[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NASA'S SPACE SCIENCE PROGRAMS:
REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 2008
BUDGET REQUEST AND ISSUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 2, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-24
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
34-907 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington KEN CALVERT, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
NICK LAMPSON, Texas FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
JERRY MCNERNEY, California W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JO BONNER, Alabama
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon TOM FEENEY, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BARON P. HILL, Indiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
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Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. MARK UDALL, Colorado, Chairman
DAVID WU, Oregon KEN CALVERT, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
MIKE ROSS, Arizona JO BONNER, Alabama
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky TOM FEENEY, Florida
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
BART GORDON, Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
May 2, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
Statement by Representative Ken Calvert, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 17
Written Statement............................................ 18
Witnesses:
Dr. S. Alan Stern, Associate Administrator, NASA Science Mission
Directorate
Oral Statement............................................... 23
Written Statement............................................ 25
Biography.................................................... 31
Dr. Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, National
Research Council
Oral Statement............................................... 32
Written Statement............................................ 34
Biography.................................................... 37
Dr. Garth D. Illingworth, Chair, Astronomy and Astrophysics
Advisory Committee (AAAC)
Oral Statement............................................... 38
Written Statement............................................ 40
Biography.................................................... 50
Financial Disclosure......................................... 54
Dr. Daniel N. Baker, Director, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder
Oral Statement............................................... 54
Written Statement............................................ 56
Biography.................................................... 63
Dr. Joseph A. Burns, Irving P. Church Professor of Engineering
and Astronomy; Vice Provost, Physical Sciences and Engineering,
Cornell University
Oral Statement............................................... 64
Written Statement............................................ 66
Biography.................................................... 70
Discussion
Most Important Issue for SMD................................... 71
Measures to Reduce Mission Costs, Specifically, Management,
Oversight and Risk Reduction................................. 72
Planned Changes in the Science Mission Directorate............. 74
Understating True Costs........................................ 76
Status and Impact of Delta 2 Launcher.......................... 77
Application of Space Research Experience to NASA Space Science
Programs..................................................... 78
'08 Appropriations Priorities to Strengthen Space Science
Programs..................................................... 79
R&A Budgeting.................................................. 80
International Collaboration.................................... 82
Status of Europa Mission....................................... 84
Chinese Cooperation............................................ 85
Lessons From Astronomy......................................... 86
Nuclear Energy................................................. 88
Arecivo Radio Telescope and Near-Earth Objects................. 89
Warming on Mars................................................ 90
ITAR and International Technological Development............... 90
Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Dr. S. Alan Stern, Associate Administrator, NASA Science Mission
Directorate.................................................... 94
Dr. Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, National
Research Council............................................... 98
Dr. Garth D. Illingworth, Chair, Astronomy and Astrophysics
Advisory Committee (AAAC)...................................... 102
Dr. Daniel N. Baker, Director, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder................. 118
Dr. Joseph A. Burns, Irving P. Church Professor of Engineering
and Astronomy; Vice Provost, Physical Sciences and Engineering,
Cornell University............................................. 122
NASA'S SPACE SCIENCE PROGRAMS: REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET
REQUEST AND ISSUES
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 2, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Udall
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NASA's Space Science Programs:
Review of Fiscal Year 2008
Budget Request and Issues
wednesday, may 2, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Wednesday, May 2, 2007 at 10:00 am, the House Committee on
Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold
a hearing to examine the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Fiscal Year 2008 budget request and plans for
space science programs including heliophysics, planetary science
(including astrobiology), and astrophysics, as well as issues related
to the programs.
Witnesses:
Witnesses scheduled to testify at the hearing include the
following:
Dr. S. Alan Stern
Associate Administrator,
NASA Science Mission Directorate
Dr. Lennard Fisk
Thomas M. Donahue Distinguished University Professor of Space Science
University of Michigan, and
Chair, Space Studies Board, National Research Council
Dr. Garth Illingworth
Professor
University of California Observatories/Lick Observatory,
University of California, Santa Cruz, and
Chair, Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee
Dr. Daniel Baker
Professor, Astrophysical and Planetary Sciences
Director,
Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics
University of Colorado, Boulder
Dr. Joseph Burns
Irving Porter Church Professor of Engineering and Professor of
Astronomy, and
Vice Provost, Physical Sciences and Engineering
Cornell University
BACKGROUND
Potential Issues
The following are some of the potential issues that might be raised
at the hearing:
Impact of Budgetary Cutbacks on NASA's Space Science
Programs--In the three years since the President's Vision for
Space Exploration was announced in early 2004, the
Administration has reduced NASA's Science Mission Directorate
outyear funding by a total of $4 billion. As a result, missions
have been delayed or deferred, supporting activities such as
technology development have been decreased and the prospects
for new activities have been pushed out into the future. At the
same time, some missions in development are costing more than
anticipated, placing further stress on Science Mission
Directorate programs. How serious a problem is the budgetary
situation facing NASA's Science Mission Directorate? What
should be done to ensure NASA has a sustainable and robust
science program?
Role of Space Science in the President's American
Competitiveness Initiative and Innovation Agenda--Research
funded through NASA's space science program exemplifies the
types of research highlighted in the National Academies report,
Rising Above the Gathering Storm, and in the President's
American Competitiveness Initiative. Specifically, the
Academies' recommendations for long-term basic research and
``special emphasis on physical sciences, engineering,
mathematics, and information sciences''; high-risk research;
research grants to early career researchers; and funding for
advanced research instrumentation and facilities also apply to
NASA. Given that, why hasn't NASA space science been included
in the President's American Competitiveness Initiative?
Moreover, why has the NASA-funded research that most directly
applies to the goals of the ACI been declining at a time when
the focus on and funding for long-term basic research at other
agencies is increasing under the ACI? What message does the
exclusion of NASA research from the ACI send to the community
of space scientists that performs that research? How does a
strategy that promotes basic research at some government R&D
agencies while cutting funding for the same type of research at
other agencies help the Nation meet the ACI goals of
strengthening research in the physical sciences, engineering,
and mathematics and building the foundation for innovation?
What, if anything, should be done to address NASA's absence
from the ACI?
Lack of Adequate Balance--Administrator Griffin
testified at the March 15, 2007 Committee on Science and
Technology hearing on the NASA FY08 budget request that NASA
has attempted to balance its science programs. However, a
number of advisory committees, including, the National
Academies and the Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory
Committee, have raised concerns about the lack of balance in
NASA science programs. In its report, An Assessment of Balance
in NASA's Science Programs (2006), the National Academies found
that:
``The program proposed for space and Earth science is
not robust; it is not properly balanced to support a
healthy mix of small, medium, and large missions and an
underlying foundation of scientific research and
advanced technology projects.''
According to the Assessment of Balance report, lack of
balance, sustainability and robustness in NASA's science
programs affects the ability to make progress on the Decadal
Surveys (research priorities for the next ten years in specific
space science disciplines that represent a consensus of the
science community); to follow a plan or sequence of missions,
to meet commitments to international partners; to develop
advanced technology; to nurture a research and technology
community; and to train and educate future space scientists and
engineers. What is NASA's definition of balance? What, if
anything has NASA done in response to findings of the advisory
committees? What does a properly balanced program look like?
Cuts to smaller science mission opportunities--
Cutbacks in small- and medium-sized mission opportunities, such
as are offered by the Explorer program, are cited in advisory
committee reports as indicators of a science program lacking
balance. Explorer missions, which are highly rated in the
decadal surveys, are competitively awarded missions that are
led by a scientist principal investigator (PI) who is given
responsibility for the scientific, technical, and management
success of the mission. Explorers examine focused science areas
not addressed by NASA's larger, agency-led, strategic missions.
They provide flight opportunities in the gaps between strategic
missions and are critical opportunities for the much-needed
training of the next generation of scientists and engineers.
That the Nobel Prize in physics for 2006 was awarded to two
U.S. researchers whose work relied on data from the Cosmic
Background Explorer (COBE) exemplifies the scientific potential
of these small spacecraft. Should funds be restored to increase
the flight rate of Explorer and other small- and medium-sized
missions, and at what cost to other missions or science
activities? What is the appropriate frequency of small- and
medium-sized missions needed to sustain the scientific
activities and researcher base that relies on such flight
opportunities? Should future budgets fence off a certain
percentage of resources for small- and medium-sized missions
such as Explorer?
Cuts to Research and Analysis--According to advisory
committee reports such as An Assessment of Balance in NASA's
Science Programs and the Annual Report of the Astronomy and
Astrophysics Advisory Committee, March 16, 2006-March 15, 2007,
a properly balanced science program is defined, in part, by the
support provided for research grants, largely through NASA's
research and analysis (R&A) accounts. R&A grants fund theory,
modeling, and the analysis of mission data; technology
development for future science missions; the development of
concepts for potential future science missions; scientific
investigations using aircraft, balloons, and sub-orbital
rockets; the training of the next generation of scientists and
engineers, among a host of other supporting research and
technology activities. The FY06 NASA operating plan cut R&A
accounts by about 15 percent across the science programs,
reducing support for graduate students, post-doctoral students
and junior faculty. The FY07 request did not restore those
cuts, and the FY08 request largely continues the previous
levels of funding for R&A. What is a healthy level of R&A
funding within the NASA science programs? How long can the
research community sustain lower levels of activity before
attrition occurs, along with a loss of expertise that cannot be
easily recovered? What, if anything, should be done about the
current level of R&A funding? Should measures be instituted to
protect R&A funding against future cuts, and if so, what would
those measures be?
Cost Growth in Missions--Several of the increases in
NASA's FY08 budget request provide funds for science missions
that have run over budget or schedule, or that run the risk of
doing so. In addition, cost growth in some of the planned space
science missions in recent years, coupled with constrained
budgets, has wound up squeezing other science activities. The
factors contributing to cost and schedule growth are not easy
to pinpoint, but can include underestimates in the technology
development required for mission readiness; increases in launch
vehicle costs; internal decisions to delay missions or alter
budget profiles; project management difficulties; and delays in
contributions from international or interagency partners. Lack
of clarity in the communication of what is included in those
costs (e.g., technology development, mission development,
operations) has also contributed to the problem. Mission cost
growth can lead to delays, cancellations, or reduction in funds
for other NASA science missions and activities. What, if
anything, can be done to control cost growth on missions? Is
there adequate understanding of the cost growth contributors or
is more information needed to come up with solutions to the
cost growth problem?
Role of Space Science in Human and Robotic
Exploration of the Solar System--Robotic exploration of the
solar system is called out in the President's Vision for Space
Exploration as being important to achieving the Vision. The
Report of the President's Commission on Implementation of
United States Space Exploration Policy states that ``science in
the space exploration vision is both enabling and enabled.''
What should be the role of science activities in the context of
the Vision for Space Exploration? Should science that supports
the Vision have a higher priority?
Future Availability of the Delta II Launch Vehicle--
The Delta II has been a highly reliable workhorse for space
science missions. Over the next two years, eight missions are
scheduled to launch on Delta IIs, however, NASA has expressed
uncertainty about the availability of the Delta II launch
vehicle after 2009 and is studying alternatives. What is the
status of the Delta II availability for science payloads after
2009? If the Delta II is not available, what is the plan for
launching Delta-class science missions? What are the
alternatives to the Delta II and what are the likely impacts of
using an alternative vehicle? If launch costs increase, does
NASA plan to alter the levels of cost-capped missions?
Technology Development and Supporting Programs--
missions proposed with immature technologies can be a root
cause of cost growth. The Academies report on Principal-
Investigator-Led Missions in the Space Sciences states that ``.
. .project technology development efforts often lag planned
progress owing to unexpected design failures, fabrication or
testing issues, or other glitches. . . .attempts by mission
projects to using promising but immature technology is a
frequent cause of PI-led missions (and others) exceeding the
cost cap.'' The FY08 budget request decreases funding for the
New Millennium Program and the research and analysis programs
both of which enable technology development for future
missions. In light of the cost growth and technical challenges
encountered by several science missions, will reductions in
technology development programs increase the risk of cost
growth on future missions? Have technology development programs
been an adequate and effective means of understanding technical
risks and mission costs? If not, why and what other mechanisms
are available to prepare for technical challenges on future
missions?
International Partnerships--NASA has a successful
history of international cooperation in science and involves
non-U.S. partners on some two-thirds of its science missions,
and also provides instruments, science support, and other in-
kind contributions to non-U.S.-led space and Earth science
missions. Successful cooperative missions can increase the
scientific content of a mission and build mutually beneficial
relationships. At the same time, cooperation can lead to delays
and added mission costs. Among the factors that have made
international cooperative missions harder in recent years is
ITAR. Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2778 of the Arms Export Control
Act, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
regulates the export of defense articles on the U.S. Munitions
Control List. The Department of State has responsibility for
administering the regulations. In 1999, scientific satellites
were added to the Munitions Control List (USML). ITAR often
poses significant challenges for space science missions, many
of which involve international partners. The time required to
manage licenses or agreements can threaten mission schedules.
ITAR can be especially problematic for U.S. universities, which
typically attract a large percentage of foreign graduate
students to their programs. Is increasing international
cooperation on planned and future missions feasible, given
recent experiences with ITAR? What factors associated with ITAR
must be considered before agreeing to international
collaborations?
Overview
Over the past five decades, NASA has fostered a world-class space
science program that has led to such discoveries as new planets outside
our solar system, the presence of dark energy and the acceleration of
an expanding Universe, the signs of possible recent liquid water flows
on Mars, and more knowledge of the Sun's interior structure and
activity. NASA missions have also improved our understanding of the
effects of solar activity and space radiation on ground-based
electrical power grids and wireless communications systems, on orbiting
satellites, and also on humans in space. The space science program's
technical achievements are equally stunning as demonstrated in the
successful landing and operation of Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity;
the recent deployment of five spacecraft to study the causes of the
changing auroras at the North Pole, and Deep Impact's successful
penetration of the comet Tempel 1. In 2006, Dr. John Mather and Dr.
George Smoot were awarded the Nobel Prize in physics for their work
with the NASA Cosmic Background Explorer. [Dr. Mather is the first NASA
civil servant to receive the Nobel prize.]
This hearing will examine NASA's space science programs within
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) and their status within the
context of the Fiscal Year 2008 budget request. The space science
programs include the following theme areas:
Heliophysics, which seeks to understand the Sun and
its effects on Earth and the rest of the solar system;
Planetary science, which seeks to understand the
origin and evolution of the solar system and the prospects for
life beyond Earth; and
Astrophysics, which seeks to understand the origin,
structure, evolution and future of the Universe and to search
for Earth-like planets.
Earth science is also an SMD theme area. It will be the topic of a
separate Subcommittee hearing.
It should also be noted that Dr. Stern has informed the
Subcommittee that he has gotten agreement to move NASA's Near-Earth
Objects (NEO) program, and its associated budget, from the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate to the Science Mission Directorate.
NASA's space science programs involve the following types of
activities:
space missions that take measurements and collect
data to investigate high priority science questions;
the analysis of that mission data, which leads to new
knowledge;
research on theories and models;
the development of new technologies to enable future
science investigations; and
the use of balloons, sounding rockets, and sub-
orbital flights to take measurements and test technologies.
Stakeholders in the NASA space science programs include academic
institutions; industry; NASA field centers, predominantly the Goddard
Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL); and
other government laboratories. There are a number of advisory panels
that provided guidance on NASA's space science programs and activities,
including the NASA Advisory Council (NAC) and the NAC Science
Subcommittees, the National Academies, and the Astronomy and
Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC).
Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request
The President's FY08 budget requests $4.019 billion to fund NASA's
space science programs--heliophysics, planetary science, and
astrophysics. The budget represents a $16.5 million increase (or about
0.4 percent) over the President's proposed FY07 budget. (Appendix A
presents the President's FY08 budget request for NASA space science
programs.) Space science programs represent 23.2 percent of the
President's total FY08 budget request for NASA. Within the proposed
FY08 budget for space sciences programs, heliophysics represents 26
percent, planetary science represents 35 percent and astrophysics
represents 39 percent of the total space science funding.
Comparing the President's FY08 budget request with the funding
requested for FY08-FY11 in the President's FY07 proposal (and under
full cost simplification) shows that planetary science gains $87M,
while heliophysics loses over $300M and astrophysics is decreased by
about $125M. The FY08 budget request shows the following cumulative
results for individual science missions, over the FY08-FY11 period,
relative to the President's FY07 budget request:
NASA adds funding to support the development of
several key missions and mission areas, including (in millions
of dollars):
However, there are significant funding cuts to other
space science activities, activities over the same period, such
as (in millions of dollars):
In 2008, the Science Mission Directorate plans to launch Kepler,
Interstellar Boundary Explorer, Solar Dynamics Observatory, conduct a
fourth Hubble servicing mission; and complete contributions to
international and interagency partner missions that are planned for
launch in 2008.
Heliophysics
The President's FY08 budget request for NASA includes $1.057
billion for the Heliophysics theme, which seeks to understand the Sun
and its effect on the Earth, the rest of the solar system, and the
conditions in the space environment and their effects on astronauts;
and to develop and demonstrate technologies to predict space weather.
Programs within the Heliophysics theme include:
Heliophysics Research--research and analysis; space
missions; sounding rockets and other scientific platforms;
science data and computing technology;
Living with a Star--investigations to understand
solar variability (space weather), its effect on the Earth and
the rest of the solar system, and the implications for ground-
based systems such as electric power grids and wireless
communications, and for on-orbit spacecraft and astronauts.
Space missions under the Living with a Star program include:
Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) to understand the
structure of the Sun's magnetic field and how magnetic
field energy forms the solar wind, energetic particles,
and fluctuations in solar irradiance. SDO will help
acquire data to enable space weather predictions. SDO
is slated to launch in 2008.
Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) to investigate
solar storms and their interaction with charged
particles, fields, and radiation in the Van Allen
radiation belts. The results of the mission will be
used to develop models that assist engineers in
designing systems to withstand radiation effects and to
alert pilots and crews of potentially hazardous solar
storms or radiation. RBSP is estimated to launch around
2012.
Solar Terrestrial Probes--missions to investigate the
Sun, the heliosphere, and planetary environments as an
interrelated system. Missions within the Solar Terrestrial
Probe program include:
Magnetospheric Multi-scale (MMS) is proposed as a
system of four spacecraft to investigate processes such
as magnetic reconnection, which involves the transfer
of energy from the solar wind to the Earth's
magnetosphere, and is an important factor in predicting
space weather. The estimated launch date for MMS is
2013.
Heliophysics Explorer Program--small and medium-class
competitively-selected missions that endeavor to provide
frequent flight opportunities to investigate focused research.
Explorer programs are cost-capped and awarded to individual
principal investigators who have sole responsibility for the
scientific and technical success of the mission.
New Millennium--a program to validate technologies
for use in future space science missions. The program reduces
the risk of new technologies that have not yet been flown in
space.
Deep Space Mission Systems--telecommunications and
navigation services (e.g., the Deep Space Network) to support
human and robotic exploration of the solar system. [This
program is located in Heliophysics as a bookkeeping function in
the FY08 request.]
Issues
``Flagship'' missions including the James Webb Space
Telescope, which is under development in the Astrophysics
Program, and the Cassini mission which is currently
investigating Saturn, for the Planetary Science program,
represent long-term, high priority scientific investigations
for those disciplines. The National Academies decadal survey
for solar and space physics recommended in 2003 the Solar Probe
as a flagship mission to measure the heating and acceleration
of the solar wind. According to NASA's Science Plan for 2007-
2016, ``a flagship mission cannot be supported within the
available funding resources.'' What are NASA's plans for Solar
Probe and why are flagship missions being pursued in other
science disciplines but not in Heliophysics? How does the
absence of a Solar Probe mission affect the balance of the
Heliophysics program?
Planetary Science
The President's FY08 budget request provides $1.396 billion to fund
NASA's Planetary Science theme, which seeks to understand:
the history and evolution of the solar system;
whether life existed or exists beyond Earth.
The FY08 budget represents a decrease of $15.4 million or one
percent cut relative to the President's FY07 budget request for
planetary science.
The Planetary Science program includes the following elements:
Mars Exploration--several mission projects aimed at
exploring Mars for indicators of life, helping to understand
the history of the solar system, and to improving our
understanding of the potential hazards to humans in future Mars
explorations.
Mars Scout 2007 (Phoenix) is a mission to help
understand the chemistry, mineralogy and composition of
gases in surface and subsurface soils at areas in the
northern latitudes of Mars. The Mars Scout line is led
by a principal investigator, a scientist who is
selected competitively to lead the development of a
mission and ensure its scientific and technical
success. Mars Scout missions are cost-capped at $475M
(FY06 dollars). Phoenix is scheduled for launch in
August, 2007.
Mars Science Laboratory is a NASA strategic rover
mission designed with a new entry, descent and landing
system to take measurements focused on identifying
possible Martian habitats for life. Mars Science
Laboratory is scheduled for launch in 2009.
Discovery Program--a program of missions that offer
scientists opportunities to form a team and submit a proposal
to design and develop innovative, medium-sized, missions that
address focused science objectives. Proposals are competed;
NASA awards funds to the scientist, as principal investigator,
leading the selected proposal. Principal investigators are
responsible for the scientific, technical and managerial
success of the mission. Discovery missions are cost-capped at
$425M, according to the Announcement of Opportunity issued in
2006. Discovery missions under development include Dawn--a
mission whose purpose is to visit and study Vesta and Ceres,
the two largest asteroids in the solar system. Dawn is
scheduled for launch in June 2007.
New Frontiers--offers opportunities for scientists to
form a team and propose to design and develop innovative,
medium-sized missions that focus on understanding the origin,
evolution, and formation of the solar system. New Frontiers
missions are led by principal investigators and have a cost-cap
up to $700M in FY03 dollars, as of 2006. New Frontiers missions
include:
New Horizons, launched in 2006, which is en route to
Pluto where it will collect data about the geology and
atmosphere of Pluto and its moon, Charon.
Juno, a mission that is being planned to investigate
several aspects of Jupiter including its interior
structure and its atmosphere. Juno is being planned for
launch in 2011. Juno is a high priority mission of both
the National Academies' solar system exploration and
solar and space physics decadal surveys.
Technology--a program to develop Radioisotope Power
Systems such as radioisotopic thermoelectric generators and In-
Space Propulsion technologies such as solar electric propulsion
and solar sail propulsion that enable solar system exploration
missions to reach distant outer planets at lower costs, with
less mass, and for shorter travel times.
Planetary Science Research includes research and
analysis, lunar science and funding for existing missions and
planetary data archiving. Specific program elements include:
Research and Analysis programs involve the
development of theory and instrumentation to enable
future planetary science missions as well as research
on specific interdisciplinary areas such as
astrobiology and cosmochemistry (research on the
origins and evolution of planetary systems and for
study of the atmospheres, geology, and chemistry of
planets in the solar system).
Lunar Science is a new program in the FY08 request,
which provides funds for the archiving of lunar science
data, lunar science instruments and payloads that are
selected through peer review, analysis of data from
lunar missions, and technology development for lunar
science missions.
The planetary science research program also supports
planetary data systems and astromaterials curation; the Cassini
Huygens mission; U.S. involvement in non-U.S. missions such as
the European cometary mission, Rosetta, and the Japanese
cometary sample return mission, Hayabusa.
Issues
NASA created the interdisciplinary field of
astrobiology in the late 1990s to increase knowledge on the
origin and evolution of life on Earth and beyond Earth. Two
National Academies decadal surveys strongly support
Astrobiology, and Astrobiology contributes to NASA's own
strategic goal to ``Advance scientific knowledge of the origin
and history of the solar system, the potential for life
elsewhere, and the hazards and resources present as humans
explore space,'' as stated in the 2006 NASA Strategic Plan.
According to the January-March 2007 Newsletter of the National
Academies' Space Studies Board, over the last two years, NASA
cut the budget for Astrobiology by 50 percent, from
approximately $65 million to $31 million. In FY07, reductions
in the astrobiology budget reduced the number of research
institutions participating as part of the NASA Astrobiology
Institute from 16 to 12, and the funding for those 12 teams was
reduced. [The Astrobiology Institute is a consortium of
institutions that have been competitively selected and provided
seed funding for astrobiology research programs.] No new
research has been provided in the Astrobiology Science and
Technology for Exploring Planets program or the Astrobiology
Science and Technology Instrument Development program since
2004. Funding for grants in the exobiology and evolutionary
biology program has been delayed. The cuts to the research
program have affected graduate students, post-doctoral students
and junior faculty, who rely on grant funding for their
research. The decrease in available funding and research
opportunities is expected to discourage younger scientists from
entering the field.
The FY08 budget request adds $27 million of new
content in FY08 through the creation of a lunar science
research program in the Planetary Science Research line. The
total funding budgeted for lunar science through FY 2012 is
$350 million. The goals for the lunar science program over the
next five years include archiving of data from the lunar
precursor robotics missions; launching missions of opportunity
for scientific instruments on lunar precursor robotic missions
or international lunar missions and funding the analysis of
data from those missions. Plans for the lunar science program
also involve providing opportunities for developing instruments
and technologies to support lunar science studies and
investigations. What priority will the new lunar science
program have relative to other space science research
activities? Is it intended to support the human lunar
exploration program, or is it independent of that initiative?
Astrophysics
The President's NASA FY08 budget request includes $1.566 billion to
fund NASA's Astrophysics program, which seeks to improve our
understanding of the origin, structure, evolution and future of the
Universe and to search for Earth-like planets. The FY08 request
represents a $2.8 million or .02 percent increase over the President's
FY07 budget proposal.
The Astrophysics program includes the following elements:
Astrophysics Research includes managing operating
missions; managing, archiving, and disseminating mission data;
funding science research and data analysis; and technology
development
Gamma-ray Large Space Telescope (GLAST) is a mission
being conducted with NASA and the Department of Energy. The
mission will take measurements of high-energy gamma rays in an
effort to understand their sources and behavior. GLAST is
scheduled for launch in November 2007.
Kepler is a competitively-selected principal
investigator-led mission in the Discovery program that will
search for Earth-like planets. Kepler is scheduled for launch
in November 2008.
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is an infrared
observatory involving a 6.5m aperture mirror and sunshade that
will unfold upon deployment in space. JWST will enable
scientific study of the early Universe and of the development
of galaxies, stars, planetary systems and the elements required
for life. JWST is the top-ranked mission from the last National
Academies decadal survey in astronomy and astrophysics and is
considered the successor to the Hubble Space Telescope. JWST is
slated for launch in 2013.
Hubble Space Telescope is a space observatory
currently utilized to study and understand the formation,
structure, and evolution of stars and galaxies in the visible,
near infrared and ultraviolet wavelengths. The Hubble was
designed to be serviced from space. The fourth Shuttle
servicing mission is scheduled for September 2008 to replace
batteries, gyroscopes, and other systems necessary for
operating capabilities and to add new scientific instruments.
Hubble was launched in 1990.
Navigator Program involves several projects aimed at
the search for habitable planets beyond the solar system:
Space Interferometer-PlanetQuest (SIM) is a mission
to conduct a census of planetary systems and to
identify the location and masses of targets for
potential further study. SIM is a technology
development project.
Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF) is a concept for a
space mission that would detect planets similar to
Earth in the areas of nearby stars that are considered
possible for the formation of Earth-like planets. TPF
would collect and analyze data on the spectra of
planets it identified for possible signs of life. TPF
is a technology development project.
The Keck Interferometer (KI) is a ground-based
effort currently under development to measure the dust
and gas around stars, especially the inner region of
stars where Earth-like planets may form.
Large Binocular Telescope Interferometer (LBTI) in
under development and will take measurements of the
dust and gas surrounding stars, including the outer
ranges of disks around stars where it is thought that
Jupiter-like planets might form and evolve.
Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy
(SOFIA) is an astronomical observatory to help understand the
birth and death of stars, how new solar systems form, among
other astrophysical questions. The SOFIA observatory includes a
2.5 meter telescope, provided by the German Aerospace Center
(DLR), that will be mounted on a customized Boeing 747
aircraft.
Astrophysics Explorer Program provides opportunities
for researchers to assemble a team and propose to design and
develop a focused science mission. Explorer missions are led by
principal investigators and are cost-capped. The program is
intended to offer frequent flight opportunities and to conduct
focused science investigations that complement larger, NASA-
developed strategic missions. Astrophysics Explorer missions in
development include Wide-Field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE)
which seeks, as a main objective, to find the brightest
galaxies in the Universe. WISE is slated for launch in 2009.
International Space Science Collaboration, which
involves the U.S. contribution of instruments, subsystems, and
U.S. investigators to two European-led missions.
Beyond Einstein, a program including space missions,
research and theory work, and technology development aimed at
improving our understanding of proposed missions to help
understand Einstein's theory of general relativity and its
predictions about the Big Bang, black holes, and dark energy.
NASA has commissioned a National Academies study to recommend
which Beyond Einstein mission should be developed and launched
first. The Beyond Einstein program, as described in NASA's FY08
budget request documentation, includes:
Laser Interferometer Space Antenna (LISA), a
collaborative mission with the European Space Agency to
measure gravitational waves.
Constellation-X Observatory (Con-X), a mission that
will harness the collective power of several x-ray
telescopes to investigate black holes, Einstein's
theory of general relativity, the formation of
galaxies, and the nature of dark matter and dark
energy, among other science goals.
Joint Dark Energy Mission, which will study the
nature of dark energy in the Universe and the expansion
of the Universe.
Beyond Einstein Future Missions, which include an
Inflation Probe to study the causes of the inflation of
the Universe and Black Hole Finder Probe, which will
conduct a census of black holes to identify where they
are and when and how they form.
Issues
The Navigator Program, a project within the
Astrophysics theme, seeks to understand how planets and
planetary systems form, search for planets around other stars,
and characterize those planets and their environments for signs
of potential life. The Space Interferometer-PlanetQuest (SIM)
mission along with the Terrestrial Planet Finder (TPF) mission
are integral components of the Navigator Program. The 2001
astronomy and astrophysics decadal survey recommends SIM for
completion and TPF as a technology development project. The
President's FY07 request for NASA delayed SIM to a potential
2015 or 2016 launch and deferred TPF development indefinitely.
The FY08 request cuts $800M from the Navigator Program between
FY08 and FY11. The FY08 request does provide funds ($35.5M) for
reinstating technology development work on TPF. What is the
appropriate path for the Navigator program? Should funding be
restored to put SIM back on track for mission development?
Should funding for TPF technology development be increased?
Should both the SIM and TPF missions be deferred until they can
be reconsidered in the next decadal survey?
As can be seen in the chart below, a large number of
highly recommended astrophysics missions have been delayed,
canceled, or deferred. At the same time, the recent National
Academies Assessment of NASA's Astrophysics Program noted that:
``Although six astrophysics Explorer missions have been
launched in the current decade, those launches are the result
of development work performed mostly in the 1990s. At this
point it appears that only one Explorer mission will be
developed and launched in this decade, and at most one Explorer
will begin development in this decade for launch in the next.''
What is the outlook for the Astrophysics program if current
trends continue, and what should be done?
The President's FY08 budget request includes an
estimate for a Space Shuttle servicing mission of the Hubble
Space Telescope in May 2008, and the budget proposes funding to
support that date. An updated Shuttle manifest moved the
mission to September 2008, leaving a gap of four months or $40
million ($10 million a month in costs). The current tentative
Shuttle manifest has moved the mission forward to an August
2008 launch, although further changes and launch delays could
widen the funding shortfall. It is not yet clear where NASA
will find the $40 million to fill the gap.
Chairman Udall. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. I would like to begin by welcoming all of our witnesses
to today's hearing. We have a distinguished panel that can
provide this subcommittee with important perspectives on the
state of NASA's space science activities. In particular, I
would like to welcome Dr. Alan Stern, the new Associate
Administrator of NASA's Science Mission Directorate. I got to
know Dr. Stern when he was at the Southwest Research Institute,
and I look forward to working with him in his new role.
As Chairman Calvert reminded me, he is also a constituent
of mine and I am glad to have Alan here.
I would also like to welcome Dr. Dan Baker, who is the
Director of University of Colorado's laboratory for Atmospheric
and Space Physics in Boulder, Colorado, also a constituent. Dr.
Baker, great to have you.
As can be seen by the title of today's hearing, we are
going to focus on a subset of NASA's science activities, mainly
its astrophysics, planetary science, and heliophysics programs.
Obviously, NASA's Earth science program is an important element
of NASA's overall science program, but it will be the focus of
a separate hearing that will expand on the Full Committee
hearing we held earlier this year.
In addition, while not currently part of the Science
Mission Directorate, NASA' life and microgravity research
programs are also important research endeavors that will be
scrutinized by this subcommittee in the coming months,
particularly in light of the deep--and many would say, unwise--
cuts that NASA has made to those programs. To paraphrase
Dickens, it is both the best of times and the worst of times
for NASA'S space science programs.
We have witnessed a whole series of exciting events in
recent months, whether it be the discovery of possible recent
liquid water flows on Mars, stereo images of solar activity, or
Nobel Prizes awarded for research enabled by NASA's cosmic
background explorer. These are just a few of the
accomplishments of NASA's space science enterprise over the
last few years.
In short, NASA's space science programs are highly
productive and exciting in addressing compelling scientific
questions. That is the good news.
What is the bad news? The bad news is that while those
accomplishments were enabled by the Nation's past investments
in NASA's science activities, the outlook for the needed future
investments is not good if present trends are any indication.
For example, the five-year funding plan for NASA's science
mission directorate has been reduced by a total of $4 billion
since fiscal year 2005, which is a significant disruption. In
addition, the impact of those cuts to NASA'S out year science
funding is magnified by cost growth that has occurred within
some science missions under development, cost growth that is
putting additional stress on the overall space science program.
Another example: the Explorer Program, which has enabled
major scientific discoveries, has seen new mission
opportunities dramatically curtailed. Funding for research and
analysis which helps to enable scientific research and train
the next generation of scientists and engineers was cut by 15
percent in fiscal year 2007. Those cuts were also applied
retroactively to fiscal year 2006, and that reduced R&A funding
level was maintained in the '08 request.
Moreover, that 15 percent R&A cut was an average cut with
some disciplines suffering much deeper cuts.
In short, at a time when NASA's science programs offer the
promise of major advances in our understanding of the Sun, the
solar system, and the universe beyond, we risk long-term damage
to the health of those programs if we are not careful. That is
why I look forward to hearing from Dr. Stern and the rest of
our expert panel today. We need to get their best assessment of
the challenges facing NASA's space science program, and the
likely consequences of inaction, and most importantly, their
recommendations for addressing those challenges.
At the end of the day, however, it is clear to me that if
we are going to ask our nation's space science program to
undertake challenging and meaningful initiatives, we are going
to need to provide the necessary resources.
In closing, again, I want to welcome our witnesses, and I
now yield to my colleague, my good friend Ranking Member
Calvert, for any opening remarks he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Mark Udall
Good morning. I'd like to begin by welcoming all of our witnesses
to today's hearing. We have a distinguished panel that can provide this
subcommittee with important perspectives on the state of NASA's space
science activities.
In particular, I would like to welcome Dr. Alan Stern, the new
Associate Administrator of NASA's Science Mission Directorate. I got to
know Dr. Stern a bit when he was at the Southwest Research Institute,
and I look forward to working with him in his new role.
I'd also like to welcome Dr. Dan Baker, Director of the University
of Colorado's Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics in Boulder,
Colorado.
As can be seen by the title of today's hearing, we are going to
focus on a subset of NASA's science activities, namely its
astrophysics, planetary science, and heliophysics programs.
Obviously, NASA's Earth Science program is an important element of
NASA's overall science program, but it will be the focus of a separate
hearing that will expand on the Full Committee hearing we held earlier
this year.
In addition, while not currently part of the Science Mission
Directorate, NASA's life and microgravity research programs are also
important research endeavors that will be scrutinized by this
subcommittee in the coming months, particularly in light of the deep--
and many would say unwise--cuts that NASA has made to those programs.
To paraphrase Dickens, it is both ``the best of times and the worst
of times'' for NASA's space science programs. We have witnessed a whole
series of exciting events in recent months, whether it be the discovery
of possible recent liquid water flows on Mars, stereo images of solar
activity, or Nobel prizes awarded for research enabled by NASA's Cosmic
Background Explorer.
Those are just a few of the accomplishments of NASA's space science
enterprise over the past several years. In short, NASA's space science
programs are highly productive, exciting, and addressing compelling
scientific questions.
That's the good news. . .what's the bad news? The bad news is that
while those accomplishments were enabled by the Nation's past
investments in NASA's science activities, the outlook for the needed
future investments is not good if present trends are any indication.
For example, the five-year funding plan for NASA's Science Mission
Directorate has been reduced by a total of $4 billion since Fiscal Year
2005--a significant disruption.
In addition, the impact of those cuts to NASA's outyear science
funding is magnified by cost growth that has occurred within some
science missions under development--cost growth that is putting
additional stress on the overall space science program.
Another example: the Explorer program, which has enabled major
scientific discoveries, has seen new mission opportunities dramatically
curtailed.
Funding for Research and Analysis, which helps to enable scientific
research and train the next generation of scientists and engineers, was
cut by an average of 15 percent in FY 2007.
Those cuts were also applied retroactively to FY 2006 and that
reduced R&A funding level was maintained in the FY 2008 request.
Moreover, that 15 percent R&A cut was an average cut, with some
disciplines suffering much deeper cuts.
In short, at a time when NASA's science programs offer the promise
of major advances in our understanding of the sun, our solar system,
and the universe beyond, we risk doing long-term damage to the health
of those programs if we are not careful.
That is why I look forward to hearing from Dr. Stern and the rest
of our expert panel today.
We need to get their best assessment of the challenges facing
NASA's space science program and the likely consequences of inaction,
and most importantly, their recommendations for addressing those
challenges.
At the end of the day, however, it is clear to me that if we are
going to ask our nation's space science program to undertake
challenging and meaningful initiatives, we are going to need to provide
the necessary resources.
In closing, I again want to welcome our witnesses, and I now yield
to my colleague, Ranking Member Calvert, for any opening remarks he
would like to make.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
you for scheduling today's hearing on NASA's space science
program, and my sincere thanks to our witnesses for taking time
from their busy schedules to join us this morning and share
their views and recommendations.
I am glad our Chairman is here today. He was out running
this morning and did a great job, that is why he is a little
sweaty in here, though the room is a little warm, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just point that out.
As everyone in this room well knows, NASA is an
extraordinary agency that, at a relatively small cost to the
taxpayer, has produced science discoveries that have
transformed man's view of the universe around us, and has also
demonstrated that man can live and work in space. The pace and
scope of science discoveries over the last decade have been
breathtaking. Dark energy, dark matter, extra solar planets,
evidence of water, as the Chairman mentioned, on Mars, just to
name a few.
Despite the fact that funding for NASA's science mission is
roughly 32 percent of the Agency's budget, including Earth
science, hovering near a historical high relative to the
overall Agency budget, the tempo of new discoveries and
capabilities that we recently enjoyed are at serious risk of
tapering off for a variety of well-understood reasons.
One, mission costs have far exceeded early projections.
Two, until Mike Griffin's arrival as Administrator, NASA
was developing too many missions for the resources they had
available, forcing the Agency to stretch out schedules, stay
within budget, and delaying the pace of new starts.
Three, cost uncertainties of launching small and medium-
sized payloads after Delta 2 is retired, and mission assurance
and accounting changes.
Everyone in this room understands that severe budget
challenges are also confronting NASA in its manned space flight
and aeronautics research programs, forcing the Agency to remove
future budget growth from the science mission directorate in
order to address more pressing needs. I don't fault NASA for
making the tough choices it did, but it shouldn't be that way.
I have stated before and I will say it again, that the
Administration must provide NASA with realistic budget requests
to match resources with program content, otherwise, the balance
among NASA's programs becomes imperiled as the Agency moves
resources around to fund priorities and invites Congress--and
this is often not a good thing--to begin imposing its own
preferences.
NASA Administrator Mike Griffin is doing an exceptional
job, in my opinion, leading the Agency. He has set priorities,
and while everybody in this room may not agree with his
decisions, he has not attempted to be disingenuous or hasn't
disguised his decisions.
NASA's science enterprise leads the world in the quest for
human understanding of the cosmos, our solar system, and
indeed, our home planet. The strength of the Agency's science
program is rooted in its close working relationship with the
science community. Our witnesses today will provide us with the
best guidance on how NASA and Congress can address the
challenges confronting the science community to ensure a return
to a robust mission tempo and to ensure a strong cadre of
scientists and engineers to propose and design future missions.
With that, Mr. Chairman, my thanks, and again, thanks to
our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ken Calvert
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling today's hearing on NASA's
Space Science program, and my sincere thanks to our witnesses for
taking time from their busy schedules to join us this morning and share
their views and recommendations.
As everyone in this room well knows, NASA is an extraordinary
agency that at a relatively small cost to the taxpayer has produced
science discoveries that have transformed man's view of the universe
around us, and has also demonstrated that man can live and work in
space. The pace and scope of science discoveries over the last decade
has been breath-taking; dark energy, dark matter, extra-solar planets,
evidence of water on Mars, to name but a few.
Yet despite the fact that funding for NASA science missions is
roughly 32 percent of the Agency's budget (including Earth Science),
hovering near an historical high relative to the overall agency budget,
the tempo of new discoveries and capabilities that we've recently
enjoyed are at serious risk of tapering off for a variety of well
understood reasons--
mission costs have far exceeded early projections;
until Mike Griffin's arrival as Administrator, NASA was
developing too many missions for the resources it had
available, forcing the Agency to stretch out schedules to stay
within budget, and delaying the pace of new starts;
cost uncertainties of launching small and medium-sized
payloads after the Delta II is retired; and
mission assurance and accounting changes.
Everyone in this room understands that severe budget challenges are
also confronting NASA in its manned space flight and aeronautics
research programs, forcing the Agency to remove future budget growth
from the science mission directorate in order to address more pressing
needs. I don't fault NASA for making the tough choices it did.
But it shouldn't be that way. I have stated before, and I'll say it
again, that the Administration must provide NASA with realistic budget
requests to match resources with program content. Otherwise, the
balance among NASA's programs becomes imperiled as the Agency moves
resources around to fund priorities, and it invites Congress--and this
is often not a good thing--to begin imposing its own preferences.
NASA Administrator Mike Griffin is doing an exceptional job leading
the Agency. He has set priorities, and while everyone in the room may
not agree with his decisions, he has not attempted to be disingenuous
and hasn't disguised his decisions.
NASA's science enterprise leads the world in the quest for human
understanding of the cosmos, our solar system, and indeed, our home
planet. The strength of the Agency's science program is rooted in its
close working relationship with the science community.
Our witnesses today will provide us with their best guidance on how
NASA and Congress can address the challenges confronting the science
community to ensure a return to a robust mission tempo and ensure a
strong cadre of scientists and engineers to propose and design future
missions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks again to our witnesses.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Mr. Calvert.
I want to do a little housekeeping at this point before we
begin the testimony. If there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, your statements will be added to
the record. Without objection, so ordered.
In addition, we would also like to include a statement for
the record from the Planetary Society in today's hearing.
Again, without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of The Planetary Society
Restoring the Vision
NASA is a great agency achieving great things. NASA brings out the
best in us, a society using some of its great wealth to help people
around the globe understand our place in the Universe and to inspire
generations of explorers. NASA's images, its heroes, along with its
scientific and engineering achievements, have changed the world for all
humankind. This statement criticizing both the proposed NASA budget and
current NASA operating plan is in support of space exploration and the
process of scientific discovery and engineering achievement that NASA
represents to the world.
