[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERSTANDING THE BUDGET AND STRATEGIC AGENDA OF THE SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY AND
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, PETER T. KING, New York
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts LAMAR SMITH, Texas
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
JANE HARMAN, California MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon TOM DAVIS, Virginia
NITA M. LOWEY, New York DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
Columbia BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana
ZOE LOFGREN, California DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
AL GREEN, Texas
ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
------
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, Staff Director & General Counsel
Todd Gee, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman
ZOE LOFGREN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
Islands GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida
BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
AL GREEN, Texas
------
Ex Officio
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi PETER T. KING, New York
Jacob Olcott, Director & Counsel
Dr. Chris Beck, Senior Advisor for Science & Technology
Carla Zamudio-Dolan, Clerk
Dr. Diane Berry, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology.... 1
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology.... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
The Honorable Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Tennessee......................................... 28
The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From
the U.s. Virgin Island......................................... 29
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 26
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 31
Witness
The Honorable Jay Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Accompanied by,
Mr. Richard Williams, Chief Financial Officer, Science and
Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
Appendixes
A. Additional Questions and Responses:
Responses from Hon. Jay Cohen................................ 43
B. Attachments.................................................. 59
UNDERSTANDING THE BUDGET AND
STRATEGIC AGENDA OF THE SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
----------
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity
and Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in
Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James R.
Langevin [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Langevin, Christensen, Etheridge,
Thompson, McCaul, Lungren and Blackburn.
Mr. Langevin. The subcommittee will come to order.
The subcommittee meeting today is to receive testimony on
understanding the budget and strategic agenda of the Science
and Technology Directorate.
Good afternoon and welcome to the first hearing of the
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science
and Technology in the 110th Congress.
I would like to begin by telling Ranking Member McCaul that
I look forward to working with him in this Congress on the
issues that I think we all agree are absolutely critical to
improving national security.
I also welcome our two witnesses to the hearing today:
Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay Cohen, and S&T
Chief Financial Officer Richard Williams. I would like to thank
both of you for your service to our country and for your time
today.
This hearing is entitled Understanding the Budget and
Strategic Agenda of the Science and Technology Directorate
because, for many years, neither the Congress nor the public
nor the employees working within the S&T itself could
understand what was going on in the S&T Directorate. Put
simply, the absence of a clear mission within the Directorate
and a lack of oversight by the Congress contributed to serious
deficiencies.
Anecdotes shared by former S&T employees in 2006 offered a
disturbing image of the Directorate. According to one former
employee with whom my staff spoke in August last year, ``what
has occurred up to now at S&T is that, following an initial
wonderful period when motivations and morale were super high,
after a year or so turf battles developed, personal agendas
dominated and many good people began to leave. Morale is now
rock-bottom, and it appears that many have lost sight of the
mission: to defend the country, against the unspeakable.''
Admiral Cohen, I understand that all this occurred before
your confirmation, and I am well aware of your work in the
Office of Naval Research and think very highly of your
capabilities. I know you have testified many times in this very
room where you have appeared before me and my work on the Armed
Services Committee, and it is great to have you here again. You
come to your new post with a great deal of credibility, and it
is my hope that you will do for the S&T Directorate what you
did for the Office of Naval Research.
But while I have a great deal of confidence in your ability
to turn things around, as the chairman of this subcommittee I
will be diligent in ensuring that the widespread problems that
existed prior to your tenure are corrected.
I recognize that you have only been on the job for 6 months
now, but it does trouble me that we still don't have the
strategic plan for the S&T Directorate, even though that was
required by the Homeland Security Act in 2002.
Admiral Cohen, I understand that you have been working on
completing this report, and we look forward to hearing more on
this report and receiving it.
I do suggest to you that a strategic plan that does not
include efforts to improve morale, minimize turnover,
strengthen workforce recruitment and secure institutional
memory is not a good plan. I suggest to you that a strategic
plan that does not include a formal, Department-wide
coordination plan on R&D, policy and procurement not be a good
plan; and I suggest to you that a strategic plan that does not
include the method by which RDT&E is prioritized and funded by
S&T is not a good plan.
It has also come to my attention that the Department has
weak performance measures for the S&T divisions. I have taken
the time to read the Performance and Accountability Report
sections devoted to the S&T Directorate in 2005 and 2006; and I
believe that the goals and measurements used to evaluate some
of the programs are, by and large, weak and, in some cases,
meaningless. I hope that you can improve on some of these
measurements during your tenure.
Finally, there is the issue of the budget.
Admiral Cohen, I understand that your new R&D budget
reflects the transfer of operations portions out of the S&T
Directorate, but these transfers don't change the fact that the
2008 budget is almost $100 million less than last year.
During our hearing last week, Chairman Thompson warned
Secretary Chertoff about homeland security on the cheap. These
are critically important areas of research and development, and
I am concerned that the President isn't focusing his priorities
on the areas that are truly important to securing our Nation.
For instance, when I look at your cuts in cybersecurity and
the infrastructure and geophysical division, for instance, I am
concerned that this is homeland security on the cheap. Now, we
can't be satisfied with putting pennies into securing our
Nation.
I am sure that we will dive into these issues a little bit
more today, but I want to conclude by thanking both of you for
appearing today, and we look forward to hearing your testimony.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for an
opening statement.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It was an honor to serve with you last Congress on this
important committee, and I look forward to working with you as
the ranking member on this subcommittee, and I know that we
will do great work together in a bipartisan spirit.
I know that you bring a lot of experience on nuclear and
biological threats that enables us to more fully explore these
and other means of attack, but we must also devote more
attention to potential attacks, targets of attack, ensure our
Nation has the technical capability to thwart terrorists'
efforts to exploit vulnerabilities in our transportation
systems, information and telecommunication networks, fixed
infrastructure and borders.
Under Secretary Cohen and Mr. Williams, I want to welcome
you here today and thank you for your testimony; and I applaud
you, also, on your choice of colors for your tie on Valentine's
Day, which matches with the chairman. I apparently didn't get
the memo on that today.
But I look forward to hearing your testimony and vision for
building a robust homeland security S&T capability and turning
around a Directorate that has been plagued by personnel
turnover and mismanagement, budget fluctuations and priority
shifts.
I would like to walk away with confidence that the Nation
is making the most of its science and technology resources to
bolster our homeland security strategy.
We sit here today more than 5 years removed from September
the 11th and 4 years since the Congress authorized the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security. The attacks of 9/11 and
the release of anthrax spores just weeks after revealed
enormous vulnerabilities in this country, particularly in our
surveillance, detection and public health response
capabilities.
During the 109th Congress, the committee focused much on
the Department's efforts to implement HSPD 10, the Biodefense
for the 21st Century.
It is an important--part of the strategy is the detection
of biological agent for which S&T Directorate plays a lead
role. The biological program within the chem/bio division in
fact consumes a large portion of the Directorate's budget. It
is $60 million in 2008, and this is after the transfer of the
operational aspects to the Office of Health Affairs. This is
more funding than most of the other divisions and involves only
a single program.
Currently, the biodetection technology is very time--and
labor-intensive and not cost-effective, in my view; and I
encourage you to continue pursuit of next-generation
technologies which will be automated in near real-time.
Because, in this game, timing is crucial. It is the difference
between the detecting to treat and detecting to warn. It is a
difference that will result in the saving of countless lives.
Another Presidential Directive released just last week is
HSPD 18, the Medical Countermeasures Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction. As the Directorate looks ahead at ways to
implement this Directive, it should leverage its experience in
conducting material threat assessments and material threat
determinations under Project BioShield.
The Directorate's threat and risk assessment process should
not be limited only to guiding acquisition of medical
countermeasures as required, but clearly it can be also applied
to prioritizing mid--and long-term research and development of
such countermeasures by identifying risks ranging from
immediate ones to those potentially emerging.
Admiral Cohen, to borrow two out of your four Bs,
technology is important not only in detecting bugs but also in
detecting bad guys across our borders. With the long border
such as that of my State of Texas to protect, the Custom and
Border Patrol relies on the S&T Directorate to provide the
technology they need to do their job effectively.
Technology such as acoustic seismic magnetic and thermal
infrared sensors, visual and infrared cameras, electromagnetic
radiometry can detect people, vehicles and tunnels. It is not
enough just to improve these technologies individually. We must
also focus on research and development creating an effective
border security system where sensors and surveillance
technologies are interconnected in a smart network.
Interoperability of information and communication
technologies is a nationwide concern. The border communications
present unique challenges that may require tailored technical
solutions. We need to do a better job at securing our borders
from illegal immigration, terrorism and drugs. Technology is
part of the solution; and this Directorate, the S&T, is
positioned to play a key role in that.
In an effort to secure our borders beyond our shores, the
Directorate should also place greater focus on developing and
integrating biometric-based information and tamper-proof
credentialing technologies in order to identify and
authenticate travelers through better security scrutiny and
reduced false alarms.
The payoff of these efforts will be realized in supporting
several homeland security missions such as TWIK for port
workers, real ID for U.S. drivers and future passports and
tamper-proof IDs. Biometric technologies will also enable the
full benefits of the use of U.S. Visa Program by implementing
the exit element, ensuring more complete tracking of our
international visitors.
I mentioned earlier the need for an interconnected network
of systems. However, it is this interconnective nature of the
Internet and information infrastructure that also makes us
vulnerable to a cyberattack. Information technology is fast
advancing. It is a fast-advancing technological field, and R&D
activities will be needed to improve cybersecurity products and
services to ensure we keep pace with changes in risk and
advances in this technology.
I have just touched on a few of these technologies that
should be on your agenda today and should consume major
portions of your budget. But I want to know about tomorrow.
When certain counterterrorism technologies have become so
sophisticated that terrorists change tactics in order to evade
them and while the Directorate needs to have short--and long-
term strategic direction, it must be remain agile enough to
keep ahead of the terrorists and readily adapt to an ever-
changing threat landscape.
They say agility comes with use, so I applaud the
Directorate's continued investment in the Scholars and Fellows
Program which trains the next generation of public-service-
oriented scientists and engineers. This effort is needed to
build a strong science and technology community that will
provide a critical advantage in the development and
implementation of counterterrorist measures and other DHS
objectives.
Other vital university programs is the Homeland Security
Centers of Excellence, which harnesses the Nation's scientific
knowledge and technological expertise in areas critical to
homeland security.
With the largest center just down the road from me at Texas
A&M, I can attest that the National Center for Foreign Animal
and Zoonotic Disease Defense draws upon the Nation's leading
experts and researchers to protect against the introduction of
such high-consequences diseases.
I am also concerned about the 20 percent reduction, though,
in these university programs in the budget for 2008. With four
new centers expected to come on line, I hope that existing
centers' funding won't be compromised. The Directorate must
continue to also not only invest in these centers but select
through them a competitive merit-based process that awards the
best in science.
We have enormous scientific and technological expertise in
this country that exists in our universities, the national labs
and in the private sector. As you bring a customer focus to
S&T, I hope the Directorate finds its niche as enablers of
technology, and that is the link between the experts in the
labs and the universities who are on the cutting edge of
science and the customers--or the end users--who rely upon that
science to translate it into useable and effective technology.
In conclusion, let me say that I know we visited last week
and I must say I was very impressed, and I do think the
Department is very lucky to have a man of your caliber on board
in this critical position. You weren't hired for an easy job,
and my job is to make sure your job doesn't get any easier.
But what I mean is, if you and I do our jobs right and
raise the standard of excellence and reinvigorate this
Directorate to think in new terms, generate innovative ideas
and breakthrough technologies, then you will face tough
decisions but the struggle will no longer be about correcting
past mistakes and regaining confidence in the Congress but
about deciding which technologies to pursue from an abundance
of promising revolutionary ideas to better protect this nation.
Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for
the purpose of an opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to congratulate you on your
first hearing as chairman of the subcommittee. The jurisdiction
of this subcommittee is important, and I have every confidence
that you will drive legislation and perform the oversight that
these critical issues deserve for this subcommittee.
As you pointed out, also, Mr. Chairman, the Department's
Science and Technology Directorate has struggled and
underperformed pretty much since its inception. The Science and
Technology Directorate has been criticized for being a hobby
shop, where research and development are not driven by
operational requirements but by the interests of the
researchers.
The Government Accountability Office has identified
significant financial management deficiencies within S&T.
Last year, the House Appropriations Committee referred to
the Science and Technology Directorate as a rudderless ship
where the committee decided to cut funding to the Directorate.
Well, I suppose when you have a rudderless ship it makes
sense to bring in an Admiral to fix the problem. I would like
to welcome you here, Admiral; and I hope you like my pun, also.
But, also, Mr. Williams, I want to recognize you and
welcome you. We could stand significant help, as you know, on
the financial side.
I want you to give us your honest opinion today in your
testimony. We have a lot of situations to address, but I think
the issue that we have speaks to credibility of the operation.
It speaks to real-time ideas being brought forward in a
reasonable period of time.
Companies come to us all the time saying I wish DHS was
like DOD, kind of pushing new ideas out, invest in them in a
real-time situation. We can see some return on investment,
rather than just never hearing from them.
So, Admiral, you have a real job ahead of you. I think you
will find this committee both at the subcommittee and full
committee level willing to work with you, want to move forward.
I share our ranking member's concern about Centers of
Excellence. I have a question a little later on it. But, at
this point, they have done a wonderful job. We just need to
expand the participation mode in those Centers of Excellence to
include all of our institutions, not just a precious few.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the comments from the
witnesses and my opportunity to ask them some questions, and I
yield back.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
opening statement and your comments. I appreciate your
leadership and look forward to working with you as well.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded of the
committee rules. Opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I welcome the first panel of witnesses here today.
First witness, the Honorable Jay Cohen, the Under Secretary
of Science and Technology at the Department of Homeland
Security. Jay M. Cohen is a Native of New York. He was
commissioned in 1968 as an ensign upon graduation from the
United States Naval Academy.
He holds a joint ocean/engineering degree from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute and masters of science in marine
engineering and naval architecture from MIT.
Admiral Cohen has a long and distinguished career with the
Navy, commanding several ships and submarines during his
tenure. He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October
of 1997. Prior to his arrival at the S&T, he served as Chief of
Naval Research, where he coordinated investments with other
U.S. and international S&T providers to rapidly meet warfighter
combat needs.
Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position
at the Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.
Our second witness, Mr. Richard Williams, is the Director
for Strategy, Policy and Budget and the Chief Financial Officer
of the Science and Technology Directorate.
Prior to coming to S&T, Mr. Williams established and served
as the original Director of the Department of Homeland Security
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation from May, 2003, to
August, 2006.
Like Admiral Cohen, he is a Navy veteran. From 1988 to
2003, he served on the staff of the Director, Naval Propulsion
Program, work run jointly by the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Energy. During his tenure there, he held various
positions, including Director of Operating Nuclear Fleet Budget
Division, Director of the Finance Division and Director of the
Fiscal Division.
From 1983 to 1993, he served on board two nuclear-powered
submarines, the USS Kamehameha and the USS Pasadena.
I understand that you have both collaborated on your
testimony. So, without objection, the full witnesses' statement
will be inserted into the record; and I now ask the witnesses
to summarize their statement in 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAY COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Langevin. Admiral Cohen, the floor is now yours.
Mr. Cohen. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin and Chairman
Thompson, Congressman McCaul, Congresswoman Christensen and
Congressman Etheridge.
First, I would like to congratulate you all on your new
assignment; and we look forward very much to working with you.
It is a personal honor for me to appear before you today and to
update you on the progress that I believe we have made to date
in the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate and also to discuss the President's budget request
for fiscal year 2008 and how I believe it will position us to
develop and transition technology to better protect the Nation
from catastrophic efforts.
I thank you for entering my testimony into the record; and,
for the that reason, I have very short remarks.
I would like to especially thank Chairman Thompson.
Just before coming here, my people shared with me a press
release where you acknowledged the work and the dedication of
the men and women of the Department of Homeland Security and
your commitment to them to give them the tools and the
oversight to make their job more effective. We all serve not
just for our Department but also for the Nation and thank you
for that consideration on behalf of the those men and women.
Today, I am joined, as the chairman has indicated, by my
Chief Financial Officer, Dick Williams. We both reported to the
Department of Homeland Security on 10 August. That was a
momentous day. That was the day of the liquid explosives plot
that was discovered in the United Kingdom, and it hasn't slowed
down since then.
When we talk about the value of science and technology, we,
as you all know from testimony that I gave in September on the
11th of August, established the rapid response team to address
this very important threat. The liquid explosives engaged not
only our Department of Energy labs, which you in the enabling
legislation very wisely have shared with the Department of
Homeland Security, but also our Center of Excellence in the
universities as well as my small laboratories, including the
Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, New
Jersey.
And based on the efforts, the testing, the overture that we
made to industry, testing real time both in Socorro, New
Mexico, against real-world formulae and at Tyndall Air Force
Base with the Transportation Security Authority using their
screening devices, Kip Hawley, the Director of the
Transportation Security Agency, was able in about 2 months to
issue what is now known as a 311 rule which was able to get
small amounts, approximately three ounces of liquids, back on
board our aircraft carrier, board luggage and to help relieve
the congestion that had developed in the checked baggage arena.
So that is just one small example of how S&T can make a
difference with risk-benefit analysis.
The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers.
Who are our customers? They are the Department of Homeland
Security components, the 22 agencies and operating components
that you so wisely put together in the enabling legislation.
They are my customers. But I am also sensitive to the
customer of my customers, and there I have two sets. In
legislation, I have the first responders, our true heroes, the
police, the firemen and EMT. But I also have, in the Coast
Guard, the guardsmen, and, in TSA, the screeners, and, in
Customs and Border Protection, the Border Patrol agents. They
are the customer of my customers, and we interact with them,
and we provide for them.
I appreciate very much the leadership and the support of
the Congress, the bipartisan support. The decision that you
took in an election year to restore the fiscal year 2007
funding to the President's requested level late in the
congressional session is enormously helpful to my efforts to
realign, refocus the Directorate, to develop a robust S&T
capability for the Nation and with the continued bipartisan
support that I have received since the election from both the
Members and the staff; and I am very appreciative of that. I
know that together we will enjoy further success.
I would like to focus in my first 6 months on the job in
laying the foundation to realign the Directorate so that it may
excel in what I think are four key areas. I shared these with
you back in September, and I have remained focused on them ever
since, and that was the four ``gets``: getting the
organization, getting the books, getting the people all right.
And when you do that, you are able to get the content right so
that we can make the Nation safer.
As Congressman McCaul indicated, he talked about two of the
Bs I have indicated, that those threats are bombs, borders,
bugs and business, where business is the underlying cyber that
enables everything we do.
I think you will see that we have made good progress in
this in 6 months. But we have a long way to go. We are striving
to help the S&T Directorate become customer-focused and output-
oriented. This is a cultural change, as you have already
indicated. The S&T management organization should be as the
Congress intended and the Nation deserves.
To share just a few of the highlights of the realignment--
and I briefed you on this previously--we have realigned in the
six divisions and three portfolio investment areas. I am as
concerned as you are about morale. This is a significant
challenge. It comes down to leadership. We welcomed 20 new
highly qualified experts and professionals on board. We are
manned up to about 66 percent of the 100 percent staffing that
I desire to have in place, and we will be there by the end of
2007. We have welcomed back four government-service employees
who left earlier in the year and have asked to come back on
board the S&T team; and, of course, we have welcomed them on
board.
I have been personally proactive in my outreach, as
Chairman Thompson has indicated, welcoming businesses, large
and small universities and vendors through SBI or Ma and Pa. I
don't know where good ideas come from, but they are welcome at
our door, and I have an open door policy.
I believe you will see we have made significant progress in
getting the books right; and, in terms of our obligations, we
have committed as of today 47 percent of our fiscal year 2007
budget. That compares with 6 percent the same time last year,
which explains some of the language that was developing and was
put into legislation last year by the Congress.
We have enabled the customers through an integrated product
team--my time is short. I know you will address this in many of
your questions. I look forward to those, but I will tell you,
if you are wondering how we are doing and the progress we have
made, I encourage you--and I know you will in your oversight
role--to ask my customers in DHS, are we meeting their needs?
To ask the universities and laboratories, are they fully
engaged and enabled? And to ask the entrepreneurs in this great
country and around the world, are we providing the resources
that they need in order to be agile and make a difference?
So, again, I am honored to be before you today on
Valentine's Day. I welcome your oversight. I look forward to
your questions and your concerns and working throughout the
year with you and your staff to make the Nation safer. Again,
thank you so much so much.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, thank you for your opening
statement; and I want to thank, again, all the witnesses for
their testimony today.
[The statement of Mr. Cohen and Mr. Williams follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of the Honorable Jay M. Cohen and Richard
Williams
Introduction
Good Morning Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before
you today to update you on the progress of the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T Directorate)
and discuss how the President's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2008
will position us to develop and transition technology to protect the
Nation from catastrophic events. Also invited to testify and joining me
today is Mr. Richard Williams, Chief Financial Officer and Director of
the S&T Strategy, Programming and Budget Division. Mr. Williams will
testify about improvements to S&T's financial management processes.
The S&T Directorate is committed to serving our customers, the
components that comprise the Department of Homeland Security--and their
customers--the hardworking men and women on the front lines of homeland
security, especially the first responders, who need ready access to
technology and information to perform their jobs more efficiently and
safely. I am honored and privileged to serve with the talented
scientists, engineers and other professionals who support these
dedicated Americans in our shared mission to secure our homeland and
defend our freedoms.
First and foremost, I am very appreciative of the leadership of the
Congress in its support of the S&T Directorate, and of me personally,
as I assumed the role of Under Secretary for Science and Technology
last August. The informed counsel of Committee Members with homeland
security oversight, and that of their staffs, has been invaluable to my
efforts to position the S&T Directorate for accountability, tangible
results and success, both for today and in the future.
Also, thank you for your vote of confidence in the Directorate,
evidenced by the decision to appropriate $848 million in FY 2007. This
has been enormously helpful in my efforts to better align people with
our mission to develop a robust science and technology capability to
protect the Nation as Congress envisioned in the enabling legislation
for the Department. We look forward to working with the 110th Congress
in a bipartisan and non-partisan manner to use science to better secure
the Nation.
I am also grateful for the leadership of the President and Homeland
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and for the vision and guidance
that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson have
contributed to the realignment process.
