    [Senate Hearing 109-195]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 109-195

                                                            Senate Hearings

                                     Before the Committee on Appropriations

    _______________________________________________________________________

                                                              Department of

                                                          Homeland Security

                                                                Fiscal Year
                                                                       2006
                                              109th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

                                                                  H.R. 2360

    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

               Department of Homeland Security, 2006 (H.R. 2360)

    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
    Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov  Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
    Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001

                                                            S. Hrg. 109-195

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                    before a

                              SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       on

                                   H.R. 2360

     AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
     FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2006, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                        Department of Homeland Security
                           Nondepartmental witnesses

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
                                   index.html

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                      THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        TOM HARKIN, Iowa
    MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                HARRY REID, Nevada
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
    MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
                        J. Keith Kennedy, Staff Director
                  Terrence E. Sauvain, Minority Staff Director
                                     ------

              Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security

                      JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire, Chairman
    THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
    RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
    LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   PATTY MURRAY, Washington
    ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              HARRY REID, Nevada
    WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado               DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

                               Professional Staff
                                 Rebecca Davies
                                  James Hayes
                                  Carol Cribbs
                              Kimberly Nelson Hill
                                Shannon O'Keefe
                           Charles Kieffer (Minority)
                            Chip Walgren (Minority)
                             Scott Nance (Minority)
                          Drenan E. Dudley (Minority)

                             Administrative Support

                                  Avery Forbes

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                            Wednesday, March 2, 2005

                                                                       Page
    Department of Homeland Security..................................     1

                           Wednesday, April 20, 2005

    Department of Homeland Security..................................   117

                            Thursday, April 28, 2005

    Department of Homeland Security..................................   349
    Nondepartmental Witnesses........................................   435

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2005

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:34 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran presiding.
        Present: Senators Cochran, Byrd, and Leahy.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENTS OF:
            MICHAEL J. GARCIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
                ENFORCEMENT
            ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
            EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR., DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
                IMMIGRATION SERVICES

                       STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
    Today we begin our committee's review of the fiscal year 2006
    budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We will
    consider specifically the request for programs and activities
    of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and
    Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
        I am pleased to welcome the Director of U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services, Eduardo Aguirre; the Commissioner of
    Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner; and the Assistant
    Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Michael
    Garcia.
        Our committee will work with you to help ensure that we
    provide the funds necessary for your agencies to carry out
    their responsibilities and missions. For fiscal year 2006, the
    President's budget requests $12.9 billion to fund the
    organizations appearing before us today. This includes
    mandatory and discretionary appropriations, user fee
    collections, and trust funds.
        We thank each of you for submitting to the committee copies
    of your statements in advance. These will be made a part of the
    record and we invite you to make any comments you think will be
    helpful to the committee's understanding of the budget request.
        Before hearing from the witnesses, I am pleased to yield to
    Senator Leahy or other Senators who may wish to make opening
    statements. Senator Leahy.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

        Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think these three agencies before us have the duty of
    keeping our Nation safe, but also keeping our historic
    commitment to legal immigration. I know I have to think about
    the fact that my grandparents came, my maternal grandparents,
    came to this country not speaking any English. If they had not
    been here, their grandson would not be here, and how proud and
    how happy they were to come.
        I remember talking with my grandparents as a child and how
    much it meant to them to be the first generations of Americans.
    It has left a mark in my own mind. You look around this room,
    look around anywhere else, look at your own backgrounds, and we
    know that we are a Nation of immigrants. We have to keep being
    able to do that.

         BUDGET SHORTFALLS AND INCREASED STAFFING FOR THE BORDER PATROL

        When we held hearings on these three agencies last year,
    Mr. Chairman, they were facing substantial budget shortfalls.
    They had imposed hiring freezes. I want to know where we stand
    today on these issues. I am concerned that the administration
    is ignoring Congress's clear and consistent call, call from
    both Republicans and Democrats, for substantial increases in
    staffing for the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol's presence on
    our northern border--and I want to remind everybody we have a
    northern border as well as a southern border; I live an hour's
    drive from it--it was minimal before the September 11th
    attacks. I think we had something like 300 agents stretched
    over 4,000 miles of border. There is no other place in the
    world similar to that.
        I authored a provision in the Patriot Act to triple that
    number. It has been achieved. A lot more needs to be done. The
    President signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004. That mandated increasing at least 2,000
    Border Patrol agents for fiscal year 2006, 20 percent of them
    for the northern border. But that is the good news and the
    President did sign that bill for the 2,000, but his budget
    provides only enough funding for 210. So he signed the bill
    with great fanfare for 2,000 and put the budget in for 10
    percent of it. And it appears none of them go to the northern
    border.
        So I hope Mr. Bonner will explain why the administration is
    not heeding this Congressional mandate and whether he now
    believes it is time to declare mission accomplished for the job
    of protecting our northern border.

                         LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

        Assistant Secretary Garcia and I have spoken a number of
    times about the excellent work of the Law Enforcement Support
    Center. We have visited this. This is the place that stores
    information for State and local police. It provides immigration
    status and identities of aliens any time of the day or night,
    every day of the year.

        FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST FOR CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
                                    SERVICES

        Of course, Mr. Aguirre, we talked before, I am concerned
    about the President's proposed budget for Citizenship and
    Immigration Services. It calls for a 50 percent cut in the
    amount of directly appropriated funds for CIS. At the same time
    the President says he will achieve his goal of reducing the
    average wait time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6
    months.
        He has asked the Congress to enact a guest worker program
    that is going to significantly increase the CIS workload. That
    is fine, we can increase it, but if the administration is
    cutting the manpower for this substantially, but wanting to add
    to the workload, I do not know how you ever get here.

                                H2B VISA PROGRAM

        I hope--the last thing is I hope the CIS and the
    administration will support bipartisan efforts in Congress to
    increase the cap for the H2B visa program. The Department
    announced in January for the second straight year the statutory
    cap has been reached and that is causing tourism-related
    businesses across the country to go into justifiable panic and
    concern.
        We have a bipartisan group of 16 colleagues introducing S.
    352, the Save Our Small and Seasonal Business Act of 2005. It
    would allow aliens who obtained H2B visas in recent years to
    reenter under that program. I hope the administration would
    support it. It is a quick, easy, I think effective, cost
    effective way of handling this.
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those are some of the concerns
    I have. I thought I would express them here because I know we
    are going to have votes in between and I may have to go back
    and forth.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Senator Byrd.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Excuse me, I am sorry.
        Senator Leahy. Any time you want.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you.
        Well, today, Mr. Commissioner and also Mr. Assistant
    Secretary and Director Aguirre, we hold the first hearing on
    the President's budget for the Department of Homeland Security.
    Chairman Cochran and I have worked together over the last 2
    years to produce bipartisan legislation to fill critical gaps
    in the security of our homeland. I commend Chairman Thad
    Cochran for his excellent leadership of this subcommittee and
    of any other committee or subcommittee that he chairs. I know
    how well it is going to be run.
        Today our witnesses will focus on issues related to border
    security, immigration, and trade. For the third year in a row,
    the President has submitted a budget for the Department of
    Homeland Security that ignores the stark reality of the
    resources needed to secure the homeland. The 9/11 Commission
    report concluded this:
        ``More than 500 million people annually cross U.S. borders
    at legal entry points, about 330 million of them non-
    citizens.'' What a flow of humanity. ``Another 500,000 or more
    enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands
    of miles of land borders or remain in the country past the
    expiration of their permitted stay.'' Now, that was the
    commission talking.
        The commission concluded that, quote: ``Two systemic
    weaknesses came together in our border system's inability to
    contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks:
    one, a lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures as a
    part of border security; and two, an immigration system not
    able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less support
    counterterrorism.''

                INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT

        In response to the commission's findings, Congress enacted
    the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In a
    December 6, 2004, letter to the Congress urging final passage
    of that Act, President Bush stated, ``I also believe the
    conference took an important step in strengthening our
    immigration laws by, among other items, increasing the number
    of Border Patrol agents and detention beds.'' Close of
    quotation.
        As enacted, the Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new
    Border Patrol agents and 800 new ICE investigators and the
    funding of 8,000 new detention beds for illegal alien
    immigrants. Yet, when the President submitted his budget
    request months after sending that letter, virtually no new
    funds were requested for any of these activities.
        At the same time, the President's own terrorism experts are
    extremely concerned about the threat posed by terrorists to our
    borders. In written testimony before the Senate Intelligence
    Committee on February 16, 2005, the Department's Deputy
    Secretary, Admiral James Loy, cited recently received
    information as the reason for his concern about the threat
    facing the Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious
    situation'' and added: ``Several Al Qaeda leaders believe
    operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico
    and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal
    entry.'' How about that, ``believe illegal entry is more
    advantageous than legal entry for operational security
    reasons.''

                                 FUNDING ISSUE

        Despite this testimony, there is virtually no funding in
    the budget to increase our border security. In addition to
    having a strong deterrent to illegal immigration at the border,
    it is critically important for the Department to have the
    resources to enforce our immigration laws. Therefore, I am very
    troubled by the fact that 6 months into the fiscal year we have
    not received a supplemental request or a reprogramming proposal
    to address a shortfall in funding for immigration and customs
    enforcement.
        Since last spring, the Congress has been ringing the alarm
    bell--ding-a-ling, ding-a-ling, ding-a-ling--that the
    Department's primary investigative arm, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement, ICE, faced significant budget shortfalls. To
    partially address this problem, ICE last year instituted a
    hiring freeze, significantly reduced spending, and took other
    painful steps--bring on the aspirin--to cope with the
    shortfall. There were even media reports that some apprehended
    illegal aliens were being released because ICE could not afford
    to cover the costs associated with holding these individuals.
        Well, Congress stepped up to the plate. This man, Cochran,
    he is on the ball. Congress stepped up to the plate by
    providing ICE with $193 million more for the current fiscal
    year than requested by the President. However, the hiring
    freeze and other spending restraints remain in place halfway
    through the new fiscal year. We are being warned by the
    Department that ICE faces a funding gap of nearly $300 million
    for the rest of this year.
        Has the President found any room in his $81.9 billion
    supplemental spending request to address this gap? No. He is
    willing to request billions of dollars for foreign aid to build
    the most expensive U.S. embassy in the world in Baghdad. I do
    not plan to go there often. But he does not seem to be able to
    find the funds to hire and support the men and women fighting
    the war on terrorism here at home.
        Today I sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff raising these
    issues, and I hope that he will work with the White House to
    send to the Congress a request that would implement the
    recommendations of the 9/11 Commission contained in the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
        [The information follows:]

                       Letter From Senator Robert C. Byrd

                                                   U.S. Senate,
                                         Washington, DC, March 2, 2005.
    Hon. Michael Chertoff,
    Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,
    Washington, DC.
        Dear Secretary Chertoff: Congratulations are in order as you assume
    the task of leading the Department of Homeland Security, an immense and
    important burden. Sadly, the President, in his fiscal year 2006 budget
    request for the Department, has not made your task any easier.
        For the third year in a row, the President has submitted a budget
    that ignores the stark reality of the steps needed to secure the
    homeland.
        The 9/11 Commission report concluded that:
        More than 500 million people annually cross U.S. borders at legal
    entry points, about 330 million of them noncitizens. Another 500,000 or
    more enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands of
    miles of land borders or remain in the country past the expiration of
    their permitted stay. The challenge for national security in an age of
    terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming
    risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.
        Our investigation showed that two systemic weaknesses came together
    in our border system's inability to contribute to an effective defense
    against the 9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counterterrorism
    measures as a part of border security and an immigration system not
    able to deliver on it basic commitments, much less support
    counterterrorism.
        In response to the Commission's findings, Congress enacted the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In his December 6,
    2004, letter to Congress urging final passage of that Act, President
    Bush stated, ``I also believe the Conference took an important step in
    strengthening our immigration laws by, among other items, increasing
    the number of border patrol agents and detention beds.'' As enacted,
    the Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new Border Patrol agents and 800
    new ICE investigators, and the funding of 8,000 new detention beds for
    illegal aliens immigration. The President's letter called that ``an
    important step.'' Yet that letter appears to be another empty
    rhetorical gesture. When the President submitted his budget request 2
    months after sending that letter, virtually no new funds were requested
    for any of these activities.
        At the same time, the President's own terrorism experts are
    extremely concerned about the threat terrorists pose to our borders. In
    written testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February
    16, 2005, the Department's Deputy Secretary, Admiral James Loy cited
    recently received information as the reason for his concern about the
    threat facing the Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious
    situation'' and added, ``several Al Qaeda leaders believe operatives
    can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also believe
    illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational
    security reasons.''
        Mr. Secretary, I know that this budget was completed prior to your
    coming onboard. I strongly encourage you to work with the White House
    to formally request additional resources to implement the Intelligence
    Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act authorization enacted to respond to
    the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
        In addition to having a strong deterrent to illegal immigration at
    the border, it is critically important for the Department to have the
    resources to enforce our immigration laws. Therefore, I am very
    troubled by the fact that, 6 months into the fiscal year, we have not
    received a supplemental request or reprogramming proposal to address a
    shortfall in funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Since
    last spring, the Congress has been ringing the alarm bells that the
    Department's primary investigative arm, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), faced significant budget shortfalls. To partially
    address this problem, ICE last year instituted a hiring freeze,
    significantly reduced spending, and took other painful steps to cope
    with the shortfall. There were even media reports that some apprehended
    illegal aliens were being released because ICE could not afford to
    cover the costs associated with holding these individuals.
        Congress stepped up to the plate by providing ICE with $193 million
    more for the current fiscal year than requested by the President.
    However, the hiring freeze and other spending restraints remain in
    place halfway through the new fiscal year. We are being warned by the
    Department that ICE faces a funding gap of nearly $300 million for the
    rest of this year. Has the President found any room in his $81 billion
    supplemental spending request to address this gap? No. He is willing to
    add to the deficit to provide hundreds of millions of dollars to build
    the most expensive U.S. embassy in the world in Baghdad, but he does
    not seem to be able to find the funds to hire and support the men and
    women fighting the war on terrorism here at home. To them, he suggests
    they carpool to work.
        Mr. Secretary, you really have your work cut out for you. Our
    repeated entreaties to the President and his representatives to provide
    the resources to meet these threats fall on deaf ears. I know that you
    will do all that you can to get this Administration to put its money
    where its rhetoric is. I wish for you success.
        With kind regards, I am.
                Sincerely yours,
                                                Robert C. Byrd,
                                                          U.S. Senator.

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

    STATUS OF SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES 2 YEARS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT
                     OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        I am going to ask our witnesses, in view of the fact that
    it has been almost exactly 2 years--March 1, 2005, actually
    would have been the second anniversary of the establishment of
    the Department of Homeland Security--in your estimation from
    what you know as administrators of these important agencies at
    the Department, are we safer now 2 years later after the
    Department of Homeland Security has been created than we were 2
    years ago?
        Mr. Garcia, would you like to start?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is a
    question I often hear in many different forms, and everybody
    brings I think their own perspective.
        Senator Cochran. I am going to ask each one to answer that
    before you proceed with your statements. Tell us what you
    think?

                                  ICE RESPONSE

        Mr. Garcia. I think we are safer, yes, and I bring
    perspective I think that is somewhat unique to that answer. I
    was a prosecutor in New York in the 1990s. I prosecuted many of
    the terrorism cases before 9/11 and I saw terrible exploitation
    of our immigration systems and our border security in those
    cases. Now, as part of the Homeland Security Department, I am a
    piece of the Government's response to those attacks in a
    Department that was created to address the vulnerabilities that
    were exposed by the 9/11 attacks.
        From that vantage point, I can clearly say that we are
    safer, and I see evidence of that, Mr. Chairman, every day. I
    will speak mostly about the ICE contributions here and how my
    agency has responded with creativity, using these new combined
    authorities that we have been given in ICE. You look at the
    systems and we have created--and I think Senator Leahy and
    Senator Byrd may have mentioned--overstays and how there was no
    tracking. We have created a Compliance Enforcement Unit that
    sends out thousands of prioritized leads to look at deterrent
    effect, to look at enforcing our immigration rules and bringing
    integrity to the system as a whole.
        We work very hard in benefits fraud with Director Aguirre's
    folks to close those vulnerabilities that were exploited in the
    past. So we are improving the integrity of the system.
        Senator Cochran. Let me ask Mr. Bonner for his reaction to
    that question before you proceed with your full statement.

                                  CBP RESPONSE

        Mr. Bonner. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
    yes, America is absolutely unquestionably safer now than it was
    before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on
    March 1, 2003. Our borders are more secure now than they were
    before 2001--excuse me, March 1, 2003. Part of that is that one
    of the truly big and important ideas of the Department of
    Homeland Security was to create one front-line border agency
    for our government that combined at our front line all of
    Customs' powers and personnel, Immigration powers and
    personnel, agriculture protection, and most importantly anti-
    terrorism as a focus and a priority mission.
        So as a result of that one step alone, unifying our border
    agencies, whereas before March 1, 2003, they had literally been
    fragmented at our borders, at our ports of entry, among four
    different agencies of government reporting to three different
    Departments, it is now one front-line border agency, that is
    Customs and Border Protection, within the Department of
    Homeland Security, with a priority mission which is nothing
    less than keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of our
    country.
        So are we totally safe? No, but we are safer and more
    secure because our borders are more secure.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre.

                                 USCIS RESPONSE

        Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, as the Director of the agency
    that is responsible for administering immigration services, I
    say unquestionably we are safer from the vantage point in which
    I sit. We process 6 to 7 million applications a year and we
    have implemented some national security components and fraud
    deterrent components that were simply not there 2 or 3 years
    ago. Therefore I think we have tightened the filter, if you
    will, to determine those who may do us harm or who wish to take
    advantage of our good nature. I think we are much better off.
        There is no finish line to this effort, but I think we are
    far, far beyond where we were a couple years ago.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
        Now you may proceed with your opening statements. Mr.
    Garcia?

                          STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GARCIA

        Mr. Garcia. Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, Senator Leahy, it
    is my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the President's
    fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement, or ICE, the largest investigative arm of
    the Department of Homeland Security. The $4.36 billion request
    underscores the vital role that ICE plays in the Department's
    mission of ensuring the security of the American people.
        In order to provide a better understanding of the
    President's 2006 budget request for ICE, I would like to first
    provide you with the context in which the request is made.
    Specifically, I would like to share with you a few highlights
    of significant ICE achievements as well as some of the
    challenges we have faced.

                          SIGNIFICANT ICE ACHIEVEMENTS

        ICE removed a record number, 160,000, illegal aliens from
    the United States in 2004. More than half of those were
    criminal aliens. We also arrested a record number of fugitive
    aliens. In fact, that was an increase of more than 100 percent.
        ICE conducted 7,600 money-laundering and other financial
    investigations. ICE agents conducted more than 2,500
    investigations into illegal exports that would have sent
    sensitive technology and weapons components to Iran, Iraq,
    China, and other nations. ICE arrested more than 5,000 sexual
    predators since Operation Predator was launched and have
    removed almost half of them from the United States. ICE agents
    also made the first 11 arrests for child sex tourism, targeting
    U.S. citizens who attempt to exploit children overseas.
        ICE arrested more than 1,600 human smugglers and ICE's
    Federal Protective Service officers made more than 4,000
    arrests, a nearly 60 percent increase over the previous year.
    ICE Federal Air Marshals logged millions of miles on tens of
    thousands of flights and Air Marshals have completed advanced
    training, an important benchmark to ensure professionalism and
    peak performance.
        Senator Leahy mentioned the Law Enforcement Support Center
    in Vermont. That Center received more than 600,000 inquiries
    from Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials last
    fiscal year, a 12 percent increase over the year before. 15,000
    detainers with police agencies nationwide on aliens were lodged
    from Vermont alone.
        I could continue with many, many additional examples of
    achievements that ICE's employees have made. I would like to
    note that ICE's accomplishments over the last 2 years, which I
    believe are unprecedented in law enforcement, were brought
    about despite significant challenges. In addition to the
    challenges faced in creating a new law enforcement agency, ICE
    has faced severe budget issues related to resource allocations.
    During the organization of the new Department, the budgets for
    component agencies, including those for overhead, information
    technology support, legal support, and other administrative
    functions, were broken apart in ways that were not entirely
    consistent. As a result, in some cases ICE was paying for
    services when the funds for those services had been allocated
    to other agencies.

                                 BUDGET ISSUES

        When we realized the budget issues that would arise from
    these allocation errors, we took swift action. ICE placed a
    freeze on new hires. We limited expenditures to those deemed
    mission essential and we moved to set clear priorities for
    funding. We also worked with the Department to undertake a
    budget review to determine what money was appropriately due to
    ICE in return for shared services.
        These measures got results. Diligent and conscientious
    efforts on the part of our employees and field management
    helped us to realize tens of millions of dollars in short-term
    savings during fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE identified
    and recouped more than $500 million from other agencies in the
    second half of 2004. ICE also bought services from other DHS
    components as part of the shared services concept, such as
    human resources, logistics, and fleet management.
        We are also in the process of systematically improving
    financial management throughout the entire agency. Some changes
    have been implemented and we expect to implement additional
    improvement in the coming months. These steps have been further
    outlined in a letter recently submitted to this committee.

                        COMMUNICATION WITH ICE EMPLOYEES

        While this has been a challenging time for ICE, we have
    made every effort to communicate the facts to our employees at
    every opportunity through such measures as town hall meetings,
    broadcast messages to all employees, and visits by myself and
    other senior members of the agency's leadership to all of our
    field offices.
        Over the past 2 years, ICE employees have refused to be
    defined by our challenges, but rather we have been defined by
    our achievements, which represent the true story of our agency.
    Our accomplishments represent the abiding commitment of all ICE
    employees to meeting these challenges head-on and accomplishing
    the critical mission with which we are charged.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

        The proposed 2006 budget builds on the foundation of our
    accomplishments while addressing many of the challenges
    outlined above. The President's 2006 budget request seeks more
    than $4.36 billion for ICE, which represents an increase of
    more than 13 percent over fiscal year 2005. I would like to
    briefly address these enhancements.

                             DETENTION AND REMOVAL

        The President's 2006 budget proposal request seeks $176
    million in enhancements for Detention and Removal operations.
    These enhancements will be used to fund detention bed space and
    management, Alternatives to Detention, Fugitive Operations, the
    Institutional Removal Program and interior repatriation. This
    funding will help ICE to continue to build on the vigorous
    enforcement efforts we have developed in the last 2 years.

                        INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

        The President's budget also seeks $171 million in
    enhancements for ICE investigations and intelligence.
    Specifically, the budget will replace funding for Organized
    Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force activities. This enhancement
    requests no additional positions or money, but proposes that
    346 positions currently on board be paid by direct
    appropriation instead of reimbursement from DOJ. In addition to
    a base increase, the enhancement allows for maintenance of Visa
    Security operations initiated in 2005 and support for one
    additional Visa Security Unit overseas. It funds 143 positions
    and training to successfully implement a worksite enforcement
    component for the proposed temporary worker program.

                          FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS SERVICE

        We are also seeking enhancements to increase staffing for
    the Federal Air Marshal Service, funding for additional
    attorneys required to improve the ability of ICE's legal
    program to complete matters in Immigration Court, and money for
    Department-wide secure classified and computer to computer
    connectivity.

                OVERVIEW OF ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

        The President's 2006 budget request for ICE is a solid step
    forward for this agency and ICE is dedicated to protecting the
    homeland by enforcing immigration and customs laws, restoring
    integrity to the immigration system, as we discussed before,
    and ensuring the sanctity of our financial and trade systems.
    We protect Federal property and we ensure the security in our
    civil aviation.
        That is a broad and diverse mission, but the men and women
    of ICE are dedicated to building this agency into a model for
    law enforcement in the 21st century. The 2006 budget request
    provides us with the resources that will make this goal a
    reality as we strive to secure the American homeland and
    protect the American people.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
    Senator Leahy, for the opportunity to testify before you today.
    I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
        [The statement follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Michael J. Garcia

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the
    President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (ICE), the largest investigative arm of the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This $4.36 billion request
    underscores the vital role that ICE plays in the Department's mission
    of ensuring the security of the American people.
        By integrating these various components in a single agency, ICE is
    able to more effectively meet the threats of the post-9/11 world,
    wherever these threats may arise--across our borders, within the
    Nation's interior, in our financial systems, at Federal facilities
    nationwide, in cyberspace, or civil aviation.
        With ICE's broad authorities and expertise, we are prepared to
    counter the threats posed by criminal and terrorist organizations in
    ways not possible before the creation of the Department of Homeland
    Security.

                         REVIEW OF ICE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        In order to provide a better understanding of the President's
    fiscal year 2006 budget request for ICE, I would first like to provide
    you with the context in which the request is made. Specifically, I
    would like to share with you a few highlights of significant ICE
    achievements as well as some of the challenges we have faced.
      --Prioritizing Removals of Criminal and Fugitive Aliens.--As part of
            our mission to restore integrity to the Nation's immigration
            system, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO)
            removed a record number of illegal aliens from the United
            States, posting approximately 160,200 such removals. More than
            half of those were criminal aliens. 7,200 fugitive aliens were
            removed last fiscal year--an increase of 112 percent over the
            previous year.
      --Protecting U.S. Financial and Trade Systems.--The ICE Office of
            Investigations conducted 7,670 money laundering and other
            financial investigations in fiscal year 2004, resulting in more
            than 1,368 arrests, 895 indictments and the seizure of more
            than $202 million. These achievements stem from ICE's
            Cornerstone initiative, in which we direct our expertise in
            financial, trade, and intellectual property investigations
            toward shutting down the schemes that criminal or terrorist
            organizations use to earn, move, and store their assets.
      --Checking Illegal Flows of Weapons and Sensitive Technology.--ICE
            agents conducted more than 2,500 investigations into the
            illegal export of U.S. arms and technology in fiscal year 2004.
            These investigations protect national security by keeping
            sensitive technologies and weapons--whether it's missile
            components or night vision technology, laser scopes for
            military rifles or sensitive software--out of the hands of our
            Nation's adversary. In the last year, ICE investigated export
            violations that would have sent sensitive technology and
            weapons components to Iran, Iraq, China, and other nations.
            These investigations not only contribute to the security of the
            United States, but they serve to enhance the security of our
            troops and allies around the globe as well.
      --Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation.--Under Operation
            Predator, ICE arrested more than 4,900 sexual predators since
            the program was launched in 2003. We have ensured that 2,100 of
            those predators were removed from the United States. ICE agents
            also made the first 11 arrests for child sex tourism, targeting
            U.S. citizens who attempt to exploit children overseas under
            the PROTECT Act. Leads developed out of ICE investigations into
            online child pornography have been provided to foreign law
            enforcement authorities through ICE's 54 International Attache
            offices. These leads have led to the arrest of approximately
            850 child pornography subscribers overseas. ICE Attaches also
            provided expertise and support to their law enforcement
            counterparts in areas ravaged by the tsunami waves in southeast
            Asia in December, to ensure that children were not victimized
            by sexual predators or trafficking networks.
      --Targeting Human Smuggling and Trafficking.--Another of ICE's top
            priorities is to dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle
            and traffic human beings for profit. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
            arrested more than 1,630 human smugglers. Operation ICE Storm,
            an initiative we launched in 2003 to target violent human
            smuggling networks in Arizona, has brought charges against more
            than 300 defendants and resulted in the seizure of more than $7
            million. This unprecedented seizure of alien smuggling proceeds
            is a direct result of the combination of our immigration and
            customs authorities (particularly customs financial crimes
            expertise). Law enforcement authorities in Arizona have
            credited Operation ICE Storm with a dramatic decrease in
            homicides and other violent crime in the Phoenix metropolitan
            area.
      --Improving Security at Federal Facilities.--ICE's Federal Protective
            Service (FPS) made 4,426 arrests in fiscal year 2004--a 58
            percent increase over the previous fiscal year. In addition,
            FPS officers prevented nearly 550,000 prohibited items and
            weapons from being carried into Federal facilities--a fourfold
            increase over the previous year. FPS officers also responded to
            430 bomb threats and more than 875 calls about suspicious
            packages and other items. All of these achievements are key
            components of the FPS mission to provide a safe and secure
            environment for Federal workers and the American public.
      --Enhancing Security in the Skies.--ICE's Federal Air Marshal Service
            (FAMS) once again logged millions of miles on tens of thousands
            of flights in fiscal year 2004, as part of the division's
            enhanced mission of providing security in the air since 9/11.
            All FAMS recruited and deployed since 9/11 have successfully
            completed advanced training--an important benchmark to ensure
            professionalism and peak performance.
      --Stopping the Flow of Drugs into the United States.--ICE plays a
            leading role in the Nation's war on drugs, with significant
            results. In fiscal year 2004, ICE agents, working in
            cooperation with our partners at other agencies, were involved
            in the seizure of roughly 3.1 million pounds of illegal drugs
            in fiscal year 2004--a 63 percent increase over the previous
            year. Another key achievement stemming from an ICE
            investigation was the extradition of one of the leaders of Cali
            drug cartel from Colombia, as well as the arrest of several
            leaders of the Norte Valle cartel.
      --Providing Support and Assistance to the Law Enforcement
            Community.--ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)
            responded to more than 603,000 inquiries related to immigration
            status from Federal, State, and local authorities in fiscal
            year 2004--a 12 percent increase over the previous year. In
            addition, the LESC placed more than 15,000 immigration
            detainers with police agencies nationwide. These detainers
            allow ICE to more efficiently remove aliens from the United
            States once their jail term is expired.

                                   CHALLENGES

        I could continue with many, many additional examples. I would like
    to note that ICE's accomplishments of the last 2 years--which I believe
    are unprecedented in law enforcement--have taken place against a
    backdrop of significant challenges.
        First, we have faced the organizational and logistical challenges
    inherent in bringing our various divisions together into an integrated
    whole within the Department of Homeland Security. The challenges of the
    DHS reorganization have been likened to ``trying to change the engine
    in an airplane in mid-flight.'' We have certainly experienced those
    challenges at ICE, where we have had to build a new agency almost from
    the ground up--bringing together divisions from four separate agencies
    into a single functioning unit, and melding the cultures and missions
    of various units into a unified whole. This process was analogous to
    that of building a new start-up company while performing a large-scale
    merger and acquisition--with the notable difference that we had but a
    few weeks to accomplish our merger, compared to the months, or years,
    that would be devoted to a merger in the private sector. While the
    reorganization is still ongoing, I am pleased to report that the
    majority of these organizational and logistical challenges have been
    met and addressed, thanks to the commitment, and perseverance of ICE
    employees.
        Another significant challenge that ICE has faced has been budget
    issues related to resource allocations. During the reorganization of
    the new department, the budgets for component agencies--including those
    for overhead, information technology support, legal support, and other
    administrative functions--were broken apart in ways that were not
    entirely consistent. As a result, in some cases ICE was paying for
    services when the funds for those services had been allocated to other
    agencies. When we realized the budget issues that would arise from
    these allocation errors, we took swift action. ICE placed a temporary
    freeze on new hires; we limited expenditures to those deemed ``mission
    essential''; and we moved to set clear priorities for funding. We also
    worked with DHS to undertake a budget review to determine what money
    was appropriately due to ICE in return for shared services.
        These measures got results. Diligent and conscientious efforts on
    the part of our employees and field management helped us to realize
    $120 million in short-term savings during fiscal year 2004. In
    addition, ICE identified and recouped more than $500 million from other
    agencies in the second half of fiscal year 2004. ICE also bought
    services from other DHS components as part of the shared services
    concept such as HR, logistics and fleet management.
        We are also in the process of systematically improving financial
    management throughout the entire agency. Some changes have been
    implemented, and we expect to implement additional improvements in the
    coming months. We will update the Congress periodically with details on
    our reforms in reports requested by the Committees.
        While this has been a challenging time for ICE, we have made every
    effort to communicate the facts to our employees at every opportunity--
    through such measures as town hall meetings; broadcast messages to all
    employees; and visits by myself and other members of the agency's
    senior leadership to all of our field offices.
        Over the past 2 years ICE employees have refused to be defined by
    our challenges, but rather by our achievements, which represent the
    true story of our agency. Our accomplishments represent the abiding
    commitment of all ICE employees to meeting these challenges head-on and
    accomplishing the critical mission with which we are charged.

                      BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

        The proposed fiscal year 2006 budget builds on the foundation of
    our accomplishments while addressing many of the challenges outlined
    above. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request seeks more than
    $4.36 billion for ICE, which represents an increase of 13.5 percent
    over fiscal year 2005. This budget request will allow ICE to pursue our
    priority missions--including the apprehension, detention, and removal
    of illegal aliens; financial and trade investigations; protection of
    Federal infrastructure; and protection of the civil aviation system--
    with even greater effectiveness. In my testimony, I will address our
    major program areas--Investigations, Detention and Removal Operations,
    the Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Federal Protective Service--as
    well as issues related to management, administration, and information
    technology.

