[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DISASTER DECLARATIONS: WHERE IS FEMA IN A TIME OF NEED?
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FULL HEARING
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-17
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
VACANCY
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Todd Gee, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 1
The Honorable Marion Berry, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arkansas.............................................. 22
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 21
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Pennsylavnia................................. 26
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 24
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolian.................................... 29
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 31
The Honorable Mike Ross, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arkansas.............................................. 1
Witnesses
Mr. Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama Emergency Management Agency
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorable Mike Beebe, Governor, State of Arkansas:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Admiral Harvey Johnson, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
For the Record
Prepared Statements:
The Honorable Kevin McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California...................................... 32
Mr. William ``Graig'' Fugate, Director, Florida Division of
Emergency Management......................................... 33
Additional Questions and Responses:
Responses From Adm. Harvey Johnson............................. 38
DISASTER DECLARATIONS: WHERE IS FEMA IN A TIME OF NEED?
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Thursday, March 15, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:29 p.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie Thompson
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee,
Christensen, Etheridge, Cuellar, Carney, Dent, and Bilirakis.
Also present: Representatives Berry, Ross and Mica.
Chairman Thompson. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on
FEMA's disaster declaration process and particularly the
application to recent disasters.
The chair would like to acknowledge that two members will
be here who are not on the full committee. Mr. Ross and Mr.
Mica would like to participate in the hearing for today.
Consistent with the rules and practices of the committee, we
were pleased to honor their requests.
I ask unanimous consent to allow Representatives Ross and
Mica to sit and question the witnesses at today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I understand, Governor, you have an event that you
absolutely positively have to be there, and we want to
accommodate you. We are going to abbreviate my remarks for this
hearing in order to facilitate an opportunity for you to go
forward.
All of you had experience in disasters, and you bring a
unique perspective to this body.
I would like to defer to Mr. Ross at this time to introduce
his governor to the panel in order for him to present his
testimony.
Mr. Ross?
Mr. Ross. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing
today.
At my request, thank you for the opportunity to sit here on
the panel with the members of the Homeland Security Committee
today.
I want to begin by apologizing to my governor, who, as we
all know, we thought the hearing was going to begin a 1 p.m. He
has an event he has to get back to Arkansas for, so he is going
to have to leave rather quickly.
But the good news is he was here on time and has been
patiently waiting for all of us to get back from votes. I want
to thank him for his patience and indulgence and for being here
with us today.
Mike Beebe is the new governor of the state of Arkansas. He
is a former colleague of mine in the Arkansas State Senate,
where he was a great friend and mentor during our 10 years
together. Governor Beebe has quickly become known as a common-
sense, no-nonsense, bipartisan governor.
I am pleased Governor Beebe has come to Washington today,
specifically made this trip to share his recent experience
working with FEMA, or attempting to work with FEMA.
I want to thank again this committee and you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this hearing and for inviting our governor to be
here today to share his recent experiences with us.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Our other two witnesses are Admiral Harvey Johnson, who is
the deputy director and chief operating officer for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Our third witness is Mr. Bruce
Baughman, who is director of the Alabama Emergency Management
Agency.
We would like to welcome you two gentlemen also.
Governor, if you could summarize your testimony for 5
minutes, we will now start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE BEEBE, GOVERNOR, STATE OF ARKANSAS
Governor Beebe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the
severe weather and tornadoes that recently struck Arkansas, and
the resulting federal response.
On February 24, our people in South Arkansas faced a
natural disaster in the form of severe storms, accompanied by
heavy rainfall, high winds, including the touchdown of an F3
tornado into Desha County. Within hours following the disaster,
I had my own staff on the ground, along with emergency
responders, state police, National Guard troops, officials of
the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, Arkansas Game
and Fish officers, Arkansas Forestry Commission personnel and
equipment, and the Arkansas Department of Corrections.
The day after the tornado, 800 Arkansans in a community of
5,000 woke up without their jobs. The Arkansas Department of
Workforce Services already knows of 450 affected individuals,
and expects a total of approximately 500 to be out of work for
extended time, roughly 10 percent of the total population in
Dumas.
On February 25, my administration set up the State
Emergency Operations Center in response to damages and
resources requested in the Dumas area. On Tuesday, February 27,
I requested federal aid including direct federal assistance,
housing assistance, and low-interest loans. I made this request
of President Bush in a letter addressed to William Peterson,
Region VI FEMA Director.
After my initial FEMA request, I spoke briefly with two
FEMA officials about the damage report. It wasn't until
Thursday, March 8 that I received an official comment from the
department. That was 10 days after the initial request and 13
days after the tornadoes destroyed Dumas.
While waiting for a response from FEMA, my administration
was receiving mixed messages through the media about our
disaster request. There were quotes from anonymous FEMA
officials stating that we were not going to receive federal
assistance due to our current state budget surplus. When we
received the letter from David Paulison denying our request for
assistance, the Bush administration made an offer of 30 FEMA
trailers from the Hope Airport.
On Friday, March 9, we were informed that we were being
given 23 mobile homes and 7 travel trailers. It was made clear
that we could get more if needed. We subsequently did,
receiving an additional nine travel trailers and one mobile
home. However, no offer of assistance in moving those trailers
or setting them up was made.
I have to thank Representative Mike Ross and our federal
delegation for their persistence and attention to this disaster
and for scheduling this hearing today to find answers to
questions that are on the minds of Arkansans. Why was Arkansas
denied federal assistance for the people of Desha County? And
what lies behind the problems of the request process?
For every home obliterated or devastatingly damaged, there
is a family who has lost everything except each other. For
every business decimated or badly damaged, there is a dream
postponed. For every day that passed without federal response,
there was a trust betrayed.
To simplify the request process, we have some suggestions:
implement a better system for timely response for disaster
declarations from FEMA; clarify the requirements for federal
aid under Title 44, Chapter 206, Section 38 Individual
Assistance; provide a greater understanding of the subjective
factors to be considered and how they are evaluated in making
the decision for an emergency declaration; talk directly to
state officials instead of through anonymous sources in the
media; make FEMA surplus trailers available for emergency
housing, but separate that process from the emergency
declaration so that that request can be considered concurrently
in a more timely manner to better serve those impacted by a
natural disaster and in need of temporary housing; and provide
support for the transportation and setup of FEMA surplus
trailers, rather than just unlocking the gate for them to be
picked up.
The last thing, Mr. Chairman, I want to say in this regard
is I think consistent with the whole FEMA philosophy and the
whole FEMA espoused and stated policy, and that is don't punish
a state, don't punish a community for helping themselves. Don't
punish people who have a good plan in place to take care of
themselves. We don't expect FEMA to solve all our problems. We
don't expect the federal government to solve our problems. We
will take care of Arkansans one way or the other, whether we
get any federal help or whether we don't get any federal help.
But it is so much easier and quicker and better and more
thorough if we can be a partner with the federal government and
obtain that assistance. We didn't ask for a full-fledged
disaster declaration. We merely asked for the emergency
declaration. We do have resources which have been on the ground
and which are continuing to be on the ground to address this
issue.
We think FEMA and the federal government should count that
against us and take that into consideration, and subtract any
assistance that FEMA would give, taking into consideration what
we are able to do. But it sends the wrong message if, indeed,
the federal government wants the states to put a plan together
to help themselves and take their share of the responsibility,
it sends the message that if you do that, we are not going to
help you at all. So it is counterproductive.
You will have, not us, I am sure, but some people less
energized to try to take care of themselves. I repeat, Mr.
Chairman, as long as Arkansans have got one hand to lend to
another, we will take care of ourselves, and we are right now,
but we would like to have had some help.
[The statement of Governor Beebe follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Mike Beebe, Governor, State of
Arkansas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am grateful
for the opportunity to discuss the severe weather and tornadoes that
recently struck Arkansas and the resulting federal response.
All Arkansans owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to Congressman
Mike Ross, Senators Mark Pryor and Blanche Lincoln, and all the State's
federal delegation for their work to support and help rebuild the
communities affected by the recent storms.
Obtaining help for our citizens in need certainly has not been a
partisan effort, but it has, instead, been an Arkansas effort, one on
behalf of the people of our State.
But let me be clear, even without the support of the President for
an Emergency Declaration and without the support of FEMA, we did not
wait before taking action. In my State, as long as an Arkansan has one
good hand to extend, we will take care of our own.
On February 24, 2007, severe storms, including heavy rainfall and
high winds, struck the South Arkansas counties of Bradley, Desha, Drew,
and Union. As part of that weather system, an F3 tornado touched down
in Desha County, leaving lives, homes, and businesses in shambles.
While we were fortunate that no deaths resulted directly from the
severe weather, there was enormous damage to the communities affected,
to homes, businesses, and the lives of our people were terribly
disrupted:
Desha County, worst hit by the tornadoes, had 27
people injured, including two hospitalized in critical
condition;
Bradley County reported six injuries, including one
life-threatening injury; and
In Union County, three individuals were transported to
the hospital with minor injuries.
Two highways, one in Dumas and one from Dumas to DeWitt, were
temporarily shut down and traffic rerouted. On Tuesday, February 27th,
Highway 65 was reopened.
A power substation was also destroyed in Dumas. A total of 2,800
customers were without power. As of March 1, 90 percent of the power
had been restored.
While this data describes major inconveniences, it says nothing of
the long-term physical destruction Arkansans are dealing with. The
residential damage in South Arkansas was expansive:
Ashley County reported minor damage to only one home
in North Crossett;
Bradley County saw five homes suffer damage;
Drew County had two houses damaged;
Union County reported that 10 homes were damaged; and
Desha County lost a total of 37 homes, including 17
mobile homes that were completely destroyed. Another 25 homes
sustained major damage, and minor damage was inflicted on
upwards of roughly 60 homes.
The storms and tornadoes devastated many Desha County public
facilities, including:
The City Park;
Baseball fields;
The Community Building; and
Twenty assisted-living units.
In addition, a school building in Reed, Arkansas, must be repaired
following major roof damage.The severe weather and tornadoes wreaked
havoc on the businesses of Desha County:
Multiple businesses in downtown Dumas were destroyed,
a total of 25; and
Nine businesses suffered major damage with more
sustaining at least some destruction.
Of the communities impacted, Dumas sustained the greatest economic
devastation.
Dumas Mayor Marion Gill has reported an approximate loss of
$775,000 from this disaster. That figure includes:
Clean-up and landfill costs;
Rental of 11 electric generators;
Traffic light restoration;
Overtime for city employees;
Hiring of extra part-time employees;
Fuel costs;
Loss in real-estate taxes; and
Destruction of the Community Center, previously
hosting 40 community events per month.
The impact on jobs for a community of 5,000 is staggering.
The largest single private employer in Dumas, Federal-
Mogul
Corporation, employing 275 people, was severely damaged;
Akin Industries Inc., employing 175 people, was
severely damaged;
Arkat Nutrition, employing 120 people, was severely
damaged.
The day after the tornado, 800 Arkansans in a community of 5,000
woke up without their jobs. The Arkansas Department of Workforce
Services has, so far, counted 450 affected individuals and expects that
a total of approximately 500 previously employed workers will be out of
work for an extended time; this is roughly 10 percent of the Dumas
population.
As hard as all of this is to bear, none of it can even begin to
describe the toll on human lives. For every home obliterated or
devastatingly damaged, there is a family who has lost everything except
each other. For every business decimated or badly damaged, there is a
dream postponed. For every day that passed without federal response,
there was a trust betrayed.
Given the magnitude of devastation, I immediately declared Desha,
Drew, and Union Counties state disaster areas on Monday, February 26,
2007. On Wednesday, February 28, 2007, I added Bradley County to that
list, as more damage there became apparent. Within hours following the
disaster, I had my own staff on the ground, along with emergency
responders, State Police, National Guard Troops, officials of the
Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, Arkansas Game and Fish
Commission, Arkansas Forestry Commission, and the Arkansas Department
of Correction. As a result, I authorized more than $200,000 from the
Governor's Disaster Fund to help those in the afflicted areas.
On February 24, 2007, the afternoon of the storms, my
administration set up the State Emergency Operations Center in response
to damages and resources requested in the Dumas area of Desha County.
Area coordinators were dispatched to the affected area to coordinate
responses and provide technical advice.
The greatest impact was seen in neighbor helping neighbor.
Communities came together as churches became shelters and the Salvation
Army and other groups began to serve hot meals to those in need.
And amidst all of this, we were hoping for aid from FEMA. On
Tuesday, February 27, the third day after the storm, I requested
federal aid in the form of an Emergency Declaration, including direct
federal assistance, housing assistance, and low-interest loans. I made
this request of President Bush in a letter addressed to William
Peterson, Region VI FEMA Director.
