[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROPOSALS TO DOWNSIZE THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND EFFECTS ON
THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL BUILDINGS
=======================================================================
(110-26)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota, Chairman
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon DON YOUNG, Alaska
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
Columbia JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
JERROLD NADLER, New York WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
CORRINE BROWN, Florida VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
BOB FILNER, California STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JUANITA MILLENDER-McDONALD, JERRY MORAN, Kansas
California GARY G. MILLER, California
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South
LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa Carolina
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
RICK LARSEN, Washington SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JULIA CARSON, Indiana JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine Virginia
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York JIM GERLACH, Pennsylvania
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California TED POE, Texas
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
DORIS O. MATSUI, California CONNIE MACK, Florida
NICK LAMPSON, Texas JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio York
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LYNN A WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa CHARLES W. BOUSTANY, Jr.,
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania Louisiana
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
HEATH SHULER, North Carolina CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MICHAEL A. ACURI, New York THELMA D. DRAKE, Virginia
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania VERN BUCHANAN, Florida
JOHN J. HALL, New York
STEVE KAGEN, Wisconsin
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
JERRY McNERNEY, California
(ii)
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia, Chairwoman
MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL A. ARCURI, New York SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania Virginia
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JOHN R. `RANDY' KUHL, Jr., New
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota York
(Ex Officio) JOHN L. MICA, Florida
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vi
Comparison Chart for Current FPS Force and DHS Downsizing Plan,
prepared by T&I Committee Majority Staff....................... xiii
TESTIMONY
Brown, Inspector General Michael J., Federal Protective Service,
Seattle, Washington............................................ 13
Canterbury, Chuck, President, Fraternal Order of Police.......... 50
Jackson, Hon. Michael P., Deputy Secretary, Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 33
Nowak, Corporal Stanley, Federal Protective Service, Kansas City,
Missouri....................................................... 13
Proctor, Jr., Inspector Sterling, Federal Protective Service,
National Capital Region........................................ 13
Ward, Officer Jim, Federal Protective Service, New York City, New
York........................................................... 13
Wright, David, President, American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 918........................................... 50
Wu, Hon. David, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Oregon......................................................... 8
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Altmire, Hon. Jason, of Pennsylvania............................. 57
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 58
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Canterbury, Chuck................................................ 61
Jackson, Michael P............................................... 66
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Wright, David, President, American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 918, Briefing on the Federal Protective
Service: Transition to FY 08 Budget, Prepared for FPS Regional
Directors...................................................... 80
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HEARING ON DOWNSIZING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE AND ITS EFFECT ON
THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL BUILDINGS
----------
Wednesday, April 18, 2007
House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Eleanor
Holmes Norton [chairwoman of the committee] presiding.
Ms. Norton. The Committee is about to begin with an offer
of my gratitude and welcome to all of the witnesses who have
agreed to appear before the Committee this morning.
The Committee and our subcommittee are particularly
interested in the status and condition of the Federal
Protective Service, the police force that protects 2 million
Federal employees and judges, and $500 billion of Federal
office space in the post-9/11 period.
Congress was quick to shore up its own security after 9/11,
bulking up the Capitol Police by approximately 50 percent since
then. The White House was the first to go on a super-vigilant
virtual lock-out mode following the Oklahoma City attack with
the shutdown of Pennsylvania Avenue, putting the White House
nearly out of reach for visitors and terrorists alike.
However, security experts report that when only some
targets get concentrated attention, softer targets become
harder and more vulnerable. Therefore, it is fair to ask what
is being done to afford necessary protection and security for
Federal employees nationwide located in every State and in most
congressional districts, many of whom protect the homeland.
The Federal Protective Service is the Federal police force
on the front lines to protect millions of civil servants,
judges, and visitors to Federal sites.
After the Oklahoma City bombing, I supported the Department
of Justice Building Vulnerability Report and particularly noted
the report's observations regarding the ability of the FPS to
provide, and I am quoting, ``security service for much of the
Federal workforce.''
In 2002, along with several members of this Committee, I
also supported moving the FPS from the General Services
Administration to the newly created Department of Homeland
Security. We had high hopes that the theory of full integration
of the FPS law enforcement expertise into the broader fabric of
national security would come together to enhance overall
security.
However, only recently, as a member of the Homeland
Security Committee, I felt obliged to offer an amendment to the
bill which authorized the Department of Homeland Security. This
amendment would have the effect of a cease and desist order on
activities to downsize the FPS until the GAO issues its report
on the status of FPS and its funding sources. This amendment
was passed without opposition because of distressing concerns
about huge structural changes in the FPS that could lead to new
terrorist and law enforcement vulnerability in Federal
facilities.
As you are aware, the FPS mission continues to be grounded
in force protection, but now includes new security duties at a
time when, ironically, the number of police officers has been
diminishing. In addition to traditional law enforcement duties
plus, of course, answering questions, assisting citizens, and
helping Federal employees, today's FPS officer is the first
line of defense against terrorists and other new criminal risks
and incidents in Federal buildings, providing comprehensive
intelligence gathering through its unparalleled network of
State and local police, providing building vulnerability
assessments, recommending appropriate security threat
countermeasures and responding to bomb threats, vandalism, and
mass demonstrations.
It is of special interest to this Committee and should be
of even greater interest to DHS that FPS has had a close and
effective working relationship with FEMA, another agency under
our Committee's jurisdiction. FPS provides emergency police and
special security services to support FEMA during natural
disasters, as well as during terrorist and criminal actions.
For example, on August 29th, 2005, the day Hurricane Katrina
hit the Gulf Coast, 29 FPS law enforcement personnel deployed
into New Orleans to provide support to FEMA and ensure security
and order in Federal facilities. Within 24 hours, one day after
the major levee breaks, FPS had deployed 113 personnel into the
affected region, and within 72 hours 211 police officers and
support personnel. In addition, three command vehicles were
deployed in strategic locations by the next day which enabled
FPS officers to maintain radio communications over the Gulf
area.
These personnel assets and command vehicles assisted the
establishment of many operations that were of central
importance. Moreover, because of the overwhelming effect
Katrina had in the region and the total breakdown of social
order in New Orleans proper, the mission of FPS expanded in
directing police in the area as well as providing humanitarian
assistance on an individual basis, in many instances personally
handing out food and water.
On another tragically historic day, September 11th, 2001,
FPS officers assigned to the mobile units around the Federal
courthouse in Lower Manhattan, immediately responded to the
initial crash and other FPS officers ran the six blocks to the
World Trade Center to assist in the evacuation efforts. By 6
p.m., officers from Region 1-New England were on site,
including the chief of operations, two special agents, and
several uniformed officers, to assist in the search.
These examples of professionalism, of police peace officer
professionalism, have been the norm for FPS officers throughout
its history as the only uniformed law enforcement presence in
DHS. All should be proud of the Federal Protective Services'
capabilities and record.
The recent transformation initiative begins a major
departure from the core FPS missions, however. Tellingly, last
fall, ICE began the process of recruiting a new FPS director
and posted two job announcements for the position, one
requiring a law enforcement background and the other requiring
managerial experience. I immediately questioned the wisdom of
advertising for a law enforcement job without requiring law
enforcement experience and credentials. After all, the lessons
from the Katrina tragedy, which shook DHS to its core, had much
to do with unprofessional staffing.
It is therefore particularly surprising that the position
descriptions for both announcements were virtually identical
except for one vital skill. To qualify for the law enforcement
announcement, the director would be required to develop plans
to respond to criminal incidents and emergencies occurring on
Federal property, as well as supervising senior law enforcement
officers in activities such as investigating incidents,
disseminating terrorism-related intelligence, and conducting
joint terrorism task force operations. Despite the fact that an
individual with all these skills and more was identified as
``best qualified'' for the job on the job announcement, ICE
selected an individual who qualified third on the managerial
analyst posting. It is as if a jurisdiction would advertise for
a police chief who had no law enforcement expertise.
The shift from a director with true law enforcement
experience to one that requires general management skills is
consistent with the change in ICE's new vision of the role of
FPS. In eliminating the 290 police officers, there will be no
officers to meet this role as written ``to interrogate suspects
who display violence and irrational temperament, seek out and
question witnesses and suspects, preserve the peace, prevent
crimes, arrest offenders, and provide crime prevention guidance
and police assistance during emergency situations.''
Instead, the new mission of FPS relies on inspectors whose
jobs include such duties as--and I am quoting--``presents
employee awareness programs, conducts crime prevention studies,
conducts physical security surveys, and coordinates minor
repairs of electronic security systems.''
What, then, is to be done about ``investigating criminal
incidents, disseminating terrorism-related intelligence, and
conducting post-terrorism force operations,'' the job
description of the FPS officer? Who will perform these
functions that are related to both traditional law enforcement
and to the new terrorist responsibilities of the FPS in
protecting Federal employees, visitors, and property?
The Chairman has mentioned on occasion to me the drastic
reduction in the number of uniformed officers in the
transportation plan. In the absence of a Federal police
presence, ICE expects local law enforcement agencies to become
the primary protectors of Federal property and employees. ICE
claims that it has Memorandums of Understanding--but we have
been unable to obtain these memorandums--MOUs with 31 city and
local agencies allow for reciprocal services; local law
enforcement can assist FPS on Federal property and FPS can
assist local law enforcement in areas adjacent to or near
Federal property. Of course, once FPS eliminates its police
officers, these MOUs will be worthless. They require
reciprocity and FPS can't reciprocate if it doesn't have police
officers.
Moreover, anyone familiar with local law enforcement knows
how unlikely these agencies are to take on the new Federal
responsibilities left behind by vacating Federal police
officers. On January 24th, 2007, the National Council of Mayors
reported ``alarming growth,'' their words, in violent crimes in
their cities, which have to come first, obviously.
At the same time, Federal funding for local law enforcement
programs has been slashed by more than $2 billion. To now ask
these same local officers to assume additional Federal
responsibilities for protecting Federal employees and property
is adding insult to injury and, worse, unlikely to occur.
Therefore, is adding risk and possible danger.
Moreover, these extra responsibilities will be significant.
In the past six months there have been more than 20,000
incidents involving FPS officers on Federal property. These
included 1,363 accidents, 849 thefts, 33 aggravated assaults,
177 incidents involving weapons and explosives, 852 fine, and 1
criminal homicide. Most of these crimes were in cities high on
the list for losing Federal Protective Service police
protection.
Who is prepared to trust the protection of millions of
Federal employees, visitors, and property to local law
enforcement, especially when the proposed plans leave FPS
without peace officers sufficient to keep their part of the
deal?
We are eager, most eager, to hear what the witnesses may
have to tell us in order to allow us, as a Committee, to review
the plan in keeping with oversight responsibilities for FPS
that we have not exercised, not once, since FPS was absorbed
into DHS. This Committee has both the opportunity and the
responsibility to require adjustments that may be necessary to
ensure the safety and security of Federal agencies.
I would like now to turn to the Ranking Member of the full
Committee, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. First of all, good morning, and I want to thank
both Ms. Norton and Mr. Graves for holding this hearing on the
Federal Protective Service, and thank our witnesses for being
here today.
As we have all been reminded by the tragic events of the
last 24 hours at Virginia Tech, our public facilities, whether
they are educational or Federal buildings, have unfortunately
been the sites of some horrific violence in the past, and it is
very timely that we hold this hearing today. I have the
greatest and deepest respect for our Federal Protective Service
and the men and women who serve us in that capacity. It is an
important responsibilities and, again, we are reminded of it by
the events we have all unfortunately seen.
Government-owned and occupied facilities have been attacked
at home and abroad, with deadly results sometimes, and it is
our responsibility in Congress to make certain that we remain
vigilant. As such, it is entirely appropriate for the Committee
to continue its oversight of the Federal Protective Service and
also our plans for protecting our Federal buildings. Our
Transportation Committee has had a long history of protecting
Federal agencies through physical security measures and also
with the men and women of the Federal Protective Service. We
have provided literally billions of dollars to locate agencies
out of harm's way where possible, design buildings against
progressive collapse, and install blast-proof windows.
When it comes to the Federal Protective Service, we have
always supported its law enforcement mission and it is
important that we continue to do that. However, this is an
interesting hearing, and I didn't know too much about the
background until I was briefed on some of the problems that
have been created when the Federal Protective Service
transferred from the GSA to DHS, the Department of Homeland
Security. In the process, the Federal Protective Service lost a
significant amount of its funding.
According to a GAO report, GSA had previously subsidized
the Federal Protective Service by at least $139 million a year.
Now that the Federal Protective Service lost that subsidy,
maintaining current operating levels is very difficult. The
Federal Protective Service needs either additional
appropriations or we need to find a way to honestly and
transparently subsidize those operations in light of the
current situation we find ourselves in with the threat of
terrorism and against violence against public buildings.
As I understand the Administration's proposal, the Federal
Protective Service is trying to close this budget gap by
raising security fees and then also by making some cuts in
personnel costs. Unfortunately, DHS was dealt not a very good
hand here, and there have been some studies conducted and right
now the current cost is right around 39 cents, I think staff
told me--is that per square foot?--and they want to raise it to
57 cents to meet some of those costs. There is actually a Booz
Allen study that was conducted and recommended an increase, I
believe, in the force from 1200 to 2700, which would increase
the costs from 57 cents, which is proposed by the
Administration, to an actual cost of around $1.69. That would
really cause some problems but, again, the purpose of this
hearing is to find solutions.
I think that there are a number of approaches that we can
look at today as a result of this hearing. We have got to find
a way to provide the services, maintain the personnel level,
and, if necessary, even increase those. However, we do face
some challenges right now in the way DHS inherited this
because, again, a portion of the funds in the past used by GSA
were used in sort of cooking the books and obscuring the true
cost of protecting Federal facilities. So we have inherited a
very difficult financial situation. We need to find some
creative solutions for getting additional funding to the
agency. I have talked with our Ranking Member, Mr. Graves, and
he is committed and our side is committed to finding a way to
help the Federal Protective Service retain its employees,
increase them, if necessary, and find the funding to do that.
So I hope the testimony of our witnesses today will help us
find solutions to resolve this problem.
I yield back.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Mica.
I would like to ask Mr. Oberstar to offer some remarks at
this time, if he would be willing.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate your
making a very comprehensive statement at the outset, really
framing the issue, while I was navigating traffic for the last
hour.
In reflecting on this hearing, 12 years ago this week
Timothy McVeigh parked a rental truck with explosives in front
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. A
massive explosion tore through the north face of that building,
killing 168 people, 19 children. On the heels of that tragedy
is another unfolding in Virginia, just near us, and one of the
victims--not a shooting victim, but a victim of the trauma, a
young student at Virginia Tech, was also engaged in Columbine
in the classroom where her classmates eight years ago were
killed. She was telling her story this morning on network news.
It reminds us of the extraordinary role of the Federal
Protective Service, which is not a fly-by-night agency. It was
started in 1790 by President George Washington, when the first
Federal buildings were established, to provide protection. And
our Chair has outlined the extraordinary reach of the Federal
Protective Service to the 330-plus million square feet of
civilian office space the Federal Government is responsible
for.
The evolution since absorption of FPS into the Department
of Homeland Security, the evolution away from Federal
Protective officers to contract employees brings back to my
mind the situation in aviation security prior to September 11th
and the horror stories of Argenbright, Huntley, and others. I
served on the Pan Am 103 Commission. I wrote the first Aviation
Security Act in this Committee room. I asked then for a Federal
protective service as we have with the Transportation Security
Administration. The Administration then wasn't willing to do
that and we didn't have enough votes in the Congress to enforce
it, but it sure happened with lightening speed after September
11th; a huge turnover in the contract forces engaged by the
airlines foreign employees, not American citizens, not having
English language capability. So the contractor guard system in
FPS, with 15,000 contract guards, is something of great concern
to me.
The Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, under which
FPS has been assumed, itself said, in an analysis of their
plan, risk assumed by transformation, which I quote--this is
the agency itself examining FPS and the plan to contract out
more and make changes in the operation--``There will be no
proactive patrol to deter attack planning, to detect or deter
suspicious criminal activity, only reactive response will be
provided. There will be no response to calls for police service
to protect Federal employees or visitors and investigate crimes
at Federal facilities. There will be no night or weekend police
response or service, no FPS presence in 50 current cities,''
meaning cities now served and protected by FPS. ``FPS explosive
detection dog teams will be stationed only in the 18 largest
cities.'' Ten cities will no longer have the capability. ``The
largest reductions will be in New York and Washington, DC due
to proactive activity elimination.'' I've never heard such
bureaucratic garbage in my life. ``States with largest
percentage reductions also include Connecticut, Maine, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming.''
I don't think it would give great comfort to the folks in
Oklahoma City to know that that is what is happening to the
Federal Protective Service in the aftermath of a tragedy that
occurred there, and we have our distinguished colleague from
the State of Oklahoma who is very familiar with that. I think
the tragedy occurred during the time when Ms. Fallin was
Lieutenant Governor of the State.