                         FISCAL YEAR 2006 ENHANCEMENTS

        The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposal request for ICE
    Detention and Removal Operations will enhance public safety and
    national security by ensuring that those aliens who pose the most
    critical threats are removed from the United States first--a critical
    objective in ICE's long-term strategy to restore integrity to the
    Nation's immigration system. In addition, this funding will help ICE to
    meet its detention needs, which are growing every year as we move to
    aggressively enforce immigration laws. This funding will help ICE to
    continue building on the vigorous enforcement efforts we have developed
    in the last 2 years.
        Detention and Removal Operations.--The DHS Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE) fiscal year 2006 President's budget seeks $176.0
    million in enhancements for Detention and Removal Operations:
      --$90 million/16 Full-Time Employees (FTEs) for Custody Management/
            Bedspace. In many cases, apprehended aliens must be detained
            while they go through immigration proceedings and until they
            are removed. Custody Management provides safe, secure, and
            humane confinement for these aliens. It also ensures that
            aliens in ICE custody appear for their immigration hearings,
            and then for their subsequent removal. This request would
            provide $90 million to fund requirements of the Custody
            Management budget activity, adding 16 FTE and increasing funded
            bedspace by 1,920 beds. This enhancement will improve detention
            efforts that ensure public safety and national security.
      --$5.4 million/7 FTEs for the Alternatives to Detention program. The
            Alternatives to Detention program places low-risk aliens under
            close supervision, rather than into traditional detention,
            serving as a cost-effective way to ensure their appearance for
            an immigration hearing or for removal. ICE's Intensive
            Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) is a community-based case
            management program that is aimed at improving the appearance
            rate of aliens at immigration hearings. This request includes
            $5.4 million/7 FTE to expand the ISAP to two additional
            locations.
      --$8.9 million for Fugitive Operations. Approximately 465,000 aliens
            have received final orders of removal but are not confirmed to
            have departed the United States. This request includes $8.9
            million to enhance case management resources that enable the
            Fugitive Operations program to locate and apprehend fugitive
            aliens in the United States. This investment will serve to
            improve the integrity of the immigration enforcement process
            that is instrumental in deterring the efforts of potential
            absconders.
      --$5.4 million/19 FTEs for the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).
            Many removable aliens are currently incarcerated in Federal or
            State prisons for criminal convictions. If these aliens are
            released upon completion of their criminal sentence, they are
            likely to avoid immigration removal proceedings. The IRP
            ensures that these aliens are not released back into the
            community before they are removed from the United States. The
            $5.4 million requested would provide for Immigration
            Enforcement Agents to enhance the IRP with staff support needed
            to facilitate the removal of aliens following completion of
            criminal sentences.
      --$39.3 million for Interior Repatriation, as part of the Arizona
            Border Control multi-agency effort. One of the major components
            of enhanced border control is a focus on border safety through
            the removal of migrants from the dangers associated with
            crossing the border illegally. The United States, in
            cooperation with the government of Mexico, has focused on the
            use of every available tool to break the cycle of migrant
            deaths in the dangerous terrain where human smugglers value
            profits more than the human life they often sacrifice for
            personal gain. One of the major tools agreed to by both
            countries is the use of a voluntary interior repatriation
            program. The interior repatriation program allows for movement
            at the U.S. border of Mexican nationals who voluntarily return
            to selected cities within the interior of Mexico by means of
            commercial flights. Without this program, a significant number
            of persons who are apprehended and returned to Mexico at the
            border seek re-entry through dangerous border terrains, thus
            repeatedly risking injury or death in the process.
      --$24.0 million for the Office of Detention and Removal. This request
            provides that the base budget for Detention Removal Operations
            be adjusted by $24 million for salary costs and operating
            expenses. These funds will augment support for increased
            detention and removal activities to ensure the departure of
            removable aliens from the United States through the fair
            enforcement of immigration laws.
        ICE's Office of Investigations and Office of Intelligence play a
    vital role in advancing national security and homeland defense through
    aggressive investigations and cooperation with other agencies to share
    information on organized criminal activity and terrorist organizations.
    ICE's investigators have a long history of targeting money laundering
    networks; narcotics trafficking; criminal financial schemes;
    counterfeiting and piracy; trade fraud; export violations; and other
    financial and economic crimes. In addition, our investigators lead the
    way in targeting child sexual predators, human traffickers, and child
    labor violators. Our investigators are also at the forefront of
    combating immigration violations, including enforcement of immigration
    laws at worksites and shutting down organizations that provide
    fraudulent documentation for a price.
        Investigations and Intelligence.--The ICE fiscal year 2006
    President's budget seeks $171.7 million in enhancements for
    Investigations and Intelligence:
      --$43.7 million/346 FTEs for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
            Force (OCDETF) activities. This increase replaces funding
            previously received on a reimbursable basis from the Department
            of Justice (DOJ) for ICE's participation in the OCDETF program.
            OCDETF is a Federal drug enforcement program that focuses on
            the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking
            organizations. OCDETF has been in existence since 1982 and
            operates under the guidance and oversight of the Attorney
            General. Employing the resources and expertise of 11 member
            Federal agencies, along with support from State and local law
            enforcement agencies, OCDETF has contributed to the successful
            prosecution and conviction of more than 44,000 members of
            criminal organizations and resulted in the seizure of cash and
            property assets totaling more than $3.0 billion. This
            enhancement requests no additional FTEs but proposes that 346
            positions currently on board be paid by direct appropriation
            instead of by reimbursable funding.
      --$5.0 million/5 FTEs for Visa Security Program Expansion. The ICE
            Visa Security Program provides follow-up investigations on visa
            applicants seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose
            of denying visas to terrorists, criminals, and persons of
            special interest. Officers are assigned to posts to perform
            this law enforcement review of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa
            applications prior to visa issuance by consular officers of the
            Department of State. This enhancement would allow ICE to
            maintain operations initiated in fiscal year 2005 and support
            one additional Visa Security Unit overseas.
      --$18.0 million/72 FTEs for Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement. As
            part of the President's proposed temporary worker program (TWP)
            to match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers,
            enforcement of immigration laws to ensure compliance is
            required. The requested resources would fund 143 positions and
            the required training to conduct employer audits, investigate
            possible violations, and prepare criminal employer case
            presentations. This funding more than doubles the resources
            dedicated to the worksite enforcement effort.
      --$105.0 million for the Office of Investigations. This request
            includes $105 million for salary and support costs, including
            vehicle and other equipment purchases.
      --$3.5 million/24 FTEs for Legal Proceedings. This enhancement would
            provide funding for additional attorneys and support staff
            required to improve the ability of ICE's legal program to
            complete matters in Immigration Court and help reduce the case
            backlog.
      --$11.3 million/1 FTE for the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). A
            total of $37 million is required for the HSDN to provide for
            secure classified, computer-to-computer connectivity. The HSDN
            is expected to streamline and modernize the classified data
            capabilities of DHS to facilitate high-quality and high-value
            classified data communication and collaboration within DHS and
            with other Federal agencies and organizations, including the
            Department of Defense (DOD). Based on modern network and
            telecommunications designs, the HSDN will optimize both the
            classified data exchanges between DHS offices, and other
            networks of classified data such as the Anti-Drug Network
            (ADNET), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), and Defense
            Message System (DMS). The HSDN will provide a scalable
            infrastructure, capable of supporting the growth and evolution
            of the DHS mission. ICE's allotted portion in support of the
            network is $11.3 million. Enhancement request includes one
            position to serve as a liaison between ICE and DHS.
        The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has been charged with
    providing security in the skies since 9/11. The President's budget
    request will help FAMS to continue in that mission as we continue the
    evolutionary process of integrating this key Homeland Security division
    into the agency.
        Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).--The ICE fiscal year 2006
    President's budget seeks $14.8 million in The Federal Air Marshal
    Service (FAMS) has been charged with providing security in the skies
    since 9/11. The President's budget request will help FAMS to continue
    in that mission as we continue the evolutionary process of integrating
    this key Homeland Security division into the agency.
        Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).--The ICE fiscal year 2006
    President's budget seeks $9.9 million in enhancements for the Federal
    Air Marshal Service (FAMS). This enhancement request would allow the
    FAMS to increase its staffing level to a level that will allow it to
    meet its mission objective through the risk-based deployment of Federal
    Air Marshals. In accomplishing this objective, FAMS works closely with
    DHS and other Federal, State and local agencies and private industry to
    develop, deploy and sustain a comprehensive intelligence-driven
    approach and response to terrorist and related criminal threats against
    the United States and its interests. FAMS provides critical support to
    the DHS mission to prevent terrorist acts within the United States,
    reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage from potential
    attacks.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for ICE is a solid
    step forward for the agency. ICE is dedicated to protecting the
    homeland by enforcing immigration and customs laws; restoring integrity
    to the immigration system; ensuring the sanctity of our financial and
    trade systems; protecting Federal property; and ensuring security in
    the air. That is a broad and diverse mission, but the men and women of
    ICE are dedicated to building this agency into a model for law
    enforcement in the 21st century. The fiscal year 2006 budget request
    provides us with the resources that will make this goal a reality as we
    strive to secure the American homeland and protect the American people.
    We look forward to continuing to work with you to accomplish these
    worthy objectives.
        I would like to thank you, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and
    Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify before you
    today. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Garcia.
        Mr. Bonner, you may proceed.

                         STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. BONNER

        Mr. Bonner. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
    Senator Leahy. I am very pleased to be here this morning to
    discuss the fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Customs
    and Border Patrol, or CBP. I am also very pleased to be here
    with my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security,
    both Director Aguirre of CIS and Mike Garcia, the Assistant
    Secretary for ICE.
        I particularly want to thank the members of this
    subcommittee for your strong support of the work that CBP does
    every day 24-7 to protect and defend the borders of our
    country. As you know, CBP's priority mission is homeland
    security and for a front-line border agency, which is what we
    are, that means that CBP's priority mission is keeping
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from getting into the United
    States.
        The budget request for 2006 in my view will provide
    resources to perform our all-important priority mission, our
    anti-terrorism mission, as well as our traditional missions,
    which go from everything from interdicting illegal drugs at our
    border to determining admissibility of people appearing at our
    ports of entry to apprehending people illegally entering the
    United States, protecting American agriculture, regulating
    trade, as well as collecting about $27 billion in duties and
    fees.

                      FISCAL YEAR 2004 WORKLOAD STATISTICS

        The magnitude of our border task is reflected by just a few
    statistics from fiscal year 2006, because in fiscal year 2004
    CBP through its Border Patrol agents apprehended over 1.1
    million people illegally entering our country or attempting to
    enter our country, 1.1 million. By the way, you want to
    translate that? It is about 3,000 each and every day of the
    year, day and night.
        CBP officers at our ports of entry and Border Patrol agents
    collectively seized slightly over 2 million pounds, nearly 1
    million kilograms, of illegal drugs attempting to be entered
    through our ports of entry. That is 56,000, by the way,
    separate seizures of illegal drugs at our borders last year.
        We seized almost $46 million in cash and currency that was
    leaving the United States, much of that of course is from the
    proceeds of illegal drug trafficking. We just seized about $1.7
    million in cash in a vehicle a couple of days ago that was
    going outbound in a vehicle through the Port of Laredo back to
    Mexico.
        There were 450,000 aliens that were turned around at our
    ports of entry. By that I mean they were not allowed to enter
    the United States because they were determined to be
    inadmissible. There were 78,000 fraudulent passports and other
    documents that were seized and intercepted by CBP at our
    borders.

                             ONE FACE AT THE BORDER

        So it gives you an idea of the magnitude of the task, but
    it also tells you what we are doing and that the job is getting
    done. We have unified our work force to create one unified
    front-line border agency for managing and securing and
    controlling the borders of our country. We have developed a
    comprehensive border strategy at our ports of entry for our CBP
    officers and Agriculture specialists and between our ports of
    entry, primarily our land borders with Mexico and Canada, with
    our CBP Border Patrol agents.
        The transfer of the air and marine operations to CBP last
    November I believe further strengthens our effort to secure our
    borders, to interdict drugs at and beyond our borders, and to
    support our homeland security mission.

                           TRADE/TRAVEL FACILITATION

        We have moved forward on important initiatives set in
    motion after 9/11 to secure the movement of goods and people
    across our border and our ports of entry without unduly
    impeding the legitimate flow of trade, the flow of legitimate
    trade and travel that is so important to our economy.

                WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

        We are also deploying more technology at our ports of entry
    and between them to help detect potential terrorists and
    terrorist weapons, including potentially weapons of mass
    destruction, and I am talking about nuclear devices and
    radiological weapons, at our borders. This includes, by the
    way, already the over 400 radiation portal monitors at many of
    our major ports of entry. We are in phases three and four of
    that project to deploy better radiation detection equipment at
    our borders.
        As I said, Mr. Chairman, because the personnel and
    functions from the front-line border agencies of our you have
    been unified into one border agency, our Nation's borders are
    more secure and our Nation is safer than it was when we were
    literally fragmented between four agencies and three different
    departments of government that were responsible for our border.
    With over 41,000 approximately FTE Customs and Border
    Protection, about one-fourth of all the employees of the
    Department of Homeland Security, is by far the largest actual
    merger of people and functions taking place in the Department.

                     COMPREHENSIVE BORDER CONTROL STRATEGY

        Having one border agency also allows us for the first time
    in the history of our country to implement a comprehensive
    border strategy, not just at our ports of entry but between our
    ports of entry as well. Between our ports of entry--along the
    Mexican border and the Canadian border--the strategic goal is
    clear. That goal is to establish operational control of our
    borders, which by the way I think was always an important goal
    for our country, but is absolutely essential, as Senator Byrd
    suggested in his comments. It is absolutely essential in the
    post-9/11 era, in the era of global terrorism.
        Now, to do this, by the way, it is not all about staffing.
    It is also about the better use and deployment of technology.
    It is about organizing ourselves better in terms of how we
    protect and secure our border. To do this, we have done a
    number of things that are not widely known. One is we have
    centralized the Border Patrol command structure and increased
    the use and deployment of technology, including remote camera
    system and sensoring devices. We are pioneering as the first
    law enforcement agency ever the use of unmanned aerial
    vehicles, or UAV's, to establish literally an aerial patrol
    over significant segments of our borders.
        But we recognize that technology alone, by the way, is not
    a substitute for well trained and dedicated Border Patrol
    Agents. One of our goals of our strategy to control the border
    is to increase our ability to more rapidly deploy Border Patrol
    Agents to respond to weak spots along our borders with Mexico
    and Canada.

                          CARGO/SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

        Let me just say one other thing. Just shortly after 9/11,
    U.S. Customs, now CBP, developed a strategy for securing the
    movement of cargo to the United States and we did that through
    essentially four interrelated initiatives: the 24-hour rule to
    get advance information on all cargo coming into the United
    States; the use of an automated targeting system to identify
    the high-risk cargo, particularly for the terrorist threat, and
    that is done at our National Targeting Center in Northern
    Virginia; the container security initiative, an initiative that
    partners with other governments to screen high-risk containers
    before they are loaded on board vessels for the United States.
    Currently there are 35 foreign seaports that are partnered with
    us in CIS, including ports like Singapore and Rotterdam, and
    most recently Shanghai, China.
        Through the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
    TPAT), our partnership with the private sector, many major
    importers in the United States, oceangoing carriers and others,
    to improve the security of the supply chain literally back to
    the manufacturer, the foreign loading docks of manufacturers in
    foreign countries, all the way to U.S. ports of arrival, in
    exchange for benefits of faster processing that CBP can give to
    goods of companies that have better secured their supply chain.
        Those initiatives provide greater protection for our
    country against potential terrorist attack and not a one of
    those initiatives existed before 9/11.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me make an opening
    statement and for this opportunity to appear, and I look
    forward to answering any questions you or the other members may
    have.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner

                           INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

        Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
    it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) fiscal year 2006 budget
    request.
        I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Committee for the
    support it provided for important initiatives implemented by CBP last
    year. That support enabled CBP to make significant progress in securing
    our borders and protecting our country against the terrorist threat. As
    the Commissioner of CBP, I look forward to working with you to build on
    these successes.
        As the frontline border agency, CBP's mission is to prevent
    terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. That
    extraordinarily important priority mission means improving security at
    our physical borders and ports of entry, but it also means extending
    our zone of security beyond our physical borders--so that American
    borders are not our first line of defense.
        And we must do this while continuing to perform our traditional
    missions well. These missions include apprehending individuals
    attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of
    illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our agricultural and
    economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
    businesses from theft of their intellectual property, regulating and
    facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and
    enforcing U.S. trade laws. In fiscal year 2004, CBP processed almost 30
    million trade entries, collected $27 billion in revenue, seized 2.2
    million pounds of narcotics, processed 428 million pedestrians and
    passengers, 121 million privately owned vehicles, and processed and
    cleared 23.5 million sea, rail and truck containers.
        We must perform all of this important security and border-related
    work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is
    so important to our Nation's economy. In other words, we have ``twin
    goals:'' Building more secure and more efficient borders.
        The fiscal year 2006 budget for CBP totals $6.7 billion, including
    $5.6 billion in appropriated resources and $1.1 billion from user fees.
    The total program increase request for fiscal year 2006 is $261
    million. This increase is paramount to help CBP fulfill its priority
    mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
    the United States. As Commissioner, I will continue to ensure funds are
    devoted to support the traditional missions for which CBP is
    responsible, including resources for the automation and information
    technology programs that will improve overall operations of the agency.
        Mr. Chairman, although I will touch on each of the priority
    programs and initiatives in my statement, I want to point out that in
    many cases, funds spent in one area have a direct and positive impact
    on other areas. For example, funds spent on automation and information
    technology provide invaluable assistance to our priority mission of
    preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
    States. Also, funds spent on our priority anti-terrorism mission often
    result in improvements in our effectiveness and efficiency in carrying
    out our traditional missions, such as interdicting narcotics.
        By way of summary of the fiscal year 2006 budget for CBP, I can
    tell you that the program increases we are requesting include:
      --$125 million to continue the deployment and enhancement of Weapons
            of Mass Destruction Detection Technology to our Nation's ports
            of entry (POE);
      --$19.8 million for the continued deployment of surveillance and
            intrusion detection technology along our Nation's land borders
            through the America's Shield Initiative;
      --$36.9 million to hire 210 new Border Patrol Agents thereby
            increasing border security and enhancing control of the borders
            between the ports of entry;
      --$20 million to replace 12 of the Border Patrol's 58 Vietnam-era
            vintage helicopters ensuring that Agents on the ground have
            adequate and reliable air support;
      --$5.4 million to enhance and improve the efficiency our cargo,
            conveyance and passenger screening systems ensuring that
            legitimate trade and travel crosses our borders without delay
            and that terrorists and their weapons, criminals or contraband
            are intercepted before entering the United States;
      --$2.0 million for expansion of the Immigration Advisory Program to
            additional overseas locations ensuring that terrorists,
            criminals or persons traveling with fraudulent documents do not
            board aircraft bound for the United States;
      --$5.4 million to expand the Container Security Initiative to
            strategically important foreign seaports;
      --$8.2 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism to
            increase supply chain security and expedite the clearance of
            legitimate trade;
      --$1.0 million for the operating expenses associated with the Arizona
            Border Control Initiative;
      --$3.0 million for the operation of the Automated Biometric
            Identification System (IDENT)/Integrated Automated Fingerprint
            System (IAFIS) so that CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents
            can positively identify known terrorists and criminals
            attempting to enter the United States;
      --$31.7 million to operate and maintain the long range radar system
            in partnership with the Department of Defense, ensuring that
            aircraft are detected and tracked as they attempt to enter U.S.
            airspace; and
      --$3.2 million to contribute to the development of the DHS-wide
            Homeland Security Data Network.
        In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others that CBP
    has been working on during the past year, and outline the actions CBP
    is planning to take in each area. I would like to begin, though, with a
    brief update for the Subcommittee on the status of CBP after its second
    year of existence as a consolidated agency within DHS.

                 CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION--THE SECOND YEAR

        Fiscal year 2004 was the first full year that CBP operated as the
    single, unified border agency for the United States. From a strategic
    and operational standpoint, this consolidation has significantly
    increased our ability to execute our anti-terrorism and traditional
    missions at our Nation's borders more effectively than ever before,
    thereby enhancing the security of the United States, its citizens and
    the economy. I believe firmly that the United States is safer today
    than it was on September 11, 2001, because of the creation of CBP and
    the efforts and vigilance of CBP's personnel.

    Achieve One Face at the Border
        With the creation of CBP, one agency has the responsibility for the
    entirety of our country's borders, for all purposes, customs,
    immigration, agriculture protection and, importantly, terrorism. This
    means that for the first time in our Nation's history, we are able to
    design a comprehensive strategy for our borders.
        To create ``One Face at the Border,'' CBP had to unify and
    integrate its operations and workforce. CBP is the largest merger of
    people and functions taking place within the DHS. Nowhere was
    unification more critical than at the ports of entry (POEs) where
    19,000 legacy Customs, Immigration and Agriculture inspectors joined
    together to carry out CBP's priority and traditional missions. To unify
    the Inspector workforce at the POEs, CBP established a new frontline
    team--the CBP officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist. In March 2004,
    former Agriculture Inspectors became CBP Agriculture Specialists and in
    July, all former Customs and Immigration Inspectors were converted to
    the CBP Officer position with a new series, title and job description.
    The two occupational groups wear the same uniform and have been unified
    under a single compensation system for overtime and premium pay,
    ensuring efficient and equitable assignment of work and compensation.
    This consolidation was commemorated in August when the new CBP badges
    with the DHS seal were issued to our personnel. Today CBP Officers and
    CBP Agriculture Specialists are our frontline team at all of our
    Nation's ports of entry and overseas pre-clearance locations.

    Secure and Improve the Flow of Global Trade
        For the first time ever, on December 9, 2004, the World Customs
    Organization (WCO) Policy Committee endorsed a Framework of Standards
    to secure and facilitate global trade. The WCO represents 164 Customs
    administrations from around the world and accounts for 99 percent of
    all global trade. The framework is based in large part on principles
    designed and implemented by CBP in the aftermath of September 11,
    including: the 24-Hour Rule; the Advanced Targeting System located at
    the National Targeting Center; the Container Security Initiative, and
    the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The WCO
    framework encourages cooperation among worldwide Customs
    administrations to secure international supply chains and facilitate
    the movement of legitimate trade and travel.

    Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Border Control Strategy
        As a sovereign Nation, it has always been important that we control
    our borders. In light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the
    continuing threat posed to our country by international terrorists, it
    is now absolutely essential that we do so. and it is likewise essential
    that we have a coherent and understood strategy for doing so. We are
    developing a new Border Patrol strategy designed to achieve the goal of
    operational control of the United States borders. This strategy will
    build on the previous Border Patrol strategies, but will be enhanced to
    reflect the current threat environment.
        CBP's Office of Border Patrol is a vital part of CBP, responsible
    for controlling the border between official ports of entry. In the last
    2 years, the Border Patrol has made significant strides in improving
    our ability to control our border and establish a substantial
    probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they
    attempt to illegally enter the United States between the ports of
    entry. For example, CBP has tripled the number of Border Patrol Agents
    on the Northern Border since 9/11, centralized the Border Patrol's
    command structure, and deployed additional technology to improve border
    enforcement operations, including cameras, electronic sensors, and
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
        As important as these milestones are, we cannot afford to become
    complacent or let down our guard. To meet the threat of global
    terrorism, we must implement a layered, defense in-depth strategy to
    protect our borders. New challenges and opportunities are on the
    horizon for CBP. Our achievements over the past year and the
    President's fiscal year 2006 budget will serve as the foundation to
    meet them.

    Integrate Air and Marine Operations
        The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
    Appropriations Act directed the transfer of missions and assets of the
    Air Marine Operations (AMO) from Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (ICE) to CBP. The transfer will be completed in two phases. Phase One,
    which was completed on October 31, 2004, moved AMO intact from ICE to
    CBP. This included the transfer of operational responsibility and
    responsibility for all AMO personnel, missions, commitments,
    facilities, and assets to CBP.
        Phase Two, which commenced in late November, is the integration of
    all CBP air and marine personnel, missions, and assets. To accomplish
    this, CBP is using the Transition Management Office (TMO) process that
    was used successfully during the merger of the legacy CBP entities. CBP
    has made significant progress in Phase Two. I am confident that upon
    completion of this process, we will have a more integrated, effective
    and efficient aviation and marine program.

    Provide Assistance to the New Government of Iraq
        In August, teams of CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents were
    deployed to the Jordanian International Police Training Center to train
    officers of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. The Iraqis have
    been provided with courses on border security tactics, human rights,
    defensive tactics, weapons training, and vehicle searches; in addition
    to basic customs and immigration activities. To date, CBP personnel
    have assisted in the training of more than 2,100 Iraqi border control
    officers. The training provided by CBP personnel will continue in the
    aftermath of the recent elections and focuses on keeping saboteurs,
    terrorists and armaments from crossing into or out of Iraq. The Iraqi
    officials CBP trained are now putting these skills to use at their
    country's borders and ports of entry.
    meeting our twin goals: building more secure and more efficient borders
        As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP's
    mission is extraordinarily important to the protection of America and
    the American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
    September 11th, CBP has developed numerous initiatives to meet our twin
    goals of improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate
    trade and travel. The fiscal year 2006 budget will help us expand upon
    those initiatives to ensure further protection of both the American
    people and the American economy. Our strategy in implementing these
    initiatives involves a number of factors, including: (A) constant
    improvement of our targeting systems to better screen people and goods
    entering and departing the United States; (B) extending our zone of
    security outward by partnering with other countries; (C) extending our
    zone of security outward by partnering with the private sector; (D)
    deploying advanced inspection technology and equipment at our ports of
    entry to improve our ability to detect weapons of mass destruction; and
    (E) deploying advanced detection and monitoring equipment between our
    ports of entry to detect illegal crossings of our land borders with
    Mexico and Canada.

    Enhancing Our Ability to Identify High-Risk People and Cargo
        Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
    increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
    information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
    ``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
    absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
    is critical because searching and scrutinizing 100 percent of the cargo
    and people that enter the United States would cripple the flow of
    legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
    advisable is searching 100 percent of the high-risk cargo and people
    that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
    is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. CBP has
    several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.

                Automated Targeting System
        The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by National
    Targeting Center (NTC) and field targeting units in the United States
    and overseas, is essential to our ability to target high-risk cargo and
    passengers entering the United States. ATS is the system through which
    we process advance manifest and passenger information to pick up
    anomalies and ``red flags'' and determine what passengers and cargo are
    ``high risk,'' and therefore scrutinized at the port of entry or, in
    some cases, overseas.
        The funding increases sought for ATS in the fiscal year 2006 budget
    will allow for the continued improvement of the system as well as
    provide it with the capacity to process the electronic data related to
    the ever-increasing number of people and goods entering the United
    States. For example, the funding will allow us to develop and implement
    a version of ATS that, for the first time, will be able to identify
    potentially high-risk travelers in passenger vehicles. It will also be
    used to upgrade our passenger targeting system by improving the amount
    of government data that the system can access and analyze as well as
    provide us with the capacity to train more people on the use of the
    system. On the cargo side, the funding will permit ATS to increase its
    capacity and upgrade its capabilities by utilizing cutting edge
    information analysis technologies developed by CBP and the private
    sector.

    Extending our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with Other Countries
                Container Security Initiative (CSI)
        To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
    weapons from entering the United States, CBP must extend our zone of
    security outward--so that our borders are not the first line of defense
    to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the United States. We
    have done this by partnering with other countries on our Container
    Security Initiative (CSI), one of the most revolutionary and successful
    homeland security initiatives developed and implemented after September
    11, 2001.
        Almost 25,000 seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at U.S.
    seaports each day. That equates to nine million cargo containers
    annually. Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
    opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
    uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Under CSI, which is the first
    program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign governments to
    identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports,
    before they are shipped to our seaports and pose a threat to the United
    States and to global trade.
        The three core elements of CSI are:
      --First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
            hour rule, before they set sail for the United States.
      --Second, performing security inspections of ``high risk'' containers
            at the foreign CSI port before they are shipped to the United
            States.
      --Third, using technology to perform security inspections of the
            high-risk containers, including both radiation detection
            equipment and large-scale imaging machines, to detect potential
            terrorist weapons.
        CSI continues to generate exceptional participation and support.
    Right now, CSI is operational in 35 foreign seaports, including:
    Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Le Havre and Marseilles, France;
    Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zebrugee, Belgium;
    Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe Japan; Hong Kong;
    Gothenburg, Sweden; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport, and
    Tilbury United Kingdom; Genoa, La Spezia, Naples, Gioia Tauro and
    Livorno Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; and Port Kelang and
    Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algericas, Spain; and Laem
    Chabang, Thailand; Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, Canada; and most
    recently Shanghai, China.
        I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
    support of CSI in fiscal year 2005. With the $5.4 million increase in
    funding requested for fiscal year 2006, we will continue expanding CSI
    capabilities to ports with strategic importance or ports through which
    containers from high risk areas are transshipped. The fiscal year 2006
    budget will allow for future expansion of the program to additional
    high-risk or strategic foreign ports.

                Immigration Advisory Program
        The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) extends our zone of security
    outward by screening passengers before boarding aircraft destined for
    the United States. Immigration Advisory Program teams identify high
    risk and terrorist watchlisted passengers using the Automated Targeting
    System and are able to intervene by questioning high risk passengers at
    overseas boarding areas of foreign hub airports. They are able to check
    documentation of high-risk passengers prior to departure and make
    preliminary decisions whether the passenger will be admissible to the
    United States upon arrival. If potentially fraudulent identification or
    immigration documents are identified, or the individual's purpose poses
    a threat, the airline is advised not to board the passenger and the
    host country law enforcement is contacted. The IAP teams have access to
    the passenger screening information produced by CBP's NTC through the
    vetting of passenger manifests against terrorist watch lists and
    criminal databases. If a ``hit'' occurs or documents are found to be
    deficient or fraudulent, the passenger is not allowed to board the
    aircraft. There are two significant advantages to this approach. First,
    terrorists, criminals or inadmissible aliens are not allowed to board,
    thereby preventing their entry into the United States and/or the
    inconvenience and expense of an in flight diversion of the aircraft.
    Second, the United States Government avoids penalties and the costs of
    detaining the individual before being deported and the airline avoids
    the costs of transporting the individual back to the originating
    airport.
        IAP is currently operating on a pilot basis in Amsterdam's Schipol
    Airport in the Netherlands and at Chopin Airport in Warsaw, Poland. The
    fiscal year 2006 budget includes $2.0 million to expand IAP to two
    additional overseas locations. I thank the Committee for their support
    of this program in the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act.

    Extending our Zone of Security--Partnering with the Trade
                Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
        The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a
    voluntary partnership between CBP and industry to secure international
    supply chains from end-to-end. C-TPAT importers secure supply chains
    from the foreign factory loading docks of their vendors to the port of
    arrival in the United States. CBP, in return, offers C-TPAT shipments
    expedited processing and provides C-TPAT participants with other
    benefits.
        As C-TPAT has evolved, we have steadily added to the rigor of the
    program. In order to join C-TPAT, a company must conduct a self-
    assessment of its current supply chain security procedures using C-TPAT
    security criteria and best practices developed in partnership with
    logistics and security experts from the trade. A participant must also
    commit to increasing its supply chain security to meet minimal supply
    chain security criteria. Perhaps most importantly, participants also
    make a commitment to work with their business partners and customers
    throughout their supply chains to ensure that those businesses also
    increase their supply chain security. By leveraging the influence of
    importers and others on different participants in the supply chain, C-
    TPAT is able to increase security of U.S. bound goods to the point of
    origin (i.e., to the point of container stuffing). This reach--to the
    foreign loading dock--which is beyond the regulatory reach of the
    United States Government, is critical to the goal of increasing supply
    chain security.
        C-TPAT is currently open to all importers, cross-border air, sea,
    truck, and rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators,
    non-vessel operating common carriers, and U.S. Marine and Terminal
    operators. We are currently enrolling certain foreign manufacturers in
    the C-TPAT program as well, and we will continue to develop ways to
    include this important element of the supply chain in the program. The
    intent is to increase point of origin to point of arrival security into
    the supply chain with active C-TPAT links at each point in the
    logistics process.
        Although C-TPAT is a partnership, the risk is too great to simply
    take participants at their word when it comes to their supply chain
    security. We have created a cadre of specially trained supply chain
    security specialists to validate the commitments made by C-TPAT
    participants--to ensure that they are increasing supply chain security
    as they have promised CBP. These specialists meet with personnel from
    C-TPAT participants and their business partners and observe the
    security of their supply chains, including security at overseas loading
    docks and manufacturing plants, as well as transportation links
    outbound to the United States. Through this process, we work with C-
    TPAT participants to identify ways that they can further increase their
    supply chain security and we ensure that companies that are not
    honoring their commitments lose their C-TPAT benefits. As of January
    12, 2005, C-TPAT had reviewed and verified the security profiles for
    4,460 companies; there are more than 3,500 company profiles pending
    acceptance. We have validated or are in the process of validating parts
    of the supply chain of over 1,200 of the 4,460 certified partners, or
    approximately 27 percent. Our fiscal year 2006 program increase request
    of $8.2 million will enable outreach activities and continue
    validations and verifications of C-TPAT certified partner profiles.

    Using Technology to Detect Weapons of Mass Destruction at our Ports of
            Entry
        As trade increases, CBP's reliance on Non-Intrusive Inspection
    (NII) technology to secure the borders becomes more and more critical.
    Only by using NII technology to speed the inspections process for
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and contraband can CBP meet its twin
    goals of increasing security and at the same time facilitating trade.
        CBP uses various technologies in different combinations to
    substantially increase the likelihood that a nuclear or radiological
    weapon or weapons grade material will be detected. In addition, CBP
    also uses NII technology to detect and interdict narcotics, currency
    and other contraband secreted in large containers and commercial
    shipments. Technologies deployed to our Nation's land, sea and air
    ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems--
    systems that can image the contents of an entire container in minutes.
    These systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS),
    Mobile VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail VACIS, Mobile Sea
    Container Examinations Systems and the Pallet Gamma-ray System. In
    September 1996, our first large-scale NII system, a Truck X-ray, became
    operational in Otay Mesa, California. Today, we have 145 large-scale
    NII systems deployed.
        In addition, we have developed and are implementing a comprehensive
    radiation detection strategy at our ports of entry. Pursuant to that
    Strategy, we are deploying nuclear and radiological detection equipment
    to include personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radiation portal
    monitors (RPMs) and radiation isotope identifier devices (RIIDs). In
    combination with our layered detection strategy--working overseas to
    prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and to detect them
    before they are shipped to the United States--and our use of multiple
    inspection technologies, these tools currently provide CBP with
    significant capacity to detect nuclear or radiological weapons and
    materials. We currently have over 400 RPMs deployed at our borders.
        The fiscal year 2006 request includes $125 million to continue the
    acquisition, deployment, and enhancement of Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Detection Technology at our Nations ports of entry. These actions will
    be coordinated with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which
    is being established to develop, acquire and support the deployment of
    the national nuclear detection architecture, including future
    acquisition issues. CBP's radiation detection strategy will be
    integrated into the overall strategy developed by DNDO.
        Our investment in WMD Detection technology is paying off as
    demonstrated by the following recent event. On January 26, 2005, at the
    Los Angeles seaport a PRD activated in proximity to a vessel from Kwan
    Yang, South Korea. A search of the vessel revealed that the source of
    the radiation was located in the ship's engine room. Subsequent
    screening with a Radiation Isotope Identifier and analysis by CBP
    Laboratory and Scientific Services Personnel stationed at the NTC
    revealed that the material was Cobalt 60, a material used in industrial
    and medical applications. Following coordination with the Science and
    Technology Directorate's Secondary Reachback Program, scientists were
    dispatched from the Department of Energy Radiation Assistance Program
    and it was confirmed that the radiation levels posed no threat to
    safety and that it was emanating from a gauge in the ship's fire
    extinguishing system. Although this alarm proved to be benign, the
    event demonstrates CBP's improving ability to detect sources of
    radiation in conveyances arriving at our borders and quickly take
    appropriate action to resolve any potential threats. Indeed, since CBP
    installed the first RPMs in May 2002, we have resolved over 10,000
    radiation hits of vehicles or cargo shipments crossing our borders.

    Detecting and Responding to Illegal Crossings Between our Ports of
            Entry
                America's Shield Initiative (ASI)
        The America's Shield Initiative, formerly known as the Integrated
    Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), is an effort to develop a
    comprehensive and unified system of electronic surveillance of our
    entire land borders. ASI is a critical part of CBP's strategy to build
    smarter borders. This, in turn, is critical to the Border Patrol's
    ability to increase its apprehension capabilities along our borders,
    and thereby establish greater control of our borders. The deployment of
    ASI is critical to prevent terrorists from entering the United States
    and to achieve operational control of our Nation's borders.
        I thank the Committee for the $64.2 million provided for ASI in the
    fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act. These resources are being used to
    solicit and award a contract for the nation-wide integration of legacy
    ISIS capabilities and to deploy additional systems along our borders.
    Nation-wide integrated ASI capabilities will provide the Border Patrol
    with a tactical, command and control, situational awareness and
    intelligence collection and management system. The $19.8 million
    requested for fiscal year 2006 would enable CBP to broaden
    substantially its ASI coverage of the northern and southern borders by
    deploying the system where no coverage currently exists. In addition,
    with the advent of ASI, system capabilities will be improved to enhance
    the sensor and video surveillance capabilities of currently installed
    components, integrate new, state of the market surveillance
    technologies and increase interoperability with other law enforcement
    agencies.
        ASI acts as an important force-multiplier that allows CBP's Border
    Patrol agents to remotely monitor the border and respond to specific
    illegal border crossings rather than having to exhaustively patrol an
    area adjacent to the border. By contrast, Border Patrol operations
    without ASI support are not only less effective, they are more
    resource-intensive and less safe for Border Patrol Agents. Expanding
    the portion of the border covered by electronic surveillance,
    integration of new components and technologies, and improved Agent
    support equipment via the ASI program will provide the Border Patrol
    with the increased ability to meet its and CBP's priority mission
    threats.

                Border Patrol Aircraft Modernization and Replacement
        Aviation is one of the most effective force multipliers used in
    securing our Nation's borders. Aircraft perform a multitude of missions
    in this environment, including border surveillance, operational patrol,
    personnel deployment to permit rapid response to intrusions, and
    medical evacuation. In fiscal year 2004, CBP Border Patrol Aircraft
    flew almost 46,000 hours, apprehending 96,341 persons and assisted in
    seizing $103.6 million in illegal narcotics. This equates to 2.1
    arrests and $2,259 in seized contraband for each flight hour. The
    largest segment of the Border Patrol fleet is its helicopters;
    including 58 that are Vietnam era vintage. The high level of fight time
    is taking its toll on these important assets. New parts are no longer
    manufactured, requiring that salvaged parts be used to repair broken or
    damaged aircraft. The $20.0 million requested will allow CBP to begin
    implementation of the fleet modernization and replacement plan through
    the acquisition of 12 new helicopters. This initiative will improve
    Border Patrol Agent safety and ensure that these valuable assets,
    essential to effective border control, continue to be available to our
    frontline personnel.

                Border Patrol Agent Staffing
        An increase of $36.9 million is included in the fiscal year 2006
    budget to enhance Border Patrol staffing by 210 Agents. The additional
    Agents will be deployed along the southwest border to areas with the
    highest concentration of illegal entry activity. To date in, fiscal
    year 2005, there has been a 15 percent increase in apprehensions along
    the southwest border when compared to the aliens from the same time
    period in fiscal year 2004. In addition, there has been an increase in
    the number of Special Interest Aliens (SIA) and High-Risk Other Than
    Mexican illegal entrant aliens that pose an increased threat to U.S.
    national security. CBP has experienced significant operational success
    in targeted areas. Additional Agents and supporting resources are
    necessary to sustain and expand the progress made in border control
    efforts.