When Arkansas has had disasters in the past, we have always
attempted to use all of our own state resources to try to address our
people's needs. Here is a list of the most recent State Disasters that
we have dealt with, without requesting FEMA's assistance:
DR 06-23 (8/14/06): Conway County ADEM Disbursed: $1758.00
DHHS--IFG Program: $50,977.31
DR 06-26 (9/22/06): Clay, Fulton, Lawrence, Sharp, and
Randolph: ADEM Disbursed: $4,248.00 DHHS--IFG Program:
$418,160.76
DR 07-01 (1/13/07): Benton, Jackson, and Pope Counties ADEM
Dispersed: $12,042.50 DHHS-IFG Program: $116,556.50
DR 07-11 (2/24/07): Bradley, Desha, Drew, Union Counties ADEM
Dispersed: $7489.00 DHHS--IFG Program: $5,392.00
After my initial FEMA request, I met with two FEMA officials, FEMA
Region VI Director William (Bill) Peterson and Deputy Director Gary
Jones, in a regularly scheduled meeting, about the damage reports. It
was not until Thursday, March 8, 2007, that I received an official
comment from the Department. That was ten days after the initial
request and thirteen days after the tornadoes destroyed Dumas.
On February 25, 2007, two FEMA officials and one SBA official were
on the ground in Dumas performing a Preliminary Damage Assessment
(PDA). Over the next few days, there were several follow-up
conversations with FEMA officials about details surrounding the request
and possible declaration.
Following the February 25, 2007 PDA, Arkansas Department of
Emergency Management officials spoke to Response and Recovery Branch
Chief Tony Robinson and FEMA Logistics Officer Wayne Fairly about the
details of the PDA and the status of our declaration. David Maxwell,
the Arkansas Division of Emergency Management Director, spoke with
Region VI Deputy Director Gary Jones and Region VI Director William
Peterson on March 5 and 6, 2007, about the request for a declaration.
Maxwell also spoke with FEMA Director David Paulison on March 7 and 8,
2007, regarding the request for a declaration.
While waiting for a response from FEMA, my administration was
receiving mixed messages through the media about our disaster request.
There were quotes from anonymous FEMA official expressing that we were
not going to receive federal assistance due to our current state budget
surplus. The anonymous official suggested that we should pay for all of
the damage with our surplus. I don't think it is right that Arkansas
should be punished for balancing a budget better than the federal
government has, especially when Georgia and Alabama are also running a
budget surplus and have received federal help for natural disasters
that occurred at a similar time.
There were other reports claiming that we would not receive
assistance due to the percentage of damage that was privately insured.
This was all being reported by the media, without attribution, as
actual discussions with FEMA officials before we had ever received
final confirmation of our request status.
On March 8, 2007, we received the letter from David Paulison
denying our request for assistance. FEMA soon made a formal proposal of
30 FEMA trailers from the Hope Airport. On Friday March 9, 2007, in a
9:30 a.m. (CST) conference call, we were informed that we were being
given 23 mobile homes and seven travel trailers. It was made clear that
we could get more if needed (we subsequently did, receiving an
additional nine travel trailers and one mobile home). Arkansas
Department of Emergency Management staff in Hope and FEMA staff have
been working cooperatively to make this an efficient and timely
process. However, because our State did not receive a disaster
declaration, we were left with all the financial and logistical
responsibilities of moving, setting up, and supporting the trailers.
On Saturday morning, March 10, a private Arkansas transit firm
began moving the trailers from the Hope Municipal Airport to Dumas at a
discounted rate for the State. Though our disaster was devastating to
our citizens, we would be left to bear the costs associated with any
good will that FEMA was finally offering to assist our citizens.
In the aftermath of these storms, the citizens in the communities
of Dumas and Backgate needed housing assistance, disaster capital, and
other direct federal assistance. FEMA stated in their denial letter
that,
``Based on our review of all of the information
available, it has been determined that the damage to
the private sector was not of such severity and
magnitude as to be beyond the capabilities of the State
and affected local governments. Furthermore, we have
determined that supplemental Federal assistance is not
necessary. Therefore, I must inform you that your
request for an emergency declaration is denied.''
The dozens of Arkansans whose homes and businesses were destroyed
would disagree with FEMA, I believe. I think those individuals whose
businesses and homes were wiped out would believe the ``damage'' was
``of such severity and magnitude'' as to warrant help. I would agree
with them.
Arkansans help pay for FEMA disaster relief. We all hope that our
tax dollars were among the FEMA assistance funds that went to tornado
victims in Alabama and Georgia, because people throughout our State
feel empathy for those who saw their lives torn apart by storms. We
only regret that FEMA declined to respond in a similar way in Arkansas,
but instead waited 12 days after a disaster to tell us no help would be
coming, based on reasoning that defies common sense.
Thankfully, recognizing the level of disaster in our state, the
Small Business Administration granted my request for disaster loans for
the people of Arkansas. These low-interest, long-term loans will help
individuals and families rebuild their homes and businesses. For that,
our State is grateful.
While we are aware of certain criteria, in Title 44, Chapter 206,
Section 38, for individual and public assistance, there is allowed a
great deal of subjectivity in that criteria. And, it remains unsaid and
unclear exactly what in that subjectivity prevented Arkansas from
warranting a federal declaration. How many homes and businesses must be
destroyed? How many lives must be put on hold by disaster before FEMA
decides to provide the emergency help our tax dollars pay for?
Arkansas's federal delegation has been resolute and steadfast
during this disaster, providing their support and a unified voice for
the residents of Desha County. I must again thank Representative Mike
Ross for his perseverance and attention to this disaster and for
scheduling this hearing today to get answers to questions that are on
the minds of all Arkansans: What exactly can states and local
communities expect from the new and improved FEMA and is there not a
better way of doing things?
To simplify the disaster declaration and request process,
refinements must be made to ensure that the process is fair and
reasonable for all states that are impacted by disasters. Some of the
suggestions that the State of Arkansas puts forward for Congressional
consideration include:
Implement a better system for timely response for disaster
declarations from FEMA;
Clarify the requirements for federal aid under Title 44,
Chapter 206, Section 38, Individual Assistance;
Provide a greater understanding of the subjective factors to
be considered and how they are evaluated in making the decision
for an emergency declaration;
Talk directly to state officials instead of through anonymous
sources to the media;
Make FEMA's surplus trailers available for emergency housing,
but separating that process from Emergency Declarations, so the
request can be considered concurrently and in a more timely
manner to better serve those impacted by a natural disaster and
in need of temporary housing; and
Provide support for the transportation and set-up of FEMA
surplus trailers, rather than just unlocking the gate for them
to be picked up.
I have provided this testimony in hopes that it will help in
finding a better resolution for the next state or community to face a
disaster. Although Arkansas has the right to appeal the decision to
deny our emergency declaration, our acceptance of disaster loans from
the Small Business Administration will pre-empt that. Our people need
the help now, not after an appeal process, and I decided on Monday,
March 12, 2007, to accept the requested SBA loans as soon as they were
offered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share Arkansas's
experiences in working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. My
State is a State of action and inclusion, and as I said at the
beginning of my testimony, as long as one Arkansan has a hand to extend
to another, we will take care of our own. I appreciate your attention
to this important issue. With Congress focused on the transition of
preparedness functions back to FEMA by March 31, 2007, I hope that the
disaster declaration and relief process will be a significant issue for
your oversight of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act. As we move forward
to recover from our recent disaster, I ask that you keep the people of
Dumas, who have suffered so much and lost so much, in your thoughts and
prayers.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Governor, for your
testimony.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to allow Congressman
Berry from Arkansas to join the Homeland Security Committee
here. Without objection.
Admiral Johnson, will you begin your testimony please?
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL HARVEY JOHNSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Johnson. Mr. Chairman, before I address the primary
purpose of the hearing today, I would like to speak to an event
that is important to you and other members of the committee.
That event will also address concerns that you raised with
Secretary Chertoff on Tuesday. That event, Mr. Chairman, is the
closure of FEMA's Bonner and Albin trailer park in Hammond,
Louisiana and the rapid relocation of its 54 families to other
FEMA trailer sites during a very short period of time.
FEMA takes most seriously our responsibilities for the
welfare of individuals, especially those individuals for whom
we provide housing assistance. Embracing these
responsibilities, FEMA leadership in the Gulf Coast Recovery
Office determined that the situation at the trailer park was
detrimental to the health and welfare of those residents, with
many children and many of those were in fragile health.
In the past 5 months, electricity has been shut off across
the entire park or parts of the park on three separate
occasions. This has been a concern to the residents,
particularly to two who are on required oxygen. Even more
disturbing, the park has seen recurring incidents of a leaky
sewage system, with many reports of standing fetid water
accompanied by, as the residents refer, unbearable stench.
This is a situation that FEMA brought to the attention of
the State Department of Health and Hospitals, who are likewise
concerned about the implications for the health and safety of
those residents. On multiple occasions, FEMA engaged in
specific discussions with the trailer park owner-operator in
order to seek resolution of these problems. Nevertheless,
despite indications that corrective action would be taken, the
problems persist.
As a result, FEMA has no reasonable expectation that the
threat to the health and safety of the park's residents would
improve. So FEMA could the only course of action that was
reasonably possible. The situation is considered so intolerable
to the residents that they were relocated to nearby trailer
sites.
Contrary to media reports, all residents were provided an
opportunity to identify a preferred location, and the vast
majority were very grateful to be relocated. FEMA provided on-
site supervision of the moving process and the residents were
provided assistance to help them in the move. No one was
evicted and no one was forced to look for alternative housing.
While the decision to relocate was unequivocally the right
one, I regret that the residents were given insufficient
advance notice and that the majority of the relocation was
completed in less than 48 hours. This proved to be unsettling
to a number of the residents. FEMA's intentions were good and
the action was initiated by genuine concern and compassion for
the health and welfare of the residents.
However, the level of communication and consultation should
have been better. We want FEMA to be characterized by its
concern and compassion for the disaster victims who we are
charged to serve, not by the kind of inadequate communications
and consultation that was revealed by this incident.
The distinction has been made clear to FEMA leadership on-
site. Mr. Chairman, you will not see this incident repeated.
Rather, you will see a FEMA that is not only concerned with
addressing the needs of housing residents, but it is also ready
to demonstrate and communicate that concern both in our actions
on the ground every day.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to begin
to address the issue that is the purpose of this hearing.
You have heard Director Paulison describe new FEMA as an
organization that aspires to become the nation's premier
emergency management and preparedness agency. Drawing on the
lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, we want to be a more
agile and responsive partner to the states by leaning further
forward to deliver assistance more effectively.
One of the ways we demonstrate progress in our journey to
achieve David Paulison's vision for new FEMA is through the
declaration process. I would like to describe that process
briefly. There are four elements of the process. There is the
request, the threshold, the scope, and the review that leads to
a recommendation and a decision.
The request, in providing either a president's declaration
of emergency or a presidential declaration of major disaster,
or a denial, either outcome is in response to a request from
the governor of the state. And such a request is required to be
a formal one, written in a manner that contains prescribed
information. The request is normally preceded by joint state
and federal preliminary damage assessments, which are designed
to qualitatively determine the impact and magnitude of damage.
These preliminary damage assessments are led by the state
and conducted jointly with FEMA, and typically include
representatives from the local government, the American Red
Cross, and the Small Business Administration. These are well-
practiced processes that results in data and information that
is descriptive, it is agreed to by all parties, and it is the
basis for which the governor bases his request and that FEMA
forms its review and recommendation.
The next element is the threshold. The basis for the
governor's request is that an incident has occurred, or
threatened to occur, and that it is of a magnitude beyond the
effective response capability of the state and the affected
local communities. This is an important point of distinction
because it points to the need to establish reasonable
expectations for the assistance between that provided by the
state and local government, and that provided by the federal
government for any given incident.
The next element, following the request and the threshold,
is the scope. The governor must identify the scope of
supplemental federal assistance. It could be individual
assistance. It can be public assistance or hazard mitigation,
or any or all of the three. I emphasize ``supplemental''
because it needs to consider not just the assistance from state
and local government, but also from the individual in the form
of insurance, from non-Stafford Act assistance from other
federal agencies, or the aid available from a wide array of
largely local disaster relief organizations.
The final element, Mr. Chairman, is the review. The
governor's request is submitted to the FEMA region where the
regional director and his staff analyze the preliminary damage
assessment data and summarize the findings and forward a
recommendation to the director of FEMA. When considering the
governor's request for a declaration, the president is required
to comply with the authorizing provisions of the Stafford Act.
That Act restricts the use of arithmetic formulas or sliding
scales based on income or population as a basis for determining
the need for federal supplemental aid.
As a result, FEMA uses a number of factors to determine the
severity, the magnitude and the impact of a disaster. These
factors are well known and they include things like the amount
and type of damage, the number of homes destroyed or damaged;
the impact on infrastructure in affected areas and critical
facilities; imminent threats to public health and safety; level
of insurance coverage available; and assistance available from
other sources; the number of injuries and deaths.
This list is somewhat different for each event, and each
event is and must be considered on its own merits. Rather than
any particular element, all of these are considered in their
totality. When this process leads to a presidential
declaration, we work then with the state to implement the
provisions of the Stafford Act in the geographic area that is
determined eligible for assistance, and provide the types of
assistance that have been approved.
When this process leads to the denial of a declaration or a
restriction in the area or the forms of assistance, the
governor may appeal.
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me, Mr. Johnson. You are 2
minutes over already. If you would wrap it up?
Admiral Johnson. Let me describe briefly our issue as this
process played out with Arkansas.