So I am just very distressed about the role of contract
guards. It depends on company and State law, it depends on the
terms of the contract, and I don't think that visitors to or
employees of Federal Government agencies, where there is a
contract service, would be very comforted by the knowledge that
if something occurs, if a gunman enters the building, that the
contract service will be able to call 911. That is not the way
we protect public facilities.
I will withhold other comments because I want to get
immediately to the testimony. I think we need to proceed. We
have limited time because we have another hearing following
shortly on the heels of this one. I thank members for their
forbearance on opening statements, which will all be included
in the record.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Oberstar.
Going to the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr.
Graves.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Oberstar's institutional knowledge in this
Committee is renowned, and his ability to recall history is
incredible, but I didn't know it goes all the way back to
Washington. Did you help craft that too, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Oberstar. Well, let me say I was not there, in
fairness. I was not there, but there were three guards hired at
the request of President Washington.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. And I want to thank all the witnesses that are here
today for coming in to talk to us about the Federal Protective
Service. In particular, I want to thank two of our witnesses
who are here today, who traveled all the way from Missouri,
from my home State and from Kansas City. The first one is going
to be Mr. Stanley Nowak. For coming in, I do want to thank him.
He is a corporal with the Federal Protective Service's Region 6
in Kansas City and he has been with the FPS since 1976. I also
want to thank David Wright for his testimony today. David is
the President of the National Federal Protective Service Union
and is an inspector with FPS Region 6 in Kansas City, Missouri.
He has been with FPS since 1986. These gentlemen are going to
be providing testimony today based on their experiences, vast
experience in the Federal Protective Service, and I thank them
for being here.
FPS is responsible not only for protecting our senior
citizens from things like being robbed of their Social Security
checks when leaving the Social Security Office, protecting us
from something as simple as that to something as far-reaching
and very important as being front line defense against any
terrorism.
The first attack on the World Trade Center, the Oklahoma
City bombing, the bombings of the Cobart Towers in Saudi
Arabia, the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania,
and the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon have made it clear that Federal facilities are
targets for domestic and foreign terrorism. We need to ensure
that the security force responsible for protecting Federal
facilities has the capability to handle all of these kinds of
threats.
This Committee has had a long history of trying to do just
that. We have strongly shown our support for the inclusion of
physical security measures in the construction of Federal
buildings and courthouses across the Country. Additionally,
over the past several Congresses, we have held hearings and
marked up legislation to upgrade FPS and address the funding
shortfall in its operating budget.
Deputy Secretary Jackson testifies today on the
Administration's proposal to address the chronic budget
shortfall. The proposal raises security fees from 39 cents per
square foot to 57 cents per square foot. The proposal also
reduces FPS personnel from roughly 1200 to around 950 full-time
employees. This proposed reduction of FPS personnel has raised
a number of questions about the impact on Federal building
security. As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee that
oversees Federal buildings, I am greatly interested in the
security and the security of the Government workforce.
Kansas City has 12 of the 35 Level 3 buildings and 15 of
the 42 Level 4 buildings located in FPS Region 6. I am
concerned about how the proposal is going to impact the
security of these Federal buildings and I am very concerned
about how the reduction in personnel will impact the FPS
personnel working in Kansas City. Those are things that concern
me a great deal.
This is an extraordinary situation and it requires
extraordinary measures, not just a prohibition on what FPS can
do. What we need is creative solutions to this problem, not
something that is going to further complicate FPS's operations.
I hope our witnesses today can help clear some of this up and
we can explore some of these creative solutions and, again, I
thank the witnesses for being here and Chairman Oberstar for
having this hearing.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Graves.
It is our custom to go to members to see if they have
statements. I am reluctant to do that in light of the hearing
that is coming right after us, the press conference we have
with the Chairman, and particularly the fact that our Deputy
Secretary, Mr. Jackson, is on the second panel, not the first
panel, but I know this is a Committee that always engages
statements. Are there any statements? Because if there were
only a few----
[No response.]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. We can then go straight to
our first witness. I am very pleased to invite Congressman Wu,
who is not here to offer a piece of legislation, but here as a
witness who has had occasion to call upon the FPS, and we very
much welcome David Wu as our first witness.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE DAVID WU, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON
Mr. Wu. Madam Chair, honored members of the Committee, I am
David Wu, 1st Congressional District of Oregon. I am here today
to thank the Federal Protective Service, to express my
appreciation for their long-time service, and to relay the
particulars of one incident that occurred earlier this year.
On most days, my staff, like yours, perform their duties
without dramatic incident. We all aspire to have service-
oriented offices and constituents are very much welcomed in our
offices. However, on this past February 8th, 2007, a
constituent armed with a large knife entered our district
office, making threats to others and to himself. Fortunately,
no constituents or staff were hurt. Most of my staff were out
of the office attending meetings on my behalf.
The three staff members who were present at the time, given
the layout of the office, two out of the three were able to
lock themselves in another portion of the office within just a
few seconds and the third was able to slip out a back door and
get into a neighboring tenant's office. All three of the staff
members almost instinctively dialed the dispatch center for the
Federal Protective Service. Each quickly gave their location
and the circumstances for the call. Within moments, FPS
officers apprehended the knife-wielding man without significant
incident.
My district office is located in a former Federal
courthouse in Downtown Portland, Oregon. The tenants are a mix
of public and private entities, and we rely on the Federal
Protective Service to provide security. The building houses a
post office on the main floor and there are no particular
security measures required to either enter the building itself,
nor to access the elevators for the floor where my district
office is located. The FPS is located within the building
itself.
My staff contacted the FPS immediately because they know
that the FPS is onsite and the FPS has always been there for
us. One thing that I know for certain is that without the FPS,
my staff would have waited longer for help, being in the same
suite of offices with a threatening person with a large knife.
Two staff members dialed 911 and got a voice mail and were
placed in a call queue. Eventually, 911 connected with them and
they were told that FPS officers were already on their way. In
fact, one of the response from 911 was that the FPS was already
in the office and had the man under control.
After this particular event, I discussed with my staff the
possibility of moving to another Federal building with higher
security and with metal detectors, but our staff concluded
that, because such incidents are relatively rare and because
FPS responded so well and so quickly, that the move was not
necessary.
Here on Capitol Hill we have the benefit of the Capitol
Police. In our district offices, where we truly have folks on
the front line, they also deserve a level of security to carry
out their jobs as best they can, and it is my hope that our
staff in the district office can continue to count on the
professional help of the Federal Protective Service going
forward into the future.
I thank you for the opportunity to share my views, to relay
this particular incident, and to thank the Federal Protective
Service for its service over many years during my time in the
United States Congress. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Congressman Wu, for this
firsthand account of an incident. You said you were in a
Federal building that was still a courthouse or used to be a
courthouse?
Mr. Wu. This is a former courthouse. It remains a Federal
building and it has a post office on the ground floor and a mix
of tenants, some of which are governmental and some of which
are private sector tenants.
Ms. Norton. You said the Federal Protective Service is
located there. Is that because they had an office there for the
area or because they were there because Federal employees such
as yourself were there?
Mr. Wu. They have an office there.
Ms. Norton. That covers the entire area of Federal
employees?
Mr. Wu. My understanding is that they also have some other
offices in the Downtown Portland area.
Ms. Norton. Now, I am concerned that your staff called 911,
because that is calling local police force, normally. Are there
generally instructions to call an FPS officer who might be
close at hand, particularly since FPS was located in the
building, or was that just the instinct to call 911 because
everybody calls 911?
Mr. Wu. Well, their first instinct was to call the FPS, and
they made those calls and there were three staff members in the
office at the time. There was a fourth in the building and
between the four of them several calls were made, the first
calls were to FPS, and there were follow-up calls or calls made
by the fourth staffer to 911.
Ms. Norton. Does this FPS have a number like 911 or do you
have to dial a number that is like an ordinary number in order
to call FPS?
Mr. Wu. Madam Chair, I actually do not have the answer to
that right now.
Ms. Norton. I will ask that of the officers. I would think
that that is the kind of change we would want to have FPS make
if we could. I would be concerned because it seems to me that
local police are almost always inclined to give--and I
recognize that most of the staff called the FPS and they knew
what to do. All credit to you and your staff that they already
knew what to do. But I would be concerned about calling 911
because many areas would simply assume that is for the Feds and
I have got to keep dealing with crime here in my own
jurisdiction. So that will be a question I reserve for the
Federal police.
I understand there was a demonstration of sorts going on at
the time in front of the Federal building in which your office
is located. Do you recall that?
Mr. Wu. I do not recall that there was a demonstration in
front of the office at that time.
Ms. Norton. Now, was there any need, after this incident,
to upgrade security in your office in your view and was it
done?
Mr. Wu. We considered either moving to a higher security
office and----
Ms. Norton. Say a word about higher security office. The
office in which you were located had what kind of security? You
said you could get through the elevator and so forth. Was there
no security at the door?
Mr. Wu. There is no security at the door. There are no
metal detectors or other screening mechanisms. It is my
understanding that there are regulations about how many Federal
employees are at a particular site before there is security at
the door or there are metal detectors. We have explored those
possibilities and we have also explored the possibility of
moving to another facility with more Federal employees, which
comes with more security. But after assessing all the options
and the fact that FPS is able to respond so quickly and the
fact that this is an office which has served us well, the staff
decision was to stay put with the FPS protection and where they
are right now.
Ms. Norton. Well, that is understandable. I see nothing
wrong with some Federal employees being in buildings where,
shall we call them, civilian agencies are located, and the risk
is based on whether or not there is a risk. And if there were a
risk, then you wouldn't be located there. People would think
that the office of a member of Congress would not present such
a risk, so I can understand and I think I would have made the
same decision. My office is located in the National Press
Office at 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue. I can assure you
that there are not many Federal offices there. But it certainly
wouldn't make financial or economic sense for people like us to
insist that we are in the most secure buildings for the most
part.
But the point, it seems to me, of the incident involving
you, Congressman Wu, is that there were Federal police on hand.
How would you assess the response of the Federal police to the
incident?
Mr. Wu. Madam Chair, that is precisely the point, that the
FPS were immediately at hand and were able to respond in a very
quick manner. From the way the incident played out, they
responded, I believe, much more quickly than local law
enforcement could have because they have a focal point, or few
focal points, for what they need to protect, which are the
Federal buildings and the Federal facilities around. Not all
district offices have the benefit of such close proximity, but
in our particular instance, the access to and the proximity of
the Federal Protective Service has been of great help,
security, and reassurance for our staff.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Congressman Wu.
I will now move to Mr. Graves to see if you have any
questions. Are there members on your side? Congressman Graves,
do you have any questions at this time for Congressman Wu?
[No response.]
Ms. Norton. Are there any questions on our side for
Congressman Wu?
[No response.]
Ms. Norton. Let me thank you, Congressman Wu, for taking
your time this morning to inform us firsthand of an experience
that I think helps us to understand the role of FPS.
Mr. Wu. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton. I would like now to call four members of the
Federal Protective Service. They are Inspector Michael--I am
sorry, I do not have their locations here, the locations from
which they come. I will ask them when they give their testimony
to tell us their location.
Would the four witnesses from Federal Protective Service--
Inspector Michael Brown, Corporal Stanley Nowak, Inspector
Sterling Proctor, Jr., and Officer Jim Ward, all of the Federal
Protective Service--come forward now and would you stand so
that I may swear you in, as we swear in all witnesses? I would
ask each of you to raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Brown. I do.
Mr. Nowak. I do.
Mr. Proctor. I do.
Mr. Ward. I do.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Be seated.
Gentlemen, you may offer testimony if you desire. You need
not offer testimony.
I need to say for the record that I felt compelled to write
to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security after I
was made aware of a letter that was sent to these officers
after they were subpoenaed by the Committee. The letter was a
kind letter; it was not, in its language, intimidating, but it
was an inappropriate letter. It asked that the officers submit
their testimony to the Department before offering it to the
Committee. Understand, these are line officers appearing in
their personal capacity, and it is in that capacity that they
were subpoenaed. This is police work and the Committee is
interested in the day-to-day effect on police work. You can't
find that out by talking to somebody in Washington or somebody
in charge of the FPS; you have got to talk to witnesses like
Congressman Wu or like the witnesses before us now.
The letter, which I will make a part of the record, signed
by Dean S. Hunter, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, said that they simply wanted to assure
that nothing would be said of a sensitive nature that would
undermine the FPS mission or endanger members of the public.
Now, we are talking about police officers appearing before us,
now. And also that any information that the officers would
offer would not be, and I am quoting, ``privileged or otherwise
restricted from disclosure by law,'' and, thus, they wanted the
opportunity to discuss their testimony.
Now, I am on another committee that has jurisdiction over
Federal employees. I can think of nothing more intimidating on
its face, however worded, than to receive a letter from someone
called the acting assistant director requesting an opportunity
to discuss your testimony. I might decide, if I were a Federal
employee, maybe this isn't such a good idea after all.
I indicated to staff that I wanted the officers to know
that I was concerned, and I said to them that this Committee
would do nothing to put these officers at risk because we had
subpoenaed them. They are not being subpoenaed because of
wrongdoing; they are being subpoenaed to offer information that
we thought only they had.
I then wrote a letter, which has not yet been answered, to
Secretary Chertoff, indicating to them how concerned and even
shocked I was that Federal employees, who were not a part of
the Administration but were line employees, were being asked to
submit their own testimony or to discuss it before coming to
appear before a committee and indicating that, in my view, this
kind of communication has a chilling effect and therefore could
prevent the Committee from receiving the candor and necessary
information we must have.
We, of course, are interested in the day-to-day routine,
particularly today, in FPS officers because, as I indicated in
my opening statement, we have had no hearing, not one,
involving the FPS since they were absorbed several years ago
into DHS, so we are a blank slate. Even though I have been on
this Committee 17 years, we are a blank slate when it comes to
knowing what the effect has been of this vital service on their
core mission, now enlarged, to protect Federal employees.
I offered in the letter, since, however inconceivable it is
that officers with this experience would offer testimony that
would in fact be of a sensitive nature or somehow disclose
matters that were not intended to the public or could harm the
public or the Federal Protective Service, I indicated that, in
any case, we would welcome the presence in the audience of a
lawyer from the Department of Homeland Security who might have,
if he heard anything of this sort, quickly alert us. But you
have to understand that they must have been talking to us,
because we are asking questions, so the assumption has to be,
therefore, not only that we would disclose, but that we,
members of Congress, would ask questions or would allow
testimony that would endanger members of the public, or that
would be sensitive information that could undermine the FPS, or
that was either privileged or restricted from disclosure by
law. So it seemed to me to be a reflection on Congress, perhaps
as much as on the officers involved.
I want to put this in the record because the first thing
that occurred to me, because I have been a member of an
administration and understand fully, and believe fully, that if
you are testifying on behalf of an administration, that your
testimony should go to the OMB and be cleared. I am fully
familiar with OMB Circular A-19 and I am equally certain that
that Circular from the Office of Management and Budget does not
apply to civil servants in the ordinary course of business.
So I had to say, therefore, in my letter to Secretary
Chertoff, that this Committee will use all of its capability to
ensure that there is no retaliatory action taken against these
subpoenaed FPS officers.
Ms. Norton. So the first thing I am going to say to the
officers is you do not have to offer testimony. You may offer
testimony if you would like or you may simply open yourself to
questions, as you see fit. What is your pleasure? Please do not
feel that it is necessary to speak up before we ask questions.
Would you prefer me to begin with questions? I would prefer it
that way, but if you would prefer otherwise, then I would defer
to you.
Mr. Nowak. Madam Chairwoman, I would prefer whatever you
request. We will go ahead and go with that.
TESTIMONY OF INSPECTOR GENERAL MICHAEL J. BROWN, FEDERAL
PROTECTIVE SERVICE, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON; INSPECTOR STERLING
PROCTOR, JR., FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION; CORPORAL STANLEY NOWAK, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE,
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI; AND OFFICER JIM WARD, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE
SERVICE, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK
Ms. Norton. In your case, officers, we subpoenaed you for
information. I can't believe that any of you have had to
prepare testimony, particularly not knowing much about what we
were interested in at some of the levels I discussed in my
opening testimony. So if you do not feel offended, I would as
soon begin with questions and ask, in these first questions,
any of you to answer.
Give me some examples of crimes, criminal acts, or events
that you, as peace officers, typically investigate or are
called to respond to.
Mr. Brown. Madam, Inspector Brown from Seattle, Washington.
In our area, the most common call is someone attempting to
bring a weapon into a Federal facility, be it a Social Security
office where the guard checks bags on a random basis or someone
who is detected trying to bring it through the magnetometer on
the way to the Veterans Administration in the major Federal
building. Followed by that would be disturbances at Federal
offices, again, Social Security offices typically the largest
generation of those complaints; followed by suspicious
circumstances and activities. We have security guards at many
of our facilities, and when they see something that is unusual,
we try to get them to call us so that, as police officers, we
can come and resolve the situation and determine whether it is
suspicious activity, whether it is illegal, or whether it is
just a citizen taking an art class, making sketches of a
Federal building.
