[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE AND THE NEXT GENERATION AIR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: STATUS AND ISSUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2007
__________
Serial No. 110-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
34-184 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois RALPH M. HALL, Texas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California Wisconsin
MARK UDALL, Colorado LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
DAVID WU, Oregon DANA ROHRABACHER, California
BRIAN BAIRD, Washington KEN CALVERT, California
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
NICK LAMPSON, Texas FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
JERRY MCNERNEY, California W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania JO BONNER, Alabama
DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon TOM FEENEY, Florida
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
BARON P. HILL, Indiana ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
------
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
HON. MARK UDALL, Colorado, Chairman
DAVID WU, Oregon KEN CALVERT, California
NICK LAMPSON, Texas DANA ROHRABACHER, California
STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
MIKE ROSS, Arizona JO BONNER, Alabama
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky TOM FEENEY, Florida
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
BART GORDON, Tennessee
RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICHARD OBERMANN Subcommittee Staff Director
PAM WHITNEY Democratic Professional Staff Member
KEN MONROE Republican Professional Staff Member
ED FEDDEMAN Republican Professional Staff Member
DEVIN BRYANT Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
March 29, 2007
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Mark Udall, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 13
Written Statement............................................ 14
Statement by Representative Ken Calvert, Minority Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science and
Technology, U.S. House of Representatives...................... 50
Written Statement............................................ 51
Witnesses:
Mr. Charles A. Leader, Director, Joint Planning and Development
Office, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 17
Biography.................................................... 22
Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement............................................... 22
Written Statement............................................ 24
Hon. John W. Douglass, President and CEO, Aerospace Industries
Association of America
Oral Statement............................................... 34
Written Statement............................................ 36
Biography.................................................... 39
Dr. Bruce Carmichael, Director, Aviation Applications Program,
Research Applications Laboratory, National Center for
Atmospheric Research
Oral Statement............................................... 40
Written Statement............................................ 41
Biography.................................................... 46
Discussion
Status and Importance of MOU Defining Agencies' Roles in
NextGen...................................................... 46
Projections For and Negative Impacts of Increased Air Traffic.. 48
NASA R&D Reorganization Efforts on FAA Technology.............. 50
Concerns Regarding JPDO's Assimilation With the FAA............ 52
Benefits of and Suggested Areas for Increased NASA Funding..... 54
Concerns Regarding the Implementation of Necessary Technology.. 56
Joint Weather Activity......................................... 58
Suggestions for Specific Legislative Provisions................ 59
Concern Regarding NASA's Retrenchment in Weather-related
Research..................................................... 60
Schedule of UAS Integration.................................... 61
Status of Unmanned Aircraft in NAS............................. 61
Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Mr. Charles A. Leader, Director, Joint Planning and Development
Office, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).................. 64
Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, Government Accountability Office....................... 70
Hon. John W. Douglass, President and CEO, Aerospace Industries
Association of America......................................... 75
Dr. Bruce Carmichael, Director, Aviation Applications Program,
Research Applications Laboratory, National Center for
Atmospheric Research........................................... 77
THE JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE AND THE NEXT GENERATION AIR
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM: STATUS AND ISSUES
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 2007
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics,
Committee on Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark Udall
[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
hearing charter
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
The Joint Planning and Development
Office and the Next Generation Air
Transportation System: Status and Issues
thursday, march 29, 2007
10:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
2318 rayburn house office building
Purpose
On Thursday, March 29, 2007 at 10:00 am, the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics will hold a hearing to examine the status of the Next
Generation Air Transportation System initiative [also known as NGATS or
NextGen--both terms will be used interchangeably in this hearing
charter] and explore key issues related to the initiative and the
interagency Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO).
Witnesses:
The witnesses scheduled to testify at the hearing include the
following:
Mr. Charles Leader, Director, Joint Planning and Development Office,
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Dr. Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
Government Accountability Office
Hon. John Douglass, President and CEO, Aerospace Industries Association
Dr. Bruce Carmichael, Director, Aviation Applications Program, Research
Applications Laboratory, National Center for Atmospheric Research
BACKGROUND
Potential Issues
The following are some of the issues that could be raised at the
hearing:
Is the JPDO effectively organized and adequately
funded to plan and develop the Next Generation Air
Transportation System? Does it have the necessary authority and
independence? If not, what changes are needed?
Is the JPDO's placement within FAA properly balanced?
As JPDO becomes more tightly integrated into the FAA, will it
continue to be viewed as an ``honest broker'' by the other
participating agencies? Will FAA's new Operational Evolution
Partnership (OEP) implement the JPDO's plans and development
products or will FAA wind up subsuming JPDO's activities within
the FAA's OEP?
What are the biggest near-term and mid-term technical
and programmatic challenges facing the JPDO as it attempts to
plan and develop the NextGen? What steps can be taken to
address those challenges?
How well are the resource commitments and R&D
activities of the agencies participating in the JPDO aligned
with the needs of the NextGen initiative?
How can we ensure that the technologies and concepts
developed for the NextGen initiative will be implemented in the
national airspace system in a timely manner? How important are
equipage and financing policies to ensuring an effective
transition of the NextGen R&D into national airspace systems
and procedures?
What role should the private sector play in the
planning and development of the NextGen? How well are the views
and concerns of the industry and the air traffic controllers
being incorporated in the JPDO planning process?
What needs to be done to ensure that aviation weather
information is integrated effectively into the Nation's future
air traffic management system and weather impacts are reduced?
Given the importance of aviation to U.S. global
commerce, how will the U.S. NextGen initiative be harmonized
with the European air traffic modernization initiative, SESAR,
as well as with modernization activities elsewhere in the
world?
Overview
While the health of the National Airspace System (NAS) is critical
to the economy, the current approach to managing air transportation is
becoming increasingly inefficient and operationally obsolete. Today's
NAS is near capacity, with delays growing to record levels, yet a
threefold increase in air traffic is expected by 2025. Current
processes and procedures do not provide the flexibility nor the
scalability needed to meet the growing demand.
In 2003, Congress created the Joint Planning and Development Office
(JPDO) as part of P.L. 108-176, Vision 100: Century of Flight
Reauthorization Act [the specific legislative provisions are included
as Attachment 1 to this hearing charter]. The JPDO is to plan for and
coordinate, with federal and non-federal stakeholders, a transformation
from the current air traffic control system to the NextGen by 2025.
NextGen (formerly called NGATS) is envisioned as a major redesign of
the air transportation system that will entail precision satellite
navigation; digital, networked communications; an integrated aviation
weather system; layered, adaptive security; and more.
Seven agencies are participating in the JPDO: the Departments of
Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; FAA; the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy. JPDO is housed within
FAA, and the FAA FY 2008 budget request includes $18 million to support
JPDO. NASA is still negotiating the amount that it will provide to the
JPDO in FY 2008. However, while JPDO has the planning and development
responsibility and can define R&D requirements, etc., that it would
like the participating agencies to carry out, it has no budgetary or
management authority over the agencies' activities in support of
NextGen. Although JPDO is responsible for planning the transformation
to NextGen and coordinating the related efforts of its partner
agencies, FAA will be largely responsible for implementing the policies
and systems necessary for NextGen, while safely operating the current
air traffic control system 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
To date, the JPDO has not established practices to institutionalize
the multi-agency collaborative process. For example, JPDO does not have
formal, long-term agreements among the partner agencies on their roles
and responsibilities in creating NextGen. The JPDO has been working to
establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between its participating
agencies since at least August 2005, but the MOU had not been signed as
of the date of this hearing, even though in a hearing a year ago this
Subcommittee was told that it ``should occur in the next few weeks.''
JPDO also currently lacks explicit policies and procedures for
decision making and dispute resolution and has not yet completed
mechanisms for leveraging partner agency resources. JPDO has been
working with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop a
means to consider NextGen-related funding, dispersed across JPDO's
partner agency budget requests, as a unified federal program.
Nonetheless, given JPDO's limited authority, the office could face
continuing challenges in sustaining the lengthy and elaborate federal
collaborative effort set forth in the Vision 100 legislation.
FAA has created a NextGen Review Board, co-chaired by JPDO's
Director and Air Traffic Organization's (ATO) Vice President of
Operations Planning. Initiatives, such as concept demonstrations or
research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP, will now need to go
through the Review Board for approval based upon NextGen requirements,
concept maturity, and risk. Additionally, as a further step towards
integrating ATO and JPDO, the Administration's FAA Reauthorization
proposal calls for the JPDO Director to be a voting member of FAA's
Joint Resources Council and ATO's Executive Council. While some see
those steps as important means of ensuring ATO can effectively
implement JPDO's plans, others fear that the steps will adversely
impact JPDO's independence.
The Vision 100 legislation also directed the Secretary of
Transportation to establish a Senior Policy Committee (SPC) to work
with the JPDO. The SPC is to be chaired by the Secretary and is also to
include the FAA and NASA Administrators (or their designees), as well
as the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, OSTP
Director (or their designees) and other federal agency representatives
as appropriate. However, the SPC has met infrequently since its
inception. According to JPDO officials, the SPC makes decisions through
consensus of the members. If there are any issues that the committee
cannot resolve among themselves, JPDO officials said that they would
expect that the Secretary of Transportation would elevate those issues
to the appropriate White House-level policy council, such as the
Domestic Policy Council.
The JPDO established eight multi-agency Integrated Product Teams
(IPTs) to facilitate the planning and development of the JPDO. They
included the following [with the lead agency indicated in parentheses]:
1. Develop Airport Infrastructure to Meet the Future Demand
(FAA)
2. Establish an Effective Security System without Limiting
Mobility or Civil Liberties (DHS)
3. Establish an Agile Air Traffic System (NASA)
4. Establish User-Specific Situational Awareness (DOD)
5. Establish a Comprehensive Proactive Safety Management
Approach (FAA)
6. Develop Environmental Protection That Allows Sustained
Aviation Growth (FAA)
7. Develop a System-Wide Capability to Reduce Weather Impacts
(DOC/NOAA)
8. Harmonize Equipage and Operations Globally (FAA)
However, the JPDO has been restructuring the IPTs, and JPDO
Director Leader should describe the changes at the hearing.
The NextGen Institute (the Institute) was created by an agreement
between the National Center for Advanced Technologies and the FAA to
incorporate the expertise and views of stakeholders from private
industry, state and local governments, and academia into the NextGen
planning process. The NextGen Institute Management Council, composed of
top officials and representatives from the aviation community, oversees
the policy, recommendations, and products of the Institute and provides
a means for advancing consensus positions on critical NextGen issues.
To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult with
the public, the Institute held its first public meeting in March 2006.
In general, transforming the National Airspace System by 2025 to
accommodate a projected demand of three times the current demand for
air transportation services, providing appropriate security and
environmental safeguards, and doing these things seamlessly while the
current system continues to operate will be a complex undertaking. As
noted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), ``. . .given the
staggering complexity of this ambitious effort to modernize and
transform the air traffic control system over the next two decades, it
will not be easy to move from planning to implementation.''
Nonetheless, implementing the JPDO's plans and products in the national
airspace system in a timely manner will be critical to the success of
the NextGen initiative.
JPDO has recently released a draft JPDO Concept of Operations for
public comment, and JPDO indicates that in the next few months it will
publish the NextGen Enterprise Architecture (originally intended to be
ready for release last summer) and the Integrated Work Plan.
External Reviews of JPDO Progress
There have been several recent independent reviews of the status of
the JPDO and its progress in developing NextGen. Some of the key
findings and recommendations of those reviews are as follows:
Government Accountability Office
In November 2006, the GAO issued a status report [GAO-07-25] on the
NextGen initiative [Dr. Gerald Dillingham, one of the hearing
witnesses, participated in the study and will be able to provide an
update]. Some of the main findings and recommendations of the GAO study
were as follows:
Findings
``JPDO's partner agencies have agreed on a vision for
NGATS [NextGen] and on eight strategies that broadly support
the goals and objectives of NGATS.''
``JPDO faces challenges in institutionalizing its
collaborative effort, addressing planning and expertise gaps,
establishing credibility with stakeholders, and harmonizing its
work with other countries' efforts to modernize their own air
traffic management systems.''
``To date, JPDO has not established some practices
significant to institutionalizing its collaborative process,
such as formalizing roles and responsibilities. Such practices
are important because JPDO is fundamentally a planning and
coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human and
financial resources needed to continue developing plans and
system requirements for NGATS.''
``FAA, as the key implementer of the transition to
NGATS, faces challenges. . .in obtaining the financial and
technical resources needed to implement NGATS. FAA also faces
challenges in finding ways to reduce costs or realize savings
to help fund the costs of transitioning to NGATS while
continuing to operate and maintain the current system. Finally,
FAA faces challenges in obtaining the technical and contract
management expertise needed to define, implement, and integrate
the numerous complex programs and systems inherent in the
transition to NGATS.''
Recommendations
``JPDO should finalize and present to the Senior
Policy Committee for its consideration and action the MOU among
the partner agencies to define their roles and responsibilities
related to NGATS planning and development.''
``[JPDO should] clarify the roles and
responsibilities between JPDO and [the FAA's] Air Traffic
Organization in the planning, development, and transition from
JPDO to FAA for implementation of NGATS.''
``[JPDO should] develop written procedures for
dispute resolution at all levels of the JPDO organization.''
``[JPDO] should determine whether key stakeholders
and expertise are not represented on JPDO's integrated product
teams, divisions, or elsewhere within its organization.''
``FAA should work to determine whether it will need
to contract with a Lead System Integrator, federally-funded
not-for-profit corporation, or other technical or managerial
entity to assist in the implementation of NGATS.''
Department of Transportation Inspector General
On February 12, 2007, the DOT Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
released an audit report [AV-2007-031] on the JPDO. In that report, the
OIG listed a number of actions that it considered to be critical for
the JPDO to be able to make progress and to make the transition from
planning to implementation. Those actions included such things as
having JPDO:
``Finalize cost estimates, quantify expected
benefits, and develop a roadmap for industry;
Have FAA and NASA come to a clear understanding of
the level of technical maturity NASA projects will have [so
that any technology gaps will be identified]. FAA has
historically relied on NASA for long-term air traffic
management research;
Establish linkage between the plans developed by JPDO
and the implementation priorities of the Air Traffic
Organization by delineating lines of responsibility and
accountability for both;
Develop and implement mechanisms for aligning
resources between agencies; and
Develop approaches for risk management and systems
integration.''
The OIG also recommended that the FAA Administrator:
``Report NGATS cost data along three vectors--
developmental efforts, adjustments to existing programs, and
NGATS implementation--when reporting NGATS financial
requirements to Congress and stakeholders;
Determine the level of technical maturity of NASA's
research projects developed for NGATS initiatives;
Review existing ongoing modernization programs to
determine if they are still needed and, if so, what adjustments
in cost, schedule, and performance parameters will be needed;
Include information in the annual JPDO progress
report on specific research projects with budget data for FAA
developmental efforts as well as budget data of other agencies
that are being leveraged and specify how the ongoing research
is supporting the JPDO;
Determine what skill sets and expertise, with respect
to software development and system integration, will be
required by the ATO and JPDO--and how they will be obtained--to
manage and execute NGATS initiatives;
In planned NGATS demonstration projects, develop
sufficient data to establish a path for certifying new systems
and identify the full range of adjustments to policies and
procedures needed to get benefits;
Continue to develop and refine procedures that
address conflict of interest issues with JPDO initiatives and
conduct annual reviews of the matter as the role of the JPDO
evolves from planning to implementation;
Use technology readiness levels in assessing the
maturity of research conducted at other agencies to help speed
technology transfer and the introduction of new capabilities
into the National Airspace System; and
Fund targeted human factors research to ensure that
the changing roles of controllers and pilots envisioned by the
JPDO can safely be accommodated. This will require a re-
prioritization of ongoing efforts at FAA and close cooperation
with NASA, which also conducts human factors research.''
The OIG report also identified a number of ``key research efforts
needed for NGATS,'' including: Automation Improvements, Separation
Standards for an Automated Environment, Cockpit Displays, and Weather
Integration into Automation. The OIG indicated that over seventy
research or policy areas have been identified as needing further
investigation and stated that the research areas would be needed
``regardless of the technology ultimately selected.'' In addition, the
OIG report stated that: ``To see benefits in the 2012 timeframe, as
projected by the JPDO, FAA officials have told us that work must begin
now, given the lag time between development and actual deployment. It
is not yet clear who or what agency will do this research. To be
effective, the research must also focus on policies, procedures, and
methods for certifying systems as safe for use.''
Other Concerns
Uncertainty Over NextGen Costs
In testimony before the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, February 14, 2007, Dr.
Dillingham reported ``A JPDO official told us they have submitted a
limited NextGen cost estimate to OMB with the 2008 budget request.'' In
his written opening statement for a March 22, 2007 Senate Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee hearing, Charles Leader wrote,
``Requirements for the first ten years range from $8 billion to $10
billion. Preliminary estimates suggest that the investments necessary
to achieve the end state NextGen system range from $15 billion to $22
billion in FAA funding.''
As noted in the November GAO study, ``There are a number of drivers
in the current uncertainty over the cost of NGATS. One of these drivers
is the decision about which technologies to include. . .. A second
driver is the sequence for replacing current technologies with NGATS
technologies. A third driver is the length of time required for the
transformation to NGATS, since, according to JPDO, a longer period
would impose higher costs. JPDO's first draft of its enterprise
architecture should constrain some of these variables.''
The November GAO study reported: ``The FAA's Research, Engineering
and Development Advisory Committee (REDAC)--developed a limited,
preliminary cost estimate, which officials have emphasized is not yet
endorsed by any agency. The REDAC estimated that FAA's budget under a
NGATS scenario would average about $15 billion per year through 2025,
or about $1 billion more annually (in today's dollars) than FAA's
fiscal year 2006 appropriation.''
In Charles Leader's opening statements last week, he reported
``MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of the
NextGen avionics costs to users. It concludes that a wide range of
costs are possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the
alignment of equipage schedules. The most probable range of total
avionics costs to system users is $14 billion to $20 billion.''
The November GAO study reported that ``JPDO has also begun working
with its stakeholders to develop initial cost information through a
series of investment analysis workshops. Representatives from
commercial and business aviation, equipment manufacturers, and ATC
systems developers attended the first workshop, held in April 2006. The
second workshop, held in August 2006, was for those involved with
general aviation and public safety operations. JPDO plans to invite
representatives from airports and regional, State, and local planning
bodies to the third workshop. According to the JPDO, participants in
these workshops are asked to discuss and comment on the appropriateness
of JPDO's current assumptions about factors that drive private sector
costs.''
NASA's Role
Both the above-mentioned GAO and DOT OIG reports expressed concern
over the potential impact of NASA's restructuring of its aeronautics
program [as has FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee], noting the FAA has
traditionally relied on NASA for key air traffic management research
taken to a relatively mature level of technology readiness. They cite
the potential ``technology gap'' and resulting delays to NextGen if
NASA reduces its involvement in those research areas. Those concerns
are echoed by a number of the hearing witnesses.
FAA's Management and Acquisition Performance
In 1995, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) designated
FAA's air traffic control modernization program as high risk because of
systemic management and acquisition problems. In its November 2006
report, the GAO noted that the FAA has taken a number of actions aimed
at improving its management practices and institutionalizing these
improvements by attempting to ensure that the reforms are fully
integrated into the agency's structure and processes. However, GAO also
noted that transforming organizational cultures requires substantial
management attention, as it can take several years for such initiatives
to be fully implemented and cultures transformed in a sustainable
manner.
However, follow-through on these changes must survive the loss of
some of the leaders during the change: The agency's COO left in
February 2007, after serving three years, and the FAA Administrator's
term ends in September 2007. Moreover the current director of the JPDO
is relatively new, having assumed that position in August 2006. He is
the third director of the JPDO in the little more than three years that
the JPDO has been in existence.
Human Factors
To quote the GAO report, the NextGen Concept of Operations
``envisions an increased reliance on automation, which raises questions
about the role of the air traffic controller. Similarly, the Concept of
Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater share of the
responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other tasks
currently performed by controllers. This raises human factors questions
about whether pilots can safely perform these additional duties.
Although the JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic
controllers' workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet
begun to model the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would
affect pilot performance. According to the JPDO, the change in the
roles of pilots and controllers is the most important human factors
issue involved in creating NextGen, but one that will be difficult to
research. . .''
Aviation Weather
It is estimated that about seventy percent of the delays in the
national airspace system are weather-related. It is anticipated that
increases in the volume of air traffic in the coming decades will make
the impact of weather on the operation of the system even more
pronounced than it is today. The JPDO established an Integrated Product
Team (IPT) to address aviation weather issues, and the JPDO has
recently announced its intention to establish an aviation weather
program office. Dr. Carmichael--who is Co-Lead of the Weather IPT's
Forecasting Group and a hearing witness--will discuss progress and
problems in addressing aviation weather in the NextGen planning. One
issue Dr. Carmichael raises in his testimony is the growing uncertainty
over NASA's funding and programmatic commitment to research in the
integration of weather into automated decision support tools, wake
turbulence research, and integration of unmanned aircraft observing
systems into the national airspace system.
International ``Harmonization''
Compatibility of the U.S. NextGen system with the air traffic
modernization efforts being planned elsewhere in the world is very
important to U.S. and international air carriers. Failure to ensure
compatibility could lead to air carriers having to equip their fleets
with two sets of communications, navigation, and surveillance systems--
something that could be very expensive. The Europeans currently have an
initiative underway, the Single European Sky Air Traffic Management
Research Programme (SESAR). It differs in a number of respects from the
U.S. NextGen initiative. FAA and the European Commission are attempting
to ensure that appropriate coordination takes place, and they signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to the effect in July 2006.
Establishing Credibility with Stakeholders That the Government Is Fully
Committed to NextGen
As noted by external experts on a GAO-sponsored panel, JPDO also
faces challenges in establishing credibility among stakeholders. For
example, some members of the panel told GAO that [to quote GAO],
``although JPDO has produced much activity, they did not feel the
effort had demonstrated sufficient progress; some stakeholders said
that both the 2004 Integrated Plan and the 2005 Progress Report lacked
sufficient detail, such as definition of research needs.''
ATTACHMENT 1
Excerpts from Title VII of H.R. 2115 (Public Law 108-176)
SEC. 709. AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM JOINT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
OFFICE.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT--(1) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish
in the Federal Aviation Administration a joint planning and development
office to manage work related to the Next Generation Air Transportation
System. The office shall be known as the Next Generation Air
Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office (in this
section referred to as the `Office').
(2) The responsibilities of the Office shall include--
(A) creating and carrying out an integrated plan for a Next
Generation Air Transportation System pursuant to subsection
(b);
(B) overseeing research and development on that system;
(C) creating a transition plan for the implementation of that
system;
(D) coordinating aviation and aeronautics research programs to
achieve the goal of more effective and directed programs that
will result in applicable research;
(E) coordinating goals and priorities and coordinating
research activities within the Federal Government with United
States aviation and aeronautical firms;
(F) coordinating the development and utilization of new
technologies to ensure that when available, they may be used to
their fullest potential in aircraft and in the air traffic
control system;
(G) facilitating the transfer of technology from research
programs such as the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration program and the Department of Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency program to federal agencies with
operational responsibilities and to the private sector; and
(H) reviewing activities relating to noise, emissions, fuel
consumption, and safety conducted by federal agencies,
including the Federal Aviation Administration, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of
Commerce, and the Department of Defense.
(3) The Office shall operate in conjunction with relevant programs in
the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Department of Commerce and the Department of
Homeland Security. The Secretary of Transportation may request
assistance from staff from those Departments and other federal
agencies.
(4) In developing and carrying out its plans, the Office shall consult
with the public and ensure the participation of experts from the
private sector including representatives of commercial aviation,
general aviation, aviation labor groups, aviation research and
development entities, aircraft and air traffic control suppliers, and
the space industry.
(b) INTEGRATED PLAN--The integrated plan shall be designed to ensure
that the Next Generation Air Transportation System meets air
transportation safety, security, mobility, efficiency, and capacity
needs beyond those currently included in the Federal Aviation
Administration's operational evolution plan and accomplishes the goals
under subsection (c). The integrated plan shall include--
(1) a national vision statement for an air transportation
system capable of meeting potential air traffic demand by 2025;
(2) a description of the demand and the performance
characteristics that will be required of the Nation's future
air transportation system, and an explanation of how those
characteristics were derived, including the national goals,
objectives, and policies the system is designed to further, and
the underlying socioeconomic determinants, and associated
models and analyses;
(3) a multi-agency research and development roadmap for
creating the Next Generation Air Transportation System with the
characteristics outlined under clause (ii), including--
(A) the most significant technical obstacles and the
research and development activities necessary to
overcome them, including for each project, the role of
each federal agency, corporations, and universities;
(B) the annual anticipated cost of carrying out the
research and development activities; and
(C) the technical milestones that will be used to
evaluate the activities.
(4) a description of the operational concepts to meet the
system performance requirements for all system users and a
timeline and anticipated expenditures needed to develop and
deploy the system to meet the vision for 2025.
(c) GOALS--The Next Generation Air Transportation System shall--
(1) improve the level of safety, security, efficiency,
quality, and affordability of the National Airspace System and
aviation services;
(2) take advantage of data from emerging ground-based and
space-based communications, navigation, and surveillance
technologies;
(3) integrate data streams from multiple agencies and sources
to enable situational awareness and seamless global operations
for all appropriate users of the system, including users
responsible for civil aviation, homeland security, and national
security;
(4) leverage investments in civil aviation, homeland security,
and national security and build upon current air traffic
management and infrastructure initiatives to meet system
performance requirements for all system users;
(5) be scalable to accommodate and encourage substantial
growth in domestic and international transportation and
anticipate and accommodate continuing technology upgrades and
advances;
(6) accommodate a wide range of aircraft operations, including
airlines, air taxis, helicopters, general aviation, and
unmanned aerial vehicles; and
(7) take into consideration, to the greatest extent
practicable, design of airport approach and departure flight
paths to reduce exposure of noise and emissions pollution on
affected residents.