                Arizona Border Control Initiative-ABCI
        This landmark program supporting the mission of CBP to detect and
    deter terrorist activities and cross-border illegal trafficking of
    people and drugs was initiated on March 16, 2004, in the Border
    Patrol's Tucson Sector. Working in partnership with Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (ICE), the government of Mexico, state, local,
    tribal and Federal law enforcement organizations, the CBP Border
    Patrol-led ABCI was designed to produce a safer and more secure
    southwest border at one of the weakest segments of our border with
    Mexico.
        The goals of ABCI were and are to: (1) achieve operational control
    of the Arizona border (2) support CBP's priority antiterrorism mission;
    (3) significantly impair the ability of smuggling organizations to
    operate; and (4) decrease the rate of violent crime and reduce the need
    for social services in southern Arizona. In fiscal year 2004, as part
    of ABCI, CBP repatriated 14,058 Mexican nationals on a voluntary basis
    to the interior of Mexico by means of commercial flights. This is the
    first successful interior repatriation effort, and it is a result of
    cooperation of and coordination with the Government of Mexico. These
    flights decreased the incidence of border crossing recidivism and
    reduced the number of heat related exposure deaths in the Arizona
    desert by 69 percent--from 45 in fiscal year 2003, to 14 in fiscal year
    2004 (during the period of July 12th through September 30th). ICE will
    assume responsibility for the interior repatriation flights in fiscal
    year 2006. Our fiscal year 2006 budget request of $1.0 million will
    assist in offsetting the costs of CBP's continued participation in the
    ABCI. These resources will be used for Border Patrol Agent support
    costs and other operational expenses including fuel, vehicle
    maintenance, and overtime associated with increased border surveillance
    within the Arizona area of operation.

                Long Range Radar
        The fiscal year 2006 CBP budget includes a total of $44.2 million,
    an increase of $31.7 million over base resources for our share of the
    joint agreement with the Department of Defense (DOD) to assume
    financial responsibility for the operations and maintenance costs of
    the primary component of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
    long-range radar system. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, CBP and DOD
    will share these costs equally.
        Continued access to the primary component of the long-range radar
    system is essential to our ability protect the United States from acts
    of terrorism and drug smuggling via cross-border aviation. The FAA's
    primary radar system is used to track aircraft that either do not have
    transponders or have their transponders turned off in an attempt to
    avoid radar detection. Most small, non-commercial aircraft do not have
    transponders and these are the vehicle of choice for smugglers
    attempting to bring loads of cocaine, marijuana and heroin to the
    United States from Mexico and other source countries in Central and
    South America.

                IDENT/IAFIS
        The Automated Biometric Identification System/Integrated Automated
    Fingerprint Identification System otherwise known as IDENT/IAFIS, was
    established to merge the capabilities of the FBI's criminal master
    fingerprint file and the former Immigration and Naturalization
    Service's immigration violator database. These systems have been
    integrated into one system that captures biometric and biographical
    information through the use of a ``10 Print'' fingerprint machine and
    computer based facial imagery. The goals of the system are to identify
    repeat immigration offenders and identify criminals and previously
    deported aliens who should be detained. IDENT/IAFIS provides CBP's
    front line personnel with access to approximately 48 million criminal
    history records dating back to the 1920's. All Border Patrol field
    locations now have access to integrated IDENT/IAFIS and all CBP Ports
    of Entry will have access to the system by the end of this year.
    Previous studies indicate that combining IDENT and IAFIS checks
    increases the probability of identifying criminal aliens by almost 10
    percent. In addition, significant efficiencies are gained by being able
    to electronically scan fingerprints to and get a response back from the
    databases within ten minutes. From October 1, 2003, through August 31,
    2004, IDENT/IAFIS technology assisted Border Patrol Agents in the
    arrest of 138 homicide suspects; 67 kidnapping suspects; 226 sexual
    assault suspects 431 robbery suspects; 2,342 suspects for assaults of
    other types and 4,801 suspects involved with illegal drugs.
        The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security has assumed
    ownership of the IDENT/IAFIS system. The fiscal year 2006, $3.0 million
    budget initiative will offset CBP's share of IDENT/IAFIS operations and
    maintenance costs.

                       AUTOMATION/INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

        Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
    American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
    complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
    and information technology to CBP's mission.
    Automated Commercial Environment
        The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is an important project
    for CBP, for the business community, for our country, and for the
    future of global trade. If done properly, it will reform the way we do
    business with the trade community. It will also greatly assist CBP in
    the advance collection of information for targeting high-risk cargo to
    better address the terrorist threat. And in doing so, it will help us
    expedite the vast majority of low-risk trade.
        The successful implementation of ACE has been and continues to be
    one of my top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from
    Congress and the Administration for ACE has been essential to the
    development of the new system. Funding of $321 million in fiscal year
    2005 has enabled us to continue development and begin to expand the
    first installment of ACE benefits to the trade community. Indeed, since
    my testimony last year, I can tell you that the development of ACE and
    the efforts to put its capabilities to work on America's borders have
    continued full throttle. We have over 350 importers, brokers, and
    carriers using the ACE Secure Data Portal and, since June 2004, have
    been collecting an increasing amount of duties and fees via the ACE
    Period Monthly Statement. CBP is also operating a pilot test of the ACE
    truck cargo release software in the port of Blaine, Washington, and
    plans to expand this new capability to ports across our northern and
    southern borders. In parallel with this development, CBP is working
    with the DHS Chief Information Officer and the US-VISIT program to
    ensure compliance with the DHS Enterprise Architecture and position the
    ACE architecture so that it can be leveraged to support the broad
    homeland security mission.
        Included within the $321 million for ACE is $16 million dedicated
    to continuing support of the International Trade Data System (ITDS).
    ITDS is our mechanism for coordinating intergovernmental support for
    ACE and ensuring that ACE meets the needs of government agencies with a
    need for trade data and a stake in border security. To that end, the
    ITDS Board of Directors has adopted a standard set of trade data as a
    step toward realizing the concept of using the ACE portal as the
    ``single window'' into government for the trade community. We are
    pleased to report that the original group of eight participating
    agencies in ITDS has now grown to twenty-six. Representatives from
    these agencies are actively involved in defining the releases of ACE
    software.
        I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
    continued support of ACE with $321 million in funding for fiscal year
    2006 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for future ACE
    releases including:

                Account Revenue and Secure Trade Data
        ACE Release 5, scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2007 will
    leverage the inherent capabilities of CBP's core financial system, SAP.
    Release 5 will integrate the entry summary business process from
    manifest receipt to entry liquidation. Through this release, ACE will
    become the system of record for all entry summaries.

                Screening and Targeting Capabilities
        The Targeting Foundation scheduled for release during fiscal years
    2005 and 2006 will extend ACE capabilities to entry summary processing
    through enhanced links to the NTC and its systems. Advanced Targeting
    capabilities will be expanded providing risk assessment and modeling,
    data mining, link analysis and pattern recognition capabilities.
    Homeland Security Data Network--HSDN
        The Homeland Security Data Network addresses the Department of
    Homeland Security's requirement for a system capable of managing and
    disseminating sensitive and classified information in a secure
    environment. The HSDN effort will streamline and modernize the
    classified data transmission capabilities of DHS in order to facilitate
    communication and collaboration within DHS and with other Federal
    agencies including the Department of Defense. When implemented, the
    HSDN will facilitate transmission of data between DHS offices and other
    networks including the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), Automatic Digital
    Network (AUTODIN) and the Defense Message System (DMS). HSDN will
    provide a scalable infrastructure, capable of supporting the growth and
    evolution of the DHS mission. CBP's share of this DHS-wide initiative
    is $3.2 million in fiscal year 2006.

                           OTHER TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

        Although CBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
    terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
    must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
    perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
    are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs, apprehending
    individuals who enter the United States illegally, regulating and
    facilitating international trade, and protecting U.S. agricultural and
    economic interests from harmful pests and diseases.

    Drug Interdiction
        Our anti-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions are not mutually
    exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
    other. The initiatives we have put in place to prevent terrorists and
    terrorist weapons from entering the United States have enabled us to be
    more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
    drugs. Indeed, one of the first results we saw after implementing ATS
    for commercial trucks on the land border was a large narcotics seizure
    from a targeted shipment. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we
    have learned in our battle against international drug trafficking will
    help us in the fight against international terrorism.
        It would be a grave mistake for drug traffickers and other
    criminals to misinterpret our focus on terrorism as a weakening of
    resolve on other fronts. If anything, we have made life even more
    miserable for drug smugglers as we have intensified our overall
    presence along America's borders. Our heightened state of security
    along America's borders has strengthened, not weakened, our
    counternarcotics mission. As we have added staffing for both inspectors
    at the ports of entry and Border Patrol Agents between the ports of
    entry, acquired more inspection technology, conducted more questioning
    of travelers, and carried out more inspections of passengers and goods
    in response to the terrorist threat, we have seized greater amounts of
    narcotics. In fiscal year 2004, for example, we seized almost 2.2
    million pounds of illegal drugs, and made some of the largest
    individual seizures ever recorded by officers safeguarding our borders.
        The CBP Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) protects the
    Nation's borders and the American people from the smuggling of
    narcotics and other contraband with an integrated, coordinated and
    highly trained air and marine interdiction force. To accomplish the
    mission, AMO's thoroughly trained interdiction assets are deployed
    throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Air and Marine Operations Center
    (AMOC) in Riverside California, provides command, control,
    communications, and intelligence for those assets by assimilating
    information from a wide array of sensors.
        Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
    agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
    success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, CBP will
    continue to cooperate closely with special agents from ICE to carry out
    this mission.

    Apprehend Individuals Entering Illegally Between the Ports of Entry
        CBP's Office of the Border Patrol is specifically responsible for
    patrolling thousands of miles of Mexican and Canadian international
    land borders. Its primary task is securing America's borders between
    official ports of entry by preventing the illegal entry of people,
    goods, and contraband across our borders.
        The Border Patrol relies on agents, enforcement equipment (such as
    a fleet of specialized aircraft and vehicles of various types),
    technology (such as sensors and night vision cameras), tactical
    infrastructure (such as roads and vehicle barriers), and intelligence
    to carry out its mission. Applied in the correct combination, these
    resources can effectively deter, detect, monitor, and respond to
    illegal border crossings, as we have seen in locations such as the San
    Diego Sector and during operations such as Desert Safeguard.
        In fiscal year 2004, the Border Patrol played a key role in
    safeguarding the United States from the entry of terrorists, criminals,
    and illegal immigrants. Among the nearly 1.2 million people apprehended
    by the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2004 were 643 aliens from special
    interest countries.
        CBP will continue to work with other agencies and the Mexican
    Government to re-institute and increase the operational tempo of the
    Arizona Border Control Initiative this year. Under this initiative, CBP
    will aim to substantially reduce the number of illegal entries that
    occur in Arizona, and, as a result, will reduce the number of deaths
    that occur as aliens try to cross the Arizona desert. In turn, CBP will
    increase its ability to apprehend potential terrorists seeking to enter
    through the Arizona corridor.

    Prevent Individuals from Entering Illegally at the Ports of Entry
        With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
    illegally at the ports of entry, CBP continues to stop hundreds of
    thousands of people a year who are inadmissible into the United States
    for a variety of reasons, including prior immigration violations,
    criminal history, or the possession of false or fraudulent documents,
    and potential terrorists.
        We are helped in this effort by our close work with the Department
    of State to ensure CBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify
    the identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by
    the Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is
    transferred electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic
    record is updated to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of
    entry, that data is transferred electronically to the Bureau of
    Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) for production of a
    permanent resident card and creation of the immigrant file.
      --In fiscal year 2004, CBP processed more than 262 million aliens
            attempting to enter the United States through the ports of
            entry; 643,091 were deemed inadmissible under U.S. law. CBP
            Officers also intercepted: 78,255 fraudulent immigration
            documents; recorded 1.8 million lookout intercepts; and,
            apprehended 399 travelers for terrorism or national security
            concerns. In addition, 19,740 criminal aliens attempting entry
            were not admitted and 566 stowaways were intercepted.

    Regulate and Facilitate International Trade
        CBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
    legitimate international trade. As I mentioned earlier, many of the
    initiatives CBP implements serve the twin goals of increasing security
    and facilitating trade. With the right level of industry partnership
    and the right combination of resources, we can develop innovative
    solutions that not only protect legitimate trade from being used by
    terrorists, but also create a better, faster, more productive system
    for moving goods and people across our borders and thus contributing to
    U.S. economic growth. The key to the success of this effort is
    partnerships, and we devote considerable time and effort to dialogue
    and interact with both large and small enterprises engaged in trade.
        We have two major venues for engaging the trade community on an
    ongoing basis. The Commercial Operations Advisory Committee, created
    under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, is the primary group that
    provides advice on the CBP issues. The Committee meets quarterly and
    holds lively discussions on the full range of critical issues on our
    common agenda. The COAC was particularly important in helping us
    implement the Trade Act, and they most recently have worked on a series
    of measures to implement the Maritime Trade Security Act and to improve
    the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
        Another key group of our private sector partners is the Trade
    Support Network (TSN), whose members work on developing specific
    requirements for the Automated Customs Environment to ensure ACE
    delivers the critical functionality required by both CBP, the trade and
    other government agencies. The TSN recently created a Supply Chain
    Security Committee, which will be the focal point for helping us
    identify information required to achieve the end-to-end view of the
    supply chain and identify the parties capable of reporting that data.
        As I have indicated, we have continued to work with the trade on
    these security and trade facilitation matters over the past year, and
    we will continue to do so in the year ahead. In fiscal year 2004, CBP
    processed 27.6 million entries of goods, a 7.9 percent increase over
    fiscal year 2003 levels and processed 23.5 million sea, truck and rail
    containers entering the United States, an increase of 5.5 percent over
    fiscal year 2003. CBP also collected more than $27 billion in revenue
    in fiscal year 2004: second only to the Internal Revenue Service in the
    Federal Government sector. CBP officers also completed 2,681 cargo
    merchandise seizures totaling almost $233 million and effected 8,586
    seizures of counterfeit commodities with a fair market value of $48.4
    million
        To increase our effectiveness and provide national direction over
    trade concerns, CBP has a National Trade Strategy that focuses on
    priority trade issues such as revenue collection, intellectual property
    rights, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, textile enforcement,
    and risks associated with intentional or unintentional contamination of
    agricultural products. The goals of the National Trade Strategy are to
    collect the appropriate duties, protect American businesses and our
    economic interests from theft of intellectual property and from unfair
    trade practices, and from the contamination of agricultural products by
    aggressively targeting high-risk shipments. In addition, CBP is
    responsible for key deliverables in the Administration's Strategy
    Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) initiative, a multi-agency effort to
    improve protection of intellectual property rights, such as using state
    of the art analytical techniques to target suspect shipments and using
    post-entry audits.

    Protect U.S. Agricultural and Economic Interests and the Food Supply
        CBP also enforces the laws and regulations pertaining to the safe
    importation and entry of agricultural food commodities into the United
    States. The traditional goals of the Agriculture Inspections (AI)
    program have been to reduce the risk of introduction of invasive
    species into the United States, protect U.S. agricultural resources,
    maintain the marketability of agricultural products, and facilitate the
    movement of law-abiding people and commodities across the borders.
    Accordingly, inspecting potentially high-risk travelers and cargo is
    critical to keeping the prohibited items out of the United States,
    monitoring for significant agricultural health threats, encouraging
    compliance with regulations, and educating the public and importers
    about agricultural quarantine regulations. In August, 2004, CBP
    Agriculture Specialists at the Port of Miami, intercepted and
    quarantined a shipment of habanero peppers infested with Mediterranean
    Fruit Fly larvae at and the False Coddling Moth. This shipment was
    manifested as coming from the Netherlands but was suspected of
    originating elsewhere. The quick actions of the CBP Agriculture
    Specialists prevented an incident that could have created severe
    economic losses to Florida's burgeoning agricultural products industry.
        With the creation of CBP, the AI program has expanded its focus to
    include a new priority mission of preventing potential terrorist
    threats involving agriculture. Indeed, the threat of intentional
    introductions of pests or pathogens as a means of biological warfare or
    terrorism is an emerging concern. To address this threat and to enhance
    its traditional AI missions, CBP has already begun using the Automated
    Targeting System, and its collective expertise regarding terrorism and
    agriculture, to strengthen our ability to identify shipments that may
    pose a potential risk to our agricultural interests.
        In addition, CBP working closely with the Food and Drug
    Administration (FDA) to implement the Bioterrorism Act to guard against
    threats to the food supply. The implementation of Phase III of the Act
    requires that prior notice of importation or intent to import all food
    to be consumed by humans be provided to both CBP and the FDA. Under the
    BTA, food products shipped by truck require two hours advance notice,
    by rail and air four hours and by sea eight hours. Enforcement of the
    provisions of the BTA are designed to protect the food that is on every
    table of every American household and to detect potential incidents of
    bio- and agroterrorism involving food. These efforts have built on our
    priority and traditional missions to make the food supply more secure,
    and will be supported in part by the targeting funding sought in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
    array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help CBP
    continue to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling
    our other important traditional missions. Because of your support, we
    are far safer today than we were on September 11th. But our work is not
    complete. With the continued support of the President, DHS, and the
    Congress, CBP will succeed in meeting the challenges posed by the
    ongoing terrorist threat and the need to facilitate ever-increasing
    numbers of legitimate shipments and travelers.
        Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy to
    answer any of your questions.

        Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner.
        Mr. Aguirre, you may proceed.

                          STATEMENT OF EDUARDO AGUIRRE

        Mr. Aguirre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
    Chairman Cochran, ranking member Byrd, and Senator Leahy. My
    name is Eduardo Aguirre and I am the Director of USCIS. I
    appear before you to discuss the President's USCIS budget
    request for fiscal year 2006.

                           PROGRESS SINCE MARCH 2003

        Yesterday, as was noted, USCIS celebrated its second
    anniversary. Today I am looking forward to sharing with you our
    tremendous progress since March 2003. We are delivering on the
    President's promise to welcome immigrants with open arms, not
    endless lines. Our remarkable progress is not an anomaly, but
    rather a strong foundation and a new baseline from which to
    grow in the coming years. We secure America's promise as a
    Nation of immigrants by fundamentally reforming our tired
    system of immigration services.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

        USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the
    Federal Government. Our 15,000 employees and contractors serve
    applicants throughout our broad national and international
    network. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget will allow us
    to build upon the progress we have made. The budget includes a
    total for USCIS of $1.854 billion, $80 million in appropriated
    funds and $1.774 billion in fees. This budget will allow USCIS
    to process over 7 million immigration benefit applications.
        We note that fiscal year 2006 will be the final year of the
    President's 5-year plan for backlog elimination. Our budget
    includes a total of $100 million to support backlog elimination
    efforts as well as improvements in applications processing.
    This brings the 5-year total for this aggressive initiative to
    $560 million. We are on track to achieve the President's
    backlog elimination mandate.
        As Will Rogers eloquently stated, even if you are on the
    right track you will get run over if you just sit there. Thus,
    we have taken and continue to take a hard reengineering look at
    the way we currently conduct our business. Since my appointment
    and confirmation as Director of USCIS, our leadership team has
    continually reviewed our processes, identified opportunities
    for streamlining and further improvement, and implemented
    meaningful changes.
        Let me plainly state that as we improve our ways we are
    committed to never compromise national security in an effort to
    increase productivity. From day 1, USCIS established three
    crystal-clear priorities: One, eliminate the immigration
    benefit applications backlog; two, enhance national security;
    and three, improve customer service. Let me briefly touch upon
    progress made on each of these priorities.

                              BACKLOG ELIMINATION

        Eliminating the backlog. Operationally, fiscal year 2004
    was truly an outstanding year for USCIS and we continue the
    momentum so far in fiscal year 2005. We successfully reduced
    the backlog to 1.365 million cases, down from a high of 3.8
    million cases just a year ago in 2004. We increased overall
    completions by 21 percent processed, met, or exceeded cycle
    time targets in 15 of 16 major form types. We completed 109,000
    asylum cases in fiscal year 2004, a 20 percent increase, and
    also 53,000 refugees were admitted to the United States in
    fiscal year 2004, an 86 percent increase.

                           NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION

        Ensuring national security as well as preventing and
    detecting fraud are essential elements of our mission. Our
    newly created Fraud Detection and National Security Unit
    developed a joint anti-fraud strategy with ICE. We enhanced our
    background check process and we share information with key law
    enforcement and intelligence agencies.

                        IMPROVEMENT IN CUSTOMER SERVICE

        As an immigrant who once passed through the old INS system,
    I insist that we treat those who come before USCIS with dignity
    and respect. That brings me to improving customer service.
    Therefore, we have promoted a customer service culture and
    expanded many of the services available to customers online and
    by phone. Electronic filing now supports 50 percent of the
    total volume of benefit applications.
        InfoPass, our web-based system, enables applicants to go
    online in 12 different languages to schedule appointments. No
    more endless lines outside our immigration offices. We expanded
    phone services and access to customer's case status information
    via our website.
        Finally, in the past year USCIS has naturalized more than
    7,000 military service members. This past October, I personally
    led a USCIS team to Afghanistan and Iraq and launched overseas
    naturalizations to our military.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        In summary, although we have a long ways to go before our
    destination, I note that we are on the right track and moving
    forward to make USCIS an exemplary United States Government
    agency. This concludes my opening remarks, prepared remarks. I
    thank you for your support and for the invitation to testify
    before this subcommittee, and of course would be happy to
    answer your questions. Thank you, sir.
        [The statement follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Eduardo Aguirre, Jr.

        Good afternoon Chairman Cochran and Ranking Member Byrd and Members
    of the Subcommittee. My name is Eduardo Aguirre and I have the honor of
    serving as the first Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
    Services, within the Department of Homeland Security.
        We are a welcoming Nation, and the hard work and patriotism of our
    immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. Since USCIS was established
    in March of 2003, we have made tremendous progress, which I will share
    with you today, to deliver the President's vision of ``welcoming
    immigrants with open arms . . . not endless lines.'' It is my sincere
    belief that the progress we have made in the past year is not an
    anomaly, but rather a strong foundation and a new baseline from which
    to grow.
        USCIS will continue to secure America's promise as a Nation of
    immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our
    customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an
    awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity
    of our immigration system. Our vision is to strengthen America's future
    by becoming a customer-focused innovator of benefits processing, a
    catalyst for citizenship education, instruction and outreach, a
    recognized and credible source of useful information, and a leading
    contributor to the security of the United States.
        USCIS has established three core values: integrity, respect, and
    ingenuity. We shall always strive for the highest level of integrity in
    our dealings with our customers, our fellow employees, and the citizens
    of the United States. We will also demonstrate respect in all our
    actions to ensure that everyone we affect will be treated with dignity
    and courtesy regardless of the outcome of the decision. And we will
    also use ingenuity, resourcefulness, creativity, and sound management
    principles to strive for world-class results.
        USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the Federal
    Government--charging fees for a variety of immigration benefits from
    individuals seeking to enter, reside, or work in the United States.
    Therefore, the actual cash flow for our business operations, including
    a network of 250 local offices, Application Support Centers, Service
    Centers, Asylum Offices, National Customer Service Call (NCSC) Centers,
    Forms Centers, and Internet portals, varies from year to year with the
    number of immigration benefit applications received.
        In any typical work day, our workforce of 15,000 (one-third of whom
    are contractors) will:
      --Conduct 140,000 national security background checks.
      --Receive 100,000 hits to our Internet website (www.uscis.gov).
      --Answer phone inquiries from 80,000 callers at four National
            Customer Service Centers.
      --Process 30,000 applications for an immigration benefit.
      --Answer in-person inquiries from 25,000 visitors to information
            counters at 92 local offices.
      --Issue 7,000 green cards.
      --Capture 8,000 sets of fingerprints at 130 Application Support
            Centers.
      --Welcome 3,000 new citizens.
      --Welcome 3,000 new permanent residents.
      --Welcome nearly 200 refugees from around the world.
      --Help American parents adopt nearly 80 foreign-born orphans.
      --Process the naturalization application of 50 individuals serving in
            the U.S. military.
      --Grant asylum to 80 individuals already in the United States.
        USCIS has established three priorities: (1) enhancing national
    security, (2) eliminating the immigration benefit application backlog,
    and (3) improving customer service. In our second year of operations,
    we have successfully reduced the backlog to 1.5 million cases (down
    from a high of 3.8 million cases in January 2004), expanded electronic
    filing to support 50 percent of the total volume of benefit
    applications, expanded InfoPass (a USCIS Web-based system that enables
    the public to go online to schedule appointments), expanded phone
    services to allow round-the-clock access via automated means, expanded
    access to customers' case status information via the USCIS website, and
    created the Fraud Detection and National Security Unit to work closely
    with the appropriate law enforcement entities in responding to concerns
    relating to aliens who may pose a threat to national security or public
    safety.
        The President's fiscal year 2006 budget will allow us to build upon
    the progress we have made in the past year. The budget includes a total
    for USCIS of $1.854 billion, $80 million in appropriated funds and
    $1.774 billion in fees. The fiscal year 2006 budget will allow USCIS to
    process over 7 million immigration benefit applications and is the
    final year of the President's 5-year plan to achieve a 6-month cycle
    time standard or less for all immigration benefit applications at every
    USCIS office, including a total of $100 million to support backlog
    elimination efforts as well as improvements in application processing.
    This brings the 5-year total for this aggressive initiative to $560
    million.
        The USCIS fiscal year 2006 budget also includes two important fee-
    related legislative proposals. One proposal involves the removal of a
    statutory cap on the Temporary Protected Status processing fee. This
    proposal will allow the fee to be adjusted above the current $50 to
    recover full costs, subject to a fee review, similar to the way other
    immigration benefit application fees are currently set. The other
    proposal is a customer service enhancement that authorizes expansion of
    premium processing service to non-employment based applications and
    petitions. The Department is currently authorized to collect a $1,000
    premium processing fee, in addition to the normal processing fee, for
    employment-based applications and petitions. This proposal would
    authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to set the premium
    processing fee for certain non employment-based applications and
    petitions, such as travel documents, advance parole, employment
    authorization, re-entry permits, fiance adjudications, etc., not to
    exceed $1,000, and in excess of $1,000 for the investor visa (EB-5)
    program.

    Eliminating the Backlog
        Although we are on track to achieve the President's backlog
    elimination mandate, we fully realize that funding alone will not
    enable us to achieve this goal. As Will Rogers so simply stated, ``Even
    if you're on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit
    there.'' Thus, we have taken, and continue to take, a hard look at the
    way we currently conduct our business. This commitment is not just one
    of words, but one of action. Since my appointment and confirmation as
    Director of USCIS, I have worked closely with the leaders in USCIS to
    continually review our processes, identify opportunities for
    streamlining and further improvement, and to implement meaningful
    change. Let me assure you that USCIS will never compromise national
    security in an effort to increase productivity.
        In the past year, USCIS forwarded to the Congress a Backlog
    Elimination Plan that outlines the roadmap to achieve the President's
    mandate. We will continue to provide the Congress with quarterly
    progress reports on our Backlog Elimination status and achievements.
        Fiscal year 2004 was truly an outstanding year for USCIS. USCIS
    increased overall completions by 17 percent over the fiscal year 2003
    volume and met and/or exceeded cycle time targets in fifteen of sixteen
    major form types. In addition, USCIS completed a total of 109,000
    asylum cases in fiscal year 2004, representing a 20 percent increase in
    productivity from the previous fiscal year, when it completed 91,000.
    USCIS also worked steadily with its refugee program partners to
    successfully meet refugee admissions levels designated by the President
    while ensuring that the integrity and security of the program remained
    intact. USCIS officers conducted refugee status interviews in 50
    countries around the world and interviewed more than 70,000 refugee
    applicants of at least 65 different nationalities. As a result of these
    efforts, almost 53,000 refugees were admitted to the United States
    during fiscal year 2004, an 86 percent increase over the previous
    year's admissions.
        USCIS will increase its focus on Information Technology through an
    enterprise-wide transformation effort to ensure that long-term backlog
    elimination goals are sustained, customer service is improved, fraud
    detection and national security capabilities are enhanced, and a
    technology environment is deployed to support new processes and
    workflow aligned with the DHS mission and the Presidential mandate for
    eGov standards. USCIS is currently undergoing an infrastructure upgrade
    of its District and Service Center operations, upgrading its web
    presence environment, and developing a new integrated case management
    system to ultimately operate in a paperless adjudication environment.

    Ensuring National Security
        USCIS understands that ensuring national security and preventing
    and detecting fraud are essential elements of its mission. As such, our
    newly established Fraud Detection and National Security Unit (FDNS)
    developed a joint anti-fraud strategy with Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE), hired and trained nearly 100 anti-fraud officers,
    and is in the midst of implementing an anti-fraud initiative throughout
    the United States. The FDNS is also leading the enhancement of USCIS'
    background check process, which is aimed at identifying applicants,
    beneficiaries, and petitioners who pose a threat to national security
    and public safety prior to granting them immigration benefits. The FDNS
    is also leading USCIS' information sharing initiative with key law
    enforcement and intelligence agencies.
        The establishment of a Refugee Corps with an expanded management
    support structure will provide a strong and effective overseas refugee
    processing program that will more efficiently identify inadmissible
    persons and those who are of national security interest without
    compromising the U.S. Refugee Program's (USRPs) humanitarian
    objectives. A Refugee Corps will ensure responsiveness to USRP
    commitments and goals, while greatly reducing the need to draw on
    scarce domestic program resources. It will also ensure the quality and
    consistency of refugee adjudications and improve the detection of
    refugee application fraud and the identification of security concerns
    relating to refugee admissions.
        USCIS also implemented the Safe Third Country Agreement on Asylum
    with Canada to help strengthen public confidence in the integrity of
    the immigration system and ensure that all asylum seekers will be
    heard, that they will receive procedural safeguards, and that they not
    be removed until either Canada or the United States has made a
    determination on the protection claim, in accordance with national laws
    implementing treaty obligations.

    Improving Customer Service
        The Office of Citizenship continues to focus on providing
    information to immigrants at two key points in their journey towards
    citizenship: when they first become Permanent Residents and later when
    they are ready and eligible to begin the formal naturalization process.
    In the past year, the Office of Citizenship introduced an orientation
    guide entitled ``Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New
    Immigrants.'' The guide, which will be available in 10 languages in
    fiscal year 2005, contains practical information to help immigrants get
    started in the United States, and provides information to assist
    immigrants in the civic integration process. The Office of Citizenship
    also held a series of focus groups across the United States during the
    spring of 2004 to hear directly from local communities about their
    strengths, gaps, and needs in the areas of immigrant integration and
    citizenship preparation. The results of these focus group discussions
    were published in a report called ``Helping Immigrants Become New
    Americans: Communities Discuss the Issues.''
        Additionally, we have been examining the standard of knowledge in
    the current citizenship test to ensure that prospective and new
    citizens know not only the facts of our Nation's history, but also the
    ideals that have shaped that history. We also are working to
    standardize testing procedures in an effort to ensure equitable and
    more uniform results. Currently, a candidate in Los Angeles is, in all
    likelihood, not tested the same way or asked the same questions as a
    candidate taking the same exam on the same day in Boston.
        We do not want to make the test more difficult. We do not want to
    make it less difficult. We want to make it more meaningful in a way
    that does not have an adverse impact on any particular group of
    applicants. Therefore, we will carefully pilot test the revised
    English, history, and government tests before implementing them. And we
    will consult with our stakeholders to solicit their input, as we have
    done throughout the process. Once the test development is done, the
    Office of Citizenship will coordinate the creation of educational
    materials to complement this important initiative.
        Our plan is to begin implementing the new test and testing process
    in 2007. Given the importance of the ultimate benefit for those
    tested--U.S. citizenship--this process is not one that can or should be
    rushed. We are committed to improving the current process and to
    improving it in the right way.
        In our commitment to modernize and enhance the delivery of
    immigration services, InfoPass was launched in Miami in June of 2003.
    InfoPass is a free, easy and convenient alternative to waiting in line.
    It allows USCIS customers to go on-line and use an Internet-based
    system to make an appointment to speak with an Immigration Information
    Officer at a time that is convenient for the customer. InfoPass is now
    available for customers at all USCIS District and sub offices.
        Other conveniences available on www.uscis.gov include ``E-Filing''
    for certain immigration applications, including the renewal and
    replacement of ``green cards,'' (Form I-90). E-Filing provides a quick,
    easy and convenient way for customers to complete, submit, and pay fees
    for petitions and applications at any time, from any computer with
    Internet access. As a further time saver, the USCIS Web site is now set
    up to accept credit cards for the payment of application fees. To date,
    USCIS has received more than 250,000 applications through its E-Filing
    system. E-Filing now supports form types that account for 50 percent of
    the total volume of benefits applications USCIS receives annually.
    During fiscal year 2005, USCIS plans to combine E-Filing with the
    Lockbox program to further streamline our internal processes. E-Filing
    will also play a key supporting role in implementing Premium Processing
    for additional form types; the newly enacted H1-B/L-1 Visa Reform Acts;
    and an electronic adjudication initiative.
        Additionally, the public is encouraged to use the Internet to check
    the status of applications filed with any of USCIS' Service Centers.
    Our Case Status Service Online, available in English and Spanish,
    allows customers who have a receipt number for an application or
    petition filed at a USCIS Service Center to check the status of their
    pending case online through the USCIS website (USCIS.gov), or by
    calling the toll-free telephone number of our National Customer Service
    Center. The Case Status Online system offers customers the option of
    establishing a portfolio of up to 100 cases that can be checked through
    a single login 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Customers can also elect
    to have USCIS automatically send an email informing them of any change
    in status of a pending case.
        In the past year, USCIS has responded to over 11,000,000 queries
    for verification of immigration status. USCIS provides immigration and
    employment authorization status information to over 126,000 government
    and private sector users. By providing the best possible verification
    services to thousands of agencies and employers, USCIS saves the
    Government money by ensuring that only eligible aliens receive public
    benefits. In addition, an employment verification pilot program
    authorized in 1996 and reauthorized in 2004, helps to ensure that jobs
    are available only to workers authorized to accept employment in the
    United States.
        As you are aware, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
    year 2004 authorized overseas military naturalizations. In the past
    year, USCIS has naturalized more than 7,000 military service members
    both in the United States and overseas, and posthumously naturalized 39
    service members who died in service to the United States.
        Finally, USCIS committed itself to the global effort to recover
    from the earthquake and tsunami by announcing temporary relief measures
    for those individuals who are unable to return to their home country
    due to the destruction and humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. USCIS
    is expediting the processing of certain immigration benefit
    applications, including requests for advance parole and relative
    petitions for minor children from the affected areas. USCIS also is
    more readily approving applications from visitors from the tsunami-
    affected countries who requested a change or extension of their
    nonimmigrant status.
        This concludes my prepared remarks. I thank you for the invitation
    to testify before this committee and I would be happy to answer any
    questions.

        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Aguirre.

                           ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

        This morning National Public Radio did a report on
    Alternatives to Detention and the program run by the
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency using ankle
    bracelets to keep up with and track noncriminal aliens as they
    await the outcome of their immigration cases being considered
    and disposed of. What is the utility of this method and do you
    consider it more humane, more efficient, and less expensive
    than detaining through forcible imprisonment, or whatever other
    devices you have, those who you know may not be legally
    entitled to be in our country? Mr. Garcia?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A timely topic as
    there is a $5.4 million enhancement for that program in the
    2006 request. We right now have eight sites where we do
    Alternatives to Detention and we plan to expand that two more
    for a total of ten.
        This is a program, Mr. Chairman, that does exactly what it
    says. It is an alternative to detention. These are illegal
    aliens who would otherwise be subject to incarceration. The
    program is in three steps: a 30-day period with an ankle
    bracelet, a monitoring and reporting requirement. If the alien
    complies, the bracelet comes off and then it is telephonic
    interviews and home visits. After an additional period, it
    becomes only telephonic interviews.
        It is extremely cost-effective, estimated at a quarter of
    the cost of detention space. It provides assistance to the
    aliens in the process, linking them with pro bono services, et
    cetera. And it asks for responsibility on the part of the
    alien, who has voluntarily opted into this program, and that is
    an important point. This is a voluntary program. But it asks
    for responsibility on the part of the participants and if they
    show that, then the conditions become less onerous over time.