Chairman Thompson. Excuse me. You will have your time to
explain it.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
[The statement of Admiral Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adm. Harvey Johnson
Good morning Chairman Thompson, and members of the Committee.
I am Harvey Johnson, Deputy Director and Chief Operating Officer of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I welcome the
opportunity to appear before this committee to summarize and discuss
FEMA's emergency response and declaration process in the event of a
natural or man-made disaster. More importantly, I am glad to be given
an opportunity to describe this process as it applied to the tornadoes
that hit Arkansas.
You have heard ``New'' FEMA described as an organization that
aspires to become the nation's preeminent emergency management and
preparedness agency. Drawing on the lessons learned from the Hurricane
Katrina experience, we want to be a more agile and responsive partner
with the States by leaning further forward to deliver assistance more
effectively.
When an incident occurs, either man-made or natural, rather than
stand-by and wait for the State to be overwhelmed before offering
assistance, we want to quickly establish contact with the State Office
of Emergency Management, deploy FEMA people, and position ourselves to
rapidly meet the emerging needs of the State.
New FEMA will press forward when disasters strike, in partnership
with the State, to immediately assess the damage on the ground, to
jointly determine what gaps may need to be addressed by Federal
capabilities, and if so, how to deliver it effectively. While FEMA is
going to lean forward, it must do so within the bounds of the law and
the guidelines that exist with regard to the President's disaster
declarations.
When an event is of the magnitude or severity that it exceeds the
State and local government's ability to respond, the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5206
(Stafford Act), authorizes the Federal government, through FEMA, to
provide emergency supplemental assistance to State and local
governments to support, but not supplant, the State's role of
alleviating the suffering and damage that results from emergency or
disaster events.
The assistance provided by FEMA is supplemental in nature.
Following the onset of an event, State and local emergency services
personnel, volunteers, humanitarian organizations, and other private
interest groups are the first line of support to provide emergency
assistance to protect the public's health and safety and to meet
immediate humanitarian needs.
A governor may determine, after consulting with local government
officials, that the response or recovery may be beyond the combined
resources of both the State and local governments and that Federal
assistance may be needed. In requesting supplemental Federal assistance
under the Stafford Act, the governor must certify that the severity and
magnitude of the event exceeds State and local capabilities; that
Federal assistance is necessary to supplement the efforts and available
resources of the state and local governments, disaster relief
organizations, and compensation by insurance for disaster related
losses; confirm execution of the State's emergency plan; and certify an
intent to adhere to cost sharing requirements.
To assist a governor in determining if a request for assistance
should be made, a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) may be conducted
at the request of the State. PDA teams are comprised of personnel from
FEMA, the State's emergency management agency, county and local
officials and the U.S. Small Business Administration.
The team begins by reviewing the types of damage or emergency costs
incurred by the units of government, and the impact to critical
facilities, such as public utilities, hospitals, schools, and fire and
police departments. The teams also examine the effect on individuals
and businesses, including the number and extent of businesses and
individual households damaged, the number of people displaced, and the
threat to health and safety caused by the event. Additional data from
the Red Cross or other local voluntary agencies is also reviewed. It is
important to note that while FEMA may collect information about all
types of damage; only damage that would be eligible for FEMA assistance
may be considered in recommending a Federal disaster declaration. For
example, FEMA is not allowed to duplicate benefits provided by
insurance and only provides public assistance grants to public and
eligible private, non-profit applicants.
The information collected during the PDA can then be used by the
governor to support a declaration request for Federal assistance that
is beyond the capacity of State and local resources. This includes
showing the cost of response efforts, such as emergency personnel
overtime, other emergency services, and damage to citizens. The
information gathered during the assessment will help the governor
certify that the damage exceeds State and local resources. The
governor's request is evaluated by the FEMA Region, and forwarded to
FEMA Headquarters with a recommendation for support or denial.
When considering a governor's request for a disaster declaration,
the President is required to consider the Stafford Act, as well as its
implementing regulations. The Stafford Act restricts the use of
arithmetical formulas or a sliding scale based on income or population
as the basis for determining the need for Federal supplemental aid. As
a result, FEMA uses a number of factors to determine the severity,
magnitude, and impact of a disaster event. The Code of Federal
Regulations, Chapter 44, Part 206, specifically details the criteria
and factors that may be considered. I would like to submit for the
record the relevant portion of the CFR. While the CFR details the
criteria and factors that are considered, I would like to identify the
primary factors here, including:
Amount and type of damage (number of homes destroyed
or with major damage);
Impact on the infrastructure of affected areas or
critical facilities;
Imminent threats to public health and safety;
Impacts to essential government services and
functions;
Unique capability of Federal government;
Dispersion or concentration of damage;
Level of insurance coverage in place for homeowners
and public facilities;
Assistance available from other sources (Federal,
State, local, voluntary organizations);
State and local resource commitments from previous,
undeclared events;
Frequency of disaster events over recent time period;
The scope and magnitude of unmet needs of those
affected by the event; and
The number of injuries and deaths.
The very nature of disasters--their unique circumstances, the
unexpected timing, and varied impacts_precludes a complete listing of
factors considered when evaluating disaster declaration requests
because they are bound to be different for each event, and each event
is considered on its own merits. However, the above lists most primary
considerations. These considerations are considered in their totality
and no single factor is considered in isolation when developing a
recommendation to the President.
FEMA recognizes that all disaster events, regardless of magnitude,
can be devastating to the people and communities affected. We
sympathize with the homeowners' efforts to repair their homes and
recover from the recent tornadoes. While we do realize that there are
individuals and households in need, the Stafford Act requires a showing
that the event is beyond the capability of the State and affected local
governments to respond.
I would like to comment on the recent tornadoes in Arkansas. On
Saturday, February 24, a severe weather system that ultimately moved
across the Southeast caused at least one, and likely two, tornadoes to
touchdown in Southeast Arkansas, primarily in Desha County. FEMA
immediately dispatched a representative to the State Emergency
Operations Center. FEMA Director R. David Paulison made numerous calls
to the Governor following the severe weather. And, FEMA personnel
joined with the State the following day, February 25, to conduct
Preliminary Damage Assessments.
In response to this event, FEMA worked with the State to respond to
their desire for manufactured housing for individuals impacted by the
tornadoes. However, without a disaster declaration, FEMA has no legal
authority to simply give Federal property directly to a State.
Generally, when FEMA has excess property, it reports this property to
GSA for disposal through that agency's system.
While Congress did give FEMA broad new authorities to respond to
disasters in the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,
and there was a provision allowing for the disposal of unused housing
units, the legislation did not authorize FEMA to, ``give away housing
for the public good.''
Specifically, the provision at issue grants to FEMA the authority
to dispose of a discrete pool of unused manufactured housing, through
GSA, and requires that we work with the Department of Interior to make
these units available to Tribal governments. FEMA is in the final
stages of policy development that will define our implementation
procedures for this new authority.
FEMA does have an overabundance of operational and disposable
inventory of mobile homes and travel trailers in storage, and we are
getting more every day as eligible applicants' requirements for them
decline. We are working with GSA to dispose of many of the excess
units. It is through GSA that FEMA has made housing units available to
the State of Arkansas. On Tuesday of last week, Director R. David
Paulison contacted David Maxwell, State Emergency Manager of Arkansas,
and indicated that working through GSA, FEMA might be able to offer
housing, and inquired how many units would they need.
On Thursday, Arkansas requested 23 mobile homes and 7 travel
trailers. At that time, Director Paulison made sure to emphasize to Mr.
Maxwell that the State could have as many as they needed, which we
would make available through GSA. This agreement was in place when the
President turned down the Governor's request on Thursday. Thus, FEMA,
working through GSA, had the flexibility to meet Arkansas' request for
trailers.
Given our current inventory of travel trailers and mobile homes, we
will continue to utilize GSA as we always have to maintain our
inventory at a level in alignment with our strategic needs.
Thank you for the opportunity to explain FEMA's declaration process
and I look forward to any questions you may have.
Chairman Thompson. We will have some questions.
Mr. Baughman, will you take your 5 minutes for us please?
STATEMENT OF BRUCE BAUGHMAN, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY, STATE OF ALABAMA
Mr. Baughman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I am Bruce Baughman. I
am director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency.
A little bit about my background so you understand I know a
little bit about the declaration process. I spent 4 1/2 years
in the position I am in right now. Prior to that, I was with
the federal government for 29 years, 22 of which I was with
FEMA, and then prior to that 4 1/2 with the Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency.
I have dealt with declarations to include the Oklahoma City
bombing, the World Trade Center, and sat in on over 300
decision-making and disaster declarations. So I have been a
part of the process for the last 32 years.
Let me talk a little bit about the disaster that hit
Alabama the week before last. Two weeks ago today, tornadoes
ripped through the state of Alabama, causing 10 deaths and
damaging hundreds of homes and public buildings in a six-county
area. At 12:30 p.m., the disaster struck Miller's Ferry in
Wilcox County, killing an individual and destroying 76 homes.
Later that afternoon, at 1:47 p.m., another tornado struck
the city of Enterprise, destroying the high school, killing
eight students, destroying 716 homes, killing an elderly woman,
injuring 60 individuals. So that was the extent of damage in
Coffee County. An additional 50 homes in Henry County were
damaged.
We activated our Emergency Operations Center at 9:00 a.m.
that morning in preparation for severe weather. As soon as
reports came in, we dispatched emergency personnel to the
affected counties to assist in response and recovery efforts.
Over 350 state personnel from 12 agencies responded to the
affected area.
We activated the Alabama Mutual Aid System and dispatched
two heavy rescue teams and a disaster mortuary team to Coffee
County. These agencies assisted the stricken jurisdictions in
search and rescue, debris removal, emergency communications,
security, traffic control, and damage assessment.
That afternoon at 3 o'clock, Governor Bob Riley declared a
state of emergency. As soon as damage reports began coming in,
the FEMA regional director, Major Phillip May, was on the phone
with me asking what type of assistance was needed. The acting
director of the FEMA Transition Recovery Office in Montgomery,
Mr. Bob Ives, was dispatched to our emergency operations center
to function as the FEMA liaison.
At 7:05 p.m., I contacted FEMA Director David Paulison and
reported the extent of the damages known at the time. Director
Paulison stated to let him know what we needed from FEMA as
soon as possible. Later that evening, we requested helicopter
support for damage assessment. The next day, damage assessment
operations began. As they were being conducted, Governor Bob
Riley, State Superintendent Joe Morton, Congressman Terry
Everett and myself toured the disaster area and met with the
key city, state and county officials.
At 3:47 p.m. that same day, Governor Bob Riley requested an
expedited major disaster declaration to the president through
the regional director for Coffee, Dallas, Henry, Lowndes, and
Wilcox Counties. The request included public assistance,
individual assistance, and mitigation in the request.
On March 3 at 9:00 a.m. while the president was touring the
disaster damages in Enterprise, he announced approval of the
major disaster declaration for Coffee County for individual
assistance. A joint PDA, preliminary damage assessments
continued throughout March 3, 4, and 5 in the affected county.
On March 6, Dale, Henry, Wilcox and Coffee Counties were added
to the disaster declaration for public assistance.
In my experience, I know the disaster declaration process,
what it is and how it works, and how FEMA can respond. FEMA was
nothing short of responsive to the needs of the citizens of the
state of Alabama, and Director Paulison and his regional
director contacted me a number of times to ensure that we had
the state resources and federal resources necessary to meet the
needs of the disaster victims.
One of the first concerns I know the emergency managers had
when FEMA was absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security
was would that slow down the disaster declaration process.
Well, the process has changed a little, because of FEMA's
inclusion in the department. I do not believe that it has
resulted in any substantial delays that have impacted the state
of Alabama.
I should add this is our sixth major emergency declaration
the state has received in the last 4 years.
That concludes my testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Baughman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Baughman
MARCH 15, 2007
Good Morning Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member King. I am the
Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, a position I have
held for the last four years. Prior to that I served 24 years with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency and four and a half years with the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency. I have spent the last thirty-
two years working over a hundred Presidential disasters and emergency
declarations to include the Oklahoma City Bombing, events of 9/11, and
being involved in the decision making process on several hundred
requests for declarations. I am here to talk to you today about
Alabama's recent experiences with disaster response and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency.
On March the first of this year, tornadoes ripped through the State
of Alabama causing ten deaths and damaging hundreds of homes and public
buildings over a six county area. At 12:30 pm a tornado struck the
community of Miller's Ferry killing one individual and damaging or
destroying 76 homes. Later that afternoon at 1:47 pm another tornado
stuck the town of Enterprise in Coffee County destroying the Enterprise
High School killing eight students, damaging or destroying 716 homes,
and killing an elderly woman. Additionally, 50 homes were damaged or
destroyed in Henry County.
