[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSITIONING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MEASUREMENTS LABORATORY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 3, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington KEN CALVERT, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
NICK LAMPSON, Texas FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
JERRY MCNERNEY, California W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JO BONNER, Alabama
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon TOM FEENEY, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BARON P. HILL, Indiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona VACANCY
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight
HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas Wisconsin
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey TOM FEENEY, Florida
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BART GORDON, Tennessee RALPH M. HALL, Texas
DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director
EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel
JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member
DOUG PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member
TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member
STACEY STEEP Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
May 3, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Michael T. McCaul, Acting Ranking
Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 11
Written Statement............................................ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 12
Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on
Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.......... 13
Panel 1:
Mr. Charles F. McBrearty, Jr., Former Director of Materials
Technology, Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick
Air Force Base
Oral Statement............................................... 14
Written Statement............................................ 15
Biography.................................................... 17
Dr. M. Anthony Fainberg, Former Program Manager, Radiological and
Nuclear Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development,
Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security
Oral Statement............................................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 20
Biography.................................................... 25
Ms. Lynn Albin, Radiation Health Physicist, Office of Radiation
Protection, Washington State Department of Health
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 30
Biography.................................................... 34
Mr. Jonathan A. Duecker, Assistant Commissioner, New York City
Police Department, Counterterrorism Bureau
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 38
Discussion
Air Force Programs With the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML)............................................. 38
EML's Role in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)........ 40
EML and Counterterrorism in New York City...................... 41
DHS' Decision to Close EML..................................... 42
More on Air Force Programs With EML............................ 44
EML's Global Sensors: North Korea.............................. 45
New York City First Responder Community........................ 46
EML Funding.................................................... 47
The Neutron Ship Effect........................................ 48
Dirty Bombs.................................................... 49
The Quality Assessment Program (QAP)........................... 49
Panel 2:
Dr. John F. Clarke, Deputy Director, Office of National
Laboratories, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 51
Written Statement............................................ 52
Discussion
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML............................. 57
The National Nuclear Security Administration................... 58
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML............................. 59
Limited DHS Science & Technology Directorate Funding........... 61
More on the First Responder Community in New York City......... 63
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML............................. 65
Panel 3:
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 68
Written Statement............................................ 68
Biography.................................................... 70
Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement............................................... 70
Written Statement............................................ 72
Biography.................................................... 73
Discussion
DHS' Assessment of EML......................................... 73
Appendix: Additional Material for the Record
Documents for the Record......................................... 80
TRANSITIONING THE ENVIRONMENTAL MEASUREMENTS LABORATORY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 3, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad
Miller [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Transitioning the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory to the
Department of Homeland Security
thursday, may 3, 2007
10:00 a.m.-1:30 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML), located in New
York City, was transferred from the Department of Energy to the
Department of Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate in
2003, under Section 303 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The
laboratory--established in 1947--was ostensibly transferred because of
its expertise in low level radioactive measurements, analysis and
assessments and its ability to significantly contribute to the S&T
Directorate's responsibilities as envisioned in Section 302 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to develop countermeasures to
radiological and nuclear terrorist threats; conduct basic and applied
research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation
activities relevant to DHS; detect, prevent, protect against and
respond to terrorist attacks; and to transfer relevant technologies or
abilities to Federal, State, local governments and private sector
entities.
When Congress transferred this laboratory from DOE to DHS, there
was a logical expectation that a lab which specialized in radiation
detection and supported the work of State and local officials and
first-responders would be a natural fit with an agency which was
charged with protecting the country from radiological threats. Having a
federal radiation detection laboratory located in the heart of New York
City, which after the 9/11 attack was clearly in the top tier of
potential targets for terrorists, seemed like an important asset for
DHS.
Yet since its transfer to DHS, the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory has largely been left to flounder. Rather than exploiting
and expanding the unique skills and capabilities of the laboratory that
could have clearly contributed to some of DHS' most important work, DHS
has terminated, transferred and curtailed key EML programs. Top
management at DHS also spent an inordinate amount of time, energy and
resources planning for the lab's ultimate closure. By 2007, the DHS
Science & Technology Directorate had stripped the lab of its
radioisotope chemical analysis labs critical for the continuation of
its radiochemistry Quality Assessment Program (QAP) praised by both
State and federal participants as directly contributing to homeland
security efforts. Other projects EML initiated with local first
responders in New York City, including a network of roof-top radiation
sensors, have been halted. Other programs have been started, stopped
and then transferred. In one of DHS's most astounding decisions, it
terminated the lab's entire global radiation monitoring network--in
existence since 1963--and halted plans to install a new EML built
radiation monitor in China, near the North Korean border in October
2005. This occurred one year before the North Korean nuclear test.
Congress never intended for the lab's programs to be disbanded, or
that the laboratory be closed. The detailed plans to close the lab,
first initiated in 2005, were never signed by the Under Secretary of
Science and Technology, Charles McQueary. Admiral Jay Cohen, who took
over that post last August, has told the Committee staff that he now
intends to put the lab on a new path and anticipates making it a valued
DHS asset.
In the 107th Congress, the Committee on Science played a key role
in drafting the legislation that established the Department of Homeland
Security, particularly in creating the S&T Directorate. As a result,
the Subcommittee's oversight role regarding the S&T Directorate is
particularly important. Up until now, the seemingly intentional actions
by DHS to strip the Environmental Measurements Laboratory--a critical
national asset--of its programs, projects and activities have occurred
within the inner sanctum of the S&T Directorate without any explanation
to Congress or the public of the rationale for these inexplicable
actions. In fact, even as the S&T Directorate was drafting plans to
close the laboratory and DHS-hired contractor Booz Allen Hamilton was
writing up a ``communications plan'' on the ``message'' DHS was
planning to disseminate to both Congress and the public about why the
lab was being closed, the S&T Directorate was telling Congress that
they expected the EML to ``serve an enduring role'' in supporting DHS.
The Subcommittee hearing will seek to obtain a fuller public
disclosure of how and why DHS terminated many of the lab's programs,
why the S&T Directorate was unable--or unwilling--to chart a new course
for the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and who was responsible
for undermining the success of the EML since it was transferred to DHS.
The Subcommittee hearing will fully examine the issues that have led to
the termination and transfer of some of the lab's programs that could
have played a critical role in both homeland and national security-
related issues. The conditions leading to the laboratory's current
state need to be examined, resolved and prevented from occurring again.
Although Admiral Cohen has recently pledged not to close the lab, it is
important that the Subcommittee ensure that the S&T Directorate has a
detailed strategic plan and clear vision for the lab that will ensure
they fully utilize the EML in the future.
Background of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory--which has undergone
several name changes since it was first established in 1947 as the
Medical Division of the Atomic Energy Agency--moved into its current
location in Manhattan in 1957. Within the Department of Energy the
small laboratory moved from the Office of Energy Research to the Office
of Environmental Management in 1997 to focus on environmental
monitoring, decommissioning and decontamination efforts around the
Nation's nuclear weapons complex. Unlike the much larger DOE
laboratories, including Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, the EML has always received much less
notice, financial support and attention. To some degree, it was never
able to compete with these other larger, better equipped, multi-purpose
laboratories within the DOE complex. Still, the EML developed world
renowned capabilities in low-level radiation measurements and has been
praised by State and federal officials for their contribution to both
homeland security and national security-related programs.
The lab's scientists and engineers have designed and fabricated
unique radiation detection instruments, played a major role in
evaluating the impact of environmental contamination from nuclear
weapons fallout and developed a global network of radiation sensors
that performed a critical role in U.S. and international nuclear non-
proliferation efforts. In the 1970s the EML established a
radiochemistry Quality Assessment Program (QAP) that grew to include
the participation of more than 150 labs, and they provided a support
role for DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, whose task is to locate
and disable nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices in the
U.S. and abroad.
But one walk down the lab's hallways today and it is evident the
lab has received only minimal upgrades since it moved to its current
location five decades ago. Its peak staff of about 120 employees also
dropped by half by the time it was transferred to DHS in 2003. The cost
of maintaining the large facility in Manhattan has been significant. In
addition, some employees who were nearing retirement had become
stagnant in their positions. Yet, the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory developed an unquestioned world renowned reputation for
radiation analysis. Its non-proliferation and quality assurance
programs, which began in the 1960s and 1970s and were still active when
the lab moved to DHS, had no equals either in the Federal Government or
commercial sector.
Quality Assessment Program (QAP)
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory established the Quality
Assessment Program (QAP) in 1976 to perform ``quality assurance'' or
``performance evaluation'' tests designed to assess the accuracy of
radiological measurements reported by radiochemistry laboratories.
Department of Energy contractor laboratories were required to
participate in the program. But other non-DOE laboratories, including
federal agencies, commercial laboratories and State public health labs
from California, Washington, Wisconsin, Texas, Tennessee, Illinois,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, New York and New Jersey, also participated, 150
laboratories in all. When EML was transferred to DHS, EML scientists
attempted to sharpen the QAP's focus on emergency response
capabilities, rather than routine environmental analysis. But DHS
terminated the program in 2004. Most disturbing is that in interviews
with Subcommittee staff Caroline Purdy, Former Acting Director of the
Office of National Laboratories in the S&T Directorate, who directed
that the program be closed, was completely unaware of what the Quality
Assessment Program actually did or how it might play a role within DHS.
``I don't remember any meetings discussing QAP,'' said Purdy. She said
that QAP was an ``old program'' that had been around a long time and
that her ``general assumption was that the DOE National Labs would do
this.'' John Clarke, Deputy Director of the Office of National
Laboratories, also clearly saw no value in the QAP or its relevance to
homeland security issues and also seemed unclear on what the program
actually did. His justification for seeking its closure was that it was
another ``self generating'' task that EML had developed.
Ironically, the S&T Directorate began the shut down of QAP and
EML's chemistry laboratories at a time when DHS was standing up a new
interagency organization dubbed the Integrated Consortium Laboratory
Network or ICLN. Government officials from the Department of Energy,
National Institutes of Standards and Technology and Environmental
Protection Agency told Subcommittee staff that they believe EML's
Quality Assessment Program would have been a key asset and perfect fit
in the newly formed ICLN organization to coordinate proficiency testing
at radiochemistry labs.
The Environmental Measurements Laboratory's QAP chemistry labs are
now in the final stages of decommissioning. In the process the lab has
donated or disposed of more than $1.7 million worth of equipment. The
Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Secret Service took some of the
radiation samples and the EML donated $6,000 of brand new flasks and
beakers to Stuyvesant High School in New York City. Dr. Damon Chaky, a
scientist at the Pratt Institute received two gamma radiation detectors
valued at $20,000 each.
Global Monitoring Program
Since 1963, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory had
developed, fabricated and maintained a global network of low-level
radionuclide sensors. The EML monitoring system was the most extensive
and comprehensive low-level radionuclide sampling network in the world,
comprised of a Global Fallout Program, Surface Air Sampling Program
(SASP) and Remote Atmospheric Measurements Program (RAMP). The network
included more than 70 monitoring sites in the U.S. and abroad,
including Antarctica, Australia, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Chile, China,
France, Greenland, Panama, Singapore, South Africa, Turkmenistan, the
United Kingdom, Uruguay and Venezuela. The network has been used
extensively by scientists to validate global meteorological and
atmospheric transport models. But the system also collected data that
assisted U.S. and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts,
helping to rapidly identify any new sources of radiological activities
due to accidental releases or nuclear weapons tests.
In January 2002 EML established a monitoring station in Guiyang in
southwest China and in April 2002 it established a second site at Mt.
Waliguan. In August 2003, EML also installed a RAMP system in Ryori,
Japan. The lab had plans to install a new radiation detector at Long
Feng Shan in China, near the North Korean border that would have been
installed in early 2006. But DHS terminated the lab's entire global
radiation monitoring program in October 2005, including its plans to
install a new detector near the North Korean border. This was
particularly unfortunate, since North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons
test in October 2006. Although portions of the program were classified,
the significance of the program to U.S. nuclear non-proliferation
efforts would have appeared obvious to anyone who had looked.
The EML sent e-mails to the sites maintaining the radiation
detectors and informed those involved that they should dispose of the
EML radiation sensors in accordance with local laws. Much of the
equipment was old and it would have been too expensive to pack them up
and return them to EML. The new radiation sensor that EML had planned
to install at Long Feng Shan, China, near the North Korean border was
never fully assembled and pieces of that planned detector remain at EML
today.
With the specialized skills that the lab's core group of scientists
and engineers possessed and their ability to design, fabricate and
manufacture unique radiation sensors and their history of developing
and producing plans and protocols for measuring and identifying
radioactive isotopes it is particularly disturbing that S&T Managers
could not envision how this laboratory--based in the heart of
Manhattan--could have contributed to DHS. Instead, the lab's newly
proposed projects were rejected, its former programs were terminated
and its ability to function at virtually any level was micromanaged to
the extreme. No one, it seems, in the S&T Directorate had a clear
understanding of what some of the lab's most impressive programs did or
how they might play a role in homeland security. Instead, they were
viewed as not being part of the ``DHS mission'' and were terminated.
The leadership chasm that existed in the S&T Directorate was chilling.
In fact, it is not clear how the S&T Directorate expected EML to
thrive, even function, within the Department of Homeland Security given
the constraints that were placed on them. It's extraordinarily telling,
for instance, that the lab had no computer access to the DHS Intranet
until 2005, two years after EML transferred to DHS. Even then, EML was
only provided with four computers that could access the DHS Intranet
and one printer, despite the fact they had more than 40 employees. John
Clarke also prevented DHS employees from attending conferences and
routinely questioned their travel plans. Documents DHS provided to the
Subcommittee show Clarke did this because of concerns over the
laboratory's financial management. But even Marc Mandler, former
Technical Director of the U.S. Coast Guard Research & Development
Center, who was detailed to DHS for a short four month tour in 2004 and
reviewed the lab's capabilities, along with Clarke, believed the
financial microscope that was placed on EML was ``very extreme,'' he
said. ``They could not even buy toilet paper,'' said Mandler, half-
joking.
In the critical Mandler/Clarke review that was concluded in October
2004, Marc Mandler says he provided an honest assessment of what he
encountered during his short tenure at DHS, but acknowledges that he
did not speak to individuals outside of EML to get their perspective on
the lab or work the lab had done for them. Mandler, who is well
respected, said he felt that many of the EML employees were steadfastly
resistant to change and unable to tailor their work towards their new
mission at the Department of Homeland Security. But he did believe the
staff that was willing to move in this direction were technically
proficient, could contribute to homeland security efforts and that the
lab had strategic value because of its location in the midst of New
York City. Mandler says he respected John Clarke, but also says that
the way the DHS S&T Directorate managed the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory had a lot to be desired. ``It was micromanagement without
direction,'' said Mandler.
Witnesses
The Subcommittee hearing will use three separate panels to tell the
story of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and to explore and
explain the systemic mismanagement that occurred on the part of the
Science & Technology Directorate in supervising, managing and leading
the laboratory.
Panel 1 will be composed of individuals from local, State and
Federal Government agencies that have utilized the services of EML as
well as a former DHS official in the S&T Directorate who quit over the
way, he believed, the laboratory was being mistreated. Two of these
witnesses have had programs they relied on with the EML terminated by
the Department of Homeland Security. Mrs. Lynn Albin, Radiation Health
Physicist, Office of Radiation Protection, Washington State Department
of Health, utilized EML's QAP for nearly two decades. She will address
the significance this program had on preparing her agency for the DHS-
led TOPOFF2 counterterrorism exercise in 2003. Mr. Charles F.
McBrearty, Jr., Former Director of Materials Technology, Air Force
Technical Applications Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, just
retired last month from the Air Force. He had a relationship with EML
for nearly three decades and took a trip to DHS Headquarters in D.C. to
make the case that EML was a critical asset and that in his experience
they were ``the masters of the universe in terms of radiation
measurements.'' Despite that, DHS terminated all of EML's work for the
Air Force. Assistant Commissioner Jonathan A. Duecker, New York Police
Department, Counterterrorism Bureau, will describe the work that EML
has been performing for first responders in the New York region since
9.11. Dr. Tony Fainberg, Former Program Manager, Radiological & Nuclear
Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development, Science &
Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, will describe
how he believed many of EML's programs could have benefited DHS.
Fainberg witnessed many of the lab's programs killed off by the S&T
Directorate and he eventually quit when he concluded that the
directorate was intent on closing the laboratory.
The sole witness for Panel 2 is Dr. John F. Clarke, Deputy
Director, Office of National Laboratories, Science & Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. Clarke is a Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory employee detailed to the S&T Directorate,
and is a key player in the ultimate degradation of the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory's capabilities and programs.
Panel 3 will look ahead to the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory's future. Admiral Jay M. Cohen, Under Secretary for Science
and Technology, Department of Homeland Security and Mr. Vayl Oxford,
Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland
Security will both discuss what role they see for the lab moving
forward.
Conclusion
The history of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory--in the
four years since it was transferred to the Department of Homeland
Security--should serve as a case study of government mismanagement and
incompetence. Once a valued critical asset, the lab has been stripped
of some of its most successful and important programs and sorely
mischaracterized by a small handful of officials in the S&T
Directorate. John Clarke particularly served as a funnel through which
information about EML flowed to many others within the S&T Directorate.
His motivations may never be clear, but Clarke's mischaracterization of
the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, the skills of its staff and
the lab's programmatic capabilities are unmistakable. Subcommittee
staff found that he has misconstrued conversations with both local
first responders and non-DHS federal agencies about their stated
positions regarding specific EML projects that Clarke eventually
terminated. Even worse, Maureen McCarthy, Clarke's supervisor and the
former Director of the Office of Research and Development (ORD) within
the DHS S&T Directorate told Subcommittee staff that John Clarke had no
``programmatic role'' in the S&T Directorate. If he was involved in
making programmatic decisions about the EML, said McCarthy--which he
clearly and repeatedly was--this was outside of his set of
responsibilities.
But McCarthy had been made aware of Clarke's propensity to overstep
his lines of authority, particularly when it came to management of the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory, by at least two DHS officials in
2005, including Tony Fainberg. Responsibility for reigning in the
detrimental actions by John Clarke regarding EML clearly fell to her.
While McCarthy says she spoke to Clarke about some of his actions, it
clearly had little if any impact. Clarke managed to terminate EML's
work for the Air Force, for example, even after those conversations. In
fact, Tony Fainberg ended up quitting his position in the S&T
Directorate partly because of the actions of John Clarke and partly
because no one above Clarke was willing to prevent him from essentially
destroying the programs, resources and morale at the Environmental
Measurements Lab.
Admiral Cohen has told Subcommittee staff that he has no plans to
close EML. He intends to maintain the lab's presence in New York City
and to re-emphasize the lab's core mission towards the Testing &
Evaluation (T&E) of equipment. This is a role the lab has taken on
since 9.11 on an ad hoc basis for the New York and New Jersey first
responder community in any event. Admiral Cohen sees EML becoming one
of the premier testing and evaluation centers for DHS nationwide, he
says. In addition, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) intends
to utilize about ten of the EML staff in the Countermeasures Test Bed
(CMTB) and other related efforts that focus on the detection and
identification of radiological threat material in the New York area.
It is encouraging that after more than four years the S&T
Directorate seems to finally have some direction for the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory. Up until now the laboratory has been left
rudderless without a paddle. Admiral Cohen has emphasized that he wants
to maintain the intellectual capital of EML's employees. Unfortunately,
many of the lab's cadre of scientists and engineers have already
retired or resigned since the lab was transferred into DHS. When the
lab was transferred to DHS they had 54 employees, 12 with Ph.D.s and 18
with Master's degrees. Today the lab has 35 employees, seven with
Ph.D.s and 11 with Master's degrees. Damage to the intellectual capital
of the laboratory has already occurred, but Admiral Cohen can still
help stem the flow.
The S&T Directorate--led by Admiral Cohen--now has an opportunity
to clearly lead the lab into the future by providing them with clear
guidance, renewed encouragement about their ability to contribute to
the Nation's security and by obtaining a much clearer understanding of
the skills and abilities of the lab's remaining personnel and how they
can be utilized to their full potential. The lab has been left to
wither for too long, staff has fled and critical programs have been
inexplicably terminated. Admiral Cohen has an opportunity to curtail
the damage that has already been done and begin a positive path forward
that will benefit the lab, its employees, DHS and the Nation.
Chairman Miller. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order for the hearing on transitioning the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory to the Department of Homeland Security.
We learned from Hurricane Katrina that we were woefully
unprepared for an entirely foreseeable natural disaster. The
failures of our response expose the sorry state of our
emergency preparedness. Many of us wondered what else was
suffering from similar neglect that we might only learn of if
something goes horribly wrong?
Today the Subcommittee is going to review the management of
the Environmental Measurements Lab by the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate. It
appears that we have stunningly neglected our obvious national
security and homeland security need to detect and measure
radiation, hindering our ability to respond to nuclear
proliferation around the world and here in the United States,
to prevent and respond to the detonation of a dirty bomb, a
promise that terrorist groups have telegraphed for years. And
while we are spending billions to develop the technology to
intercept a missile in the air, to hit a bullet with a bullet,
a task that many think is a fool's errand, we have shortchanged
research to develop the technology to prevent a nuclear device
from being smuggled into the United States and detonated in an
American city, a far more likely event.
EML has specialized in radiation detection analysis for 60
years. It traces its roots to the Manhattan Project. It should
have been a welcome asset and a natural fit for an agency
chartered with protecting our country from radiological
threats. Instead, detailed plans to close the lab were
concealed from both the EML staff and Congress. Critical
national security programs at the lab were terminated and the
lab's employees to be left to wonder about their future for the
past four years without any clear direction or decisions from
the Department of Homeland Security.
When the Environmental Measurements Laboratory was
transferred to Homeland Security from the Department of Energy
in 2003, Congress expected that the laboratory would add value.
Beginning with the work on the Manhattan Project, EML
scientists developed a world-renown expertise in low-level
radiation measurement, a skill that would be of critical value
to both help prevent and respond to potential radiological or
nuclear terrorist attack. Instead of exploring and expanding
unique skills and the capabilities of the laboratory in a
strategic location in Manhattan, Homeland Security's S&T,
Science and Technology, Directorate soon proceeded to reject
the lab's proposals for future work and terminated its existing
programs.
S&T managers downplayed, dismissed, disparaged the
capabilities of the lab, arguing that it had no real unique
skills, had low credibility in the view of local first
responders, and could not compete with other larger national
laboratories. Our first panel today is composed of local, State
and federal, officials and a former DHS manager. They will
provide a contrary view to that assessment. We will also
examine some of EML's key programs that were terminated. One of
those was the lab's worldwide radiation monitoring program.
Beginning in 1963, EML had built a global network of low-
level radiation sensors that were used by scientists to
validate global atmospheric transport models. But the system
also played a key role in nuclear nonproliferation efforts,
rapidly identifying any new sources of radiological activities
from nuclear weapons tests. The lab had installed two radiation
monitors in China in 2002 and had plans to install a new one, a
new detector in China, near the North Korean border, in early
2006. But on October 1, 2005, the program was terminated by
DHS. Almost exactly a year later, on October 9, 2006, North
Korea carried out a nuclear weapons test. It is hard to know
how valuable the EML's Global Monitoring Program, and
particularly its new radiation sensor, would have been in
helping determine the sophistication of the North Korean
nuclear test. We only know that because of DHS's action, the
sensor was not in place and remains unassembled at EML today.
In 2005, DHS also stripped EML of its radioisotope chemical
analysis labs, critical for the continuation of its
radiochemistry Quality Assessment Program. That is pronounced
QAP. It sounds like Elmer Fudd using a mild profanity--QAP. It
is praised by both State and federal participants as directly
contributing to homeland security efforts. This program helped
ensure the results produced by radiochemistry tests by
radiochemistry labs, whose task is to analyze radioactive
samples whether from a nuclear facility or in response to
radiological attack, were accurate.
Some projects EML initiated with local first responders in
New York City, including a network of rooftop radiation
sensors, were halted by DHS. Other programs were started and
stopped and then transferred. The way the EML has fared since
being transferred to DHS shows an appalling lack of leadership
at DHS S&T Directorate. The lack of clear decisions and
direction regarding EML permitted a haphazard approach and its
programs to fester within the S&T Directorate. And as a result,
the lab's programs were decimated and its staff demoralized and
a seemingly reckless disregard for how the lab's skills and
projects could have benefited DHS, other federal agencies or
the Nation.
Top S&T managers responsible for terminating some of the
lab's key programs had no idea what those programs actually did
and had no discussions about how they might benefit DHS. In
addition, S&T managers squandered an inordinate amount of time
and effort planning for the demise of the EML laboratory,
rather than attempting to determine how the lab might be
effectively used and its staff successfully employed to
contribute to DHS. Because of all of these actions, the lab has
been left in limbo. Many of its programs have been terminated,
new projects halted, the skills and capabilities of its
employees disparaged, and its staff reduced by a third.
The Subcommittee hopes that EML and the leadership of S&T
Directorate have turned the corner and we can now expect some
positive change in the future. Our last panel today will look
at the lab's future role in DHS. The vast majority of those
actions did not occur under Under Secretary of Science and
Technology Admiral Cohen's watch. The Subcommittee is pleased
that the new leadership of the S&T Directorate appears willing
to utilize a lab that many have referred to as a national
asset. Again, we appreciate that the S&T Directorate and the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office will work together to employ
fully the skills of the staff at the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory.
And now I would like to recognize the Ranking Member, Mr.
McCaul, for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Brad Miller
Good morning.
We learned from Hurricane Katrina that we were woefully unprepared
for an entirely foreseeable natural disaster. The failures of our
response exposed the sorry state of our emergency preparedness.
Many of us wondered what else was suffering from similar neglect
that we might only learn of if something else goes horribly wrong.
Today, the Subcommittee is going to review management of the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) by the Department of
Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate. It appears that
we have stunningly neglected our obvious national security and homeland
security need to detect and measure radiation, hindering our ability to
respond to nuclear proliferation around the world, and here in the
United States to prevent or respond to the detonation of a ``dirty
bomb,'' a punch that terrorist groups have telegraphed for years. And
while we are spending billions to develop the technology to intercept a
missile in the air, we have shortchanged research to develop the
technology to prevent a nuclear device from being smuggled into the
United States and detonated in an American city, a far more likely
event.
EML has specialized in radiation detection and analysis for 60
years. It traces its roots to the Manhattan Project. It should have
been a welcomed asset and natural fit for an agency charged with
protecting the country from radiological threats. Instead, detailed
plans to close the lab were concealed from both the EML staff and
Congress, critical national security programs at the lab were
terminated and the lab's employees have been left to ponder their
future fate for the past four years without any clear direction or
decisions from DHS.