                           USE OF RADIATION MONITORS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, we understand too the
    importance of upgrading technologies in the Border Patrol area,
    and you highlighted that in your statement. What is the success
    that you anticipate from using radiation monitors? Is this a
    technology that has been proven? I ask this in the context with
    our experience in Iraq, where the weapons inspectors were using
    radiation monitors there and David Kay made a point of saying
    you can deploy these monitors, but after the sand and the heat
    and the other influences of nature take place you might have a
    useless piece of equipment there in the desert. Have you had
    any experiences similar to that at CBP?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, the main thing that we have
    going in terms of detecting against a nuclear device or special
    nuclear materials is a combination of technology that we would
    deploy and we are deploying at our ports of entry principally.
    So there is where we have radiation portal monitors. We have
    completed the first two phases, which is the International Mail
    Facility, so every package that comes in is screened. The
    International Air Express Consignment Facilities are completed.
    We have substantially deployed well over 200 portal monitors on
    our northern border ports of entry with Canada. We are in the
    process of now deploying a significant number along our
    southern border ports of entry with Mexico, and we have started
    deployment at some of our major seaports.
        We have a long way to go here. But the question is are they
    effective. Well, you need a combination of technology.
    Radiation portal monitors are highly sensitive to both gamma
    and neutron detection. In other words, you can have, without
    getting into sort of the classified area here, you can have a
    fair degree of confidence in the fact that you are going to
    detect radiation. In fact, since we started deploying the
    radiation portal monitors--and these are large things at our
    ports of entry, through every--not just commercial truck, every
    passenger vehicle that comes through--since we have started
    deploying them, we have resolved over 10,000 radiation hits.
        The good news to tell you is that those radiation hits
    turned out to be negative. In other words, we resolved them to
    be naturally occurring radiation sources or radioactive
    material consistent with the shipment of goods. That might be,
    by the way, a shipment of tiles, which very frequently emits
    radiation that reads for thorium and so on.
        So this is not the only thing, though. We combine that with
    our targeting system, and our NII equipment, that is our large-
    scale X-ray scanning machines, as well as isotope identifiers
    and other personal radiation detector equipment, to give us a
    combination of resources that improves our ability to detect
    against a dirty bomb coming across our border and/or
    potentially a nuclear device, which is obviously of the most
    momentous consequence one can imagine.
        We have found them to be effective. Now, we are looking
    for--we are always looking for better technology to detect
    against this issue.

             SIX-MONTH AVERAGE FOR PROCESSING BENEFITS APPLICATIONS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, you mentioned reducing the
    backlog of your benefit application cases down to 1.3 million
    cases from a high of 3.8 million in January of 2004. I know you
    have devoted special funding in this area, too. Once you do not
    set aside dollars to bring down the backlog, are you going to
    be able to maintain this 6-month average of processing
    applications?
        Mr. Aguirre. Senator, I am certain of that. I am certain
    that we are going to meet the commitment to eliminate the
    backlog by September 2006. In fact, I will be surprised if we
    do not beat that by a little. And in the process, we have re-
    engineered all our processes so that not only are we
    eliminating the backlog and perhaps put it below a cycle time
    of 6 months, but also making sure that we are taking care of
    the applications that are coming in day in and day out.
        So once this 5-year commitment expires, I do not feel that
    we are going to need to go back to any appropriated funds for
    this particular endeavor.
        Senator Cochran. We have a vote that is occurring on the
    floor of the Senate right now. But before we cut off the right
    of any Senator to ask questions, I am going to proceed and
    recognize Senator Byrd and Senator Leahy both if they wanted to
    ask questions before we go vote.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesies
    always.
        First, let me ask unanimous consent that a letter from me
    to the Honorable Michael Chertoff be included in the record
    following my earlier statement.
        Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                  ANTIDUMPING/COUNTERVAILING DUTY COLLECTIONS

        Senator Byrd. Thank you.
        Commissioner Bonner, on December 17, 2004, Customs and
    Border Protection (CBP) issued its regular annual report on the
    Byrd Amendment trade law. The annual report describes how
    hundreds of millions of dollars in duties are not being
    collected by Customs, and the agency has been unable to explain
    why it cannot collect these funds.
        In fiscal year 2003, the agency failed to collect $130
    million in duties owed to the United States under the U.S.
    anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, and CBP failed to
    collect an additional $260 million in fiscal year 2004. The
    majority of that $390 million is the result of uncollected
    duties on goods imported from China. The conference report
    accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
    Act for fiscal year 2005, which was enacted in October 2004,
    included language that directed Customs and Border Protection
    to submit a report to the House and Senate Appropriations
    Committees by January 15, 2005, on the implementation of
    recommendations that were made by the U.S. Treasury
    Department's Inspector General concerning the Customs and
    Border Protection's implementation of the Byrd Amendment trade
    law.
        The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet received
    that report. Why is this problem of noncollection growing, and
    what are you doing to address it? Finally, do your efforts
    respond to the recommendations of the Treasury Inspector
    General?
        Mr. Bonner. Let me first of all say, Senator Byrd, that we
    are committed, I am personally committed, to improving our
    collection efforts. I am troubled that we used to say when we
    were settling cases that we were leaving too much money on the
    table here that is not collected. It is not accurate to say
    that we are unable to explain what the problem is. I think we
    have a pretty good understanding of the problems and we have
    taken some steps to improve our collections of antidumping and
    countervailing duty assessments. But let me just identify a
    couple of ways where we are moving forward. One of the problems
    in terms of collections was the insufficiency of continuous
    duty bonds for these kinds of high-risk shipments. These tend
    to be, by the way, agriculture and seafood products, a lot of
    it coming from China, but some other countries, and the
    continuous duty bonds were not nearly sufficient when the
    ultimate duty assessment was made by the Department of
    Commerce.
        So we have taken steps to raise the continuous duty bonds
    on goods that are particularly those types of goods that are or
    are very likely to be subject to antidumping duties, a final
    order.
        There were insufficient single entry bonds. In other words,
    we did not have recourse. So we are more diligent. We now have
    something that is very close to real-time monitoring of
    shipments that are subject to preliminary orders of commerce or
    potentially high-risk shipments of goods, and are raising the
    single entry duty bonds to higher levels that are more
    consistent with what we expect the ultimate duty assessment to
    be.
        By the way, just to let you know that we have taken not
    just those two steps to increase the bond coverage, but we have
    a better mechanism now for potentially identifying
    circumvention of the antidumping duties. By the way, as you can
    imagine, there is all sorts of circumvention. It is everything
    from fraudulent misdescribing of the goods, so that it is not a
    good that was subject to an antidumping order--we have had
    that, by the way, with respect to catfish shipments mislabeled
    as groupers. I know you are interested in this issue, Mr.
    Chairman. But we have had that.
        We have had sham companies that are set up and so forth. So
    we have ratcheted up our enforcement effort through our
    Commercial Enforcement Division and, frankly, are working very
    closely with ICE in nine significant and hopefully potential
    criminal prosecutions, but criminal investigation of fraud. We
    think that it would be very important to bring additional cases
    in this area for its deterrent value.
        We are better coordinating with the Department of Commerce
    so that we are actually in communication with them before even
    a preliminary order comes out and we can take some steps.

                          DEFAULT OF A SURETY COMPANY

        We have discussed with the Treasury Department one other
    issue, and that was actual default of a surety company, which
    was about $100 million of the total failure to collect. This
    was a surety company that had been approved by the Treasury
    Department and it defaulted on its surety bond obligations. So
    we are working with Treasury to make sure that the surety
    companies that are approved by the Treasury Department to write
    customs bonds are financially viable when payment time comes
    up.

                   INITIAL PRELIMINARY ORDERS IN LIQUIDATION

        So we have taken all these steps. Now, there is a lag time,
    as you know, between the initial preliminary orders in
    liquidation. So it is going to take some period of time before
    we see substantial results here, but I do think we have taken
    some very important steps to identify the problem and take
    concrete actions that are going to improve, and I hope
    substantially improve, our collection rate.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Commissioner, I am heartened by your
    response. I know that you are very much alert to the problem.
    It is complex, it is difficult, and I compliment you on the way
    that you are working with other agencies and departments to
    deal with this problem. I thank you. I urge you to continue to
    work on it and to work even harder. I do appreciate your
    efforts.
        Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, let me close, because we are up
    against the voting situation over there. Incidentally, I have
    cast over 17,000 votes, but I do want to cast some today. I am
    going to submit the remainder of my questions, if I may, to be
    answered for the record.
        I thank all the witnesses.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your contribution
    to the hearing.

                         ICE HIRING IN FISCAL YEAR 2006

        Senator Leahy. Just very quickly and I will put most of my
    questions in the record. To Assistant Secretary Garcia: When
    ICE was here last year it had severe budget problems, a hiring
    freeze. Does the fiscal year 2006 request bring ICE back to
    fiscal solvency? Will you be lifting the hiring freeze. If not,
    when?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Leahy. You are correct, we
    were here last year, we had a hiring freeze. We have taken a
    number of steps to address that. Working with the Department,
    we continue to do that. We need to take further steps.
    Secretary Loy testified a couple of weeks ago to that effect.
        The 2006 as we have proposed it will move us forward. We
    will be hiring in 2006.
        Senator Leahy. All these temporary people who have been
    there for 3 or 4 years, does that mean they can be looking for
    permanent positions now?
        Mr. Garcia. That is certainly our intention, Senator. I
    know that there are a number of those temporary positions at
    our Law Enforcement Support Center up in Burlington. As we have
    discussed, I only see the role of that Center expanding and
    becoming more important under our homeland security mission.
        Senator Leahy. Does the budget cover what you need or are
    you going to need reprogramming?
        Mr. Garcia. Hard to answer because, as we go along I will
    look at that. I have not been able to do that yet, obviously,
    because of the lack of clarity on some of the budget issues and
    the challenges we have been facing. But it is an issue that we
    consider a top priority.

                     BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING INCREASES

        Senator Leahy. Mr. Bonner, I mentioned before the budget
    only asks for 10 percent of the mandated agents. You think we
    need further agents on the northern border.
        Mr. Bonner. Well----
        Senator Leahy. Because you are only asking for 10 percent
    of what Congress mandated.
        Mr. Bonner. As you know, Senator, I am in full, violent
    support of the President's budget request, which requests 210
    Border Patrol agents in addition to, of course, replacing
    attrition.
        Senator Leahy. But none of them for the northern border?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, you know, you did note----
        Senator Leahy. We needed more.
        Mr. Bonner. You did note and let me note that we had 360
    Border Patrol agents on the northern border for the entire
    border with Canada on 9/11. On March 1, 2003, that was up to
    about 500.
        One of the first actions I took was to direct Border Patrol
    to meet the 1,000 goal, which they did actually in fiscal year
    2003.
        Senator Leahy. Do we need any more--this is what the bottom
    line is. Do we need any more on the northern border? Do we have
    enough on the northern border today?
        Mr. Bonner. You mean beyond what we have in the request?
        Senator Leahy. No, no. Do we have enough on the northern
    border with the number we have today. There is no request for
    the northern border. It is 210, 10 percent of what we mandated.
    But that is not for the northern border.
        Do we have enough on the northern border? It is an easy
    answer, yes or no.
        Mr. Bonner. We do not have enough agents. We do not have
    enough technology to give us the kind of security we need on
    the northern border.
        Senator Leahy. I am just a lawyer from a small town in
    Vermont. I do not understand. Is that a yes or a no?
        Mr. Bonner. I am just a lawyer from a small town in Kansas,
    so--
        That moved to California at some point.
        Senator Leahy. Here we are in the big city. Is it yes or
    no?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, we need more agents----
        Senator Leahy. Help me out here.
        Mr. Bonner. We need more agents. But look, I think it is
    the right combination of people and technology, and essential
    to this is the American Shield Initiative. The fiscal year 2006
    budget includes $81 million for technology, for more
    helicopters, and for UAV's for the Border Patrol. We need to do
    a smarter and a better job. I think we can do that. The
    President's request is for 210 more Agents. I do not know that
    they are necessarily earmarked all for the southern border. If
    you are asking me, I think probably most of them will go there.
        Senator Leahy. We should have this discussion in greater
    detail, because I am not happy. I do not think we are getting
    the number, we are certainly not getting anywhere near the
    number that the Congress mandated.

                                I-91 CHECKPOINT

        I also want to have your staff and mine talk about this
    checkpoint you have on Interstate 91 in Vermont, a long, long
    distance from the border, that just stops honest Vermonters
    that have been driving back and forth there forever and ever.
        You had people--aliens that have been there for ever and
    ever, they keep getting stopped over and over and over again.
    There is a real suspicion of some racial profiling people who
    have honestly, working in New Hampshire and Vermont for years
    and years, and just continuously get stopped. They continuously
    get asked the same questions as they got asked the day before.
        The irony is, of course, if anybody wanted to circumvent
    that they would just go out one of the back roads, and the
    agents would never find them.
        So let our staff talk about that. It is creating, both in
    the ``Live Free Or Die'' State of New Hampshire and the former
    independent republic of Vermont, it is creating a bit of a
    concern. It is not going to do anything to stop people from
    coming across the border, because they are not the ones getting
    stopped.
        Mr. Bonner. Could I briefly respond, though? That is that
    part of the strategy is not putting everything on the line
    itself. There has to be a second line of defense. It is not
    that the checkpoint is necessarily going to--that terrorists
    that might come across the Canadian border into the United
    States. Part of the strategy of a checkpoint is lateral
    enforcement from the checkpoint. It gives us a second line of
    defense.
        Senator Cochran. Senator, we have a vote.
        Mr. Bonner. It is going to be important. It is an important
    part of the overall strategy to get better control of our
    borders, something you and I have a common interest in.
        Senator Leahy. Yes. But when I have to stop and prove my
    identification and I am a U.S. citizen, I know this is helping
    somebody. It is sort of like security stopping Ted Kennedy a
    dozen times from going on a plane because he is seen on a
    terrorist list and the government does not know how the hell to
    get him off it.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cochran. This Senate hearing will stand in recess
    until we go vote and we will return to resume our questioning
    of the witnesses. We appreciate your indulgence.

              NEW OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

        Thank you very much for your patience. I apologize for
    having to go vote on the floor of the Senate during our
    hearing.
        The President's budget proposes to create the Office of
    Screening Coordination and Operations within the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. How do each of you see
    this new office contributing to the Department's ability to
    implement the 9/11 Commission recommendation? Mr. Bonner, let
    us start with you.
        Mr. Bonner. Well, I would say this, that certainly there
    will be some benefits from thinking through this issue of
    screening, particularly for the terrorist threat. So I expect
    that it will assist in terms of coordinating those efforts,
    understanding that there are fundamentally very different
    screening opportunities that are presented depending upon which
    homeland security agency you are talking about.
        We have the broadest law enforcement authority of any law
    enforcement agency in our country, Customs and Border
    Protection, and that is because we have the full authority to,
    without cause or suspicion, ask questions of anybody who is
    crossing our border or entering our country through our
    official entry points and certainly to arrest anybody who is
    not. Secondly, we have the broad customs search authority,
    which is the broadest search authority under the Fourth
    Amendment of our Constitution, which permits us to search and
    inspect luggage of everybody, by the way, U.S. citizens, non-
    citizens, without cause, warrant, or suspicion.
        So we have broad authorities, which we are using right now
    in terms of being as intelligent as we can to perform that
    priority mission of preventing terrorists from entering our
    country. But I think nonetheless the Screening Coordination
    Office should, I believe, play a helpful role.

                            VETTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS

        There is another area, just briefly let me touch on it, Mr.
    Chairman, where the Screening Coordination Office I think could
    play a valuable role. That is, there are in place right now
    essentially what I call trusted, vetted traveler programs.
    Customs and Border Protection vastly expanded the Nexus program
    at the Canadian border. We now have almost 80,000 people that
    we have vetted. That is not only taking biometrics from them;
    that is a personal interview to make sure that they pose no
    terrorist threat or smuggling threat. We have a similar program
    that we inherited from INS, the SENTRI program at the Mexican
    border. We have FAST, the FAST program for commercial truckers
    from both Mexico, coming from Mexico or Canada, and so forth.
        We have mature actual programs. They are not pilots. We
    have enrolled about 200,000 people into these programs. But on
    the other hand, TSA is piloting a registered passenger program
    and so forth. You need to look at the issue of what are the
    biometrics that should be collected from each person that is
    enrolled or is going to be considered to be a trusted or
    registered individual for receiving some benefits. You need to
    look at the biometric you use to identify them when they appear
    at the border port of entry or when they appear at the airport
    if it is a TSA issue and the like, and so forth.
        I think the Screening Coordination Office could play a very
    important role in getting those policy decisions, and they are
    policy decisions, made and implemented in the most visionary
    way possible, so that at the end of the day somebody that is
    vetted in for one of these programs, let us say for the Nexus
    program, would be cleared in for other kinds of trusted
    passenger programs.
        That is a big idea and I think the Screening Coordination
    Office can and I hope will play a valuable role in harmonizing,
    if you will, the technology issues for these different kinds of
    trusted, vetted, or registered passenger or traveler programs.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, this was part of the
    presidential commission, the National Commission on Terrorist
    attacks, the 9/11 Commission's, recommendations, that there be
    a centralized office created, designed to provide comprehensive
    screening across, addressing common problems and setting common
    standards in a systemwide operation. Do you see this office
    contributing to the Department's ability to implement this
    recommendation?
        Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, absolutely.
    Again, you tie it back to the 9/11 Commission report. I think
    you also look at the staff report on terrorist travel, the
    recommendations in there, incredibly important work, the
    conclusion that terrorist travel is at least as important an
    area or vulnerability as terrorist financing. This center
    certainly moves us forward in addressing those vulnerabilities.
    ICE will play a role, as we will CBP and CIS, in working with
    that center. For example, as we discussed, people who are
    screened who are turned back we now can follow through with
    associates present in the country by looking at our systems and
    our data.
        We can use our forensic document lab to examine their
    travel documents and provide bulletins and intelligence
    analysis to the front-line folks by analyzing that travel
    documentation that terrorists or other national security
    threats use to try to enter the country.
        So certainly centralization of the screening function, and
    as importantly I think what will flow from that within the
    Department and within the agencies.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, does this affect your agency
    and how are you cooperating in this effort if so?
        Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, it does affect our agency
    because, of course, we are all in the immigration business to
    one extent or another. Even though we are not on the
    enforcement side, we are involved in the biometric of,
    capturing biometrics of millions of applicants year in and year
    out, and those biometrics of course are oftentimes being used
    for law enforcement purposes where necessary.
        I actually view the issue from a service standpoint, in
    contrast to the enforcement standpoint. Any time you can have
    consistency and coordination of the identification process and
    the biometrics and so on, it can be an expedited opportunity
    for those who do not have hits or do not have any reason to
    feel the need of scrutiny.
        So I think it would expedite the processing of the 97, 98
    percent of those individuals that cross in and out. As you
    probably know, USCIS is the organization that generates many of
    the cards that are being used today. For instance, the Green
    Cards are produced by us. We have put in those Green Cards--
    permanent residency card--any number of biometric data for our
    colleagues on the enforcement side to be able to work with.

            OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS MISSION

        Senator Cochran. Commissioner Bonner, should the Office of
    Screening Coordination and Operations have actual operational
    authority for various screening programs, as proposed, or
    should it focus on the integration and coordination function
    necessary across so many programs involved in the activity?
        Mr. Bonner. I would say with respect to operations, you are
    talking about the actual gathering of biometric data on
    potential enrollees. You are talking about the actual interview
    that we do and have done with a couple hundred thousand people.
    I think that probably should be an operational function left
    with the agency that is ultimately responsible for and going to
    be held accountable for whatever benefit is being given.
        If you took just the border issue in terms of our screening
    at our ports of entry, international airports, land border,
    ultimately CBP is operating these programs right now--the NEXUS
    program, the SENTRI program. It may well make sense to leave
    that operation at the agency level, in the agency that actually
    is responsible.
        Now, having said that, let me say we have a new Secretary
    of Homeland Security, Mike Chertoff. By the way, I think
    Secretary Chertoff is somebody who, based upon my past
    experience, is going to be an extraordinary Secretary. He
    ultimately makes the decision, not me, as to how you make this
    distinction between what operational functions should remain at
    the agency level and what, if any, systems functions should be
    performed by the Screening Coordination Office.
        I do not think that has been decided. Those are my views
    subject to, of course, further guidance from Secretary
    Chertoff.
        Senator Cochran. Director Aguirre, what is your take on
    that? Just from an opposite point of view, should the
    Citizenship and Immigration Services programs, screening
    programs, be moved to the Office of Screening Coordination and
    Operations?
        Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that in the vacuum
    of this hearing I can give you an accurate answer. I think the
    issue of operations and the issue of ``who is responsible for
    what'' needs to be weighed in the context of is it working
    well/is it not working well/and how can it work better. So
    within Homeland Security I think we have a number of components
    that can always stand improvement, and to determine here and
    now what is better or worse, I would be ad libbing.

             INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT/BORDER PATROL STAFF INCREASES

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, this request does not include
    resources to fulfill the new Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act authorizations. Were the new authorizations
    considered or was the bill enacted into law too late to be
    considered when the fiscal year 2006 budget process was
    completed inside the administration?
        Mr. Bonner. That is a good question. I need to probe my
    memory on it in terms of the time line. Obviously, as you know,
    the process is that we did make a request that goes through the
    Department process, and ultimately ends up getting a lot of
    scrubbing and review. I actually participated in the
    Departmental Resources Review Board. I am not on that Board,
    but I was allowed to be present and to present the CBP budget
    request.
        I need to get back to you. I do not have the time line
    clearly in mind, but I do not remember as I was presenting the
    CBP budget to the Department that the intelligence bill I do
    not believe had passed with that authorization level. In fact,
    I am just reminded it was not signed until December 17, 2004.
    So it may have been one of those things where the budget was
    being put together before we even knew what the Congressional
    intent was in the intelligence bill.
        That said, by the way, let me say that--and I was
    addressing this a little bit with Senator Leahy--we have in the
    last 10 years or so, literally tripled the size of the Border
    Patrol, from about 4,000 Border Patrol Agents in the mid-90's
    to now, and with the President's request it will be just about
    11,000 Border Patrol Agents.
        There is a limit, by the way, in thinking of bringing new
    agent resources on board, there is a limit to how much a law
    enforcement organization like the Border Patrol can absorb.
    There are limits to how many agents the Border Control can
    recruit, hire, and train in a single year, and still maintain
    its cohesiveness as a law enforcement organization.
        But that is going beyond your question, Senator. I think
    the answer is I do not believe that the 2000 number was out
    there as the budget request was going forward.

                     IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISA REFORM ACT

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, the Visa Reform Act was
    passed as part of the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated
    Appropriations Act. That act tightens controls on the L1 visa
    and expands the cap on the H1B visas. What steps have been
    taken to begin implementation of that act?
        Mr. Aguirre. Well, Mr. Chairman, on the L1B visas there is
    a provision for additional resources, human resources, to be
    ensured that we can prevent fraudulent applications on the L1B.
    I think you are clearly aware that fraud is a major issue for
    Immigration Services, and L1B visas in particular are ones that
    we have felt, and I think the Congress has felt as well, that
    it is vulnerable to fraud. Therefore we are putting additional
    human resources and applying our fraud detection and national
    security unit to make sure that the applications are properly
    processed, and expedited in the normal process, but that we
    identify if there are any indices of fraud that we can identify
    appropriately.

                        L1 VISA INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE

        Now, on the H1B applications, as you know, there is a
    provision for an additional 20,000 applications, or the cap is
    raised by 20,000. We are in the process of implementing that
    number and within the next few days, if not weeks, we will have
    an improved process to take advantage of that.
        Senator Cochran. Has the L1 Visa Inter-Agency Task Force
    been set up?
        Mr. Aguirre. Senator, I am not aware of that, no, sir.

                    UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES--CATFISH IMPORTS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, this committee is interested
    in the progress to protect American industries from unfair
    competition. You mentioned the catfish and grouper issue a
    while ago. Of importance of course in our State and in the
    South is the catfish industry and the enforcement of
    antidumping orders in connection with Vietnamese tra and basa.
    What are ICE and CBP doing now to enforce this antidumping
    order?
        Mr. Bonner. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that going back
    to October of last year we began a special enforcement effort
    to essentially identify the misdescription, mislabeling of
    catfish, imported catfish that would be subject to antidumping
    duties. We do have a laboratory science and services branch
    where we were taking samples literally of imports that were
    coming into the port of L.A., Long Beach, Miami, and the Port
    of New York, and determining whether in fact they were what
    they were represented to be. We found that there was
    significant misdescription of a product that was being shipped
    from Vietnam.
        We have taken three important actions. One, based upon that
    identification at the port levels, we have raised the
    continuous duty bonds. We are requiring higher single entry
    duty bonds with respect to product that we believe in fact was
    subject to the countervailing duties, that is to say was in
    fact catfish. We have required payment of additional duties. We
    are actively pursuing what are called section 1592 penalty
    actions against those importers who imported mislabeled, I
    might say falsely and potentially fraudulently mislabeled
    product. We are working with ICE, as I indicated to Senator
    Byrd, to attempt to get further investigation through the ICE
    special agents, and potentially we are hopeful to get criminal
    prosecutions in at least some of these cases in conjunction
    with the Department of Justice and the relevant U.S. attorney's
    offices.
        Clearly, we have taken some steps. We are moving out on
    this issue because there is clearly some false labeling that is
    taking place here to essentially circumvent and fraudulently
    evade the antidumping duties.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, you have some responsibilities
    in this area as well, do you not?
        Mr. Garcia. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. ICE, as Commissioner
    Bonner indicated, is responsible for investigations in this
    area. We are committed to doing that. I know this crime has a
    very real impact on industries in this country. I have spoken
    with a number of members of Congress about those impacts in
    their particular districts and particular industries.
        I have seen a number of significant cases, and again
    Commissioner Bonner touched on them, that have come across my
    desk. I believe that we will be moving forward, again with the
    relevant U.S. attorney's office, to seek to bring criminal
    charges in a number of cases. We are using our overseas assets
    very aggressively to root out some of the fraud that has been
    going on in this area.
        So we have made progress and we are committed to continuing
    those enforcement efforts.

                       BORDER PATROL AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, the budget request includes
    some money, $20 million, to begin replacing Border Patrol
    helicopters. The plan calls for the full replacement of the air
    fleet to be completed in 2010. Is the request that is included
    in the budget sufficient to get you started in this direction?
    Would additional resources allow you to speed up the
    replacement of the fleet?
        Mr. Bonner. I am happy to get started on the
    recapitalization of the Border Patrol air assets. As I think
    you know, Mr. Chairman, out of the 110 or so air platforms that
    the Border Patrol has, roughly--this is a rough estimate as I
    do not have the exact number, about 40 to 50 of those are
    Vietnam vintage aircraft--the OH-6's, the small bubble
    surveillance helicopters, as well as about maybe 10 or 12
    Vietnam vintage Hueys.
        It is a good start. As we move forward with the integration
    of the Air and Marine Office in a better configuration with the
    Border Patrol air assets, we are going to find that there are
    some benefits there in terms of how we look at the air
    resources we need.
        But nonetheless, there is a significant amount of
    recapitalization that is going to need to be done and this is a
    start on it. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if there were more funding it
    would help us get there faster.

                    INTEGRATION OF CBP AIR AND MARINE ASSETS

        Senator Cochran. The integration of the air and marine
    resources has begun, as you point out. What progress is being
    made toward integrating the units with the Border Patrol?
        Mr. Bonner. There is some good progress. First of all, of
    course, the first phase of it was essentially the integration
    or the transfer. In some ways I see it as a transfer back to
    U.S. Customs, but anyway it was the transfer in November of
    last year of the Air and Marine Operations (AMO) office to CBP.
    That was phase one. That has been completed.
        We are now into phase two. In phase two, I am using the
    Transition Management Office process that we used very
    successfully to unify and integrate CBP. It is a process that
    essentially looks at the ways that we can now further integrate
    essentially the air assets and also the marine assets that are
    now all within CBP.
        By the way, there have already been some very important
    benefits from this, from the transfer of AMO to CBP in terms of
    better operational coordination between the Border Patrol and
    AMO and the like. But phase two will do this. It will better
    integrate one procurement, for not just the Border Patrol and
    not just for AMO, but for both. It will better integrate one
    maintenance system for all aviation air assets, one training
    system for all of our pilots, whether they are from the Border
    Patrol or whether they were AMO pilots. Ultimately, as part of
    this process, we are going to determine ways to better
    operationally integrate the efforts of both of these air and
    marine groups and assets.
        I have had several briefings on this already. I believe
    that we will be able to make some key decisions along the lines
    I have described certainly in the next couple of months or so,
    so that we are continuing to move forward with the best optimal
    organization, if you will, of the sum total of the air and
    marine assets that are now within CBP.
        Senator Cochran. I appreciate very much the cooperation of
    each of you and your agencies with our committee and the
    requests that we submit for information from time to time.
    Particularly, I appreciate your taking time to come here today
    and participate in this hearing, which is very important for us
    to have to get a full understanding of how you are allocating
    the resources under the budget request and what the priorities
    are.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        We want to help you succeed in your activities. So we thank
    you very much for your cooperation with our subcommittee.
    Senators may submit questions to you in writing and we ask you
    to respond to those within a reasonable time for our committee
    record.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                       CONTINUED FUNDING SHORTFALLS--ICE

        Question. In September of 2004, this Committee approved a request
    to transfer and reprogram $152 million in order to allow Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ``to effectively manage its financial
    position through year end''. In other words, the request was to move
    $152 million to ensure that ICE did not have a shortfall.
        This Committee worked with the Department to permanently move $193
    million in base resources from Customs and Border Protection to ICE in
    the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act. Admiral Loy recently testified
    to the House Appropriations Committee that he expects there to be a
    reprogramming request submitted soon to provide anywhere from an
    additional $250 to $300 million to ICE in order to finish out fiscal
    year 2005.
        The cycle of stopgap solutions needs to end. Too much time seems to
    have been spent trying to figure out how this situation came about--
    what is termed ``mapping''--rather than trying to make sure this
    problem is resolved so that we can move forward to ensure that an
    agency vital to combating terrorism is solvent.
        When will this Committee receive the transfer/reprogramming
    proposal to address the fiscal year 2005 shortfall?
        Answer. The notification of the proposed reprogramming was
    transmitted to the Appropriations Committees on March 12, 2005, in a
    letter dated March 11, 2005.
        Question. Have Congressional initiatives funded in the fiscal year
    2005 Appropriations Act been deferred until this problem is resolved?
        Answer. In the proposed reprogramming, ICE is proposing to defer
    $85.216 million of the $193.916 million in enhancements, i.e.,
    Congressional initiatives, funded in the fiscal year 2005
    Appropriations Act. Item 2, on page 5 of the Report of Proposed
    Reprogramming Action discusses, in detail, the enhancements which are
    being reduced from their original appropriated amounts. The
    enhancements that have been reduced are shown below:

    Fugitive Operations
        The enhancement is reduced to $9 million from the appropriated $50
    million level. This will allow funding of 42 positions instead of the
    236 positions originally planned. The reduction will mean that fewer
    Fugitive Operations teams can be deployed as originally planned.

    Institutional Removal Program
        The enhancement is reduced to $4 million from the appropriated $30
    million level. This will allow funding of 37 positions instead of the
    279 positions originally planned. Higher cost Special Agents will
    continue to perform some institutional removal duties, instead of
    replacing all of them with Immigration Enforcement Agents.

    Compliance Enforcement Units
        The enhancement is reduced to $11 million from the appropriated
    level of $16 million. This will permit funding of 89 positions instead
    of the 130 positions originally planned.

    Alternatives to Detention
        The enhancement is reduced to $2 million from the appropriated
    level of $11 million. This will permit funding of 11 positions instead
    of the 60 positions originally planned. Some capacity increases will
    occur at each of the current eight Intensive Supervision sites, though
    not to the anticipated levels.

    Guantanamo Migrant Operations Center
        The enhancement is reduced to $2 million from the appropriated
    level of $6.2 million. The level should be sufficient to support the
    Center's operations. (Note: remaining, fully-funded, enhancements
    include $26.5 million for Detention Bed Space; $25 million for Benefit
    Fraud; $14 million for the Visa Security Unit and the Office of
    International Affairs; $6 million for the Immigration Court Backlog; $5
    million for Worksite Enforcement; and, $4.2 million for the Cyber Crime
    Center.)
        Question. What assurance do we have that the fiscal year 2006
    request for ICE will solve this problem permanently?
        Answer. The full funding level requested in the President's Budget,
    internally realigned for the impact of the fiscal year 2005
    reprogramming request, will allow ICE to carry out its mission during
    fiscal year 2006. We do not foresee the need for further reprogramming
    or funding transfers among bureaus.
        Question. ICE has now lived under a hiring freeze for close to a
    calendar year. What impact is this having on the organization's ability
    to carry out its mission?
        Answer. ICE has had to implement several measures to ensure it
    operates within existing resources. It has had to prioritize funding
    requirements. In all cases, ICE has worked to ensure that mission
    critical requirements have been funded with the intent of minimizing
    any adverse impact on its national security related mission.
        Question. There are significant resources requested for fiscal year
    2006 to increase the base funding available to ICE: $105 million for
    the Office of Investigations, $24 million for the Office of Detention
    and Removals, and a significant portion of the $90 million for Custody
    Management. What method was used to come up with these estimates?
        Answer. Estimates were derived by looking at the entire operation
    and determining that the resources of these offices/programs needed
    increases in order to attain key operational goals.
        Question. Will the fiscal year 2006 request provide ICE with the
    funding necessary to enable it to lift the hiring freeze on October 1,
    2005?
        Answer. ICE continues to work closely with DHS, BTS, and OMB to
    identify solutions to address its financial issues. One of ICE's
    priorities is to implement financial solutions that will allow the
    lifting of the hiring freeze. This work is ongoing and as a result, it
    is too early to state whether the hiring freeze will be lifted on
    October 1, 2005. An alternative may be to implement solutions that
    would allow the freeze to be lifted later in the fiscal year.
        Question. According to the just delivered ``ICE Financial
    Management Overhaul'' report, ``The ICE Assistant Secretary brought in
    a team from other components of DHS on a 90-day detail to help identify
    solutions to ICE's financial issues. The team will make recommendations
    to the Assistant Secretary by later this Spring.'' Its charter
    includes: development of short-term recommendations to address fiscal
    year 2005 funding issues; an action plan with key recommendations to
    place ICE into a stable funding position for fiscal year 2006 and
    beyond; and recommendations for policies and procedures that will
    result in transparent budget and financial planning and execution. What
    potential is there that these recommendations could cause significant
    revisions to the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request?
        Answer. The President's Budget includes the necessary funding to
    ensure ICE can accomplish its mission to detect vulnerabilities and
    prevent violations that threaten national security. As mentioned in the
    ``ICE Financial Management Overhaul'' report, the team is developing
    recommendations to improve ICE's financial position in 2006.
        As noted in your question, the final report is due to the Assistant
    Secretary later this spring. The team's recommendations will be shared
    with the ICE's new CFO and Budget Director. ICE appreciates your
    interest in this effort and looks forward to working with you and your
    staff where necessary to implement any recommendations.
        Question. How is it that this organization is almost 2 years old
    and is just now looking to develop sound financial planning policies
    and procedures?
        Answer. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security
    represented a reorganization unprecedented in the Federal Government.
    2005 represents the first year that ICE has focused on issues other
    than transition and reconciliation. It is an opportune time to further
    refine financial policies and procedures previously implemented and to
    continue developing sound policies and processes as necessary.
        Question. ICE has two outsourcing competitions on going--labor
    management and intelligence support. Is this an area where ICE could
    see significant cost savings?
        Answer. Fiscal year 2005 would have been U.S. Immigration and
    Custom Enforcement's (ICE's) initial full year of participation in
    competitive sourcing since its inception. ICE intended to initiate its
    original studies on a relatively small scale in order to properly
    establish its competitive sourcing infrastructure. Significant cost
    savings were not expected to be realized based on the fiscal year 2005
    studies. More significant savings would be anticipated based on broader
    studies under consideration for fiscal year 2006. ICE expects to be an
    active participant in the initiative in fiscal year 2006.
        Question. Please provide a chart with the on-board staffing level
    for ICE, by position type, for September 30, 2004, and fiscal year 2005
    through January 31, 2005, both excluding Air and Marine Operations.
        Answer. Attached are the ICE on-board staffing charts for the end
    of fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, through the pay period ending
    February 5, 2005. Federal Protective Service positions are included,
    but Federal Air Marshal Service positions are not included.
        Highlighted changes from 2004 to 2005 are:
      --An increase of 185 positions transferred from Customs and Border
            Protection to ICE for International Affairs
      --The movement of 112 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
            positions from reimbursable to direct
      --The movement of 138 positions from reimbursable to direct