We activated our emergency operations center (EOC) at 9:00am on
March 1, 2007 in preparation for severe weather. As soon as reports
began to come in, we dispatched emergency personnel to the affected
counties to assist in response and recovery efforts. Over three hundred
and fifty state personnel from twelve state agencies (Alabama Emergency
Management, Department of Public Safety, Department of Forestry,
Alabama Department of Economic and Community Affairs, Department of
Environmental Management, Department of Human Resources, Alcohol and
Beverage Commission, Insurance Commission, State Fire Marshal's Office,
Department of Transportation, the National Guard and Department of
Public Health) responded to the affected area immediately. We also
activated the Alabama Mutual Aid System and dispatched two heavy rescue
teams (from Dothan and Mobile Fire and Rescue Departments) and a
Disaster Mortuary Team (from Cullman County). These agencies assisted
the stricken jurisdictions with search and rescue, debris removal,
emergency communications, security, traffic control and damage
assessment.
At 3:00 pm on March the first, Governor Bob Riley declared a State
of Emergency. As soon as the damage reports began to come in the FEMA
Regional Director (Major Phillip May) was on the phone with me asking
what type of assistance we might need. The Acting Director of the FEMA
Transitional Recovery Office in Montgomery, Alabama (Robert Ives) was
dispatched to our EOC to function as the FEMA liaison. At 7:05 pm I
contacted FEMA Director David Paulison and reported the extent of our
damages as known at that time. Director Paulison stated to let him know
what was needed from FEMA as soon as possible. Later that evening we
requested helicopter support from FEMA to assist in damage assessment.
The next day when damage assessment operations began, Governor Bob
Riley, State School Superintendent Dr. Joseph B. Morton, Congressman
Terry Everett and myself toured the damaged areas and met with key
city, county and state officials in Coffee and Wilcox counties. At 3:47
pm that same day (March 2) Governor Riley submitted a request for an
expedited Major Disaster Declaration to the President (through the FEMA
Regional Director) for Coffee, Dallas, Henry, Lowndes and Wilcox
Counties. The request included the Individual Assistance, Public
Assistance, and Mitigation Assistance programs. On March the 3rd at
9:00 am, the President while touring the damages in Enterprise
announced that he had approved the Major Disaster declaration for
Coffee County for the individual assistance program. Joint Federal and
State damage assessment continued throughout March 3, 4 and 5 in the
effected counties. On March 6, Dale, Henry, Wilcox and Coffee counties
were added to the declaration for the Public Assistance Program.
In my experience, I know how the disaster declaration process works
and how FEMA should and can respond to a disaster. FEMA has been
nothing short of responsive to the needs of the citizens of the State
of Alabama and Director Paulison has personally contacted me during
disasters to ensure that the state has the resources necessary to meet
the immediate needs of disaster victims. One of the first concerns that
emergency managers around the country had when FEMA was included in the
Department of Homeland Security was how the disaster declaration and
relief process would work. While that process has changed a little
because of FEMA's inclusion in the Department, I do not believe it has
resulted in any delays that have impacted the State of Alabama.
Attachment 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ivan Dennis Katrina
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. When disaster occurred 9/13/04 7/10/05 8/29/05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. When Governor issued 9/13/04 7/08/05 8/28/05
proclamation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. When we requested declaration 9/15/04 7/09/05 8/29/05
from FEMA
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. When it was granted 9/15/04 7/10/05 8/29/05
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Baughman.
According to the committee rules, I will begin the
questioning, but I will, in the interests of making sure we get
the governor on the record with any questions they might have,
I have one question.
Governor, you have heard Mr. Baughman talk about how much
Mr. Paulison was in contact with him during this emergency. Can
you tell us what kind of contact you or your representatives
had with FEMA during the same time?
Governor Beebe. I never talked to Mr. Paulison. I actually
did talk with two FEMA officials who happened to be for a
scheduled visit anyway. As it turned out, they were in my
office the day after we requested the federal relief.
It is my understanding that our people, including my
director of emergency management, was in constant contact,
though, with FEMA officials. They talked quite a bit. I think
there were several instances where we didn't get a couple of
calls returned from the director, but aside from that, my staff
and our emergency folks were in contact with the FEMA officials
every day.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Admiral Johnson, we have some 8,000-plus trailers in Hope,
Arkansas right now. Those are new. I think there are some used
ones, too.
Can you tell me what statute prevents situations like the
one in Dumas from getting new trailers, rather than the offer
of used trailers? And what is it that this committee can do to
facilitate freeing up any surplus property that we might have
that a chief official like the governor here might request?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, two points.
First is that the Stafford Act prevents FEMA from providing
trailers or housing units to states absent a declaration. In
this case, the declaration was denied, and so FEMA was unable
by the Stafford Act to provide the trailers at no charge to the
state.
Second is that the legislation also prevents FEMA from
giving trailers to the state, particularly absent the
declaration. And so what we did, and this is the first instance
that we have been able to do this, is we worked through GSA.
What FEMA can do is identify trailers that are in excess to our
requirement. We work through GSA to provide those from FEMA to
GSA, and then from GSA directly to Arkansas. So that is the
mechanism that we used, and it took us a while to figure that
out, and we wish we had done it sooner.
Second, sir, is that the Stafford Act also prevents us from
expending Stafford funds to transport trailers absent a
declaration. And that was a proviso that we could make those
trailers available to the state via GSA, but the state would
have to pay for transporting those trailers and installing
them.
Chairman Thompson. So your testimony is all we have to do
is modify those two provisions of the Stafford Act that would
accommodate this particular situation?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Thompson. The other thing that so many members of
Congress are having conflict is that with all those mobile
homes at Hope, Arkansas, I guess we are the largest trailer
park in America now. It would really help us if FEMA could come
to Congress and propose a way of doing away with the trailers,
because FEMA bought too many. I guess as long as those trailers
are sitting unoccupied, that is a problem. If I am not
mistaken, we are paying $25,000 a month lease on the property.
So I guess the situation is, in emergencies when people
need housing, 2 hours down the road are over 8,000 trailers.
You are told, ``Well, we can't let you have them,'' and then we
are told we will let you have a used one. That is a problem.
So I would like your assurance that you and Director
Paulison will work with us on getting rid of any of the
encumbrances that prevents you from helping chief executives
like Governor Beebe and others in times of emergency, where a
disaster is not declared, but yet still there are opportunities
where we can be helpful.
If you will work with our staff, or if you would at least
provide us with what prevents you from helping people when help
is requested, we can then go from there.
Admiral Johnson. Mr. Chairman, we would be pleased to work
with your staff on a range of issues that could address this
situation.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Now I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for conducting
this hearing.
I have an opening statement that I will submit for the
record. I would like to submit that.
[The statement of Mr. Dent follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative
in Congress From the State of Pennsylvania
While disaster assistance is not under the jurisdiction of this
Committee, we do have a strong interest in ensuring that the reforms of
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of last year are
implemented.
This legislation, also known as the FEMA reform bill, strengthened
and increased the authority for FEMA to prepare for, and respond to,
terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
The FEMA reform legislation clarified incident command structures;
required establishment of a surge capacity force; created a pre-
positioned equipment program; and an improved logistics system.
It also consolidated emergency communications, grant-making, and
other responsibilities critical to emergency preparedness and response.
This Committee has already held hearings and briefings to review
the Department's implementation of the mandated reforms, and will
continue to do so throughout the 110th Congress.
While challenges remain, FEMA has improved its response capability.
Today we have with us representatives of two States whose residents
suffered the effects of terrible tornadoes.
While both suffered the same type of disaster, the damage and
destruction was quite different _ as was the level and type of Federal
assistance.
I look forward to discussing FEMA's statutory requirements
regarding the provision of disaster assistance with Admiral Johnson.
I would particularly like to discuss how FEMA assesses the
capability of a State or local government to meet the response needs of
its affected residents.
I look forward to discussing this process, including Preliminary
Damage Assessments, with both Governor Beebe and Alabama Emergency
Management Director Bruce Baughman.
It is my understanding that Arkansas has its own State disaster
assistance fund.
I am curious to hear how this fund is managed and how it is
supporting the tornado victims.
I understand that Mr. Baughman previously served as FEMA's Director
of Operations and was with the agency for 24 years.
I look forward to hearing his thoughts on FEMA's recent performance
and its efforts to address the shortcomings of the past.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dent. Vice Admiral Johnson, I know you didn't get a
chance to complete your testimony, but I had a few questions
for you nonetheless. What is the general timeframe for FEMA
officials to arrive at a location impacted by a storm or some
other event?
Admiral Johnson. In this case, sir, the tornado actually
hit in Arkansas about 2:53 on a Saturday afternoon. By 0800 the
following morning, FEMA had a representative in the state
emergency operations center. On that same day, FEMA had two
representatives arrive in the state, one that was an expert in
public assistance, and the second an expert in individual
assistance. And then they did join with the state Office of
Emergency Management to begin conducting preliminary damage
assessments on the day following the incident.
Mr. Dent. So within a day, you had people in Arkansas.
Admiral Johnson. And that is typical. As Mr. Baughman
commented, we are very quick to reach out by phone to the
state, make a connection, have a FEMA representative in the
state emergency operations center and provide assistance as
quickly as possible.
Mr. Dent. And you provided some kind of preliminary damage
assessment at that time when you got there, within that day?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, we did. Those are led by the
state. It is a joint PDA led by the state. They conducted that
and they finished that in 1 day.
Mr. Dent. How did this differ? How did FEMA's response--how
did that differ from the experience in Alabama?
Admiral Johnson. The response was different in that in
Alabama, there was a presidential declaration that was
approved. With a declaration approved, that opened the Stafford
Act and that allowed FEMA to provide more resources as we
always do in an instance where there is a declaration.
In this case, as the governor indicated, it took a long
time to arrive at ``no.'' And part of the reason for that is
that we were going back and forth with our own staff and back
to the state to get a little bit more information, trying to
see if we could get to ``yes.'' We could probably have arrived
at ``no'' sooner and to provide the governor with a more direct
answer perhaps would have been more helpful in a number of
areas. But we typically respond to these declarations as
quickly as possible.
Mr. Dent. And I guess the question is, so what types of
information is FEMA looking for when you are going to recommend
to the president whether or not to make a disaster declaration?
What was the difference between, say, an Arkansas and an
Alabama application?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. While I don't want to fixate on
just a single metric that is perhaps illustrative, in the area
of damaged homes, a major damage to a home or destroy a home,
is one of the metrics that we use in looking at individual
assistance. In the issue in Arkansas, there was a total of I
believe it is 37 homes that were destroyed and 25 that were
major damage(a total of 62. There were twice that number in
Alabama, and three times that number in Georgia.
We also look at the amount of insurance, and the insurance
rates were very much different between the three states. And so
again, as I list a number of criteria, in totality it was our
judgment, our view from the preliminary damage assessments,
that for the thresholds that we have for individual assistance,
that the request of the state did not reach that for federal
assistance.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Maybe just, help me again, but the role of
the state--explain the role of the state to me in the damage
assessment process. I am just trying to make sure I understand
this.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The preliminary damage
assessments are a standard practice. They are required to help
arrive at information that we both have transparent and share
the information. A preliminary damage assessment team is led by
the state. It typically is comprised of a state representative,
a FEMA representative, a member from the Red Cross, a member of
the Small Business Administration, and a person from the local
community. In this case, they arrived and were joined halfway
through the process by Mayor Hill of Dumas who helped guide
them through that process.
It is a standard procedure. They go in with experts who can
assess the damage. They are looking, again, for minor damage,
major damage, houses destroyed, impact on infrastructure. They
are looking at the extent of damage, whether it is in a
compressed area or a wide area--and just a fairly good set of
criteria, both in terms of individuals, public property,
private property, to get a whole sense for the damage and
magnitude of the storm.
Mr. Dent. Okay, my final 30 seconds here, how many requests
for declarations does FEMA typically receive in a year? And how
many of those requests would be granted and how many would be
denied? Do you have an idea on that?
Admiral Johnson. I don't have that information with me.
Rather than guess, I can provide it to you.
Mr. Dent. Okay. Thank you. We would appreciate receiving
that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We have two colleagues from Arkansas who have particular
interest. If I can get unanimous consent from our members to
allow them to ask questions, it would be much appreciated.
Without objection.
Mr. Ross, if you have questions?
Mr. Ross. Questions or an opening statement? Which?
Chairman Thompson. It is up to you.
Mr. Ross. Okay.
Chairman Thompson. Questions for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ross. Let me direct a question to Admiral Johnson.
You mentioned that FEMA worked with the mayor in Dumas. In
Arkansas, we have county judges. They are not attorneys. In
some states they are called county supervisors, some are called
county administrators, some are called county executives.
You used the guy that in this instance helped lead the
cleanup after the tornado, and of course the tornado knows no
city limit boundaries. In fact, one of the most devastated poor
communities was the Backgate community outside Dumas. The
county judge, the county supervisor has indicated that no one
from FEMA ever contacted him.
So my question to you is, why didn't they? And since they
didn't, was the rest of the damage outside the city limits of
Dumas taken into account?
Admiral Johnson. Congressman, my information is that the
PDA team met with Mayor Hill. I use that as illustrative of the
fact that PDA teams typically consist of local members as well.
I can't confirm or deny that FEMA met with the county
officials.
What I can say is that the preliminary damage assessment
team is led by the state. At the conclusion of the PDA, at the
end of the day, the state saw all of the information that was
collected. The state was satisfied, as indicated to us, at the
damage information that was collected, and we have heard
reports back since then that the state officials were satisfied
with FEMA's response and our engagement with them and with
local officials.