(d) REPORTS--The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall transmit to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation in the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure and the Committee on Science in the House of
Representatives--
(1) not later than one year after the date of enactment of
this Act, the integrated plan required in subsection (b); and
(2) annually at the time of the President's budget request, a
report describing the progress in carrying out the plan
required under subsection (b) and any changes to that plan.
(e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Office $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2004 through 2010.
SEC. 710. NEXT GENERATION AIR TRANSPORTATION SENIOR POLICY COMMITTEE.
(a) IN GENERAL--The Secretary of Transportation shall establish a
senior policy committee to work with the Next Generation Air
Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office. The senior
policy committee shall be chaired by the Secretary.
(b) MEMBERSHIP--In addition to the Secretary, the senior policy
committee shall be composed of--
(1) the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
(or the Administrator's designee);
(2) the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (or the Administrator's designee);
(3) the Secretary of Defense (or the Secretary's designee);
(4) the Secretary of Homeland Security (or the Secretary's
designee);
(5) the Secretary of Commerce (or the Secretary's designee);
(6) the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (or the Director's designee); and
(7) designees from other federal agencies determined by the
Secretary of Transportation to have an important interest in,
or responsibility for, other aspects of the system.
(c) FUNCTION--The senior policy committee shall--
(1) advise the Secretary of Transportation regarding the
national goals and strategic objectives for the transformation
of the Nation's air transportation system to meet its future
needs;
(2) provide policy guidance for the integrated plan for the
air transportation system to be developed by the Next
Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning and
Development Office;
(3) provide ongoing policy review for the transformation of
the air transportation system;
(4) identify resource needs and make recommendations to their
respective agencies for necessary funding for planning,
research, and development activities; and
(5) make legislative recommendations, as appropriate, for the
future air transportation system.
(d) CONSULTATION--In carrying out its functions under this section, the
senior policy committee shall consult with, and ensure participation
by, the private sector (including representatives of general aviation,
commercial aviation, aviation labor, and the space industry), members
of the public, and other interested parties and may do so through a
special advisory committee composed of such representatives.
Chairman Udall. This hearing will come to order.
Before we begin, I would like to explain to the panel
members that are here and of course the audience that Ranking
Member Calvert is not here because the President of the United
States, George Bush, called a special meeting of the Republican
Caucus this morning. Evidently, they are all down at the White
House. The meeting was scheduled to be finished at 9:30, from
what I understand, so we hope Ranking Member Calvert will join
us as soon as he possibly can, but in the meantime, we have his
approval to go ahead and proceed, and since time is money, time
is valuable, we appreciate the panel's presence. I thought I
would kick the hearing off and we look forward to hearing from
you after I share my opening statement with you.
As I have said, we have a distinguished panel and I look
forward to your testimony. The topic of today's hearing, the
status of the Nation's NextGen initiative and the multi-agency
Joint Planning and Development Office, tasked with overseeing
the initiative, is one of the most important topics that we
will address this year. It is important because it concerns the
future of America's air transportation system and the question
as to whether we will have a system that will be able to meet
the needs of our 21st century economy.
I think we can all agree that we need to be able to answer
that question in the affirmative for the health of our economy,
the quality of life of our citizens, the safety of our flying
public, and our international competitiveness. In short, we all
want the NextGen initiative to succeed.
Yet, hope and good intentions by themselves are not going
to be sufficient to ensure success. We are going to need
commitment, accountability, and ultimately effective
performance by all involved.
I am troubled by indications that all may be not going as
well as hoped with the NextGen effort and I hope that our
witnesses will be able to shed some light on the true status of
the initiative.
For example, we held a hearing before this subcommittee
exactly a year ago. The Department of Transportation and Joint
Planning and Development Office told us that that a Memorandum
of Understanding defining the NextGen partner agency's roles
and responsibilities would be finalized ``within the next few
weeks.'' One year later, it is clear that did not happen and
still hasn't happened.
At that same hearing, we were told that the JPDO planned to
release an Enterprise Architecture for NextGen in the summer of
2006. That did not happen and still hasn't happened.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to align
its Airspace Systems Research Program projects ``so that they
directly support the objectives of the JPDO's Next Generation
Air Transportation System Integrated Plan'' and to do that by
the end of 2006. Based on at least some of the witness
testimony, that alignment doesn't appear to have happened
either, and a similar situation exists with respect to the
FAA's R&D programs.
In addition, today's witnesses are echoing concerns we have
heard in previous hearings about the negative impact that
NASA's uncertain commitment to its aeronautics program is
having on a host of important R&D initiatives.
Equally troubling from the standpoint of the management--
excuse me--of management continuity, there have been three JPDO
Directors in the past three years and two NGATS Institute
Executive Directors in the past two years with the Institute
position currently vacant.
Moreover, the head of the FAA's Air Traffic Organization
has recently left the agency, the FAA Administrator is
scheduled to depart later this year, and the Department of
Transportation has a new Secretary.
In addition, the multi-agency Senior Policy Council, which
was established to provide high-level advice and policy
guidance for the JPDO on the NextGen, initiative has met just
three times in the past three years and not once in the past
year.
Finally, we haven't yet seen a clear plan from FAA and the
JPDO for implementing agreed-upon NextGen technologies and
procedures into the national airspace expeditiously. That is
worrisome because it is clear that that there are very real
costs associated with undue delay.
Now, I want to be clear that my comments are not criticisms
on the dedication or commitment of the JPDO team. I recognize
that developing and implementing the NextGen system are
enormous challenges. However, we need to take a look both at
where progress is being made and equally important, where
improvement is needed. That is what today's hearing is intended
to accomplish, and again I want to appreciate my appreciation
to our witnesses for helping the Subcommittee in that task.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Mark Udall
Good morning. I want to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing.
We have a distinguished panel, and I look forward to your testimony.
The topic of today's hearing--the status of the Nation's NextGen
initiative and the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office
tasked with overseeing the initiative--is one of the most important
topics that we will address this year. It's important because it
concerns the future of America's air transportation system, and the
question is whether we will have a system that will be able to meet the
needs of our 21st century economy.
I think we can all agree that we need to be able to answer that
question in the affirmative--for the health of our economy, the quality
of life of our citizens, the safety of the flying public, and our
international competitiveness. In short, we all want the NextGen
initiative to succeed.
Yet, hope and good intentions by themselves are not going to be
sufficient to ensure success. We are going to need commitment,
accountability, and ultimately, effective performance by all involved.
I am troubled by indications that all may not be going as well as
hoped with the NextGen effort, and I hope that our witnesses will be
able to shed some light on the true status of the initiative.
For example, when DOT and JPDO testified before this subcommittee
exactly a year ago, we were told that a Memorandum of Understanding
defining the NextGen partner agencies roles and responsibilities would
be finalized ``within the next few weeks.'' One year later, it is clear
that that did not happen and still hasn't happened.
At that same hearing, we were told that JPDO planned to release an
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen in the summer of 2006. That did not
happen and still hasn't happened.
The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 directed NASA to align its
Airspace Systems Research program projects ``so that they directly
support the objectives of the JPDO's Next Generation Air Transportation
System Integrated Plan''--and to do that by the end of 2006. Based on
at least some of the witness testimony, that alignment doesn't appear
to have happened either--and a similar situation exists with respect to
FAA's R&D programs.
In addition, today's witnesses are echoing concerns we have heard
in previous hearings about the negative impact that NASA's uncertain
commitment to its aeronautics program is having on a host of important
R&D initiatives.
Equally troubling from the standpoint of management continuity,
there have been three JPDO Directors in the past three years and two
NGATS Institute Executive Directors in the past two years, with the
Institute position currently vacant.
Moreover, the head of FAA's Air Traffic Organization has recently
left the agency, the FAA Administrator is scheduled to depart later
this year, and the Department of Transportation has a new Secretary.
In addition, the multi-agency Senior Policy Council, which was
established to provide high-level advice and policy guidance to the
JPDO on the NextGen initiative, has met just three times in the past
three years--and not once in the past year.
Finally, we haven't yet seen a clear plan from FAA and the JPDO for
implementing agreed-upon NextGen technologies and procedures into the
national airspace system expeditiously. That is worrisome, because it
is clear that there are very real costs associated with undue delay.
Now, I want to be clear that my comments are not criticisms of the
dedication or commitment of the JPDO team. I recognize that developing
and implementing the NextGen system are enormous challenges.
However, we need to take a look both at where progress is being
made, and equally importantly, where improvement is needed. That's what
today's hearing is intended to accomplish, and I want to express my
appreciation to our witnesses for helping the Subcommittee in that
task.
Chairman Udall. Now, at this point I would normally
recognize Chairman Calvert--former Chairman Calvert and now
Ranking Member Calvert for his opening remarks and I also want
it to be known that if there are Members who wish to submit
additional opening statements, that those statements would be
added to the record. But given that Chairman Calvert is not
here at this point, let me introduce our panel of witnesses,
and I will start--move across from my left to right and then we
will come back to you, Mr. Leader, after I have introduced
everybody.
Mr. Charles Leader is the Director for the Joint Planning
and Development Office of the Federal Aviation Administration.
He is in charge of the planning and the development of the
NextGen initiative. Next to him, we have Dr. Gerald Dillingham,
who is the Director of the Physical Infrastructure Issues in
the Government Accountability Office and has been actively
involved in GAO's oversight of aviation-related issues. Next to
him we have the Honorable John Douglass, who is former
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and he currently is the
President and CEO of the Aerospace Industries Association. He
also served on the Aerospace Commission, and Mr. Douglass is a
frequent visitor to this committee. It is always good to see
you, Mr. Douglass. And I am pleased to introduce, finally, Dr.
Bruce Carmichael. He is Director of the Aviation Applications
Program at the National Center for Atmospheric Research, or
NCAR, which is located in my district in Boulder, Colorado. Dr.
Carmichael holds an M.S. from Northwestern University in
applied mathematics and a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland
in computer science. His more recent work has been involved
with the aviation industry and automation of maintenance
processes, air traffic control and weather information. He has
also been involved in system engineering of approved FAA
automation and weather systems. He is currently the co-lead of
the Forecasting Group, the JPDO Weather Integrated Product
Team. I again want to welcome all of you.
As you all know, spoken testimony is limited to five
minutes each, after which the Members of the Subcommittee will
each have five minutes to ask questions in each round of
questioning. The lights there are helpful to you, I am sure.
Mr. Leader, we will start with you. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. CHARLES A. LEADER, DIRECTOR, JOINT PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)
Mr. Leader. My name is Charles Leader and I am the Director
of the multi-agency Joint Planning and Development Office. With
your permission, I would like to submit my formal statement for
the record and take this opportunity to make a few opening
remarks.
Chairman Udall. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Leader. Thank you, sir.
I think you will agree that the United States has the
safest and most efficient air traffic control system in the
world. It handles a staggering amount of traffic every day.
This includes passenger flights, air cargo, military
operations, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launches, but as
capable as it is, we are already seeing the limits of the
current system. Delays and cancellations are growing, and
unless we begin to transform the system now, the problems are
only going to get worse.
The issues concerning the future capacity and flexibility
of the National Air Transportation System are matters that the
House and this Committee understand very well. In 2003, Vision
100, the FAA reauthorization, chartered the Next Generation Air
Transportation System Initiative and established the Joint
Planning and Development Office.
The scope of this undertaking as well as the length of the
commitment is almost unprecedented in government. It involves
the joint efforts of the Departments of Homeland Security,
Commerce, Defense and Transportation as well as NAS and the
FAA. But it is far more than just a large government program.
It also represents a unique collaboration with industry.
NextGen is a long-term transformation of our nation's air
transportation system. We are leveraging existing technologies
such as satellite-based navigation and networking while at the
same time developing new capabilities and new technologies that
will change our entire approach to managing the air
transportation system. Often, one of the challenges in
explaining the NextGen system is putting what we are doing in
context.
With that in mind, an approach I would like to take in
explaining NextGen is to relate the technology and procedural
improvements we are making to the air transportation system to
applying the technologies in ways that we are familiar with.
One good example of a day-to-day application of the kind of
technology, one that relates to NextGen, is the General Motors
product that comes with many of their new cars called OnStar.
Although applied to automobiles and operating in a two-
dimensional environment of roads and vehicles, it uses GPS
technology as well as voice and data links to help drivers find
out where they are and at the same time uses the same type of
voice and data links that we will be using in the NextGen
system. The OnStar data link can receive messages from the GM
command center, sent directly to the automobile's computer to
do such things as unlock the doors, report problems with the
vehicle or report an automobile accident.
We will be using the same sort of existing technology in
NextGen to allow flight crews to communicate, navigate and
report their positions while operating within the National
Airspace System.
Implementation of NextGen has already begun. Two programs,
both fundamental foundational technologies, are the Automatic
Dependence Surveillance Broadcast, ADS-B, and System Wide
Information Management, SWIM. Both of these programs are funded
and already underway. ADS-B relies on GPS and is critical in
developing NextGen satellite-based navigation and control
capabilities. SWIM is developing our key networking
capabilities and will establish the critical networking
infrastructure.
Indeed, I want to make a point about SWIM and network-
enabled operations, namely that DOD, DHS and the FAA are each
contributing $5 million to a real demonstration of this
capability later this year. Each of these programs and the
capabilities they represent are essential in beginning the
transformation of our current air traffic control system from
one that relies on voice communications and ground-based
navigation to one that is satellite-based, network-enabled, and
uses advanced digital communication.
By its very nature, this kind of initiative needs to use a
portfolio-based approach. In other words, the approach has to
be one that allows the Joint Planning and Development Office to
integrate a wide range of research initiatives and investments.
That is why some of the most important products for the JPDO
have been its three planning tools: the Concept of Operations,
which went out for final review last month; the Enterprise
Architecture, which will be released for stakeholder review in
late May; and the Integrated Work Plan, which will be released
for comment in July. These will be the guides for the future
research, investment and implementation of the NextGen System.
I also want to make a point that Dr. Carmichael will talk
about in further depth in a few moments to express the
importance of weather, weather research, and weather
forecasting in meeting the objectives of the NextGen system.
The success of NextGen relies heavily on improvements in
gathering better weather data and implementing a common
probabilistic forecasting capability. That is why we are
working with each agency that has a weather responsibility to
establish a common approach to developing this technology and
the research strategy that is required to be pursued. NextGen
is a long-term initiative and in its early stages. If given the
authority and resources, I believe that JPDO can be catalytic
in transforming the National Airspace System.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Leader follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles A. Leader
Good morning, Chairman Udall, Congressman Calvert, and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am Charles Leader, Director of the multi-agency
Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO). I am honored to be here
this morning to testify about the JPDO, and the work we are doing to
develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(NextGen) while providing operational and safety enhancements that
deliver benefits to our customers today.
Moving to NextGen is inextricably linked to changes in the FAA's
financing system. We need to establish the financing of current and
future operations based on actual costs and investment requirements
that will realize tangible benefits and increasing efficiency. The
NextGen Financing Act of 2007, as proposed by the Administration,
provides the necessary reforms to our financing, and puts us on the
path towards fully implementing the NextGen system.
And implementing that system is imperative. Our nation's air
transportation system has become a victim of its own success. We have
created the most effective, efficient and safest system in the world.
But we now face a serious and impending problem: today's system is at
capacity. While the industry downturn following the attacks of
September 11 temporarily slowed the growth in the aviation industry
that began in the late 1990's, demand is growing rapidly. And we have
to change if we a going to be ready to meet it.
The warning signs are everywhere. Flight delays and cancellations
have reached unacceptable levels. Other issues, ranging from
environmental concerns to the complexities of homeland security are
placing additional stresses on the system. If we fail to address these
issues, we will suffocate the great engine of economic growth that is
civil aviation. A MITRE study done for FAA concludes that the current
system cannot handle the projected traffic demands expected by 2015--
absent modernization, the consequences will be serious.
NextGen is about a long-term transformation of our air
transportation system. It focuses on leveraging new technologies, such
as satellite-based navigation, surveillance and network-centric
systems. Enabling any far-reaching, systematic and long-term
transformation requires a vision of what you want and need to achieve,
and plans for how to get there from here. That's where the work of the
Joint Planning Development Office has come in to develop, the Concept
of Operations, the Enterprise Architecture, and the Integrated Work
Plan. These documents provide us with that picture of where we want to
go and the plans for how to achieve it.
The Concept of Operations is a description of the transformed state
of NextGen, much like what an architect's blueprints offers a builder.
Then, to adequately lay the groundwork and basic plans for the NextGen
system requires another step in the process, developed concurrently
with the Concept of Operations, and that's the Enterprise Architecture.
The Enterprise Architecture provides the next level of technical
details of the transformed NextGen system, much like a builder's
plumbing and wiring diagrams, specifying how the house will get its
power, water, sewage, cable, and internet connections to the rest of
the community. Finally, the Integrated Work Plan is the equivalent of
the general contractor's work plan. It specifies the timing and
interdependencies of the multi-agency research, demonstrations, and
development required to achieve the NexGen system vision.
This set of documents will define the NextGen system and guide the
future investment and capabilities, both in terms of research and
systems development. The JPDO released the NextGen Concept of
Operations for public comment on February 28th. It is now available on
the JPDO website for review and comment by our stakeholders, and we are
anxious to receive their feedback. The NextGen Enterprise Architecture
and the Integrated Work Plan should be released within the next few
months.
Let me emphasize, however, that we are not waiting for 2025 to
implement technologies to promote safer, more efficient operations, and
increase capacity in an environmentally sound manner. FAA and JPDO are
beginning to move from planning to implementation. In fact, the FAA's
FY 2008-2012 Capital Investment Plan (CIP) includes $4.6 billion in
projects and activities that directly support NextGen. The CIP is a
five-year plan that describes the National Airspace System
modernization costs aligned with the projects and activities that the
Agency intends to accomplish during that time. Several key NextGen
technologies and programs have already been identified and are funded
in the FAA's FY08 budget request. These technologies and programs are:
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B); System Wide
Information Management (SWIM); NextGen Data Communications; NextGen
Network Enabled Weather; NAS Voice Switch; and, NextGen Demonstrations
and Infrastructure Development. FAA proposes to spend $173 million on
these programs in FY08.
These technologies are essential to begin the transition from
today's air traffic management system to the NextGen system of 2025.
Perhaps the most significant of these transformational technologies is
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast or ADS-B. ADS-B is, quite
simply, the future of air traffic control. A key element of the NextGen
system, it uses GPS satellite signals to provide air traffic
controllers and pilots with much more accurate information on aircraft
position that will help keep aircraft safely separated in the sky and
on runways. Aircraft transponders receive GPS signals and use them to
determine the aircraft's precise position in the sky, which is combined
with other data and broadcast out to other aircraft and controllers.
When properly equipped with ADS-B, both pilots and controllers will,
for the very first time, see the same real-time displays of air
traffic; thereby substantially improving safety.
ADS-B has been successfully demonstrated through the FAA's Capstone
program in Alaska, and it has contributed to the recent reduction of GA
accidents in Alaska by more than 40 percent for ADS-B equipped
aircraft. One of the first uses of ADS-B technology outside of Alaska
will be in the Gulf of Mexico. The FAA has signed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the Helicopter Association International (HAI),
helicopter operators and oil and gas platform owners in the Gulf of
Mexico to improve service in the Gulf. Using ADS-B technology,
helicopter operators will transmit critical position information to the
Houston Center, enabling enhanced Air Traffic Control services in the
Gulf.
The FAA is looking at a rule-making that would mandate the avionics
necessary for implementing ADS-B in the national airspace system, and
is working closely with stakeholders to determine an appropriate
proposed timeline for a future NPRM.
In today's NAS there are a myriad of systems with custom-designed,
developed, and managed connections. The future, however, demands an
infrastructure that is capable of flexible growth, and the cost of
expanding today's point-to-point system is simply prohibitive. System
Wide Information Management (SWIM) responds to that need. SWIM will
provide high quality, timely data to many users and applications. By
reducing the number and types of interfaces and systems, SWIM will
reduce unnecessary redundancy of information and better facilitate
multi-agency information-sharing. When implemented, SWIM will
contribute to expanded system capacity, improved predictability and
operational decision-making, and reduced cost of service. In addition,
SWIM will improve coordination to allow transition from tactical
conflict management to strategic trajectory-based operations. It will
also allow for better use of existing capacity enroute.
The heart of the NextGen advanced airspace management concepts
lies--like much of our society--in the ability to communicate large
amounts of complex information in a fast, efficient, and robust manner.
In the current system, all air traffic communications with airborne
aircraft is by voice communications--in other words you pick up the
``phone'' to talk to someone else on another ``phone.'' NextGen
transformation cannot be realized through today's voice-only
communications, especially if you want to manage tens of thousands of
aircraft flights on optimal trajectory-based routes. Data
communications enabled services, such as 4-D trajectories and
conformance management, will shift air traffic operations from short-
term, minute-by-minute tactical control to more predictable and planned
strategic traffic management. Eventually, the majority of
communications will be handled by data communications for
appropriately-equipped users. It is estimated that with 70 percent of
aircraft data-link equipped, exchanging routine controller-pilot
messages and clearances via data can enable controllers to safely
handle approximately 30 percent more traffic. [FAA ATO-P Future Enroute
Work Station Study, Preliminary Results, 2006]
The NextGen Network Enabled Weather will serve as the backbone of
the NextGen weather support services, and provide a common weather
picture to all NAS users. Approximately 70 percent of annual national
airspace system delays are attributed to weather. The goal of this
investment is to cut weather-related delays by at least 50 percent. The
weather problem is about total weather information management, and not
just the state of the scientific art in weather forecasting. The
weather dissemination system today is inefficient to operate and
maintain, and information gathered by one system is not easily shared
with other systems. We must integrate predictive weather information
with decision support tools and provide uniform real-time access to key
common weather parameters, and common situational awareness. The
benefits will be improved utilization of air space across all flight
domains, and reduced flight delays.
The NAS Voice Switch will provide the foundation for all air-to-
ground and ground-to-ground voice communications in the air traffic
control environment. The switches today are very static, and our
ability to adjust the airspace for contingencies is limited. Under the
current system it is very difficult and time consuming to coordinate
and redesign the airspace. In the future, the impacts of bad weather
could be responded to in real-time, thereby minimizing its disruptions
to air traffic. The new voice switch allows us to replace today's
rigid, sector-based airspace design and support a dynamic flow of
traffic. Voice communications capabilities and network flexibility
provided by the NAS Voice Switch are essential to the FAA's ability to
implement new NextGen services that are necessary to increase
efficiency and improve performance.
At this early stage of NextGen, it is critical to better define
operational concepts and the technologies that will support them. A
crucial part of this activity is demonstrations of new technologies and
capabilities. In late April, we will demonstrate the use of continuous
descent approaches with time metering. We are requesting funding for
additional activities related to defining operational concepts and
technologies in the FY08 budget. This funding will support two
demonstrations and a series of infrastructure development activities.
The primary purposes of these demonstrations are to refine aspects of
the trajectory-based operations concept, while lowering risk by phasing
in new technologies. One demonstration will test trajectory-based
concepts in the oceanic environment. The ultimate goal is to increase
predictability on long-duration international flights and improve fuel
efficiency. The other demonstration will accelerate the first
integrated test of super-density operations using procedures for
increasing capacity at busy airports. This demonstration should achieve
near-term benefits at the test airport, and give us the tools to
implement the same procedures at other locations.
It is important to understand that NextGen is a portfolio program.
The technologies described above, and those that will be defined over
the next several years, are interdependent, creating a series of
transformations that will truly modernize today's system. Let me
provide a few examples of this.
In the future, trajectory-based operations will enable many pilots
and dispatchers to select their own flight paths, rather than follow
the existing system of flight paths, that are like a grid of interstate
highways in the sky. In the high performance airspace of the future,
each airplane will transmit and receive precise information about the
time at which it and others will cross key points along their paths.
Pilots and air traffic managers on the ground will have the same
precise information, transmitted via data communications. Investments
in ADS-B, SWIM and Data Communications are critical to trajectory-based
operations.
The NextGen system will enable collaborative air traffic
management. The increased scope, volume, and widespread distribution of
information that SWIM provides will improve the quality of the
decisions by air traffic managers and flight operators to address major
demand and capacity imbalances. SWIM and NAS Voice Switch are
instrumental in achieving this collaborative air traffic management.
With NextGen, the impact of weather is reduced through the use of
improved information sharing, new technology to sense and mitigate the
impacts of weather, improved weather forecasts, and the integration of
weather into automation to improve decision-making. New capabilities in
the aircraft and on the ground, coupled with better forecasts and new
automation, will minimize airspace limitations and traffic
restrictions. Network Enabled Weather and SWIM are vital investments
for these improvements.
Another vital consideration in the development of the NexGen system
is successfully managing aviation's environmental impacts. We have set
out an aggressive vision that grew out of a report to Congress that was
requested under Vision 100. Two years ago we delivered ``Aviation and
the Environment--A National Vision.'' Developed through the Partnership
for Air Transportation Noise and Emissions Reduction (PARTNER) Center
of Excellence, it brought near 40 stakeholders together: airlines,
manufacturers, community groups, airports, universities, research
establishments, and other government agencies to develop a common
vision. The participants agreed that the U.S. aviation system should
ensure significant impacts from noise and local emissions continue to
decline, identify appropriate metrics to deal with greenhouse gas
emissions, improve the relationship between airports and communities
that surround them, and ensure the U.S. remains a global leader in
aviation environmental matters--even as we grow the system two to three
fold.
A preliminary JPDO analysis has shown that long before we run into
limits from technology, we run into constraints to capacity from noise
and emissions impacts. In fact, we potentially lose tens of billions of
dollars in foregone aviation activity. That's why the NexGen
reauthorization is so important. It offers a number of programs that
are essential if we are to meet the environmental objectives--and so
foster capacity expansion and benefits it brings to the American
public. These include: demonstrating the use of new environmentally-
friendly procedures; underwriting the implementation of such procedures
at airports; targeting research of environmental issues at the airport
level; accelerating the maturing of new noise and emission reduction
technologies for use in aircraft; and exploring the use of alternative
fuels to enhance supply security and environmental performance.
