the nearest city 30--40 miles away or more.
Developing new infrastructure is costly and must be coordinated
with limited construction seasons.
Questions from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
Responses from Richard Stana
Question 1.: What benefits may be derived from placing US-VISIT
within a mission-focused agency, such as Customs and Border Protection?
Response: US-VISIT is intended to enhance the security of our
citizens and visitors and to ensure the integrity of the U.S.
immigration system while facilitating legitimate trade and travel and
protecting individuals( privacy. To achieve these goals, US-VISIT is to
record selected travelers( entry and exit to and from the United States
at over 300 ports of entry (POEs) around the country, verify their
identity, and determine their compliance with the terms of their
admission and stay. Within these goals, US-VISIT has identified seven
capabilities that it considers critical for meeting the missions of its
customers: identify a person; assess risk and eligibility; record
entry, exit, and status; take law enforcement actions; communicate with
external entities; manage knowledge, information, and intelligence; and
manage the immigration and border management enterprise.
Currently, US-VISIT is placed within the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD), along with other components that have a
cross-agency coordination and communication role. This placement could
facilitate US-VISIT(s ability to perform its identity management and
communication/coordination capabilities across the department. On the
other hand, placing US-VISIT in a mission-focused agency like U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) could better position US-VISIT to
focus on completing the design and implementation of a statutorily
mandated, comprehensive, biometric entry/exit system. Because CBP, US-
VISIT, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have
substantial immigration enforcement roles, this would also enhance
accountability and the development and application of common
performance measures. This is not to say that maintaining focus on
completing the entry/exit system could not be done from NPPD. Rather,
establishing program management linkages and organizational crosswalks
for the entry/exit capability within CBP could be easier than
establishing them from a non-mission-oriented agency. However, it is
also fair to say that establishing program management linkages and
organizational crosswalks from CBP to other DHS components for the
identity management capabilities could also be challenging, although
such linkages and crosswalks have been built between ICE(s Law
Enforcement Support Center and CBP and the FBI, among other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Question 2.: Do you have any concerns about the Department's new
emphasis on US-VISIT's ``identity management'' functions?
Response: According to US-VISIT, the movement toward an identity
management capability includes recording an identity for an individual;
connecting that identity to available and appropriate information about
an individual's criminal history, immigration history and status; and
verifying the individual's identity at each subsequent interaction.
These capabilities are important and have merit. It is too early to
tell what impact US-VISIT's focus on identity management will have on
developing and implementing a biometric exit capability. A concern
would emerge if the focus on identity management drew substantial
attention and resources away from that endeavor. Moreover, having a
biometric exit capability is important to fully developing an effective
identity management function, because recording when an individual left
the country is a key piece of information needed to determine an
individual's status and whereabouts.
Question 3.: What type of challenges does the US-VISIT program face
operating in a context that is not defined by the comprehensive
strategic plan required under section 7208 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004?
Response: In March 2007, US-VISIT issued its ``Comprehensive
Strategic Plan for US-VISIT'' which includes a ``review of US-VISIT's
status and US-VISIT's strategic plan.'' The plan discusses section 7208
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which
calls for a report to the Congress on how DHS was to fully implement a
biometric entry/exit program. US-VISIT's plan describes the previously
discussed seven capabilities that it considers critical for meeting the
missions of its customers (i.e. identify a person; assess risk and
eligibility; and record entry, exit, and status), the general
strategies for delivering these capabilities, some of the benefits to
be derived, and expected outcomes for each of the seven capabilities.
However, the plan does not describe expected costs or timeframes for
implementing the seven capabilities, nor does it show how US-VISIT
intends to measure results. Furthermore, the plan is not clear on DHS's
plans for implementing the statutory requirement for a biometric exit
capability and it remains unclear how US-VISIT will work in combination
with other border security initiatives, such as the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative and the Secure Border Initiative. Absent this
information, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to
prioritize and allocate program resources, and DHS faces substantial
risk that US-VISIT will not align or operate with other border security
initiatives and thus not cost-effectively meet mission needs.
Question 4.: What type of management controls and coordination
efforts should the National Protection and Programs Directorate
implement to ensure proper oversight of the US-VISIT program and
linkage with stakeholders?