Ms. Norton. Do the other officers have any experience they
would like to offer in answer to that question?
Mr. Ward. We have the same in New York City. Another
initiative we have in New York City is that we have initiated
an operation we dubbed Operation Stinking Badges. Persons who
enter the Federal buildings in Lower Manhattan go through a
screening process by the security guards, and during that
screening process we frequently detect, identify, arrest, and
prosecute persons who are in possession and using fraudulent
law enforcement credentials, badges, parking placards, law
enforcement style uniforms and equipment. They use these items
sometimes to unlawfully gain entry to the building posing as
law enforcement officers or just carry these on their person
and use it for other means. There is an investigation going on
at this time for Operation Stinking Badges that continues and
has been very successful in working with the NYPD, their Police
Impersonation Unit and with our Threat Management Branch, in
stopping these persons from unlawfully our Federal facilities.
Ms. Norton. All of us, of course, when you speak
particularly of weapons, are still, frankly, in shock about
what has just happened in Virginia, just across the line. None
of us take lightly the notion that people come in, even though
obviously most of them may have forgotten. Who could assume
that after what we have just experienced? False IDs, that is
bothersome. That is very bothersome.
Would you make us understand? I think the general public
doesn't understand the difference, often, between a ``peace
officer'' and a contract officer in Federal buildings, because
we have a mix of officers, and should have a mix of officers in
Federal buildings. Gentlemen, are you not the full equivalent
of a police officer, for example, for Federal facilities of the
kind we would have in the District of Columbia, for example?
Mr. Proctor. Yes.
Mr. Brown. Yes.
Mr. Nowak. Yes.
Mr. Ward. Yes.
Ms. Norton. Now, what is the difference between you as a
peace officer and other officers that also have duties,
protective duties, in Federal buildings?
Mr. Brown. Madam, as inspectors, the first is our training.
We attend the same police training course at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center as do the members of the Secret
Service Uniformed Division and the members of the Capitol
Police. When we get back to our station, we have a field
training officer program that lasts approximately eight more
weeks, where we learn the trade craft of working with the
people in our particular area, learn where our facilities are,
and all the things we have to do. And we have the full
authority to enforce Federal law, including misdemeanor
building rule violations or conduct felony investigations and
refer them to the U.S. attorney for prosecution.
Contract security officers, on the other hand, have the
same power as any citizen on the street in most States.
Ms. Norton. Now, what does that mean? Does that mean the
same ability that I have on the streets?
Mr. Brown. Yes, to make a citizen's arrest. That is the
only authority they would have. They can detain people at our
request, and frequently do, but that is for a limited duration.
Ms. Norton. Do they have guns to do that?
Mr. Brown. They have guns and handcuffs and radios--
depending on the terms of the contract and the facility, and
their training is about one week given by the contractor and
about 16 hours given by the Federal Protective Service, and
then marksmanship training of another week.
Ms. Norton. So what I have been calling the other fashioned
word ``peace officers,'' they are not.
Mr. Brown. No, madam.
Ms. Norton. Because while they have guns, they lack most of
the authority of a Federal Protective Service officer.
Mr. Proctor. Yes.
Ms. Norton. They are not the functional equivalent of a
police officer in a local jurisdiction.
Mr. Proctor. No.
Ms. Norton. And they have one week's worth of training,
perhaps.
Mr. Ward. They primarily observe and report.
Ms. Norton. Say that again?
Mr. Ward. They primarily observe and report, and then an
FPO would be the enforcement.
Mr. Proctor. Right. They do no investigations of that sort,
merely just access control.
Ms. Norton. I want to ask one more question before I go to
Mr. Graves, because I am just simply trying to set up what we
have here.
We are told that there will be 50 cities--we don't know
what they are--that will no longer have any peace offices, that
is to say, men and women like you, people who not only carry
guns, but who have total police authority. In such a city, with
nobody with full police authority, how do you contemplate that
those officers will respond to crimes in local cities, in local
jurisdictions? What would be the difference between the way
whoever is left there operates now and the way you operate? I
would like you to evaluate what the security and crime
protection situation would look like in a city where there were
Federal buildings where the Federal Protective Service once had
jurisdiction but now find that there are no FPS officers.
Mr. Brown. One of the beats I had when I first started with
the Federal Protective Service included a large area of four
counties in Western Washington. We have a Federal building in
Port Angeles, which is up on the tip of Puget Sound, about an
hour and a half from Seattle, where I was based. And when
incidents happened there, the contract security guard called
our megacenter, who referred it to the Port Angeles Police, who
responded. But we had a good working relationship with them and
we helped them out when we could, and they were happy to
respond for those calls. But calls of suspicious activity
around the building, where it didn't involve a criminal threat
or an indication of a criminal threat, he called us, and
sometimes it was that day, sometimes it was the next week
before one of us was able to get out there. That, with a
reduced presence, is going to happen in more cities.
Ms. Norton. Why did it take you that long to get out there?
Mr. Brown. It depended on what else we had going on, how
many cases we had, how many people we had available and, again,
the significance of the call. If it was recurring activity,
where we had identification on the individual, we would go out
there that night and stay until we finished it. If it was
merely an indication of someone parked across the street or
something like that, we would typically talk to the local
detectives and then we would come out and follow up with them
later.
Ms. Norton. So if you are not there at all, what happens in
a situation like that? For any of you, actually. What happens
now if even if you, who apparently didn't have the manpower to
come out for every call? If you are not there, there must be
somebody there, and we will find out exactly who. Who do you
think will be there?
Mr. Ward. Local law enforcement.
Mr. Nowak. In Kansas City, for instance--I don't know how
the other cities are, but during the summertime the Kansas
City, Missouri Police Department goes into what they call
blackout. That is where all officers are already out on calls--
these are local officers--and if they have a call to a Federal
facility, it will just have to be stacked up and wait for when
an officer becomes free. That could be three, four hours, or
the next day. And a lot of times, when I have been dispatched
to distant facilities within our region, we always beat the
local police in, even if they were 20 miles away. If our travel
time was 20 miles, we generally always beat the local police
into that facility, IRS office or Social Security office. We
generally beat them in.
Mr. Ward. I have a specific example from last week. Being
from New York City, the largest police department in the
Country, we responded to a call that came in through our
megacenter of a disturbance in the Federal building at 26
Federal Plaza. Myself and my fellow officers responded to this
call. It was a disturbance. It was actually two disturbances
going on simultaneously. We were able to resolve both
instances. It was an altercation between CIS clerk and a person
seeking some services from that agency.
Forty-five minutes later I was back out on my patrol,
having left that call 45 minutes earlier, and I was approached
by an NYPD sergeant, and he said I received a call at this
location inside 26 Federal Plaza of a disturbance, can you
please go in the building and respond there and telephone me
back at the desk at the local precinct house and let me know
what the disposition is? So, once again, we responded. It was
the same identical location. Spoke to the complainants at that
location; they said, yes, they had placed a call simultaneously
to the megacenter and to 911. So what happened was, when the
call came to FPS, we responded immediately. When the call went
to 911, NYPD, they responded up to an hour later.
So here is the largest police department in America, and
they can't even get to the calls in a prompt, timely manner.
That is one specific incident. It happens routinely at 26
Federal Plaza in the Lower Manhattan area. FPS gets there a
long time before the locals get there. And the locals are just
tied up, it is nothing with them. There are a lot of things
that go on in the Lower Manhattan area that keeps the local
NYPD pretty tied up with what they are doing, and they already
know that we are there in these Federal buildings providing
police services.
Ms. Norton. Well, in fairness, we don't know that New York
would be one of the areas. In fact, we don't know what they
would be. We do know this, that if a call comes from a
neighborhood and it comes from a Federal building, it better
stack up the Federal call, as opposed to not responding to the
taxpayers in their own local community.
Mr. Proctor, finally, you are in the National Capital
Region. That, of course, is not just the District of Columbia.
They probably will have police here. In fact, we have more
police here because there are other kinds of Federal police
here. But I tell you that half the Federal presence is located
in the suburbs, in what might be called the counties or smaller
communities. So, Mr. Proctor, would you answer that question
for your jurisdiction?
Mr. Proctor. Yes. I am located here in the National Capital
Region, but I cover Prince George's County, mainly the Suitland
Federal Center, which is an exclusive jurisdiction. We get
various calls, suspicious activity----
Ms. Norton. Now, that is in Prince George's County. What is
the town?
Mr. Proctor. Suitland.
Ms. Norton. The town is Suitland.
Mr. Proctor. Suitland, Maryland.
Ms. Norton. And the police are Suitland police or Prince
George's police?
Mr. Proctor. Well, on Suitland Federal Center it is
exclusive jurisdiction, so the only police is FPS.
Ms. Norton. If in fact there were local law enforcement to
rely upon----
Mr. Proctor. It would be Prince George's County. Prime
example, we got a call maybe about a month ago for suspicious
activity--like Inspector Brown was saying, we get that quite a
bit too--where individuals are walking around the Suitland area
because the Suitland Federal Center is going through a new
makeover; we have a new census building out there. And this
particular individual was stopped by Prince George's County
Police and they called FPS and we had to come over there and
investigate the incident, and the guy was taking pictures of
the Federal building, which is not really a crime, but it just
raised our suspicion on to why an individual would like to take
pictures of the Federal building. So what we try to do is make
sure they are not taking pictures of any entry points or exit
points of the Federal facility, and what we do is we look
through the camera to make sure they don't have any pictures of
your entry points, where the guards are located, so that in
case, if they are some type of terrorist activity, we can try
to prevent it by confiscating the camera, if need be.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Proctor.
Before I go to Mr. Graves, I do want to say I am a member
of the Homeland Security Committee. What this officer said
about suspicious activity is exactly what we are about. We
don't want the bomb to go off. We want to err on the side of
seeing whether this citizen--and, remember, you have every
right to have a camera--seeing whether this citizen is a
suspicious person or not.
Now, I can tell you one thing. It reminds me reading the
paper. Prince George's has had a spurt in crime, and a terrible
spurt in crime, and I can say, I think without fear of
contradiction--Mr. Wynn is not on this Committee--that there is
a very fat chance in you know where that any priority could
possibly be given to the Suitland facility, a very important
Federal facility.
Mr. Graves.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I am going to be a little parochial, if that is all right,
and specifically talk about Kansas City, because that is
obviously where I represent and very important to me, and I can
kind of translate that into what is going to happen around the
Country. So my question is to Mr. Nowak.
Are we staffed adequately now, in the Kansas City area, to
cover all the things that you have to cover? And what is going
to happen, under this new proposal, to us in Kansas City if you
get cut 15 slots, which I think is the proposal right now,
which will take you down to 43 individuals?
Mr. Nowak. Sir, we are not adequately staffed. We haven't
been for years. And if they remove the police officers, all you
will have is the contract guards, and guards, on the most part,
are pretty good, but there are problems with them: the
employees don't respect them; people coming in off the street
for service and visitors don't respect them, they know they are
just guards; and if they are asked to do something, the only
time the employees will listen to the guards is if they know we
back them up, and without us there, there is no backup for
them. And local police will not come into a Federal building to
enact any or protect the employees there unless they are called
in, but if we are there they won't come over unless we are
there. If we are moved after whatever date, they still are kind
of hesitant to come into the Federal facility because of prior
problems they had on Federal property years ago.
Mr. Graves. Are you concerned for the safety of the folks
working in those buildings?
Mr. Nowak. Very much so.
Mr. Graves. And that will obviously just increase if this
is implemented, that concern?
Mr. Nowak. Yes, very much so.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
Mr. Bishop?
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
I represent New York 1, which is the eastern half of Long
Island, so first to Officer Ward. I understand that the
proposed reduction in Federal Protective Service people for
Federal Region 2, which includes New York, is 45 percent; for
New England it is 50 percent; for Region 4--Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky--it is only 15 percent. As a professional law
enforcement officer, can you tell me by what logic does a
reasonable, well-intentioned person think that it is okay to
cut law enforcement presence in a region like New York, which
includes New York City, obviously, by 45 percent?
Mr. Ward. I don't understand the logic myself, so I am
unable to explain it. But if you do that, then you are going to
place these Federal buildings at serious risk and there is
going to be some serious situation that is going to occur in
the future because, as we all know, terrorists will attack
again; there will be another attack. And if you peel away that
layer of security that you currently have in place, and if you
don't increase that layer of security and add additional police
officers, the risk is just going to be even greater.
Mr. Bishop. Congressman Graves just asked if the security
presence in Kansas City was appropriate at this time. Would you
consider the current staffing in New York to be appropriate or
is it light?
Mr. Ward. It is light. Another example is Plumb Island. We
used to have----
Mr. Bishop. I wanted to come to Plumb Island in a second.
Let me do that.
Mr. Ward. Okay.
Mr. Bishop. Plumb Island is just that, an island, and it
has a very sensitive Federal facility on it, and my
understanding is that there are now no Federal Protective
Service personnel on the island, and that the Memorandum of
Understanding that the Chairwoman referred to earlier in her
statement, vests law enforcement authority on a local police
officer which, best case, is a 45 minute boat ride away. So I
would ask all of you, as professional law enforcement officers,
do any of you consider that to be an appropriate arrangement
for any kind of facility, but particularly one that studies
very sensitive and very dangerous diseases?
Mr. Ward. Absolutely not. There should be an FPS presence
on that island 24/7. We had one police officer there and there
is a contract security guard for us that does not have law
enforcement authority, but we do need an FPS presence on Plumb
Island 24/7 given the sensitive nature and the sensitive
diseases that are there.
Mr. Bishop. One last question. It is my understanding, and
correct me if I am wrong, please, that the MOU with the local
police force vests authority in that police force to execute
arrests only if the police force has been deputized. Is that
your understanding as well?
Mr. Ward. I am not sure an MOU exists. I haven't seen a
copy of it, so----
Mr. Bishop. One does exist. After great difficulty, we have
obtained a copy. One does exist.
Mr. Ward. If the island was exclusive jurisdiction, then
somebody would have to be deputized with Federal law
enforcement powers in order to execute any arrests on that
island.
Mr. Bishop. And if that local law enforcement entity has
not been deputized and there is no Federal Protective Service
currently on the island, is it reasonable to assume that there
is, therefore, no local or even Federal authority that has the
authority to execute arrests?
Mr. Ward. That is correct. And not to disparage that police
department, but that is a very small police department.
Mr. Bishop. It's a first rate police department, but you
are right, very small.
Mr. Ward. And they have their community they have to
protect, and for them to get the extra burden of having to
worry about Plumb Island, which should be the responsibility of
the Federal Government, just places that additional burden on a
small town police department that shouldn't have to worry about
that.
Mr. Bishop. I couldn't agree more. Thank you very much for
your testimony and thank you for what you do to protect our
buildings. Thank you.
Mr. Ward. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop.
Who else on this side? Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
First of all, thank you for your service. Mr. Brown, good
to see you. I was the sheriff in Seattle before I came to
Congress; have done 33 years of cop experience with the
sheriff's office, so I kind of miss the badge and the gun and
the uniform. You guys look good and you do good work. How were
you selected to be subpoenaed today? How did the four of you,
out of 1200 and some employees, get subpoenaed?
Mr. Ward. I don't really know, sir.
Mr. Reichert. You just ended up with a subpoena in your
mailbox?
Mr. Ward. Yes.
Mr. Nowak. Kind of volunteered.
Mr. Reichert. Volunteered. Okay. Do you have any fear of
retaliation testifying today, about your job?
Mr. Ward. Do not.
Mr. Nowak. Well, there is always that thought in the back
of your mind.
Mr. Reichert. Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. No problem, sir. I was subpoenaed because a
Committee staffer called me. I think somebody had provided the
Committee with some of my work on staff modeling.
Mr. Reichert. You know, let's just get down to the bottom
line and talk some cops talk. You have a job to do on that
Federal property in those Federal buildings, and the
relationship that you have with the Seattle Police Department
in Mr. Brown's case, with the King County Sheriff's Office, I
know personally is exemplary. Do you know anything different,
Mr. Brown?
Mr. Brown. No. We work very closely with Seattle and King
County, as well as the other surrounding police departments
where there are Federal facilities.
Mr. Reichert. And the three of you all experience the same
partnership with the local police departments?
Mr. Proctor. Yes.
Mr. Reichert. How many positions in Seattle are we talking
about losing?
Mr. Brown. They haven't announced how many they are losing.
We currently have 5 police officers and four inspectors, so
with 9 now, if the police officers are going, it would be 5 or
6.
Mr. Reichert. What is the contingent of the private
security that you have talked about? You already have some
contingent there that you are working with in all four areas, I
assume.
Mr. Brown. Yes. In the Seattle area we have got--I am not
sure of the number of guards because some are part-time and
some full-time, but we have over 60 guard posts, including 24-
hour guard posts at the major Federal facilities and guard
posts at Social Security and other service level offices.