The Vision for Space Exploration--which is supposed to be guiding
NASA's program and budget--has become distorted. Its mantra, ``go as
you pay,'' has become ``go as you cannibalize other programs.'' Its
scientific underpinnings have been removed, leaving it suspended with
uncertain public support and public interest.
This statement of The Planetary Society, is designed to represent
that public interest. The Society is the largest public space-interest
group in the world, a non-governmental organization that represents no
particular profession, but instead represents the interest of citizens
who believe in the value of space exploration to the Nation and to the
world.
The original Vision for Space Exploration's first goal was ``a
sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar
system and beyond.'' Instead, the robotic program has been undercut and
the solar system is nearly unmentioned in the human program.
The original Vision for Space Exploration was to ``Undertake lunar
exploration activities to enable sustained human and robotic
exploration of Mars and more distant destinations in the solar
system.'' Instead, Mars robotic exploration in the next decade has been
almost eliminated, and lunar exploration activities have been diverted
to constructing a permanent lunar base with macro-engineering projects
in place of exploration objectives.
The original Vision for Space Exploration directed NASA to
``Conduct robotic exploration of Mars to search for evidence of life,
to understand the history of the solar system, and to prepare for
future human exploration; Conduct robotic exploration across the solar
system for scientific purposes and to support human exploration. In
particular, explore Jupiter's moons, asteroids and other bodies to
search for evidence of life, to understand the history of the solar
system, and to search for resources; and Conduct advanced telescope
searches for Earth-like planets and habitable environments around other
stars.'' Instead, Mars exploration has been cut, the mission to
Jupiter's moon Europa and the Terrestrial Planet Finder mission have
been eliminated, and the search for extraterrestrial life has been cut
in half.
Instead of ``for scientific purposes,'' the program has seen $3
billion eliminated from four years of space science planning, and
science research and data analysis--the ``seed corn'' that allows NASA
to reap future benefits from its exploration programs--was cut 15
percent across the board.
These contradictions between the conduct of the NASA program and
the originally stated Vision for Space Exploration explain why The
Planetary Society supports the Vision but opposes its current
implementation plan. The word ``exploration'' has been hijacked and is
now used to mean human space vehicle development, instead of missions
and discoveries in the solar system.
Not only do we still support the Vision, we also support the NASA
Administrator in his incredibly difficult effort to, at long last,
redirect human space flight beyond Earth orbit. Mike Griffin is not
against science, but he has been given too few resources and too many
constraints to properly administer either the Vision or space science
and exploration.
NASA cannot juggle limited resources and overburdening constraints
without dropping a few balls. NASA's budget should be increased as was
originally envisioned, and as this committee particularly supported, to
restore the Vision's scientific underpinnings and to prepare for human
exploration of the solar system. If such a realistic budget increase is
not possible, then the Vision's timetable should be stretched. In fact
originally the Vision was said to have no timetable. Most of the
current dislocations in the Vision's Constellation program are being
driven by arbitrary dates having only political objectives. There is no
national security or economic driver that requires its current
timetable.
``Save Our Science'' has become a rallying cry for The Planetary
Society--we submitted thousands of petitions to Congress last year, and
thousands more to the President this year, from citizens asking to
restore the science funding that was cut from the NASA plan.
Intellectually, science and exploration are inextricably linked, but
the ``firewall'' that once helped protect science needs to be restored.
We fully recognize that space science is not an entitlement program
and that it can proceed at a slower pace. Our call to restore the
scientific underpinnings to the Vision and to NASA's budget is not a
statement of special interest for scientists. Too often, NASA is forced
to make decisions in order to bolster one or another part of its work
force because of some special interest. Our call is dominated by the
public interest and by public support for the great ventures of space
exploration--the ventures that for the past decade brought such
extraordinary credit and support for NASA in the U.S. and around the
world.
Consider just three examples: the remarkable, continuing three-year
odyssey of the Spirit and Opportunity rovers on Mars; the complementary
discoveries about water being made from spacecraft in orbit around
Mars; and the thrilling international Cassini/Huygens mission in the
Saturn system. The fantastic discoveries from these explorations--the
watery history of Mars and the possibility of liquid water on its
surface today; water geysers in the Saturnian system; and hydrocarbon
lakes on Titan, to name a few--are only part of the rewards that the
U.S. has accrued. The adventures of roving on Mars, probing Titan, and
voyages through the solar system have enthralled the public, motivated
a generation of students and their teachers, and have advanced American
technology. And, of course, we should mention the Hubble Space
Telescope and the Voyager probes. Their decades-long explorations have
inspired generations of students to strive for excellence, and yet NASA
was ready to abandon them both just a few years ago.
The FY 2007 budget damaged the future of NASA. Science missions
were delayed or canceled; technology funding was slashed, as was
research funding--astrobiology, in particular. The slash in research
and technology funding put at risk the ability to develop future
missions and to adequately analyze data from existing ones; it will
drive many young people from the field, thereby mortgaging the future
of NASA science and exploration.
Congress recognized these problems last year, the FY 2007
Appropriations Bill passed by the House would have partially rectified
these problems. The Senate was also working to correct the situation.
But all that work was lost when no budget was passed last year. We
urgently ask you to support restoration for some of the losses in NASA
science, technology, and flight missions.
There is one additional thing that you could do to help open the
box in which NASA has been placed--the box defined by too much politics
and not enough resources. That is international cooperation. Four
nations, besides the U.S., are planning lunar missions: Japan and China
this year, India next year, Russia soon afterwards. In fact, these
countries are not just sending single lunar missions, but each has a
lunar program with orbiters to be followed by landers and rovers.
Europe is also planning lunar missions as part of its Aurora
exploration program. For the U.S. to plan a lunar base completely
independent of these missions is not just wasteful, it lacks rationale.
It lacks vision.
The Planetary Society has called for an International Lunar Decade
in which the space-faring nations of the world can cooperate to advance
their exploration objectives, and in which the developing world can
share in the benefits of space science and exploration. The U.S. could
return to its original Vision for Space Exploration, looking forward to
Mars. We have already landed humans on the Moon. We can work with other
nations as they now reach for the Moon, and in that way, build a
rationale that serves more than just a space program, but global
cooperation as well.
This statement has focused on exploration, the goal enunciated in
the Vision for Space Exploration to extend human presence into the
solar system. More specifically, we have focused on the planets. That
isn't too surprising--we are after all, The Planetary Society. However,
we were founded on the premise that one of the chief goals of planetary
exploration is to learn about ourselves, and about our own planet. The
very first observations and models of global climate change came from
planetary missions to Venus, and then later, to Mars. The most basic
scientific work of our co-founders Carl Sagan and Bruce Murray was
about comparative planetology, studying other worlds to understand the
processes at work on our own planet. Never in our history has
understanding the Earth been so important. Congress should, along with
addressing all other science concerns, restore the programs and
missions in NASA to observe the Earth.
This past year, NASA dropped ``understanding the Earth'' from its
mission statement. The Planetary Society picked it up, and added it to
our own mission statement.\1\ But we cannot pick up the budget for the
planetary and Earth science that has been cut from the NASA budget.
Congress must do that. We urge Congress to help NASA achieve the goals
articulated in the Vision for Space Exploration, for the benefit of our
future, and our children's future. Save our future; Save Our Science.
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\1\ To inspire the people of Earth to explore other worlds,
understand our own, and seek life elsewhere.
Statement of J. Craig Wheeler
President, American Astronomical Society
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on NASA's 2008 science
budget from my perspective as President of the American Astronomical
Society (AAS).
The AAS believes that NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD)
should be part of the American Innovation Agenda, which seeks to
bolster funding for the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science, and the National
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). These agencies have been
identified as vital to America's leadership in innovation, by training
a highly-skilled workforce and fostering the discovery and development
of new ideas. NASA Science is a partner in these endeavors.
Specifically, we advocate for increasing NASA SMD's FY 2008 budget to
$5.566 billion, which is six percent over the final FY 2007 amount and
a modest increase over the President's FY 2008 request.
The AAS is the major organization of professional astronomers in
the United States. The basic objective of the AAS is to promote the
advancement of astronomy and closely related branches of science. The
membership, numbering approximately 7000, includes physicists,
mathematicians, geologists, and engineers whose interests lie within
the broad spectrum of modern astronomy. AAS members advise NASA on
scientific priorities, participate in NASA missions, and use the data
from NASA's outstanding scientific discoveries to build a coherent
picture for the origin and evolution of the Earth, the solar system,
our Galaxy, and the Universe as a whole.
In the recent past, the astronomical community, working together
with NASA, has produced a remarkable string of successes that have
changed our basic picture of the Universe. Observations with the Hubble
Space Telescope (HST) of exploding stars whose light has been traveling
for half the age of the Universe, combined with the exquisite map of
the glow from the Big Bang itself from the Wilkinson Microwave
Anisotropy Probe and information from other observatories, shows that
the Universe we live in is not the Universe we see. Mysterious Dark
Matter makes the ordinary particles clump together to form stars and
galaxies. Even more mysterious Dark Energy makes the expansion of the
Universe speed up. Both of these concepts challenge our understanding
of the nature of matter and energy in the Universe and open up broad
new vistas for future work. An ambitious set of Great Observatories,
now including Spitzer in the infrared and Chandra at X-ray wavelengths,
is hard at work, enriching our understanding of how the Universe works.
Similarly, exploration of the solar system has been a resounding
success for NASA, with exciting missions to Mars and to Saturn
revealing a beautiful and intricate history that is interwoven with the
history of our planet Earth. The discovery of planets around other
stars has been a great triumph of the past decade, raising hopes for
seeing planets like our own Earth, and placing our own solar system,
and life itself, in a new context.
NASA's key role in these discoveries makes its science program of
deep interest to AAS members. In the past, NASA has worked with the
astronomical community to find the most promising paths forward. The
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is a large program that was endorsed
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Decadal Survey in astronomy.
When completed in the next decade, it will help expand the frontier of
knowledge to the deepest reaches of space and time and into the hidden
places where stars and planets are formed. The astronomical community
also recommended, and NASA plans to execute, a wide range of other
programs--some of moderate scope and others that nourish the
infrastructure for a healthy and vibrant community. This balanced
approach has proved best--with a range of opportunities carefully
crafted to get the best science from NASA's Science budget.
Recognizing the current challenging budget climate, in which
federal non-security, discretionary spending is declining by about one
percent, the current NASA budget for science is nonetheless cause for
concern. The continuing resolution (CR), now Public Law 110-005,
provided funding for many federal agencies including NASA for FY 2007.
NASA Science has suffered a $78.8 million shortfall from the
President's FY 2007 request. The President's FY 2008 budget request
represents a 0.9 percent increase in NASA Science spending over the FY
2007 request; however, with inflation currently around two percent, the
FY 2008 request still represents a decline in real dollars available
for research in science compared to the President's FY 2007 request. A
key question is what will become the new baseline for NASA Science
funding, the FY 2007 request or the CR. If the CR is adopted as the new
baseline, this could represent a loss to NASA Science in the outyears
of $1 billion or more.
The AAS therefore recommends that Congress increase the FY 2008
budget for NASA Science by six percent over the CR level. This modest
increase over the President's FY 2008 request will help maintain
balance within the science portfolio, which is critical to our
community. It is important to support small missions and research
grants to individual investigators. Otherwise, many exciting programs
to explore the solar system, to detect planets around other stars, to
measure gravitational waves from astronomical events, to explore black
holes in all their manifestations, and to seek the nature of the dark
energy may be threatened. In particular, we advocate for restoring
funding to the Explorer program and protecting the Beyond Einstein
mission.
We further advocate that NASA Science should be part of the
American innovation agenda. Maintaining and strengthening American
innovation in science and technology has broad bipartisan support, both
in Congress and the Administration. Our recommended increase of six
percent in NASA Science is smaller than the increases proposed for the
science component of other agencies identified as strategically
important for innovation. These include an 8.7 percent increase for
NSF, a 16 percent increase for Department of Energy's Office of
Science, and nearly 21 percent for NIST (all increases over the CR
levels). For AAS members, the cuts in NASA's support for science
threaten to offset or overwhelm the increases that have been aimed at
improving America's innovation through the NSF, DOE, and NIST. A real
effort to improve science and engineering in the U.S. should treat
NASA's science program as part of the solution. NASA's science missions
inspire new generations of young people to pursue careers in science,
engineering, and mathematics and train these students and young
scientists to become the innovators of the future.
Finally, the AAS applauds the Administration and Congress for
upholding the priorities of the NAS Decadal Survey in astronomy. We are
pleased that the development of JWST and HST servicing mission are
priorities in the new budget, but we stress that balance is critical in
the Science portfolio.
NASA Science has been and continues to be a beacon of innovation
and discovery by inspiring generations of young people, capturing the
imagination of the public, developing new technologies, and discovering
profound insights into the nature of our Universe.
The AAS and its members are prepared to work with Congress and with
NASA to help find the best way forward. We will give you our best
advice and we will work diligently to make the most of NASA's
investment in science.
Chairman Udall. I would like to acknowledge the presence of
Eddie Bernice Johnson, Congresswoman Johnson. She is a Member
of the Full Committee, and she is here today with us. Also, I
would like to acknowledge, Dr. Stern, with your forbearance, an
esteemed and highly accomplished American, Dr. John Mather, who
is a winner of the Nobel Prize and the new NASA chief
scientist, so Dr. Mather, we are honored to have you here as
well.
At this time, I would like to introduce our panel of
witnesses, and I will go across and introduce each one of you,
and then we will come back and start with Dr. Stern.
As I mentioned earlier, we have a constituent, a friend of
mine, Dr. Alan Stern, who in addition to serving as the
principal investigator on NASA's New Horizons mission to Pluto,
has now become the new Associate Administrator of NASA's
science mission directorate.
Next to him is Dr. Lennard Fisk, who is the Thomas M.
Donahue distinguished Professor of Space Science at the
University of Michigan, currently serving as the Chairman of
the National Research Council Space Studies Board.
Next to him is Dr. Garth Illingworth, who is a Professor of
Astronomy and Astrophysics at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, and is the Chair of the Astronomy and Astrophysics
Advisory Committee.
Dr. Daniel Baker, who I mentioned earlier, is Professor of
Astrophysical and Planetary Sciences and Director for the
Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, fondly known as
LASP, and it is located in my home district at the University
of Colorado, Boulder.
Finally, we have Dr. Joseph Burns who is the Irving Porter
Church Professor of Engineering and Professor of Astronomy, and
currently serves as Vice Provost for Physical Sciences and
Engineering at Cornell.
Again, welcome to all of you. We really are appreciative of
you taking time today.
You will each, as I think you know, have five minutes for
your opening remarks, and after which the Members of the
Subcommittee or Members of the Full Committee, as it may be,
will have five minutes to ask questions.
Dr. Stern, the floor is yours. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. S. ALAN STERN, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, NASA
SCIENCE MISSION DIRECTORATE
Dr. Stern. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Udall, Ranking
Member Calvert, Congresswoman Johnson. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today.
I am excited and humbled by the task I assumed four weeks
ago, leading NASA's Space Science Mission Directorate, the
world's premiere space and Earth science effort, without doubt.
The President's budget for NASA fiscal year 2008 provides
$5.4 billion for science in that year alone. This allows us to
operate a fleet of 52 orbital and interplanetary missions while
simultaneously developing another 41 new missions for launch
over the next seven years. That is an impressive total, 93
space missions in development or flight.
Within this budget, we also support a modest sub-orbital
research program, and more than 3,000 scientist-led research
projects across the entire spectrum of Earth and space
sciences.
More complete details of NASA's fiscal year 2008 science
budget request are included in my written testimony, but you
asked me to comment on how I see my role at NASA, and I want to
turn heads while I am here. I want to produce landmark
scientific achievements and to make my Directorate and its
various projects run more efficiently and stay within their
cost boundaries. I see this as a requirement for my being an
agent for change.
I want to highlight two examples of change that have
already taken place since I began work at NASA four weeks ago.
The first is the establishment of an Office of Chief Scientist,
or OCS. This office will provide an independent technical
analysis and advice regarding scientific matters within our
portfolio, particularly on issues of prioritization within and
between each of the four scientific disciplines. As I said, we
opened this office on my first day at NASA, and it is a signal
of our renewed commitment to scientific excellence. OCS is led
by one of the most impressive and experienced space scientists
in the United States, cosmologist and 2006 Nobel Laureate Dr.
John Mather from NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. John is
with us here today, and he is ably supported by two deputies,
one for Earth sciences and one for the space sciences.
I have also created a position called a senior advisor for
research analysis within the leadership of the Directorate, and
I have appointed Dr. Yvonne Pendleton to that position. She is
also here just behind me. Yvonne? Dr. Pendleton was formerly
the Space Science and Astrobiology Division Chief at NASA's
Ames Research Center where she set an outstanding record about
science program management and achievement. Dr. Pendleton is
charged with guiding our research and analysis program and
making recommendations for ways that we can both improve the
processes and the content of our core research and analysis
effort. This really is a core part of our entire science. Never
before has NASA's scientific leadership included a position
focused solely on improving our research and analysis programs.
Now, let me turn to the four specific questions you asked
of me. The first question asked about my top goals, I have
three, and they are first, to make stronger progress at all
four of the Decadal surveys. Secondly, to get more from our
existing and planned budget, and third, to help the Division
for Space Exploration succeed.
Your second question concerning the top three management
risks as I see them, these are the cost of launches to space
for science missions, cost growth in science mission
development, and the sometimes immature cost realism and the
resulting unrealistic expectations that have been set by some
recent Decadal surveys.
Your third question concerned how we will prioritize and
balance our objectives across the portfolio. The answer is that
we must balance with four considerations: science impact,
affordability, development risk, and technological readiness. I
have chartered Chief Scientist Mather to make a fair and
deterministic process that takes these four factors into
account to balance our priorities within each portfolio element
and between the four portfolios.
The final question concerns strategic investments that I
would like to make. These will be in three areas: research and
analysis, data analysis from space flight missions, and sub-
orbital programs. To say a little bit more specifically, I want
to make scientists more efficient and productive and increase
the funding to research and analysis so we can better achieve
our research objectives. Regarding data analysis, an increase
in data analysis would provide the taxpayers and decision-
makers like yourself with an enhanced value for the investments
that we make in the missions to actually get the goods out at
the other end, to the analysis and make the discoveries after
the data is collected.
Finally, regarding sub-orbital programs, using rockets and
high altitude balloons, I intend to provide opportunities to
train space scientists in the art of space flight, to bridge
the 2010 to 2012 desert in orbital and planetary mission
launches, and to provide opportunities for technology
development and demonstration through this sub-orbital program.
I will close now by thanking you again for inviting me, and
I look forward to answering your questions and working with you
in the future.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Stern follows:]
Prepared Statement of S. Alan Stern
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today as the new Associate Administrator for
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD). The four weeks I have spent
on the job at NASA Headquarters have been personally rewarding, and I
look forward to continuing that experience in appearing before the
Subcommittee today to discuss NASA's plans for the future of SMD's
space--and Earth--science portfolio, as represented in the President's
FY 2008 budget request for NASA, and to highlight my vision for this
organization. I appreciate this opportunity to address your questions
and concerns.
First, permit me to note that although my scientific background and
expertise is in astrophysics and planetary science, I serve as the
Associate Administrator for all four of our Earth and space science
disciplines, and that I look forward to learning more about Earth
Science and Heliophysics in order to further advance these important
programs in SMD's science portfolio.
The President's Vision for Space Exploration calls upon NASA to
conduct robotic and human exploration of the Moon, Mars and other
destinations, to conduct robotic exploration across the solar system,
and to conduct advanced telescope searches for Earth-like planets
around other stars. Other Presidential directives and legislative
mandates instruct NASA to conduct Earth observation and scientific
research and to explore the origin and destiny of the universe. With
enactment of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-155), the
Congress provided a fresh legislative mandate for this charge, calling
for a balanced program of science, exploration, and aeronautics.
I am committed to implementing this direction, and bringing to NASA
and the Congress the best possible slate of programs and program
success within the significant resources already available. This
includes programs synergistic with NASA's Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate and also research that both enables, and is enabled by,
human exploration plans for the Moon and Mars. I am an enthusiastic
advocate of human exploration and believe that a strong science program
associated with this exploration is important to maximizing the
benefits to the Nation of such human exploration.
Vision for SMD
Before I outline the recent scientific achievements of NASA's space
science program and the President's request to further advance that
program in FY 2008, I would like to share with the Subcommittee several
guiding principles I am instilling in SMD, as well as an important
change to the way matters of scientific prioritization are analyzed and
debated within SMD.
Below are my three guiding principles for SMD, each is extremely
important and of equal priority:
1. To make strong progress advancing the priorities of all
four decadal surveys\1\, for example by increasing our
international collaboration efforts;
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\1\ The term ``decadal survey'' refers to a regular series of
reports conducted by the National Research Council of the National
Academies on behalf of NASA and its partner agencies. Each of SMD's
science disciplines has its own decadal survey, representing community
consensus in each field. These surveys assess proposed activities and
recommend investment priorities over a ten-year timeframe.
2. To get more from our existing and planned budgets, for
example by better managing flight missions and by ensuring that
data analysis from missions is sufficiently funded to ``get the
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
promised goods out;'' and
3. To help the Vision for Space Exploration succeed, for
example by fostering a lunar science community.
As stated above, I also have made an important change to the way
matters of scientific prioritization are analyzed and debated within
SMD. That change is both to our processes and to our senior leadership
in SMD. On my first day with NASA, one month ago today, I established a
new office, the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS), reporting directly
to me as the Associate Administrator for SMD. The primary function of
this new office is to provide independent technical analysis and advice
regarding scientific matters in the SMD portfolio. In particular, this
includes issues of prioritization both within, and between, each of the
four scientific disciplines in SMD's portfolio. Previously, no strong,
formal, independent advice function was in place. To ensure the highest
quality of advice, I asked cosmologist and Nobel Laureate Dr. John
Mather to lead this effort as the SMD Chief Scientist, and he has
accepted. John is ably supported by two deputy Chief Scientists, one
for the Earth Sciences and one for the Space Sciences. I believe Dr.
Mather and his team, coupled with the strong role they are chartered to
play in mission prioritization, selection, and science management
decisions, will produce increasing benefits as we go forward.
Scientific Achievements
Now I will turn to some of the recent scientific achievements of
NASA's science program.
I am proud to be leading a world-class effort that consistently
returns historic scientific results. This past year alone was truly
remarkable for scientific discovery about our Earth, the Sun, our solar
system, and the universe. This is exemplified in part by the fact that
NASA alone was responsible for 11 percent of Science News magazine's
top stories--covering all fields of science--for 2006; this is an all-
time record in the 34 years that this metric has been tracked.
Important findings resulting from our program ranged from new
observations of familiar phenomena like the ozone hole, hurricanes, and
rainfall, to the discovery of lakes of organic hydrocarbons on Saturn's
planet-sized moon Titan, to the identification of new classes of
planetary abodes across our galaxy, to the study of the Sun's magnetic
field, showing it to be more turbulent and dynamic than previously
expected.
As these and other results about our world and the universe pour
in, NASA also continues to develop and launch our next generation of
missions, and to support a vigorous scientific community via research
and data analysis funding. In total, I note, NASA currently is
developing or flying a total of 93 space and Earth science missions--
far more than all of the other space agencies of the world combined.
NASA also supports over 3,000 separate space and Earth science research
investigations in our Research and Analysis programs, spending
approximately $600 million annually on scientific data analysis,
modeling, and theory across the four disciplines of Earth and space
science spanned by SMD.
I intend for SMD to continue to turn heads across the world by
developing space missions and supporting scientific research that
rewrites textbooks in all of our science disciplines.
At present, NASA is operating 52 space and Earth science missions
and, simultaneously, developing 41 new flight missions. These new
missions range from modest Principal Investigator-led efforts like the
Interstellar Boundary Explorer (IBEX) currently planned for launch in
2008 and the Phoenix Mars lander about to launch this summer, to the
flagship NASA space science missions like the James Webb Space
Telescope (JWST) mission in development for launch in 2013.
In 2006, NASA launched four new science and technology
demonstration missions: New Horizons, Solar Terrestrial Relations
Observatories (STEREO), CloudSat, and Space Technology (ST)-5. We also
partnered with other Federal and international agencies to launch five
other science and technology missions: Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared
Pathfinder Satellite Observations (CALIPSO), Two Wide-Angle Imaging
Neutral-Atom Spectrometers (TWINS)-A, Hinode (Solar-B), ST-6, and the
NOAA GOES-N satellite. Below Is more detail on this impressive list of
newly launched missions.
In January 2006, NASA launched the New Horizons mission to the
planet Pluto and the ancient Kuiper Belt in which it orbits. New
Horizons, the fastest spacecraft ever launched, will begin its
reconnaissance of these bodies eight years hence, in 2015, following a
three billion-plus mile crossing of our planetary system. I am very
proud to have been since its inception, and to continue to be, the
Principal Investigator of this mission. Just 13 months after launch,
this February, New Horizons flew by Jupiter, making important new
observations of a wide variety of exotic phenomena in the Jupiter
system, including, for example, the eruption of the gargantuan Tvashtar
volcano on Jupiter's moon, Io.
Following on the launch of New Horizons with the April 2006 launch
of the CloudSat and CALIPSO spacecraft, NASA added two important assets
to the ``A-train'' of satellites flying in close proximity polar orbits
around the Earth to gain a better understanding of key factors related
to climate change.
NASA has also been very active this past year launching new
heliophysics missions. The agency collaborated on the Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency's new Hinode (Solar-B) mission, which was
successfully launched in September 2006. Early results have already
provided new insight on solar magnetic processes operating in the Sun's
atmosphere.
Then in October 2006, NASA's twin STEREO spacecraft were launched
to help researchers construct the first-ever three-dimensional views of
the Sun's atmosphere. This new view will improve our abilities in space
weather forecasting and greatly advance the ability of scientists to
understand solar physics, which, in turn, enables us to better protect
humans living and working in space.
Already this year, on February 17, we launched all five THEMIS
(Time History of Events and Macroscale Interactions during Substorms)
microsatellites on a single rocket to study the genesis of Earth's
aurora. On April 25, the Aeronomy of Ice in the Mesosphere (AIM)
mission was launched to study ice clouds in the polar regions of
Earth's upper atmosphere. We also remain on track to launch both the
Dawn mission to explore fascinating and important Ceres and Vesta in
the main belt of asteroids between Mars and Jupiter, and also the
Phoenix Mars lander by late this summer.
From across the solar system, NASA's spacecraft have provided
startling new insights into the formation and evolution of the planets.
Images from the Mars Global Surveyor have revealed recent deposits in
gullies on Mars, evidence that suggests water may have flowed in these
locations within the last several years. The Mars Reconnaissance
Orbiter, which began its primary science phase in November 2006, has
not only taken extraordinary high resolution images of Mars at
resolutions greater than any other mission to-date, but has taken
incredible images of Opportunity and Spirit on the surface, and helped
the Phoenix lander find a safe landing area. From its orbit around
Saturn, the Cassini spacecraft recently found unexpected evidence of
liquid water geysers erupting from near-surface water reservoirs on
Saturn's moon, Enceladus.
Additionally, the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP)
Explorer mission was able to gather new information about the first
second after the universe formed, while the Chandra X-ray Observatory
provided new and strong evidence of dark matter, and the Hubble Space
Telescope identified 16 candidate planets orbiting other stars near the
center of our galaxy.
In late October 2006, NASA Administrator Mike Griffin announced
plans for a fifth and final Space Shuttle servicing mission to the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) to extend and dramatically improve its
capabilities for the future. The repaired and revitalized HST will
boast two new major scientific instruments with capabilities that will
make it 10 times more powerful than the HST we have today.
In Earth Science, researchers are using Tropical Rainfall Measuring
Mission (TRMM) data to provide a complete picture of low-latitude
precipitation and storms around the entire world; in 2006, researchers
used eight years of continuous data from the TRMM lightning Imaging
Sensor to identify the regions on Earth that typically experience the
most intense thunderstorms.
Using instruments flying closer to Earth, NASA investigators flew
29 separate scientific instruments to 60,000 foot altitudes aboard
NASA's WB-57F Canberra aircraft in the Costa Rica Aura Validation
Experiment (CAVE). These airborne measurements, coupled with
measurements from the orbiting Aura spacecraft, shed light on how
ozone-destroying chemicals get into the stratosphere over the tropics
and how high-altitude clouds affect the flow of water vapor--a powerful
greenhouse gas--in this critical region of the atmosphere.
Additionally, scientists using nearly a decade of global ocean
satellite data were able to demonstrate a strong relationship between
warming climate and a decline in the microscopic marine plant life
(phytoplankton) at the base of the marine ecosystem.
Examples of important successes in our data analysis programs are
also diverse. Astronomers combining data from the Hubble Space
Telescope with data from ground-based and other space-based telescopes
have created the first three-dimensional map of the large-scale
distribution of dark matter in the universe. NASA researchers also
found organic materials that formed in the most distant regions of the
early solar system preserved in a unique meteorite that fell over
Canada in 2000. And, using a network of small automated telescopes,
astronomers have discovered a planet orbiting in a binary star system,
showing that planet formation very likely occurs in most star systems.
In our home solar system, scientists predicted that the next solar
activity cycle will be 30-50 percent stronger than the previous one and
up to a year late. Accurately predicting the Sun's cycles will help
plan for the effects of solar storms and help protect future
astronauts. And a breakthrough ``solar climate'' forecast was made with
a combination of computer simulation and groundbreaking observations of
the solar interior from space using the NASA/ESA Solar and Heliospheric
Observatory (SOHO).
The list of achievements resulting from NASA's space and Earth
science portfolio is much longer than these examples alone. I am
excited to tell you that lack of time here today rather than lack of
results, causes me to have to move on from this topic to discuss the
President's FY 2008 budget request for space science.
Highlights of the Science Mission Directorate's FY 2008 Budget Request
NASA's FY 2008 budget request for the Agency's science portfolio is
$5.5 billion. This represents an increase of $49.3 million (or one
percent) over the FY 2007 request, adjusted for NASA's new, simplified
full cost accounting system. It will enable NASA to launch or partner
on 10 new missions, operate and provide ground support for more than 50
spacecraft, and fund a wide array of scientific research related to and
based on the data returned from these missions.
The Planetary Science budget request of $1.4 billion will advance
scientific knowledge of the solar system, search for evidence of
extraterrestrial life, and prepare for human exploration of the Moon
and Mars. NASA will get an early start on Lunar science when the
Discovery Program's Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3) launches aboard India's
Chandrayaan-1 mission in March 2008. Also aboard this mission will be
Mini-RF, a technology demonstration payload, supported by NASA's
Exploration Systems and Space Operations Mission Directorates which may
glean evidence for water in the Moon's polar regions. In support of
expanded opportunities for pursuing lunar science, the President's
request includes $351 million from FY 2008-2012 for a Lunar Science
Research budget line within the Planetary Science Division. The Science
Mission Directorate is already hard at work creating synergy with the
programs of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate. After the
Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter completes its prime mission for the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, the Science Mission
Directorate plans to fund extended mission operations through this
budget line in order to maximize scientific return from the spacecraft.
In addition, the new Lunar Science Research Initiative includes
Missions of Opportunity, technology development, data archiving, and
expanded basic lunar research. The Discovery and New Frontiers programs
also provide opportunities for the science community to propose
missions to accomplish lunar science investigations, and one such
mission is under study. We have tasked the National Research Council
(NRC) to conduct a study on the scientific context for the exploration
of the Moon. Their preliminary report is in hand, and their final
report is due this summer. That report will help us mature our lunar
science plans in the months ahead. We have also begun similar
coordinating steps for Mars, where SMD already has a mature and robust
program of scientific exploration.
The FY 2008 budget also supports the Mars Exploration Program by
operating five spacecraft at Mars, flying the Phoenix lander, scheduled
for launch in August 2007, and continuing to develop the Mars Science
Laboratory for a launch scheduled in 2009. The Discovery Program's Dawn
Mission dual asteroid orbiter will be operating en route to the
asteroid belt, and the Mercury Surface, Space Environment, Geochemistry
and Ranging (MESSENGER) spacecraft will make its first flyby of
Mercury. Last year, three Discovery mission proposals and three
Discovery Missions of Opportunity were selected for Phase A studies
which will culminate late this year in new mission and instrument
selections. The Discovery Program plans to again invite proposals for
additional new missions in 2008. Additionally, the New Frontiers
Program's Juno Mission will undergo both a Preliminary Design Review
and a Non-Advocate Review in FY 2008 in preparation for entering
development towards a 2011 launch to study Jupiter's interior, aurora,
and magnetosphere. Like Discovery, the New Frontiers Program plans to
release a new Announcement of Opportunity (AO) in 2008.
The Heliophysics budget request of $1.1 billion will support 14
operational missions and six missions in development to better
characterize and understand the Sun and its effects on Earth, the solar
system, and space environmental conditions that will be experienced by
astronauts, and to demonstrate technologies that can improve future
operational systems. Additionally, during FY 2008, the Explorer Program
will launch both the Interstellar Boundary Explorer (IBEX) mission,
focused on the detection of the very edge of our solar system's
heliosphere and the Coupled Ion-Neutral Dynamics Investigation (CINDI)
Mission of Opportunity. The Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO) to study
the Sun's magnetic field is also scheduled for launch in late 2008 or
early 2009. The Geospace Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) mission,
presently in formulation, will undergo a Preliminary Design Review and
a Non-Advocate Review in FY 2008 in preparation for entering
development in early FY 2009. RBSP will improve the understanding of
how solar storms interact with Earth's Van Allen radiation belts. We
remain on track to release the next Explorer Announcement of
Opportunity in very early FY 2008 and we hope to select three new
astrophysics and heliophysics missions, as well as one or more Missions
of Opportunity, as a result of that call for proposals.
The Astrophysics budget request of $1.6 billion will support
continued operation and data analysis from NASA's orbital astronomical
observatories, including the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Chandra X-
Ray Observatory, and the Spitzer Space Telescope, and to build more
powerful instruments to peer deeper into the cosmos. HST is scheduled
for a final servicing mission in August 2008 using the Space Shuttle.
Along with repairs and service life extension efforts, two new
instruments will be installed during the servicing mission that will
dramatically extend HST's performance and enable further discoveries,
including Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), which will re-enable some science
observations that have been affected by the recent failure of the
Advanced Camera for Surveys. After the servicing mission, HST is
planned to have six fully operational instruments (including a suite of
cameras and spectrographs that will have about 10 times the capability
of older instruments) as well as other new hardware planned to support
another five years of world-class space science. Additionally, the
Gamma-ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST) will launch in FY 2008 to
begin a five-year mission mapping the gamma-ray sky and investigating
gamma-ray bursts, and the Kepler mission development will be near
completion in preparation for launch in FY 2009, to determine the
frequency of Earth-like planets. Further, the James Webb Space
Telescope astrophysics flagship mission will undergo its Preliminary
Design Review and a Non-Advocate Review in FY 2008, in preparation for
entering hardware development.
As the Subcommittee is aware, the SOFIA airborne observatory, which
we have been developing with the German Aerospace Research Center (DLR)
has been reinstated. I am pleased to report that SOFIA had its first
functional check-out flight last week; it is scheduled to undergo an
ambitious program of flight testing that begins this year and will
continue in 2008. Though we know of no technical showstoppers in regard
to the airworthiness of the aircraft or operation of the telescope,
this program has some remaining hurdles to overcome and so remains
subject to a careful management review later this spring chaired by the
NASA Associate Administrator. The SOFIA program baseline will be
finalized at that time.
Also in our Astrophysics program, ESA's Herschel and Planck
missions are planned for launch in FY 2008; both of these missions
include important contributions and scientific participation from NASA.
While the focus of this hearing is on space science, I would also
like to briefly address the FY 2008 President's Budget request for
Earth Science. The Earth Science budget request is $1.5 billion, an
increase of $27.7 million over the FY 2007 request, to better
understand the Earth's atmosphere, lithosphere, hydrosphere,
cryosphere, and biosphere as a single connected system. This request
includes additional funding for the Global Precipitation Measurement
(GPM) mission in response to the high priority placed on GPM in the
National Research Council (NRC) Decadal Survey. As the follow-on to the
highly successful Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission, GPM's Core
satellite is planned for launch no later than 2013, followed by a
Constellation spacecraft the following year. Other satellites in the
GPM constellation will be provided by NASA's international partners or
domestic operational partners. The Earth Science budget also includes
increased funding for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission and for the
Glory mission, and provides funds for the National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) Preparatory Project
(NPP) to reflect instrument availability and launch delays. Funds are
requested for continued development and implementation of the Ocean
Surface Topography Mission to launch in 2008, the Aquarius mission to
measure the ocean's surface salinity to launch in 2009, and the
Orbiting Carbon Observatory mission planned for launch in 2008. NASA
will continue to be the largest contributor to the Administration's
Climate Change Science Program by collecting global data sets and
improving predictive capabilities that will enable advanced assessments
of the nature, causes, and consequences of global climate change. Over
the coming months, NASA will evaluate strategies for implementing the
recommendations of the National Research Council's Earth Science
Decadal Survey and responding to challenges to the continuity of
climate measurements resulting from the Nunn-McCurdy recertification of
the NPOESS program. By working together, NASA and NOAA have already
been able to initiate the restoration of one of the de-manifested
sensors to (the Ozone Mapping and Profiling Suite limb instrument) to
the NPP satellite, which will help continue the record of high vertical
resolution ozone profile measurements into the next decade. I am
personally committed to continuing and continually improving the
working relationship between NASA and NOAA, and met with NOAA
executives on my first week in office to transmit this message.
Looking Forward
With that overview of the FY 2008 budget request as a backdrop, I
turn now to addressing the specific questions raised in the letter of
invitation to this hearing. The Subcommittee's first question concerns
my goals for SMD over the next five years.
I view my role as the Associate Administrator for SMD as being an
agent for change, to make SMD work better and more efficiently, and to
turn heads by producing landmark scientific accomplishments. With that
in mind, as outlined earlier in my testimony, I have three goals for
the organization that I want to share with you today. The first is to
make strong progress advancing all four decadal surveys, which we will
attack as vigorously as possible, for example by increasing our
international collaboration efforts. The second is to get more science
accomplished from our budget. I believe that by looking for ways to
increase efficiency within our organization, and within the way we
manage missions, we can make new funding available within the
President's budget that will enable us to do significantly more. My
third objective is to help ensure that the Vision for Space Exploration
is successful by increasing the scientific yield it will produce. There
are many ways that SMD and the scientific community will help support
the Vision, such as through a robust lunar science research program. By
providing increased opportunities to conduct lunar science, I believe
that we can grow a strong lunar community, just as the Mars community
increased once regular flight opportunities were made available in the
mid-1990s.
The Subcommittee's second question concerns SMD's top three
programmatic risks. The first is the rising cost of launches to space.
The Delta-II launch vehicle has been the reliable workhorse for
launching science missions to Earth orbit or in the inner planets
neighborhood across SMD disciplines. However, the supplier of that
launcher is getting out of the Delta-II business in favor of larger and
more expensive Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). NASA's Space
Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD) acquires launch services for SMD,
and we are working with SOMD on their assessment of options for the
future. These options include: design of the future medium-class
mission set to fit either larger or smaller ELVs; planning to co-
manifest more missions to optimize the use of larger ELVs, and working
with SOMD to qualify new and as yet unproven alternate launch vehicles
to be offered by new entrants into the market. A second risk area is
cost and schedule growth as SMD pursues its challenging flight
missions. At both the Agency and SMD level, we are putting in place
better cost-estimating tools and capturing lessons learned from recent
missions. We are also carefully examining the readiness of new
technologies before we confirm missions that use them, and we are
introducing new experience-based standards for the selection of
Principal Investigators. This ties into the third risk, which is
uncertainty in mission development risk. SMD will work harder to
understand and reduce risks, rather than waiting for problems to appear
when missions are deep in development when cost impacts are most
severe. I note that these kinds of emphasis on good management will be
key to getting more from our budget so that future missions are not
delayed or canceled to pay for problems on existing mission
developments.
The Subcommittee's third question concerns prioritization and
balance. NASA's approach to setting the balance of investment among
science areas is based on the following considerations: science value,
mission affordability, mission risk, and mission readiness. The SMD
makes a commitment to progress on each of the four SMD-assigned science
objectives in the 2006 NASA Strategic Plan and each of the four decadal
surveys produced for us by the National Academy. Long-term outcomes are
science-based, not solely mission-based; thus sub-orbital and research
and analysis (R&A) programs are also part of this. We assess progress
against community roadmaps laid out for each science area. The pace of
progress can be influenced by ties to other NASA and Federal programs,
e.g., the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and NPOESS in the case of
Earth Science, and human exploration time lines in the case of the Mars
Exploration Program. Many science objectives can be accomplished using
a mix of small, medium and large missions, international collaboration,
and innovative missions of opportunity; others require large missions
that are more difficult to initiate. NASA begins in each science area
with the priorities defined in decadal surveys of the NRC, then
generally sponsors science community-led teams to develop `roadmaps' to
plan implementation of survey research and mission priorities. We then
pass these through the filter of budget availability to set final
priorities that are affordable and at an appropriate stage of
technological readiness and risk reduction. Within each science area,
the challenge is to find the proper balance among large, medium and
small missions, research and analysis in all its forms, data analysis,
and technology development. At the Directorate level, as I previously
highlighted, I have charted an Office of the Chief Scientist and
appointed Dr. John Mather to lead that office in making recommendations
for the best way to balance priorities with in and among each of our
four portfolio areas.
The Subcommittee's fourth question concerns strategic investments
in space and Earth science I would like to make as the Associate
Administrator. I must preface by noting that my analysis of the SMD
portfolio is not yet complete and that there are many areas that likely
warrant attention or refocus; I address a few here. I believe that,
within the SMD five-year budget profile put forward in the President's
FY 2008 request, SMD can make modest investments in three key areas
that will yield profound and lasting improvements to our bottom line
that will increase in our understanding of the Earth, the Sun, the
solar system, and the Universe. The first area in which I would invest
is Research and Analysis (R&A). This investment would, in part, focus
on process improvements to make scientists more efficient and
productive; it would also seek new research funding initiatives offered
to members of the scientific community. I have appointed a Senior
Advisor for R&A, Dr. Yvonne Pendleton, to oversee SMD's efforts in this
area and to make recommendations for ways we can improve R&A processes
and program content. Dr. Pendleton will work closely with Dr. Mather
and the office of Chief Scientist in this regard. The second investment
I hope to make is in mission data analysis, so that the taxpayer gets
the best value for the investment we make in science missions. Too
often, data analysis efforts are curtailed as a result of rising
mission development and operations costs. This problem will be
addressed beginning this year. The third area in which I would invest
is our Sub-orbital programs. Sub-orbital flight using rockets and
balloons, as well as aircraft, provide opportunities to train new space
scientists in the art of space flight, to bridge the 2010 to 2012 gap
in orbital and planetary mission launches, and to produce some exciting
science as well. I would also like to see sub-orbital opportunities
expanded. Again, I believe it is possible to make progress within the
SMD five-year budget profile put forward in the FY 2008 President's
request.