The First 180 Days_Aligned and Open for business
My first six months on the job have been focused on laying the
foundation in organization, people, and processes to enable the
Directorate to skillfully apply the resources you have wisely provided
in ways that best serve the American people and better secure our
homeland. I am pleased to report that we are ``open for business,'' and
your support of the President's FY 2008 Budget Request will allow us to
build upon that momentum.
As I've said on many occasions, the S&T Directorate must excel in
four key areas if we are to accomplish these goals: We must get the
organization, the people, the books, and the program content right.
These four ``gets'' are the cornerstones of the realignment effort and
we've made significant progress in each of these areas. In addition to
the four gets, the four Bs--bombs, borders, bugs and business--provide
the thematic approach to help keep us focused on the priority areas for
the S&T Directorate.
I have realigned the S&T Directorate to help it fulfill its
potential of becoming the customer-focused, output-oriented, science
and technology management organization that Congress intended it to be
and the Nation deserves. I thank Congress for its support of the new
organizational structure that, in turn, is supportive of a broad and
balanced range of activities that are aimed at identifying, enabling
and transitioning new capabilities to our customers to better protect
the nation. We have organized our program management into six technical
divisions that are led by veteran S&T Directorate staff members and
linked to three research investment portfolio directors in a ``matrix
management''structure. The technical divisions are focused on the
enduring homeland security disciplines of Explosives; Chemical and
Biological; Command, Control & Interoperability; Borders and Maritime
Security; Human Factors; and Infrastructure Protection and Geophysical
Sciences. The portfolio directors--Director of Research, Director of
Transition, and Director of Innovation/Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)--provide cross-cutting coordination
of their respective aspects of the investment strategy within the
technical divisions.
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I am pleased to report that today the S&T Directorate has a strong
leadership team in place with all key positions filled. Since August,
we have also welcomed 20 new highly qualified subject matter experts
and professionals to the S&T Directorate, including three former DHS
S&T employees who had previously left the Directorate and who have
returned. Overall, we are 66 percent staffed and plan to have 100
percent of staff in place by the end of 2007.
I have made significant strides in ``getting the books right'' by
holding the S&T Directorate to a high standard of fiscal
responsibility. Toward this end, I have established an Office of
Strategy, Policy & Budget Division led by the S&T Chief Financial
Officer that has put in place the systems and protocols that will
enable the S&T Directorate to be fully responsive and transparent in
the budget development process and in the sound fiscal management of
S&T appropriations. This new office is enhancing the efficiency of S&T
operations by integrating related functions of policy, planning,
programming, budgeting and execution. Centralizing financial oversight
has enabled the S&T Directorate to implement corrective actions to
address financial management deficiencies and accelerate the
distribution of funds to DHS Laboratories, Department of Energy
National Laboratories, private industry and academia. As a result, the
S&T Directorate has committed 47 percent of its FY 2007 budget compared
to 6 percent at the same time last year, significantly accelerating the
distribution of funds to DHS Labs, DOE Labs, industry and academia,
which will result in accelerated technology development and delivery to
keep our Nation safer.
In other developments, I have added a director of Special Programs
to work in select, mission-critical areas. And a new director of Test &
Evaluation and Standards is building upon the S&T Directorate's
previous work in homeland security standards and adding test and
evaluation capabilities to advance this effort and draw greater
industry participation in developing new technologies for homeland
security applications throughout DHS. We have also established a
Corporate Communications Office to inform and engage our customers and
their customers in the S&T Directorate's broad investment portfolios.
I also know that we must look beyond our Department, indeed beyond
our nation's borders, for solutions in combating domestic terrorism.
Therefore, consistent with DHS enabling legislation, I have established
Interagency and International Program Offices responsible for,
respectively, coordinating with other Executive Branch agencies to
reduce duplication and identify unmet needs, and coordinating our
international outreach efforts to help us tap into science and
technology communities across the globe for solutions to counter
domestic terrorism. Embedded S&T Directorate liaisons in Europe, the
Americas and Pacific/Asia are casting a wide global net to identify the
most viable homeland security solutions and their providers.
Last December, we saw the ``physical manifestation'' of our
restructuring plan spring to life with the relocation of 340 of our
staff members within the Directorate. Staff are now physically co-
located within their new organizational alignments. At the same time, I
issued the first S&T Organization and Requirements Manual (STORM) that
defines functions, duties and responsibilities for the administration
and management of the Directorate. The STORM tells our customers who we
are and how we function so they may better understand the capabilities
we can bring to bear in support of their protective missions.
Throughout this process, it was very important to me personally
that S&T staff be kept informed of our plans for the realignment and
that they have a forum for asking questions and expressing their views
and concerns. Since last August, I have held four ``All Hands''
meetings at regular intervals to brief all S&T staff, including
teleconference links with staff in other locations such as the
Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City, Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New
York City. These meetings also allow me to recognize the achievements
of staff members, to answer questions and solicit input, and, most
importantly, express my gratitude for their excellent work and for all
the cooperation, support and patience they have exhibited during this
transitional period.
During the first six months of my tenure as Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, I have focused on building the organization,
team and processes that are necessary for any science and technology
management organization to succeed. While our effort to completely
institutionalize these changes continue, we now have a foundation in
place that allows us to focus on delivering products to our customers
as we execute our FY 2007 appropriation. The S&T Directorate is
striving to be effective, cost-efficient, responsive, agile and
flexible, and with your support of the President's FY 2008 Budget
Request we will build on our current momentum.
CUSTOMER/OUTPUT FOCUSED
The S&T Directorate functions as the science and technology manager
within the Department. We invest in science and technology that
supports DHS components in their efforts to protect our homeland
against catastrophic events--technology that makes the Nation safer. In
the last six months, we have established meaningful working
relationships with our DHS operational component customers. As they
appear before you this year, I encourage you to ask them about the ways
that S&T is addressing their operational needs. Thanks to the support
of the Congress and the leadership of the Department, we are gaining
significant momentum, and I humbly ask for your continued trust and
support so that we can build on those efforts.
The S&T Directorate develops and manages an integrated program of
science and technology, from basic research through technology
transition to customers that are the operating components of DHS,
State, local and tribal governments, first responders and private
sector entities. The managers of this program are predominantly active
scientists and engineers in the many disciplines relevant to Homeland
Security. They are guided by a multi-tiered investment strategy and
review process based on higher guidance, the stated needs of our
customers, and technology opportunities.
The President's FY 2008 Budget Request includes $86 million for the
basic research portfolio which addresses the long-term R&D needs for
the Department in sciences of enduring relevance to Homeland Security.
The transition portfolio, designed to provide mission-capability
relevant technology in support of the Department's acquisition
programs, is driven by customer needs through a DHS customer-led IPT
process. The President has requested $343 million in FY 2008 for this
effort. The Director of HSARPA administers the $73 million innovation
portfolio (includes the Small Business Innovation Research program) to
promote revolutionary changes in technologies with a focus on
prototyping and deploying technologies critical to homeland security.
This portfolio, balanced around risk, cost, impact and time to
delivery, produces capabilities of high technical quality responsive to
homeland security requirements.
DHS Science & Technology Investment Portfolio
Balance of Risk, Cost, Impact, and Time to Delivery
Product Transition (0-3 yrs)
Innovative Capabilities (2-5
Focused on delivering near-term yrs)
products/enhancements to acquisition
Customer IPT controlled
Cost, schedule, capability
metrics
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic Research (>8 yrs)
Other (0-8+ years)
Enables future paradigm changes
University fundamental research
Gov't lab discovery and invention
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Science & Technology Investment Portfolio
Basic Research (>8 years)
The S&T Directorate's basic research portfolio addresses long-
term research and development needs in support of DHS mission
areas that will provide the Nation with an enduring capability
in homeland security. This type of focused, protracted research
investment has the potential to lead to paradigm shifts in the
nation's homeland security capabilities.
The S&T Directorate's basic research program enables
fundamental research at our universities, government
laboratories and in the private sector. Approximately $95
million is allocated for basic research in FY 2007 and $86
million, 13 percent, is allocated in FY 2008. Eventually, I
would like up to 20 percent of the S&T Directorate budget
allocated for basic research. It is critical that basic
research be funded at consistent levels from year to year to
ensure a continuity of effort from the research community in
critical areas that will seed homeland security science and
technology for the next generation of Americans and prevent
technological surprise.
Product Transition (0 to 3 years)
The centerpiece of the S&T Directorate's product transition
portfolio are Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPT) that function in
mission-critical areas to identify our customers' needs and enable and
transition near-term capabilities for addressing them. These Capstone
IPTs engage DHS customers, acquisition partners, S&T technical division
heads, and end users as appropriate in our product research,
development, transition and acquisition activities.
The IPT process enables our customers to identify and prioritize
their operational capability gaps and requirements and make informed
decisions about technology investments. The S&T Directorate, in turn,
gathers the information it needs to respond with applicable technology
solutions for closing these capability gaps. The science and technology
solutions that are the outcome of this process, referred to as Enabling
Homeland Capabilities, draw upon technologies that can be developed,
matured, and delivered to our customer acquisition programs within
three years.
Capstone IPTs have been established in 10 major areas: Information
Sharing/Management; Cyber Security; People Screening; Border Security;
Chemical/Biological Defense; Maritime Security; Explosive Prevention;
Cargo Security; Infrastructure Protection; and Incident Management
(includes first responder interoperability).
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The S&T Directorate's product transition/IPT process ensures that
appropriate technologies are engineered and integrated into the DHS
acquisition system for our customers. Approximately $343 million is
allocated for product transition for FY 2008, a little over 50 percent
of my budget.
The IPT process has created an excellent forum for the S&T
Directorate to gain a better understanding of the most important issues
of our customer agencies. Another tangible benefit of this Capstone IPT
process has been improved coordination in addressing common functional
challenges across the Department. This is due in large measure to the
enthusiastic participation of DHS agency heads such as TSA
Administrator Kip Hawley, Secret Service Director Mark Sullivan, and
Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar and many other DHS leaders who have
all personally chaired the IPTs relevant to their interests.
In FY 2008, the S&T Directorate plans to transition or transfer
four programs that pre-date the IPT process. These programs have
reached technical maturity and will be transferred to other DHS
agencies who will be responsible for their continued operation. The
budget request reflects the transfer to the Office of Health Affairs of
the operations portions of BioWatch 1 & 2, the Biological Warning and
Incident Characterization (BWIC) system, and the Rapidly Deployable
Chemical Detection System, totaling $84.1 million. Moving the
operations portions of BioWatch out of S&T allows us to focus on
completing the development of BioWatch 3. BioWatch is a bio-aerosol
monitoring system designed to provide cities the earliest possible
detection of a biological attack. BWIC interprets warning signals from
BioWatch and public health surveillance data using incident
characterization tools (e.g., plume and epidemiological models) to
quickly determine the potential impacts a release may have. Together,
these two systems provide emergency personnel with the information they
need to respond effectively and initiate life-saving medical
countermeasures. In addition, the FY 2008 budget request reflects the
transfer of the SAFECOM program to the National Protection and Programs
Directorate, totaling $5.0 million.
It is important that the S&T Directorate also engage the emergency
responder community and address operational issues to help them do
their jobs more quickly, effectively and safely. S&T's Technology
Clearinghouse and TechSolutions initiatives provide direct support to
emergency responders' technology needs. The Technology Clearinghouse,
created in accordance with a provision of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, is designed to be a ``one-stop shop'' for access to technology
information for Federal, State, and local public safety and first
responder communities. TechSolutions provides a Web-based mechanism for
responders to register their input regarding capability gaps that need
to be addressed to help them in their jobs. S&T responds by identifying
existing technology that may meet the need, or if nothing is available,
proceeding with the rapid prototyping of an appropriate solution to be
fielded in less than 18 months. S&T also houses the Office for
Interoperability and Communications, which aims to increase levels of
emergency responder interoperability by developing tools and
methodologies, as well as advancing standards that emergency response
agencies can put into effect.
Innovative Capabilities (2 to 5 years)
S&T's Innovation/HSARPA portfolio supports a key goal of mine for
the Directorate in its efforts to put advanced capabilities into the
hands of our customers as soon as possible. It has made important
inroads in research areas aligned with our DHS customers. Toward this
end, S&T has introduced two important new initiatives. One of these,
Homeland Innovative Prototypical Solutions (HIPS) are designed to
deliver prototype-level demonstrations of game-changing technologies
within two to five years.
The second initiative, High Impact Technology Solutions (HITS), is
designed to provide proof-of-concept solutions within one to three
years that could result in high-payoff technology breakthroughs. While
these projects are very high-risk, they offer the potential for ``leap-
ahead'' gains in capability should they succeed. While projects are
separately budgeted in ``Innovation/HSARPA'' (based on moderate to high
risk with a high payoff, if successful), ALL are executed within the
six technical divisions.
The S&T Directorate also continues to manage an active Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program on behalf of DHS that
currently issues two solicitations each year and generates multiple
awards for the small business community. The first solicitation for FY
2007 opens in mid-February and the second solicitation is planned for
release in May. The solicitations will address topics in areas that are
aligned with the six technical divisions.
The Innovation/HSARPA portfolio is receiving $60 million in FY 2008
funding for the innovative/leap-ahead HIPS and HITS projects. Because
of the short timeline for HIPS and HITS, we anticipate that these
projects will respond to the urgent needs of the DHS components for
solutions to fill capability gaps.
Enabling U.S. Leadership in Science & Technology
University Based Centers of Excellence
The S&T Directorate is developing a robust, results-oriented
network of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (COEs) to leverage
the independent thinking and ground-breaking capabilities of the
Nation's colleges and universities. The COEs are conducting
multidisciplinary research and education, each focused on an area
critical to homeland security. The Office of University Programs is
providing the communications and infrastructure to produce, share, and
transition the Centers' research results, data, and technology to
customers and end users.
Currently, seven pre-existing COEs connect experts and researchers
at more than 80 colleges and universities, including several Minority
Serving Institutions (MSI). More than 20 partners representing
industry, laboratories, think tanks, nonprofit organizations, and other
agencies also participate. University Programs is coordinating COE
efforts with other S&T Directorate-sponsored, university-based
initiatives. Under the new S&T organizational construct, existing COEs
are being strategically aligned with at least one S&T division, or to
Directorate-wide activities such as Operations Analysis and the
Homeland Security Institute, in a structure that will best support the
Divisions' fundamental research and development activities and other
requirements.
We are proceeding with plans to establish four additional COEs over
the next two fiscal years to help round-out the Directorate's need for
university-based fundamental research. The new COEs will combine the
research missions of some existing COEs and add new research areas
under the division-aligned construct to meet DHS needs. S&T has
released Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) regarding plans to establish
new COEs in the areas of explosives detection, mitigation, and
response; border security and immigration; maritime, island, and
extreme/remote environment security; and natural disasters, coastal
infrastructure and emergency management. The competitive selection
process is designed to ensure that institutions of high quality and
academic merit participate from as many areas of the United States as
practicable.
DHS Scholars and Fellows Program
DHS education programs are helping to attract and nurture future
scientific leaders for the homeland security workforce and to
strengthen the expertise of our existing labor pool. University
Programs is engaging high-performing students through the DHS Scholars
and Fellows program. Increasingly, S&T's scholarships and fellowships
will become aligned to the Centers of Excellence and to the DHS
mission. During this period of transition, we will honor our
commitments to all currently participating Scholars and Fellows.
The FY 2008 budget requests $38.7 million for S&T's University
Programs, which includes the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence
and the Scholars and Fellows Program.
Office of National Laboratories
In carrying out its mission, the S&T Directorate works to develop,
sustain, and renew a coordinated network of DOE National Laboratories,
Federal laboratories and University Centers, the infrastructure needed
by multi-disciplinary teams of scientists, engineers and academics to
discover, develop and transition homeland security capabilities to
operational end-users.
The FY 2008 budget request includes $88.8 million for the
Office for National Laboratories (ONL), through which the S&T
Directorate's laboratory facilities programs are executed. ONL
provides the Nation with a coordinated, enduring core of
productive science, technology and engineering laboratories,
organizations and institutions, which can supply knowledge and
technology required to secure our homeland. In addition to
oversight of laboratory operations in direct support of the
Department and its missions, ONL also has the specific
responsibility for coordinating homeland security-related
activities and laboratory-directed research conducted within
the DOE National Laboratories.
Industry Participation in DHS Science & Technology
Industry is a valued partner of DHS S&T and its continued
participation in developing solutions for homeland security
applications is vital to our effort to safeguard the nation. Consistent
with S&T's new structure, our Innovation/HSARPA portfolio and six
technical divisions will be releasing BAAs that seek industry
participation to address specific challenges in their respective areas.
For example, Innovation/HSARPA has already posted BAAs seeking
expertise in tunnel detection technologies, container security (SAFECON
program), and a mobile screening laboratory to support human screening
R&D in the field.
Innovation/HSARPA plans to release six additional BAAs shortly to
address areas that include critical infrastructure protection, hostile
intent detection and other key areas. No later than spring 2007, we
intend to issue a BAA for longer-term efforts that cover our complete
innovation topic area portfolio.
No one knows where good ideas come from and for that reason I have
been personally proactive in both seeking out and receiving technology
briefs and opportunities. This is a culture I am working to instill
throughout the DHS S&T Directorate.
The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies
(SAFETY) Act of 2002, administered in the S&T Directorate, is proving
to be a valuable tool in expanding the creation, proliferation and use
of cutting edge anti-terrorism technologies throughout the United
States. Over the past year we have made significant improvements in
implementing the Act, including a revised, streamlined Application Kit;
new coverage for emerging technologies that are undergoing test and
evaluation; increased use of pre-application teleconferences between
SAFETY Act technology evaluators and applicants to review requirements
and answer questions prior to submitting a full application; and
procedures to expedite applications for technologies involved with
pending government procurements. In 2006, 65 unique technologies and
services were approved for coverage under the Act, with approximately
40 currently under evaluation. I am mindful of the interest in this
program in the Congress and across the Nation.
As part of our outreach efforts to encourage greater industry
participation, the Directorate is hosting the first Homeland Security
Science & Technology Stakeholders Conference, May 21--24. The
conference will inform government, industry and academia of the
direction, emphasis, and scope of the research investments by the S&T
Directorate, and provide information about business opportunities. The
conference will present the Directorate's new organization, explain how
to do business with the DHS S&T research enterprise, and provide
visibility into new and emerging technologies through an Innovation
Gateway Marketplace. I hope you will join us for this event at the
Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center.
FY 2008 BUDGET OVERVIEW
Science and Technology Directorate's budget request of $799.1
million includes $142.6 million for Management and Administration (M&A)
and $656.5 million for research, development, testing and evaluation.
M&A funds federal employees' salaries, benefits, travel, and other
expenses at Headquarters and the S&T laboratories. This staff maintains
oversight of S&T's extensive day-to-day technical and administrative
operations. M&A also funds business operations, including working
capital fund, and management support. Research, Development,
Acquisition and Operations supports the needs of the operational
components of the Department and is categorized to match the new S&T
organization.
The $25.9 million requested for Borders and Maritime
Security will support technology development for the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI), a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure America's
borders. This Division is providing the tools, processes, and manpower
to ensure SBI implementation is effective and affordable. We are
working directly with the SBI program executive office to provide a
transformation strategy for SBI; develop the next generation of
modeling and analysis tools for strategic planning; and provide systems
engineering support. The Division will also develop and transition
technologies to industry to reduce risk and support border security
programs like SBInet, a technology acquisition program under the
Customs and Border Protection SBInet Program Management Office.
We are also developing technologies to ensure the integrity of
cargo shipments with known origins, and to better target suspicious
shipments, and to enhance the end-to-end security of the supply chain--
from the manufacturer of goods to final delivery. One of the most
significant potential terrorist threats to the Nation is the vast
numbers of shipping containers that flow through our borders each year,
most of which enter without physical inspection. Technologies and
processes developed within this area will assure government customs and
shippers of the integrity of shipping containers and its cargo and
communicate the container's status as well as security information. By
employing a system-of-systems approach, this will deliver technological
capabilities to DHS customers and end users that address supply chain
vulnerabilities. These capabilities are directed toward enhanced
physical security and information management, and bound by a security
architecture which encompasses the world's supply chain.
The $228.9 million requested for Chemical and Biological
will provide the basic knowledge, technologies and systems needed to
protect against possible chemical and biological attacks on the
Nation's population, agriculture or infrastructure. The greatest
emphasis is on those biological attacks that have the greatest
potential for widespread catastrophic damage to the population. These
include--but are not limited to--aerosolized anthrax, and smallpox.
The Division conducts material threat and risk assessments on both
naturally occurring and engineered agents; conducts experiments to
close major scientific knowledge gaps that could have a large impact on
how the Nation responds to a biological attack; and provides scientific
support to the intelligence community. As such, the primary output is
an intelligence-informed, scientific characterization and
prioritization of the bio-terrorist risks to be used by the Homeland
Security Council and partnering agencies (e.g. DHHS, EPA, USDA, and the
Intelligence Community).
Based on this knowledge, we are developing effective measures for
deterrence, detection, and mitigation of biological terrorism acts
against the U.S. population, infrastructure, and agricultural system.
This includes developing tools to meet Federal, State, and, local
emergency responder needs such as operational models to support
Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC).
The Division is developing next-generation, biological-threat-agent
detectors that recognize the signatures or fingerprints of biological
agents. These detectors will be incorporated into the BioWatch system
to substantially increase the system's capabilities and significantly
reduce the response time. Other significant program activities include
developing biological aerosol detection and sensor systems for
monitoring the Nation's critical infrastructure such as government
buildings, airports, subways, office buildings, shopping malls, sports
arenas, hotels and hospitals. These ``detect-to-protect'' systems
detect biological agents within minutes (acting as reliable `smoke
alarms') to protect high value facilities and their occupants. Many of
the technologies being developed in this program will be manufactured
and used by the private sector.
Chemical countermeasures work enhances the Nation's capability to
anticipate, prevent, protect from, respond to and recover from chemical
terrorist attacks. The chemical threat spectrum comprises a broad array
of chemicals, to include chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial
chemicals, and non-traditional agents (NTAs). NTAs include highly toxic
materials that have seen development interest by foreign entities but
are not yet fully developed as weapons. The barrier to proliferation of
critical NTA information into rogue states and terrorists is
increasingly thin. Existing and emerging chemical warfare agents can
potentially be used against virtually any civilian target resulting in
significant loss of life and impedance in the use of key
infrastructure. Chemical countermeasures addresses these threats by:
enabling comprehensive understanding and analyses of chemical threats;
developing pre-event assessment, discovery, and interdiction for
chemical threats; developing warning, notification, and timely analysis
of chemical attacks; optimizing technology and process for recovery
from chemical attacks; and enhancing the capability to identify a
chemical attack's source.