        Question. Please provide updated fee projection charts for each fee
    account for fiscal year 2006 as compared to fiscal year 2005, with the
    chart for the Student Exchange Visitor Information System broken out by
    month.
        Answer. Attached are fee projection charts for ICE by fee account
    for fiscal year 2006 versus fiscal year 2005.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                  Fee accounts                     2005            2006
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Immigration User Fee....................        $100,000        $101,621
    Breached Bond Detention Fund............         114,000         115,260
    Student and Exchange Visitor Program:
        I-901 Revenues:
            October.........................       1,459,215       2,039,431
            November........................       2,636,660       2,166,852
            December........................       3,451,620       3,135,481
            January.........................       2,211,365       2,092,676
            February........................       1,970,220       1,485,072
            March...........................       2,661,321       2,661,321
            April...........................       4,452,487       4,452,487
            May.............................       6,211,727       6,311,727
            June............................       7,225,460       7,509,932
            July............................       7,149,570       7,441,213
            August..........................       4,515,573       4,524,954
            September.......................       2,072,375       2,072,375
                                             -------------------------------
              Total.........................      46,017,593      45,893,520
                                             ===============================
        I-17 Revenues:
            October.........................          30,659       1,050,960
            November........................          27,960         403,680
            December........................          38,416         187,920
            January.........................          28,540         231,420
            February........................          33,330         320,740
            March...........................          29,000         211,120
            April...........................          29,000         372,940
            May.............................          29,000         309,720
            June............................          29,000         161,240
            July............................          29,000         132,820
            August..........................          29,000          53,360
            September.......................          29,000          62,640
                                             -------------------------------
              Total.........................         361,905       3,498,560
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Please provide a chart with the fiscal year 2006
    annualization projections broken out by fiscal year 2005 initiative.
        Answer. Please see table below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Enhancement                             Annualization   One-time costs        Net
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Compliance.....................................................         $13,743         ($9,710)          $4,033
    IRP............................................................          28,478         (11,420)          17,058
    Fugitive Ops...................................................          25,799         (11,543)          14,256
    Alternatives...................................................           4,925          (2,856)           2,069
    Bed Space......................................................           2,869          (1,326)           1,543
    Backlog........................................................          13,256          (2,222)          11,034
    Worksite.......................................................           3,044          (1,648)           1,396
                                                                    ------------------------------------------------
          Total....................................................          92,114         (40,725)          51,389
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Please provide detailed comprehensive justifications for
    each program increase requested in the fiscal year 2006 President's
    budget.
        Answer.
    Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN)

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                         Program                        2004 budget     2005 budget     2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ICE's portion of HSDN \1\.......................  ..............  ..............          11,300          11,300
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Note: There is no base budget for HSDN. However, the Department's Working Capital Fund assessment for fiscal
      year 2005 is currently estimated to be $8.695 million. ICE contributed $3.2 million to the WCF in fiscal year
      2004 for HSDN.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for HSDN totals $11.3 million and
    1 FTE.
        HSDN is a multi-agency, Department-wide project, funded from
    contributions from participating agencies. For fiscal year 2005, ICE's
    estimated contribution to HSDN is $8.7 million. In fiscal year 2004,
    ICE contributed $3.2 million to HSDN. Although ICE contributes funding
    for HSDN, the development, deployment, and management of the network is
    the direct responsibility of the HSDN Program Office which also manages
    all the funding for this ICE-sponsored initiative.
        The HSDN is a secure communication network for transmission of
    information classified up to SECRET. It has been designed to replace
    several disparate legacy systems. HSDN will provide connectivity to the
    Department of Defense (DOD) Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
    (SIPRNet) to all users. DOD has indicated that non-DOD agencies should
    not use the SIPRNet as their primary classified communications medium.
    HSDN will provide access to SIPRNet via controlled gateways, satisfying
    this DOD concern. There are more than 400 DHS sites requiring HSDN
    deployment. Funding of this initiative will provide access to as many
    as 700 users in fiscal year 2006.
        Funding for this request would support a HSDN coordinator to serve
    as a liaison between ICE program offices and the DHS's Science and
    Technology (S&T) Directorate, the HSDN program manager. The remaining
    resources would be provided to S&T for costs associated with the HSDN
    development process, including a survey of ICE locations, installation
    of equipment, set-up of terminals, and activation of service to
    terminals.
        HSDN implementation was designed to follow a phased schedule. The
    first phase--which included the design and approval of the overall
    network design--has been completed. The second phase proposes the
    installation of a limited number of terminals in 72 locations. Among
    these, 13 are ICE locations which include facilities within the Office
    of Intelligence and Office of Investigations. Equipment installation at
    these ICE locations is expected to continue through fiscal year 2005.
        The remaining HSDN implementation phases will encompass the
    installation of all remaining locations including State and local
    offices. ICE has identified an additional eighty-eight locations which
    will have the HSDN installed in these remaining phases. These include
    the remaining Special Agent in Charge Offices, most Resident Agent in
    Charge Offices, Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams, and
    remaining Office of Intelligence locations.
        Performance Impact.--Funding of this initiative will provide access
    to HSDN as follows:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
          Performance increase         2006 request    2007 request    2008 request    2009 request    2010 request
                                           level           level           level           level           level
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total number of HSDN users......             700           1,000           1,000           1,000           1,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Visa Security Unit

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                 Program                2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base      2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Visa Security Unit..............  ..............          10,000          10,000          15,000           5,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for VSU totals $5 million and 5
    FTE.
        The ICE Visa Security Unit (VSU) conducts in-depth review of visa
    applicants wishing to enter the United States, with the goal of denying
    visas to terrorists, criminals, and persons of special interest. Visa
    Security Program officers are assigned to posts to perform this law
    enforcement review of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applications
    prior to visa issuance by consular officers of the Department of State.
        For fiscal year 2005, the VSU's first year of funding, $10 million
    was provided to: (1) establish permanent operations in Saudi Arabia;
    (2) expand visa security operations to five additional high-risk
    locations (locations are not named here due to law enforcement
    sensitivity); and (3) hire 22 permanent positions (five at Headquarters
    and 17 at the overseas posts).
        The enhancement requested for fiscal year 2006 would support nine
    additional positions ($4.827 million) and provide $173,000 for
    Investigations Training. These resources would advance incremental
    progress toward program expansion.
        A $5 million enhancement to the base would:
      --fund new overseas visa security post (to be selected based on
            current risk), staffed by three permanent Visa Security
            Officers, to expand the scope of visa security operations.
            Overseas operations involve: conducting in-depth scrutiny of
            high risk visa applicants; providing advice and training to
            consular officers to enhance their ability to detect terrorist,
            criminal, and otherwise fraudulent visa applicants through the
            consular adjudication process; and initiating investigations
            under DHS authority;
      --hire two additional officers at Headquarters to provide operational
            and administrative support to the overseas operations;
      --hire four permanent officer positions to replace temporary duty
            personnel currently investigating Security Advisory Opinions
            (SAOs) and ``Section 306'' cases (visa applicants from a State
            Sponsor of Terrorism);
      --expand funding for Consular Training programs, including
            Headquarters consular training program development, Rapid
            Response Team capability, and consular evaluation program
            development.
        Performance Impact.--The Homeland Security Act authorizes the
    Secretary of Homeland Security to assign employees of the Department to
    diplomatic and consular posts at which visas are issued, unless the
    Secretary determines that such an assignment to a particular post would
    not promote homeland security. The Secretary must submit an annual
    report to Congress that describes the basis for each determination that
    the assignment of an employee of the Department at a particular post
    would not promote homeland security.
        Conducting the activities of the VSU in Saudi Arabia and expanding
    to the locations designated as highest risk by the Secretary are
    expected to generate an increase in homeland security outputs such as:
    recommendations to refuse individual visa applications, generation of
    investigative leads, additional lookouts and watch list entries,
    identification of visa fraud schemes (including fraudulent documents,
    businesses, organizations, and associates), delivery of formal and
    informal training to consular officers, and other enforcement actions.
    The outcomes associated with these outputs may include a decrease in
    the vulnerabilities in the visa issuance process, increased integrity
    of the immigration system, and a greater awareness of terrorist
    suspects and activity patterns.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year  Fiscal year
                                        Fiscal year      2006         2007         2008         2009         2010
             Performance level           2005  est.    request      request      request      request      request
                                           level        level        level        level        level        level
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Percentage security review of all           100          100          100          100          100          100
     visa applications in Saudi Arabia
    Percentage of high risk visa                 NA
     applicants scrutinized at the non-
     Saudi posts......................
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Legal Proceedings

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Fiscal year
                 Program                Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year        2006
                                        2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base      2006 budget    enhancements
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Principal Legal Advisor.........          86,423         113,105         119,514         123,014           3,500
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: Funding from the Salaries and Expense account only. Does not include reimbursable funding.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Legal Proceedings totals $3.5
    million and 24 FTE.
        Of the fiscal year 2005 enhancements, 16 attorney and 12 support
    positions are scheduled for Headquarters while 38 attorneys and 8
    support positions are targeted for the Field. The Headquarters
    positions will be distributed among existing Headquarters teams dealing
    with the following areas:
      --Commercial and Administrative Law Division (primarily working on
            Merit Systems Protection Board appeals, and defending Equal
            Employment Opportunity claims generated by ICE clients (Federal
            Protective Service (FPS) and Federal Air Marshals (FAMS)), and
            handling bid protests primarily generated by FPS contracts;
      --the National Security Law Division overseeing the litigation of
            national security cases, providing legal advice to the Office
            of Intelligence, and performing liaison activities with other
            law enforcement agencies;
      --the Customs Enforcement Law Division, dealing with policy issues,
            and day to day monitoring of undercover operations, and ongoing
            criminal investigations; the Enforcement Law Division, dealing
            with a wide range of issues generated by the Office of
            Detention and Removal, the Office of Investigations, FAMS, and
            FPS, including statutory authority, search and seizure, use of
            force, and parole and custody issues, and the Human Rights Law
            Division, coordinating the litigation and advices the field on
            human rights abuser and persecutor cases.
        The fiscal year 2005 field positions will be devoted to the
    following field areas:
      --increased time and efforts spent on national security, predator and
            persecutor cases at the field level;
      --increased training of staff on national security and persecutor
            issues;
      --increased review of Notices to Appear prior to issuance or the
            hearing date;
      --more timely movement of ``change of venue cases'' between district
            offices to cut down on adjournments because the agency
            representative does not have the file;
      --increased amount of time spent on preparing a case for hearing,
            with a particular focus on review of alien evidentiary
            submissions and investigation thereof so as to minimize the
            number of adjournments required for document checks (by the
            Forensic Document Laboratory, the Department of States, and
            ICE/CIS offices abroad);
      --increased emphasis on benefit and asylum fraud, including
            development of criminal prosecutions, so as to discourage the
            filing of fraudulent or frivolous applications;
      --increased emphasis on responding to motions to reopen and filing
            responses to alien briefs before the Board of Immigration
            Appeals so as to diminish the number of non-meritorious cases
            that are reopened, and to speed up appeal processing at the
            Board of Immigration Appeals level.
        These increased resources will also be used to assist the Office of
    Immigration Litigation (OIL) and the Offices of the United States
    Attorney (USAO) litigating Petitions of Review of removal orders and
    habeas challenges to custody and removal.
        Past, current, and planned deployment of resources (Attorneys/
    Support):

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Planned fiscal  Planned fiscal
                                                                          Current        year 2005       year 2006
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Arlington.......................................................            11/4            13/4            14/4
    Atlanta.........................................................             8/3             9/3            10/3
    Baltimore.......................................................            10/4            11/4            12/4
    Boston (Includes Hartford Office)...............................            19/6            21/6            23/7
    Buffalo.........................................................             8/3             8/3
    Chicago (Includes Kansas City Office)...........................            17/7            19/7
    Dallas..........................................................            10/4            10/4
    Denver (Includes Helena and Salt Lake City Offices).............            11/5            12/6            12/7
    Detroit (Includes Cleveland, Cincinnati Offices)................            12/4            14/5            16/6
    El Paso.........................................................            10/4            11/4            12/4
    Honolulu........................................................             2/1             2/1
    Houston.........................................................            18/7            19/7            20/7
    Los Angeles (Includes Las Vegas Office).........................           75/26           83/28           89/32
    Miami...........................................................           52/18           56/19           60/22
    Newark..........................................................            21/7            23/7            24/8
    New Orleans (Includes Memphis Office)...........................            14/5            16/5            17/5
    New York........................................................           75/26           77/27           80/29
    Orlando.........................................................            11/4            12/4
    Philadelphia....................................................            15/5            16/6            17/7
    Phoenix.........................................................            22/8            25/9            27/9
    St. Paul (Includes Omaha Office)................................             8/3            10/3            11/3
    San Antonio (Includes Harlingen Office).........................            22/8            23/8            23/9
    San Diego.......................................................            25/9            25/9
    San Francisco...................................................           41/14           43/14           45/15
    San Juan........................................................             3/2             3/2
    Seattle (Includes Portland and Anchorage Offices)...............            11/4            11/4
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        EOIR's statistical data demonstrates that the largest pending case
    load exists in descending order in Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San
    Antonio (including Harlingen), San Francisco, Chicago, Boston
    (including Hartford), Orlando, Arlington, and Philadelphia Many cases
    from Harlingen are ultimately transferred through a change of venue
    order to more urban locations.
        The specific results expected by the investment of resources and/or
    the impact of not providing the investment:
        At present, six different entities (CIS--Asylum Offices and
    Examinations; CBP--Inspections and Border Patrol; ICE--Investigations
    and Detention and Removal) create the Notices to Appear (charging
    documents) that form the basis for litigation before the immigration
    court. With these expanded resources, ICE legal staff will be able to
    review more ICE generated charging documents to ensure better quality.
    It can also take more proactive steps to review charging documents
    created by other offices prior to the first master calendar on these
    cases, amending those charges that are legally deficient and filing
    such amended charges with the court in advance of the hearing date.
    This will lead to a reduction in adjournments. In addition, it will
    also permit the ICE litigation staff to terminate any cases that may
    have been improvidently brought.
        Another source of adjournments (and hence backlog) stems from those
    cases where venue of the hearing has been transferred from one district
    to another. Frequently, because of a lack of support staffs, the needed
    files are not forwarded to the gaining office on a timely basis. With
    these added support resources, more focus can be made on those files,
    which are the subject of a change in venue, with either the losing
    office sending the file more expeditiously or the gaining office making
    more determined efforts to obtain the needed file in advance of the
    scheduled hearing date. These same support personnel can also more
    readily assist Assistant Chief Counsel in administrative tasks, which
    consume a great deal of attorney time best spent on moving a case
    forward.
        The nature of immigration court litigation case has grown
    exceedingly complex. In the larger city offices, the vast majority of
    cases before the court are asylum claims, which are very time intensive
    to litigate. Unfortunately, asylum claims are frequently fraudulent and
    can be used by unscrupulous individuals as a way to gain status in the
    country. As part of the application process, aliens normally provide a
    large number of documents in support of their claim, many of which may
    have been manufactured. To attempt to ensure the process is not abused,
    the Assistant Chief Counsel must conduct intensive alien file and
    document review. The Assistant Chief Counsel attempts to make full use
    of the Forensics Document Laboratory and other avenues of investigation
    to determine if the claim/documentation is bona fide. The Assistant
    Chief Counsel must also try to track down related alien files to
    determine if the alien has applied for a benefit under a different
    alien number/different name, locate alien files of relatives to
    determine consistency of the claim, and run extensive record checks.
    Assistant Chief Counsel also needs to contact victims in cases that are
    brought under the ICE Predator Initiative to assure that they are
    available to testify regarding the life long adverse impact these
    actions caused to them to assure alien sexual violators are removed and
    their relief applications are denied. With these additional attorney
    resources, Assistant Chief Counsel will be in a better position to do
    more complete and timely case review, and to request document checks,
    make record checks, and review related files in a timely manner. This
    in turn not only makes a better record on which the immigration judge
    can base his/her decision; it speeds up resolution of the case because
    all the crucial steps in the process are undertaken sooner.
        Agency lawyers also work closely with the Office of the United
    States Attorneys, and Office of Immigration Litigation litigators by
    preparing litigation reports, reviewing records where remands are
    proposed, preparing recommendations for further review where judicial
    decisions are adverse to DHS interests and by providing guidance,
    advice and assistance on complex immigration law issues.
        In a related vein, in larger city offices, ICE tries to have joint
    attorney-investigator focus on travel agencies and corrupt attorneys
    who actively encourage and assist in the filing of fraudulent or
    frivolous asylum cases. These cases clog the system and lead to
    additional court backlog. Currently, these joint attorney-investigator
    efforts have had to be more ad hoc and limited in nature. With these
    additional attorney resources, the staff would devote more time and
    effort to identifying the individuals who are the source of such
    claims, and work more closely with the criminal investigators in
    developing criminal prosecutions for the United States Attorneys
    Offices.
    Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement (TWP/WSE)

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year
                         Program                        2004 budget     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                                                            \1\         2005 budget     2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TWA.............................................  ..............           5,000          23,000          18,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ No funding was devoted to ``Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement'' in fiscal year 2004, but approximately
      $18 million was devoted to Worksite Enforcement in fiscal year 2004.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for TWP totals $18 million and 72
    FTE
        As part of the President's proposed temporary worker program to
    match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers, enforcement
    of immigration laws to ensure compliance is required. Under the
    President's proposal, the temporary worker program would be open to new
    foreign workers, and to the undocumented men and women currently
    employed in the United States. The program would allow workers who
    currently hold jobs unlawfully to participate legally in America's
    economy, while not encouraging further illegal behavior.
        The spend plan for the $5 million enhancement in fiscal year 2005
    focuses on field training, employer outreach, and reconstituting the
    Worksite Enforcement Program infrastructure within the Office of
    Investigations in Headquarters in the final half of fiscal year 2005.
    Resources requested for fiscal year 2006 will primarily fund the
    deployment of FTEs to States (CA, TX, FL, NY, IL) having the greatest
    population of unauthorized workers.
        The $18 million enhancement (of which $16.216 million is required
    in the Investigations Operations activity and $1.784 million is
    required in the Investigations Training activity) would fund 140
    Special Agent and 3 support positions.
        Performance Impact.--The additional resources will broaden the
    scope of the worksite enforcement program's strategic goals to include
    protecting the jobs and wages of legal workers by identifying and
    removing unauthorized workers. ICE will increase its presence at
    worksites, concentrating on employers in specific industries and
    geographical areas who intentionally violate the law or who have
    historically hired large numbers of unauthorized workers. ICE will also
    coordinate with Citizenship and Immigration Services to improve and
    expand verification services (Basic Pilot Program) to employers
    nationwide pursuant to the Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion
    Act of 2003.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                  Performance measure                Fiscal year 2006 request level    2007 request    2008 request
                                                                                           level           level
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Administrative Worksite Case Completions......  Base............................    + 20 percent    + 30 percent
    Criminal Employer Case Presentations..........  Base............................    + 20 percent    + 30 percent
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                         Program                        2004 budget     2005 budget     2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    OCDETF..........................................          47,300          33,100          43,678          10,578
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: In fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, OCDETF funding was reimbursable. In fiscal year 2006, funding
      proposed to be directly appropriated to ICE.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for OCDETF totals $43.678 million
    and 346 FTE.
        Currently, funding for ICE OCDETF is provided on a reimbursable
    basis from the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beginning in fiscal year
    2006, funding is being requested via direct appropriations to ICE.
    Funding requested would cover salary costs for 332 Special Agents
    ($41.840 million) and 14 Intelligence Research Specialists ($1.838
    million) for a total of $43.678 million.
        The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program is
    a Federal drug enforcement program that focuses attention and resources
    on the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking
    organizations. OCDETF provides a framework for Federal, State, and
    local law enforcement agencies to work together to target well-
    established and complex organizations that direct, finance, or engage
    in illegal narcotics trafficking and related crimes. Related crimes
    include money laundering and tax violations, public corruption, illegal
    immigration, weapons violations, and violent crimes. The OCDETF program
    has been in existence since 1982 and operates under the guidance and
    oversight of the Attorney General. Utilizing the resources and
    expertise of 11 member Federal agencies, along with support from State
    and local law enforcement partners, OCDETF has contributed to the
    successful prosecution and conviction of more than 44,000 members of
    criminal organizations and resulted in the seizure of cash and property
    assets totaling more than $3.0 billion.
        No new FTEs are being requested. Rather, existing personnel will be
    paid by direct appropriation instead of by reimbursable funding.
        In fiscal year 2004, ICE was reimbursed $47.3 million for costs
    associated with OCDETF. The reimbursable agreement for fiscal year 2005
    provides for up to $33.1 million--a decrease of $14.2 million.
        Performance Impact.--This initiative is intended to restore funding
    that was cut in fiscal year 2005, to ensure a consistent and more
    reliable funding source for ICE OCDETF activities, and to establish an
    appropriated base in lieu of reimbursable funding. This initiative is
    intended to provide funding that supports dedicated resources engaged
    in OCDETF activities and to maintain priority status for the program.
    The impact resulting from the decrease in reimbursable funding in
    fiscal year 2005 has ICE OCDETF requirements competing for funding--
    including priority status--within the ICE operational base. As a
    result, there can be no assurance that prior year performance levels
    can be maintained or achieved. Direct appropriated base funding is
    expected to support out-year ICE operations' planning that promotes the
    continued collaboration with other OCDETF participating agencies to
    achieve OCDETF goals and objectives.
    $105 Million Base Increase for Investigations Operations

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Fiscal year
                Program               Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     2006 budget   Fiscal year 2006
                                      2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base          \1\       enhancements \1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Investigations Operations.....         796,478       1,138,495       1,099,554       1,267,437          167,883
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Note: The President's budget proposes enhancements of $167.883 million to the Investigations Operations
      budget activity. Of that amount, $105 million is a base increase, $4.827 million is for the Visa Security
      Unit, $16.216 million is for Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement, and $41.840 million is for OCDETF
      activities.

        The $105 million base increase will provide resources required to
    fund base requirements for the Office of Investigations, including
    salary costs, vehicle replacement, and other general expenses.
        Performance Impact.--Improved infrastructure on which to support
    continuation of investigative activities, both domestically and
    internationally.
    Detention Bed Space

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Fiscal year
                Program               Fiscal year     fiscal year     Fiscal year     2006 budget   Fiscal year 2006
                                      2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base          \1\       enhancements \1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DRO-Custody Management \1\....         550,912         697,855         594,169         727,769          108,600
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Note: There are three enhancements to the Custody Management program, totaling $90.0 million, $25.0 million,
      and $18.6 million respectively. The $25.0 million for ABC/Interior Repatriation is excluded in this display,
      as it is described separately.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Detention Bed Space totals
    $108 million and 16 FTE.
        The President's Budget requests an additional $90 million for
    detention bed space and $18.6 million as a base increase for the
    Custody Management program. Approximately $63 million of the $90
    million is intended for the direct cost of providing an additional
    1,920 beds. The balance of the $90 million request is intended to fund
    32 new positions (16 FTE) to provide staff to support to those beds.
    This increase in bed space responds to increased demand for detention
    bed space generated by apprehending agencies (e.g., Border Patrol,
    Inspections, Investigations, etc.). The $18.6 million increase will
    provide resources required to fund base requirements for the Custody
    Management budget activity within the Office of Detention and Removal.
        The fiscal year 2005 appropriation provided an additional $26.5
    million for 1,216 new beds and 28 positions (14 FTE) above fiscal year
    2004 levels.
        Detention capacity and the necessary resources are fundamental
    components to the immigration enforcement mission. For the immigration
    enforcement mission to be successful, detention capacity must be
    considered at an appropriate ratio compared with resources provided for
    investigations and apprehensions. Increased detention capacity will
    improve the ability of ICE to verify alien identity, deter subsequent
    illegal entry, dramatically increase removal rates, prevent criminal
    aliens from returning to communities, and protect national security.
    Criminal aliens comprise more than half of the total detained
    population and we expect their numbers continue to rise due to enhanced
    enforcement efforts like IRP (Institutional Removal Program) and 287(g)
    expansion (local law enforcement authority to enforce immigration
    violations). Criminal aliens comprise a significant portion of our
    mandatory detention population (those individuals who have received
    final orders of removal and whose removal is imminent, those who are
    pending expedited removal activities, and those who are otherwise
    required by law or policy to be detained). In recent months, ICE's
    mandatory population has increased at a gradual, but steady rate due to
    increased enforcement activities (particularly from Expedited Removal
    initiative). As these targeted enforcement efforts continue, further
    growth in our mandatory detention population is likely. ICE continues
    to improve the efficiency of its detention program by consolidating
    populations and improving capacity management. These measures are
    anticipated to reduce costs by eliminating travel from detention
    facilities to proceedings, reducing average time in detention, and
    providing for more consistent and higher quality conditions of
    confinement for the detained population.
        ICE will continue to enforce its robust facility inspection program
    and coordinate with our governmental organizations and non-governmental
    organization partners in pursuit of maintaining acceptable and
    appropriate conditions of confinement for the detained population. We
    are committed to effectively enforcing our immigration laws and
    protecting our Nation's security in a manner that affords the rights
    and proper treatment obligated under our laws to detainees, including
    those claiming asylum.
    Fugitive Operations

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Fiscal year
                 Program                Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year        2006
                                        2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base      2006 budget     enhancement
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DRO-Fugitive Ops................          26,916          44,687          48,121          57,001           8,880
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for the Fugitive Operations is
    $8.88 million and 0 FTE.
        The President's Budget requests an additional $8.88 million to
    support increased efforts to apprehend fugitive aliens. While estimates
    vary, the alien absconder population is more than 465,000 and that it
    continues to grow at a rate of more than 40,000 absconders per year.
    Experience with the current fugitive operations teams suggests that
    each team yields at least 500 absconder apprehensions/case closures per
    year. This success is very encouraging and expanding these efforts will
    stem the growth of the alien absconder population and begin to reduce
    the overall numbers of alien absconders at large.
        ICE currently employs 16 fugitive operations nation-wide. Cities
    with fugitive operations teams include: Los Angles (2 teams), Boston,
    San Francisco, Miami, Houston, New York City (2 teams), Chicago, Newark
    (2 teams), Detroit, Atlanta, Baltimore, San Diego, and Seattle.
        The fiscal year 2005 reprogramming request reduced the $50 million
    appropriated enhancement to $9 million. For fiscal year 2005, $9
    million will support 42 full time positions (21 FTE) and additional
    funding for bed space and operating costs associated with increased
    apprehension activity.
        This proposed enhancement is aligned to Department of Homeland
    Security Strategic Objective 2.2, Enforce trade and immigration laws.
        All increases in removal rates increase the control DRO has over
    the removal alien population which contributes directly to national
    security.
    Institutional Removal Program (Criminal Alien Program)

                                                [In thousands of dollars
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Fiscal year
                 Program                Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year        2006
                                        2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base      2006 budget     enhancement
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DRO-IRP.........................          17,467          31,512          33,706          39,041           5,335
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The fiscal year 2006 Institutional Removal Program (IRP)
    enhancement is $5.355 million and 19 FTE.
        The President's Budget requests an additional $5.355 million to
    expand the IPR program and to continue the transfer of the program from
    the Office of Investigation to the Office of Detention and Removal
    Operations. The fiscal year 2005 amount will complete the transition of
    the State of New York and a sizable portion of the State of California.
    The fiscal year 2006 amount will continue the staffing of California.
        IRP, now referred to as ICE's Criminal Alien Program (CAP),
    identifies aliens who are in criminal incarceration and processing them
    for removal prior to their incarceration release. This is an effective
    approach to preventing criminal recidivism and to ensure removable
    aliens are actually removed once so ordered by an immigration judge.
        Currently, the ICE Office of Investigations administers the IRP
    program with a variety of resources (including job series 1811 criminal
    investigators). The workload for each immigration enforcement agent
    (IEA) is 300 charging documents served per year. This figure
    encompasses the number of interviews and record checks of individuals
    that are not amenable to removal but are of foreign birth. The plan for
    CAP is to interview 90 percent or more of all foreign born inmates in
    Federal, State and mega-county (populations over 1 million) areas.
    287(g) (local law enforcement authority to enforce immigration
    violations) and video teleconferencing will serve the outlying areas.
        ICE has placed increased emphasis on complex criminal
    investigations for its 1811 job series. In recognition of this,
    Congress provided an additional $30 million in the fiscal year 2005
    appropriation to initiate the transfer of IRP from OI to DRO. The
    fiscal year 2005 reprogramming requests the enhancement be reduced to
    $4 million. This will allow for 37 positions and thus, Special Agents
    will continue to perform some institutional removal duties, instead of
    replacing all of them with Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEA).
    Criminal Alien Program (CAP) is the unification of the old
    Institutional Removal Program (IRP) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension
    Program (ACAP). All DRO activities in the incarcerated criminal alien
    arena will be referred to simply as CAP in the future.

                                 STAFFING MODEL

        Based on recent production numbers from New York State Department
    of Corrections (DOC) and Florida Department of Corrections, an IEA will
    in a year will do 600 interviews in Southern tier States and 500
    interviews in Northern tier States. The statistics from these two DOCs
    suggest a higher percentage of naturalized foreign-born individuals in
    southern tier States requiring more interviews to obtain the goal of
    300 charging documents issued per agent.
        The transition will focus on a state-by-state transition of
    responsibility from OI to DRO. The first States, in order, are New
    York, California, Texas, Florida and Illinois. The transition, to date,
    is limited to the New York City Jail of Riker's Island.
        New York.--The plan has been coordinated with NY State Department
    of Corrections and New York City Department of Corrections, the two
    largest non-Federal partners. Pre-existing system and partnerships with
    Executive Office for Immigration Review and Bureau of Prisons exist
    under legacy Institutional Hearing Program (IHP). Video
    teleconferencing will cover traditional ACAP locations at smaller
    county facilities. Equipment and staffing will be at newly completed
    Castle Point Facility which offers space for increased staffing.
        California.--Plans have been discussed to improve the efficiency of
    identifying and starting removal proceedings for amenable aliens with
    the California Department of Corrections. The system is currently in a
    number of locations. Pre-existing system and partnerships with EOIR and
    BOP exist under legacy IHP. Video teleconferencing will cover
    traditional ACAP locations at smaller county facilities. Equipment and
    staffing will be hired and located to meet the needs of the State of
    California stretch the capacity of the New York VTC center. Due to the
    costs of installing VTC equipment to local detention facilities, the
    need will be relatively small in the first years and will be built up
    as demand grows.
    Arizona Border Control (ABC)/Interior Repatriation

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                         Program                        2004 budget     2005 budget     2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABC.............................................  ..............  ..............          39,349          39,349
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        This fiscal year 2006 enhancement is $39.349 million for the ABC/
    Interior Repatriation Program. With this funding, the Interior
    Repatriation program will transfer from Customs and Border Protection
    to ICE/DRO in fiscal year 2006. DRO is in the business of removals and
    will use its experience to build on previous successes.
        Interior repatriation (IR) is a component of the Arizona Border
    Control initiative (ABCI). ABCI is a multi-pronged approach to
    controlling the Arizona Border, which includes anti-smuggling
    investigations, fugitive arrests, as well as controlling and arresting
    illegal crossings. IR has a singular focus of the repatriating Mexican
    nationals. IR's aim is promoting deterrence, reducing recidivism of
    illegal crossings and thus reducing the number of deaths along the
    Arizona border.
        In fiscal year 2004, 14,058 undocumented immigrants were
    voluntarily flown from Tucson, AZ, to the interior of Mexico from July
    12 to September 30, 2004, after screening by DHS and a Mexican Consular
    Official. During the IR, Border Patrol Agents interviewed 96,793
    potential candidates.
        Of those interviewed, 82,735 refused to participate. Of those who
    declined to participate, 14,069 had been deemed ``at risk'' migrants.
    These migrants as well as the other migrants who refused to participate
    were processed either through voluntary return to the Arizona/Mexico
    border or other removal mechanisms.
        A total of 7 percent (1,008) of IRP participants were arrested
    attempting re-entry into the United States during the IRP operation
    dates. This is much lower than the Tucson sector's average recidivism
    rate of 37 percent.
        Interior repatriation can result in a dramatic reduction in the
    number of deaths in the desert suffered by intending immigrants.
    Interior repatriation efforts have resulted in strong U.S.-Mexico and
    cooperation. Since the IR pilot last year, DHS has also implemented
    expedited removal between ports of entry in the Tucson and Laredo
    sectors, resulting in additional apprehensions in the Tucson area.
    Alternatives to Detention

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year   Fiscal year 2006
                Program               2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base      2006 budget   enhancements \1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DRO-Alternatives..............           8,659          12,202          12,733          23,533           10,800
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Note: There are two enhancements to the Alternatives to Detention program, each totaling $5.4 million.

        The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Alternatives to Detention
    totals $10.8 million and 7 FTE.
        The President's Budget requests an additional $5.4 million to
    expand the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) and $5.4
    million increase for the Alternatives to Detention program, for a total
    of $10.8 million in enhancements. Alternatives to Detention include
    intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, and telephonic voice
    recognition. Currently, ICE (through the Office of Detention and
    Removal Operations--DRO) is piloting several alternatives to detention
    initiatives. Early indications are encouraging and suggest that these
    approaches to monitoring aliens who are not in physical custody may
    yield better appearance rates to immigration proceedings and better
    rates of removal once an alien has been ordered removed. The program is
    still too new to draw definitive conclusions. Over the next 6 to 12
    months ICE will be collecting data and evaluating the efficacy of
    various alternatives to detention strategies.
        ICE began piloting this initiative in fiscal year 2004 and has
    expanded the pilots in fiscal year 2005. Pilot cities include: Miami,
    Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland, Denver, San Francisco, and others.
    The fiscal year 2005 Budget provided $11 million to expand the number
    of pilot locations and to fund 60 new full time positions (30 FTE). The
    fiscal year 2005 reprogramming reduces the funding to $2 million which
    permits funding for 11 new full time positions.
        DRO will measure the performance of the ISAP program on three
    levels: (1) Do aliens enrolled in ISAP have a greater rate of
    appearance at hearings than the rate of a control group of non-detained
    aliens not enrolled in ISAP? (2) If ordered removed or granted
    voluntary departure, do aliens enrolled in ISAP surrender/depart at a
    greater rate than a control group? (3) If the alien fails to surrender
    for removal or otherwise fails to depart, are absconding aliens in ISAP
    re-apprehended at a greater rate than that for a control group?
        DRO and its ISAP contractor are collecting certain data to test the
    hypothesis that the performance measures for aliens in ISAP will
    indicate a greater success rate than the performance measures for a
    control group of non-detained aliens. ``Success'' is defined as a
    statistically significant increase in the appearance rates, surrender
    rates, and re-apprehension rates. The hypothesis test will involve
    standard statistical tests (such as ``t tests'') and commonly accepted
    levels of statistical significance (generally the significance level in
    social science research is set to .05). DRO expects it will have gained
    a sufficiently large sample population to draw statistical inference
    within the next 6 to 12 months.
        DRO and its contractor will also collect data on the appearances at
    hearings, surrenders for removal, departure from the United States,
    number of re-apprehensions of absconders.
        The ISAP population is non-criminal aliens that are not mandatory
    detention, who live within a reasonable commuting distance of an ISAP
    office, and who agree to the conditions of the program. DRO will select
    a control group of non-detained aliens that are not participating in
    ISAP. These aliens will be selected from Docket Control Offices that
    have ISAP. The control group will closely match the ISAP group on such
    relevant characteristics as country of origin, gender, and length of
    stay in the United States.
        General Explanation and Justification for the Initiative.--
    Detention of all aliens that are apprehended and placed into removal
    proceedings is not the only way to ensure that aliens appear at their
    immigration hearings or for removal. Aliens who disappear from ICE
    supervision pose a potential threat to public safety and national
    security. To mitigate this flow of cases into the fugitive population,
    ICE's DRO seeks to further develop alternatives to detention in two
    ways. First, expansion of the ISAP to two additional locations in
    fiscal year 2006. Each site is intended to accommodate 200 participants
    daily. These additional resources would bring the total number of
    participants nationwide on any given day to 2,000. The ISAP is a
    community-based, case management program that provides close
    supervision of illegal aliens emphasizing compliance with Immigration
    Court requirements. Expansion of the program requires 14 positions (7
    FTEs). In order to properly execute the alternatives to detention
    program within DRO, positions must accompany program expansion. These
    positions will be used to manage the alternatives to detention docket
    including enrolling participants, managing the data, ensuring departure
    from the United States as required, and acting as the local Contracting
    Officer's Technical Representative.
        This proposed enhancement is aligned to Department of Homeland
    Security Strategic Objective 2.2, Enforce trade and immigration laws.
        Performance Impact.--This is a cost-effective way to ensure that
    aliens will appear for their immigration hearings or for removal. This
    program will increase the integrity of the immigration enforcement
    process by adding two additional ISAP locations, each intended to
    accommodate 200 participants daily. ICE is still analyzing the results
    of alternative to detention programs and will baseline the appearance
    rates in fiscal year 2006 to begin measuring the true outcome of ISAP.
    The goal of this program is in line with the strategic objective of
    removing all removable aliens. The anticipated increase in appearance
    rates will also mean fewer cases entering the fugitive population.
    Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                 Program                Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     2006 budget        2006
                                        2004 budget     2005 budget      2006 base          \1\         enhancement
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FAMS............................         610,290         662,900         678,994         688,860           9,866
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        This enhancement will allow the FAMS to increase its staffing level
    to a level that will allow it to meet its mission objective, the risk-
    based deployment of Federal Air Marshals. FAMS works closely with DHS
    and other Federal, State and local agencies and private industry to
    develop, deploy and sustain a comprehensive intelligence-driven
    approach and response to terrorist and related criminal threats against
    the United States and its interests. FAMS provides critical support to
    DHS' missions to prevent terrorist acts within the United States,
    reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage from potential
    attacks.
        Additional information can be provided in a secure manner.
    Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)

                                                [In thousands of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                         Program                        2004 budget     2005 budget     2006 budget     2006 change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SEVP............................................           1,465          40,000      \1\ 58,100      \1\ 18,100
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These numbers have been revised since submission of the President's budget on February 7, 2005.