We recognize that there are many challenges in converting the
JPDO's vision of the NextGen system into reality. Because the JPDO is
not an implementing or executing agency, the FAA and the other JPDO
partner agencies must work closely with the JPDO to develop an
implementation schedule for the operational changes required as new
technologies are deployed to realize the NextGen vision. The FAA is
using the Operational Evolution Partnership, the new OEP, to guide
their transformation to NextGen. In the past the Operational Evolution
Plan successfully provided a mid-term strategic roadmap for the FAA
that extended ten years into the future. The new OEP will include
strategic milestones through 2025. JPDO representatives will
participate along with the FAA in OEP development and execution.
The NAS and NextGen Enterprise Architectures will provide the
backbone of this new OEP by specifying roadmaps for system and
certification requirements, operational procedures, program phasing,
and prototype demonstrations. This Operational Evolution Partnership
will be the mechanism by which we hold ourselves accountable to our
owners, customers, and the aviation community for the FAA's progress
towards the JPDO vision, while assuring that the JPDO and the FAA are
jointly on-track to deliver the NextGen system.
Cost will be a vital factor: we cannot create a NextGen system that
is not affordable. Out-year funding estimates over the first ten years
range from $8 billion to $10 billion. Preliminary estimates suggest
that the investments necessary to achieve the end state NextGen system
range from $15 billion to $22 billion in funding. We are working to
continuously refine these estimates, particularly with our users as we
implement new cost-based financing mechanisms, as proposed in the Next
Generation Air Transportation System Financing Reform Act of 2007, the
FAA's reauthorization proposal.
MITRE, working with FAA, has developed a preliminary estimate of
the NextGen avionics costs. It concludes that a wide range of costs are
possible, depending on the bundling of avionics and the alignment of
equipage schedules. The most probable range of total avionics costs to
system users is $14 billion to $20 billion. This range reflects
uncertainty about equipage costs for individual aircraft, the number of
very light jets that will operate in high-performance airspace, and the
amount of time out-of-service required for equipage installation.
The importance of developing this system of the future is also
quite clear to policymakers in Europe, where a comparable effort known
as Single European Sky Air Traffic Management Research (SESAR) is well
underway. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity to the
United States. Creating a modernized, global system that provides
interoperability could serve as a tremendous boost to the aerospace
industry, fueling new efficiencies while creating jobs and delivering
substantial consumer benefits. The further opening of U.S. and European
markets in the recently-agreed ``Open Skies'' agreement reinforces this
need. Alternatively, we could also see a patchwork of duplicative
systems and technologies develop, which would place additional cost
burdens on an industry already struggling to make ends meet.
Last year, Administrator Blakey signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with her European counterpart that formalizes cooperation
between the NextGen initiative and the SESAR program. The FAA and the
EC are identifying opportunities and establishing timelines to
implement, where appropriate, common, interoperable, performance-based
air traffic management systems and technologies. This coordination will
address policy issues and facilitate global agreement within
international standards organizations such as ICAO, RTCA, and
Eurocontrol, and contribute greatly to the success of this critical
initiative. We hope to take the first steps under this agreement later
this summer to lay out a roadmap of flight trials to test a number of
procedures and technology that will reduce noise and emissions.
Our European counterparts have released a preliminary cost estimate
for SESAR. SESAR is conceived as a system that, while smaller in scope
and size, has similar air traffic management goals as NextGen. They
consider different system scenarios and a range of total costs of $25
billion to $37 billion in U.S. dollars through the year 2020. SESAR,
like NextGen, has a lot of work remaining to refine assumptions and
better define the system. However, there is an important difference in
scope between SESAR and NextGen. While SESAR focuses almost exclusively
on air traffic management, NextGen takes what's called a ``curb-to-
curb'' approach, and includes not only air traffic control, but also
airports, airport operations, security and passenger management, and
DOD and DHS NAS requirements.
Our overarching goal in the NextGen initiative is to develop a
system that will be flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of
users--very light jets and large commercial aircraft, manned and
unmanned aircraft, small airports and large, business and vacation
travelers alike, while handling a significantly increased number of
operations with a commensurate improvement in safety, security,
environment and efficiency. Research will continue to help us find the
right balance between a centralized satellite and ground system and a
totally distributed system, where aircraft ``self-manage'' their flight
with full knowledge of their environment.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I would be happy to
answer any questions the Committee may have.
Biography for Charles A. Leader
Mr. Leader is the Director of the Joint Planning and Development
Office (JPDO), appointed on August 7, 2006, by the FAA Administrator
Marion C. Blakey.
As Director of the JPDO, Mr. Leader is charged with the goal of
transforming the air transportation system of the United States. His
interagency office is tasked with developing and implementing a
National Integrated Plan to improve the level of safety, security,
capacity, efficiency, quality, and affordability of the National
Airspace System. The National Plan, known as the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NGATS), is being developed with the support and
resources of the Administrator of the FAA, the Administrator of NASA,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Secretary of Commerce, and the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP). These government agencies are partnered with
more than 200 industry stakeholders to produce this transformational
plan. Beginning with the safest transportation system today, NGATS will
lay out a technology and policy roadmap to deliver space-based,
precision navigation, ``Super Density'' operations to a world-wide
audience. To insure global inter-operability and economic growth, NGATS
will promote international harmonization of these transformational
plans and programs among International stakeholders.
Mr. Leader is a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps and a graduate of
the University of Notre Dame and of Harvard Business School. During the
past fifteen years, Mr. Leader has held CEO and general management
positions in several corporations, including Hughes Aircraft. He was a
partner at McKinsey & Co. and co-leader of their Aerospace/Defense
practice. Mr. Leader's experience includes working in technology
development, systems integration, and the realignment of large and
complex organizations.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Mr. Leader.
Dr. Dillingham, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. GERALD L. DILLINGHAM, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Dr. Dillingham. Thank you, Chairman Udall. My testimony
today on the status of JPDO's efforts to plan and coordinate
the development of the NextGen focuses on questions. First,
what has been the outcome of JPDO's efforts to establish its
organizational and operational structure; second, what is the
status of JPDO's technical planning; and third, to what extent
has funding been identified for near-term research and
development?
Regarding JPDO's structure and operations, our research
shows that the JPDO partner agencies have worked together to
develop key strategies for implementing NextGen. JPDO has also
leveraged its partner agencies' resources by staffing various
levels of its organization with partner agency employees.
Additionally, the establishment of the Institute provides a
method for involving non-federal stakeholders in planning
NextGen.
Our work has identified some organization issues that, if
not addressed, could seriously jeopardize the JPDO's chances of
success. For example, the frequency of leadership turnover at
JPDO and the Institute has raised concerns about the stability
of the office and the future of the initiative. During its
three years of existence, JPDO has had three directors, and
there have been two directors of the Institute. Additionally,
some stakeholders have expressed concerns about the
productivity and the pace of JPDO's efforts. Concerns have also
been raised by some private sector stakeholders as to whether
potential conflict-of-interest issues are adequately addressed
by current Institute policy.
To its credit, JPDO officials are currently proposing
several changes to JPDO's structure and operations to improve
the effectiveness of the organization. We believe that these
changes could help address stakeholder concerns but their
effectiveness will need to be monitored, evaluated and linked
to a policy of continuous improvement. Furthermore, we believe
that FAA and JPDO must also identify and address the factors
that have contributed to the frequent turnover of its senior
management.
JPDO also has a continuing challenge in ensuring the
involvement of all key stakeholders. For example, active
traffic controllers and technicians are not currently involved
in NextGen planning. Our analysis of FAA's current air traffic
control modernization program has shown that involving
stakeholders is a very critical requirement for successful
implementation of efforts such as NextGen.
With our regard to our second question about JPDO's
technical planning, as you heard Mr. Leader testify, JPDO has
made significant progress towards completing several key
technical planning documents including a Concept of Operations,
an Enterprise Architecture and an Integrated work Plan. We
think that JPDO is focusing on the right types of planning
tools for the NextGen initiative.
In our earlier testimony before this committee, we noted
that JPDO is, fundamentally, a planning and coordinating body
that lacks authority over the key human and technological
resources of its partner agencies. To its credit, the JPDO has
begun to explore ways to help ensure that it has the needed
resources and authority. For example, JPDO is working on
aligning Enterprise Architectures of its partner agencies. It
is also working with OMB to establish a cross-agency mechanism
for NextGen funding decisions and it is working with FAA to
revamp its key planning tool, the Operation Evolutionary
Partnership, to focus on the NextGen effort. Institutionalizing
these types of collaborative processes will be critical for
JPDO to maintain its achievement and ensure further progress
despite personnel changes and the competing priorities of the
partner agencies.
Now, I would like to turn to our final question: to what
extent has funding been identified for near-term research and
development? FAA and JPDO recently estimated total federal
costs for NextGen will range between $15 and $22 billion.
However, questions remain as to which organizations will fund
and conduct some of the necessary R&D and demonstration
projects. This R&D will be key to making decisions about
NextGen technology, developing regulations, and addressing
human factor issues. In the past, a significant part of this
research was conducted by NASA. FAA's R&D advisory committee
has estimated that it would cost nearly a half a billion
dollars in additional funding and delay NextGen by five years
for FAA to develop the necessary infrastructure and assume the
previous NASA R&D. According to JPDO, the organization is
exploring ways to address the R&D funding challenge and they
expect to issue a report in August of this year.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I want to emphasize that JPDO has
achieved much in its short existence but much remains to be
done. This is one of the Federal Government's most complicated
undertakings. There are many challenges on the horizon that
will have to be overcome and will require the joint efforts of
the Congress, the partner agencies and the private sector
aviation community. Failing is not an option.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Dillingham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss
the progress of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) in
conceptualizing, planning, and facilitating a transformation of the
current national airspace system to the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen). Our nation's current airspace system
is under growing strain as the demand for air travel is steadily
increasing, from over 740 million passengers flying in fiscal year 2006
to an estimated one billion passengers by 2015, according to Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates. The system is also expected to
absorb a growing variety of aircraft, from the jumbo A380 which can
hold more than 500 passengers to very light jets which will transport
six or fewer passengers per flight. The consensus is that the current
system cannot be expanded to meet this projected growth. Without a
timely transition to NextGen capabilities, JPDO officials estimate a
future gap between the demand for air transportation and available
capacity that could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars annually.
In 2003, recognizing the need for system transformation, Congress
authorized the creation of JPDO,\1\ housed within FAA, to lead a
collaborative effort of federal and non-federal aviation stakeholders
to conceptualize and plan the NextGen system. NextGen is envisioned as
a major redesign of the air transportation system that will move from
largely ground-based radars to precision satellite-based navigation and
includes digital, networked communications; an integrated weather
system; layered, adaptive security; and more. In addition to FAA, JPDO
operates in conjunction with multiple federal partner agencies,
including the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Defense, and
Homeland Security; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.
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\1\ JPDO was authorized by the Vision 100-Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (Pub. L. No. 108-176). The office began operating
in early 2004.
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My testimony today focuses on the following question: What is the
status of JPDO's planning and facilitation of NextGen with respect to
its organizational structure, technical planning, and initial research
and development? My statement is based on our November 2006 report to
this subcommittee\2\ as well as on-going work. We conducted this work
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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\2\ GAO, Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and
Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace
System, GAO-07-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2006).
In summary:
JPDO has made progress in several areas in its planning of the
NextGen initiative, but continues to face a number of challenges.
JPDO's organizational structure incorporates some of the practices that
we have found to be effective for federal interagency collaborations,
and includes an institute that facilitates the participation of non-
federal stakeholders. JPDO has faced some organizational challenges,
however. Leadership turnover at JPDO and the Institute have raised
concerns about the stability of JPDO and the NextGen initiative.
Additionally, we and JPDO officials have heard concerns from
stakeholders about the productivity of some integrated product teams
(IPTs) and the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. In response, JPDO
officials are currently proposing several changes to JPDO's
organizational structure aimed at improving the effectiveness of the
organization. We believe that these changes could help address
stakeholder concerns, but the effectiveness of these changes will have
to be evaluated.
JPDO has also made progress toward releasing several key planning
documents, including a Concept of Operations, an Enterprise
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan, although in some cases on a
revised and extended timeline. JPDO is focusing on the right types of
key documents for the foundation of NextGen planning, although the
current draft Concept of Operations still lacks important details. In
our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. JPDO has identified several tasks that will help
institutionalize collaboration, including aligning the enterprise
architectures of its partner agencies, working with OMB to establish a
cross-agency mechanism for NextGen funding decisions, and working with
FAA to revamp a key planning document to focus on the NextGen effort.
JPDO has made progress in developing cost estimates for NextGen,
recently reporting that it estimates the total federal cost for NextGen
infrastructure through 2025 will range between $15 billion and $22
billion. Questions remain, however, over which organizations will fund
and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that in the past were often conducted by NASA,
and which will be key to achieving certain NextGen capabilities. For
example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily on a
NASA modeling platform that NASA does not plan to upgrade for two
years. As a result, JPDO's investment simulation capability might be
constrained. JPDO also faces a challenge in addressing questions
concerning how human factors issues, such as the changing roles of air
traffic controllers in a more automated NextGen environment, will be
researched and addressed. Finally, JPDO has a continuing challenge in
ensuring the involvement of all key stakeholders. For example, active
air traffic controllers and technicians are not currently involved in
NextGen planning. Similarly, issues have arisen over whether conflict
of interest issues could chill the participation of industry
stakeholders.
In November 2006, we recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation direct JPDO to take actions to institutionalize the
partner agencies' collaboration in supporting NextGen, including action
on a Memorandum of Understanding among the partner agencies, actions to
finalize procedures to leverage partner agency resources, and actions
to develop procedures for dispute resolution. We also recommended that
the Secretary direct JPDO to determine whether key stakeholders and
expertise are not currently represented in JPDO planning efforts. JPDO
officials neither agreed nor disagree with our recommendations, but
said they would consider them.
JPDO Has Made Progress in Planning NextGen, but Continues to Face a
Number of Challenges
JPDO has continued to make progress in facilitating the
collaboration that is central to its mission and in furthering its key
planning documents. However, JPDO faces a number of challenges
involving its organizational structure, institutionalization of its
efforts, research and development activities, and stakeholder
participation.
JPDO's Organizational Structure Facilitates Collaboration, But
Continues to Evolve
Vision 100 includes requirements for JPDO to coordinate and consult
with its partner agencies, private sector experts, and the public.
JPDO's approach has been to establish an organizational structure that
involves federal and non-federal stakeholders throughout the
organization. This structure includes a federal interagency senior
policy committee, a board of directors, and an institute to facilitate
the participation of non-federal stakeholders. JPDO's structure also
includes eight integrated product teams (IPT), which is where the
federal and non-federal experts come together to plan for and
coordinate the development of technologies for NextGen. The eight IPTs
are linked to eight key strategies that JPDO developed early on for
guiding its NextGen planning work (see Table 1).
JPDO's senior policy committee is headed by the Secretary of
Transportation (as required in Vision 100) and includes senior-level
officials from JPDO's partner agencies. The Next Generation Air
Transportation System Institute (the Institute) was created by an
agreement between the National Center for Advanced Technologies\3\ and
FAA to incorporate the expertise and views of stakeholders from private
industry, state and local governments, and academia. The Institute
Management Council (IMC), composed of top officials and representatives
from the aviation community, oversees the policy, recommendations, and
products of the Institute and provides a means for advancing consensus
positions on critical NextGen issues. The IPTs are headed by
representatives of JPDO's partner agencies and include more than 200
non-federal stakeholders from over 100 organizations, whose
participation was arranged through the Institute. Figure 1 illustrates
JPDO's position within FAA and the JPDO structures that bring together
federal and non-federal stakeholders, including the Institute and the
IPTs. To meet Vision 100's requirement that JPDO coordinate and consult
with the public, the Institute held its first public meeting in March
2006 and plans to hold another public meeting in May 2007.
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\3\ The National Center for Advanced Technologies is a nonprofit
unit within the Aerospace Industries Association.
In November 2006, we reported that JPDO's organizational structure
incorporated some of the practices that we have found to be effective
for federal interagency collaborations--an important point given how
critical such collaboration is to the success of JPDO's mission. For
example, the JPDO partner agencies have worked together to develop key
strategies for NextGen and JPDO has leveraged its partner agency
resources by staffing various levels of its organization with partner
agency employees. Also, our work has shown that involving stakeholders
can, among other things, increase their support for a collaborative
effort, and the Institute provides a method for involving non-federal
stakeholders in planning NextGen.
Recently, JPDO officials told us they have proposed to FAA
management and the IMC executive board a change in the IPT structure
and operation to improve the efficiency of the organization. JPDO has
proposed converting each IPT into a ``work group'' with the same
participants as the current IPT, but with each work group led by a
joint government and industry steering committee. The steering
committee would oversee the creation of small, ad hoc subgroups that
would be tasked with short-term projects exploring specific issues and
delivering discrete work products. Under this arrangement, work group
members would be free of obligations to the group when not engaged in a
specific project. According to JPDO officials, if these changes are
approved, the work groups would be more efficient and output- or
product-focused than the current IPTs. JPDO officials also noted that
they are proposing to create a ninth work group to address avionics
issues.
We believe that these changes could help address concerns that we
have heard from some stakeholders about the productivity of some IPTs
and the pace of the planning effort at JPDO. Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of these changes will have to be evaluated over time.
Also, JPDO's director has pointed out the need for the office to begin
transitioning from planning NextGen to facilitating the implementation
of NextGen. We believe that these changes are potentially useful in
supporting such a transition. However, it will be important to monitor
these changes to ensure that the participation of stakeholders is
neither decreased nor adversely affected. Maintaining communications
within and among work groups could increase in importance if, as work
group members focus on specific projects, they become less involved in
the overall collaborative planning effort.
Finally, while the organizational structure of JPDO and the
Institute have been in place and largely unchanged for several years
now, both of these entities have suffered from a lack of stable
leadership. As JPDO begins its fourth year in operation, it is on its
third director and operated during most of 2006 under the stewardship
of an acting director. The Institute pointed out in its recent annual
report that JPDO's leadership turnover had made it a challenge for JPDO
to move out more aggressively on many goals and objectives, as the
office waited on a full-time director. The Institute also stated that
JPDO's leadership turnover had limited the ability of the IMC executive
committee to forge a stronger relationship with JPDO leadership and
work jointly on strategic issues and challenges. However, the Institute
has also had issues with turnover and is currently functioning under an
acting director due to the recent departure of its second director, who
had been in the position less than two years. The leadership turnovers
at both JPDO and the Institute raise concerns about the stability of
JPDO and about the impact of these turnovers on the progress of the
NextGen initiative.
JPDO Has Made Progress Toward Releasing Key Planning Documents,
Although Further Work Remains
JPDO's authorizing legislation requires the office to create a
multi-agency research and development plan for the transition to
NextGen. To comply, JPDO is developing several key documents that
together form the foundation of NextGen planning. These documents
include a NextGen Concept of Operations, a NextGen Enterprise
Architecture, and an Integrated Work Plan.
The Concept of Operations is the most fundamental of JPDO's key
planning documents, as the other key documents flow from it. Although
an earlier version was delayed so that stakeholder comments could be
addressed, Version 1.2 of the Concept of Operations is currently posted
on JPDO's website for review and comment by the aviation community.
This 226-page document provides written descriptions of how the NextGen
system is envisioned to operate in 2025 and beyond, including
highlighting key research and policy issues that will need to be
addressed.\4\ For example, some key policy issues are associated with
automating the air traffic control system, including the need for a
backup plan in case automation fails, the responsibilities and
liabilities of different stakeholders during an automation failure, and
the level of monitoring needed by pilots when automation is ensuring
safe separation between aircraft. Over the next few months, JPDO plans
to address the public comments it receives and issue a revised version
of the Concept of Operations.
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\4\ Following an introductory section, the Concept of Operations
has eight sections covering air traffic management operations, airport
operations and infrastructure services, net-centric infrastructure
services, shared situational awareness services, security services,
environmental management framework, safety management services, and
performance management services.
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In addition to the Concept of Operations, JPDO is working on an
Enterprise Architecture for NextGen--that is, a technical description
of the NextGen system, akin to blueprints for a building. The
Enterprise Architecture is meant to provide a common tool for planning
and understanding the complex, interrelated systems that will make up
NextGen. According to JPDO officials, the Enterprise Architecture will
provide the means for coordinating among the partner agencies and
private sector manufacturers, aligning relevant research and
development activities, and integrating equipment. JPDO plans to issue
an early version of its Enterprise Architecture next month, although it
was originally scheduled for release in September 2006.
Finally, JPDO is developing an Integrated Work Plan that will
describe the capabilities needed to transition to NextGen from the
current system and provide the research, policy and regulation, and
schedules necessary to achieve NextGen by 2025. The Integrated Work
Plan is akin to a project plan and will be critical for fiscal year
2009 partner agency budget and program planning. According to a JPDO
official, the office intends to issue its initial draft of the
Integrated Work Plan in July 2007.
We have discussed JPDO's planning documents with JPDO officials and
examined both an earlier version of JPDO's Concept of Operations\5\ and
the current version that is out for public comment.\6\ Based on our
analysis, JPDO is focusing on the right types of key documents for the
foundation of NextGen planning. As for the Concept of Operations, the
current version is much improved from the prior version, with
additional details added. Nonetheless, we believe that it still does
not include key elements such as scenarios illustrating NextGen
operations, a summary of NextGen's operational impact on users and
other stakeholders, and an analysis of the benefits, alternatives, and
trade-offs that were considered for NextGen. In addition, it lacks an
overall description that ties together the eight key areas that the
document covers. As noted, JPDO does plan to release another version of
the Concept of Operations later this year.
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\5\ Concept of Operations for the Next Generation Air
Transportation System, Version 0.2, July 24, 2006.
\6\ Our senior level technologist reviewed JPDO's current Concept
of Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System,
Version 1.2, dated February 28, 2007, by comparing it with the IEEE
Standard 1362-1998 for concept of operations documents.
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In fact, JPDO plans further versions of all of its key planning
documents. We see the development of all three of JPDO's key documents
as part of an iterative and evolutionary process. Thus, it is unlikely
that any of these documents will ever be truly ``finalized,'' but
rather will continue to evolve throughout the implementation of NextGen
to reflect, for example, the development of new technologies or
problems uncovered during research and development of planned
technologies.
Finally, while each of the three key documents has a specific
purpose, the scope and technical sophistication of these documents
makes it difficult for some stakeholders to understand the basics of
the NextGen planning effort. To address this issue, JPDO is currently
drafting what the office refers to as a ``blueprint'' for NextGen,
meant to be a short, high-level, non-technical presentation of NextGen
goals and capabilities. We believe that such a document could help some
stakeholders develop a better understanding of NextGen and the planning
effort to date.
Institutionalizing the Collaborative Process Poses a Continuing
Challenge for JPDO
In our November 2006 report, we noted that JPDO is fundamentally a
planning and coordinating body that lacks authority over the key human
and technological resources of its partner agencies. Consequently,
institutionalizing the collaborative process with its partner agencies
will be critical to JPDO's ability to facilitate the implementation of
NextGen. As we reported in November, JPDO has not established some
practices significant to institutionalizing its collaborative process.
For example, one method for establishing collaboration at a fundamental
level would be for JPDO to have formal, long-term agreements among its
partner agencies on their roles and responsibilities in creating
NextGen. Currently, there is no mechanism that assures the partner
agencies' commitment continuing over the 20-year timeframe of NextGen
or their accountability to JPDO. According to JPDO officials, they are
working to establish a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by the
Secretary or other high-ranking official from each partner agency,
which will broadly define the partner agencies' roles and
responsibilities. JPDO first informed us of the development of this MOU
in August 2005; in November 2006 we recommended that JPDO finalize the
MOU and present it to the senior policy committee for its consideration
and action. However, as of March 28, 2007, the MOU remained unsigned by
some of the partner agencies.
Another key method for institutionalizing the collaborative effort
is incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the partner
agencies' key planning documents. For example, we noted in November
2006 that NASA and FAA had incorporated NextGen goals into their
strategic plans. These types of efforts will be critical to JPDO's
ability to leverage its partner agency resources for continued JPDO
planning efforts. Even more importantly, these efforts will be critical
to helping ensure that partner agencies--given competing missions and
resource demands--dedicate the resources necessary to support the
implementation of NextGen research efforts or system acquisitions.
Recognizing that JPDO does not have authority over partner agency
resources, FAA and JPDO have initiated several efforts to
institutionalize NextGen. For example, JPDO is working with FAA to
refocus one of FAA's key planning documents on the implementation of
NextGen--an effort that also appears to be improving the collaboration
and coordination between JPDO and FAA's Air Traffic Organization (ATO),
which has primary responsibility for modernization of the air traffic
control system. FAA has expanded and revamped its Operational Evolution
Plan (OEP)--renamed the Operational Evolution Partnership--to become
FAA's implementation plan for NextGen.\7\ The OEP is being expanded to
apply to all of FAA and is intended to become a comprehensive
description of how the agency will implement NextGen, including the
required technologies, procedures, and resources. (Figure 3 shows the
OEP framework.) An ATO official told us that the new OEP is to be
consistent with JPDO's key planning documents and its budget guidance
to the partner agencies. According to FAA, the new OEP will allow it to
demonstrate appropriate budget control and linkage to NextGen plans and
will force FAA's research and development to be relevant to NextGen's
requirements. According to FAA documents, the agency plans to publish a
new OEP in June 2007.
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\7\ Prior to expansion of the OEP, the document centered around
plans for increasing capacity and efficiency at 35 major airports.
In addition, to further align FAA's efforts with JPDO's plans for
NextGen, FAA is creating a NextGen Review Board to oversee the OEP.
This Review Board will be co-chaired by JPDO's Director and ATO's Vice
President of Operations Planning Services. Initiatives, such as concept
demonstrations or research, proposed for inclusion in the OEP will now
need to go through the Review Board for approval. Initiatives are to be
assessed for their relation to NextGen requirements, concept maturity,
and risk. An ATO official told us that the new OEP process should also
help identify some smaller programs that might be inconsistent with
NextGen and which could be discontinued. Additionally, as a further
step towards integrating ATO and JPDO, the administration's
reauthorization proposal calls for the JPDO director to be a voting
member of FAA's Joint Resources Council and ATO's Executive Council.