Mr. Reichert. And is it the purpose of those positions to
free you up to respond to criminal calls and calls for help?
Mr. Brown. It is for that and so that we can engage in
proactive patrols. An example, a Federal facility that has U.S.
Court of Appeals, the Environmental Protection Agency, and a
child care center is next to Freeway Park in Seattle, and when
the children come out we go up there and conduct patrols of the
areas around the outside of the building. Last week, the
officer that went up there found one individual who was smoking
marijuana. Not a particularly big problem. He also happened to
be a level 3 sex offender after we contacted and checked him.
Two other individuals on the other side there climbed over a
wall where the sign says you can't climb over, climbed back.
Unusual. The officer went over there, asked them to come up on
him, one dropped a baggy; it had eventually eight balloons of
heroin and some needles in it. So those are the kinds of things
that we find outside facilities and we can stop from happening,
be it terrorist or criminal.
Mr. Reichert. So if we eliminate these commission
positions, is it your understanding that there will be
additional security guards hired, then, to fulfill some duties,
or are you going to maintain the same security personnel and
reduce your commission ranks?
Mr. Ward. If they can't afford police officers, how are
they going to afford the security guards? If the whole purpose
is to save money by eliminating positions, you are not going to
be able to go back and have extra money to go out and buy
security guards. In some cases security guards are more money
than police officers.
Mr. Reichert. Yes.
Mr. Brown. I haven't seen anything that would indicate that
in the Seattle area----
Mr. Reichert. So we are just going to have a reduction in
security, as far as you know.
Mr. Brown. We are going to take the risk of not doing any
proactive patrol between responses to calls. Instead of it
being two or three people working out on proactive patrol, be
it an inspector or police officer responding, but myself, as an
inspector, I may be conducting a security review or an
assessment of a facility or a security meeting with the
committee that is in charge of security for that facility, and
I am taking a call from that meeting to respond to an incident,
as opposed to it being somebody on patrol and me moving as a
backup officer.
Mr. Reichert. Well, I again just want to say thank you for
your service to our communities and keep up the good work. I
know how important it is to have you where you are and to have
the numbers of people that you need to do your job correctly.
The sheriff's office was always understaffed too, and it is
always a struggle for law enforcement to come up with the right
numbers to do the job they need to do to protect the public,
and I admire each and every one of you for what you do. Thank
you.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Reichert. I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Arcuri?
Mr. Arcuri. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here and, more importantly,
for the work that you do. I am also from New York, and until
very recently I was a DA, so although a local prosecutor, I
worked very, very closely with many Federal agencies, and I can
tell you that the benefit that we received as a local agency
from being able to work with Federal agencies, regardless of
what it was, whether it was the FBI or one of the other
agencies, was just dramatically helpful to us.
My concern is this. I think one of the things that people
fail to see is that crime is cyclical, and if today we are
doing our job in terms of cutting back on crime and we don't
continue that effort, tomorrow crime is just going to be on the
rise again, that it is a constant vigilant job that we have to
do. Obviously, my concern is when we cut agencies, Federal
agencies such as yours, the void is going to have to be filled
somewhere, and crime is going to rise. And if that void is
filled, obviously, by local law enforcement, it is going to
hurt because that is going to be local police officers off the
street.
I think, more importantly, however, is the role that you
play in terms of working with local law enforcement. If you
could, could you tell me a little bit about some of the
different interactions that you have had with local law
enforcement agencies in your time? Have you had a great deal of
cooperation with local agencies?
Mr. Nowak. When we approach suspicious people on our
properties, we contact our megacenter and we have to make a
direct call to the Kansas City Police Department, and we do a
lot of warrant arrests, so we just take a ride over practically
across the street, up the stairs to the jail, and we book them
over there, either at the city jail, the county jail, or we
take them to another county. So we do a lot of interaction with
the local police department on their warrant arrests.
Mr. Arcuri. Does your agency do any investigatory work on
the inspectors? Inspector, do you do any investigatory work?
Mr. Brown. Yes. Typically, crimes against property, simple
assaults and those kinds of things, and the initial
investigation on almost anything. But one of our special agents
would typically follow up and take over the investigation on
the more serious ones, although sometimes we will do long-term
ones. I participated on an identity theft case and that was a
formal prosecution.
Mr. Arcuri. And did you work with local prosecutors, local
law enforcement during the prosecution of the case?
Mr. Brown. Yes. This case, the King County Sheriff's
Department had a case on the same individual. Two of the
agencies on the east side of the lake did. She had shown us
fraudulent ID when we arrested her for possession of marijuana
at a Social Security Office, which is how we got involved, and
ultimately, between the King County prosecutor and the U.S.
attorney's office, our case gave her a five year additive on
what she pled to.
Mr. Arcuri. Thank you.
Yes, Mr. Nowak?
Mr. Nowak. We have been involved also on two drug
undercover operations with local police departments involving
two different government agencies. We planted a young officer
agent in there for a year or so and were able to bust employees
within the agency that were selling or dealing in drugs. So we
worked with the local police departments and other Federal
agencies to take care of that problem.
Mr. Arcuri. Officer Ward, do you know if the agency in New
York works with the NYPD on intelligence_the intelligence group
that they have in New York City? Are you a part of that?
Mr. Ward. We work very closely with them. I mentioned
Operation Stinking Badges earlier. They worked with the local
prosecutors in probably all five burroughs on that effort. We
also work with them on what we call the Fugitive Apprehensions
Statistical Tracking Program, where we apprehend fugitives who
enter into Federal buildings that are applying for benefits and
are identified that they have an outstanding warrant in an
outside jurisdiction. We will deal with those persons as well.
And frequently, with NYPD, we are provided with training from
their Counterterrorism Division, different courses that are
available to us. We also provide training to them and with the
United States Park Police, conduct training that helps us in
our counterterrorism effort and protecting Federal facilities
in New York City.
Mr. Arcuri. And do all of you share intelligence with local
law enforcement agencies as you develop it?
Mr. Ward. We have daily bulletins that they provide to us,
suspects, murders, stuff like that. We put BOLOs out; we
contact them.
Mr. Brown. We participate in the local regional working
groups. We have had our special agents--and still do in many
locations throughout the Nation--that are on the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Forces with the local jurisdictions and there is
a lot of cross-information back and forth at the intelligence
level and then the common criminal intelligence level, who is
doing what. We will arrest somebody that has been frequently
arrested by another agency and we will typically let them know
that we picked that person up and where we did.
Mr. Proctor. In the National Capital Region, primarily our
investigators are the ones that are working in the task forces
and stuff like that. We rarely use a uniformed officer, such as
they use out in Kansas City, to do plain clothes work of that
sort.
Mr. Arcuri. Inspector Proctor, do they do undercover work?
Do your people do undercover work ever?
Mr. Proctor. We have someone. I don't know if we have any
investigators on it now, but in the past I know on several task
forces we have deployed investigators.
Mr. Arcuri. I just want to say thank you again. I think it
is so important that we not cut money to law enforcement,
whether it is on the Federal or local level, because the job
that you do obviously is critical to keeping all of us safe
and, equally important, trickles down to local law enforcement
as well. So I thank you very much for what you do. I appreciate
it.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Arcuri.
Congresswoman Fallin, I know you are from Oklahoma. Perhaps
you have some questions?
Ms. Fallin. Yes, ma'am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact,
tomorrow will be our twelfth anniversary date of the Oklahoma
City Murrah Building that was bombed, and I had been in office
101 days, Mr. Chairman, when that occurred, and I still
remember that day very vividly because the governor and I were
brand new on the job, just a couple of months, and security
whisked us away to a bomb shelter and our command control
center with all of our State agencies, and we stayed there from
9 in the morning, when it happened, until 3 in the afternoon,
approximately, until we could figure out who was attacking our
Federal building in Oklahoma City.
I must say that we learned many great lessons about
security and about the need for law enforcement to work
together and to communicate together and to have good emergency
procedures in place to be prepared for any type of catastrophe
that would happen like that, and sometimes you learn those
lessons when they happen. So I think the Nation has made a
great effort to secure our Federal buildings and make sure that
we are just secured as a Nation.
I am listening to this discussion and this is new to me. I
am one of the new members, guys, so I am listening with
interest. Of course, when Timothy McVeigh came up to our
building, Mr. Chairman, he drove up in a U-Haul truck and just
parked, never even came inside the building. I have seen the
videotape when he drove up and some of the footage around that
and, of course, some of the police reports, so he never even
made it into the building for an officer to be able to see at
that time.
I had a couple of questions for you. Let me just say, first
of all, thank you for what you do. I know it is a hard job, and
we appreciate what you do to take care of our buildings and to
make sure that they are secure, and our other structures.
I was reading in this report about the FPS proposal to
realign the law enforcement personnel from police officers to
inspectors, and I know we have got a combination of both
sitting here, and the differences and roles between a police
officer and an inspector. So I don't want to put anybody on the
spot, per se, but in your professional opinion, is it
satisfactory to mix the roles, to realign the law enforcement
roles between the police officers and the inspectors? Will we
still receive the same qualify of law enforcement?
Mr. Brown. What we do as inspectors is both the security
side and the police officer side, so it is an integrated
effort. We can look at a facility we are assigned to; we can
see the security weakness or the opportunity that a criminal or
a terrorist has to attack that, and as police officers we can
actually resolve that in how we respond to crimes, and then it
feeds back into the security development process. In most
larger cities we have enough facilities and enough work for a
policeman as well, whose job is primarily to patrol and
respond, certainly for after-hours. I would think that with the
proposed administration budget of 950 people, we would be hard
pressed to have 24 hour coverage in a single city when that is
implemented. I think we are down to 7 or 8 now. At one time it
was as high as 15. Staffing studies have recommended between 18
and 23 cities should have that round-the-clock coverage.
So that is the difference between what we do. We all
enforce the law, inspectors do a little bit more, and there is
very definitely a role for our straight police officers as
well.
Ms. Fallin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Proctor. Well, see, that is where the problem comes in.
The problem comes in because the inspector, as well as
patrolling, you have so many other duties: your BSCs, which is
your building security committee meetings; your awareness
programs, where you go out to the Federal facilities and you
hold programs regarding thefts in the building, crime in the
area, which we call our crime awareness; then some inspectors
have been tasked as being the COTR, which is the contracting
officers' technical representative, for a particular contract,
guard contract. So with the inspector wearing so many hats, as
well as being assigned to patrol, that is why we need the O83
police officer, because we can't do it all. So we need the O83
police officer. We need the ones that are primarily actively
patrolling.
Ms. Fallin. So are you saying that you think the
realignment may not be the best policy?
Mr. Proctor. No. I truly think downsizing will cause a
great terrorist risk. I believe that we need to build up. I
have been a part of FPS since 1996. I was part of the hiring
right after the Murrah bombing, and we have built our numbers
up, but now the numbers have declined, and it is just mind-
boggling.
Ms. Fallin. Can I ask you is there an issue with the
concept of and the use of contract employees over the policy,
or the policy, I should say, to reduce the FPS oversight and
the duties? Do you feel like you work well with contract
employees?
Mr. Proctor. Well, the contract employees--not to diminish
their role--they are our eyes and ears while we are out doing
our other duties. I am not saying that there is no need for
them, because I think there is a need for them, but they just
don't have the training that we get, and to cut us would be
just terrible.
Ms. Fallin. And do you have good working relationships with
local State and Federal agencies? Do you really try to marry
that together to where you communicate between each other?
Mr. Proctor. Yes.
Ms. Fallin. That is one of the lessons we learned in
Oklahoma City, is that we have to have a good line of
communication between all the different agencies.
Mr. Proctor. As far as I know, we have a very good working
relationship with the locals.
Ms. Fallin. Good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Fallin.
The Chairman may well have questions.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you very much.
I particularly appreciate and welcome the testimony, in her
own words and her own experience, of Congresswoman Fallin, who,
as lieutenant governor, lived through the experience with the
Murrah Building, and it is just by coincidence that we are
having the hearing on the same day. But her experience in this
tragedy I think can be very instructive for us. She has already
pointed out several valuable lessons, and we thank you very
much for your contribution.
Thank you very much for your willingness to testify. I know
that under these circumstances you may do so with a little bit
of trepidation and with some distress, but as I have learned in
the oversight investigative work over the years, it is our
responsibility to protect witnesses against any retribution,
and we do not anticipate that there will be any.
In 2005, the former director of the Federal Protective
Service commissioned a workload survey to determine the
appropriate staffing levels. What was the purpose of that
activity? Were you engaged in that study? Whoever wishes to
answer.
Mr. Brown. I was engaged in that study; I am the only one
of the panel who was. It was a study with representatives from
all 11 regions and all the disciplines of the Federal
Protective Service. It included two deputy region directors,
several district commanders, several area commanders, the
first-line of supervision, and three inspectors. We looked at
what the FPS required to do its job, as our mission was
delineated then, in terms of how many inspectors and how many
police officers, and the team recommended a total of about
2,730, of which----
Mr. Oberstar. That was system-wide you were looking at. Did
you do facility-by-facility assessment to determine appropriate
staffing levels?
Mr. Brown. We allocated the staffing levels based on the
four levels of the Department of Justice vulnerability study,
so obviously considerably more for the Level 4, considerably
less for the Level 1, about 9 percent of the Level 4 for the
Level 1; and then we looked at where a facility was located and
looked at about 70 communities where we established they should
have some type of daily proactive patrol based on the number of
employees, the density of the facilities and the security level
there, and 23 cities that should have 24 hour/7 day patrol.
Mr. Oberstar. So you did a very thorough review; facility-
by-facility, level of activity, level of security requirement,
number of Federal employees in the facility.
Mr. Brown. Yes. We didn't reach down to the individual
facility. Our goal was to provide the field supervisors enough
people to handle the average number of facilities in their area
based on its numerical security level and its location, and
then they would have the flexibility, based on individual
threat assessments and threat for their particular area, to
move those people around.
Mr. Oberstar. Here we have a professionally undertaken,
conducted and completed, review of staffing level needed. What
resulted from the effort? To whom was your report submitted?
Mr. Brown. Our report was submitted to the deputy director
of FPS at the time, Mr. Durette, and it was submitted as a
draft. We started in----
Mr. Oberstar. And then where did it go from the deputy
director?
Mr. Brown. I briefed Mr. Durette on it after he became the
acting director and, as a result of that, I developed some
other models with----
Mr. Oberstar. Did he send it on up to ICE?
Mr. Brown. I don't know. The other model I developed I did
brief the Assistant Secretary on.
Mr. Oberstar. You don't know where it went from there,
then.
Mr. Brown. I am not sure where this particular model went,
no, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And, in the end, did the Department of
Homeland Security, in establishing staffing levels, take into
account this study and did they make the adjustments that your
study recommended?
Mr. Brown. Not as far as I know, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. Did your study recommend the level of FPS
personnel as well as any contract personnel?
Mr. Brown. We didn't establish contract levels; we
recommended 1700 and some uniformed FPS inspectors and
officers, and then the special agents, support people and
supervision that would go with that.
Mr. Oberstar. At the outset of the hearing today, I quoted
from the ICE report, which was a very chilling--to me,
shocking--assessment--an honest assessment, it seems to me--of
what would happen, and yet the Department has gone ahead with
stopping levels and with changes and with increases in contract
personnel without taking into account those cautionary
statements. What will be the risk, in your judgment, to Federal
facilities of 50 not having security at all, and others being
downgraded or FPS substituted with contract persons? What will
be the result?
Mr. Ward. It will place those Federal facilities at great
risk of terrorist attack, crimes, and other things that may
occur.
Mr. Oberstar. In Ms. Fallin's comment and accurate
observation which I made in my opening statement, the McVeigh
vehicle was parked on the street; he did not enter the
property. But the lesson we learned from Murrah, the lesson we
learned from the aviation security is that you push the
perimeter ever further out, whether that perimeter is
intelligence gathering from foreign or domestic sources, or
surveillance cameras further out to detect and deter suspicious
activity. If you don't nave enough personnel, you can't push
that perimeter out far enough, is that correct?
Mr. Brown. That is correct.
Mr. Proctor. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. What is the turnover level in your FPS
personnel?
Mr. Brown. From the summer of 2002 until last year, the
force was fairly stable. We brought on new people and they
stayed. Because we had had so many leave before, we were
authorized a 10 percent retention allowance. As they encouraged
people to leave, starting last summer, so that they could get
the numbers down to the budget, they eventually removed that
and I think the turnover rate is going even higher. Everybody
sitting at this table took between a----
Mr. Oberstar. Did you lose retention pay?
Mr. Brown. Yes, we did, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. My experience over 44 years of public service
in the Congress in one capacity or another is that the Federal
Protective Service has been a very stable guard force; that
those who sign up for duty and are in the career force enjoy
their work, are extremely loyal to it, they stay with it. But
as we learned in aviation security, turnover was immense out at
Dulles Airport. They had a 400 percent turnover rate with
Argenbright. They also hired non-English speaking, or at least
non-English fluent guards, others who had not had background
security checks, and some who were not even American citizens.