The $63.6 million requested for Command, Control and
Interoperability will fund programs focused on cyber security;
communications, compatibility and interoperability; and knowledge
management.
Cyber security research, development, testing and evaluation is
focused on improving the security of the existing cyber infrastructure
and providing a foundation for a more secure infrastructure through
coordinated efforts with other Government agencies and private
industry. Cyber attacks on U.S. information networks can have serious
consequences such as disrupting critical operations, causing loss of
revenue and intellectual property, or loss of life. The Division also
addresses cyber security requirements from internal Department
customers in support of the DHS's operational missions in critical
infrastructure protection. It also addresses related aspects of
national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications.
Communications, interoperability and compatibility programs within
Command, Control and Interoperability strengthen interoperable wireless
communications, improve effective information sharing, and develop
tools to enhance overall coordination and planning at all levels of
government. Currently, the Nation's capacity for interoperable
communications is hindered by suboptimized planning and coordination,
and Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, and Integrated
Federal, State and local information sharing are working to strengthen
and integrate interoperability and compatibility.
We are also developing knowledge management tools to reduce the
risk of terrorist attacks and to prepare for and respond to natural and
man-made disasters. This will provide new capabilities for the DHS
Intelligence & Analysis Directorate and the DHS information enterprise
for the integration, management, analysis, and dissemination of
actionable information. This knowledge management research provides
tools and methods to handle massive amounts of information that is
widely dispersed in a great variety of forms. Being able to find such
information, understand its meaning, and then use it to assess an
actual threat and determine the level of risk before an attack or
incident occurs is the best way to save lives and preserve our way of
life.
The $63.7 million requested for Explosives will fund
programs focused on the detection, mitigation, and response to
explosives threats such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
suicide bombers. The Division employs a broad range of existing and
emerging approaches to detect and lessen the impact of explosive
materials. These include baggage-screening devices as well as the
capability to identify explosives residue. Terrorist events like the
Madrid rail bombing, the London Underground attack, and the recent
disclosure of planned attacks on U.S.-bound flights from the United
Kingdom, all involved explosive threats. Those events underscore the
operational need for a unified approach to the detection of, response
to, and mitigation of explosive threats across all modes of
transportation.
In explosives detection, we are improving existing explosive
detection methods, developing new technologies, and integrating
improvements and technological developments into both deployed and new
systems. Detection is a key defense against successful attacks. For
example, the Check Point Program applies to multiple venues where real
or virtual portals exist. Historically, airports have received the most
attention, but similar portal situations can be found at rail stations
and cruise ship terminals. Check point programs address suicide
bombers, carry-ons, leave-behind IEDs, and vehicle-borne IEDs. The two
other principal programs in this area are checked baggage and cargo.
Like aviation, rail and ship modes share checked baggage and cargo
screening challenges.
The check point program addresses the risk of catastrophic loss of
mass transit resulting from small IEDs detonated in passenger cabins
and the catastrophic loss or hostile takeover of mass transit resulting
from the presence of certain weapons in passenger cabins. The principal
objective of the program is developing advanced technology for
integration with future check point systems to detect explosives and
concealed weapons, while meeting requirements for automation,
efficiency, and cost reduction. Longer-term objectives include applying
systems integration and a seamless flow of information with reduced
impact to the checkpoint operations environment. The program also
strives to upgrade currently deployed technologies to address emerging
threats and concealment methods.
The checked baggage program identifies and develops the next
generation of checked baggage screening systems, and supports
continuous improvements toward the Congressionally directed goal of
100-percent screening of aviation checked baggage by electronic or
other approved means with minimum or no impact to the flow of people or
commerce. Checked baggage will focus on continuing work with Manhattan
II by conducting system development and integration of the Manhattan-II
checked baggage program, complete the preliminary system architecture
test and evaluation, and conduct detection-technology test and
evaluation.
The cargo program is developing the next generation of air cargo
screening systems, with transition targeted for FY 2011.
The $12.6 million requested for Human Factors will apply
the social and behavioral sciences to improve detection, analysis, and
the understanding of threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical
movements. This knowledge will support the preparedness, response and
recovery of communities impacted by catastrophic events and to advance
national security by integrating human factors into homeland security
technologies. Further this will enhance the capability to control
movement of individuals into and out of the United States and its
critical assets through accurate, timely, and easy-to-use biometric
identification and credentialing validation tools.
The $24.0 million requested for Infrastructure and
Geophysical will develop technical solutions and reach-back
capabilities to improve State, local, tribal, and private sector
preparedness for and response to all hazardous events impacting the
population and critical infrastructure.
The Division's focus is on identifying and mitigating the
vulnerabilities of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors and key
assets that keep our society and economy functional. The Division
models and simulates the Nation's critical infrastructures to determine
how various scenarios will affect each sector, provides decision
support tools to guide decision makers in identifying gaps and
vulnerabilities, and develops predictive tools and methods to aid in
preparing for and responding to various catastrophes. Additionally, the
Division focuses on responder preparedness and response capabilities
that improve the ability of the Nation to prepare for, respond to, and
recover from all-hazards emergencies. Applying the best available
science and technology for the safety and security our emergency
responders and homeland security professionals ensures they may
effectively perform their jobs--saving lives and restoring critical
services.
The Division is also developing a capability that will enable
owners and operators of the most vital critical infrastructure sites to
implement affordable and reliable blast and projectile mitigation
measures improving capabilities to withstand these threats. The program
is developing suites of advanced materials, design procedures, and
innovative construction methods that can be used to protect critical
infrastructure and key resources.
In addition, the Division is developing decision-making and
information-sharing tools to aid responders. This will dramatically
enhance the information management and information sharing capabilities
of incident commanders and emergency responders as emergencies
increasingly demand more highly coordinated responses.
The $73 million requested for Innovation/HSARPA, 59.9
million of which will focus on homeland security research and
development (R&D) that poses a risk of failure, but if successful would
lead to significant technology breakthroughs that would greatly enhance
DHS operations; the remainder includes the SBIR program. HSARPA carries
out its activities in two areas: (1) Homeland Innovative Prototypical
Solutions, which are designed to deliver prototype-level demonstrations
of game-changing technologies in two to five years. These programs are
moderate risk, but offer high pay-off and (2) High Impact Technology
Solutions, which are designed to provide proof-of-concept answers that
could result in high-payoff technology breakthroughs. Though there is a
considerable risk of failure, these projects offer the potential for
significant gains resulting from success.
The $88.8 million requested for Laboratory Facilities will fund
operation of the S&T laboratory facilities, including Plum Island, the
Transportation Security Lab, Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the
Chemical Security Analysis Center, and the National Biodefense Analysis
and Countermeasures Center. Laboratory Facilities also funds design
work on the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility and upgrade of the
Plum Island facility.
The $25.5 million requested for Test & Evaluation and
Standards funds two areas Test and Evaluation (T&E) and Standards. T&E
works across DHS and ensures that systems meet the capability needs of
users, validates performance and provides measurable improvement to
operational capabilities. Effective testing and evaluation programs
provide crucial information to decision makers for acquisition and
deployment of technology. Standards are consensus based measures--from
basic specifications to performance criteria--that give DHS and its
customers confidence that technology and systems will perform as
required. The S&T Directorate works across DHS and with numerous
external partners to build consensus and support development of needed
standards.
The $24.7 million requested for Transition programs will
expedite technology transition to deliver near-term products and
technologies to meet DHS component requirements. This area also funds
the Office of the SAFETY Act Implementation, transition support
programs such as the Technology Clearinghouse, and the S&T
Directorate's international and interagency programs.
The $38.7 million requested for University Programs will
allow the S&T Directorate to engage the academic community to support
current DHS priorities and enhance homeland security capabilities by
providing ground-breaking research, analyses and educational
approaches. The program is designed to bring together the best
scientific talent and resources from U.S. academic institutions to help
solve complex and technologically challenging homeland security
problems facing our Nation. Program activities simultaneously focus on
building homeland security expertise in the academic community,
creating strategic partnerships, and fostering a new generation of
homeland security experts.
The program works to:
Strengthen U.S. scientific leadership in homeland
security research;
Generate and disseminate knowledge and technical
advances to aid homeland security frontline professionals;
Foster a homeland security culture within the academic
community through research and education programs; and
Build a highly-trained science and engineering
workforce dedicated to homeland security that will sustain
progress over time.
This program invests in two areas: the university-based Centers of
Excellence, and student Scholarships and Fellowships intended to build
and develop the next generation of academic researchers in disciplines
that are relevant and essential to homeland security.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I am pleased to report that the S&T Directorate is
well positioned today to mobilize the nation's vast technical and
scientific capabilities to enable solutions to detect, protect against
and recover from catastrophic events.
Our plans for restructuring the organization have been implemented
and it is indeed gratifying to see that they appear to be working as we
advance to the critical phase of product transition. Increasingly, our
DHS customers are recognizing the substantial value that S&T's
technical expertise brings to their operations. We have engaged them,
eliciting participation at the highest levels, to join us at the table
to work constructively on solutions for countering the formidable
threats this nation faces.
We appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers' precious dollars
and you have my commitment that the S&T Directorate will be wise
stewards of the public monies you have entrusted to us. We are
steadfast in our resolve to serve the best interests of the nation by
investing in the talent and technology that will provide America with a
sustainable capability to protect against acts of terror and other
high-consequence events for generations to come.
Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss a newly realigned Science & Technology
Directorate that is meeting homeland security challenges with a renewed
sense of purpose and mission. I look forward to working with you
throughout the 110th Congress.
Mr. Langevin. I will remind each member that he or she will
have 5 minutes to question the panel, and I will now recognize
myself for questions.
Admiral with respect to personnel and morale problems at
the S&T Directorate, Admiral Cohen, I have a question about
these issues. A government agency, as you know, is only as good
as its employees; and we are seeing some extremely disturbing
trends in the Department, as I said in the past. The recently
released Office of Personnel Management survey ranked DHS at or
near the bottom in job performance and job satisfaction.
Though I know that the Department's employees are, by and
large, extraordinarily capable and dedicated, I am concerned
that the best and the brightest are either no longer willing to
come to the agency or are leaving in droves because they are
fed up with poor management.
Anecdotes shared by former S&T employees are disturbing, as
you can imagine. Committee staff has spoken with several former
employees last year, admittedly at the early stages of your
tenure, which I acknowledge. Most spoke about their high hopes
for the organization. Which eventually yielded the
disappointing realities of deficient leadership and
bureaucratic morass.
Now I mentioned the quote by the former employee in August
, 2006, which deeply concerns me. I am also concerned about the
Department's efforts to hire more government workers and less
contractors.
In reviewing your budget, I see that there are a large
number of employees at the GS-14 level, actually, about 133
employees, and GS-13 employees, 89 or so on the scale, compared
to employees at the middle levels of the schedule.
You previously stated that one of your priorities is to
establish an organization composed primarily--or predominantly,
rather--of government employees, with a small number of
contracting support staff and IPAs. I am concerned that the
current organization, composed mostly of upper-level employees,
does not encourage long-term stability.
So my question is this, will you provide the subcommittee
will your plan to improve morale, minimize turnover, strengthen
workforce recruitment and secure institutional memory within
your Directorate?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. Good answer. Thank you.
Let me turn now to delay of issuing the national S&T
strategic plans. Homeland Security Act, section 302, part 2,
that suggests that Congress pass the 2002, requires the
Secretary to develop, one, a national policy on homeland
security science and technology and, two, a strategic plan for
the Science and Technology Directorate.
Unfortunately, neither of these plans has ever been
produced. I understand that the S&T strategic plan, but not the
national plan, will finally be delivered to the Congress by the
end of March. I think this strategic plan must explain the
method by which long-term and short-term projects are
prioritized and funded within the Directorate.
As you know, the S&T is working with a very limited budget
right now. S&T needs to make sure that its investments will
more than likely lead to procurement requests by the Department
components. Similarly, the Department components need to be
able to discuss their requirements with S&T through the process
to ensure that S&T is providing them with what they need.
Therefore, there must be some formalized Department-wide
coordination on R&D policy and procurement.
Now I studied your Integrated Project Team, IPT, structure;
and I believe that this is a definitely a step in the right
defection. The IPT allows the communication between acquisition
component and S&T program manager to make sure that everyone is
working together. But I would like to see some formal documents
or agreements that S&T and the components enter into to really
ensure that the expectations of both parties are clearly
spelled out ahead of time. So I would like to know how these
projects would be prioritized. I think that we were all
bewildered, actually, last summer when we found that liquid
explosives were not a high-priority issue for the Department at
the time.
So the strategic plan must explain how projects are
prioritized on the corporate review board, which oversees large
acquisitions, and the old Management Directive 1400, which
previously recreated coordination between S&T and the
components.
So my questions are these:
First, will these issues be addressed by your strategic
plan; and, second, when can we expect the release of the
national plan for science and technology?
Mr. Cohen. Well, chairman, first of all, as you know, I
believe in full transparency. The enabling legislation
indicates that the vast majority of the S&T and the research
that I do in my Directorate be unclassified. We have provided,
as you know, in the new organizational construct for special
access programs and classified programs, but I believe that my
priorities and the adjustment portfolio needs to be transparent
so that the best can contribute.
Concerning the National Research and Development Plan, I
have had a chance to review that draft, and it is quite thick,
as you can imagine, because it involves almost all of the
Federal agencies that was prepared in both 2005 and 2006. I
will make that available to the Congress. I have no
participation in that.
But the enabling legislation was very wise. You did not
intend, as I read those 19 pages, to have me recreate the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation,
the DOD or the DOE labs; and I believe that was a very good
model. You did give me access to leverage, and I appreciate
that very much, the DOE labs and my own small labs.
But you did want and encourage me and the other departments
of government to have me leverage their tens of billions of
dollars of S&T science and technology investment, whether it is
basic research, applied research or advanced technology,
without further investment by me so that I could then harvest
it and apply it to the needs of the homeland security mission.
I cannot specify to those other departments where or how
they invest. They have their own requirements process. They
have their own appropriations law and oversight. But, to the
extent they do, they give that to me; and then I can leverage
that.
Our integrated product team, for instance, we have the
Technology Support Working Group, TSWG, which is the central
focus in the Department of Defense, at the table offering
technologies to my customer. We have brought the Department of
Energy and others, HHS, USDA, on board likewise.
So the national plan had difficulty--and I am going now on
information that I have received--in getting approval by all of
the departments throughout the Federal Government because there
was a perception--I believe an incorrect perception--that the
S&T Directorate in Homeland Security was trying to mandate how
and where they should invest, which is not provided for in the
enabling legislation.
So on the national plan, I will work--as you know, in my
organization I have a liaison for agencies and a foreign
liaison who are already very active in doing this--to bring to
you a coordinated plan that leverages what they are doing but
focused on homeland security; and I hope to do that under Dr.
Marburger, who is responsible, in large measure, for
coordinating S&T across the government.
As for my strategic plan, I have put in place in the last 6
months an organizational construct and processes which, as we
did in Navy, very quickly aligned to the goals and the
requirements of the customer and the mission of the
organization. Then what we do is we take excursions, whether
that is an innovation, higher risks, sometimes too high a risk,
for acquisition, but also where we can't solve problems or we
don't have the enabling technology, that is the basis for basic
research. That is where we invest in the universities and the
laboratories.
So what you will see--and you will get this no later June
of 2007--my strategic plan as we go forward--and it will be
comprehensive--addressing the concerns that you have addressed
this afternoon, because I share those concerns--you will see
would follow the processes I have put in place.
Finally, we have been going very fast, as you know, because
the Nation is at war and I want to get the deliverables to my
customers and the customer of my customers. Organizationally, I
have established--and it is in writing, and it will become a
Management Directive--what I call the STORM, Science and
Technology Organization Regulation Manual; and it clearly
specifies in writing without question what the roles and
responsibilities are to support the organization. I briefed the
committee and you on that.
We are operating under--that is the basis for our budget,
that the Congress very kindly allowed me to come in with an
omnibus reprogramming for fiscal year 2007 to initiate these
programs as well as OMB, who aligned the 2008 budget to do
this.
But we in the IPT process, which we have in large measure
taken from what we did in the Navy, we have informal documents
now. We are glad to provide to you the memorandums of
understanding.
We are in the fourth round now in all of the capstone--11
capstone integrated product teams, with Kip Hawley, Mark
Sullivan, Vice Admiral Johnson, Chief Aguilar, sit as the
customer. They have not delegated this. They sit there. They
tell us their needs. We tell them when the money--we will
translate that into a Management Directive now that we have
Paul Schneider, the new Under Secretary from management on
board; and I am so pleased to be working with him because he
and I had the same tag team in Navy and we expect the same
results in Homeland Security.
So we will give you the formal documents, but I will not
allow the administration and the bureaucracy to get in the way
of the deliverables for my customer.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. I have great confidence
in you and look forward to our working with you.
It is now my pleasure to recognize my ranking member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome the witnesses again. Admiral Cohen, after
our visit last week, I am convinced the Department has hired
the right man at the right time; and I know, as we say in the
Navy, you will be able to turn this ship around.
I come from a State, as you know, that has more
international border with Mexico than any other; and it has one
of the largest ports in the world, Port of Houston. I think our
greatest fear on this, sitting on this committee, is the
thought that a weapon of mass destruction could somehow get
into this country. I know you share that concern, which is why
you are where you are doing the great service you are to this
country.
I want to hit on three areas that I want you to address
from a technology standpoint but also from a budgetary
standpoint in terms of what you intend to do about it.
The first has to do with detection capabilities. I know
that DNDO is primarily focused on nuclear detection at the
ports and at the border. They had made some progress which I am
happy to see. But BioWatch obviously is a program that is under
your jurisdiction that has to do with detecting biological
weapons possibly getting in either through ports or at the
ports of entry, land ports.
The second issue is the biometric and credentialing
technologies that I believe are so important to determine who
is coming into this country, how can we keep track of these
individuals, and how can we enforce an exit program which I
think is severely lacking, if you will, today. And if we are
going to discuss any sort of temporary worker program, that is
obviously going to be a key element to that.
Then, finally, as you know, we passed in the last Congress
a Secure Fence Act which does call for physical barriers at
strategic points on the border. I have always been a believer
that technology can be our best friend here and technology
between those barriers can provide a virtual wall, and we are
just not quite there yet.
If you can comment on the status of that. I know I am
throwing a lot in into one question. Comment on these three key
points and where are we in terms of budgeting for these issues?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
Well, all of these, of course, are very, very important
issues that the Congress has shown leadership and worked
closely with the administration on. You have indicated that in
the nuclear radiological area that the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, DNDO, which with the concurrence of the
Congress under section 872, was divested from the S&T
Directorate last year and now stands as a cradle-to-grave
organization very similar to naval reactors in the Department
of the Navy.
I know that Vayl Oxford, who heads DNDO, testified with me
last year. I am sure he will testify with me again and
independently of me this year. And I know that Secretary
Chertoff in the hearings he has already had this year has
addressed the significant efforts that we have made in nuclear
radiological screening at the ports, not only seaports but the
port of entry and the plans to go forward over the next couple
of years.
I know that there have been some press articles on this for
some of the experimentation which I salute Vayl Oxford for
leaning forward in the New York City area. But, as I briefed
you, I have responsibility. While Vayl is inch wide and a
thousand miles deep, I am one inch deep and a thousand miles
wide. That is the nature of S&T, and I think that is
appropriate.
So in our innovation portfolio, under what I call our
homeland innovative prototypical solutions, we have proposed in
the budget that I go forward with an initiative which we call
SAFECON, for safe container. We have to be mindful not only of
the security but also of the economic impacts of what we do.
So in the 30 seconds it takes for the claw to take that
20--or 40-foot container off a ship and then land it on the
trailer as we go forward, it is my goal, in at least two
different ports, to go ahead and experiment with nuclear
radiological scanners which we will ask DNDO to help us with,
but also chemical, biological as well as explosives, meaning
conventional explosives, and also looking for stowaways,
looking for people who are illegally trying to come into the
country through these means. So that in the 30 seconds that a
claw is on that container, as it is being moved it will do all
of those scans.
It may require that we have a composite top instead of a
steel top on containers. But we know how to do that in
legislation. It may require that there be rubber-sealed
puncture holes at specified points where probes can go in and
sense what is inside the container. But the goal would be in
the 30 seconds all these scans would be done.
If the operator gets a green light, it is clear. It lands.
Commerce goes on.
If the operator gets a yellow light, it means scanning
complete. It goes to the holding area. We inspect it by other
means.
If they get a red light, it means there is something
nefarious; and in my mind, although I am not operational, it
will go back on the ship and we will consider the ship's
sailing. There are a lot of people who don't like that
solution, but there are other things you can do. The ship
doesn't necessarily have to sail.
So that is what we are looking to do to bring technology to
bear.
Now some people have told me some of these technologies
don't exist. Others may take 30 hours, others may take 30
minutes. I am a big believer in competition. Leadership by
embarrassment. Build it and they will come. So if we can't get
everything in 30 seconds it tells me where I need to change my
basic research. It goes to the chairman's point of how do we
focus where we invest to find a phenomenology.
You asked about biometrics. This is a very important area.
The Secretary, Secretary Chertoff, has already testified to the
desire to get the 10 fingerprints. Candidly, I didn't
understand why you needed 10 fingerprints before I came to the
Department. But I do now understand that there are so many
latent fingerprints, you know, that are unidentified that now
with 10 fingerprints we can better identify identities to
events, crimes, other events that have occurred, as part of
keeping one of Secretary Chertoff's top priorities, bad people,
out of the United States.
We are committed to this. And I think if you ask the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, he will share with you, if he
hasn't already, a testimony. His handheld detector that we
provided that they take on board ships, it takes a picture of
the individual. In his case, it takes one finger. We are going
to give him 10 fingers here before too long. Ideally, we will
give him 10 fingers without even having to touch the screen,
and they are then connected wirelessly. The Commandant has told
me that he gets a 14 percent hit rate with individuals that
they are scanning as they board ships who are people of
interest.
And I will leave it at that.