While progress is being made in incorporating NextGen initiatives
into FAA's strategic and planning documents, more remains to be done
with FAA and the other JPDO partner agencies. For example, one critical
activity that remains in this area will be synchronizing the NextGen
enterprise architecture, once JPDO releases and further refines it,
with the partner agencies' enterprise architectures. Doing so should
help align agencies' current work with NextGen while simultaneously
identifying gaps between agency plans and NextGen plans. Also, while
FAA is making significant progress toward creating an implementation
plan for NextGen, the other partner agencies are less far along or have
not begun such efforts. JPDO's lack of authority over partner agency
resources will be minimized as a challenge if the partner agencies
commit to NextGen goals and initiatives at a structural level. By
further incorporation of NextGen efforts into strategic planning
documents, the partner agencies will better institutionalize their
commitments to JPDO and the NextGen initiative.
Finally, another important method for institutionalizing the
collaborative effort will be for JPDO to establish mechanisms for
leveraging partner agency resources. JPDO has made progress in this
area, although further work remains. As we noted in our November
report, JPDO is working with OMB to develop a process that would allow
OMB to identify NextGen-related projects across the partner agencies
and consider NextGen as a unified, cross-agency program. We recently
met with OMB officials who said that they felt there has been
significant progress with JPDO over the last year. JPDO is now working
on an OMB Exhibit 300 form for NextGen.\8\ This will allow JPDO to
present OMB a joint business case for the NextGen-related efforts
within the partner agencies and will be used as input to funding
decisions for NextGen research and acquisitions across the agencies.
This Exhibit 300 will be due to OMB in September 2007 to inform
decisions about the partner agencies' 2009 budget submissions.
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\8\ Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission,
and Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.
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Ultimately, the success of JPDO will have to be measured in the
efforts of its partner agencies to implement policies and procedures
and acquire systems that support NextGen. To date, JPDO can point to
its success in collaborating with FAA to fund and speed its roll-out of
two systems considered cornerstone technologies for NextGen: Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and System Wide Information
Management (SWIM). ADS-B is a new air traffic surveillance system that
will replace many existing radars with less costly ground-based
transceivers. SWIM will provide an initial network centric capability
to all the users of the air transportation system. This means that the
FAA and the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense will
eventually share a common, real-time, secure picture of aviation
operations across the airspace system. Identifying such NextGen
programs across the partner agencies and establishing implementation
plans for them in JPDO's Integrated Work Plan will be critical going
forward to creating performance metrics for JPDO.
Although we recommended in our November report that JPDO develop
written procedures that formalize agreements with OMB regarding the
leveraging of partner agency resources, this is still a work in
progress. For example, OMB officials said they had not reviewed JPDO's
2008 partner agency budget guidance prior to its release to the partner
agencies, which highlights the need for JPDO to further develop its
procedures for working with OMB. Going forward, it will be important
for Congress and other stakeholders to evaluate the success of the 2009
budgets in supporting NextGen initiatives, especially as 2009 is
expected to be a critical year in the transition from planning NextGen
to implementing NextGen.
FAA and JPDO Have Begun to Release Early Cost Estimates for NextGen,
but Questions Remain Over Who Will Conduct
Necessary Research and Development
In our November report, we noted that JPDO had not yet developed a
comprehensive estimate of the costs of NextGen. Since then, in its
recently released 2006 Progress Report,\9\ JPDO reported some estimated
costs for NextGen, including specifics on some early NextGen programs.
JPDO believes the total federal cost for NextGen infrastructure through
2025 will range between $15 billion and $22 billion. JPDO also reported
that a preliminary estimate of the corresponding cost to system users,
who will have to equip with the advanced avionics that are necessary to
realize the full benefits of some NextGen technologies, produced a
range of $14 billion to $20 billion. JPDO noted that this range for
avionics costs reflects uncertainty about equipage costs for individual
aircraft, the number of very light jets that will operate in high-
performance airspace, and the amount of out-of-service time required
for installation.
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\9\ JPDO, Making the NextGen Vision a Reality: 2006 Progress Report
to the Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2007).
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FAA, in its capital investment plan for fiscal years 2008-2012,
includes estimated expenditures for 11 line items that are considered
NextGen capital programs.\10\ The total five-year estimated
expenditures for these programs is $4.3 billion. In fiscal year 2008,
only six of the line items are funded for a total of roughly $174
million; funding for the remaining five programs would begin with the
fiscal year 2009 budget. According to FAA, in addition to capital
spending for NextGen, the agency will spend an estimated $300 million
on NextGen-related research and development from fiscal years 2008
through 2012. The administration's budget for fiscal year 2008 for FAA
includes a total of $17.8 million to support the activities of JPDO.
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\10\ FAA has six capital investment programs that it considers
transformational NextGen programs slated to receive funding in fiscal
year 2008: ADS-B nationwide implementation, System Wide Information
Management (SWIM), NextGen Data Communications, NextGen Network Enabled
Weather, National Airspace System Voice Switch, and NextGen Technology
Demonstration. In addition, five other programs are slated to begin
funding in 2009: NextGen System Development, NextGen High Altitude
Trajectory Based Operations, NextGen High Density Airports, NextGen
Networked Facilities, and NextGen Cross-Cutting Infrastructure.
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While FAA and JPDO have begun to release estimates for FAA's
NextGen investment portfolio, questions remain over which entities will
fund and conduct some of the necessary research, development, and
demonstration projects that will be key to achieving certain NextGen
capabilities. In the past, a significant portion of aeronautics
research and development, including intermediate technology
development, has been performed by NASA. However, NASA's aeronautics
research budget and proposed funding shows a 30 percent decline, in
constant 2005 dollars, from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2011. To
its credit, NASA plans to focus its research on the needs of NextGen.
However, NASA is also moving toward a focus on fundamental research and
away from developmental work and demonstration projects, which could
negatively impact NextGen if these efforts are not assumed by others.
According to its 2006 Progress Report, JPDO is building a research and
development plan that will document NextGen's research needs and the
organizations that will perform the work.
For example, JPDO's investment simulation capability relies heavily
on NASA's NAS-wide modeling platform, the Airspace Concepts Evaluation
System (ACES).\11\ This investment simulation capability permits JPDO
to, among other things, evaluate alternative research ideas and assess
the performance of competing vendors. According to a JPDO official,
this capability, which is critical to NextGen research, is eroding as
JPDO's investment simulation requirements are expanding. As part of its
fundamental research mission, NASA intends to upgrade to ACES-X (a more
sophisticated representation of the national airspace system), but not
for another two years. Until then, JPDO investment modeling capability
will be constrained unless the office or another partner agency can
assume the modeling work. While one option would be to contract with
private sector vendors to do this type of modeling on a per simulation
basis, this solution could be expensive for the government. Moreover,
JPDO might not be able to continue facilitating participation by both
small and large companies, thus giving both an equal opportunity to
demonstrate their ideas, because small companies would have to pay for
access to this proprietary modeling capability. This is an issue that
needs to be addressed in the short-term.
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\11\ ACES provides a detailed flight simulation environment and an
open framework to integrate the results of other simulations. This
allows JPDO to test concepts well before they have to be demonstrated
with real hardware and people. This platform provides a basis for
evaluating the timing of many agencies' current budget requests and is
a method for comparing competitive ideas.
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JPDO faces the challenge of determining the nature and scope of the
research and technology development necessary to begin the transition
to NextGen, as well as identifying the entities that can conduct that
research and development. According to officials at FAA and JPDO, they
are currently studying these issues and trying to assess how much
research and development FAA can assume. An FAA official recently
testified that the agency proposes to increase its research and
development funding by $280 million over the next five years. However,
a draft report by an advisory committee to FAA stated that FAA would
need at least $100 million annually in increased funding to assume
NASA's research and development work, and establishing the necessary
infrastructure within FAA could delay the implementation of NextGen by
five years.\12\ More work remains to completely assess the research and
development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and the other JPDO
partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary initiatives.
This information is critical as the timely completion of research and
testing of proposed NextGen systems is necessary to keeping the NextGen
initiative on schedule.
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\12\ Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee,
Draft Report on Financing the Next Generation Air Transportation System
(Washington, D.C.: April 2006).
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Some Fundamental NextGen Capabilities Will Require Human Factors
Research
Addressing questions about how human factors issues will affect the
move to some key NextGen capabilities is another challenge for JPDO.
For example, the NextGen Concept of Operations envisions an increased
reliance on automation, which raises questions about the role of the
air traffic controllers in such an automated environment. Similarly,
the Concept of Operations envisions that pilots will take on a greater
share of the responsibility for maintaining safe separation and other
tasks currently performed by controllers. This raises human factors
questions about whether pilots can safely perform these additional
duties.
Although JPDO has begun to model how shifts in air traffic
controllers' workloads would affect their performance, it has not yet
begun to model the effect of how this shift in workload to pilots would
affect pilot performance. According to a JPDO official, modeling the
effect of changes in pilot workload has not yet begun because JPDO has
not yet identified a suitable model for incorporation into its suite of
modeling tools. According to a JPDO official, the evolving roles of
pilots and controllers is the NextGen initiative's most important human
factors issue, but will be difficult to research because data on pilot
behavior are not readily available for use in creating models. In
addition to the study of changing roles, JPDO has not yet studied the
training implications of various systems or solutions proposed for
NextGen. For example, JPDO officials said they will need to study the
extent to which new air traffic controllers will have to be trained to
operate both the old and the new equipment as the Concept of Operations
and enterprise architecture mature.
JPDO Faces A Continuing Challenge in Ensuring the Involvement of All
Key Stakeholders
Some stakeholders, such as current air traffic controllers and
technicians, will play critical roles in NextGen, and their involvement
in planning for and deploying the new technology will be important to
the success of NextGen. In November 2006, we reported that active air
traffic controllers were not involved in the NextGen planning effort
and recommended that JPDO determine whether any key stakeholders and
expertise were not represented on its IPTs, divisions, or elsewhere
within the office. Since then, the head of the controllers' union has
taken a seat on the Institute Management Council. However, no active
controllers are yet participating at the IPT planning level. Also,
aviation technicians do not participate in NextGen efforts. Input from
current air traffic controllers who have recent experience controlling
aircraft and current technicians who will maintain NextGen equipment is
important when considering human factors and safety issues. Our work on
past air traffic control modernization projects has shown that a lack
of stakeholder or expert involvement early and throughout a project can
lead to costly increases and delays.
In addition, we found that some private sector stakeholders have
expressed concerns that participation in the Institute might either
preclude bidding on future NextGen acquisitions or pose organizational
conflicts of interest. FAA's acquisition process, generally, precludes
bids from organizations that have participated in, materially
influenced, or had prior knowledge of the requirements for an
acquisition. The Institute was aware of this concern and attempted to
address it through an amendment to its governing document that
strengthened the language protecting participants from organizational
conflicts of interest for participation in the NextGen initiative.
However, while the amendment language currently operates to protect
stakeholders, the language has never been tested or challenged. Thus,
it is unclear at this time whether any stakeholder participation is
being chilled by conflict of interest concerns.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions from you or other Members of the Subcommittee.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Dillingham.
Secretary Douglass, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. DOUGLASS, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Douglass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to ask your permission, sir, to
submit my written statement for the record.
Chairman Udall. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Douglass. I will cover this briefly with a summary.
Sir, my first involvement and deep immersion in this issue came
back in 2002 when I was a commissioner on the bipartisan
commission on the future of the aerospace industry and one of
the extraordinary things that the commissioners discovered was
that if you looked at the capacity of our air traffic control
system and all of the estimates for growth in the air traffic
in the United States, the two didn't match. There was a very
big disconnect there and we could see fairly clearly that we
were not going to be able to stay ahead of the demand unless we
did something radically different, and one of the ideas that
came from the commission was the creation of the JPDO, or Joint
Office, to develop this new system and the vision of this Joint
Office was that the technology that we need to do this task
largely exists in other parts of the government. It exists in
the Department of Defense. It exists in NASA and other parts of
the government and we all knew that this was going to be an
episodic thing that we do about every 40 or 50 years as a
nation, a very complex task, and so we didn't want to reinvent
the wheel, and from that was born the concept of the Joint
Planning and Development Office. In the five years since this
report was issued, we have seen the Department of
Transportation, the FAA, and to its enormous credit, Congress,
largely led by this and several other subcommittees support
this concept and I would associate myself with much of what you
said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman.
So now, after five years, we find that much of the planning
has been implemented but it is time for us to begin to actually
implement the development of the new system and as we begin
this task, it is really important to remember as both of my
predecessors have said this morning, this is an enormously
complex task. There is probably not another one that I can
think of that is as broad an interagency effort, but the payoff
if we do it right is huge in savings for the American people,
both in the development process and in the important results of
the project once it is implemented.
It is also important, though, Mr. Chairman to note that
time is short. Five years have gone by since this commission
report and there are people who are believing that we may see a
meltdown this summer of the system because of thunderstorms and
things of that nature and traffic is back ahead of where it was
before 9/11. So we in industry share your concern about the
need to get on with this and we are very concerned that the
research and development funding shortfall, particularly in
NASA and the Department of Homeland Security, need to be taken
care of now and not pushed off into the out years. I have been
told that there are some alignments coming into play as far as
2009 and 2010 down at OMB and we think that is too late.
So we believe that there is some additional accountability
needed here to pull all of this together. We think JPDO needs
to be accountable to the Congress. We need--we believe that the
agencies that support the JPDO also need to be accountable to
Congress. We are particularly concerned about the lack of
regular meetings of the Senior Policy Oversight Committee that
you mentioned in your opening statement. I can tell you, sir, I
was a part of most of the big joint programs in the Department
of Defense when I was at General Law, sir, when I was Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, and I have learned from hard experience
that you have to meet very regularly to oversee these very
complex projects.
Finally, my last point that I would like to make, sir, is
that industry is very much a partner in this effort, not only
in the development in the system but in the financing in the
system. We expect that our side of the cost will probably be
somewhere between $15 and $30 billion over the development
cycle and it is enormously important for industry to have the
confidence that the government part of the program will stay on
track, and when the industry loses confidence that it will stay
on track, then the funding dries up. Obviously, the airlines
don't want to quit if they don't believe that a new system will
actually be put into implementation.
So in summary, Mr. Chairman, I think this committee and the
Congress has an important role to play in focusing the
authority properly on the JPDO, making sure the resources are
available. If those things happen, I think what you will see if
that industry will do its part and the other parts of the
government will fall in line if there is some strong oversight,
especially from the Congress.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. John Douglass follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Douglass
Chairman Udall, Representative Calvert, and Members of the
Subcommittee: I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the critical
need to overhaul of our nation's air transportation system as mandated
by Vision 100, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2003.
A safe, secure and efficient air transportation system is essential
to the economic vitality of the United States. Approximately 10 percent
of the U.S. economy is directly tied to aerospace and aviation.
Aviation continues to drive our nation's economic growth, and it will
do so increasingly as air traffic triples over the next 20 years.
Transformational improvements to our nation's air transportation
infrastructure are essential to address the known capacity constraints
in our current system. Since that system is operating close to the
point of grid lock, it is crucial that our country develop and
implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS or
NextGen) under the guidelines of Vision 100.
Members of the Aerospace Industries Association strongly support
the mission of the JPDO, first conceived and recommended by the
bipartisan Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace
Industry in November 2002, and we remain constructively engaged to make
NextGen a reality. AIA represents almost 300 manufacturing companies
with over 635,000 high-wage, highly skilled production employees. We
operate as the largest aerospace trade association in the United States
across three sectors: civil aviation, space systems, and national
defense. Our member companies export 40 percent of their total output,
and we routinely post the Nation's largest manufacturing trade surplus,
a level that approached $55 billion last year. Aerospace companies also
continue to invest heavily in R&D, spending more than $50 billion over
the last 15 years.
The JPDO has steadily built a consensus around its vision for
NextGen. This vision was initially expressed in its first two reports
to Congress in 2004 and 2005. By spring, JPDO should complete the
vision building stage when it releases more its detailed Concepts of
Operations (ConOps) and Enterprise Architecture documents. Timely
development and execution of an effective integrated NextGen plan is
critical, especially since the current draft of the ConOps identifies
167 research issues and 77 policy issues that must be resolved to
implement NextGen. These issues cross the disciplines and resources of
all of the JPDO partner agencies.
The Administration and Congress must ensure that the appropriate
levels of responsibility, accountability and urgency exist across the
agencies to ensure that they properly manage and conduct the full range
of integrated NextGen activities. From our evaluation of JPDO's
process, products, and progress to date, we find that action is needed
in the following areas for JPDO to achieve its aviation safety,
security, environmental and transformation missions. AIA urges the
Subcommittee and Congress to explore options to rectify these
persistent problems.
Lack of Urgency: Preliminary estimates provided by the JPDO
indicate that in lost passenger revenue alone, the cost of not
implementing NextGen will exceed $50 billion per year by 2025. This
loss, however, does not account for the associated economic harm from
not transforming into NextGen that will be felt by general aviation,
cargo transportation, and other air services components. Nor does it
include the adverse impacts, such as lost productivity, that will occur
in other areas such as the overall manufacturing sector.
The situation is even more urgent, however. Although flight
disruptions temporarily subsided during the decrease in air travel
following 9/11, news stories now remind us of the disruptions that can
occur as a result of weather or other factors in a system that has
reached its capacity. The FAA has publicly stated that by 2015 the
system will be unable to handle the projected volume of traffic. Given
the length of time required to conduct research, validate or prototype
concepts, create new rules and procedures, certify systems, and
incorporate the necessary upgrades into our nation's infrastructure and
operational fleet, we--and many others--question whether our country
can meet this looming crisis.
So far, the JPDO partner agencies' actions do not seem to match the
urgency of the situation. It is estimated that NextGen development and
implementation will require at least $1 billion more per year,
including an additional $200-$300 million annually for federal
research. Unfortunately, the Administration's FY08 budget request fails
to make these investments. The FAA's FY08 proposal for NextGen, for
example, is only three percent higher than the FY07 requested
levels.\1\ Of this amount, the FAA dedicates only an additional $4.8
million for their research efforts. Similarly, the proposed funding
level for NASA aeronautics research remains inadequate. Last year, NASA
proposed reducing its aeronautics funding by $188 million. Congress
soundly rejected this approach and instead provided $166 million over
the FY07 request. Nevertheless, the Administration has once again
proposed NASA aeronautics research funding comparable to the FY07
proposal.\2\
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\1\ FAA's Budget in Brief provides figures for NextGen-related
funding levels: Total NextGen Transformational and Contributor Programs
request: FY07 $1,152 billion, FY08 $1,188 billion; RE&D Contributor
Programs: FY07 $57.9 million, FY08 $62.7 million.
\2\ NASA proposed $724.8 million for aeronautics for FY07. Their
FY08 proposal is $554 million. However, NASA's accounting system has
changed due to a new scheme to handle facilities charges. In NASA's
FY08 budget submission they note that the $554 million request equates
to $731.8 million under the old accounting system.
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Under current timelines, the NextGen R&D of the JPDO partner
agencies will not achieve full alignment until FY09 at the earliest. We
cannot accept this protracted timeline. For each delay, the cost of
NextGen development will increase and more disruptions will occur,
posing greater risks to the Nation's mobility and economic
competitiveness.
Authority & Accountability: The Vision 100 legislation tasks the
JPDO with ``creating and carrying out an integrated plan for a Next
Generation Air Transportation System.'' The recently released National
Aeronautics R&D Policy also recognizes the importance of the JPDO. On
December 20, 2006, President Bush signed the Executive Order that
requires the policy's implementation. According to the explicit
language of the policy, the JPDO ``should be responsible for planning,
coordination, and oversight of both research and implementation for the
NGATS to meet the Nation's civil, military, and homeland security
needs.'' The policy also highlights the critical importance of
interagency alignment with JPDO goals, and instructs the JPDO partner
agencies to ``. . .integrate their operational mission-specific
requirements into the NGATS plan,'' and to align their air
transportation system-related R&D efforts ``with NGATS objectives to
the maximum extent practicable.''
Creating and implementing a national plan that depends on
systematic interagency cooperation is a challenging task, especially
since the JPDO cannot provide or direct agency resources. While many
debate whether the JPDO has sufficient authority to complete its
objective, it is clear that there is a lack of agency accountability.
Accountability must be increased to ensure that agencies fully engage
JPDO and execute as necessary to meet the Vision 100 objective. With
the onset of the implementation phase, it is even more crucial that the
agencies are held accountable for all of their respective roles in
NextGen: conducting the research; defining and implementing the
policies, requirements, and systems acquisitions that are needed.
Clear, measurable, and visible performance metrics must be defined.
Both the Administration and Congress must hold the agencies accountable
to these performance metrics if NextGen is to become a reality.
On a more immediate level, insufficient accountability and
authority is inherent in the current JPDO operational structure. None
of the agency employees assigned to the JPDO (with a few exceptions)
report to the JPDO Director, nor does he have direct input into their
performance reviews. This lack of accountability to the JPDO Director
and his inability to directly incentivize personnel makes a tough job
even harder. Both the JPDO and other appropriate agency personnel
should have all performance-based compensation that they receive linked
to the achievement of NextGen milestones.
From our perspective, a partial solution to the lack of agency
accountability could be the broader application of an anticipated DOD
plan to designate a senior-level officer as the responsible individual
for all military-related NextGen programs and the Pentagon's engagement
with the JPDO. This is so simple, yet so efficient and effective, that
we believe it should be required of all JPDO participating agencies.
Then it will be clear, both within the Administration and to Congress,
who is responsible for each agency's NextGen-related performance.
Program Alignment/Integration/Management: A lack of sufficient
NextGen program integration across the various JPDO agencies poses a
significant risk. For this reason, the relevant agencies must make
every effort to complete the alignment of their activities and
resources with the JPDO planning process now. Schedules and resource
requirements must be realistic and reflect the input and capabilities
of both government and industry stakeholders. Robust systems
integration tools must be consistently used. Clearly visible and
traceable alignment of federal funding must be established for this
multi-agency effort. JPDO's coordination with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) is a significant step in this direction: identifying
existing partner-agency programs and funding that align with NextGen
requirements. But the current timelines fail to address immediate
needs.
Dependence on OMB for program integration, however, is not a long-
term solution. The JPDO's system engineering and program management
capabilities must continue to be strengthened. JPDO's pending
reorganization of the office, which AIA applauds, will place an
increased emphasis on systems engineering. At the same time, the JPDO
requires additional resources to bring its system engineering,
planning, and program management capabilities up to the level required
to meet the Vision 100 objectives. While Congress authorized up to $50
million per year for the JPDO in its authorizing legislation, JPDO's
budget has never approached that level. The FAA's FY08 budget proposal
would contribute only $14.3 million for JPDO operations.
Enhanced Engagement With Industry: Testifying before the House
Transportation & Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation last week, the
DOT Inspector General characterized the overall NextGen program as
``extremely high risk'' and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
echoed this view. According to their assessment, some of the chief
issues that have derailed programs in the past--such as underestimating
complexity, requirements creep, and inadequate stakeholder input--will
likely reoccur with NextGen. Continuing to strengthen engagement with
industry will help minimize these risks and promote more effective and
timely implementation. Manufacturers in particular have significant
expertise to offer in complex program development, risk management,
system engineering, and integration. Not only can industry bring
valuable insights and expertise to the JPDO, but it will likely pay a
substantial portion (approximately half) of NextGen implementation
costs. By current estimates, industry's share of NextGen development
and implementation expenditures will approach the $15-$20 billion
range. Therefore, it is critical that industry stakeholders have a
strong voice in setting the detailed system requirements and
implementation timelines.
While industry has been involved with the JPDO's Integrated Product
Teams for some time, the engagement must become more robust and
effective. The JPDO's evolving reorganization should strengthen
industry engagement on the critical elements of JPDO planning. With
this planned reorganization that is patterned after the recommendations
of the DOT Inspector General and the National Research Council for
greater industry coordination, JPDO should have a sharpened product-
driven focus and greater clarity regarding the tasks and deliverables
of its working groups. This deeper private sector partnership will
allow JPDO to enhance its productivity and focus on delivering
realistic system requirements and plans. Yet engagement cannot end with
the initial planning phases. As implementation activities begin
throughout the agencies, the need for them to continue to engage both
JPDO and industry remains crucial if critical planning and execution
details are to remain aligned.
Closing the R&D Gap: We must ensure that sufficient transitional
R&D is conducted so that technologies are sufficiently mature when
implementation decisions are made or NextGen is likely to stray off
course. Perhaps the most crucial challenge facing timely and effective
NextGen development and implementation is the transitional R&D gap that
exists between FAA and NASA. This gap has emerged from NASA's new focus
on foundational aeronautics research. Foundational technologies must be
properly assessed and validated before they can be implemented in
either new standards or products. However, the FAA lacks the ability
and resources to conduct the transitional research needed to mature
NASA's foundational technologies. As a result, no agency claims
responsibility for this critical research segment. AIA raised this
issue last summer in testimony before this subcommittee and the DOT
Inspector General's office amplified the same concern in its February
report. The importance of transitional research also emerged as a
significant discussion topic at the Subcommittee's hearing on FAA R&D
programs last week.
The transitional research gap need not exist and it must be closed
as soon as possible. Congress and this subcommittee in particular have
shown outstanding leadership in addressing aeronautics research issues
by mandating the development of the National Aeronautics R&D Policy and
its associated integrated research roadmap. At the same time, three
provisions of the NASA Reauthorization Act of 2005 set the stage for
addressing the transitional research gap. Section 422 of the Act set
targets for NASA to develop and demonstrate critical aviation critical
technologies related to environmental performance and other areas that
are directly related to achieving NextGen goals. Sections 423 and 424
require NASA to align its airspace systems and safety research to the
JPDO's Next Generation Air Transportation System Integrated Plan within
one year of enactment. Furthermore, the National Aeronautics R&D Policy
highlights NASA's role in transitional research for public interest
research (e.g., safety, environment), high-risk technology gaps, and
government internal R&D, including support of the FAA and JPDO. It also
calls for NASA to align its programs to NextGen objectives ``to the
maximum extent practicable.'' However, the full, integrated aeronautics
roadmap still needs to be developed and NASA has yet to meet its
obligations under sections 422-424.