When the Environmental Measurements Laboratory was transferred to
Homeland Security from the Department of Energy in 2003, Congress
expected that the laboratory would add value. Beginning with their work
on the Manhattan Project, EML's scientists developed a world renowned
expertise in low-level radiation measurement, a skill that would be of
critical value to both help prevent and respond to a potential
radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. But, instead of exploiting
and expanding the unique skills and capabilities of the laboratory and
its strategic location in New York City, Homeland Security's S&T
Directorate soon proceeded to reject the lab's proposals for future
work and terminated its existing programs.
S&T managers downplayed, dismissed and disparaged the capabilities
of the lab arguing that it had no unique skills, had low credibility in
the view of the local first responders it worked with and could not
compete with other larger national laboratories. Our first panel today
is composed of local, State and federal officials and a former DHS
program manager. They will provide a contrary view to that assessment.
We will also examine some of EML's key programs that were
inexplicably terminated. One of those was the lab's worldwide radiation
monitoring program. Beginning in 1963, EML had built a global network
of low-level radiation sensors that was used by scientists to validate
global atmospheric transport models. But the system also played a key
role in nuclear non-proliferation efforts, rapidly identifying any new
sources of radiological activities from nuclear weapons tests. The lab
had installed two radiation monitors in China in 2002 and had plans to
install a new detector in China near the North Korean border in early
2006. But on October 1, 2005, the program was terminated by DHS. Almost
exactly a year later, on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out a
nuclear weapons test. It is hard to know how valuable the EML global
monitoring program and particularly its new radiation sensor that the
lab had planned to install near the North Korean border would have been
in helping to determine the sophistication of the North Korean nuclear
test. We only know that, because of DHS's actions, the sensor was not
in place and sits unassembled at EML today.
In 2005, DHS also stripped EML of its radioisotope chemical
analysis labs critical for the continuation of its radiochemistry
Quality Assessment Program (QAP) praised by both State and federal
participants as directly contributing to homeland security efforts.
This program helped ensure that the results produced by radiochemistry
labs--whose task is to analyze radioactive samples whether from a
nuclear facility or in response to a radiological attack--are accurate.
Some projects EML initiated with local first responders in New York
City, including a network of roof-top radiation sensors, were halted by
DHS. Other programs were started, stopped and then transferred.
The incomprehensible way the Environmental Measurements Laboratory
has fared since being transferred to DHS is testimony to an appalling
lack of leadership at the S&T Directorate. The lack of clear decisions
and direction regarding EML permitted a haphazard approach to the EML
and its programs to fester within the S&T Directorate. As a result, the
lab's programs were decimated and its staff demoralized with a
seemingly reckless disregard for how the lab's skills and projects
could have benefited DHS, other federal agencies or the Nation as a
whole. Top S&T managers responsible for terminating some of the lab's
key programs had no idea what these programs actually did and held no
discussions on how they might benefit DHS. In addition, S&T managers
squandered an inordinate amount of time and effort planning for the
demise of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory rather than
attempting to determine how the lab could be effectively utilized and
its staff successfully employed to contribute to DHS.
Because of all of these actions, the lab has been left in a
disturbing state of limbo. Many of its programs have been terminated,
new projects halted, the skills and capabilities of its federal
employees disparaged and its staff reduced by one-third. The
Subcommittee hopes that the EML and the leadership at the S&T
Directorate have finally turned the corner and that we can expect
positive change to be forthcoming.
Our last panel will look towards the lab's future role in DHS. The
vast majority of these actions did not occur under Under Secretary of
Science & Technology, Admiral Cohen's watch. The Subcommittee is
pleased that the new leadership at the S&T Directorate appears willing
to utilize a laboratory that many have referred to as a national asset.
We anticipate that the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office will work together to fully employ and exploit the
skills of the staff at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Chairman Miller. As I said, it is
your lucky day. I am filling in for Mr. Sensenbrenner today. I
want to welcome our witnesses and those out there. I want to
thank the Chairman for holding this hearing on the Department
of Homeland Security's Environmental Measurements Laboratory.
As the Ranking Member on the Homeland Security Committee's
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science
and Technology, I am particularly interested in the future of
the Department's national labs. To that end, I hope the
witnesses before us today can help us understand what EML's
capabilities are and how they can best fit into DHS. Any time a
facility is transferred from one agency to another, there is
understandably a realignment of work in order to serve the
agency's and the Nation's best interest. EML is no exception.
They will have to adapt to their new homeland security mission,
which will likely mean a different focus and direction for the
lab. In identifying this new path, we should also be mindful of
other work EML does that may not be in line within the DHS
structure and mission and make sure that we don't lose a
national capability just because of turf considerations.
That being said, I am confident that there is a safe place
for EML in DHS, after all, EML is a unique asset located in the
heart of downtown Manhattan. They have built up a strong
relationship with State and local entities there and are
undisputedly experts in low-level radiation analysis, clearly a
high priority for DHS. As I said, I look forward to the
testimony. I hope this will be a productive hearing and we will
leave here with a better understanding of how EML can best be
utilized in the future. And with that, I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Michael T. McCaul
Thank you, Mr. Miller. I will be filling in for Mr. Sensenbrenner
today as Ranking Member. I want to welcome our witnesses here today and
thank the Chairman for holding this hearing on the Department of
Homeland Security's Environmental Measurements Laboratory. As the
Ranking Member on the Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats, Cyber Security, and Science and Technology, I'm
particularly interested in the future of the Department's national
labs.
To that end, I hope the witnesses before us today can help us
understand what EML's capabilities are, and how they can best fit into
DHS. Anytime a facility is transferred from one agency to another,
there is understandably a realignment of work in order to serve the
agency's, and the Nation's, best interests. EML is no different. They
will have to adapt to their new homeland security mission, which will
likely mean a different focus and direction for the lab. In identifying
this new path, we should also be mindful of other work EML does that
may not be aligned with the DHS mission and make sure that we don't
lose a national capability just because of turf considerations.
That being said, I am confident that there is a place for EML in
DHS. After all, EML is a unique asset: Located in the heart of
Manhattan, they have built up strong relationships with State and local
entities, and are undisputedly experts in low-level radiation
analysis--clearly a high priority for DHS. I look forward to all of our
witnesses' testimony--particularly Under Secretary Cohen's and Mr.
Oxford's. I hope this will be a productive hearing, and that we will
all leave here with a better understanding of how EML can best be
utilized in the future.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. If there are other
Members--Mr. Rothman is welcome to submit any kind of opening
statement for the record, which he has shaken his head to show
that he does not.
Mr. Rothman. If I may, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am
very interested in today's hearing, period.
Chairman Miller. The Chairman welcomes similar opening
statements from the Members of the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative F. James Sensenbrenner Jr.
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Sensenbrenner Lauds Value of
Environmental Measurements Laboratories
Washington, May 3, 2007--As the Ranking Republican on the House
Science and Technology Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-MI) made the following comments
following today's Subcommittee hearing on Environmental Measurement
Laboratories (EML), and its transition from the Department of Energy to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
``If an American city was a victim of a dirty bomb attack, our lack
of preparedness would affect our ability to triage medical care and
limit panic,'' said Sensenbrenner. ``Proper equipment and training
would allow experts to quickly assess and disclose the levels of
radiation and the risk to the public, allowing people who are not at
risk to be put at ease and freeing emergency responders to focus on
those people most in need of care.''
``After a Subcommittee investigation that has spanned the past
several months, it is clear that DHS has, thus far, struggled to fully
realize the value of EML's expertise,'' Sensenbrenner continued. ``It
is equally clear that EML, which specializes in low-level radiation
measurements, can have a valuable place within DHS and can help prepare
America to respond to a catastrophic attack.''
A supervisor with the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene, Lynn
West, worked with EML through its Quality Assessment Program (QAP)
before that program was terminated by DHS. Ms. West explained that
while America has done a lot to prepare for a full-scale nuclear
disaster, it has lagged in its preparedness to respond to lower-level
radiological emergencies, like a dirty bomb.
``There is currently no program, federal or otherwise, focused on
developing the ability of radiochemistry labs to respond to
radiological emergencies. The QAP program, had it not been terminated,
would have helped in this area,'' Sensenbrenner concluded.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello
Good morning. Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing to
receive testimony from witnesses on the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS)'s Science and Technology Directorate Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML).
In the 1970s, EML established a radiochemistry quality assessment
program that grew to include the participation of more than 150 labs.
They have provided a support role for the Department of Energy's
Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, whose task is to locate and disable
nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices in the U.S. and
abroad.
EML was transferred from the Department of Energy to the DHS's
Science and Technology Directorate in 2003, under the Homeland Security
Act of 2002. Since its transfer to DHS, programs at EML have been
terminated and curtailed in order to plan for the lab's ultimate
closure. The reasons for shutting down the lab are not clear and the
Science and Technology Directorate within the DHS has not provided an
explanation to Congress or the public of the rationale for closure.
I look forward to hearing from our panel of witnesses in order to
obtain full disclosure on what happened with the EML and why Congress
was not made aware of the systemic mismanagement that occurred in
supervising, managing, and leading the laboratory.
Chairman Miller. We would now like to introduce our panel
of witnesses. On the first panel is Mr. Charles McBrearty,
former Director of Materials Technology, Air Force Technical
Applications Center, Patrick Air Force Base in Florida; Dr.
Tony Fainberg, former Program Manager, Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures, Office of Research and Development, Science
and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security;
Lynn Albin, Radiation Health Specialist or Physicist, Office of
Radiation Protection, Washington State Department of Health;
and Assistant Commissioner Jonathan Duecker with the New York
Police Department Counterterrorism Bureau. You can all take
your seats. Thank you.
Your oral testimony is limited to five minutes. All of you
have submitted written testimony which will be placed in the
record and without objection, we may enter various documents in
the hearing, whether identified or not during the hearing. I
assume that is without objection. So after the entire panel has
given your five-minute testimony, the Members of the Committee
will have five minutes each to ask questions. I will try to be
fairly strict about that, although Mr. McCaul has not been an
offender in that regard. And we do swear the witnesses, so it
is our practice to do so. Do any of you have any objections to
being sworn in, to taking an oath? You also have the right to
be represented by Counsel. I know hearing that does not
necessarily put you at your ease. There is no reason. None of
us anticipate that you need Counsel, but you may have Counsel
if you want it and none of you have Counsel today.
Okay, if you would all now please stand and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. McBrearty. You
may begin.
Panel 1:
STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES F. MCBREARTY, JR., FORMER DIRECTOR OF
MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY, AIR FORCE TECHNICAL APPLICATIONS CENTER,
PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE
Mr. McBrearty. I appreciate the opportunity to represent
the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) at this
hearing on the transition of EML. A detailed response to the
questions you asked me, sir, is in the written testimony that I
provided. I will just give a quick summary of some of those
points and would be happy to answer and elaborate.
The mission of AFTAC is to provide the national authorities
quality technical measurements to monitor nuclear treaty
compliance by foreign nations, and to develop advanced
proliferation technologies which are vital to the national
security. In terms of this Committee's inquiry, AFTAC had
maintained an outstanding relationship with the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory for almost four decades. In 2005, when
Dr. Clarke of DHS informed AFTAC that EML would be closing, I
traveled to the DHS offices to personally discuss the matter
with him. My purpose was to emphasize the importance of the
work that EML was doing for AFTAC, as well as my view of the
potential value, an important value EML represented to the new
department.
The DHS decision did not change as a result of that mission
meeting, so AFTAC proceeded to transfer its nuclear monitoring
support functions, which we're doing on at EML, to Los Alamos
National Laboratories and its engineering and nuclear analysis
sampling technology evaluation support functions to Pacific
Northwest Laboratories, two laboratories which, again, we have
had and do have long-term relationships with.
The termination of AFTAC's efforts at EML created a short-
term impact on our programs during the transfer of the analysis
work to the other laboratories. Based on the DHS decisions, we
adjusted our operations and today are generally comfortable
with the new arrangements. Because of this decision, or the
threat of it, key EML staff scientists have moved on or retired
and specialized equipment has been transferred. Thus the core
of the capability of great value to AFTAC no longer currently
exists at EML.
From my position as a customer of EML and versed and
experienced with about 38 or so years in this field, I believe
that the intangible worth of EML's excellent technical
experience and contacts within the international radiation
measurements community were not fully appreciated. We did
appreciate them and made great use of all of those contacts in
matters like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and things of
that nature.
However, that said, the ultimate decision of whether or not
to continue EML's operations was one ultimately DHS had to
make. Our operations only funded a small portion of the work
that went on there, so we had no choice once the decision was
apparently made to terminate other than to move on, move our
stuff onwards.
If you have any other questions, I will be happy to answer
them.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McBrearty follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles F. McBrearty, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate
this opportunity to represent the Air Force Technical Applications
Center (AFTAC) at this hearing on the transition of the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The mission of AFTAC is to provide national authorities quality
technical measurements to monitor nuclear treaty compliance and
develops advanced proliferation monitoring technologies to preserve our
nation's security. In terms of this committee's inquiry, AFTAC had a
long and valued association with the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory going back over three decades. During that period, EML
provided services to AFTAC through the Department of Energy (DOE)
``Work of Others Program.'' These efforts consisted of task-order
based, technical support and consulting services associated with the
area of their expertise, the measurement of radioactivity in the
environment. EML also provided AFTAC with assistance on other national
security projects that we will not be able to discuss in today's open
hearing.
EML Program Support to AFTAC
At the time the EML was transferred to the DHS, we were maintaining
a relatively small effort (on the order of $200K-$300K per year) with
the laboratory. The focus of that work was largely for trace
radionuclide analysis of specific samples collected by the United
States Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS) operated by AFTAC. EML
performed this analysis on gas samples collected by AFTAC's Nuclear
Debris Collection and Analysis (NDC&A) program to monitor provisions of
the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
In addition, AFTAC made good use of EML's scientific expertise and
excellent connections/reputation in the International Community. We
routinely asked their advice, support, and assistance in tasks
associated with the enhancement of the USAEDS, innovative sampler
design and development, and consulted closely on matters of common
interest with regard to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
During development of CTBT protocols in the mid 1990's AFTAC,
strongly recommended that EML be designated as the U.S. ``States
Party'' radionuclide analysis laboratory. They were subsequently so
designated.
Dr. John Clarke of the DHS notified AFTAC in September 2005 that,
``Our year-long review has now concluded and the programmatic decision
has been made to close the EML.'' He also informed EML and AFTAC that
the DHS would no longer accept funding for this work. Dr. Clarke noted
in that e-mail that he had contacted both Mr. Scott Smith, the AFTAC
Project Officer, and I and stated, ``They both understand and accept
that the nature of future radiation measurement work at EML is still
under review in DHS and that DHS cannot commit to a new contract with
their organization at this time.'' AFTAC worked with EML over the next
seven months to relocate the government furnished equipment needed to
perform our nuclear treaty monitoring mission to Los Alamos National
Laboratory. AFTAC also assisted EML in relocating their sample
inventory to qualified sample management facilities at AFTAC and AFTAC-
sponsored laboratory facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory and
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
Value of EML Activities to AFTAC and Support to National Security
We highly valued the work of EML. Not only was the laboratory a
reputable and highly respected analytical facility from whom we could
always count on quality and cost effective work, they were unmatched in
their understanding of the operational realities of sample collection
operations. The culture that had evolved at the laboratory was, in my
view, one of seeking practical, rugged and sustainable collection
systems and collection concepts.
Again, we cannot go into the details of the national security work
performed by EML in this environment. While we had significantly
reduced the amount of national security work being performed by EML
under this portion of the effort, some aspects were quite valuable to
the USAEDS treaty monitoring efforts.
The engineering and nuclear debris sampling and radiometric
technology evaluation support was of high value to AFTAC. The EML
scientists, as federal employees, were noted for impartial and
independent judgment on nuclear measurement related issues.
The radiometric measurements on gas samples collected by AFTAC's
NDC&A program were of very high value to AFTAC. Many of the national
laboratories could perform these types of radiometric measurements, but
EML was unique in its proximity to our gas sample processing laboratory
in New Providence, NJ. Samples could be driven to EML in less than an
hour if required and time is often of the essence for measuring the
short lived isotopes associated with nuclear weapons testing.
AFTAC's Efforts to Persuade DHS to Maintain EML Programs
I was initially quite pleased to learn that a decision had been
made to transfer EML to the DHS. My organization and I highly regarded
the expertise and competence of EML in the field of trace radionuclide
detection, and I believed those same capabilities that were of such
value to AFTAC could also be of great help to the new Department. EML's
excellent national and international reputation in a field of critical
need by DHS (trace radioactive materials detection and expertise in
sample collection, data analysis and quality control) were, in my mind,
extremely valuable assets.
I was surprised when I learned that closure of the laboratory was
being considered. When we received clear indication from the new
program office in DHS that closure was planned, I made a special trip
to Washington to discuss the issue, its implications for my programs,
and expressed my opinion of the inherent value EML capabilities
represented to DHS.
During this visit in September 2005, I meet with Dr. John Clarke
and discussed these topics. Dr. Clarke indicated that actions were
underway to close the lab and that unless we wanted to pick up the tab
for the operation, (a sum of about $10M per year as I recall), we
should plan on moving our work elsewhere. I expressed my surprise at
the proposed decision and emphasized my view that a credible, unbiased
resource for testing, reviewing, and quality control of the plethora of
radiation detection concepts being pushed by numerous commercial
enterprises as well as the National Laboratories themselves. .
.capabilities I believed resided in EML. . .was critically needed.
DHS's response to my points was that ``EML was quite costly and did
not fit into their `Business Model'.''
AFTAC's Response to DHS's Decision to Halt EML Support to AFTAC
After being notified of the DHS programmatic decision to close EML,
AFTAC considered a number of possible alternatives to continue the
national security portion of the effort. Dr. Clarke offered to assist
AFTAC in finding an organization within the Federal Government that
could take over this effort. Based upon the new capabilities, either
already in place or scheduled for being operational with the next two
years, AFTAC decided to terminate the national security effort rather
than attempting to transition that effort to another organization.
The majority of the remaining engineering and nuclear debris
sampling and radiometric technology evaluation support transitioned to
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, another long-term USAEDS mission
partner for AFTAC. This work is sponsored by both AFTAC and the DOE
Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development. AFTAC particularly
valued the ability to consult with EML as an honest broker for
engineering advice and technical evaluation. AFTAC successfully
transitioned the gas sample radiometric measurement effort to Los
Alamos National Laboratory, a long-term USAEDS mission partner for
AFTAC, in the spring of 2006. EML requested permission to discontinue
operating and maintaining these systems, and AFTAC approved this
request on 14 March 2006. Personnel from EML and Los Alamos packed up
the detectors and other Air Force government-furnished equipment and
shipped them to Los Alamos in late April 2006.
Conclusion
AFTAC had maintained an outstanding relationship with the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory for four decades. When Dr. John
Clarke, DHS, informed AFTAC that DHS would be closing EML, I traveled
to DHS to personally discuss the matter with him. The DHS decision did
not change as a result of that meeting, so AFTAC proceeded to transfer
its nuclear treaty monitoring support functions to Los Alamos National
Laboratory and its engineering and nuclear debris sampling and
radiometric technology evaluation support functions to Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory. AFTAC terminated its support for the
national security work due to increased capabilities elsewhere and
other priorities.
The termination of AFTAC efforts at EML created short-term impact
on our program during the transfer of analysis work to other
laboratories. Based on the DHS decisions, we adjusted our operations
and today are generally comfortable with the new arrangements. Because
of this decision (or threat of it), key EML scientific staff have moved
on or retired and specialized equipment has been transferred. Thus, the
core of the capability of value to AFTAC no longer exists at EML.
From my position as a customer of EML's, I believe the intangible
worth of EML's excellent technical experience and contacts within the
international radiation measurements community was not fully
appreciated. From AFTAC's perspective, this was important, and in my
view was, in many ways, a unique national asset representing an
experience base unlike any other laboratory in the DOE complex.
However, in the larger picture, DHS as the parent agency, the primary
designated customer of EML's output and the agency which was funding
the bulk of EML's activities was better positioned than we, as
occasional users, were to make the final funding decision. Ultimately,
we--AFTAC--made our own decision as to whether or not to support a
wider range of activities than we had historically supported in order
to keep EML together, and we, too, decided that we couldn't provide
that level of support.
Thank you for your attention. If you have any questions, I would be
happy to address them.
Biography for Charles F. McBrearty, Jr.
Charles F. McBrearty, Jr., retired as the Director of Materials
Technology at the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC),
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida on 30 April 2007. Prior to his
retirement, Mr. McBrearty directed AFTAC's largest product area with an
annual program budget of more than $140 million and directed the work
of over 200 scientific and engineering personnel. He was responsible
for the management of a network of 13 analytical laboratories engaged
in trace nuclear and non-nuclear materials analysis, in support of
AFTAC's global treaty-monitoring tasking to detect, collect, and
analyze nuclear material associated with nuclear tests. He guided
AFTAC's research and development programs exploring new technologies to
enhance and assist treaty verification and efforts to limit the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction. His responsibilities covered diverse sciences and
technologies ranging from nuclear engineering, chemistry, and
meteorology, to collection and analysis technique development. Mr.
McBrearty directed AFTAC nuclear analysis and evaluation support to the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Department of State, in
their monitoring of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Mr. McBrearty has served in a variety of leadership, academic and
technical positions in government and industry. He entered the Air
Force in 1967 as a distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M University
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program and served as a
commissioned officer until 1991.
He held two command positions with AFTAC, taught at the Air Force
Academy, and served in numerous staff and scientific positions.
Following his retirement from active duty, he managed NASA's Toxic
Vapor Detection Laboratory supporting Space Shuttle operations at
Kennedy Space Center.
Mr. McBrearty returned to federal service in 1993 to assume his
current position and was appointed to the Air Force Senior Executive
Service in 1998. He was awarded The Presidential Rank, Meritorious
Executive Award in 2005.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. McBrearty. Remarkably, you
had a minute and 45 left. Dr. Fainberg.
STATEMENT OF DR. M. ANTHONY FAINBERG, FORMER PROGRAM MANAGER,
RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES, OFFICE OF RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Fainberg. Mr. Chairman and Congressman McCaul, thank
you and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss my experiences with EML and my views on that lab
today. I wish first to state that while I happen to be adjunct
staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses, my views
are entirely personal and no way reflect any positions taken by
that organization. I will try quickly to cover several topics
requested by Committee staff.
My background and training is as an experimental physicist
and I recently retired from the government after 20 years of
service. In 2003, for the first few months at DHS, I was
responsible for both administrative and programmatic oversight
of EML and the DHS Office of Research and Development within
the S&T Directorate. Later on, I managed radiation detection
and explosive detection research at national labs and at EML.
While at DHS, I visited the lab several times to learn
about its history and resources. Its work had been mainly in
the area of radiochemistry and low-level radiation
measurements. There was some mismatch between some of their
activities and DHS needs, but I judged that, in the field of
radiation detection, their experience would be useful for DHS.
My initial assessment was that the lab space was in sad
condition, rented from GSA at far too high a price. There were
60 staff members, down from over a hundred some years earlier.
DOE had left the lab as a neglected backwater, perhaps because
of DOE's recently declining emphasis on environmental cleanup,
which had become the lab's chief area of responsibility.
However, although the lab had been in decline, staff welcomed
and indeed embraced the chance for a rebirth as part of a
mission in which they held a strong and vital interest. Located
about a mile north of the World Trade Center, they were
strongly and viscerally affected by 9/11 and were extremely
motivated to become part of the global anti-terrorism effort.
Regarding the staff, some had been employed a task that had
not changed much for decades and appeared ready for retirement.
On the other hand, a large fraction of the technical staff, of
varied ages, impressed me as highly motivated, energetic and
very capable in their areas of expertise. Upon moving to DHS,
EML management had transitioned their work to projects that it
felt would be useful to and welcomed by DHS. One example of
this activity was a New York area science and tech working
group which held seminars for first responders in the area on
radiation and operating radiation detection equipment. I
learned later from some participants that these sessions were
well attended and appreciated.
I found several projects to be of interest. They are
written about more in my remarks, but one that particularly
struck me was an experiment related to the so-called neutron
ship effect, carried out by a physicist of national stature,
Dr. Paul Goldhagen. This involved measurements of neutrons
generated by cosmic rays striking large structures such as
ships. It was directly relevant to determining whether it would
be useful to try to detect nuclear material in containers bound
for the United States on cargo ships.
Overall, I would like to make one comment. Since, upon its
creation, the S&T Directorate had willingly accepted EML as
part of its new organization, it was clearly incumbent on S&T
management to establish that lab's new mission. In fact, one
would have thought S&T would have had some idea of how the lab
would be useful to them before agreeing to accept them.
However, I saw little evidence that serious thought had been
given to this matter. Indeed, after a year or two, I heard
grumbling in headquarters that EML had no idea of what its
mission should be, as though this were not the responsibility
of S&T itself.
Committee staff have asked me to explain why I resigned
from S&T. The matter is not that important, except that the
reasons reveal some existence of management issues and without
going into too many details, I had some disagreements with Dr.
John Clarke, who was supposed to be responsible for facility
management, over projects at EML. After a series of meetings
with him, I suggested that he manage the programs himself,
except for those that had already been approved at a higher
level by the Office Director of ORD. He agreed but shortly
thereafter he came to me and tried to block this neutron ship
effect project, for which I had a certain amount of interest
and respect. I had asked my management after that for--well, I
appealed to my management after that for help because they had
previously approved that project and my management chain was
entirely deaf to my e-mails, all of them, except at one point
the Deputy Office Director, Robert Hooks, told me that we
should fix the matter ourselves.
Since they ignored my pleas to reaffirm their earlier
commitments on this project, and since I was having a very
difficult time keeping other projects there alive and
functioning, I submitted my resignation, deciding that
management was broken. Management proved later to me, three
days, that it was broken, because my immediate supervisor, Dr.
Gerald Parker, came to me and handed me a letter of counseling,
which was a reprimand, for daring to resign and then he
threatened me with sanctions if I continued such bad behavior.
This divorcement from reality, I thought, was noteworthy and
complete.
Naturally, I left ORD as soon as I could, within about two
working days, I think it was, and was able, fortunately, to
join the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office for my remaining
federal service, where I found the working environment quite
satisfactory. The ship project went forward eventually, but it
is kind of interesting that I had to be forced to resign to
accomplish this.
From my perspective, I concluded, then, that S&T management
was trying to squeeze EML out of existence by turning off or
crippling projects, one by one, so that it could be finally
asserted that the lab had no function. I do not know why this
was done. Several other projects I had thought useful had also
been rejected earlier by my superiors. I cannot prove there was
an overt intent to close the lab. Indeed, Mr. Hooks assured me,
at this time, that such was not the case. However, in spite of
such an assurance, the facts indicated to me that an intention
to shut down the lab was the simplest explanation for what was
going on.