Finally, a secure fence area, the Secretary has testified
that under SBInet he drove for proven technologies, and that
was to get the solution out there at a reasonable and a
predictable cost. Boeing and others subs went ahead and won
that contract, and they are in the process of putting that
solution in place.
But, Congressman, you have it exactly right. We can go a
lot farther in technology.
Again, with what we are doing, we talked a little bit about
a Project CLOE, and there are other things to bring unmanned
aerial vehicles, persistent surveillance. I think the Under
Secretary has testified that, by using microwave radars between
two mountain peaks, that Customs and Border Protection were
able to identify day and night everybody going through and then
with helicopters and vans able to intercept everybody.
So I think your focus is very well defined. We have
investments in all of those areas, and we are pushing them
pretty hard, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
The Chair will now recognize other members for questions
they wish to ask the witnesses. In accordance with our
committee rules and practice, I will recognize members who were
present at the start of the hearing based on seniority in the
subcommittee, alternating between majority and minority. Those
members coming in later will be recognized in the order of
their arrival.
It is now my pleasure to recognize for 5 minutes the
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Etheridge, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, welcome. Thank you for being here. I know you have
been working hard to reorganize the S&T Directorate, and we
appreciate that. Obviously, a lot of issues have come up as the
best way to utilize the S&T personnel, and we are appreciative
of that also.
Let me ask you a question about some particular issues with
the use of Intergovernmental Personnel Act employees, known as
the IPAs. Because there is--as you just said, we can deal with
all the gadgets we want, but at the end of the day it really
comes back to the people we have in our agency who work with
us.
This committee is familiar with the December 05 GAO report
that describes the significant problems with the way that S&T
handled its IPAs. As you know, IPAs are paid by the Department
of Homeland Security but actually are not employees of the DHS.
They are essentially on loan to the Federal Government from
universities or State and local government.
This is a great way of not paying in and--I think you
agree--to utilize the expertise and get the much-needed talent
into the Department that we need very quickly; and we are
thankful for the hard work that many of these IPAs have brought
to the staff and the work that they do every day.
Unfortunately, as the GAO points out, the Department does
not have adequate ethical procedures or ethics procedures to
utilize these IPAs. In response to a query by committee staff,
DHS legislative affairs wrote October 12, 2006, and I quote,
S&T is working with the Chief Human Capital Officer and the
Office of General Counsel on a guide that will provide the
comprehensive information needed for the hiring of IPA
detailees and administering their assignments.
My question to you is this: What are your plans for
integrating IPAs into DHS workforce? Number two, how do IPAs
fit into your overall strategy for reorganizing the
Directorate? Third, has a guide been produced? And, if it has,
has it enabled you to fully utilize these IPAs? And if it has
been provided and produced, will you please provide the
committee with a copy of that type?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir.
First of all, I would like to thank the Congress for
providing for the Interagency Personnel Act. This is
invaluable, not just in science and technology but throughout
the government, to get the best of the best, as you have
indicated, on a rotational basis, whether it is from
laboratories or universities. In my case, the enabling
legislation very wisely paralleled the legislation, unique
legislation, for the defense advance research projects and you
allowed me to have DARPA like IPAs; and I am fully utilizing
that in my innovation portfolio.
But I was very familiar with IPAs when I got to the Office
of Naval Research; and, as you know, I was there for 6 years.
And in the 6 years I was there I reduced IPAs from 60 to under
30. We produced a Management Directive--I will use the DHS term
instead of the Navy term--that was very clear, and I brought
that Directive with me to the Department of Homeland Security.
Because if you don't apply the highest ethics and the highest
standards to the IPA program, while you may not have a
statutory problem, you certainly have a perception problem.
So when individuals come as IPAs to my organization, they
must sign clear nondisclosure to their parent organization.
They must recuse themselves from any dealings, whether it is
contractual or otherwise, with the parent organization. But,
even with those constraints, the IPAs are far too important to
the safety of the Nation for us not to utilize those.
Mr. Cohen. So I will as soon as I turn my Navy management
directive, which I have been following, vetted by the OGC,
vetted by the IG, et cetera, and let me just say, Chairman
Langevin, so you understand, as we talk about integrated
product teams or anything else I do, I have invited the DHS IG,
and they have willingly and actively sat in as observers to all
the processes I have put in plan, and I extend that invitation,
as I did in Navy, to the staff majority and minority, whenever
is convenient for them, whether it is my budget reviews,
anything that is not executive department proprietary, which is
very small in my portfolio, they are welcome to see how these
things work.
I have already reduced the number of IPAs in Homeland
Security by five. IPAs are well worth what we pay for them, but
the very ability of the cost is significant depending upon who
their sponsor might be. We can end up paying twice or more the
salary that the individual is getting for overhead at the
parent organization, and as a custodian of the taxpayers'
precious investment and with the limits that I have on my M&A
account, I just cannot afford that. So I will share with you
the directive that I use if you will accept the Navy version
first. I am glad you can hold me accountable for that. I will
then put it into DHS language. But I have my director of
research has come to me from Los Alamos. Many of you know Dr.
John Vitko, created the world class BioWatch program which, you
know, 3 years ago, was poorly received and now just
transitioned to the Office of Health Affairs. I have in test
and evaluation, an area that is critically important, a world
expert that comes from southern Maryland; he actually comes to
me on the cheap.
So they are peppered throughout the organization, but
everyone knows who they are, and we are going by the letter of
the law, and I welcome the oversight.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you very much. We would welcome the
material, and you are a breath of fresh air.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. The gentlelady from Tennessee, Ms. Blackburn.
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here. Admiral, I love hearing you talk
about deliverables and talk about the expectations that we and
you have. And I think that is an important dialog for us to
continue because our constituents certainly are concerned about
security. I would say it is the number one issue as they look
at the security of this Nation, both home an abroad. And we
appreciate the work that you are doing and the task you have
taken.
I loved your enthusiasm when you were talking about the ten
fingers and getting the print there as we fight--look for our
bio vulnerabilities if you will and BioWatch. And I recently
had the opportunity to view the new vein imaging technology
that is coming online and was amazed with the accuracy rate
with that. I am hopeful, as you are, that there are
possibilities there.
I want to discuss four separate areas with you, one is the
IEDs and then another one is SBI Net, the screenings and then
cyber security. So we will go through these as far as we get in
the 5 minutes allowed. We will submit to you in writing if we
don't get through them. Looking at your testimony and
considering IEDs, and you spoke to this a little bit talking
about your cargo screening, and I imagine some of the
technology that you are using there looking through, looking at
screening cargo and then at cargo carrier protection, you are
also applying that to vehicles. And I would like to know if you
are or what you are doing that would look at the vehicle
protection.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, ma'am. As you are well aware, IEDs and
vehicle-borne IEDs are in large measure the weapon of choice
today by terrorists around the world. You see the carnage that
they are causing in Iraq. I am not in DOD anymore, but in the
paper they indicate upwards of 70 percent of all the casualties
are associated with IEDs.
The Congress has been very generous with General Montgomery
Migs and the joint IED task force in the Department of Defense.
I believe you have invested over $6 billion over the last--
Mrs. Blackburn. If I may interrupt, sir. Specifically what
are you all doing, what are you targeting there? Are you at
liberty to tell us what kind of timeline you are on for
producing something that will give extra protection to vehicles
for these explosive devices?
Mr. Cohen. The short answer is that the $6 billion has been
spent on the here and now, what you would call the low-hanging
fruit. And we have had enormous success, but the leakage, the
leakage, and I will leave it at that without percentages, still
causes the carnage that you see.
I had lunch with Secretary Gordon England in December at
his request. As you know, he was secretary of the Navy, then
deputy secretary of Homeland Security, then back and forth and
3 years ago, he started what he called the Manhattan Project to
predict, detect, defeat and destroy IEDs at range. That
includes vehicle IEDs, and he defined it as 100 yards.
The reason that he wanted to do that was to change the
calculus so that we and our first responders as well as our
military would be able to detect, and while there still might
be collateral damage with these explosions, they would be set
off when we desired, not when the bomber desired.
This is an area we today do not yet have the technology,
and so why I have budgeted for this and what I am working with
DOD is for me to take the basic research working with our
laboratories, DOE, working with our universities, in short,
Congresswoman, I am looking to replicate a dog's nose that our
first responders can use to go ahead and do this. The
technology is not there today. We have many means to thwart
IEDs, but we have got to do better, and I am committed to that.
Mrs. Blackburn. Okay. Then on the SBI Net, are you all
coordinating with Boeing on the SBI Net project?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, ma'am. As you are well aware, this comes
under customs and border protection, Boeing is the prime. And
as one of my 11 capstone IPTs, I have border protection. Chief
Aguilar and Director Basham sit as the customer on that. They
then provide to me what their capability gaps are that perhaps
the SBI Net is not fulfilling or were too high-risk for that
contract. And they then direct me to slave my S&T dollars to
de-risk and provide examples, proof of concept, so that they
then can offer that with adequate risk tolerance to Boeing to
include in the technologies used on the border.
So we are in a one-to-one correspondence.
Mrs. Blackburn. Mr. Chairman, I will submit my screening
questions. I did have one on the article today in USA Today on
the rail test and then some questions on practices and
processes with cybersecurity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms.
Christensen, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome the witnesses.
Admiral Cohen, I am impressed with some of the progress
that you have reported thus far, especially when you talk about
people coming back, asking to come back to the Directorate.
I notice, under your budget, the proposed budget for 2008,
under chem and bio, there is a drop that, if my BlackBerry
calculator is working correctly, is about 28 percent. I am
concerned about that drop, especially given the problems we are
having with BioShield, the slowness of developing new counter
agents to respond to biological terrorism and also decrease in
bioterrorism preparedness funding. It seems to put a lot of
responsibility on your Department for surveillance, detection,
protection, and you have those three areas, ag, bio and chem to
fit into that.
As you looked at what the budget was providing you for your
Directorate, did you have to sacrifice some of your objectives
to fit within that budget? And as you are answering, I am also
not clear what exactly is left after--what did BioWatch take
away and leave because we are still talking about surveillance
and detection under the Directorate.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, ma'am. As in our personal lives and our
professional lives, we always have to make a balance in our
investments. But I would like to address the chem-bio because
you very accurately represented what has happened. The Congress
last year, I believe, very wisely established the Office of
Health Affairs which now has Dr. Runge as the chief medical
officer, and you also established the Office of Emergency
Communications.
Now one of the problems that you have in S&T is it can
become a self-licking ice cream cone. If in S&T we are
responsible for not only discovering the solutions, then
maturing the solutions, but also operating the solutions beyond
prototypical demonstration, operations are time intensive and
take a disproportionate amount of money. And so without the
Office of Health Affairs, and this is why I thank you for it, I
didn't have a customer for my BioWatch. And as you know,
BioWatch 2 has been largely successful, and it is in 30 of our
major cities. We have had over 3 million samples of which we
have had, I think, 15 or 16 positives which have been reacted
to. And in fact, just a month ago, the stink bomb that occurred
in New York City, within an hour of that, Mayor Bloomberg was
able to say to the good people of New York: We don't know what
it is, but we know it is not hazardous, and in part, that was
because of the BioWatch investment.
So what I did was, and it is in a one-time adjustment to my
budget, was an $81 million transfer, which is totally the
operational cost of BioWatch 2 to the Office of Health Affairs
under Dr. Runge. And what it does is allows Dr. Vitko and his
good people and my laboratories to now focus on BioWatch 3,
which we think will be four times cheaper to operate. It will
be real-time microchip determination as opposed to what we have
now, the little disks that have to be collected and analyzed,
and it will be wireless connected so that we will be able to
cover many more cities in real time.
So I would prefer to have the $81 million on top of my S&T,
but it was not S&T, and what we have done is a one-time proper
alignment.
Mrs. Christensen. I really think that is what you are to
do, to do the research, and then once the product is developed,
turn it over to your customer. Is there any work being done at
S&T on shortening the time from the time an agent presents
itself to developing counter measures? We have introduced some
legislation before, thinking about introducing it again to
foster and support that kind of research. Are you doing
anything like that now?
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely. In fact, on Monday, I was at Plum
Island where we do foot-and-mouth disease. Genomics and what we
see around the country and in so many of the States represented
here is an incredible growth industry, and the rate of problem-
solving is increasing exponentially.
So I am very encouraged and very enthusiastic. I am not
sure legislation is required here. In a free-market society,
you see what is happening, you see where the jobs are being
created.
Mrs. Christensen. I just wasn't sure it was being done. And
knowing that it has in the past taken a long time and we don't
know what we are going to be faced with specifically, it
becomes increasingly important to shorten the time to be able
to provide something to treat or a vaccine to a newly developed
or mutated agent.
Mr. Cohen. You are exactly right, and one of the exciting
areas is what we call DNA, or it has been renamed now agile
vaccines, that do exactly what you are talking about. Because
of genomics, we can analyze what the pathogen is, and we then
can design or tailor the vaccine, and then when the bad guys
modify it, which regrettably more people and more people have
access to in a flat world, we then can rapidly respond. There
is an area that DOD has been very active on, but it is spilling
over into all areas.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Langevin. I am pleased to recognize now the gentleman
from California, Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for testifying and thank you for your
service. Admiral, can you tell me what the Department's plan
for cybersecurity research and development is? This is an area
that, among other areas, I think needs a lot of work both here
on the Hill and also within the Department and within the
private sector.
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. As you know, this is the fourth of my
Bs; the bombs, borders and bugs are tangible, but the business
is not tangible. And I don't know, I am close to it, but I
don't have personal knowledge, but the papers say that we live
in a negative savings rate society, which means we live from
ATM withdrawal to ATM withdrawal; 401(k)s now are all in cyber.
Everything we do is enabled by cyber, not only our security but
the underpinnings of our society.
And so while we can't touch or feel it, we understand the
consequences of it, and this is an area where, again, because
the world is flat, there are a lot of evil people who would
like to do damage to our society and to our economy. So this is
an area that we take very seriously.
As you know, in Homeland Security, we now have a cyber
czar. This represents one of the 11 Capstone IPTs, Integrated
Product Teams, where my command, control and interoperability
division is focused. Interestingly enough, the leadership of
Homeland Security made me bifurcate this particular IPT even
though it falls under FEMA, and the reason they did that, and
this was with the input of the bipartisan staff from the
Congress, was it was concerned that if I had interoperability
competing with cybersecurity, that interoperability would take
all the money. And whether that is true or not, we have put
protections in place.
And so, as I have indicated in the integrated product teams
with the cyber czar sitting, Mr. Salazar, in fact sitting as my
customer, I have a prioritized list from him with a cut line as
to what we can afford that go to secure protocols, process
control systems, wireless security, automated vulnerability,
discovery tools, lack of worldwide data for research
continuity, and I could go on, but the bottom line, sir, is
that I expect my customer to hold me accountable in S&T for
cost, schedule and technology readiness level metrics which we
review together on a semi-annual basis. And to deliver, I get
to take risk with millions to prevent putting their systems and
their acquisition at risk in billions so that we can provide
the solutions they need. But this is an area that we must stay
on top, and the challenges will only get greater, not less.
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask you a question about cyber security
and innovation. As I look at the budget, out of the $20 million
designated for cyber security, about 38 percent are directed
towards innovation, $7.5 million. That is the highest, at least
on my cursory look, percentage of any of the program areas; a
third of funding for cybersecurity directed towards innovation.
But then there don't appear to be any projects within the
innovation office that are focused on cybersecurity. That seems
to be inconsistent. Is there any way to clear up my confusion?
Mr. Cohen. What I have done here in the command, control
and interoperability, and that is the supporting of my six
divisions and divisions that support cybersecurity and HITS on
that integrated process team along with infrastructure
protection because interoperability is shown mostly under
command, control and interoperability, but the Department views
cybersecurity more as an infrastructure protection issue. What
we have done is laid out the change detection for what we may
see, people attempting the physical attacks on cybersecurity,
because it is copper; it is fiber optics; it is wireless, et
cetera. But I will take that for the record so that we can get
you the specific details.
I will tell you that, in the 6 months I have been on board,
the definition of innovation has been a little bit of a
challenge. My definition of innovation is where we have a known
need and we take a higher risk in a shorter period of time than
acquisition might be able to ingest, but we de-risk it and then
bring it in where acquisition can use it.
The customary definition of innovation before I got to this
Directorate was anything that didn't have a customer. That is
not an adequate definition of innovation. So I will take this
for the record, and I am glad to come by, talk with you or your
staff, and I welcome your input in this area, sir.
Mr. Langevin. With the agreement of the ranking member, we
are going to go for a second round if you will bear with us.
Mr. Cohen. Absolutely,
Mr. Langevin. Admiral, we have already sunk nearly $300
million into the Counter-MANPADS Program, and we now have the
technology ready to deploy and no interest among the commercial
carriers to use it mostly due to the cost figures of around $1
million per airplane to install. And then you have the
maintenance and add fuel costs on top of that. I know that you
are looking at other ways to protect commercial aircraft. What
is the point of your doing this research and testing this
equipment if the airline industry won't partner with us just to
keep their own airplanes safe.
And so my other question is would you say it is just a $300
million boondoggle, and will your new management structure
ensure this doesn't happen again?
Mr. Cohen. Well, the short answer is, I am not into
boondoggles. And in my setup, as you know, I believe in
transparency, and so I think if I would suggest something like
that, you would nip it in well in advance of that investment.
My understanding, as a citizen watching this before I came
to the Department, I think this was one of the mandates jointly
from the Congress and from the administration because of the
threat, the credible threat of MANPAD shoulder-fired weapons
against commercial as well as military aircraft. As you are
well aware from your other committee assignments, on the
military side, we have advanced counter measures and systems
that are already deployed and employed and just get better. And
so this was to show the efficacy of this for commercial
aviation.
The counter measures do work. We have demonstrated those.
The $300 million was in large measure used--as I understand it,
this pre-dates me--to apply that to wide body and other
commercial aircraft, both cargo and now passenger. I think, as
you are aware, last year, shortly after I came on board, there
was an alternative solution at the $10 million level, again,
encouraged by the Congress to look at alternative solutions
because of the resistance of the airlines for all the reasons
that you said to equipping the planes with this, and we in fact
went to contract on that. I think the three providers are
Northrup Gruman, BAE and Raytheon, if my memory serves me
right, a total of $10 million. They are looking at a ground-
based off-plane solution but we are looking as you know, and we
have presented in this fiscal year 2008 budget as an off-plane
solution but using persistent surveillance flying above and
airport where we can use a high-performance, high-endurance
unmanned vehicle as a decoy, so to speak, and if that is
successful in testing, we may be able to offer the Congress,
the administration, Federal Aviation and the industry an
alternative solution which would give us not only the counter-
MANPADS using the technologies that we demonstrated on the
plane but, now on the UAV, would also give us the ability for
the more advanced MANPADS to have a decoy which would allow the
MANPADS to operate to exhaustion, fuel exhaustion, without
putting the landing and taking off planes at risk. So I think
this is an area where we are taking a slightly different
approach than DOD did, this is an area of innovation. I am
excited about it. Will it work? Stay tuned. I can't address
whether $300 million is a boondoggle, and I certainly can't
address why the aviation industry has not embraced it to date.
I will leave that to others.
Mr. Langevin. Just a point, not to ask another question on
this topic, but obviously, closer working with the customers
ensures that once we feel that they are actually going to take
us up on it and work with us to implement it. Admiral, just
briefly, your budget request includes 20 percent reduction in
university programs, at the same time you are touting the
creation of four new university Centers of Excellence. I know
that the existing centers are forward funded with 3-year money,
but it is my understanding that you are going to abandon this
practice for annual appropriations. I would like to ask--I
would like to see these new centers succeed, but I am also
worried that you may end up spreading yourself too thin. And
both the new and existing centers will suffer. Can you explain
how this is supposed to work?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
As you are aware, as I came into the job in August, there
was some very strong language in the pending appropriations
bills relative to the Centers of Excellence. For whatever
reason, my Directorate was not able to show the alignment of
the Centers of Excellence that existed at that time with the
mission requirements of not only the Department but also the
Directorate. And there was also great concern throughout the
Congress in a bipartisan way that the Centers of Excellence did
not adequately represent the intellectual basis around the
country, and I won't get into the details of that. This was the
perception on the Hill, and it was reflected in the
legislation.
As you know from our prior dealings and public statements I
have made, I feel very strongly about the responsibility I
have. It is one of my three strategic goals, and that is to
proactively invest in the underlying workforce development.
This includes the student bodies.
We are in crisis in this country in science and technology.
People in middle schools in all States are turning away from
science and math. My understanding is 80 percent of all science
and math today in the middle schools and high schools are
taught by good teachers, but 80 percent of them are not trained
as science and math teachers.
So this is an area we have got to turn around. To the
extent that I can dual-use the precious dollars that you give
me for universities, for students, for fellowships and
scholarships, I want to make the most of that and, again, I
want it to be transparent. And so working with both sides of
the aisle and both the other body and the House in August and
September, I think you are aware we were able to come to a
proposal that aligned the Centers of Excellence, which all of
the existing Centers of Excellence enthusiastically, I met with
all of the directors--in September, as you know, we had a
display here on the Hill in the middle of September. And
because I had six enduring divisions, which you are familiar
with, they aligned to one or more of those divisions. And what
that did was it gave me an underlying foundation so that, as we
have said, with the customer if I didn't have a technology
solution, I could now go to a Center of Excellence or to a
laboratory to do the underlying basic research. You don't know
what you don't know, and that is a very important area of what
we do.
And so I found that two of my areas didn't have aligned
Centers of Excellence, and I had several in bio of a wide
variety, several in communications, command and control, and
interoperability, and so we asked them to combine and align
while establishing four new Centers of Excellence which were
aligned and will be aligned. Now those broad agency
announcements are out there. We look forward to the
competition. In my model, I want to see universities aligned
with national labs, because they bring so much to that, but on
top of that, I am also aligning my fellowship and my
scholarships, which were totally independent of the COEs. Here
I have 82 universities and colleges who stepped up to the
plate, who established curricula that was supportive of the
mission needs of Homeland Security in their universities, and I
was not aligning my fellowship and scholarships to those
schools. That didn't make any sense to me.
So what I have done now is, we are going to use, and I am
not going to do it all, we will work with you, 60-40, 70-30. I
don't know what the number will be, but I want to give those
fellowships and scholarships to the COEs and associated had
colleges and universities for them to invest in the students
that are taking those courses. For the other students who go to
other universities that I don't want to disenfranchise, we will
go ahead and make sure they get fellowships and scholarships,
as we did in Navy, but they must take Homeland Security related
curricula.