In addition to providing critical direction on aeronautics, the
FY07 Continuing Resolution allocated an additional $166 million for
NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate. In AIA's July 2006
testimony, we recommended that any additional aeronautics research
funds NASA receives above the requested amount go towards NextGen-
related transitional R&D. Congress has provided the necessary funds.
Now it is up to NASA, working with JPDO and FAA, to jumpstart its
research execution this year and close the research gap now. Our
country cannot afford to wait. One point is certain: our entire nation
will reap the benefits of NextGen success. Just as certainly, our
entire nation will suffer the negative consequences if it is allowed to
fail.
Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to
testify.
Biography for John W. Douglass
John W. Douglass is President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), which represents the Nation's
leading manufacturers and suppliers of civil, military, and business
aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, space systems, aircraft engines, material,
and related components a, equipment services, and information
technology.
Mr. Douglass became the seventh full-time Chief Executive of the
Association in 1998. Before that he served for nearly three years as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for research, development and
acquisition of defense systems for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.
A nationally recognized expert in systems acquisition, Mr. Douglass
has extensive acquisition experience in Congress, the Defense
Department, and the executive branch as a policy authority, contracting
officer, engineering officer, test and evaluation officer, program
control officer, and research director.
Before being named Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Douglass
was with the Senate Armed Services Committee where he was foreign
policy and science and technology advisor to Senator Sam Nunn and
served as lead minority staff member for defense conversion and
technology reinvestment programs.
Earlier Mr. Douglass completed 28 years of U.S. Air Force service
and retired as a brigadier general in 1992. His numerous Air Force
assignments included service as the deputy U.S. military representative
to NATO as well as Director of Plans and Policy and Director of Science
and Technology in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He also
served as special assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition.
Within the Office of the President, Mr. Douglass was Director of
National Security Programs for the White House, responsible for
formulating policy on a broad range of national security issues. He
served as President Reagan's personal representative to the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management chaired by David Packard.
A native of Miami, Florida, he earned a Bachelor of Science degree
in industrial engineering from the University of Florida, a Master of
Science degree in industrial engineering from Texas Tech University and
a Master of Science degree in management science from Fairleigh
Dickinson University. Mr. Douglass has done postgraduate work at the
Cornell University Center for International Studies where he was an Air
Force Research Fellow with the Peace Studies Program.
Mr. Douglass is a member of the Board of Governors of the Aerospace
Industries Association and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
National Center for Advanced Technologies. He served on the Commission
on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry, which issued its
final report in November 2002. Mr. Douglass is Chairman of the
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries
Associations.
AIA Positions
Member, AIA Board of Governors
Chairman, Board of Trustees, National Center for Advanced Technologies
Chairman, National Institute for Aerospace Studies and Standards
Member:
American Astronautical Society Board of Directors
Council of Manufacturing Associations Board of Directors, National
Association of Manufacturers
International Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations
FAA Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee
Industry Management Council, Next Generation Air Transportation System
Institute
National Contract Management Association
University of Tennessee Aerospace Advisory Council
Chairman Udall. Thank you very much, Secretary Douglass.
Dr. Carmichael, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE CARMICHAEL, DIRECTOR, AVIATION
APPLICATIONS PROGRAM, RESEARCH APPLICATIONS LABORATORY,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH
Dr. Carmichael. Thank you, Chairman Udall. I would request
submission of my testimony--written testimony for the record.
Chairman Udall. I am sorry. Yes, unanimous consent, so
ordered. Let the record show that Dr. Carmichael's full remarks
are included in the record.
Dr. Carmichael. As you heard from Mr. Leader, aviation
weather research is critical to the successful development and
implementation of NextGen. Seventy percent of delays in today's
system are attributed to weather. That is the bad news. The
good news is that as much as 60 percent of today's delays and
cancellations for weather stem from potentially avoidable
weather situations. Enhanced weather forecasts as well as
improved use of forecasts can contribute to a reduction in
these avoidable weather impacts. Improved weather information
supports an agile decision-making process to manage air traffic
expected in the future system. It allows the system to smoothly
mitigate the potential impacts of summer and winter storms,
turbulence, en route icing, and reduce ceiling visibility
conditions. This can be achieved only through the introduction
of new technologies related to the observation, forecasting,
dissemination and integration of improved weather information
into our traffic management decision support tools and
processes.
The investment in aviation weather safety research must
continue in order to ensure that an increase in accidents does
not accompany an increase in traffic. Such investments have
yielded and will continue to yield critical improvement for the
flying public.
A promising program initiative of the JPDO is to develop a
NextGen network-enabled weather system to be executed by the
FAA, DOD and NOAA to integrate the forecasting and
dissemination capabilities of the different weather forecasting
agencies. The JPDO weather team has compiled a list of 130
research tasks needed for NextGen. These tasks address a number
of issues that are critical if the Nation is to successfully
integrate aviation weather into NextGen. Many of the issues are
known, and research is already underway. Research in improved
forecasting and integration of forecasts into decision support
tools is absolutely critical to NextGen. It must be recognized
that sustained and predictable aviation weather research
funding at a significantly increased level is required in each
of the JPDO stakeholder agencies. This funding stability is
needed to allow the laboratories to hire, develop and maintain
the highly specialized researchers needed to address the
complex issues at hand.
The community of weather and automation researchers has
been hard at work for three years supporting the JPDO planning
process almost totally on a collateral basis. To maintain this
very talented experience base, it is critical that funding be
appropriated to begin to directly support this expert team.
Changes to NASA's aeronautics program are having a serious
impact on the effectiveness of the Aviation Weather Initiative.
The NASA aeronautics program has experience in ATM decision
support and is a logical partner for the JPDO and FAA in this
endeavor. However, in my view, the current NASA funding
direction in aeronautics provides little hope for a strong
effort by NASA in the area of integration of weather into
automation tools. This is unfortunate.
In conclusion, aviation research--aviation weather research
is vital to the successful development and implementation of
NextGen. Most of the technology needed to build NextGen has
already been invented. Weather remains an area with significant
inventions still to be done if we are going to successfully
integrate it into NextGen. All agencies and laboratories with
relevant skills must be brought to bear on these difficult
problems if we are to be successful, but current changes to
NASA's aeronautics program are having a significant negative
impact on the effectiveness of the Aviation Weather Integration
Initiative.
This concludes my testimony, and I thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carmichael follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Carmichael
Good morning, Chairman Udall, Congressman Calvert and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am honored to be here this morning to testify on
the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and the Next
Generation Air Transportation System. I am Bruce Carmichael, Director
of the Aviation Applications Program at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR). For the past 16 years I have worked at
NCAR to improve weather information for pilots, dispatchers, and
controllers with special focus given to the hazards of thunderstorms,
turbulence, icing, winter weather, and ceiling/visibility. For almost
three decades, I have been involved with the aviation industry in the
automation of maintenance processes, air traffic control, and weather
information. I serve the JPDO Weather Integrated Product Team as the
Co-Lead of the Forecasting Group, and the National Business Aviation
Association, Inc., as Weather Chairman of the Access Committee.
The importance of aviation weather research to the successful
development and implementation of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen).
Advances in aviation weather research will be critical to the
success of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).
Seventy percent of delays in today's system are attributed to weather.
Moreover, as traffic grows, weather-related delays will worsen. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that unless we can make
progress on better weather forecasts, by 2014 there could be 29 days of
delay worse than the worst delay day of 2006. That is the bad news. The
good news is that as much as 60 percent of today's delays and
cancellations for weather stem from potentially avoidable weather
situations. Enhanced weather forecasts as well as improved use of
forecasts can contribute to a reduction in these avoidable weather
impacts. Research guidance given to the JPDO departments and agencies
including FAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), includes many recommendations. A high
priority is the development of a consolidated summer and winter storm
forecast system. All of the agencies involved agree with that strategy.
A goal is to gradually merge 16 different forecasting systems so that
by early in the next decade we will have a single system that utilizes
the best-of-the-best elements of today's technologies.
Better weather forecasting skill is a vital building block for
NextGen, facilitating performance targets for the years 2015 and 2025
that will reduce congestion by providing far greater capacity than our
current system with higher efficiency levels than we have today, while
maintaining or enhancing safety. Improved weather information provides
support for an agile decision-making process to manage the large volume
of air traffic expected in the future. It allows the system to smoothly
mitigate the potential impacts of summer and winter storms, turbulence,
enroute icing, and reduced ceiling/visibility conditions. As a result,
the system will be able to respond quickly to changing air traffic
needs in the face of changing weather. This can only be achieved
through the introduction of new technologies and procedures, innovative
policies, and advanced management practices related to the observation,
forecasting, dissemination, and integration of improved weather
information into air transportation decision support tools and
processes.
NextGen Network Enabled Weather (NNEW).
One of the program initiatives coming out of the JPDO to synthesize
the weather research activities and to move the research toward
operational capabilities is the concept of network enabled weather. The
DOD already has a number of aspects of network enabled weather that it
uses to collect, process, and disseminate weather to operational units
around the world. DOD, FAA and NOAA are collaborating on a joint
program office concept that would begin to integrate the forecasting
and dissemination capabilities of the different agency weather
programs. A number of the research concepts that I've already mentioned
would be incorporated into this joint program office. The FAA has
requested initial funding in FY 2008 and an interim goal is to move
toward early working prototypes by the 2011-2012 timeframe. I would
defer to others more directly involved to discuss the details.
Research on aviation weather safety issues, although not
highlighted as a part of the NextGen activity, is actually assumed to
underlie all other weather activity. Aviation weather safety research
is essential to meeting safety objectives and NextGen performance
targets. The potential of the NextGen system to handle tremendous
growth in air traffic compels us to maintain our vigilance in weather
safety research. We must continue to invest in weather safety to reduce
accident rates to insure that an increase in accidents does not
accompany the increase in traffic. Unmanned aerial systems will also
require more precise weather forecasts. Investments in weather safety
R&D over the last 25 years have yielded, and will continue to yield,
critical safety improvements. Our scientists and engineers, for
example, developed the solution to the microburst and wind shear
problems; developed the state-of-the-art Aviation Digital Data Service
(ADDS); improved forecasts of summer and winter storms; developed far
more precise forecasts of airborne icing and turbulence; improved
ceiling and visibility forecasts; and improved aviation radar products.
Weather research to transform airport operations in NextGen is also
critical. Key elements of this research are to increase the capacity
and improve the safety of aircraft operating from airports in winter
weather and reduced visibility conditions. As the number of operations
at our airports continues to rise, weather research projects must
include integration with decision support tools that insure safe
transit of aircraft on taxiways and runways, improving our
understanding of the effects of winter weather on the safety of
aircraft operating in ice and snow conditions, and the development of
state-of-the-art technology that uses improved weather skill to
minimize the disruption during deicing and plowing operations.
In NextGen, weather is also important if we are going to meet the
increasing demand for flying in an environmentally sound manner. The
weather focus of the environment goal is making aviation quieter,
reducing pollution in communities around airports, and reducing climate
impact. New investments in weather research are required to help us
better understand how to couple weather information to an agile air
traffic management (ATM) system to dynamically reduce noise, pollution,
and climate impacts.
Given expected demand growth, it is important to improve operations
well in advance of 2025 so we can avoid grid lock. With that in mind,
weather research is critical now to support mid-term capabilities that
must be put in place. The JPDO weather team is helping to define
Initial Operating Capabilities that can deliver mid-term results and
also provide needed stepping stones to NextGen.
Significant issues that need to be addressed if the Nation is to
successfully integrate aviation weather into the Next Generation Air
Transportation System.
The JPDO weather team has compiled and prioritized a list of over
130 weather research-related tasks needed in the NextGen environment. A
preliminary allocation of those tasks among FAA, DOD, NASA and NOAA has
been discussed and FY 2009 guidance has been given to those agencies.
Assimilating weather into decision-making is a critical enabler of the
NextGen system. Common situational awareness, system capacity, system
efficiency, and safety will be increased due to the availability of
authoritative, net-centric 4-D weather information to all systems
users. Current thinking is that the NextGen weather environment will
address four nested spatial scales (airport and metro area, regional,
continental, and global), and will allow users to safely plan and
conduct 4-D, gate-to-gate, trajectory-based operations that avoid
hazardous weather and provide safe and comfortable flight conditions.
All users will have access to real-time critical hazardous weather
information (diagnostics and forecast) to facilitate weather avoidance
and efficient flight operation. Aircraft will become nodes on the
network. The information will support all phases of the flight include
pre-flight planning, in-flight updates, and post flight review. The Air
Traffic Management (ATM) system is expected to be able to maximize
safely navigable airspace due to the seamless, automatic assimilation
of adaptive nowcast/forecast information into the software logic of ATM
decision support tools. I'm sure that the JPDO would be happy to brief
you and your staff on the concepts, initiatives and timetables in the
weather research plan.
Fortunately, in collaboration with the FAA, the aviation weather
research community has been steadily and carefully refining R&D goals
and portfolios to meet the needs of the aviation community for more
than twenty years. We continually assess our research programs in
conjunction with our stakeholders and users to ensure we keep our R&D
resources focused on the most critical tasks. Thus many of the 130
tasks noted by the JPDO are already known and research is already
underway.
Integrating Weather into Decision Support Systems
The weather R&D program has received expert advice and guidance
from the FAA's Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee
(REDAC). The REDAC, under its National Airspace System (NAS) Operations
Subcommittee, recently established a Weather ATM Integration Working
Group (WAIWG) to do a focused study on the difficult problem of
automatically integrating real-time and forecast weather information
directly into the software logic of ground-based and cockpit-based
decision-support tools and processes. The working group includes
weather and operations experts from national laboratories, MITRE
Corporation, NASA, DOD and the airline industry. The weather research
program will benefit significantly from the recommendations provided by
this group regarding how to deal with weather ATM integration. This
working group is interacting closely with the weather and automation
R&D communities to develop recommendations that will be effective.
As a member of this group I can tell you that one of our greatest
challenges is our ability to understand what the future system will
look like. What new weather forecasting and decision-support
technologies will be available? The JPDO weather team has developed a
comprehensive Weather Concept of Operations to raise the questions
needed to focus research and systems development. This is all
significant work, essential to understanding the transformed
operational environment and helping us to develop a plan for achieving
it. It also makes clear many of the difficult questions that the
weather research community must answer if NextGen is to succeed.
Better Processing of Huge Amounts of Information
To some extent our nation's aviation weather system has become a
victim of its own success. We have created the most effective,
efficient and safest system in the world dealing with weather issues.
But we now face a serious and impending problem: today's weather system
produces a large volume of information with such frequent update that
human users are overloaded when trying to effectively make use of the
valuable detail available to systematically fine tune flight plans and
their execution. We must continue to improve our forecast skill, and
this implies increasing our time and space resolution. Automated
decision-support tools will have to achieve several breakthroughs in
order to effectively and automatically apply enhanced weather
information to route planning, and route re-planning for FAA and
airline traffic flow management specialists.
Weather research will help achieve NextGen by identifying
challenges, understanding scientific barriers, and developing solutions
that jointly address weather safety, weather mitigation of
environmental impacts, weather for improved air traffic management,
human factors associated with highly automated weather systems,
systematic integration of weather into decision support tools, and
effective system separation of aircraft from weather. NextGen must
address the challenges of operating the safest, most efficient, high-
capacity air transportation system in the world. We are a long way from
knowing how to do the weather portion of this, but the job of research
is to discover the solution. We must identify the scientific
constraints and barriers imposed by weather to separate solutions that
are effective from those that are not.
To address such issues, research in improved forecasting and
integration of those forecasts into decision-support tools is
absolutely critical to NextGen. It must be recognized that sustained
and predictable aviation weather research funding at a significantly
increased level is required in each of the JPDO stakeholder agencies.
This funding stability is needed to allow the laboratories to hire and
develop the highly specialized researchers needed to address the
complex issues at hand.
Human Factors research and demonstration projects will be needed to
develop the best approaches for integration of improved weather
information into decision support systems to help mitigate potential
errors and exploit the problem-solving capacity of humans. Performance
metrics should be developed that measure the value added by people as
elements of the weather decision system versus the impact of new
technologies.
Historically, aviation weather R&D has had a focus on near-term
operational goals and objectives. A large share of the R&D was focused
on specific near-term safety and capacity issues. The weather research
program must be adapted to be more flexible, balanced, and dynamic so
that we can respond simultaneously to the critical near-term needs of
the system while providing for the cutting-edge NextGen requirements.
The JPDO weather team is the mechanism by which the multi-agency
stakeholders and the community will assess weather R&D requirements for
NextGen, and new initiatives will be reviewed and prioritized, before
being recommended to one or more agencies for execution.
The aviation weather research community, with guidance from the
JPDO, is incorporating NextGen into its planning activities, including
a strong requirement for systematic integration of weather forecasts
directly into decision-support tools and processes used by FAA traffic
flow managers, airline dispatchers and pilots. In addition, the weather
community is using the NextGen planning process to guide our
transformation of weather capabilities in a way that is tightly coupled
with the transformation of decision-support tools. In the past, the
weather research community's plans and execution successfully provided
benefits in safety, capacity, and efficiency to the community. But the
new approach of developing plans that are tightly coupled with the
decision-support tool research community promises to significantly
enhance our success. This includes the R&D work in decision support
tools at the MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development
(CAASD). I believe that a timely and efficient transition to NextGen
requires the weather research community to participate in concept
development, validation, prototyping, and field demonstrations. Such
involvement will give us in-depth understanding of required NextGen
weather improvements and hasten our ability to implement NextGen
weather systems. Of particular importance are demonstration projects
that show the feasibility and utility of seamless integration of
weather into new decision support tools that use System Wide
Information Management (SWIM) as the source for weather. Such
demonstrations can lower our risk and provide rapid implementation
opportunities.
The weather research community is also using the JPDO process as a
way to plan, execute and implement partnerships with private industry.
Through the JPDO weather team we are seeking stakeholder input,
evaluating available technologies, defining and prioritizing research
and development requirements, establishing milestones and commitments,
and providing status, context and guidance for weather initiatives
related to NextGen.
The JPDO weather team also provides a single point for initiatives
to be coordinated among all stakeholder agencies and institutions. It
ties initiatives directly to each organization's budget process, and in
this way moves us toward a coordinated development of JPDO's vision of
the future aviation weather system. It provides an integrated view of
the programs, systems and procedures that are critical to transforming
the Nation's aviation weather system; and it will let us plan our
activities within the framework of the steps that must be taken by all
JPDO agency weather partners in order to achieve timely implementation.
It also allows us to understand the near-term steps and mid-term goals
that we must accomplish to transform the aviation weather system on our
way to the NextGen system of 2025.
The community of weather and automation researchers has been hard
at work for three years supporting the JPDO planning process, almost
entirely on a collateral basis. However, now that the planning stage
has matured and we are on the verge of stepping up the tempo in
research and applications dealing with weather and NextGen, it is
critical that funding be appropriated to begin to directly support
these expert teams and the program advances that the JPDO has
identified.
Impacts that the changes to NASA's aeronautics program are having on
the effectiveness of the aviation weather initiative.
NextGen is committed to reducing congestion in our nation's air
transportation system. Future congestion can only be alleviated by
transforming the system we have today through bold moves that include
systematic integration of more skillful weather information into the
heart of innovative new automated decision-support tools. The NASA
aeronautics program has a wealth of experience in the development of
decision-support tools for air transportation, and is a logical partner
for the JPDO and FAA in this endeavor. The Center-TRACON (Terminal
Radar Approach Control) Automation System (CTAS) is a good example of
NASA's prior work in this area. However, in my view, the current NASA
funding direction in aeronautics provides little hope for a strong
effort by NASA in the area of integration of weather into automated
tools. This is very unfortunate.
The FAA is requesting substantial funding to support wake
turbulence research to help increase capacity while maintaining safety.
This will help us to safely reduce separation distances between
aircraft, support the efficient use of closely spaced parallel runways,
and allow airports to operate closer to their design capacity. NASA has
a long track record of partnership with the FAA in this research area.
Wake turbulence is viewed by the JPDO as a weather issue, and is part
of the planning process for the weather team. In large part, this is
because of the critical importance of the weather connection when
predicting wake turbulence behavior. Wake turbulence is a research
activity that is in need of significant JPDO attention to rationalize
the activities of the various agencies. Uncertainty of NASA's funding
and lack of integration with the rest of the weather community in this
area is creating difficulty in coordinated weather research planning.
Research in use of unmanned aircraft systems as platforms for
targeted observations of the atmosphere offers considerable promise to
improve forecasts in high value areas with sparse observations. NextGen
needs to explore the integration of unmanned aircraft observing systems
into the National Airspace System. This research is a natural fit for
NASA, but programs in this area have disappeared.
In conclusion, aviation weather research is vital to the successful
development and implementation of the Next Generation Air
Transportation System (NextGen). Most of the technology needed to
implement NextGen is already relatively mature. Weather remains an area
with significant issues that need to be addressed if the Nation is to
successfully integrate aviation weather into the Next Generation Air
Transportation System. All relevant agencies and laboratories must be
brought to bear on these difficult problems if we are to achieve
success. Current changes to NASA's aeronautics program are having a
significant negative impact on the effectiveness of the aviation
weather integration initiative.
This concludes my testimony, and I thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the committee. I would be happy to answer any questions
the committee may have.
Biography for Bruce Carmichael
Dr. Carmichael holds a M.S. from Northwestern University in Applied
Mathematics and a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland in Computer
Science. He has 38 years of experience spanning a number of activities
including university teaching, commercial research, government service,
consulting, and academic research. His past 27 years have been involved
with the aviation industry in automation of maintenance processes, air
traffic control, and weather information. He has been involved in
system engineering of improved FAA automation and weather systems. For
the past 16 years he has been at the National Center for Atmospheric
Research, where he serves as Director of the Aviation Applications
Program. This program is working to improve weather information for
pilots, dispatchers, and controllers, particularly related to the
hazards of thunderstorms, turbulence, icing, winter weather, and
ceiling/visibility. He is currently serving the Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO) Weather Integrated Product Team as the Co-
Lead of the Forecasting Group, and the National Business Aviation
Association, Inc., as Weather Chairman of the Access Committee. For the
past nine years he has coordinated the Friends/Partners in Aviation
Weather activity, a grass roots group which brings together the weather
provider community and user community to discuss topics of common
interest. Dr. Carmichael is also an active commercial instrument-rated
pilot.
Discussion
Chairman Udall. Dr. Carmichael, thank you for your
testimony.
Status and Importance of MOU Defining Agencies' Roles in
NextGen
At this point we will open the first round of questions.
The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes.
Mr. Leader, I would like to start with you, if I might. As
you know, the JPDO, as it is currently organized, has no direct
budgetary or programmatic authority over its participating
agencies. Again, as we have heard, and certainly in my remarks,
I also mentioned if those agencies don't work together and make
the necessary resource and R&D commitments, the NextGen
initiative is unlikely to succeed, and that is why I am
troubled by the fact that a year after this subcommittee was
told that an MOU would be signed that clearly defined each
participating Agency's roles and responsibilities, it still
hasn't happened. Given that it has already slipped by a year,
it is clear that one or more significant issues are holding up
the signing of the MOU. Could you outline what those issues are
and how you intend to address them? And to give a heads-up to
the other witnesses, if they would like to comment after your
comments, I would be eager to hear what they have to say, and
in particular, how important is it that an MOU be agreed upon
by the participating agencies.
Mr. Leader.
Mr. Leader. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We currently--it is correct
that we currently do not have a signed Memorandum of Agreement.
We have a signature on the draft by the Secretary of
Transportation and by the Administrator of NASA. The Department
of Defense, it is my belief, has reviewed the draft MOU and is
prepared to sign it but is waiting for the Department of Air
Force to be recognized as the executive agent for Next
Generation issues. Secretary Wynn has, I believe, already seen
it and has been through the DOD General Council's Office so it
is a question now of getting the authority for the Air Force to
be the signatory on the Memorandum of Agreement.
It is probably more important symbolically to have the
Memorandum of Agreement signed. More important would be the
active commitment of the various departments and agencies to
the success of the initiative.
Chairman Udall. Do the other panelists care to comment? Dr.
Dillingham.
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, Mr. Chairman Udall. I agree that the
Memorandum of Understanding is important because I think you
need something in place that is going to span this change in
senior executives in the various places, be it, you know, the
secretaries of the various Cabinet departments, the
Administrator of FAA. All of those are sort of changing
positions, changing people, personalities, and this is a long-
term undertaking and I think there needs to be some document,
some formal document that is there. On the other hand, I think
some of the things that are also taking place now are very
useful in that vein. For example, I think, you know, working
through OMB to have an Exhibit 300 where the NextGen projects
across the government are tagged as such and it makes a
portfolio. It is very important because that sort of, you know,
where the money is. It is also important as well as having that
sort of agreement. Similarly, I think if JPDO can go through,
again working through OMB to coordinate the various Enterprise
Architectures across the various participating partner
agencies, that again is sort of--you know, in a strategic way,
it is the kind of thing that will give some
institutionalization to JPDO. So the Memorandum of
Understanding is important but these other kinds of activities
are also useful and important, I think.
Chairman Udall. Secretary Douglass.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. These things are vital. I was just
thinking back in my memory, when I was a young officer I was
the business manager on the Joint Cruise Missile Project
Office. You may recall, Jimmy Carter cancelled the B-1 bomber
and he said we are going to put cruise missiles on the B-52s
and so we had a Memorandum of Agreement which was imposed down
on the Navy and the Air Force to go have the Navy develop these
missiles, and even with the agreement, sir, you know, there
were daily arguments about who was going to do what and so on.
The agreements just begin the--are the first step in a lengthy
discussion of agencies working together. My experience on Joint
Strike Fighter later when I was Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, also there are Memorandums of Agreement between the
services for things like air-to-air missiles so that if we
develop new air-to-air missiles that can work on the F-15, the
F-16, the F-18, the Joint Strike Fighter, so on. These things
are fundamental. If you don't have them, the dialog that comes
later when you try to actually implement things together is
almost impossible to put into any rational context. So I can't
emphasize as an old joint program guy myself how important
these things are, sir.
Chairman Udall. Function follows form, I hear you saying,
Mr. Douglass.
Dr. Carmichael, would you like to comment?
At this juncture, the Chair would like to recognize an
important and contributing Member of this committee, Mr.
Rothman from New Jersey.