        DHS Strategic Objective Supported: 2.2 Enforce Trade and
    Immigration Laws
        The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) was created to
    restore integrity to the U.S. immigration system by ensuring that
    international students, scholars, and exchange visitors studying in the
    United States comply with the terms of their visas. One of SEVP's
    primary functions is to track the immigration status of foreign
    students and exchange visitors.
        In fiscal year 2004, SEVP operated with two separate streams of
    funding--a fee collection process for school certification and
    appropriated dollars from counter-terrorism funds. The Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 mandated
    the establishment and maintenance of a fee collection process to
    support the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and
    SEVP. To become a fully fee funded program, SEVP implemented a fee
    collection process (the SEVIS I-901 Fee) on September 1, 2004. This fee
    is paid by all prospective students and exchange visitors ($100 for
    most and $35 for some exchange visitors) prior to seeking a visa at the
    consulates and embassies overseas. The I-901 fee and the fees collected
    from schools seeking certification to host nonimmigrant students (I-17
    Fee), provides the full funding for SEVP, portions of the Compliance
    Enforcement Unit (CEU), and the Department of State efforts.
        In fiscal year 2005, SEVP projects it will collect $46 million from
    the SEVIS I-901 fee and $362,000 from the I-17 school certification
    fees. In addition, SEVP had a carryover balance of $2.6 million from
    fiscal year 2004. Although SEVP projects to have total resources of
    $49.0 million for fiscal year 2005, the execution level will remain at
    $40 million to ensure continuity of funding for the program.
        In fiscal year 2006, SEVP projects to collect $45.9 million from
    the SEVIS I-901 fee and $3.5 million from the I-17 school certification
    fees. The increase in I-17 school certification fees is based on SEVP
    collecting initial fees as well as the re-certification fees whereas in
    fiscal year 2005 they will only collect initial fees. In fiscal year
    2006 SEVP will have a full cycle of SEVIS I-901 fees since its
    inception in September 2004. SEVP projects to have total resources of
    $58 million for fiscal year 2006 that includes a $9 million carryover
    balance from fiscal year 2005.

        The additional $18.1 million spending authority for fiscal year
    2006 will allow SEVP to:
      --Maintain staffing levels--the cost of salaries and benefits of
            newly hired employees
      --Continue to improve SEVIS with IT enhancements--allows SEVP to
            accelerate the implementation of planned enhancements to
            improve the batch and real time interface processing,
            incorporate historical data from the SEVIS predecessor (CIPRIS)
            and implement a user-friendly reporting tool. This increase in
            funding will also allow SEVP to develop a search tool for the
            historical data.
      --Conduct analysis of current fee structures (I-901 SEVIS fee and I-
            17 school certification)--fee studies for both the I-901 SEVIS
            fee and the I-17 school certification were conducted in early
            2000
        SEVP will continue to perform the following functions:
      --Certify schools desiring to participate in SEVIS
      --Provide law enforcement with current information on F, M and J
            nonimmigrants
      --Conduct outreach to the academic community
      --Accept and process fee payments
      --Enhance the functionality of the SEVIS system
      --Write policies and regulations to implement statutory requirements
      --Train users of the SEVIS system
      --Assist ports of entry, DoS consular officials, schools and program
            sponsors with the entry and stay of F, M and J nonimmigrants

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Fiscal year     Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                          Performance Increase                         2006 request    2007 request    2008 request
                                                                           level           level           level
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Percent of F, M, and J nonimmigrant information maintained in                100             100             100
     SEVIS..........................................................
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Are there any services that ICE is being assessed working
    capital fund charges for in fiscal year 2004 or fiscal year 2005 that
    are not directly utilized by ICE? Is ICE being charged for services on
    a basis proportionate to its usage?
        Answer. According to the DHS Working Capital Fund reimbursable
    agreements, ICE will only be billed for actual services received. This
    was true for fiscal year 2004 WCF billings, and is expected for fiscal
    year 2005 billing. DHS provided detailed proration guidance with the
    fiscal year 2005 anticipated WCF billings. ICE agrees with DHS
    proration of WCF costs.

       OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS (9/11 COMMISSION
                                RECOMMENDATION)

        Question. The President's Budget proposes to create the Office of
    Screening Coordination and Operations within the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. CIS has significant screening and
    identification capabilities and needs, yet the President's budget does
    not propose moving the operational responsibility for any of those
    programs out of CIS. In order to ensure that there is the closest
    possible coordination across screening programs, should CIS screening
    programs be moved to the Office of Screening Coordination and
    Operations?
        Answer. The Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO)
    is the first step in implementing the requirements of HSPD-11, which
    directs DHS to review and integrate all screening requirements across
    the Federal government. USCIS operational requirements and other
    security elements are being reviewed within the Department, and where
    deemed appropriate, may be incorporated within the purview of the SCO.

                   TERRORIST TRAVEL (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT)

        Question. In addition to the formal 9/11 Commission Report, the
    Commission issued two staff monographs, one of them on Terrorist
    Travel. While no specific recommendations were made, the report reached
    interesting conclusions. One conclusion was that ``Border inspectors
    today still do not have basic intelligence and operational training to
    aid them in detecting and preventing terrorist entry.'' They are not
    talking about people who are on watchlists, but providing inspectors
    with training to detect terrorists not on the watchlist. What steps is
    CBP taking to incorporate the information uncovered by the 9/11
    Commission staff on terrorist travel into basic training for CBP
    officers?
        Answer. CBP has established anti-terrorism response protocols to
    more effectively handle potential terrorism threats identified by CBP
    personnel. These national-level CBP policies operate both for a CBP
    Officer questioning a person applying for admission at a port of entry
    and for a Border Patrol Agent processing an individual who's been
    apprehended after crossing the border illegally to ensure consistent
    application throughout the border. CBP has also developed specific
    anti-terrorism training for passenger processing that includes specific
    instruction in behavioral analysis, deception detection and eliciting
    information.
        The integrated curriculum for new CBP Officers includes three (3)
    specific components: Pre-Academy, Academy Basic training at Glynco, GA,
    and post-Academy training conducted at the Ports of Entry (In-port
    training). Academy Training courses for new CBP Officers include new
    anti-terrorism passenger training and fraudulent document detection.
    Most importantly, the role of an Officer in CBP's priority mission,
    anti-terrorism, is taught on day one and reiterated throughout the
    curriculum.
        Under our new curriculum, our basic trainees receive 16 hours in
    fraudulent document training at the Academy that culminates with a
    graded practical exercise during which trainees examine characteristics
    of unique documents and determine if the documents are genuine,
    counterfeit or altered. The course highlights fraud indicators that may
    be present in evaluating any document for authenticity. Security
    features of United States entry documents and imposter detection are
    emphasized as well. Trainees that fail to successfully complete the
    course are removed from training. All instructors teaching this course
    have received training from the Forensic Document Lab.
        With regard to questioning techniques, we use practical exercises
    throughout a trainee's 15 weeks at the Academy. With the help of role
    players, students are presented with scenarios based on primary
    inspection situations. During the labs and graded practical exercises,
    trainees review documents presented, question role players about their
    visit to the United States and make ``refer or release''
    recommendations. Interviewing labs require trainees to practice
    observational skills and questioning skills, while applying their job
    knowledge of documentation requirements, immigration issues, customs
    exemptions, prohibited and restricted articles, and agricultural
    issues.
        Question. Has CBP considered asking the 9/11 Commission staff to
    put together a seminar on its findings for all current inspectors,
    allowing them to sharpen their skills?
        Answer. CBP is open to new training concepts, and though we are not
    sure that using former Commission staff for training CBP inspectors is
    an optimal approach, we will keep such ideas in mind as we continue to
    refine training programs.
        Question. The report on Terrorist Travel also calls attention to
    the lack of ``viable options to prevent documents known to be
    fraudulent from being returned to travelers denied entry into the
    United States''. What additional authority would CBP need to be able to
    confiscate or in some way invalidate fraudulent documents prior to
    denying entry to someone?
        Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented on
    January 1, 2005, under existing legal authority, a comprehensive
    program for the seizure and systematic processing of fraudulent travel
    documents presented for admission into the United States. Key parts of
    that program include the requirement that no fraudulent travel document
    be returned to the subject presenting the document and the mandatory
    forwarding of all seized documents to CBP's newly established
    Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit for intelligence collection and final
    disposition (return to issuing authority for destruction). Subjects
    from whom fraudulent documents have been seized are now issued a Single
    Journey Letter (SJL) to facilitate their return travel. The SJL
    conforms with all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
    Annex 9 standards for issuance of such documents. It includes
    interdiction and biographic information as well as the subject's
    photograph and fingerprints from both right and left index fingers.
        Question. The report also states ``There is no programmatic effort
    to focus on terrorist travel facilitators, and special agents lack the
    resources and authority to pursue visitors for immigration violations
    associated with terrorist activity''. What is the Department's position
    on this statement? What can be done to change this?
        Answer. ICE has special agents assigned to CBP's National Targeting
    Center (NTC), the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Travel Task Force (FTTTF) and
    the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section. All three locations
    have developed specialized databases to facilitate the investigation of
    terrorist travel and terrorist travel facilitators. ICE Attaches
    assigned to posts around the world, and the ICE special agent assigned
    to the Department of Defense Central Command, are also well-positioned
    to act upon information relating to terrorist travel facilitators.
        Question. One of the most interesting findings included in the
    report on Terrorist Travel, was related to the U.S. Department of
    Justice's Absconder Apprehension Initiative, started in 2001. Today,
    this initiative has become the responsibility of ICE's Fugitive
    Operations Program.
        Of the almost 6,000 aliens determined to be the highest priority to
    track down and remove, 5 percent had been granted U.S. citizenship or
    had become legal permanent residents after being ordered deported. Can
    ICE and CIS guarantee that this can never happen again? What steps have
    been taken to ensure that this cannot happen again?
        Answer. ICE works to ensure that data is shared and has developed
    and implemented agreements with CIS to share data. ICE also routinely
    runs CIS cases against the fugitive database. In addition, CIS has
    access to the Deportable Alien Computer System (DACS), which tracks all
    cases under removal proceedings.
        Question. Is all of the relevant information that each organization
    has in its records being shared today? Is the Department confident that
    someone who has been ordered deported from this country can not be
    granted U.S. citizenship while an absconder?
        Answer. The information regarding who is an absconder is readily
    available for queries and searches for CIS to determine if an applicant
    is considered an absconder or fugitive. An applicant for citizenship
    has the burden of establishing that he was lawfully admitted for
    permanent residency in the United States. The Naturalization
    application requires additional identity and security checks; a
    definitive response from the FBI background checks, and IBIS checks. In
    addition, all applications are processed in accordance with established
    Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP).
        Question. When someone is found to be attempting to fraudulently
    obtain U.S. citizenship, through the use of a false name or some other
    method, why does it take so long to bring them to justice?
        On February 10, 2005, Mostofa Kamal, aka Shaheen Sardar, a native
    of Bangladesh, was arrested in New York. He entered this country in
    1994, over 10 years ago. He was ordered to leave the United States in
    1997. This individual made his first fraudulent request for benefits in
    1997. Mr. Kamal was interviewed by CIS in connection with his
    application for U.S. citizenship in November of 2004, an application
    that was received by CIS in August of 2003, but he was only arrested 3
    weeks ago. The Department has known for sometime where he was--employed
    by the New York City Police Department as a Traffic Enforcement Agent.
    What is the issue? Is it resources, priorities? Why do these cases drag
    on so long before ICE arrests someone?
        Answer. In the referenced case, the subject had previously entered
    the United States in 1993 under a false name and made claims to
    political asylum. His asylum claim was denied, and an Immigration Judge
    granted him Voluntary Departure with an alternate order of deportation
    should he not depart by the specified date in May of 1996. In 1997, he
    changed his name (name referenced in question), married a U.S. citizen,
    and applied for a benefit through that relationship. Based on that
    relationship, he left the United States, reentered, and was admitted to
    the United States as a Lawful Permanent Resident in 2000. He, in
    effect, caused an alternate order of deportation when he departed the
    United States to pick up his Visa. As a result of the name change, the
    fraud had not been detected. In continuance of this fraud, the subject
    applied for citizenship, for which he passed all stages in the process
    and was awaiting a naturalization date. The fraud was discovered. In
    February 2005, he was presented for criminal prosecution in the
    Southern District of New York for committing naturalization fraud.
        It may take many years for an individual to exhaust his legal
    administrative remedies. Normally, arrests would not take place while
    there is an adjudicative or administrative judicial process being
    pursued and would only take place if the subject were considered likely
    to abscond. Generally, single scheme frauds are not accepted for
    criminal prosecution unless there are extraordinary circumstances that
    would sway the U.S. Attorney's office to consider it.

                       ARIZONA BORDER CONTROL INITIATIVE

        Question. The Arizona Border Control (ABC) Initiative has been
    underway for almost a full 12 months. What are the results of this
    initiative so far? Has it been a success?
        Answer. The Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI) has been very
    successful. Initial successes have established a foundation to expand
    on during fiscal year 2005 in order to achieve operation control of the
    Arizona/Mexico Border under control. Intelligence and arrest trends
    collected through ABCI indicate that alien smugglers have been forced
    to change their operating procedures as a result of ABCI. Selected
    statistics associated with ABCI are as follows:
      --42 percent increase in arrests over the previous year
      --105 percent increase in narcotics seizures over the previous year
      --26 percent decrease in migrant deaths
      --22 percent increase in Immigration Felony Prosecutions
      --461 percent increases in vehicle seizures
      --350 percent increase in weapons seizures
        Question. What lessons from the ABC initiative can now be
    incorporated into the operations of CBP, ICE and others across the
    Nation?
        Answer. Lessons learned that can be incorporated throughout the
    Nation include:
      --Development of Planning Cell Committees of agency leadership
            personnel to coordinate the creation of operation plans to
            foster a seamless flow of information and to establish
            operating coalitions.
      --Establishing a coordinated leadership structure with an emphasis on
            information and intelligence sharing and ensuring that
            sufficient resources are deployed is a requirement for success.
      --Integrating operations between all BTS entities, State, local,
            tribal agencies and foreign governments achieve better results
            than working alone.
      --Integrating ground-based surveillance technology, air surveillance,
            and ground personnel creates a ``defense in depth'' posture,
            which inhibits the ability of criminal enterprises to operate
            freely along the U.S./Mexico Border.
        Question. Funding for this initiative has been requested in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget request. Should this initiative now be regarded
    as a permanent resource enhancement?
        Answer. The $1 million increase included in the fiscal year 2006
    President's Budget for the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI)
    should be considered to be a permanent increase to CBP's base funding.
    These additional resources are required to meet the objectives of the
    ABCI.
        Question. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles as a part of the ABC
    initiative has been considered very successful. However, the contract
    vehicle that the Science and Technology Directorate was using to
    provide the UAVs has ended, and there is no UAV coverage while CBP
    evaluates how best to continue this project. When does CBP expect to
    have this issue resolved so that UAV coverage can be put back into
    place in the Tucson Sector?
        Answer. CBP is currently refining requirements to issue a request
    for proposals (RFP) to the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry. The
    contract will specify delivery of the system within 30 days of contract
    award, which will allow CBP to establish a UAV initial operating
    capability on the Southern Border in support of the Arizona Border
    Control Initiative. CBP expects to award a contract for UAV procurement
    in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005.

                          ASYLUM AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL

        Question. The United States Commission on International Religious
    Freedom recently issued a report entitled ``Asylum Seekers in Expedited
    Removal''. The report contains a number of recommendations for the
    Department of Homeland Security. The report raised specific issues on
    the difficulty of applying the standards for asylum and credible fear
    in a consistent manner across the Department. Has a working group or
    other mechanism been put in place to look into how the standards are
    applied and ensure consistent treatment of asylum seekers?
        Answer. Since the inception of the expedited removal process in
    1997, a standing inter-agency working group has addressed expedited
    removal issues. The Expedited Removal Working Group is an established
    forum for discussing all issues relating to expedited removal and
    comprises experts from each of the affected DHS entities (U.S.
    Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection,
    and Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
        Pursuant to former Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy's concurrence
    with a joint memorandum from former Undersecretary of Border and
    Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson, USCIS Director Eduardo Aguirre,
    and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Daniel Sutherland, the
    Expedited Removal Working Group has been tasked with coordinating
    review of the United States Commission on International Religious
    Freedom report, ``Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal.'' The working
    group also will draft the Department's responses to the report's
    recommendations. The working group will report on its review and
    proposed responses to BTS, USCIS, and CRCL, and their report then will
    be forwarded to the Secretary.
        Question. The report also raised concerns about the detention
    policies and facilities used for the majority of asylum applicants.
    CBP, ICE, and CIS must all balance the national security needs of this
    country with the humanitarian needs of legitimate asylum applicants. In
    fact, almost at the same time that this report was made public, the
    11th defendant in a significant case ``Operation Jakarta'' involving
    asylum fraud and document fraud pleaded guilty in a Federal court in
    Virginia. What is being done to review these programs and evaluate the
    specific recommendations of the Commission?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security established a working
    group to review and respond to the recommendations suggested by the
    Commission. The working group will issue an evaluation on those
    recommendations this summer.
        Question. What steps have been taken as a result of ``Operation
    Jakarta'' to track down anyone who received benefits fraudulently
    because of this criminal enterprise and remove them from the United
    States?
        Answer. During the course of the criminal investigation, the USCIS
    Asylum Offices have reviewed 12,000 Indonesian asylum cases in order to
    identify all fraudulent cases related to ``Operation Jakarta.''
    Approximately 800 principal asylum cases were directly linked to the
    perpetrators of the fraud and will be processed for termination. Due to
    the high volume of fraud cases, the Asylum Offices have created teams
    of Asylum Officers to process the cases expeditiously. As the cases are
    terminated, the individuals will then be referred for judicial review
    to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). All of the
    individuals that applied for and/or received benefits associated with
    this fraud will be entered as ``lookouts'' in the Treasury Enforcement
    Communications Systems (TECS).

               USE OF STOLEN PASSPORTS--INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

        Question. In December of 2004, the Department of Homeland
    Security's Office of Inspector General issued a report entitled ``A
    Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Countries to
    Enter the United States''. Both ICE and CBP concurred with the
    recommendations in this report. What progress has ICE and CBP made to
    implement those recommendations?
        Answer. ICE and CBP have implemented coordinated standard operating
    procedures to ensure ICE receives information on all individuals
    present in the United States who entered on a lost or stolen passport.
    On January 28, 2005, the Director of the National Targeting Center
    (NTC) sent the ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) a letter
    confirming the agreement between ICE and CBP. CBP will ensure lookouts
    are placed on all lost or stolen passports, conduct appropriate
    database queries, and forward information to the CEU on anyone present
    in the United States who entered on a lost or stolen passport.
        Question. Please provide the Committee with a detailed, item by
    item, breakout of any fiscal year 2004 representation funds that were
    allocated to CBP, CIS, ICE, and the Under Secretary for Border and
    Transportation Security.
        Answer. The requested information has been provided in the tables
    below.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year
             Organizational element                2004         Fiscal year
                                               appropriated   2004 obligated
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Office of Under Secretary for BTS.......  ..............  ..............
    CBP.....................................         $40,000         $37,661
    ICE.....................................          15,000           6,837
    USCIS...................................           5,000           4,953
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUMMARY OF RECEPTION & REPRESENTATION FUND OBLIGATIONS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Date                       Event               Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
         U.S. Customs and Border
               Protection

    30-Oct-03.......................  Official luncheon              $381.14
                                       held in honor of
                                       U.S./Mexico Border
                                       Partnership
                                       Meeting.
    13-Nov-03.......................  Protocol Supplies..             170.98
    03-Nov-03.......................  Refreshments served              74.82
                                       at the Operation
                                       Safe Commerce
                                       Meeting.
    08-Nov-03.......................  Sponsor the                     150.00
                                       Ministers from
                                       Trinidad & Tobago
                                       at the Marine
                                       Corps Ball in
                                       Trinidad in
                                       furtherance of
                                       CMAA negotiations.
    12-Nov-03.......................  Refreshments for                 21.09
                                       meeting hosted by
                                       Deputy
                                       Commissioner with
                                       Mexican Delegation.
    17-Nov-04.......................  Official Dinner in              402.82
                                       honor of Lars
                                       Karlsson, 2nd
                                       Deputy Director
                                       General, Sweden
                                       Customs.
    19-Nov-03.......................  Official Dinner                 923.55
                                       with officials
                                       from New Zealand
                                       during CIS
                                       Discussions.
    02-Dec-04.......................  Official reception              326.97
                                       for the opening of
                                       the CSI Port in
                                       Durban, South
                                       Africa.
    12-Dec-03.......................  Protocol Supplies--           1,200.00
                                       Commissioner of
                                       Customs office.
    18-Dec-04.......................  Official Reception           10,523.50
                                       hosted by
                                       Commissioner of
                                       Customs in honor
                                       of foreign
                                       dignitaries and
                                       high level
                                       officials from
                                       various Embassies.
    21-Jan-04.......................  Honorary Award Item              95.00
                                       for WCO Regional
                                       Security
                                       Conference in
                                       Senegal.
    21-Jan-04.......................  Official luncheon               148.00
                                       hosted by Chief De
                                       La Vina in honor
                                       of Mexican
                                       Officials,
                                       Fernando Creixell
                                       and Agustin Caso.
    23-Jan-04.......................  Official luncheon               213.68
                                       in honor of Canada
                                       Border Security
                                       Agency, President
                                       Alain Jolicoeur
                                       and Director Greg
                                       Boatbe.
    28-Jan-04.......................  International                 3,473.00
                                       Customs Day
                                       Reception.
    29-Jan-04.......................  Official dinner               1,487.20
                                       hosted by
                                       Secretary Ridge in
                                       honor of Canadian
                                       Prime Minister and
                                       delegation.
    24-Feb-04.......................  Official Luncheon               608.00
                                       for Italian
                                       Delegation during
                                       CSI Program Review.
    03-Mar-04.......................  Flowers sent on                 219.06
                                       behalf of Customs
                                       and Border
                                       Protection upon
                                       the death of
                                       Comptroller of
                                       Customs, Robin
                                       Dare (New Zealand).
    24-Mar-04.......................  Official luncheon               125.13
                                       hosted by Acting
                                       Assistant
                                       Commissioner,
                                       International
                                       Affairs in honor
                                       of Mr. Kaci Abes,
                                       Director, External
                                       Cooperation &
                                       Relations.
    22-Apr-04.......................  Protocol Supplies               261.52
                                       for US/EU Signing.
    28-Apr-04.......................  Official Luncheon               379.10
                                       hosted in honor of
                                       US/EU signing and
                                       the Joint Customs
                                       Cooperation
                                       Committee.
    08-May-04.......................  Protocol Supplies--              10.60
                                       Office of Trade
                                       Relations.
    13-May-04.......................  Official luncheon               592.62
                                       hosted in honor of
                                       Mr. Mu Xin-Sheng,
                                       Minister, General
                                       Administration of
                                       China Customs and
                                       his delegation.
    24-May-04.......................  Refreshments during             616.92
                                       meetings held with
                                       the European
                                       Community & U.S.
                                       Expert Groups on
                                       Container Security.
    08-Jun-04.......................  Dinner hosted by                450.00
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner in honor of
                                       the U.S./Canada
                                       Shared Border
                                       meeting.
    08-Jun-04.......................  Official luncheon               514.30
                                       hosted by
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner in honor of
                                       U.S./Canada Shared
                                       Border meeting.
    08-Jun-04.......................  Official Reception            1,967.06
                                       hosted by
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner at the U.S./
                                       Canada Shared
                                       Border Meeting.
    14-Jun-04.......................  Official luncheon               216.25
                                       hosted by
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner in
                                       conjunction with
                                       the U.S./Mexico
                                       Bilateral Meeting.
    16-Jun-04.......................  Official luncheon               562.50
                                       hosted by Acting
                                       Assistant
                                       Commissioner,
                                       International
                                       Affairs in honor
                                       of high level
                                       Georgian Officials.
    22-Jun-04.......................  Official luncheon               323.01
                                       hosted by Acting
                                       Assistant
                                       Commissioner, INA
                                       for the New
                                       Zealand delegation
                                       attending the WCO
                                       Policy &
                                       Commission
                                       meetings..
    25-Jun-04.......................  Official luncheon               421.65
                                       and toast hosted
                                       by Commissioner
                                       Bonner at the
                                       signing of the CSI
                                       agreement with the
                                       Hellenic Republic.
    28-Jun-04.......................  Official Luncheon               495.00
                                       hosted by
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner for high
                                       level French
                                       Customs officials.
    14-Jul-04.......................  Refreshments for                297.01
                                       CSI Global
                                       Targeting Assembly
                                       of Technical
                                       Experts Conference.
    27-Jul-04.......................  Official luncheon               878.41
                                       hosted by Acting
                                       Deputy AC, INA for
                                       attendees of the
                                       U.S./Australia
                                       Regional Movement
                                       Alert List System
                                       Conference.
    04-Sep-04.......................  Protocol Supplies--              27.73
                                       Director, Trade
                                       Relations.
    15-Sep-04.......................  Refreshments during             106.60
                                       conference with
                                       Russian officials
                                       and CBP on
                                       Passenger Name
                                       Record
                                       connectivity.
    22-Sep-04.......................  Protocol Supplies--             290.76
                                       AC, INA and
                                       Commissioner
                                       Bonner's Office.
    22-Sep-04.......................  CSI PTP, Malaysia               301.62
                                       Luncheon.
    23-Sep-04.......................  Honorary Award                8,404.74
                                       Items for Foreign
                                       Officials.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Obligation..........  ...................          37,661.34
                                                          ==================
      U.S. Immigration and Customs
               Enforcement

    11-Dec-03.......................  Assistant Secretary           1,325.89
                                       Holiday Reception
                                       for members of
                                       Congress and other
                                       dignitaries.
    3-Feb-04........................  International                   717.75
                                       Attache briefing w/
                                       light refreshments
                                       hosted by the
                                       Federal Air
                                       Marshal Services.
                                       Dignitaries and
                                       honorable guests
                                       traveled from
                                       Netherlands,
                                       Austria, Japan,
                                       China, Belgium,
                                       Egypt,
                                       Philippines,
                                       Brazil, New
                                       Zealand, Hungary,
                                       et.al.
    2-Mar-04........................  Breakfast with                  205.53
                                       Danish Minister at
                                       ICE.
    3-Mar-04........................  ICE One Year                    299.06
                                       Anniversary Event
                                       attended by
                                       Captains, Chiefs
                                       of Police, State
                                       Police Officials,
                                       and
                                       representatives of
                                       other Federal
                                       Agencies.
    20-May-04.......................  Luncheon event for              416.75
                                       the Office of the
                                       Assistant
                                       Secretary with
                                       local officials
                                       and dignitaries
                                       who made
                                       substantial
                                       contribution to
                                       Nation or DHS.
    8-Jun-04........................  Detention and                   203.66
                                       Removal Operations
                                       Dinner during Four
                                       Country Conference
                                       in San Diego, CA
                                       to address mutual
                                       immigration and
                                       removal issues.
                                       Hosted by DRO;
                                       attendees included
                                       representatives
                                       from the Embassy
                                       of Australia;
                                       Canada Border
                                       Protection Agency;
                                       United Kingdom
                                       Immigration
                                       Service; and other
                                       foreign officials.
    20-Aug-04.......................  Opening ceremony                490.00
                                       for ICE Air and
                                       Marine Operations--
                                       Bellingham Branch;
                                       attended by U.S.
                                       Senator Patty
                                       Murray, U.S.
                                       Representative
                                       Rick Larsen, and
                                       other
                                       Congressional
                                       representatives.
                                      Purchase of food                476.08
                                       and beverage items
                                       for AMO ceremony.
    18-Sep-04.......................  ICE Air and Marine            2,702.13
                                       Operations
                                       briefing and site
                                       visit for
                                       Congresswoman Kay
                                       Granger and
                                       others. Includes
                                       purchase of
                                       refreshments for
                                       the event.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Obligation..........  ...................           6,836.85
                                                          ==================
    U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
                Services

                                      Kitchenware                     389.07
                                       supplies for
                                       Director's suite,
                                       for hosting VIPs
                                       and dignitaries.
                                      Honorary award                  998.93
                                       items (coasters)
                                       for VIPs and
                                       dignitaries.
                                      Official luncheon                25.77
                                       with dignitary
                                       Eduardo Ibarolla
                                       and Director
                                       Aguirre.
                                      Official dinner                 220.96
                                       with incoming
                                       Mexican Ambassador
                                       Icaza and Director
                                       Aguirre to
                                       establish
                                       professional
                                       rapport.
                                      Honorary award item              79.95
                                       (Cufflinks) for
                                       guest speaker at
                                       USCIS 2004
                                       Director's
                                       Leadership
                                       Conference.
                                      Honorary Award                1,075.95
                                       Items (Cufflinks)
                                       for senior
                                       representative and
                                       foreign
                                       dignitaries during
                                       official travel
                                       and visits.
                                      Honorary Award                1,135.00
                                       Items (Lapel Pins)
                                       for distribution
                                       by Director
                                       Aguirre during
                                       official travel
                                       and visits.
                                      Honorary Award                1,000.00
                                       Items (Pewter
                                       bowls and
                                       platters) for high-
                                       level dignitaries.
                                      Official Luncheon                27.52
                                       with senior-level
                                       guest (Alecia
                                       Casteneda) to
                                       establish
                                       professional
                                       interagency
                                       rapport.
                                                          ------------------
          Total Obligation..........  ...................           4,953.15
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

       SECURE ELECTRONIC NETWORK FOR TRAVELERS RAPID INSPECTION PROGRAM
                                    (SENTRI)

        Question. In June of 2004 the Department of Homeland Security's
    Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on the Secure
    Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection program, known as
    SENTRI. CBP agreed with the recommendations made by the Inspector
    General. Please provide an update on the progress that has been made in
    implementing each of the OIG's recommendations regarding the SENTRI
    program.
        Answer. On January 24, 2005, a new Standard Operating Procedure
    (SOP) Manual was sent to the San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, Field
    Offices for the administration of the SENTRI program that addressed the
    majority of the recommendations in the OIG's report, including stating
    clearly the program eligibility criteria, establishing procedures for
    background checks and their resolution, developing minimum documentary
    requirements, separation of duties between initial enrollment and final
    approval, monitoring continued eligibility, and recording SENTRI
    violations. Certain other recommendations, relating to the Global
    Enrollment System and integration with related information systems are
    awaiting technical upgrades to achieve completion.

                          IMMIGRATION ADVISORY PROGRAM

        Question. The Immigration Advisory Program is designed to improve
    border security against the threat of terrorism by enabling CBP to
    identify and intercept suspected terrorists and undocumented passengers
    before they board planes bound for the United States from overseas
    locations. The pilots established in Amsterdam and Warsaw in 2004
    appear very promising. The fiscal year 2006 request includes funds to
    expand this program to two additional airports. Can, or should, this
    program be expanded more quickly?
        Answer. Based on the results from Amsterdam and Warsaw through
    February 28, 2005, CBP believes the IAP should be expanded and has
    great potential for similar success at other large European, Latin
    American, and Asian hub airports. IAP expansion is dependent on
    reaching a bilateral agreement with the host country government and
    will be rolled out as expeditiously as possible while ensuring
    operational connectivity to port of entry operations.
        Question. Please provide any evaluations or reports on the
    effectiveness of the IAP pilots.
        Answer. Accomplishments for June 5, 2004, to February 28, 2005, for
    Amsterdam and September 5, 2004, to February 28, 2005, for Warsaw
    follow:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    No Board Advisements....................................             222
    Fraud Intercepts........................................              34
    NTC Targets Confirmed...................................              16
    CBP Costs Avoided.......................................        $334,554
    Potential Carrier Savings...............................        $414,150
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests an additional $8.2
    million to expand the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
    TPAT). The fiscal year 2006 President's budget states that as of
    January 12, 2005, CBP had reviewed and accepted the security profiles
    of 4,460 companies, making these companies certified partners. The next
    step in the process is validation. According to information that was
    submitted for the record after last year's hearing, CBP planned to
    complete 400 validations of C-TPAT certified partners in fiscal year
    2004. Was that goal met last fiscal year (fiscal year 2004)?
        Answer. CBP initiated 500 validations and completed 287 during
    2004. As of March 25, 2005, over 540 validations have been completed,
    with an additional 400 underway or in various stages of completion. CBP
    anticipates that over 900 validations will be completed by the end of
    fiscal year 2005.
        In fiscal year 2004, CBP created a new position, Supply Chain
    Specialist (SCS), and sought to recruit qualified officers throughout
    the year. CBP continues to aggressively recruit permanent Supply Chain
    Specialists, and has trained field officers to help assist in the
    initiation of validations.
        Question. What is the target number of validations CBP plans to
    complete in fiscal year 2005?
        Answer. CBP will complete 500 validations in fiscal year 2005, for
    a total of 900 since the inception of program.
        The overwhelming response by the trade community (volume of
    applications) forced CBP to reconsider the original goal to validate
    all certified members within a 3-year period.
        CBP's strategy is for C-TPAT to determine and prioritize which
    sectors of membership will be selected for validations, selecting
    individual companies based upon a standardized risk assessment, and
    identifying ``company specific'' high-risk supply chains to better
    focus our efforts/resources.
        Question. How many more validations will CBP be able to complete
    each year with the new resources that have requested?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 request of $8.2 million will allow CBP
    to conduct as many as 600 more validation trips per year. Oftentimes,
    multiple validations are conducted on a single trip.
        CBP anticipates having 100 Supply Chain Specialists (SCSs) on board
    by the end of fiscal year 2005. Each SCS is expected to complete 17
    validation trips per year, with more than one validation conducted per
    trip. With 100 SCSs on board, CBP anticipates completing 1,700
    validation trips per year. When fully staffed with SCSs, CBP could
    complete 2,669 validation trips per year.
        Question. Last year, the Committee was informed that validations of
    foreign manufacturers would begin in calendar year 2004. Was that
    review of foreign manufacturers begun last year (calendar year 2004)?
        Answer. During calendar year 2004, CBP initiated 500 validations of
    importers' foreign supply chains, which includes foreign manufacturers,
    and completed 287.
        Validations of the Mexican manufacturer enrollment sector began in
    earnest in March 2005. Additional validations of Mexican manufacturers
    are being planned for June 2005.