Now, in the area of minority-serving institutions, when I
came on board I can tell you, and all you have to do is look at
the universities who are associated with the COEs, they were
significantly under represented. And when I met with the
students, I wasn't seeing the face of America. And we have got
to go to the best of the best. You are very familiar with what
we did in Navy with the summer intern program which allowed
students to come with a $3,000 to $5,000 stipend to the warfare
center at Newport, Rhode Island, and Pax River and elsewhere on
an annual basis. And we went to almost 70 universities all
around the country.
It is not surprising that the best of the best at
University of Houston were Hispanic and the best of the best
after Hampton University were African-American. So we had the
face of America just by throwing out a broader net. This is
critically important, and so one of the things I did in the
2007 budget, with the help of the Hill and the OMB, was we set
aside, and I think it was appropriate, $4 million focused on
minority-serving institutions to kick start this new paradigm.
And in the 2008 budget, that is $3.75 million.
Now you asked why I had a 20 percent reduction. The reason
was with the language on the Hill, with the lack of alignment
of student programs and COEs to the output function of the
Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security leadership
had also lost confidence in this program. And so I was fighting
a two-front battle. Number one, I had to restore the confidence
of the Congress in these important programs. And now as you
know, sir, we have divided all of the COEs into a class system
very similar to the Congress where every 2 years one-third will
be up for a 6-year recompetition. And as I was required to and
did brief the Appropriations Committees within 60 days after
the passage of the fiscal year 2007 appropriations law, they
will be able to recompete for one 6-year term, but then we have
term-limited them to 12. And I was following the manufacturing
technology model of 5 years, but 6 years was more appropriate
for the universities.
We will continue to fund--when we commit to that 6 years,
we will fund at agreed-upon levels, assuming the appropriations
from the Congress, to those levels for those COEs. But we now
have strong minority-serving commitment that I am personally
committed to do and in the broad agency a announcements that he
we just put out we strongly encourage not only the
participation but the leadership of MSIs as appropriate,
whether it is on borders, explosives or in other areas.
So I brought back, B-R-O-U-G-H-T, a lot of the money to get
us to 80 percent of where we were previously, and I look
forward based on the success of the program to continue to grow
that part of my portfolio.
Mr. Langevin. I recognize the ranking member, the gentlemen
from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, share your concerns over the cut in funding for the
Centers of Excellence, and Admiral, I know you agree with that.
You submitted--had a budget that was higher. I have several
universities in my district, one close by that isn't a Center
of Excellence. I think it is a great symbiotic relationship
with the Department.
I think, given your realignment of fellowships and
scholarships, your leadership, perhaps it will restore the
confidence of the Congress and the administration so we can
look at restoring that funding for you.
Also to echo my colleague from California, the concern over
cybersecurity, I think most people don't understand the grave
threat that cyberspace can pose to not only this country but
the world, far more than a single weapon of mass destruction.
It could shut down this entire country.
So I am glad to hear that you provide the leadership on
that as well. In terms of the cybersecurity czar, I would
continue to ask that you make that a priority under your watch.
I understand that you do have a briefing that will be a closed
door briefing for the members of this subcommittee, and I look
forward to that briefing as well.
The other members have touched on most of the topics. The
other one I wanted to mention was interoperability. This comes
up a lot for us when we go back home in our districts. Why,
more than 5 years since September 11th, have we not been able
to become interoperable? If you could answer that question, but
also as it deals with technology, is this a technology issue,
our problem, or is it a human turf problem or maybe both is my
guess?
Admiral?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, it is a combination, and I know
because of your interest in this area that you are familiar
with the scorecard that came out at Christmas, and because it
is not an area that I was focused on, we are 20 years in the
Department of Defense under Goldwater-Nichols, and we still
have interoperability challenges. Some of those are technical,
and some of those are cultural.
But I just didn't appreciate the governance issues with the
first responders. When I look at the scale issues that I have,
I have to deal with the sheriff of Mayberry. And I have to deal
with the New York City Police Department. And I have to deal
with a volunteer fireman on a tribal reservation with a 1939
LaFrance pumper, and I have to deal with the Chicago Fire
Department. Those scale issues are significant.
The technology is there. Today, if we wanted to buy it, we
can buy digital programable radios, but I wouldn't begin to
suggest either to the administration or to the Congress that we
refurbish all of the 35,000 fire departments in this country,
of which 80 percent are volunteer, or the more than 7,000,000
uniformed policemen that we have. It would be a temporary fix.
Today, if you can get on the internet, and some of you
probably have voice-over IP. If you can get there by copper, by
fiber, by radio frequency, by any means, it doesn't matter if
you are Windows or Mac, we have interoperability. Where I am
focused now is really in the RF. And Secretary Chertoff has
committed that we will be interoperable in voice by the end of
this administration, but we are also looking, and this is S&T,
at data, which is bandwidth, and streaming video, which gives
you the common operating picture. Today with iPod and V-Cast we
have the technical capability.
And so I am most focused on the disenfranchised user. This
is the individual where we have to worry about the last mile.
And it always comes down to the last mile. And whether it is
the rural policemen or the Border Patrol, once we can get them,
and it is generally by radio frequency, onto the Internet
backbone by any means, which has vulnerabilities and cyber
challenges, we are doing okay.
The governance issue that I found and I think shining light
on this will help enormously is we have some chiefs of police
in their cities where the patrolmen and firemen have the
ability to talk to one another technically, but the governance
requires the police only to talk to police headquarters and the
chief of police to the fire marshal, who then passes the
information down to the firemen. That is not how you win wars,
even wars against terror.
So I think the score card will suffer as well, but it will
be a balance of technology and governance. And we look forward
to your leadership in this area to help.
Mr. Langevin. The gentleman from North Carolina is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral again, thank you. Talking about score cards and
that last mile and the person out there at the end, let me ask
a question on that for just a moment because I know that you
have done much to reorganize as you pursue the S&T Directorate
as you developed it to make it work better, I commend you for
that and thank can you for it. I understand, as you put your
new organization structure together, it is designed to serve
those people in the organization that make use of the
technologies and capabilities to use to protect the homeland.
And I applaud your effort in that and thank you for it.
But the first responders and others who use Homeland
Security in the field, they also appreciate the effort for
those they get, the efforts they get, because they really are
the front line when it comes to protecting the homeland. I
remind my colleagues, and I don't need to remind you because,
you know, because if someone has a fire or emergency or
something happens in their community, whether it be manmade or
natural, and they dial 911, it normally does not ring up here;
it rings in their hometown.
So with that, let me ask you how are you are ensuring that
the work is in fact aligned with local needs. In particular, I
know that you are establishing integrated project teams that
are making excellent progress in defining customer needs.
However, in looking at the IPT membership, it looks like your
customer base is Federal. There are no stakeholders outside the
Department.
So my question is three-fold: How are you involving State
and local governments? And number two, do you have the ability
to form an IPT with a non-governmental agency, such as a
private sector owner of critical infrastructure? Thirdly, can
you give me some examples of your IPT's, priorities and what
gaps that are there that may need to be addressed or something
we may need to help with?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir. The short answer is I can form an IPT
with just about anybody, and again, the enabling legislation, I
think, was very, very wise. As you know, in my organizational
construct, I do have a directorate for agency and foreign
liaison. Initially, it was my intent to also have, as I
discussed, association liaison, because I talked about the
scale. It is much better for me to deal with fraternal order of
police or fire prevention or firemen organizations, and they
are well represented of course in the Congress. But what I
found out in DHS was a common complaint from State and local as
well as first responders--and first responders are our heroes;
they are my customers--was that there were too many entry
points. There were too many people trying to engage with them,
and there was great confusion. And of course, the first
responders are focused on providing the mission that they do,
and this was part of overhead. And so I am satisfied now that I
have gotten smarter on the construct of the Department of
Homeland Security that we have the appropriate organizational
people who come from that background, whether they are the
Paulsens or the Forsemans or others who understand how to deal
with State and local communities as well as associations, and
so then while they are not formally identified in my IPT
structure. I can deal with them and get to the first responders
and the associations without causing this left hand, right hand
problem.
But that is not enough for me. We have to be able to
empower the first responders. They have to have faith that the
science and technology is there for them and not just the
bureaucracy of Homeland Security. And so one of the things I
did in Navy, because I had this same challenge, there my
customer was the system commands that procure the items and
maintain the weapons systems in ships but also the sailor and
Marine. And we established a Web-based text solutions, that is
what we called it, and made it available with 1 percent of my
budget where they could come in on the web, and these kids are
smart, and they know solutions. And they read Popular Science
and Popular Mechanics, and they have been there, and they have
college degrees, et cetera. And they would then come in and
tell me the problems they had, offer solutions if they knew, I
would then broker that to my warfare centers in Navy, we would
stay in touch with that sailor, and we then would provide the
solution.
And the Chairman is familiar with one of these. We had a
young kid from the Persian Gulf. It is very hot in the Persian
Gulf in summer, 130 degrees. He is on an aircraft carrier, and
he says, you know, 4.5 acres takes several hundred people to
degrease the flight deck, and it is really dirty work, like
holystoning the old sailing ships. He said, I am from Boston.
And when I go to the Bruins, he said, after each period, they
have got a Zamboni, and they resurface the ice. Why can't we
have a degreasing Zamboni?
I have got to tell you, this was right on the edge of S&T.
And I justified it, not that we were developing a Zamboni. We
weren't, but we had to treat the petrochemicals and not put
them over the side. And so we spent a million dollars, and God
bless, through our warfare centers and industry, we provided a
degreasing Zamboni to that aircraft carrier. Now you can
imagine this young sailor never had to buy another beer with
that crew in his life.
So that was an example. What I am telling you is, I have
now established text solutions. We have the Web site for first
responders. We are getting the word out. And I will do with my
DOE labs, with national labs and my own labs the same thing for
first responders that I did for the sailors, but that is not
enough. You very wisely provided for a tech clearinghouse. Now,
this, regrettably, was not fully enabled by my Directorate. I
am very pleased that I understand that the tech clearing house
has hired a very good person who knows how to do this from
Sandia labs. I look forward to sitting down with this person.
We are going to take the unspent moneys, which are
considerable, and we are going to focus directly on the first
responders.
So we are going to take a two-faced approach, and I will be
glad to get back to you on the details of those projects, but
they will come from the first responders, not from me.
Mr. Etheridge. Good. Thank you very much.
Mr. Langevin. Finally, the gentleman from California, Mr.
Lungren is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. I didn't know how we were going to get into
Zambonis. A friend of mine is actually the nephew of Mr.
Zamboni who owns the Paramount ice rink in Paramount,
California who figured out somebody had to figure out how to do
the resurfacing of the ice rather than doing it the old way. I
am glad to see it also helped in the Navy.
Admiral I see that you commanded the USS Hyman Rickover,
and I notice that you graduated from Naval Academy the same
time I graduated from Notre Dame. Did you ever undergo the
famous Admiral Rickover interview?
Mr. Cohen. Yes, sir, I did, and I would like to publicly
acknowledge that, in the entire time I have been in the Navy,
which was 1964 through 2006, Navy played Notre Dame every year,
and we have yet to defeat you, sir.
Mr. Lungren. I know.
Mr. Cohen. So I congratulate you. But I did go through the
interview.
Mr. Lungren. My good friend, Admiral Tom Lynch, was the
captain of the last team to beat Notre Dame.
Mr. Cohen. 1963.
Mr. Lungren. We don't forget those things. I am not an
expert on this but I am starting to look at it, the
configuration of the internet IPV4 versus IPV6. We are the ones
who invented the Internet. We are stuck in the old protocols,
so to speak. It is limited compared to the tremendous expansion
of what I would just call very simply Internet Web sites, for
want of a better term. It appears that is the nature of the
future. It also gives us, because of its expanded volume,
tremendous opportunity in the area of security and yet do you
think that we have the emphasis in the Federal Government to
move in that direction. And the reason I ask that is we have
made a decision in the television industry to move to digital
so that we can open up bandwidth. We as a Federal Government
have made decisions that basically are going to result in the
American people buying new televisions or having convertors
because we thought that was important from a standpoint of
opening up bandwidth and also product improvement to the
public. But from my standpoint, this other issue is a far more
serious issue in terms of potential security needs. And are we
going to, in that new world, build in the kind of security we
need against terrorist attacks on cyber security that we didn't
when we first started with the Internet because, frankly, we
weren't in that world? And what is your office doing to take
this challenge seriously?
Mr. Cohen. Congressman, I would like to thank you for your
personal interest in this area. This is critically important,
and there is always a balance between access and security and
putting a damper on innovation by regulation, et cetera. This
is the wild, wild west, and this curve hasn't even started bend
over. In fact, I think it is accelerating, and it is exciting.
And the same advantages that we have that enable the business,
regrettably, give the terrorists access to do widespread harm,
as you have indicated. I don't know if our government is
organized for this new world and this new threat. And I am glad
to work with the Congress and with the administration to help,
and anyone else, industry of course. In the enabling
legislation, you made me responsible for standards, standards
Department-wide. We talked a little bit about interoperability,
and I am having to balance IEEE versus ANCI versus NIST
standards, and what you find is people are coming to me and
saying, look, in some ways, standards are things of the past.
With middle wear, it doesn't matter what standard. We can
design a program that will give us the interoperability. So I
have 6 pages from the IPT, from my cyber czar customer, many of
which, Congressman Lungren, address exactly the issues you are
talking about. And we were able to fund about half of these,
and half I have budgeted in the out years because this fund, as
you know, zero to 3 years, refreshes itself.
I think this issue is much bigger than this particular
hearing and might be best if we discussed this off line, and I
am glad to do that, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Langevin. I want to thank the witnesses for very
valuable testimony and the members for their questions.
Admiral on a personal note, I am glad that my first hearing
as chairman of this subcommittee was with you as our witness.
Thank you for your testimony.
The members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in
writing to those questions. Hearing no further business, this
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix A: Additional Questions and Responses
----------
Questions From the Honorable James R. Langevin, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science Technology
Responses From the Honorable Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and
Technology
Question 1.: Regarding cuts in funding, last year, Congressional
appropriators expressed frustration with the Directorate's production
by slashing the budget and withholding funds.\1\ An August 2006 article
in the Washington Post said that the organization is ``hobbled by poor
leadership, weak financial management and inadequate technology,'
stating that S&T ``has struggled with turnover, reorganizations and
raids on its budget.'' \2\ The President's budget included some
reductions in the areas of University Programs (which includes the
University Centers of Excellence) and the Infrastructure and
Geophysical programs (including the Southeast Regional Research
Initiative (SERRI) and the Community Based Critical Infrastructure
Protection Institute).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``The Committee is extremely disappointed with the manner in
which S&T is being managed within the Department of Homeland Security.
Despite the efforts of the Acting head of S&T, this component is a
rudderless ship without a clear way to get back on course.'' The
Committee directs the Secretary to immediately develop a 5-year
research plan, including performance measures, which reflect DHS's
research and funding priorities, and brief the Committee no later than
60 days after the date of enactment of this act. Developing and
implementing this 5-year plan is the only way S&T will be successful.
\2\ Washington Post, Aug. 20, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can you explain why these programs were singled out for such large
cuts?
Response: Program level increases and decreases in FY 2008 are a
reflection of the transition or transfer of mature technologies to
other DHS Components, the completion of programs, reduction of funding
needs for construction and laboratory operations, and better alignment
of some programs and leveraging of others.
The Department will continue to balance research and development
needs and funding resources so that the S&T Directorate's budget
reflects the priorities of the Department. The development of new
technologies and measuring the potential impact they have on our
operations and acquisitions are more critical as we are committed to
operate more efficiently and accomplish more with fewer resources.
Question 2.: Regarding cybersecurity, the President's budget cuts
cybersecurity R&D funding this year from its request of $22.7m last
year.
In light of all of the executive reports that have been released
highlighting the importance of spending federal dollars on
cybersecurity R&D, how can this Administration continue to justify its
meager spending in the field?
Cybersecurity research and development (R&D) has been and will
continue to be a priority in the President's budget, the Department of
Homeland Security and in the newly formed Command, Control and
Interoperability Division within the S&T Directorate. The FY 2008
cybersecurity R&D request is $14.88 million, a 32 percent increase over
the FY 2007 enacted level. Based on the capability gaps that have been
generated by the Department and other Federal agencies, the S&T
Directorate in coordination with the DHS Assistant Secretary for Cyber
Security and Communications has developed a focused budget that
addresses the Nation's critical cybersecurity needs where the
government can have the greatest impact.
Question 3.: Regarding basic research, S&T seeks to balance risk,
cost, impact, and time to delivery. Your goal for Basic Research
investment is 20% of the budget. When we talked with your staff, they
expressed how this particular area is difficult for the customer to
envision the long term investment needed in basic research. How will
you get your customers to understand the importance and support Basic
Research investment?
Response: The S&T Directorate is working closely with its customers
to build an understanding of the importance of basic research. For
example, the S&T Directorate, in its interactions with customers
through a capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT) process, is providing
guidance on which types of research are likely to produce results that
will lead to technology development that will fill customer's needs.
Basic research may be required when:
The S&T Directorate's Transition program may only be
able to fulfill a partial gap requirement and would require
basic research to develop a deeper understanding of the science
and technology needed to fulfill the entire gap; or
There may not be current or near term technical
solutions available to address identified future threats. A
basic research program would investigate science to provide the
fundamental understanding that could be used by scientist and
engineers to develop practical solutions.
We are educating our customers about our capability to quickly tap
into areas of basic research that can be exploited for homeland
security solutions. The basic research program is attuned to new
scientific developments in many communities through domestic and
international technical exchanges, symposia, various publications and
leverages science used to develop solutions and funds projects of
specific interest to exploit collaborative and interdisciplinary
relationships to solve fundamental issues to advance needed
technologies.
Question 4.: Regarding contracting officers, for FY 2006 funds, S&T
had a $125m rescission because they were not committing and obligating
funds in a timely manner. I understand that one of your top priorities
is for S&T to become more efficient at executing their FY 2007 funds
with a goal of 100% commitments by the end of May. It seems that you
are making good progress and I commend you for that. S&T, and the
Department in general, has historically had trouble getting money out
the door due, in part, to limited numbers of DHS contracting officers
available.
Do you have an adequate number of DHS contracting officers assigned
to S&T to execute in a timely manner?
The DHS S&T Directorate and the Office of Procurement Operations
(OPO) have agreed to a staffing plan that will serve all of the S&T
Directorate's needs. OPO is currently hiring to fill that staffing
plan.
Question 5.: I understand that DHS Contracting Officers are
detailed to various component agencies including S&T. The Contracting
Officers are on-site to S&T, but their performance assessments do not
include input by S&T. How can you effectively work with DHS contracting
officers detailed to S&T if the process does not allow for S&T's input
regarding their performance?
Response: The DHS Office of Procurement Operations (OCO) personnel,
assigned to DHS S&T, are collocated with the S&T organization; the S&T
Directorate has provided working space for contracting offices at the
Vermont Avenue location. This day-to-day working arrangement provides
opportunity for the contracting officers to quickly gain familiarity
with the S&T Directorate's mission and objectives and address issues as
they arise--all within a team environment. The performance goals flow
directly from the goals of Chief Procurement Officer to the Head of the
Contracting Activity to the contracting specialists. S&T leadership
does provide evaluation commentary and feedback on those collocated at
Vermont Avenue. However, OPO believes that the evaluation of the
quality of the work performed by contracting professionals is best
performed by other contracting professionals because of the
complexities involved in the work. The OPO branch chiefs, division
directors and oversight team provide a significant portion of the input
on the performance of the contracting professionals. Additionally, the
contracting professionals are thoroughly trained and certified in
accordance with the Department of Homeland Security Management
Directives. Further, the OPO workforce management team monitors the
contracting professionals' initial training as well as determines
required skills currency training.
Question 6.: Regarding integrated project teams, the Integrated
Project Teams (IPT) established and currently ongoing are making
excellent progress in defining customer needs. In looking at the IPT
membership, your customer base is Federal; there are no stakeholders
outside of the Department. I have questions about the following:
How are you involving State and Local governments?
Do you have the ability to form an IPT with a non-government
agency, such as private sector owners of critical
infrastructure?
Can you give me some examples of your IPTs priorities and what
gaps they address?
What parts of the customer's mission is the IPT priority
addressing?
I know you have introduced the IPT concept to ensure customer
collaboration and buy-in.
What is the formal agreement in an IPT? Do all members of the
IPT sign an MOU, for instance?
Response: (1) The first phase of establishing Capstone Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) focused on developing and strengthening the
relationship with Departmental component customers to ensure that the
S&T Directorate focused on technology that would best support DHS
components? strategic mission priorities. We know that the DHS
components have long-standing relations with their appropriate State
and local representatives and interest groups that already address the
mission requirements and capability gaps in the IPT functional areas
and therefore felt it was best at the beginning of the IPT process to
have the Departmental Components choose how to address the priority
needs of their customers.
As the Capstone IPT process is maturing, the S&T Directorate is
reaching out to the National Guard Association and other representative
State and local groups to communicate technology requirements and
priority mission capability gaps as identified by Departmental
Components. The S&T Directorate has invited these groups to join the
IPT process to ensure that the capability gaps of the end-user
community are properly understood as well as ensure these organizations
understand the process by which technology requirements are vetted and
prioritized for science and technology investments. From a procurement
integrity standpoint, some caution must be exercised about involvement
of contractors in the requirements-setting phase of contracting. The
IPT can and will obtain the best ideas of the private sector, but must
be careful not to create a competitive advantage by involving only a
few contractors in this process.
First Responder and State and local governments can also make their
technology requirements known to the S&T Directorate through the Tech
Solutions program where their input on current capability gaps and
technology requirements is received by the S&T Directorate via a
website. We will pursue technology solutions directly through this
approach, as well as bring forward these requirements to the
appropriate Capstone IPT for inclusion in the Capstone IPT process.
(2) At this stage, the S&T Directorate has not included private
sector organizations in its formation of IPTs; however, when
appropriate, input from the private sector is sought and incorporated
into the IPT process. For example, the S&T Directorate's Infrastructure
Protection Division brought into the Capstone IPT process the priority
requirements generated with the 17 Sector-Specific Agencies, which
represent the private sector's critical infrastructure priorities.