Mr. Rothman, you have five minutes.
Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank for the very
kind introduction.
Projections For and Negative Impacts of Increased Air Traffic
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and your
appearance today. I have another hearing with the Defense
Subcommittee with Secretary Gates and the head of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff next door so I am going to be bowing out after
my questions, but please don't take that departure and my late
arrival--I was there first--as a lack of interest. I am
passionate and completely and totally focused on what you are
doing and in particular the work of the FAA, frankly for lots
of reasons.
Number one, there is an airport in my district, Teterboro
Airport, and we also have air traffic overhead from Newark and
from LaGuardia, and JFK is in the immediate, or nearly
immediate vicinity as well, so hundreds of thousands of people
in the New York metropolitan area are suffering today with the
present levels of activity from aircraft noise, emissions from
aircraft that are not healthful, they are unhealthy, and with
living every day with the masses of aircraft coming over our
houses at various altitudes, one after another after another
after another, and you folks want more aircraft in the sky over
our heads?
Let me ask you this question I asked the previous panel,
which I would respectfully ask you to consider. Let us assume
that you could get your wish on technology, you could make it
silent--planes silent. You could make them without any harmful
emissions and you could make it safe for them and you could
make it safe for them to operate wing to wing to wing to wing
and it could cover the sky, the horizon so much so that it
blotted out the sun. Is that what you are shooting for? Is that
the kind of world you want me to live in or you want your
children to live in? Is that progress? Is that necessary?
Commerce is supposed to serve and benefit the quality of life
of the people. That is why we have commerce. But when the level
of commerce becomes harmful to your physical well-being or your
emotional well-being and becomes destructive, then commerce had
got to find a different avenue of pursuing its goals.
And so, I read with some interest, discouragement--I saw
that you have as one of the strategies and related agencies,
develop environmental protection that allows sustained economic
growth, aviation growth, and I am assuming by environmental
protection you mean noise and emissions. And that is fine, that
is great, but I tell you, there are millions of people around
the country, millions, who are fed up and they don't care if
you can achieve these, you know, more efficiency in the sky and
pack more planes into the sky. That is not what they want. And
when a two-lane road becomes crowded, people have to find
another avenue, another way to get where they want to go. And
so, I tell you, I for one--and I understand the importance of
aviation to our economy and to our security, et cetera,
completely. But it is not going to be at the expense of the
quality of life of the people, which is already too great--of
the people who are paying too great a price. And so, I
respectfully, but forcefully, plead with you to take these
matters into consideration. Otherwise, I will be a uniform--a
bigger thorn in everybody's side and I know that I represent
millions and millions of people across this country.
But about my question about the wing to wing to wing to
wing hypothetical, has any--have we thought about that? And if
you say that is fine, then that says something about your view
of the quality of life of the people of this nation. If you say
wing to wing to wing and it blots out the sun, it is just too
much. Then tell me where you draw the line of what is a
reasonable limit on blotting out the sun or constant, massive
plane line overhead, if there is time for an answer.
Chairman Udall. Mr. Douglass.
Mr. Douglass. Congressman, we--I think most people
recognize that there is a natural tension in a democracy among
constituents of different value streams. If you live around an
airport, you see the negative side of air congestion. Probably,
it is a part of your life much more than if you are a person
who wants to go visit your granddaughter in California and you
are a working person and you only have a day or so that you can
take off and you can't spend the whole time to go in your car
or go on a train or some other factor. But the fact of it is,
sir, the sky is a big place and I would ask you--I am sure you
fly home to New Jersey occasionally, look around when you fly
and how--think of how seldom it is when you are in the air that
you can actually see another airplane. It is a rare thing. I am
an aviator. I have been in the Air Force and served in the Navy
and, you know, I tend to look out the window, look for other
airplanes because that is what I did when I was on active duty.
But you seldom see them. It is a very big place. The truth of
it is, there is a great margin of accommodation here between
the millions and millions of Americans who have an interest in
flying for business reasons or recreational reasons or whatever
and the countervailing interest of people that live around
airports. And I will tell you, sir, that the industry, both the
manufacturers and the airlines themselves are absolutely
dedicated to doing everything they can to relieve the burden on
the people around them.
Mr. Rothman. I know my time is up, Mr. Secretary, but we
don't live within--you know, Teterboro Airport is a little
generation aviation airport which causes a lot of problems when
they fly low and Newark flies high, and that can be fixed and I
hope that that will. But the people who are affected are living
further and further away from airports who report--and I am
there at their homes and see these planes coming overhead, so
it may not seem like it when you look out a window, but when
you look up on your kid's soccer field and you see the planes
every day--I know I have taken too much time but it is not just
people who live within--who moved into a house within sight of
an airport. They are living farther and farther away and never
thought they would be affected by an airport or the region's
airports who are now being affected. So those are--it is
getting worse, in my view.
Chairman Udall. The gentleman's time has expired.
We have been joined by former Chairman Calvert, Ranking
Member Calvert now, and I know he has an opening statement and
then I would also like to extend to him five minutes for
questions if he would like to use those five minutes.
Mr. Calvert.
Mr. Calvert. Well, I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. I had a--
we had a meeting with the President of the United States so he
trumped you, I am afraid, Mr. Chairman. So--but I am glad I got
back to give this statement and to thank you. I do have to fly
back to California later this afternoon. I do it every week and
I am glad that there are airports that take me and I can get
back here to Washington early Monday morning.
But anyway, I want to thank you for scheduling this hearing
to assess the progress of the Joint Planning and Development
Office and thanks to our witnesses for taking time out of your
busy schedule to appear before us this morning. Even though
this Subcommittee held our last hearing on JPDO just last year,
in my mind, Congress can't exercise enough oversight in such a
critically important and fast-paced program, much to the
dismay, I suppose of the JPDO's leadership but I think it
speaks volumes about Congress's interest in assuring the
successful development of the Next Generation Air Traffic
Management System. Failure to keep pace with growth in air
travel would be disastrous to this economy.
I look forward to hearing from you. I will have a couple of
questions, hopefully, before we have votes on the Floor, and
get your candid assessment about the progress that has been
made or not made and challenges remaining in meeting the goals
of the Vision 100 legislation. I know teams of federal and non-
federal experts have been working hard to put in place the
processes and management structures required for such a massive
undertaking, but in the few minutes I have remaining I will
limit my comments to NASA's evolving role in air traffic
management research.
NASA R&D Reorganization Efforts on FAA Technology
When Vision 100 legislation was enacted, Congress
anticipated the Federal Aviation Administration, as the
operator of our nation's ATM system, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration as our nation's leading
aeronautics and R&D organization, would continue to work
collaboratively as they have for more than 40 years, NASA's
research into developing long-lead, high-risk technologies, FAA
adapting their research products to incorporate them into a
national airspace system. It has been a productive
relationship, and over the years each agency has collaborated
their R&D programs and budgets to reflect that. The JPDO
recognized NASA's expertise early on by selecting them to lead
the Agile Airspace Integrated Product Team.
In the last 18 months, however, the subsequent--and
subsequent to the creation of the JPDO, NASA's aeronautics R&D
program has undergone, as you know, a major reorganization. I
don't dispute the rationale for making the reforms but NASA
also made a fundamental change in its R&D relationship with FAA
by limiting future research to a level of technical maturity
far lower than they have in years past. This has left the FAA
with no recourse other than to cover the technology shortfall
by increasing its own R&D budgets. Money, as you know,
especially around here, is fungible, but talent and expertise
doesn't easily transfer and, simply stated, my concern is that
it will take FAA several years to adapt to this change.
I remain concerned that this early grand endeavor now known
as NextGen has happened at a time when R&D roadmaps are being
finalized and spending for developing integrated new
technologies is about to ramp up. I would strongly prefer that
NASA's Airspace Management Program continue to advance
promising technologies to a high level, thus freeing the FAA to
focus on integrating them into NextGen. It is my sincere hope
that NASA's actions don't hinder JPDO's efforts to develop
technologies upon which NextGen will be reliant upon.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Calvert follows:]
Prepared Statement of Representative Ken Calvert
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling today's hearing to assess
the progress of the Joint Planning and Development Office, and my
thanks to our witnesses for taking time from their busy schedules to
appear before us this morning.
Even though this subcommittee held our last hearing on JPDO just a
year ago, in my mind Congress can't exercise enough oversight on such a
critically important and fast-paced program, much to the dismay, I
suppose, of the JPDO's leadership. But I think it speaks volumes about
Congress' interest in ensuring the successful development of the next
generation air traffic management system. Failure to keep pace with
growth in air travel would be disastrous to our economy.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses to gain their candid
assessment about progress made, and challenges remaining, in meeting
the goals of the Vision 100 legislation.
I know teams of federal and non-federal experts have been working
hard to put in place the processes and management structure required
for such a massive undertaking, but in the few minutes I have
remaining, I'll limit my comments to NASA's evolving role in air
traffic management research.
When the Vision 100 legislation was enacted, Congress anticipated
that the Federal Aviation Administration, as the operator of our
nation's ATM system, and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, as our nation's leading aeronautics R&D organization,
would continue to work collaboratively as they have for more than forty
years: NASA researching and developing long-lead, high risk
technologies; FAA adapting their research products to incorporate them
into the national airspace system. It has been a productive
relationship, and over the years each agency has calibrated their R&D
programs and budgets to reflect this collaboration. The JPDO recognized
NASA's expertise early on by selecting them to lead the `Agile
Airspace' integrated product team.
In the last eighteen months, however, and subsequent to the
creation of the JPDO, NASA's aeronautics R&D program has undergone a
major reorganization. I don't dispute the rationale for making the
reforms, but NASA also made a fundamental change in its R&D
relationship with FAA by limiting future research to a level of
technical maturity far lower than they have in years past. This has
left the FAA with no recourse other than to cover the technology
shortfall by increasing its own R&D budgets.
Money is fungible, but talent and expertise doesn't easily
transfer, and simply stated my concern is that it will take FAA several
years to adapt to this change. I remain concerned that so early in this
grand endeavor now known as NextGen, one of the two key partners is
changing the rules of the game, and it's happening at a time when R&D
roadmaps are being finalized, and spending for developing and
integrating new technologies is about to ramp up. I would strongly
prefer that NASA's Airspace Management program continue to advance
promising technologies to a high level, thus freeing FAA to focus on
integrating them into NextGen.
It is my sincere hope that NASA's actions don't hinder JPDO's
efforts to develop technologies upon which NextGen is reliant.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Calvert. So with that, I want to thank you for that
statement, Mr. Chairman, and allowing me to do that, and I have
a question for everyone.
When JPDO was first created, it was established as an
adjunct to the Federal Aviation Administration but over the
last year the JPDO has become more tightly integrated within
the FAA. Are there any concerns that JPDO's assimilation with
the Federal Aviation Administration is viewed by other federal
partners as being a proxy for FAA and not an honest broker
working with other federal agencies?
Concerns Regarding JPDO's Assimilation With the FAA
And I guess we will start with you, Leader--Mr. Leader.
Mr. Leader. Thank you, sir. I have heard the same concern
expressed but I do not share that view. In fact, I think even
during the course of my relatively short tenure here the links
to the other partner agencies have been strengthened and they
have become more engaged.
Dr. Dillingham. I think over the last year or so the
integration of JPDO and FAA, particularly through the OEP plan,
has on one hand it might have been seen by some as sort of
being too entwined, but I think the other way to look at this
is that the JPDO is the vision part of the air traffic control
modernization program, and the current FAA is handling what is
in place now, and it is very important that they work together
and that there is sort of an exchange of information and ideas
and approach with FAA.
I think that what we just got through talking about, this
Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the other initiatives
that are underway to bring all of the agencies closer together
are things that need to be completed. Our research shows that
there is sort of a mixed bag in terms of the relationship
between the various partner agencies. In some cases, like NASA
and Commerce, the relationship seems to be pretty strong in the
kind of way we want it to be. In some other cases, Homeland
Security, DOD to some extent, it is still a work in progress.
So I think at this point there is pluses and minus associated
with the arrangements.
Mr. Douglass. Sir, to really answer your question you have
to go back to 2002 when I was a commissioner on this commission
on the future of the industry. And we found ourselves in the
extraordinary position of the FAA's OEP having an improvement
program that did match the growth in the industry, and you
don't see that too often in government. You do see it
occasionally, but you wouldn't see the Department of Defense,
for example, sending troops--having a plan to build a tank, for
example, that they knew would be defeated by the enemy tank in
a one on one battle or they would actually plan to build a
fighter airplane they knew was inferior to one that would come
up against in combat. We try to stay ahead of what we know the
demand or the threat or whatever is.
And so, the commissioners detected a feeling that there was
something wrong here. We have a national need and we have a
plan to meet that need which doesn't meet the need, and so we
looked at it and we said, look, you know, we know these
technologies exist. For example, when I was Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, just before I was on that commission, we had
various kinds of technologies that knitted all the radars and
the fleet. We were very much in the network centric warfare. We
could tell where a sea skimming cruise missile was within a few
fractions of a centimeter at any portion of a second in time.
And so, we wanted to take those technologies and move them
over to the FAA and get the FAA energized to do something
different than it had been doing before, and that is there the
JPDO was born out of that concept. And so now, five years have
gone by, and we find ourselves with a department with the FAA
doing, I think, about the best they can under the
circumstances. We have seen the Department of Transportation
pretty much dedicated to this approach, and we have seen
Congress dedicated to it. But at the same time we see other
parts of the government who don't seem to get the message.
Despite the fact what this committee says, NASA goes again and
continues to under fund its aeronautics as you pointed out in
your statement.
So there is concern that the government in its entirety has
not recognized the seriousness of the problem and really
engaged to solve it, but I wouldn't place that blame on the
FAA. I think they are doing the best they can under the
circumstances.
Dr. Carmichael. It has taken us three years of thoroughly
concerted effort to finally get to the point with the FAA where
the FAA is actually buying in to the JPDO program, and I think
this is refreshing. And I can only hope that we can bring the
other agencies to this same point where they have an equivalent
level of buy-in into their own programs and infrastructure to
the JPDO.
Mr. Calvert. You probably heard the sirens go off. We have
a vote coming up, but I just want to make a comment and then I
am going to submit some questions for the record that you can
answer, hopefully, in the next couple of days back to the
Committee. But, as you know, I think we are spending
approximately $185 million in R&D money which was extremely low
I think relative to the agency, what we are trying to do to
create a safe environment for the future to fly increasing air
traffic. In spite of our own parochial interest about airports
nearby, the fact of the matter is air traffic will continue to
increase and will continue to be an important and integral part
of our economy as it should be.
And it is incumbent upon all of you, the experts, and those
you work with to make sure that we have a safe, and continue to
have a safe and effective way to travel, and that the traveling
public can look forward to that in the future. So you have a
big job ahead of you and in a relatively short time frame
because I think the system that we have has been hobbled
together and has been effective over the last number of years,
but I don't think anyone here would disagree has pretty much
met its limitations.
So anyway, as we move forward, there has been a lot of
delays in this so I don't think we can delay any longer, and I
look forward to working with you and working with the Chairman
to making sure that we have a safe and effective air traffic
system for this country and continue to be leaders in the
world. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Udall. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments
and his questions, and clearly the ranking member has a
significant encompassing grasp of not only the challenges here
but the opportunities that present themselves to us if we--I
shouldn't say if but when we implement the next system. As
Ranking Member Calvert mentioned, we have a vote. I think for
the best use of our time, I am going to temporarily recess the
Committee. I will go over and vote as quickly as I can, come
back, and if the panel can stay we will hope to resume in 10 to
15 minutes because you have traveled a long way, and I want to
take advantage of your expertise and insight. So we will
temporarily recess, and I will be back as soon as I can.
[Recess.]
Benefits of and Suggested Areas for Increased NASA Funding
Chairman Udall. Thank you for your forbearance. We will get
right back to questions. Mr. Leader, if I could direct a
question at you and then the panel in turn can respond. You
stated a NextGen initiative has a number of important research
areas that need to be addressed if it is to succeed. In the
joint resolution for fiscal year 2007, Congress wound up giving
NASA's aeronautics program an additional $187 million above the
President's fiscal '07 request. Mr. Douglass, in his testimony
recommended that the additional NASA aeronautics funding go
towards NextGen related transitional R&D. How much would the
NextGen initiative benefit from increased NASA funding of
NextGen research needs? Could you tell us what projects and
activities NASA should apply additional aeronautics funding to
in order to best address the research needs of the NextGen
initiative? If I could get your thoughts now, I would also like
to have you respond for the record.
Mr. Leader. Yes, sir, I will provide a response for the
record. I have not thought of the issue in terms of the
question as you framed it and quantify it in financial terms. I
can speak briefly to what our top R&D priorities are though.
Obviously, safety-related issues because the National Airspace
System is a safety system it is our highest factor and relative
to that human factors were to support how flight crews and
controllers would operate in the NextGen system remains
critically important to us, as does support of our safety
management system that would be predictive rather than
forensic. We believe that there can be a significant
contribution there as well.
In addition, there are automation issues and conflict
resolution that are going to be very important to maintaining
separation required to increase capacity, and also relative to
capacity would be wake vortex work that would drive separation
procedures.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. Dr. Dillingham.
Dr. Dillingham. Chairman Udall, I think we haven't looked
at that real thoroughly but we do have a couple of thoughts.
One is again we want to commend JPDO for taking a wide ranging
look to try to determine what their research needs were and
various ways in which they might be able to fund that R&D. But
one thing that does come to mind for us, particularly at this
stage of trying to move towards implementation, and that is our
understanding is that NASA has a capabilities test bed where
companies can come in and put their concept to the test in
terms of what will work well in the mass.
It is also a situation where if you are a small company,
you can come in and use it free of charge whereas a large
company like Boeing or Lockheed, they probably have their own.
Our understanding is that NASA is not going to be upgrading
that capability and is something that can be very useful, we
think, to the JPDO in the near-term.
Chairman Udall. Thank you, Dr. Dillingham. Mr. Douglass, do
you have a comment?
Mr. Douglass. Just to add that we think that the area that
needs a lot of emphasis is the systems engineering work and the
phenomenology examination like looking at wake vortex, some of
the weather issues Dr. Carmichael has mentioned are excellent
candidates for additional research by NASA. Dr. Dillingham
mentioned the modeling and the test beds that NASA has. Those
things need to be funded and updated. One of the really
interesting things that is going to happen as we get further
into this, there are going to be periods of time when we are
bringing the new system on but we still have the old system,
and how do you run two things in parallel so that you have the
confidence? Do you take the old one down now and depend on the
new one? That requires a lot of modeling.
We have done those kind of things before in the Department
of Defense and they are not easy. So I think there is a pretty
good shopping list. Now let me just add one caveat to it that I
think helps put it in context. You know, NASA is struggling to
create a new system beyond the Shuttle, and the NASA
administrator is keenly aware of the fact that there is a ten-
year gap from 2010 to--now it is almost up to a five-year gap,
where we have no access to space essentially. And so the NASA
administrator is under a lot of pressure, of course, to close
that gap. It is going to take more money to do that and so I
think you have to look at NASA's decision making in the context
of the other problems that they have. But, clearly, for the
benefit of the Nation, we need to fund these aeronautic
shortfalls.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Carmichael, do you have any additional
comments?
Dr. Carmichael. I do. The NextGen is predicated on the
notion of a trajectory based air traffic management system, and
by that we mean that the aircraft in the system have a contract
that at a particular point of time an aircraft is supposed to
be at a certain place in its four dimensional space. To do that
absolutely requires accurate weather information. Where the
weather is in space to a large extent is determined by where
the weather is. Now as you are designing an air traffic system,
and NASA has done this for years, they are very good at
building a system for the nominal case. In other words, on a
clear day the automatic systems work really well. Bring the
weather in and everything becomes non-linear.
So a lot of the things that we have been pressing NASA to
do is essentially a new start. We are saying you do great work
on building air traffic decisions or tools but now we are
asking you to start building those tools with weather
integrated into those tools from day one. This is a new start,
and to get a new start kind of activity within NASA right now
is exceptionally difficult so that is our issue.
Mr. Douglass. If I might add one after thought to that, and
that is this work on weather phenomenology has lot of benefit
to our Department of Defense as well. You can imagine the
effect that weather can have on combat operations so when you
think about us as a nation investing in this work there are
multiple payoffs beyond just the air traffic control system,
sir.
Chairman Udall. That is a very good point. Just so the
panel is aware, we have another vote scheduled in 40 or so
minutes, I believe. If you all could stay till lunch time till
noon or so, I would really appreciate it. We got--it looks like
I have, I should say, a series of additional questions I would
like to extend to you. But I think we can cover most, if not
all of them, over the next 30 minutes or so. And, Mr. Leader, I
am not intending to pick on you first with every question but I
would like to start with you again.
Concerns Regarding the Implementation of Necessary Technology
And I wanted to mention last week we had an FAA R&D hearing
and several of the witnesses there indicated that one of the
key challenges facing the NextGen initiative is how to
transition to agreed-upon NextGen technologies and procedures
into the National Airspace System expeditiously. I think Mr.
Douglass was speaking to that earlier. They and other observers
are concerned that the FAA and the JPDO don't appear to have a
clear plan for implementing those technologies and procedures
in a timely fashion, and my set of questions to you includes is
that a valid concern? If not, what are your specific plans for
getting such technologies and procedures into the National
Airspace System as soon as possible? Do you have clear and
well-defined agreements on certification and operational
procedures approval for such things as ADS-B or the operation
of military UAVs in the National Airspace System, and to make
your job even easier, if not, why not, and when will you? And
then I will put the other witnesses on notice that I also would
appreciate your comments if you would like to do so after Mr.
Leader.
Mr. Leader. Yes, sir. We do believe we have an ever clearer
and evolving approach to implementation and it is a challenge
to explain it because it is not a blanket approach. The
relationship between JPDO and the partner departments and
agencies is for fairly obvious reasons fundamentally different.
With FAA with whom we have the largest relationship in the
sense that FAA will fund and implement the largest part and
subsequently operate the Next Generation system, we are working
with them through the evolved operational evolution
partnership, which is the process by which concepts and
requirements from JPDO will be installed into the planning and
execution systems within the FAA, but that is a FAA-specific
process.
Within the Department of Commerce, our primary interest is
obviously weather, and we are moving forward in an effort
involving FAA, Department of Commerce, and Department of
Defense to bring forward to the senior policy committee early
this summer a specific recommendation for the creation of a
joint office that would pursue weather research development and
the creation, ultimately, of tools to be used by the three
agencies involved. Within the Department of Defense there is a
recommendation awaiting approval to create a program office
that would be specifically dedicated to the Next Generation
system and whose charter would be to manage the exchange
between JPDO and Defense as well as to implement--oversee
implementing programs, joint programs, with them.
With NASA, our primary interaction, as we have discussed
earlier in the area of research and development, and we have
recently provided our desired research guidance to them and are
working very closely with NASA to clarify that, so I think you
can see that in each case we are evolving how we will
transition from the theory of the case within JPDO into the
actual implementation into the NextGen system.
Chairman Udall. Other witnesses care to comment?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think what we
mentioned earlier in our testimony about the operational
evolution partnership between FAA and JPDO is very important,
it sort of is the process by which they are going to move these
new technologies into the NAS. However, the question that you
ask is very important because it brings up a couple of
integrated points. One is the need to have these key planning
documents, concept of operations, enterprise architecture, and
the like, because that in fact sort of is the blue print that
describes how things are going to be integrated together. You
need that in order to go to the next step which is to decide
about the necessary regulations and human factors research that
needs to be undertaken.
Tied to that is the need for R&D monies, which we just got
through talking about, in terms of the concern about enough not
being available and organizations not being identified to do
it. So there are positive things on some side but the need to
get these documents finally completed so that they serve as the
base to move forward is also very critical.
Chairman Udall. Mr. Douglass.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir. I have a couple of comments. I
think it was you in your opening statement noted that this
September we will lose our FAA administrator. We have already
lost the head of the air traffic office. The institute recently
lost its staff director for a variety of reasons. Some of these
problems have to do with the complexity of the task and some
are just inevitable. I mean the administrator is moving because
it's the end of her five-year term. When Congress plays its
role in bringing a new administrator in, I would strongly urge
Congress to be mindful of the skill sets that this next
administrator is going to need which is someone who understands
how big systems like this are pulled together and managed.
Another thought that I think needs to be put into the mix
here is I think the senior policy committee has probably
suffered a little bit because we have changed from one
Secretary of Transportation to another, and I don't mean that
as a criticism of the current Secretary. I just mean when you
change people it takes a while for everybody to get up and so
on. But, clearly, this project is going to need someone at the
very top of the FAA who understands systems acquisition. It is
going to need some kind of enforcing function to keep everybody
working together, and if it is not the SPC, I am not sure what
it would be unless it is somebody up here on the Hill who
really rides very close herd on this in a way that is difficult
for an oversight committee to do. So I am concerned. I think
industry is watching to make sure that we do have some way of
pulling this all together because it is a very difficult task
and it is an episodic task.
It is important to remember that we only do this about
every 40 or 50 years so it isn't like over in the Pentagon when
you go from one fighter program to the next, you have a whole
group of people who just finished the last one. You can kind of
move them over to the new one and so on. This is something that
we do rarely, and there aren't a lot of people here today who
invented the last system, and so we have to relearn certain
things as we go along. And that is going to require central
control of some magnitude in my opinion, sir.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Dillingham, did you have an additional
comment?
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to sort of
give a footnote to what Mr. Douglass said. I think the statute
that created the position for chief operating officer for the
air traffic organization in FAA, which is sort of the match for
JPDO, created a five-year term, the potential of a five-year
term, for that position. Mr. Chew was able to fill that
position for three years. I think as FAA goes out to find a new
chief operating officer that to the extent that someone can
commit themselves to the five-year term might be important.
We are at a point now that as we move from planning to
implementation if you got somebody that is going to be there
for five years it is a better shot than if you got them there
for less time than that.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Carmichael, did you have any thoughts
on the various questions that have been posed?
Joint Weather Activity
Dr. Carmichael. I just wanted to put a footnote on Mr.