Conclusion
In summary, let me say that the President's FY 2008 budget request
funds an exciting, productive, and balanced portfolio of Space and
Earth science missions, and presents a program that will yield even
better results than formerly anticipated though increased efficiencies.
This exciting program of research is described in the Science Plan for
NASA's Science Mission Directorate (2007-2016), recently submitted to
this Subcommittee as directed in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
(P.L. 109-155). I look forward to working with this Subcommittee to
implement this Plan, as well as my plans to help shape SMD for the
years to come. I would be happy to respond to any questions the
Subcommittee may have regarding SMD, SMD's portfolio, and the exciting
scientific results NASA Is achieving.
Biography for S. Alan Stern
Dr. S. Alan Stern is the Associate Administrator for NASA's Science
Mission Directorate.
He directs a wide variety of research and scientific exploration
programs for Earth studies, space weather, the solar system and the
universe beyond. In addition, he manages a broad spectrum of grant-
based research programs and spacecraft projects to study Earth and the
universe.
Stern is a planetary scientist and an author who has published more
than 175 technical papers and 40 popular articles. His research has
focused on studies of our solar system's Kuiper belt and Oort cloud,
comets, satellites of the outer planets, Pluto and the search for
evidence of solar systems around other stars. He has worked on
spacecraft rendezvous theory, terrestrial polar mesospheric clouds,
galactic astrophysics and studies of tenuous satellite atmospheres,
including the atmosphere of the Moon.
Stern has had a long association with NASA, serving on the NASA
Advisory Council and as the principal investigator on a number of
planetary and lunar missions, including the New Horizons Pluto-Kuiper
Belt mission. He was the principal investigator of the Southwest
Ultraviolet Imaging System, which flew on two Space Shuttle missions,
STS85 in 1997 and STS-93 in 1999.
He has been a guest observer on numerous NASA satellite
observatories, including the International Ultraviolet Explorer, the
Hubble Space Telescope, the International Infrared Observer and the
Extreme Ultraviolet Observer.
Stern joined NASA in April 2007 from the Southwest Research
Institute's Space Science and Engineering Division, Boulder, Colo.,
where he had served as Executive Director of the Space Science and
Engineering Division.
He holds Bachelor's degrees in physics and astronomy and Master's
degrees in aerospace engineering and planetary atmospheres from the
University of Texas, Austin. In 1989, Stern earned a doctorate in
astrophysics and planetary science from the University of Colorado at
Boulder.
He is an instrument-rated commercial pilot and flight instructor,
with both powered and sailplane ratings. Stern and his wife have three
children.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Stern.
Dr. Fisk.
STATEMENT OF DR. LENNARD A. FISK, CHAIR, SPACE STUDIES BOARD,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Dr. Fisk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here to testify.
I was asked to testify on the top three goals for NASA's
Space Science Mission Directorate, SMD, top three programmatic
risks, the top three investments that should be made, and also
to comment on the balance among the various science themes
within SMD.
As you well know, within the last few years, there has been
dramatic changes in the funding that has been provided to SMD.
Some $3 billion to $4 billion was removed from the run out
budget, primarily to pay for the cost of the return-to-flight
of the Shuttle and the completion of the International Space
Station. There is, as was noted in opening statements, there is
no way to remove that much money from the budget without
causing disruptions in ongoing programs and distortion to the
balance among programs, and this is the context in which these
strategic goals and risks and investments required for SMD
should be evaluated.
The first strategic goal for SMD might be stated get back
the money that was lost. A more constructive way to make that
statement would be to note, as again was made in the opening
statements, how inadequate NASA as an agency is currently
funded. It is being asked to do too much with too little, and
as a result, all components of the Agency, including science,
are sub-optimally funded. We should all make it a strategic
goal to provide NASA with the funding that is required.
The risk to SMD for inadequate funding is simply that it
can't perform its assigned tasks. The charge to SMD is to
explore the universe, lay down the foundation of knowledge
required for the human expansion into space. It is to determine
the future of the Earth so that we can make sound policy
decisions, and it is to contribute to the capability of the
United States to compete in the world, whether it is through
knowledge, new technology or new workforce. The funding for SMD
is currently inadequate to perform these tasks.
The investment required is the same investment the Nation
is prepared to make in the American Competitiveness Initiative.
It is difficult, in fact, it is impossible in my judgment to
distinguish between the fundamental science being conducted by
the NSF and the DOE Office of Science, and the fundamental
science that is being conducted by SMD. Those agencies, of
course, saw increases--major increases in support through ACI.
The first strategic goal--excuse me, the second strategic
goal for SMD is to make more cost effective use of the funds
that have been provided to it. There is a disturbing upward
trend in the cost of flight missions, particularly--and I would
like to focus on the moderate and small flight missions. The
cost of launch vehicles has increased, the cost of management
oversight has increased. Whatever the reason, it should be a
strategic goal to get the maximum science for the minimum
funding. There will be investments required to achieve this
goal, whether it is in new launch vehicles, new technology, or
new management practices.
Finally, if the funds for SMD can be provided, if the
missions can be executed more cost effectively, or preferably
both, the third strategic goal should be to use these funds to
rebalance the program. When the funding for the out years in
SMD was reduced, the large flight programs under development
were protected. It is the future that has been sacrificed.
Missions still in technology development were halted. The
pipeline that is essential to the development of technology of
human capital, the research and analysis program, the sounding
rocket program, small flight missions, they are the ones that
were seriously disrupted. The portfolio of activities in SMD
needs to be rebalanced so that we can compete--complete what we
have begun while at the same time recognizing that the
investments that we need make now, whether it is in people or
it is in technology in the planning of future flight missions,
will determine the vibrancy and the success of the scientific
exploration utilization of space in the decades ahead.
The final question that was asked was the balance among
science disciplines at SMD, and I included all four in
answering these questions, astrophysics, planetary science,
heliophysics, and Earth science. Each has an important task to
perform and each has need of more funding, more cost effective
use of its funding, a rebalance program, and the investments
required to achieve these goals as we talk.
In the case of Earth science, however, no amount of
efficiencies, no internal rebalance within the discipline, no
modest investment will provide the resources necessary. There
is not adequate funding in Earth science in NASA to accomplish
the goals that have been assigned to it, which is to use the
global vantage point of space to provide information on the
immediate future of Earth.
This is not a rebalancing question. It is in the sense that
Earth science should grow at the expense of other science
disciplines, nor should it grow at the expense of other
programs within NASA. All of NASA's programs are currently
inadequately funded and all have a role to play in the national
priorities. Rather, it is time for a new initiative to pursue a
vigorous Earth science program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fisk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lennard A. Fisk
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting
me here to testify today. My name is Lennard Fisk and I am the Thomas
M. Donahue Distinguished University Professor of Space Science at the
University of Michigan. I also served from 1987 to 1993 as the NASA
Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications. I appear
here today in my capacity as the Chair of the National Research Council
(NRC) Space Studies Board. The views I share with you today, however,
are my own and not necessarily those of the NRC.
You have asked me to testify on the top three goals for NASA's
Science Mission Directorate (SMD); the top three programmatic risks
facing SMD; the top three strategic investments that should be made in
SMD; and also to comment on the balance among the various science
themes within SMD. The first three items are of course interrelated.
The goals in part should be to eliminate the major risks, and identify
the strategic investments needed to do so. I will thus answer these
three questions as an interrelated set. I will then comment on the
balance among NASA's space science disciplines.
Before considering the questions, I would like to comment on the
recent history of SMD, since this context determines the goals, the
risks, and the investments required. Throughout much of the history of
the space program, space and Earth science in NASA was considered to be
a fixed fraction of the NASA budget. In the mid-1990s, however, that
rule was discarded, and the budget for space and Earth science was
allowed to grow at the same rate as non-defense discretionary spending.
Human space flight was not permitted this growth, and so the budget for
space and Earth science became an increasingly larger fraction of the
overall NASA budget. Whether deliberate or accidental, the result was
that science in NASA was considered to be part of the Nation's
investments in science, not simply as a fixed part of the investments
in space. This rapid growth in science, however, was not uniform. The
traditional space science disciplines--astrophysics, planetary
sciences, and heliophysics--did very well. However, even in these times
of growth in science funding, Earth science was kept at a constant
budget, and then in FY2000 it began a steep decline in funding.
With the advent of the Vision for Exploration in FY 2005, to extend
human presence first to the Moon and then beyond, dramatic changes have
occurred in the funding for SMD. Initially, the overall funding for
space and Earth science, taken together, was projected to do well. Some
disciplines, favored in the Vision, did very well, in some cases at the
expense of other disciplines; but summed together, the funding for
space and Earth science continued to increase. However, it became
increasingly obvious that NASA was not being provided with the funds
required to execute the Vision; return the Shuttle to flight, and
complete and use the International Space Station; maintain a healthy
science program; and support its other missions such as aeronautics
research. And so the squeeze was on. One by one, the funding for the
various missions that NASA is responsible for have been reduced to a
sub-optimum and, in some cases, critically inadequate funding level.
In the case of the funding for SMD, some $3 billion was removed
from the runout budget primarily to pay for the cost of the return to
flight of the Shuttle and the completion of the International Space
Station. There is no way to remove that much money from a budget
without causing disruptions in ongoing programs and distortions in the
balance among programs. Ongoing major flight programs, well into
development, have priority; new flight programs--the future of the
program--are seriously delayed or in effect canceled. Small flight
missions and basic research support--for technology development, the
training of students, theory, data analysis, and new mission planning--
all become vulnerable when there is a sudden and unanticipated change
in the expected growth in funding.
To understand the inadequacies in the SMD budget, we need to
consider how science is conducted. Science is about making
discoveries--they can be profound discoveries that alter the concepts
we hold of our place in the cosmos, or they can be minor discoveries
that reveal some new aspect of a previously studied process.
Discoveries lead to insight, insight to knowledge, and in some cases
knowledge yields immediate applications that benefit society. Knowledge
almost always benefits society in the long run.
A measure, then, of the health of a science discipline is the pace
at which discoveries are being made. Similarly, the prospects for the
future of a science discipline can be measured by whether there are any
factors that limit the pace of discovery.
Space and Earth science is primarily an observational science. Our
discoveries thus come from observations. In each of the disciplines in
space and Earth science there are, in fact, extraordinary opportunities
to make discoveries. Technology is advancing to where more detailed and
revealing observations can be made. And our understanding of prior
observations has improved to where we can search intelligently for new
knowledge.
Given that abundant discoveries await us, if we are only bold
enough to make the observations, the primary determinant of a bright
future for space and Earth science is the rate at which we make new
observations; that is, the rate of new space missions. And here the
trends are very disturbing. For each of the disciplines in SMD there is
a sobering downward trend in missions and thus opportunities for
discovery. In the mid-1990s there was an average of seven launches per
year for missions in space and Earth science. In the last few years,
the rate is more like five per year. In 2010-2012, the rate is
projected to be under two per year.
There are some disciplines for which the downward trend in
opportunities for discovery is clearly unacceptable. In Earth science,
society is demanding to know the consequences of global climate change
in order to plan our future. In the other disciplines of space science,
it is a grating waste of the Nation's capabilities to reduce our pace
of discovery. We have painstakingly built the infrastructure to make
the Nation foremost in the scientific exploration of space. To allow it
to atrophy borders on neglect.
There is another consequence of the inadequacies of the SMD budget,
and that is the vitality of our disciplines. The issue for space and
Earth science is how do we ensure the infusion of new and better
observing techniques, new minds, new ideas that challenge the
established concepts? It is in fact very difficult to ensure the
infusion of revolutionary technologies and concepts in budgets that are
not growing. Rather, there needs to be new investments.
There is a need to maintain or, better yet, optimize the pace of
discovery. There is a need to maintain the quality and vibrancy of the
NASA science program through the introduction of revolutionary
technologies and concepts. Both requirements demand a budget for space
and Earth science that is growing. I remind you that the projected
budget for space and Earth science in NASA grows at only one percent
per year, which is a declining budget when inflation is included. There
needs instead to be real growth.
Strategic Goals, Risks, and Investments for the Science Mission
Directorate
The first strategic goal of the Science Mission Directorate (SMD)
might well be stated--get back the money that was lost. A more
constructive way to make this statement would be to note how
inadequately NASA as an agency is currently funded. The Agency is being
asked to do too much with too little, and as a result all components of
the Agency, including science, are sub-optimally funded. We all need to
recognize that without major relief to the total funding for NASA this
nation does not have a viable space program capable of meeting the
broad national needs that have been assigned to it. And we should all
make it a strategic goal to provide NASA with the funding that is
required.
The risk to SMD from inadequate funding is that it cannot perform
its assigned tasks. The charge to the space and Earth science program
in NASA is to explore the universe and lay down the foundational
knowledge for the human expansion into space. It is to determine the
future of the Earth, so sound policy decisions can be made to protect
the future of our civilization. It is to contribute to the capability
of the United States to compete in the world, whether it is through new
knowledge, new technology, or a new workforce. The funding for space
and Earth science in NASA, particularly the growth in funding in the
years ahead is inadequate to perform this job, and failure to address
this problem is a fundamental risk to the success of SMD in being able
to fulfill its obligations to the scientific excellence of the Nation.
The investment required in SMD is the same investment that the
Nation is prepared to make in the American Competitiveness Initiative.
ACI has resulted in increases in funding for programs in fundamental
science in, e.g., the National Science Foundation and the Office of
Science in the Department of Energy. These programs were among only a
few that saw increases beyond their FY 2006 budget level in the enacted
FY 2007 budget. It is difficult, in fact, impossible, to distinguish
between the fundamental science conducted by NASA in SMD and the
fundamental science conducted by the NSF or the DOE Office of Science.
It is interesting to note that had the funding for SMD been allowed to
increase in the same proportion as the NSF it would have followed the
pattern of growth it had enjoyed in the late 1990s and the early 2000s,
and would have provided funding that was better able to support the
needs of the space and Earth science program.
The second strategic goal is for SMD to make more cost-effective
use of the funds that have been provided to it. There is a disturbing
upward trend in the cost of flight missions. The problem seems to be
most egregious in the case of moderate and small flight missions. We
seem unable to execute a mission of comparable complexity today for
anywhere near the cost that was required in the previous decade. The
cost of launch vehicles has increased. The cost of management oversight
is increasing. We take actions that are perceived to reduce risk, but
may not be cost effective. Whatever the reason, it should be a
strategic goal to get the maximum science for the minimum funding, and,
in my judgment, the most likely place to realize cost savings is in the
execution of moderate and small flight missions.
There is a risk to SMD should it fail to improve the cost-
effectiveness with which it executes moderate and small flight
missions. Under any circumstance, funding will be limited. We need to
get the maximum science for the minimum available funding, if for no
other reason than to introduce flexibility into the SMD budget to fund
new missions and needed investments.
Investments are required to achieve the strategic goal of improving
the cost-effectiveness of small and moderate missions. Investments may
be required in new launch vehicles so that the cost of access to space
is reduced, particularly with the planned retirement of the Delta-II
launch vehicle. Investments will be required in innovative management
procedures and new technologies. There needs to be a concerted effort
made to make full use of the best of the Nation's vast infrastructure
to conduct cost-effective space missions. We have great talent in this
country for space hardware. We need to ensure that we are using this
talent properly; that our processes ensure good engineering solutions
and not simply someone's perceived reduction in risk.
If new funds for SMD can be provided, if missions can be executed
more cost-effectively, or preferably both, the third strategic goal
should be to use the funds realized to rebalance the program. When the
funding in the out-years for SMD was reduced, the large flight programs
under development were protected. It is the future that has been
sacrificed. Missions still in technology development were halted. The
pipeline that is essential to the development of technology and human
capital--the Research and Analysis programs, sounding rockets, small
flight missions--have been seriously disrupted. The portfolio of
activities in SMD needs to be rebalanced so that we complete what we
have begun, while at the same time we recognize that the scientific
exploration and utilization of space is a long-term effort that will
extend into the indefinite future. The investments that we make now, in
people, in technology, in balloons and sounding rockets, in small
flight missions, in the planning for future flight missions, will
determine the vibrancy and the success of the scientific exploration
and utilization of space in the decades ahead.
The risk of failing to meet the strategic goal of rebalancing the
SMD program is, in my judgment, the most serious risk. The pipeline of
human capital and technology has been disrupted, and the future of the
space and Earth science program is at risk. Consider a case in point.
Almost every experimental space scientist currently practicing learned
his/her trade in the sounding rocket or balloon programs. Yet with
recent budget cuts, these programs are unable to perform this task.
Small flight missions are the next step in the natural evolution of
experimental capabilities, whether it is the development of new
technology or the development of experienced scientists and engineers.
And yet with recent budget cuts, the flight rate of small missions has
been diminished compared to its previous rate.
It follows, then, given the importance of rebalancing the SMD
program to protect the future of space and Earth science, that an
investment that ensures a proper pipeline in human capital and
technology will have the highest return. Research & Analysis funding,
sounding rockets and balloons, and small flight missions all need to be
restored to their proper place in the SMD program.
The Balance Among the Science Disciplines in the Science Mission
Directorate
Each of the science disciplines in SMD--astrophysics, planetary
sciences, heliophysics, and Earth science--has important tasks to
perform, ranging from providing fundamental knowledge of the universe,
to, in the case of Earth science, providing knowledge that is a direct
and immediate benefit to society. Each of the disciplines has need of
more funding, more cost-effective use of its funding, a rebalanced
program, and the investments required to achieve these goals, as we
discussed above.
In the case of Earth science, however, no amount of efficiencies,
no internal rebalance within the discipline, no modest investment will
provide the resources necessary. There is not adequate funding for
Earth science in NASA to accomplish the mission that it has been
assigned--to use the global vantage point of space to provide
information on the immediate future of Earth, on which we can base
sound policy decisions to protect our future. This deficiency is the
result of a downward trend in the funding for Earth science that has
persisted for a decade, and which has been in serious decline since FY
2000. The recent NRC decadal survey for Earth science outlined the
measurements and flight missions that NASA needs to accomplish, to
provide society with the knowledge that is required. And the survey
pointed out that these measurements can be made only if the Earth
science budget, over the next several years, is increased back to at
least the level of funding that was available in FY 2000, an
approximately $500 million increase over the current budget.
This is not a rebalancing question, in the sense that Earth science
should grow at the expense of other science disciplines. Nor should it
grow at the expense of other programs within NASA. All of NASA's
programs are currently inadequately funded. And all have a role to play
in the national priorities. Rather, it is time for a new initiative, a
specific directed task to NASA, with requisite funding provided, to
pursue a vigorous Earth science program, in which the required
measurements on the future of Earth are all made.
We need to consider NASA as an agency with many important tasks to
perform. It is not just the Agency that is to return us to the Moon,
and all else is a secondary priority. Space is integral to the fabric
of our society. We depend on it in our daily lives; we protect our
nation through our space assets; we use space to learn about our
future; we enrich our society with knowledge of our place in the
cosmos; we are moving our civilization into space; we expect the next
generation of scientists and engineers to be versatile in the
utilization and exploration of space. NASA has an essential role to
play in each and every one of these national pursuits, and its role in
each pursuit needs to be properly funded.
Thank you very much.
Biography for Lennard A. Fisk
Lennard A. Fisk is the Thomas M. Donahue Distinguished University
Professor of Space Science at the University of Michigan, where from
1993-2003 he was Chair of the Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and
Space Sciences. Prior to joining the University in July 1993, Dr. Fisk
was the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In this position he
was responsible for the planning and direction of all NASA programs
concerned with space science and applications and for the institutional
management of the Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland
and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California.
Prior to becoming Associate Administrator in April 1987, Dr. Fisk
served as Vice President for Research and Financial Affairs and
Professor of Physics at the University of New Hampshire. In his
administrative position, he was responsible for overseeing the
University's research activities and was the chief financial officer of
the University. Dr. Fisk joined the faculty of the Department of
Physics at the University of New Hampshire in 1977, and founded the
Solar-Terrestrial Theory Group in 1980. He was an astrophysicist at the
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center from 1971 to 1977, and a National
Academy of Sciences Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Goddard from 1969
to 1971.
Dr. Fisk is the author of more than 185 publications on energetic
particle and plasma phenomena in space. He is a Member of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the International Academy of Astronautics
(IAA); he is a Foreign Member of Academia Europaea and a Fellow of the
American Geophysical Union. He currently serves as Chair of the NAS
Space Studies Board; he is a co-founder of the Michigan Aerospace
Corporation and a Director of the Orbital Sciences Corporation. He is
the recipient of the NASA Distinguished Service Medal in 1992, the AIAA
Space Science Award in 1994, and the IAA Basic Science Award in 1997.
He is a graduate of Cornell University. In 1969, he received his
doctorate degree in Applied Physics from the University of California,
San Diego.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Fisk.
Dr. Illingworth.
STATEMENT OF DR. GARTH D. ILLINGWORTH, CHAIR, ASTRONOMY AND
ASTROPHYSICS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AAAC)
Dr. Illingworth. Thank you, Chairman Udall, Ranking Member
Calvert, Members of the Committee and Subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on NASA's astrophysics
program.
I am the Chair of the Congressionally chartered committee,
the Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee. This
committee was established to assess and make recommendations
regarding the coordination of the astronomy and astrophysics
programs of NSF, NASA, and DOE, and to assess progress on the
National Academy's Decadal Survey on Astronomy and
Astrophysics. While we deal extensively with all three
agencies, NASA has been a particular focus of our attention
recently because of the contrast with NSF and DOE science. The
decreasing budget in real terms for NASA science contrasts very
substantially with ACI led growth in the other agencies, and
this is very unfortunate, given that NASA's science missions
play such a central role in scientific advances in the last two
decades. NASA missions have dramatically changed our
understanding of the universe, of our own solar system, and of
our planet Earth. And so, NASA's science program has been an
extraordinarily successful enterprise.
As we look at the suite of missions that are now available
to the science community, as Alan emphasized, we have a wide
array of capabilities. For astrophysics, Hubble, Chandra,
Spitzer are all returning remarkable data, while several
medium-sized missions, GLAST, Kepler, WISE, will be launched
over the next few years.
Yet, this leadership in the scientific and technological
arena with the visibility that it brings to our nation's
technological and scientific achievements is clearly at risk in
the coming years. The rate at which new missions are being
launched drops dramatically in 2009, and continues at a low
level for many years well into the foreseeable future.
Furthermore, during the first part of the decade, the
number of operating astrophysics missions, of course, will
decease, such as current missions near the end of their life.
The three great observatories will be replaced by one. JWST, of
course, will be a remarkably powerful observatory, but it
cannot encompass the full breadth of science areas that three
great observatories do now, Chandra, Hubble, and Spitzer.
SOFIA will become operational, and a possible small
Explorer. These are the only new capabilities in the first part
of the next decade. Furthermore, the decline in the
astrophysics budget in real terms, by 25 percent starting 2009
and throughout for several years after that, greatly reduces
the opportunities for new missions following the next Decadal
Survey report, which will be released in 2010.
Though NASA has had extraordinary successes over its last
decade from its challenging, ambitious science missions, it
produced stunning science return. In 10 to 15 years, as we
stand and look back, will we be able to make the same
statement? I am concerned that we are on a track that will make
it very difficult and will maybe preclude such a positive
outlook at that time.
The next question is how do we recover from this? More
resources are clearly needed, but I would like to emphasize it
is my view that it is neither wise nor productive to expect
that they will come from NASA's human space flight program. No
discussion of the budget challenges of the science of NASA can
take place without acknowledging the challenges that face the
Agency overall. It has become widely recognized that NASA is
significantly underfunded to the mandate that it has been given
to implement the Vision for Space Exploration. The lack of
growth in the NASA budget is stressing all of the Agency's
activities.
AAAC is deeply concerned about the growing impact on the
space and Earth science program, and strongly endorses efforts
to increase NASA's budget to allow it to undertake the
transformation and vision without imparting serious damage to
the science program.
The issues faced by NASA are so challenging that they
really require broad consensus between the Administration and
Congress on the Nation's goals for its space endeavors. I hope
that some form of higher level discussion forum such as
recently been proposed both in the House and the Senate does
come to fruition and provides clear guidance for NASA and
enhancement of its budgetary framework.
I would like to comment, though, that in all conscience I
cannot ask for additional resources for the science programs
without commenting on the undercosting that has occurred over
the last decades, in fact, in our programs. The cost growth in
missions both moderate and large has been substantial and
clearly indicates the need for better cost estimates for each
of the project phases by both NASA and the Decadal Survey. We
need to work together on this, and the need to use life cycle
costs for planning and roadmapping instead of just construction
costs.
What counts, of course, is what we are going to be spending
on a mission over the 10- to 20-year lifetime of that program,
and not just what it takes to build a mission. When mentioning
cost growth, JWST is the immediate program that comes to mind,
but SIM and SOFIA are comparable examples. All of these
programs have suffered huge growth with their budget over the
numbers that were given in our Decadal Surveys. SIM and SOFIA
were both $250 million missions in 1990. Both are now $3
billion programs. JWST went from $1 billion to $4.5 billion.
But this is not new. Chandra, the current mission we are flying
in x-ray astronomy, was a $500 million mission in 1980 and when
re-costed in current dollars, it is $3.4 billion. So we clearly
do need to understand much more carefully and fully the
programs that we are putting forward.
So it is really clear that we need to develop reliable and
robust life cycle cost estimates. I think it is to the credit
of both NASA and the community that there is recognition of
this and much more open discussion of these issues, and it is
my view that we will do better, but it will take significant
effort.
I would just like to note on a couple of the questions that
came from the Chairman, since I am running out of time on this,
was that I would like to note the three risks that were
mentioned in the question, and they, in my view, are the lack
of small and medium missions beyond 2009; the inability to
respond to the 2010 Decadal Survey, I think we will do a very
serious effort of putting forward an incredibly vibrant science
program that is much more realistically costed, but it would be
tragic if we, in fact, were not in a position to respond to
that; and the current lack of technology development and
mission development funding is a serious concern as well,
because this obviously impacts mission cost and readiness. And
the three strategic investments that I would make would be R&A
funding--I think there is unity on the importance of this
across the community and probably amongst the speakers here;
technology development for missions; and the importance of
competed cost-capped missions at the small and medium level as
well.
So in closing, I would like to emphasize the remarkable
productivity of the current program, but the dramatic changes--
and not for the better, unfortunately, lie ahead if we continue
with the budget of this declining substantially in real terms.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy
to respond further.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Illingworth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Garth D. Illingworth
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting
me to testify. I am a Professor and Astronomer at the University of
California, Santa Cruz and the University of California Observatories/
Lick Observatory. I am the Chair of the Congressionally-chartered FACA
committee, the Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC).
This committee was established to assess and make recommendations
regarding the coordination of astronomy and astrophysics programs of
NSF, NASA and DOE and progress on the National Academy National
Research Council's (NRC) Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal reports. As
required by the enabling legislation, the AAAC generates an Annual
Report in March of each year (the 2007 AAAC report is at http://
www.nsf.gov/mps/ast/aaac.jsp). As Chair of the AAAC, the
recommendations of that committee underpin this testimony.
In addition to responding to the questions from the Chairman, I
would also like to highlight some issues that were a concern of the
AAAC and will increasingly impact science at NASA unless rectified.
Arguably science is the crown jewel of NASA. The science missions give
NASA great return through their frequent and exciting results that
capture the imagination of the public. They are equally a frequent
demonstration of our nation's scientific and technical capabilities.
However, that jewel is becoming tarnished by the effective reductions
in the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) budget.
SCIENCE AT NASA AND THE CURRENT NASA BUDGET PROJECTIONS
Science at NASA: NASA's science program has been an extraordinarily
successful enterprise. The scientific productivity of its diverse suite
of science missions has made many of them household names. Missions
like the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), the Mars Rovers, the very
successful Explorer missions like the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy
Probe (WMAP), the remarkable outer planet images in our Solar System
from Cassini-Huygens and Galileo, along with numerous other remarkable
missions and projects, are a demonstration of U.S. technological
leadership. NASA has shown time and time again that novel technology,
driven by great science goals, can dramatically expand our horizons and
bring exploration of the cosmos beyond our Earth within the reach of
all. NASA's missions have dramatically changed our understanding of the
universe--its origin, evolution and structure, the existence of massive
black holes, when and how galaxies formed, and the birthplaces of star
and planets--our solar system, and our home planet Earth. The value of
these science missions is widely recognized for generating enthusiasm
for science and engineering and for stimulating the interest of the
Nation's youth.
Yet this leadership in the scientific and technological arena--with
the visibility that it brings to U.S. technological and scientific
achievements--is clearly at risk in the coming years. The breadth and
balance within NASA's science program is a major factor in this
visibility. The substantial budget changes envisaged for the coming
five years are already having a major impact on the future science
program. The resulting major restructuring of the long-term science
program is a great concern to the science community and will, over
time, significantly change NASA's perceived value to the Nation. NASA
has had extraordinary successes over the last decade from its
challenging, ambitious science missions, combined with continuing,
broadly-based research support that produces stunning science return
from a diverse portfolio of programs. In ten years as we look back,
will we be able to make the same statement? There will be highlights,
but will we feel that NASA's science program has had its golden era? I
feel very strongly that we all do not want that to be the case, but if
we are to explore our universe and our Earth through the unique
capabilities that NASA brings, then we must step up to the plate and
commit the resources needed.
The problems that are visible in SMD flow not just from NASA trying
to implement the Vision for Space Exploration, but also from the
recovery from the loss of Columbia and major impacts such as Katrina.
Science at NASA suffered a major hit when $3B was removed from SMD in
the FY07 five-year projected budget request. The SMD budget is now down
seven percent in inflation-adjusted FY06 dollars by 2012 in the FY08
request, instead of growing as in the FY06 request. The reduced SMD
budget stems from the overall problems of the NASA budget and it's
disconnect with its current mandate. This is discussed further below,
after the discussion of the role of NASA science in the American
Competitiveness Initiative (ACI).
Innovation, Competitiveness, ACI and NASA: Research is essential to
innovative activities and underpins a technologically-competitive
society, as enunciated in the NRC report, Rising Above the Gathering
Storm. The inclusion of ACI increases in the FY07 budget request for
NSF, DOE Science and NIST was a very strong response to the challenges
faced by the Nation in staying at the forefront of scientific and
technological development. The continuation of the ACI in the FY08
budget request demonstrated the Administration's commitment to building
a robust R&D base in the physical sciences. Congressional support for
NSF research and DOE science in the FY07 appropriation through the
Joint Funding Resolution was a further key step in strengthening
science and technology through the Congressional Innovation and
Competitiveness effort. However, the exclusion of NASA science from the
ACI contrasts with the inclusion of DOE science. There is no question
that NASA is at the cutting-edge of science and technology research.
This exciting and highly visible research contributes to the vitality
of the national skill set and has encouraged young people to move into
science and engineering. The Congressional interest in Innovation and
Competitiveness enables a fresh opportunity for enhancing NASA science.
The AAAC in its Annual Report strongly encourages Congress to consider
enhancing the support for science at NASA explicitly to improve
innovation and competitiveness, as has been done for NSF and DOE
science.
Funding for NASA for the Vision for Exploration: Before discussing
the science program further I would like to comment on the overall
context in which the NASA science budget is developed. It has become
widely recognized that NASA is significantly underfunded for the
mandate that it has been given to implement the Vision for Space
Exploration. No discussion of the budget challenges for science at NASA
can take place without acknowledgement of the challenges that face the
Agency overall. The challenges of transitioning within the current NASA
budget to a new generation of space capabilities in the framework of
the Exploration Vision, with no new funding, are obvious. NASA's
overall budget has remained essentially unchanged through the last
three budget requests. Yet in that timeframe the real costs of the
transition to a new human space flight structure have been recognized.
As a result, the balance among the needs of Space Shuttle (STS)
operations and ramp-down, International Space Station (ISS) completion
and operation, Exploration Systems development and a robust Space and
Earth Science program has come under great strain. I recognize the
support that the Administrator has to transition the Agency from being
driven by the vestiges of its past program--one that was devised in the
1970s--into a new, forward-looking set of objectives. Broadly I support
the goals of transitioning the human space flight program into a new
set of capabilities. A nation as technically-advanced as ours, with
such human, technological and fiscal resources, should be able to
explore beyond the Earth. Furthermore, these new capabilities will
benefit science missions and scientific ``exploration.'' But to ask
NASA to transition and develop these new capabilities, while
undercutting its most innovative and productive component, its science
program, is unwise. NASA needs more resources if it is to explore in a
``feet on the ground'' sense through a human space flight program, and
to explore our universe by unearthing its secrets through a vibrant
science program.
The AAAC hopes that Congress can work to rectify this problem,
since the recent fiscal year requests have not provided the resources
to enable NASA to carry out its mandate in the Vision. Adequate funding
is critical over the next few years when NASA is trying to support
Shuttle operations and ramp-down, completing the ISS, initiating new
launch and transportation capability, and carrying out a comprehensive
science program. Long-term impacts to both science and human space
flight will accrue if the funding is not adequate during this period.
The AAAC recognized the issues with its highest-priority recommendation
in its Annual Report in the discussion re NASA: ``The lack of growth in
the NASA budget to respond to the Exploration Vision is stressing all
the Agency's activities. The AAAC is deeply concerned about the growing
impact on the space and Earth science program.'' The AAAC was also
concerned about the potential out-year impact of the reduced funding
for NASA overall in the FY07 appropriation if this funding is used as a
base for the FY08 appropriation. The science community appreciated that
the FY07 Joint Resolution budget for NASA explicitly designated and
made statutory only a small cut ( 1.5 percent) to science compared to
the FY07 budget request level, but remains concerned that further cuts
may arise if the FY07 base is used. The AAAC noted: ``The AAAC is
concerned that the appropriation for FY08 and beyond may lead to a
further cut by using the FY07 appropriation as the base for future
budgets, and recommends that the FY08 request be the base to preclude
added impacts on science at NASA.''
The issues faced by NASA are so challenging that they really
require broad consensus between the Administration and Congress on the
Nation's goals for its space endeavors. I hope that some form of high
level discussion forum, such as has been recently proposed both in the
House and Senate comes to fruition, and provides clear guidance for
NASA and enhancement of its budgetary framework.
Astrophysics--an overview: If one takes a near-term view, and looks
forward with a horizon around 2009-2010, the mission mix in
Astrophysics looks fairly good. Over the next 5 or so years
Astrophysics will have a reasonably well-balanced program, i.e., one
with a mix of small, medium and large missions in operation covering a
diverse range of scientific areas. The launch of a mid-size mission,
the Gamma Ray Large Area Space Telescope (GLAST--in late 2007), a
Discovery mission Kepler (in 2008), an Explorer mission, the Wide-Field
Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE--in 2009), and participation in two
powerful European Space Agency (ESA) missions Herschel and Planck
(2008-9) strengthens the program. Astrophysics is operating three Great
Observatories, Chandra, Hubble and Spitzer, and providing significant
funding for data analysis for those missions. The next Hubble Servicing
Mission (SM4) and the instrument upgrades will rejuvenate Hubble. The
Stratospheric Observatory for Far-Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) is moving
towards its first science demonstration in 2010 and full science
operation in 2013. NASA is progressing on an extremely powerful Great
Observatory-class mission, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST). NASA
is also planning for a possible Beyond Einstein mission that would
begin to be funded for development in the same time frame (though its
launch would not be until the middle of the decade or beyond). These
elements of the program are consistent with community-developed
strategic plans such as the National Academy Astronomy and Astrophysics
Decadal Survey.
So why is the astronomy and astrophysics community so concerned?
And why is this concern reflected so strongly in the AAAC annual
reports, and the reports and discussions of the NASA Advisory Council
(NAC) Astrophysics Science Subcommittee, and the NRC committees (Space
Studies Board--SSB; Board on Physics and Astronomy--BPA, Committee on
Astronomy and Astrophysics--CAA)? First, the cuts that have occurred in
the Research and Analysis (R&A) funds are a very serious issue for the
community. R&A funds support theory and modeling, training of students
and postdocs, and development of new technologies, and so are of great
future value to NASA as well as the community. Second, it is when we
look up from the immediate future and look down the road that we see
that the new mission pipeline is strikingly empty beyond 2009. This is
a major issue. This can be seen in the Figure below. The next few years
look good because we are benefiting from the achievements of the past
decade, or even longer. The missions from the 1990s and early 2000s are
operating or coming to fruition--but the dearth of new small and medium
missions initiated in the last few years is reflected in the next
decade. SOFIA does not come into full science operations until 2013.
JWST, when it launches in 2013, will be an amazing observatory, as
dramatic in its way as Hubble was in 1993 (when its optics were
corrected), or when the Hubble Advanced Camera was installed in 2002.
In contrast to these major programs there is nothing else in the years
2010-2014, except for a possible Small Explorer (SMEX) in Astrophysics
in 2014 (from the recent SMEX announcement of opportunity--AO).
How limited the options are for Astrophysics can be seen in the
Table below. In real terms the Astrophysics Division suffers a
precipitous decline in FY09 (down by 23 percent in constant dollars
relative to 2006) that worsens in the outyears. Even though a number of
important and productive missions will be operating into the next
decade, the long lag between inception and launch will lead to a period
with far fewer operating missions by the middle of the next decade,
unless this budget trend is reversed.
Need for better cost estimates and the use of ``life cycle''
costing: I have emphasized the impact of the projected budget decreases
for the science program at NASA, with particular emphasis on the
situation in Astrophysics. But I think we all recognize that there is
another aspect that has impacted our ability to plan ahead--and that is
the unrealistic and incomplete costs estimates that have been used in
the past for science projects by NASA and the community. The AAAC has
strongly encouraged the adoption of a consistent and common approach to
mission costing by the community and NASA, and advocated that the
baseline be ``life cycle'' costs (from conceptual development through
the end of operations--from pre-Phase A through Phase E). Doing so
would eliminate some of the uncertainty that has surrounded cost
numbers in community discussions and lead to more realistic costs. In
addition, better cost estimation is needed for the Phases, utilizing
independent cost estimates as a cross-check. The transition to full-
cost accounting at the NASA Centers also is resulting in more realistic
cost estimates for missions.
The Decadal Survey recommendations are typically implemented over
10-15 years. This is therefore the timeframe over which we should be
costing our missions if we are to match our recommended mission suite
to likely budgets. The full costs of JWST, the Space Interferometry
Mission (SIM), and SOFIA over that 10-15 year timeframe were not
appreciated because the costs used for planning in the Decadal Survey
and elsewhere were typically construction or Phase C/D costs (and also
were not subject to an independent cost study). This ``undercosting''
(to use the NASA Administrator's very appropriate word) has led to a
gap between what we wanted to do and what we can do. Fortunately, both
NASA and the astronomy community have recognized the problem that this
approach has caused. We do not want to repeat this mistake and so ways
to improve the mission and project budgets are under serious discussion
for the next Decadal Survey.
One important step in being more realistic about mission costs is
to ensure that we understand the ``life cycle'' costs of our currently
operating missions. These estimates have significant uncertainty, given
the very different situations under which the missions were developed.
Nonetheless, they will allow us all to compare new, current and old
missions in a more uniform way. Some examples are (for life cycle costs
in current dollars in a full-cost accounting environment, including
design and technology, construction, launch and operations): HST:
$7.5-9B (including SM4 plus five years of added operations); Chandra:
$3.4B (15 years of operations); Spitzer: $1.3B (with operations
through 2011); Cassini-Huygens: $3B (including ESA and DOE
contributions); JWST: $4.5B (assuming 2013 launch and 10 years of
operations); SIM: $3B (uncertain since launch date unclear--12 years
of operations); SOFIA: $3.4B (with 20 years of operations).
The Decadal Survey numbers were traditionally ``construction''
costs. These were typically under-estimated and this, in combination
with the change to life cycle costs, led to some dramatic increases.
JWST (2000 survey as NGST) has gone from $1B to $4.5B, but such cost
growth is not rare. Chandra (1980 survey as AXAF) went from $500M to
$3.4B. SOFIA (1990 survey) went from $230M to $3.4B. SIM (1990 survey
as AIM) grew similarly $250M to $3B. Correcting for inflation changes
the factors a little, but the growth is still very large. The examples
of SIM and SOFIA, both of which were moderate-size $250M missions in
the 1990 Survey, but which grew to be $3B programs life cycle, have
made us aware of the challenges. JWST was a major surprise when it grew
to $4.5B life cycle, but given that we now understand that, in current
dollars, with full-cost accounting, Chandra is a $3.4B program and HST
is over double that, the life cycle cost of JWST, while high, is not
extraordinary compared to other major programs.
The discrepancies clearly indicate the need for better cost
estimates for each of the project Phases by both NASA and the Decadal
Survey, and the use of life cycle costs for planning. Great cost detail
is not necessary (nor is it possible), but knowing that JWST would be
an $4B program life cycle instead of a $1B program, or that SIM and
SOFIA would be $3B life cycle instead of $0.25B, would certainly help
the development of a more robust Decadal Survey, and subsequent
planning and roadmapping. It is already clear that developing reliable
life cycle mission cost estimates is considered to be very important
for the next Decadal Survey--both NASA and the community are learning
from our previous mistakes.
Summary
The key points from this discussion are:
NASA's science program has been an extraordinarily
successful enterprise. NASA has shown time and time again that
novel technology, driven by great science goals, can
dramatically expand our horizons and bring exploration of the
cosmos beyond our Earth within the reach of all.
The exclusion of NASA science from the ACI contrasts
with the inclusion of DOE science; the AAAC encourages Congress
to consider enhancing the support for science at NASA
explicitly to encourage innovation and competitiveness, as has
been done for NSF and DOE science.
The lack of growth in the NASA budget to respond to
the mandate of the Exploration Vision is stressing all the
Agency's activities. The AAAC is deeply concerned about the
growing impact on the space and earth science program and
strongly endorses efforts to increase NASA's budget to allow it
to undertake the transformation envisaged in the Vision,
without imparting serious damage to the science program.
The decline in the Astrophysics budget in real terms
by 25 percent (from 2009) greatly reduces the opportunities
for new missions following the next Decadal Survey in 2010.
Even though a number of important and productive missions will
be operating into the next decade, the long lag between
inception and launch will lead to a period with far fewer
operating missions, with scientific and productivity impacts,
by the middle of the next decade, unless this budget trend is
reversed.
The cost growth in missions, both moderate and large,
clearly indicates the need for better cost estimates for each
of the project Phases by both NASA and the Decadal Survey, and
the need to use life cycle costs for planning and roadmapping.
It is already clear that developing reliable and robust life
cycle mission cost estimates is considered to be very important
for the next Decadal Survey--both NASA and the community are
learning from our previous mistakes.
I would also like to add that the changes in SMD under the new
Associate Administrator Alan Stern are being viewed very positively.
His efforts to add to the many very experienced people in SMD with new
people to strengthen the scientific focus of the Directorate is being
well received in the community.
RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE CHAIRMAN
1. What are the AAAC's concerns and recommendations with respect to
NASA's astrophysics program?
The AAAC noted a number of concerns in its report. The broadest
issues concerning the NASA budget (``too small for the mandate it has
been given'') and ACI (``NASA science is equally as important for the
Nation as DOE, NSF, and NIST science'') were discussed above. The AAAC
is very concerned that the NASA science program has been seriously
impacted and that further stresses lie ahead for a science program that
has been such an effective demonstration of U.S. science and technology
leadership. These broad concerns led directly to two of the AAAC's 2007
recommendations: ``NASA's science funding outlook should be restored.