Response: The management controls to ensure proper oversight of the
US-VISIT program and linkages with stakeholders would be needed
regardless of where US-VISIT is placed. Some needed controls are
already in place, but others were identified in the various reports we
have issued over the last 4 years.\1\ Given that US-VISIT has been
placed in NPPD, it is important that NPPD managers and US-VISIT
officials reach a mutual understanding about organizational roles and
responsibilities, performance expectations, and accountability
mechanisms for US-VISIT. In addition, US-VISIT officials would need to
work with key stakeholders to establish and maintain a positive control
environment that provides a framework for planning, directing, and
controlling operations to achieve NPPD and US-VISIT objectives;
employing ways to identify, analyze, and articulate the risks
associated with achieving those objectives; having control activities
(policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms) that are designed to
ensure that management directives are carried out; having relevant,
reliable, and timely communications to ensure that information flows
down, across, and up the organization, as well as across the spectrum
of US-VISIT's customers and external stakeholders that support the US-
VISIT program; and monitoring to ensure the quality of US-VISIT's
performance over time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Information Technology: Homeland Security Needs to Improve
Entry Exit System Expenditure Planning, GAO-03-563 (Washington, D.C.:
June 9, 2003); GAO, Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and
Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed, GAO-03-1083
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003); GAO, Homeland Security: First Phase
of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements
Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004); GAO, Homeland
Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program, GAO-05-202
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005); GAO, Homeland Security: Contract
Management and Oversight for Visitor and Immigration Status Program
Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-404 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006);
GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational,
and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248
(Washington, D.C., December 6, 2006); GAO, Homeland Security: Planned
Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be
Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278; (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
14, 2007); GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-378T (Washington, D.C.; January 31, 2007), and GAO, Homeland
Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and Longstanding
Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed GAO-07-499T
(Washington, D.C.; February 16, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding US-VISIT's performance, it is particularly important that
NPPD and US-VISIT define and measure progress against program
commitments and hold themselves accountable for program results. In our
past work, we have reported that US-VISIT has yet to fully establish
performance and accountability mechanisms to ensure that problems and
shortfalls can be addressed in a timely fashion and so that responsible
parties can be held accountable.
Question 5.: What are the advantages and disadvantages of imposing
statutory deadlines on the Department for implementing biometric exit
capabilities at land, air, and sea ports of entry?
Response: Imposing statutory deadlines would underscore the
importance that Congress places on implementing workable biometric exit
capabilities at the various ports of entry and may prompt the
Department to devote additional attention and resources toward that
end. In deciding whether to impose a statutory deadline for
implementing a biometric exit capability at the ports, one would have
to consider existing technology and resource constraints. For example,
US-VISIT(s pilot testing showed that deploying an exit capability at
air and sea ports of entry was feasible, so a statutory deadline could
prompt action that would result in a workable system at those ports in
the near future. On the other hand, the pilot tests at the land ports
of entry showed that the technology currently available would not
effectively support a biometric exit capability without substantial
investments in port infrastructure. Imposing a statutory deadline would
not likely speed the development of new technology, and could result in
the Department investing in infrastructure to mirror the current entry
process when less intrusive options may be forthcoming. A concrete
plan, with expected costs and milestones, for identifying and testing
various options in the land port environment might better facilitate
the eventual deployment of a workable and less costly biometric exit
capability.
Question 6.: Given the detailed reviews your office has performed
on US-VISIT and other Department initiatives, is it fair to
characterize US-VISIT as one of the ``great successes of the
Department,'' as some have done? If not, what more needs to be
accomplished?
Response: Since 2003, we have issued several reports and testified
several times on the US-VISIT program, and these have identified
fundamental challenges that DHS continues to face in meeting program
expectations (i.e. delivering program capabilities and benefits on time
and within cost).\2\ We continue to believe that the program carries an
appreciable level of risk and must be managed effectively if it is to
be successful. DHS has made considerable progress implementing entry
capability at most ports of entry and has begun to work to move from 2
to 10 fingerprint biometric capabilities and expand information sharing
among stakeholders. However, a biometric exit capability is not
currently available and developing and deploying this capability,
particularly at land POEs, remains a sizable challenge. In addition,
DHS continues to face longstanding management challenges and future
uncertainties. For example, DHS has launched other major security
programs, such as the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) and the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative without defining the relationship between
US-VISIT and these programs. Furthermore, DHS has not implemented key
acquisition and management controls needed to ensure that DHS(s
investment in US-VISIT is economically justified and adequately
managed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-03-563; GAO-03-1083; GAO-04-586, GAO-05-202, GAO-06-404;
GAO-07-248; GAO-07-278; GAO-07-378T and GAO-07-499T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions from Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
Responses from Hon. Richard Robert Zitz
Question 1.: What border security capabilities and expertise does
the newly established National Protection and Programs Directorate
(NPPD) contain?
Response: Of the NPPD components, the US-VISIT Program provides the
most direct expertise on the screening of individuals at our physical
borders and throughout the immigration management enterprise. These
information services support other DHS components that have a
responsibility towards border security.
Question 2.: What is the mission of NPPD and how it is consistent
with the border screening functions and core goals of US-VISIT?