Leader's comment about the joint weather activity. You know, in
today's world there are three weather forecasting services in
this nation. There are two in DOD, one in the Air Force, one in
the Navy. And then there is the National Weather Service. And
if a pilot asks the same question about the weather over
central Kansas at 10,000 feet at 5:00 this afternoon, they may
very well get three different answers. DOD is under extreme
pressure, budgetary pressure. Even though the defense budgets
are high that money is not going to the people who do aviation
weather forecasting. And so they are under pressure to
streamline to be more efficient and effective in aviation
weather.
And so they have a strong desire to collaborate with the
Weather Service and with JPDO in this joint weather activity.
It is to the benefit of the FAA, NOAA and DOD to have a single
entity that is providing aviation weather service for all. And
so I am very hopeful that this new joint activity is going to
be successful.
Chairman Udall. Mr. Douglass, did you have a follow-up
thought as well?
Mr. Douglass. I did. I just was going to say I agree with
Dr. Dillingham. I think those five-year terms that came about
both for the administrator and for the ATO officer are well
served and I would hope that when we replace Mr. Chew we can
find somebody who would give us a five-year commitment.
Suggestions for Specific Legislative Provisions
Chairman Udall. Let me move to my next question, if I
might. We in the Congress will be reauthorizing the FAA this
year, and this committee will play an important role in that
reauthorization process. I thought since I had you all here, I
would ask if you have any thoughts on specific legislative
provisions that we ought to include as a part of this
reauthorization process. Mr. Leader, I am going to assume that
you would suggest we adopt the Administration's FAA proposal. I
am going to let you off the hook and----
Mr. Leader. Yes, sir, that is a very safe assumption.
Chairman Udall. And start with Dr. Dillingham. We will let
you catch your breath this time.
Dr. Dillingham. Mr. Chairman, overall what we understand
about the programs that are being changed or modified for
reauthorization, we don't find any serious problems with that.
However, we have raised some concerns about the funding
mechanism that is being proposed for the FAA. Specifically, we
are concerned about the basis of the cost allocation system
that they have set up to charge user fees, and we testified
before that this is a pretty complicated proposal that hasn't
had that much time for people to look at and evaluate, so we
would caution going forward with something so dramatic as what
is being proposed in terms of funding.
Chairman Udall. Mr. Douglass.
Mr. Douglass. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. When I think about
this, I am mindful of that scene in the movie, Oh, Brother,
Where Art Thou, where the three convicts are chained together
and the two guys on the outside are arguing who is going to be
the lead on the team, and the guy in the middle says, well, I
am for you fellers. Our business, we sell to both the general
aviation community and to the airlines. Our products go across
the industry. And we are reluctant to be caught between those
two communities in their dispute about who should pay more for
the use of the system.
The one part of the current proposal though that we really,
really don't like is there are user fees in there for the
certification of new products, and if you read the language,
Mr. Chairman, it is very open ended. It is lots of the
administrator may and then there is a long list of things that
you could put user fees on, and no bounding of that. And we
believe that the certification process in the civil aviation
part of our industry is an inherently government function and
it should be funded through the FAA. Just like when we produce
our military products, the Department of Defense has a part of
its organization that inspects them and makes sure they are
billed correctly and so on, and we like the way the FAA is
currently doing it today and would like to see the current
system maintained rather than go to use some sort of user fee
system for certification of new products. That is our principal
concern with the new proposal.
Chairman Udall. Dr. Carmichael, do you have any thoughts on
the reauthorization of the FAA.
Dr. Carmichael. I want to address the method of funding,
but I would like to say that if we are going to accomplish what
we are planning to accomplish with the NextGen it is absolutely
critical that we have stable funding, predictable funding, that
we can build a multi-year research program to accomplish, and
so the stability of that funding is critical.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. Mr. Douglass, I can't help but
relate a quick story that Judge Hall, I think, told me,
Congressman Hall, a ranking member on this committee, when a
public official was faced with a particularly dirty issue and
asked what his position was. He said some of my friends are for
it, and some of my friends are against it. I am for my friends.
It sounds like that is the position that you think is most
appropriate here.
Mr. Douglass. That is exactly our position, Mr. Chairman.
Concern Regarding NASA's Retrenchment in Weather-related
Research
Chairman Udall. Let me turn to Dr. Carmichael, and take
advantage of his deep expertise when it comes to weather and
weather analysis, weather forecasting. In your testimony you
raised concerns about the impact on NASA's restructured
aeronautics program on important aviation weather research
initiatives, and we have heard from a wide variety of expert
witnesses, and I hope Congress and the White House will heed
those warnings and take corrective action. So that we can
better understand what is at stake, could you please elaborate
a bit on the nature of your concerns and what the consequences
of a NASA retrenchment in these aviation weather-related
research area would likely be?
Dr. Carmichael. Well, let me first of all be clear that it
is not our position that we expect NASA in their aeronautics
program to be performing weather research. What we are asking
NASA to do because they are the experts in automation system
research is we are asking NASA to team with the folks who do
aviation weather research to build automation decision support
tools that have weather tightly coupled into the algorithms
inside those systems. So that is what we think is critical.
Now, if NASA doesn't do that work then I think the fall back
position is that the FAA has to have funding to find other ways
to do that work. MITRE Corporation, MITRE, CAASD, probably is
the beneficiary of building a work force on FAA funding to do
that work if NASA is not able to do it.
And I would like to put a footnote also on the question of
funding. Currently the R&D is divided up into buckets. There is
a safety bucket and there is a capacity bucket. And weather
sometimes falls victim to this notion of where does it fit, is
it safety or is it capacity. And sometimes these artificial
labels cause problems in allocating and managing funds so I
would ask that, if possible, with the funding that somehow
weather be recognized as funding that is not easily put into
either a safety or a capacity bucket. Thank you.
Chairman Udall. Thank you. We look forward to calling on
you further given your expertise and insights into really
important areas, as we discussed before the hearing began. Let
me turn back to Mr. Leader. In your testimony you refer to a
number of agreed upon NextGen technologies including the ADS-B,
SWIM, NextGen, Enabled Weather, and the NAS Voice Switch. And
obviously, a timely transition in the National Airspace System
will be key to the success of the NextGen initiative. When will
each of those systems be fully implemented into the NAS, and
please provide for the record if necessary, I know these are
fairly complicated dynamics here, and what prevents them from
being fully implemented earlier?
Mr. Leader. That is a question, sir, that I will have to
answer for you for the record later.
Schedule of UAS Integration
Chairman Udall. Thank you, and we look forward to those
answers. Dr. Dillingham, in your testimony at last week's T&I
Aviation Subcommittee hearing, you reported that the ``FAA has
begun reviewing its existing safety regulations developed for
manned aircraft to determine how or whether they need to be
modified to enable UAS to be safely integrated into the
National Airspace System. FAA expects this to be a five to ten-
year effort.'' That was the end of the quotes of the statement
I have here. Given the growing expectations for UAS
applications, do you regard this as a timely response, and, if
not, what would you recommend be done?
Dr. Dillingham. Chairman Udall, we currently have a study
underway that is addressing that question. It has been raised
by several members of Congress whether this is actually too
long a lead time in that state governments, local governments,
are increasingly wanting to use UAS so if you would allow us to
get a little further along with our research we certainly would
report back to you on that point.
Chairman Udall. Do you have a time sense of when that might
happen, not so much the reporting back but the actual
initiative itself or would you like that to be part of----
Dr. Dillingham. I would like that to be a part of what we
report back to the record.
Chairman Udall. Should other government entities be
involved, other government agencies?
Dr. Dillingham. Beyond FAA?
Chairman Udall. Yes.
Dr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I think that--and they are
involved in it at this point. DOD is involved in it for sure.
And I am not sure--and Homeland Security is also involved in
it. So what we are doing is we are trying to see to what extent
they are coordinating their work, and we are also trying to see
if there are some lessons learned that we can get from
international UAS activities.
Status of Unmanned Aircraft in NAS
Chairman Udall. Excellent. Dr. Carmichael, you have
testified to the great potential of unmanned aircraft for
targeted observations of the atmosphere to improve forecasts.
Do you think that JPDO is moving fast enough to include
unmanned aircraft in the NAS?
Dr. Carmichael. I think this is another area where NASA
could play an extremely beneficial role. We focus a lot on how
do we integrate the unmanned aircraft into the system but from
a weather standpoint it provides a tremendously valuable
opportunity for us to seek our observations in areas where we
need observations to improve the forecast. And those areas may
differ from day to day so the ability to actually move an
observing platform where you need it together with observations
can make a significant improvement in the weather forecast. So
I think this is another area where NASA could be extremely
helpful. As far as I understand now, they have no program in
this area.
Chairman Udall. Let me follow on. You testified that
``Unmanned aerial systems will also require more precise
weather forecasts.'' That was the end of the quote. Does that
comment imply that you believe in some ways unmanned aircraft
control won't be as robust as piloted aircraft control?
Dr. Carmichael. No. What I mean by that is that the
unmanned aircraft systems span a broad range of capabilities,
and some of those aircraft are going to be very, very weather
sensitive, so it is important to have weather that is going to
be suitable for all classes of unmanned aerial operations all
the way from things that may be the size of your thumb or your
hand all the way up to huge aircraft. And as you might guess,
the small aircraft may be very weather sensitive.
Chairman Udall. I could continue asking questions but I
have other appointments over the noon hour, and I am sure all
of you do as well. Before I bring the hearing to a close, I
want to thank all of you for appearing here today before the
Committee. Your testimony has been very thought provoking and
helpful. If there is no objection, the record will remain open
for additional statements from the Members for answers to any
follow-up questions the Committee may ask of the witnesses.
Without objection, so ordered. This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix:
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Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Charles A. Leader, Director, Joint Planning and
Development Office, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. The development and transition to the NextGen is one of the most
complex efforts that FAA has ever undertaken.
Q1a. What do you consider to be the biggest near-term and mid-term
technical and programmatic challenges facing the JPDO as it attempts to
plan and develop the NextGen?
A1a. One of the greatest challenges is to ensure that the research in
civil aeronautics by the partner agencies is consistent with the needs
and plans being identified and developed by the JPDO. Further we need
to assure that agency resources can be leveraged, technically and
programmatically, in such a way to enable the effective implementation
of NextGen operational concepts and capabilities. Over time, the
transition from the near-term to the mid-term will bring greater
challenges in the area of integrating multiple capabilities into wide-
ranging operational contexts.
Q1b. What steps do you intend to take to address those challenges?
A1b. With respect to R&D, the JPDO is working with its partner agencies
to develop the NextGen R&D Plan. This product will be delivered to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) at the end of August. The plan
will identify the R&D needed to enable the mid-term transition to the
NextGen end-state as well as the funding requirements and agency
responsibilities.
Systematic technical and programmatic coordination across the
agencies will play a vital role in ensuring success as NextGen moves
from the near-term to delivering mid-term capabilities. The recent JPDO
realignment is aimed at ensuring that success and results in the
refocusing of JPDO's efforts from long-term planning to implementation
facilitation. Among the principles changes to support this include: (1)
evolution of the Master Integrated Product Team (MIPT) into an
Integration Council (IC); (2) creation of a Regulatory Council (RC);
(3) reformation of the Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) into Working
Groups (WGs); and (4) creation of a Joint Architecture & Engineering
Board (JAEB). These entities are further described on the JPDO website
at www.jpdo.aero.
Q2. In your testimony you refer to a number of agreed upon NextGen
technologies, including ADS-B, SWIM, NextGen Enabled Weather, and the
NAS Voice Switch. Obviously, a timely transition of these technologies
into the national airspace system will be a key determinant of the
success of the NextGen system. Please provide the dates by which each
of these systems will be fully implemented into the NAS. What prevents
them from being implemented earlier.
A2. The FAA plans to award the contract for the ADS-B ground
infrastructure in August 2007. By December 2009, the agency expects to
make the ``in-service decision'' that essentially commissions ADS-B for
the National Airspace System (NAS) and certifies its use for air
traffic control separation services. The deployment across the NAS is
planned to be completed by 2013.
Since the ADS-B implementation requires both ground infrastructure
and avionics equipage, the FAA is also preparing a proposed rule that
will require operators to install ADS-B avionics in order to fly in
certain classes of airspace. This rule will be consistent with the way
we currently operate the Nation's airspace, and structured much like
the rule that today requires transponders for operations in controlled
airspace and the areas surrounding busy airports. The FAA will issue
the proposed rule in September 2007, and expects it to become final in
November 2009. It is projected that there will be 100 percent
compliance to the rule by fiscal year 2020.
The first segment of SWIM will be complete in 2013 and will include
the SWIM architecture, initial core services, and information services
between selected NAS systems. SWIM cannot be implemented earlier
because the first segment will connect other NAS systems which are not
fully in place, and are dependent on other modernization efforts. For
example, SWIM segment 1 will be developed in conjunction with ERAM
Release 3, Traffic Flow Management Modernization, Terminal Data
Distribution Service, and the development of the Corridor Information
Weather System. SWIM cannot be accelerated without accelerating those
programs, which would introduce considerable risk.
Beyond the first segment of SWIM, future segments of the SWIM
program will implement services that are available from NextGen systems
as they come online. Therefore, the final SWIM solution will unfold as
other NextGen systems are developed and fielded. The full scope of SWIM
cannot be accelerated without accelerating the rest of the NextGen
program.
Regarding the NextGen Enabled Weather, the plan calls for a phased
implementation of improvements through full implementation in FY 2020.
There will be two major phases which build on each other sequentially.
The first major phase provides ready access by most users via a
network-enabled capability to a limited set of advanced convective and
wind shear products to be operational in FY13. The second phase,
building upon the network-enabled capability from the first phase, will
migrate and upgrade additional products for direct user access and will
enable integration into decision support tools on the ground and on the
flight deck.
Earlier implementation is limited by several factors, including the
time frame for implementation of the first segment of the SWIM Program
and the need to maintain current aviation weather capabilities while
transitioning a to network based solution from a hard-wired legacy
system approach. In addition, extensive coordination among the multiple
agencies of the Joint Planning and Development Office, especially the
Department of Defense and Department of Commerce, will be required to
produce a government-wide solution rather than a solution which meets
the needs of only the Federal Aviation Administration. Finally, the
development of large scale data networking and assimilation techniques
will require several spirals to assure reliability in use by the
aviation community.
The NAS Voice Switch program is just beginning the initial
investment analysis phase. NVS will have two operational systems in the
NAS by FY 2015 as part of its initial operational capability (IOC). The
En-route Air Traffic Control Centers and large TRACONS are scheduled to
be complete by FY 2022 in line with current mid-term and full
capability NextGen goals. Other smaller facility voice switch
modernization schedules will be dictated by a combination of end-of-
useful life predictions for the legacy systems, and the need to
operationally cutover specific airspace in synch with the NextGen
transition. The NVS IOC date is contingent on the ongoing investment
analysis. This analysis is addressing the total system life cycle cost
based upon the projected facility installation waterfall plan. This
plan can be accelerated to keep pace with other facility plans by
increasing the budget line item accordingly.
The Data Communications Program is in the initial investment
analysis phase. The program anticipates deploying capability in three
segments beginning in 2014 with upper en-route airspace and select
large airports, and concluding with all airspace coverage by 2025. The
pacing item for the Data Communications Program will be the airborne
user equipage profile. These plans are being developed and synchronized
with direct input from the aviation community. Current planning calls
for initial equipage starting as early 2013 to support departure
clearance and other airport operations, and covering all upper en-route
airspace users by the 2017 timeframe. The program will then evolve into
terminal airspace in large metropolitan areas. In concert with the
investment analysis, the FAA is addressing the rule-making strategy for
the program. Acceleration of these dates is unlikely given the user
equipage required.
Q3. How much would the NextGen initiative benefit from increased NASA
funding of NextGen research needs? What projects and activities should
NASA apply any additional aeronautics funding to in order to best
address the research needs of the NextGen initiative?
A3. The NextGen R&D plan is due to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) at the end of August. The R&D plan intends to answer the question
of what R&D is needed and which agency is responsible.
Q4. With respect to R&D needed for the NextGen initiative,
Q4a. How well are the resource commitments and R&D activities of the
JPDO participating agencies aligned with the needs of the NextGen
initiative?
A4a. The JPDO partner agencies are working together to specify NextGen
R&D needs and perform a gap analysis against agency plans. The R&D plan
due to the OMB at the end of August will answer the question of what
R&D is needed and which agency is responsible.
Q4b. Has the JPDO developed a clear set of research requirements for
the NextGen initiative along with the agency's research
responsibilities? If not, why not, and when will these requirements be
developed?
A4b. See answer to question 4a. The R&D plan is due to the OMB at the
end of August.
Q4c. Do you consider JPDO research requirements ``guidelines'' for
each NextGen participating agency to consider, or do you consider them
to be mandatory requirements that will have to be addressed completely?
A4c. See answer to question 4A. The plan will identify the R&D
requirements as well as agency responsibilities. The plan results from
the participation and decisions of the partner agencies; the plan in
total represents both the requirements and the commitments of the
partner agencies.
Q4d. Has the JPDO established agency resource and research
contributions to the degree of specificity that it can determine if an
agency is failing to meet its commitments? If not, why not?
A4d. See answer to question 4A. The NextGen R&D plan results from a
series of needs and gap analysis activities. The gap analysis
activities will determine the difference between what is and what
should be for the period of FY 2009 through FY 2013.
Q4e. Is there a process for remedying a situation in which one or more
agencies is not follow through on commitments to NextGen?
A4e. The JPDO NextGen Senior Policy Committee (SPC) is responsible for
oversight, decision-making, and providing assurances in support of
partner agency commitments to NextGen. This responsibility is
summarized below, as referenced in VISION 100--Century of Aviation
Reauthorization Act (Public Law 108-176).
(1) advise the Secretary of Transportation regarding the
national goals and strategic objectives for the transformation
of the Nation's air transportation system to meet its future
needs;
(2) provide policy guidance for the integrated plan for the
air transportation system to be developed by the Next
Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning and
Development Office;
(3) provide ongoing policy review for the transformation of
the air transportation system;
(4) identify resource needs and make recommendations to their
respective agencies for necessary funding for planning,
research, and development activities; and
(5) make legislative recommendations, as appropriate, for the
future air transportation system.
Q5. Do NASA and FAA have an agreement on how far NASA will go in
maturing NextGen technologies before transitioning them to FAA? If so,
where is the dividing line? If there is not such an agreement, how are
you able to plan? If there is no agreement yet, has NASA told you how
far (in terms of technological maturing) it will take the research that
it is planning to do?
A5. We are depending on NASA for the longer-term, transformational
elements of the transition to NextGen that we expect to begin
implementing after 2015. Up to that point, the research, much of which
was originally pioneered by NASA, has largely been completed or is at a
more advanced stage of development.
Therefore, for the next several years, we do not expect that there
will be any significant technology gaps. The FAA's reauthorization that
is currently with Congress reflects our expanded requirements for R&D
to meet the mid-term needs of the transition to NextGen (up to 2015).
In the long-term, we are looking to NASA to answer challenging
transformational questions, such as the relative roles of humans and
automation in NextGen, how to implement automated, fault-tolerant gate-
to-gate 4D trajectory management within the NAS. We are actively
working with NASA and JPDO to understand the details of the research
that is required and to ensure we have a technology transition pathway.
Q6. NASA is moving toward a focus on fundamental research and away
from demonstration projects. Industry experts have expressed the
concern that this will leave a gap in technology development. This
leads to the question of what entity will do the development work that
will be important to NextGen? According to JPDO officials, JPDO has
conducted gap analysis on the impact of NASA's actions on NextGen
planning.
Q6a. When will that analysis be completed? Please provide the results
to this committee.
A6a. The R&D gap analysis begins in May and will be completed with
submission of the R&D Plan to OMB in August.
Q6b. Does the FAA budget for FY08 with its five-year run out assume
that FAA will fund all of the technology maturation tasks for the
NextGen initiative that you had been counting on NASA to do? If not,
how much additional funding will be required for FAA to do all of the
technology maturation, and what will be the extent of the resulting
delays, if any, in implementing the technologies?
A6b. The Director of the Joint Planning and Development Office was
unable to provide an answer for the record.
Q7. You have stated that preliminary cost estimates for NextGen
include $15-22 billion in FAA funding and $14-20 billion in avionics
costs to users, for a total of $29-42 billion. At the same time, you
state that the total costs of the European SESAR system are estimated
at $25 to $37 billion. Given that you describe the European system as
``smaller in scope and size'' and focused ``almost exclusively on air
traffic management'' while NextGen ``includes not only air traffic
control, but also airports, airport operations, security and passenger
management, and DOD and DHS requirements,'' why isn't the cost of the
U.S. system much higher than the European system, rather being only
about 15 percent higher?
A7. The preliminary cost estimates of $15-22 billion apply to the FAA's
capital funding requirements. The avionics cost estimates are
preliminary and recognize that the range reflects uncertainties
concerning the individual aircraft, operational requirements, and
equipage schedules. Through the development of the NextGen business
case, the JPDO is actively working to comprehensively identify the
future NextGen resource requirements as it spans the partner agencies,
user community, and other stakeholders. The SESAR cost estimates
reflect a preliminary but broad estimate across all its stakeholders,
while the NextGen estimates, to date, largely reflect those of the
public sector and preliminary user equipage costs.
Questions submitted by Representative Jim Matheson
Q1. What is the time frame for implementation of the FAA's Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system and when will it be
required for civilian aircraft to be equipped?
A1. The FAA plans to award the contract for the ADS-B ground
infrastructure in August 2007. By December 2009, the agency expects to
make the ``in-service decision'' that essentially commissions ADS-B for
the National Airspace System (NAS) and certifies its use for air
traffic control separation services. The deployment across the NAS is
planned to be completed by 2013.
Since the ADS-B implementation requires both ground infrastructure
and avionics equipage, the FAA is also preparing a proposed rule that
will require operators to install ADS-B avionics in order to fly in
certain classes of airspace. This rule will be consistent with the way
we currently operate the Nation's airspace, and structured much like
the rule that today requires transponders for operations in controlled
airspace and the areas surrounding busy airports. The FAA will issue
the proposed rule in September 2007, and expects it to become final in
November 2009. It is projected that there will be 100 percent
compliance to the rule by fiscal year 2020.
Q2. Does FAA anticipate the elimination of ground-based radar
installations, such as Automatic Surveillance Radar (ASR-11) after the
implementation of the ADS-B system?
A2. The FAA does not have any plans in the near-term to eliminate
ground-based radars. An important part of the plan for ADS-B is to
maintain 50 percent of the current system of secondary radars at high-
density locations to serve as a back-up in case of an outage of the
Global Navigation Satellite System (known in this country as GPS, or
Global Positioning Satellites). Some older legacy surveillance systems
are planned for removal starting in 2016, well after the commissioning
of ADS-B for the national airspace system in 2013. Removal will occur
slowly over the years, with the last of the targeted legacy systems
eliminated by 2023.
Q3. If ASR-11 will not be eliminated, does FAA plan to extend radar
coverage to new locations? If so, how will this be accomplished? If
not, why not?
A3. There are currently no plans to expand radar coverage to new
locations beyond current program baselines. In addition to the set of
en route and terminal secondary radars that will remain in place as
part of the ADS-B backup strategy, primary radars such as ASR-9 and
ASR-11 will also be used to support backup surveillance where they are
currently located. In areas outside of these locations, backup
surveillance capabilities will not be required, and so the long-term
expansion of surveillance services to these areas, if required, will be
accomplished using ADS-B alone. As with any capability in the NAS, the
need for these surveillance services will continue to be periodically
assessed as the NAS evolves to the next generation system.
Q4. Does FAA anticipate the elimination of other ground-based
navigational systems such as ILS equipment or VOR? How does FAA plan to
accommodate the elimination of these systems?
A4. The FAA anticipates reducing, but not eliminating, both VOR and ILS
equipment. Reductions will be designed to minimize the operational
impact on aircraft while maintaining sufficient numbers of these
systems to provide a safe and efficient backup to satellite navigation.
Analysis is underway to establish the criteria for identifying which
specific systems will be retained and which will be candidates for
elimination.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
FAA Financing Proposal
Q1. What would be the effect, if any, on the NextGen budget if
Congress does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation
financing reform package (ticket prices, aviation fuel taxes) as part
of a new authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel
taxes in place?
A1. The FAA, like the Congressional Budget Office, projects Trust Fund
revenues to continue to grow over the long run under the current
system. However, this does not necessarily mean the current system can
efficiently accommodate the requirements of NextGen. Under the existing
financing system, our revenue is inflexible and is vulnerable to
factors--such as ticket prices--that are unrelated to the cost of
providing service. This year-to-year volatility makes long-term
planning difficult, and will severely hamper the efficient
implementation of NextGen in time to avoid gridlock in the 2014-2015
timeframe.
Our financing proposal will create the flexibility to provide the
resources we need for NextGen when we need them, through adjustable
cost-based user fees and taxes, a well-defined general fund
contribution, and borrowing authority. In addition, under the current
system, FAA's discretionary spending must compete within the budget
caps for all government discretionary programs. In other words, even if
the Trust Fund does have enough money, the FAA may or may not get
access to it when we need it.
Under the proposal, user fees would be offsetting collections, not
subject to the overall discretionary spending caps. This is a key
reason this year's President's Budget is able to accommodate the
significant capital spending increases that will be required for
NextGen, and proposes a capital spending increase of $1 billion a year
by 2012.
NextGen Cost Estimates
Q2. You stated that the full-up cost of NextGen is on the order of $15
billion to $22 billion, and I understand that JPDO is working to refine
these estimates. Please break down this estimate on an agency by agency
basis?
A2. The estimates cited above apply to the FAA. The estimates by agency
are currently in development and will be reflected in the NextGen
business case.
NASA's Role in JPDO
Q3. Traditionally NASA has developed promising technologies to a high
maturity level enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical
maturity, does FAA and the other federal partners have the resources
and capability to fill this void?
A3. Timely and efficient transition of research products will require
the FAA to engage at lower technical maturity levels. While we have
been successful at transitioning NASA technologies to the National
Airspace System in the past, this process has required a considerable
length of time. Far slower than we can afford if we are going to be
able to develop the NextGen capabilities we need in order to meet
forecasted demand.