And I have concerns about turning over protection of our
Federal facilities to contract authority and falling back into
the failure of aviation security.
What training requirements for the private security guards
compared to yours? I know you have answered this for a previous
colleague, but I want you to say it again.
Mr. Brown. The FPS standard requires 40 hours of basic
training and 40 of firearms training if they are going to be an
armed guard----
Mr. Oberstar. Probably half of the security personnel.
Mr. Brown. It varies from State to State.
Mr. Oberstar. From State to State?
Mr. Brown. For a private security guard not contracted by
the Federal Protective Service.
Mr. Oberstar. They don't measure up to Federal standards?
Mr. Brown. There isn't a Federal standard for licensing or
certification of private security guards.
Mr. Oberstar. And they are protecting Federal property.
Mr. Brown. Those that protect Federal property that we hire
through FPS, or I should say we contract through FPS, have a
standard.
Mr. Oberstar. But some agencies have the authority to
contract on their own.
Mr. Brown. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And are their security guards subjected to
FPS standards or to State standards?
Mr. Brown. They are subjected generally to State standards,
not FPS standards.
Mr. Oberstar. And they are protecting Federal property and
Federal personnel.
Mr. Brown. Yes, sir. So they don't undergo the same
rigorous background check that is part of our risk mitigation
strategy with our----
Mr. Oberstar. And we have 15,000 of those in the protective
service.
Mr. Brown. The 15,000 meet the standard. The 15,000 meet
FPS's standard; they receive the background check, they receive
the training that is called for in our contract. But there are
places where other agencies will hire or contract for guards,
or will pay for them through the building owner, and those
guards we don't supervise and we don't apply those measures to.
Mr. Oberstar. Is there a situation where there is a Federal
Government agency also contracts out and you have a mixed force
within the building?
Mr. Brown. Twenty-four facilities on a delegation to the
Passport Agency. The State Department, through the Passport
Agency, hires their own security guard contractors and they
don't work for us, and they work inside the same building as we
maintain----
Mr. Oberstar. So if an emergency occurs and a knife-
wielding suspect, as Congressman Wu described earlier, gets
into the facility, they would call FPS?
Mr. Brown. They would call FPS, and the terms of the
delegation requires them to assist us.
Mr. Oberstar. Do they work 40 hours a week, the FPS-
contracted personnel?
Mr. Brown. Some work more; some work less. That is up to
the contractor and how he meets his requirements. We do
generally prohibit the contract guard from working more than 12
hours in a row.
Mr. Oberstar. Twelve hours in a row. But in the non-FPS
hired force, we have information that typically they do not
work full 40 hours, that their contracts do not include
comparable benefits that you have in retirement and health,
etc., in the Federal workforce.
Mr. Brown. I know that to be the case with two of my
facilities where----
Mr. Nowak. That is the same way it is in Kansas City, sir.
Mr. Proctor. For the most part----
Mr. Oberstar. I didn't mean for Inspector Brown to be
answering everything, but all of you can respond to your own
experience.
Well, that sets up two standards, creates two standards of
service to the public. I want to make it clear that the Federal
Protective Service is there to protect not only the Federal
employees, but those of the public who come to seek services of
the Federal Government. They are also being protected. Keep
that in mind.
Do you have concerns that this contracting out is going to
extend even further than it is today? Do you have inside
information about what further plans are within the Department?
Mr. Ward. No. And where would the money come from? If they
are reducing paid Federal employees who are law enforcement
officers to save money, they are not going to be able to spend
more money on these contract personnel.
Mr. Oberstar. The argument that we have heard is, oh, well,
there isn't enough money to do this, but the OMB, the Office of
Management and Budget, is the one that sets the level, and
Federal Protective Service, I know from several years, has
asked for an increase in the fee they charge the Government
agencies, and OMB has not approved that fee increase.
Mr. Brown. We understand that to be correct, sir, and,
again, that is increasing taxes on other agencies. Their money
is to provide their services to the public. When we reach out
and collect money back from them to pay for us, I think that is
not what we wanted to do with the Department of Homeland
Security being responsible for everything. The money should
probably be appropriated to the Department, and we shouldn't
ask agencies to make decisions on spending their budget to
support the public or to pay for security for their employees.
Mr. Oberstar. I appreciate your statement not only because
it is a very thoughtful statement, but it is something I have
long believed. We are just taking money out of one Government
pocket to put it into another Government pocket, asking one
Federal Government agency to support the activity of another
Government agency which is supposedly rendering service, and
now the agencies you serve are being called customers. I think
that is wacky, frankly. They are not customers, you are in the
business of public service. This is not the Post Office. They
have gone to calling postal patrons customers. Well, if they
want to do that, but the person coming to seek services from a
Government agency is not a customer; it is a citizen of the
United States and should be treated as a citizen, not as a
customer who just blew in off the street. Excuse me.
Mr. Ward. This was discussed on July 17th, 2002. In fact,
before FPS moved into Homeland Security, the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee sent a letter to the Senate
Government Affairs Committee and said that FPS should be funded
directly and the money that is given to these other agencies
should go directly to FPS through DHS or direct appropriations
funding.
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Madam Chair, there are many other questions, some of which
I think we will submit in writing to the panel. There are more
factual affirmations that I would like to see, but I think we
need to move on to the next panel.
Ms. Norton. Are there any more questions for these
witnesses?
I only have one more question, and I just want to apologize
to Deputy Secretary Jackson, who has very kindly sat through
this testimony. He and I work very closely together. We are
going to get to him very shortly. There are things that we are
simply trying to learn, frankly, about these activities and we
are foregoing any number of these questions in order to try to
get written answers.
One thing I just have to understand because I want to be
clear. There is something about making officers, both officers
and inspectors is kind of neat. I am not a member who objects
to efficiencies that do not have a negative impact on the
underlying mission.
If I could tell you where I am coming from, as someone who
headed a Federal agency that was in deep trouble, one of the
first things I did when I went to the EOC was to decide that we
were going to settle cases. The great notion that you had to go
through the Federal courts to do everything made didn't make
any sense. Lawyers understood that you settle cases, and the
earlier you settled them the better. Because in my days as a
student, I came out of the civil rights movement and knew all
the civil rights leaders, they would say, look, Eleanor is
going to settle cases right out from under us. Well, I found
that at the EOC they weren't getting any remedies because the
cases got so old, and once we went into a very professional
settlement mode, as opposed t simply haggling, the remedy rate
went way up.
So I am real open to greater efficiencies. I am even open
to the notion that police officers can be inspectors, because I
know good and well, here in the Capitol, the officers are doing
security when yesterday, if you will forgive me, friends, they
were cops. Today they are not only police officers, you know,
we regard them as our security officers and a lot of what they
are doing we are learning on the job. A lot of it doesn't
involve what you do or what the inspectors do, going around
and, in fact, looking at various places to see what is
happening, although, as you see them patrol, they clearly are
doing precisely that.
I need to know whether my impression is right that the
inspectors will not be doing the kind of patrols that we
learned might be necessary outside the building to keep the
event from coming in or the kind of ordinary police responses
that on the Homeland Security Committee we would regard as
preventative of terrorism or preventative of crime. Will these
inspectors, who obviously will be doing some form of double
duty, continue to patrol the facility to keep it safe the way
every staircase in the Capitol, every floor in the Capitol is
patrolled by a Capitol Police officer?
Mr. Proctor. No, ma'am.
Mr. Ward. No.
Ms. Norton. Will there be any patrol? That is what I want
to know.
Mr. Proctor. Very little. Very little patrol, because of
all the other duties that are required from the physical
security side.
Mr. Ward. In New York City we have the police officers, a
large amount, patrolling around the Federal buildings basically
in the Lower Manhattan area and the outer burroughs, and as a
police officer conducting these patrols myself, I rarely, very
rarely see an inspector on patrol. We have a very limited
number of inspectors, we are understaffed in inspectors because
we lost a few recently, and the workload is just every-
increasing in our COTR responsibilities, as mentioned earlier,
monitoring of the contract guards. All this places an
additional burden on these inspectors, and they are only
inspecting maybe 5 percent or less of their time conducting law
enforcement patrol and response to calls. The burden is even on
the canine officers who are doing the dual duty of inspector
role. So here is a canine, an explosive detection dog that
should be out patrolling the perimeter of our Federal
facilities, sitting in an office while the canine inspector is
conducting his administrative duties related to physical
security of these buildings.
Mr. Brown. The goal, ma'am, of the inspector program is for
the inspector to spend at least half of his time doing that. In
Seattle, we have been fortunate enough to have enough people
that we can spend half of our time doing law enforcement and
patrol work and the other half with surveys and taking care of
the security tasks. It is unusual, but that is because we have
enough inspectors there. There should be more inspectors; there
should be more police officers.
Mr. Nowak. In Kansas City, the inspectors aren't even in
uniform or police officer; they wear khaki pants and a polo
shirt.
Ms. Norton. The inspectors are not peace officers,
necessarily?
Mr. Nowak. They do not wear a uniform, they wear khaki
pants and a polo shirt.
Ms. Norton. Why not at least let them wear a uniform?
Mr. Nowak. I don't know. That is their uniform now.
Mr. Brown. That is not the case in our part of the Country.
We are police officers and we wear a uniform.
Mr. Ward. In New York City we only have two explosive
detection dogs that are assigned to inspectors, and the only
time I see those dogs around the perimeter is when it is--
excuse the lack of a better term--time to walk the dog, and
then go back up to the office and get their paperwork done. But
other than that it is just when the dog needs a break is the
only time the dog is outside any Federal facilities in New
York.
Mr. Proctor. The inspectors here in NCR wear uniforms and
like Inspector Brown said----
Ms. Norton. I don't mind it if they are doing undercover
work, but otherwise the uniform is a deterrent. That is all I
am thinking about. To have fewer people, the more people they
see look like cops, the more people respond as if they are not
supposed to penetrate that.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for testimony of the kind we
need in order to intelligently respond to what the agency is
trying to do.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to say something that apparently
the Federal Government has never done that also came out of
this hearing that I think we would like to perhaps just
investigate with the agency, and that is that you can have
security guards. And I, for one, understand why we have to have
some people who are security guards and others who are peace
officers, but apparently there are no standards, and it does
seem to me, at least with respect to buildings that are either
Federal buildings or buildings where there are Federal
personnel, there would be some minimal standards. Now, those
standards could be set by the local jurisdiction if they were
high enough, but the notion that there would be no standards
uniformly across the Federal workforce would put, it seems to
me, this Committee at risk and has made it look like we didn't
care about our facilities and X, Y, or Z place who were
operating with contract guards, perhaps, who were not up to the
standard of some other place. That is something I want to look
at separately.
Above all, I want to thank each of you for coming here to
Washington--Mr. Proctor, of course, was in the region--for
offering us very important testimony.
I ask that the next witness come forward and excuse these
witnesses.
Again, as he is coming forward, I want to apologize to Mr.
Jackson. It is the way of hearings that there is no way to tell
how long they will take and the Committee was particularly
interested in hearing the perspective of the officer. Perhaps
after hearing it, Mr. Jackson will be able to correct some of
the impressions and help us better understand.
Could I ask you, sir, if you would stand so that I can
administer the oath, as we do to all witnesses?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Jackson. I do.
Ms. Norton. Just briefly, Mr. Secretary, you and I have
worked well together. We are working on very important project
of this Committee together right now and have done so both in
the last Congress and in this Congress very well.
I don't know if you were here when I expressed my concern
about the fact that these officers had been asked to discuss
their testimony ahead of time, even though they were not
appearing in their professional capacity, and even though they
were appearing under subpoena. The kind letter had no
intimidating language in it from the agency; nevertheless, if
you put yourself in the position of the line Federal employee,
has to have an intimidating or at least chilling effect, and
reflecting, it seems to me, on the Committee as well, since the
notion was you wanted to make sure the security and information
that should not be disclosed, as if members of Congress
wouldn't want to protect that as much as the agency.
I don't want to examine you about that; I have written to
the secretary about that. I am only asking that in the future,
particularly since the OMB Circular A-19 contemplates people
who speak for the Administration, that if we are to ever call
upon civil servants again, that they not receive such a letter.
Let me assure you, because I am a longstanding member of a
committee with jurisdiction over civil servants, normally we
call the union. We didn't think the union could tell us what we
wanted to know here. We needed to know from somebody who, as it
were, walked the beat. That is all we are after.
Thank you very much, sir. I am ready to hear your
testimony.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Jackson. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for having me
here. I am grateful to be with Chairman Oberstar and Mr. Graves
as well. I feel very much at home in this Committee. I have
been welcomed here many times before and I am glad to be here
to talk about this important topic.
I would like to just start. I won't try to take, Madam
Chairman, the question that you ended with there into any great
length, but I will tell you that I am extremely grateful and a
tremendous admirer of the work done by FPS. Honestly, the men
and women that do these jobs have a tremendously difficult
challenge in many cases. They are dedicated. You don't do these
type of jobs for the money; you do it because you have a
commitment and a passion to public service, and I respect and
honor and am grateful for that commitment that I see in these
gentlemen.
I have to tell you, if there was a chill cast by any
departmental action, I tried to throw a little heater on it
this morning because I said to these guys before they came up,
I said, thank you for being here, thank you for testifying; say
whatever the heck is on your mind; tell them everything you
know and whatever you think is the right thing to do; these
people are here to help us make FPS a success, and I want you
to be able to say that.
So I will tell you that from the Department's highest
levels we are happy to have these people testifying. We are
happy to do that again in the future with you. I get my
testimony scrutinized by a bunch of lawyers too before I come
here, and I think that is just the standard practice of the
Department, and that is all we are trying to do, is make
certain that we are disciplined in the way that we appear
before you and provide truthful evidence for you.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that you spoke
directly to the officers. Your last remarks made me think that
you were simply working in the ordinary course of business. The
ordinary course of business would not involve these officers
submitting their testimony in any way because they are not
subject to the Circular.
Go ahead.
Mr. Jackson. Okay. I would like just to start in the vein
of saying how important the people are to the success of this
mission.
Chairman Oberstar, to just say a quick word about the
conversation you raised, perhaps I can shed a little light
hopefully for you on the selection of our new director. Gary
Shinkler is in the room with us today here.
Gary, could you raise your hand for the Chairman to see?
I want to tell you about the selection that we made for
him. Gary is a veteran of the Marine Corps and has spent--I am
going to look for it here--29 years in the Marine Corps. He
also is a veteran of the Chicago Police force, and he came to
us, Chairman Oberstar, from the TSA, where he was the deputy
FSD at Chicago Midway Airport, which has a very substantial, as
you know almost as well as anyone, law enforcement mission in
those airports. He was not number three on the list. The list
was, I am told, in alphabetical order. The review was a career
SES review. He was the number one choice of that review of the
career SES folks that looked for it and was the recommendation
made to Julie Meyers, who is here with me today and who is
responsible for ICE and FPS. I am the chairman of the
Department's committee that reviews all SES appointments, and
when I got this one I stopped because it was such an important
one. I went out and did a little bit of my own nosing around to
ask about the guy, and everything that I found was
extraordinarily complimentary of his military, his police, and
his TSA experience.
So I just want you to know that this is not an appointment
that we made lightly, but it is the person who was most
qualified for the job and is an excellent guy. You are going to
like working with him, sir, I can guarantee you that.
I think that the framing remarks for this, first of all,
Madam Chairwoman, can I just thank you for this testimony? This
needs light shone on FPS. You are absolutely right in your
remarks about how important FPS is to the Country, to the
Federal workforce, to those who visit our Federal buildings,
and I welcome having this Committee as partners and us thinking
through what is the future structure, the financial discipline,
and the funding mechanisms necessary to make the workforce that
we need to do the job that is at hand.
I will tell you that Congressman Mica was absolutely spot-
on, and I am grateful for him just pointing out that DHS has
inherited a very complex stew of management, financial, and
operational problems, and we are trying to sort these out. I am
actually very, very impressed at the work that ICE has done to
try to get us to a better place here. I won't try to go through
the financial disciplines and controls that have been put in
place over the last two years, but I will just say that that
report that GAO made where they suggested that there was a $139
million deficit in the amount of money that the fees paid for
is, I believe, spot-on, and we see, even today, in looking at
costs that were picked up by GSA initially in IT, in HR, in
legal, and in building fees--GSA didn't use to charge building
fees for the space that these guys occupy. Now we have to pay
it. We are a--sorry, Mr. Oberstar--customer of GSA and we are
paying the bill. So this is about $59 million worth of expenses
this year, in 2007, that were not part of the cost of doing
business when this was moved, prior to it being moved into DHS.