Response: NPPD supports several of the Department's key goals, such
as protecting our nation from dangerous people, protect our nation from
dangerous goods, protect critical infrastructure, and building a
culture of preparedness.
The NPPD promotes the sharing and integration of information by
different components, both of which are central to the Department's
long-term strategy for developing a unified immigration and border
management enterprise. US-VISIT's services supports three of the NPPD's
critical missions:
Fostering stronger and better integrated national
approaches among key strategic homeland security activities;
Protecting the Nation's critical infrastructure, both
physical and virtual; and
Enhancing the security of our citizens and visitors by
facilitating legitimate travel with appropriate safeguards.
Question 3.: With respect to the inclusion of US-VISIT within NPPD,
what steps is NPPD taking to ensure an expeditious transition?
Response: Prior to April 1st, the NPPD, US-VISIT, and the Resource
Management Transformation Office (RMTO) coordinated to ensure that the
US-VISIT Director reported to the Under Secretary for the NPPD on March
31, 2007. However, informal NPPD support had been provided to US-VISIT
as a precursor to the formal transition. This helped US-VISIT resolve
several long-standing issues. As of March 31st, Director Robert Mocny
reports directly to the Under Secretary and attends a weekly Key
Component meeting with the latter and other NPPD Directors and
Assistant Secretaries. In addition, Director Mocny meets separately
with the Under Secretary to discuss critical issues for US-VISIT.
The next phase of the US-VISIT transition into the NPPD will
utilize working groups to develop information sharing and coordination
agreements. In order to ensure that this takes place in a coordinated
manner, the NPPD and US-VISIT leadership--are developing an overall
intent and approach to this process before these working group
sessions--begin. The Under Secretary is committed to developing a
written approach and intent agreement for the transition, and
appointing an NPPD transition lead to work with the US-VISIT transition
lead.
Question 4.: How will US-VISIT be linked to internal and external
stakeholders, and will all stakeholders have equal access to data
contained in the system?
Response: US-VISIT's move into the NPPD will not negatively impact
the program's ability to share information with stakeholders. All
current information technology connections and information sharing
agreements which US-VISIT has with other U.S. Government agencies will
still be in operation after the move into the NPPD.
Question 5.: What type of management controls and communication
efforts will NPPD implement to meet the needs of Customs and Border
Protection inspectors and ensure proper oversight of US-VISIT's
operational context?
Response: Coordination between U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and US-VISIT has existed since the latter's creation in 2003, and
the Department anticipates the current level of management controls and
communication to continue. For example, CBP is a member of the
Integrated Project Team, which helps govern US-VISIT. Additionally, CBP
has on-site staff assigned to US-VISIT to assist with day-to-day
activities.
Question 6.: How are the cross-cutting features of US-VISIT
different from the Department's other broad systems, such as CBP's
Automated Targeting System and ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center,
which provide law enforcement support to internal and external
stakeholders but are housed within mission-specific agencies?
Response: The Automated Targeting System (ATS) is housed within CBP
because it primarily addresses screening issues at the ports of entry
where CBP operates. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) is housed
within ICE because it primary addresses interior enforcement issues.
US-VISIT, on the other hand, supports multiple agencies with different
missions including CPB, ICE, USCIS, TSA, and USCG, as well as the
Departments of State and Justice, in a variety of environments (e.g.,
at ports of entry, consulates abroad).
Question 7.: Are there any challenges that the US-VISIT system
might face operating under ``Acting'' management and leadership within
the NPPD? If so, what types?
Response: Prior to April 1st, the NPPD, US-VISIT, and the Resource
Management Transformation Office (RMTO) coordinated to ensure that the
US-VISIT Director reported to the NPPD Under Secretary for the NPPD on
March 31, 2007. Beginning March 31st, Mr. Robert Mocny, the Acting
Director, reported directly to the Under Secretary. On April 2, 2007,
Mr. Mocny was named the permanent Director of US-VISIT. He attends a
weekly Key Component meeting with the Under Secretary and other NPPD
Directors and Assistant Secretaries. In addition, Director Mocny meets
separately with the Under Secretary to discuss critical issues for US-
VISIT. Currently, DHS leadership is working diligently to name the
other permanent members of the US-VISIT leadership team.
The next phase of the US-VISIT transition into the NPPD will
utilize working groups to develop information sharing and coordination
agreements. To ensure that this takes place in a coordinated manner,
the NPPD and US-VISIT leadership are developing an agreement on the
overall intent and approach for this process before these working group
sessions begin. The Under Secretary is committed to developing a
written approach and intent agreement for the transition, and
appointing an NPPD transition lead to work with the US-VISIT transition
lead.