My view is that S&T should have realized it was fortunate
in acquiring an asset in New York City, which is a prime
terrorist target. The lab had, on its own, established
excellent working relations with city officials and could have
functioned as S&T's presence in the area and these relations
could have facilitated communication and cooperation between
federal and State and local homeland security officials, at
least in the radiological arena. This opportunity to take
advantage of a ready-made local asset was unfortunately missed
by S&T.
As to what should have been done with EML, my suggestions
would have been to allow it to continue some of the local
projects in which it had been engaged. I would have supported
continual global monitoring, thinking that, in 2004, it was not
impossible that it might be useful to have some detectors near
North Korea. I would have had it fully engaged in supporting
the rest of DHS and the local radiological projects. And
finally, I would have authorized the hiring of some young
scientists with recent degrees to reinvigorate what had been a
leading radiation laboratory some 20 to 30 years earlier.
Briefly, I would have decided that, although the lab had some
issues that needed to be fixed, it would have been worthwhile
rebuilding it into a high-profile DHS S&T facility in New York.
It may be too late for some of these thrusts, but on the whole,
the lab still can and should be resuscitated. I am very glad to
learn that finally this may happen.
To save time, I have dropped some other remarks from my
oral presentation regarding another S&T lab, the Transportation
Security Lab in Atlantic City, with which I have some
acquaintance over a decade or two. This lab is the Nation's
premier source of expertise in explosives detection and in
development of detection equipment, particularly regarding
aviation security. Practically everything you see in terms of
security equipment at U.S. and many foreign airports has been
developed at that lab. This lab has suffered from devastating
institutional buffeting since 9/11, transferring between
agencies twice, having its budget rocket up by factors of two
and three and then drop by factors of four. I feel we may be in
danger of losing this major national asset that helps protects
us from terrorist attack.
I would be happy to respond to questions about this lab as
well as about EML. Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fainberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of M. Anthony Fainberg
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Sensenbrenner, I thank you for the
opportunity to discuss my experiences with the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) in New York City, as an official who was
present at the stand-up of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on
March 1, 2003.
I had actually begun work with the predecessor of the Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate--the Transition Planning Office (TPO)--a
few months before stand-up, in December 2002. At the time I began work
there, I had over 17 years of experience in government. I had been an
analyst, in areas where science and national security policy intersect,
and a program manager, overseeing research and development programs for
the Federal Aviation Administration and the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency. As an analyst for the former Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment, I had, in 1990-1991, written the first detailed analysis of
the potential uses of technology in countering terrorism. My training
is as an experimental physicist in the field of high energy physics, in
which I received a doctorate in 1969.
When I began at the TPO, later the S&T Directorate, there were very
few people on staff, perhaps some 25. That number ramped up quite
quickly in the months after March 2003. At first, many of us shared
duties; I was in charge of the Explosives Countermeasures Portfolio for
a few months and at the same time responsible for overseeing EML, this
latter task only for a few months. In addition, I worked in the
Radiation and Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio group as well. My
efforts to understand EML were aided by the presence of two EML staff,
who were on detail to the TPO and subsequently to S&T.
By summer 2003, things had settled down a bit, and I had just a
dual responsibility: Program Manager for Radiation and Nuclear
Countermeasures and Program Manager for Explosives Countermeasures in
the Office of Research and Development (ORD). In these roles, I was
responsible for research programs that were carried out by the
Department of Energy's (DOE) National Laboratories, and those carried
out by EML. Nearly all of my efforts were devoted to the large National
Laboratories, as their projects consumed nearly all the budget
allocated to my Program.
EML Programs at Transition to DHS
My responsibilities regarding EML began soon after departmental
stand-up, with administrative and programmatic oversight. During the
time that I had this broad responsibility, I visited the site, became
acquainted with current projects and staff and learned about the lab's
capabilities, which they were trying to adapt to DHS needs.
It was clear that there would be some mismatches in capabilities
relative to the new DHS needs. Their previous work centered around low-
level radiation measurements. These were in support of environmental
clean-up and monitoring and of global monitoring for fallout from
nuclear weapons testing. However, I judged that their abilities in the
area of radiation detection were adaptable to DHS requirements. EML
staff also worked on or led activities that provided the environmental
monitoring community with manuals on procedures and protocols for
environmental sampling. This work could have some application for DHS,
for example, in providing advice for clean-up after a dirty bomb
attack.
Another major line of work at EML was the Quality Assurance Program
(QAP), which vetted scores of radiological laboratories, in the United
States and also in other countries, to determine the quality of their
analytical practices. This was a service provided by EML, earlier
funded by DOE, but in which DHS had no interest at the time (I
understand that recently, S&T is setting up an Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks, in which the QAP might have been a useful
component). Unfortunately, this service, which was used by many State
and local laboratories, and, to my knowledge, was widely appreciated,
disappeared when DHS decided to end funding for it. I understand that a
commercial laboratory is now providing a similar service, but at
significant cost.
Overall Assessment of EML at Transition
My assessment of the laboratory and its potential uses for DHS were
as follows. First, the laboratory space, rented from the General
Services Administration, was in sad condition, depressing, and barely
functional. The rent paid was far too high for the quality of the
plant. About 60 staff members were on the payroll, down from about 120,
a decade or two earlier. DOE had clearly left this laboratory in a
neglected state, as a backwater, perhaps because emphasis on DOE clean-
up activities dropped in recent years. The lab was in a clear decline,
but welcomed and embraced the chance for a rebirth as part of a mission
in which they had a strong and vital interest. The lab is located only
about a mile from the World Trade Center, and staff were strongly and
viscerally affected by 9/11. They were extremely motivated to become
part of the global anti-terrorism effort, as well as to be in a
position to take practical steps to aid in protecting New York against
future attacks.
Some of the technical staff had been employed at tasks that had not
changed much for several decades. Many appeared ready for retirement,
and, indeed, in the following years, a large number did retire. Some
retirements, however, especially in 2005 and beyond, were apparently
occasioned by disappointment, if not outrage, at the treatment they
felt EML was receiving from DHS Headquarters.
On the other hand, a large fraction of the technical staff, of
varied ages, impressed me as highly motivated, energetic, and very
capable in their areas of expertise. The laboratory had transitioned
their work over to projects that they felt would be useful and welcomed
by DHS.
One activity, the NY Area Science and Technology (NYAST) Working
Group, held seminars for New York Metropolitan Area first responders:
police, firemen, medical technicians, and civilian staff from the
Office of Emergency Management. Lessons were given these non-scientists
about understanding radiation, the dirty bomb threat, and how to use
radiation measuring equipment. In talking with some participants on
later occasions, I learned that these sessions were appreciated and
considered very useful. They were quite well attended.
Another project of interest to me and to New York City officials
was the Comprehensive Radiation Sensor Program, which deployed a small
number of inexpensive but effective gamma ray detectors on rooftops in
Manhattan. This network was intended to send data back via a wireless
connection to a command center at the lab. The project was meant to
function as an early prototype for a detection architecture that would
produce relatively inexpensive monitoring of selected areas of the
city, in the case of a radiation release. City officials at the Office
of Emergency Management were enthusiastic about this program (as long
as they did not have to fund it). This project was scheduled to be
halted at the time I left, and headquarters funding was cut off, but it
has been resurrected since, paid for only by staff salaries and time.
A third project, extremely interesting to me, was run by an EML
physicist of national stature, Paul Goldhagen. Dr. Goldhagen was
measuring the spectrum of neutrons from cosmic rays, in order to
understand better the ``ship effect.'' If we understood this effect, it
might enable us to reject this background and be able to detect
radiological material in containers on ships, as they traveled across
oceans to United States ports. This was basic research with a clear and
vital connection to homeland security needs, and only a very few
researchers in the country were involved in similar work.
Finally, there was program of global atmospheric monitoring, which
had national security implications. It was co-funded by DOE/NNSA and
the USAF, and provided useful, near-real time sets of atmospheric data.
By summer, I had transitioned to my program management role, and
had no further oversight over the lab as a whole, except insofar as
they carried out projects for me.
My View of the Proper Role for EML
Since, upon its creation, DHS had willingly accepted EML as part of
its organization, it was clearly incumbent upon DHS management to
establish that lab's new mission, of course with input from and in
collaboration with lab management. Indeed, DHS should have had an idea
how the lab would be useful to them before accepting it on board. I saw
no evidence that serious thought was given to this. Indeed, after a
year or two, I heard grumbling among S&T management that EML had no
idea what its mission should be, as though this were not the
responsibility of S&T itself. Actually, EML had proposed some ideas for
the proper scope of their activities, but none was accepted. I was
concerned that there appeared to be no meaningful dialogue between S&T
and EML to address the lab's mission. During this period, EML tried to
conduct its own planning, work, and outreach without much help or,
indeed, interest from S&T.
My view, then and now, is the following: DHS was fortunate in
acquiring an existing laboratory asset located in New York City, a
prime target of international terrorists. The lab had, on its own,
developed excellent working relations with city officials and could
function as S&T's presence in the area. These relationships could have
greatly facilitated communications and cooperation between federal and
local homeland security officials, at least in the radiological area.
The opportunity to use a ready-made asset in this way was unfortunately
missed by S&T.
The laboratory had both negative and positive aspects: some staff
were old and tired, but others were extremely energetic and effective.
The physical plant was in bad shape, but could be improved or else the
lab could be moved, perhaps to an existing DHS facility in the area,
where the cost of rental would not be an issue. Finally, some excellent
capabilities existed at the lab, which could have been expanded upon.
Some of these were:
the atmospheric monitoring project;
the neutron ``ship effect'' work;
a strong operational and statistical understanding of
low-level radiation contamination measurements;
the vetting of a nationwide network of radiochemical
laboratories;
the development of an inexpensive distributed network
of radiation detectors;
and, most importantly, a cadre of willing and active
scientists who were anxious to help, for example, with
developing, operating, and staffing a radiation measurement
test bed in New York.
This last item was fortunately accomplished: EML scientists became
an integral part of DHS's Countermeasures Test Bed, operationally
testing radiation detection equipment that was deployed at air- and
seaports in the New York area.
Unfortunately, most other items were not accomplished.
Had I had the authority, I would have tried to have EML both engage
in the above work and also support the rest of DHS fully in other
radiological projects in the New York area. I would have considered
trying to provide some of the services, such as the QAP, for the good
of the community of radiochemical laboratories in the country, probably
in collaboration with DOE. And I would have kept some of the
atmospheric monitoring work that was useful for other U.S. Government
agencies, even though it did not fit within the prevailing definition
of DHS responsibilities.
Further, I would have authorized the lab to hire some young
scientists with recent degrees, to reinvigorate what had been a leading
radiation measurements laboratory, some 20-30 years earlier. Many such
newly-minted Ph.D.s would, in my opinion, have been keenly interested
in contributing their knowledge and talents to defending the Nation
against the terrorist threat. Briefly, I would have decided that
although the lab had some issues, it would have been worth rebuilding
it into a high profile DHS/S&T facility in New York.
Apparently, DHS management did not share my feeling.
Proposals and Rejections
During 2003, S&T management wisely decided to permit ongoing
projects to continue. In 2004, management naturally and correctly
wanted to develop a program plan for EML that corresponded more to DHS
needs and requirements. EML proposed several projects, working with me
as appropriate, but very few of these met approval from management
above my level. The Comprehensive Radiation Sensor project, for
example, was disapproved, even though NY City officials were very
interested in it. Management decided that many projects were not within
DHS's mission, and, indeed, this might have been true in some cases,
although I disagreed with their assessments in others. At this point, I
sensed a growing difficulty in the relations and communications between
EML and S&T's management.
By spring 2005, as we were still working on programs and budgets
for FY05, which had begun six months earlier, little remained of what
EML had initiated post 9/11. Technical assistance and training for
local officials was cut back by two-thirds. Other proposals were
rejected in their entirety.
In addition, a bit later, a new project, involving EML, was
requested by S&T 's Portfolio Manager for Radiation and Nuclear
Countermeasures, Dr. Sonya Bowyer. This effort was called
``reachback.'' It proposed using EML scientists (together with
scientists from Brookhaven National Laboratory in Long Island) to
provide assistance to local officials and responders, when their
radiation monitoring equipment produced alarms. The general idea, which
had been conceived much earlier, was to have a process in place to deal
quickly with inevitable false alarms. Experts from the labs would
provide advice to the responder in real time in analyzing the alarm. On
those few occasions where they could not resolve the alarm, another
level of reachback would be provided by the national weapons
laboratories. This program was to serve the New York region. There were
efforts to make similar arrangements with other laboratories for other
regions of the country.
Fortunately, reachback has now been resurrected by the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), located within DHS, but independent of
S&T. I understand that this work is about to be realized, both
regionally and nationally. However, I am told that there are still
problems in that EML was experiencing difficulties in getting approval
to purchase a few hundred dollars of equipment to enable their
participation. I hope this has been resolved.
My Resignation from S&T
Committee staff have requested that I recount the story of my
resignation from S&T. In most respects, this is not an important
matter. However, the reasons that led me to resign may be of interest.
With your forbearance and for the record, here is the long story.
In March and early April of 2005, I had to spend much time
explaining the detailed costs of several EML projects. I was asked to
justify detailed expenditures, at a minute level, for several proposed
ideas. This was demanded by an ORD colleague, Dr. John Clarke, who was
supposedly in charge of EML as a facility. It was disturbing to me that
the facility manager was deciding at such a nickel and dime level how
much each R&D project should cost and whether it should proceed, since
this should reasonably have been the purview of the program manager.
However, to maintain comity, I took time away from far more complex and
larger projects at other laboratories, for which I was also
responsible, to try to accommodate his requests. In the end, since I
had those other demanding tasks to take care of, and since this
exercise was draining my time over relatively small matters, I
suggested that Dr. Clarke take over the whole set of EML projects, with
the exception of a few that I had been told (by Robert Hooks, Deputy
Director of ORD) had already been approved at the Office Director
level.
One of the exceptions was the ``ship effect'' project, being
handled by the excellent physicist I mentioned above. I had approved
the project, but Dr. Clarke somehow was able to place a hold on the
money, because he objected to the purchase of a neutron detector that
was included as part of the work. Dr. Clarke insisted that he had this
right. He further stated that he could not approve such an expense
unless we could show that the detector could be used after the
project's end. This demonstrated that Dr. Clarke had no idea of how
research and development is carried out: if a project is approved, you
buy the necessary equipment to carry it out, whether or not you can
find another use for it later. The cost and need of equipment are
factored into the approval process. Indeed, one usually can find
another use for equipment and this case was not an exception: we could
have. The impression was clearly that Dr. Clarke was trying even to
derail a project already approved at the highest appropriate level.
Having vociferously defended this project earlier, and since I had
been previously assured by Mr. Hooks that this project had indeed been
approved at the Office Director's level, I was quite properly outraged.
I sent e-mails that included my direct supervisor, Dr. Gerald Parker,
and his supervisor, who was Mr. Hooks, but they brought no response.
Finally, I received a response from Mr. Hooks on March 28, 2005, to the
effect that Dr. Clarke and I had to work this out. This contradicted
what Mr. Hooks had told me about the project's approval a week or two
earlier. A further request to Dr. Parker for clarification elicited no
response whatsoever.
At this point, I decided that S&T/ORD management was broken to the
degree that I could no longer perform my job, and I had to leave my
position. On April 4, I sent an e-mail with my resignation to my chain
of command, including Dr. Parker, Mr. Hooks, and the Office Director,
Dr. Maureen McCarthy.
It turned out that I was correct in determining that management was
broken: within three days, Dr. Parker summoned me to his office and
handed me a ``Letter of Counseling''--essentially a reprimand--for
daring to resign, and threatening me with reprisals if I continued such
unreasonable behavior. I was also chastised for objecting to Dr.
Clarke's overstepping his authority. This divorcement from reality was
noteworthy.
Incidentally, in nearly 20 years of government service, I had never
before received a reprimand of any sort. I have, however, received a
number of commendations for my work, both verbal and written.
Naturally, I left S&T as soon as I could, within two working days,
and accepted a position with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
remaining there for the rest of my federal service, and retiring on
September 30, 2005. Indeed, most radiological work was already being
transitioned from S&T to this new office. The working environment there
was quite satisfactory.
Afterwards, I was happy to discover, the ``ship effect'' project
had been approved in its entirety, probably as a result of the furor.
But, to keep the project going as it should have, I had been forced to
resign in order to draw sufficient attention to the matter.
Conclusions
It appeared to me that in 2005, S&T management was trying to
squeeze EML out of existence by turning off projects one by one, so
that it could finally be asserted that the lab had no function. It
became increasingly difficult to obtain approval for any expenditures
beyond the basic minima of salaries and benefits, heat, light, and
rent. Further, EML was not permitted to replace staff departures, and
the number of personnel has shrunk from 60 in 2003 to 34 today. I
cannot prove there was an overt intent to close the lab; indeed, Mr.
Hooks assured me at the time I left that this was not the case, but
Occam's Razor (adopt the simplest hypothesis that satisfies all the
known data) indicated to me strongly that this was, in fact, what was
happening.
EML still exists, to my knowledge, in great part because DNDO is
using some of their personnel for projects in the New York area.
Perhaps, since responsibility for radiological and nuclear issues has
transitioned to DNDO, it might be appropriate for EML to come entirely
under its aegis.
If EML were to remain in existence, my remarks above contain some
ideas on what I feel it might do, and how it might make a significant
contribution to homeland security. Even at its current, depressed,
levels, it can be successfully resurrected, if a clear mission is
articulated and appropriate management is applied. I do think this is
possible. Some changes will be needed, of course: for one thing, it
should probably move to a new venue in the New York area, perhaps, as I
noted above, within a DHS-owned facility.
If its mission would include functioning as the focus of DHS's
technical capabilities in the New York area, beyond radiological and
nuclear issues, it would be necessary to hire some new scientists and
engineers with expertise in chemical and biological countermeasures.
This would transform EML into a broader and more capable organization.
One could also imagine adding collaborative efforts with another S&T
laboratory, the Transportation Security Laboratory in Atlantic City,
about 100 miles to the south. TSL specializes in explosives detection,
and joint work in testing this sort of equipment in New York City would
probably be a useful synergy. If EML were to be broadened in this way,
one could argue that it should remain within S&T, which, having
recently been reorganized, might be more receptive to such a concept
than it was in the past.
An Additional Observation
There may be a broader issue here.
In 2003, two laboratories, EML and the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC), were relocated from other agencies to S&T, a new
organization within a new organization. I understand from the press
that there are now plans to close Plum Island and relocate its
activities elsewhere, probably with a largely new staff. It is not
surprising that, amidst all the difficulties of establishing new,
nested structures, and under the watchful eye of a fearful public
following 9/11, these two laboratories have experienced serious
difficulties while trying to fit into a new Department and to develop
missions rather different from their previous ones.
However, I am also concerned about a third laboratory, the above-
mentioned Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL), also involved in
post-9/11 turmoil. TSL has just (2006) transitioned to S&T from the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is, of course, also
within DHS.
TSL is not a minor player: it is the world's gold standard for
developing and certifying explosives detection equipment, especially as
applied to transportation security. Virtually all security technology
in U.S. (and in many foreign) airports today have been developed there.
Vitally needed improvements are being developed there right now. The
lab and its staff are impressive: I urge the Committee Members to visit
it.
Unfortunately, in the bureaucratic turbulence following 9/11, TSL
has been moved between agencies twice. Its budget has undergone wild
fluctuations, both up and down. This year, I am told, their budget has
dropped by a factor of two from last year. This unstable situation,
both institutional and fiscal, is destroying morale there; some
scientists have left, others may well leave soon. Staff have been
reduced from about 80, a few years ago, to 54 now. Like EML, they have
not recently been able to hire new scientists or engineers. There are
rumors that its equipment certification unit, which has been looked
upon to provide aviation security equipment standards around the world,
may be asked to raise money from vendors to continue its effective
existence, beyond the fees currently levied on those asking for
certification. There are other rumors that this federal laboratory,
staffed by federal employees, may be required to compete for its
existence with national laboratories (that have relatively immense
levels of staffing, much other funding and other missions) and with the
private sector.
I hope these tales aren't true. The Federal Government's ability to
issue standards for explosives detectors should not depend on a revenue
stream. Moreover, TSL and other federal laboratories are part of the
federal infrastructure: they are federal assets, run by federal
employees, who have loyalty to the mission, and who do not have to keep
an eye out for profits or for obtaining the next contract. This
laboratory is especially needed to provide for the Nation's security,
particularly regarding air travel, where we all know there is a
serious, ongoing terrorist threat.
I trust and hope that DHS will now be able to provide TSL with
steady and predictable funding and a consistent vision, so that it may
continue its excellent work. I fervently hope that TSL will not be
subject to the same perturbations that the other two laboratories
within DHS have endured during this difficult period of adjustment.
Biography for M. Anthony Fainberg
Upon retiring from federal service after twenty years, Dr. Fainberg
recently became a Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
At retirement, Dr. Fainberg was Director of the Office of
Transformational Research and Development of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office of the Department of Homeland Security. At the
Department of Homeland Security, he had previously been Program Manager
for Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures and for Explosives
Countermeasures in the Science and Technology Directorate of the
Department. Earlier, he served as Director for Federal Laboratories in
that Directorate. Previously, he was Division Chief at the Advanced
Systems and Concepts Office, Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
Department of Defense, and before that, he held the title of Director
of the Office of Policy and Planning for Aviation Security in the
Federal Aviation Administration.
After receiving his training and degrees in experimental particle
physics, Dr. Fainberg worked as a researcher and university lecturer
for eleven years, producing some 40 technical publications. His
experience includes work at U.S. National Laboratories; at CERN, the
international nuclear laboratory in Geneva; and at universities in the
U.S. and Italy. He turned to applied physics in 1977, entering the
field of nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation at Brookhaven National
Laboratory, where he was responsible for projects involving technical,
systems, and policy issues. In the course of his duties at Brookhaven,
he worked with officials at the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency in Vienna.
In 1983, Dr. Fainberg became a Congressional Science Fellow of the
American Physical Society and spent a year as a legislative aide in the
office of a U.S. Senator. Following the fellowship, he joined the staff
of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, where he
specialized in national security issues. He worked for several years in
analyses of missile defense technologies. Later, he worked on projects
dealing with the Department of Energy nuclear weapon complex, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and has originated and
directed projects on terrorism and on technologies of use in military
operations other than war.
Dr. Fainberg has frequently testified before Congress and has
briefed both congressional staff and the media in his areas of
expertise; he has appeared on National Public Radio, CNN, BBC, CNBC,
and other outlets. He has also briefed National Academy of Sciences
panels on aviation security matters. Dr. Fainberg is also active in the
American Physical Society and the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, and has co-edited a book on energy supply and
demand.
EDUCATION:
Ph.D., 1969, University of California, Berkeley; High Energy Physics.
A.B., 1964, New York University; Magna cum Laude, Physics.
EXPERIENCE:
Currently: Adjunct Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses,
researching issues related to the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime, risk analysis in the context of homeland
security, and problems at the intersection of technology and
counterterrorism.
2005: Director of Office of Transformational Research and Development,
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Department of Homeland
Security. Develops and implements research program to produce
breakthroughs that radically improve on current radiation
detection technologies and methods.
2004-2005: Program Manager for Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
and for Explosives Countermeasures in the Office of Research
and Development of the Science and Technology Directorate,
Department of Homeland Security. Structures and manages about
$50 M of research and development programs in these two areas.
Most of this work is implemented by the laboratories internal
to the Department, including those parts of the Department of
Energy laboratories that now function as part of the Homeland
Security research and development complex.
2003: Director for Federal Laboratories, Science and Technology
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. Responsible for
oversight of the federal laboratories that are part of the
Science and Technology Directorate of the Department.
2002: Special Assistant for Technology, Office of Policy and Planning
for Civil Aviation Security, Transportation Security
Administration. Planning and analysis of science and technology
approaches to improving transportation security.
1999-2001: Division Chief, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office,
Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Planning and overseeing
projects with long-term impact studying the reduction of
threats to the United States from weapons of mass destruction
and establishing criteria for future U.S. nuclear forces
structure. Preceptor, Georgetown University, Program in
Science, Technology, and International Affairs.
1996-1999: Director, Office of Policy and Planning for Aviation
Security, Federal Aviation Administration. SES-level position
responsible for overseeing aviation security research and
development; promulgating rules and regulations governing civil
aviation security; and developing policies and procedures for
assuring security at FAA facilities.
1995-1996: Self-employed consultant, national security analyst
specializing in counterterrorism, nuclear safeguards, remote
sensing technology. Clients included Department of Defense,
Brookhaven National Laboratory, National Academy of Sciences,
George Washington University, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, and other research organizations.
1985-1995: Senior Associate and Project Director, Office of Technology
Assessment, U.S. Congress, Washington, DC. Areas of expertise:
technology and terrorism; ballistic missile defense; nuclear
proliferation; proliferation and the former Soviet Union;
science policy. Most recent project: international peace
support operations.
1991-1992: Visiting Fellow, Center for International Security and Arms
Control, Stanford University, worked on issues in nuclear non-
proliferation.
1983-1984: Legislative Aide, Office of Senator Jeff Bingaman,
Washington, DC. Handled foreign policy issues as well as
technical matters related to arms control; worked in areas
related to Armed Services Committee, foreign policy, and
science policy.
1977-1983: Physicist, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York.
Responsibilities included technical and systems studies of
problems in nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation.
1977-1978: Adjunct Associate Professor of Physics, Syracuse University,
Syracuse, New York. Responsible for developing proposals for
experiments in particle physics.
1973-1977: Research Assistant Professor of Physics, Syracuse
University, in residence at Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Research in particle physics and teaching, directed small teams
of physicists and technicians.
1970-1972: Staff Physicist, Italian National Institute of Nuclear
Physics, Turin, Italy. Engaged in particle physics research at
European Centre for Nuclear Research, Switzerland.
LANGUAGES:
Fluent French, Italian, German, conversational Spanish.
HONORS, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, and OFFICES:
Member, American Physical Society (APS), American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Fellow, APS. Congressional Science
Fellow, APS, 1983-1984. Past Chair, Forum on Physics and Society of
APS; Vice-Chair, APS Panel on Public Affairs.
CLEARANCES:
Top Secret, Q (Dept. of Energy).
SELECTED PUBLICATIONS, 1985-present
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) publications:
``Improving the Prospects for Future International Peace Operations,''
September 1995.
``Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency,'' May
1995.
``Proliferation and the Former Soviet Union,'' September 1994.
``Technology and Terrorism: Structuring Security,'' January 1992.
``Technology and Terrorism: The Federal Effort,'' July 1991.
``Review of the Department of Energy Modernization Plan,'' September
1989.
``The Potential Biological and Electronic Effects of EMPRESS II,''
November 1988.
``SDI: Technology, Survivability, Software,'' May 1988.
``A Treaty-Compliant Accidental Launch Protection System,'' April 1988.