The FAA's reauthorization request reflects our expanded
requirements for R&D to meet the mid-term needs of the transition to
NextGen. The requested funding will allow this transition. We will
focus internal resources on NextGen research and technology development
and will use attrition to hire technical and program management
expertise. We will use the Operational Evolution Partnership to focus
MITRE CAASD research on NextGen requirements. We are also assessing
resources available at Volpe to supplement FAA capabilities, and we may
look to industry for assistance.
We are in the process of seeking outside expertise in the form of a
``blue ribbon panel'' to explore strategies to strengthen our technical
and contract management expertise.
Industry Led Development of NextGen
Q4. What is the current thinking on the role of the private sector in
the development and operation of NextGen? Has the JPDO come to any firm
decision on using a Large Systems Integrator approach?
A4. The role of the private sector in the development of the NextGen
infrastructure and in the actual operations of NextGen is still being
discussed and analyzed. However, some private sector involvement, in
the provision of certain key NextGen capabilities, is likely.
With regard to the use of a large systems integrator approach this
too is still being evaluated. The focus of implementation continues to
rely on the partner agencies and as such, so far at least, hasn't
involved a centralized systems integration approach. However, one
possibility as the initiative develops, and this has yet to be
evaluated, may be to rely to some degree on a lead systems integrator.
Certification
Q5. In his statement before the Subcommittee, Mr. Douglass expressed
concerns about the time required to prototype, validate, and certify
new technologies required for NextGen, in addition to time required for
rule-makings. Do you share Mr. Douglass' concerns? How much of a risk
do these processes pose to the timely development of NextGen?
A5. With so much of the NextGen initiative involving new equipment,
changes in procedures and new approaches to the operation of the
national airspace system, there are going to be a large number of new
certification requirements. Mr. Douglass is justified in his concerns.
However, the JPDO, through the development of a comprehensive planning
process that accounts for these requirements, as well as the lead time
involved, is working to mitigate the risks these certification needs
will have on the timely development of NextGen.
Accountability
Q6. In his statement before the Subcommittee, Mr. Douglass raised
concerns about the potential lack of accountability and authority in
the current JPDO structure, especially with regard to partner agencies.
He recommends that each partner agency designate a senior level
official as the responsible individual for all NextGen related
programs. Do you share Mr. Douglass' concerns? Should agencies
designate a senior program official?
A6. The existing legislation already mandates that the partner agencies
support NextGen and the JPDO. However, Mr. Douglass' point is well
taken and the JPDO, working closely with its major partner agencies has
put a considerable emphasis on developing sound working relationships
with all of its partner agencies. We have had considerable success in
developing processes and linkages that allow us to closely align
critical programs and funding to support NextGen initiatives.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, Government Accountability Office
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. How long should the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO)
exist, and should its role evolve from its current one? If so, in what
ways?
A1. JPDO was established to plan and coordinate the development of the
next generation air transportation system (NextGen) and should exist
for the duration of those tasks. The basic planning documents that JPDO
is developing for NextGen are near completion, but further iterations
of these planning documents will be needed as NextGen technologies are
developed and implemented. As NextGen has progressed from the initial
planning to the early implementation phase, JPDO's role has evolved to
include coordination and facilitation activities, as well as planning
activities. GAO believes this is a reasonable evolution and a proper
role for JPDO and is consistent with the language of JPDO's authorizing
legislation.
One example of this evolution is the role JPDO has begun to play in
incorporating NextGen goals and activities into the Air Traffic
Organization's (ATO) strategic plans. ATO has expanded and revamped its
Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP) to become the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) implementation plan for NextGen. The Review
Board that oversees the OEP is co-chaired by JPDO and ATO. If JPDO
ceased to exist before NextGen was more fully developed, some
alternative means of planning and coordinating NextGen's development
would have to be established, which could delay NextGen's
implementation. Similar developments are expected to occur with other
partner agencies as JPDO completes a Memorandum of Understanding with
these agencies.
JPDO's role could further evolve to include more coordination and
oversight activities. For example, JPDO could establish a program
oversight capacity that would enable it to perform such functions as
(1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among the partner
agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and systems-
engineering and integration activities of the cooperating agencies and
industry; (3) overseeing multi-agency projects; (4) overseeing, with
FAA, the selection of products or outcomes of research and development
that would be moved to the next stage of a demonstration project
through the Joint Resources Council (JRC);\1\ (5) overseeing the
fundamental research activities that support the long-term strategic
investments of NextGen by managing a research portfolio among NASA,
academia, federally funded research and development centers, and
industry; and (6) maintaining a baseline modeling and simulation
environment for testing and evaluating alternative concepts to satisfy
NextGen enterprise architecture requirements.
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\1\ FAA's Joint Resources Council establishes and manages
acquisition program baselines which define cost, schedule, performance,
and benefit parameters for programs over the full life cycle of the
program.
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Another example of the evolution of JPDO's role is the
organizational shift from integrated product teams to working groups.
This shift reflects the extension of JPDO's role beyond planning to
development of work products or ``outcomes'' that will contribute to
the early development of NextGen and facilitate its implementation. As
JPDO assumes more responsibility for facilitating NextGen's
implementation, greater authority and resources would allow it to do
more to coordinate the efforts of the partner agencies and work with
the Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of
contact. With adequate funding and authority, JPDO could acquire staff
with the project management and systems engineering skills needed for
JPDO to be an effective oversight and coordinating office.
Q2. Should JPDO be moved out of the Federal Aviation Administration's
Air Traffic Organization to be given greater visibility and authority?
For example, should it report directly to the Office of the Secretary
of Transportation? Why or why not?
A2. Currently, JPDO is located within FAA and reports to both the FAA
Administrator and the Chief Operating Officer of ATO. In GAO's view,
JPDO should not be moved out of FAA. Since JPDO provides the vision for
the future air traffic control (ATC) system and ATO is to be the
principal implementer of that vision, the two organizations need to
continue working closely together.
However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to
interact on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies.
On one hand, JPDO must counter the perception that it is a proxy for
the ATO and, as such, is not able to act as an ``honest broker.'' On
the other hand, JPDO must continue to work with ATO and its partner
agencies in a partnership in which ATO is the lead implementer of
NextGen. Therefore, it is important for JPDO to have some independence
from ATO. One change that could begin to address this issue would be to
have the JPDO Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This
change may also lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as
unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making
and other JPDO and NextGen processes.
As a part of any change in the dual reporting status of JPDO's
Director, consideration could be given to the possibility of creating
the position of Associate Administrator of NextGen and elevating the
JPDO Director to that post. This would give greater credibility,
authority, and visibility to this important position.
JPDO should not report to the Secretary of Transportation because
placing JPDO in the Secretary's office would remove it too far from the
implementation and operations of NextGen.
Q3. What are the specific roles of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) in JPDO?
Q3a. Do we know how much DOD plans to spend on NextGen for its
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be?
Q3b. Do we know how much DHS plans to spend on NextGen for its
development and implementation? If so, how much will it be?
A3a,b. The specific role of DHS in JPDO is to lead the Security Working
Group and to develop an effective security system for the national
airspace system (NAS) without limiting mobility or civil liberties. DHS
carries out this role through its Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). More specifically, DHS's task, through TSA, is to
develop and implement a real-time network to share information with
appropriate parties about passengers, cargo, and aircraft and to create
a transparent set of security layers that will deliver security without
causing undue delays, limiting access, or adding excessive costs and
time.
The specific role of DOD in JPDO is to lead the Net-Centric
Operations Working Group and to establish user-specific situational
awareness. Situational awareness means that each user of the NAS,
including DOD and the civilian sectors, has the awareness needed to
reach decisions through the creation of a combined information network.
All users of the system will have access to the air transportation
system data they require for their operations.
The specific roles of both DHS and DOD in JPDO are related to the
``curb-to-curb'' approach to air traffic management that Vision 100
established for NextGen. Under this approach, JPDO envisions an
expansion of the air transportation system that includes airport
departures and arrivals as well as flights. The JPDO working groups,
which evolved from FAA's former integrated product teams (IPT), focus
on eight strategies, such as how to use weather information to improve
the performance of the NAS. The working groups are composed of
personnel from FAA, other federal agencies, and the private sector.
Each of the working groups is headed by a steering committee under both
a federal agency--in this case, DHS or DOD--and a private sector
representative.
We do not know how much either DOD or DHS plans to spend on
NextGen. However, we are aware that DOD, FAA, and DHS each plan to
provide $5 million for net-centric (i.e., a continuously-evolving
network of information sharing and situational awareness)
demonstrations. Both DOD and DHS also provide a variety of ``in-kind''
services through personnel assigned to the JPDO working groups and
through the potential leveraging of mission-specific research that
could support the development and implementation of NextGen.
Q4. NextGen technologies will increase flight efficiency by means of
automated flight operations and reduced separations.
Q4a. Will this render the system more brittle against disturbances
such as terrorism and equipment failure and acts of nature?
Q4b. How will we ensure the continued safe operation of the system in
the event of such disturbances?
A4a,b. NextGen technologies will not render the system more brittle
than the current system. Although no system is 100 percent safe, GAO
has not seen any data or other information indicating that the planned
satellite based navigation system is more vulnerable to security
threats than the current ground based radar system. JPDO's plans call
for robust security system protocols and firewalls to increase
protection, as well as sufficient redundancies within the system to
reduce vulnerabilities and offset any disruptions. Security will exist
in ``layers of defense'' designed for early detection of threats from
terrorism, equipment failure, and natural disasters and will provide
appropriate intervention. Additionally, although the system will become
more automated, there will still be opportunities for human
intervention if the system fails.
Questions submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
Implementation by Other Federal Partners
Q1. In your written statement, when discussing the planning efforts of
the JPDO partner agencies (exclusive of NASA and FAA), you stated that
they are not as far along developing implementation plans and
institutionalizing JPDO goals into their planning documents. Why is
that? Does this reflect a lack of commitment?
A1. The current situation does not necessarily reflect a lack of
commitment on the part of the partner agencies. JPDO partner agencies
face competing mission and resource demands. In addition, NextGen is an
extraordinarily complex undertaking, and some agencies are still
learning to work collaboratively. By contrast, FAA and NASA have a long
history of working with each other, and the core effort of JPDO is
within their purview.
The partner agencies will engage more collaboratively as NextGen's
processes and mechanisms mature. For example, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) was recently designated as the Managing Partner
responsible for ensuring collaboration among the partner agencies in
implementing NextGen-related research and development. DOT is also
responsible for submission of the OMB 300 for the NextGen as a
portfolio project after review by JPDO.\2\ JPDO's decision to develop a
Memorandum of Understanding to broadly define the roles and
responsibilities of the partner agencies is another positive step.
Additionally, the extent to which Congress provides JPDO with the
authority and resources it needs for program oversight will affect the
nature and scope of the partner agencies' collaboration.
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\2\ Section 300 of OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission,
and Execution of the Budget (Nov. 2, 2005), sets forth requirements for
federal agencies for planning, budgeting, acquiring, and managing
information technology capital assets.
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FAA Financing Proposal
Q2. What would be the effect, if any, on the NextGen budget if
Congress does not enact the Administration's proposed aviation
financing reform package (ticket taxes; aviation fuel taxes) as part of
a new authorization, but instead leaves the current ticket and fuel
taxes in place?
A2. The current FAA funding structure can provide sufficient funding
for NextGen--with some caveats. Congress has used the current funding
structure--excise taxes plus a General Fund contribution--to fund FAA
for many years. As the number of air travelers has grown, so have
excise tax revenues. Even though revenues fell during the early years
of this decade as the demand for air travel fell, they began to rise
again in fiscal year 2004, and FAA estimates that if the current taxes
remain in effect at their current rates, revenues will continue to
increase. According to projections prepared by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO),\3\ revenues obtained from the existing funding structure
will increase substantially. Assuming the General Fund continues to
provide about 19 percent of FAA's budget, CBO estimates that through
2016 the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (Trust Fund) can support about
$19 billion in additional spending over the baseline FAA spending
levels CBO has calculated for FAA (the fiscal year 2006 funding level,
with projected growth for inflation) provided that most of the spending
occurs after fiscal year 2010. How far this money will go to fund
modernization is subject to a number of uncertainties--including the
future cost of NextGen investments, the volume of air traffic, the
future cost of operating the NAS, and the levels of future
appropriations for the Airport Improvement Program, all of which
influence the amount of funding available for FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Congressional Budget Office, Financing Investment in the Air
Traffic Control System (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006)
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However, if the desired level of funding exceeded what was likely
to be available from the Trust Fund at current tax rates, Congress
could make changes within the current structure to provide FAA with
additional revenue. Congress could raise more revenue from airspace
system users for NextGen or for other purposes by raising the rates on
one or more of the current excise taxes. Congress could also provide
more General Fund revenues for FAA, although the Nation's fiscal
imbalance may make a larger contribution from this source difficult.
JPDO Organizational Authority
Q3. Would GAO recommend any changes to the authorities and resources
now provided to JPDO to enhance its effectiveness in coordinating the
partner agencies, and if so, what would they be?
A3. Yes, providing JPDO with the authority and the resources to
establish a program oversight capacity would enable JPDO to perform
such functions as (1) harmonizing the enterprise architectures among
the partner agencies; (2) coordinating the research, development, and
systems-engineering and integration activities of the cooperating
agencies and industry; (3) overseeing, with FAA, the selection of
products or outcomes of research and development that would be moved to
the next stage of a demonstration project through the Joint Resources
Council (JRC); (4) overseeing the fundamental research activities that
support the long-term strategic investments of NextGen by managing a
research portfolio among NASA, academia, federally funded research and
development centers and industry; and (5) maintaining a baseline
modeling and simulation environment for testing and evaluating
alternative concepts to satisfy NextGen enterprise architecture
requirements.
JPDO will need additional funding and staff to expand its role in
coordinating the efforts of the partner agencies and working with the
Office of Management and Budget as the principal NextGen point of
contact.
However, JPDO's dual reporting status hinders its ability to
interact on an equal footing with ATO and the other partner agencies.
Therefore, it is important for JPDO to have some independence from ATO.
One change that could begin to address this issue would be to have the
JPDO Director report directly to the FAA Administrator. This change
might also lessen what some stakeholders now perceive as unnecessary
bureaucracy and red tape associated with decision making and other JPDO
and NextGen processes. As a part of any change in the dual reporting
status of JPDO's Director, consideration could be given to the
possibility of creating the position of Associate Administrator of
NextGen and elevating the JPDO Director to that post. This would give
greater credibility, authority, and visibility to this important
position.
NASA's Role in JPDO
Q4. Traditionally NASA has developed promising technologies to a high
maturity level, enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA
is confining its development work to a basic level of technical
maturity, do FAA and the other federal partners have the resources and
capability to fill this void?
A4. It is not clear whether FAA and the other federal partners have the
resources and capability to fill this void. As your question indicates,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) formerly
conducted the type of intermediate research and development (R&D) and
demonstration projects that will be needed for the NextGen program, but
the funding for these efforts was discontinued when NASA's aeronautical
research portfolio was restructured to focus more on fundamental
research. Although FAA has not fully determined the impact of the NASA
restructuring on the R&D needs for NextGen, some additional R&D funds
will be needed and are critical for the timely development of NextGen.
FAA recognizes that this is a critical issue and has already taken some
action to address it. For example, in the President's fiscal year 2008
budget request for FAA, funds have been included for developmental and
transition research in the Facilities and Equipment (F&E) Activity 1
account. In light of the NASA restructuring, FAA has also undertaken a
study to assess the nature and scope of its NextGen R&D needs.
According to JPDO officials, this study will be completed in August
2007. More work remains to completely assess the research and
development needs of NextGen and the ability of FAA and the other JPDO
partner agencies to budget for and conduct the necessary initiatives.
One way to fill an identified research and development need might be to
make more use of the resources available at the FAA Technical Center in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the FAA Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma.
Certification
Q5. In his statement before the Subcommittee, the President and CEO of
the Aerospace Industries Association, Mr. Douglass, expressed concerns
about the time required to prototype, validate, and certify new
technologies required for NextGen, in addition to the time required for
rule-makings. Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? How much of a risk
do these processes pose to the timely development of NextGen?
A5. Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns. The time required to
prototype, validate, and certify a technology can present a significant
risk to the timely and cost effective implementation of NextGen. We
have studied the lead times required to prototype, validate, and
certify new technologies. JPDO or FAA do not currently have sufficient
resources to prototype, validate, and certify new technologies, and
cannot currently develop them internally without causing significant
delays in the implementation of NextGen. In addition, stakeholders have
expressed concern over the time it takes to develop rules for new
equipment and the problems caused when equipment is fielded before
rules are finalized. Any activities that will be required to implement
new policies, demonstrate new capabilities, set parameters for the
certification of new systems, and develop technologies will take time.
Just as important, the time required to prototype, validate, and
certify a new technology must be balanced against the need to ensure
the reliability of the technology and the safety of the flying public.
Accountability
Q6. In his statement before the Subcommittee, Mr. Douglass raised
concerns about the potential lack of accountability and authority in
the current JPDO structure, especially with regard to partner agencies.
He recommends that each partner agency designate a senior-level
official as the responsible individual for all NextGen-related
programs. Do you share Mr. Douglass's concerns? Should agencies
designate a senior program official?
A6. Yes, we share Mr. Douglass's concerns and further note that these
fundamental leadership issues are exacerbated by the apparent
inactivity of JPDO's Senior Policy Committee (SPC). This committee is
responsible for overseeing the work of JPDO, but has met only four
times in three years and has not convened as a body since November
2005. The committee is chaired by the Secretary of Transportation and
includes senior leaders from the partner agencies and the Director of
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. SPC was
established to provide policy guidance and review; make legislative
recommendations; and identify and align resources. A more regular
schedule of meetings and an agenda for SPC could lead to more
participation and accountability on the part of the partner agencies.
Additionally, assigning sole responsibility for supporting NextGen
to a senior official from each agency would be a positive step. As a
point of contact and coordinator for NextGen activities, that person
should, within prescribed limits, have access to, and authority from,
the SPC member from their agency to make decisions and act on behalf of
their agency.
Finally, to the extent that the pending Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between the partner agencies defines the roles and
responsibilities of each agency, it will, when signed, be a useful
document for ensuring accountability.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by John W. Douglass, President and CEO, Aerospace Industries
Association of America
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. The Aerospace Industries Association has stated its concern that
the NGATS Institute, established to facilitate industry involvement in
the JPDO, ``has not attained the extensive industry partnership that
was envisioned.''
Q1a. Could you please elaborate on the nature of your concerns?
A1a. The initial draft of the Concept of Operations (Con Ops) was
drafted without meaningful input from the Integrated Product Teams
(IPT), resulting in nearly 1,500 comments when it was released for
comment. Due to this overwhelming response, completion of the Con Ops
was further delayed. Had the IPTs been engaged in the process from the
outset, the Con Ops may have been completed in a more reasonable
timeframe.
Q1b. What would you recommend be done?
A1b. With the delayed release of the Con Ops, AIA, in addition to
numerous participating organizations, are calling for a closer
coordination of working groups within the JPDO. Reorganization of the
IPTs, with clear objectives demonstrated is a positive step which AIA
applauds, will place an increased emphasis on systems engineering. At
the same time, the JPDO requires additional resources to bring its
system engineering, planning, and program management capabilities up to
the level required to meet the Vision 100 objectives.
Q2. The costs to users for equipage have been estimated at $14 to $20
billion. NextGen can't be realized unless this investment is made.
Q2a. Will incentives or mandates be required?
A2a. AIA believes that a business case for necessary equipage is
necessary to allow timely operational and equipage decisions.
Additionally, a combination of operational and perhaps financial
incentives should be considered. Statutory requirements will be
required to encourage full equipage. However, clear and unambiguous
product development and certification standards will be required to
obtain the required systems in a timely way. Numerous cargo operators
and airlines have begun to implement technologies such as ADS-B in
order to maximize operational efficiency.
Q2b. What specifically needs to be done to ensure that a sustained
commitment to NextGen exists in booth industry and government?
A2b. The JPDO and the partner agencies must achieve tangible results in
the near future. Without which, Congress and industry partners will
loose faith in the initiative. A clear plan must be developed,
aggressively followed and we all must see satisfactory performance
resulting from the plan. AIA is calling for increased accountability
and adherence of all NextGen Partner Agencies to their responsibilities
with the JPDO. Further, AIA requests that true performance metrics be
developed, monitored, and reported to Congress by the [GAO/DOT Office
of Inspector General] at least annually.
Question submitted by Representative Ken Calvert
NASA's Role in JPDO
Q1. Traditionally, NASA has developed promising technologies to a high
maturity level enabling FAA to incorporate them into its air traffic
control system without too much additional development. Now that NASA
is confining its development work level of technical maturity, does FAA
and the other federal partners have the resources and capability to
fill this void?
A1. As with many portions of the NextGen Initiative, timing is of the
essence. If another agency were tasked with completing this work,
substantial time would be lost as they spool up. Budget would have to
be amended, facilities will likely need to be created or transferred
and staff would have to be hired or transferred from NASA for the work
to be preformed by another agency.
Research and development (R&D) is key to the success of NextGen;
however, NASA is the only agency capable to conducting the required
R&D, particularly in the required timeframe. If the R&D
responsibilities were to shift to another agency, the necessary spool
up time would slow the modernization effort by many years. We believe
NASA has been allocated an adequate budget to step up in 2007, and
firmly believe they need to do so now.
Answers to Post-Hearing Questions
Responses by Bruce Carmichael, Director, Aviation Applications Program,
Research Applications Laboratory, National Center for
Atmospheric Research
Questions submitted by Chairman Mark Udall
Q1. In your testimony you state ``It must be recognized that sustained
and predictable aviation weather research funding at a significantly
increased level is required in each of the JPDO stakeholder agencies.''
Is that fact recognized in each stakeholder agency? Which agencies do
you consider to be the ``stakeholder'' agencies?
A1. Within each stakeholder agency their representatives and experts
involved in the JPDO Weather initiative, clearly understand the need
for sustained, predictable funding at a significantly increased level
for aviation weather research. Senior management of these agencies has
varying degrees of understanding of these needs and discussions are
underway as the agencies formulate their FY 2009 budgets.. For example,
Russ Chew, former COO of the FAA ATO, specifically identified
convective weather as an especially critical area in need of attention
as aviation traffic increases. General Johnson, Director of the
National Weather Service and former head of the Air Force Weather
Agency is supportive of the concept of a fully integrated forecasting
system. The stakeholder agencies involved with the JPDO weather
initiative are FAA, NOAA, NASA, and DOD.
Q1a. How much would you recommend funding be increased in each agency
for this research?
A1a. The FAA needs an increase of $40 million in its Research,
Engineering and Development appropriation to be allocated among efforts
to understand how to improve observations unique to aviation, to
increase forecasting skill, to capitalize on the proposed Network
Enabled Architecture, and to integrate weather information into
automated decision support systems. NASA needs an increase of $30
million, of which $10, million should augment the Science Directorate
to support research on improving observations for aviation, and $20
million to Aeronautics to support the integration of weather
information into automated decision support tools in ground-based
systems and aboard aircraft. NOAA and DOD each need an increase of $20
million for aviation weather research and associated in-house staff
resources to support the development of a seamless, joint modeling and
forecast post-processing capability so that the United States
Government can produce a single, global, authoritative 4D aviation
forecast grid.
Q1b. What determines how quickly NextGen weather capabilities can be
incorporated into the National Airspace System? Are we waiting for a
better understanding of weather, or the development or implementation
of enabling technologies, or organizational decisions?
A1b. The most significant pacing factor for incorporation of NextGen
weather capabilities into the National Airspace System is the
establishment and execution of a joint program between the weather
research community and the ATM automation research community. A
collaborative program will advance understanding the nature of
forecasts suitable for incorporation into a new generation of
probabilistic ATM tools based on a decision theory approach to
management of air traffic. Although there are significant advantages to
developing a better understanding of weather, and enabling technologies
such as improved observation platforms and faster supercomputers will
move system performance in a positive direction, a clear organizational
decision to move rapidly toward a much more highly automated system
with weather fully integrated into the automation is currently the most
critical need.
Q2. Improved weather forecasting and forecast dissemination is an
important part of the NextGen vision. It is estimated that 60-80
percent of air traffic delays are weather related. Is the necessary
research being conducted?
A2. The necessary research has been scaled back in the last several
years, a victim of budget pressures and reprogramming of funds. Joint
weather and ATM community research on how to seamlessly integrate
improved weather information into a new generation of automated ATM
decision support tools is barely funded. This is an effort that should
begin at once as a joint effort between NASA, FAA, NOAA, DOD, and
research laboratories such as Mitre, NCAR and MIT/LL. In addition,
research to improve the skill of aviation weather forecasts has eroded
since 9/11 because of continuing cuts in the FAA's Aviation Weather
Research Program (AWRP) and the reprogramming of AWRP funding to meet
other FAA objectives.
Q2a. Which NextGen weather initiative do you consider to be the most
challenging and why?
A2a. The correct forecasting of weather activity, whether for aviation
or other purposes, will continue to be a challenge, but it is a
challenge that the atmospheric research community is actively and
continually engaged to meet. With continued research funding, each year
the aviation weather forecasts will become more skillful. But we
recognize that they will always be uncertain. The biggest challenge at
the current time is to work together as weather researchers and ATM
automation researchers to learn how to use weather information that is
uncertain to make optimal deterministic decisions for management of the
air transportation system.
Q2b. There are many weather prediction tools and data formats. Who
will decide between them for NextGen? For example, in your opening
remarks you state that ``A high priority is the development of a
consolidated summer and winter storm forecast system. . . A goal is to
gradually merge 16 different forecasting systems so that by early in
the next decade we will have a single system that utilizes the best-of-
the-best elements of today's technologies.'' Does the JPDO weather team
have the clout to make that happen? After all, different groups may
have made substantial investments in technologies that now they will be
told to discard.
A2b. The foundational concept of NextGen Weather is that an automated
ATM system is fully integrating the very best weather information
available, to produce a common operating picture of the system,
including weather. The system is facilitating all management decisions
based upon this common operating picture. The JPDO cannot dictate
systems and technologies to be discarded, but it can, and must, dictate
how forecast information will be fused to form the NextGen Common
Operating Picture for weather.