These requirements were then addressed within the appropriate Capstone
IPTs to ensure the private sector owners' priorities are known and
considered.
(3) Attached are representative technical priorities for each of
the 11 Capstone IPTs and the mission capability gaps that these
solutions will address. These priorities have been set by the component
leads of the IPTs. (See attachment A)
(4) The customer-led Capstone IPTs are addressing those parts of
the mission space where customers believe that technology is a
significant contribution and provides value to their operations.
Attached is a list of focus areas that the IPTs addressed during their
discussions. The Capstone IPTs are focused on identifying programs that
will develop near-term (0--3 years) deliverables that improve mission
capability. (See attachment B)
(5) Charters will be executed for each Capstone IPT that will
identify the representatives and mission areas under that IPT's
authority. Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs) will be executed
between the S&T Directorate and the project customer to formalize in
detail the technologies to be transitioned to the customer.
Additionally, the S&T Directorate is drafting a Management Directive
for consideration by the Department that will codify this process.
Question 7.: Regarding personnel problems within S&T, he recently
released OPM (Office of Personnel Management) Survey ranked the
Department at or near the bottom in four major personnel categories,
including performance and job satisfaction. During the hearing, Under
Secretary Cohen stated that that he will provide the Committee with a
plan to improve morale, minimize turnover, strengthen workforce
recruitment and secure institutional memory within the Directorate.
When will that plan reach the Committee?
Response: The S&T Directorate received the results from the Chief
Human Capital office for the Office of Personnel Management Federal
Human Capital Survey on January 30, 2007. We reviewed both the
Departmental responses and the S&T Directorate's responses and were
able to identify four findings that point to areas in the S&T
Directorate that require improvement. Below you will find the plan
which identifies the four findings, actions taken to improve
dissatisfaction, and metrics for measuring our success.
The first area cited is lack of respect for and honesty conveyed by
senior leaders. To improve in this area of dissatisfaction, senior
leadership has taken proactive measures to communicate the S&T
Directorate's vision, mission, and path forward as well as provided
feedback opportunities for all staff by:
Holding regular ``All Hands'' staff meetings every
four to six weeks (previous meetings have been held August 11,
September 12, October 20, December 19, and February 9);
Holding weekly ``Corporate Board'' meetings composed
of senior staff, which began on October 25, 2006;
Releasing S&T Snippets, a newsletter touting recent
S&T Directorate activities;
Published a ``Corporate Calendar'' in January 2007;
and
We will measure our success using input received from these
meetings, releases and publications, which, to date, have been very
positive.
The second finding is the lack of recognition for performance, to
include promotions/raises/awards not based on merit. To improve in this
area of dissatisfaction, we are providing training for all employees in
performance management and leadership. We offered Performance
Leadership Training, Goal Writing Training and Performance Training.
The S&T Directorate's leadership team has also initiated the
presentation of awards to employees at the ``All Hands'' meetings. To
date, we have given five awards and will continue to acknowledge the
special performance of employees at other ``All Hands'' meetings.
The third finding is lack of sufficient personnel on board to get
the job done. To improve on this problem, we are currently developing a
staffing plan to address critical needs and gaps to fulfill our mission
requirements. The S&T Directorate intends to measure the staffing plan
through execution and will continue to evaluate and seek the needed
resources for staff to do their jobs.
The final area of concern is the lack of opportunity to improve
skills. The S&T Directorate is committed to employee development and
has launched an aggressive set of initiatives to develop learning
opportunities for staff. We have implemented a training initiative that
encourages and facilitates employee training. For example, the S&T
Directorate encourages employees to participate in program management
training opportunities such as the S&T's new Homeland Security
Acquisition Course 101, which was piloted in November 2006, and offered
again in March, and April, and slated for June. We had several other
learning and development opportunities available to S&T Directorate
employees, to include the Graduate Education Program, Senior Executive
Service (SES) Development Program, Fellowships, and the SES Career
Development Program. The S&T Directorate has approved 30 requests for
employees to take job related training in fiscal year FY 2007. Finally,
we are in the early stages of discussion concerning intern development
opportunities and student hiring plans. We will measure the success of
the training program by the number of employees who avail themselves of
the training, obligation/expenditure rates, and program review results
(cost, schedule, and capability); however it is too early to provide
results at this time.
In conclusion, we believe that the actions taken to date as well as
future measures to improve the satisfaction level of staff will result
in positive feedback and improvement over time. We expect that results
from the next DHS survey, anticipated for September 2007, will show a
marked improvement in the Directorate's survey scores.
Question 8.: We believe it is important to have a Federal workforce
within the Department, especially in a directorate like S&T where
institutional knowledge is needed. Instead, we see an over-reliance on
contractors with just a few Federal project managers. Are you committed
to shifting from such a contractor-based operating picture to one that
hires and grooms Federal workers? Are you actively recruiting younger
members and not just proven program managers?
Response: The S&T Directorate agrees that institutional knowledge
is critical to meeting the mission of Directorate and DHS. The S&T
Directorate initiated a realignment that is structured not only to
develop a workforce with the skill sets to meet our mission, but also
to provide a supportive structure to ensure a collaborative team
focused environment.
The S&T Directorate is allocated 383 (FY 2007)/ 381 (FY 2008) full-
time equivalents (FTE). Our goal is to reach the level either on hand
or in the hiring pipeline by the end of the year. The S&T Directorate
relies on contract support and the talent brought to the organization
through detailees from other Federal agencies and those members through
the Inter-Governmental Personnel Act. These various methods of bringing
onboard the leading talent in the Nation to address new issues in areas
of research, development, test and evaluation helps the S&T Directorate
maintain a highly skilled, flexible and agile workforce. This mix of
highly skilled talent is critical in creating a dynamic environment;
one in which employees will thrive. To enhance the recruitment process
the S&T Directorate developed Scholars (undergraduate) and Fellowship
(graduate) programs aimed at students with backgrounds in the science
and technology areas. In addition, the S&T Directorate is in the early
discussion/planning stage to develop an internship program.
Question 9.: Regarding personnel (ethics) issues at the S&T
Directorate, this Committee is familiar with the December 2005 GAO
report that described the significant problems with the way that S&T
handles its IPA (Intergovernmental Personnel Act) employees. The IPA
issue is important to resolve because IPAs are actually not employees
of the Department of Homeland Security, but are essentially on loan to
the federal government from universities or state/local government. The
Department usually pays their salary. This is a great way to get much-
needed talent into the Department, and we are thankful for the hard
work that many of the IPAs that are on your staff put in every day.
Unfortunately, as the GAO pointed out, the Department does not have
adequate ethics procedures to utilize their IPAs. In response to a
query by Committee staff, DHS Legislative Affairs wrote on Oct. 12,
2006, that ``S&T is working with the Chief Human Capital Officer and
the Office of General Counsel on a guide that will provide the
comprehensive information needed for the hiring of IPA detailees and
administering their assignments.''
Will you please provide the Committee with that guide?
Response: Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) employees are a
critical component of the S&T Directorate's workforce and have been
since the organizational was created. The Directorate is aware of the
ethics issues that may occur in this talent sharing relationship
between the Federal sector and universities/national laboratories/state
and local entities. The S&T Directorate has developed and drafted
several process documents and/or guides to assist managers and our
partners in understanding the requirements involved in an IPA position.
In developing these documents the S&T Directorate collaborated with the
DHS Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO) and the Office of General Counsel
(OGC) representatives matrixed to the S&T Directorate. In addition to
the ethics program the guide addresses a broad range of administrative
requirements including travel. The Directorate believes the best
practices have been captured as they relate to the S&T Directorate's
environment. The draft IPA policies and procedures were developed
f7ollowing the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance and by
benchmarking best practices across the Federal agencies. The S&T
Directorate analyzed and compared the IPA policies and procedures used
by the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, National Science Foundation, National Institutes of
Health and the Office of Naval Research. These are the premiere users
of Intergovernmental Personnel Act and have the most mature policies
and procedures. Currently, the S&T Directorate is testing the adequacy
of the draft guidance as we await the publishing of the DHS Management
Directive on the IPA program. The S&T Directorate is pleased to share
with you our draft guide with the understanding that revisions may
result from further review. (See Attachment C) \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, `Intergovernmental
Personnel Act (IPA) Program Reference Guide, April 30, 2007.
[Maintained in the Committee file.]
Question 10.: Interoperability depends on several factors, one of
which is technology. Others have to do with governance and standard
operating protocols. Last year you made technology recommendations on
how to fix the problem. Can you explain what the technology solution
you outlined and what needs to be done to finally fix this problem?
Do you have any role in that process, or do you feel that you have
now made your recommendation and it is up to others to implement?
In the Fall of 2006, the Under Secretary Cohen testified before the
House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Science, and Technology on the reorganization of the Department's
Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. In his testimony, Under
Secretary Cohen discussed the establishment of technological standards
for interoperable communication among emergency responders.
Technological differences in equipment have become a major factor that
cripples the ability of the Nation's emergency responders to
communicate during a crisis.
To combat this problem, the Office for Interoperability and
Compatibility (OIC) within the S&T Directorate has been actively
involved in Project 25 (P25) standards development, an initiative that
will help produce voice communications equipment that is interoperable
and compatible, regardless of manufacturer. OIC was established to
serve as the office within the S&T Directorate to strengthen and
integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to improve
Federal, State, local, and tribal emergency response preparedness and
recovery. The P25 suite of interface standards is a major building
block for achieving interoperable communications. P25 is part of a
voluntary consensus standards development process led by the
Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA). Over 20 interested
parties (government and commercial entities) meet regularly to
negotiate and document the P25 standards suite. While OIC promotes the
acceleration, completion, and wide-spread adoption of P25 standards,
neither OIC nor DHS has the authority to set standards.
With support from Congress, the S&T Directorate's OIC has worked
closely with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
to establish a clear vision and communicated key priorities for
standards. As a result, industry has dramatically accelerated the
development of key standards. OIC has helped develop initial standards
for six of the eight major system interfaces associated with P25. All
key component standards that comprise the P25 suite are nearing
completion and work continues on test protocols to validate
interoperability. Through the work of OIC and NIST, the P25 standards
suite should be completed within the next 18--24 months.
Since October 2005, OIC has also worked with NIST to develop a P25
Compliance Assessment Program. This program will ensure that equipment
from different manufacturers not only interoperates, but also meets
minimal requirements for performance and conformance. In addition, the
program will work with manufacturers so that their voice communications
products supposed to comply with published P25 standards actually do.
Finally the program will help ensure that Federal grant dollars are
being used appropriately by State and local governments.
Though the S&T Directorate's OIC has made significant progress
toward standards development, the work is far from complete. As
standards are developed and tested, OIC will continue to actively
engage stakeholders and congressional leaders. With continued
cooperation of industry, the emergency response community, and the
Federal Government, interoperable P25 equipment will be available
across the Nation.
Question 11.: I have a question about the method by which the
Department evaluates the performance of the programs within your
Directorate. Every year, the Department provides the President and
Congress with the Performance and Accountability Report, also known as
the ``PAR,'' which is an audit conducted each year by KPMG designed to
assess the effectiveness of the Department's mission performance and
stewardship of resources. The goals and measurements used to write the
2005 and 2006 reports are, by and large, weak and meaningless. Allow me
to offer a few examples to explain what we mean. For example, the PAR
looks at the Explosives Countermeasures portfolio, where the stated
performance goal is to ``improve explosives countermeasures
technologies and procedures to prevent attacks on critical
infrastructure, key assets, and the public.'' That's a good goal. But
the performance measure is to count ``the number of pilot programs that
the Department has initiated.'' KPMG explained that the Explosives
Countermeasures portfolio met their performance goal because they
initiated 4 pilot programs. My point is that the number of pilot
programs initiated, by itself, is not a significant measurement of how
this program is performing. This measurement, coupled with follow-on
measures or reporting on how these pilots have positively impacted
running the program would make this reporting more meaningful. Here's
another example from your Directorate. The SAFETY Act performance
measure is to count ``the percentage of full applications that receive
SAFETY Act coverage? The target in 2006 was 65%. Again, this
measurement is meaningless. Who is to say that these applicants even
merited SAFETY Act coverage? We want to judge the SAFETY Act Office by
how many applications were filed, or how many applicants found the
application process to be user-friendly, or how quickly the Department
is able to turn around applications. So again we have an example of a
meaningless performance measurement.
I have the following questions:
What efforts are underway at S&T to modify the way that some of
these programs are being assessed?
Are you discussing ways to improve these assessments with KPMG?
How can you evaluate performance over time if you have a
constantly changing baseline?
Can you provide us with your future goals and where are these
documented or stated?
Response: Performance measures are a key piece in our efforts to
get the content right and to that the end the S&T Directorate has
initiated a number of changes to ensure that programs are assessed in a
more meaningful manner. For example, a set of basic cost, schedule and
performance measures have been developed that will be used to assess
the health and progress of programs and projects across the S&T
Directorate. These measures are to be tracked in the S&T Plan Database,
a new system used to manage, track and execute customer driven S&T
Directorate investments.
A more effective way to assess programs across the S&T Directorate
is to measure how well they meet customer-driven milestones. Achieving
milestones and delivering capabilities to our customers are key to the
overall performance of the S&T Directorate. Therefore, the S&T
Directorate has developed a consistent measure across each of the new
budget lines that ties directly to the work and milestones identified
in its comprehensive Execution Plan for FY 2007--2008. For example,
Chemical and Biological Countermeasures has identified several
milestones in the FY 2007--2008 Execution Plan such as:
Completing BioWatch (Gen 3) studies and working with
local BioWatch users to develop preliminary concepts of
operation (CONOPS) to better characterize and respond to
biological attacks.
Completing the Project BioShield material threat
determinations for all traditional bio-threat agents of
significant public health concern.
Initiating the prototypes of an integrated CB
detection systems--the system is targeted for use in subways,
high-profile office buildings, and for deployment at special
events.
The S&T Directorate will measure how well it is meeting the program
milestones and goal as identified in the document, and will provide
this information to Congress in its performance-related documents such
as the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), Performance
Budget Overview (PBO), and the Performance and Accountability Report
(PAR). This information, coupled with specific programmatic measures,
will enable a comprehensive assessment of how well the Directorate is
executing its programs and meeting its customer's needs.
To help ensure we meet customer needs, the S&T Directorate has
established the Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to identify
our customers' needs and transition near-term capabilities for
addressing those needs. The Capstone IPTs engage DHS customers,
acquisition partners, S&T Directorate technical division heads, and
end-users in our product research, development, transition and
acquisition activities. This process, which began late in 2006, will
provide a way to measure the success of the programs via the
development of Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs). TTAs document
the technologies to be transitioned to the customer, and commit the
customer to funding to deployment of technologies that the S&T
Directorate develops. The technologies available for transition either
have to be accepted or meet user-defined criteria. This funding
commitment by the customers will provide a clear indication of customer
satisfaction with the products developed by the S&T Directorate.
Finally, the S&T Directorate is currently outlining its business
model, which addresses plans for program performance, in the Five-year
Research and Development (R&D) plan required by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2007 which will be
delivered to Congress in early summer 2007. The S&T Directorate
considers performance vital to the management of strong programs and
will continue to review and evaluate performance throughout the year as
well as during the S&T mid-year review. The S&T Directorate will also
develop processes and measures for different levels and types of
performance-related, data-based reviews of programs and projects. The
S&T Directorate plans to work with KPMG through the Department's
Program Analysis and Evaluation office to ensure that they are aware of
the changes that are being implemented and seek input throughout the
yearly assessment.
Question 12.: Regarding the PART, I also have a question about the
effectiveness of some of your S&T programs. You are no doubt familiar
with the OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which was
developed to assess and improve program performance so that the Federal
government can achieve better results. Severak S&T programs have been
rated by this tool, and the results have varied from ``Effective'' to
``Results not Demonstrated.'' For example, the Biological Division has
been rated ``Effective,'' while University Fellowships, Rapid
Prototyping, and Emerging Threat Detection are all ``Moderately
Effective.'' Threat and Vulnerability, Testing and Assessment received
a ``Results not Demonstrated.'' In each report, an Improvement Plan is
outlined.
What is S&T doing now to address these areas, so they are all
considered ``Effective''?
Are Improvement Plan suggestions part of the measures within the
Performance Accountability Report or other document?
Response: The S&T Directorate is taking actions to address the
scores and results of the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART). In
addition to the improvements being made at the program level, the S&T
Directorate is implementing several Directorate-wide initiatives to
ensure that all of its programs are managed efficiently and
effectively.
To better address overall program management, the S&T Directorate
has designed an information tool, the S&T Plan Database (PDB) that
enables more efficient management of research and development (R&D)
budget resources. The PDB is part of the S&T Directorate's ``one set of
books'' and will be used to manage, track and execute customer- driven
R&D investments. The S&T Directorate is also implementing program
management training that will include modules on financial and budget
processes. This will ensure that all program managers in the S&T
Directorate are well trained for the management of their programs.
To better address performance measures and the results, the S&T
Directorate, through the PDB, will collect and report performance on
schedule, cost, technical maturity and customer satisfaction. It will
also report on how closely programs are adhering to their plans for
milestones and deliverables. Progress on these detailed project-level
milestones and deliverables will in turn be linked to higher level PART
milestones and outcomes. The ultimate measure of effectiveness of our
work will be how well we meet the needs of our customers.
To help ensure we meet customer needs, the S&T Directorate has
established the Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to identify
our customers' needs and enable and transition near-term capabilities
for addressing those needs. The Capstone IPTs engage DHS customers,
acquisition partners, S&T Directorate technical division heads, and end
users in our product research, development, transition and acquisition
activities. This process not only provides a clear customer, but will
provide a way to measure the success of the programs via the
development of Technology Transition Agreements (TTAs). TTAs formalize
in detail the technologies to be transitioned to the customer, and
commit to the customer to funding to deployment of technologies that
the S&T Directorate develops. This funding commitment by the customers
will provide clear indications of customer satisfaction with the
products developed by the S&T Directorate.
The following is a chart summarizing the scores and improvement
actions that have been taken to ensure that these programs become
stronger and managed efficiently and effectively. (Chart--Attachment`
D)
Question 13.: Regarding minority serving institutions, on an
application for scholarship and fellowship programs for students there
is a list for ``Fields of Study with Codes.''
Is this list deemed an exhaustive list of Homeland Security-related
curricula?
If it is, why is foreign language not included?
If it is not an exhaustive list, please provide us with a copy of
such list.
Response: For the current year, the list of Homeland Security-
related curricular is exhaustive, but the S&T Directorate will revisit
the list for 2008. Specific to foreign language, since they are
considered humanities they are outside the scope of the S&T
Directorate's mandate. However, linguistics studies of the interaction
of language and terrorism would fall within the accepted social science
disciplines. Additionally, having a foreign language component of some
disciplines, such as computer science-based textual analysis, would
also fall within the scope.
Question 14.: Admiral Cohen, you have indicated that you have
significant interest in ensuring quality partnerships with minority-
serving institutions (``MSIs'') and Centers of Excellence (``COEs'').
However, in addition to the overall twenty percent reduction to
university programs, MSIs generally receive a very small portion of
funding given to the various COEs (i.e. tens of thousands as compared
to the hundreds of thousands).
If MSIs are not given the funding to be ``quality partners,'' how
do you expect MSIs to become stronger partners with less funding
available?
Response: The COE program has evolved since its establishment. The
solicitations for the first COEs did not explicitly encourage MSI
partners, nor did they include meaningful participation of MSIs as an
evaluation criterion to ensure that the homeland security mission is
bolstered by the diversity of viewpoints and research MSIs may offer.
As a result, when the first consortia were formed, MSIs were not
explicitly sought by lead institutions as partners. UP issued later
solicitations which encouraged MSIs to compete and submit proposals
with the result that the last two COEs both have MSI partnerships.
All new and extended COEs are encouraged to have meaningful
partnerships with MSIs and MSIs are encouraged to submit competitive
proposals to lead new COEs. Demonstrated ability and commitment to
establishing meaningful partnerships with MSIs is now an explicit
criterion for evaluating new COE applications and awarding extensions.
Of course, MSIs should also submit proposals to serve as lead
institutions. The evaluation criteria for new COEs include the
following language:
Minority Serving Institution Partnerships: The demonstrated
ability and commitment to establish meaningful partnerships
with MSIs to develop a quality MSI research and training
program, and the quality of the proposed program. The
application should demonstrate the proposed COE's ability to
create a high-quality and enduring education and research
program capabilities at minority-serving institutions in
disciplinary areas important to homeland security. [NOTE: Lead
institutions seeking MSI partners and MSI researchers wanting
to participate in this COE should register their respective
needs and qualifications at: www.sciencetosecurity.org.
Further, we encourage MSI's to submit proposals as lead
organizations for our future COEs, and we will encourage all new COEs
to have substantial partnerships with MSIs.
Question 15.: For FY 2007, you implemented a targeted outreach plan
to MSIs.
Can you provide a copy of your current MSI outreach plan that
includes your accomplishments?
How has MSI participation increased since you began the outreach
plan?
Response: The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Minority
Serving Institutions (MSI) strategy is a flexible approach to develop
new initiatives, retain those that work, and modify others based on
feedback from MSIs. The MSI program has a number of components,
described below, to increase MSI involvement in the S&T Directorate's
activities.
In 2005 and 2006, University Programs (UP), within the S&T
Directorate, held a series of regional MSI workshops to introduce MSI
opportunities and encourage MSIs to work with UP. In the summer of
2005, as a result of these workshops, ten teams of faculty and students
participated in the MSI Summer Research Team (SRT) program. This
program provides opportunities for teams of MSI students and faculty to
spend 10 to 12 weeks conducting a research project at a DHS Center of
Excellence (COE) facility. Similarly, in 2006, six teams participated
in a redesigned SRT program. Moreover, these outreach efforts
contributed to the development of additional criteria for newer COEs.
As a result, the most recent COE at John Hopkins University (JHU) had
two MSI partners with significant roles included in the grant
applications, compared with no proposed MSI partners at the first COEs,
when such participation was not explicitly encouraged.
In 2007, following establishment of a new MSI Program by Under
Secretary Cohen, UP hosted three regional MSI workshops, which took
place on February 4 in Baltimore targeting Historically Black Colleges
and Universities (HBCUs), on February 21 at Broward Community College
(Florida) targeting Hispanic Serving Institutions (HSIs), HBCUs and MSI
community colleges and on February 28 at USC (California) targeting
HSIs and tribal Colleges. At these workshops, DHS:
Introduced the MSIs to the new COE solicitations,
explained the opportunities those represent and encouraged the
MSIs to participate, including as lead institutions,
Explained the ideas and expectations for the new MSI
program that U/S Cohen initiated, and solicit the MSIs input.