Mr. Ross. Let me ask you this, you indicated that you had
FEMA officials on the ground on Sunday. The Arkansas Department
of Emergency Management has indicated to me that FEMA had
people on the ground on Monday. Which was it?
Admiral Johnson. The information I have is that we had a
representative in the state operations center on Sunday.
Mr. Ross. We have the director of the Arkansas Department
of Emergency Management sitting behind you, sir, and he is
nodding his head. Led the record reflect he is nodding his head
in the negative.
Let me explain something to you, Mr. Deputy Director. Here
is the frustration. I understand the requirements for a federal
disaster, and if you want me to believe that 800 people out of
work, 150 homes destroyed, no power for 6 days, and the
National Guard being called out for a week, qualifies as a--
let's see, how did your FEMA spokesman John Philbin said, ``The
damages or need for federal assistance are not readily
apparent.''
I mean, if that is not readily apparent, then I don't know
what is and I am not sure why we are even in the business of
emergency management from a federal perspective, if that is how
we are going to treat communities.
My biggest concern, though, is not the lack of a federal
declaration. My concern, and what I have trouble explaining to
my constituents, who drive down U.S. Highway 278 from Hope to
Nashville. They see 8,420 new, never-used, fully furnished
mobile homes that were purchased in 2005 for Hurricane Katrina
victims that never got to them either, and they are just
sitting there. Not to be confused with the camper trailers,
some 20,000 of those are coming back now where they are being
refurbished and stored for future disasters. That makes sense.
That is being a good steward of the taxpayer's dollar.
My problem and my constituents' problem is if you have
8,420 never-used, brand new, fully furnished mobile homes
sitting in a cow pasture in Hope--and Mr. Chairman, you
indicated they are paying $25,000 a month to store them there,
and that is just the cost to store them there. Their operation
down there has become quite a bureaucracy and costs about
$250,000 a month total, counting the security they have there
and all of that.
My concern is if there are 8,420 of these things sitting
there, these mobile homes sitting there that have never been
used, and we have 150 homes that are totally destroyed or
heavily damaged 160 miles away, and we can't use those homes to
help the people in Dumas and Desha County, my question for you,
sir, is: Will they ever be used to help people?
Admiral Johnson. Congressman, those trailers are available
and they are used when we have a disaster. While you refer to
those that are specifically in Hope, throughout the past year,
whether it was in Tennessee, whether it was floods in New
England, there are a number of declarations where we have had a
disaster where we have provided new trailers.
So that is an inventory. It did accumulate following
Katrina. And as the chairman asked, and as we will do, we will
meet with him and identify to him what are plans are right now
to begin to reduce that inventory. But those are available, and
as I indicated, they are available primarily that we can't
provide them without a declaration.
We have found a way, and by the way, those units that were
provided, while we use the term ``used,'' those were fully
mission-capable units, and all the reports that we have back
from the state are, number one, is that we provided every
trailer and mobile home that they asked for; and number two is
they were quite satisfied with the quality of the trailer
provided.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much. The time for the
gentleman has expired.
Governor, I know you are going to have to excuse yourself
at some point. We want to thank you for coming. At whatever
point during this hearing you depart, we know you have other
business to take care of.
If there is other information you think we might need for
the record, I want you to feel very comfortable in providing
the committee with that information. I assure you the goal of
this committee, as well as others here, is to do as much as we
can for whatever state that is in an emergency situation.
Again, thank you for your testimony.
Governor Beebe. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for
accommodating us. You have been most gracious, and I am very
grateful. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
We will now hear from Mr. Bilirakis of Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
Admiral I wanted to thank you, first of all, for the quick
response to the devastating tornadoes in the state of Florida.
But we are here today, we want to talk about Arkansas and other
states that haven't received the kind of response that my state
has.
One question: Should FEMA's threshold for providing
assistance to states after disasters be revised?
Admiral Johnson. That is a good question. FEMA continues to
evaluate our processes. We certainly will evaluate the results
of this hearing. As the chairman suggests, we will meet and
talk about where we are with our current inventory of trailers,
and we will look at the process as we go through it.
Over the years, we have made adjustments to the process to
be more practical and to be more responsive to states and
responsive to victims in need. But we also want to make sure
that we are consistent as we apply those parameters across all
disasters and all locations regardless of the cause.
So we want to balance how to respond in an individual
incident, and how to respond from a national perspective. But
we are certainly open to continue to listen and engage with
states, engage through NEMA and other associations to look and
examine how we implement the Stafford Act and interpret and
apply the regulations.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Next, what steps can state and local
officials, as well as residents, take to better prepare for
these events, these disasters?
Admiral Johnson. Sir, as you know from Florida, there is a
significant emphasis on personal preparedness. I think you saw
examples of personal preparedness in Arkansas, just as you saw
it in Florida and in Georgia and in Alabama. Certainly having
insurance, for example, is one of the elements in terms of
preparedness.
In terms of other things, individuals, the generosity that
we are seeing, as the governor mentioned, in Arkansas, helping
each other out. That is always good to see. I think in terms of
dealing with state and locals, the issue, for example, of
availability to conduct preliminary damage assessments, to have
a good, common perspective on what the damage is, to be
transparent in the information that we share, and to
communicate as often as we do between FEMA and the state Office
of Emergency Management(all of those are very helpful to
arriving at a conclusion that surprises no one.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Next question. Governor Beebe in his
written testimony suggested that Arkansas's budget surplus was
the reason they were denied the FEMA assistance. Was this a
factor? If so, how much emphasis does it have on the decision-
making process?
Admiral Johnson. Well, it is unfortunate that issue was
raised in the media, then raised by a FEMA employee. But in the
declaration process, that was not an issue. I talked personally
to people on the declaration staff. There was no discussion
whatsoever in evaluating their request for a declaration based
on the size of the state surplus.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you.
One more question for Mr. Baughman. Generally speaking, are
there any measures FEMA or states can take to enhance their
working relationships?
Mr. Baughman. With FEMA?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, correct.
Mr. Baughman. Absolutely. What we do if we have a rigorous
exercise program where we interface with FEMA staff almost on a
monthly basis. As a matter of fact, Admiral Johnson will be
coming hopefully down to our governor's workshop on hurricane
scenario to walk through that so they understand what our
requirements are. So routine exercises, but again, we have had
a lot of experience with real-world disasters--six in the last
4 years has given us a lot of experience also in working with
the FEMA staff.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, thank you very much.
Thanks, The Chairman. I appreciate it.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
We will now recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr.
Berry.
Mr. Berry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the committee
for allowing us to be part of this.
My first question would be to you, Admiral Johnson, or to
Mr. Baughman. How long did it take the president after the
event in Alabama occurred to declare a presidential disaster?
Mr. Baughman. The event occurred around noon, 1 o'clock on
Thursday, and by 9 o'clock on Saturday morning, we had a
declaration.
Mr. Berry. From the president.
Mr. Baughman. From the president.
Mr. Berry. Admiral Johnson, you said that you have these
criteria. Who sets those criteria?
Admiral Johnson. Some of those criteria are listed in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
Mr. Berry. No, I said who sets them? Who makes those? The
Congress doesn't do that, does it?
Admiral Johnson. Right. FEMA drafted the regulations. There
is a regulatory process that you are familiar with, and those
criteria are identified in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Mr. Berry. So FEMA sets them. Is that right?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct. They are set by FEMA.
Mr. Berry. Is there a provision in there for waivers?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, there is.
Mr. Berry. So you could waive these provisions?
Admiral Johnson. We could.
Mr. Baughman. Under unique circumstances, there is a
provision for waiver. Now, keep in mind that the criteria,
there is a criteria for declaration for the public assistance
program, but not one for the individual assistance program.
That is what I think was more problematic on this one is there
is no fixed criteria. I think the argument against fixed
criteria over the years is, then, is there a provision for
waiver. I think probably the time has come for a fixed criteria
for declaration for the individual assistance program.
Mr. Berry. How many jobs were lost in Alabama?
Mr. Baughman. What we have is what is called the ``disaster
unemployment process.'' We are in the process of taking those
applications right now. So I can't give you, Congressman--
Mr. Berry. You can't even guess?
Mr. Baughman. Pardon me?
Mr. Berry. You can't even guess?
Mr. Baughman. I can't. No, I can't, because again, direct
result, we had no major factories, no major industry. The
largest thing that was hit was the school. The school is back
in business. So we didn't have a major loss of any jobs.
Mr. Berry. I can tell you this, I was at the White House
and I was a member of Congress when James Lee Witt ran FEMA.
The way you run it today, Admiral, is a damned disgrace. You
ought to be ashamed of yourself. We didn't run FEMA like that
when FEMA was run like it is supposed to be done. You all
should be ashamed of yourselves. Maybe you help some people,
maybe you don't. It shouldn't be an arbitrary decision. And you
are going to have to live with that, not me, not my colleagues.
This little area that was hit in South Arkansas, I don't
represent that district, but I can tell you it is just across
the river from me, and they are very special people to me. It
is heartbreaking to see the way that they were treated. I went
through this in my district last year. FEMA came. It would have
been better if they hadn't come, because they are nothing but
an aggravation when they get there.
I know the gentleman from Alabama testifies to a different
tale. But let me tell you what the people where I live are
saying about you right now in the coffee shops up and down the
street on Main Street, and when they run into each other at the
post office. FEMA denied assistance to Desha County because
they vote Democratic. They vote for Democrats. They elected a
Democratic governor in the state of Arkansas in November, and
that is the reason.
I would like to see any and all communications that FEMA
had with the White House, with anyone in the administration or
anyplace else that had anything to say or do about how or when
or whether or not this declaration was made.
What do you have to say about that, sir?
Admiral Johnson. Congressman, I regret that your view or
the view of some of your constituents is that FEMA is not
helpful. I believe that every person in FEMA, all 12,000 either
permanent or temporary employees of FEMA, are dedicated to
doing their job in a conscientious way to help people. I
believe that we respond that way consistently across the nation
in disasters.
In this instance, there was no declaration, but that
doesn't mean that FEMA people don't also have some sense of
empathy and sympathy for the people who are impacted by a
disaster. So I believe your characterization of FEMA as an
agency and FEMA as a face of the federal government to not be
completely accurate.
Mr. Baughman. I would also like to respond to that, because
I spent many years working for James Lee Witt. As a matter of
fact, he is the one that promoted me as a senior executive. The
same criteria that James Lee Witt has used for a declaration is
still in use. What has happened with FEMA is Dave Paulison has
just taken over.
Mr. Berry. He has been there a year.
Mr. Baughman. Well, he has been there a year sir, but there
are some things to change an organizational culture.
Well, James Lee Witt will tell you after he took over, it
took about a year-and-a-half to turn the agency around. He told
me that personally. And I think it has taken Dave Paulison some
time to turn it around. I understand your frustration, sir.
Mr. Berry. Well, I can tell you this, this ain't my first
rodeo either. I was there when James Lee Witt took over. And
when we had the 1993 flood in the summer of 1993, I am sure you
remember that. And the response that we had to the 1993 flood
was infinitely better than what FEMA had to an isolated
situation in the country that just happened once. It didn't
cover the whole Upper Mississippi Valley. And we did a better
job with that. And I was in the Clinton Administration at that
time. We did a far better job with the flood than you did with
the tornado in one county, or than FEMA did.
So don't try to tell me I don't know what I am talking
about. I don't care how long you worked for FEMA or anything
else, because you done picked the wrong dude to correct here.
Mr. Baughman. Yes, sir. All I am saying is that our
experience(
Mr. Berry. All I am saying is that FEMA is an incompetent
bunch of nincompoops that simply cannot run their agency.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The gentleman's time has expired.
We will now to go Mr. Cuellar, the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral I want to follow up on what the chairman talked
about, because I agree with him. We want to see from you all if
you all can give us some suggestions as to what changes we
ought to make.
Under the Stafford Act, a state may apply for two types of
declarations. One is the major disaster declaration, and the
other one is an emergency declaration. There are certain
elements that must be satisfied, and I would ask you all to
look at those elements when you respond to the chairman, and
then, of course, the parts of the rules that you all have also
issued out.
The reason I am saying that is because I think what we are
looking at is how do we best use in an efficient way the
resources that we have? I assume we are all in agreement that
the statement that the DH Inspector General Richard Skinner
made that it is obvious that FEMA purchased manufactured homes
in excess of housing needs during the hurricanes that we had. I
think we are all in agreement with that.
I think what you are seeing is some members are seeing
this. For example, there are 12 staging areas across the
country where we have those trailers. Is that correct?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. And one of them, of course, is the
well-publicized one that we have in Hope. In 2006, FEMA spent
about $47 million to store and maintain those homes. Is that
correct?
Admiral Johnson. That is generally correct, sir, yes.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. And Dumas, or should I say in Hope, that
staging area currently has somewhere between 8,000 to 9,000
units that we have.
Now, in looking at those excess units that we have, my
understanding is that excess units are being auctioned off to
the general public through GSA. Is that correct?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct, sir. Let me just point
out that at Hope we have what we call an operational inventory,
and those are either new or refurbished units that are fully
mission-capable. And those units are not being auctioned off by
GSA.