``Permanently Orbiting Space Cyclers Between Earth and Mars,'' April
1986.
``Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,'' September 1985.
Non-OTA publications:
``National Comparative Risk Assessment Pilot Project,'' IDA Document D-
3309, 2006.
``Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Past Performance,
Future Prospects, and Technical Issues,'' Paper presented to The First
Bi-Annual International Symposium of the Center for Asian Terrorism
Research, October, 2005, Denpasar, Indonesia, The Anatomy of Terrorism
and Political Violence in South Asia, Proceedings published as IDA
Paper P-4096.
``Aviation Security in the United States: Current and Future Trends,''
Transportation Law Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1998.
``Technology for International Peace Operations,'' (Washington, DC: The
Institute for Technology Assessment, March 1998).
``Strengthening IAEA Safeguards: Lessons from Iraq,'' (Stanford, CA:
Center for International Security and Arms Control, May 1993).
``Explosives Detection for Aviation Security,'' Science, 20 March 1992.
``How Soviet, U.S. Scientists Could Cooperate on Research,'' op-ed, San
Francisco Chronicle, January 22, 1992.
With Ruth Howes, co-editor, The Energy Sourcebook, (New York: American
Institute of Physics, February 1991).
``Fossils Fuels: Coal, Petroleum, Natural Gas'' in The Energy
Sourcebook, R. Howes and A. Fainberg, co-editors (New York: American
Institute of Physics, February 1991).
``SDI: How Much Should the Public be Told?'' Forum for Applied Research
and Public Policy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, Spring 1990.
``ALPS and the ABM Treaty,'' Arms Control Today, April 1989.
``Observations on the Feasibility and Survivability of Near-term
Strategic Defense,'' in Nuclear Arms Technologies in the 1990s, eds.
Hafemeister, D. and Schroeer, D., (New York: American Institute of
Physics, 1989).
Book Review of ``Lost at the Frontier: U.S. Science and Technology
Policy Adrift,'' by R. Roy and D. Shapley in BioScience, May 1986.
With E.V. Weinstock, ``Verifying a Fissile-Material Production Freeze
in Declared Facilities, with Special Emphasis on Remote Monitoring,''
in Arms Control Verification, ed. Tsipis, K., Hafemeister, David W.,
and Janeway, P., (Pergamon-Brassey's: Washington, DC), 1986.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Fainberg. Ms. Albin.
STATEMENT OF MS. LYNN ALBIN, RADIATION HEALTH PHYSICIST, OFFICE
OF RADIATION PROTECTION, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Ms. Albin. Chairman Miller, Congressman McCaul and
Committee Members, thank you for the opportunity to provide
testimony on the experience of Washington State in our
environmental radiation monitoring efforts following the
termination of EML's Quality Assurance Program. I have worked
for the Washington State Department of Health for 21 years. I
began as a radiochemist with the responsibility to provide
accurate analysis of radioactive contaminants in environmental
samples. Presently, I am a health physicist with the Department
of Health, where I use the data to assess public and
environmental health risks and to provide oversight of federal
and State licensed facilities that could potentially release
radioactive contaminants into the environment. I am also
responsible for analyzing radiochemical data to determine its
quality and its validity.
The Washington State Department of Health has operated in
environmental radiation monitoring programs since 1961. All of
the samples collected by the Department of Health are analyzed
by the Public Health Laboratory. This laboratory has the
capability to analyze for very low levels of naturally
occurring radionuclides, mixed fission products and source
materials in any environmental media.
Of particular interest to the Department of Homeland
Security, the Public Health Lab analyzes the air we breathe,
the water we drink, the soil in which we grow our food, the
food we eat and the external radiation levels that surround us.
The laboratory uses rapid methods to screen deposition samples
to quickly identify contaminants. The data provides the basis
of environmental assessments and decisions that are made during
radiological emergencies. I can't emphasize enough how
important it is that we are confident that the data is both
accurate and precise when we make public health decisions.
When it was part of the Department of Energy, EML provided
performance testing samples for exactly the type of work the
Public Laboratory performs. This program was available at no
charge to the Public Health Laboratory and was an important
component of quality assurance.
QAP provided a link to the scientists within the
Environmental Monitoring Laboratory. Radiochemists who develop
many of the classical methods of analyzing radionuclides in the
environment worked for EML. These methods were complied into a
manual that is widely regarded as the standard of radiation
measurement techniques. As a new radiochemist, I was handed the
manual as a basis of understanding radiochemistry. This
practice continues today.
It wasn't only the EML performance testing samples and the
radiochemistry manual that benefited the quality of
measurements. It was also that the scientists themselves were
easily approached to assist Public Health Laboratory chemists
in solving questions regarding radiochemistry. Radiochemistry
is part science and part art. The science behind the chemistry
allows separation and concentration of specific radionuclides,
but there is also an art that requires experience to correctly
interpret resulting data. It takes years of experience to be
proficient in radiochemistry. The EML assisted the Public
Health Laboratory whenever called upon.
Performance testing is important for assessment of
laboratory capabilities, as well as important to the Department
of Health's credibility when we use lab data to support
decisions. The value of the performance testing comes into play
when data or decisions are questioned. From Washington State's
point of view, the more performance tests we have to support
our data the better.
Two examples of how QAP helped prepare Washington State to
respond to an actual emergency are the state's response to
fires on the Hanford nuclear site in 2000 and the Department of
Homeland Security's TOPOFF2 exercise in 2003. During the
Hanford fire, the state mobilized field teams to collect
samples. As the fire burned, wind created the concern that soil
surface contamination would be blown offsite. The Department of
Health analyzed soil, airborne particulates and charred
vegetation samples. Sampling results showed that first
responders were not working in a radiologically hazardous
environment and no offsite public or environmental health
impact existed.
It is just as critical that decision-makers are confident
that the laboratory has reached appropriate detection limits,
even in cases where the data reveal no impact. QAP provided an
independent evaluation of lab performance that specifically
supported the credibility of Washington State protective
actions. Performance testing is essential in assuring that if
results are questioned, there is a reliable method to verify
data. Washington State, since losing the program, participates
less often in performance testing programs because of budget
considerations.
During TOPOFF2, Washington State had to make quick
assessments of radiological conditions following a simulated
terrorist attack. Although unplanned, samples collected by
other agencies, including the EPA and the Federal Radiological
Monitoring Assessment Center, were also brought to the Public
Health Laboratory for analysis. The lab's strong quality
assurance program gave confidence that the initial assessments
were correct, even though samples were not commonly analyzed at
the laboratory. It further provided evidence to other agencies
that lab services had documented verification and it was
capable of accurately and precisely measuring radioactive
contamination in environmental samples. Once again, the data
reported by the Public Health Lab was used to support
protective action decisions. Confidence in that data was
essential.
In 2003, the department participated in a performance test
sponsored by NIST, designed to test the capability and capacity
of laboratories to quickly measure radioactive contaminants in
environmental media as well as synthetic urine and feces. One
of the findings of the study was an appreciation for the
analytical uncertainty in the reported result, which was much
higher than for traditional performance tests. This gave rise
to questions of how good is good enough for emergency samples,
how do we communicate analytical uncertainty to decision-
makers, and how, in turn, will that uncertainty be factored
into protective action? These are all questions that remain
unanswered and could be a starting point for future EML support
to states for homeland security-related emergencies.
As a person who reviews data validity, I must be confident
that I am handing the best information to the decision-makers.
The welfare of the public, emergency workers and the
environment rely on the quality of laboratory data. These
results for the basis for decisions concerning health risk,
food embargoes and population relocation. Performance testing
supports data quality assessment by providing an independent
evaluation of lab capability. This independent review helps
defend data, whether they support recommended protective
actions that may impact someone's life, or whether they lend
confidence to a recommendation of no action.
In conclusion, accurate, defensible data improves
environmental assessments and enables managers to make better
and more cost-efficient decisions. The termination of the QAP
affects Washington State because we can't guarantee the level
of participation in the private laboratory replacement programs
due to costs. Cutting performance programs weakens the
defensibility of the data. We are also missing the solid
technical support to the Public Health Laboratory provided by
the Quality Assurance Program and the scientists at
Environmental Measurements Laboratory.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Albin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lynn Albin
Dear Chairman Miller and Ranking Member James Sensenbrenner,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the
experience of Washington State in our environmental radiation
monitoring efforts following the termination of the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) Quality Assurance Program (QAP). My name
is Lynn Albin and I have worked for the Washington State Department of
Health for 21 years. I began as a radiochemist with the responsibility
to provide accurate analyses of radioactive contaminants in
environmental samples. Presently, I am a radiation health physicist
with the Department of Health's Office of Radiation Protection. My
responsibilities include using radiochemical analyses to assess public
and environmental health risks and to provide oversight of federal and
State-licensed facilities that could potentially release radioactive
contaminants in the environment. Additionally, I am the liaison between
Office of Radiation Protection and the Department's Public Health
Laboratory (PHL). In this capacity, I am responsible for analyzing
radiochemical data to determine its quality and validity.
The Washington State Department of Health has operated an
environmental radiation monitoring program since 1961. The early
program looked primarily at atmospheric fallout from nuclear weapons
tests. The program expanded to evaluate off-site environmental impacts
related to operations of nuclear facilities and to provide readiness
for assessment in case of a radiological emergency. An essential part
of the assessments is the independent analysis of environmental
samples.
All of the samples collected by the Department of Health are
analyzed at the Public Health Laboratory. The Laboratory has the
capability to analyze for very low levels of naturally occurring
radionuclides, mixed fission products and source materials in any
environmental media.
Of particular interest to the Department of Homeland Security, the
Public Health Laboratory analyzes the air we breathe, the water we
drink, the soil in which we grow our food, the food we eat and the
external radiation levels that surround us. The Laboratory also uses
rapid methods to screen deposition samples to quickly identify
radioactive contaminants. The data provided is the basis of
environmental assessments and decisions made during radiological
emergencies. I cannot emphasize enough how important it is that we are
confident that the data is both accurate and precise when we make
public health decisions.
When it was part of the Department of Energy, the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory, provided performance testing samples for
exactly the type of work the Public Health Laboratory performs. This
program was available at no charge to the Public Health Laboratory and
was an important component of laboratory quality assurance. Through
this program, the Public Health Laboratory was supplied with
environmental samples that contained well-quantified amounts of
radionuclides. The Laboratory analyzed the samples and reported the
results back to EML. EML would then evaluate the data and document the
accuracy of the submitted result against the known value and against
the mean value submitted by all participating laboratories.
As far as I know, all radiochemistry laboratories supporting
environmental monitoring in the Northwest participated in the Quality
Assessment Program. Because the QAP results for all laboratories were
included in the summary reports, I was able to use these reports when
reviewing performance of other Northwest environmental radiochemistry
labs.
Additionally the QAP provided a link to the scientists within
Environmental Monitoring Laboratory. Radiochemists who developed many
of the classical methods for analyzing radionuclides in environmental
samples worked for EML. These methods were compiled into a manual that
is widely regarded as the standard of radiation measurement techniques.
As a new radiochemist, I was handed that manual as the basis of
understanding radiochemistry. This practice continues today.
It wasn't only the EML performance testing samples and the
radiochemistry manual that benefited the quality of measurements; it
was also that the chemists themselves were easily approached to assist
Public Health Laboratory chemists in solving questions regarding
radiochemistry. Radiochemistry is part science and part art. The
science behind chemistry allows the separation and concentration of
specific radionuclides but there is also an art requiring experience to
correctly interpret the resulting data. It takes years of experience to
be proficient in radiochemistry. The Environmental Measurements
Laboratory assisted the Public Health Laboratory in evaluating the
ability to correctly interpret spectral data through consultation and
through their Gamma Spectrometry Data Evaluation Program. This program
provided simulated spectral data to the Laboratory to test the accuracy
of the gamma-ray spectrometry software and the ability of the chemists
to correctly interpret the results of their own software. There is no
replacement for this program.
The Quality Assurance Program was one of several performance
testing programs in which the Public Health Laboratory participated.
Table 1 attached to this testimony summarizes the history of those
programs. When the QAP program terminated, the Department of Health
lost a cost-effective resource for evaluating laboratory performance as
well as the resource provided by EML scientists themselves. The Public
Health Laboratory replaced the QAP with a performance testing program
provided by a private laboratory and augmented tests from an existing
program. This private laboratory provides the same environmental media
and tests that were previously provided by QAP. The disadvantage of the
new program is that it is expensive. In fact, this year the Public
Health Laboratory could not afford to fully participate in this
performance testing program.
While there is no legal requirement to participate in all
performance tests, laboratories cannot be certified by EPA to analyze
drinking water samples or be qualified to perform environmental
measurements in support of the Department of Energy's Environmental
Management's activities without successfully passing a minimum number
of tests. Performance testing is important for assessment of laboratory
capabilities as well as important to the Department of Health's
credibility when we use laboratory data to support decisions. The value
of the performance testing program comes into play when data or
decisions are questioned. From Washington State's point of view, the
more performance tests we have to support our laboratory results, the
better.
Two examples of how the Quality Assurance Program helped prepare
Washington State to respond to actual emergency situations are the
State's response to the fires on the Hanford Nuclear Site in 2000 and
the Department of Homeland Security's TOPOFF2 exercise in 2003.
During the Hanford fire, the State mobilized field teams to collect
samples. The Laboratory provided quick-turnaround results and health
physicists interpreted results and guided decision-makers regarding
protective actions. As the fire burned, wind created concern that soil
surface contamination would be blown offsite. The Department of Health
analyzed soil, airborne particulates and charred vegetation samples.
Sampling results showed that the first responders were not working in a
radiological hazardous environment and no offsite public or
environmental health impact existed.
It is just as critical that decision-makers are confident that the
laboratory has reached appropriate detection limits even in cases where
data reveal no impact. QAP provided an independent evaluation of
laboratory performance that specifically supported credibility of
Washington State protective actions. Performance testing is essential
in assuring that if results are questioned, there is a reliable method
to verify data. Washington State, since losing the program,
participates less often in performance testing programs because of
budget considerations.
During TOPOFF2, Washington State had to make quick assessments of
radiological conditions following a simulated terrorist attack. The
first samples analyzed by the Public Health Laboratory were non-
standard media: deposition collected on tape and soiled bandages from a
victim of the initial simulated blast. These samples provided the
hazard description and were followed by the customary environmental
samples such as air particulates and soil. Although unplanned, samples
collected by other agencies including the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
were also brought to the Public Health Laboratory for analysis. The
laboratory's strong quality assurance program gave confidence that the
initial assessments were correct even though the samples were not
commonly analyzed at the laboratory. It further provided evidence to
other agencies using the State's laboratory services that the
laboratory had documented verification that it was capable of
accurately and precisely measuring radioactive contamination in
environmental samples. Once again the data reported by the Public
Health Laboratory was used to support protective action decisions.
Confidence in that data was essential.
In 2003 the Department of Health participated in a performance test
sponsored by the National Institute of Science and Technology designed
to test the capability and capacity of the laboratories to quickly
measure radioactive contaminants in environmental media as well as in
synthetic urine and feces. This was the first such performance test and
Washington State was one of two states that participated. The samples
were a challenge to complete within the designated time and required
adjustments in measurement protocol. One of the findings of the study
was an appreciation for the analytical uncertainty in the reported
result which was much higher than for traditional performance tests.
This gave rise to questions of how good is good enough for emergency
samples, how do we communicate analytical uncertainty to decision-
makers and how, in turn, will that uncertainty be factored into
protective actions? These are all questions that remain unanswered and
could be a starting point for future EML support to states for homeland
security-related emergencies.
As the person who reviews the data validity, I must feel confident
that I am handing the best information to the decision-makers. The
welfare of the public, emergency workers, and the environment rely on
the quality of the laboratory data. These results form the basis for
decisions concerning health risk, food embargoes, and population
relocation. Performance testing supports data quality assessment by
providing an independent evaluation of laboratory capability. This
independent review helps defend data, whether they support recommended
protective actions that may impact someone's life or whether they lend
confidence to a recommendation of no action.
In conclusion, accurate, defensible data improves environmental
assessments and enables managers to make better and more cost-effective
decisions. The termination of the QAP affects Washington State because
we cannot guarantee the level of participation in the private
laboratory replacement program due to costs. Cutting performance
programs weakens the defensibility of the data. We also are missing the
solid technical support to the Public Health Laboratory provided by the
Quality Assurance Program and the scientists at the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory.
Biography for Lynn Albin
Lynn Albin is a Radiation Health Physicist with the Washington
State Department of Health. She has 21 years experience in the
environmental radiation field assessing public and environmental
health. She began her career analyzing plutonium in coral soils from
the United States nuclear testing ground in the Marshall Islands. As
part of her graduate studies in Radiation Ecology at the University of
Washington, Ms. Albin studied the removal rates of radioactive
contaminants from the Marshall Island Atoll ecosystem.
Ms. Albin was influential in initiating environmental monitoring at
the University of Washington to assess radioactive fallout following
the 1986 fire and explosion of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the
Ukraine. The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(later the Department of Health) also responded to the accident. In
addition to monitoring fallout in air, rainwater and ambient radiation
levels, the Department monitored for contamination in milk, food and
other environmental media. In June of 1986, Ms. Albin joined the
chemists at the State's Public Health Laboratory to assist with their
response to the Chernobyl accident.
In 1988, Ms. Albin transferred within the Department of Health to
the Office of Radiation Protection. As a senior Radiation Health
Physicist, her duties include environmental oversight of radiological
monitoring programs within Washington State including the US Department
of Energy's Hanford Site and the Energy Northwest nuclear power plant.
She provides technical support in radiological site assessment and
radiological risk evaluation and leads quality assurance activities
within the Office of Radiation Protection.
Ms. Albin is the laboratory liaison between the Office of Radiation
Protection and the Department of Health's Public Health Laboratory. She
is responsible for analyzing radiochemical data to determine validity,
quality and scientific significance related to public health and the
environment.
Ms. Albin is member of the Department of Health's Emergency
Response Team. In this capacity she uses her expertise to provide
support at the project level to ensure sampling design and analysis
criteria are appropriate and technically defensible. She has
participated in numerous emergency response drills and exercises
including TOPOFF2 and has also responded to actual emergencies such as
the fire on the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford site in 2002.
Ms. Albin is a member of the Conference of Radiation Control
Program Directors' G-2 Committee on Ionizing Measurements.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Ms. Albin. Assistant
Commissioner Duecker.
STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN A. DUECKER, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, COUNTERTERRORISM BUREAU
Mr. Duecker. Good morning, Chairman Miller and Members of
the Committee. My name is Jonathan Duecker. I am the Assistant
Commissioner of Counterterrorism for the New York City Police
Department and previously, I was the Director of the Office of
Homeland Security of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I am
pleased to be here today and I thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you about something that is of vital importance to
both the city and State of New York as well as the United
States.
When Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly took office in
January 2002, the pyre in the grounds of the World Trade Center
was still burning. He made his personal mission to ensure that
New York City would never fall victim to such an event again.
Commissioner Kelly's leadership and vision was the nascence of
the NYPD's Counterterrorism Bureau. The mission, to make New
York City inhospitable to terrorists, to their sympathizers,
their supporters and their facilitators.
Fortunately, New York City and the NYPD has thwarted more
than one plot against New York since September 11, 2001. One
widely supported success was the investigation, the arrests and
the convictions of terrorists planning to blow up the Herald
Square subway station two weeks before the Republican National
Nominating Convention. In addition, the NYPD's robust
deterrence and counter-surveillance program has proved its
success, confirmed by Khaled Sheik Mohammed himself, who cited
NYPD deployments as the sole reason that an Ohio truck driver,
Iyman Farris, presently serving a prison sentence for his role
in the plot to demolish the Brooklyn Bridge, decided that he
would, in fact, not carry out that plot.
In New York City, we are combating terrorism aggressively.
We acknowledge and welcome the synergy that comes with joining
State, regional and federal partners, all of whom bring
resources and expertise to the fight. Over the past few years,
our relationship with the Department of Homeland Security has
matured. I can say that, despite differences that have cropped
up from time to time, the level of cooperation we presently
enjoy has never been better. It is in the spirit of cooperation
and collaboration that I ask you today to ensure that the
critical federal resources are neither squandered nor withdrawn
from New York City. I am talking about the yeoman's work taking
place at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory located in
Manhattan.
The EML has distinguished roots dating back to the
Manhattan Project. It enjoys a renowned reputation as a subject
matter expert in all things nuclear and radiological, from
detection to testing to measurement and assessment. Although
EML moved organizationally from under the direction of the
Atomic Energy Commission to the Department of Energy and then
to the Department of Homeland Security, it never left its home
in New York City.
The NYPD has found EML to be a responsive neighbor and
partner. A few years ago, when we determined that we needed to
purchase small, portable but reliable radiation detectors, we
asked our federal colleagues to recommend a laboratory capable
to testing the products then available on the market. We were
told that we would have to travel across the country to the
northwest, where testing would consume a year's time. EML
stepped in and performed the testing for us in a few weeks and
made recommendations that work for us to this day.
As a result, the NYPD has acquired approximately 700 hand-
held gamma monitors and 120 gamma neutron detectors to detect
potential radiological weapons of mass destruction. They have
been deployed throughout the department and are in daily use
throughout Manhattan and access points to the city. In
addition, advanced gamma detectors and Geiger counters have
been assigned to specialized units such as the Emergency
Service Unit and the Bomb Squad. The department continues to
seek out and acquire new technologies to aid us in the war on
terror. In the future, we plan to procure additional nuclear,
biological and chemical detection monitoring devices. EML has
been instrumental in helping us make wise choices from among
the available technology and the available products.
Now, however, the importance of keeping a vibrant EML in
New York City is more important than ever. Secretary Chertoff
announced last year that the Securing the Cities Initiative,
STC, would be inaugurated in New York City. Under STC, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at DHS has been tasked with
developing and implementing the deployment of a system to
detect the introduction of nuclear material into our cities for
illicit purposes. The EML plays a pivotal role in STC in New
York City, providing technical and management roles.
The Acting Director of EML, Dr. Adam Hunter, has served as
a key liaison between DHS and the myriad of federal, State and
local partners that comprise the STC partnership. He has served
as a mentor to jump start initiative activities and has been a
key advisor on technical details regarding the acquisition,
evaluation and operation of radiological detection equipment,
and he has provided critical guidance on the operational
exercise activities currently underway in support of these
initiative goals. Without Director Hunter's guidance and
assistance from his laboratory, the STC goals of creating a
formidable, in-depth defense of New York City and the region
from radiological or nuclear attack would be severely degraded.
In fact, EML stood next to New York City in our early
efforts to establish a defense of the city through the
successful Regional Radiological Pilot Project. That program
yielded significant research and funding, which led to the
fielding of discrete radiological detection equipment currently
used to locate and identify radiological source material.
Clearly, EML's work in the New York region has been
tremendously successful and has provided a substantial
credibility for federal, State and local agencies to join in a
coordinated defense against a terror threat of the radiological
or nuclear attack against the New York region. In fact, more
assistance from EML would be welcome and would help consolidate
the initial success achieved through the programs, such as
Securing the Cities. The outcome of that program will result in
a significant increase in the number of detection equipment
deployed by STC partners, equipment which will need precision
calibration and support going forward.
Also, private industry is rising to the challenge to
enhance the sensitivity and capabilities of radiological
detection equipment and we look to EML to provide further
guidance on acquisition, evaluation and operational deployment
on technologies yet to be identified. The question is not
whether EML has been a success in answering the threat posed by
international terrorism; rather, the question is whether EML
stands ready to expand its efforts going forward. The success
of STC in New York is important to the entire Nation and we
expect it to be a model for implementing similar initiatives
throughout the country.
I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duecker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan A. Duecker
Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner and
Members of the Committee. My name is Jonathan Duecker and I am the
Assistant Commissioner of the New York City Police Department's (NYPD)
Counterterrorism Bureau (CTB). I was previously the Director of the
Office of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. I am
pleased to be here today and I thank you for this opportunity to
address your committee on a matter that is vital to the health and
welfare of, not only the State and City of New York, but our nation.
When Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly took office in January of
2002, the pyre on the grounds of the World Trade Center was still
burning. He made it his personal mission that New York City never fall
victim to such a calamity again. Commissioner Kelly's leadership and
vision was the nascence of the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau. The
mission: make New York City inhospitable to terrorists, and to their
sympathizers, their supporters, and their facilitators.
Fortunately, the NYPD has thwarted more than one plot against New
York City since September 11, 2001. One widely reported success was the
investigation, arrests and convictions of terrorists planning to blow
up the Herald Square subway station two weeks before the Republican
National Nominating Convention. In addition, the NYPD's robust
deterrence and counter-surveillance program has proved its success,
confirmed by Khaled Sheik Mohammed himself, who cited NYPD deployments
as the reason that an Ohio truck driver, Iyman Farris, presently
serving a prison sentence for his role in the plot to demolish the
Brooklyn Bridge, decided that he could not carry out the plot.
In New York City, we are combating terrorism aggressively. We
acknowledge and welcome the synergy that comes with joining State,
regional and federal partners, all of whom bring resources and
expertise to the fight. Over the past few years, our relationship with
the Department of Homeland Security has matured. I can say that,
despite differences that crop up from time to time, the level of
cooperation we presently enjoy has never been better. It is in this
spirit of cooperation and collaboration that I ask you today to ensure
that critical federal resources are neither squandered nor withdrawn. I
am talking about the yeoman's work taking place at the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) located in Manhattan.
The EML has distinguished roots, dating back to the Manhattan
Project. It enjoys a renowned reputation as the subject matter expert
in all things nuclear and radiological, from protection to testing to
measurement and assessment. Although EML moved organizationally from
under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Department
of Energy and then to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), it
never left its home in New York City.
The NYPD has found EML to be a responsive neighbor and partner. A
few years ago, when we determined that we needed to purchase small,
portable but reliable radiation detectors, we asked our federal
colleagues to recommend a laboratory capable of testing the products
then available on the market. We were told that we would have to travel
across the country to the Northwest, where testing would consume a
year's time. The EML stepped up and performed the testing for us in a
few weeks and made recommendations that work for us to this day. As a
result, the NYPD has acquired approximately 700 hand-held gamma
monitors and 120 gamma neutron detectors to detect potential
radiological weapons of mass destruction. They have been deployed
throughout the Department and are in daily use throughout Manhattan and
access points to the city. In addition, advanced gamma detectors and
Geiger counters have been assigned to specialized units such as the
Emergency Service Unit and the Bomb Squad. The Department continues to
seek out and acquire new technologies to aid us in the war on terror.
In the future, we plan to procure additional nuclear, biological, and
chemical detection and monitoring devices. EML has been instrumental in
helping us make wise choices from among available products.