Note: UP revamped the MSI Leadership Grant program
significantly in response to comments received from MSIs at
these workshops,
Described the 2007 Summer Research Team program,
Described DHS Scholarship and Fellowship Programs and
the DHS Postdoctoral Research Associateship Program, and
Invited the MSIs to a ten-day summer workshop on
teaching terrorism (SWOTT) specifically developed for MSIs.
Note: DHS is supporting the attendance of interested MSI
faculty to this workshop until capacity is reached.
Other UP MSI Activities have included:
Participation in the White House Initiative on HSIs'
conference planning committee in Fall 2006;
Meeting with Hispanic Association of Colleges and
Universities and HBCUs at their annual meetings and at UP's
requests on ways to disseminate information, engage HSIs and
HBCUs, and present at their major conferences;
Participation in a workshop for Native Americans on
the risk of terrorism for Casinos;
Meeting with a number of other Federal agencies on
ways to collaborate and leverage MSI resources;
Collaboration with the White House Initiatives on
HBCUs and TCUs on ways to disseminate information and provide
speaking opportunities at their key venues; and
Reaching out to MSIs to encourage MSI students to
apply for DHS Scholarships and Fellowships.
Question 16.: Regarding ``Get Backs'' from the hearing, please
provide the Committee with dates for the release of the following items
that the Under Secretary pledged to provide the Committee:
Science and Technology strategic plan (required by Homeland
Security Act)
Copy of Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual
(STORM)
Date for National Homeland Security R&D plan (required by Homeland
Security Act)
IPA Directive (the Under Secretary mentioned that this might come
in a Management Directive, though in the meantime he would provide the
Committee with the language he used while at the Office of Naval
Research)
Response: The Science and Technology's (S&T's) 5 year R&D Plan
required within 180 days of enactment of the FY 2007 Homeland Security
Appropriations Act is in development. The S&T Directorate received a
two month extension from the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The
report is scheduled to be delivered in June 2007.
The Science and Technology Organization Regulation Manual (STORM)
is available. A copy has been provided to your staff.
The National Homeland Security Research and Development plan will
be available in June of 2007.
Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) employees are a critical
component of the S&T Directorate's workforce and have been since the
organizational was created. The Directorate is aware of the ethics
issues that may occur in this talent sharing relationship between the
Federal sector and universities/national laboratories/state and local
entities. The S&T Directorate has developed and drafted several process
documents and/or guides to assist managers and our partners in
understanding the requirements involved in an IPA position. In
developing these documents the S&T Directorate collaborated with the
DHS Chief Human Capital Office (CHCO) and the Office of General Council
(OGC) representatives matrixed to the S&T Directorate. In addition to
the ethics program the guide addresses a broad range of administrative
requirements including travel. The Directorate believes the best
practices have been captured as they relate to the S&T Directorate's
environment. The draft IPA policies and procedures were developed
following the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance and by
benchmarking best practices across the Federal agencies. The S&T
Directorate analyzed and compared the IPA policies and procedures used
by the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, National Science Foundation, National Institutes of
Health and the Office of Naval Research. These are the premiere users
of Intergovernmental Personnel Act and have the most mature policies
and procedures. Currently, the S&T Directorate is testing the adequacy
of the draft guidance as we await the publishing of the DHS Management
Directive on the IPA program. A copy of this draft guide has been
provided to your staff.
Questions From the Honorable Michael McCaul, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology
Responses From the Honorable Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and
Technology
Question 17.: Is biometrics a part of the Science and Technology
Directorate's Human Factors Division or Border Division? What is the
relationship between the Human Factors Division and Border Division in
pursuing biometric and credentialing technologies? What percentage of
the S&T budget in FY 2008 covers biometrics and credentialing
projects--it appears to be only a small fraction of the budget.
Response: Biometrics and credentialing projects in the S&T
Directorate are managed by the Human Factors Division, with the
exception of programs dealing with development of standards in the area
of biometrics and credentialing, which are managed by the Test &
Evaluations and Standards Division.
The Human Factors Division coordinates activities with all of the
divisions and offices in the S&T Directorate including the Borders and
Maritime Division as well as interagency coordination bodies in DHS
such as the DHS Biometrics Coordination Group and the People Screening
CAPSTONE IPT and government-wide NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics. One
example activity is the partnership with the Coast Guard's Mona Pass
Project to pilot the use of at-sea mobile biometrics in an operational
setting. Information gathered from this pilot will be used to inform
the S&T Directorate's transitional mobile biometrics work beginning in
FY 2009 so that the S&T Directorate can ensure future mobile biometrics
devices meet not only the Coast Guard's operational needs, but the
needs of other DHS users as well.
For FY 2008, $6.5 million or 1 percent of the President's Budget
Request for the S&T Directorate's Research, Development, Acquisition
and Operations budget is dedicated to biometrics and credentialing
activities.
Question 18.: The FY 2008 budget request for the Centers of
Excellence has decreased by $9.9 million (20%), yet a recent BAA called
for 4 new Centers of Excellence this year. Does this mean that some of
the existing Centers will receive less money or have their funding
terminated when their contract is up for renewal?
Response: The existing Centers of Excellence (COE's) will not
receive any less money during their current period of performance. As
they are being extended, each Center is informed of its available
budget and develops a workplan for the extension period accordingly. To
date, each Center has voluntarily opted for an extension at the level
of funding available from the S&T Directorate. In some cases, that
amount will be less than they received annually for their initial 3-
year period of performance, based on current budgets. However, the COEs
planned from the outset for an initial period of performance of three
years. As a result, many of the projects that the COEs supported in the
initial period are being completed within that period and do not
require further funding. Moreover, the COEs have become successful at
leveraging other sources of funding by using their positions as COEs
and funds from the S&T Directorate. We anticipate that the existing
COEs will re-compete to continue as Centers as their first terms end.
Question 19.: The Centers of Excellence are a vital part of the S&T
program, with leading experts providing the genesis of ideas for the
next generation of homeland security technologies. These Centers focus
on basic, long-term research which can take on the order of 8 years,
yet these Centers must re-compete for funding every 2 to 3 years. How
does S&T reconcile the difference in timeframes? Specifically, how will
S&T judge performance and progress of basic research after just a
couple of years? Will this deter some Universities from applying to
become Centers because funding is not guaranteed from start to
completion of research projects?
Response: Initially, the period of performance for the five
original Centers of Excellence (COEs) was three years, with the
possibility of an extension depending on performance and the
availability of funds. Three of these COEs have already been reviewed
for performance and extended for either two or three years, for total
periods of performance of five to six years, which is commensurate with
Centers supported by other federal agencies.
With the S&T realignment initiated by Under Secretary Cohen, all of
the COEs ultimately are moving to a six year period of performance,
with the potential for re-competing for a COE in the same topic area
one additional time. That is, the existing Centers will be eligible for
a total tenure of 11 or 12 years, if they are successful in winning a
re-competed COE grant. The new COEs being initiated in FY 2007 and
beyond have initial periods of performance of four to six years, with
the possibility of winning a six-year re-competition once for a total
period of performance of 10 to 12 years. The initial periods vary in
order to get all nine planned COEs on a schedule of one-third of the
centers re-competed or competed every two years. This enables the S&T
Directorate to spread the administrative workload and provides for
continuity within the community (network) of Centers.
Regarding judgment of performance, the S&T Directorate conducts
reviews of the Centers on their second anniversary to ensure they are
on track, focusing on the right research and well-managed. We use both
academic subject matter experts and the potential end users of research
products for these reviews. The results of these reviews provide
direction for course corrections, if necessary. The S&T Directorate
plans to continue conducting these reviews periodically to fulfill its
oversight responsibilities. We do not anticipate that periodic reviews
will deter universities from applying; so far, the academic response to
past solicitations has been strong even with the initial 3-year
performance period and prospect of reviews after the second year.
Question 20.: What criteria does S&T use for selecting Centers of
Excellence?
Response: The S&T Directorate uses the following criteria to
evaluate full proposal submissions for a Center of Excellence (COE).
The first six criteria (a--f) are critical elements of the proposal and
of equal significance. Proposals that do not provide satisfactory
responses to all of these essential criteria will be declined. The
remaining criteria (g--k) also are important to meeting the S&T
Directorate's overall objectives and, while they are listed in
approximate descending order of importance, each should be fully
addressed by applicants.
a. Technical Merit and Quality: the degree to which the
proposed research focus will achieve excellence (to offer
results capable of commanding the respect of active researchers
and of probing a frontier area well). The originality and
creativity of the proposed research questions and the
appropriateness and adequacy of the proposed research methods.
For example, the following questions may be considered during
the evaluation: Is the research approach practical and
technically defensible, and can the projects be performed
within the proposed time period? Will the research contribute
to scientific knowledge in the topic area? Will the results be
disseminated broadly to enhance scientific and technological
understanding? What are potential benefits of the proposed
research to society? Is the proposal well-prepared with
supportive information that is self-explanatory or
understandable?
b. Mission-Related Significance: the degree to which the
proposed research focus can yield results that overcome
existing and difficult technical limitations, or that offer the
scientific basis to enable major technological advances in the
foreseeable future. The responsiveness of the proposal to the
research needs identified in this announcement and the
willingness and ability of the applicants to consult with
Federal, state, local and private stakeholders to refine
research questions and design to make results applicable to
homeland security issues or policy. For example, the following
questions may be considered during the evaluation: Does the
proposal adequately address the objectives specified by the S&T
Directorate for this topic area? Can the applicants communicate
their results in formats accessible to and understandable by
Federal, state and local end users?
c. Geographical distribution of all Centers of Excellence and
major partners. The Centers of Excellence program's authorizing
legislation states: ``. . .the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, shall operate extramural research, development,
demonstration, testing and evaluation programs so as to ensure
that colleges, universities, private research institutes and
companies from as many regions of the United States as
practicable participate.'' Geographical location of the lead
institution and its major partners will be a factor in
evaluating proposals submitted in response to this COE.
d. Qualifications of Investigators: The qualifications of the
principal investigator(s) and other key personnel, including
training, demonstrated knowledge of pertinent literature,
experience, and publication records, and the extent to which
key personnel will make a significant time commitment to the
project.
e. Facilities and Equipment: The availability and/or adequacy
of the facilities and equipment proposed for the project. For
example, the following questions may be considered during the
evaluation: Are there any deficiencies that may interfere with
the successful completion of the research?
f. Management: The ability of the lead institution to manage a
complex Center of Excellence in terms of achieving research
results when due, managing large and complex budgets and
communicating research outcomes, and the adequacy of the
proposed management plan to ensure quality research and
education programs from researchers at both primary and partner
institutions. Note: Applicants are advised to designate a
qualified, full-time Center Director with the ability to manage
a large results-oriented research program.
g. Knowledge of Current Research: Evidence that the applicant
is familiar with the research and resources of existing DHS
COEs, other DHS S&T, federal agency or National Laboratory
research and development programs, and other relevant
university programs and can demonstrate its ability to take
advantage of these resources. Information about the existing
COEs is available at www.sciencetosecurity.org. S&T programs
are described in general terms at http://www.dhs.gov/xres/
programs/.
h. Education: The adequacy of education plans and supporting
materials demonstrating the proposed COE's ability to establish
an enduring and comprehensive program of study in disciplines
related to the specific research areas cited in this
announcement. This plan should demonstrate how it will
contribute to the development of new generation of scientists
and professionals working in homeland security fields, as well
as developing continuing education for current professionals.
i. Minority Serving Institution Partnerships: The demonstrated
ability and commitment to establish meaningful partnerships
with MSIs to develop a quality MSI research and training
program, and the quality of the proposed program. The
application should demonstrate the proposed COE's ability to
create a high-quality and enduring education and research
program capabilities at minority-serving institutions in
disciplinary areas important to homeland security. [NOTE: Lead
institutions seeking MSI partners and MSI researchers wanting
to participate in this COE should register their respective
needs and qualifications at: www.sciencetosecurity.org.]
j. Results Transition: The effectiveness and soundness of a
strategy to transition research results to end users and
mechanisms to accomplish this transition, and demonstration of
a clear and effective plan for transitioning research results
for each project or research area ultimately to homeland
security mission agencies.
k. Budget: Although budget information does not reflect on the
application's scientific merit, the evaluation will include the
appropriateness and/or adequacy of the proposed budget and its
implications for the potential success of the proposed
research. Input on requested equipment is of particular
interest.
Question 21.: Is the ultimate goal to have only one Center
supporting each S&T Division? What happens, for example, if there are
unique research areas within a Division and one Center doesn't have the
needed expertise to cover the basic research needs to support each
distinct mission? For example, within the Chemical and Biological
Division, elements of chemical defense are distinct from biodefense
which are distinct from food and agriculture security. How will you
base decisions on how many Centers are needed to support a single
Division's mission?
Response: The S&T Directorate's ultimate goal is to create as many
Centers of Excellence as the S&T Directorate and its customers believe
are needed to develop the fundamental science essential to improve or
extend homeland security. There are currently nine Centers planned for
the foreseeable future, but as requirements are refined and resources
allow, more may be planned. Every Center will be aligned with the
mission and activities of one or more S&T Divisions, with no less than
one per division.
Question 22. The funding request in FY 2008 for laboratory
facilities has decreased by $16.8 million. However, the Committee
understands that because of delays in the National Bio and Agro-Defense
Facility (NBAF) site selection process (which has delayed the
establishment of the NBAF until 2014) and the limited space at Plum
Island Animal disease Center, S&T plans to increase capacity at Plum
Island to provide interim animal and zoonotic disease research
capabilities. Since the fundingd does not apprear to be accounted for
in your FY08 budget, where will this funding come from?
Response: The President's budget request for fiscal year 2008
includes $17 million for upgrades to the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC). The laboratory facilities reduction in FY 2008 is not a
cut to the program; it simply reflects the funding needs for that year.
We are requesting lower funding levels for PIADC upgrades as we are
nearing completion of the corrective actions as well as less funding
for the NBAF project in FY 2008 than in FY 2007 as we are completing
the preliminary phases of the project. The corrective actions and
upgrades at PIADC will allow the use of the facility through the
transition to NBAF. The operational funding for all of our laboratories
is intact and our plans for FY 2008 accommodate all of our needs for
laboratory facilities operations including PIADC. Future funding for
operational cost increases associated with increased work load will
appear in the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) and the
appropriate year's budget request.
Question 23. Please explain the decrease in the Infrastructure/
Geophysical Division's budget request for FY 2008. The Committee
understands that this reduction is the result of the elimination of a
number of programs including the Southeast Regional research Initiative
(SERRI) and the Community Based Criticval Infrastructure Protection
Institute and reduction of other programs such as the Regional
Technology Integration Intitiative (RTII). Please explain why these
programs were eliminated and what the impact will be?
Reponse: The Southeast Regional Research Initiative (SERRI) and the
Community Based Critical Infrastructure Protection Institute each have
un-obligated funds remaining from prior fiscal years appropriations.
Both entities have periods of performance that extend into fiscal year
2008 that will use these un-obligated balances to continue their
projects. Both entities were expected to expire once all currently
appropriated funds have been obligated, however work that might be
assigned to SERRI in the future will most likely be assigned to one or
more of the newly formed University Centers of Excellence, as posted in
recent Broad Agency Announcements. S&T will stretch the funds requested
in fiscal year 2008 for to the Regional Technology Integration
Initiative by deferring some projects and scaling down others.
Question 24. The Committee understands that there is a new focus on
leap ahead, innovative technologies through your HITS and HIPS. DARPA
was set up to do something similar and to keep fresh ideas coming, they
rotate program managers every 3 years or so. Does S&T anticipate doing
the same, when the Directorate has experienced difficulty retaining
personnel? How will S&T balance the need for continuity versus the need
for fresh ideas?
Response: We do not intend to use the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) program manager rotation model. The Director of
Innovation of Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency
(HSARPA) has projects that will range from 1 to 5 years. When a project
is complete, the S&T Directorate will have the opportunity to move a
program manager into a new project. HSARPA's projects come from DHS
leadership, from DHS component customers, and from creative unsolicited
ideas from industry and laboratories. Starting in FY 2009, the Director
of Innovation anticipates about a 33 percent refresh of projects every
year. We expect to retain program managers longer.
Question 25. Within the FY 2007 budget, out of the $20 million that
was designated for Cybersecurity, over $7.5 million or 38% was
directred towards ``Innovation''. This percentage is by far the highest
of any of the program areas. Over a third of funding for Cybersecurity
was directed towards Innovation and yet there does not seem to be any
projects within the Innovation office focused on cybersecurity. Please
explain this discrepancy.
Response: The Under Secretary's priorities for the S&T Directorate
include producing technologies to increase the security of our Nation's
Business Sector. During the realignment of its FY 2007 Budget, the S&T
Directorate conducted an in-depth review of all programs and their
alignment to the Department and its priorities to identify those
programs that lacked clear deliverables and Departmental customers.
Those efforts were cut to fund accelerated and high impact programs in
the Innovation Division that address key gaps identified by DHS
leadership. One of those projects is a Resilient Electric Grid that
will provide a more robust and flexible infrastructure for the
transmission of power. This project directly impacts the cyber
infrastructure and allows for more resilient operation during a natural
or man-made disaster. The remaining Cyber Security programs address the
highest priority areas where the Federal Government can have the
greatest impact.
Question 26.: Does the S&T Directorate have any projects focused on
moving the U.S. Government toward the utilization of Internet Protocol
version 6 (IPv6)?
Response: The S&T Directorate does not have projects directly
focused on moving the Federal Government toward the utilization of
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) although the Department is
implementing IPv6 as part of the Administration's effort to transition
to IPv6 by June of 2008. The S&T Directorate is exploring the impact of
IPv6 on new solutions for domain name system (DNS) security and routing
security, which the President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
calls out as critical Internet infrastructure components with
vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. The S&T Directorate has
projects focused on moving the Federal Government toward deployment of
solutions for these areas, which each interact with IPv6. In these
activities, the S&T Directorate is working with the Department of
Commerce and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
which are the lead agencies charged with the deployment of IPv6. The
S&T Directorate is also working with the Department of Defense (DoD) as
they deploy IPv6.
Question 27.: What tradeoff analysis was conducted to determine
that the proposed HITS/HIPS are more of a priority than projects/
programs currently below the funding cut line for FY 2008 and beyond?
Is there a separate Integrated Products Team (IPT) process for HITS/
HIPS versus the individual Division IPT process and if so, which
Department components are the lead considering the HITS and HIPS span
mutiple Division mission area?
Response: The initial (current) set of HIPS and HITS projects were
selected in early FY 2007, prior to the initial meeting of the S&T
Directorate's Capstone Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). They were
selected as a result of the Undersecretary for Science and Technology's
interaction with Department leadership. The Undersecretary was able to
identify the priority gaps in capability as described by leadership and
those gaps became the initial HIPS and HITS. The list of HIPS and HITS
projects has been extremely well received by our customers and has
generated tremendous interest among industry.
New HIPS and HITS will be selected from various inputs including
the IPT process, unsolicited input from industry and laboratories, and
from teaming opportunities with other agencies. The S&T Directorate's
Corporate Board will review all potential candidates for HIPS and HITS
categories and make final program decisions.
Question 28.: How are the actual end-users, such as the first
responders and infrastructure providers (as opposed to DHS customers)
engaged in the Integrated Products Team (IPS) process? How are end-
user's capability needs included in the requirement setting process?
Response: End-users are included at the discretion of the IPT
leads. The Infrastructure Protection (IP) and Incident Management (IM)
Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) provide two examples of how end users
were brought into the initial Capstone Integrated Product Team (IPT)
process. The Infrastructure Protection (IP) and Incident Management
(IM) Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) used robust and established
processes for engaging and eliciting requirements from end-users, such
as First Responders, infrastructure providers and industry owner/
operators. Within the IPT construct, the Preparedness Directorate in
the IP IPT and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the IM
IPT, representing their respective customers, are charged with
collecting, vetting and prioritizing user requirements.
The input to the IP IPT is developed in coordination with the
Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) who, in partnership with the Sector
Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils
(GCCs), determine sector-specific priorities and requirements for
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR) protection. The SSAs
submit their priorities and requirements to DHS in their sector annual
reports which inform the National Critical Infrastructure Protection
(NCIP) Research and Development (R&D) Plan and its technology roadmap.
The input to the IM IPT is developed from the results of Project
Responder, input from responder communities through workshops, outreach
venues such as conferences and symposiums, coordination with the
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) and the Inter-Agency Board,
requests generated through the Grants and Training process, and the
Regional Technology Initiative (RTI) Program which directly gathers
requirements from responders in several representative urban areas.
As the Capstone IPT process is maturing, the S&T Directorate is
reaching out to other representative groups to join the IPT process to
ensure that the capability gaps of the end-user community are properly
understood as well as ensure these organizations understand the process
by which technology requirements are vetted and prioritized for science
and technology investments.
First responders and State and local governments can also make
their technology requirements known to the S&T Directorate through the
Tech Solutions program where their input on current capability gaps and
technology requirements is received by the S&T Directorate via a
website. We will pursue technology solutions directly through this
approach, as well as bring forward these requirements to the
appropriate Capstone IPT for inclusion in the Capstone IPT process.
Questions from the Honorable Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Mississippi
Responses from the Honorable Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and
Technology
Question 29. There was a recent GAO report on the failure of
technology to screen airport passengers for weapons and bombs (GAO-07-
448T). Please describe the reasons for this failure and discuss what
S&T is doing to address the need for explosive detection technologies,
and liquid detection technologies in particular.
Response: Detecting weapons and explosives within the
transportation systems of the United States requires a process that not
only includes a reliance on technology, but also on intelligence and
surveillance activities, passenger pre-screening, pat-down searches of
individuals, and physical searches of property. This layered,
multidimensional approach to transportation security and passenger
screening drives our efforts to improve security. As the GAO report
``AVIATION SECURITY: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains'' (GAO-07-448T) indicates,
more can be done procedurally and with technology. The S&T Directorate
is working with the Transportation Security Administration on several
efforts to improve detection of weapons and explosives at airport
checkpoints. Those efforts include:
Improving the reliability and detection capability of
two explosive trace portal (ETP) configurations;
Evaluating two new sets of technologies, one based on
back scatter X-ray and one based on millimeter wave technology
with a much higher possibility of weapons detection hidden on
the body as well as explosives;
A multi airport testing of a liquid explosives
detection device;
Advanced Technology X-ray units to detect liquid
threats in carry-on luggage;
Hostile Intent Detection methods and systems; and
Automated checkpoint explosives detection systems
(Auto EDS) program.