Doing so would be entirely consistent with the commitment to innovation
and competitiveness already demonstrated by the Administration and
Congress for the NSF and the DOE Office of Science'' and ``The AAAC
strongly encourages Congress to consider enhancing the support for
science at NASA explicitly to improve innovation and competitiveness,
as has been done for NSF and DOE science.''
Beyond the budget question (but obviously related) the central
issue is the trend in the mission mix in Astrophysics. It is clear that
Astrophysics at NASA is living off the past and the mission pipeline
will, with the exception of JWST, largely run dry post-2009. JWST will
be a remarkably powerful observatory, as dramatic in its impact as
Hubble was in the 1990s, but astronomy and astrophysics encompasses
much more than the science enabled by JWST. The only other new
opportunities are SOFIA, a possible SMEX by 2014 and a possible Beyond
Einstein mission by the middle of the decade. Serious problems with
cost growth, both from underestimates and from not using life cycle
costs, have occurred in a wide range of programs from Explorers through
Discovery to large missions like SIM, SOFIA, JWST and HST SM4. The cost
growth has combined with the budget changes to leave the future looking
bleak.
Other areas of concern and recommendations in the AAAC 2007 Annual
Report are summarized here (and discussed in more detail in the 2006-
2007 AAAC report at http://www.nsf.gov/mps/ast/aaac.jsp):
Research and Analysis (R&A) funding. The widespread concerns in the
community about the cuts and trends in R&A funding were reflected in
the report. R&A encourages creative extension of archived data,
theoretical studies that can cross traditional disciplinary boundaries,
laboratory studies that provide fundamental measurements, and new
instrumentation and sensor technologies that pave the way for new
science initiatives. With its strong academic emphasis R&A is a key
factor in the scientific training and development of younger members of
the community--reductions will certainly impact their involvement and
run counter to the overall goals of ACI. The R&A program is broader
than mission-specific data analysis, and has significant direct value
to NASA for science planning and future flight opportunities. A strong
R&A program will result in greater productivity from the mission
investment at NASA.
The AAAC would very much like to see recovery (and enhancement) of
the very valuable R&A program. However, we recognized the great strains
on the Astrophysics budget in the near-term due to SOFIA reinstatement,
HST SM4 delays, preparing for GLAST, Kepler and WISE launches and
ensuring JWST stays on track, so we were reluctant to recommend an
``unfundable activity.'' In the end we recommended that R&A be given
high priority if any additional funds became available in the near-
term, and if not, that R&A be considered for recovery in the 2009-2010
timeframe as part of the ``wedge'' that opens up as HST servicing
mission activities are ramped down and as JWST construction funding
ramps down. We recognize that incrementing R&A competes with the
``Beyond Einstein'' and the ``Decadal Survey'' wedges, but that
exemplifies the very serious problems faced by Astrophysics.
Competed, cost-capped missions. The Explorer and Discovery mission
lines have been very productive. The AAAC believes that a similar
program of larger cost-capped missions, the Einstein/Origins Probes
(analogous to the Planetary Division's New Frontiers line), would be
particularly valuable for Astrophysics. Several concepts for Probes are
being discussed, including the Joint Dark Energy Mission (JDEM). The
AAAC felt that development of this concept and discussion with the
Decadal Survey about their potential broad value to Astrophysics would
be a valuable step and recommended that the Probes be discussed as a
mission line for Astrophysics.
Current major programs in Astrophysics. The AAAC discussed a number
of the major activities in its report because of their importance to
the Astrophysics program.
The AAAC was very encouraged by the results of the
JWST Technology Non-Advocate Review. Technically, JWST appears
to be in excellent shape, with all major technologies at TRL-6
(flight readiness). The added contingency provides a better
buffer too. JWST is a major, cutting-edge project and we are
not naive enough to expect a completely smooth progression to
launch, but the committee, like the community at large, hopes
that its cost-growth problems are now in the past.
The committee is very supportive of HST SM4, even
more so now that the ACS has failed. A modern camera is needed
to restore Hubble's imaging capability. Accommodating the costs
of servicing remains a major challenge, especially budgeting
for the four-month launch delay in 2008. This further reduces
the flexibility within the Astrophysics program.
The Navigator program is under stress, with two large
missions, TPF and SIM, given the recognition that SIM is in
reality a $3B program. Guidance from the ExoPTF and the
Decadal Survey is needed on how to move forward on the study of
other planetary systems.
Major mission technology and conceptual development. It is crucial
that programs under consideration for implementation by the Decadal
Survey process reach a level of maturity that is characterized by a
well-defined architecture with well-vetted costs. The AAAC has
emphasized that consistent support, roughly at the $10M level, would
make a significant difference in the robustness of the mission
selections in the next Decadal Survey. The AAAC recommended that early
phase development funds for the major missions in Beyond Einstein
(Constellation-X; Con-X and the Laser Interferometer Space Antenna;
LISA) and in Navigator (Terrestrial Planet Finder; TPF) should be
continued if possible until the Decadal Survey reevaluates the mission
suite in the Astrophysics arena.
SOFIA. The SOFIA program underwent dramatic changes in the last
year: the project was first reduced to $0 and effectively terminated.
SOFIA then underwent a recovery and is now part of the Astrophysics
budget. SOFIA has had a troubled and costly development history and
will not reach full operations until 2013, more than 15 years after the
project began. SOFIA has a distinctly different operational model, akin
to ground-based telescopes, in that its instruments can be developed to
take advantage of ongoing technological developments. Because of this
the science opportunities can be high. SOFIA is a major mission, with a
full life cycle cost for 20 years of operations that is $3.4B (FY08
budget request). From FY09 its yearly cost is estimated to be $90M,
including Institutional costs, broadly comparable to Hubble (excluding
servicing costs) and JWST. When fully operational, SOFIA is estimated
to provide 900 hours of on-target time per year for science
observations--space missions average significantly more (HST 2500
hrs.; JWST 6000 hrs.). The cost-per-hour of on-target operation is
comparable to Hubble and several times JWST, and so the AAAC considers
that it is crucial that SOFIA operates as efficiently as possible and
fully involves the science community to provide high science returns.
Advisory structure. The AAAC expressed great concern last year in
our 2006 report about the lack of an advisory process at NASA, and were
very encouraged when the new NASA advisory committees were established.
The new structure has, however, lost a valuable role that was once
provided by the Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC). That
structure encouraged dialogue, on wide-ranging issues that cut across
the SMD divisions, between SMD and a broadly-representative group from
the science community. While the AAAC welcomed the re-establishment of
the advisory structure at NASA, we noted our concern that dialogue
between SMD and a broadly-representative group from the science
community is missing in the new structure. The AAAC (and the community
more broadly) would welcome an evolution of the current advisory
structure that would provide more dialogue with SMD through a more
scientifically-diverse group, even as formal recommendations are
channeled through the NAC to the Administrator.
Task forces. The agencies have responded very supportively to the
AAAC's requests for community-based task forces to advise the agencies
on implementation approaches for key scientific areas. NASA's recent
support for two interagency activities, the Dark Energy Task Force and
the ExoPlanet Task Force was appreciated (in addition to its earlier
support for the Task Force on the Cosmic Microwave Background). With
the substantial advances on the ground and the recognition of the
challenges and cost of major space missions for planet search projects
like SIM and TPF, the AAAC recommended last year that NSF and NASA
constitute a Task Force to develop a strategic framework for how to
move forward on the detection and characterization of planets around
other stars. The AAAC greatly appreciates that the agencies responded
positively and quickly; the ExoPlanet Task Force (ExoPTF) has been
formed and has begun its deliberations. Its report is expected late in
2007. The AAAC also welcomed the decision by SMD last year to ask the
NRC to carry out a study to determine which Beyond Einstein mission
should go forward if funding became available in a possible FY09/10
funding ``wedge'' as HST SM4 is completed and JWST passes the peak of
its spending curve. The selection of three JDEM mission concept studies
for conceptual development by NASA Astrophysics, and the joint support
of the NRC Beyond Einstein Program Assessment Committee (BEPAC) study
by DOE were also highly welcomed by the AAAC.
National Virtual Observatory (NVO). While this is a very small
program, it was considered to be of particular importance in the 2000
Decadal Survey. It is a joint NASA-NSF activity. The agreement on a
joint NASA-NSF solicitation for management of the NVO operation has
been moving forward at a very slow pace, and the AAAC would like to see
this come to closure to minimize the disruption to a small but
important activity.
2. What are your perspectives on the balance of the NASA astrophysics
program in terms of the mix of mission sizes, R&A, theory, modeling and
technology development? What if any adjustments are needed in your
view?
A balanced program within Astrophysics has been a consistent goal
of the astronomy community. Such a program provides the most cost-
effective way to address the great science issues of our time. Some can
be addressed through smaller missions like COBE and WMAP (the cosmic
microwave background), others require medium missions like Kepler
(planet searches), GLAST (the gamma-ray universe) and JDEM (dark
energy), while the largest missions (the Great Observatories like
Hubble, Chandra, Spitzer and JWST) can address some of the most
challenging scientific questions that cannot be answered any other way.
The versatility of such Observatories also allows them to be used for
follow-up of discoveries with very little time lag. However, where the
Observatory capabilities cannot address a particular high-priority
science objective the relatively rapid response with small missions
provides a means of doing so. The last three astronomy and astrophysics
Decadal Surveys have all emphasized the importance of a balanced
program of small, medium and large missions, and have given particular
emphasis to the Explorer program and to a healthy program of research
support (Data Analysis--DA, and Research and Analysis--R&A).
In the near-term, over the next few years, as noted above,
Astrophysics will have a range of missions including an Explorer
(WISE), a Discovery mission (Kepler) and a medium class mission
(GLAST). Data Analysis (DA) funds from the ongoing Great Observatories
are supporting a very wide variety of science objectives. The biggest
immediate concern is the cut in R&A, which, while modest, had great
impact because cuts in a multi-year program are immediately felt by the
new or renewing investigators. Another concern that is also vitally
important for the future of the Astrophysics program is the current low
level of technology development funding. This gets less attention, but
it is the ``seed corn'' for future missions.
However, the clouds on the horizon portend a more dismal future.
The future program is dominated by JWST and SOFIA, both of which are
large programs (in $ terms). As can be seen in the Figure above, the
dearth of small and medium missions post-2009 is a great concern for
the vitality of the field in the next decade. The continuing effective
reductions in the R&A budget (in the FY08 budget and by inflation) will
further impact the community, unless the trend is reversed. As Spitzer,
Hubble and Chandra approach the end of their lives the community will
also see reductions in data analysis funds. The DA and R&A funds and
smaller-scale missions serve a critical role in supporting the broad
fabric of research needed for realizing the science from future
missions and in enabling the development of the necessary personnel and
skills.
The program is clearly unbalanced in the future beyond 2009. There
are no small-medium Astrophysics missions for many years after 2009.
The first mission might be a Small Explorer (SMEX) in 2014. The
unbalance across Astrophysics is but one aspect. There is a need for
balance within the very broad areas encompassed by Astrophysics--a
single large program in one broad science area and only small missions
in another also indicates unbalance. For example, searches for and
research on exoplanets will benefit from an ensemble of small-to-large
missions complemented by ground-based facilities. A broad, systematic
cost-effective approach is needed. The same could be said of a broad
science program to explore our universe from its earliest moments to
the present day (Origins), and the Beyond Einstein program. Both have
very broad goals that together encompass most of the ``great
questions'' within astronomy and astrophysics, and need a suite of
missions of different scales to address those fundamental questions.
As much as possible it would be good to not have all our eggs in
one basket--especially for space missions. Whole areas of science could
be drastically undercut if problems occur. Realistically, there are
high priority science objectives where there is no other way than by
doing a large space mission, as with JWST's search for the earliest
galaxies in the early days of the universe. However, as much as
possible, we should try to accommodate a diverse range of mission and
project scales (and to give particular attention to complementing
ground-based studies, and collaborations both with other agencies and
internationally).
R&A funding needs to improve since it is essential for providing
the research base and the development of skills on which future return
from missions will depend. Funds for technology development are needed
to ensure that optimal choices are made when selecting missions and
that the mission options available are broad. There is a crucial need
to encourage and support technology development in the science
community, as well as at NASA Centers. Core capabilities are required
in the NASA Centers, but the Centers might be encouraged to involve the
academic community more routinely and directly, possibly through R&D
funding that supports more technology development.
I would give particular focus on strengthening the theory and
modeling program in R&A. This is remarkably inexpensive for its value
to the scientific enterprise. I am not a supporter of acquiring reams
of data without concurrent theoretical development. Results drive
theoretical efforts and give them relevance, but it is a synergistic
and two-way effort, where theoretical developments also help focus
observational efforts. It is crucial to have the challenge that comes
from having theory observations confront each other, and challenge and
test each other.
In summary, in my view adjustments are needed to provide a more
balanced mission suit across the whole program and also within broad
scientific areas, along with support for technology development, and
increased support for R&A, particularly for theory.
3. Does the program, in your view, reflect the priorities of the
National Academy of Sciences' decadal survey for astronomy and
astrophysics? If not, where does the program diverge from the decadal
survey?
As discussed above, the Astrophysics program in the near-term, does
have a number of launches and a suite of operating missions, and so
looks fairly balanced and productive. There are very real concerns,
however, about R&A funding, the frequency of small missions (Explorers)
and the very limited funds for technology development. The concern
grows substantially as one looks further into the future. Moreover, as
one takes a longer-term view the program increasingly moves away from
the goals of the Decadal survey. The mission mix becomes very
unbalanced. JWST will be a remarkably powerful mission, but the mission
suite is devoid of other space missions. SOFIA should be operating on
the ground, and hopefully a Beyond Einstein program will be under
development early in the decade, but launch would be many years away
(5-7?). An Astrophysics Small Explorer (SMEX) may be operational by
2014, but other launch opportunities may not arise for years. This is
not a balanced program, either scientifically or by mission scale
(small-medium-large), and will become increasingly unbalanced as the
current Great Observatories begin to end their useful life. This
unbalance will be accentuated as the missions launched in 2007, 2008
and 2009 start to approach their end of life towards the early-middle
of the decade. The lack of scientific breadth and limited numbers of
operating missions will be a serious departure from the breadth of the
program envisaged in the Decadal Survey. This will be compounded if the
problems with R&A funding and technology development continue.
4. What do you regard as the top three risks facing NASA's
astrophysics program over the next five years and how should those
risks be addressed?
The challenge of dealing with a reduction and a dramatic change of
slope in the Astrophysics budget, combined with recognition of the
costs of the current mission suite have resulted in great concern about
future opportunities in Astrophysics. I am assuming that we will
develop processes that ensure that we have more realistic cost
estimates and that we will use life cycle costs for programs for
planning and roadmapping. I then see the top risks from a scientific
perspective as:
1) The lack of small and medium missions beyond 2009. The dramatic drop
in the small-medium launch rate beyond 2009 is a major concern. The
recently announced Small Explorer SMEX call for proposals later this
year could lead to an opportunity for Astrophysics, but the earliest
likely launch date would be around 2014. The contrast with the next few
years, and with the early part of this decade (when many small and
medium Explorers were launched) is dramatic. SOFIA will not reach full
operations until 2013. JWST will be a superb scientific mission with
wide-ranging capabilities but it alone cannot encompass the science
goals of the astronomy and astrophysics community. This becomes
especially so since Spitzer, Chandra and Hubble will all be nearing or
past their end of life (Spitzer will lose a lot of its science
capability by mid-2009 as its cryogen is exhausted). The risk is of
greatly reduced scientific returns in the coming decade. An associated
risk is that of launch vehicle availability at reasonable cost. This is
a serious issue for mission frequency if a substantial fraction of the
cost of an Explorer or SMEX is the launch vehicle cost.
2) Inability to respond to the 2010 Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal
Survey. The funding for Astrophysics drops by 25 percent in real terms
around the time when the new Decadal Survey is released and so the
opportunities for ramping-up on the recommended missions will be quite
limited. The Decadal Survey will be discussing and making
recommendations on many high priority programs that have been under
development or discussion for some time. For example, Con-X, LISA, SIM,
TPF and SAFIR will all be discussed, as well as a variety of Einstein
Probe missions that are being considered in the current BEPAC study.
The AAAC ExoPlanet Task Force will likely identify additional areas for
development and missions. Some hard choices face the community in the
upcoming Decadal Survey. The natural outcome of the more realistic
costing that will be part of the next Decadal Survey will be a reduced
program, better matched to the available funding. However, the lack of
a significant funding opportunity will limit the ability to initiate a
strong effort following the survey. This translates to a risk of
significantly diminished scientific returns on the highest-priority
science questions of the decade. The next generation of missions will
also be at risk if technology development cannot be initiated because
of the same funding problems.
3) The current lack of technology development and mission development
funding and its impact on mission costs and readiness. The very limited
funding available in recent times has severely limited the technology
development efforts for both current missions in early development
(like Con-X and LISA, and now TPF), and also more innovative and
speculative technologies for future opportunities. This will have far-
reaching implications for mission opportunities in the next decade and
is significant risk to future astrophysics missions and competed
opportunities. It also increases the risks of cost growth if conceptual
development and technology development have been unable to progress
steadily.
These areas are identified as risk areas because of two problems.
The first is the dramatic change in the budget situation for
Astrophysics over the next few years, particularly the cuts in FY09 and
beyond. Second, the poor cost estimates in the past have exacerbated
our current problems. The agency and community together did not deal
very well with the cost estimates and budgets of the missions and
programs that we jointly developed. However, it is my view that this
situation has changed dramatically with the much more realistic and
open approach of the new Administrator and with a more sophisticated
and realistic view of project costs and the costs over the life cycle
of missions by the community and the Agency. While I think we are now
working to deal collectively with the undercosting problem, a solution
to the budget problem for science is a more challenging concern for the
future. If we are to have a strong, productive and broadly-based
science program, additional funding is needed. Recognition is needed
that NASA science plays a role as important as that of DOE science, NSF
and NIST in the Nation's science enterprise.
5. If you could make three strategic investments that could benefit
the astrophysics program over the long-term, what would those
investments be?
Strategic investments are key to positioning the Astrophysics
Division, the astronomy and astrophysics community, the NASA Centers
and industry partners to be able to extend the limits of scientific
endeavor and scientific understanding. To meet the science goals of the
community, NASA and the community need to be able to move forward on a
variety of missions from large Flagship missions to medium and smaller
scale missions, while returning cutting-edge science results from the
current missions. I think the following three areas would be excellent
strategic investments to position the Agency and the community for a
cost-effective program of science missions. The first two are
relatively low cost (though still very difficult to fund in the current
budget environment), while even the third could be carried out in an
Astrophysics budget that is constant at the FY06 dollar level.
1) R&A funding is a strategic investment. This is particularly so for
theory, modeling and cutting-edge technology development to complement
mission specific data analysis. Clearly R&A and mission-specific DA
maximizes the science return from current programs and also maximizes
the ``return on investment'' in space science. Support for such
activities is also a strategic investment from NASA's perspective. A
key aspect of an implementable long-range plan is knowing what are key
science questions, why they are important, and whether answering them
is doable. Exploiting current data, along with theory allows us to set
science priorities. Furthermore, exploring novel technologies and
strengthening the technological base amongst graduate students and
postdoctoral researchers is an investment for the future.
2) Technology development for missions. Astrophysics missions utilize
state-of-art technology, and it is essential that that technology be
developed and demonstrated to flight readiness levels before a mission
enters construction. Retiring technological risk early helps to
minimize the likelihood of cost growth. There is another aspect as
well. The science community must make strategic choices on how to spend
limited funds as wisely and effectively as possible. For this to happen
we must understand the level of risks and costs at the time we
undertake our Decadal Surveys. We cannot afford to have moderate scale
missions at the few hundred million dollar level grow into multi-
billion dollar programs. Modest (by comparison with the final costs)
expenditures on technology development and on establishing a strong
science and management team early in the planning and development
process would be money very well spent.
3) Competed, cost-capped missions. These missions, at the medium scale
(Einstein and Origins Probes--like New Frontiers), along with the
smaller Explorers and Discovery-class missions have a valuable role.
Having been a strong proponent of large ``Flagship'' missions (through
personally spending a great deal of my career working to make Hubble a
success and NGST--now JWST--a reality in its early years) I do not want
to downplay the central role that large missions play in the
Astrophysics science enterprise. Flagships, however, are rare and it is
essential for the vitality of the field for frequent launch
opportunities at the medium and small scale. Cost-capped, competed
missions have many attractive features (e.g., focused science
opportunities, community involvement, responsive to more current
science goals, controls on cost-growth). However, heavy reliance on
such quick response, ``bottom-up'' missions may undercut the benefits
of strategic planning through the Decadal Survey. This can be rectified
if the Decadal Survey gives guidance on broad areas that the community
sees as important and ready for investigation (e.g., searches for
planets around other stars--exoplanets; the early universe; dark matter
and dark energy). A additional major concern for such missions could be
the cost of launch vehicles with the demise of the Delta 2 launchers.
This has the potential to be a serious issue for the small-medium scale
missions.
As noted, an Astrophysics budget that is constant in FY06 dollars,
with the FY06 base, could accommodate all these recommendations. Any
growth as part of the legislative Innovation and Competitiveness agency
would enable, for example, a new large Flagship mission in the next
decade as well.
Biography for Garth D. Illingworth
POSITIONS HELD
1988- Astronomer, University of California Observatories/Lick
Observatory
1988- Professor, Department of Astronomy and Astrophysics, University
of California, Santa Cruz
1985-1987 Research Professor, Department of Physics and Astronomy,
Johns Hopkins University
1984-1987 Deputy Director, Space Telescope Science Institute
1978-1984 Astronomer, Kitt Peak National Observatory
1976-1977 Miller Fellow, Department of Astronomy, University of
California, Berkeley
1974-1975 Postdoctoral Fellow, Kitt Peak National Observatory
MAJOR ACTIVITIES/ACHIEVEMENTS (LAST SIX YEARS)
1. Major ongoing programs on galaxy evolution in clusters at z 1, and
galaxy formation and evolution at high redshift (from z 2 7 and
beyond): four graduate students and postdocs plus a number of major
HST, Spitzer, Keck, VLT and Magellan collaborations. Many talks at
international workshops on high redshift galaxies in the first 1-2
billion years.
2. Chair, Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee. Editor, AAAC
Annual Report to NSF, NASA and DOE, and to Congress and OSTP.
3. Deputy PI, HST Advanced Camera (ACS): Successful completion and
launch of most powerful instrument yet on the Hubble Space Telescope.
Improved HST's performance by 10 times.
4. Co-organizer major workshop (``Hubble's Science Legacy'') on
science issues and technical challenges for a large space telescope
successor to HST.
5. Chair, for four years, of Space Telescope Institute Council, STIC.
6. Search for planets using space coronagraph/nuller. Member TPF-C
STDT committee.
7. HST Key Project, ``Determining the Hubble Constant to 10 percent.''
Achieved 10 percent goal.
ACADEMIC HISTORY
1965-1968 B.Sc. (Honors) 1st Class (Physics), University of Western
Australia
1969-1973 Ph.D. (Astrophysics) Australian National University, Mount
Stromlo and Siding Spring Observatory
2007 Invited Speaker, EU ASTRONET Worshop--Status of U.S. Astronomy
Program
2006 Invited Plenury Speaker, SPIE, ``Large Telescopes'' Meeting--
Astronomy and the Decadal Survey
2005- Editor, with AAAC committee, AAAC Annual Report for Congress and
Agencies
2004- Chair, AAAC, Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee
2004-2006 TPF-C Science Technology Definition Team
2004 Chair, Spitzer TAC (GO Time Assignment Committee)
2004-2007 Nominating Committee, Aspen Center for Physics
2003 Elected General Member, Aspen Center for Physics
2003 PI, Visions proposal for >20-m UVOIR Telescope
2002-2005 SScAC, NASA Space Science Advisory Committee
2002-2003 NAAAC, National Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory
Committee
2000-2007 AURA Board of Directors
1999 NGST Instrument Study Team
1999-2000 HST Second Decade Study Committee
1998-2002 Chair, Space Telescope Institute Council
1997-2003 Member Representative, AURA (University of California
Representative)
1996-2002 Space Telescope Institute Council
1995-1996 AURA Board of Directors (University of California
Representative)
1995 NRC SSB ``Task Group on BMDO New Technology Orbital Telescope''
1995- Deputy PI, HST Advanced Camera
1994-1995 NASA HQ UVMOWG
1993-1999 Co-Chair, Keck Telescope Science Steering Committee
1992 HST Second Generation Instrument Review Team
1991-1993 JPL special review panel for HST camera, WFPC-2, chair
Charles Townes
1991-1999 Member, Keck Telescope Science Steering Committee
1990-1991 Co-chair, Keck Telescope Science Steering Committee
1990-1992 Chair, NGST SEWG (Next Generation Space Telescope Science-
Engineering Working Group) to oversee technology development
program for future large space telescope
1989-1990 Chair, ``UV-Optical In Space'' Panel of Astronomy and
Astrophysics Survey Committee
1988-1989 Chair, Scientific Organizing Committee for Workshop on ``The
Next Generation: A Successor to Hubble Space Telescope''
sponsored by NASA HQ and STScI
1987-1990 Keck Telescope Science Steering Committee
1987-1990 Chair, Keck Telescope Segment Acceptance Committee
1987-1989 NASA HQ UV-Visible-Relativity Management Operations Working
Group
1987 Executive Committee, HST Maintenance and Refurbishment Workshop,
Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland
1986-1987 Co-Chair, HST Science Certification Review
PUBLICATIONS (recent selections from 295 papers total)
196. ``Spectroscopic Confirmation of a Substantial Population of
Luminous Red Galaxies at Red shifts z > 2,'' P.G. van Dokkum, N.M.
Forster Schreiber, M. Franx, E. Daddi, G.D. Illingworth, I. Labbe, A.
Moorwood, H.-W. Rix, H. Rottgering, G. Rudnick, A. van der Wel, P. van
der Werf and L. van Starkenburg. ApJL, 587, L83-L87, 2003.
202. ``Hubble's Science Legacy: Future Optical/Ultraviolet Astronomy
from Space,'' K.R. Sembach, J.C. Blades, G.D. Illingworth and R.C.
Kennicutt, Jr. In: ASP Conf. Ser. 291: Hubble's Science Legacy: Future
Optical/Ultraviolet Astronomy from Space, held 2-5 April 2002 at
University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, USA, eds. K.R. Sembach, J.C.
Blades, G.D. Illingworth and R.C. Kennicutt, Jr., 335-338, 2003.
208. ``Requirements for an optical 8-m space telescope with a MEMs
deformable mirror to detect Earth-like planets around nearby stars,''
H.C. Ford, M. Clampin, G.D. Illingworth, J.E. Krist, S.S. Olivier, L.
Petro and G.E. Sommagren. SPIE, 4854, 554-557, 2003.
222. ``Star Formation at z 6: The Hubble Ultra Deep Parallel
Fields,'' R.J. Bouwens, G.D. Illingworth, R.I. Thompson, J.P.
Blakeslee, M.E. Dickinson, T.J. Broadhurst, D.J. Eisenstein, X. Fan, M.
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Chairman Udall. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Baker.
STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL N. BAKER, DIRECTOR, LABORATORY FOR
ATMOSPHERIC AND SPACE PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER
Dr. Baker. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and
Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to address the impacts of the proposed fiscal year
2008 budget on the NASA program and heliophysics.
In addition to my roles at the University of Colorado, I am
also the Chair of the National Research Council's Committee on
Solar and Space Physics, and a member of its parent body, the
RC Space Studies Board.
Part of the views I express today are my own.
Let me begin by thanking you for your continuing and
substantial support for NASA science. We in the science
community sincerely appreciate the support, and fully recognize
the difficulty of funding NASA science in a constrained budget
environment.
Heliophysics division at NASA has a number of exciting
missions that have been launched recently. Stereo, NODI and
DEMES are already providing remarkable new measurements.
Because of our large role in the program, we at LASP are very
excited and proud of the successful launch just last week for
the upper atmospheric AIM spacecraft as part of the Explorer
program.
However, beginning with the fiscal year 2005 NASA budget
plan, and continuing through the fiscal year 2008 budget in its
five year run out, the future heliophysics program has been
significantly compromised. For example, the solar terrestrial
probes, or STP line, has had over half of its budget content
removed, resulting in at least a six year gap in STP launches.
A highly successful Explorer mission line has had over $1
billion of budget authority removed in the run out from the
fiscal year 2005 budget onward.
As shown in the figure here, the Explorer budget in the
fiscal year 2008 plan is about half of what would have been
expected, based on the fiscal year 2004 budget, which greatly
reduces our ability to respond effectively to new science and
technology advances. Noted by others, the sounding rocket
program, and indeed the entire sub-orbital program is also at a
dangerously low bare bones resource level.
In the fiscal year 2008 budget plan, the space weather
oriented living with the STAR program also sees its funding
stretched out so that it substantially--missions have been
reduced, and the radiation belt storm probes and atmosphere/
thermosphere probes have--no longer have simultaneity.
Alarmingly, and rather inexplicably, the previously budgeted
funding for the RBSP missions of opportunity is eliminated in
the fiscal year 2008 plan.
In response to your questions about my perspectives on the
balance of the NASA heliophysics program and its mix of program
elements, I must say that considerable anxiety exists in the
science community due to anticipated reductions in the smaller
missions and sustaining research programs that perform the
support for much of the community based research.
I am delighted that Dr. Stern is taking actions now to
remedy the sub-orbital situation. I am also encouraged by the
fact that a new announcement of opportunity for small explorers
will be released, thanks to Dr. Stern and his team, by October
2007. There is widespread recognition as well that R&A cuts are
harmful and will inevitably reduce the number of new students
who enter university programs. This definitely needs to be
addressed.
As for how the heliophysics program reflects the priorities
of the decadal survey in solar and space physics, NASA is
attempting to implement some of the highest priority programs
from the 2003 survey, but the pace and balance of activity
seems highly unlikely to achieve the decadal goals. It now
appears that with mission cost growth and reduced heliophysics
funding it is very unlikely that most survey missions will be
completed within the decadal window.
The three top risks facing the heliophysics program over
the next five years, in my opinion, are first, fear of failure.
There is a proper level of redundancy, scrutiny and oversight
that matches the risk of a robotic mission failure, and
balances that with the program's scale. To do more than this
due diligence drives costs for even small end missions out to
extraordinary heights. I fear this is paralyzing the space
science program at present, this fear of failure.
Lack of affordable access to space is the second.
Unfortunately, the cost of launching missions into space has
grown out of all proportion to the cost of small scientific
payloads and satellites. This imbalance is destroying the
ability of the heliophysics to develop and maintain a regular
and frequent launch of all class submissions.
The third risk is the erosion of trained work force. The
NRC has recently issued a report on the NASA work force, and it
confirms my view that NASA needs to invest in space science
programs that allow universities to attract and engage
undergraduate and graduate students in all aspects of mission
development and deployment.
Finally, the top three investments that could be made to
benefit the heliophysics program over the long-term are, first,
I would say, lower costs and frequent access to space. Congress
and other stakeholders should work together to make sure that
every avenue for launching space hardware is made readily
available to research teams.
In this category of access to space I would also place
missions of opportunity. Launching NASA instruments or payload
suites on commercial or foreign spacecraft can provide
tremendous bang for the buck.
Secondly, would be a regular cadence and more frequent
small end missions. This echoes what other speakers have said.
The key to a healthy, robust heliophysics program is to have
more and better opportunities for small explorer, university
class explorer and sub-orbital missions.
Investment necessary to achieve the desired outcome in this
arena could be readily accomplished, I believe, by restoring
the Explorer mission line to the budgetary level that existed
in the fiscal year 2004 budget plan. It was about $350 million
per year.
Finally, and I can't stress this strongly enough, is
improved management of mission costs. I believe that
heliophysics should invest time and money now into developing
an approach to mission management that uses prudent levels of
reviews and much wiser risk mitigation strategies.
Thank you very much for your attention. I look forward to
answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Baker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel N. Baker
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and Members of the
Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity today to address key
issues that face the NASA science enterprise. I want specifically to
address the impacts of the proposed FY 2008 budget on the NASA
Heliophysics program. My name is Daniel Baker and I am a Professor of
astrophysical and planetary sciences at the University of Colorado. I
am also the Director of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space
Physics at CU-Boulder. The Laboratory is a research institute that has
over 60 teaching and research faculty in the several disciplines of
space and Earth sciences. My institute, which we call LASP for short,
receives some $50-$60 million per year to support experimental,
theoretical, and data analysis programs in the Space and Earth
Sciences. The vast majority of these resources come from NASA. Other
strong support comes from NSF, NOAA, and other federal agencies. LASP
presently supports some 120 engineers, dozens of highly skilled
technicians, and over 20 key support personnel. We are very proud, as
well, that LASP has over 60 graduate students and another 60
undergraduate students who are pursuing education and training goals in
space science and engineering.
I myself am a space plasma physicist and I have served as a
principal investigator on several scientific programs of NASA. I am now
a lead investigator in the upcoming Radiation Belt Storm Probe (RBSP)
mission that is part of NASA's Living With a Star program. I am also an
investigator on NASA's Cluster, Polar, MESSENGER, and Magnetospheric
Multi-Scale (MMS) missions. Presently, I serve as Chair of the National
Research Council's Committee on Solar and Space Physics. By virtue of
that position, I also am a member of the Space Studies Board, chaired
by my colleague, Dr. Len Fisk. The views I am presenting here are my
own, however.
First, and foremost, I would like to begin by commending the
American people, and you as their representatives, for the significant
investment made in NASA science. The scientific community is well aware
of how difficult it has become to find funding for the many worthy
programs that you must consider. We sincerely appreciate continued
support from Congress and from the American public. It is a major and
lasting achievement of our nation that it finds the means and the will
to look beyond the pressure of present-day concerns, to focus on
questions about humanity's place in the universe, our relationship to
our Sun and the nearby planets, how the Earth and its environment have
functioned in the past, and how they may change in the future. I
believe--as do you, I suspect--that the United States has benefited
greatly from investment in space research. Not only is the
technological base of our country strengthened by NASA innovations, but
our prestige and competitiveness in the world and our educational
investment in the future technical workforce are greatly enhanced by
NASA science leadership.
Overview of FY 2008 Budget Impacts to the Heliophysics Program
The National Research Council's (NRC's) 2003 Solar and Space
Physics (SSP) Decadal Survey, The Sun to the Earth--and Beyond: A
Decadal Strategy for Solar and Space Physics, laid out a clear,
prudent, and effective program of basic and applied research. The
envisioned program would address key science objectives such as:
understanding magnetic reconnection--the physical process underlying
much of space physics; discovering the mechanisms that drive the Sun's
activity and produce energetic particle storms in the heliosphere;
determining the physical interactions of the Earth's ionosphere with
the atmosphere and magnetosphere; as well as addressing a host of other
questions that are essential to understanding our local space
environment. The Decadal Plan would also have allowed an end-to-end
view of the connected Sun-Earth system through NASA's Living With a
Star (LWS) program, thereby enhancing greatly the ability to provide
realistic specification and forecasts of space weather. Through both
its basic research component and its applied component, the
Heliophysics Program would therefore contribute substantially and
directly to national needs and to the Vision for Space Exploration.
At present, the Heliophysics Division (HPD) of NASA has a number of
exciting projects that have been launched or are ready for launch. The
dual-spacecraft STEREO mission is being commissioned and is returning
amazing new three-dimensional views of the Heliosphere. Detailed images
of the Sun are also being provided by the newly-launched Hinode
mission, a joint Japan-U.S. venture. The five-spacecraft THEMIS mission
was successfully launched in February 2007 and is already providing
remarkable multi-point measurements in Earth's magnetosphere. Because
of our large role in the program, we at LASP are very excited about the
successful launch just last week of the upper atmospheric AIM
spacecraft as part of the Explorer program. The first LWS mission,
Solar Dynamics Observatory (SDO), is well into development preparing
for launch in 2008. Thus, the HPD program has several highly capable
new space assets that are joining the Heliophysics Great Observatory
constellation of operating spacecraft.
Beyond this good news, however, there are significant concerns.
Beginning with the FY 2005 NASA budget plan, and continuing through the
FY 2008 budget and its five-year run-out, the future Heliophysics
program has been significantly compromised. The Solar-Terrestrial
Probes (STP) line of missions has had over half of its budget content
removed, resulting in at least a six-year gap in STP launches. Within
the current NASA budget horizon extending to 2015, the STP line is now
down to a single mission launch, the Magnetospheric Multi-Scale (MMS)
mission. The venerable and highly successful Explorer mission line
(managed by HPD for all of NASA) has had over $1 billion of budget
authority removed in the run-out from FY 2005 onward. As shown in the
figure below, the Explorer budgets in the FY 2008 and its run-out are
about half of what they would have been expected to be based on the FY
2004 budget and its run-out.
As Principal Investigator (PI)-led missions with a rapid
development time, Explorers have proven invaluable for investigating
the broad range of Heliophysics science. The drastic funding reduction
in this line has greatly reduced HPD's ability to respond effectively
to new science/technology advances. The sounding rocket program (and,
indeed, the entire sub-orbital program) is at a dangerously low, bare-
bones resource level. The Research and Analysis (R&A) program was
deeply cut last year and no funding restorations seem likely at
present. The impact of these cuts will be felt for many years since
R&A, Explorers, and Sub-orbital programs are key elements in
capitalizing on the investments that have already been made and for
attracting and training the next generation of space scientists and
engineers. Moreover, the high priority ``Flagship'' mission for
Heliophysics, the Solar Probe Mission, is not presently contained in
NASA's plan.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Solar Probe mission was the highest priority large-class
mission in the NRC solar and space physics decadal survey. An early
start of Solar Probe would have required resources beyond those
anticipated at the time the survey was completed; however, the
anticipated budgets supported a start in FY 2010. Long a priority of
the heliophysics community, the Solar Probe mission promises to
revolutionize our knowledge of the physics of the origin and evolution
of the solar wind. Moreover, by making the only direct, in-situ
measurements of the region where some of the deadliest solar energetic
particles are energized, Solar Probe would make unique and fundamental
contributions to our ability to characterize and forecast the radiation
environment in which future space explorers will work and live.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The other major component of the Heliophysics program is Living
with a Star (LWS). The funding profile for LWS as defined by the FY
2005 and FY 2006 budgets allowed for a robust program. In the FY 2008
budget plans, however, LWS funding is stretched out so that
simultaneity between missions such as Radiation Belt Storm Probes
(RBSP) and Ionosphere-Thermosphere Storm Probes is lost. Alarmingly,
and rather inexplicably, the previously-budgeted funding for the RBSP
Missions of Opportunity is eliminated from the FY 2008 plan. Such
reductions to LWS are threatening the success of the immediate program
as well as the timely implementation of missions such as Sentinels,
which are necessary to fulfill the President's 2004 Vision for Space
Exploration. These reductions are impeding progress in understanding
the origins of the severe space weather events that have the potential
to disrupt civil and military satellite communications, applications
that rely on the Global Positioning System (GPS), and power generation
and transmission systems. Given the large investments that NASA will
make to fulfill the Vision for Space Exploration and the investments
that the Nation, as a whole, is increasingly making in space-based
technology, it seems ill-considered to decrease support for LWS, the
NASA program that is most closely directed toward protecting those
investments.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For example, in 2004, it was reported the economic benefits of
providing reliable warnings of geomagnetic storms to the electric power
industry alone were approximately $450 million over three years. See,
``Solar Storms Cause Significant Economic and other Impacts on Earth,''
and references therein, in NOAA Magazine, available on the Internet at:
.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, some of the fiscal problems in Heliophysics and
elsewhere are related to mission cost growth. Much of this problem,
however, lies in non-technical issues that the science community and
the Decadal Survey could not have anticipated, including substantial
increases in launch vehicle costs, the effects of full-cost accounting,
and mandates for additional layers of oversight and review. As noted
above, the problems with the Heliophysics program started well before
the FY 2008 budget plan, but the trends have been perpetuated in the FY
2008 budget and its five-year run-out.
Specific Questions Concerning Heliophysics
I present here my detailed answers to the questions addressed to me
by the Chairman in his letter of 11 April 2007:
1. Perspective on the balance of the NASA Heliophysics program and its
mix of program elements.
Considerable anxiety is being caused in the science community due
to the anticipated and extraordinary reductions in the smaller mission
opportunities and sustaining research programs that form the support
for much of the university-based research (in which students and early-
career scientist are involved). Small missions, such as those in the
Explorer and Earth System Science Pathfinders programs, provide
projects in which new concepts are tested for a modest investment and
where students first learn the space science and engineering trade.
This particularly applies to sounding rockets, balloons, and aircraft
flights that provide opportunities on a time scale that falls within
the educational horizon of a graduate student. Since 2000, the
historical sounding rocket launch rate has dropped more than half (from
about 30 to 10 missions per year), with anticipated further reductions
as a result of the FY 2008 budget. The present run-out budget places
even the regular launch facilities, such as those at Poker Flat in
Alaska, in danger by 2008. Staff reductions may be necessary at the
Wallops Island Flight Facility in a matter of months if additional
funds are not forthcoming to the sounding rocket program. I am
delighted that Dr. Alan Stern, the new Science Mission Directorate
(SMD) Associate Administrator, is taking actions now to remedy the sub-
orbital situation.
The Explorer program is another prime example of the severe impacts
in the Heliophysics program. Explorers are the original science
missions of NASA, dating back to the very first U.S. satellite,
Explorer I. They are universally recognized as the most successful
science projects at NASA, providing insights into both the most remote
parts of our universe and the detailed dynamics of our local space
environment. The Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) now stands as our
sentinel to measure, in-situ, large mass ejections from the Sun and the
energetic particles that are a danger to humans in space. Two
relatively recent Explorers, TRACE and RHESSI, study the dynamics of
the solar corona where large solar storms originate, storms that often
threaten satellites and other technological assets on which we depend.
The recently launched THEMIS constellation and the AIM mission were
both done under the Explorer program aegis. Explorers are among the
most competitive solicitations in NASA science, and offer opportunities
for all researchers to propose new and exciting ideas that are selected
on the basis of science content, relation to overall NASA strategic
goals, and feasibility of execution. As noted in the figure above, the
FY 2008 proposed run-out for Explorers will mean a program that is
reduced by over half from its proposed FY 2004 guidelines. I am again
encouraged by the fact that a new Announcement of Opportunity for Small
Explorers will be released, thanks to Dr. Stern, by October 2007.
A specific continuing concern to university-based scientists is the
impact on the sustaining Research and Analysis (R&A) budgets. The R&A
program initiates many of the new, small scientific efforts that
eventually lead to the major missions that NASA pursues. R&A grants are
highly competitive, maximize the science investment of on-going
missions by allowing all scientists to use available data, and are
heavily geared toward student and young faculty participation. These
are moderate-duration efforts, usually lasting three to four years,
where new hardware and theoretical approaches are explored. NASA was
forced last year by budget realities to propose an across-the-board
reduction of 15 percent in these programs. This may not appear
catastrophic at first sight, but a sudden reduction in such a long-term
program can have huge effects. If the budget were allowed to grow once
again, the R&A program would slowly recover over the next few years.
However, with the present budget prospects, there is skepticism about
such future restoration. There is widespread recognition that these
realities will inevitably reduce the number of new students who enter
university programs such as mine.
2. Does the Heliophysics program reflect the priorities of the NRC
Decadal Survey in solar and space physics?