Now, however, the importance of keeping a vibrant EML in New York
City is more important than ever. Secretary Chertoff announced last
year that the Securing the Cities (STC) initiative would be inaugurated
in New York City. Under STC, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) at DHS has been tasked with developing and implementing the
deployment of a system to detect the introduction of nuclear material
into our cities for illicit purposes. The EML plays a pivotal role in
STC-NY, providing technical and management roles.
The Acting Director of EML, Adam Hutter, has served as the key
liaison between DHS and the myriad groups of federal, State, and local
partners that comprise the STC partners. He has served as a mentor to
jump-start initiative activities and has been a key advisor on
technical details regarding the acquisition, evaluation and operation
of radiological detection equipment and he has provided critical
guidance to the operational exercise activities currently underway in
support of initiative goals. Without Director Hutter's guidance and
assistance from his laboratory, the STC goals of creating a formidable,
in-depth defense of the New York region from radiological or nuclear
attack would be severely degraded.
In fact, EML stood next to New York City in our early efforts to
establish a defense of the city through the successful Regional
Radiological Pilot Project. That program yielded significant research
and funding which led to the fielding of discrete radiological
detection equipment currently used to locate and identify hostile
radiological source material.
Clearly, EML's works in the New York region have been tremendously
successful and have provided a substantial capability for federal,
State, and local agencies to join in a coordinated defense against the
terrorist threat of a radiological or nuclear attack against the New
York region. In fact, more assistance from EML would be welcome and
would help consolidate the initial success achieved through programs
such as Securing the Cities. The outcome of that program will result in
a significant increase in the numbers of detection equipment deployed
by STC partners, equipment which will need precision calibration and
support. Also, private industry is rising to the challenge to enhance
the sensitivity and capabilities of radiological detection equipment
and we look to EML to provide further guidance on acquisition,
evaluation, and operational deployment on technologies yet to be
identified. The question is not whether EML has been a success in
answering the threat posed by international terrorism; the question is
whether EML stands ready to expand its efforts going forward.
The success of STC-NY is important to the country--it is expected
to be the model for implementing similar initiatives throughout the
country.
I would be delighted to answer any questions you may have.
Biography for Jonathan A. Duecker
Assistant Commissioner of Counterterrorism Jonathan Duecker
graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1986 and was
commissioned an Ensign in the U.S. Navy. After attending Navy flight
school at Pensacola, FL, and receiving his Naval Flight Officer wings,
he was assigned to the EA-6B ``Prowler'' tactical electronic warfare
community and flew electronic countermeasures missions from several
fleet aircraft carriers. After his initial sea tour, Assistant
Commissioner Duecker was assigned as the Electronic Warfare Range
Officer at the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility at Naval
Station, Roosevelt Roads, PR, where he was responsible for all aspects
of operational electronic warfare training of surface, sub-surface, and
aviation units prior to their deployment overseas.
Assistant Commissioner Duecker attended the University of Wisconsin
Law School where he received his Juris Doctor, and was admitted to the
Wisconsin Bar in 1995. He attended the U.S. Department of Justice Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Basic Agent Training at Quantico, VA,
and was ultimately assigned as a Special Agent to the Mobile
Enforcement Team in the DEA Philadelphia Field Division.
Immediately after September 11, 2001, Assistant Commissioner
Duecker was assigned by the DEA to the Philadelphia FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force. Subsequently, he was mobilized to active duty to the Joint
Intelligence Task Force--Combating Terrorism at the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) providing counterterrorism intelligence
analysis in support of Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom.
While at the DIA, Assistant Commissioner Duecker was responsible for
creating the Homeland Defense Division, which monitors the
transnational terrorist threat to the continental U.S.
Assistant Commissioner Duecker was demobilized at the end of 2002.
In 2003, he was appointed the Deputy Director of the Pennsylvania
Office of Homeland Security by Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, and in
2004, was elevated to Director. He served in that position until
October 2005. Assistant Commissioner Duecker is currently a Commander
in the U.S. Navy Reserve assigned to the DIA in Washington DC.
Discussion
Chairman Miller. Thank you. And before beginning with the
questioning, I mentioned earlier that there would be various
documents, but there is a specific set of documents that have
been provided to the Minority staff and I now ask unanimous
consent to enter that set of documents in the record. Thank
you.
[The information referred to appears in Appendix:
Additional Material for the Record, Documents for the Record.]
Air Force Programs With the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML)
Chairman Miller. And now the Chair recognizes himself for
five minutes of questions. Mr. McBrearty, beginning with you. I
understand that the Air Force has had a longstanding
relationship with EML, and the lab has participated in various
nuclear nonproliferation-related programs. I understand that
some of the work, some of the arrangements, some of what EML
has done may be classified. Obviously, if we ask a question
that would lead you into disclosing classified information, do
not answer that. If it is necessary that we know that to
understand the answer to the question, we may make other
arrangements to get that information from you.
Mr. McBrearty. That would be perfectly fine.
Chairman Miller. But in this setting, do not.
Mr. McBrearty. Right.
Chairman Miller. Obviously, do not disclose classified
information. And that goes for anyone else who has classified
information. Mr. McBrearty, is AFTAC now engaged in any program
or project with EML?
Mr. McBrearty. We had terminated all the activities that we
had with them. So currently, no, we have none going on.
Chairman Miller. Why is that?
Mr. McBrearty. Well, at the time we had both--some of the
points made here were excellent. We used their quality control
and the engineering support to a large extent and used them as
advisors to our activities. The major reason is that we had--
the small project that we did have was approximately $400,000 a
year. It was the level-of-effort project. The reason we
terminated the activities was, as I sort of alluded to and made
mention in my written testimony, upon notification by DHS that
there was an intention to close the laboratory, it was
absolutely necessary that we move these important activities to
other laboratories within our United States Atomic Energy
Detection System Network. We had to make that move upon the
notification that the laboratory was to be closed. So while we
value it, as I said, very much, what they are capable and have
been able to do, it was necessary for us to move on.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And again, how did you learn that
there was a decision to close EML?
Mr. McBrearty. In about 2005, in the fall, my project
officer got a call from, I think, Dr. Clarke or people in the
DHS office, notifying us that the laboratory was--they were
planning--that DHS had planned to terminate the laboratory and
that it would be necessary for us to move our work elsewhere.
Or the other option given to us would be to pick up the tab for
it. DHS did not seem interested in the laboratory or what it
had for their particular job that they had identified.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And I understand that EML that--
excuse me. The e-mail that you have referred to is one of the
documents that we----
Mr. McBrearty. Yes. We have that exchange of e-mails. It
was absolutely essential for us to move quickly and over the
course of the next year, we transitioned the equipment and a
large portion of the sample library, which is a nice national
asset in some respects, to our other laboratories.
Chairman Miller. Right. And Mr. McBrearty, I understand
that you were not pleased with that decision to close EML. What
did you do about it, if anything?
Mr. McBrearty. I personally came up here from Florida. It
is always an interesting trip to come from Florida up here, so
it was important for me to do so. I came up to talk with the
people at the Department to explain the importance of the work
that we saw going on, albeit small, with regard to EML, but
more importantly, to sort of touch on some of the points that
were made in here. As I said in my written testimony, I was
initially extremely pleased to hear DHS had picked the EML up,
because the DOE had not really had a lot of use for them, as
the transitions from environmental measurements and things were
going on. The focus, as has been identified, was more toward
the larger laboratories. EML has, and had had in the past,
large assets that were rather unique in the system. So in
seeing DHS pick this little laboratory, but a very competent
laboratory, up, I was initially extremely pleased.
As was mentioned by Mr. Duecker, there has been a plethora
of what I call Tricorders created for detection of radiation,
and the entrepreneurship that is out there on the market to
sell these things is huge. Quality control, measurements,
validation and testing of these sorts of things, so that you
have compatibility and things actually work, is critical. And
to me, that was a job that EML has shown capability to do in
the past.
So my initial impression when I heard they were being
picked up by DHS was great, this is a good location. I was
disappointed, obviously, when the decision was made, or
indications of that decision, from two perspectives. One, we
had to do some moving and shuffling of stuff, which was an
impact which we have recovered from. But I think, as has been
mentioned here, the intangibles are the things that worried me
most.
Chairman Miller. Okay. I have further questions, but in
order to set an example for the Committee, I will now recognize
Mr. McCaul.
EML's Role in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Fainberg, I want
to--if you could, tell us about EML's infrastructure
capabilities and morale prior to its transfer to DHS. I wonder
if you could expand beyond that, whether you think these
capabilities fit within the DHS mission.
Dr. Fainberg. As to the morale before it transferred, I was
not directly aware of it. I didn't have close contact. The
morale shortly after transition I can talk about. People were
very happy to be away from DOE and within DHS. Regarding their
infrastructure, as I said, their plant, their lab space was
fairly depressing and barely functional. However, they did have
laboratories within that lab space that they did keep
functioning quite well, supporting the QAP program, for
example.
And they had quite a bit of capability in radiation
detection technologies. Their development of--I think it was a
called comprehensive monitoring system--was kind of
interesting. This was a set of gamma ray detectors they had
assembled from parts on the market, but at much cheaper prices
than you could buy assembled detectors on the market. That
became the core of their rooftop sensor system. Hooking that
all into a central command room at DHS was--at EML was quite a
useful thing to do as a demonstration for what one might do in
the future, putting a radiation monitoring system in a large
city. What you have to be careful of, you don't want to put a
million monitors out there, because you will never be able to
manage that, but you could think of putting maybe 50 or 100
monitors in strategic places. And this kind of work was an
interesting pilot for that.
As I also indicated in my remarks, some of the people there
were clearly ready for retirement. However, I identified at
least a quarter of the technical staff who I thought were
extremely active, up with current technologies and good and
many of them, in fact, were useful to the comprehensive--the
monitoring test bed that was set up by other elements in DHS in
New York City. They assisted with that, where they were out on
bridges and tunnels at all hours of the day, taking
measurements, testing out systems and running down alarms. What
they could be useful for in the future, all of that expertise
in radiation detection still is there. I am not sure how many
people remain in the radiochemical area. Reconstituting that
certainly is possible, but it is not certain to me that the
cost benefit analysis would favor reconstituting laboratories
that were there. It would be useful, however, I think, to use
those people who are still in the system, who are still federal
employees there, and their expertise in helping other
laboratories do quality assistance--quality assurance work. I
think that could be done. There is a lot that can be done there
and if S&T wanted to establish a serious technological presence
in New York City, nothing would prevent them from hiring a few
more people, as I said, younger people, to reinvigorate it.
I would also suggest that they are really being ripped off
by GSA. That is not a good place to be and the prices, I
understand, are going up for the rental, because the prices in
Greenwich Village, where this is located, are going up and GSA
is able to match rental to local market values. If it were up
to me, I would try to put them in another facility in the New
York area, perhaps in Lower Manhattan, owned by other elements
at DHS. That probably would be a lot more----
EML and Counterterrorism in New York City
Mr. McCaul. Thank you for raising that point and it is a
good transition. I was going to ask Mr. Duecker the value of
having the DHS Science and Technology footprint in Manhattan or
where you are located, in response to Dr. Fainberg's comments,
but also what role they can play to better assist your
counterterrorism efforts in New York.
Mr. Duecker. Yes, sir. In your opening remarks, you
commented that this was critical for national security
purposes, it was a critical resource. We take a very parochial
approach to that in that regard and we look at this as a very
critical local resource. They provided us significant test and
evaluation capabilities, as I mentioned, looking at the rad
pagers that we currently have on the street. And as was
mentioned, there is so much technology out there nowadays that
making sure that what our cops on the streets carry, in terms
of detection equipment, in fact, is going to detect something
that we should be watching for, is of critical importance.
There is a lot of technology out there and frankly, the New
York City Police Department isn't--we are not the subject
matter experts on test and evaluation of this kind of
equipment. We rely on our partnership with EML. And having them
local to Manhattan, and having them basically a partner within
the city, has become something that we rely on to a great
degree. Otherwise, we would either have to go further up on
eastern Long Island to BNL, which is a laboratory about 65
miles outside the city, or elsewhere outside the region.
And in terms of the threat to the city, the rad threat and
nuke threat to the city, that is just not a workable solution
for us. So we look at the partnership that we have with EML,
Dr. Hunter, in particular, as being something that has been
good in the past and we are looking to grow that in terms of
the Securing the Cities Initiative that we currently have.
Ultimately what we want to do is we want to create a ring of
sensor technology around the region to protect to New York
City, because, as we know, New York City is the primary threat
set for the threats
Mr. McCaul. In your experience, has the transition from EML
to DHS been a smooth one? Is it a positive experience or what
could be done to make it better assist you?
Mr. Duecker. We have always asked for more. You know, if
the New York City Police Department constantly asks--requests
for items and we get a portion of those and we are happy with
those, but we are always constantly asking for more. I can't
really speak to the transition from DOE to DHS in that term,
but I can tell you that, since about 2004, the relationship
that we have had with them has been growing since 2003, and we
would like for them to stay in New York City and greatly
enhance their capabilities in New York City, so that as we go
forward with the rad detection system that we envision, we have
a partner that is right there that we can work with that is
local. I mean, one of the things that we rely on in New York
City is that we don't have to rely on folks in Washington, D.C.
or outside the region. We like to interact with them right
there in the city.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I see my time has expired.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. There should be ample time for
all of us to have a second or even a third round of questions.
Mr. Rothman.
DHS' Decision to Close EML
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank you
for holding these hearings this morning. Let me just start by
saying, not surprisingly, as a Representative from the northern
part of New Jersey, across the George Washington Bridge from
Manhattan, representing that district, I am a firm believer
that the number one target of terrorists, New York City and the
New York metropolitan area, should be given the commensurate
amount of the Homeland Security funding and counterterrorism
funding, because it is justified on the basis of risk.
In addition, because of the quality of the work of the New
York Police Department and the other law enforcement, the first
responders in New Jersey and New York, we have come up with
great approaches to the threats and have invented the wheel, so
to speak, and so other targets around the Nation can come to
us, as they often do, as the model for programs and it is a
more efficient use of the Nation's national security or
Homeland Security funding. So the burden of proof, in my mind,
should be on any agency or individual who would withhold funds
or close Homeland Security projects in New York City, or New
York metropolitan area, to prove why that is a good thing or
necessary.
Here is my general question to any of the panel members or
all of you who want to answer. I look forward to hearing from
Dr. Clarke and I have read his testimony. Is the closing or the
decision to close EML, was that simply a good faith decision
that people can disagree with, but nonetheless, was it a good
faith effort on their part to best manage the taxpayers' funds,
yet accomplish its mission? Or did it evidence some bias or
poor judgment or pattern of bad management decisions that you
would like to comment on?
Dr. Fainberg. Well, Congressman, sympathetic to where you
come from, I grew up in Hackensack and my parents are still
there.
Mr. Rothman. My constituents.
Dr. Fainberg. That is a coincidence. I had no idea of this
beforehand.
Mr. Rothman. Okay.
Dr. Fainberg. I was told, as I said in my testimony, that
there had been, in May of 2005, no plan to close the laboratory
and in fact, there had been talk of establishing, sort of in
its place or transitioning it into something called a technical
liaison office, which I never understood and it didn't make any
sense to me, but maybe you can hear about that from later
witnesses. It appeared to me that there was a decision to close
it down and I do not know why. I don't know what caused it, if
there were bad feelings that had been generated by earlier
miscommunications between laboratory management and
headquarters. I don't know if it was just, and I suspect this
is what it is, the difficulties of starting a new organization,
S&T, within another new organization, DHS, and assimilating
pieces and laboratories from elsewhere and the confusion that
reigned at that point. It may well have been a good faith
effort. I wouldn't question that. I do think it was a very poor
judgment and that is all I can say about it.
Mr. Rothman. Any other panel members wish to comment?
Mr. McBrearty. Yes, sir, I guess I would throw a little
into this, too. Was there a decision to close? Yes, we had the
impression there was a decision to close the place. Was there
bias? Two parts to your question. Bias, I don't know that that
was the case. I simply feel that there was a lack of
appreciation of the intangible values that were embedded in
this small laboratory located in New York City. Two, it was
very costly. You have heard indications of the cost of doing
business in the city and I guess that comes with the territory.
But it was viewed as a costly operation vis-a-vis the new
organization and I don't think the new organization appreciated
that it could utilize those--that it had those talents.
Mr. Rothman. But you don't see a bias or an under-
appreciation of the threat that New York City and its
surrounding areas were under, vis-a-vis the corn fields of Iowa
or the sheep farms in Montana, who are getting a
disproportionate share of DHS money?
Mr. McBrearty. Well, sir, I don't know how the
distributions go, but I will say this, as I said earlier, I
thought it was good that they had been picked by DHS, because
they were in the location that needed some help. There is
analog to the DHS/New York City thing in the Argonne National
Laboratory located in Chicago. The synergy that is derived by
the presence and working closely with first responders, the
homeland security kind of initiatives that Chicago has
developed has made great use of Argonne and to me, that model
was one I thought was going to prevail in the EML relationship.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. Mr. McBrearty, you
described DHS, the S&T Directorate not really understanding
what they had. The image that comes to my mind is the last
scene in the Raiders of the Lost Ark, where the Ark of the
Covenant is in a crate being loaded into a warehouse on top of
other crates by a forklift, and I have the sense that they
don't--they didn't quite comprehend what they had, from what
you have said, and that is your impression as well. You said
you came to Washington to discuss the value of the lab. Did you
give a classified briefing to Mr. Clarke or anyone else?
Mr. McBrearty. No, sir. During that visit, the venue was
not available for a classified briefing. However, the
importance of EML to us, in any unclassified venue, there are
relationships with the international community, our
associations with them in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
development, development of samplers, those sort of things,
those values that we derive from this little entity, those were
those sorts of things I imparted.
Another particular bias of mine, perhaps, is that I valued
EML and AFTAC valued EML, too. It is a small government
laboratory as opposed to a DOE facility. Now, we love the DOE
laboratories. We have great associations with them and a lot of
work that goes on. But what EML uniquely provided, in my
opinion and it is in my written testimony, is the ability to
independently assess technologies and do so in a very capable
manner. So in that regard, they were--that was part of the
value or pitch that I thought EML represented to the DHS.
More on Air Force Programs With EML
Chairman Miller. Thank you. We have been called to a vote.
We will continue for a while. We all have a very good idea of
exactly how long it takes us to get to the Floor and we have 15
minutes and we should be able to at least complete my round of
questions. Did the decision by DHS force you to terminate any
of your programs?
Mr. McBrearty. Is that directed to me, sir? Yes?
Chairman Miller. Yes. I am sorry. Yes.
Mr. McBrearty. Well, actually, we had some activities with
which EML assisted us that we were not able to carry out. So I
will have to leave that at that point.
Chairman Miller. Is that because of the nature of the
information?
Mr. McBrearty. Yes, and----
Chairman Miller. Okay.
Mr. McBrearty.--I would rather not go into that.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. And at that point, did you have
any plans to transfer or terminate or halt or cancel any of the
programs until you got the e-mail telling you that EML was
going to be terminated?
Mr. McBrearty. No, sir, not at all. We and my staff had
full impressions that we would continue operations into the
future pretty much as we had in the past.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And if EML employees were told that
the Air Force was not any longer interested in working with
them, was that--that was inaccurate?
Mr. McBrearty. Oh, absolutely. We were basically told that
we needed to find other places for our work, because there was
an intention to close the laboratory. We were also told that it
was considered private information and that we were asked not
to discuss the issue with EML staff. We respected the fact that
the decision had not been made and we made no contact to any of
the employees, per se, regarding that.
EML's Global Sensors: North Korea
Chairman Miller. Okay. One last question and I think we
will all go to vote and then we will be in recess and come back
and complete the hearing, and I apologize for the herky-jerky
nature of this. It is simply what our schedules are like. But
one last question, Mr. McBrearty, and I know that probably you
more than any other witness have to tread carefully to avoid
disclosing classified information. But I know that you must
have been aware of EML's network of global sensors.
Mr. McBrearty. Yes, sir, very much so. In fact, we were
close with them on that and appreciated the work that they did
in developing that network, because it gave the monitoring
community at large a better capability.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And EML had installed two radiation
sensors in China in 2002 and had plans to install a third
sensor near the North Korea border in 2005, just before DHS
shut down that program. From the technical expertise you have
in this area, what would have been the value of the information
gained from those sensors?
Mr. McBrearty. As part of the expansion of an international
network of samplers and a national or international----
Chairman Miller. I am sorry. Excuse me.
Mr. McBrearty. That is a hard question to answer directly,
but always more samplers, more locations, more interplay
between these networks, samplers within a network, is of value.
So from AFTAC's perspective, with its job of worldwide nuclear
test monitoring, we have always been interested in the
advancements at EML and the associations that they had with
these things. To have a sampler closer to Korea, given those
things, a joint operation with the Chinese and the United
States through EML, was certainly a valuable undertaking and we
were quite interested in seeing that as means of improving the
ability to globally monitor those things that all the nations
who have signed up to this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have
expressed a utility in.
Chairman Miller. And I know my time has expired and we need
to go vote, but just one last question. I know there are other
sources of information about the detonation of a nuclear device
anywhere in the world. Was the information you would have
gotten from those sensors duplicative? Would it have been
helpful additional information?
Mr. McBrearty. It could have been supplemental, sir. AFTAC
is the operator of the United States Atomic Energy Detection
System. We are the ones that provide that information and did
detect and report it on that nuclear test. For those sorts of
things, we look at the entire suite of systems available, both
United States, international and those that EML would have had
and it could--those things could help under certain
circumstances. In the North Korean test, they would not have
helped because the situation is that the samplers that are
involved or were involved, whether worldwide RMP, or Remote
Monitoring Program, have to do with monitoring particulate
debris as opposed to the noble gases that actually came out of
the tunnel. In that particular case, we, AFTAC, collected the
gases using our aircraft. So those samplers, per se, were not--
would not have, in hindsight, been useful in that case.
However, if the event that occurred had vented, had thrown
particulate debris into the atmosphere, depending on the
meteorology, depending on where the sample was transported to,
they could have indeed played a part, but that is a scenario
that did not occur. However, the more is always better.
Chairman Miller. All right, thank you. Okay, again, I
apologize to all of the witnesses, but we do need to stand in
recess to allow us to vote and we will back as quickly as we
can. Thank you.
[Recess]
Chairman Miller. The Committee will be back in order. Any
moment, Mr. Rothman will be prepared to ask some questions. Mr.
Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Commissioner
Duecker or Duker?
Mr. Duecker. Duecker.
Mr. Rothman. Duecker. Thank you for your service, first of
all, and please convey our thanks to all the men and women that
you serve with on NYPD.
Mr. Duecker. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Rothman. You just do a great job and thank you for your
work with New Jersey's finest and bravest and all of our first
responders.
Mr. Duecker. We were out with them yesterday carrying the
Cities Initiative. We were with Passaic and Bergen Counties. It
was the second phase to the Securing the Cities Initiative.
There is going to be quite a few more phases going forward, but
yesterday was a good day for us.
New York City First Responder Community
Mr. Rothman. Great. As you know, many people in my district
work in Manhattan and many of our first responders were the
ones who came into New York City to help out, as well as doing
a lot of the medical care at Liberty State Park.
Commissioner Duecker, there was apparently a report
prepared by the employees of DHS that evaluated EML. I think
the report is 2004-2005. That report painted a portrait of the
New York City first responder community as being lukewarm in
its feelings about EML. Do you recall if that is an accurate
statement of the feelings of the New York City first responder
community at that time?
Mr. Duecker. I don't know what comprises the first
responder community to which you refer. I don't know how broad
that was.
Mr. Rothman. Right.
Mr. Duecker. I don't know to what degree the New York City
Police Department was involved in that assessment or that
survey. I can tell you that, with respect to the relationship
that we have, and it is evolutionary with EML, it is
evolutionary because the technology that we see in terms of rad
and nuke detection devices, that is evolutionary. Our
relationship with them has grown. It has grown more in the last
year, I think, than it did in the two or three years previous
to that. A lot of that has to do with the leadership of Dr.
Hunter, as I mentioned, and his willingness to be a partner in
the Securing the Cities Initiative and understanding that.
Instead of having technology drive operations, I think he is
willing to allow operations to drive technology and he is----
Mr. Rothman. Commissioner, how long have you been aware of
the workings of EML?
Mr. Duecker. I have been with the NYPD for about a year and
a half, so it has been--I was aware of the rad issues as soon
as I got there and the fact that EML played a pivotal role in
the testing of the rad detection devices that we have on the
street.
EML Funding
Mr. Rothman. Okay, thank you. Dr. Fainberg, Dr. Clarke's
prepared testimony, in it he says that a review of EML found no
S&T project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 and
any other activity, other than the CMTB, Countermeasures Test
Bed Project. You were the Program Manager for radiological and
nuclear countermeasures in the DHS S&T Directorate at the time.
Did you plan to fund any projects at EML beyond 2006?
Dr. Fainberg. Yes, I was Program Manager until--I believe
it was late April of 2005.
Mr. Rothman. Right.
Dr. Fainberg. At that time, we were not planning anything
very much in the fiscal 2007 timeframe for EML or for any of
the labs. We were kind of consumed with doing fiscal 2005 and
2006. My intention had been to propose continuing funding in a
number of areas. I had not been asked, at least I do not recall
having been asked, if I intended to fund them beyond fiscal
2006. Had I been asked, I would have said yes, I would have.
Mr. Rothman. In your experience, decades of experience in
your field, is it customary to--or for people to ask about
projects and their longevity several years beyond the present?
Dr. Fainberg. It can be. I mean, some projects by their
nature are large, long-term projects.
Mr. Rothman. But your testimony is you just weren't asked?
Dr. Fainberg. Yes, I do not recall having ever been asked
if I--what I wanted them to do in 2007. In documentation that
we were supposed to provide each year for the research plan,
there was a list of projects and how long they would last and
how long we anticipated they would last. Some of the ones I had
down, like the ship effect, was supposed to finish in 2006, but
there was a possibility it might have continued into 2007, for
example. Other things that were going on, like the New York
area Science and Tech working group, were ongoing things which
I would have wanted to keep. I wanted to keep the global
monitoring, for example. But a number of these projects that I
had wanted to keep, I had been told at a higher level, not by
Dr. Clarke, but by other people who had responsibility up the
chain, that they were not going to be approved.
The Neutron Ship Effect
Mr. Rothman. If I may, just one other question. The neutron
ship project.
Dr. Fainberg. Yes, neutron ship effect.
Mr. Rothman. That ultimately was worked on by some other
group?
Dr. Fainberg. Well, no, it is worked on by Dr. Goldhagen,
even today, I believe, in collaboration with RSL, a laboratory
at the Nevada Test Site. It also has interest in it. But Dr.
Goldhagen, I believe, is still working on that today.
Mr. Rothman. So just forgive me. Was he at EML?
Dr. Fainberg. Yes.
Mr. Rothman. And then----
Dr. Fainberg. As far as I know, he still is.