So I want to just say that this financial and operational
discipline and the work that we are trying to do to make sure
that we are spending the taxpayers' money wisely is responsive
to a slew of GAO and IG reports before this group came to DHS
and after, and we are systematically working through it. I know
one story from my reviews of this, where we had contracting
authority spread out all around the Country so people could
make commitments for a contract workforce and not tell, in a
disciplined way, what was there. We couldn't even obligate the
appropriate amount of money if we didn't know a contract had
been let. In one case, one of Julie Meyers' inspectors went out
and found a pile of these contracts that had not been sent up
through the contracting process, and they became known only
when the bills started piling up and asking for payment. So the
work that has been done in the last two years is something that
I want to just say off to the side here is worth your coming to
understand better and digging into more. It is very substantial
and I think very good.
Let me just talk about the task that we face. I am grateful
for your forbearance. I won't talk long and then we can just
talk questions.
The task that we face is to live within a funding structure
and mechanism that Congress established. It is a fee-based
business. Then we had this gap between the type of costs that
were not covered by the fees but which GSA absorbed that was
the old business model. So now we have that gap that we have to
deal with. During the course of fiscal year 2003, essentially,
in the beginning of fiscal year 2004, this gap was not evident
at DHS because there were some unobligated balances that
carried into DHS that obscured the actual loss of or the gap
between the fees collected and the expense of running the
organization.
In 2004, some of that gap was itself disguised by Katrina,
because what happened is we detailed people in calendar year
2004, we detailed people in effect to the FEMA, FEMA fully
reimbursed all those costs through the Stafford Act funds, and,
therefore, in some cases, for a while, more than 200 people
were not doing FPS police work or investigatory work or
inspector work, they were doing the Lord's work for us at FEMA
and being reimbursed for that.
So last year was when the crisis became absolutely
unmanageable for us. We took almost $30 million from other
parts of DHS to be able to make sure we did not go anti-
deficient in FPS. We have made a proposal for what is a very,
very substantial increase in the fee structure. I would just
note, for example, that Judge Julia Gibbons, who chairs the
judicial conference's budget committee, testified in the other
chamber to the appropriators recently that this increase that
we have proposed is very, very burdensome on the judiciary and
was saying that we are asking too much money for our work here.
So some of our--I am going to call them partners rather than
customers because I am getting my vocabulary right--are not
quite pleased at the big increase that we are asking for to
accommodate our current level of operations.
So let me just make a final set of points and then stop.
It is about what we are doing. First of all, Chairman
Oberstar, the report that you had, I would like to give you
better figures. It was a preliminary work, it was not the final
decision of what we are going to use to guide Gary's new work;
and he is going to finally validate the course of action. I
will give you just one example. In our current thinking, we
actually propose to increase the number of FPS officials in 21
cities, the number of people we have on the ground, and in 19
cities to reduce it. That is just fundamentally different than
the early calculations that you saw from a report that had not
gone through the full process.
The size of this force has grown from, prior to Oklahoma
City, of about 2300 total people on the outsource, the private
contractor, to, after 9/11, now 15,000. So what we have seen is
a growth that was about 7,000, 6,000 to 7,000 outsourced people
prior to 9/11. There has been a very, very substantial growth.
We are trying to bring discipline to how those people are used.
I just want to answer, Madam Chairman, a question you had
at the very end. We actually do impose a standard discipline
for the training. There is a curricula that is established for
the guards by ICE, by FPS. It involves 72 hours of contractor
training and 8 hours of FPS training. These are for the FPS
approved and managed contractors. There are other contractors.
For example, at my former department, at Transportation, they
have had a delegation from GSA to be able to do their own
hiring of this, and it is precisely one of those questions that
we are trying to address in the transformation plan that FPS
and Julie are working on to make certain that we have given
greater clarity and guidance and standards.
I have been through that with you, sir, on the TSA front. I
see this problem, our team does; we are working that. But that
is a considerable amount of training. They have annual firearm
certification; they have a background suitability examination;
and, additionally, on an annual basis they have first aid and
CPR training and periodic refresher courses. So there is an
established and mandatory set of training and background
investigation that is required for our management of these
contracts.
I will just say that there has been a lot of discussion
here this morning about the differences between three types of
law enforcement officers: police officers, investigators, and
our inspectors. So what I want to say to you is I agree with my
colleagues back here, some of them who are inspectors, that we
have not adequately sized and supported the inspector workforce
that we need. Therefore, ICE's proposal in this re-calibration
is to increase by a considerable number that workforce of
inspectors. So what we will do is we will say--I think you
understand that they have the same police training and police
skills that a straight police officer has. They are police
plus. They should wear uniforms, I think. I don't know about
the khaki deal; I will go look at that. But we expect them to
show both presences of doing those two roles.
Our investigators also have substantial law enforcement
capabilities and 1811 certification so they can do the work
that they do. Right now we have about 1131 people actually
working on FPS work on the payroll. We have about 48 that are
assigned to other tasks on a fully reimbursable basis. This is
a non-crisis level reimbursable basis job. One of them is to
help stand up chemical security evaluations and the other one
is to do some work in OPR, our professional responsibilities
for managing the workforce across ICE altogether. So what we
are going to do is grow the inspector workforce and focus on
standards for building, focus on holding people accountable,
getting greater discipline around what will actually work and
how to manage our roles there. We are unable to take the money
that we have in front of us and make it cover the additional
proactive police monitoring work outside these buildings, so we
have taken the assets that we have and we have put them in the
most coherent form that we think we can give to you with the
money that we believe is available to do this job.
So I will just stop there and answer any questions for you
and be happy to unpack a little bit of this to the best of my
ability.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson. It was
important testimony I think you did clear up a number of
matters. What are the cities that will no longer be served by
Federal Protective Service officers?
Mr. Jackson. We have not made a final determination about
this. The number that I mentioned to you is and estimate, and I
would like honestly not to just publish that in the open
hearing here today. I can talk to you about that process
working, but what we are trying to do is let Gary take each of
his regional directors. We are not laying off anybody in this
process; we are using natural attrition, and that natural
attrition is uneven. There may be more in one city that decide
to retire or to move to ICE. We are taking some of these
positions and we are very aggressively trying to offer
individuals who are in the FPS job opportunities in the law
enforcement responsibilities that ICE has. So we have not made
some final Solomaic determination of exactly where----
Ms. Norton. I appreciate that it does not involve layoffs
from a workforce that apparently already has been thinned
enormously, but let me ask you this. We understand there are 50
cities, 50 jurisdictions where you expect that Federal
Protective Service officers will not be necessary. Is that
true?
Mr. Jackson. There are 51 cities right now that have 10 or
fewer police officers. This would be the----
Ms. Norton. Ten or fewer of FPS?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, ma'am, police officers. This would be the
universe of places where I think the likelihood would be that
we would end up with no officers if there is a city that ends
up with no police officer.
I will tell you I looked at the list this morning, and
there are a considerable number of mid-sized cities in the
Country that have one officer, one police officer in that city.
That is not a 24/7 cover, it is only 8 hours cover, and it is
not what I would call a substantial enhancement to the law
enforcement capabilities if we only can marshal one person for
that city. So what we are doing is we are taking a risk-based
approach, we are saying cities like New York, Washington, Los
Angeles, Chicago, places where there is a large Federal
concentration and a larger risk is where we will move the
resources that we have.
Ms. Norton. At some point, of course, it is going to be
common knowledge where the FPS cities are or are not, so we
would ask you to submit that for the record as soon as those
cities have been determined.
Mr. Secretary, I want you to know I don't have any bias in
terms of location of personnel. The real question is coverage
and prevention. Obviously, we also have very different threats
in different parts of the Country, and I am the first, sitting
here in the District of Columbia, to understand that. In fact,
your agency has been criticized not for what you did, but for
what Congress did in kind of depositing people and resources
all over the Country without regard to risk and consequences.
So it is the risk assessment that the Committee will want to
see when entire jurisdictions are reduced to no FPS officers.
How, then, are these MOUs to work? If I am sitting in a
local jurisdiction where you have carefully negotiated an MOU
saying the local police agree to come, do they know that there
are not going to be any peace officers there?
Mr. Jackson. No, ma'am. This is not an easy task and a
simple turnkey thing where a bunch of people like me are going
to sit in Washington and say do it this way and, you know, hope
it works. These will require leveraging the very substantial
relationships that we have with the local law enforcement
community to say--let's look at two categories. If we are
eliminating presence of a police patrol capability in a given
location and we have an MOU there, what we will have to do is
revisit that MOU and say can you backstop with local police
support some of the activity that we were previously----
Ms. Norton. Why should they do that? This is an unfunded
mandate. You are saying we don't have any now. We have got to
ask you to amend this MOU because there are no peace officers
here. Why should a local jurisdiction agree, once you want to
change the terms of the MOU?
Mr. Jackson. Well, there are approximately 780,000 State
and local law enforcement officers in this Country. We have a
couple of hundred FPS police officers. So what we think is that
in those locations where we need to that we can ask the
cooperation of these----
Ms. Norton. No, no, my question is why should they. In my
opening statement, I said that the crime spurt throughout the
United States now, and we have had $2 billion cut in funding
for local police like the cops. Why should a local police
officer agree to this and if so, why should he give reports
from Federal facilities any priority, given his own
responsibilities in the local area?
Mr. Jackson. Because if I am a chief of police, if I can
borrow what Congressman Oberstar said, these are my citizens.
These are my people that I am protecting. I am the chief of
police and this is my city and I am going to try to make
certain that all the facilities----
Ms. Norton. This may or may not be the people who you are
protecting. It is in a Federal facility.
Mr. Jackson. But they live in those communities, they work
in those communities, the people visiting there. It is the same
enforcement. Look, I understand that we are making tough
choices here. But I can't----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, it is not that you are making
tough choices. You are making choices for the local
jurisdiction which the Committee cannot guarantee will protect
the visitors and the employees in that jurisdiction. And very
frankly, as somebody who knows something about local law
enforcement, I think a police chief would be crazy to accept
those terms. It is an unfunded mandate. You don't want the
expense on the big kahuna's budget, and you want to shift it to
local jurisdictions and they ought to take it with a smile? How
do you think they are going to do that? Because we have to
probe that kind of change and wonder if there is greater risk,
both terrorism and to criminal incidents.
I am not one of those who say you have to have Federal
police presence of the kind the FPS, round the clock Saturday
and Sunday. Look, I am 24/7 here because I represent the
District of Columbia. If you come down Independence to our
entrances, you will see one entrance manned on the weekends.
That is the South Capitol--sorry, that is the New Jersey, the
main entrance. Go to D Street, you won't see any of those
manned. If you come to South Capitol--have I complained? The
reason I have not complained is because I do believe in risk
assessments. I don't think about Al Qaeda, and say, wow, nobody
is in the building, this is a great time to bomb the Capitol.
Of course, we are at the Capitol, our folks are at the Capitol
24/7. I think that this was long before DHS was set up, over
here the Capitol Police, who have the most to lose, decided on
a risk basis that it was a waste of their personnel to put
people all along D Street, to put people all along Independence
Avenue, the way they are most of the time, but to have someone
at the main entrance.
I know there will be people on my Committee who disagree
with me. Well, I disagree with them. We can't take the position
in the Department of Homeland Security that funds ought to be
done based on a risk analysis throughout the Country. Hey, but
when it comes to us, or for that matter, Federal employees, we
want to be covered with security.
But what we need to see if your risk analysis. Again, you
see, I am on both committees, we will be very, very leery of
invidious comparisons between the kind of security we want for
people like us and the kind of security we want for two million
fellow employees, for visitors who walk into a Social Security
building, or for after-hours. So you need to be on notice that
we are going to insist upon being briefed on the risk analysis
when in fact we find whole jurisdictions with no peace officer
dependent upon the local police chief to give our facility,
with all we have invested in it, and our employees and our
visitors all the attention they deserve. Because after all, we
are all one big, happy family. You ask a police chief who his
family is when it comes to his regular duties.
I want to go on to Mr. Graves, then to the Chairman.
Mr. Graves. I don't have any questions, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Oberstar. Well, Madam Chair, I think you described the
situation here at the Capitol very well. We are not securing
the perimeter here on weekends very effectively. That is not
Secretary Jackson's concern, but it is a good lesson for the
other Government agencies that we are dealing with.
In your description of, first of all, your entire
statement, which I read in detail last night and again this
morning, will appear in full in the record, of course, and any
supplements that you wish to make thereto will be included as
well. It is always a pleasure to have you here before the
Committee. There was a time when you spent a good deal of your
life here in this Committee room when we were doing TSA.
Now, let's go to the funding issue, because I think that is
at the core of much of what is happening. It is true that the
Office of Management and Budget sets the fee scale, is it not?
Mr. Jackson. The Administration does, and----
Mr. Oberstar. OMB makes that decision.
Mr. Jackson. The Administration does, and OMB is part of
the Administration, yes, sir. I am not going to run away from
the Administration in that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oberstar. Specifically, it is done, I know, I have been
dealing with the green eyeshade folks for 40 years. But the fee
is not OMB's origination. They didn't create it. It was just
there. It evolved over time, probably as an adjunct to the
Federal Public Buildings Fund, in which agencies contribute to
the fund and from which future structures are built or leased.
Is this shuffle an appropriate way to fund this security
function? Have you given that some thought about whether, now,
in aviation, there is the security fee that passengers pay. And
it covers nearly all of the TSA operational function.
Mr. Jackson. Well, maybe not all of it.
Mr. Oberstar. A good portion. I said nearly. There is a big
gap, yes, a gap that we need to fill. But it fills what it was
intended to do largely in the beginning. But that is a
different mission from this one. And from a budget standpoint,
you have done a great deal with budgets, does it make a
difference, does it have a budgetary effect whether the funding
comes directly from an appropriation and a funding request from
the Administration to FPS, or through the shuffle from the
several constituent agencies?
Mr. Jackson. As you know, sir, that is an excellent
question. It goes to the heart of what we are struggling with
in terms of the financial stream. Let me try to answer it as
honestly as I can and with the intellect that I can bring to
the topic. I am going to tell you that there are pros and cons
to this on both sides. Let me just try to eliminate some of
that.
Mr. Oberstar. But my question is, is there a budgetary
effect, pro or con?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, there is.
Mr. Oberstar. Answer the question.
Mr. Jackson. So on that score, for example, there are many
places in DHS where we are fee-funded, as you have already
indicated, through TSA. Our citizenship and immigration
services is virtually entirely fee-funded. That is a legitimate
way to do business and it works. And Congress in its wisdom
over the years has continued this method of funding FPS.
There is one downside, for example, since you have to
anticipate changes in the services that we need to provide in
the growth and you have to model those fees in advance of the
time that you collect them. So there can be changed in the
environment, changes in the threat, and some lag there as we
collect them. There are always unknowns with respect to some
margin of the fee that we would ultimately collect that have to
do with new buildings opening and closing and delegations that
might authorize a particular agency not to operate within this
structure of the same type of fee collection.
Most of the agencies, for example, to whom we have
delegated the responsibility for doing their own guard service,
for example, are paying the basic fee that is our basic service
charge, which covers the perimeter outside, not the work that
is done inside the building. So I think that you could, in
principle, imagine paying for this both from direct
appropriation and from a fee. The fee works, it just requires a
little bit of skill. It also honestly, when it is at the bottom
of the line, when it has hit DHS now, it is no longer part of
the big rent payment that you make to GSA and all of the IT
office space, HR, lawyer expenses that were bundled at GSA into
serving the FPS needs are gone now. We are having to pay for
those out of this fee.
So it does put a big spotlight for our Federal partners on
that fee. It creates some discontent, as I mentioned to you
earlier, from the Judiciary testimony earlier.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes. The budgetary effect is that this cost
does not appear on the books of the Department of Homeland
Security, it appears on the books of the several constituent
agencies housed in the respective Federal buildings, correct?
Mr. Jackson. That is correct.
Mr. Oberstar. From a budgetary standpoint, if it is $100
million, just to pick a number out of the air, it has no
relationship to anything, if it costs $100 million in fees from
the several Government agencies who are paying it out of their
appropriated funds, or if it is $100 million appropriated to
and allocated to the FPS. The budgetary effect is nil.
Mr. Jackson. I think that is right, sir. I am not a total
budget geek here.
Mr. Oberstar. I am not asking you to certify this. It will
not be covered under your oath.
Mr. Jackson. Tell me when that time period stops, sir. You
are getting straight answers all the time.
Mr. Oberstar. But from the standpoint of the public and
from this view of the Congress, there is greater transparency
in the latter.
Mr. Jackson. I would argue there is substantial
transparency in this one. Because we know how much money comes
and hits the bottom line as revenue. Instead of showing it as a
budget item all placed in one location, you are still seeing
that same total dollar figure, and you are getting something
additional of value, which is to say, you have a greater degree
of transparency into where those services are actually coming
from, who we are helping, how we are doing it, in what
proportion and where those priorities and risks are.
Mr. Oberstar. Now, we have, is it correct to say that fully
loaded cost for an FPS officer grade 8 is roughly $100,000?
Mr. Jackson. It is $121,000, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And a fully loaded cost for a contract guard
is in the range of $83,0000?