Whereas NASA is attempting to implement some of the highest
priority programs from the NRC's 2003 Decadal Survey, the pace and
balance of activities seems highly unlikely to achieve the Decadal
goals. In 2004, an NRC committee was tasked to assess the role of solar
and space physics in the Vision for Space Exploration--Solar and Space
Physics and Its Role in Space Exploration. This committee stated that:
NASA's Heliophysics program depends upon a balanced portfolio
of space flight missions and of supporting programs and
infrastructure. There are two strategic mission lines--Living
With a Star (LWS) and Solar-Terrestrial Probes (STP)--and a
coordinated set of supporting programs. LWS missions focus on
observing the solar activity, from short-term dynamics to long-
term evolution, that can affect the Earth, as well as
astronauts working and living in a near-Earth space
environment. Solar-Terrestrial Probes are focused on exploring
the fundamental physical processes of plasma interactions in
the solar system.
Solar and Space Physics and Its Role in Exploration examined the
2003 Decadal Survey and made the following three recommendations:
1. To achieve the goals of the exploration vision there must
be a robust program, including both the LWS and the STP mission
lines, that studies the heliospheric system as a whole and that
incorporates a balance of applied and basic science.
2. The programs that underpin the LWS and STP mission lines--
MO&DA [Mission Operations and Data Analysis], Explorers, the
sub-orbital program, and SR&T [Supporting Research and
Technology]--should continue at a pace and level that will
ensure that they can fill their vital roles in Heliophysics
research.
3. The near-term priority and sequence of solar, heliospheric,
and geospace missions should be maintained as recommended in
the Decadal Survey report both for scientific reasons and for
the purposes of the exploration vision.
These recommendations remain valid today and the mission priorities
within the basic (STP) and applied (LWS) science mission lines as
listed in the original Decadal Survey are basically reflected in the
Heliophysics budgets for these two mission lines. Where NASA has
deviated from the Decadal Survey is in putting greater weight on Living
With a Star missions and losing the balance between applied and basic
science. Such a priority of emphasizing short-term capability of
predicting space weather over the long-term goal of understanding the
underlying physical principles may have some practical expedience. A
more critical issue, however, is the fact that small missions and
supporting research have not kept pace. If these budgets are allowed to
decline greatly, Heliophysics will quickly cease to be a robust, viable
discipline. It now appears that with mission cost growth and reduced
Heliophysics funding, it is very unlikely that most Decadal Survey
missions will be completed within the decadal window.
The Sun to the Earth--and Beyond was the first Decadal Survey
conducted by the solar and space physics community. The Decadal Survey
involved hundreds of scientists in discussions that spanned nearly two
years. The scientific priorities set out in the survey remain valid
today and there is no community movement to change them. But Decadal
Surveys are not just a list of science priorities. To design a coherent
program across a decade it is essential to have a realistic budget
profile as well as reasonably accurate estimates of both technical
readiness and costs of each mission. The Decadal Survey committee
worked hard with engineers and NASA management to develop realistic
mission costs and a program architecture that fit within budget
profiles anticipated in the FY 2003 budget. But changes to the budget
profile beginning in FY 2005 necessitated a substantial stretching of
the mission schedule. Furthermore, under-costing of just a few missions
wreak havoc with even the best-laid plans. The scientific community
needs to work with NASA to find ways to cost missions accurately,
particularly large missions (for example, by applying lessons learned
from management of smaller, PI-led missions as appropriate, and
insisting upon greater accountability).
3. What are the three top risks facing the Heliophysics program over
the next five years?
Heliophysics, like most of the NASA science enterprise, is
significantly affected by some very basic, systemic issues. These
issues spread throughout all programs, projects, and missions. A
continued forward propagation of these problems ultimately represents a
huge level of risk for the sub-disciplines of the SMD and for the
Agency as a whole:
Prudent Management of Risk. Getting into space, working in
space (either for humans or for machines), and returning appropriate
data from space is an inherently ``risky'' business. Despite highly
competent people exercising all sensible and prudent care, there can be
failures of space missions. For those programs involving humans and
human life, truly heroic measures must be employed and extraordinary
efforts must be extended to assure that missions do not fail: In the
human space flight realm, failure is not an option.
In the robotic exploration realm, there are a wide range of mission
sizes and costs. Very large, high-profile missions of great complexity,
international prominence, and resource investment may have to be
safeguarded by many levels of review and hardware redundancy. Such
approaches tend to drive up program costs tremendously. However, for
smaller missions, there is a proper level of redundancy, scrutiny, and
oversight that matches the program scale. To do more than this ``due
diligence'' drives costs for even small-end missions to extraordinary
levels. Such fear of failure, or undue ``risk aversion'' is having very
detrimental effects on Heliophysics missions.
What we really need to focus on is the management of risk. Since
the first Explorer, almost 50 years ago, NASA science projects have
been extraordinarily successful. But over the years, the management
procedures and quality assurance burden for robotic science projects
has grown to an almost unsustainable level--commensurate with human
space flight missions--without any quantifiable impact on improving the
ultimate reliability of science missions (as far as many scientists can
discern). In my view, the American people accept the idea that the
space business is risky, especially during launch and re-entry. Given
launch risks, it makes no sense to spend hundreds of millions of
dollars on procedures that might improve the reliability of payloads
far beyond, say, the 98 percent or 99 percent reliability level.
There is considerable debate whether present reliability approaches
are actually achieving more assurance than this. We have all learned
that unnecessary risk in human space flight programs has tragic
consequences and clearly more must be done to minimize that risk. It is
equally true that not taking risks in leading-edge robotic science
projects has undesirable results. Not only must science continue to
push the technological envelope where failure is a risk that
accompanies new ideas, but these projects provide opportunities for
training staff and students in an environment where failure is not
life-threatening, and where a student can gain hands-on experience in
the real work of building state-of-the art instrumentation. Having
gained this expertise, these students can go on to form the workforce
of future operational robotic science missions and human space flight
missions.
Lack of affordable access to space. A major hallmark of the
past science program of NASA has been the regular, frequent launches of
a balanced portfolio of small, medium, and large missions to address
key science questions and to test new enabling technologies.
``Balance'' in this context does not mean equal dollars in all mission
categories, but rather it means appropriate investment in small-end
missions targeted toward specific science questions and toward
workforce development, as well as investments in major flagship
programs. In my view, there should be heavy emphasis on smaller
spacecraft and sub-orbital missions. (This idea has been endorsed by
last year's NRC report An Assessment of Balance in NASA's Science
Programs).
Unfortunately, the cost of launching missions into space has grown
out of all proportion to the cost of small scientific satellites and
payloads. This imbalance between payloads and launch costs is
destroying the ability of the Heliophysics Division to develop and
maintain its regular, frequent launches of Small Explorers, University-
Class Explorers, and even Solar-Terrestrial Probe missions. The risks
associated with increasing costs of access to space, in my view, are
threatening to sink the entire carefully-laid plans for Heliophysics
science.
There are some disturbing recent signs in the access to space
arena. One of the longest-serving launch vehicles for NASA missions,
the Boeing Delta II vehicle, is being eliminated as an option for
future science programs. Much of the NASA medium-lift needs for Earth-
orbiting and planetary missions was carried out using the Delta II.
Losing the ``sweet spot'' around which so many NASA launches were
planned will, I fear, propagate in highly detrimental ways throughout
the space science enterprise.
I have also mentioned above the removal of funding for the RBSP
Missions of Opportunity. It is hard to imagine a more cost-effective
investment that NASA can make than to launch instruments on commercial
or partner-nation spacecraft. For a relatively small NASA investment,
the science enterprise gains access to a highly leveraged program and
can often provide a complementary science capability that lends a
robustness and insurance that could not be afforded any other way. I am
very encouraged that Dr. Stern has voiced strong public support for
MoOs.
Erosion of trained workforce. A key to the success of NASA as
a whole, and Heliophysics in particular, is the availability of
hardware-educated scientists and ``hands-on'' trained engineers. Nearly
all space projects require a great deal of technical competence, and a
correspondingly competent workforce. There has been a steady erosion of
that workforce, not only at NASA but across the entire country, and
this fact has been decried from many quarters. The NRC report, ``Rising
Above the Gathering Storm,'' makes this case most emphatically. Other
technical industries have been able to compensate somewhat by tapping
the pool of highly-trained immigrants and foreign students, and they
often outsource work abroad. But spacecraft are ITAR sensitive items,
so this pool is not available to NASA or to its outside space-
enterprise partners, even to universities, because of the constraints
of the law. All the space programs at NASA, DOE, NOAA, and the DOD feel
this shortage acutely. And the situation will probably just get worse
unless something is done.
NASA commissioned the NRC to study how the workforce necessary to
carry out the Vision for Space Exploration can be maintained given the
impending retirement of much technical talent. The report, released
earlier this week, cites the need for more highly skilled program and
project managers and systems engineers who have acquired substantial
experience in space systems development, and identifies limited
opportunities for junior specialists to obtain hands-on space project
experience as one of the impediments to NASA's ability to execute the
Vision. The report recommends that NASA place a high priority on
recruiting, training and retaining skilled program and project managers
and systems engineers, and that it provide hands-on training and
development opportunities for younger and junior personnel (Building a
Better NASA Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National
Vision for Space Exploration, p. 7).
It is clear that there is a shortage of engineers and scientists
who have actually built space hardware, and know how that hardware can
be integrated and function within larger, more complex systems. NASA
science programs are a critical source of this needed native talent,
whether they remain in NASA science programs or move out into the
larger industrial base. Education at its very best is a process of
discovery and of trial-and-error: the efficacy of learning-by-doing has
been proven over many years.
NASA needs to maintain its investment in space science programs
that allow universities to attract and engage undergraduate and
graduate students in all aspects of mission development and
deployment--from proof of concept studies, to proposal submittal, to
prototype development, to launch, data analysis, and publication.
Whether these programs have short or long time horizons, there are ways
to allow the next generation of space scientists to participate in all
aspects of an exciting NASA mission.
4. What would be the top three investments that could be made to
benefit the Heliophysics program over the long-term?
The Heliophysics Division would benefit substantially in the long-
term from several immediate investments. These include not only
dollars, but ``intellectual capital'' and renewed commitments to a
properly balanced experimental, theoretical, and modeling program.
Lower cost and frequent access to space. In my view, the
single greatest impediment to a healthy and vigorous Heliophysics
program is the uncertainty and cost of getting spacecraft and sub-
orbital missions launched. Obviously, the Heliophysics Division cannot,
and should not, pay for developing new launch vehicles. But HPD, NASA
in general, the Congress, and other stakeholders should work together
to make sure that every avenue for launching space hardware is made
readily available to research teams. This should include less expensive
domestic launch vehicles, ``military'' launchers (such as the Minotaur
rocket), secondary launch capabilities on commercial and U.S. military
vehicles, and unfettered access to non-U.S. launch vehicles. In the
latter category are launches on European, Indian, Japanese, and other
launch systems that can offer very attractive prices for access to
space. A secondary launch on an Ariane 5 vehicle, for example, could be
obtained for as little as $1 million or so.
In this category of access to space, I would also place Missions of
Opportunity (MoOs). Launching NASA instruments or payload suites on
commercial or military vehicles, or on-board foreign spacecraft, can
provide tremendous ``bang for the buck.'' I know from public statements
by Dr. Stern that he recognizes the power and benefits of MoOs and I
hope this avenue to space can be pursued aggressively. The MoO
component should certainly be restored explicitly to the Radiation Belt
Storm Probe program.
Regular cadence and more frequent small-end missions. As
pointed out above, the key to a healthy, robust Heliophysics program is
to have more and better opportunities for Small Explorer (SMEX),
University-Class Explorer (UNEX), and sub-orbital missions. This
emphasis is wholly consistent with the Decadal Survey recommendations
and it fulfills a wide variety of programmatic, educational, and
workforce training goals that I have alluded to above. The investment
necessary to achieve the desired outcome in this arena could be readily
accomplished (I believe) by restoring the Explorer mission line to the
budgetary level that existed in the FY 2004 budget plan (?$350 million
per year). The combination of sound management approaches, reasonable
launch costs, sensible numbers of reviews, and appropriate levels of
risk tolerance would, I maintain, allow a very vigorous small-mission
capability within Heliophysics for a very modest amount of new
budgetary authority.
Improve management of mission costs. As has been alluded to
above, the Heliophysics missions--as with most of NASA programs--have
increased in cost to well above the levels planned in the 2003 Decadal
Survey. Much of this has been due to factors touched on earlier: access
to space has become prohibitively expensive and ``risk aversion'' has
increased mission development costs to extraordinary heights. I believe
that Heliophysics should invest time and money now into developing an
approach to mission management that uses prudent levels of reviews and
much wiser risk mitigation strategies. Some years ago--perhaps a decade
or so--``best practices'' were developed for PI-led missions and I
firmly believe those practices could and should still serve as the
basis for managing essentially all Heliophysics instrument and
spacecraft programs. A small investment now in improved management
approaches both at NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers would pay
tremendous future dividends.
Summary
Fortunately, smaller-end programs such as R&A, sounding rockets,
and the Explorer mission line could be restored to the levels
anticipated in the FY 2004 budget by infusions of modest amounts of
budget authority. For the larger Heliophysics programs (Solar-
Terrestrial Probes and Flagship missions), comparatively higher levels
of resources are required. Better management of programs and
containment of cost growth is clearly necessary to stretch available
dollars. However, absent a restoration of more balanced budgets to
levels planned as recently as FY 2004, it will not be possible to have
a robust program that is capable of meeting high priority national
needs.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Biography for Daniel N. Baker
Dr. Daniel Baker is Director of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics at the University of Colorado-Boulder and is Professor of
Astrophysical and Planetary Sciences there. His primary research
interest is the study of plasma physical and energetic particle
phenomena in planetary magnetospheres and in the Earth's vicinity. He
conducts research in space instrument design, space physics data
analysis, and magnetospheric modeling.
Dr. Baker obtained his Ph.D. degree with James A. Van Allen at the
University of Iowa. Following postdoctoral work at the California
Institute of Technology with Edward C. Stone, he joined the physics
research staff at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and became Leader
of the Space Plasma Physics Group at LANL in 1981. From 1987 to 1994,
he was the Chief of the Laboratory for Extraterrestrial Physics at
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. From 1994 to present he has been at
the University of Colorado.
Dr. Baker has published over 700 papers in the refereed literature
and has edited five books on topics in space physics. He is a Fellow of
the American Geophysical Union, the International Academy of
Astronautics, and the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS).
He currently is an investigator on several NASA space missions
including the MESSENGER mission to Mercury, the Magnetospheric Multi-
Scale (MMS) mission, the Radiation Belt Storm Probes (RBSP) mission,
and the Canadian ORBITALS mission. He has won numerous awards for his
research efforts and for his management activities including
recognition by the Institute for Scientific Information as being
``Highly Cited'' in space science (2002), being awarded the Mindlin
Foundation Lectureship at the University of Washington (2003) and being
selected as a National Associate of the National Academy of Sciences
(2004). Dr. Baker has been chosen as a 2007 winner of the University of
Colorado's Robert L. Stearns Award for outstanding research, service,
and teaching. Dr. Baker presently serves on several national and
international scientific committees including the Chairmanship of the
National Research Council Committee on Solar and Space Physics and
membership on the Space Studies Board. Dr. Baker recently served as
President of the Space Physics and Aeronomy section of the American
Geophysical Union (2002-2004) and he presently serves on advisory
panels of the U.S. Air Force and the National Science Foundation. He
was a member of the NRC's 2003 Decadal Survey Panel for solar and space
physics and he was a member of the 2006 Decadal Review of the U.S.
National Space Weather Program.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Baker.
Dr. Burns.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOSEPH A. BURNS, IRVING P. CHURCH PROFESSOR OF
ENGINEERING AND ASTRONOMY; VICE PROVOST, PHYSICAL SCIENCES AND
ENGINEERING, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
Dr. Burns. Chairman Udall, Ranking Member----
Chairman Udall. Dr. Burns, if you would turn your
microphone on.
Dr. Burns. That works much better. Let me try that again.
Chairman Udall, Ranking Member Calvert, and Representative
Johnson, I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to testify to
you today.
Since Sputnik's launch 50 years ago this October, all
Earth's peoples have been privileged to participate as our
planetary environs have been explored, discovered, and
understood, to invoke NASA's mantra.
This continues today. We have two twin Mars rovers that
are--carried back the story that there--Mars was once wet. We
have a remarkable spacecraft in orbit around Saturn, the
Cassini spacecraft. We also have Alan's New Horizons. It has
just slipped past Jupiter a few months back.
So this is a--America's planetary exploration program today
is indeed doing extremely well, but its future is quite
uncertain. I submit that an appropriate analogy might be that
today's planetary program is a powerful ship that appears to be
staunchly cruising along, but our vessel is sailing so smoothly
nowadays principally because of yesterday's investments.
Without continued investment and attention, the ship's momentum
will inexorably drain away.
Today's craft is running low on fuel. Some of its machines
are not being properly maintained. Upgraded, improved
replacement instruments are unavailable, and sadly, to me, the
boat's crew is aging.
Fortunately, to deal with these treacherous times, we have
a new Admiral, Alan, and a new Captain to our ship, Jim Green.
These are excellent choices, and we are very pleased to be able
to work with them.
I would like to move to your question--the questions that
you asked me. The first concern, mission mix. Missions are, of
course, the engineering marvels that provide us the capability
to explore, as NASA's slogan states. So how do the various
missions and their mix fare in the fiscal year 2008 budget and
beyond?
The pace of the future Discovery missions seem about on
track right now, after several years of delayed selections. The
New Frontiers line, the middle line, seems also on track,
roughly. I am sorry, has fallen to half of the plan grade. The
next selection should be made in the next year to get this
program back on track.
Once again, there are no new flagship missions in the
planetary area, and the fact no funds are available in the
foreseeable future to actually build and fly any flagship, if
one were to be selected. Mars flight missions have been reduced
from a nominal two launches per opportunity to just one every
two years.
So the reigning in of the aspirations of the planetary
program is a direct consequence of fewer dollars being
available. The Agency budget has not grown to accommodate the
President's exploration vision, and NASA has covered its
shortfall by draining three or $4 billion from the science
program, much of that coming from solar system exploration,
especially the Mars program.
I am especially perplexed that NASA should--would choose to
lessen robotic solar system studies, especially investigations
of Mars, given the ultimate destination for the President's
vision.
Much of the slowdown in America's exploration of the solar
system is not presently apparent, because most of the pain has
been deferred to past 2010. Planetary missions require
technological development, an educated work force, an excited
work force, advanced planning, especially if we are to
collaborate with international partners.
What about research and analysis funds? Research and
analysis funds have dropped by one-quarter since fiscal year
2005. The budget that you are considering today recommends that
this line continue to slip further behind the inflation rate,
in clear contradiction to the decadal report.
Yet, it is only through these studies that the American
population will understand the data that is being Mars, Saturn
and our other outposts. We can only plan for the future wisely
if we have sufficient R&A funds.
Similarly, if we are to discover things, that whole process
becomes problematic if there are only limited opportunities
exist to analyze the mission results. Funding for data analysis
should increase in proportion to the growing data volume and
the diversity of targets that we are visiting.
What are the top risks for the next five years? The future
U.S. space enterprise is jeopardized by the loss of its core
competencies, both in technology development and personnel, and
this is a consequence of inadequate base program resources.
Furthermore, the rapid growth in mission costs limits the
nature and number of flights that we can fly. And finally, the
lack of a long lived power sources will prevent any missions to
the outer solar system.
What are especially beneficial strategic investments? I
believe investments in core technologies, science instruments
and infrastructures, such as the Deep Space Network, will be
most fruitful for the long-term health of the planetary
exploration program.
The overall budget for solar system exploration should be
reinstated so as to allow a continuing reasonable rate of
Discovery and New Frontier flights, but also a new flagship
mission, since all classes of mission size play important roles
in any balanced plan. A sharp increase in R&A funds are
essential to a healthy program.
In conclusion, these are exciting times for the planetary
program. Unfortunately, budgetary constraints are jeopardizing
the future of this program. If the United States is to explore,
discover and understand Earth's surroundings, as NASA claims it
wishes to do, more attention and additional fundings are--
funding are required.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for
your attention today, but most of all for your continuing
support of the planetary exploration program.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph A. Burns
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I appreciate having this opportunity to testify before you today.
For most of my professional life, I have been an active planetary
scientist and an unabashed enthusiast for space exploration. I chaired
the 1994 National Research Council (NRC) strategy for solar system
exploration, and more recently I was a member of the NRC's 2003 decadal
panel on planetary sciences. I also served as a panel member on the
NRC's 2001 decadal report for astronomy and astrophysics.
We meet at a time when, once again, NASA's planetary missions are
returning truly remarkable results. For the last three years, the twin
Mars Rovers have marched systematically across Mars's arid surface,
poking their instruments into assorted rocks. These measurements and
observations by several superb orbiting spacecraft have revolutionized
our perception of the Red Planet, revealing it to have previously been
episodically much wetter and perhaps even hospitable to life. Cassini,
the most recent planetary flagship mission, is orbiting Saturn, where
its broad instrument suite has been surveying this ringed beauty for
nearly three years, finding that a disparate pair of Saturnian
satellites--Titan and Enceladus--are potentially habitable islands in
this frigid world. Stardust's capsule has returned samples of comet
Wild-2's dust back to Earth and this material has testified about the
turbulent nature of the gas/dust cloud that gave birth to our local
planetary system. New Horizons peeked at Jupiter as it streaked past on
its voyage to Pluto. And just last week, a Swiss team spied the 229th
extra-solar planet, and a most special one: the first known so far, but
for Earth, to reside in its star's habitable zone, where water--life's
requisite ingredient--remains fluid. The early 21st century is truly a
time of extraordinary discovery in planetary and other space sciences.
The continuing generous and unwavering support of Congress and the
American people has made these accomplishments possible.
Starting with Sputnik's launch fifty years ago this October, all
Earth's peoples--including you and I--have been privileged to
participate as our planetary environs have been ``explored, discovered
and understood'', to invoke NASA's mantra. Scientists believe that this
exploration program addresses profound questions about our origins and
that it provides unique insights into how our Earth functions as a
planet. At the same time the public finds this investigation of Earth's
surroundings to be inspiring and meaningful. January's issue of the
popular magazine Discover listed its top-ranked one hundred findings
across all scientific disciplines during 2006. Of these, fully one-
seventh came from astronomy, with half concerning solar system objects
or extra-solar planets. So what could be better? The reason why we
aren't all celebrating is, because, while America's planetary
exploration program is indeed doing well currently, its future is quite
uncertain.
I submit to you that an appropriate analogy might be that today's
planetary program is like a powerful ship that appears to be staunchly
cruising along, making good progress as its crew explores and probes a
rich, ever-surprising shoreline. But our vessel is sailing so smoothly
nowadays principally because of yesterday's investments. Without
continued attention, the ship's momentum will inexorably be drained
away. In fact, today's craft is running low on fuel, some of its
machines are not being properly maintained and upgraded, improved
replacement instruments are unavailable, and sadly the boat's crew is
aging. Surprisingly, this ship is from the Nation that has always led
in exploration of the cosmos. Maybe other nations instead will guide
humankind's search of the next shoreline, just as four centuries ago
England replaced the Portuguese and the Spanish, partway through the
exploration and subsequent development of the New World. Only if we are
vigilant today will our ship's journey be secure, with it re-supplied,
its instruments revitalized and its crew replaced.
To carry our nautical analogy one step further, fortunately during
these treacherous times NASA's Science Mission Directorate has a new
admiral--Alan Stern--and the Planetary Science Division has a new
captain--Jim Green. These are excellent choices--enthusiastic,
knowledgeable and creative scientists who happily are also experienced
and successful managers. They will be energetic advocates for--and
tireless workers toward--a productive, healthy and effective planetary
program.
I now respond to the topics that you have asked me to address.
Please note that my ordering is a little different than yours and that
many of these items are linked so that my answers to one may overlap
with another topic.
Mission mix
Here I will restrict my comments to a consideration of missions;
these engineering marvels provide us the capability to ``explore'' as
NASA's slogan states. Technology development and research funding will
be discussed in later sections.
Planetary science's 2003 decadal survey recommends a finely tuned
mix of mission sizes, each with its own programmatic purpose, cost cap
and launch rate. Discovery missions (e.g., Deep Impact that slammed
into comet Tempel-1 on July 4, 2005) permit rapid response to
discoveries across a range of topics; such missions should launch every
eighteen months or so. New Frontiers spacecraft (e.g., the New Horizons
mission en route to Pluto and beyond) allow thorough study of pressing
scientific questions, with a selection every two or three years.
Flagship missions (e.g., the Cassini spacecraft presently observing the
Saturn system)--comprehensive investigations of extraordinary high-
priority targets--should be flown at the rate of about one per decade.
The separate Mars program has a comparable breakdown of mission classes
into large, medium and small (Mars Scout) categories.
How do the various missions and their mix fare in the FY08 budget
and beyond? The pace of future Discovery missions seems about on track,
after several years of delayed selections. The New Frontiers line has
fallen to half the planned rate; the next selection should be made in
the next year to get this program back on track.
Once again, no new Flagships have been started. The Europa
Geophysical Orbiter has been indefinitely deferred; it was THE Flagship
mission recommended for this decade by the decadal study. In fact, at
present, no planetary flagship mission is in development, an
unprecedented situation that has not happened since the start of the
American planetary program. Hence, in view of the necessary
preparations and required budget, no major mission will be launched
until 2017, and even that schedule will require a significant
augmentation to the budget. I am somewhat encouraged that NASA has
recently initiated $1M studies of four potential very capable missions
to satellites of Jupiter and Saturn; three of these spacecraft would
reconnoiter their targets for their suitability to sustain life.
Nonetheless it should be recognized that no funds are available in the
foreseeable future to actually build and fly any Flagship, if one were
to be selected.
Mars flight missions have been reduced from a nominal two launches
per opportunity to just one every two years. To accommodate this
change, the number of medium-class missions to the Red Planet is
lowered, and two Mars Scouts are eliminated. In terms of Flagships,
during the FY 2006 budget-rebalancing exercise, Mars Sample Return, a
crucial mission to understand the Martian mineralogy and to develop a
Martian chronology, was delayed from ``early in the next decade'' until
at least 2024.
The reining-in of the aspirations of the planetary program is a
direct consequence of fewer dollars being available. The agency budget
has not grown to accommodate the President's exploration vision, and so
NASA has covered its shortfall by draining $3 B from the science
program, 97 percent of that coming from solar system exploration,
especially Mars. Thus the planetary program has become a source of
funds to support other demands for NASA's needs. I am puzzled that NASA
would chose to lessen robotic solar system studies, especially
investigations of Mars, given the ultimate destination for the
President's vision. The NRC's Space Studies Board has been steady in
its belief that robotic exploration and human exploration are
complementary ventures to understand and exploit Earth's neighbors.
At the time when the American solar system exploration program is
slowing down, our international partners (and competitors) are
expanding theirs. The European Space Agency has very capable spacecraft
orbiting each of Earth's planetary neighbors, as well as another well-
instrumented craft on its way to land on a comet. And soon yet more
European spacecraft will be exploring the Moon, where it will join
scientific missions from Japan, China and India. Now, when other
nations have improved capabilities, we should be pursuing increased
interactions with them. However, ITAR regulations hamper international
cooperation on existing and planned space missions.
Much of the slowdown in America's exploration of the solar system
is not presently apparent because most of pain has been deferred to
beyond 2011. . .to the next administration. But planetary missions
require extended advanced planning, especially if we are to collaborate
with international partners. For example, the Cassini-Huygens mission
to Saturn, on which I am a member, started planning in the early
1980's, selection of payload instruments and team members took place in
1990, launch in 1997, arrival in 2004. Scientific results were not
returned until more than twenty years after the mission was initially
devised.
The reduced run-out budget for the planetary division, coupled with
growth in the cost to mount each of these mission classes, means that
the planetary survey's plan is not attainable. New flight projects,
especially for outer planet (see below) and Mars exploration, will not
be started. The reduction in missions can be painlessly accommodated in
the short term because the affected missions occur beyond 2011.
However, if the workforce drifts away to other areas and if technology
development lags, the loss to the U.S. planetary program will become
increasingly irreversible. Analysts suggest that a minimum of at least
$200 M more annually would be needed in the PSD budget in order to
bring it in line with the strategic plans of the decadal survey.
Research and analysis funds
Now I will address the support for research and analysis (R&A) and
technology development. The 2003 planetary survey recommended ``an
increase over the decade in the funding for fundamental research and
analysis programs at a rate above inflation. . .[till it reaches]
closer to 25 percent of the overall flight-mission budget.'' Instead
R&A funding has fallen one-quarter from its FY05 level. The budget that
you are considering today recommends that this budget line continue to
slip further behind the inflation rate, in clear contradiction to the
decadal report. Yet it is only through these studies that the American
populace ``understands'' the data being returned from Mars, Saturn and
other scientific stations.
This continuing decline in R&A funding is troubling for several
reasons. Improved understanding and answers motivate our visits to
other solar system bodies; to accomplish these goals requires follow-up
studies. When funds for supporting research are tight, scientists who
are early in their careers are most affected. I know several young
scientists who are contemplating career changes because they perceive
bleak prospects with space missions. Moreover, any shortfall in the
science and engineering workforce will damage the long-term technical
and scientific capabilities that underpin the solar system exploration
program. Finally, with few academic posts as yet in this emerging
discipline and with limited interest to date from the defense/
commercial sectors, a higher fraction of the planetary community is
supported by soft money than in other astronomical disciplines. Taking
a bigger view, I am surprised that NASA's science program has not been
considered part of the America's Competitive Initiative, for this
program has drawn many to engineering and science as careers.
NASA's goal to ``discover'' becomes somewhat problematic if only
limited opportunities exist to analyze mission results. Funding for
data analysis should increase in proportion to the growing data volume
and the diversity of targets, now including solar wind samples, comet
dust, remote-sensing data obtained by dedicated missions at terrestrial
and giant planets and measurements taken at academic laboratories.
Top risks for next five years
The future U.S. space enterprise is jeopardized by the loss of core
competencies (both technology development and personnel) as a
consequence of inadequate base-program resources. Furthermore, the
rapid growth in mission costs limits the nature and number of flights
that can be flown. Finally the lack of long-lived power sources will
prevent missions to the outer solar system.
Monies for technology development are limited. Nonetheless the
American planetary program needs more capable instruments to perform
more effectively in more difficult environs. For example, dollars could
be saved and mission opportunities expanded if in-space advanced
propulsion and more efficient radioisotope power systems were
available. Future missions will require that samples be returned from
inhospitable places and/or that on-site analytical tools be accessible.
A healthy funding level would support new instrument development
through space flight qualification. A limited budget causes a chicken-
and-egg problem: present-day funds cannot support both capable missions
and the technology that makes those missions as worthwhile as they
might be.
Mission costs are rising quickly for several reasons. For some
years NASA has been risk-averse and, in today's litigious society, this
tendency has only increased. This leads to unnecessary oversight and
documentation, with attendant costs, both financial and programmatic.
The absence of an adequate technology development program requires
either the costly ab initio development of new instruments or flying
last year's technology. ITAR, which considers satellite technology to
automatically be munitions under State Department rules, hamstrings
spacecraft operations and complicates international space programs.
Expendable launch vehicle costs are growing faster than inflation,
because of the limited market. Discovery has a separate problem: the
imminent phase-out of the Delta-II expendable launch vehicle, which
will require future flights to be flown aboard the more-expensive and
too-capable EELV (evolved extended launch vehicle) fleet, namely Delta-
IVs and Atlas-Vs. Given Discovery's fixed cost cap, substantial
increases in launch-vehicle costs erode the science that these missions
can achieve.
The usual power supply for missions beyond Jupiter--RTGs containing
plutonium-238--is increasingly scarce, meaning that new starts to outer
solar system are no longer feasible. Unless this issue can be resolved
to provide power on distant flights, the solar system no longer extends
to comet belt, but rather it stops at Jupiter, something similar to
halting Henry Hudson at the Azores. This is especially troubling as
many of the discipline's highest priority targets--Jovian and Saturnian
satellites plus Neptune/Triton--are very distant. These power
generators are also preferred for energy-intensive explorations of
Mars.
Especially beneficial strategic investments
Investments in core technologies, science instruments and
infrastructure will be most fruitful for the long-term health of the
planetary exploration program. Such investments are likely to also
benefit other parts of NASA, additional federal agencies that have
space platforms and the commercial sector.
The overall budget for solar system exploration should be
reinstated so as to allow a continuing reasonable rate of Discovery and
New Frontier flights, but also a new Flagship mission, since all
classes play important roles in any balanced plan. A sharp increase in
R&A funds is essential to a healthy program.
The Human Exploration program needs to be stabilized in order to
minimize its potentially adverse impact on science programs. The
Shuttle should be retired by 2011 to obviate serious concerns about its
safety. Moreover, the operational costs of the Shuttle are eating
NASA's lunch (and dinner!).
Place of NASA's proposed lunar science initiative
In spite of the current drought in new mission starts, humankind's
exploration of the Moon is reasonably robust, thanks in part to
significant international involvement. At the Moon, or soon to be
launched, are six lunar missions: four from other nations (Europe,
China, Japan and India) as well as a U.S. Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
and a U.S. Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite. With this
expansion of information about the Moon, it may be time to reassess the
adequacy of the current lunar research budget line to benefit fully
from the returned results about the surface and interior of Earth's
natural satellite.
In addition to these more focused missions, one of the decadal
study's recommended New Frontiers was to return samples from a deep
lunar crater, partly to learn what the lunar interior can tell about
the Moon's origin, but also to develop technology that may be deployed
at Mars and Venus as well as on comet nuclei. This mission has not yet
been selected, but it undoubtedly will be a candidate in the next
round. In the more distant future, we have the prospect of human
exploration of the Moon beginning as early as 2020. All told, these
programs form a sustainable initiative of lunar science exploration.
Concluding Remarks
These are exciting times for the planetary program. Unfortunately
budgetary constraints are jeopardizing the future of this program. If
the United States is to ``explore, discover, understand'' Earth's
surroundings, as NASA claims it wishes to do, more attention and
additional funding seem to be required. The planetary science community
believes that, with Congressional support, and new very capable leaders
at the helm of our ship of discovery, our nation's exploration of the
solar system will continue to make great progress in understanding our
neighboring worlds.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for your
attention today, but most of all for your continuing support to NASA's
planetary exploration program.
Outline of Joseph A. Burns's remarks to the U.S. House Science
Committee 5/2/07
The U.S. planetary program is producing extraordinary scientific
results across the solar system as a result of long-term support from
Congress. However, the proposed FY08 budget i) is insufficient to allow
the mix and pace of flight missions that was recommended by the 2003
planetary decadal survey; ii) should be augmented to support more data
analysis; and iii) falls far short of the funds that would adequately
strengthen the necessary associated Research and Analysis. The top
risks faced by NASA's Planetary Science Division are inadequate funding
of technology development, lessened availability of suitable flight and
power systems, rising mission costs and the dwindling supply of
plutonium to allow missions to the outer solar system. Additional
strategic investments in infrastructure, core technologies and
scientific personnel would prove especially valuable for the long-term
vitality of the U.S. solar system exploration program. The lunar
exploration program is reasonably sound, principally because of
international missions. Without augmented funding, it is questionable
whether NASA will be able to fulfill its stated goal of ``explore,
discover, understand.''
Biography for Joseph A. Burns
Joseph A. Burns is the Vice Provost for Physical Sciences and
Engineering, the Irving Porter Church Professor of Engineering and
Professor of Astronomy at Cornell University. Joe received a B.S. from
Webb Institute of Naval Architecture in 1962; Cornell awarded his Ph.D.
in space mechanics in 1966. In addition to his activities in Ithaca,
Burns has held year-long appointments at two NASA facilities (Goddard
Space Flight Center and Ames Research Center), at UC-Berkeley and at
the University of Arizona. Burns has also spent extended leaves in
Moscow, Prague, and Paris. He is a member of the imaging teams for the
Cassini (Saturn) and Rosetta (European comet) missions, and was an
associate of the Galileo imaging team.
Burns has written more than two hundred papers--both original
research and extensive review articles--in the refereed literature. His
current research concerns the orbital and rotational evolution of solar
system bodies, especially planetary rings and the small bodies of the
solar system (dust, satellites, comets and asteroids). Using ground-
based telescopes and spacecraft, his students and he have discovered
dozens of irregular satellites and several planetary rings.
Burns edited Icarus, the principal journal of planetary science,
between 1979-1997. He edited two books, Planetary Satellites (1977) and
Satellites (1986). He currently sits on the editorial boards of
Science, Icarus and Celestial Mechanics & Dynamical Astronomy. Joe has
served on many NASA scientific advisory groups and two terms on the
Space Studies Board of the National Research Council (NRC), chairing
its Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration; the latter wrote the
NRC's first planetary exploration strategy in 1994. He also sat on the
executive committee for the 2003 planetary decadal report and was a
panel member for the astronomy community's 2001 decadal strategy. He
has been Vice President of the American Astronomical Society; earlier
he led its Divisions for Planetary Science (DPS) and on Dynamical
Astronomy (DDA). He chairs the International Astronomical Union's
Commission on celestial mechanics and dynamical astronomy. Burns is a
fellow of the American Geophysical Union and of the AAAS, a member of
the International Academy of Astronautics, and a foreign member of the
Russian Academy of Sciences. He has received the DPS's Masursky Prize,
the USSR's Schmidt medal and several NASA awards for research
achievements.
Funding. Professor Burns's current personal research support comes
solely from NASA. He has held a Planetary Geology and Geophysics grant
for theoretical and dynamical modeling for many years. He is funded as
an imaging team member of the Cassini mission at Saturn by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. These grants pay for two post-doctoral
associates and a graduate student, and part of Burns's summer salary.
His work as an imaging team member on the European Rosetta comet
mission is unfunded. Burns has previously received grants from the NY
Council on the Arts, NATO, the National Research Council' Soviet
Exchange Program and the NSF. As Vice Provost for Physical Sciences and
Engineering, Burns is Cornell's cognizant administrator over about a
dozen interdisciplinary research centers, most of whose primary grants
are from the NSF.
Discussion
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Burns. I want to thank the
panel in general. We will move now to the period where we will
ask a series of questions. I think we are going to at least
have a couple of rounds, and perhaps a third round, depending
on what is happening on the Floor. And Dr. Stern, I am going to
start with the rest of the panel, but I want you to know that
we will come back to you. And since we have the panel here, I
would like to ask each of the witnesses, you heard Dr. Stern
testify about his vision priorities. I would like ask each of
you what, in your opinion, is the most important issue that Dr.
Stern needs to address as head of the--Science Mission
Director.
I should say I am yielding myself the five minutes here,
and we will move to Mr. Calvert. So we will start with Dr. Fisk
and move across.
Most Important Issue for SMD
Dr. Fisk. First of all, let me state that I have great
faith that Alan's going to make really good decisions, and the
reason is, I believe he understands from his experience, having
been a working P.I. and having been from the community,
understands the issues that we are facing in the community.
In very simple terms, the issue is--and the one we have
flagged throughout this--these statements, in fact, is the
balance what we are doing at the moment and what we--and how to
protect the future of this program. And the future of the
program is in people, the future of the program is in new
technologies. The future of the program is in new missions, and
we have to create the right investments in that future in this
current budget in order to make sure that the space program
goes on and is productive for the decades to come.
We are not ending this adventure. This adventure is only
beginning, and the question is, how do we make sure that we are
doing today protects, enhances and makes possible that future?
Chairman Udall. Dr. Illingworth.
Dr. Illingworth. Yes, thank you.
I think all of us who have been involved in space missions
recognize that there are very long lead times, often decades or
more. I actually was involved in one of the first meetings that
was organized for JWST in 1988. It would be 25 years before we
launched that program, and this is not uncommon.
And so, a lack of funding profile in the future,
unfortunately, eats the seed corn for the future as well. That
if we are at the position where we are not building a strong
people base, a strong technological base, we are placing our
future program at risk in ways that are not immediately
obvious.
Fortunately, I think Alan and his group, because of his
recognition of this, having been a working P.I., is strongly
concerned about this, and the statements that he has made over
the last month, and moves that he has done in bringing in new
people, I think have been very good. But it will be a
challenge, because it also requires resources to do this. So it
is recognition one, and then resources two. Thank you.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Baker.
Dr. Baker. I believe that the amount of money that is
available for science in NASA, $5.4 billion or so, is a
tremendous amount of money, and can be used more effectively
than it is being used.
I believe that number--the steps that Alan has outlined in
his testimony and in his public statements, I think, has the
potential for utilizing those resources very, very effectively.
I think that taking steps at the smaller end of the
spectrum requires less dollars, but has dramatic effects, the
sub-orbital program, the research and analysis. Smaller
missions such as Explorers or systems--science pathfinders,
these are things that can be worked on, can be relatively
readily remedied, compared to some of the larger, more
challenging flagship missions in the--so I strongly support
what my colleagues have said, and I believe that, from what I
have seen, Alan is taking some very good initial steps in this
direction.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Baker. Dr. Burns.
Dr. Burns. I am going to say much the same. Mainly, we need
to support the core infrastructure, especially R&A, research
and analysis funds. Making those funds difficult to obtain
affects, especially people who are early in their careers, and
so we are seeing youth drift away.
And that is something--the, you know, if the work force
drifts away to other areas, and if technology development lags,
the loss to the program will become increasingly irreversible.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, panelists. I am going to, at
this point, yield five minutes to the Ranking Member, Mr.
Calvert.
Measures to Reduce Mission Costs, Specifically, Management,
Oversight and Risk Reduction
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thing that we
heard, I think, consistently through the panel was reducing
mission costs.
I think I will start with you, Dr. Stern. From the
perspective of management and oversight and risk reduction,
what measures can NASA take that would provide meaningful help
to reduce mission costs? And maybe you can provide some
management examples of, you know, is there too much risk
reduction work, do you believe there is unnecessary paperwork,
other costs that are imposed upon these programs that make the
investment impractical? And after you answer the question, I
will ask the panel to add to the answer.
Dr. Stern. Yes, sir. Well, you and the panel members had
pointed this whole problem out, had your finger on something
very important. We would, in fact, despite how ambitious, with
93 missions in development or flight, and our program is, we
would, in fact, have more missions in development were we
better able to control costs on the same budget. And so, I am
setting out to do that.
Really, our missions in the space science directorate fall
in two categories. There are principal investigator led
missions, and then those larger missions that are done
strategically at the centers.
With regard to the centers, Administrator Griffin has
wisely put in place a new policy that our cost estimating will
be done at the 70 percent confidence level, a much higher
confidence level than in the past. This causes us to have a
greater degree of realism as we budget for missions.
We have to marry that with stronger controls so that we
stay within that, but at least we are going to be able to begin
now with a much more realistic view of what missions cost and
don't have unrealistic expectations that are dashed.
With regard to principal-investigator led missions, some of
those have also run into problems. And we put in place a couple
of things that I think will help.
First, in this new Explorer announcement of opportunity
that we have just called for, and which will be out later this
year, we are calling for a minimum experience level for the
principal investigators themselves. These are the project
leaders, the scientist that runs the project.