Mr. Rothman. Oh, he still is?
Dr. Fainberg. Yes.
Mr. Rothman. So that work continued----
Dr. Fainberg. That work----
Mr. Rothman.--at EML?
Dr. Fainberg. That work did continue, yes.
Mr. Rothman. Then I must have misunderstood you. Was there
some slowing down or hindrance of that work?
Dr. Fainberg. Oh. Dr. Clarke wanted to prevent the
acquisition of a detector that was vital to do the work
properly. After people at the higher level, the office
director, had approved it and it was over this issue that I
resigned. I said it seems to me that you are trying to block
something that you don't have competence to do. I went to my
management and I said, why are you allowing this, and my
management ignored me.
Mr. Rothman. And how long after you resigned did the
equipment get approved?
Dr. Fainberg. I don't know. Probably within a month or two,
but I don't know. I was told within a few weeks that it would
be or it had been.
Mr. Rothman. Well, you believe there was a causal
relationship between your resignation and the acquisition of
this equipment?
Dr. Fainberg. I think so, yes.
Mr. Rothman. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dirty Bombs
Chairman Miller. Thank you. I understand Mr. McCaul has no
further questions of this panel. I do have a few more of Ms.
Albin. Ms. Albin, I mentioned in my opening remarks that one of
the most likely terrorist events, one that has been amply
telegraphed, is a dirty bomb. Could you describe what role EML
might play in the event of a dirty bomb or any other kind of
radioactive event?
Ms. Albin. So far, we have been talking and implying that
the events that would be covered, people would be able to carry
instrumentation into the area and say whether or not it is safe
or not safe, kind of go or no go. Those hand-held instruments
are good for that, good for looking at first responder safety
and good for making a quick call if you need to evacuate an
area.
In the case of dirty bomb, those instruments have limited
capabilities and it really is going to be the radiochemical
analysis of samples that are going to give us the information
we need to know what is the extent of the contamination, if it
was a dirty bomb and unsafe. Can they come back to their
houses, if they have been evacuated? And for us, and a lot of
people in the trenches, we are the people that are doing that
analysis and we are handing our results off to government
officials that are going to make decisions and we need to have
the credibility and make sure that we are doing the best we can
do. So if we are analyzing samples and we are giving data and
we tell people, you know, you need to stay away, that is one
problem. But if we are also telling people it is okay to go
back, it is safe to come back, there is no hazard here, those
no-action decisions require that we have a lot of confidence in
our data and that is where the performance testing, like the
QAP program helped us, because it independently verified the
work that we do and independently gave us that assurance that
the data that was being produced by the Public Health
Laboratory can be used by decisions makers to address those
problems.
The Quality Assessment Program (QAP)
Chairman Miller. Okay. You mentioned the Quality Assessment
Program, QAP, and as I understand it, it set standards for
laboratories to verify the reliability of their detection
equipment. Can you describe how Washington State's involvement
with QAP at EML helped your programs?
Ms. Albin. Well, the QAP program was directly providing our
samples that were directly related to the type of work we do,
low-level radiochemistry analysis, so that is how we used them
with the QAP program. But EML also had other programs. They
sponsored an international inter-comparison to look at external
radiation levels, and there was another program where they
tested the ability for the analysts to correctly look at
spectral data, and there was a lot of interaction with EML,
from the QAP program as well as availability of the scientists
to answer questions, to collaborate on what to do if we get
into a situation and we have a problem analysis.
Chairman Miller. I feel like I am talking to you by cell
phone. You are kind of going in and out.
Ms. Albin. Oh, sorry. How is that?
Chairman Miller. Oddly enough, the Science and Technology
Committee does not always have the best technology. And oddly
enough, our witnesses are sometimes worse than Congress in
using the technology. I don't know if you have answered this,
but now that QAP has closed, what do you do? Who do you go to
for what QAP formerly did?
Ms. Albin. We participate in other performance testing
programs and one of them is through a mixed--it is a program
that is sponsored by a DOE lab in Idaho and it is developed for
mixed waste and they augmented their program to include some of
the radionuclides and the work that the QAP program was doing
and their performance and distribution schedule. And there is
also a private laboratory that has picked up quality assurance
for environmental samples. And the difference is that we cannot
fully participate in the private laboratory's program because
of costs and we are limited by costs and the government samples
or the samples from EML were at no charge to us. And the Idaho
laboratory samples are similar but they lack some of the
natural products and things that were provided by the QAP
program.
Chairman Miller. Your answer to this question seems
evident, but if the QAP program were reconstituted in EML would
you use it again?
Ms. Albin. We would use it again, yes.
Chairman Miller. Thank you. I think we are fine now with
this panel. Thank you all very much for your testimony. Mr.
McCaul, I know you need to leave shortly. If we could maybe
take a shorter break than we would ordinarily take and we could
have you ask questions first.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. Okay. The next panel is not really a
panel. It is Dr. Clarke. So if we could just take a couple,
three minutes to stretch and let people reposition ourselves,
we could begin with Dr. Clarke.
[Recess]
Chairman Miller. Okay, the Committee has now reconvened and
Dr. Clarke is our next witness. Dr. John F. Clarke is the
Deputy Director of the Office National Laboratories, Science
and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. As
you know, Dr. Clarke, your testimony will be limited to five
minutes, but you have submitted a written statement which has
become part of the record. And after you have given the
testimony, each of the Committee Members will have five
minutes. We may have more than one round and we will call on
Mr. McCaul first to accommodate his schedule. We do swear our
witnesses, Dr. Clarke, if you would stand. Do you have any
objection to being sworn?
Dr. Clarke. No.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And you also have a right to
Counsel. If you could raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn]
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Dr. Clarke, you may begin.
Panel 2:
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. CLARKE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
NATIONAL LABORATORIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Clarke. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Sensenbrenner and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It
really is a pleasure to be here today. I want to thank you for
holding this hearing and specifically for inviting me to
testify. I think that your oversight is providing the catalyst
for key decisions by the leaders of the Department of Homeland
Security that I hope will allow the EML staff to develop a more
productive role within the department.
I have been honored to serve in the Department of Homeland
Security since July of 2004. Like many of my colleagues in
Homeland Security, I was moved by the events of 9/11. I
interrupted my career to devote time to national security. Now,
for me, the motivation was quite personal. I am a New Yorker.
Eleven people with my family name and 69 fellow Fordham
University alumnae died on that day and that was basically my
motivation for coming to Homeland Security. I was very
fortunate to find the Office of Research and Development and
they gave me the opportunity to apply my 37 years of research
and management experience to assist in the integration of the
DOE national laboratories and the specialized DHS organic
laboratories into a complex, a laboratory complex that would
serve the need of homeland security.
Now, you have asked me to testify regarding the termination
or transfer of programs, projects or activities at one of these
labs, the EML. You wanted to know how these decisions were made
and the impact of these decisions. My written testimony
addresses these issues in context and I apologize for the
length, but it is a historical record based on extensive
written documentation--and it has been entered in the record.
Now, the extensive Science and Technology reviews in which I
participated found that the EML had serious challenges, let me
put it that way, to overcome with regards to matching their
legacy capabilities with the current missions of the Department
of Homeland Security.
I assure you that to properly address this kind of issue,
the transition of a laboratory, involves people and their past
experience and many, many factors. You have to approach it with
frankness and candor in order to make realistic management
decisions about the future of the institution. And these
judgments and findings are summarized in my testimony for the
record. But I wanted to do is to assure you that throughout the
process of investigation, review which went on for oh, well
over year, perhaps 18 months, the leaders within the Science
and Technology Directorate at that time always acted with great
empathy for the people, the individuals at the EML who, after
all, had been caught up in a difficult transition which was not
of their making. Nonetheless, the Under Secretary and his
predecessors are pursuing an important national mission with
limited resources. They have attempted to tackle the difficult
challenges associated with the EML forthrightly, honestly and
in my view, courageously in order to blend the EML capabilities
with the national needs served by the Department of Homeland
Security.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement Mr. Clarke follows:]
Prepared Statement of John F. Clarke
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee I am John Clarke, Deputy
Director of the Office of National Laboratories in the DHS Science and
Technology Directorate. I would like to thank the Committee for the
opportunity to discuss the transition of the Environmental Measurements
Laboratory (EML) from the Department of Energy (DOE) to the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate's management of EML since its transfer in March 2003.
In particular, you have asked me to testify regarding the
termination or transfer of programs, projects or activities at the EML,
how these decisions were made, and the impact of these actions. In
previous correspondence, the Committee inquired about the period FY
2002 through the present, part of which predated the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), so the prior history of EML within DOE is
relevant to subsequent DHS management decisions.
In 2004 the Office of Research and Development conducted a series
of reviews concerning the EML. I was only peripherally aware of the EML
during my service in the Department of Energy. Consequently, when I was
asked to participate, I consulted EML staff and also talked to current
and former DOE officials in the Office of Science (OS), the OS Office
of Health and Environmental Research and the Office of Environmental
Management who had managed, and had personal knowledge of, EML from the
late 1970's until its transfer to DHS.
Background on EML
The EML is located in a General Services Administration (GSA)
office building in lower Manhattan. It was transferred from the
Department of Energy to the Department of Homeland Security in March
2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The current EML evolved from the Health and Safety Laboratory
(HASL) of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). HASL contributed
significantly to various national programs during the ``Cold War.''
However, the laboratory's size and the uniqueness of its capability
declined as the global nuclear industry matured and national priorities
changed. With the formation of the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977,
the HASL was renamed to EML to reflect its narrower focus on the
measurement of low level environmental radiation.
In subsequent years, continued changes in national priorities led
to a decline in EML's technical capability relative to the private
sector and other DOE National Laboratories all of whom possessed
broader scientific and engineering capabilities and missions. According
to officials in the DOE Office of Science and its Office of Health and
Environmental Research, during the 1990's, the DOE Office of Energy
Research struggled to decide whether to close the facility or to find a
viable mission for EML. Finally, in 1997, the EML was transferred to
the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) where it provided
radiation measurement and quality control services supporting DOE's
internal environmental monitoring, decommissioning, decontamination,
and remediation mission. Periodically, EML also provided radiation
measurement services to the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) and, through an Interagency Agreement between the Air Force and
DOE, it provided similar services to the Air Force Technical
Applications Center (AFTAC), both of which were concerned with nuclear
non-proliferation.
Immediately following its transfer to DHS in 2003, the EML
continued to work on the internal DOE Quality Assessment Program (QAP),
which supported DOE environmental site cleanup, some radiation detector
projects and two small and intermittent measurement activities related
to non-proliferation. By 2004 when the S&T reviews began, EML was
supplying a few staff to provide local support to the S&T Directorate
Standards ( 1.5 FTE) program and Counter-Measures Test Beds (CMTB)
project ( 4.8 FTE) in its testing of radiation and explosive detectors,
performing two radiation monitoring projects and offering advice and
seminars to local first responders.
Science & Technology Directorate Management Reviews of EML:
Since its transfer to DHS in March 2003, the S&T Directorate's
Office of Research and Development (ORD) had numerous meeting with the
EML's Director and staff of the EML to inform them about the evolving
S&T program. ORD also provided funding to EML to support transition
planning and the Director had weekly discussions with the ORD Director.
In 2004, growing concerns about EML's progress in transitioning its
capabilities to support S&T programs, led to a series of reviews by
ORD. The first was conducted by Dr. Mark Mandler, who, at the time was
the Technical Director of the Coast Guard Research & Development Center
on assignment to S&T to assist with lab transitions.
Dr. Mandler's review of the FY 2005 EML Facilities Plan revealed
that the EML had a carryover from FY 2004 of 42 percent in their O&M
budget and 26 percent in their assigned project funds. This increased
S&T concerns about EML's progress in managing its transition to DHS.
Further, Dr. Mandler's review also found that, despite the EML's large
FY 2004 under run, the EML Director's funding projections for FY 2005
staff were significantly overestimated and also contained inflated
funding for self-initiated EML projects. It concluded that EML
management did not understand the organization's actual capabilities
and entertained unrealistic expectations of its potential role within
DHS. The final conclusion of Dr. Mandler's review was that S&T needed
to reassess how it could utilize the EML. After review and acceptance
by the Under Secretary, these conclusions led to the initiation of a
more comprehensive Top-to-Bottom ORD management review of the EML.
My personal involvement in the management of the EML began in the
fall of 2004 when I was tasked by the ORD Director to work with Dr.
Mark Mandler in performing this Top-to-Bottom review.
The Top-to-Bottom management review was to examine whether EML
staff could provide more support to the S&T Directorate projects such
as the ongoing CMTB project, which was S&T's largest operational
activity in New York and New Jersey. It was also to examine what other
work was ongoing at EML, what S&T programs it served, what new work was
proposed and what priority these EML activities had within DHS.
Finally, and most importantly, it was to determine how S&T could best
apply the resources invested in maintaining the EML to support the
science and technology needs of DHS components as well as the local
agencies in the New York area.
The Top-to-Bottom review followed a systematic data gathering
process to answer these questions. This included visiting EML, talking
to EML staff, examining EML progress reports with S&T project managers,
reviewing its quarterly cost reports with S&T Chief Financial Office
(CFO) staff, discussing EML's role and contributions with CMTB
management and S&T Project Managers, consulting DOE officials familiar
with EML and reviewing EML's new and existing work proposals in context
of the program plans of S&T managers. The review was completed by late
October of 2004. At that time, it was decided by the ORD Director that
the results of the review should be presented to EML's management. The
conclusions are summarized below.
An S&T team consisting of Dr. Parker, Mrs. Alyce Bridges from S&T
Human Resources and I visited EML on Dec. 17, 2004. We met with Dr.
Erickson and his senior managers and reviewed the S&T Directorate's
mission and goals with them. We informed them of the conclusions of the
Top-to-Bottom review and reminded them of ORD's expectations for EML.
After reviewing S&T's current and future program directions, it was
noted that the CMTB, which utilized some of the EML staff, seemed to be
the closest match to the EML's radiation measurement competency.
However, Dr. Parker also warned the EML management team that, even
within the CMTB, change was coming. We further noted that the ongoing
CMTB test and evaluation program required more than experience in
radiation measurement and, as it developed, it would need core
competencies in field operations, pilot deployment and consequence
management. We informed them that ORD expected EML management to engage
in a serious assessment of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and
barriers to its success in identifying and serving DHS customers such
as CMTB project.
We then reviewed the detailed findings of the Top-to-Bottom Review
on each of the currently funded activities at the EML. The review had
found that in the area of standards development, urban atmospheric
circulation measurements and radiation monitoring development
activities, S&T program managers believed that EML was not competitive
with other institutions. Consequently, these managers expected that
current EML activities in these areas would be completed by 2005 with
little, if any, follow-on work. The review had not found any S&T
project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 in any activity
other than the CMTB project.
The review had also gathered mixed reviews of the EML relationships
with local New York area government agencies. EML was recognized for
holding seminars for local government personnel, for answering their
questions related to radiation measurement and for the contributions of
their staff to the CMTB test program. However, the review found that
Homeland Security support to local government agencies was multi-
faceted and required not only a broad range of technical expertise but
significant skills in relationship management with both S&T, other DHS
components and local agencies, skills which EML had not exhibited
outside of the CMTB test program.
Based on overall DHS goals, we told the EML managers that creating
an operational platform to coordinate the development, operational
testing and transfer of homeland security technology to local
government agencies was potentially a critical success factor for S&T.
The CMTB fulfilled part of these functions and EML was already
contributing to its test and evaluation program. However, this
participation, while certainly valuable, employed only a fraction of
the EML staff and was not sufficient by itself to justify the existence
of EML. We informed the EML managers that ORD would be performing a
market survey of S&T technology suppliers and potential users in New
York to determine a concrete value proposition for such an operational
platform. ORD expected to evaluate EML's future role based on their
institutional strategic and business plans and the results of the DHS
market survey.
Following this meeting, S&T together with a team of organizational
management experts from Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH), conducted dozens of
interviews with potential customers for, and suppliers of, science and
technology services in New York for the purpose of determining a vision
and value proposition for S&T activities in New York. The teams also
gathered information from several DOE National Laboratories, other
government laboratories, DHS component agencies and local agencies both
at Headquarters in Washington, DC and in New York.
The teams identified S&T operational activities in New York of
value to a broad cross-section of homeland security technology
suppliers and operational users. These activities fell into four
categories: 1) Providing operational liaison to maintain interactive
communication between developers and operators; 2) Identifying
opportunities to exploit emerging science and technology; 3) Spiral
development to evaluate developmental technology in an operating
environment and; 4) Providing continuous technical support during
technology test and evaluation, insertion and deployment.
The team briefed ORD management throughout the process and by the
summer of 2005, the ONL team was instructed to developed strategic and
business plans for an operational platform to perform these identified
functions: the Technology Liaison Office (TLO). The TLO's value
proposition focused on providing relationship management between
technology developers and potential users to coordinate operational
test and evaluation and on providing interactive communication and
mutual support between potential users and S&T developmental technology
programs.
As recommended by the Top-to-Bottom review, ONL then evaluated
EML's potential future role in S&T based on its staff capabilities, its
institutional strategic and business plans and the results of the DHS
market survey and resulting value proposition. The EML's leadership of
the CMTB local support activities (4.8 FTE) fell within the scope of
the TLO value proposition. Unfortunately, when ORD compared the range
of professional skills required to achieve the TLO value proposition
with those skills extent at EML, it found only this small overlap.
This led to a recommendation to ORD management that the EML should
be phased out as an institution because its capabilities were neither
competitive nor necessary to the mission of the S&T Directorate.
Furthermore, it had no prospects of future S&T R&D program support, the
skills of most of its staff were not suited for a useful S&T
operational role in New York, and its operating costs were high and
rising. The team also recommended that a TLO serving the identified
customer needs in New York be established and that EML staff and
capabilities be transitioned as far as possible.
ORD management accepted this recommendation in the summer of 2005.
ONL, S&T Human Resources and Congressional Relations were then tasked
to prepare detailed transitions plans for the EML staff and facilities.
This work was completed during September 2005 and Under Secretary
McQueary was briefed on the results. He commented on ORD's thorough and
systematic preparation for a difficult decision. He verbally agreed
that phase-out of the EML was the right thing to do and asked that a
final decision package be prepare for Secretarial approval. The
Secretarial decision package was completed by ONL and forwarded to the
Under Secretary by ORD.
Under Secretary McQueary announced his resignation shortly
thereafter and the Secretarial decision package was put on hold pending
the arrival of his successor. After Dr. Runge was named Acting Under
Secretary, he received a memo from Dr. Vayl Oxford, Director of the
Domestic Unclear Detection Office (DNDO), noting that DNDO was planning
a regional reach back initiative and proposed to use staff from
Brookhaven National Laboratory and EML as its staff on a part time
basis. This request required modification of the plan for the EML phase
out and the startup of the TLO. A second Secretarial decision package
with these modifications was prepared for Acting Under Secretary Runge.
However, when Retired Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen was nominated to be
Under Secretary of the S&T Directorate, this second package was held
pending his confirmation.
S&T Management Actions and Rationale:
While the options for the future of EML were being developed and
reviewed, a number of S&T management actions were taken to address
concerns identified during the Top-to-Bottom Review. The overall intent
was to increase EML's focus on transitioning its staff to viable
missions within Homeland Security.
First ORD conducted a detailed review of the EML Program Execution
Plan (PEP) for FY 2005. This review was conducted for Dr. Parker and
coordinated with S&T's Chief Financial Office (CFO), the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) and the project managers who were currently
funding activities at EML. For this purpose, ONL supported Dr. Parker.
With respect to the EML operation and maintenance budget, the PEP
Review found that most of the cost was due to EML occupying space
equivalent to more than an entire city block--with most of the space
unused for years. For instance, EML had six chemistry labs that were
utilized over decades on various DOE programs--primarily for sample
preparation prior to analysis and data acquisition for DOE programs. As
the programs were reduced or terminated by DOE, the need for
maintaining these labs no longer existed but they were, nonetheless,
maintained by EML management. The review also identified traditional
EML expenditures that were no longer necessary, such as a special EML
security guard, in a federal building already secured by the Federal
Protective Service--for which EML was also paying. It also found that
EML was requesting project funds for activities that involved little
more than staff time, which was funded separately.
The review recommended specific operating budget reductions to
eliminate these and other unnecessary expenses. The review also
recommended that the unused EML space and facilities be decontaminated
in anticipation of returning the excess space to GSA.
The ORD Director reviewed the recommended budget and decided that
it contained sufficient funds to allow EML to carry out all activities
proposed in the EML PEP that had any relationship to DHS goals. She
adjusted the EML budget request accordingly and reserved the savings
for EML cleanup purposes. The result of this review was to focus EML
staff on actual DHS goals and ORD management was able to redirect
nearly a million dollars to initiate decontamination and disposal of
unused and unneeded space at EML.
As part of the cleanup of the unused EML Chemical laboratories, all
unused reagents, materials, and equipment of value were sorted and
offered to other research institutions (i.e., DHS labs, other federal
labs, State labs, universities, and GSA). Any mixed waste or
radioactive waste was collected and disposed of by Brookhaven National
Lab. The empty lab spaces, including fume hoods, benches, storage
cabinets, and other physical structures that are not removable, are
being surveyed and decontaminated for ``free-release'' by a
subcontractor through the U.S. Army Field Support Command. Other unused
areas of the approximately 96,000 sq. ft. occupied by the EML were also
surveyed and are being decontaminated.
Given additional concerns with EML's management raised by the
findings of the budget review, the ORD Director assigned ONL to monitor
future EML operating expense requests, including requests for travel,
new staff, facility modifications and information technology equipment.
The travel review was directed at eliminating unnecessary expenses
related to the continuation of their former DOE activities by EML
staff.
The IT review, which was done in conjunction with the S&T Chief
Information Officer (CIO), was aimed at eliminating unreasonable
expenses given the limited EML activities. The CIO reviewed EML IT
needs and provided connectivity to the DHS network through four, rather
than the requested forty, computers. These computers were to be used
for EML travel, financial and procurement activities and active CMTB
business. The existing EML computer network was found adequate to be
used for all other business. Blackberries were provided to EML
management personnel and those who were active on DHS projects outside
of EML.
Much of EML's nominal budget in FY 2004 was actually procurement or
``pass- through'' for work at other laboratories, rather than to
support local EML activities. When the procurement warrant holder who
resided at EML retired, the S&T CFO and the DHS Office of Procurement
Operations (OPO) determined that it was not practical or cost effective
to replace him and that procurements could be handled through S&T/OPO.
As a result, for FY 2006 CMTB major procurements were handled through
S&T/OPO and minor purchases made through the EML purchase cards. From
that point on, major CMTB procurements and funds for the Urban
Dispersion Project was routed directly through the UDP Principal
Investigator to the multiple laboratories actually carrying out the
project. The effect of these decisions was to eliminate unnecessary
duplication of effort. However, they did not in any way reduce the
technical capability of the EML.
The Top-to-Bottom Review had found that a serious impediment to the
transition to DHS was that some EML personnel were adhering to their
former roles within DOE. As a result of reviewing the proposed EML
travel, ONL advised individual EML staff to phase-out their roles on
various DOE related interagency committees and activities that required
travel without a DHS justification. Any travel that related to active
DHS functions was approved immediately. Compared to the other ONL
management responsibilities with respect to other DHS Laboratories,
this travel monitoring did not involve a great deal of money. However,
it was extremely important to refocus EML staff from their
identification with their former roles in DOE upon their current DHS
situation.
Similarly, the Acting Deputy Director of ORD, Dr. Carolyn Purdy,
detailed the EML Director to Washington to strengthen his understanding
of S&T programs. He is currently supporting the S&T Infrastructure and
Geophysical Division. Dr. Adam Hutter, who had successfully managed EML
support of S&T CMTB activities, was asked to serve as Acting EML
Director. Mr. Hutter has taken on the EML Director's assignment of
defining a strategic and business plan for EML and has been working
very successfully with DNDO in developing expanded EML support of their
regional reach-back and testing activities.
Project Closures at EML:
Aside from these internal S&T management actions aimed at
eliminating unnecessary expenditures and redirecting EML's focus to
actual DHS requirements, there have been a number of unrelated project
changes or closures at the EML. The Committee has inquired specifically
about four of these: the Global Monitoring Activity, the Quality
Assessment Program (QAP), the Urban Dispersion program (UDP) and a
Reach-Back Pilot Program (RPP). Even though I have generalized
knowledge about these programs through my responsibilities in the ONL,
I was neither the program manager for any of these projects nor did I
direct any actions be taken in connection with any of these programs.
The first two items, the Global Monitoring Activity and QAP, were
never DHS programs and decisions on their funding were made
independently by their sponsoring agencies.
The third program, the UDP, is a DHS research program that was
started, successfully executed and is in the process of transferring
its results to the intended recipients.
The last program, the RPP, was discussed by the S&T Portfolio
Manager as a concept but never approved or funded. Under Secretary
Cohen has addressed each of these programs in his letter to Chairman
Miller dated March 13, and since I did not have programmatic oversight
over those programs it would be more appropriate for others to comment
on the specific facts associated with any particular project.
Conclusion:
Unfortunately, despite S&T's identification of several valuable
functions for an operational presence in New York and the joint S&T/EML
efforts to address the problems that the Top-to-Bottom review
identified in 2004, by the Fall of 2005 the EML had not been able to
find a function within DHS that matches the size and capabilities of
the majority of its existing staff. This led Under Secretary McQueary
to make a preliminary program level decision that a phase-out of the
EML was in the best interests of both S&T and the EML staff. Changes in
the S&T Directorates management delayed the transmittal of S&T's
recommendation to the Secretary of DHS for a final decision.
Of course, this delay has been extremely stressful to the people at
EML. A year ago, one of the EML professionals advised our Human
Resources office that the lack of decision was hurting EML's
professional demeanor, impacting mental health, and hurting people in
their home life. He was speaking for himself as a professional who only
wanted a significant job to perform but he also said that the situation
was impacting everyone at EML including the large support staff. S&T
management was aware of, and very sensitive to, the difficult situation
that the transfer to DHS had created for the people at EML.
S&T management was, and continues to be, sympathetic to the
difficult situation of the EML staff. Since the transfer of EML in
March 2003, the S&T Directorate has tried to provide responsible
management which balanced concern for the people at EML with
stewardship of the mission and public resources with which we are
entrusted.
Some progress has been made in the one area where EML capabilities
matched the Homeland Security needs that the review identified in New
York. The Acting EML Director, Mr. Hutter, has been doing a commendable
job in providing EML support for the S&T radiation detection test and
evaluation activities, which have since been transferred from S&T to
DNDO. He has also been working with Brookhaven National Laboratory to
provide support for the DNDO regional initiative in New York and in
examining the potential technology liaison activities that might be
addressed by his staff.