                          AMERICA'S SHIELD INITIATIVE

        Question. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes a
    request of $19.8 million for the America's Shield Initiative (ASI).
    These funds will allow CBP to begin deployment of next generation
    technology for electronic surveillance along our Nation's land borders.
        CBP is working on awarding a contract for the integration of ASI
    sometime this year. At the same time, CBP needs to operate and maintain
    the equipment that is in the field today. There are currently
    significant critical operational breakdowns, cameras with unusable
    pictures, cameras down due to lightening strikes, camera control
    problems, cameras that have been replaced but are missing enclosures.
    In fact, the maintenance contract for the current installations lapsed
    in September of 2004, and CBP is still working on finalizing the
    replacement of those services. What is the plan to get the maintenance
    backlog taken care of?
        Answer. As noted, CBP is moving ahead with plans to develop and
    implement the America's Shield Initiative (ASI), which will provide a
    more comprehensive, integrated solution to electronic surveillance the
    border. But simultaneously, CBP is still working to ensure that
    existing border surveillance infrastructure remains operational. For
    example, with regard to operational Remote Video System (RVS)
    installations in the field, activities are underway to address repair
    issues for operational sites. In addition, data and lessons learned
    from these current activities are being used to provide baseline data
    towards the development of an interim operations, maintenance, and
    repair program. This interim program will provide maintenance and
    repair support to existing field equipment pending the development and
    implementation of a maintenance and repair program that will support
    both existing and new field equipment.
        Currently within CBP, the ASI Program Management Office (PMO), the
    National Emergency Equipment Repair and Maintenance Program (NEEMR),
    and the Tactical Communications Organization (TCO) have partnered to
    address several of these repair issues. For example, NEEMR, TCO, and
    the ASI (PMO) partnered to address the lightning strike incident that
    occurred at the Douglas, AZ Border Patrol RVS site. A team consisting
    of these three components responded to repair this installation. That
    activity was initiated at the beginning of February and concluded at
    the beginning of March. The result of this activity was the repair of
    the installation to a pre-lightning strike state, an assessment of
    current installation issues, and a collection of significant amount of
    baseline data regarding how these components worked together.
        Question. When will the maintenance backlog be cleared up?
        Answer. Establishing the ASI Program Management Office and the
    partnership with the National Emergency Equipment Repair and
    Maintenance Program (NEEMR) and the Tactical Communications
    Organizations (TCO), and awarding contracts for parts and equipment
    repair to original equipment manufacturers has significantly reduced
    the maintenance backlog. CBP believes that the maintenance backlog will
    be completely eliminated during the summer of 2005.
        Question. This fiscal year, the plan for ASI calls for spending $10
    million on surge technology. Please provide an explanation of what this
    is and what the plans are for this surge technology?
        Answer. Surge technology is surveillance equipment that can be
    rapidly deployed in self-contained system packages that have the
    mobility and deployment capabilities to allow it to be positioned in a
    very short period of time to support changes in national operational
    needs. The plan at this time is to procure vehicle-mounted ground radar
    equipment that is co-mounted with a cooled, thermal imaging system that
    can sense and identify a vehicle as well as a human over 5 miles away.
    A system of this type will allow the detection and tracking of multiple
    items-of-interest and provides vectoring information to agents on the
    ground. By virtue of their mobility and transportability, CBP will be
    able to deploy these assets to the geographic regions or corridors that
    align with the current, nationally-assessed threat environment.
        Question. CBP also plans to spend $10.6 million for replacement/
    repair of ground sensors in fiscal year 2005. Given that plans are in
    place to possibly award an integration contract to upgrade all of this
    technology, why are we replacing ground sensors now? Is it possible we
    will be replacing these again with something new in just a year or two?
        Answer. In the early 1990's, the Federal Communications Commission
    (FCC) modified the spectrum range of commercial and government
    frequency usage. As such, CBP is required to change its systems to
    support the FCC frequency spectrum allocation requirements. CBP's
    Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is purchasing new unattended ground
    sensors to further augment its already deployed sensor fleet, to meet
    operational objectives, and to meet these FCC requirements.
        An objective of this procurement effort is to ensure compatibility
    with any future systems that are acquired. Replacement of newly
    procured unattended ground sensors in a year or two is not anticipated.
    An objective of this procurement is to ensure that these sensors will
    readily integrate with future systems.
        A cost analysis is being performed regarding the ability to upgrade
    our currently deployed unattended ground sensors that were procured and
    deployed prior to the FCC frequency spectrum allocation modification.
    This effort is also being undertaken in such a manner as to ensure that
    these upgrades are made to meet FCC requirements and future systems
    integration.
        Question. What is the timeline for initiating and completing all
    identified ground sensor repairs?
        Answer. A proposal has been developed to augment sensor
    capabilities in Tucson Sector with 1,240 new digital sensors. As these
    sensors are deployed, the ``old'' sensors that are replaced, or rotated
    in from the field will, be assessed for redeployment to other Sectors
    as needed and in alignment with current enforcement objectives and
    national threat assessments. The project is scheduled to begin June
    2005, with projected completion March 2008.

                        AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT

        Question. CBP has been working on modernizing the information
    technology systems that it uses for some time. The most significant
    project is the Automated Commercial Environment, known as ACE. Last
    year, CBP released the re-baseline estimate for completion of the ACE
    system. The new schedule has ACE being fully deployed in 2011, and
    costing an additional $1 billion. How confident is CBP that this new
    timeline can be accomplished?
        Answer. CBP is confident the project can be completed in that time
    frame. That said, the new proposed baseline is presently under review.
    CBP will continue to strive to find ways to deliver ACE better, sooner,
    and at less cost. In addition, CBP has worked to improve ACE
    management. The staffs of legacy systems were merged into the CBP
    Modernization Office last December. The merger greatly increased the
    number of government staff on the program, as well as available subject
    matter expertise and IT project management skills. This will help keep
    the program on budget and schedule.
        CBP now also has the advantage of working with an operational
    system. Release 3, implemented in June 2004, is fully operational and
    has already increased the amount of duty collected via Periodic Monthly
    Statement from $80,000 in June to over $109 million in February 2005.
    The Release 4 pilot in Blaine, Washington although currently
    experiencing some technical problems, has processed over 40,000 trucks.
    Having these ACE systems operating in ``real-world'' CBP environments
    provides excellent experience and feedback for the program team, and
    provides a solid base on which to build future capabilities.
        Question. What is the status of the pilot in Blaine, Washington, of
    e-Manifest Trucks?
        Answer. The ACE truck cargo/eManifest pilot was initiated in
    Blaine, Washington, on December 12, 2004. The system was very well
    received by the CBP Officers in the port, demonstrating a number of
    improvements over previous systems. However, system issues were
    uncovered, which caused delays in the processing of trucks. This
    resulted in a temporary halt to the pilot in late December in order to
    implement necessary changes.
        The ACE pilot was re-started in mid-January with improved
    capabilities and significant streamlining of the cargo screening and
    release functions. With these changes, ACE has been processing trucks,
    on average, more quickly than the different release systems that had
    been in use prior to ACE. Average truck processing times were in the 70
    second range.
        Additional problems with the pilot were uncovered in early March.
    These problems were manifested as a result of the increased volume of
    trucks being processed (over 40,000 trucks had been processed with
    ACE). The problems have been corrected, and the revised system has been
    tested. Since the testing results were positive, CBP re-started the
    pilot April 4.
        Part of the reason for difficulties with the pilot has been the low
    volume of electronic manifests submitted by carriers and service
    providers. A combination of difficulties with the CBP eManifest
    certification process and the effort required by the trade participants
    to make changes to their systems have led to the low participation.
    However, for those eManifests that have been submitted, ACE has
    performed extremely well, demonstrating the full promise of the system.
    CBP is working closely with the carrier community to increase, as
    quickly as possible, their use of eManifests.
        CBP firmly believes that the current problems with the ACE pilot
    will be quickly corrected and the pilot will be operating successfully
    in the Port of Blaine. Plans have been developed to expand ACE to
    additional ports on the northern and southern land borders. Efforts are
    also underway to support 28 new carriers and service providers who have
    state their intentions to begin providing eManifests.

                  AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS--RECAPITALIZATION

        Question. A request for funding to begin the re-capitalization of
    the Border Patrol air fleet was included in the fiscal year 2006
    budget, but there is no request for the replacement of Air and Marine's
    fleet. When can we expect to see such a request?
        Answer. A program increase for re-capitalization of the Air and
    Marine Operations (AMO) fleet is not included in the fiscal year 2006
    President's Budget, however, the fiscal year 2006 AMO base budget does
    include approximately $55 million for the procurement of replacement
    aircraft and deployment of new aircraft to CBP air wings.
        Modernization of CBP air and marine assets is a priority in order
    to meet expanded missions in the areas of detection, surveillance,
    deterrence and apprehension, search and rescue, interdiction and
    Airspace Domain Security.
        CBP is currently conducting a review of AMO and Border Patrol air
    and marine missions, operations and assets with the objective of
    determining how best to allocate and manage resources. It is
    anticipated that areas of both integrated and distinct aviation and
    marine missions will be defined, and opportunities for combining fleet
    modernization requirements will be identified. The existing AMO and
    Border Patrol modernization plans will be reviewed in the context of
    supporting the updated mission needs resulting from the transition
    analysis. All opportunities for commonality of aircraft, vessels,
    facility locations, command and control, maintenance and procedural
    standards are being reviewed. Potential benefits include enhanced
    threat engagement, procurement cost efficiencies, reduced life cycle
    costs, increased mission readiness and operational performance.
        Development of a unified recapitalization plan for all CBP air and
    marine assets is will commence following completion of the integration.

                              WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

        Question. The President's budget requests $18 million for
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to double the resources
    devoted to worksite enforcement. The President's budget does not
    request any additional investigators for this program. Are there a
    sufficient number of investigators to pursue any leads or cases that
    may be developed?
        Answer. ICE's fiscal year 2006 President's Budget requests $18
    million for the temporary worker program to fund 140 agents and
    investigations training. It is proposed that the agents be assigned to
    field offices nationwide primarily to conduct employer audits, examine
    and prioritize leads, prepare and deliver Notices of Inspection and
    Notices of Inspection Results, and develop employer cases involving
    administrative fines. Agents would be assigned to field offices in the
    States with the greatest number of unauthorized workers.
        The requested resources would enable ICE to increase its presence
    at worksites in specific industries and geographical areas,
    concentrating on employers who intentionally violate the law or who
    have historically hired large numbers of unauthorized workers.
        Question. Please provide the Committee with a description of ICE's
    current worksite enforcement program, including what authorities are
    being enforced and how the program is run.
        Answer. ICE worksite enforcement program activities focus primarily
    on removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure
    facilities to reduce the risk of terrorist attack from insiders. This
    may be accomplished through screening and arrest operations to identify
    and remove the unauthorized workers, as well as through strategic
    partnering with employers and the law enforcement entities controlling
    facility access. ICE worksite enforcement activities also target
    criminal employers whose violations have a nexus to human smuggling,
    immigration document or benefit fraud, and worker exploitation.
        The authorities being enforced generally include one or more of the
    civil and/or criminal provisions of INA 274A (Unlawful Employment of
    Aliens). Many criminal employer investigations also charge violations
    relating to harboring, smuggling, and document fraud.
        Question. Please provide the Committee with a breakout of worksite
    enforcement workload of administrative cases versus criminal
    investigations for fiscal years 1999 through 2004, including a breakout
    of the FTE devoted to this area by type of employee for those same
    years.
        Answer. Please see table below.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Fiscal year
             Performance category         --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               1999         2000         2001        2002        2003        2004
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Criminal Employer Cases..............      \1\ 182      \1\ 109      \1\ 239      \1\ 21       \1\ 4      \3\ 59
    Notices of Intent to Fine Issued.....      \1\ 443      \1\ 213      \1\ 141      \1\ 73      \1\ 16       \1\ 3
    Number of Fines Collected............      \4\ 890      \4\ 478      \4\ 292     \4\ 115      \4\ 54      \4\ 64
    Fine Amounts Collected...............  \4\ $3,690,  \4\ $2,234,  \4\ $1,599,  \4\ $509,8  \4\ $212,3  \4\ $118,5
                                                   575          181          323          35          22          28
    Worksite Arrests.....................    \5\ 2,849      \5\ 953      \5\ 418     \6\ 816     \6\ 505     \6\ 642
    Investigative Work Years (Work             \5\ 278      \5\ 202      \5\ 134     \5\ 152     \5\ 105      \5\ 90
     Year=1,695 hours)...................
    Case Completions.....................    \5\ 3,844    \5\ 1,966    \1\ 1,595   \1\ 2,061   \1\ 1,490     \7\ 523
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Source: LYNX.
    \2\ Source: TECS.
    \3\ Calculated utilizing Treasury Enforcement Comms System(TECS) records (criminal employer cases opened).
    \4\ Source: Debt Management Center.
    \5\ Source: PAS.
    \6\ Manually calculated utilizing internal reports submitted by field offices.
    \7\ Manually calculated based upon the number of completed cases in LYNX and the number of cases reported closed
      in TECS.

                               VISA SECURITY UNIT

        Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $5 million
    to expand the Visa Security Unit. The recently submitted ``Visa
    Security Program: Annual Report for 2003-2004'' talks about the
    critical need for coordination and training with the Department of
    State Consular Affairs and CBP. What mechanisms are in place to ensure
    that there is the closest possible cooperation in this program?
        Answer. The Visa Security Program (VSP) within ICE is responsible
    for implementing Section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act, which
    calls for the deployment of DHS officers to visa-issuing posts, unless
    such a deployment would not benefit homeland security. One of their
    principal duties under Section 428(e)(1) is to provide advice and
    training to consular officers regarding specific security threats
    relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes
    of applications. DHS Visa Security Officers in Saudi Arabia are
    currently providing this training, and upcoming deployments of Visa
    Security Officers will expand this activity to additional posts. In
    addition, ICE and the Department of State have designated points of
    contact at Headquarters who coordinate closely on issues including
    consular training. A representative from the Visa Security Program has
    briefed each graduating class of consular officers since October 2004.
        VSP also coordinates with CBP on several operational levels. Visa
    Security Officers regularly utilize the National Targeting Center as a
    supporting element in their in-depth review of visa applications. In
    addition, CBP officers have served temporary details at Headquarters
    and in the field. Finally, VSP has opened announcements for permanent
    positions to both ICE and CBP officers in order to recruit officers
    with a full range of immigration enforcement skills to serve overseas
    as Visa Security Officers.
        The President's requested increase of $5 million in fiscal year
    2006 will fund expanded VSP operations in the field and at
    Headquarters, to include its consular training responsibilities.
        Question. In August of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's
    Office of Inspector General issued an evaluation of DHS activities to
    implement section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This
    evaluation included a number of recommendations to improve the workings
    of the Visa Security Officers. What is the status of implementing each
    of the recommendations in that report?
        Answer. Since the DHS Inspector General's (IG) evaluation in late
    2003, shortly after the initial deployment of officers to Saudi Arabia,
    Visa Security Program operations in Saudi Arabia have made significant
    progress. Of the IG's twelve recommendations, three had been closed at
    the time of the report's publication. The remaining nine
    recommendations were resolved, and remain open while they are
    implemented. Below is an update on each of the IG's recommendations.
        Recommendation 1.--Develop a curriculum of homeland security
    training for consular officers consistent with the requirement in
    Section 428(b)(1) of the Act.
        ICE is working to develop homeland security training for consular
    officers. A VSP's program development staff member has attended the
    Basic Consular Training Program at the Department of State's (DOS)
    National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) as a basis for ICE's
    recommendations to DOS about consular training. VSP staff also held a
    curriculum development conference with training experts from the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and ICE Academy to plan
    the development of the consular training program. Since October 2004,
    VSP leadership has been addressing each graduating class from the Basic
    Consular Training Program, to introduce them to the visa security
    mission and to prepare them to work with Visa Security Officers in the
    future.
        Recommendation 2.--Develop a training program for Visa Security
    Officers (VSOs) that includes foreign languages, country studies, and
    interview and fraud detection techniques.
        Working with the ICE Academy and FLETC, VSP developed a 4-week
    training curriculum for Visa Security Officers, incorporating the IG's
    content recommendations. With specific regard to language training,
    ICE's VSO selection criteria will continue to emphasize language
    ability, and VSP will continue to exercise best efforts to provide
    additional language training where necessary.
        Recommendation 3.--In coordination with DOS, develop performance
    standards to evaluate consular officers.
        ICE continues in an audit capacity, to advise DOS on consular
    performance evaluation. A VSP staff member recently attended Basic
    Consular Training to assess how consular officers currently are trained
    and evaluated.
        Recommendation 4.--Develop written criteria for assigning VSOs to
    other countries.
        Closed. ICE established such criteria in early 2004, and the OIG
    closed this recommendation as it published the report in August 2004.
        Recommendation 5.--Assign responsibility to develop and publish the
    report to Congress required by Section 428(e)(4).
        ICE/VSP will prepare the report, and BTS will submit the report to
    Congress.
        Recommendation 6.--Conduct a study of the personnel management
    techniques used by other agencies with a global workforce and evaluate
    ways to facilitate the overseas rotations of DHS employees.
        DHS is continuing to evaluate its international presence. No
    specific policy recommendations have yet been announced.
        Recommendation 7.--Discontinue the practice of filling the VSO
    positions with temporarily assigned officers and move toward filling
    the positions with permanently assigned officers.
        VSP has announced and selected positions for Saudi Arabia. VSP will
    announce permanent positions for all future offices.
        Recommendation 8.--Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on
    required experience and skill sets to support the visa security
    operation.
        Closed. ICE established such criteria in early 2004, and the OIG
    closed this recommendation as it published the report in August 2004.
        Recommendation 9.--Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the
    visa security operations receive all required support and that DOS is
    promptly reimbursed for the support that it provides.
        VSP has received funding in fiscal year 2005 for its existing posts
    in Saudi Arabia and for expansion to four additional locations. This
    will become the base for fiscal year 2006 and the out-years for all
    locations opened in or already in operation as of fiscal year 2005. To
    facilitate administrative coordination, DOS and VSP recently signed a
    Memorandum of Agreement that explains how reimbursements and other
    administrative matters will be handled.
        Recommendation 10.--Propose a technical correction to Section
    428(i) to align it with Section 428(e) and permit DHS to review only
    those applications with homeland security interest in Saudi Arabia.
        Closed. The OIG agreed with ICE's position that the legal
    requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia should not
    be modified. The OIG closed this recommendation as it published the
    report in August 2004.
        Recommendation 11.--Evaluate the possible benefit of analyzing the
    existing visa applications in DOS files of young Saudi males who were
    issued visas in the 2 year period prior to September 11, 2001. BTS
    should coordinate with DOS, the FBI, and other Federal agencies, as
    necessary, before making a determination about whether, or how, to
    proceed to analyze the applications.
        ICE agrees that there may be value in reviewing certain
    applications submitted in Saudi Arabia in the 2 years prior to
    September 11, 2001. DHS is still evaluating whether or how to proceed
    with such an analysis.
        Recommendation 12.--Develop an interface between BTS and DOS
    computer systems that permits a fast and efficient method to automate
    the visa security name check process and eliminate the duplicative data
    entry for database checks.
        ICE has been working with DOS to improve information sharing and
    access and has succeeded in virtually eliminating the manual data entry
    that the IG observed in late 2003/early 2004. VSP is working with DOS
    to further enhance regular information sharing and expects the new
    process to be in place in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005.

                             OVERHEAD COST SHARING

        Question. Last fiscal year and this fiscal year, ICE plans to
    charge a portion of the headquarters overhead costs to the Federal
    Protective Service (FPS) and the Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). On what
    basis were the overhead charges calculated to ensure that those
    organizations were paying for services they received on a basis
    proportionate to their usage?
        Answer. Early in the fiscal year, FPS and/or FAMS were expected to
    provide funding for overhead based for the actual costs for services.
    The headquarters (HQ) overhead costs are allocated to the ICE
    components using full-time equivalents (FTE), at the beginning of the
    fiscal year, to construct the proration percentages. Following a review
    of the overhead costing issue for the FAMS and FPS, a final decision
    was made that the FAMS and FPS would only pay for services actually
    being utilized. However, they will not be assessed an overhead charge
    in fiscal year 2005.
        Question. Will this become a permanent charge to FPS and FAMS? If
    so, why are no additional resources being requested to ensure that the
    funds are available to pay these bills?
        Answer. All ICE Programs, Projects and Activities (PPAs) should be
    expected to share HQ overhead costs for the overhead services that ICE
    provides. However, for fiscal year 2005 there will not be an assessment
    for FPS and FAMS.
        HQ overheads are covered out of base appropriated funds.
    Additionally, every new enhancement request includes funds for HQ
    overhead in the modular costs used to compute the enhancement.
        Question. Will this have an adverse impact on the ability of the
    FAMS to maintain its staffing levels?
        Answer. No, the FAMS are not being assessed an overhead charge.

                              FUGITIVE OPERATIONS

        Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $8.8
    million to expand the capabilities of the fugitive operations teams. In
    answer to questions submitted after last year's hearing, ICE stated
    that the strategic plan called for the elimination of the 400,000
    fugitive backlog within 10 years based on significant increases in the
    fugitive program.
        What impact are the continued funding shortfalls having on the
    Office of Detention and Removals' ability to implement that plan?
        Answer. ICE continues to track and apprehend fugitives and continue
    to surpass goals and previous year's statistics. However, some existing
    teams need additional staff that have not yet been hired, and no new
    teams have been deployed. When corrected later this year, this delay
    will have no effect in meeting the 10-year plan.
        Question. Does the fiscal year 2006 budget request include
    sufficient resources for ICE to continue making progress in locating
    and deporting absconders?
        Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2006 Budget will allow ICE to show
    significant progress in locating, apprehending and removing absconders.
        Question. Has ICE been able to move ahead with the data integrity
    projects related to the absconder records despite the funding
    situation? What results have been seen from the data integrity
    projects?
        Answer. ICE has been investigating data integrity issues with the
    records of absconders. ICE drew random samples of records of aliens
    with an unexecuted order of removal that did not indicate that the
    alien was an absconder. There are approximately 130,000 such alien
    records (does not include aliens with an acceptable reason for an
    unexecuted order). The samples indicated that almost 70 percent of
    those aliens were absconders. The absconder statistics have been
    revised accordingly. DRO estimates that the absconder population on
    September 30, 2004, was 465,353 aliens.
        ICE believes that the new data system to track aliens in removal
    proceedings (EREM) will address many of the data integrity concerns.
    The data system will be easier to use which will encourage completeness
    and accuracy. It will also be more tightly integrated with the work
    process used in an alien's case.

                              FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS

        Question. On January 27, 2005, ICE announced the creation of the
    Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) Advisory Board. The advisory board will
    provide information and recommendations on key FAMS policy and
    operational issues. Some of the issues the FAMS Advisory Board will
    initially address are hiring, dress code, technology, the FAMS role in
    airport security and the FAMS career ladder within ICE. When does ICE
    expect that the advisory board will begin making recommendations on
    some of these issues?
        Answer. While it is difficult to predict with specificity when the
    FAMS Advisory Board will be prepared to make recommendations, the Board
    is currently meeting on a regular basis. One of the objectives of the
    Board is to increase the pace of the FAMS integration into ICE. To that
    end, the Board hopes to be in a position to make recommendations in the
    near future.

                         INSTITUTIONAL REMOVAL PROGRAM

        Question. What progress has been made in transitioning the
    Institutional Removal program from the Office of Investigations to the
    Office of Detention and Removals?
        Answer. In the planning for the transition of responsibility from
    the Office of Investigations (OI) to Detention and Removal Operations
    (DRO), a review of performance standards and available resources was
    completed.
        This review found less than 50 percent of criminal aliens were
    being identified and removed from the United States (comparing State
    Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) numbers to the Performance
    Analysis System (PAS)).
        The prior performance standard based on the number of aliens
    removed is not reflective of the function of the Criminal Alien Program
    (CAP). The performance standard for DRO will be the percentage of
    incarcerated foreign born screened for removal. A performance level of
    90 percent of all foreign-born incarcerated in Bureau of Prisons, State
    department of corrections and mega-counties (areas with populations
    over 1 million) will provide a high level of coverage throughout the
    United States. Smaller population areas would be encouraged to
    participate in 287(g) programs or video teleconferencing with newly
    established VTC centers.
        After careful consideration, DRO determined that a state-by-state
    approach would be the most effective way to ensure a successful
    transition. By approaching the transition on a State level, staffing
    plans and proactive communications with relevant State agencies can
    enhance the productivity and workflow.
        The State of New York was determined to be the first State to
    transition because of the existing work force available in DRO to
    assist in covering the City of New York. DRO assumed sole
    responsibility for the City of New York Department of Corrections (NYC
    DOC) on December 17, 2004. With ten facilities, one satellite facility
    in Bronx, 120,000-130,000 inmates admitted annually and with an average
    daily population of 15,000, NYC DOC is one of the largest detention
    programs in the United States.
        The transition at NYC DOC has been remarkably smooth and in the
    first quarter of fiscal year 2005, improvements have been substantial.
    In the last quarter of fiscal year 2003, prior to the transfer, 921 of
    3,542 incarcerated aliens were screened (26 percent). In the first
    quarter of fiscal year 2005, there were 1,866 of the 2,696 incarcerated
    aliens screened (69 percent). Though well below the stated performance
    level; significant progress has been made without additional staffing.
    As staffing becomes available, NYC DOC operations will achieve the
    target level of screening.
        The State of New York effort has provided an excellent blueprint
    for subsequent transfers, and using the lessons learned, DRO has
    completed transfer plans for California, Florida, Illinois, Arizona and
    New Mexico.
        Question. Are there other ways ICE could be working with State and
    local officials to improve communication in order to identify
    incarcerated aliens in a more timely manner?
        Answer. In the planning for the transition of responsibility from
    the Office of Investigations (OI) to Detention and Removal Operations
    (DRO), a number of possible communications enhancements have been
    explored by DRO.
        The most basic approach to improve communications is and continues
    to be open, face-to-face dialogue with the local and State officials to
    determine the needs and requirements of both parties, to establish an
    approach to accomplish the mutual goals, and to maintain an open line
    of communication between the parties.
        During the planning for the State of New York, ICE met with State
    officials that oversee the entire New York State Department of
    Corrections, Parole and Probation and the State Police. These
    discussion have led to an enhanced streamlined approach to processing
    aliens, centralized release of aliens to ICE custody, created a
    procedure for State of New York Parole to compare information and
    update their information based on removal information and opened the
    dialogue to continue improvements in the areas of conviction documents,
    appeal processes in State courts and new procedures for automated
    immigration status checks. Dialogue has already been started with the
    State of California and a meeting between ICE/DRO and the Assistant
    Chief of Staff of the Governor's office has been planned for the end of
    March.
        ICE has also investigated whether the 287(g) program by State and
    local governments is another opportunity to train local law enforcement
    in the authorities as well as what the information provided to them
    means. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and supportive data
    bases can be confusing to experienced officers, much less individuals
    that have not had years of experience in these issues. The formalized
    training allows for concise communication of status to ensure proper
    enforcement of the INA. Expansion of the 287(g) program has a direct
    impact on the DRO program through the additional identification of
    individuals amenable to removal.
        The PEGASUS program is operated under a COPS grant and allows a new
    venue to share information with local and State authorities. The
    program provides Sheriffs and municipal law enforcement with secure
    access to other participating law enforcement agency databases. Through
    recent presentations, DHS is considering how best to incorporate parts
    of our databases to assist identification of aliens amenable to removal
    as well assist DHS in our mission. The databases in question would
    definitely include the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) and would
    allow an automatic data search system via a ``pointer system''. The
    possibilities of an automated system would greatly enhance the
    identification of aliens in removal proceedings and those already
    removed. The extent of the data sharing that DHS is willing to consider
    is still under review.
        The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) continues to provide a
    one-stop location for searching several data systems. The LESC,
    currently operated by OI, accepts queries from a multitude of law
    enforcement agencies and sends responses back to the originating
    agency. In cases where the alien in question is identified as a
    removable alien, a detainer is placed by the LESC for the local DHS
    office to pursue appropriate removal action.

                           FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

        Question. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has been in the
    midst of a very difficult transition from the General Services
    Administration's (GSA) financial management system to that of ICE.
        Given the financial problems of ICE, which extend to not having
    proper internal fund controls, why wasn't more consideration given to
    having FPS continue to use the GSA financial system for at least 1 more
    year, or until eMERGE2 was ready?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Under
    Secretary for Management, initially directed that the FPS transition
    from the GSA financial management system be completed by October 1,
    2003. Following the initial review of the unique financial management
    requirements needed to support the FPS offsetting collections program,
    the transition date was extended to October 1, 2004. At the time that
    this decision was made, ICE felt that the additional year for planning
    the transition would be sufficient to avoid any major problems. The GSA
    and ICE Financial Management staffs worked closely to plan for a smooth
    transition. However, the technical financial and accounting differences
    between the GSA and ICE financial systems proved to be much greater
    than either agency had anticipated. The ICE Financial management staff
    has been following an aggressive plan and timetable to complete the FPS
    transition by September 30, 2005.
        With regard to the specific financial situation, specific planning
    milestones called for a successful transition of FPS to ICE, as agreed
    with GSA, FPS and ICE. This plan was successful, with the only
    contributing factor being data transmission problems from GSA. That
    situation exacerbated payment problems in the ICE transition. Much of
    the data from the GSA financial system has had to be manually uploaded
    into the ICE system, requiring additional quality assurance steps to
    maintain the highest level of data integrity.
        Question. The current remediation plan for fixing the financial
    problems at FPS call for the reconciliation of payments to be finished
    by March 31, 2005. How will this plan solve all of the problems and
    ensure that contractors will get paid in a timely manner?
        Answer. In addition to a full reconciliation of FPS payments, ICE
    is convening a high level working group to address the financial
    problems at FPS. This group will evaluate and make appropriate changes
    in the business process flow to ensure that contractors are paid timely
    and that financial events are properly and timely recorded. ICE will
    continue to work with GSA to resolve any discrepancies in the balances
    transferred. A full reconciliation of financial activities is
    anticipated by September 30, 2005.

                                HUMAN SMUGGLING

        Question. What is ICE doing in the area human smuggling? What has
    happened in the Carreto case that was the subject of a recent CBS News
    report?
        Answer. Recognizing that global human smuggling is of the nature of
    organized crime, ICE has employed Task Force methodologies to attack
    and dismantle the operations and networks that profit from these
    crimes. An example of this methodology is Operation ICE Storm in
    Phoenix, Arizona. ICE, in conjunction with partners in the Federal,
    State, local and foreign law enforcement community, has initiated a
    task force to address widespread violence, kidnapping, extortion, and
    other crimes associated with human smuggling. By vigorously applying
    its money laundering authorities, ICE and our State and local and
    partners in Arizona have deprived human smuggling organizations of
    nearly $7.3 million of their criminal proceeds. Since the inception of
    ICE Storm in October 2003, over 320 persons have been prosecuted for
    human smuggling and related crimes and over 170 firearms have been
    seized. Over 6,700 smuggled aliens have also been arrested and removed
    from the United States.
        ICE is fully supporting the Arizona Border Control (ABC)
    Initiative, which was developed to focus on criminal organizations and
    supporting infrastructures that are currently exploiting the Arizona
    region. ICE's role in this initiative, which is being coordinated
    closely with other BTS components as well as State, local and foreign
    law enforcement agencies, focuses on interdiction and investigation
    efforts to target human and contraband smuggling organizations
    operating near the Arizona/Mexico border. To date, a total of 635
    individuals have been prosecuted as a direct result of those
    enforcement efforts. In addition to what has already been seized under
    ICE Storm, approximately $2.1 million in U.S. currency has been seized
    and 26 weapons have been removed from the streets.
        Since July 2004, ICE has implemented the LAX Initiative, which was
    developed to address the human smuggling organizations using the Los
    Angeles International Airport. This operation targets not only the
    vulnerabilities of airline and border security, but related financial
    institutions and support industries directly affected by the identified
    criminal activity. ICE has seized approximately $1.2 million in U.S.
    currency, 486 undocumented aliens have been arrested, and there have
    been 11 Federal prosecutions in connection with these enforcement
    efforts.
        At this time, we cannot comment on the Carreto case, since it is an
    ongoing criminal investigation.

                             BACKLOG REDUCTION PLAN

        Question. CIS has reduced the benefit application backlog to 1.5
    million cases, down from a high of 3.8 million cases in January of
    2004. What is the plan for maintaining a 6-month average processing
    time--once dollars are no longer specifically set aside for this
    purpose?
        Answer. USCIS is in the process of reengineering its business
    practices to ensure that it will be more efficient and effective. USCIS
    also plans to invest in IT transformation efforts, including a new case
    management system, to build the necessary infrastructure to ensure that
    backlogs do not return for the foreseeable future. Finally, USCIS has
    recently completed an in-depth staffing requirements analysis which
    will ensure that each USCIS office receives the appropriate amount of
    staff necessary to maintain the 6-month cycle time standard.
        Question. What assurances do we have that the productivity gains
    are not coming at the expense of quality, that the right decisions are
    still getting made by the adjudicators?
        Answer. Backlog elimination efforts will not come at the expense of
    national security or adjudicative integrity. USCIS has struck a solid
    balance in this area by ensuring that processes facilitate legal
    immigration, while preventing those who would misuse the system from
    entering or remaining in the United States. It is imperative that the
    integrity of the benefits process not be compromised in the effort to
    stimulate additional productivity.
        Efforts to benchmark and assure quality are at the heart of every
    production initiative. For example, USCIS is committed to attacking
    benefit fraud and has created an Office of Fraud Detection and National
    Security (FDNS) specifically to lead USCIS efforts in this area. FDNS
    will assist USCIS adjudicators in verifying applicant and petitioner
    information, and will work cooperatively with ICE to ensure that fraud
    schemes are identified and referred to ICE for criminal investigation
    and prosecution. USCIS field officers have been instructed to issue
    Notices to Appear for removal proceedings in instances where an
    applicant or beneficiary has attempted to defraud the government.

                                CUSTOMER SERVICE

        Question. In order to improve customer service, CIS is working on
    improving the ability of beneficiaries to interact with the Department
    of Homeland Security electronically. USCIS has now expanded electronic
    filing to support 50 percent of the total volume of benefit
    applications. When is the next expansion of the online filing of
    benefit applications planned?
        Answer. The e-filing system currently includes 8 application form
    types, which represent approximately 50 percent of the USCIS workload.
    The e-filing application volume has doubled each year since its
    inception. The current phase entails enhancing system functionality and
    capabilities, which will include accepting Premium Processing filings
    of the Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) in the third
    quarter of this fiscal year.
        Question. Which applications does CIS plan to add next?
        Answer. USCIS intends to expand e-filing, but has not yet
    determined which applications will be targeted for the next e-filing
    phase.
        Question. What are the current plans for re-designing and re-
    launching the CIS website?
        Answer. USCIS is creating a consolidated ``Customer Service
    Portal'' to integrate and align all public-facing USCIS websites. The
    current USCIS web configuration of ``core'' USCIS.gov content was
    completed in 1998. While the core content is continually refreshed, its
    underlying information architecture (IA) has never been refreshed.
    Moreover, three additional USCIS customer service websites, each adding
    a valuable new service, were appended onto USCIS.gov. However, their
    development was not integrated into the core website due to technical
    limitations at the time.
        This new project will enhance the ability to manage the USCIS.gov
    web content; enforce the DHS branding guidelines; standardize the
    presentation of all USCIS.gov web content as being part of ``One Voice,
    One Face, Many Channels,'' and help initiate the development of a
    comprehensive USCIS-wide web governance.
        The development of the USCIS customer service portal will be
    conducted in phases. The initial phase of the project seeks to enhance
    USCIS.gov content by developing a comprehensive information
    architecture (IA) within which all current and anticipated USCIS.gov
    web content and e-services may be organized. The initial phase includes
    standing up a refreshed, customer-oriented USCIS.gov in the newly
    developed environment, with emphasis placed on the requirements of the
    USCIS Office of Communications. Additional phases will concentrate on
    the development of the consolidated web portal, and the requirements of
    other organizations providing content to USCIS.gov and integrating, to
    the degree possible, content from the three service-oriented websites,
    InfoPASS, Customer Relationship Interface System (CRIS), and e-Filing
    into USCIS.gov. As of March 2005, the project has been funded by the
    USCIS Senior Review Board. A Statement of Work for all phases of the
    project is currently being drafted, and USCIS anticipates awarding the
    contract in fiscal year 2005.
        Question. What is the status of the initiative to begin electronic
    adjudication of Temporary Protected Status applications?
        Answer. The electronic adjudication of Temporary Protected Status
    (TPS) applications began with the re-registration of TPS applicants
    from Honduras and Nicaragua on November 6, 2004, and continued with
    applicants from El Salvador on January 5, 2005. The next designated TPS
    country eligible for electronic adjudication is unknown at this point
    in time.

                OFFICE OF FRAUD DETECTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

        Question. Please provide a detailed update on the establishment and
    expansion plans for the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security
    (FDNS).
        Answer. USCIS Director Eduardo Aguirre created the Office of Fraud
    Detection and National Security (FDNS) to implement two high priorities
    that support the USCIS mission:
      --Conducting effective background checks on persons seeking
            immigration benefits, and;
      --Detecting and combating immigration benefit fraud.
        Background: In fiscal year 2004, FDNS developed and implemented a
    joint anti-fraud strategy and initiative with the Bureau of Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (ICE). To support this effort, the FDNS
    developed the necessary policies, procedures, and organizational
    structure. This included incorporating the staffs of the Service Center
    Fraud Detection Units (FDU) with the allocation, deployment, hiring,
    and training of over 150 new employees at field and headquarters
    locations throughout the interior United States starting in fiscal year
    2004. The present staff of the FDNS is 222 permanent and term
    appointment employees. Of the new employees, 110 are field office
    Immigration Officers located within Districts, Sub-offices, Regional
    offices, and Headquarters. Within the FDUs and Headquarters, FDNS has
    61 Intelligence Research Specialists and 30-term appointment
    Investigative Assistants. The remaining staff provides administrative
    and management support to the field officers and are located within the
    FDUs and Headquarters offices. Utilizing fees generated from the H-1B
    and L Visa Reform Act of 2004, USCIS plans to fill 160 FDNS positions.
    These new positions will enable FDNS to make adjustments to current
    staffing and provide specific levels of support for both the anti-fraud
    and national security operations.