Previously, there was no minimum experience level, so a
scientist who had not been involved in space flight could write
a sufficiently good proposal and lead a team to a win, and
sometimes that gets you in trouble. You know, you may wake up
in the morning and want to do brain surgery, but it doesn't
mean that you can do it. Space flight is an art, and I think
this is an important new step that we are taking.
Let me mention just one other--we are going to be willing,
in the future, when missions get into trouble, and a principal
investigator is not controlling the cost of their mission, to
consider and then execute on changing the principal
investigator.
And this would be a very strong feedback loop, because to
the principal investigator, and I speak as one myself, having
been involved in 24 space flight missions, that the only
incentive for the scientist leader of the project is to collect
and analyze the data and make discoveries, not to carry out the
project.
And so, the control mechanism that we will put in place,
where the principal investigators know that their job is on the
line as the leader if they can't perform, if their view of a
P.I. led mission is that the P.I. is led around, then they are
at risk, and we will find somebody who can do it better, close
and finish on schedule and on cost.
Dr. Fisk. Just sort of a corollary statement, perhaps. It
is kind of two different directions that you can go at when you
think about what missions are going to cost. You can worry
about what they are likely to cost in advance, you can cost
improperly. We haven't done that very well in the past, and I
think there are a lot of things in the works at the moment,
even in the future decadals and so forth, which will do a
better job on that.
But then the question is, does it have to cost that much?
Even if it is estimated correctly, did it have to cost that
much? And the question is, were there things that we could have
done in the management of the program, or the execution of it,
not only to control the cost--we have an estimate, we try and
reach the estimate cost.
You say, was that a success? Well, it was a success. We
reached the--we got the cost right. But perhaps there was a way
to do the mission more efficiently, and that would be even a
better victory. Not only did we come in on cost, but the cost
that we thought it was going to be, we either executed it for
less, or we found a way to manage this program in such a way
that the cost was reduced. We got more science for our dollars.
I think more emphasis on that latter point needs to be
made, and it comes down, particularly in this area of small and
moderate missions. The question is, are we doing things that
actually do reduce risk, or are we, in fact, managing in such a
way that we are comfortable? We have reviewed it, we have
paperwork. We are sure that nothing will go wrong, but we
wasted money in deciding that because it either didn't--it
didn't add to our risk reduction.
And I guess what the community is sort of asking of NASA,
choose experienced P.I.s, that is a good thing. But if they are
really experienced, let them do the program in such a way that
they can produce this in the most cost effective way possible.
And so, there is an issue, then, of sort of driving--
getting a partnership with NASA that we get the missions for
the least cost, maximum security, minimum risk. Find the sweet
spot.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Doctor. My time has expired. I will
come back for the second round.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Ranking Member Calvert. I would
like to turn to Dr. Stern at this point. Doctor, in your
testimony you talked with a lot of enthusiasm about being an
advocate of human exploration, and then you went on to state
that one of your three guiding principles for SMD is to help
the Vision for Space Exploration succeed.
Planned Changes in the Science Mission Directorate
In specific terms, what changes do you plan to make to the
goals, priorities and plans of the science mission directorate
to help the vision for exploration succeed?
Dr. Stern. Yes, sir. Well, I see two things that we should
be doing. The first is supporting the Vision for Space
Exploration by providing the knowledge necessary to return to
the Moon and to Mars, particularly issues of astronaut safety.
Whether it is in heliospheric studies, understanding the
Sun, the radiation environment, for example, or understanding
the properties of lunar--the size and density of the Moon,
toxicity of Martian soils, whether Mars is biologically active
and presents a threat to our astronauts, et cetera. That is one
area.
The other is we need to build a lunar science community.
Really, there was a very strong lunar science community during
Apollo. And--but when the Apollo program was terminated, the
lunar science research and analysis funds that went with that,
and the data analysis funds very quickly tapered off. And
today, there is only a small remnant of that lunar science
community.
The Moon is a fascinating world. An in member silicate
planet, it has a kind of tenuous surface boundary exosphere
that is the most common type of atmosphere in the solar system.
Its origin is intimately tied to the origin of the Earth, and
the giant impact that we believe occurred to create the Moon. I
could go on and on.
This is a ripe scientific area, waiting for us to help it
flower, in the same way that 15 years ago the decimated Mars
science community from the 1970's was brought back by a series
of a robotic Mars missions, beginning after the demise of the
Mars Observer. And now, we have a very strong Mars science
community. I want to do the same with lunar science.
Chairman Udall. Any of the other witnesses care to comment?
Doctor?
Dr. Illingworth. Yes, thank you. At--maybe at some slight
risk of disagreeing with the A.A., but I would like to comment
on this.
In the sense that, while I think there are opportunities
with regard to lunar science, it is very important when
opportunities come up, they are chosen for other reasons, that
the science community think about that in the context of its
broad goals.
And so, this is obviously been something that has happened
recently, as folks have started to think about missions on--
that we would put on the Moon versus elsewhere. But it does
need to be done in the broad context. I don't think that we
want to find that we are driven to do things on the Moon
because we are there. It is not of the higher scientific
priority.
So, encompassing all solar system objectives, for example,
discussing that and choosing the opportunities that arise from
having access to the Moon is good, but in context. Thank you.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Baker.
Dr. Baker. I would like to just comment--I had the
privilege of chairing a recent ad hoc committee for the NRC
that was looking at the radiation risk for the human space
exploration program. I just want to endorse what Dr. Stern
said. I think that the heliophysics community in particular is
excited, and I think quite capable of developing new predictive
models, and I think would gladly undertake the effort to help
provide information that would be very enabling for the Vision
for Space Exploration.
But as with all things, this has to be balanced against the
other basic kind of understanding that we need, and the
programs that we have talked about today, I think, can
contribute some of that basic knowledge that can then be
converted into very effective predictive models.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Fisk.
Dr. Fisk. I just have one comment on the scientific
activities that are--that you--on the lunar science, and the
exciting things that can be done there. The science mission
director some time ago asked the NRC to do a study on science
to be done on the Moon, or lunar science to be done in advance
of and at the beginning of the human exploration of the Moon.
That report will come out shortly. There was an interim
report earlier, and if you--I haven't--I can't comment on the
final report, but the interim report pointed out a number of
very important scientific topics that involved the Moon that
need to be pursued.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Burns, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Burns. Well, the science that can be done on the Moon
is useful, certainly. I think, on the other hand, that there--
the--we need the background knowledge in order to have a
successful human exploration program, and I think that if the
purpose of being there is to get that knowledge, then probably
those funds should come from the exploration program rather
than from the science director.
Chairman Udall. The Chair recognizes Mr. Calvert for five
minutes. Thank you.
Understating True Costs
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to stick
with the mission--for a little bit. Dr. Illingworth, obviously
you commented about astrophysics is at risk because of the drop
that we may experience down the road, but one of the things
that I want you to comment about is the understating,
sometimes, of true cost when we get in these large programs,
and, specifically, the James Webb Space Telescope which now is,
I believe, four times the cost that came up in the decadal
survey, four times the cost.
And obviously when we in Congress try to determine what
dollars we are going to set aside for future missions, it makes
it extremely difficult when we have to, basically, take all the
money out of these various programs and fund what you obviously
believe is a very important instrument that we are going to put
up. Any comment about that? Because I think that is probably
the most obvious one out there that is just out of whack right
now.
Dr. Illingworth. Yes, certainly. I think that cost
estimation is critical to our credibility as a community, and
to NASA's credibility. We work together on these activities,
and NASA provides input to the decadal survey. I think the
input that was given then was not optimal, and I think that we
in the community and the folks in the survey didn't ask the
right questions, or think in the right context.
And as I mentioned, JWST was a very significant example,
but there are others as well that we are dealing with that has
led to major changes in the current program because of those
collective cost growth.
And though think the crucial thing here is, of course,
getting independent estimates of the cost, thinking about the
costs over the full life cycle, over the 10 to 15 years that
the decadal survey is referring to, and not just construction
costs. Asking questions of the proponents and trying to fully
understand what it is they are proposing.
I think if we understood the costs better as we are
discussing the science missions, it would also help us frame
the resulting priorities much better, that we would not bring
forward a program that was so much larger than is likely to be
doable in a given decade, with so many attendant problems that
come from that.
So there are, I think, ways that this can be done. I think
just by asking the right questions, by thinking in the right
way, and I get a very strong sense from all the folks who are
thinking about the next decadal survey that we are all on the
same wavelength here.
We do not want to repeat what we have done in the last two
or three Decadal Surveys. We want to get more accurate cost
estimates. We want to test them independently. We want to have
people involved who have recognition of mission cost
development in the process, and we want to have NASA work with
us on that and try and give us the best cost estimates based on
their very extensive experience.
Status and Impact of Delta 2 Launcher
Mr. Calvert. One of the things that we are going to
experience here in the near future, obviously, is the
discontinuation of the Delta 2 launcher, and what that will do
to launch costs, how are we going to manifest payloads, and
what are we going to put it on? I would like to hear some
comments from you. Obviously, there are some folks out there
trying to come up with less expensive ways to get to a low-
Earth orbit, but I want to hear from you.
Maybe we will start with Dr. Stern about how are we going
to do this here in the next decade?
Dr. Stern. Yes, sir, it is a very important issue. Our
Delta 2 inventory allows us to fly out all of the missions
through 2012 that we planned to fly, and we do have some
smaller launchers, for example Pegasus and Taurus. The Pegasus
launched two small explorers this year, including the A mission
that Dan Baker spoke about that just launched last week and is
doing very well on orbit.
We are additionally--I mean the Agency--looking at some
alternatives to, or additions, to those possibilities to give
us low-cost access to space again for small and moderate-sized
missions. Those decisions have not been made, but I can assure
you that it is important, not only to the science-mission
directorate, but to the larger agency.
Dr. Fisk. We are all encouraged that NASA has got this on
their agenda to do because, I mean, there is a very simple
problem here that the range of the Delta 2--this has been the
workhorse of the science-mission directorate since the
beginning of the space program, and so everything is sized for
this, whether it is the size of your chambers that you build
satellites for. And so the idea is, if you don't have that
capability, there is a whole range of things that you will not
be able to do, and there will be a whole range of things that
you will have to make adaptations to your infrastructure to be
able to do in the absence of that vehicle.
So it needs to be a problem that is solved, and I--it has
to be a robust solution, and I--you know, this is not something
the Nation--and the Delta--it can't be simply, you know, keep
the Delta 2 alive, because that will probably be too expensive
of a solution. Someone needs to comes up with a less expensive
solution, or at least comparably expensive solution, and the
assurance needs to be there to have that happen.
Dr. Baker. I would like to comment I support strongly the
idea that the Delta 2 provides the sweet spot for many missions
in planetary science and heliophysics. I also believe that if
we lost that kind of capability, we are going to--this is going
to propagate through the system in a number of ways.
Going to larger launch vehicles immediately adds tens of
millions of dollars to the mission cost, and by sort of taking
the cap off of mass constraints and things like that, it can
also allow for unexpected growth in mission that--just as I
say, it compounds itself over and over again, and I think that
we would be well advised to try to restore that capability or
make sure that we have something that is very comparable to the
Delta 2 to enable these missions.
Dr. Burns. The same thing, especially for the low-cost
mission like Discovery, this is a critical issue, because in
percentage-basis, once you start increasing your launch costs
by a few ten of missions of dollars, percentage-wise, that is
just staggering, very damaging.
Chairman Udall. I think if the panel is willing to do so we
will engage in another round here. It is been very helpful. Dr.
Stern, let us talk a little bit about New Horizons, if you
would, and I would note for the record that of you many
talents, you have also been considered for the astronaut corps,
and I don't know whether that is still on the possible list of
undertakings that you would pursue. I know you have got----
Dr. Stern. Kind of a busy day job right now.
Chairman Udall. Yes, you have got a day job, but we will
see what we can do. I think there are some people in the
country who would like to send Congressman Calvert and myself
to Pluto, but that is another discussion topic.
Dr. Stern. I would love to have you bring a sample back.
Application of Space Research Experience to NASA Space Science
Programs
Chairman Udall. Are there any lessons that you have learned
from your space-research experience that you want to apply to
NASA space-science programs, and if you see some of those,
would you outline them a little bit for us?
Dr. Stern. Sure, absolutely. Well, it is been a privilege
for my peers and for the Agency, when I was on the other side,
on the so-called receiving end of the bureaucracy, to be given
the responsibility to lead space missions and space
instruments, and I found two things were absolutely required to
do a good job: one was a complete commitment of time and
resources, personal time and resources, on the part of the PI
to the project; and to realize that when you have been
entrusted with that kind of responsibility that other aspects
of you professional career should be secondary to the very
great responsibility of carrying out that mission. For example,
I made a conscious and public decision to reduce the rate at
which I was writing research papers while we were getting New
Horizons built, and I think that PIs would be wise to do that
in general and to keep their eyes on the ball, and to get
commitments from their university or their institution to
remove them from management or teaching responsibilities. After
all, we are talking about entrusting those individuals with
$100 million to $1 billion project. This is big science. It is
a big enterprise by any standard.
The second and other area I will speak to has to deal with
being the adult in the room or being able to say no to control
requirements, and not just the scientific requirements on a
mission, but also the engineers who oftentimes or almost always
want to please, and yet sometimes, I found, that we went a
little overboard in that regard, and I was able to make a
contribution to simplify what we were doing and that always
paid off, because in the end, we were always short on money
trying to finish, and some of those decisions made early on
that were painful really paid off because in the end, what
matters is that you get a successful mission out of it, and you
know, the best gilded lily that is still a bird on the ground
doesn't get you very far in terms of scientific return. I would
offer those two things.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. Those were very insightful, and
you certainly come with a great deal of experience, and I think
that is why you are the right person for the job at this
particular job, given all of your experience as a PI.
I turn back to the panel, and I think this may be slightly
redundant, but we really want to drill into this. Over the next
couple of months, we are going to be deciding on the '08
appropriation for NASA, and I would like to ask each one of you
what is the most important what NASA could do in the '08 NASA
appropriation to strengthen the space-science programs?
'08 Appropriations Priorities to Strengthen Space Science
Programs
Okay, we will start over here, Dr. Burns, and we will come
back this way. How is that?
Dr. Burns. I am going to say the same thing again. We have
got a consistent message here, and it is we need funding for
R&A support, and we need to keep our young people here, and we
need to make use of the data that we are getting so that we can
understand the places that we are visiting and so that we can
better plan our future missions.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Baker.
Dr. Baker. Yes, I agree that the research and analysis and
sub-orbital, as we have talked about. I feel very passionately
about the Explorer program and like programs. I think that
these offer so much. They return wonderful science. They give a
chance for hands-on engineering, hands-on science education,
and they give the kind of frequency and cadence of missions
that really build enthusiasm through the community and through
the country, I believe, so I think that is a real place to put
resources, if possible.
Chairman Udall. When I see you, of course, all I think
about--well, not all I think about, but a lot of what I think
about is the University of Colorado students that I have seen
running satellites, being engaged, excited, committed to a
long-term career and to the program in general.
Dr. Baker. We have 60 graduate students, 60 undergraduate
students. Many of the undergraduates are operating spacecraft,
and it is just a marvelous thing and it builds a cadre of
people that go out into industry, and they do marvelous things.
Chairman Udall. Doctor?
Dr. Illingworth. Yes, I think I used the word seed corn
before. I think R&A is--on the human front, on the people side,
is what is critically important here in investing for the
future, and this is for NASA's benefit as well. NASA will have
its science program, its most striking results, with a strong
community behind it. And then I would add to that the Explorer
level, the cost-capped, moderate-sized missions as being very
important for getting returns quickly, and providing very high
scientific leverage for the money.
Chairman Udall. And Dr. Fisk.
Dr. Fisk. I am probably bolder than my colleague here on
this issue. Let me come at it from the very top. I hope when
the '08 budget is considered, you will keep recognizing how
much money NASA has lost from what the President said it could
have for its budget when he announced the vision for
exploration, and I am talking several billions of dollars. And
then, if you add to the things that were not in the budget,
such as the return-to-flight of the Shuttle and new
initiatives, such as Earth science, you are way off. And so, if
you, then, can recognize at that level, then of course, it
feeds down to the science. Science can have some of its funding
restored, and the investments that need to be made at that time
are the kinds of investments--there are two investments,
actually. A lot of things were decelerated that should be
accelerated, and the R&A funds and the future of the program
needs to be restored.
But I don't think we should lose sight of the big picture
here, which is science is only one of the abused parts of the
NASA budget, and the whole budget is several billion dollars
short. It is several billion dollars short from the
authorization amount that your committee put into effect when
you authorized the New Vision, and we have to drive it back to
those kinds of levels.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. I am going recognize Mr. Calvert
here, again, but I just want to make a note that I was
anticipating leaving it to the end of the hearing, but I think
this appropriate on the heels of what has been said, that
Chairman Gordon and myself have written to the President,
asking him to meet with Congress to address the funding
challenges facing NASA. Ranking Member Calvert and other
Members have made a similar request. We will see where that
leads.
It is my pleasure to recognize my friend and the Ranking
Member, Mr. Calvert, again, for another five minutes.
Mr. Calvert. I point out to my friend and Chairman that
also we have an appropriations process that we need to support,
and I hope that all of you--I know that Dr. Stern is in the
position of supporting the President's budget, and I would
hope, at the very least, we can hit that mark. But as you know,
under the continuing resolution, we took a $500 million hit,
and we want to make sure that our friends don't believe that
that is the new baseline for the NASA budget, or all of the
NASA budget will be deeply impacted even worse than it is
today, so we need to hear support to educate Members of
Congress to the importance of it.
While we are on the research and analysis activities, and
obviously you all believe. I will turn to Dr. Stern for this
answer, but he can listen to it. What do you believe is the
metric or rule of thumb that should be used to suggest how NASA
establish the appropriate amount of money to put into this, and
should it be a fixed level, should it be money provided by a
certain percentage? What are your suggestions, because that is
certainly an ongoing, I am sure, discussion within your
committee.
R&A Budgeting
I will start on the right this time.
Dr. Burns. Thank you. I really appreciate you always
starting with me.
The planetary decadal panel considered this issue, and as a
rule of thumb, they felt that something like 25 percent of the
budget that is being used for the mission costs would be an
appropriate percentage, and we are well below that. We were
well below it even before the fiscal year 2005 cut in the R&A
funds by 25 percent.
Mr. Calvert. Dr. Baker, do you agree with that?
Dr. Baker. Thank you for keeping me to second, but it still
hasn't helped me too much to come up with a formula to answer
your question but my impression is that we were better a few
years back than we are now. I think that the kinds of cuts that
have occurred and the kind of bailing out of other things at
the expense of the research and analysis across the board in
all of the disciplines has been very, very detrimental. But I
think we recognize that there is too little now. What would be
optimal or what would be healthiest? I don't think that has
been totally established. Each of the disciplines treats
research and analysis somewhat differently, and I am very
encouraged that--again, that Alan Stern is focusing on this and
have a person, Yvonne, who is really going to focus on R&A
specifically and look at the question that you have asked in a
very systemic way. I think it is very important.
Dr. Illingworth. Yes. Let me add my thoughts on this. I
would like to distinguish that there are two components to the
R&A area. Very broadly, one is the data analysis that goes
explicitly with the operating missions, and NASA has been very
good at funding these and with the goal, of course, that one
maximized the scientific return from a very substantial
investment by the Nation in these projects.
I think that the 25 percent number would be wonderful to
have. I think none of our current missions come close to that.
I suspect that it would be--I actually think it would be useful
to do an assessment of this question and ask what may well be
needed. There was one many years ago, in fact, two decades ago,
that was done for Hubble, but I am not aware of any more recent
assessments, and maybe this is something that NRC might like to
do across the various programs.
The second part, of course, is R&A itself, which tends to
be a grab bag for a lot of activities, from technology
development, to theory, to reworking data sets. And those
individual elements, probably, are the areas that need to be
considered instead of looking at the overall picture, and
trying to assess whether or not the funding that is being put
into those areas, like theory, is really adequate for the
returns that we are getting for the investment that we are
putting in on the mission side, and the data analysis side.
Certainly, I think my theory colleague think it is not, but
doing it--finding metrics to do that is a challenge, but it may
well be that the right approach here is to think about doing
this in a somewhat systematic way.
Dr. Fisk. I have a similar sort of answer. The mission-
operations data-analysis costs are the easiest to figure out
because you sort of know what it is that you are costing to
operate the mission, and you want to get the maximum number of
years out of things, so you get the maximum return on
investment. You do that calculation, and you add it up.
One of the questions that is the hardest one is on
technology development, training of the next generation, theory
and so forth. It all comes together. And there, I think you
have to go in sort of discipline by discipline, and you have to
ask yourself the question--and this is a question that NASA can
perform the analysis--and say what does this community need to
have a future? If the community is aging and aging rapidly, and
there needs to be an infusion of new talent, that focuses some
of that money on this. If it is not, then, maybe less money is
needed. You need theory because no one knows what it is this
data means. You know you need that, and so on. But you need--it
will vary from discipline to discipline. The analysis needs to
be made and the funding provided because we all agree on the
goal. The question is what is the right way?
Mr. Calvert. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Congressman Calvert.
International Collaboration
Dr. Stern, if I could come back to you, in your testimony
you state that you plan to increase international collaboration
as a means to advance the priorities of the National Academy's
decadal surveys. While international survey--excuse me. While
international collaboration can provide scientific and other
benefits to both parties, it can also lead to increased costs
and delays. What actions do you intend to take to reduce the
costs and programmatic risks of such collaborations? And we did
talk about this when we met. It is exciting area, and I will
give you a chance to talk about that as well.
Dr. Stern. Yes, sir. Well, I do think that there are other
ways besides throwing money at problems to increase the
productivity of this program, and we are looking at cost
controls, as I spoke to earlier. We are conducing a zero-based
review across all four divisions to see what may have been
important in the past that is not important now, and
international collaboration is yet another way to accomplish
that. And to be quite frank, any country who is on an
acceptable list, who has the space programming capability that
could fly our instruments or collaborate on missions is
somebody that I want to talk to. And I mean that to be a win-
win. Certainly, Asian nations like the Japanese and the
Indians, who are space powers, the European Space Agency, the
European national space programs, the Canadian Space Agency,
and other all come to mind.
One important, new element of international collaboration
that addresses what you are asking about is the possibility
that we could collaborate, instead, at the hardware level
within a mission, where different parties, NASA and a foreign
partner, for example, divide up who builds which part of the
spacecraft and the payload. Instead, we would collaborate at
higher, more strategic level, at a mission level, so that for
example, a given foreign partner might want to build an
astrophysics missions that we are very interested in and that
is close to something in our decadal survey, and yet, we might
be able to build a mission, a planetary mission for example,
that is of interest to that party. And they would go about
their business; we would go about ours; but have a science team
formed from both nations or both parties, so that there is very
little swapping of hardware, software, technology, but that the
science data analysis is win-win for both parties and the field
advances more rapidly than might otherwise.
Chairman Udall. It seems to me there is a great deal of
room here in which to maneuver and develop some of these new
relationships. I want to commend you for taking a hard look at
this and moving ahead.
Would anyone else on the panel care to comment, in
particular about the.
Dr. Burns. I have a couple of comments, actually.
Chairman Udall. Yes.
Dr. Burns. One of my concerns is the fact that ITAR
automatically considers satellite technology to be munitions
under the State Department rules, and that really hamstrings us
in interacting with other nations. I have cases of post-docs
who have written code, going back to Germany and France, and
they can't access the code that they wrote because they are
foreigners.
I think another issue is--and this, I know, is a no-no--but
a question of whether or not to consider other launch vehicles
than American launch vehicles because competition, according to
America is a good thing, and I wonder if that might lower the
cost in some way.
And finally, of course, we need to be firm and make sure
that when we say we are going to do something, we carry it out.
At present, we tend to drag things on and then sometimes stop,
and that does not make for good international relations.
Chairman Udall. Anyone else care to comment?
Dr. Baker. Well, I would just like to add on the ITAR issue
that I agree that is seems inappropriate to be stifling what we
are able to do with foreign partners, and I know that the NRC
is going to have a workshop this fall and kind of look further
into what effect this is having on the space program, and
perhaps what could be done to remedy it. I couldn't agree more
that seizing all possibilities for foreign launchers, for
foreign missions of opportunity or a much stronger
collaboration, it just seems to me it offers tremendous
possibilities of leveraging the resources that we have.
Chairman Udall. Anyone else? Dr. Illingworth.
Dr. Illingworth. Yes, just to comment on this, I think it
really can be win-win with international partnerships, and I
actually was intrigued by Alan's idea of creating, in some
sense, different missions, ensuring access. I think that is a
very good approach. It probably isn't a way that will work,
necessarily, for the very largest and rarest missions, but
probably more for medium. And there is actually--from my hat
that I war as the AAAC Chair, I also think across the other
agencies as well, and we are also trying to encourage active
collaborations where practical, and particularly with DOE on
missions as well, with their science interests. And something,
they are also as challenging because of the different
approaches and culture.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Fisk, has it all been said, or would
you like to add?
Dr. Fisk. I think it is all been said.
Chairman Udall. There is an old Washington saying that it
has all been said, but not everybody said it, so I don't want
to cut you off, but I think you all have given us a homework
assignment. Mr. Calvert and I have been speaking up here about
ITAR and trying to find a sweet spot to give on our national
security concerns, but also, we are actually putting ourselves
at competitive----
Dr. Fisk. I will add to that. I encourage you to do
something. It has become a nightmare, and is probably the
single biggest impediment to international cooperation in the
science program.
Chairman Udall. I am happy, again, to recognize Mr. Calvert
for five minutes.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree that we need
to come up with some solution on ITAR, but obviously, we both
serve on the Armed Services Committee, also, and as we all
know, the technology can be not just for peaceful purposes.
Status of Europa Mission
One question, because I am going to have to go out to a
markup, regarding the Europa mission, I want to get all of your
thoughts regarding the relative importance of sending a
satellite to Europa, versus other moons that may harbor water,
such as Enceladus or Titan. I know at one time, the planetary
community seemed committed to launching a Europa mission, but
with the findings from Cassini, has anyone kind of shifted or
changed their mind and want to look at something else? I was
just kind of curious. I will start with you again, Dr. Burns.
Dr. Burns. Man, you are my friend. That is a very difficult
question because the results that we have gotten from the
Cassini mission on both Enceladus and Titan are of great
importance. They show the possibility of conditions that are
appropriate for the formation of life, both the presence of
water and organics and energy sources, much like Europa. I
think that there is a benefit for continuity in the program,
however, and the Europa mission continues to be a very exciting
mission. I believe that since there--NASA has put forward a
million dollars for each of four studies to look at the two
missions that you mentioned and two in the Jovian system,
including the Europa mission. I think we will have an answer to
this question.
Dr. Baker. Thank you. Planetary science is part of what my
laboratory does, and I am just struck by what a target-rich
environment planetary science is. Everywhere you turn there is
something, there is an object, that would just be wonderful to
visit in more detail, and I am not prepared to say which of
those--and my planetary friends probably can make a judgment
about that--but it is just astonishing. Had we the resources, I
think there are just a very large number of objects that would
be worth investing, and we would learn a great deal about the
universe beyond by studying them.
Dr. Illingworth. Just to note here, this is really an area
which is beyond--well, maybe inside astrophysics. Astrophysics
starts outside of the solar system, so I don't have an explicit
comment.
Mr. Calvert. Dr. Fisk.
Dr. Fisk. Well, the Europa mission, you know, was a
priority in the decadal survey, and I have, sort of, two
comments on that. One is it was, and we need to take that into
account because the community consensus that is where you
should go. The second thing is it probably points out one of
the issues that we need to always deal with in decadals, and
will have to deal with the next one that is starting up in a
year or so, which is as new science comes in, how do you decide
whether or not you should stick to your previous
recommendations or you should move to some other target because
we learned something? Well, I think there is a lesson in the
Europa discussion for the future decadals, and also, that we
need to simply make intelligent decisions now as to how to do
this.
Mr. Calvert. Flexibility. Dr. Stern.
Dr. Stern. Yes, if I could speak to this point: it is a
very rare and special opportunity to be able to fly a flagship
in any field, including in planetary science. Outer-planet
flagships come approximately every quarter century. I think it
is our responsibility as program leaders in NASA to take a
careful look at the new data that is coming in, for example
from Cassini, and the excitement that that has generated and
not simply genuflect to decision made before that data was
available. We might come back to the same conclusion that
Europa is the mission to fly, and we might find that the
community consensus is that this is just such a special
opportunity, we only have one, it should be different target.
But I think that we absolutely have the responsibility to
make that decision consciously and not implicitly or simply
because of a report written years ago.
Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have to go to a
markup, so I thank the witnesses for attending today and look
forward to seeing you again soon. Thank you.
Mr. Wu. [Presiding] Thank the Ranking Member, and our new
Ranking Member.
Chinese Cooperation
The Chairman recognizes himself for five minutes. We had
some discussion of ITAR earlier and perhaps we will return to
that subject because it is related to what I intend to ask
about. Over three decades ago, at a time when our relationship
with the then-Soviet Union was not on the friendliest of terms,
we initiated some cooperation in human space flight, which has
born significant fruit and perhaps given us an opportunity to
find areas of cooperation as well as share some costs. Many of
the problems that we face in space exploration today whether
they are human exploration or robotic missions, you know, the
stress is on matching the resources with the mission. The
Chinese have a vigorous space program going as well as a
vigorous economy. There are obviously some challenges in
developing any human space flight cooperation programs with the
Chinese because of the structure of their human space flight
program but I would like the panel of witnesses, in particular
Dr. Stern, to comment on the potential for cooperation in human
space exploration as the Chinese develop their space program
and also whether this might potentially help us match mission
and budget.
Dr. Stern. Yes, sir. As you well know, the Administrator
has said that the return to the Moon and the eventual
exploration of Mars by human beings is a program that the
United States and NASA is very, very open to international
participation. We would like to provide the core infrastructure
and have other partners, other nations and multi-national space
programs such as the European Space Agency or others come in
and participate and add to the value of what we are doing.
Mr. Wu. Dr. Fisk or any other of the panelists?
Dr. Fisk. This is stretching the limits of my--I suppose
like any good university professor, I am supposed to have an
opinion on everything. I mean, it is--I mean, clearly you raise
the early issues, which is, you know, how do we cooperate, you
know, in ITAR in particular and so that will be an impediment,
particularly in dealing with the Chinese. I think the thing the
country needs to be most concerned about when we decide whether
we are going to do these things cooperatively, how we are going
to do them, is the fact that if we choose not to, there are
alignments that will take place among other nations whether it
is the Chinese and Russians or the Russians and the Chinese,
and so various things could take place and we could find
ourselves in a space race with the world, and that would
probably be an unwise position. So the figuring out how to
cooperate in a way that we sort of use the world's resources is
probably not only a wise offensive strategy on our part, it is
a wise defensive strategy.
Dr. Illingworth. Let me just comment on this. You know,
ITAR is a significant concept for the community and it is right
at the working level. Alan mentioned the possibility of doing
missions where the primary responsibility was taken by an
international partner but there was a joint science team, but
that in itself poses problems because the science team that we
had that involved international scientists, getting into many
of the technology areas may determine whether or not one can
carry out the science and those sort of discussions are very
challenging to do with ITAR regulations, and it has been an
impediment to bringing together international teams, even on
smaller programs. So it does have a substantial impact at a
level which is often not recognized. It narrows the expertise
and the involvement that you would like to use on these
programs. So, the hope, of course, is very broadly in the
community that there are ways in which this can be changed for
a lot of the missions that we would like to carry out.
Mr. Wu. Dr. Baker.
Dr. Baker. I would just say that cooperation done well and
wisely can be very cost-effective and can use scarce resources
very well. I think forcing cooperation in unnatural ways or
ways that are not going to be well thought out could very well
drive up the cost to the United States and so I think that it
is very, very important to think through thoroughly what is the
appropriate role for whatever foreign partner we might have and
whatever program we have.
Mr. Wu. Thank you.
Dr. Burns.
Dr. Burns. I will just comment on a sideline of this and
that is the fact that it is interesting to note that within the
next year we will have three foreign spacecraft in orbit around
the Moon. We will have Japan, China and India, and they will
provide a very significant part of humankind's understanding of
what the Moon is all about and thereby aid our exploration
program and I think we need to carry that into other spheres.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much. I see that my time has expired
and I yield to the Ranking Member, the gentleman from
California.
Lessons From Astronomy
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I apologize for not
being here earlier. I was at another hearing where I am the
Ranking Member of that subcommittee, as this often happens. I
am jumping from the human rights report of the State Department
to scientific exploration, and that is just the jumps we have
to make.
First of all, I have been a big supporter of astronomy and
in fact, the more I have been involved with astronomy, the more
I have been impressed with what we learn from astronomy is
actually important. I always remind everybody that I have this
much knowledge about that much but I don't have this much
knowledge about anything, and maybe one of you could tell us,
the fundamental importance of having an understanding through
astronomy of what is going on out in the universe because at
one point it was like--it was this great revelation when they
told me, well, if you see it out there working out there, we
actually then could understand how molecules and how the basic
building blocks of the universe at our level down at a
molecular level in our bodies and various things here work.
Maybe somebody could just give a 30-second or one-minute
explanation of that to me. Does anybody want to jump forward?
Don't we have anybody that----
Dr. Burns. I am both a Professor of Engineering and a
Professor of Astronomy so let me start as an engineer. As an
engineer, you want to know how planets work, and the way you
learn how things work is, you look at a batch of them. You
don't look at one car, you want to look at a variety of cars in
order to see the different characteristics and what those
characteristics lead to, and I think it is essential in that
sense that we go and explore various planets before we try to
understand the Earth. And then my astronomy hat says these are
the most profound questions that mankind faces: who are we,
where do we come from, and we can only understand that if we
see how commonplace the formation of organic molecules and the
possibility of life elsewhere might be.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Are the fundamental principles that we
learn from astronomy applicable to the scientific basis for
decisions that we make here?
Dr. Burns. Physics is everywhere. Chemistry is everywhere.
I mean, it is the same stuff.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, tell me about that in layman's
terms, if someone would like to----
Dr. Fisk. Let me try from a slightly different tack here.
Astronomy at the moment, real astrophysics, is--and I am a
practitioner only----
Mr. Rohrabacher. So astronomy is astrophysics?
Dr. Fisk. They are becoming completely synonymous for the
following reasons, that is, we are now--as we look out, you
know, and see space and there so--there are very fundamental
problems that have been surfaced, even in the last decade. We
only see a few percent of the universe. We don't know what the
other 99 percent is. There is evidence of a dark energy, as it
is called, which is causing the expansion of the universe in a
way that we did not anticipate. We don't know what it is. And
what that says to you, I mean as a practitioner--I am not a
practitioner. I never venture beyond the orbit of Pluto. That
is just--that is my domain so I am talking about things that
are beyond this point now. And you say these guys are going to
find that there is a very basic physics which governs
everything that we don't understand. We don't know what it is.
And when we do, the laws of physics as we know them will be
revised. Now, I can't think of anything more compelling than to
try and figure out what the laws of physics are because the
laws of physics concern everything that happens right down to
the microscale and the molecules and all this stuff, and so you
need to be able to--they are probing the most fundamental
questions in the universe about how does it work and we thought
it worked the same everywhere, all scales. Now there is
something we see that doesn't fit; we don't know what it is.
And when we find it out, the world will change.
Nuclear Energy
Mr. Rohrabacher. Does this have anything to do with
Einstein and the nuclear bomb? How do the physics of
understanding what is going on way out there have anything to
do with our ability to create nuclear energy?
Dr. Fisk. How about if we leave Einstein in but we leave
the bomb out?
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Nuclear energy then. Leave the bomb
out.
Dr. Stern. If I might chip in, I think to answer your
question, Mr. Rohrabacher, there are a couple of--if you take
the long view, there is both economic and a strategic
importance to doing astronomy. You know, the guys that were
playing around in physics labs in the middle of the 19th
century with electricity had no concept of what that would
yield for the future of the economy, and the same can be true
of quantum mechanics in the 1920s and how that has impacted our
view, and more importantly, impacted our ability to build the
electronics that we all depend upon today, and the same way the
energy sources that we see in the universe may have some
application in the future that we can't anticipate and that is
the advantage of basic research is that it often yields
something far beyond your imagination which completely
transforms the world, and from a strategic standpoint, I think
it is crucial that the United States has been the Nation that
has led in astronomy, astrophysics and planetary science. As we
go forward into the future, in future generations and future
centuries, when folks are taught science, school children in
whatever nation they are in, those discoveries that opened up
the universe and that opened up the solar system will always be
tagged with American space missions, American facilities,
American scientists like Dr. Mather, who is here, and his
collaborator, Dr. Smoot, who really put the point on what was
only a theory and established the Big Bang with observational
evidence and won the Nobel Prize for it.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Just to note that astronomy is also
something that we can--and which I have tried to do as a Member
of Congress, find ways of getting young people involved in
something that they can actually do. You know, young people can
actually have a telescope. Young people can actually go into
planetariums and look into this. So I had legislation in the
past that passed. That that in itself is of great value in
exciting young minds, giving them something that is specific
they can do. Let me--something else that I was involved in, in
terms of to delve into this, was trying to instruct NASA to
conduct a survey of Near-Earth Objects that might hit the
Earth, and at this point I understand that there is a telescope
in Puerto Rico that the Administration is thinking about
shutting that may indeed be contributing to our ability to find
and catalog near-Earth objects. Is there something move to shut
down this telescope in Puerto Rico and----
Arecibo Radio Telescope and Near-Earth Objects
Dr. Stern. I believe you are speaking about the Arecibo
radio telescope that is used for radar purposes, and the radar
is used to better determine the orbits of some of these near-
Earth objects so that we get a better bead on whether or not
they have a potential for hitting the Earth.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Is there some plan to shut that down?
Dr. Stern. Yes, but it is actually a facility in the budget
that is supported by the National Science Foundation that is at
risk. The NASA support for that program, the grants, for
example, that we have in the science mission directorate, are
not affected and that really is an NSF issue.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So let me note, in order for us to support
basic science, quite often we have to try to show people that
there is a direct relationship, a cost-benefit relationship to
our life and our safety, let us say, as part of our life, of
course, and that to have a telescope that one of the services
it provides is helping us to track near-Earth objects or to
catalog them, I think it is a great disservice to try to shut
something like that down and I would hope that you keep that
priority in mind.
I would like to ask a question about the study--am I out of
time? Can I ask one more question? Would the Chairman indulge
me one more question?
I understand that we have determined that there are warming
trends going on on Mars and other planets. Maybe Dr. Burns or
Baker could let me know. So we have determined this, that the
other planets are becoming warmer or at least Mars is becoming
warmer, and how does that fit into calculations that our own
planet may be becoming a little warmer?
Dr. Burns. Let me, if you don't mind, step back for a
moment because I am quite intimately involved with the Arecibo
telescope and in fact maybe I shouldn't be speaking because I
am sort of biased. The university that runs that telescope is
my university and in fact sits under my domain, and that is a
crucial facility, as Dr. Stern said, for determining the orbits
and surface characteristics of asteroids and thereby helping us
avoid the threat, and the problem that has occurred is that the
NSF budget has been cut for the observatory and that has
necessitated the loss of the radar capability as of this coming
October, and that facility originally received its funding from
NASA which NASA decided three, five years ago that they were
not willing to fund a ground-based facility and so they shifted
it over to the NSF. The NSF now says hey, that is not a
problem, we are shifting it back to NASA, and there is a
discussion between the two agencies. From the standpoint of the
science community, we think this is a unique--we know it is a
unique world facility and we don't care who funds it but it
needs to be funded.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I think you put us on notice on that and I
think we should make sure we pay attention to that admonition.
Warming on Mars
Dr. Burns. Let me move on to your other question. I mean,
certainly there are changes that are occurring on Mars in the
upper atmosphere of Mars, in particular that suggests there is
a deposition of some energy there but the evidence for that is
much less than the evidence that we believe we see here on
Earth for the increasing local temperatures and so forth and so
on. I will let others address that question actually.
Dr. Baker. I would just comment that I believe that one of
the great strengths of planetary science is comparison back
with the Earth so what we see in planets in different stages of
development with different processes dominating helps us better
to understand our own planet.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, if Mars is indeed warming as I have
read in several reports, as some of the other planets may be
warming as well, it would indicate to me that the warming
trends going on in the universe have little to do with SUVs and
humankind unless of course we are talking about SUVs and UFOs
are the same thing, which I doubt. So it would seem to me that
solar activity may have a lot to do with changes in climate on
the Earth and other places.
With that said, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
ITAR and International Technological Development
Mr. Wu. I thank the gentleman, and I only have one further
question, to return to the ITAR subject. Dr. Burns, you
referred to that in your testimony and several of the panelists
referred to ITAR and its potential effect on international
cooperation in space. I want to look at this in a slightly
different way. Are some of you concerned that potentially
overrestrictive provisions of ITAR have resulted in giving
foreign governments an incentive to developing sensitive space
and sensor and other technologies that perhaps they would not
have otherwise developed and in fact that they then proceed to
market around the world as ITAR-free technology?
Dr. Fisk. I think the answer to that is categorically yes
and I think there are lots of studies on that point that have
been conducted by the AIAA and I think perhaps even the Defense
Science Board, and it is a concern whether or not we are in
fact protecting ourselves or simply encouraging. The science
perspective is probably--I mean, I wouldn't make this a science
issue. That is an issue of, you know, American space industry
and its ability to market its technologies around the world and
its competitors finding incentives and reasons for being able
not to do that. That is a much bigger issue than just the
science question.
Mr. Wu. Any other comments from the panelists?
Dr. Burns. I would just say it is a very delicate balance
that one has to play when dealing with ITAR issues. You
obviously don't want to go overboard and allow access to
sensitive technologies. On the other hand, if you hamper the
science and hamper our own activities, that is detrimental to
us as well and I worry too much that, you know, we are so
worried about the competition that we are weakening ourselves
in many of these avenues.
Mr. Wu. Dr. Illingworth.
Dr. Illingworth. Thank you. Yes, I would like to reinforce
that because I think this does come back to hurt ourselves.
Science engineering, these areas benefit from dialog from
competition in a sense of ideas and actual techniques and so
where there is not those opportunities to engage in those
activities, we are the ones that lose out as much as anybody
else or maybe more so because other people have the
opportunities for that dialog and that sort of competitive
spirit that we may not be able to carry out.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much. I understand that Mr.
Rohrabacher has one quick question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Very quick. Just for the record, I have no
trouble with cooperation between scientists from free countries
and from other democratic countries. I think that we have to be
very cautious in training scientists who will then return to
dictatorships that may be opposed to our way of life and may
actually create a threat to Western civilization. I mean,
whether or not is a bomb in Pakistan, I would hate to think
that we had Pakistani scientists here and trained them how to
make that bomb. I would hate to think that democratic countries
like our own would use our science and so indiscriminately
provide information that we provide the means for a
dictatorship like China to set up a computer system that will
spy on its own people and put believers in God in jail and be
able to control the Internet in their societies when they
couldn't have done it without our help, things such as that. So
I just would like to make sure that we balance off the pure
science isn't an end in and of itself. If it works with people
who are tyrants and negative forces on this world, that science
is not a good thing to transmit to those people.
So with that said, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am
sorry I was a little late but I am running back and forth.
Mr. Wu. I thank the gentleman, and I think we all have this
concern about appropriate development of technology and
national security.
Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want to thank all
of our witnesses for testifying before the Subcommittee today.
The record will remain open for additional statements from
Members and for answers to any follow-up questions the
Subcommittee may ask of witnesses. I also ask unanimous consent
to insert into the record additional and extraneous material.
Without objection, so ordered. The hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by S. Alan Stern, Associate Administrator, NASA Science
Mission Directorate
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. Your testimony refers to new standards for the selection of
Principal Investigators on space missions. Could you please elaborate
on those standards and how they will help to manage mission costs?
A1. NASA is instituting minimum Principal Investigator (PI) space
flight experience standards for the 2007 Small Explorer (SMEX)
Announcement of Opportunity and all future PI mission selections in
order to reduce the inherent risk in PI-led missions with PIs who have
never played a significant role in a space flight mission or instrument
development. This risk jeopardizes PI-led mission cost and schedule
attainability, and can affect mission technical risk level. Cost,
schedule, and technical problems in turn adversely affect the frequency
of future missions NASA can mount, and jeopardize the viability of PI-
led missions. The PI experience standards we are implementing are
designed to significantly mitigate these issues to the benefit of NASA
and the science community as a whole. Other senior mission science team
personnel such as mission Deputy PI, Project Scientist (PS), Chief
Scientist, Science Team Lead, and instrument PIs that may be involved
in PI-led missions need not meet the same space flight experience
standards as the mission leader--the PI--though their experience level
will remain a factor in Technical, Management, and Cost evaluations.
There are three parts to the minimum space flight experience
standards for a SMEX and all future PI mission selections--the PI will
need senior project experience on a project that went into space. More
specifically:
(a) A PI will need to have served previously as the PI, the
Deputy PI, the PS, or the Deputy PS on a qualifying space
project.
(b) A qualifying space project can be a full mission, an
instrument, or an experiment.
(c) The qualifying project must have been a space project that
has been launched. A space project is one that goes into the
space or near-space environment. Space projects include sub-
orbital projects (sounding rockets, scientific balloons),
orbital projects, and deep space projects. Within these
standards, a large number of U.S. space scientists qualify.
Q2. In your testimony, you state that ``by looking for ways to
increase efficiency within our organization, and within the way we
manage missions, we can make new funding available within the
President's budget that will enable us to do significantly more.'' What
fraction of the space science budget (or, alternatively how much money)
do you realistically think you will be able to free up through those
efficiencies? What's the basis of that estimate?
A2. Over the three year period from February 2004 (FY 2005 budget
request) to February 2007 (FY 2008 budget request), 28 Science Mission
Directorate (SMD) flight missions required budget increases totaling $4
billion in estimated Life Cycle Costs (LCC). This is a major source of
inefficiency corresponding to approximately 75 percent of one year's
budget for SMD. NASA needs to avoid such LCC growth in the future via
stronger program management practices. While we cannot specify the
exact amount of future mission LCC growth we will avoid, we expect
significantly better performance than in the last three years. We also
plan to institute smaller dollar (but important) efficiency gains in
the management of grant paperwork.
Q3. Immature technologies have been identified as a key contributor to
mission cost growth in the past. However, the FY 2008 budget request
reduces the opportunities for technology development through the New
Millennium and research and analysis programs.
Q3a. Why is NASA reducing the New Millennium and R&A technology
development activities?
A3a. The decision to reduce funding for the New Millennium program was
necessary in order to make funding available to achieve a balanced,
executable portfolio within the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) and
to concentrate more heavily on SMD's main mission: producing scientific
results that advance the priorities of the four National Research
Council (NRC) Decadal Surveys (Earth science, Astrophysics,
Heliophysics, and Planetary science). Specifically, funding was
eliminated for the Space Technology (ST)-9 mission since that early
(competitive Phase A) formulation and had only reached the Concept
Study Report stage. Furthermore, its priority as a technology flight
demonstration was lower than the current science missions vying for
funding in this time period.
With regard to funding for the Research and Analysis (R&A) program,
total funding in the FY 2008 budget request for technology-based R&A
activities represents a slight increase over the funding available in
FY 2007. The R&A program includes a number of instrument incubator and
technology development elements designed to enable future science
missions in each of SMD's four portfolio areas. In addition, SMD is
looking for ways to increase opportunities, such as through the
addition of four new investigations to the Astrophysics and
Heliophysics sounding rockets programs, which not only provide training
for investigators, but also help develop the next generation detectors
required for future science missions.
Q3b. How important do you think it is to maintain a long-term
technology development activity in NASA's space science program? What
fraction of overall funding should that technology development activity
represent?
A3b. It is very important to maintain a long-term technology
development activity in NASA's space science program. The funding
reductions for long-term technology development in FY 2008 reflect the
relative priority and are temporary as NASA works off the backlog of
missions already in formulation and readjusts the phasing of its future
mission plans. In the future, technology efforts will be more closely
tied to specific mission needs, as has recently been successfully
demonstrated by James Web Space Telescope. There is not an optimal
single overall fraction of funding that should be allocated for
technology development. This decision must be made for each science
discipline within the context of the community-based priorities and
mission plans. In some cases, the reapplication of technologies that
are already in hand can go a long way towards meeting the science
priorities identified in the National Research Council (NRC)'s decadal
surveys. In other cases, significant technology development will be
required in order to achieve these priorities. Each science division
within NASA's Science Mission Directorate will work with their
communities, including the NRC and the subcommittees of the NASA
Advisory Council, to identify critical technology needs for specific
missions and their relative priorities in the context of the overall
science program.
Q4. The science community has commented on the absence of mechanisms
by which the community can have input into NASA's space science program
through its internal advisory process. A recent National Academies
report recommended that ``NASA should consider changes in its advisory
structure to shorten the path between advisory groups and relevant
managers so as to maximize the relevance, utility, and timeliness of
advice as well as the quality of the dialogue with advice givers.'' In
specific terms, how do you plan to work with the space science
community and with internal and external advisory committees?
A4. NASA restructured the NASA Advisory Council and its Committees and
Subcommittees in November 2005 in order to ensure that the
Administrator receives advice that is fully integrated across the
science, engineering, and business disciplines involved. Over the last
year and a half, the communications links between the NAC and its
subcommittees and relevant NASA managers remain intact. Each of the
science subcommittees of the NAC holds open meetings, which NASA
mangers regularly attend and are often asked to make presentations.
Further, each subcommittee generates a report for each meeting that,
while addressed to the Chair of the NAC Science Committee, is copied to
the relevant NASA science division director. Externally, NASA maintains
its long-standing relationship with the Boards and Committees of the
National Research Council/National Academy of Sciences, as well as the
Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC). Members of NASA's
Science Mission Directorate (SMD) senior management team are regular
participants at NRC Space Studies Board meetings, and at any given
time, the Board has several studies underway to provide advice
requested by the Agency on science community priorities. The next round
of space science decadal surveys will begin formulation next year.
In addition to these formal channels by which the community can
provide input to NASA's SMD, the new SMD Senior Management team has
begun a series of active townhall meetings with members of the science
community as a way to receive informal feedback. These town halls occur
across the country, with participants at science conferences and
scientists at universities, research laboratories, and NASA centers.
Through early June 2007, meetings have taken place in California,
Maryland, Hawaii and Arizona. SMD has also established an e-mail
address to receive questions, concerns, and suggestions from members of
the science community.
Q5. The Science Plan for NASA's Science Mission Directorate 2007-2016,
notes that an important question is ``whether the science activities
enabled by the human exploration program and identified as compelling
by the science community have greater or lesser priority than
activities previously planned by [NASA's Science Mission
Directorate].'' How do you plan to address this question of priorities?
A5. NASA will address the question of priorities of science that
derives from human exploration activities and capabilities using the
results of the upcoming National Research Council (NRC) report on lunar
science priorities, ``The Scientific Context for Exploration of the
Moon.'' In addition, NASA will ask the next round of Decadal Surveys,
beginning with the 2008 kickoff of the 2010 Astrophysics Decadal
Survey, to incorporate human exploration-enabled science in their
deliberations.
Q6. You have informed the subcommittee that you will move NASA's Near-
Earth Object program, along with its associated funding, from the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate to the Science Mission
Directorate. Could you please elaborate on your plans for the Near
Earth Object program?
A6. The Near-Earth Object Observation (NEOO) program is being
transferred back to NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD), along
with its budget, effective in FY 2008. The Program will be housed in
the Earth Science Division (ESD) as ESD studies hazards to the Earth,
and NEOs are one such hazard, much like the ozone hole and global
warming. While there are currently no plans to alter the budget for the
NEOO program, NASA does plan to continue NEOO efforts after 2008 when
the current survey down to one-kilometer sizes is completed. That new
work will concentrate on reducing orbit uncertainties in catalogued
NEOs, finding the few (10 percent) undiscovered NEOs with one km or
larger sizes, and locating new but somewhat smaller NEOs. In addition,
NASA's Planetary Astronomy grants program supports NEO observations
that reveal new physical insights into their nature and our Discovery
mission program is evaluating a finalist proposal to visit and sample
an NEO.
Q7. Dr. Stern, given the constraints on growth in NASA's space science
programs, how do you plan to help ensure the lunar science program is
sustainable? Where will the money for it come from?
A7. NASA's FY 2008 budget request includes $351 million over five years
for a lunar science research project. This project, part of the Science
Mission Directorate's Planetary Science Division, is being designed to
provide for the activities outlined below:
1) Ingest and archive of Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
and Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS)
data into the Planetary Data System;
2) competed opportunities for scientific payloads to fly on
both international missions;
3) competed opportunities to analyze scientific data from
lunar missions and accompanying scientific payloads;
4) competed opportunities to develop technology and
instruments to support lunar science studies; and,
5) competed basic lunar science investigation.
Additionally, in 2010, SMD will take over the LRO mission from ESMD
for an extended mission of lunar science observations. Funding to
create the lunar science project came from the reprogramming of funds
from lower priority activities within the Planetary Science Division.
SMD is also encouraging the use of its existing orbital assets like the
Hubble Space Telescope and Chandra for observing the surface of the
Earth's moon.
Q8. In your testimony, you talk about being an enthusiastic advocate
of human exploration. You then go on to state that one of your three
guiding principles for the Science Mission Directorate is ``to help the
Vision for Space Exploration succeed.'' In specific terms, what changes
do you plan to make to the goals, priorities, and plans of the Science
Mission Directorate to help the Vision for Space Exploration succeed?
A8. NASA's Science Mission Directorate will support human exploration
efforts by funding a developing lunar science community. This effort is
included in the President's FY 2008 budget request as a new line item
in the Planetary Science Division of SMD, with a total funding of $351
million over five years. That funding will be used to analyze lunar
data from the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and Lunar CRater
Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) missions, to institute a
lunar R&A program, to fund a science-driven mission extension of LRO in
FY 2010, and to fund new instruments to fly on future foreign lunar
missions.
Q9. NASA has imposed cost ``caps'' on a number of its small- and
medium-sized mission programs, such as Discovery. With the advent of
full-cost accounting, are those cost caps still realistic or should
they be adjusted? Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool?
A9. While full cost charges have varied over time as full cost
accounting has been implemented at NASA, the cost cap in each
Announcement of Opportunity has taken this factor into account. These
cost caps have increased in recent years for the purpose of
compensating full cost accounting-driven increases in the cost of work
done at NASA centers. Additionally, NASA has consistently instructed
that all proposed mission costs include full cost accounting.
Cost caps serve an effective role in guiding management decisions
both within projects and at NASA Headquarters, and we plan to continue
using cost caps on PI-led and other missions for this purpose. Some of
the benefits of using cost caps are outlined below.
Cost caps help bound the complexity of possible
missions, thus simplifying the evaluation and selection process
by ensuring there is no bias towards those missions with the
most complexity.
Cost caps enable long-range program planning for
future solicitations since the maximum cost of each mission is
known.
Cost caps provide clear and strategic limits on how
much mission implementation costs can grow after selection
without termination.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Q1. Statements made by other witnesses indicate a strong preference
for flying frequent small- and medium-sized competed missions, with a
flagship mission once every decade. What would you consider to be a
healthy tempo for competed, Principal Investigator-led missions?
A1. At our current budget level, the optimum rate for Principal
Investigator (PI)-led missions is approximately one to two per year in
each of our science disciplines: astrophysics, Earth science, planetary
science, and heliophysics. The Agency is taking steps to move towards
this level within our available resources. For example, NASA will
select three Small Explorer (SMEX) missions, instead of one Medium-
Class Explorer (MIDEX) mission, in the next Explorer Announcement of
Opportunity (AO), to be released this October. NASA also will release
an Earth science PI-led mission AO in the 2008-2009 timeframe. Finally,
NASA will increase the rate of sub-orbital PI-led missions, as
evidenced by our recent selection of four new PI-led missions in the
astrophysics and heliophysics sounding rocket programs. Within the next
few months, NASA's Science Mission Directorate (SMD) will select new
PI-led missions from the Discovery Program and from the Mars Scout
Program. In addition, SMD plans to call for a number of different types
of PI-led proposals in 2009.
Q2. With respect to future deep space missions, what is the
availability of RTGs (or other forms of nuclear power sources) to power
spacecraft? How many would be available over the next decade?
A2. At the present time, the first Multi-Mission Radioisotope
Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG) is being qualified for the Mars
Science Laboratory (MSL) rover mission, which is planned for launch in
September 2009. Following qualification of MMRTG for MSL, one flight
unit and a spare are planned to be ready in time for the scheduled
launch opportunity. It is anticipated that use of MMRTG for a large
mission to an outer planet destination such as Jupiter would require
fabrication of six to seven more MMRTGs, assuming spacecraft power
requirements do not exceed about 1 kilowatt at the beginning of the
mission, and preferably no more than about 800 watts. NASA would work
with the U.S. Department of Energy to determine resource needs and the
schedule to meet potential launch dates.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board, National
Research Council
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. NASA has imposed cost ``caps'' on a number of its small- and
medium-sized mission programs, such as Discovery. With the advent of
full-cost accounting, are those cost caps still realistic or should
they be adjusted? Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool?
A1. There have been two principal drivers that have required increases
in cost caps: launch vehicle costs, and full-cost accounting, the
primary impact of which has been increased management costs of
missions. NASA needs to continuously assess the realism of the cost
caps, to ensure that quality missions can be proposed and executed. The
realism of the assigned cost caps can be validated by the proposals
submitted. So long as the science community can propose and
subsequently execute exciting missions within the assigned caps, the
cap is realistic. As a management tool, the caps have been highly
effective. Missions with caps have far fewer, and less-severe cost
overruns than do the larger missions, which are generally not initiated
with a cap in place.
Q2. The National Academies report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm,
recommends ``emphasis on physical sciences, engineering, mathematics
and information sciences,'' as well as high-risk research, grants to
early career researchers, and funding for advanced research
instrumentation and facilities, among other actions, that can help
foster innovation and sustain a strong economy. How relevant are NASA's
space science research programs to those recommendations? Can you offer
any specific examples? NASA's science program was not included in the
President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). Would you
advocate NASA's science programs be made part of the ACI in future
budgets? If not, why not?
A2. There are three areas in which NASA science could participate in
the ACI: education, direct impact on the economy, and fundamental
knowledge:
Education: Currently and historically, NASA's most important
contributions to education have come from the Science Mission
Directorate (SMD), and, when it existed, the program in physical and
biological sciences in microgravity. Hands-on projects have been
provided for undergraduates and graduate students, fellowships have
been available, and most R&A grants to universities provide support for
students. Students are trained by participating in projects of varying
complexity, ranging from sounding rockets and balloons, to actual space
instrumentation that is being built in university labs.
In recent years, NASA has cut back dramatically on its support for
university research labs, particularly those doing space hardware. This
is the result of reduced flight opportunities of small and moderate
missions, and a retrenchment into the NASA centers. The consequence has
been fewer and fewer opportunities to train undergraduate and graduate
students in the construction of actual space hardware. The historical
role that NASA has had to provide the Nation with a technically
competent workforce has been greatly abated.
A useful role for NASA in the ACI would follow from an initiative
to enhance the participation of the Nation's research universities in
the development of space hardware, thereby, as a direct consequence,
providing hands-on experience for students. It is important to note
that these are not to be watered-down projects, such as student
satellites. There is no reason why university researchers and their
students cannot develop the most sophisticated instruments needed for
forefront research.
Direct Impact on the Economy. There are certain NASA science
disciplines that have direct impact on the American economy. Foremost
is Earth science, and to a lesser degree, heliophysics [the influence
of the Sun on the climate and space weather]. Knowing what is the
immediate future of the climate is essential to a variety of
industries, from agriculture to insurance, to the auto industry, to
coastal infrastructure, etc.
The current funding for Earth science is not adequate to provide
the required information on the future of the climate. There are also
deficiencies in the funding for heliophysics, particularly if space
weather, and its influence on space or ground assets, is considered
important.
Fundamental Knowledge. All of the science disciplines in NASA--
astrophysics, planetary, Earth science, heliophysics, life and physical
sciences in microgravity--provide fundamental knowledge. Since this is
a thrust of ACI, with the inclusion of the NSF and the DOE Office of
Science, each of the NASA science disciplines could be an active
participant in ACI.
Q3. A recently released study of the National Academy of Sciences on
Building a Better NASA Workforce recommended that: ``. . .NASA increase
its investment in proven programs such as sounding rocket launches,
aircraft-based research, and high-altitude balloon campaigns, which
provide ample opportunities for hands-on flight development experience
at a relatively low cost of failure.''
Q3a. Could you please explain in concrete terms how the sub-orbital
programs are used to train students and young workers?
A3a. There is a very powerful statement that can be made about the sub-
orbital program: Essentially every major experimentalist currently
executing NASA's space and Earth science program learned his/her skills
in the sub-orbital program. The projects are of limited duration, and
thus can be executed during the time required for a graduate thesis.
They involve the essential skills of system management and data
analysis, as well as challenging engineering.
The sub-orbital program has been reduced systematically over the
years, to where it is now a shadow of its former robustness. With the
arrival of Alan Stern as Associate Administrator, there has been some
welcome revitalization to the sub-orbital program, but it is still
inadequate to meet the needs of training the next generation of
experimentalists.
Q3b. What do these sub-orbital programs typically cost and do they
produce peer-reviewed research?
A3b. There are certain science disciplines that can use the sub-orbital
program effectively. Sounding rockets can study plasma phenomena such
as the aurora directly, and sounding rockets and particularly balloons
can be used for forefront astronomical observations. There are also
aircraft that can be used as appropriate platforms for astronomical and
Earth science observations. It would be helpful in Earth science, if
there were a more robust program in Unpiloted Airborne Vehicles (UAVs).
Other disciplines, such as the study of the heliosphere, where it is
necessary for a spacecraft to make in-situ observations, cannot profit
from the sub-orbital program for science; however, instrumentation that
will ultimately fly on a spacecraft can be tested.
Q4. NASA's Research & Analysis (R&A) programs are mentioned as being
critical for developing new mission concepts and advanced technology.
What impacts will the cutbacks in R&A have on the opportunities for
future missions and programs? If R&A remains at current levels, what
are we likely to see, or not see, in the next five years?
A4. Science is an evolutionary process. We make observations, and then
we develop theories and models to explain the observations. The
theories and models then demand new observations as tests. Similarly,
we build our missions on existing technology, but in the process
recognize the opportunities that new technology can provide us. The
availability of the new technology, plus the demand, results in new
missions. The R&A program, with its support of theory and modeling, and
technology development, is the lynchpin in this evolutionary process.
The program sits at the nexus between what we have done and what we
want to do.
Historically in NASA science, when the flight rate was low, the R&A
program was enhanced, to increase the demand and the opportunities for
new missions. The flight rate and funding for R&A have thus been anti-
correlated. The odd part of the recent cuts in R&A is that they
occurred when the flight rate is in decline. It thus follows, that at
the current reduced funding level, the R&A cannot readily serve its
historical role in the evolutionary process of advancing space and
Earth science.
Q5. What is the current frequency of Explorer and Discovery missions,
and what do you believe should be the frequency of launch opportunities
if we want to sustain a healthy space science research program in each
of the disciplines?
A5. The Explorer program, which supports the astrophysics and
heliophysics program, is NASA's oldest flight program. Over the 49-year
history of the space program, there have been more than 100 Explorers,
or an average of more than two per year. The flight rate today is a
small fraction of this rate, as a consequence of more than $1 billion
having been removed from the runout of the Explorer line. The Discovery
program has fared somewhat better, being better able to maintain its
historic flight rate of about one every other year. Other moderate
missions, such as the Solar Terrestrial Probes (STP), have greatly
reduced flight rates, since the first mission in this line has been
allowed to grow substantially in cost. In Earth science, the Earth
System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) missions are effectively at a stand
still, and, so far, it has not been possible to initiate the new
missions called for in the recent decadal survey for Earth science. As
a consequence of all these reductions and delays, the flight rate for
small and moderate missions is greatly reduced. The total fight rate
for all NASA science missions will be under two per year in 2010-2012,
compared to an historical rate in the 1990s of an average of seven per
year.
Clearly, it is necessary to restore the flight rate of small and
moderate missions. These missions not only perform excellent science,
but they are an essential part of the continuum that is essential for
the development of human capital and technology; it begins with R&A and
extends through small and moderate missions, to NASA's most challenging
flight programs. A reasonable goal would be to return the overall
flight rate of science missions to above seven per year, balanced
across the disciplines. Since there is no room in the budget for
additional large programs, this can be accomplished only by additional
small and moderate missions. In addition, a major Earth science
initiative to implement the recommendations of the decadal survey
should be allowed to increase the flight rate even further.
Q6. In your view, what role does the structure of the advisory system
play in ensuring the strength of the space science programs?
A6. Early in the history of the space program, a very effective
advisory structure for science developed. The National Academies'
National Research Council, primarily through the Space Studies Board,
provided strategic advice, and the internal NASA advisory committees,
particularly those that advise the Science Mission Directorate and its
predecessor offices, provided the tactical advice for implementing the
strategies. This advisory system, which was practiced for 40 years, has
ensured the quality of NASA science. Recently, NASA has effectively
abolished the internal NASA advisory structure, particularly the advice
that was given directly to the Associate Administrator for the Science
Mission Directorate. This is an unfortunate loss, and removes from the
Associate Administrator an effective means to formally interact with
the science community. It is possible to work around this deficiency,
and there is an expectation that the current Associate Administrator,
Alan Stern, will. Nonetheless, in the next NASA administration, the
decision to abolish the internal advisory structure for science should
be reversed.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Q1. What metric should NASA use to establish an appropriate level of
technology development investment across the programs? Should it be a
percentage of the overall program funding, or should it be a fixed
amount?
A1. This question does not have a simple answer. The technology
investment required, as well as R&A funding in general, will vary from
discipline to discipline. It will depend on the current state of
technology development for the discipline; is it adequate to support
future missions or are major breakthroughs required to advance the
science? For example, as noted above, there is a logic in making more
R&A investments when the flight rate is low, to yield a greater flight
rate, and thus funding R&A should not be a simple percentage of the
existing program.
This is an area that is worthy of a detailed study to set up
appropriate strategies for R&A funding for each science discipline. R&A
funding is perceived to be inadequate, particularly with the recent
cuts, and it is important to have a detailed defendable strategy to
justify the restoration of funds and any future funding level.
Q2. What mission assurance and management requirements imposed by NASA
do you believe are counter-productive or impose costs that are
disproportionate to the size of the mission, or that offer little added
value?
A2. Over the decades, the United States has developed great
capabilities to execute space and Earth science missions. The expertise
resides in university labs, in industry, as well as in the NASA
centers. In the best of worlds, the organizations with expertise and
experience are allowed to perform their tasks in the most cost-
effective manner possible, with the aim that they achieve mission
success. Many of these projects are managed out of NASA centers. With
full-cost accounting, and the need to justify the civil service
workforce, the number of individuals participating in this management
has grown substantially. It is not obvious to experienced scientists
and engineers that this additional management oversight, which carries
a cost for both the NASA center and the contractor, adds value and
reduces risk. Rather, it is more likely that risk is increased since
the oversight, if extreme, can reduce the attention paid to good
engineering practices. For larger, more complicated missions, highly
sophisticated management oversight is required. However, the
distracting practices are particularly onerous for small and moderate
missions, and of no clear benefit.
Q3. How should NASA and the space science disciplines best develop
estimated mission costs, at a reasonable level of confidence, during
the next round of decadal surveys? Who should perform these estimates?
What level of confidence do you believe is appropriate?
A3. In the current Beyond Einstein Program Assessment Committee
(BEPAC), the NRC has engaged a subcontractor specializing in cost
estimating to perform independent cost estimates for the missions under
consideration. If this arrangement proves satisfactory, it will be an
appropriate model to follow for the next round of decadals and other
NRC priority setting studies. The cost of such studies to the
sponsor(s) will increase commensurately, but the final product would be
more valuable in that priorities would be set with greater clarity
about project costs, and assurance that the cost estimate was developed
independently of the project, as well as the Agency overall. The NRC
does not take a position on what level of confidence should be used for
such cost estimates, and will rely on the sponsor to specify the level
of confidence required. NASA's current policy for missions in the
Science Mission Directorate is 70 percent, and that is the confidence
level being used for BEPAC.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Garth D. Illingworth, Chair, Astronomy and Astrophysics
Advisory Committee (AAAC)
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. NASA has imposed cost ``caps'' on a number of its small- and
medium-sized mission programs, such as Discovery. With the advent of
full-cost accounting, are these cost caps still realistic or should
they be adjusted? Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool?
A1. With the advent of full-cost accounting, are these cost caps still
realistic or should they be adjusted? There has been a growing sense
that the previous cost-caps were too small for Explorers and Discovery
missions. It has become increasingly difficult to undertake cutting-
edge science programs within the cost-caps. Several changes have
contributed to this, in addition to the impact of full-cost accounting.
NASA advocated an increase in contingency to 30 percent for these
programs several years ago, given the concerns with continuing overruns
in the cost-capped missions. The Space Science Advisory Committee
(SScAC) supported increasing the contingency to try and minimize
overruns, even though it appeared to limit what the proposing team
could do within the cost-cap. A further problem is the increasing cost
of launch vehicles for Explorer and Discovery missions, especially with
the discontinuation of the Delta launch vehicles. There is another
factor also which reflects the increasing maturity of the scientific
studies in the Planetary and Astrophysics programs. The ``low-hanging
fruit'' has been picked, i.e., the easiest studies have, in many cases,
been done already. This results in future missions needing more
sophisticated detection systems and/or larger optics, both of which
tend to drive costs higher. While increases in cost caps will trade
against mission frequency, unless the budgetary situation improves
significantly, it is my sense that many prospective projects that have
high scientific value are potentially excluded with the ``traditional''
level of cost caps and so some reduction in frequency for higher cost-
caps might be an appropriate trade-off.
The cost-cap for the last Discovery mission proposals proved to be
extremely challenging for the Astrophysics missions that were proposed
for planet searches. Increases are needed, at least to accommodate
planet search options. The next Explorer call for proposals will need a
much larger cost-cap than that used in 2002 to offset the effect of
full-cost accounting, appropriate levels of contingency, and the
uncertainty and likely higher cost associated with the launch vehicle.
The cost-cap associated with the Astrophysics Probes, now being
discussed as an analog to the Planetary Division's New Frontiers
program, will need careful consideration as well, since all the same
elements (full-cost accounting; contingency; launch vehicles) will
challenge those $0.6+B scale missions as well.
Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool? It is my view
that cost caps are an effective tool. They are no guarantee that
missions will come in on budget, but the caps provide a number of
advantages. First, they provide great pressure on the proposing team
and the NASA center to rigorously assess the likely cost of the mission
before and during the proposal process. The cost caps also provide
similar pressure during the Phase A process after preliminary selection
and before final selection. Second, they provide some very specific
budget points at which the agency and its advisory committees begin to
discuss the project performance. This provides additional pressure on
the project to work to the budget. There are no guarantees that any
project will come in on-budget, but the cost-capped missions do have a
number of mechanisms that help this situation. The recent emphasis on
the experience of the PI before selection, and on the performance of
the PI during development and construction, provides an additional
pressure point on the project. Overall it is my view that cost-capped
programs are a very desirable component of the mission suite in SMD,
but more realistic cost-caps are needed.
Q2. The National Academies report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm,
recommends ``emphasis on physical science, engineering, mathematics and
information sciences'', as well as high-risk research, grants to early
career researchers, and funding for advanced research instrumentation
and facilities, among other actions, that can help to foster innovation
and sustain a strong economy. How relevant are NASA's space science
research programs to these recommendations? Can you offer any specific
examples? NASA's science program was not included in the President's
American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). Would you advocate NASA's
science programs be made part of the ACI in future budgets? If not, why
not?
A2. How relevant are NASA's space science research programs to these
recommendations? NASA's science programs are extremely relevant to the
issues and concerns raised in the Gathering Storm report. A substantial
fraction of NASA's science programs relate directly to the areas
highlighted in Gathering Storm as needing emphasis, namely physical
science, engineering, mathematics and information sciences.
Furthermore, NASA's science programs bring a largely unique coupling
between academia (university and research organizations), industry
(aerospace contractors) and government (NASA centers) on cutting-edge,
high-technology projects.
Can you offer any specific examples? I think the cost-capped PI
missions (e.g., Explorers, Discovery, Astrophysics Probes, New
Frontiers) are particularly good examples of programs that have these
interfaces and encourage innovative thinking. However, at the other end
of the cost scale, I also think that missions like JWST are
particularly responsive to these recommendations. They bring together
the best people from a wide range of areas, encourage them to work
together innovatively and demand cross-cutting skill development that
is remarkably valuable for all those involved. The end product of the
JWST effort will be a mission like Hubble in its likely impact and thus
likely to be the seed from which great public interest in the physical
sciences will grow.
NASA's science program was not included in the President's American
Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). Would you advocate NASA's science
programs be made part of the ACI in future budgets? Given the above
aspects and roles of the NASA science program, and its national
recognition, the NASA science program should be considered especially
deserving of any funding gains that might grow from Gathering Storm
and, in particular, therefore deserving of inclusion in ACI. I
personally advocate, very strongly, that NASA's science programs be
made part of ACI in future budgets, and hope that Congress is willing
to support and increase funding for NASA's science programs as part of
its Innovation Initiative. The AAAC has also endorsed this approach
through one of its primary recommendations for NASA in the 2007 AAAC
Annual Report:
``The American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI) recognized the
challenges faced by the Nation in staying at the forefront of
scientific and technological development. Research is essential
to innovative activities and underpins a technologically-
competitive society, as highlighted in the NRC report Rising
Above the Gathering Storm. The exclusion of NASA science from
the ACI, in contrast to the inclusion of DOE science, is
inconsistent. There is no question that NASA is at the cutting-
edge of science and technology research.
This exciting and highly visible research contributes to the
vitality of the national skill set and has encouraged young
people to move into science and engineering. The Congressional
interest in Innovation and Competitiveness enables a fresh
opportunity for enhancing NASA science. The AAAC strongly
encourages Congress to consider enhancing the support for
science at NASA explicitly to improve innovation and
competitiveness, as has been done for NSF and DOE science.''
Q3. A recently released study of the National Academy of Sciences on
Building a Better NASA Workforce recommended that: ``. . .NASA increase
its investment in proven programs such as sounding rocket launches,
aircraft-based research, and high-altitude balloon campaigns, which
provide ample opportunities for hands-on flight development experience
at a relatively low cost of failure.''
a. Could you please explain in concrete terms how the sub-
orbital programs are used to train students and young workers?
b. What do these sub-orbital programs typically cost and do
they produce peer-reviewed research?
A3. A continuing concern for the science community has been the ability
to train young researchers in the complexities and details of space
science missions. This has traditionally happened through the sub-
orbital programs (rockets and balloons most typically for Astrophysics)
and through the Explorer-class missions. However, the Explorer-class
missions, even small Explorers (SMEX), happen rarely, involve long
timescales from proposal to fruition (typically five years or more),
and are now at cost levels ( $300+M for an Explorer and >$100M for a
SMEX) that makes student and postdoctoral involvement challenging. The
sub-orbital programs appear to be the best mechanism for doing these
``training'' activities. While I have no direct experience with the
sub-orbital program, recent discussions confirmed my view that the
rocket program, as an example, allows for direct, end-to-end, hands-on
involvement by students and postdocs and so can provide for
substantially training that is of great value in building up a cadre of
researchers who have developed significant experience with doing
science in space. The sub-orbital program faces challenges in the
present funding environment, like many areas, and it would be valuable
for the upcoming Decadal Survey to assess its value for training and
science, and to provide some guidance on the role that the sub-orbital
program should play in the coming decade in astrophysics.
Could you please explain in concrete terms how the sub-orbital
programs are used to train students and young workers? As an example
(which surely varies by program in its details), a typical rocket
flight can give a student or postdoc insight into most of the elements
that constitute a ``science'' space mission. A typical rocket program
might run from instigation to published results in a couple of years.
The young researchers involved with a program could be involved in
concept development and science experiment ``design,'' to hardware
design, through ``bread-boarding'' to construction and testing in the
home institution, to integration at the launch facility (at NASA's
Wallops Flight Facility), launch and science data acquisition (even
doing real-time control of the experiment), and then to data analysis
and publication. If the peer-reviewed publication that results is done
by a graduate student, then that publication would constitute a
significant part in the Ph.D. thesis of the student. Being involved in
this sequence of events, with the interactions with engineering
personnel and rocket operations personnel, gives a young researcher
valuable insight into the steps involved in doing space mission
development. They can build on this subsequently with involvement in
more complex and expensive programs and missions.
What do these sub-orbital programs typically cost and do they
produce peer-reviewed research? The sub-orbital program is
distinguished by being inexpensive (relative to orbital missions). The
2007 budgets for sounding rockets, balloons and aircraft at Wallops are
$32M, $22M and $10M. These are modest programs in NASA terms. The
flight opportunities for rockets and balloons are typically 20 per
year. A typical rocket mission is thus in the million-dollar range ($1-
2M), very low compared to any Explorer. Balloon programs have also been
of significant value to the overall science program, and provide
similar training opportunities at similar modest cost (by space mission
standards). Of course, the science returns from a typical sub-orbital
program are less than from an Explorer, as would be expected, but the
combination of training and science from the sub-orbital program is of
great value. Even though the costs are modest these programs are quite
competitive and involve selection through peer-review. The sub-orbital
programs have consistently produced peer-reviewed research. It is well
recognized in the community that one must publish in peer-reviewed
Journals to be seen as successful, and the same is true if one is to be
competitive in subsequent competitions for R&A support and access to
the sub-orbital facilities. The research from the sub-orbital program
has played a significant role in a large number of Ph.D. theses, as
noted above, and resulted in publication in peer-reviewed journals. The
peer-reviewed research productivity has then been a factor in the peer-
reviewed selection of subsequent sub-orbital proposals.
Q4. NASA's Research and Analysis (R&A) programs are mentioned as being
critical for developing new mission concepts and advanced technology.
What impacts will the cutbacks in R&A have on the opportunities for
future missions and programs? If R&A remains at current levels, what
are we likely to see, or not see, in the next five years?
A4. Research and Analysis (R&A) funds are used for a very wide range of
activities related to the NASA science program. These are directly
relevant for science productivity and science preparation for future
programs through the theory component, through a variety of diversified
research activities that improve the foundations and underpinnings of
the scientific framework, and through training and development of young
scientists. These young scientists are the future researchers who will
both implement and provide the scientific returns. Furthermore, R&A
funds have been used for technology development and for mission concept
development. Major projects, in particular, typically take decades from
concept development to launch. This was true of AXAF (Chandra), which
was developed conceptually back in the 1970s and eventually launched in
1999 after 20+ years. The same was true of SIRTF (Spitzer), which also
took some 20+ years from initial conceptualization to launch. NGST
(JWST) will launch in 2013, but the first international workshop took
place in 1989. I personally was a co-organizer on that workshop and
know directly the importance of support in the early stages for concept
development. During much of the 1980s and 1990s key technologies were
developed for these and other missions (including the HST 2nd and 3rd
generation instruments) using a variety of funding sources, but many
development activities by scientists and organizations were carried out
using R&A-like funds. It is hard to quantify the role that R&A funds
played, and would require a substantial effort to trace the use of
funds in the early stages of mission development and their ultimate
role in early project and technology development. The anecdotal
evidence is widespread, however, with many senior scientists noting how
support for them allowed for significant efforts on the early phases of
major projects, both on hardware development and on concept
development.
What impacts will the cutbacks in R&A have on the opportunities for
future missions and programs? The level of effort in such areas is now
substantially less, even within the NASA centers, and considerable
concern exists that we are not investing enough for the missions of the
next decade and beyond. I do not see the same level of involvement in
future missions and programs that existed in the 1990s. I think that
the involvement of the University/academic community in long-range
development is not at a healthy level for providing the ground-work for
the major missions of the next decade and beyond, nor even for the next
round of larger cost-capped missions. Innovative efforts are being
limited by R&A funding shortfalls. The level of funds available for
small missions, like Explorers, has an impact too. The recent SMEX
(Small Explorer) announcement is good, but they provide less
opportunities for Astrophysics than for Heliophysics--the Astrophysics
science opportunities within the SMEX size, weight and orbital
constraints are limited.
If R&A remains at current levels, what are we likely to see, or not
see, in the next five years? Unfortunately, since it takes about five
years to do even the smallest missions, any changes that we implement
now will not have an impact for longer than five years. This is why the
dramatic decrease in missions in SMD beyond 2009 (and in Astrophysics
in particular) is such a concern (see the Figure below from my
testimony to the Subcommittee). To increase the mission frequency by
the middle of the next decade will require an increase in the budget
for small and moderate missions in the next couple of years.
Q5. In your view, what role does the structure of the advisory system
play in ensuring the strength of the space science programs?
A5. I have been involved with, and on, advisory committees for the
agencies, and NASA in particular, for some 20 years, and will have
chaired the Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee (AAAC) for
four years when my term ends next year. It is my view, based on this
extensive experience, that the advisory structure for the science
agencies plays an incredibly important role as an interface between the
community--which sets the broad goals, defines the mission or project
suite, and carries out the scientific research program--and the agency
which implements and manages the very complex missions and projects,
and enables the science program. The management and implementation of
these activities is clearly an agency responsibility, but the
effectiveness of their role is crucially dependent on a continuing
dialogue and advice from the community as the implementation realities
impact projects, and as agency budgets and goals evolve. This is
particularly true of NASA where there is a very complex set of
interfaces with the agency, both at HQ and the Centers, the science
community and with the contractors, and where the political environment
plays such an important role (given the fiscal scale of the missions
being undertaken). The AAAC paid particular attention to the lack of an
advisory process in 2005 and early 2006 when the NASA advisory process
was in abeyance, and wrote extensively about its importance. The AAAC
followed up on this in its most recent 2007 report. The AAAC summary
statements regarding advisory committees at NASA for the science
program are given below:
The AAAC statement regarding the NASA science advisory structure in
our 2006 report was: ``For the past year the lack of an advisory
structure for NASA--and for science at NASA--has been a deep concern
for the community. By the time the new science advisory committees are
selected, approved and assembled, a year will have passed without
discussions on issues that are critical for the community and for NASA
science. During that time, far-reaching decisions were made without any
scientific input (e.g., the effective cancellation of SOFIA whose
budget was reduced to $0 in FY 2007 and beyond without a review). The
AAAC welcomes the creation of a new advisory structure. However, we and
others are concerned that this structure may not be as effective as
that previously employed. The lack of close coupling of the science
subcommittees to the SMD leadership is likely to be a significant
impediment. The AAAC has every hope that the new structure will work
effectively and in a timely way by providing feedback to SMD quickly
with minimal modification. However, if the structure is perceived by
either party to be ineffective, the AAAC hopes that the Administrator
and the Associate Administrator for Science will evolve the structure
to better serve NASA and the community. These committees play an
essential role in optimizing the science program within the
programmatic and budgetary constraints faced by the agency and thus are
of great value both to NASA and to the community. The NASA advisory
process has been a mainstay of a productive and mutually beneficial
relationship with the space and earth science community, including the
astronomy and astrophysics community. The AAAC considers effective
advisory committees to be essential for developing consensus and
support for an effective science program.''
The AAAC statement regarding the NASA science advisory structure in
our 2007 report was: ``The AAAC expressed great concern last year in
our report about the lack of an advisory process at NASA. We were very
encouraged when the new NASA advisory committees were established. The
new structure does differ from that used previously, providing a
clearer path for advice to the Administrator. The new structure has,
however, lost a valuable role that was once provided by the Space
Science Advisory Committee (SScAC). That structure encouraged dialogue,
on wide-ranging issues that cut across the SMD divisions, between SMD
and a broadly-representative group from the science community. An
improved interface with SMD is in the best interests of both NASA and
the science community to restore this important two-way communication
link that has contributed to the success of NASA science in the past.
The AAAC welcomed the re-establishment of the advisory structure at
NASA last year, but notes that dialogue between SMD and a broadly-
representative group from the science community is missing in the new
structure.''
Q6. Your testimony mentions the creation of an ExoPlanet Task Force
that will consider the missions and science related to the search for
extrasolar planets. What is the charge for this task force? Will it
provide advice on the future direction for the SIM and TPF missions?
A6. The ExoPlanet Task Force is a subcommittee of the AAAC. The charge
letter is attached separately, along with the request letter from the
AAAC. These can also be found on the AAAC website (see: http://
www.nsf.gov/mps/ast/exoptf.jsp), along with the list of members. The
AAAC requested that the agencies consider setting up a task force to
assess how to move forward in a coordinated way (ground and space) on
extra-solar planet detection and characterization. The core statement
of that letter was:
``Over the last year there have been discussions at several
AAAC meetings about establishing an ExoPlanet Task Force
(ExoPTF) to assess approaches and options for extra-solar
planet detection and characterization, using both space and
ground-based facilities. Planet searches are technically
challenging and projects that will enable major advances have
long development lead-times and will be costly. Planned space
missions and major ground-based instruments will provide near-
to-intermediate term results, but the way forward on a
synergistic, cost-effective approach involving both space and
ground-based facilities remains unclear. In the 2006 AAAC
Annual Report the AAAC recommended the formation of such a task
force later this year so that its report would be available
late in 2007 or early in 2008, providing guidance both to the
agencies and the upcoming Astronomy Decadal Survey.''
What is the charge for this task force? The charge letter consists
of three pages of background, a broad statement of the charge, and ten
explicit questions to be addressed by the committee. The broad
statement of the charge from the attached charge letter is:
``The ExoPTF is asked to recommend a 15-year strategy to
detect and characterize exo-planets and planetary systems, and
their formation and evolution, including specifically the
identification of nearby candidate Earth-like planets and study
of their habitability. The strategy may include planning and
preparation for facilities and missions beyond the 15-year
horizon. Since future funding levels are uncertain, and project
costs are difficult to establish at an early stage, it is
important to develop an efficient and adaptable plan. To the
extent possible, the recommendations should accommodate a range
of funding levels representing conservative and aggressive
programs. The ExoPTF will work in cooperation with agency
efforts to advance the justification, specification and
optimization of planet finding and characterizing
opportunities.''