Under Secretary Cohen has indicated a commitment to right-sizing
the EML facilities and workforce. This will include both supporting
those individuals working on the DNDO activities and transitioning the
remaining staff to a productive roles working on S&T programs. We all
look forward to assisting in this transformation.
Discussion
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML
Chairman Miller. Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Chairman for accommodating my
schedule. Dr. Clarke, there has been a lot of controversy in
terms of how you handled EML at the transition time. We heard
from Mr. McBrearty that, in his testimony, that you notified
AFTAC in December of 2005 that DHS had made the programmatic
decision to close EML and my question is who actually made that
decision?
Dr. Clarke. Well, perhaps could I just clarify?
Mr. McCaul. Sure.
Dr. Clarke. Dr. McBrearty's statement. In fact, the AFTAC
contacted the Science and Technology Directorate and myself in
an e-mail, which I have, and this e-mail said that they were
preparing their fiscal year 2006 budget and they needed to know
what the status of our review was. This was a little difficult
because our review was not completed, which I told them. The
process of getting a decision through the Department of
Homeland Security had not been completed. However, at the
programmatic level, in the Officer of Research and Development,
the decision had been made to close the laboratory; not to
withdraw from New York, but to close this specific laboratory
called EML.
Mr. McCaul. Who made that decision?
Dr. Clarke. Oh, sorry. To answer your question, it was Dr.
McCarthy, who is the Director of the office, after many, many
briefings.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Do you know if this decision ever rose to
the level of the Under Secretary?
Dr. Clarke. Yes, I do. After the final decision was made at
the programmatic level, and I emphasize this was not a Homeland
Security decision because that has to go through the Secretary.
But at the programmatic level in the Office of Research and
Development, I was instructed to prepare a package that would
go from the Under Secretary to the Secretary and that package
contained our plans for, as I say, the closure of the
institution called the EML and simultaneously the standup of a
new organization that would satisfy the value proposition that
we had identified for S&T activities in New York.
Mr. McCaul. And again, did this rise to Under Secretary
McQueary's level?
Dr. Clarke. Yes, it did. I was present at the briefing.
Mr. McCaul. And did he basically approve this decision?
Dr. Clarke. He agreed that this was the right thing to do
and he was the one who requested that the decision package be
prepared through Dr. McCarthy.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. And the decision was to close, just to
explain the decision, itself. How is it going to change the
role of----
Dr. Clarke. Well, as I stated in my testimony, this process
went through three stages. First was the review of what the
reality of EML was, which was very staggering. The second
review was, well, since the reality of EML, as it stood at that
time, was not contributing much. They did contribute some, but
they weren't contributing anything commensurate with the cost
of maintaining the laboratory, that we better do an
investigation and find out what would be valuable in Manhattan.
Dr. McCarthy was very determined that if possible, if we could
a valuated mission that we would maintain a capability in
Manhattan. We did this.
We consulted widely across the department with all of our
coast and border protection, the FEMA, all of the agencies
within Homeland Security to see what they thought they needed
in terms of technology support in Manhattan. We consulted with
the Office of Emergency Management in New York. We consulted
with our agencies both in New York and in Washington. We
consulted widely with everybody that we could think of and we
came up with a value proposition. The value proposition was
basically the types of things that Commissioner Duecker was
talking about, supporting the first responders with certain
types of technology support, including the Countermeasures Test
Beds. That was one of the things that we found that was
obviously of benefit.
But it only involved, at that time, 4.8 full-time
equivalents out of a laboratory which has over 40 people and
costing us in excess, at the time, of, as I recall, $7 million
a year. So you see, that was the reason behind all of this. We
were trying to find a cost-effective method of supporting both
DHS operations and the first responders in New York.
Mr. McCaul. And so that is a value added that remained in
the mission.
Dr. Clarke. Exactly.
The National Nuclear Security Administration
Mr. McCaul. And what happened to the other core missions?
Dr. Clarke. Well, let us get back to that. The only other
core missions that EML had, you have heard the testimony about
the QAP program, the AFTAC program and you haven't heard about
the NNSA program. That was also supporting this counter-
proliferation mission. In the spring, I believe, of 2005, in
the preparation for her decision, before she made the decision,
Maureen McCarthy asked us to consult with these small programs.
As you heard from Dr. McBrearty, $400,000, involved basically
one full-time staff member to service that program. And the
NNSA program was a few sample measurements during the year; it
didn't amount to very much. But she was thorough and she asked
us to consult with these agencies to see if we made a decision,
at that time, on EML, what would be the effect on their
programs. We didn't want to disrupt the valuable programs of
other agencies.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. I see that my time has expired. Thank
you.
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Dr. Clarke. Dr. McQueary is
from Greensboro, which is in my district and he is well
regarded in that community. He is regarded as very competent
and has a high reputation for integrity. So this is not, the
question is about these decisions are not personal attacks, but
they really do go to the correctness of the decision. Your
testimony just seems to be irreconcilable to the testimony of
all the other witnesses that we have heard from today and I
think we will hear from in a later panel. I know that others
were involved in the decision, from your testimony. You heard
Mr. McBrearty testify that there was no classified briefing,
that he did come to Washington to complain, to protest what was
happening to EML and to explain that it had an important role
in AFTAC and other programs by the Air Force, but that there
was no classified briefing, is that correct?
Dr. Clarke. No, it is not correct.
Chairman Miller. It is not correct?
Dr. Clarke. No.
Chairman Miller. Okay.
Dr. Clarke. Now, I have no personal knowledge of this and
that I did not participate in the briefing, but I was told by
Dr. Parker.
Chairman Miller. Who is Dr. Parker?
Dr. Clarke. Dr. Parker was the head of research and
development in the Office of Research and Development. He
reported to Dr. McCarthy. He told me that he had a classified
conversation with AFTAC. Now, that is all I know about it. I
don't know who he talked to or whatever, but you know, that was
a classified discussion.
Chairman Miller. And at that point, then you understand
that AFTAC conveyed to the Air Force--conveyed to DHS the
nature of the programs of its programs that EML contributed to
and that it would be disrupted by the closing of EML, is that
right?
Dr. Clarke. No, that is--I just testified that I don't know
what the content of that discussion was.
Chairman Miller. Okay.
Dr. Clarke. Because it was a classified discussion, I was
not involved with it.
Chairman Miller. I assume you have security clearance. You
could be in a classified.
Dr. Clarke. I could have been and yet I was not invited.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Well, it was our impression the
reason you are sitting there today is that we understood that
there was no one at DHS who knew more about EML than you did.
Is that wrong?
Dr. Clarke. Well, Mr. Chairman, before I was assigned to
this task by my management, I had--I knew EML just by the name.
I had no knowledge of it. But when I was assigned this
management review task, I did due diligence and I talked to
people in the Department of Energy who had managed this EML
throughout the decades and you know, so I learned a great deal
about EML. So I suppose that statement is true, that I was--I
knew more about it than anybody else, but it was only because
of the reviews that I was conducting for the Department.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Did you know, from Mr. McBrearty,
that there were programs, AFTAC and others, that he regarded as
important to national security that would be disrupted by
closing EML?
Dr. Clarke. I did not talk to Mr. McBrearty, initially. I
contacted the AFTAC Program Manager when, as I said, I was
requested by my management to find out the effect of any change
in EML on their programs. I talked to a Mr. Scott Smith and we
later exchanged e-mails and it was in that conversation that--
well, let me back up. The conversation was about a proposed
trip of an EML staff member to China. I inquired about whether
this trip was, in fact, requested by AFTAC. In the course of
that conversation, I mentioned that we were reviewing the EML
and its role in S&T, and then I proceeded to the question that
I was tasked to ask, which was, in the event that a decision
was made to change EML, and at that time, of course, no
decision was made of closure or otherwise, if a decision was
made, what effect would it have on your program? Mr. Smith told
me at that time that it would have minimal effect. He
mentioned, if I recall correctly, five other laboratories that
could do the work that EML was doing and that----
Chairman Miller. And which work is that we are talking
about?
Dr. Clarke. We are talking about the AFTAC work and Mr.
Smith was their Program Manager. Dr. McBrearty was the head of
the materials division in AFTAC. This is the man directly in
charge of the program. And that occurred in the summer, before
the discussions that Dr. McBrearty was talking about.
Chairman Miller. Did either Mr. McBrearty or anybody else
discuss with you the national security implications, the
importance for monitoring of nuclear proliferation of the
sensors in China.
Dr. Clarke. Yes. I don't believe this--well, I am not sure
whether that was mentioned specifically. As Dr. McBrearty
testified, he did come to see me in Washington. He was actually
there, as I understand it, for a meeting at DHS and he stopped
in and we talked for about an hour and our conversation was
pretty much as he indicated, that he expressed his, just as in
his testimony, he expressed his personal confidence in EML. He
expressed his opinion that EML was a valuable resource. I gave
him the situation. I described to him the situation that we had
with a laboratory that was costing the Department of Homeland
Security millions of dollars servicing a $400,000 program, as
he described it, which took up, as I understand it, one full-
time equivalent in EML.
It was servicing some episodic measurements for the
National Nuclear Security Administration, which took up a few
staff hours several times a year. That is what we discussed and
I just put it to him, I said it is costing us a lot of money.
Your programs are being conducted under an agreement with the
Department of Energy, not with Homeland Security. The Economy
Act, in the event that something is done with the laboratory,
the Economy Act would cause us to charge you a lot more than
you are paying now because there are no other DHS activities
that are being supported. That was my half of the conversation.
Chairman Miller. And did he say if you charge him more we
are not going to do it?
Dr. Clarke. Yes, he was astonished. He was astonished at
the costs that I related to him from the laboratory. Now, he
had no idea about what else was going on in the laboratory, so
when I told him, basically, what is in my testimony, that we
had not identified, you know, work for this laboratory after
2006 and he recognized that this was reality. This was not my
choice, not his; this was the Economy Act.
Chairman Miller. My time is up and I do want to recognize
Mr. Rothman, but a year ago I was in Hawaii on a Congressional
delegation from this Committee, to the South Pole, to
Antarctica. But while we were in Hawaii on the way, we saw the
device, the floatation device that was to be towed and
positioned. It is a massive device with radar equipment and
other sensing equipment to be towed and positioned in the
Bering Sea to support our technology that has yet to succeed in
intercepting a missile and I don't know how much we are
spending on that, exactly, but I assume it is many billions.
So the amount of money that you are talking about for this
lab, which would help us respond to a dirty bomb; would help us
identify a dirty bomb before it detonated; would help us
identify or had the potential, if we furthered the research, to
identify if a ship was carrying a nuclear device, which strikes
me as a much more likely threat to the United States than a
missile from the soul of another country; that had the ability
to tell us more about nuclear detonations in the region of the
world where we are most worried about proliferation, that
adjoins North Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan. It seems to me that
no, this lab is not that expensive. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Clarke, do you
know how much the review and analysis of EML costs, this 18
month review?
Dr. Clarke. How much it costs?
Mr. Rothman. Yes.
Dr. Clarke. No, I really don't. It was some of my time.
This was not my full-time activity. Some of Dr. Mandler's time.
Mr. Rothman. You hired a firm called Booz Allen?
Dr. Clarke. Yes, Mr. Hooks, our Deputy Director had a
contract with Booz Allen, it is our ASETA contract for
technical support and he arranged to have a team of about four
people, but they didn't work full-time on this.
Mr. Rothman. Can we get that for the record? Is it
possible----
Dr. Clarke. I don't have that information, but I am sure it
can be provided.
Mr. Rothman. Can you provide it?
Dr. Clarke. I cannot provide it. It wasn't my contract.
Limited DHS Science & Technology Directorate Funding
Mr. Rothman. Okay. Doctor, you said that S&T was, I believe
you were referring to S&T, was involved in an important
national mission with limited resources.
Dr. Clarke. Yes, sir. My personal view, but----
Mr. Rothman. Yes. Do you think it is being under-funded by
the Congress?
Dr. Clarke. Congressman, that is a policy question. It is
way above my pay grade.
Mr. Rothman. Do you have an opinion?
Dr. Clarke. On whether----
Mr. Rothman. It is under-funded.
Dr. Clarke. Let me put it this way. I attend reviews of the
programs that we have. I look at the yearly budgeted activities
and there are always projects that appear to be very, very
worthwhile projects that fall above the funding level that the
directorate has. Now, they say that is a policy issue. That is
not for me to decide.
Mr. Rothman. Have you ever gone to your superiors and said
there is a program that needs to be funded and for whatever
reason they have said we don't have the money for that?
Dr. Clarke. No, sir. I have not had any programmatic
responsibility while I was at Science and Technology
directorate. I offered management advice and analysis to my
superiors when asked.
Mr. Rothman. Did you call those resources limited? I
suppose it just--you meant nothing by that?
Dr. Clarke. Well, what I meant was what I just said, that I
see, in the budget process every year, projects that look like
they are worthy projects that have been requested by customers
for the Science and Technology directorate and they are not
funded. That is what I meant.
Mr. Rothman. But it hasn't been under your jurisdiction
to----
Dr. Clarke. No, not my responsibility.
Mr. Rothman.--to comment on their being not funded?
Dr. Clarke. No, sir.
Mr. Rothman. I think I followed the chronology in your
written testimony and in the remarks that you made. If I have
got it correct, at some point new people came in and changed
the decision that had been made with regards to EML? Is that a
fair characterization or how would you characterize it?
Dr. Clarke. Actually, that is a very good question and if I
may just respond completely. I don't want to waste your time if
you have others, but there seems to be a misunderstanding about
the term closure. I tried to indicate before, in my previous
remarks, that when we were using the work closure, we were
using that with respect to an organizational entity with the
title Environmental Measurements Laboratory because frankly,
even that title is not appropriate for this department.
Mr. Rothman. No, I understand. I am not asking about the
closure.
Dr. Clarke. Okay.
Mr. Rothman. Whatever changes you were going to make with
regards to EML. Apparently, some or all of those decisions were
revoked, made null and void, find new leadership? Can you
comment? Is that true?
Dr. Clarke. I would say not. If you look at the value
proposition that we identified through all of our work in New
York, which is recorded in my testimony, and then you look at
the decisions that will be discussed by Admiral Cohen and Mr.
Oxford, you will see that there is a strong overlap. Supporting
the testing and evaluation that Mr. Duecker talked was in
there, that was part of our value proposition.
Mr. Rothman. Excuse me, Doctor. Just refer, if I may, to
part of your written testimony. At several different places in
your written testimony you say that because an under secretary
or somebody retired or resigned, new people were coming in,
that recommendations to the Secretary were never acted upon.
Dr. Clarke. Um-hum, that is correct.
Mr. Rothman. So is it fair to say, then, that those
recommendations that you made have still not been acted upon?
Dr. Clarke. That is correct, yes. Yes. At least at the
Secretarial level. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Rothman. They haven't been acted upon, period? They
haven't been effectuated.
Dr. Clarke. That is correct.
Mr. Rothman. Please go ahead.
Dr. Clarke. No, I thought you were asking me, at least what
I heard was that you said that the recommendations were revoked
and----
Mr. Rothman. Okay.
Dr. Clarke.--the decision didn't go forward. What I was
trying to emphasize was----
Mr. Rothman. They just haven't been effectuated.
Dr. Clarke. That is correct.
Mr. Rothman. The 18 months' review and the recommendations
have never been effectuated by DHS.
Dr. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you.
More on the First Responder Community in New York City
Chairman Miller. A few more questions, Dr. Clarke. One of
the reasons that you have consistently given was the relatively
low value assigned to EML. It had little credibility among
first responders in New York. We asked the police to send us
someone to testify. They sent us Deputy Commissioner Duecker
and the gist of his testimony was we love those guys. I
understand, from our staff, that we have talked to that they
have talked to all the first responders; the police, the fire,
the EMS, in New York City and adjoining areas and consistently
they hear the same thing, that Mr. Duecker said today, which
was that they thought that EML's work was outstanding. It was
the gold standard in radiation monitoring and detection and
analysis. From whom did you hear that EML had a poor
reputation, it had little credibility among first responders?
Dr. Clarke. From the people that we interviewed. From the
FEMA Director in New York, from the people in the Office of
Emergency Management. Let us be clear. What Mr. Duecker was
talking about was the work that was supervised by Adam Hunter
in the Countermeasure Test Bed doing testing and evaluation of
radiation detectors, which he feels is so important for the
City of New York. That work was never questioned. That work was
never intended to be closed down. But that work was a very
small part of what we are talking about here, which is the
larger EML. The management issue that we had was what do we do
with this larger part of the EML which is not being employed,
with no disrespect and a great deal of respect for the
productive activities led by Dr. Hunter.
Chairman Miller. And did you talk to the first responders
personally or you kind of heard it through the grape vine?
Dr. Clarke. I didn't talk to first responders. I mean,
there are 40,000 police in New York and----
Chairman Miller. No, did you talk to the leadership of the
first responders, the emergency response folks?
Dr. Clarke. I talked to operational DHS elements in New
York and the Office of Emergency Management, which has the job
of coordinating all first response in New York. I did not talk
directly to the police or the fire department.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And can you identify, for our staff,
after this hearing, the folks that you did talk to and if you
had correspondence by e-mail, can we see the e-mail exchange?
Dr. Clarke. Well, you should have it. I gave you everything
that I had in my computer.
Chairman Miller. Have we gotten that? Okay. Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. I have another meeting of a bunch of folks on
another important matter, but Mr. Chairman, I thank you for
allowing me to ask this question. Dr. Clarke, do you have an
opinion about as to whether the, as a consequence of the 18
month review, the work of EML was affected positively,
negatively, no effect, hurt their operations, slowed them down
or not? And if so, could you share that with us, your opinion?
Dr. Clarke. Actually, I was very pleased to hear Mr.
Duecker's testimony in which he said that the contact and the
support from EML to the New York Police Department greatly
accelerated over the last year and a half and I believe that is
in the record from his testimony. So in the area in which the
EML was making a positive contribution, namely, the test
evaluation work led by Dr. Hunter, that work has improved.
Mr. Rothman. Well, he only was there for a year and a half,
so he said for the year and a half he was there they worked
well together.
Dr. Clarke. I am working from memory here but we can look
at what he said. I believe that is what I heard.
Mr. Rothman. I think he has only been there a year and a
half.
Dr. Clarke. But then he did say that it had accelerated
over that period.
Mr. Rothman. Over this last year and a half.
Dr. Clarke. Which is what you asked me, whether as a result
of our actions, I could venture an opinion.
Mr. Rothman. Well, when were the recommendations shelved or
that you made not acted upon? If you will understand what I
mean. I can go back into your testimony, if you don't remember.
Dr. Clarke. I do.
Mr. Rothman. You do?
Dr. Clarke. Yes, the first package we submitted was in
December.
Mr. Rothman. Yes. Of what year?
Dr. Clarke. Of 2005.
Mr. Rothman. Right.
Dr. Clarke. That was when Secretary McQueary was still the
Under Secretary. In planning for the transition of EML, we had
to figure out how to preserve the valuable sections of the
laboratory and what we should do about the people that----
Mr. Rothman. But is it fair to say that your 18 month
review concluded in December of 2005 or no?
Dr. Clarke. I would say so, yes.
Mr. Rothman. Okay. And that is about the time he got his
job, Mr. Duecker?
Dr. Clarke. Yes.
Mr. Rothman. Okay. So during the 18 months that preceded
December 2005, do you have an opinion as to whether that review
process affected EML during that time up to December 2005?
Dr. Clarke. Yes. Now, this is a much narrower answer
because it is with respect to the management of a small special
purpose laboratory. In my view, it did improve. When we began
this review, there were a number of EML staff who were
traveling around, spending public money on behalf of their
interests in carrying out the roles that they had formerly been
responsible for in the Department of Energy. That was stopped.
And my own opinion, based on a certain amount of experience in
management is that this was good for the staff because it
focused their attention on their new role in the Department of
Homeland Security, rather than their old role.
Mr. Rothman. So overall, would you say this 18 month review
had a positive, negative or neutral effect on EML?
Dr. Clarke. Overall, I would say, taking account of the
stress on the staff from the lack of decision, I would say that
it was a terrible burden on the staff.
Mr. Rothman. Mr. Chairman, if I am allowed to come back by
my staff, I would like to ask that question of the next panel.
If not, Mr. Chairman, if it is possible for somebody to ask
that same question to the next panel? I appreciate your
testimony, Doctor, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
More on DHS' Decision to Close EML
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Rothman. Just a couple more
questions, Dr. Clarke. Dr. Fainberg testified here this morning
that he fought to fund various projects at EML. The global
radiation monitoring program, their rooftop radiation sensors--
and I think others, and he testified that he consistently
advocated for that and resigned out of frustration. And your
testimony was, today, your written testimony is that there was
no project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006. No S&T
project manager who intended to fund EML beyond 2006 and any
activity other than the Countermeasure Test Bed project. Now,
Dr. Fainberg was an S&T project manager, isn't that right?
Dr. Clarke. That is correct.
Chairman Miller. Is his testimony incorrect?
Dr. Clarke. Well, in part and I believe he said that he was
never asked or he couldn't remember whether he was asked and he
certainly was. One of the first stops when Dr. Mandler and I
were conducting the initial review of EML was to interview him
because he was funding most of the ongoing activities at EML.
And at that time, he gave us some very frank evaluations of the
worth of the projects. Now, what he said in his testimony was
that he felt they had some value. Well, as I testified, the
competition for funding of worthwhile projects in Science and
Technology is very fierce and just because something has some
value doesn't mean that it necessarily will be approved. Now, I
personally did not make any decisions on the funding of any
project at EML. Those decisions were made by Dr. Jerry Parker.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Clarke, I am just struck by the fact
that you and I seem to have heard different testimony just an
hour or so ago. I didn't detect any ambivalence in Dr.
Fainberg's testimony about the value of EML's programs. I
detected in him great frustration and that certainly is
consistent with the e-mail that he sent, resigning, in which he
said John Clarke is reaching into my program, preventing me
from carrying it out under the guise of exercising his
authority over EML. He has a clear aim of eliminating as much
of EML's work for me as he could. It goes on and on. I am sure
you must have seen this e-mail.
Dr. Clarke. I have seen several e-mails, yes.
Chairman Miller. Well, this is actually to Maureen
McCarthy.
Dr. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. It does not show a cc to you. It does show
to Dr. Parker and Robert Hooks and Carol Linder, but I assume
that----
Dr. Clarke. Dr. Parker shared this with me after the fact
and so what he says in this e-mail is not correct.
Chairman Miller. Is that your testimony?
Dr. Clarke. No, I am not challenging Dr. Fainberg's
opinions. They are his opinions. His opinions were not accepted
by management, not accepted by Dr. Parker or Carolyn Purdy, for
example. They were present at the final discussion that led to
Dr. Fainberg's decision. I was not involved. I was not there. I
was informed after the fact. So I am not challenging his
opinions, but they are his opinions.
Chairman Miller. Okay. It seems that that is a very
different take, that he had opinions that you considered but
rejected, rather than what you--it sounded to me like you said,
a moment ago, that he candidly talked about the programs of
questionable value.
Dr. Clarke. We are talking about a period of about four
months and what I just said about the initial interview between
myself and Dr. Mandler and Tony Fainberg, and there was another
person present, the contractor, whose name escapes me. We had a
very frank discussion about the value of these programs. The
issue we are talking about now occurred four months later and
it was between Dr. Parker, Dr. Purdy and apparently Dr.
McCarthy. I had nothing to do with that.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Is it true that Dr. Fainberg wanted
to continue funding and increase funding for the EML labs, for
the EML programs? That he advocated for that?
Dr. Clarke. Yes. He mentioned a couple of specific
projects. A neutron ship effect which was, in fact, continued.
It is still ongoing. He commented on the--if I remember
correctly and I am just working from memory, he commented on
the seminars that were held for the New York first responders.
Those programs were continued and are continuing today. There
was one just recently. I can't remember what else he commented
on specifically. So those programs, that I recall, that he was
in favor of, were, in fact, continued.
Chairman Miller. Dr. Clarke, you said that in addition to
the lack of credibility that the lab had, it was simply a cost
concern and I certainly applaud every agency of government
looking for ways to spend money and not feeling like they had
to spend everything that they have got, but this a lab that
total funding was $7 million. I think we heard $10 million, but
$7 million to $10 million. You know, again, a good deal less
than that contraption I saw in Hawaii that was hauled away to
the Bering Sea.
Dr. Clarke. Yes, sir.
Chairman Miller. And according to the S&T Directorates,
budget information in fiscal year 2005 there was $505 million
at the end of the year in un-obligated funds, in other words
money that had been appropriated, not spent. I applaud savings,
frugality. In fiscal 2006, $51 million in un-obligated funds or
money that is appropriated but not spent and right now, for
fiscal year 2007, for $223 million in un-obligated funds or
money that is appropriated but not spent. Are those figures
correct?
Dr. Clarke. That is above my pay grade. I had fiduciary
responsibilities in one small area and that is what I was
addressing.
Chairman Miller. Okay. Well, I have no further questions,
but I encourage frugality in all of the Federal Government, but
I am sure that FEMA saved a lot of money in the time leading up
to Katrina. In retrospect, that appears to be penny wise and
pound foolish. And the money that the S&T Directorate saved on
EML, I fear greatly, is going to appear at some point in the
future to be penny wise and pound foolish if we are not ready
to prevent and respond to a radiological attack. Thank you, Dr.
Clarke.
And we will take a five minute recess so everyone can
stretch and refocus and attend anything else that needs
attending to, and we will reconvene shortly.
[Recess]
Chairman Miller. The Subcommittee has reconvened. The
hearing is in order again and I will now call our third panel,
Admiral Jay M. Cohen, the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security; and Mr. Vayl
Oxford, Director of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security.
And you all have been here for the other panels, so I am
sure you know that you have five minutes to present all
testimony. Your written testimony has already been placed in
the record and after you have given your testimony, each Member
of the Committee, which may be just me, will have five minutes
to ask questions. Or Mr. Rothman may be able to return.
And we do place everyone under oath. Do either of you have
any objection to taking oaths, being sworn? And you also are
entitled to counsel, if you want it. Do you have counsel or do
you wish counsel? And both of you are already raising your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Miller. Thank you. Mr. Oxford.
Panel 3:
STATEMENT OF MR. VAYL S. OXFORD, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Oxford. Good afternoon, Chairman Miller. I would like
to thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss how DNDO
has worked with EML in the past and our plans for working with
them in the future. I am pleased to appear in front of you with
my colleague, Under Secretary Cohen.
EML has been an important partner for us and support us in
three core areas; the Securing the Cities Initiative that you
heard about; a testing series underway at the New York
Container Terminal, as well as providing technical reach back
within the Northeast region. They also perform a variety of
other technical support efforts to include the neutron ship
effect program that we have heard about this morning.