These efforts support the existing risk-based, layered approach to
transportation security. The S&T Directorate goal is to improve
existing technologies and develop new technologies, while working with
TSA and vendors to increase detection capabilities and throughput,
while reducing costs, down-time, and false alarms.
Question 30.: There was a recent failure of a pilot program focused
on detection of explosives for rail passengers and systems. Please
discuss S&T plans to develop effective detection technologies aimed at
rail systems?
Response: The Rail Pilot Program was a series of studies to
determine if off-the-shelf equipment and prototype stand-off imaging
technologies would work in passenger rail systems. During the pilot, we
tested and evaluated numerous technologies. Although we did not adopt
or endorse any of the technologies as ``ready for deployment,'' we
gained valuable information that indicated which technologies will not
work and which technologies have potential to work in rail transit
systems.
The S&T Directorate has several ongoing stand-off detection
technology evaluation projects that could be used within rail and other
transportation systems to screen passengers. These could also be
applied to a follow-on pilot program should one be directed. Examples
of projects that could be used include the development of:
A spectroscopic and trace detection technologies (IR,
Fluorescence-based, etc.) for standoff or remote suicide bomber
detection;
Explosives screening stations which can be rapidly
deployed and remotely operated; and
An accurate, near-real-time, contactless, biometrics-
based, card-and-reader system.
Further, in order to develop a system that could aid in the
standoff detection of concealed explosives on persons, a series of
field demonstrations will be held in conjunction with the Secret
Service, the FBI, other Federal, State, and local law enforcement and
first responder agencies.
Question 31.: Please address what type of spectrum analyses and
jamming frequency technology S&T is developing to detect IEDs and the
new IED systems being found in Iraq?
Response: In collaboration with the Technical Support Working Group
(TSWG) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the S&T Directorate
funded the Remote Control IED Electronic Counter Measures National
Capability (frequency jamming) effort in FY 2005 and FY 2006. Program
plans include additional funding for this effort in future years.
The new IEDs that have been written about recently in the press
typically refer to sophisticated insurgent attacks on armored U.S.
military vehicles using home-made anti-tank weapons with ``shaped''
explosive charges. Other-wise known as EFPs (Explosively Formed
Penetrators), these devices are primarily used to defeat armored
vehicles traveling in convoy. Currently, the S&T Directorate does not
have a development effort to counter the road-side bomb threat because
our customers do not perceive this to be a priority threat within the
continental United States relative to other threats.
Appendix B: Attachments
----------
Attachment A: Response to Question #6
Capstone IPT Representative High Priority Technology Areas
Border Security: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved ballistic protection via Ballistic Protection:
personal protective equipment. Provides improved ballistic
protection for personnel
(Borders/Maritime Division
Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to improve detection, tracking, and BorderNet: Provides improved
identification of all threats along the surveillance and data
terrestrial and maritime border. integration tool for real
time detection, tracking,
identification and
classification of targets
in land, maritime, air
(Borders/Maritime Division
Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need ability to access ICE databases in Voice Linking System
which voice information is entered; Modernization: Provides
provide analytical, reporting, and improved identification,
automated case deconfliction; classify, analysis, sharing and
identify voice samples. storing of telephone voice
data (C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need non-lethal compliance measures for Pursuit Termination:
vehicles, vessels, or aircraft allowing Provides non-lethal
for safe interdiction by law enforcement compliance measures for
personnel. vehicles, vessels, and
personnel to allow safe
interdiction by law
enforcement personnel
(Borders/Maritime Division
Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need non-destructive tools that allow for Hidden Compartment
the inspection of hidden or closed Inspection Device: Provides
compartments to find contraband or non-intrusive inspection
security threats. tools to identify hidden
compartments in vehicles
and containers (Borders/
Maritime Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved analysis and decision-making SBI Systems Engineering and
tools that will ensure the development/ Modeling and Simulation:
implementation of border security Provides Modeling and
initiatives. simulation decision-making
tools to inform development
and implementation of
border security initiatives
(Borders/Maritime Division
Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the ability to non-intrusively Project Hostile Intent:
determine the intent of subjects during Provides determination of
questioning. intent devices for
interviews (Human Factors
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the ability for law enforcement Gunfire Locator: Provides
personnel to quickly identify the origin the capability to locate
of gunfire and classify the type of gunfire and classify
weapon fired. weapons (Borders/Maritime
Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the ability for law enforcement Less-Lethal Compliance
officers to assure compliance of lawful Measures: Provides improved
orders using non-lethal means. less-lethal capabilities to
law enforcement personnel
(Borders/Maritime Division
Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cargo Security: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need enhanced screening and examination by CanScan: Provides enhanced
non-intrusive inspection. capability to detect or
identify terrorist or
contraband items (Borders/
Maritime Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need increased information fusion, anomaly Automatic Target
detection, Automatic Target Recognition Recognition: Provides
capability. information fusion, anomaly
detection, and automatic
target recognition systems
to identify high threat
cargo and ensure its
delivery (Borders/Maritime
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to detect and identify WMD materials Requirements Analysis for
and contraband. WMD Sensor: Develop
requirements for developing
WMD sensors applicable to
the cargo security
environment, with
multimodal considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need capability to screen 100% of air Requirements Analysis for
cargo. Bulk/Break-Bulk: Analysis
to develop methods for
securing and monitoring
bulk/break bulk cargo
shipped by air or maritime
(Borders/Maritime Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to test the feasibility of seal Secure Carton Testing:
security; Detection of intrusion. Develop and test advanced
non-intrusive inspection
methods (Borders/Maritime
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to track domestic high-threat cargo.. Domestic High Threat Cargo
Tracking: Enhances Marine
Asset Tag and Tracking
System capability (Borders/
Maritime Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to harden air cargo conveyances and Air Cargo Composite
containers. Container: Develop
materials for hardening air
cargo conveyances (Borders/
Maritime Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need Positive ID of cargo & detection of Advanced Container Security
intrusion or unauthorized access. Device: Provides improved
cargo security devices
including container
intrusion detection
(Borders/Maritime Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chem/Bio Defense: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need tools to detect and mitigate animal Foreign Animal Disease
disease breakouts. Modeling: Provides tools to
detect and mitigate
catastrophic animal disease
outbreaks (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need policy net assessments to provide Bio-Defense Net Assessments:
fresh perspectives on fundamental Provides recommendations
elements of the national biodefense for rebalancing and
strategy. refining investments among
the pillars of our overall
biodefense policy (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved tools for integrated CBRN Bio-Threat Characterization
Risk Assessment. Center (BTCC): Provides
improved tools for
integrated CBRN risk
assessments to include
traditional and emerging
bio, chem and agricultural
threats and human health
and economic effects (Chem-
Bio Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need an incident characterization Systems Approaches for
capability for response & restoration. Restoration: Provides a
systems approach to rapidly
restore large areas after
bio or chemical attack
(Chem-Bio Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved ChemBio Forensic Analysis Bio Forensics R&D Near Term:
capability. Provides improved
biological and chemical
forensic capabilities,
including sample handling
and extraction, and bio-
phys-chemical
characterization (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need national-scale detection Chemical Security Analysis
architectures and strategies to address Center (CSAC): Provides
outdoor, indoor (e.g., highly trafficked analysis and scientific
transportation hubs) and critical assessment of the chemical
infrastructure. threat against our civilian
population (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need consequence assessments of attacks on Chemical Infrastructure Risk
chemical facilities and Chem Bio attacks Assessments: Consequence
on other critical infrastructure. assessments of attacks on
chemical facilities and
chem bio attacks on other
critical infrastructure,
including cascading effects
on other sectors (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need Integrated CBRNE Sensor Reporting Integrated CBRNE Detection
capability. System: Provides an
integrated CBRNE sensor
reporting capability in
support of a common
operating picture (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need handheld rapid biological and Next Gen Low Vapor Pressure
chemical detection systems. Chemicals Detection Systems
(LVPCDS): Provide handheld,
rapid, biological and
chemical detection systems
with broad agent coverage
and extremely low false
alarm rates (Chem-Bio
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need detection paradigms and systems for Next Generation Biological
enhanced, emerging and novel biological Detection System: Develop
threats. technologies and systems to
identify unknown and
emerging biological threats
(Chem-Bio Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Security: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need secure protocols Securing the Infrastructure:
Provide secure protocols
including standard security
methods (C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need Process Control Systems (PCS) Securing the Infrastructure:
Security. Provide Process Control
Systems (PCS) Security (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need large-scale cyber security test beds. Enabling Technologies for
Cyber Security &
Information Assurance R&D:
Provide improved capability
to model the effects of
cyber attacks and
understanding of internet
topography (C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need composable and scalable secure Advanced and Next Generation
systems. Systems & Architectures:
Provide comprehensive next-
generation network models;
(C2I Division)
Composable and scalable
secure systems (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives Prevention: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need standoff detection on persons Suicide bomb detection:
(portable solutions). Provide standoff portable
explosive detection system
for all operating
environments (e.g., suicide
bombers, backpack-sized
explosives, ferries, cruise
ships, and field operating
environments) (Explosives
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need system solution for detection in Automated Carried Bag EDS:
baggage (checked & carried). Provides system solution
for detection in baggage
(checked & carried)
including air cargo
(Explosives Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need capability to detect VBIED / large Vehicle Borne Improvised
threat mass (container, trailer, ship, Explosive Device / Large
vessel, car, rail). threat mass detection for
the transit environment:
Provide capability for
Large threat mass detection
for the transit environment
(Explosives Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need capability to detect homemade or Stand-alone technologies for
novel explosives. detection of homemade or
novel explosives: Provide
homemade/ novel explosives
detection characterization
and detection capability
(Explosives Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the capability to assess, render Render Safe Technologies:
safe, and neutralize explosive threats. Provide capability to
assess, render safe, and
neutralize explosive
threats (Explosives
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to optimize canine explosive Canine explosive detection
detection capability. optimization: Optimize
canine explosive detection
(Explosives Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need a systems solution for detection in Manhattan II: Provides a
baggage (checked & carried). system solution for
detection in baggage
(checked & carried)
(Explosives Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incident Management: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need an integrated Modeling, Mapping and Simulation Based Incident
Simulation capability. Planning and Response:
Provides integrated and
enhanced modeling and
simulation for incident
planning and response (IP/
Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need a Personnel Monitoring (Emergency Advanced First Responder
Responder Locator System) capability. Locator System: Provide
emergency responder locator
systems for rapid
identification of downed or
at risk responders in
complex threat environments
(IP/Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need a Personnel Monitoring (Physiological Advanced First Responder
Monitoring of Firefighters) capability. Physiological Monitoring
System: Provides a
physiological monitoring
capability (IP/Geophysical
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need an Incident Management Enterprise Advanced Incident Management
System. Enterprise System: Provides
an Incident Management
Enterprise System that
includes web-based
collaboration and tracking
tools that are field
deployable and
interoperable across
multiple agencies (IP/
Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need a logistics management tool.......... Incident Logistics and
Resource Tracking System:
Provides Logistics
management tools and
improved in-transit
logistics visibility (IP/
Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Sharing: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need Data Fusion from multiple sensors.... COP Data Fusion Technologies
Pilot: Provides capability
to fuse data from multiple
sensors into Common
Operating Picture (COP)
(C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to improve real-time Data Sharing Suspicious activity
across agencies on encounters. reporting and Pilots:
Provides ability to improve
real-time data sharing of
law enforcement information
(C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to manage identities and establish Network Identity Management
interoperability with Identity and Pilot: Provides ability
Adjudication Support Systems. to manage user identities,
rights and authorities (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need distribution capability for Multi-Level Intelligence
Intelligence Products. Dissemination: Provides
ability to support
distribution of
intelligence products (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need capability to share information Threat Dissemination
within and across sectors on terrorist Standards: Provides
threats. standards and protocols for
information sharing within
and across sectors on
terrorist threats (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need real-time Data Processing and Real Time Data Processing
Visualization. and Visualization: Provides
automated, dynamic, real-
time data processing and
visualization capability
(C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need analytic capabilities for structured, Integrated Data Processing
unstructured, and streaming data. and Analysis: Provides
analytic capabilities for
structured, unstructured,
and streaming data (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need information sharing capability for USCG Collective Situational
Situational Awareness between USCG and Awareness Pilot: Provides
Partners. capability for the USCG to
exchange information across
disparate National System
security networks (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need Sensor Fusion between Law Enforcement Sensor fusion between law
and Intelligence Partners. enforcement and
intelligence partners (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Infrastructure Protection: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need analytical tools to quantify Unified Blast Analysis Tool:
interdependencies and cascading Provides ability to
consequences as disruptions occur across identify existing
critical infrastructure sectors. vulnerabilities to blast,
evaluates protective
measures, and provides
design guidance for blast
resistant construction (IP/
Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need analytical tools to quantify Real-Time Decision Support
interdependencies and cascading Tools: Provides tools for
consequences as disruptions occur across federal decision-makers
critical infrastructure sectors. that update models
dynamically during crises
(IP/Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need effective and affordable blast Protective Measures Advanced
analysis and protection for critical Materials Design Tools:
infrastructure; improved understanding of Provides capability to
blast failure mechanisms and protection address high consequence
measures for the most vital CI/KR. critical assets, as
identified by the Office of
Infrastructure Protection,
including mitigation and
hardening technologies and
advanced materials (IP/Geo
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need analytical tools to quantify Real-Time Decision Support
interdependencies and cascading Tools: Provides rapid and
consequences as disruptions occur across automated response
critical infrastructure sectors. technologies to limit
damage from disruptions of
critical infrastructure and
prevent cascading effects
(IP/Geophysical Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need advanced, automated and affordable Advanced Surveillance
monitoring and surveillance technologies. Systems: Provides advanced,
automated, affordable
monitoring and surveillance
technologies to provide
situational awareness at CI/
KR (C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interoperability: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to research, test, and evaluate IP- IP Enabled Backbone
enabled backbones. Evaluation: Develops and
evaluates Internet Protocol
(IP) enabled backbones (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need test and evaluation on commercially Wireless Broadband Standards
available and emergent wireless broadband and Broadband
data. Productization: Provides
test and evaluation of
emergent wireless broadband
data systems (C2I Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to accelerate the development and P25 Interface: Accelerates
testing of P25 IP-based interfaces. test and evaluation of P25
IP-based interfaces (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need to develop messaging interface EDXL Data Standards
standards that enable emergency Initiative: Identifies and
information sharing and data exchange. develops messaging
interface standards (C2I
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime Security: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need for wide-area surveillance from the Affordable Wide Area
coast to beyond the horizon; port and Surveillance System:
inland waterways region--detect, ID, and Provides persistent,
track. integrated sensor systems
that can detect, track, and
identify vessels
(especially small vessels)
between the port regions
and beyond the horizon in
all weather conditions
(Borders/Maritime
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need data fusion and automated tools for Advanced Automated Scene
command center operations. Understanding: Provides
Tactical Information Fusion
and Situational Assessment
tools that improve operator
performance (Borders/
Maritime Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need for vessel compliance through non- Pursuit Termination:
lethal compliance methods. Provides non-lethal
compliance measures for
vessels (Borders/Maritime
Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need an enhanced capability to Covert Illegal Contraband
continuously track contraband on ships or Tracker: Provides improved
containers. system for tracking
contraband shipments and
aliens including at night
tracking or rough seas
tracking (Borders/Maritime
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved ballistic personal Ballistic Protection:
protective equipment for officer safety. Provides improved ballistic
protection and
communications tools for
agents (Borders/Maritime
Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need improved WMD detection equipment for Technology to screen
officer safety; improved screening passengers, baggage, and
capability for WMD for maritime security vehicles for explosives,
checkpoints. contraband and CBRN in the
high volume environment of
maritime ferries and cruise
ships (Borders/Maritime
Division Lead)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
People Screening: Representative Technology Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gap Summary Enabling Homeland Capability
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need systematic collection and analysis of Group Violent Intent
information related to understanding Modeling: Provides tools
terrorist group intent to engage in for understanding terrorist
violence. group intent to engage in
violence (Human Factors
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need non-invasive monitoring: Identifying Hostile Intent Detection:
and tracking unknown or potential threats Provides non-invasive
from individuals at key checkpoints. Real- monitoring technologies to
time detection of deception or hostile allow identification and
intent through integrated system of human tracking of potentially
and machine methods. threatening individuals at
key checkpoints (Human
Factors Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the capability in real-time for Biometrics Spiral II:
positive verification of individual's Provides real-time,
identity utilizing multiple biometrics. positive verification of
identity using multiple
biometrics (Human Factors
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need the capability for secure, non- Credentialing: Provides
contact electronic credentials; secure, non-contact
contactless readers or remote electronic credentials
interrogation technologies for electronic capability (Human Factors
credentials. Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need mobile biometrics screening Mobile Biometrics Screening:
capabilities, to include hand-held, Provides mobile biometrics
wireless, and secure devices. screening capabilities to
include hand-held,
wireless, and secure
devices (Human Factors
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Need high-speed, high-fidelity ten-print Ten Print Capture: Provides
capture capability. high-speed, high-fidelity
ten-print capture
capability (Human Factors
Division)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attachment B: Response to Question #6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Focus Areas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Sharing/Management
Information Interoperability
(class to unclass,
disparate database
Reconnassance, Surveillance,
and Investigative
technology
Common Operating Picture
systems and tools
Knowledge Management
Information analytic tools
Border Security
Land border Enforcement
SBI Systems approach
Immigration Enforcement
Non-intrusive Detection at
Borders
Chem/Bio Defense
Bio and Chem Threat
Assessments
Bio and Chem risk decision
support tools
Chem
Forensics and Analysis
Surveillance and
Detection systems
Response and Recovery
systems
Bio
Agricultural Security
Bio Forensics
Surveillance and
Detection systems
(including Biowatch)
Maritime Security
Boarding Officer tools and
protection
Maritime surveillance
technologies
Command Center data fusion
Explosive Prevention
Counter-MANPADS
IEDs
Standoff Detection
Explosives Detectors
Blast Mitigation
Personnel Screening for
explosives
Incident Management
Personnel monitoring and
tracking
Situational awareness
Logisitics issues
Protection of emergency
personnel
People Screening
People Screening at
Checkpoint
Hostile Intent and Deception
Identity Management
(includes Biometrics)
Credentialing
Social and Behavioral Threat
analysis
Insider Threat
Human systems integration
into technology
Infrastructure Protection
Critical Infrastructure
modeling and simulation
analysis
Risk Reduction Technologies
Protection and mitigation
for critical IP sectors
Response and restoration of
CI/K
Advanced surveillance and
detection to protect CI/KR
Cargo Security
Security Devices
Cargo tracking systems
Supply chain architecture
Integration of detection
systems specific to cargo
Interoperability
first Responder
communications
Cybersecurity
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Attachment C: Response to Question #9
Science & Technology Directorate, Intergovernmental Personnel Act
(IPA) Program Reference Guide, April 2006.\1\
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\1\ See committee file.
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Attachment D: Response to Question #12
Chart Summary
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Actions planned
Program Rating Improvement for FY 2007 and
Actions Taken FY 2008
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Biological Effective (1) Developed
Countermeasures qualitative and
(Chemical and quantitative
Biological) metrics
(2) Developed a 5
year plan based
on requirements
identified
through the IPT
Capstone process
that was chaired
by the Chief
Medical Officer
and the Assistant
Secretary of
Infrastructure
Protection.
(3) Reviews the
programmatic and
technical
progress of key
projects that
contribute to the
PART on a monthly
basis -conducted
by the Division
Head.
(4) Chem
Countermeasures
underwent
independent
evaluation with
positive findings
(1) Develop
efficiency
metrics
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Standards (T&E and Adequate (1) Developed (1) Develop
Standards) quantitative efficiency
metrics metrics
(2) Convened the
standards council
to ensure agency
wide gathering of
standards needs.
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Threat Awareness Results (1) Developed (1) Develop
Portfolio Not quantitative efficiency
(C2I and Human Demonstrat metrics (1) Develop
Factors) ed (2) External additional
evaluation of quantitative and
program commenced qualitative
summer 2005 metrics
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University Programs Moderately (1) Developed (1) Continue
(Research Division) Effective quantitative external review
metrics of program and
(2) External Centers of
review of program Excellence
and one DHS
Center of
Excellence held
in 2005 and 2006
respectively
(3) External
assessment of
program planned
for the fall of
2006
(4) Independent
review of two
centers planned
for fall 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emerging Threats Moderately (1) Developed (1) Develop
(C2I) Effective quantitative efficiency
metrics
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rapid Prototyping Moderately (1) Developed (2) Plans for
(Transition) Effective quantitative regular
metrics 1) independent
Develop reviews are
efficiency scheduled to
begin in FY 2007
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Chemical and Results (1) Developed (1) Development
Explosives Not metrics for major of expenditure
Countermeasures Demonstra chemical projects plan in process
(Explosives) ted (2) Scores and (2) Engage in
recommendations dialogue with
discussed with the GAO, IG and
planning staff other
and senior independent
management evaluators
(4) Completed
Countermeasures
expenditure plan
in October 2006
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Interoperability and Results (1) Scores and (1) External
Compatibility (C21) Not recommendations review of
Demonstra discussed with program planned
ted planning staff (2) Development
and senior of strategic
management plan
(2) Engaged in (3) Engaged in
dialogue with the dialogue with
GAO throughout the GAO, IG and
the fall. other
(3) Engaged an independent
independent evaluators
evaluator to (4) Develop
conduct a study efficiency and
of OIC additional
effectiveness and metrics
coordination with
its partners and
stakeholders. The
study is
currently in
progress.
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SAFETY Act Results (1) Scores and (1) Development
(Transition) Not recommendations of stategic/
Demonstra discussed with program plan
ted planning staff (2) Development
and senior of additional
mangement metrics planned
(2) External (IG) (3) Develop
review in August efficiency
2006 resulted in metrics
certified and
accredited
computer system
(3) Streamlined
evaluation
process,
improving FY 2006
performance by
27%
------------------------------------------------------------------------