We also have what we call a disposable inventory. Those are
units that have been used, some several times in various
disasters. They are not in a good state of repair, and in our
assessment will require more than $1,500 to make them fully
mission-capable. So it doesn't make good use of the taxpayer's
dollar to fix those units. It is that inventory that is about
40,000 units that are being sold, excessed or sold through GSA.
Mr. Cuellar. My understanding is that GSA has sold more
than 6,000 housing units since the beginning of the fiscal year
2005. Is that correct?
Admiral Johnson. I don't have those numbers in front of me,
but that sounds about accurate.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Which has brought in in excess of $50
million to the government, but when you look at the costs that
we used to purchase the homes, and what we are getting now, I
guess what I am trying to emphasize is that we have homes that
are being auctioned off at very reduced price.
At the same time, what we are seeing is we are seeing
situations here where you get members, and you can see the
Arkansas delegation here that is a little frustrated, and what
I want to do is I want to join the chairman and ask you to
please look at those elements under the Stafford Act, because
certain things have to be met before the president can declare
that.
At the same time, we have those assets that are available.
So what I would ask you, and I am joining the chairman to ask
you to please review those elements of the Stafford Act, look
at your rules and regulations, and ask us if you can sit down
with us to tell us what changes we can make to provide you that
flexibility, what I call flexibility, so we can help address
some of these situations that we are seeing before this
committee at this time.
Admiral Johnson. Mr. Cuellar, I think that is a very
objective request, and we certainly we want to do that.
I would just like to point out, and I have read these media
reports as well, we are all familiar with our automobiles about
what depreciation is. Depreciation is quite a bit higher for
mobile homes, and they are even higher for mobile homes that
have been used by people who don't really own those homes, and
in some cases maintained them with less than the quality you
would expect of something that you owned.
And so in reality, when you look at the original purchase
price of that motor home, the time that it has been used and
its condition, I think our return on that investment is still
something that perhaps it not appreciated by the media.
Mr. Cuellar. No, and I understand. What is the cost of an
average mobile home that you have there?
Admiral Johnson. Some of those were like $18,000, but some
were less, those that were the stock model that we bought,
based on just the standard. We actually have a couple of
different varieties. When Katrina first happened, we thought we
would have to house a large number of people, and we actually
bought them right off of the lots of some motor home sales. So
those were higher quality and cost more.
Mr. Cuellar. I understand. I am familiar with this, that
once the mobile home is taken off the lot, it depreciates right
away. I understand that. All I am saying is, I want to join the
chairman as to say that there are certain elements in the
Stafford Act, there are certain rules that you have. We are
just saying, work with us to come up with some language to
address this type of situation.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. That is a very good request. We
will be glad to do that.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Cuellar.
Consistent with that, as I understand, I had made an
earlier request on documenting FEMA's emergency housing life-
cycle costs, including contracts for the hauling and installing
of these units. And that response was due on the 28th of
February. I want to remind you, Admiral, that we are still
looking for it, and that is consistent with some of the things
Mr. Cuellar was asking for, too.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. We will get that
response to you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney.
Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing. I think it is important we shed light on these
issues, and get them out in the open.
Admiral the committee learned that prior to the lease with
FEMA at the Hope site, a farmer was paying about $5,000 for
that land, to lease that land. And now we are paying about
$300,000 a year for that land. Are those numbers right? Do you
know?
Admiral Johnson. I don't know that to be true, sir. I will
have to get back to you on that.
Mr. Carney. Yes. I hope it is not true. I hope we not
paying $295,000 more than we need to to put trailers on there.
But yes, please, I would look forward to that answer. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Baughman, I have questions for you, actually. You have
20 years combined experience in emergency management at the
federal and state level. I think that is great. What
recommendations, based on that experience, would you have to
change the way the disaster declaration process works?
Mr. Baughman. The chief one is thresholds for the
individual assistance program. For years, FEMA resisted setting
thresholds. Some years ago, they came out with thresholds for
declarations for the public assistance program. They don't have
similar for the individual assistance program. I would like to
see some set thresholds. That way a state knows whether they
have enough to qualify. And again, there are conditions that
could be waivered.
Also, in an emergency declaration, there are some unique
federal assets such as a travel trailer that it used to be that
you could do an emergency declaration to turn that on. Let's
say that it was a unique federal DOD piece of equipment that
you needed, then in fact you could do an emergency declaration
just to provide that piece of equipment. But that still can be
done, so I would like to see that used. I think that that could
be used more often.
Mr. Carney. I appreciate that. Unfortunately, in my
district we had a couple of 100-year floods in the last couple
of years. For one reason or another, initially the White House
decided not to declare the disaster area after the most recent
event. But after reassessment, they decided to declare a
disaster area. How can we regularize this whole process? I
think it is something we really need to focus on.
Mr. Baughman. Yes, again the preliminary damage assessment,
by having fixed thresholds, I think that you will at least know
you are approaching that or not. We have had two tornadoes in
the state of Alabama within the last 2 years that we knew 19
insured homes weren't going to qualify, so we didn't ask. But
again, when it starts getting up to around 40 or 50 homes, you
just don't know. Do you ask? Don't you ask?
What takes longer is if you are in a ``marginal'' state, it
takes longer to ring that up because FEMA wants to make sure
they have all the data before they turn you down.
Mr. Carney. Ordinarily, how long does it take to get that
data?
Mr. Baughman. Well, it depends on how widespread the damage
is, how much insurance recoupment--a lot of the variables that
Admiral Johnson was talking about. It depends on how fast those
preliminary damage assessment teams can gather that data. In
our particular case, we got an immediate declaration for Coffee
County only.
We did not add on the additional five counties until the
following Tuesday. So that is 4 or 5 days later, but we needed
to gather the information. For example, Wilcox County, while
there were 76 homes that were damaged, most of those were
insured; 50 of those were secondary homes. They were not
primary residences.
Mr. Carney. Okay. Thank you for your answer. I appreciate
it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Baughman, let me just say how very impressed I am with
your knowledge of just disaster preparedness and response. You
do the state of Alabama great credit. I saw that you cut your
teeth in Mississippi, so let me just say you do us well, too.
Mr. Ross, do you have another question? Anything you want
to add at this point?
Mr. Ross. I would like to, if I could just in a few brief
moments, Mr. Chairman, for the record and for your benefit
share with you my thoughts on the situation and why I want to
try to effect change here.
On February 27th, 3 days after the storms hit, the governor
requested a federal disaster declaration from FEMA. Later that
day, I led a conference call with Director Paulison and
expressed my support for the governor's request, as well as
requested that FEMA transfer some of the 8,420 new fully
furnished and never used manufactured homes located just 3
hours away at the so-called FEMA staging facilities in Hope,
Arkansas, to the families in need. These homes were originally
purchased for Hurricane Katrina victims, but never made it to
them either.
However, help did not come that day. In fact, for the next
7 days, I pleaded with FEMA officials to help this poor delta
community. Finally, 12 days after the tornadoes destroyed parts
of my district, and 9 days after the governor's request, we
finally received a response from FEMA. FEMA said no. They
denied the state's request. As a result, the state, county and
city are now responsible for 100 percent of the storm cleanup
expenses and were not allowed to receive even one of the new
never used mobile homes FEMA has stored in Hope since 2005.
But after 13 days of waiting, working and prodding to the
point of our story becoming national news, FEMA finally offered
to give the state of Arkansas 30 used and/or refurbished mobile
homes and trailers from the staging facility in Hope, if the
state would pay to transport them and set them up for victims
who remain homeless for 2 weeks.
The people of Dumas were grateful to receive them. In fact,
I would like to share part of an email I recently received. It
goes like this: ``I am a tornado survivor in Dumas. While my
husband and I have the means to take care of our own housing, I
am fully aware that there are some who cannot. I am a
schoolteacher to many of the Hispanic families who received
trailers this weekend. You have no idea how much this has made
an impact on these students. They came into school this morning
with bright smiles on their faces, saying 'I got a new house.'
''
Mr. Chairman, that is why you and I do what we do. And it
is why FEMA needs to do what they should do. I am frustrated
with the massive bureaucracy involved in simply helping people
in an emergency situation, which is what FEMA is supposed to be
in the business of doing. It is astounding to me that for 13
days, hard-working families in my district had nowhere to live,
and yet 160 miles away, also in my congressional district,
8,420 new fully furnished never used mobile homes sat
untouched.
I want to use this hearing as an opportunity to improve
this process for the next town that is forced to deal with a
natural disaster that might not be declared a federal disaster
by FEMA.
Mr. Chairman, I want to work with you and this committee to
enact legislation to empower FEMA, or maybe some other federal
agency, to distribute the surplus homes in a timely manner to
the people who so desperately need them in the direct aftermath
of a natural disaster, whether declared a federal disaster or
not. Homeless people remain homeless until they get some help.
As my constituents drive down U.S. Highway 278 from Hope to
Nashville, they still see 8,420 new mobile homes sitting there
untouched and never used, when storm victims remain homeless.
To them, these homes are a symbol of why our citizens have lost
faith in FEMA and feel that our government is failing them.
My question for FEMA is this: Are these 8,420 new fully
furnished never used mobile homes going to be used? Or is FEMA,
in its rules and regulations and red tape, going to continue to
keep them from ever being able to get these homes to needy
communities like Dumas, Arkansas?
I believe that we owe it to the people of Desha County and
so many other communities who are devastated by natural
disasters to change the system. I am optimistic that this
hearing is a first step in the right direction, because Mr.
Chairman, on February 24th, a tornado struck Dumas, Arkansas.
The next one could very well be in your district or mine or any
other member of this panel.
I think it is important we find a commonsense solution to
this problem and put these mobile homes to use to help storm
victims. They are not doing anybody any good sitting in a hay
meadow at the airport in Hope, Arkansas.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for including me today.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Ross. Your
statement will be entered into the record.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Baughman, I understand you have a
flight to catch. We don't want to detain you again. We
appreciate your testimony before the committee. I am sure
somewhere you will be hearing from us, and keep doing the good
work. Thank you very much.
Mr. Baughman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Etheridge, would you like to ask
questions for 5 minutes?
Mr. Etheridge. I would, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral I guess it will just be you and I here for just a
minute. Thank you.
Let me, if you would, expand a little bit on the issue of
availability of state resources as a factor. You said earlier
it wasn't a factor in determining whether the president made a
disaster declaration. But I want to talk about it a bit because
I think it is important in this process, because I happen to
know from my home state of North Carolina, where we are under a
constitutional requirement to have a balanced budget.
And even if we have money within our budget, and you have a
disaster, there are a lot of other needs the state has, and
states really don't have a choice in that. Depending on where
you are, you are more likely to be hit than others. In our
case, it is a hurricane, and we tend to feel like we are like
the ``9-1-1'' state. Like Florida, we get hit.
But it seems to me that in any case, a disaster is a
disaster. I do hope you and folks in the department will come
back with some suggestions, because I think today's testimony
is some indication that some things need to be addressed.
What I happen to believe is what really matters is no more
than how many people have been harmed, and how all the
resources we have--public, private, local, state and certainly
federal--can be brought to help people who have a great need.
They have lost their livelihood in a lot of cases. They have
lost their homes. No matter what their home may be, it is their
home.
In some situations, I know recently in California the farm
workers suffered an economic loss because of the severe freeze
that was unusual, and a disaster declaration was made very
quickly, because they had lost their jobs. I happen to think
that was the appropriate thing to do. And I am glad they were
able to get federal help and get it.
I think the thing that concerns me is, I just hope North
Carolina doesn't fall in the crack that my friends in Arkansas
have, because I think an average thinking person would say, you
know, we failed. We failed, because those people have a need.
It is clear to me that people have a need, and the fact that we
weren't able to help, then if it is a problem, we need to fix
it, it seems to me.
So my question to you is this: What makes this situation
less a disaster and why, when there is a clear need, that we
didn't try to find a way to bend over backwards, rather than--
you know, I learned a long time ago, you can sort of lean
forward and help, or you can lean back and find reasons not to
do it. It ought to be our job to try to find a reason to help
people.
I would appreciate your comment on that, because I think
that is really part of our job. These are American people. They
don't live overseas in the sands of Saudi Arabia or in any
other place in the world. They are tax-paying Americans.
I would be interested in that, sir.
Admiral Johnson. Congressman, let me first say that when
FEMA evaluates some number of potential disasters every year,
and it is about 50 to 70 per year, and of those there are only
about 8 to 15 a year on average that are denied. And so in
large part, declarations that are requested are approved.
Mr. Etheridge. Admiral, just a point, I noticed in 2004
there were 68 major declarations, nine denials, and four
appeals. In 2005, there were 48 declarations, 13 denials--it
went up 44 percent, and the same thing happened in 2006--
substantial more denials. I am certain there is a reason for
that.
Admiral Johnson. Part of that, sir, is that we do think
that, and Mr. Baughman makes an excellent point, that we do
have very specific thresholds in public assistance, but we
don't have thresholds in individual assistance. Part of that is
the communication between FEMA and the state. When a state
submits a declaration, in many cases it is a discussion as to
whether the state thinks their declaration would be approved.