Mr. Jackson. It is $83,720 is our estimate.
Mr. Oberstar. Are we getting value for value?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, we are getting value from both. But they
are very different.
Mr. Oberstar. What are the values?
Mr. Jackson. They are different functions.
Mr. Oberstar. They are different missions.
Mr. Jackson. Different missions, yes, sir.
Mr. Oberstar. And different training levels?
Mr. Jackson. Exactly.
Mr. Oberstar. Skills?
Mr. Jackson. Exactly. They are not law enforcement
officials. They don't have arrest authority, they don't have
the same set of responsibilities, training and skills that the
law enforcement officers have. But as I have explained in the
training curricula that we are trying to impose in a
disciplined and systematic way, there is a substantial
requirement. In our days of talking about the pre-TSA
screeners, you could basically become a screener in a morning.
And here what we are talking about is substantial training, 80
hours of training, basically.
So that is not an inconsequential requirement when you add
also the annual qualifications and the certifications that are
ongoing.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, but there is recertification, 40 hours
every two years for a contract officer and every year for----
Mr. Jackson. Exactly, appropriately so.
Mr. Oberstar. Are there circumstances, other circumstances
in which an individual Federal office building among the
several agencies, where one of them opts out to contract with
private security guards and they operate in the same structure
with FPS officers?
Mr. Jackson. I am not sure I understand the question.
Mr. Oberstar. What I am getting at is whether, and I ask
the question blind, which in a hearing like this I don't like
to do, because you are never sure of the answer you are going
to get. What I am getting at is whether there are situations in
which there are multiplicity of services.
Mr. Jackson. There are a variety of services that do
sometimes overlap in the same buildings. So for example, if we
have one tenant, think of the first one, which is built into
our basic services agreement. It covers the work that my
colleagues were speaking about, of the police officers who
provide perimeter security and patrol. And also our people who
do the evaluations of how to structure the security for a given
building, the inspectors. That is paid by the basic fee.
Inside the building, there is a building-specific fee. So
for example, the building that Congressman Wu talked about
early in his testimony did not have a guard force at the front
door. It would have to be paid by an assessment for that
specific building, by the occupants of that building. That
building has both Federal and private sector tenants and they
have a security committee that works with our FPS officers to
determine what is the best set of security tools and can they
afford it and will they pay for it.
So that is something of a negotiation that we have to do
with each of the buildings in which we operate to say what
level of security do we recommend. And remember, that is
exactly where we are trying to beef up our team, to be standard
setters, to look across and see best practices, to make certain
that we are giving good counsel about risk-based investments to
these buildings. But the individual tenants ended up having to
pony up and pay.
So sometimes we could be in a building where FPS is
providing private contract type of assets, cameras or the like,
to a portion of the tenants and another contractor is doing so
directly for another Federal agency.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, I asked the question earlier of the
officers who were testifying about the effect of a survey that
was done for appropriate staffing levels. And I want to ask you
if you have completed review of that issue. I refer to the
report, the internal report on the Federal Protective Service
transition to fiscal year 2008 budget. And you said that was an
interim report. Do you have it completed?
Mr. Jackson. We do have a more complete and more
contemporary version of that.
Mr. Oberstar. When would we get a copy of that?
Mr. Jackson. I have to ask when it would be available.
Within a month or so. What we are trying to do is let our new
director, these reports were built bottom up from each of the
11 regions. We have given advice to the director----
Mr. Oberstar. Have you determined whether ICE is the final
location for FPS and why, and when you are answering that, why
can't it stand on its own? Why does it have to be subsumed into
another agency?
Mr. Jackson. I do believe that ICE is the right home. One
of the reasons I believe that ICE is the right home is that
this organization is in a considerable need of the financial
discipline, the management supervision, the financial controls,
the IT systems, and the support that comes from having a big
brother that makes you part of his family.
Mr. Oberstar. Yes, well, we saw FEMA having big brother
oversight, and it just went to hell in a handbasket, Mr.
Secretary.
Mr. Jackson. Well, we just gave FEMA a lot more plates to
say grace over. And I think in this case, honestly, Mr.
Chairman, ICE has made this a very significant priority. I
personally in our second stage review looked and talked to
other operating component heads in the Department about whether
there was a better place for it. We had those types of
conversations with virtually every component in the Department.
I came to the conclusion, and Mike Chertoff came to the
conclusion that this was the best home for this organization,
inside the Department.
By being part of just a slightly larger organization, and
ICE is a large organization, the largest law enforcement
organization in the Department, they have a natural nexus to
the law enforcement mission in support for this. But they also
have these management controls and financial controls and
procurement assets that are inherently part of ICE that are
being used to support the mission of FPS. I think that is a
very valuable thing at this stage in FPS' evolution.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, in your, in your testimony, you present
the work of the Department of Homeland Security as taking over
a problem-ridden Federal Protective Service and correcting it.
Instead, what has happened is, the number of contract guards
has gone up, the number of professional officers has gone down.
There are more facilities that are unprotected by FPS officers
than previously. And it does not appear that security is
improved; rather, it appears to be dis-served.
Mr. Jackson. I think we are improving security, and I think
we are clearly improving the management, discipline and
financial accountability for the taxpayers' investment that is
taking place within FPS. Are we at the perfect stage? No,
absolutely not. But we are repairing fundamental ruptures in
how the organization was supported.
The last thing I want is to say, I am not going to have
enough people to do this mission. But it is also equally
irresponsible for us to say, we are not going to train them, we
are not going to let them travel, we are not going to let them
have the skills, the tools, the support they need to do their
job. We are here cutting our losses and focusing on the things
that really matter most, which is this somewhat new vision of
where FPS' core capabilities should be focused.
And that is why I welcome this dialogue with the Committee,
who needs to own this with us, to think through this with us
and to understand it in the same way we do. But we are trying
to beef up this capacity to look at a building, see its
vulnerabilities and insist upon the work force that is
contracted out to meet standards that we will define, to go in
and audit them and to watch them and to work with them to make
certain that they are doing the job right.
So that is the skill set we are bumping up. That is why we
are adding a very considerable number of people to the work
force for the inspectors.
Mr. Oberstar. You cited earlier sort of evaluating
facilities into various size, large size and mid-size and
smaller size. Is Oklahoma City a mid-size city?
Mr. Jackson. I would say so, yes, sir. It is a larger city,
it is not the small size I was talking about. I will give you
just an example.
Mr. Oberstar. Will it have a force?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, it will have a force.
Mr. Oberstar. All right. FPS is historically, as we have
discussed, a fee for service operation. ICE is not.
Mr. Jackson. That is correct.
Mr. Oberstar. How do you mesh those two cultures within the
same entity?
Mr. Jackson. Where your money comes from, to be honest,
doesn't have anything to do with the culture and the ability to
operate it.
Mr. Oberstar. That partially answers the question I asked
you earlier.
Mr. Jackson. It is a Government convenience that has been
established for us. We are going to make either way that the
revenue stream arrives on the table work. But in this case,
there is a strong, I think, affinity because of the law
enforcement mission of ICE and their capacity to work on
investigations and operational details with our guys.
Mr. Oberstar. Is the culture of FPS likely to be shifted,
modified from community policing, from crime prevention, like a
traditional uniformed police department to be molded into the
service of ICE? Are you going to maintain the separate culture
and identity and mission of FPS within ICE?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir, absolutely. We are trying to, I know
it seems peculiar and even to some of my colleagues in FPS, but
what we are trying to do is preserve their capacity to excel at
their unique mission and to give them the focus and the mission
clarity and the tools necessary to be successful. We are not
trying to make one big mush and say it is all ICE. What we are
saying is, ICE is the administrative home for a very important
and unique asset, FPS, and we want to burnish and support FPS
within that framework.
Mr. Oberstar. Well, it is an infrastructure protection
service, that of FPS. We want to make sure that continues, and
we don't want to leave Achilles heels, for want of a better
term, around the Country. Had the Murrah Building been the
result of an Al Qaeda operative, it would have turned the
Country into a tailspin. It is bad enough that they hit New
York City. But to strike in the hinterland of the United
States, in the heartland of the Country, to have something like
that go off in Duluth or in Billings, Montana, as a result of a
terrorist assault would be destructive.
So be careful, be careful. We are looking very carefully at
the beginning of this process at those facilities that have
been left vulnerable, if you will.
Mr. Jackson. Mr. Oberstar, there is really almost no one in
Congress that I admire more for his capacity to focus with
passion on these issues, that is why I enjoyed working with you
so much, even when we disagree on the particulars. We are in a
constant balancing game that 9/11 has magnified to a whole new
level. It is trying to decide how to balance security and
safety with mobility and affordability in some appropriate
balance. We are looking all the time at the risks from all
sorts of sources from the tragic type of events that we saw in
Blacksburg earlier this week to the Murrah Building itself.
So I cannot guarantee that we will always find that balance
with some perfection. Because after an attack or after an
incident, it will look clear that oh, gee, we should have put
more at it. We are trying to work with you here and to find
where that right balance point is, how to support this
important team, how to take the men and women who put that gun
on every day successful and to protect them and to defend them
and support them.
So I think we are finding a relatively reasonable and
affordable balance point right now. It could be tweaked, and we
will be happy to talk to you about tweaks.
Mr. Oberstar. We will do more than tweaking. We will do
some very serious in-depth discussions, starting with the
manner in which FPS is funded. It has not been revisited in a
very long time, should have been. We need to rethink that
process from a budget standpoint and from an individual agency
service standpoint. The respective roles of security guards and
FPS officers, the right-sizing of facilities, you know, we go
through that periodically at FAA and right-sizing towers and
centers and TRACONs. You know that from your work at the
Department. That is a matter that we look forward to working in
a very intensive, cooperative fashion, and we should not be
waiting four months for an answer to a letter we sent in
December.
Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. If there is a letter that has been
four months outstanding, I don't know about it and I will get
you an answer if I can.
Mr. Oberstar. We have to vacate this room, because we have
another hearing coming.
Ms. Norton. I would like to give Mr. Bishop the
opportunity, and of course, we have another panel, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to focus on a facility that is in my district. But
before I do, what I hear you saying is that the decision to cut
the number of Federal Protective Service staff by 25 percent is
a decision that at least in part is driven by the inability to
identify offsetting revenue. Is that essentially what you are
saying?
Mr. Jackson. I am saying that the revenue issue is a real
and meaningful thing that we are trying to find the balance.
Mr. Bishop. All right. We are saying the same thing. I am
not going to ask you to comment on this, but I am forced to
observe that the very same Administration that thinks that this
is a good idea is the Administration that is presiding over the
expenditure of $19 million an hour on a war of choice, is
presiding over the subject of the hearing we are going to have
in this room in about an hour, in which we have squandered tens
of millions of dollars on bolts that no longer can be used
because of design flaws. This is one of the reasons why I think
people have lost faith in the way in which we make decisions
here in Washington. But I will leave that aside.
I have a facility in my district called the Plum Island
Animal Disease Laboratory. In September of 2003, the Government
Accountability Office issued a report on the inadequacy of the
security at that facility and cited several specific ways in
which the security was inadequate. The response of the
Department of Homeland Security at that time was to place two
Federal Protective Service people on the island. Those people
have now been withdrawn and there has been, as I understand it,
a memorandum of understanding entered into with the Southold
town police force, which is a first-rate force, but very small.
They, as I understand it, are expected to be the first
responders for any incident that takes placed on the island.
They are very good, but they are separated from the island by a
45 minute boat ride.
So my question to you, in response to a question that was
put to you by Chairman Oberstar, you said that you believed
that the net effect here was that we were improving security.
How do you square that statement with what specifically is
happening on this facility in my district?
Mr. Jackson. I would like to be able to get back to you on
the details of what is going on on Plum Island. I am
exquisitely aware of that facility and the importance of that
facility to the Nation. It is not a GSA-controlled facility, so
it doesn't flow under the normal revenue stream and controls
that----
Mr. Bishop. But it is a DHS-controlled facility.
Mr. Jackson. It is a DHS facility, yes, sir. Therefore, and
it is a very important DHS facility that deserves our
protection. My understanding of where that is is that our new
Under Secretary for Science and Technology has worked on this
issue to be able to make certain that we are providing
appropriate security. I would like to be able to consult with
him.
Mr. Bishop. In fairness, he has responded to a letter that
I sent to him. But the response is that we have this MOU with
the Southold town police force. So that is a response that----
Mr. Jackson. I understand your point.
Mr. Bishop. It looks good on paper, yes, we are dealing
with it. But in the real world, to have the response mechanism
be separated by 45 minutes worth of a boat ride, I think you
would agree fall short of what we ought to be striving for.
The other thing I would say, my current understanding is
that in order for the Southold town police force to have arrest
authority on Plum Island, they must be first deputized. My
current understanding is that they are not yet deputized. So
following from that, if an incident were to take place today on
Plum Island, what law enforcement body would have authority to
execute an arrest?
Mr. Jackson. I will get back to you with that answer. It is
a very fair and appropriate question. Let me just get you the
facts.
Mr. Bishop. Okay. Let me just go one further thing. This
was a question that I asked before with the panel of officers.
New York is taking a 45 percent hit on the allocation of
officers, according to the chart that I believe is part of your
presentation. We are going from 99 officers in Federal Region
II to 56, which is a reduction of 43. I am just doing it in my
head, it is roughly a 45 percent reduction.
Mr. Jackson. I think that is the same problem that I spoke
to Chairman Oberstar about, which is the version of the paper
that I think the Committee has gotten possession of is not the
version that the ICE folks and the FPS folks are working on.
Mr. Bishop. So you are saying that when we get the same
version that you have I will be looking at different numbers
for New York that will be somewhat less distressing than these?
Mr. Jackson. I think so, yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Okay, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Oberstar. The Secretary has committed to submitting a
complete accounting for all of this to the Committee in the
next month or so.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. I want to thank you, Mr.
Secretary. Just a further question. I had wondered whether or
not there was a functional equivalent to 9-1-1 in the Federal
Police Service so that a Federal employee can dial it. Is
there?
Mr. Jackson. A 9-1-1 for FPS?
Ms. Norton. You dial 9-1-1, you are dialing into a backup.
For FPS, is there a number like 9-1-1 that Federal employees
have access to?
Mr. Jackson. Is there a single number? I think so.
Ms. Norton. What is it?
Mr. Jackson. One eight seven seven for FPS, 4-1-1.
Ms. Norton. That is outrageous. Why do you think 9-1-1 was
invented?
Could I ask you, sir, to go back and at least do this
rudimentary thing, for the FPS, I am very concerned whether or
not there is an FPS presence or not that is not some shorthand
way to--I don't know these folks in Congressman Wu's office
knew where to call. I bet they were not carrying that around in
their head.
Mr. Jackson. They were not. We provide the numbers for
local response to our occupants in our facilities, so that they
know ho immediately to get access to the security services in
their building.
Ms. Norton. I am asking for the functional equivalent of 9-
1-1. If it is an FPS, you heard testimony for example from New
York, they were still waiting to come an hour later and FPS has
been right there. We don't need to hear that about New York. If
there is a number, it could differ place to place, I don't know
why it shouldn't be a nationwide number, I don't know, 8-1-1. I
don't know what it is. But could I ask you to report back to us
in 30 days whether or not that is feasible to do?
Mr. Jackson. Yes, certainly.
Ms. Norton. I am going to let you go. Let me just say to
you on two points, if you want us to add anything on the, some
agencies are dazzled by brass. So if someone says they have
been in the military, that is the functional equivalent of
everything we need, I don't have any way to judge whom you
chose. You indicated that you chose somebody from the Marine
Corps. My first notion would be, was he in the Marine Corps
police, would have some police experience in Chicago some years
back. The best qualified person, as I understood, was a deputy
director who had that experience and the managerial experience.
We looked at who is chosen in the Department of Homeland
Security, particularly after Katrina and being dismayed at what
it took to become a high level official in the agency then. So
I want you to know that it is hard for me to understand, except
for some overlay of military credentials, why being in the
Marine Corps, unless you were in the Marine Corps police. If
you had Federal experience, there may be other reasons. But
apparently this was deemed by the credentials best qualified.
I want you to know on inspectors versus patrol, you heard
me say perhaps to the officers that I kind of like
efficiencies. Those of who believe in government ought to take
the lead on efficiencies. It is hard for us to reconcile double
duty and efficiencies. It is hard for us to reconcile double
duty and cutting the work force as efficient. I want you to
know that our concern is rooted in fact. In 2007, the ICE FPS
budget showed 1,543 officers would be needed to do the FPS job.
Now apparently 915 and going down every day. This in spite of
the fact that everybody else over here has gulped up, because
we are adding duties. So everywhere where there are high level
Federal officials, like in the Congress or in the White House,
you stumble over a cop. Here we reduce it, and yet tell them
you are supposed to be an inspector, you are supposed to look
at everything.
My concern, patrols. We are not here to simply say, respond
when the blow the place up. You understand full well as a high
level official in Homeland Security, the point is prevention.