Will it provide advice on the future direction for the SIM and TPF
missions? The ExoPTF will certainly be thinking about SIM and TPF and
their role in the overall suite of missions, telescopes, instruments
and projects that will be part of the framework for the next decade or
so of extra-solar planetary research. The committee is being asked to
provide guidance on the type of capabilities and sequencing of
capabilities that are needed to undertake a vibrant program of extra-
solar planetary studies. They are being asked to not consider specific
missions, but the expectation is that they will provide guidance and
recommendations which will bear strongly on the role that SIM and TPF-
like missions will play in the coming 1-2 decades.
Q7. Please provide your recommendations for what the highest priority
uses of any additional resources should be if they become available for
science at NASA in the FY08 appropriations process?
A7. At the highest level I think it is important to enhance the science
budget for NASA. The NASA science program has been incredibly effective
in its exploration of new frontiers and in its coupling to the American
public through a very effective outreach program. The strength of the
response to the Hubble cancellation was a testament to the
effectiveness of the science program in coupling with the public's
imagination. Thus I feel that NASA and SMD should get at least the
funding level in the FY08 budget request. Furthermore, I would hope, as
enunciated above, that NASA SMD is seen in the same light as NSF, DOE
science and NIST and gets ACI-like increases which set it on a track
for substantial recovery and increases in the FY08 appropriation
(through the Congressional Innovation effort, for example) that are
above the FY08 request. Increases in the SMD budget at the 7 percent
level, like the ACI increases at the other agencies, would do much to
restore the vitality of the science program. These funds would provide
a much more robust future for the science program by increasing the
mission flight rate in the next decade, and would generate greater
science return and output from the current and near-future missions.
I believe that the details of how these funds would best be used
would be through discussion by SMD with its advisory committees. In the
spirit of the question however, I personally think that additional
resources would be most effectively used for (i) recovery and increases
in peer-reviewed and competed R&A funding, (ii) a variety of peer-
reviewed and competed technology development programs (particularly
those that encourage the science community to invest effort on
technologies with their students and young researchers--I would be less
supportive at this stage of those funds going largely to the NASA
Centers and/or contractors for technology development), and (iii) more
cost-capped missions of the Explorer, Discovery or Astrophysics Probes
scale. I think that relatively modest investments in these areas would
return a great deal of scientific results, begin development of new
concepts, and provide opportunities for a wider range of science
missions on relatively short timescales.
Q8. In your testimony, you highlighted the importance of obtaining
both more realistic cost estimates of missions, including the use of
life cycle costs. You gave some examples, but it would be useful for
the Subcommittee to have a tabulated summary of life cycle mission
costs for past and present astrophysics missions on a uniform basis (as
much as is practical) in current dollars including full-cost accounting
estimates, with any assumptions given as well. Please provide that
information to the Subcommittee, working with NASA to ensure that the
cost numbers are developed consistently.
A8. The importance of having life cycle costs for missions has been
dramatically demonstrated over the last few years. The use of
``construction costs'' in community discussions has contributed to
``under-costing.'' For many programs the bulk of the costs are not in
construction (Phase C/D) but actually in Phase B and earlier
activities, and in operations. An extreme example is SOFIA which stands
at $3.4B life cycle (in actual year dollars), but whose Phase C/D
costs, while hard to define because of the poor management oversight
and structure for this program, is probably around $0.6B. Even for
major missions such as JWST and SIM, the Phase C/D costs are about 30-
40 percent of the total. For planning it is essential to develop
reliable cost estimates and to use life cycle costs (over the lifetime
of the mission) in the discussions between NASA and the community. This
will ensure that program planning within the astrophysics Decadal
Survey, and subsequent agency roadmaps, can be carried out within
likely budgets.
The Table below summarizes life cycle mission costs (LCC) in
constant 2007 dollars, with a summary of the caveats/comments
appropriate for the derivation of these numbers. These numbers are from
the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD). Since these numbers were
derived by NASA, I would hope they become the baseline numbers for
subsequent discussions of mission costs. Obviously taking costs from
past missions done under very different accounting structures and
converting them to present day structures will be uncertain, but they
provide a very useful guideline for planning purposes and for setting
the scale for missions under discussion. They are estimated as likely
to be accurate to better than 10 percent, probably about 5 percent. I
would like to express my deep appreciation to the NASA SMD leadership
for providing these numbers and notes for the response to this
question.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Q1. What metric should NASA use to establish an appropriate level of
technology development investment across the programs? Should it be a
percentage of the overall program funding, or should it be a fixed
amount?
A1. What metric should NASA use to establish an appropriate level of
technology development investment across the programs? The level of
technology development funding required for a given project will depend
on a number of factors. My feeling is that there are three primary
factors: (i) the maturity of the technology, (ii) the maturity of the
project, and (iii) the scale of the project. There will be a wide
dispersion in the needed funding for technology, but all science
projects are demanding of technology and require early technology
development to minimize risk and minimize overall cost. During the
early phases of a project the cost of developing and retiring
technologies can be rather small, though there are disadvantages to
working some technologies too far ahead of the mission (they could
become outdated). For Discovery and Explorer-class missions, even
funding levels around $1M/yr at the pre-proposal and Phase A stage can
make a significant difference in the maturity of the technologies and
the likelihood that the mission can be selected and implemented
effectively. This is not the case with larger missions. Even during
their early phases they may require budgets more like $10M/yr to make
significant progress, in part because a number of key technologies must
be developed and demonstrated. The AAAC in its deliberations and
discussions with NASA personnel came to see at least $10M/yr as a
figure that was needed for missions like Con-X, LISA, and TPF to
develop to the point where useful assessments could be made of their
likely cost and readiness for moving ahead for further development.
The funding required when missions transition to Phase B can be
significantly higher. Substantial funding was needed for AXAF (Chandra)
to develop the mirror technology to the point where the project could
convince review boards that the project was ready to move forward. The
approach currently being taken by JWST is one that was chosen after it
was realized that much of the cost growth in the HST program came
because required technologies were being developed during construction
(Phase C/D). This can lead to large cost overruns when the marching
army pauses because of a problem in a key system. While JWST has had
its problems, we should not lose site of the very rational approach
that was developed with this mission based on the experience with HST
(and others such as AXAF)--that is, all technologies should be at TRL-6
before JWST transitions to Phase C/D. The goal is have this project
proceed rapidly through construction (Phase C/D) in 5 years, with
minimal risk of delays from unresolved technology issues.
My view is that the approach should be (i) early, careful
assessment of the key technologies, with emphasis on identifying all of
them well in advance, (ii) plans to develop them to TRL-6 before Phase
C/D, and (iii) assessment of the timing such that they reach maturity
at the needed time (before the end of Phase B). In parallel with these
developments, the value and power of integrated modeling has been
recognized in many industries as providing a (relatively) low cost
cross-check on the performance of the final product. Modeling is no
substitute yet for extensive subsystem and system level testing, but it
provides an extremely powerful cross-check. Integrated models should
also be developed early and refined as the system develops.
Should it be a percentage of the overall program funding, or should
it be a fixed amount? I think that experience has shown that a
fractional amount is more appropriate, though the percentage is hard to
establish. As a ballpark I might suggest one percent per year of the
expected total program cost in the very early phases, rising to a total
expenditure of tens of percent during Phase B, so as to adequately
retire risk before construction commences. I would suggest eliciting
further input on this topic from others with extensive project
experience.
Q2. What mission assurance and management requirements imposed by NASA
do you believe are counter-productive or impose costs that are
disproportionate to the size of the mission, or that offer little added
value?
A2. I recognize and agree with the goal of minimizing mission costs.
Clearly, we can do more missions within the available budget if we can
lessen the cost of missions. However, in thinking about this I came to
the conclusion that much of the oversight within the current mission
assurance and management structure is necessary. The missions that we
do, even the smaller cost-capped missions, are generally very complex
and technologically challenging. The larger missions stretch our
collective abilities to manage them. The teams that work these missions
consist of project managers, engineers, scientists and support
personnel, from the contractors, the NASA centers and the academic and
scientific community. They deal with very complex issues, with tight
deadlines and with tight budget constraints. The teams hold evaluations
and progress assessment meetings on timescales of weeks and months.
These meetings deal with detailed project issues and problems as they
arise--which tends to be frequently. Fewer meetings might help progress
at times, but having fewer will also allow some problems to persist
longer than they should and require greater efforts and costs for
recovery actions.
While these rather routine meetings are part of the process, there
is another aspect that is crucial for our most challenging missions
(and possibly even for our less challenging missions, as I will note
below). My view is that it is crucial to have independent, external
oversight boards and teams. These boards should consist of a small
number of people who have a great deal of project experience, who are
independent of the project and report to NASA HQ above the project and
program level. They should meet often enough that they are conversant
with the project, but not so often that their independence is lost.
From watching the JWST project over the last few years it is my
understanding that such groups are now in place and that they appear to
be fulfilling a very important role.
By putting such groups in place at an earlier time in major
projects I would hope that some of the problems with missions like JWST
in its earlier days could be averted. We have now done many large
science missions and it would be useful to have a ``lessons-learned''
assessment at some point before we embark on others. And it is not just
the most challenging missions like JWST that develop problems. As an
example of when projects go awry, SOFIA should be an excellent case
study. It is dramatically behind schedule and over budget, yet it is
not one of NASA's most challenging missions. In fact, it is probably at
the less demanding end of the range technically. Yet when it finally
reaches science operations it will be approaching a decade behind
schedule (aircraft completion and science operations were quoted in
1999 as being on track for startup in 2001!). I think it is an example
of poor management and inadequate oversight, and would hope that
lessons are learned also from this program to lessen the chance of a
repeat occurrence.
Q3. How should NASA and the space science disciplines best develop
estimated mission costs, at a reasonable level of confidence, during
the next round of decadal surveys? Who should perform these estimates?
What level of confidence do you believe is appropriate?
A3. There is no doubt that better cost estimates are clearly needed for
the upcoming Decadal Survey. The recognition that this was a serious
problem for the last Survey has led already to extensive discussion of
how to improve the cost estimates. It is clear also that this is a work
in progress. The BEPAC study (the Beyond Einstein Program Assessment
Committee) is assessing mission costs in its current evaluation of what
should be the first Beyond Einstein mission to be carried out early in
the next decade. Deriving accurate costs is a challenge at an early
stage of mission development, but it is clear that we do need to do
better. Even with the clear recognition on the Astrophysics side that
mission costs need to be much more reliably assessed and used in the
development of a the Decadal program, the recent Earth Sciences Decadal
Survey did a rather poor job of costing the programs it discussed and
recommended. They appear to be systematically underestimated.
How should NASA and the space science disciplines best develop
estimated mission costs, at a reasonable level of confidence, during
the next round of decadal surveys? There are two steps that need to be
taken. The first is to clearly agree that life cycle costs will be
used; the second (below) is to obtain ``accurate'' costs. The overall
or life cycle costs should be at least the costs over a 10-15 year
period appropriate for the recommendations from a Decadal Survey group.
The examples of SIM and SOFIA, both of which were moderate-size $250M
missions in the 1990 Survey, but which grew to be $3B programs life
cycle, provide a sobering lesson. In detail, SIM was $250M in the 1990
Survey (as AIM, the Astrometric Interferometry Mission), or $420M
inflated to 2007 dollars, and was costed last year in actual year
dollars at $3.4B if launched in 2015-16, or $2.7B if launched in 2011
($2.6B in constant 2007 dollars for 2015/16 launch--see Table above).
SOFIA was listed as a $230M program in the 1990 survey, or $386M
inflated to 2007 dollars, and is now, in the FY08 budget request, $3.4B
life cycle in actual year dollars ($2.7B in constant 2007 dollars).
JWST and Chandra provide other examples where our initial costs
were significant underestimates of what the mission ultimately cost.
JWST went from $1B as quoted in the 2000 Survey, or $1.2B in 2007
dollars, to $4.4B life cycle, while Chandra went from $500M in the 1980
Survey, or $1.4B in 2007 dollars, to $4.0B life cycle in 2007 dollars
with full-cost accounting. One should note that the costs quoted from
the Decadal Surveys were not usually life cycle costs (they were
probably closer to construction costs). However, they are so different
from the reality of the actual or expected life cycle mission costs
that the lesson that we must learn from these comparisons is that we
must deal directly and thoroughly with the cost issue and bring the
cost estimates closer to reality.
What level of confidence do you believe is appropriate? The second
important element, to make the life cycle costs accurate, is that the
costs for each of the phases of missions should be derived with minimal
systematic underestimation. This is much more important than having
costs given to many significant figures. It is worthwhile to add a note
of caution against undertaking very elaborate cost studies and
expecting too much from them. We are undertaking technically-
challenging projects using cutting-edge technology. Getting costs to
two significant figures with small uncertainty at an early stage is a
practical impossibility. But if we can get costs to one significant
figure with a fair degree of confidence that they are not
systematically underestimated, we will be markedly better positioned
for reliable planning than in previous surveys. Knowing during the
Decadal Survey that a program of the scale of JWST is $4B instead of
$2B or $3B would be a major achievement, especially if that cost
included a significant contingency. Reliably identifying whether space
missions are at <$0.5B, $1B, $1.5B, $2B, $3B would be sufficient
granularity, in my view, if the costs were devoid of significant
systematic uncertainties.
Who should perform these estimates? A key issue will be to balance
the level of cost reliability with what can realistically be done
before and during the Decadal Survey process. A realistic goal might be
to (i) establish common ground rules (e.g., any cost estimates would
most usefully include both full life cycle costs and costs within the
coming decade), (ii) provide independent cost estimates (not just cost
estimates from the project proponents), (iii) aim to provide costs that
are less systematically underestimated, (iv) aim for accuracy and not
precision, and (v) include experts in project management and cost
assessment in the deliberations. In particular it might be useful to
have a panel that is used as a resource by other panels to evaluate
costs, and to include at least one person with good project oversight/
management experience on each panel to help frame the right questions
for the ``cost expert'' panel. NASA cost estimation emphasizes life
cycle costs and thus can provide feedback from considerable in-house
experience (e.g., see NASA Cost Estimating Handbook CEH--at http://
www.nasa.gov/offices/pae/organization/
cost-analysis- division.html). The Program
Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E) office has provided a more focused role
for these issues under the new Administrator (http://www.nasa.gov/
offices/pae/home/index.html), and provides a web-enabled version of the
2004 NASA CEH or a downloadable pdf version at the above URL for the
cost analysis division. Furthermore, if funding allows, it would be
very useful to use independent organizations, such as Langley Research
Center and Aerospace Systems Design Lab, to provide some separate
estimates, even if they were ``rough,'' early-stage estimates.
Appendix:
Re ExoPTF and Question 6: The following letters relate to Question 6
regarding the ExoPlanet Task Force. They are the original request
letter from the AAAC to NSF and NASA regarding the ExoPTF, and the
Charge letter that the agencies developed in their request to the AAAC
to form such a subcommittee.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Daniel N. Baker, Director, Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. NASA has imposed cost ``caps'' on a number of its small- and
medium-sized mission programs, such as Discovery. With the advent of
full-cost accounting, are those cost caps still realistic or should
they be adjusted? Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool?
A1. Capping costs on projects provides one part of the framework for
the principal investigator and project manager to actively manage the
project. This is healthy for a program. Projects could always use more
funding (if available) and so balancing costs with scientific return is
part of the management challenge. One of the significant factors in the
overall cost of missions is the launch vehicle cost, and factoring this
cost in should be one of the key considerations in setting the mission
cap.
The effect of the full-cost accounting on the mission cost cap is
somewhat dependent on the mission. The new full-cost accounting rules
only apply for the NASA centers. Other subcontracts for NASA, such as
to LASP for satellite instruments, have been implementing full-cost
accounting since the 1990s. Consequently, PI-mode missions where NASA
centers primarily provide oversight have seen minor adjustments when
NASA centers converted to full-cost accounting. However, missions at
NASA centers have seen significant growth in costs. Some growth has
just been in where the cost is book kept, but also some real cost
growth that would require a higher cost cap. I believe that NASA
centers are able to provide more detailed information on the specific
cost growths that have resulted.
I believe that full cost accounting has not been helpful to cost-
capped projects. Full cost accounting forces everyone in NASA centers
to actively charge to a program code. While this might sound like a
responsible and sensible approach to managing cost, it is one of the
principal reasons for requirements creep in flight missions, making
management-to-cost extremely challenging. Although planned as an
accounting change that would be revenue-neutral, full cost accounting
has, in fact, resulted in a monetary tax on each program that was not
previously there. The Agency is struggling with this change, as the
culture of NASA has in the past been collaborative and collegial in
nature. NASA was never a corporation, and full cost accounting is a
poor prescription for improving the Agency's performance. Two impacts
are unfortunate: First, individuals within the NASA structure who had
not been actively charging to programs are now actively seeking out
projects to charge to--whether or not they can actively contribute.
This effectively creates a tax on projects. In additional to direct
costs rising, cost-capped programs are being forced to absorb more
staff who, in turn, need to somehow demonstrate their meaningful
participation. Reviews are longer and more numerous, there are more
action items--many of which are unnecessary, yet need to be addressed--
and consequently more inefficiency as a result of larger teams. Setting
the idea of a cost capped mission aside, it is the view of myself and
my colleagues at LASP that NASA's ability to team and collaborate in a
collegial way has been hurt by the move to full cost accounting.
Q2. The National Academies report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm,
recommends ``emphasis on physical sciences, engineering, mathematics
and information sciences,'' as well as high-risk research, grants to
early career researchers, and funding for advanced research
instrumentation and facilities, among other actions, that can help
foster innovation and sustain a strong economy. How relevant are NASA's
space science research programs to those recommendations? Can you offer
any specific examples? NASA's science program was not included in the
President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). Would you
advocate NASA's science programs be made part of the ACI in future
budgets? If not, why not?
A2. NASA should be included in the American Competitiveness Initiative
(ACI) as NASA's satellite programs are science-based missions that
require advanced instrumentation, require highly technical developments
in many different engineering areas, develop sophisticated data
processing and distribution systems, and offer education and hands-on
training for students and early career researchers. LASP's experience
with NASA's PI-mode missions (SORCE and AIM most recently) clearly
support many ACI objectives, and this really can be said for most NASA
missions. It has often been noted that NASA technology development
can--and does--play a big role in U.S. economic competitiveness.
NASA is becoming more aware of the need to support the
recommendations of ``Gathering Storm,'' at least as they pertain to
supporting education infrastructure and young scientists. NASA has not
fully articulated how the Agency would support ACI, but it is clear
that the shift in EPO (Education and Public Outreach) from K-12 and
informal education now to the inclusion of undergraduate and, in some
cases, graduate education is a response to this. There seems to be a
growing understanding at NASA that universities need to be playing a
primary role in this much-improved EPO effort.
It is unclear why NASA was not invited to join the DOE and the NSF
as partners in the ACI. With the emphasis in the ACI of connecting
industry, education and government in supporting and sustaining
innovation in science and engineering, surely NASA has a track record
that merits its participation. I think it particularly crucial that
NASA be included in the ACI at a time when the Agency is actively
engaged in looking at workforce issues.\1\ Targeted NASA ACI resources
that support workforce training, particularly in the engagement of
universities and sub-orbital programs, would be ideal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See National Research Council, 2007. Building a Better NASA
Workforce: Meeting the Workforce Needs for the National Vision for
Space Exploration, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.
Q3. A recently released study of the National Academy of Sciences on
Building a Better NASA Workforce recommended that: ``. . .NASA increase
its investment in proven programs such as sounding rocket launches,
aircraft-based research, and high-altitude balloon campaigns, which
provide ample opportunities for hands-on flight development experience
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
at a relatively low cost of failure.''
a. Could you please explain in concrete terms how the sub-
orbital programs are used to train students and young workers?
b. What do these sub-orbital programs typically cost and do
they produce peer-reviewed research?
A3. Sub-orbital programs have always had three key elements that
differentiate the work from a larger space program: 1) Sub-orbital
programs are typically hands-on projects, providing participants with a
broad experience that is not possible to get on a larger project. 2)
Sub-orbital projects tend to be of shorter duration, allowing
participants to see the project from start to finish. It is almost
always the case that everyone on a sub-orbital team gets experience in
all phases of the effort; and 3) Results are usually immediate. This
``instant feedback'' goes hand-in-hand with trial-and-error learning
that cannot be experienced in larger, more risk-adverse space programs.
Sub-orbital programs have been the training ground for engineers and
scientists, and keeping these projects supported will add to the
vitality of the space program.
Sub-orbital Student Training
A typical sub-orbital program at LASP includes support primarily
for an experienced instrument scientist, an experienced system
engineer, a graduate student, and a couple of undergraduate students.
The students, with the help of close mentoring from the professional
staff, are responsible for most of the work. They are also heavily
involved with the project from cradle-to-grave, as the same students
design instruments, fabricate and assemble the instruments, calibrate
and test the instruments, integrate and then launch the rocket payload
at a NASA facility, and finally analyze and model the rocket data. All
of this work is over a 2-3 year period, which is commensurate with a
student's timetable for completing college. In contrast, a typical
satellite program at LASP has a duration of about 10 years, and student
involvement on such programs is necessarily more limited. Typically,
the student will support the professional staff and he/she will not be
responsible for major project development milestones.
Sub-orbital Costs
A typical sub-orbital program at LASP costs about $300K per year
and has a duration of three years (two years to develop the payload and
launch, with data analysis in third year). Because the payload is
recovered, it can be flown multiple times, usually with enhancements
developed by successive students. The LASP cost for a re-flight is
about $150K. In addition to the science payload cost, NASA's cost for
its rocket subsystems, launch vehicles, and launch range is about $2M
per launch.
Peer-Reviewed Research
The NASA sub-orbital program research is peer-reviewed, initially
through the research proposals that are submitted to NASA and peer-
reviewed by a NASA proposal panel, and later through peer-reviewed
research papers as a result of the analysis of the rocket measurements.
The LASP graduate students involved in the sub-orbital program are
expected to write first-authored research papers, and the results from
the rocket flights often lead to a Ph.D. dissertation for the graduate
students.
Q4. NASA's Research & Analysis (R&A) programs are mentioned as being
critical for developing new mission concepts and advanced technology.
What impacts will the cutbacks in R&A have on the opportunities for
future missions and programs? If R&A remains at current levels, what
are we likely to see, or not see, in the next five years?
A4. Much of the technologies for satellite programs depend on research
development prior to program initiation. Therefore, the NASA Research &
Analysis (R&A) funds are critical to develop new instrument concepts,
detector technology, and satellite subsystems, and then select the
best, most-proven technology for the satellite flights. The sub-orbital
rocket program is a excellent example where technology is developed
quickly to address specific science objectives. These results are then
used successfully for more detailed, thorough investigations on
satellite missions that can last for years.
If R&A remains at current levels, LASP expects that its staff
number will shrink (both science and technical staff) because many
employees are still working on multiple-year grants that were
established some years ago when the R&A program was more robust. In
addition, this effective reduction in grant budgets will force LASP to
reduce the number of students involved in the Lab's research projects,
and laboratory and facility maintenance is likely to suffer.
It is likely that reducing of R&A programs will increase the
competitiveness of the environment: Good researchers will potentially
improve, marginal researchers will not be able to make a living in the
business, and new people will find increased difficulty in gaining
access into space research. As some point the idea of a critical mass
of researchers has to enter into policy-makers' thinking. I have great
concern that we are not at a healthy mass now: smaller definitely is
not better.
Q5. What is the current frequency of Explorer and Discovery missions,
and what do you believe should be the frequency of launch
opportunities.if we want to sustain a healthy space science research
program in each of the disciplines?
A5. For Small-class Explorers (SMEX), the recent launch frequency is
one every four years (AIM was launched in 2007 and GALEX was launched
in 2003). The next SMEX, IBEX, is planned for launch in 2008 and then
there is a four-year gap until the next SMEX is launched in 2012.
For Medium-class Explorers (MIDEX), the frequency is one every 2.5
years (SWIFT launched in 2004, THEMIS in 2007, and WISE is planned for
2009). With the current funding profile for Explorer program, there is
expected to be a very large gap until the next MIDEX is launched in
2017!
For Discovery missions, the recent launch frequency is about one
every year (Genesis in 2001, CONTOUR in 2002, MESSENGER in 2004, Deep
Impact in 2005, DAWN planned in 2007, and Kepler planned in 2008).
For Earth System Science Pathfinders (ESSP), the launch frequency
had been about one every two years (GRACE in 2002, CALIPSO in 2006,
CloudSat in 2006, OCO planned in 2008, and Aquarius planned in 2009.
However, the HYDROS mission scheduled for 2011 was not selected for
formulation and there have been no solicitations for new ESSP missions
since the round that selected OCO and Aquarius in 2002.
There are 24 key measurement parameters defined for the NASA Earth
Observing System (EOS). Assuming that a small satellite (e.g., ESSP)
could measure two key parameters and that each mission could last for
six years, then the Earth Science division needs to have two launches
each year.
One of the original goals for these programs is to have a launch
once a year to keep the space science research program healthy, so the
present mission lines are under-funded by about a factor of two to
accomplish this goal. At this present pace of launch opportunities, the
community is badly impacted in numerous ways. The chance of being
selected in any competition--even for highly experienced teams with
capable management skills--is in the neighborhood of 10-20 percent.
Having both infrequent opportunities to propose and small chances of
being selected means that fewer and fewer groups will survive to
propose (or will be able to afford to propose). This could be a
prescription for disaster in the science community. It is crucial to
get the launch rate for smaller missions to a much higher level.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Q1. What metric should NASA use to establish an appropriate level of
technology development investment across the programs? Should it be a
percentage of the overall program funding, or should it be a fixed
amount?
A1. The present NASA science program has very little specific funding
for instrument development or for advanced technology development. Many
small-end missions have been living on ``off-the-shelf''
instruments.\2\ This is unsustainable. It is crucially important that
resources be identified and made available to raise instrument and
spacecraft technologies to a high readiness level in order to avoid
development delays when missions are in full implementation phases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ This point has been made in a number of NRC reports; e.g.,
National Research Council, 1997. Scientific Assessment of NASA's SMEX-
MIDEX Space Physics Mission Selections, National Academies Press,
Washington, D.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A percentage of program total cost could be a useful guideline for
gauging technology development. Some missions will require higher
technology development than others, and also trades between risk and
cutting-edge science is highly dependent on the mission objectives. So
like most guidelines, the technology development metric should not be a
rigid requirement.
Q2. What mission assurance and management requirements imposed by NASA
do you believe are counter-productive or impose costs that are
disproportionate to the size of the mission, or that offer little added
value?
A2. There once was a management belief at NASA that the comparatively
lower-cost and more frequent small satellite programs should require
lower quality parts, fewer documents and processes, and fewer reviews
than those for large satellite programs. The current NASA management
approach is largely driven by risk aversion. Consequently, requirements
for small satellite programs have evolved to have the same high level
of mission assurance and management as that of the large satellite
programs. However, the allocated resources for small missions have
remained relatively low over the past decade. Thus, new small missions
are forced to have much reduced science goals in order to afford the
higher cost mission assurance expectations. The space science community
generally supports having more small satellite missions that have more
science per dollar that can be accomplished by having less management
oversight and accepting higher risks.
The recent AIM spacecraft launched by NASA (and managed by LASP)
had 54 additional reviews during the course of its development compared
to what was budgeted for the program originally. This horrendous
additional load on engineers, scientists, and managers for the program
was nearly unsustainable. Such a huge review load detracted from real
design and development work, distracted engineers and managers from
their real jobs, and for the most part did not add substantial value.
Such out-of-control risk aversion must be reigned in or else NASA will
not be able to afford any meaningful science flight program.
Q3. How should NASA and the space science disciplines best develop
estimated mission costs, at a reasonable level of confidence, during
the next round of decadal surveys? Who should perform these estimates?
What level of confidence do you believe is appropriate?
A3. NASA has primarily used scientists for defining the mission
concepts for its decadal surveys. While scientists are required to
specify the science objectives critical for strategic planning, most
scientists are not well trained in costing all components and phases of
satellite missions. Future mission cost estimates could be improved by
having at least two panels, one of primarily scientists for science
planning and one of primarily satellite engineers for mission
definition, with significant overlap between the panel members.
When developing the first concepts for a mission, a 50 percent
margin (reserve) is usually added for resources like mass, power, and
data rate, and a similar 50 percent margin should also be added to the
first cost estimates. NASA missions have sometimes been defined with
these early mission concepts and then later forced to reduce scope or
have been canceled because of exceeding the expected cost cap. Starting
with realistic cost estimate and with generous margin can mitigate this
type of mission development disaster. Recently, the National Research
Council published a report of a workshop on decadal surveys that
addresses the issues above in greater detail.\3\
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\3\ National Research Council, 2007. Decadal Science Strategy
Surveys: Report of a Workshop, (2007), National Academies Press,
Washington, D.C.
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Joseph A. Burns, Irving P. Church Professor of Engineering
and Astronomy; Vice Provost, Physical Sciences and Engineering,
Cornell University
Please recognize that my answers, unless noted otherwise, represent
the perspective of someone who has participated primarily in the
exploration of the solar system. My knowledge of other disciplines of
space science is through reading and listening at committee and
department meetings, not through practice.
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. NASA has imposed cost ``caps'' on number of its small- and medium-
sized mission programs, such as Discovery. With the advent of full-cost
accounting, are those cost caps still realistic or should they be
adjusted? Have the cost caps proven to be an effective tool?
A1. As an academic never involved in NASA's business models and
bookkeeping procedures, I do not know how full-cost accounting has
influenced the agency's actual out-of-pocket expenses, nor its use of
federal employees vs. contractors. Thus I cannot address whether the
cost caps should be adjusted specifically to accommodate the agency's
newly instated method of accounting.
I can note, however, that any effectiveness of the cost caps in
limiting expenses today has been compromised by problems both inside
and outside the agency's control. First, excessive program reviews
carried out within NASA Headquarters (as well as those done at its
request) have added expense and time to the development of missions
[see the response to Representative Calvert's #2 below]. Furthermore,
the poor estimation of costs when missions are proposed followed then
by a lack of discipline as missions are developed has also made it
difficult for the agency to carry through on the caps. These failings
by proposing teams mean that NASA is then confronted by an unpleasant
choice, often late in the game: either lose the funds already spent or
fly a mission that accomplishes little more than previous flights.
Delays associated with insufficient funds lead to a stutter-step
development, further increasing costs. Finally, cost caps over the last
few years have had to confront major cost breakers outside the agency's
control, namely a substantial inflation in the cost of launches plus
the added expenses associated with ITAR requirements.
An important subtext to this topic is specifically what cost caps
should particular mission classes have and can effective missions be
developed within contemporary cost caps, currently $425 M (FY06) for
Discovery and $750 M in FY07$ for New Frontiers, according to the SSE
2006 Roadmap. A simple test exists: are the current missions in these
classes providing good value. Most observers would answer, `Yes!' but
with some strain in their voices concerning the future, as missions
necessarily become more ambitious payloads increase in sophistication,
technology costs grow at above the inflation rate, and launch vehicles
are less available but more costly.
Q2. The National Academies report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm,
recommends ``emphasis on physical sciences, engineering, mathematics
and information sciences,'' as well as high-risk research, grants to
early career researchers, and funding for advanced research
instrumentation and facilities, among other actions, that can help
foster innovation and sustain a strong economy. How relevant are NASA's
space science research programs to those recommendations? Can you offer
any specific examples? NASA's science program was not included in the
President's American Competitiveness Initiative (ACI). Would you
advocate NASA's science programs be made part of the ACI in future
budgets? If not, why not?
A2. The influential NAS report Rising Above the Gathering Storm
convincingly documents and argues that America must bolster its
competitiveness by strategically strengthening those disciplines that
most contribute to our global business position. I firmly believe the
same point: the physical sciences and engineering are crucial if the
United States is to remain internationally competitive. It is primarily
our technological prowess that sets the U.S. apart from its economic
competitors.
NASA's Space Science Research Program covers many economically
important fields through its support for fundamental research in
physics, chemistry and biology. These sciences contribute directly to
placing our nation in the world's forefront technologically, thus
stimulating the economy. This connection is perhaps a little less
apparent for the earth sciences, space physics and astronomical
sciences. Nonetheless research in such scientific subjects benefits the
mining and oil industries, the energy sector, telecommunications
companies and those investigating plasma fusion. NASA's space science
missions and their instrument payloads have obvious applications of
considerable interest to a number of commercial and defense spacecraft
builders. To mention just a few engineering examples relevant to these
latter industries, NASA's Space Science Research Program supports
instrument design, remote-sensing devices across a broad spectrum, the
miniaturization of advanced detectors and image-processing algorithms.
In addition, the space program plays an important role in our
country's science education at all levels. Images of Earth's planetary
siblings and the wider universe appeal broadly to the public,
especially young people. Such materials help to attract K-12 students
to the STEM disciplines. At the other end of the educational chain,
graduate students drawn to, and trained in, the space sciences often
move into the commercial and defense sectors upon graduation.
Thus I feel that many of Gathering's recommendations apply equally
to NASA research as to NSF, DOE and DOD research. Accordingly I urge
Congress to include NASA's Space Science Program in the President's
American Competitiveness Initiative. Its exclusion was an oversight.
Q3. A recently released study of the National Academy of Sciences on
Building a Better NASA Workforce recommended that: ``NASA increase its
investment in proven programs such as sounding rocket launches,
aircraft-based research, and high-altitude balloon campaigns, which
provide ample opportunities for hands-on flight development experience
at a relatively low cost of failure.''
a. Could you please explain in concrete terms how the sub-
orbital programs are used to train students and young workers?
b. What do these sub-orbital programs typically cost and do
they produce peer-reviewed research?
A3. Low-altitude terrestrial flights employing rockets, aircraft and
balloons are generally not effective schemes for pursuing planetary
research: missions can achieve much better resolution and coverage with
close planetary encounters. Hence these Earth-bound platforms are no
longer actively employed by planetary scientists. However, I understand
that the sub-orbital program benefits other space-science disciplines
in NASA. This program provides effective training for students because
its missions flown are usually small-scale and, of course, nearby.
Hence students can complete an end-to-end project (wherein they select
a topic and target, build appropriate instrumentation, launch and
collect data, and finally analyze results) for their doctoral
dissertations rather than being assigned to a single aspect of research
(e.g., data analysis) within a large team. For students in planetary
exploration, some of the benefits of rocket and balloon research (e.g.,
hands-on) may be gained by building instruments for Discovery missions.
My answer to this question highlights that the various disciplines
of space sciences may have substantial differences in research
techniques and funding. One of the questions that was asked during our
May 2 hearing dealt with data analysis funds for various missions and
the answer given by an astronomer on the panel (who probably was
considering the success of the investigator support for astrophysics'
``Great Observatories'' (e.g., Hubble, Chandra and Spitzer) was that
all was well. Time prevented me from mentioning that this is not true
for the information returned by recent planetary missions, whose data
analysis has been sorely under-funded. As a personal example, I
received no funds as an associate of the Galileo mission to Jupiter
beyond travel support even though I planned all the image sequences of
Jupiter's rings and published the primary papers interpreting those
results. After this several-billion-dollar mission ended, the total
funds for the analysis of its returned data was a few million dollars.
As another local illustration, I am a current member of the imaging
team on the Cassini mission (the latest solar-system-exploration
flagship) in orbit about Saturn since 2004, for which my support is
primarily for planning and archiving data, not for modeling or
interpretation. My group's analysis of the data is covered by six weeks
of summer salary. We've been fairly effective only because Cornell has
been partly supporting my research. As in the case of Galileo, the
Cassini data analysis program for last year and again this year only
receives about $2-3 M. Effectively the U.S. is annually spending about
0.1 percent of the total planetary mission cost for the analysis of the
data that is the advertised reason for the mission. This seems very low
to me.
The less than optimal funding for doing science on missions extends
to the Discovery line.
Q4. NASA's Research & Analysis (R&A) programs are mentioned as being
critical for developing new mission concepts and advanced technology.
What impacts will the cutbacks in R&A have on the opportunities for
future missions and programs? If R&A remains at current levels, what
are we likely to see, or not see, in the next five years?
A4. The researchers supported by R&A funds accomplish more than simply
publish papers that interpret the data returned by missions. They
deepen our understanding of our solar-system surroundings, thereby
introducing new paradigms for how the planets work and how the solar
system originated. As a result of these findings, the program as a
whole evolves: new mission concepts and perhaps new targets are chosen
in order to address the latest ``big questions.''
A large fraction of the R&A monies that are awarded to university
staff are used to hire graduate students. So these funds also produce
the next generation of space explorers, the individuals who will be
designing, building and operating future missions and programs. In
addition, R&A dollars are used to develop improved instruments to
permit more sensitive and broader observations.
Because of the crucial role that R&A programs play in shaping the
future missions, as laid out in the paragraphs above, the answer to the
last question is straightforward. If NASA's planetary R&A budget
continues at its present level, which is 25 percent below FY05 support
and even further beneath that recommended by the 2003 decadal report,
the program will be addressing last year's questions with an older,
less numerous work force using outdated equipment.
Q5. What is the current frequency of Explorer and Discovery missions,
and what do you believe should be the frequency of launch opportunities
if we want to sustain a healthy space science research program in each
of the disciplines?
A5. The Discovery program was initiated to provide a continuing stream
of low-cost, focused, innovative missions, chosen competitively, that
would complement the much-less-frequent but much more competent and
broader flagship missions that are usually designed conservatively. The
Scout program serves the same function within the Mars program. The
Discovery line is now fifteen years old, during which time seven
missions have been launched, eight if the Dawn spacecraft flies this
summer as planned. That's one flight every 22 months, whereas the
original plan was to launch one every 18 months. That is a good record.
However, the selection rate has slowed dramatically: after choosing a
pair in each of alternate years (FY 95, FY97,. . .) no selections have
been made since FY01, although two (responding to last year's AO) may
be yet chosen in FY07. There is a reasonable concern that this slow
rate will continue due to potential future budget reductions with the
higher cost cap and increased launch costs with the end of the Delta 2
line.
The New Frontiers line for medium-scale missions was endorsed by
the 2003 decadal panel and then placed in the NASA budget. This line
was jump-started with the already-in-process New Horizons (based on an
FY01 AO). The rate of New Frontiers too may have slowed; Juno was
chosen from an FY05 solicitation and the next AO is yet to be released.
This slower pace for both Discovery and New Frontiers should be placed
against the backdrop of the indefinite deferral of both flagship
missions (Europa Geophysical Orbiter and Mars Sample Return)
recommended by the decadal panel. These delays likely result from the
draining of $4B from the science program, the vast majority coming from
solar system exploration. Analysts suggest that a minimum of $200 M
more annually would be needed in the Planetary Sciences Division in
order to meet the decadal survey's strategic goals.
Discovery and New Frontiers require frequent launches to fulfill
their roles as recommended by the decadal report. Based on the
historical record, 5-6 Discovery missions per decade should be
sustainable along with 2-3 New Frontiers per decade.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Q1. What metric should NASA use to establish an appropriate level of
technology development investment across the programs? Should it be a
percentage of the overall program funding, or should it be a fixed
amount?
A1. While I can't give you an informed number, technology development
should be a fixed percentage or, better, within a fixed range of
percentages, flexible on an annual basis, of the total mission
development budget. The metric should be developed depending on the
anticipated needs for future missions in the decadal plan.
One will want to have a range within which to operate, so that the
amount is somewhat variable as demand changes. For example,
preparations to return a sample from the Moon are quite different than
if we wish to take a piece of a comet back to Earth. Similarly, it's
much easier, and already has been demonstrated, to drop a long-lived
mobile laboratory onto the plains of Mars, than it will be to parachute
a capable probe through Venus's lethal environment onto its scorching
surface. Any sophisticated in-situ laboratory will demand much advanced
development and the associated funding stream as will many generic.
outer solar system vehicles. Because of this variability in the sorts
of technology development that is required at any particular time, it
is only rational if the level of funding is a percentage of overall
program funding. However, what the correct percentage is for the next
decade is a question that should be studied by the NRC. For a well-
managed, focused program, I would guess that 10 percent is appropriate,
but that's only a guess.
To some degree, however, this query overlooks another important
issue. The fact is that NASA technology development has not generally
been very effective in correctly choosing and then maturing the
technologies necessary for future missions. In some areas, for example
electronics and communications, the record is a ``solid B.'' In others,
for example, sampling devices, it is much less acceptable. What is
required is a prioritized list of critical technology for the highest
priority future missions and then the willingness and financing
necessary to promptly produce these technologies. At present, it's as
much the lack of focus as the lack of funds that has been a problem.
Q2. What mission assurance and management requirements imposed by NASA
do you believe are counter-productive or impose costs that are
disproportionate to the size of the mission, or that offer little added
value?
A2. The mission assurance and management requirements imposed by NASA
are well defined in its mission development directive 7120. Any
additional reviews are superfluous and of no value. NASA HQ should re-
adopt the `trust but verify' attitude it used to take toward its
mission implementers. Currently, NASA HQ's attitude is fearful and
distrustful, imposing costly and even damaging additional reviews with
every flight project hiccup or milestone. Today's world is increasingly
risk-averse. To mitigate this, NASA should insist that decisions are
made at the lowest possible levels, by individuals who are close to the
details and specifics. Money is wasted when inappropriate requirements
are imposed by someone far removed from the actual projects who does
not understand what is appropriate.
Furthermore, the level of management burden imposed should be
commensurate with the funds expended. Since New Frontiers missions cost
two or three times less than Flagship missions, whereas Discovery
missions typically cost one-half New Frontiers missions, the Discovery
should not be expected to go through all the bureaucracy appropriate
for a Cassini-class endeavor. The agency should be willing to accept
more risk for Discovery than for any other mission class. In the
original manifestation of Discovery, a significant fraction of these
missions were expected to be high-risk since in part they demonstrated
new technologies. One might ask whether today's missions in this line
have been aggressive enough since only one has failed, and that was due
to a well-known but occasional flaw in a conventional rocket.
Finally, any group of principal investigators will always, and
probably justifiably, ask that the review processes be streamlined.
Q3. How should NASA and the space science disciplines best develop
estimated mission costs, at a reasonable level of confidence, during
the next round of decadal surveys? Who should perform these estimates?
What level of confidence do you believe is appropriate?
A3. Forecasting estimated mission expenditures has been a perennial
problem in the space sciences and it will never be entirely solved. Not
every difficulty can be foreseen and some expenses lie outside the
NASA's control, such as launch charges as well as the cost of
radioisotope thermal generators and fuel. The prices for the
development and ultimate construction of new technology items are
notoriously hard to predict in all the scientific disciplines.
Nonetheless, the recent scorecard within the agency and in the space
industry has been poor. Forecasts of mission costs could be improved
significantly by spending more in deriving these costs. Enough effort
needs to be devoted to this early in order to develop a cost estimate
that has a reasonable chance to be correct. History indicates that 1-2
percent of the eventual total mission price tag should be invested to
get a reliable preliminary estimates of mission costs. By this metric,
the $1M being spent on each of the current studies for outer planet
missions is low by a factor of ten.
This indicates that much more investment should be made in order to
get reliable cost estimates for the prospective missions in the
beginning stages of any decadal report. Otherwise the estimates lack
credibility, implying that the full report is likely to be unrealistic
advice and hence flawed. Most likely NASA must take this responsibility
on itself to use its implementers plus independent cost estimators to
provide the technical studies and cost estimates. I believe that the
NRC has a study underway about how to properly devise this process. A
probable answer is that two or three independent estimates are needed
from separate autonomous institutions. In order for these estimates to
be meaningful, any mission's concept has to be clearly defined to make
sure that each institution is costing the same mission.