All of the criteria that I have mentioned are well known to
the states. There is no secret process. And so while there may
not be a fixed threshold, the process is fairly well known. And
so some of these numbers reflect the fact that states are
considering when they request federal assistance.
Mr. Etheridge. Are you telling me it is a moving target?
Admiral Johnson. No, sir. What I am saying is that in
individual assistance, there is no set threshold. For example,
there is a clear dollar amount pre capita in public assistance,
and that is the way it is. But in individual assistance, it is
a much--
Mr. Etheridge. Admiral, do you have to have a declaration
before you can get that?
Admiral Johnson. That is the process. That is what you have
to do to get the declaration. So that is the criteria we look
at before we recommend either a declaration or a denial.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay.
Admiral Johnson. So there needs to be more communication.
We need to work harder at identifying what the thresholds are
in individual assistance.
Let me also say that working in FEMA, it is not a heartless
association. And so for example in this case, our director, we
probably could have said ``no' sooner, but it was an exchange
of information back and forth to our region to find more
information, and was it possible to arrive at ``yes.'' We could
have said ``no'' and waited for perhaps more information.
For example, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, his state
initially received a denial, but then subsequently in the
appeal they provided much more information to us and allowed us
to reach an approval of the declaration. So it is a process
with the states.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, I know I am overboard.
Who has the authority to issue the waiver? Does FEMA do it,
or does the president do it?
Admiral Johnson. My understanding is that for the initial
declaration, that that declaration is made by the president. If
a declaration is approved, then the FEMA director has
discretion, for example, to broaden the number of areas,
counties that might apply for the declaration. He can extend
the types of coverage once a declaration is approved. And he
can extend the operational period for which damage can be
considered for the declaration.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Etheridge.
I thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and
the members for their questions. Sorry.
Ms. Jackson Lee for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, believe
it or not, I am sitting in the hot seat because I am in the
middle of a markup, but this was such an important hearing, and
I am just going to be very brief.
What I have been able to determine, Admiral, is this
clearly needs a legislative fix. Those of us who I guess
remained, my good friend Mr. Cuellar, who I know was here, the
chairman and Mr. Ross, and certainly Mr. Etheridge, and many
others on this committee are here because we are committed to
securing the homeland. We recognize coming from areas that have
had their long history of disaster, that we are frankly in the
hot seat.
And so we cannot imagine why it took 2 weeks to respond. I
would simply ask you this question, because I really want to
throw my hands up, but I also want to acknowledge that Director
Paulison and the team has really worked. You have tried to do
amends, if you will, for the horrific actions of Katrina. I
recognize that. Let us be your partner, because people are
suffering.
And so what I would suggest that you do is what kind of
legislative fix can we construct so that there is a backup to
the actual declaration of disaster, particularly when you can
move chairs around.
Admiral you are the deputy over management operations.
Would some sort of clarity, some sort of legislative fix be
instructive and helpful in this effort?
Admiral Johnson. Well, it certainly would. I appreciate the
offer of the chairman to me, with the committee, to take the
testimony today, both from Mr. Baughman and from the governor.
We know we have had issues in the past in terms of when we do
have a denial, and these are issues are raised again. It is a
fair time to take a look at that.
What is it that is the will of the Congress? How can we
work better to inform a decision that will address the pain and
suffering?
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I may, because my time is short, I,
too, agree with the chairman, but let me just say point blank:
Would a legislative fix clarification help you?
Admiral Johnson. That is correct. It would.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. I ask unanimous consent my
statement be made part of the record.
Chairman Thompson. The admiral has already heard from Mr.
Cuellar and Mr. Carney, a couple of us, talking about the need
to collaborate on some fixes.
Again, I want to thank the admiral and others who were here
as witnesses for this hearing. The members of the committee may
have additional questions for you, and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
Hearing no further business, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Kevin McCarthy, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California
I am honored to serve on the Homeland Security Committee and I look
forward to working with Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and the
members of this Committee to strengthen the security of our homeland.
Today, we examine an issue important to my constituents and all
Americans, our Federal Government's response to disasters. When the
President makes a disaster declaration, FEMA's responsibility is to
provide timely relief to those in need.
I have personally seen how a positive response can affect a
community. In 2003, I was having lunch in San Luis Obispo County in
California, a county I currently represent, and felt the 6.7 magnitude
San Simeon earthquake that led to the loss of life and damage to our
communities. Even though I wasn't in Congress at the time, I know
firsthand how important FEMA's response can contribute to people and
communities getting back on their feet. FEMA opened up disaster
centers, and provided timely information to help people get the help
they needed. However, with the hurricanes in the Gulf Coast region, we
have also seen how a FEMA response can suffer from bureaucratic errors
and a lack of clear oversight and accountability.
On the Homeland Security committee, we need to ask the important
questions on how to ensure that FEMA's mission is exercised efficiently
to those in need that will rely on its assistance after an emergency,
as well as efficiently and fairly completing damage claims in the
months or even years after a disaster. But we also need to be sure to
clarify the mission of FEMA, and thus the scope of a federal response
to any emergency, what the Federal Government will shoulder in the
aftermath of an emergency, and what federal taxpayers expect the
states, local governments, and Americans to be responsible for before
and after a natural disaster.
I thank the chairman for the time, and I yield back.
__________
Prepared Statement of Wialliam ``Graig'' Fugate, director, Florida
Divsion of Emergency Management
Regarding
Preparedness for the 2007 Hurricane Season
May 15, 2007
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member King, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity testify before
you on preparedness efforts for the 2007 Hurricane Season. I am Craig
Fugate, the Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. I
have over 25 years of experience in state and local emergency
management, serving in various positions including ten years as the
Emergency Management Director for Alachua County, Florida, Chief of the
Bureau of Preparedness for the State of Florida, and the appointment to
my current position in 2001. I continue to serve and have been
reappointed to my position by Governor Charlie Crist. In my time with
the State of Florida, I have served as the Governor's authorized
representative for major disasters such as the 2004 Hurricane season
including Hurricanes Charlie, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne and coordinated
the State Emergency Response Team (SERT)'s response for all Florida
disasters and for state-to-state mutual aid for Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita.
Emergency management is built upon three very basic concepts: (1)
All-hazards preparedness is the foundation in which readiness is built
for all disasters regardless of the cause or size; (2) The emergency
management cycle includes preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation; and (3) All disasters are local. There are several key
areas that I wish to discuss with you today that need to be addressed
in order to secure our preparedness for all disasters:
1. We must maintain an all-hazards approach to emergency
management;
2. Funding for the Emergency Management Performance Grant
(EMPG) program should be increased, at least restored to FY
2005 levels;
3. We need federal support of the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
4. The FEMA Temporary Disaster Housing Program can be more
effective with a transition plan that includes HUD resources.
MAINTAINING THE ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
All-hazards emergency preparedness is the key building block and
foundation for emergency management. Natural hazards continue to be the
pervasive disaster that occurs regularly. In the past several years,
major disaster declarations were for events including severe storms and
tornadoes, typhoons, tropical storms, multiple hurricanes, flooding,
ice storms, snowstorms, and wildfires. Natural disaster preparedness
must not suffer as a result of homeland security efforts, but rather
should be viewed as the most frequent opportunity to validate domestic
preparedness efforts and to also build best practices. We need to start
looking at the system in terms of hazards preparedness. Furthermore,
our emergency response system must be built for all-hazards and
terrorism should be a component of the system. We cannot afford to
build duplicate systems by hazard or to eliminate programs to support
the homeland security effort. An all-hazards approach should be viewed
as building a single team to deal with a large variety of hazards.
Since I have been with the State of Florida, we have had had 22
major disaster declarations, five emergency declarations, and 45 fire
management assistance declarations. While hurricanes are the most
urgent and prevailing threat we have faced, we do not prepare for
hurricanes alone. Florida was the first state with anthrax cases in
2001, the terrorists for 9/11 trained in Florida, we have three
commercial nuclear power plant sites, host major sporting events
including Superbowls, and boast three national championships in the
past two years in college football (2006) and basketball (2006 and
2007). We have extensive threats for tornadoes, flooding, fires, and
severe freezing. You will recall the February 2, 2007 tornado that left
21 people dead and destroyed hundreds of homes with more than $17
million in federal assistance for victims. Additionally, we have done
significant influenza pandemic planning for our large special needs
populations and planning for mass migration incidents from the
Caribbean.
While every state may not experience a disaster every single year,
preparedness is essential. Florida took the lead in ensuring that
localities were prepared for any disaster when our state legislature
made changes after Hurricane Andrew that a surcharge is set aside for
emergency preparedness from every insurance policy written in the
state. This fund called the Emergency Management Preparedness and
Assistance Trust Fund, which exists only in Florida, helps us to ensure
that localities have the necessary means to prepare for disasters and
citizens do their part too. In addition, we utilize the only all-
hazards funding source, the Emergency Management Performance Grants to
supplement these funds to build our key preparedness programs.
Hazards need to be explored in the context of disasters too. A
disaster is really caused by humans as a result of getting in Mother
Nature's way. Humans build in harms way, we traditionally build at the
cheapest costs, and we build power grids that are subject to wind
damage. When we prepare for terrorism, we harden critical
infrastructure and look for ways to prevent events. We develop strong
public health systems and plans to address pandemics. However,
addressing hazards before a natural disaster means stronger building
codes, enforcing those codes, heeding warnings ahead of disasters and
having business and family plans in place when disaster does occur. We
have to begin looking at the complexities and scale of the consequences
of hazards.
The federal government must continue its commitment to ensuring
national security through all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of state and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for
adequate emergency management systems from the ground up. Instead of
making unbalanced investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must
maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our
response system for all disasters regardless of cause.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every state
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
state and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness
activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our
country is continuing long term recovery efforts from one of the
largest natural disasters in history and making strides to improve the
nation's emergency preparedness/readiness, we cannot afford to have
this vital program be just maintained. EMPG is the backbone of the
nation's all-hazards emergency management system and the only source of
direct federal funding to state and local governments for emergency
management capacity building. EMPG is used for personnel, planning,
training, and exercises at both the state and local levels. EMPG is
primarily used to support state and local emergency management
personnel who are responsible for writing plans; conducting training,
exercises and corrective action; educating the public on disaster
readiness; and maintaining the nation's emergency response system. EMPG
is being used to help states create and update plans for receiving and
distribution plans for emergency supplies such as water, ice, and food
after a disaster; debris removal plans; and plans for receiving or
evacuating people--all of these critical issues identified in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the following investigations and
reports.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only all-hazards preparedness program within the
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the state and
local level. The match is evidence of the commitment by state and local
governments to address the urgent need for all-hazards emergency
planning to include terrorism. EMPG requires a match of 50 percent from
state or local governments. According to the National Emergency
Management Association's (NEMA) 2006 Biennial Report, states were
continuing to over match the federal government's commitment to
national security protection through EMPG by $96 million in FY05, which
is an 80 percent state and 20 percent federal contribution. To bring
all state and local jurisdictions up to the fifty percent level, $135
million is needed. This would allow as many as 3,030 additional local
jurisdictions to become part of the program. To bring non-participating
jurisdictions into the program at the 50 percent level requires an
additional $152 million.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
During the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, the interdependencies
of the nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one
of the success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC). EMAC enabled 48 states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin
Islands, and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than
2,100 missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
impacted states. The estimated costs of these missions will exceed $829
million. Of the personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,503
were National Guard personnel and 19,426 were civilians. Many of the
civilians sent to provide assistance are supported by the EMPG program
in their state. The nature of the nation's mutual aid system vividly
shows the need for all states to have appropriate capabilities to
respond to disasters of all types and sizes. In Florida we used EMPG to
build self-sustained response teams that are able to respond to
disasters in our state and in neighboring states when called upon to
provide assistance. The increased reliance on mutual aid for
catastrophic disasters means additional resources are needed to
continue to build and enhance the nation's mutual aid system through
EMAC.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after ten
years of straight-lined funding, the program needs to be adequately
resourced based on building capacity. The increased flexibility of EMPG
is offset by funding shortfalls estimated in the NEMA Biennial Report
in 2006 to be over $287 million for all 50 states. The current total
need is $487 million. The Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act authorized EMPG
at $375 million for FY 2008.
Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with
these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006
Quick Response Survey found that if states were to each receive an
additional $1 million in EMPG funding for FY 2007, states would use the
following percentages for each of the following activities: 88 percent
of states responding would use the funding to support the update plans
including evacuation, sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic
disasters and others; 83 percent would provide more training
opportunities for state and local emergency preparedness and response;
88 percent would provide additional preparedness grants to local
jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct more state and local exercises;
and 61 percent would use funding for state and local NIMS compliance.
(States were able to respond to multiple activities, as each state has
multiple emergency preparedness priorities.)
Last year's Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report completed by the
Department of Homeland Security found that current catastrophic
planning is unsystematic and not linked within a national planning
system. The report cites that, ``This is incompatible with 21st century
homeland security challenges, and reflects a systematic problem:
outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary
contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of
the Review support the need for a fundamental modernization of our
Nation's planning process. The report goes on to explain that all
states do not adequately address special needs populations, continuity
of operations, continuity of government, evacuation plans, and resource
management. EMPG is the ONLY source of funding that can address these
significant and immediate needs. The current EMPG shortfall does not
take into account these findings.
BUILDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the nation's history through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned
previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines
from all member states to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas. The process enabled National Guard, search and
rescue teams, incident management teams, emergency operations center
support, building inspectors, law enforcement personnel, and other
disciplines to immediately assist the requesting states in need of
support. The National Guard even chose to continue under EMAC when
deployed under Title 32 because of the organization, liability
protections, accountability, and tracking abilities EMAC provides.
EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the member states of
the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable
mutual aid among member states in emergency situations. The Southern
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by
participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs
nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and
FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (P.L. 104-321). Currently all 50
states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia are members of EMAC. EMAC requires member states to have an
implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC
Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement,
liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
The following is a synopsis of the historical support that the
state of Florida provided to Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the largest support mission in the history of EMAC. The State
of Florida, acting under provisions of the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact and a direct request from the Governor of
Mississippi, deployed a self-contained response team on the day of
landfall to the impacted coastal area of Mississippi (3 coastal
counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson; 3 contiguous inland
counties to the north consisting of Pearl River, Stone, and George). By
the evening of landfall on August 29, 2005 assets of law enforcement,
firefighting, search and rescue, medical, Incident Management Teams,
and others were in the area of operations in coastal Mississippi
performing lifesaving, safety, and security missions. Major logistical
assets were sent to the area, as well, to include ice, water, food,
fuel, and other commodities to support initial response operations. Due
to the dire situation caused by Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi
coast, the mission of the Florida Task Force grew significantly and
commodities and personnel continued to flow from the State of Florida
continuously until the end of October 2005 (note: some smaller level
missions continued with Florida support up until November 2006). The
Florida Task Force set-up a major command and logistical staging area
at Stennis Space Base which became the hub of the operation. This
command communicated with and supported Incident Management Teams from
Florida which were located in the 6 assigned counties to support the
local Mississippi Emergency Management Directors. In relation to this
effort, it must be noted that the State of Florida had itself been
impacted by Hurricane Katrina (a weaker storm at that time) prior to
its passage into the Gulf of Mexico. It is a tribute to the entire
Florida State Emergency Response Team (state and local government,
private entities, faith based organizations, etc. . .) that they were
able to effectively rise to the challenge of responding to the South
Florida impact of Hurricane Katrina while providing significant and
necessary assistance to our neighbors on the Gulf Coast.
Overview of EMAC Support to the State of Mississippi
COMMODITIES: (Purchased and provided by the State of Florida)
Water--768 truckloads--3,648,000 gals.
Ice--457 truckloads--19,194,000 lbs.
Juice--16 trucks--16,000 cases
Shelf Stable Meals--138,000 meals
USDA commodities--6,000 cases
Baby food, formula, etc.--20,892 cases
Baby supplies (nipples, diapers, wipes)--4,962
cases
Adult diapers, wipes--376 cases
Children Liquid Supplement--10,200 cases
Adult Liquid Supplement--5,100 cases
1,304 State Trucks of
Commodities
2,057 Trucks Total of
Commodities
PERSONNEL and TEAMS:
6,404 Personnel Total
Three Area Command Teams with 115 personnel to
manage entire area of responsibility of six counties
Six Incident Management Teams sent to County
Emergency Operation Center's
Three Logistics Management Teams
Urban Search and Rescue Teams
Three Type I Teams
Four Type II Teams
Two Water Rescue Teams
One Law Enforcement Mutual Aid Coordination
Team
Law Enforcement Personnel with vehicles and
equipment
207 Fire Fighting Personnel
70 ALS Ambulances and EMS personnel
710 Medical Personnel in various disciplines
30 Elder Care Specialists
1 School Recovery Team
1 FDOT Advance Recon Team (10 personnel)
1 FDOT Bridge Recovery Team (7 personnel)
14 Public Information Officers
497 National Guard Personnel (also sent
aircraft and equipment)
3 zodiac boats w/trailers
3 High Mobility Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV's)
2 GSA vans
2 UH-60 ``Black Hawk''
helicopters
1 CH-47 ``Chinook''
4 Hazmat Teams (8 personnel)
14 Volunteer, Donations and Reception Center
Personnel
13 Animal Control Teams (60 personnel)
1 State Animal Response Team (5 personnel)
16 Water/Wastewater Facility Teams (101
personnel)
4 Communications Personnel
38 Recovery Personnel
Continued support of EMAC will allow Florida to focus on the
implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
such as training and education for all mutual aid stakeholders,
resource typing and credentialing, and information and resource
management.
ADDRESSING TEMPORARY DISASTER HOUSING PROGRAM CHALLENGES
Housing is often seriously impacted following natural disasters,
leaving many families in the impacted areas with no place to call home.
Disaster housing consists of three phases:
1. The initial phase focuses on retaining citizens in the
affected area and providing interim housing solutions for them.
2. The next phase focuses on rebuilding local housing
resources.
3. The final phase deals directly with developing long-term
redevelopment strategies.
Providing housing assistance following a disaster can not just be
based on expiration dates and eviction dates; the focus must be on long
term housing solutions for the affected area. Disaster case management
of survivors that deals with the entire scope of housing and human
needs is necessary throughout all the phase to transition those
affected from interim situations into longer term solutions. Typically
in a community where the ability to transition disaster survivors into
permanent housing is problematic, there is usually an existing housing
problem before the disaster struck the community.
A disaster housing partnership between the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) would
provide a disaster housing solution that is more responsive, flexible
and would provide a more cost effective long term disaster housing
solutions. Bringing HUD's financial resources and their subject matter
expertise regarding building loans, subsidies and land management into
the fold early on in the disaster housing process, would greatly
improve an impacted community's ability to recover and develop long-
term housing solutions and strategies. Additionally, HUD is capable of
providing case management experience for permanent solutions for
affected citizens that will provide permanent solutions to local
situations. Case management will result in accountability on all levels
of disaster housing.
CONCLUSION
The first goal the State of Florida looks at when preparing for any
sort of disaster is how we can best serve our citizens. This goes back
to my previous statement regarding the fact that all disasters are
local and that all groups involved in responding to disasters must use
a team approach, regardless of the type of disaster, to prepare for and
respond to these events. This team approach is imperative when
addressing the federal role in responding to disasters, it is important
that the response from the federal level is one of a supporting role
for state and local emergency management, it cannot supplant these
efforts.
Florida is successful and is looked to as a leader due to the fact
that our leadership has invested in emergency management through the
creation of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Emergency
Management Preparedness and Assistance Trust Fund. Additionally, the
state has worked to develop strong partnerships that will ultimately
insure the state's success in affecting positive outcomes for those
impacted when a disaster occurs in our state. This type of investment
was on display recently when the Florida Legislature, based on Governor
Crist's budget recommendations, approved an appropriation of $895,000
in the state's FY 07--08 budget to upgrade Florida's State Warning
Point. The Florida State Warning Point is a function of the Division of
Emergency Management and is housed in the Emergency Operations Center.
The Florida State Warning Point is responsible, through Florida
Statutes and federal regulations, to be the central clearing house for
all emergencies occurring in the State that require response by or
resources from multi-county incidents, multi-State agency incidents or
any incident requiring County/State/Federal communications and/or
coordination.
With the passage of the Post-Katrina FEMA Reform Act, Congress has
affirmed their support for ensuring preparedness for our nation's
continuous vulnerability against all-hazards. We must continue to build
national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. We
appreciate Congress' increased attention and focus on disaster
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation efforts. We ask that
Congress look at ways to immediately influx the system with resources,
encourage and reward innovation in order to face the challenges of the
day. We cannot afford to continue to repeat history as we did with
Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Katrina. We must, once and for all,
learn the lessons of the past and resolve ourselves to ensure that
Federal, State and local governments have adequate funding for baseline
emergency preparedness so exercises and training can ensure that plans
and systems are effective before a disaster.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your
committee today and want to affirm Governor Crist's dedication to
continually working with our federal partners to improve the nation's
capabilities to respond to all types of hazards that our communities
may face on a daily basis.
__________
Additional Questions and Responses
Question From the Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Committee on Homeland
Security
Responses From Adm. Harvey Johnson
Question: I understand that FEMA has potentially identified a
software solution to accept and process relief applications and
maintain real time record keeping of money spent. Does FEMA plan to
purchase and implement this type of solution? If so, when?
Answer: FEMA currently has the ability to accept and process relief
applications and maintain real time record keeping of money approved
through use of the National Emergency Management Information System
(NEMIS). This data management system supports the disaster victim
application process and subsequent payments to eligible applicants
under FEMA's Individuals and Households Program.
Questions From the Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Pennsylvania
Question: My State and my district have many small streams and
rivers that flood repeatedly after heavy rain. As you may be aware, the
Natural Resources Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture
has the authority to address this problem, but lacks the funding to do
so. FEMA has some monies available but apparently has no authority to
engage in stream remediation.
Is there any way that FEMA and the Natural Resources Conservation
Service can enter into an agreement to distribute stream remediation
funds so as to avoid making disaster declarations in the first place?
Answer: FEMA has no authorized funds specifically for ``stream
remediation.' The disaster relief fund is available only if there is a
disaster declaration.
Question: Local and State authorities have told me that FEMA's
flood maps are out of date. Some people apparently are living in flood
zones and don't know it, as these maps are inaccurate.
What is FEMA doing to fix this problem? Wouldn't it be better to
make sure that flood-prone properties are properly identified in
advance of any natural disaster to avoid the need for Federal
assistance?
Answer: Recognizing in 2003 that current flood zones were outdated,
FEMA embarked on an aggressive five-year initiative to update the
Nation's flood hazard maps known as Flood Map Modernization (Map Mod).
This initiative is a direct effort to provide property owners in flood
prone areas with the most accurate and current information possible for
making major investment decisions, including the decision to purchase
flood insurance to help protect their financial investment in the event
of flooding. In this way, Map Mod is an integral piece of New FEMA's
vision to ``Reduce vulnerability to life or property'' so that the
impacts of natural disasters and the resultant need for Federal
assistance will, over time, be reduced (mitigated). With funding
provided by the President and Congress, and with input from Congress
and priorities identified by State, regional, and local partners and
stakeholders, FEMA is transforming the way flood maps are created and
accessed nationwide, working to modernize the 93,000-panel flood hazard
map inventory. Under the Map Mod initiative, the quality, accuracy and
usability of national flood hazard data is being improved by developing
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)--based products with the best
available technologies and enhanced technical standards.
To measure success in achieving Map Mod goals, FEMA has set targets
that measure the percentage of population for whom maps are available
online and have been adopted by the community. As of December 31, 2006,
digital flood map products were available for 48 percent of the U.S.
population; approximately 2,800 communities had preliminary digital
flood hazard data; approximately 2,900 other communities had adopted
digital flood hazard data; and digital flood map products were
available for 15 percent of the land area of the continental United
States (approximately 0.5 million square miles).
By the end of the Flood Map Modernization initiative, FEMA
estimates that it will have provided accurate flood risk data in GIS
format for a typical flood map project for 92 percent of the population
and 65 percent of the land area of the continental United States. A
typical Flood Map Project takes 2--3 years to complete. Based on funds
provided through prior year appropriations and requested in the FY08
President's Budget, mapping projects will continue to be developed
through 2010.
Question: What steps are you taking to help warn people in advance
of a disaster, such as an impending flood? Our State authorities have
told me that funding for the Flood Observation and Warning System
(IFOS), which places sensors in rural stream areas to detect rising
water, is very low. Wouldn't investing in such a system now help to
save dollars down the road when disaster declarations are requested?
Answer: FEMA is charged with integrating teams and resources for
the coordinated and comprehensive approach to disasters natural or
otherwise. Further, FEMA is tasked to disseminate needed supplies and
services to minimize suffering and disruption when natural disasters
and terrorist events occur. Further, FEMA is to coordinate the
logistics to return disaster areas to normal functions. The approach
for the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA, in accordance with
FEMA's mission, is to help people plan for emergencies. Regardless of
the disaster type, being prepared is key.
FEMA continually stresses the importance of preparedness, through
programs, such as Ready.gov, which urges individuals and families to
identify potential hazards and emergencies so that they can adequately
understand their risk and plan accordingly. Protection for families
should include: being informed, planning for emergencies, assembling a
disaster supply kit, planning for effective shelter, and identifying
special needs and concerns. FEMA has also produced several educational
materials, such as Are you Ready? An In Depth Guide to Citizen
Preparedness (IS-22), which present a comprehensive source for
individual, family, and community preparedness.
Thus, although being able to predict natural weather disasters by
using stream monitoring systems and other flood and observation and
warning devices is useful, such practices are in the domain of the
National Weather Service. Since it is desirable to be current on
forecasts, warnings and guidance, FEMA can rely on IFLOWS, and myriad
other programs operated by other entities, to tailor its readiness
messages.
IFLOWS is a software package designed for the National Weather
Service that enables the two-way transfer of messages and the one-way
transfer of forecasts, warnings, guidance, and data between the NWS
internal communications systems and the base-station computers of the
SCFIS and PFWS.