First let me talk about Securing the Cities. DNDO
established the Securing the Cities initiative to equip the New
York region State and local personnel with radiation detection
capabilities and develop a defensive architecture for the
protection of New York City. EML personnel, using their
experience with radiation detection systems and the
relationship with the New York regional law enforcement
agencies, are supporting these federal efforts. They provide
subject matter expertise on detection system performance to the
regional partners and participate in the development of
conceptive operations.
Second, DNDO is currently testing its next generation
systems called Advanced Spectroscopic Portals at the New York
Container Terminal. The results of the testing done at NYCT
will help DNDO determine if these systems are ready for full
reproduction. EML provides the test director for this effort,
oversees data quality management, and leads the multi-lab team
to complete this test series.
Third, to support the deployment of detection systems into
the field, DNDO provides training, response protocols, and
technical reach back capabilities to assist federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies and response personnel in
resolving detector alarms. EML provides technical support to
the deployments we have throughout the Northeast. Their
spectroscopic expertise is available 24 hours a day, seven days
a week to provide technical support for alarm resolution.
In conclusion, DNDO sees EML as an important partner in our
development, test, and deployment activities and projects.
There will be an enduring need for EML into the foreseeable
future.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention. I will be
glad to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, the
Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and I would
like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss how DNDO has
worked with the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML) in the
past, and our plans for working with them in the future. EML is a
federally owned and operated DHS laboratory, located in lower
Manhattan. It was a Department of Energy research facility with
competencies in low level radiation detection and monitoring, and was
transferred to DHS S&T in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
As Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), my
office is responsible for developing new technologies, as well as
ensuring that we deploy detection systems properly across the domestic
nuclear detection architecture. EML has been an important partner for
us, particularly because they provide technical support in the New York
City metropolitan area, where there are three ongoing DNDO efforts. Of
the 25 technical staff present at EML, currently, nineteen support DNDO
in various capacities at a level of effort equivalent to about 9.5 full
time equivalents.
The three core areas where we receive support from EML are:
Securing the Cities (STC), test support at the New York Container
Terminal (NYCT), and technical reach-back. EML provides a combination
of regional experience with radiological and nuclear subject matter
expertise. Specifically, EML personnel serve as the focal point in New
York for regional federal, State and local partners, federal technical
participants, and industry/facility operators. This has resulted in a
strong and trusted partnering among federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies and the various technical Subject Matter Experts.
Through EML, we have developed excellent working relationships with end
users such as the Port Authorities of New York & New Jersey; New York
Police Department; Fire Department of New York; New Jersey Office of
Homeland Security and Preparedness, including the New Jersey State
Police; New York Office of Homeland Security, including the New York
State Police; New York City Office of Emergency Management; and local
Customs and Border Protection, among others.
I would like to take a moment to go into more detail about some of
the specific DNDO programs that EML supports.
Securing the Cities
To help address the threat of a radiological or nuclear attack
against urban area targets, DNDO established the STC initiative to
equip State and local personnel with radiation detection technologies
and develop a defense-in-depth architecture for the protection of the
New York City area. EML personnel, using their experience with
radiation detection systems and their established relationships with
New York City metropolitan area law enforcement agencies, are
supporting the federal participation. They are also helping us
integrate DNDO Regional Reach-back into STC activities and procedures.
Moreover, they are providing subject matter expertise on detection
system performance and capabilities to STC regional partners, as well
as participating in the development of concept of operations.
Test Support at the New York Container Terminal
DNDO is currently testing its next-generation systems called
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) at NYCT. The results of the
testing at NYCT will be part of a larger data set that will help DNDO
determine if our ASP systems provide significant improvements in
performance over current generation systems to support the Secretary's
certification decision, as required by the DHS FY 2007 Appropriations
Act, prior to a full-rate production decision. As you can see, this is
an important task, and EML provides the Test Director for this effort
and is part of the multi-lab team that we are relying on to get this
task completed. Other participating labs include Sandia National
Laboratories (SNL) and Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL).
Technical Reach-back
We often use a four-factor formula to define success at DNDO--
successful encounter, detection, identification, and interdiction. If
any of those factors are unsuccessful--for example, you mistakenly
dismiss a threat--you are looking at the possibility of mission
failure. Therefore, in support of the deployment of detection equipment
into the field, DNDO is developing and implementing a technical reach-
back capability to assist federal, State, and local law enforcement and
response personnel in understanding and resolving detector alarms.
EML, along with Brookhaven National Laboratory, provides technical
support to the deployments we have in the Northeastern region. Regional
reach-back spectroscopists--the people who can look at alarm data and
determine the presence or absence of a threat--are available twenty-
four hours a day, seven days a week. They work with DNDO's Joint
Analysis Center (JAC) to provide technical support to federal, State
and local personnel if a detection incident occurs that requires
further investigation and analysis. The laboratory spectroscopists
evaluate the data provided through the JAC in order to determine what
material(s) have been detected by the equipment, and provide other
technical assistance as needed, such as answering questions about
equipment, commodity shipping, or radiation safety.
Other Efforts
In addition to these three key areas, EML has played a technical
advisory role to DNDO's Assessments Directorate. They have helped us
with test planning and execution, assisted in the planning and
execution of our pilot programs, and provided quality assurance and
data quality management for our test and evaluation activities. Also,
EML is participating in one of our Transformational Research and
Development projects that will help DNDO determine the physical limits
of detecting nuclear materials and devices while a cargo ship is in
transit. This type of research may lead to detection solutions that
enable us to push out our borders and intercept threats well before
they reach U.S. shores.
Conclusion
In conclusion, DNDO sees EML as an important partner in our
research, development, and test, and deployment support activities. We
are especially aware of the relationships they maintain with federal,
State and local law enforcement and first responder personnel in the
New York metropolitan region. Combined with their subject matter
expertise in the rad/nuc field, we see those that currently support the
DNDO mission at EML as valuable assets.
This concludes my prepared statement. Chairman Miller, Ranking
Member Sensenbrenner, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for
your attention and will be happy to answer any questions that you may
have.
Biography for Vayl S. Oxford
Mr. Vayl Oxford was appointed Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) in September 2005, reporting to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security with responsibility for the
establishment of the new, jointly staffed office and for directing all
activities associated with the organization.
Prior to his appointment to DHS, Mr. Oxford served as the Director
for Counterproliferation (CP) at the National Security Council.
Before his assignment to the White House, Mr. Oxford was the Deputy
Director for Technology Development at the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA).
From 1993 to 1998, Mr. Oxford served at the Defense Nuclear Agency,
and, then, the Defense Special Weapons Agency as the Director for
Counterproliferation.
During his Air force tenure, Mr. Oxford held several positions
associated with aircraft and weapons development, and war plans
analysis in Europe and the Pacific. He also served as an Assistant
Professor of Aeronautics at the United States Air Force Academy from
1982 to 1986.
Mr. Oxford is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and
the Air Force Institute of Technology and the recipient of numerous
military awards. He received the DOD ACTD Technical Manager of the Year
Award in 1997. He was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in 1997
and received the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award in 2002.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Mr. Oxford. Admiral Cohen.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAY M. COHEN, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Cohen. Chairman Miller, it is a great honor, as
always, to appear before the Science and Technology Committee
and I wanted to let you know personally how much I appreciate
the professionalism of the Committee staff in this matter.
Science and technology has and will change the world and it
holds the potential to make our nation safer. I grew up in the
shadow of the EML building in Lower Manhattan and fully
appreciate both its strategic location and its capabilities. I
assumed my duties as Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security on the 10th of
August. You may remember that was the day of the London liquid
explosives plot. Immediately thereafter, on the 11th of August,
I established a rapid response team similar to what I had done
in Navy and then after 9/11.
The very first thing we did was to convene and at that time
we did not have a means to have a secure video teleconference,
so we just had a conference call with all of my organic labs,
including the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and all of
the Department of Energy laboratories, which the enabling
legislation so wisely allowed me to leverage. I challenged them
with their diverse backgrounds and talents, especially the DOE
labs, with all the class chemistry and physics capabilities to
help us solve the problems associated with liquid explosives on
the aircraft.
Within two months those efforts allowed TSA to establish
the 3-1-1 rule, which is the three ounces in one bag per
person, and get our aircraft back to some normalcy. I found
that, in August, with the bipartisan support of the Congress
and the Administration, I immediately went about aligning my
directorate for success as I believe the enabling legislation
wisely envisioned. I established what I call the Four Gets. I
had to get the organization right; I had to get the people
right; I had to get the books right; and I had to get the
content right. And along with these I established what I
believe to be the principle threats or as I call it, the Four
Bs; bombs, border, bugs and business where business represents
the underlying cyber that enables our whole society and our
economy.
The organization was approved the first week of September
2006. The president's fiscal year 2008 budget was realigned to
the new six division customer outward focused model that I put
in place. And in October, the Congress, in a bipartisan way,
asked me to realign the fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland
Security appropriations law to the new model. The status of my
directorate at that time was clearly documented in fiscal year
2007 legislation. The Transportation Security Lab's assignment
to the Department of Homeland Security S&T versus TSA was in
doubt. The universities' Centers of Excellence were at risk,
moral was low and good people were leaving my directorate.
Congress was on the verge of cutting my fiscal year 2007
budget by $200 million. As I previously testified, Mr.
Chairman, it took great courage on both sides of the aisle in
an election year to restore those monies, as you did so late in
the year and I am very appreciative of that. Over the last
eight months, we have, with the help of Congress, largely
achieved the Four Gets. Included in that, government service
scientists and engineers who had left my directorate last
spring, last fall asked to come back and we welcomed them with
open arms and they are now part of my team.
The final piece of that effort was bringing the full
integration of both my organic DHS labs with national
Department of Energy labs, as well as university Centers of
Excellence, to provide the two pillars of basic research so
important to our national safety. I have some charts, should
you ask questions, that will allude to how we have done that.
Finally, Vayl Oxford and I are military and naval academy
graduates who understand the meaning of leadership
responsibility and accountability. For all my DHS S&T mandated
missions, the buck stops with me. People are the most valuable
asset. The Nation is in crisis in science and technology. No
one knows that better than the Science and Technology Committee
and I salute your efforts in the stand and so many other
initiative areas and we want to be part of that.
I regularly meet with and listen to all of my people. I
have worked to make amends to them for any perception that they
were not fully valued and appreciated at the Department of
Homeland Security. I can assure you they are. Mr. Chairman,
Members of the Committee, we can and will do better for the
Nation. I welcome your oversight and your questions and I will
look forward to working with your Committee and your staff.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jay M. Cohen
Good Morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Sensenbrenner, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear
before you today to update you on the Department's plans for the
Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML).
The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate is committed to
serving our customers, the components that comprise the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)--and their customers--the hardworking men and
women on the front lines of homeland security, especially the first
responders, who need ready access to technology and information to
perform their jobs more efficiently and safely. I am honored and
privileged to serve with the talented scientists, engineers and other
professionals who support these dedicated Americans in our shared
mission to secure our homeland and defend our freedoms. Many of those
talented people work at our organic DHS laboratories, the
Transportation Security Lab, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and
EML.
EML is a federally owned and operated DHS laboratory, located in
lower Manhattan. It was a Department of Energy research facility with
competencies in low level radiation detection and monitoring, and was
transferred to DHS S&T in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. EML has
currently 35 federal employees. Twenty-five are technical with
backgrounds in radiation health physics, dosimetry, atmospheric
transport, radio-chemistry, and nuclear spectroscopy. There are also
ten administrative support employed at EML. Since coming to DHS, EML
staff has provided support to the S&T Directorate and, since its
inception in April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).
DNDO was established pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 14 and Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L.
107-296). Section 501 of the Security and Accountability For Every
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-347) statutorily established DNDO,
and amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002 removing all radiological
or nuclear responsibilities and authorities from the Under Secretary
for Science and Technology. Although the laboratory is managed within
the S&T Directorate, EML has applied its staff's radiation detection
expertise and operational testing experience primarily to support DNDO
programs. Currently, nineteen EML staff members support DNDO at level
of effort equivalent to about 9.5 full-time employees. DNDO director
Vayl Oxford and I have discussed DNDO's requirements and have agreed
that this is approximately the long-term workload that EML can expect
in support of DNDO programs.
EML staff has also been involved with radiation and explosives
detection Test & Evaluation (T&E) involving a number of federal, State,
and local end-users; and with standards development, including program
management and working group activities. As the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 also assigned me the responsibility of coordinating all T&E
activities of the Department, together with my DHS S&T Directorate T&E
Director and EML leadership, I am personally and actively working to
identify an appropriate T&E role for the remainder of the EML
workforce. The President's Budget Request for FY 2008 reflects my
expectation that DNDO will continue to require the current level of
support from EML, and that we will be able to productively utilize the
remainder of the workforce in a meaningful DHS T&E role.
EML currently leases 96,000 sq. ft. in the GSA building at 201
Varick Street New York, NY. The leased space includes basement storage,
a four bay garage and loading dock, and a rooftop platform. The current
lease expires at the end of FY 2008 and the rent is expected to
increase in 2009. I will work to ``right size'' both leased floor space
at the current EML location and a sustainable technical and
administrative workforce that will ensure EML's new role in supporting
both DHS S&T and DNDO in making the Nation safer. EML will be fully
integrated into my organic and DOE laboratory governance model designed
to align my supporting laboratories to the current DHS S&T Directorate
organization, similar to the alignment being accomplished with DHS S&T
university Centers of Excellence. I greatly respect the invaluable
contribution that the intellectual capital our S&T workforce of
scientists, engineers and associates at EML (and all other S&T
activities supporting DHS missions) make through discoveries and
inventions to equip our DHS components and First Responders with
cutting edge technology to protect America well into the future.
I appreciate the many demands on the taxpayers' precious dollars.
You have my commitment that the S&T Directorate will be wise stewards
of the public monies you have provided to serve the best interests of
the Nation by investing in the talent and technology that will provide
America with a sustainable capability to protect against acts of terror
and other high-consequence events.
Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to
meet with you today to discuss this important matter. I welcome your
interest and oversight. I look forward to working with you and your
dedicated staff throughout the 110th Congress.
Biography for Jay M. Cohen
Department of Homeland Security, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Jay M. Cohen is a native of New York. He was commissioned
in 1968 as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States Naval
Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and
Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from
MIT.
His early Navy assignments included service on conventional and
nuclear submarines. From 1985 to 1988 Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G.
RICKOVER (SSN 709).
Following command, he served on the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a senior
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, responsible for
certifying the safe operation of nuclear powered ships and crews.
From 1991 to 1993, he commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 36) including a
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation DESERT STORM.
After Spear, he reported to the Secretary of the Navy as Deputy
Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs. During this assignment, Cohen was
responsible for supervising all Navy-Congressional liaisons.
Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and
reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations
responsible to the President and DOD leaders for strategic weapons
release authority.
In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office
responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new
century.
In June 2000, Cohen was promoted in rank and became the 20th Chief
of Naval Research. He served during war as the Department of the Navy
Chief Technology Officer (a direct report to the Secretary of the Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps).
Responsible for the Navy and Marine Corps Science and Technology (S&T)
Program (involving basic research to applied technology portfolios and
contracting), Cohen coordinated investments with other U.S. and
international S&T providers to rapidly meet war fighter combat needs.
After an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of
Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired on February 1, 2006.
Under Secretary Cohen was sworn in to his current position at the
Department of Homeland Security on August 10, 2006.
Discussion
DHS' Assessment of EML
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Admiral Cohen. I do have a few
questions for each of you. Mr. Oxford, in your testimony this
morning, mixed testimony. It was skills, the strengths, the
capabilities of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory and
obviously there were some people, at least within the S&T
Directorate, who did not believe that the lab had any unique
skills, it did not have any qualities, that its programs could
be easily replicated in other labs and then others on the first
panel this morning who took, in my hearing, a very different
point of view. What is your own assessment of the Environmental
Measurements Laboratory?
Mr. Oxford. We have, Mr. Chairman, found them to be very
adaptable and responsive to the changing landscape. When I was
first standing up DNDO, the view in S&T at the time was that
the Countermeasures Test Bed would draw upon them to continue
the efforts. We actually contemplated moving the
Countermeasures Test Bed to DNDO because it had been
predominately a rad nuke related activity with EML providing
some of the support, but the vision of S&T at the time was to
broaden that into explosives and chemical support work within
that region so we chose to leave Countermeasures Test Bed
within S&T and just leverage that.
As we revisited the needs within DNDO, we realized we
needed strong State and local partnerships and regional
partnerships and with the emergence of things like the test
series, the Securing the Cities initiatives I talked about, we
recognized the presence of EML and the support they had already
provided in the past was a very valuable activity. I had heard
some rumblings that there were studies underway within S&T to
maybe change that landscape. I cautioned against that. I even
had a short discussion with the Secretary, suggesting that this
needed to be fully vetted before any action was taken.
I later found that there was a briefing and it was in
preparation, I think you heard reference to it this morning, to
make a recommendation from the Under Secretary at the time to
go to the Secretary to possibly make a recommendation to close
the lab. Within that briefing, when I got a copy of it, it said
that there had been no near-term requirements identified for
the laboratory and specifically cited DNDO as one of those
entities that had no near-term requirements. I had not been
personally consulted at the time, so that was when I wrote the
letter to the acting Under Secretary at the time, outlining
what we thought our specific needs were, which equated at the
time between nine and twelve people to provide the support to
the three programs I mentioned in my opening statement. So we
have found them to be more than competent in the changing
landscape that we confront right now in the New York region.
Chairman Miller. And I know it sounds redundant, but they
had skills, they expertise that was important to your office,
important to what you were doing?
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. I am a big believer in bringing
together the combination of technologists and operators, and by
having people that have the trust of the New York City
officials, as you heard from Assistant Commissioner Duecker
this morning, the bridge that the technical expertise--there
are vendors in this world, as you probably know, with the
committee oversight that you have, that will sell almost
anything to anybody and the operators are particularly prone to
that kind of marketing. EML helps provide the bridge between my
office and the New York City officials who are deluged with
these kind of marketing schemes to provide technical assistance
on a daily basis to make sure that as we develop systems and
they acquire systems, they get the right equipment, so it was
very valuable.
Chairman Miller. Okay. And we have heard different
testimony about how EML was regarded by first responders. I
understand that your office works closely with the first
responders, the first responder community, particularly in New
York. Do you know, based on your own dealings with the first
responder community, how EML is viewed by New York's first
responders?
Mr. Oxford. As you say, Mr. Chairman, we work very closely
with the State and local community up there. I have developed
personal relationships through the Securing the Cities
relationship with the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, the Office of Emergency Management, the fire
department, as well as regional partners in New York State and
New Jersey State, as well as Connecticut. This is all under the
umbrella of the Securing the Cities and the police
commissioner.
However, I can tell you that they call upon EML on a daily
basis to provide the technical consultation that I have talked
about, not only in the development of systems, but also in
looking at a regional deployment architecture where detection
systems may be the most efficient and effective, as well as to
provide this technical support; if they ever do get alarms, how
fast can we respond?
Chairman Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Oxford, and I
hope that, under your leadership, we can make EML an asset to
our national security and our homeland security.
Admiral Cohen, thank you also for being here and I know
that we talked this morning about what has happened in the past
with respect to EML and the problems and I certainly hope that
you can get things on track. You apparently share the view that
things have gone off track with respect to EML and that EML is
a value to the Nation's security and homeland security. Am I
correct in taking your testimony today as a pledge to make the
EML an asset, a contributor to our response to the threats that
we face?
Admiral Cohen. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. If I may just
follow up a little bit on Mr. Oxford's testimony of the value
of EML to New York and also to homeland security and the first
responders in the tri-state area, when I was Chief of Naval
Research, about a month after the tragic events of 9/11, I was
asked by the Police Commissioner of New York to come up to his
office, look at Ground Zero, which of course, we did, and as
Mr. Oxford has indicated, so many people offered so many
solutions; Radiacs, and we saw this after 10 August where I was
inundated with handheld devices for liquid explosives.
In the enabling legislation here at DHS, not only am I the
executive for Science and Technology for the Department, but
you have given me two department-wide responsibilities in
addition, which I value very much. One is the Test and
Evaluation Executive setting the policy throughout the
Department and the other is for standards, working alongside
the National Institute of Standards and Technology. This is an
area that was not widely exercised before my arrival as part of
the realignment that we talked about and we have that all in
writing in what I call the STORM, the Science and Technology
Regulations Manual, so everyone knows what their
responsibilities are, what the chain of command is, that for
the liquid explosives, we asked people to come in.
We sent them to Sequoia, New Mexico shortly after 10
August. We actually did standardized testing and no surprise, I
think Mr. Oxford would agree with these statistics. We found
about half didn't work even though they looked very good on
CNN. And the other half, some variation of those were easily
spoofed, putting a liquid dye in a clear liquid. When the
liquid was clear, they could determine what it was, but once
you put a dye in it, they couldn't. And so about a month after
9/11, I was invited, as Chief Naval Research, in a naval
research laboratory right here on the Potomac reported to me at
that time to go to New York.
The police commissioner takes me into a room, table about
twice this size, and it is just full of handheld Radiac, these
are radiation detection devices. And he said Admiral, he said
we--and Mr. Chairman, you have to remember at this point, the
anthrax attacks are continuing. You don't know when the next
shoe is going to fall. And so he says we want to equip all of
our squad cars with a Radiac and he said we don't know what to
buy. Admiral, would you help me? And I said absolutely. I said
if you will just have a qualified patrolman, whoever you want,
bring these to the Potomac Naval Research Lab. I will test them
compared to what the manufacturer says they are going to do and
I will let you know. I will not, however, make recommendation.
We did that for the New York City Police Department, so it
is no surprise to me, when I came into this new job, not having
prior knowledge of EML, to know that we had a group there where
when you looked at the concentration of people, the efforts
that DHS and other activities government agencies are making,
the high probability of the threat to the tri-state area, that
this was a jewel that we needed to maintain, but as been
testified to earlier, we needed to work with EML so that they
could support both DNDO and its very important areas which I no
longer, based on the fiscal year 2007 legislation, have
responsibility for nuclear radiological. All those reside with
DNDO. And in my area, especially if test and evaluation for
many of the different sensors that we are bringing to bear, as
Mr. Oxford indicated, we want to expand that not just from
nuclear, but to include chem, bio and explosives, which are my
responsibility. So I am committed to it, sir, but it does take
time to change the culture of a land.
Chairman Miller. Admiral Cohen, unless you just especially
want to show us your charts, I am happy to excuse the two of
you now.
Admiral Cohen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Oxford. Thank you.
Chairman Miller. I want to thank all the witnesses. I have
to say I am disappointed in the way the EML has been regarded
in the last few years. I am glad that I am able to express
disappointment rather than outrage, as we piece together,
months after a radiological attack, what might have been done
different. And I hope that the errors that we have made at this
point we can correct and I appreciate the commitment by Mr.
Oxford and Admiral Cohen to correct those errors. My able
staff, the able staff of our committee, when they heard me
talking about the contraption that I saw in Hawaii, through the
wonders of the Internet were able to find out what the
contraption was. And it is massive. Admiral, I don't have a
chart for you.
It is a heavy lift vessel, the Blue Marlin, and on a deck
and that is where I saw it. I saw it on the Blue Marlin. The
Sea-based X-band radar, as it completed the photograph, as it
completed the 1600 mile journey from Corpus Christi, Texas and
then it would go on from there to the Bering Sea. According to
Wikipedia and so we assume that no one had gone on Wikipedia
and changed the numbers. At that point, this one contraption
had cost $900 million. That does not count the annual operating
cost. That is the radar to support a missile defense system
that we have never made work. It seems to me that it is very
unlikely that our nation will be struck by a nuclear weapon
fired from a missile from the soil of another country.
It is not unlikely because we will intercept it out of the
air, that we will hit that bullet with a bullet. It is unlikely
because the Nation that fired the missile would cease to exist
because of retaliation. They say that if you owe a bank $20,000
you have got a problem; if you owe a bank $200 million, the
bank has got a problem. It appears that if your program is $7
million a year and not many people have heard of it, it pretty
much doesn't matter what it does, what its value is, that
program is at risk. If you spend $7 billion on a program,
almost despite the evidence that that program is never going to
do anything, it never goes away.
I hope that we do go forward and recognize that this lab,
although small, although before this hearing it may be even
with this hearing, obscure, does play an important role in our
ability to respond to the most likely threats we face. To
prepare for, we hope, we pray to prevent and then to respond to
the most likely threats that we face; a dirty bomb; God forbid,
a nuclear device, not fired from the soil of another country,
but in a freighter, smuggled into the United States in a truck.
And that the neglect that we have shown to this lab in the next
three years will not be something that we review again,
wondering what if, whether these three years or four years of
neglect would not have led to a different result. But thank all
of you for being here and thank you for your testimony today.
Admiral Cohen. Mr. Chairman, if I just may, what you see
here is a picture of a meeting that we had. I believe it is the
first ever meeting on the 1st of May, just two days ago. These
are all of the lab directors, principals only of all the DOE
labs, as well as my organic labs. You can see Adam Hunter. He
is standing just to the left of the fellow in the light shirt.
Adam is the Acting Director of EML. He, Transportation Security
Lab, my End Back and my Plum Island labs were sitting at the
table. Thirty-five people, 35,000 people. They had the same
vote and we are now aligned as we have aligned the Centers of
Excellence and we appreciate so much North Carolina's
contribution to that, so that we are supporting, in the basic
research area, those critical initiatives to make the Nation
safer. So this meeting was scheduled long before we had
knowledge of this hearing. It is the last piece of the puzzle,
in my alignment, and now it is up to me, working with Vayl, to
make it a reality and we look forward to working with you, sir.
Chairman Miller. Thank you, Admiral Cohen. I am delighted
that you were able to use the easels that you brought here this
morning.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Additional Material for the Record
Documents for the Record
1. E-mail message on the decision to close EML from John
Clarke to Scott Smith (September 14, 2005).
2. E-mail message on Dr. Fainberg's resignation from Tony
Fainberg to Maureen McCarthy (April 4, 2005).
3. Top Down Review of EML PowerPoint presentation by Marc
Mandler and John Clarke (October 28, 2004).
4. E-mail messages on EML FY05 Budget including John Clarke,
Mitchell Erickson, Catherine Klusek, etc. (April 2005).
5. Summary for MAPEP Survey of DOE Quality Assurance
Stakeholders.
6. Mr. Joseph Bruno, New York City Office of Emergency
Management letter to Dr. Charles McQueary, Under Secretary for
Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(December 21, 2004).
7. E-mail messages on the Technology Liaison Office (TLO)
between Kevin Clark and John Clarke (November 21, 2005).
8. E-mail on Clarke re: EML including Maureen McCarthy, Huban
Gowadia and Adam Hutter (April 4, 2005).
9. Department of Homeland Security, Environmental
Measurements Laboratory (EML) Communications Plan (November 3,
2007).
10. Closure of EML Human Resource Plan, Alyce Bridges (June
30, 2005).