We fail to understand how lack of patrols assures the safety of
Federal employees, visitors, judges, and the like. We are very
concerned about the six month figures, 1,300, I mean, 850
thefts, 33 aggravated assaults. These are nation figures. One
hundred seventy-seven incidents involving weapons and
explosives. We are living here in the shadow of Virginia Tech.
It is disturbing.
We have heard your testimony. I wanted you to leave with my
concerns about the disparity between increased duties and a
decreasing work force and my lack of confidence that this kind
of disparity promotes efficiency. And you are talking to a
member who likes the notion of efficiency and who does not see
a problem with contractors, risk based, does not see a problem
with people being inspectors and peace officers. But when I
learned that nobody is patrolling to prevent incidents of
terrorism and crime, then you get my attention.
Sir, if you have anything to say before you leave the
panel, I would be glad to hear it.
Mr. Jackson. No, ma'am. Thank you for the focus you are
bringing to this issue. We look forward to working with you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. We will be seeing you on the new
headquarters shortly.
Mr. Jackson. Good.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for all
your patience and for your very informative and graciously
given testimony.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. The last panel, David Wright, President of the
American Federal of Government Employees, Local 918; and Chuck
Canterbury, President of the Fraternal Order of Police.
Gentlemen, we apologize to you. I think you understand why
we had to proceed in some detail with those witnesses, and we
did not mean to give you short shrift.
I wish you would each raise your right hand and respond. Do
you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
[Witnesses respond in the affirmative.]
Ms. Norton. Please be seated.
Which of you would like to proceed first?
Mr. Wright. Madam Chair, I will proceed first. I have a
verbal statement I would like to open with.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 918; CHUCK CANTERBURY, PRESIDENT,
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Madam Chair, members of the
Committee.
On behalf of the FPS police officers, inspectors, special
agents and other key personnel at the Federal Protective
Service, represented by AFGE, I am David Wright, President of
Local 918, the National Federal Protective Service Union. I am
also a veteran FPS police officer-inspector of 21 years.
Madam Chair, it appears that we are at one of the lowest
points in this agency's history and at a critical decision
point for its future. I find it disturbing that I am testifying
before you and the Committee on the eve of the 12th anniversary
of the destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City on April 19th, 1995, defending the notion that
Federal law enforcement officers on 100 percent proactive
patrol are the most viable front line protection against
terrorism and crime at Federal facilities.
The Federal Protective Service is the only Federal agency
charged with a specific mission of protecting and securing
virtually all GSA-controlled facilities across the U.S., some
8,800 in total. These buildings often house sensitive and high
level Government offices, Federal court buildings, numerous
agency headquarters and public access facilities, such as
Social Security and Immigration offices. I need not remind
anyone in this room, particularly officials at the Department,
that the most infamous terrorist attacks on U.S. soil occurred
either at Federal buildings or in buildings which house Federal
agencies. For example, the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City on
April 19th, 1995, and at the World Trade Center on February
26th, 1993 and September 11th, 2001.
As an FPS officer, it is extremely difficult for me to
imagine a more likely strategic or symbolic target for
terrorists than a building that houses U.S. Government
operations. Despite an obvious need to invest in or rebuild
this critical Homeland Security Agency responsible for
protection of Federal facilities, the Department proposal will
result in the elimination of most direct law enforcement
services by FPS.
Two hundred forty-nine Federal Protective police officer
positions directly responsible for law enforcement patrol and
response to Federal properties are to be eliminated. Most FPS
special agent positions responsible for prosecution of Federal
crimes, intelligence gathering and dissemination will be cut.
The Administration's budget submission offers this
description of its plan for FPS in fiscal year 2008. In 2008,
the Federal Protective Service will set security standards and
enforce the compliance of those standards to protect Federal
facilities. Those few words in the budget submission belie a
proposal that is both dangerous and in our opinion, foolhardy,
in the post-9/11 world in which we live. If anyone in this room
doubts me on this, let me quote directly from a document
prepared by U.S. ICE and FPS officials for the FPS regional
directors, dated December 20th, 2006, where the agency
describes the impact of the proposal:
``No proactive patrol to deter attack planing and detect or
deter suspicious and criminal activity; no response to calls
for police service to protect Federal employees and visitors,
or to investigate crimes at Federal facilities in areas where
FPS will no longer have a presence; no FPS presence in
approximately 50 current cities; participation in FBI joint
terrorism task forces reduced to 12 special agents from 24;
special agents available to investigate serious crime reduced
to 14 from 58; no night or weekend police response or service
anywhere; largest reductions in New York and Washington, D.C.
due to proactive activity elimination.''
And the list goes on, Madam Chair. We have attached a copy
of this document for the record.
The agency has since issued statements to employees and the
media denying the official nature of the document and describe
a plan which leaves out the above particular highlights.
Nonetheless, these are the facts as detailed by the agency and
they are, in our view, shocking.
Madam Chair, members of this Committee, I urge you to
reject this ill-conceived initiative proposed because of a
financial deficit due to problems that the Department has
neglected to remedy. Before we decide to eliminate this core
FPS responsibility, let us pause and take a close look at
whether this is the direction we really want to go. Do we
really want to reduce this agency to an essentially regulatory
body with no real law enforcement responsibilities? Do we
really want to rely on a few hundred inspectors to oversee and
ensure compliance with security guidelines for a vast work
force of 15,000 private security guards? And finally, do we
really want to reduce one facet of our Nation's essential
homeland security protection just six years after September
11th? I don't think so, and pray that you don't, either.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Wright. We will go to
Mr. Canterbury.
Mr. Canterbury. Madam Chairperson, thank you for the
ability to be here. I think I probably bring a very unique view
to the panels that you have had today in that I represent State
and local police officers. I am a retired deputy chief of about
a 250 man police department in South Carolina, and I am
President of the National Fraternal Order of Police, the
largest police labor organization in the Country.
I have heard quite a bit today about police response from
State and local, MOUs, cooperation. I think the most important
thing that I have heard here today was when Mr. Oberstar talked
about human life versus capital. The new HR term in the Country
is human capital. Well, where I live, that is people.
One of the things that as a State and local police officer
I want to let you know is that we are going to respond to calls
for service when called by citizens in our States. But I will
tell you that the added responsibility of responding to Federal
buildings will just add to the over-burden that local law
enforcement has today. We talked about the 750,000 State and
local officers that are out there. That is a reduction over
what there was five years ago in the United States. Our funding
has been cut over $2 billion, as Ms. Norton, as you relayed on
several occasions today. On top of that, more responsibilities
with these cuts.
We talked about the honesty of ICE in this report. I think
it was refreshing to see that they talked about being a
reactive rather than a proactive force. One of the things that
I have testified before Congress before is that we would much
rather be a preventive force than have to send red, shiny fire
trucks to clean up a problem.
When we are here talking about appropriations and homeland,
we believe that prevention would be much better than having to
react. We bring that to this Committee again today and say that
our brothers and sisters in the Federal Protective Service, I
will let you know that if I respond to a Federal building in my
jurisdiction, I do not want to be met at the door by a contract
security guard that slept in a Holiday Inn Express last night.
I want to be met by a professional law enforcement officer who
has attended FLETSI, who has received the same training level
that I have received, and that I could interact in an emergency
situation, having full faith and confidence that as a police
officer I would enter that building with equal or even better
skills than the State and locals.
That is not to disparage contract security officers. They
have a job to do. But they do not have the same training,
capabilities, knowledge, skills and abilities of the police
officers that are protecting these Federal buildings today. So
we urge you to look at those issues.
But the most important thing that I have heard out of this
is, I don't believe that DHS or ICE have any real goal to
reduce force for efficiency. It is a budgetary issue. I sit
here today and ask that this Committee relay to the powers that
be in this matter that whether it is fee-based or
appropriations-based, FPS needs to be funded to a level to
protect the citizens of the United States. That is the most
important thing I heard here today. I would like to relay on
behalf of the Fraternal Order of Police that we support this
Committee's efforts to look at that and protect human capital,
which is the most important thing that we as police
professionals do.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Canterbury.
Mr. Graves, do you have any questions?
Mr. Graves. No, thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Norton. Let me just ask you quickly, you have heard us
question the line officers, you have heard us question top
management. As you might imagine, many of our questions have
already been answered. I do want to say that the training level
bothers me a great deal. In this time of budgetary constraints,
I think all agencies, yes, even security agencies, have to be
prepared to accept less than they would desire.
But for that reason, it seems to me the training level, you
would expect better training levels, precisely if you believe
you must have fewer officers. That is one problem I have.
Another problem I have, it makes me wonder about the theory
of law enforcement. For example, and I have to ask this
question of you two experienced law enforcement officers, one
of the reductions is in explosive detection dog teams. Only in
18 of the largest cities, 10 cities will no longer have the
capability. Teams will be reduced from 60 to 29.
Now, as a law enforcement matter, I am trying to think
through, how do I reduce personnel consistent with a risk
analysis? One of the things that would occur to me, and here I
am speaking absolutely as a layman, leave aside patrol and the
other areas, one thing that would occur to me as one of the
things we most fear, some kind of bomb or explosion, it seems
to me that I would say, well, canine it seems to me is one of
the things I would like to, if anything, increase, where I am
going to have less people. Because these dogs, at least the
best of them, are extremely efficient, better than machines. I
have a large problem with the reduction in personnel and the
reduction in canines, sitting up here in the most secure
facility on the planet, and saying to Federal employees, you
all will get by.
Now, enlighten me on the canine, the role of canine and
whether or not if anything they might help if they feel they
must reduce or whether it makes some sense in your view, in
light of what you know about risk, to reduce canine patrols as
well.
Mr. Wright. Madam Chair, the canine explosives detection
program came about as a result of September 11th, 2001. FPS
went to the finest training facility in the world for canine
explosives detection, Auburn University. We trained 60 canine
officers and we have expended untold amounts of funds getting
these teams up and running. To have even the suggestion of a
proposal to cut these critical detection teams is----
Ms. Norton. Wait a minute. I know how difficult it is to
train them, to get the very best. Are you saying when they go
they will, where are they going to go to after we have invested
in the training? What are we going to do with them?
Mr. Wright. My understanding is that it would be a complete
elimination of approximately 29 teams.
Ms. Norton. Well, one of the things we are going to have to
find out for the record, I will say to staff is, given how
extraordinarily valuable canine dogs are and people who are
trained in handling them, we need to know what they intend to
do with canine that they are reducing. I certainly hope they
will be somewhere in the Federal sector, so we can retrieve
them at some point. That would bother me a great deal.
Mr. Wright. I could only assume that they would be offered
to local agencies or other Federal agencies.
Ms. Norton. Let me ask Mr. Canterbury, where in South
Carolina, sir?
Mr. Canterbury. Myrtle Beach.
Ms. Norton. What would be, you are the Myrtle Beach Police
Department?
Mr. Canterbury. Actually the county police, Horry County.
But it is in the area that Myrtle Beach----
Ms. Norton. What is the county?
Mr. Canterbury. Horry County.
Ms. Norton. Give me your assessment of an MOU with Horry
County that would say, now, you all pick up the slack here when
we can't get there. How would you as a police chief respond to
that? Would you sign such an MOU?
Mr. Canterbury. Without an agency to have the MOU with,
there wouldn't be any need. We would be charged with making
that response. There wouldn't be a need for an MOU in a county
that FPS is gone. We would respond, but it would be on a
priority basis with all the other calls in that jurisdiction.
So most local politicians, regardless, are going to charge the
local police department with making that response.
But in my particular area, we are a tourist area, we don't
have an FPS unit. But I am very close to Charleston, which
does. And I know, for instance, where I worked, our canines for
explosives came from 100 miles, when I was still employed.
Ms. Norton. Came from what, I'm sorry?
Mr. Canterbury. Came from 100 miles away. We did not have
canine. We had a 250 man police department.
Ms. Norton. That's it, around the Myrtle Beach area?
Mr. Canterbury. There is now one explosive canine in the
county, and that is a city jurisdiction.
Ms. Norton. But there are no Federal facilities?
Mr. Canterbury. Not there that is protected. But around the
Country, I have traveled all over the United States as
President of the Fraternal Order of Police, and I have dealt
with them in all these jurisdictions. But when they cut the,
especially the explosive teams, a lot of those cities are not
going to be cities that have their own canine explosive units.
So even if you do sign an MOU, you are not going to get an MOU
that will leave that standard there.
We talk about tactics and standards, Timothy McVeigh used a
truck on the building in Oklahoma City. Al Qaeda learned from
that and used airplanes in New York. They will adjust their
tactics, and they have shown that in Iraq and they have shown
that in the United States. Terrorism is terrorism, whether it
is domestic or foreign. Those tactics will adjust. Professional
police officers are better qualified to deal with that than
contract security guards.
Ms. Norton. So in your professional judgment, will these
MOUs be observed, such that they would respond quickly and
adequately to protect Federal employees and visitors from your
experience with local police officers, right?
Mr. Canterbury. Not to a satisfactory standard. They will
be adhered to, because they are still going to respond to a
call for service. That is what we as police officers do,
regardless. But that we prioritize calls. What we would think
would be a priority as a local police officer may be totally
different when you are inside a Federal facility and you don't
know what is in that facility, you don't know what they are
guarding in that facility. No, the response would not be the
same. They would get a response, but it would not be the same.
Ms. Norton. I have lived in a number of jurisdictions. A
constant complaint of residents is, they didn't come as quick
as I wanted them to come. I understand that pressure. I
understand the pressure on local law enforcement. I am not sure
I want to put any more pressure on local law enforcement on an
unfunded mandate. That takes colossal gall----
Mr. Wright. We agree.
Ms. Norton.--to save money in the Federal sector, at the
expense of local law enforcement. And I don't know what we can
do about it. They are operating within an OMB budget. We do
have a new Congress, and we are certainly going to look to see
what we can do about it. We are not opposed to efficiencies. I
believe that everybody is going to have to find greater
efficiencies.
You heard me say that I am not even opposed to the notion
of an inspector, these inspectors will, I think for the most
part, be peace officers. It is an interesting idea. I know one
thing, the job description about people, employee awareness and
the rest, and that kind of duty, is not intended to prevent day
to day terrorist and criminal activity. It is a long range and
good approach to making sure that you are shored up.
The average visitor, the average citizen wants to know is
there somebody out there who has made sure that the bad guys
can't get in.
Mr. Wright, did you have a final comment on that?
Mr. Wright. Yes, ma'am. On the inspector versus FPS police
officer position, I would like to clarify. All inspectors are
peace officers. And we do our share of patrol. The real
difference here is in my duties as an inspector, I am sitting
in an office preparing substantial reports. I am out in the
field measuring properties, conducting security assessments.
All that time takes away from me being out there patrolling the
streets. Whereas police officers are out there 100 percent of
their time, patrolling and surveilling.
Inspectors, we do our share of patrol and response, but it
is really the police officers that carry the load in that
aspect.
Ms. Norton. Again, understand I am speaking from the point
of view of somebody who has heard a lot of testimony, done a
lot of work on risk consequences, when it comes to homeland
security. If anything, I have seen from day one responses when
we were all truly amateurs, I could only call over-response,
before the whole notion of how you do a risk-based analysis and
do your personnel accordingly. I think Americans are something
else if they expect somehow to be treated as if we have
individual protection. So I step back from this, having gone
through the ritual with DHS of a risk-based analysis. I
understand that if you live in somewhere, forgive me, the
hinterland and not in D.C., you deserve some protection. But we
require them to do a risk-based analysis so they can protect
the big targets, like New York and D.C., without leaving people
totally uncovered. We wasted billions of dollars, as has been
shown in testimony after testimony, of people who just used the
money that we threw out there for whatever they could find to
use it on.
So I understand how difficult it is where you have more
than 400 districts who want their share of the money. When it
comes, however, to protection of this kind, if ever a risk-
based analysis was going to be required, it certain is with
respect to how do you prevent, let me just use that word again,
prevent an event in a Federal building. I know you all will
come if something bad happens. The point of spending any money
is to keep something bad from happening. We have a tough job,
because we can't say, hey, we who believe that there ought to
be pledged to a pay-go, we are not going to enlarge the
deficit. We have been very critical of the other side in
enlarging the deficit willy-nilly.
So we recognize that even as we say this can't possibly be,
we are going to have to look for ways to in fat enhance the
funding, enhance the resources and make sure that the FPS does
not dwindle into an essentially bureaucratic body and no one
that uses the very expensive training we pour into them and not
into others.
I want to once again thank the officers who came and
offered us first-hand experience. I particularly want to thank
you, Mr. Wright, and you ,Mr. Canterbury, because you have bene
most patient of all in sitting through our endless questions.
Mr. Wright. You are welcome.
Ms. Norton. I have unanimous consent on testimony to be
entered into the record from Congressman Barney Frank.
The record will remain open for five days for entry into
the record of any other relevant materials.
I thank you all for coming and the hearing is now closed.
[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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