    Fraud
        The primary objective of the anti-fraud operation is to detect and
    combat immigration benefit fraud by referring articulated leads to ICE
    for criminal investigation, and conducting administrative inquiries
    when ICE rejects a request for investigation. The primary duty of an
    FDNS Immigration Officer (IO) is to review fraud-based leads referred
    by adjudicators and other sources. This review consists of performing a
    variety of system checks, including data mining; conducting field
    administrative inquiries, which includes interviewing various entities;
    and supporting criminal investigations conducted by ICE and
    prosecutions by U.S. Attorneys. It also includes placing individuals in
    removal proceedings when fraud is verified, collecting and analyzing a
    variety of intelligence data, and posting look-outs on individuals
    involved in fraud conspiracies. By removing cases containing elements
    of fraud from the mainstream adjudications process, adjudicators are
    able to concentrate their expertise on applicants and petitioners
    deserving of, and eligible for, the benefits sought. Thus, this anti-
    fraud effort will improve the quality of adjudications, increase
    productivity, and reduce cycle times. The 160 new positions will enable
    FDNS to:
      --Place FDNS IOs in the largest districts and each center, where the
            overwhelming majority of immigration benefit fraud exists, as
            well as in most of the sub-offices.
      --Put a position in the Department of State's Fraud Prevention
            Program Office in Washington, DC, to enhance inter-departmental
            fraud detection and planning efforts.

    National Security
        Shortly after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, USCIS
    implemented a policy requiring the completion of background checks on
    applicants, petitioners, beneficiaries, and other individuals seeking
    immigration benefits. The National Security Unit has developed, and is
    implementing, a new policy and process pertaining to the
    identification, reporting, and resolution of IBIS national security
    hits. The Interagency Border Information System (IBIS) is the primary
    tool used to conduct background checks on applicants, petitioners,
    beneficiaries, and other individuals seeking immigration benefits.
    Currently, FDNS is conducting a pilot to test the electronic/paperless
    resolution of background checks and the entry and check of all aliases
    at the front end of the adjudication process.
        Question. How are the relationships working with the Department of
    State and Immigration and Customs Enforcement?
        Answer. ICE and the Department of State (DOS) have a productive
    working relationship and coordinate on issues of visa security as well
    as critical law enforcement issues often involving foreign governments.
    For example, ICE is working closely with DOS to develop and implement a
    ``diplomatic'' strategy to encourage several countries to accept
    repatriation of their citizens when they are ordered removed from the
    United States. Additionally, ICE works closely with DOS and other
    agencies as members of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to
    synthesize intelligence, law enforcement and other information to bring
    effective international action against smugglers, traffickers of
    persons and criminals facilitating terrorists' clandestine travel. In
    U.S. embassies around the world, a network of ICE attaches, who with
    DOS, are working with their counterparts in foreign law enforcement
    agencies combating transnational crimes involving national security,
    financial, smuggling, illegal arms exports, forced child labor, child
    pornography, human trafficking, intellectual property rights,
    commercial and immigration fraud violations. ICE looks forward to
    continuing and expanding the collaborative relationship with DOS to
    further safeguard our borders and the American people.
        Question. Please explain what the FDNS fraud tracking system will
    be? Who will have access to this system? What are the timeline and
    major milestones for development of the system?
        Answer. FTS Requirements:
      --The ability to maintain and report on fraud lead and case data in a
            central repository that is available at a national level to all
            FDNS staff and authorized external agencies
      --The ability to reference benefits application data related to the
            subject of a case
      --The ability to share case and lead data on validated fraud cases
            with fraud investigators at ICE
      --The ability to perform reactive and ad-hoc data searches against
            benefits claims data
      --The ability to perform data mining analysis on benefits claim data
      --The ability to define fraud profiles and apply them against
            incoming application receipts
      --The ability to track fraud profile matches and analyze data
            commonalities
      --The ability to generate and report information for management use
      --The ability to generate and automatically report G22 statistics for
            FDNS
        Access.--FTS is being sized to accommodate up to 500 simultaneous
    users. This will accommodate the current 222 FDNS field staff,
    supervisors, managers and support staff located in geographically
    disparate locations nationwide, but also potential expansion. It will
    also accommodate information sharing with other agencies such as the
    FBI, CIA, Department of State, and other DHS and intelligence entities
    with need to access this information for national security and law
    enforcement purposes.

                                                MILESTONES AND TIMELINES
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Days            Start            End
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Discovery Stage.................................................               7         2/18/05         3/17/05
    Design Stage....................................................              13         2/18/05         3/25/05
    Configuration Stage.............................................              18         3/10/05         4/04/05
    Validation Stage................................................              15         3/22/05         4/11/05
    Deployment Stage................................................               4         4/12/05         4/15/05
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Please provide a detailed plan for the development and
    rollout of the benefit fraud assessment tool, including timelines and
    milestones.
        Answer. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (CIS) Fraud
    Detection and National Security (FDNS) Unit will implement a Benefit
    Fraud Assessment program (BFA). This program was approved in February
    2005, and will be implemented in various phases through October 2005.
    ICE supports FDNS conducting the BFA so that ICE can direct its
    resources to investigating/prosecuting actual benefit fraud violators.

                             OFFICE OF CITIZENSHIP

        Question. Please provide the following information regarding the
    Guide for New Immigrants: which languages will the guide be produced
    in; how many will be printed in each language in the initial run; how
    will the guides be distributed electronically and physically; what is
    the timeline for translating the guide into each of the planned
    languages; and what is the timeline for producing hard copies in each
    language.
        Answer. To ensure that immigrants from a variety of language groups
    have access to the Guide, the Office of Citizenship will translate the
    English version of the Guide into ten (10) languages--Spanish, Chinese,
    Vietnamese, Tagalog, Portuguese, Russian, French, Korean, Haitian
    Creole, and Arabic.
        Hard copies of the Spanish and English versions of the Guide will
    be available for purchase through the Government Printing Office (GPO),
    and all other versions will be accessible online. In order to initially
    market the product, the Office plans to print approximately 250,000
    copies of the English guide and 150,000 copies of the Spanish guide.
        In addition of the current availability of the English Guide online
    (additional languages to be posted as translations are completed) the
    Office is coordinating a national mailing list of community and faith-
    based organizations, immigration service providers, State and local
    contacts and adult educators in an effort to disseminate the Guide
    nationally. USCIS Community Liaison Officers and local field Directors
    will also receive copies of the Guide for additional local
    dissemination. GPO order forms will also be included as part of the
    dissemination effort. In addition to planned dissemination efforts, the
    Office also plans to implement a comprehensive outreach/public
    education effort in key communities. These events will be strategically
    located according to where the centers of the various foreign language
    communities are. Plans include high-profile events in: Los Angeles for
    the Spanish version (May); San Francisco for the Chinese, Tagalog, and
    Vietnamese versions (May); New York City for the Russian and Korean
    versions (July); and Detroit/Dearborn for the Arabic version (August).
        Spanish translation should be completed in April; Chinese, Tagalog
    and Vietnamese will be completed in May; Russian, Korean and Arabic
    will be completed in June; and Portuguese, Haitian Creole and French
    will be completed in July.
        Hard copies of the English and Spanish guides will be available in
    June. All other translation will be available online late summer. There
    are currently no plans to print hard copies of the additional
    languages.

                                    STAFFING

        Question. Please provide a complete FTE staffing plan for fiscal
    year 2005 and 2006, including but not limited to; location (i.e.,
    District Office, Service Processing Center, etc), position type (i.e.,
    Immigration Information Officer, Adjudicator, etc), and physical
    location (i.e., Burlington, VT; Dallas, TX; etc).

        Question. Please provide a breakout of attrition rates for each of
    fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 by type of position and location.
        Answer. USCIS only has attrition rates for fiscal year 2004. For
    the major position types, they are:
      --Adjudications Officer: 2.3 percent
      --Asylum Officer: 6.1 percent
      --Asylum/Adjudications Clerk: 2.3 percent
      --Immigration Information Officer/Customer Service
                    Representative: 1.2 percent
        Data is not available by location.
        Question. Please provide a chart with the numbers and types of
    employees that have been trained at Glynco, GA for each of fiscal years
    2003, 2004, and 2005.
        Answer:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Fiscal year
                  Position type                 Fiscal year        2005
                                                   2004         (estimate)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Adjudication Officer....................             751           1,098
    Asylum Officer..........................             116             170
    Immigration Information Officer.........             142             207
    Other...................................              58              85
                                             -------------------------------
          Total.............................           1,067           1,560
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year 2003 data is not available.

                                  CALL CENTERS

        Question. Please provide a chart with the number of contractors
    assigned to each call center for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
        Answer. USCIS does not determine the number of contractors assigned
    to each contract call center. Under our contract, the vendor is
    required to have sufficiently trained staff to meet our performance
    requirements, and is responsible for determining the placement and size
    of each of its operations.
        Question. Please provide a chart for each of fiscal years 2004 and
    2005 of the total number of calls received by call center, broken out
    by type of call.
        Answer. USCIS has two kinds of call centers. Contract call centers,
    which provide initial live assistance, and USCIS staffed call centers,
    which answer questions that cannot be answered by the contract staff.
        Our contract call centers operate as one. We do not route calls to
    our general customer service line based on the nature of the call, but
    based on agent availability. Calls are routed to the next available
    agent with the appropriate language skills regardless of location.
    Thus, staff scheduling, availability and performance affect call
    routing, not the nature of the call. USCIS, therefore, does not track
    information by type of call.
        The table below shows the volumes and percentage of live assistance
    calls handled by staff at each of the four (4) contract call centers
    for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 (through mid-March).

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   2004                  2005 (through mid-March)
                                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Volume          Percent         Volume          Percent
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Phoenix, Arizona................................       1,269,059            16.0         531,867            17.1
    Lawrence, Kansas................................       1,534,164            19.3         636,945            20.4
    Corbin, Kentucky................................       4,800,717            60.5       1,809,688            58.1
    Arlington, Virginia.............................         334,911             4.2         138,153             4.4
    Total live assistance calls handled by contract        7,938,851  ..............       3,116,653  ..............
     call centers...................................
    Total calls received to USCIS...................      21,295,256  ..............       8,454,022  ..............
    Percent of total calls that were handled by       ..............            37.3  ..............            36.9
     contract call centers..........................
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

                            ICE--CYBER CRIME CENTER

        Question. Last year, $4.2 million was secured in the fiscal year
    2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act to expand the ICE Cyber Crime
    Center to ICE field offices. Are these funds at risk of being diverted
    to address the base budget shortfall within ICE this fiscal year?
        Answer. At this time, it is ICE's intent to execute the entire $4.2
    million in fiscal year 2005 for the purpose for which it was
    appropriated.

                              IMMIGRATION SERVICES

        Question. With the split of immigration and enforcement functions
    precipitated by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
    Alaska's capitol, Juneau, was left with no personnel to provide
    immigration services. Without immigration services, immigrants are
    forced to fly to Anchorage to access services. What steps have been
    taken by the Homeland Security Department to ensure Juneau's need for
    immigration services will be met?
        Answer. Since the creation of USCIS, the agency has met the needs
    of Juneau and other distant communities of Alaska by sending an officer
    2 or 3 times each year on periodic circuit rides to conduct benefits
    interviews, naturalization ceremonies, and community outreach. USCIS
    has recently expanded the circuit rides to 4 times a year, even though
    there were only 400 Naturalization and Adjustment of Status cases in
    the entire District in the first quarter of this year. The most recent
    trip was in November 2004, and there are trips to Juneau scheduled for
    April, August, and October of 2005. The current cycle times are just
    over 6 months for naturalization, and just under 6 months in Adjustment
    of Status cases.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

                               LAND PORT OF ENTRY

        Question. America has 197 land ports of entry, and it has been
    almost 20 years since we launched a major effort to upgrade
    infrastructure at those ports. That last effort occurred in 1986--
    almost 15 years prior September 11, 2001.
        Since September 11, we have placed increasing emphasis on upgrading
    protective measures for our airports, seaports, and critical
    infrastructure. It is imperative that we also improve land port
    security if we are going to be successful in the war on terror. To that
    end, I intend to introduce a bill which will authorize additional funds
    for investment in our Nation's border crossings.
        Have you considered what kinds of improvements are necessary at our
    land ports of entry and how much these upgrades might cost?
        Answer. CBP has initiated a Construction Master Planning Process
    that will allow for increased security at the Nation's borders by
    providing critical facility and infrastructure improvements that are
    prioritized using a rigorous capital investment planning process.
        The planning methodology and resulting allocation of construction
    projects will optimize available resources to support the expanded
    methods of CBP operations and comprehensive border enforcement
    strategy. The construction planning process aligns with the DHS mission
    and strategy, forecasted future growth, identify and justify required
    projects and estimate their associated costs. The CBP Construction
    Master Planning Process was developed in response to the reporting
    requirements included in House Report 108-774 and House Report 108-541.
        Question. Based on your experience at CBP, what do you believe are
    the three top priorities for securing our land ports?
        Answer. Since September 11, 2001, CBP has tightened procedures for
    entry into the United States at all ports of entry, based on three
    strategic priorities:
      --Advance Information and Risk-Targeting.--CBP has moved forward with
            programs that provide information regarding cargo and
            passengers as far in advance of arrival to the United States as
            possible, and systems to review this information and develop
            targeted response to high-risk cargo and individuals. These
            programs and systems include C-TPAT, CSI, advance cargo
            manifests, Advance Passenger Information Systems, all screened
            through our National Targeting Center.
      --State of the Art Technology.--CBP is investing in state-of-the-art
            technology, including non-intrusive radiation detection
            systems, making additional information systems available to
            inspectors at the ports of entry, and addition of biometric and
            other systems to enhance security.
      --Training.--CBP has significantly revised and reprioritized our
            training for CBP Officers based on operational priorities,
            beginning with the establishment of anti-terrorism protocols
            for all ports of entry and developing and implementing anti-
            terrorism training for all CBP Officers.
        Question. Specific improvements are needed at the Columbus port of
    entry in New Mexico, and I understand that the General Services
    Administration (GSA) has proposed that construction on the Columbus
    project begin in 2007 or 2008. Do you support GSA's recommendation and
    will you keep the project on track for construction?
        Answer. CBP has requested GSA to modernize and expand the border
    station in Columbus, NM. The existing facility constructed in 1987, is
    a full service port of entry with pedestrian, non-commercial and
    commercial traffic. It is the only 24-hour border crossing point for
    pedestrians and privately owned vehicles in New Mexico. The facility is
    in need of significant renovation and expansion to safely process the
    increased volume of traffic that has occurred since originally
    constructed.
        CBP has requested GSA to include this project at the earliest
    opportunity. If approved for design in fiscal year 2007, construction
    should begin in fiscal year 2009.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby

                               OPERATION PREDATOR

        Question. Mr. Secretary, first, let me thank you again this year
    for ICE's efforts to stop the exploitation of children. I understand
    that Operation Predator has had many successes and I am glad to hear of
    its achievements. I believe it is a critical program and I hope it
    continues to be successful. We should continue to do all within our
    power to ensure that children around the world are protected from those
    individuals that would harm them and shamelessly exploit them for
    simple pleasure and monetary gain.
        To that end, I ask that you share with the Committee some of ICE's
    other efforts to eliminate the abuse and exploitation of children. I
    know that you have many partners in this effort. I would appreciate you
    expounding on your opening statement as to what ICE is doing and who
    you are working with to accomplish these goals.
        Answer. In addition to Operation Predator, ICE attempts to
    eliminate the abuse and exploitation of children by enforcing the laws
    related to Forced Child Labor (FCL). ICE has implemented a proactive
    outreach schedule targeting an audience comprised of leaders in
    domestic industry and their employees/agents responsible for foreign
    purchases and related internal security procedures. Our goal is to
    educate this community, promote voluntary compliance, and encourage
    vigilance and reporting of suspected violators. The ICE FCL program
    staff regularly attends other United States Government agency, foreign
    government, and non-governmental organization functions related to
    forced or indentured child labor. In particular, FCL program staff
    attends and participates in monthly meetings with the National Child
    Labor Coalition, an organization that exists to serve as a national
    network for the exchange of information regarding children in an effort
    to end child labor exploitation by promoting progressive initiatives
    and legislation; established contacts with various domestic industry
    trade show representatives and coordinated participation in commodity
    specific events; and published the Forced Child Labor Advisory and
    accompanying pamphlet, produced in English and translated into 5
    foreign languages for distribution in training and outreach activities.
    ICE currently has 20 open investigations related to allegations of the
    importation of products manufactured or produced with forced or
    indentured child labor. During fiscal year 2005, three new
    investigations were opened, twelve were closed, and one investigation
    is in pending status.
        During 2004, ICE hosted two international symposiums on FCL and
    related child exploitation issues as defined in the International Labor
    Organization (ILO) Convention 182. These symposiums hosted in Singapore
    and Johannesburg, South Africa, were geared at educating foreign law
    enforcement partners on U.S. laws, promoting information sharing, and
    enhancing networking vital to successful investigations, and included
    presentations and training on: Forced Child Labor, the Protect Act and
    Operation Predator, Child Pornography, Basic Computer Forensics and
    Investigative Techniques, and Child Sex Tourism. In addition, at the
    Johannesburg, South Africa conference, a block of training was
    conducted by ICE on human smuggling and trafficking particularly with
    regard to children on the African continent.
        In regard to human smuggling and trafficking into the United
    States, ICE does not keep statistics delineating children versus
    adults. However, in terms of all human trafficking (men, women, and
    children), many of these victims are lured from their homes with false
    promises of well-paying jobs; instead, they are forced or coerced into
    prostitution, domestic servitude, or other types of forced labor. ICE,
    with its wide range of authorities, expertise and capabilities attacks
    human trafficking organizations through the aggressive use of human
    trafficking, smuggling and money laundering statutes, as well as
    identification and seizure of criminal proceeds and assets. Each and
    every allegation received by the ICE FCL program is researched,
    analyzed, and referred to the appropriate domestic or foreign office
    for further investigation. ICE's education and outreach process
    provides guidance to ICE agents in distinguishing the clear differences
    between human smuggling violations and human trafficking. This process
    has enabled ICE agents, our State and local law enforcement partners
    and community groups to better understand and identify trafficking
    violations and to better care for victims. ICE office of investigations
    has also conducted extensive outreach and training with our law
    enforcement partners abroad. Coordinating with the ICE Attaches in
    numerous countries, ICE works to combat trafficking organizations, in
    source and transit nations, as well as in the United States.

                               ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

        Question. Among each of your roles, is the charge to secure our
    borders and to control illegal immigration. Estimates of the number of
    illegal immigrants range greatly. Some say 8 million others say
    millions more. I believe that we all know that 8 million is an
    extremely conservative estimate.
        What is your best estimate on the number of illegal aliens
    currently residing in the country?
        Answer. It is estimated that the number of illegal aliens currently
    residing in the country is most likely between 11-12 million.
        Question. How many new illegal aliens entered the country last
    year?
        Answer. The total for ``first time'' illegal aliens, in fiscal year
    2004, making entry into the United States between the ports of entry is
    608,073. These numbers are derived from using the data provided in the
    Enforce Integrated Database (EID). This data is based on persons
    identified by biometric data (fingerprints) as first time
    apprehensions.
        Question. Is that an increase or a decrease from the previous year?
        Answer. There was a 20 percent increase in first-time
    apprehensions/entries into to the United States in fiscal year 2004
    compared to fiscal year 2003.
        Fiscal year 2004--608,073.
        Fiscal year 2003--504,889.
        Question. If we are so uncertain about the numbers, doesn't that
    seem to indicate that we are not doing enough to secure our borders and
    our homeland?
        Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is enhancing and
    planning operations in areas along the borders which pose the greatest
    threat to national security. With the development and implementation of
    the Border Patrol's National Strategy, a measured but aggressive
    approach is being taken to increase border security. The guidelines and
    goals outlined in the National Strategy have been translated into the
    CBP/USBP implementation plan.

                                 VISA OVERSTAYS

        Question. Another major problem with our immigration system is the
    fact that many of those people currently counted as illegals actually
    entered the country legally, but have overstayed their visas.
        Does the Department have any recent numbers on visa overstays?
        Answer. The US-VISIT Program Office conducted an analysis of
    biometric entry and exit data for the first 9 months of the program
    (January 5, 2004 to September 30, 2004) and initially, the findings
    indicate that, for visa holders on whom biometrics are collected at
    both entry and exit, nearly 90 percent exit the country before their
    periods of admission expire. In addition, US-VISIT's preliminary
    findings show that there is no exit record for less than 1 percent of
    these visa holders. Due to current limitations in capabilities to
    capture complete entry and exit data on all visa holders, the small
    sample size, and the abbreviated period covered by the analysis, US-
    VISIT is unable to provide more detailed findings.
        Question. How many temporary visa holders never return to their
    home country?
        Answer. Except for the preliminary information mentioned in the
    previous question, US-VISIT does not yet contain all the technological
    elements that would readily provide this type of status information.
    However, according to a report from the Office Immigration Statistics
    using data from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), a total of
    23.6 million nonimmigrant departures were recorded by NIIS during 2003.
    Of those, 22.1 million or 94 percent were matched to an arrival and
    showed valid arrival and departure dates.
        The proportion of all admissions matched varies among the broad
    categories of admission. Short-term visitors had the highest match rate
    (95 percent), followed by diplomats and other representatives (93
    percent), students and temporary workers (88 percent), and expected
    long-term residents (87 percent). Records missing the category of
    admission have the highest non-match rate (48 percent) but as a group
    represented less than one percent.
        The report also gives length of visit estimates. Nonimmigrants
    included in NIIS who departed in 2003, remained in the United States an
    average, or mean, of 34 days, or just under 5 weeks, per visit. The
    median length of visit was 8 days, indicating half of all departing
    nonimmigrants remained in the country for 8 days or less. Over 95
    percent of departing nonimmigrants remained for less than 6 months per
    trip, with approximately 4 percent remaining between 6 months and 1
    year, and 1 percent remaining 1 year or more.
        Question. Can you tell us what percentage of the total illegal
    population is visa overstays?
        Answer. It is very difficult to accurately estimate either
    population. The fiscal year 2006 US-VISIT budget request includes $24
    million for the person-centric view that would begin the transformation
    of these systems so as to provide timely and accurate visibility to all
    DOS and DHS officers associated with the visa process regarding those
    who chronically overstay, or are overstaying for extended periods.
        Question. Given that these people make up a large percentage of our
    illegal population, has any consideration been given to strengthening
    the vetting process? What I mean by that is, if a large percentage of
    those people obtaining visas are not returning do you think there a
    breakdown somewhere in the process?
        Answer. Managing the entry, stay and departure of alien visitors is
    a major component of controlling our borders and requires collecting
    information regarding the movement of aliens in, through, and out of
    the United States. The information in the US-VISIT system is available
    to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at ports of entry,
    special agents in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
    adjudications staff at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
    services offices, U.S. consular offices, and other law enforcement
    agencies. Such information allows these officers to identify and take
    action against those who violate the law, to locate individual aliens
    of interest to law enforcement entities, to validate the immigration
    status of aliens so that only eligible persons receive immigration
    benefits, and to intercept terrorists and other persons who should not
    be allowed into the country. Additionally, the United States Government
    (USG) will be able to use this data to make informed policy and
    management decisions regarding enforcement prioritization,
    participation in visa waiver programs, or immigration benefit programs.
        Collecting exit information through US-VISIT will strengthen the
    vetting process by giving officials who issue visas timely, accurate
    and comprehensive visibility into an applicant's compliance patterns,
    so that appropriate action can be taken on the visa request. Once all
    of the elements of the exit/entry system are in place (i.e., at all
    land, air and sea points of entry, including immigration status
    information capabilities), we will have the ability to accurately
    assess and investigate the overstay population.
        Question. Following-up on that what is your agency doing now and
    what are you planning to do in the future to ensure that this does not
    continue to be a problem?
        Answer. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the
    responsibility for several significant national security programs/
    initiatives to track nonimmigrant aliens' compliance with the terms and
    conditions of their admission to the United States. These programs/
    initiatives include: the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
    System (SEVIS), the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System
    (NSEERS), and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
    Technology (US-VISIT) program. ICE formed the Compliance Enforcement
    Unit in June 2003, to investigate criminal and administrative
    violations identified through these programs. The CEU receives violator
    data from these programs/initiatives, analyzes the data and sends
    proactive investigation requests to field offices to locate and remove
    the violators. The CEU will continue to exploit the benefits of these
    programs/initiatives.
        Additionally, the fiscal year 2005 budget provides for the hiring
    of additional ICE criminal investigator positions to be assigned to
    compliance enforcement units across the country. ICE plans to staff
    these additional positions in field offices to support compliance
    enforcement investigations generated by the ICE Headquarters CEU. The
    positions will support compliance enforcement of the US-VISIT, NSEERS,
    and SEVIS programs based on current enforcement need projections.
        Question. I know that US-VISIT is slowly being implemented.
        What progress has been made to date and what assurances can you
    give us that we know who is legally entering the United States?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has met the December
    31, 2003, and December 31, 2004, Congressional deadlines to deploy an
    entry-exit program that strengthens security and facilitates travel for
    legitimate visitors while protecting their privacy and ensuring the
    integrity of our immigration system. In conjunction with the Department
    of State's Biometric Visa Program, we are creating a continuum of
    security measures that begins before individuals enter the United
    States and continues through their arrival and departure from the
    country. US-VISIT also works with commercial carriers to receive
    notification of passenger lists before passengers arrive in and depart
    from the United States.
        Since its beginning on January 5, 2004, US-VISIT has implemented
    entry procedures at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and in the secondary
    inspection areas of the 50 busiest land ports of entry. In September
    2004, US-VISIT was expanded from individuals with visas to include
    processing of visitors traveling to the United States under the Visa
    Waiver program. US-VISIT processed over 20 million foreign travelers
    from January 5, 2004, to February 24, 2005, and has prevented 536
    criminals and immigration violators, including Federal and State prison
    escapees, from gaining admission to the United States.
        US-VISIT is protecting our visitors by making it virtually
    impossible for anyone else to claim their identity should their travel
    documents to be stolen or duplicated. Our fingerprint matching system
    has an accuracy rate (True Acceptance Rate or TAR) of 99.6 percent for
    one-to-one verification and a TAR of 96 percent for one-to-many
    identification. DHS is currently working with National Institute of
    Standards and Technology and industry leaders on several initiatives to
    examine mechanisms to increase the level of accuracy.
        Later this summer, US-VISIT will conduct tests using automatic
    identification (Radio Frequency Identification Technology or RFID) at
    land ports of entry to capture entry/exit information. US-VISIT is on
    track to deploy entry procedures to the remaining land ports of entry
    by December 31, 2005, meeting the Data Management Improvement Act
    (DMIA) mandate.
        The work of US-VISIT will extend far past these current efforts. In
    the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress
    included requirements and actions to be taken by DHS, the Department of
    State and US-VISIT with the goal of completing a biometric entry and
    exit data system as expeditiously as possible. US-VISIT is preparing a
    Strategic Plan that will describe how a single, unified approach to
    immigration and border management--a U.S. Immigration and Border
    Management Enterprise--will look and operate in the future. The Plan
    will include the overarching vision for how the United States
    Government will manage immigration and its borders, as well as how
    data, facilities, and information technology will contribute to the
    Enterprise mission.
        Question. Conversely, I believe it is important that we know who is
    leaving the country. Specifically, that ties directly into the visa
    overstays. If we know that people are leaving we will have a very good
    accounting of the number of folks that have chosen to stay here
    illegally. Can you tell us what progress has been made on implementing
    the exit portion of the program?
        Answer. In the air and sea environments, DHS is currently
    collecting biographic arrival and departure data through electronic
    manifests submitted by the transportation carriers and is using this
    data to identify alien travelers whose authorized periods of admission
    have expired and for whom no matching departure information is
    available. This information is already being shared with U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). US-VISIT is working
    collaboratively with the ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) to
    research existing data limitations and develop protocols and procedures
    to effectively vet these records through additional data sources to
    develop more complete, accurate and actionable information.
    Additionally, US-VISIT is conducting pilots to determine the most
    effective means of capturing exit information.
        Airport and Seaport Pilots.--US-VISIT is currently piloting three
    alternative methods of biometric departure confirmation at one seaport
    (Miami International Cruise line Terminal) and eight airports (Chicago
    O'Hare; Baltimore Washington International; Denver International;
    Dallas/Fort Worth International; Newark Liberty International; Luis
    Munoz International in San Juan, Puerto Rico; San Francisco
    International; and Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County). DHS anticipates
    making a decision on the best method(s) to implement shortly, and
    determining a schedule to expand biometric exit.
        Automated Land Border Entry-Exit.--Later this spring, US-VISIT will
    begin testing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. Using
    an automatic identifier, RFID technology can detect a visitor at a
    distance and provide primary inspection with entry information as well
    as provide a mechanism for an accurate and timely record of exits. By
    July 31, 2005, testing will begin at the ports of Nogales East and
    Nogales West in Arizona, Alexandria Bay in New York, and the Pacific
    Highway and Peace Arch in Washington. Testing will continue through the
    spring of 2006.
        Question. When does the Department expect the entire program to be
    fully operational?
        Answer. DHS will complete deployment of an initial biometric-based
    entry and exit program at all U.S. ports of entry by the end of 2005,
    meeting the requirements established by legislation. It is important to
    note that the Data Management Improvement Act, which established the
    majority of initial deadlines, only required the integrating of
    existing arrival and departure information--it did not require the
    collection of new information, such as biometrics. The Enhanced Border
    Security and Visa Entry Reform Act contained a requirement to
    biometrically compare and authenticate certain travel documents by
    established dates. DHS, recognizing the importance of biometrics in the
    process, added the requirement to collect biometric information, and is
    establishing additional procedures, beyond those required by statute,
    to enhance security.
        Ultimately, US-VISIT will manage data on foreign nationals covering
    their interactions with U.S. officials before they enter, when they
    enter, while they are in the United States, and when they exit. This
    comprehensive view of immigration and border management will create a
    virtual border and will improve interactions with foreign nationals. In
    its strategic plan (required under the Intelligence Reform and
    Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004) US-VISIT will describe how the U.S.
    Immigration and Border Management Enterprise will look and operate in
    the future.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me how many people were
    detained or deported for overstaying their visas last year? Does ICE
    take proactive measures towards apprehending overstays?
        Answer. Statistics obtained from ICE's administrative booking
    system, ENFORCE, revealed that in fiscal year 2004, 3,784 nonimmigrants
    were processed for removal from the United States under the charge of
    INA 237(a)(1)(C)(i), violation of nonimmigrant status or condition of
    entry. The INA does not have a specific charge for visa overstays. The
    above number will include individuals that violated their nonimmigrant
    status by overstaying their visa, as well as other nonimmigrant
    violators. These other nonimmigrant violators include: student visa
    violators, individuals found working without authorization, and
    nonimmigrants that have violated their status by committing a crime.
        The Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) receives violator data from
    NSEERS, US-VISIT, and SEVIS. The CEU analyzes the data and sends
    proactive investigation requests to field offices to locate and remove
    the violators. In fiscal year 2004, the CEU sent out over 2,050 visa
    overstay leads generated by NSEERS, US-VISIT, and SEVIS to ICE SAC
    offices throughout the country. The CEU will continue to receive and
    assign overstay leads to ICE SAC offices for investigation.
        Question. What are the ramifications and penalties for overstaying
    a visa? There must be a way to keep track of these folks.
        Answer. A nonimmigrant that has failed to maintain the status in
    which he/she was admitted, or fails to comply with the conditions of
    any such status, to include nonimmigrants that stay beyond their period
    of admission, is subject to removal from the United States under the
    charge of INA 237(a)(1)(C)(i), violation of nonimmigrant status or
    condition of entry.
        DHS implemented the US-VISIT program in January 2004, to address a
    Congressional mandate to implement a nationwide entry-exit tracking
    system. Once fully implemented, US-VISIT will biometrically document
    the entry and exit of all foreign visitors to the United States. The
    CEU works closely with the US-VISIT Program to identify potential visa
    overstay violators and to conduct the necessary follow up
    investigations.

                                BORDER SECURITY

        Question. Every year, I travel to every county in Alabama to hear
    the issues of my constituents and one of their greatest and most
    frequent concerns is immigration and more to the point illegal
    immigration. Every year I feel compelled to tell my constituents that
    while we are making progress we are nowhere near where we need to be.
        What is the Directorate doing to make our borders more secure and
    to eliminate the influx of illegal aliens?
        Answer. ICE is a key player--along with our partners at U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services (USCIS)--in the Department's mission to secure the
    borders and restore integrity to the Nation's immigration system. That
    is a mission ICE takes very seriously--as the tragic results that can
    follow when those wishing to do us harm breach the Nation's border
    security and exploit immigration laws. The key to this effort is
    prioritization--systematically attacking the most serious threats
    first. Specifically, ICE has made the apprehension and removal of
    dangerous criminal aliens and national security threats our top
    enforcement priority. This is not to suggest that ICE does not fully
    and consistently enforce the law in other situations but that ICE
    focuses on addressing the serious threats that individuals with
    possible terrorist associations, fugitive alien absconders, violent
    criminal aliens, sexual predators, and others pose to our communities,
    our families, and our Nation. ICE's objective is to strategically
    target our resources and authorities on the most dangerous aliens in
    order to remove them from the streets before they can do harm.
        It's a strategy that is getting results. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
    removed more than 160,200 aliens with more than half of them having
    prior criminal convictions and 18 fugitive absconder teams across the
    Nation who apprehended more than 11,000 fugitives last year. ICE
    created a ``Most Wanted'' list of the most dangerous criminal aliens,
    which has been a valuable tool for generating tips and leads. From the
    original list, nine of the ten were captured within a few weeks, and
    the tenth was determined to have already left the country. Under ICE's
    ``Operation Predator,'' which targets pedophiles, child sex tourists,
    and child pornographers we have arrested more than 5,000 child sex
    predators who exploit children for pleasure or profit. Approximately 40
    percent of the predators arrested under this program have been illegal
    aliens, and an additional 20 percent have been visitors to the United
    States who were ``out of status,'' meaning that they had overstayed or
    otherwise violated the terms of their admission.
        Another priority is to dismantle criminal organizations that
    smuggle and traffic human beings for profit. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
    arrested more than 1,630 human smugglers. Operation ICE Storm, an
    initiative launched in 2003 to target violent human smuggling networks
    in Arizona, has brought charges against more than 300 defendants and
    resulted in the seizure of more than $7 million. This unprecedented
    seizure of alien smuggling proceeds is a direct result of the
    combination of ICE's immigration and customs authorities (particularly
    customs expertise in financial crime investigation). Law enforcement
    authorities in Arizona have credited Operation ICE Storm with a
    dramatic decrease in alien-related kidnappings and other violent crime
    in the Phoenix metropolitan area.
        ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) responded to more than
    603,000 immigration status inquiries from Federal, State, and local
    authorities in fiscal year 2004 and placed more than 15,000 immigration
    detainers with police agencies nationwide allowing ICE to more
    efficiently remove aliens from the United States once their jail term
    has expired. ICE is also fostering innovative new relationships through
    our 287(g) program, which delegates authority for immigration
    enforcement to State and local law enforcement. Under the terms of
    Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Sec. 113, April
    30, 1996), State and local authorities can request this authority for
    their jurisdictions. Once this agreement is in place, ICE provides
    officers with a 5-week training program in immigration issues, and
    provides supervision and support for State and local officers engaged
    in immigration enforcement. These authorities are currently in effect
    in Florida and Alabama.
        The examples above are just a sampling of the critical immigration
    enforcement accomplishments of ICE. By aggressively enforcing our
    immigration laws and targeting criminals, ICE seeks to deter criminal
    and terrorist organizations that threaten our way of life. ICE will
    continue to work with its partners at the Federal, State, and local
    levels to secure the borders and protect the homeland.
        Question. How many aliens have been detained and deported in the
    last year?
        Answer. Based on data reported in the Deportable Alien Control
    System (DACS), as of January 2005, ICE removed/deported 161,090 aliens
    in fiscal year 2004. This number of final order removals is made up of
    criminals and non-criminals, detained and non-detained aliens. This
    does not include any voluntary removals, nor does it include any
    expedited removals, largely handled by the bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection. Virtually all of these removals were detained at least 1
    day prior to their removal.
        Based on data reported in DACS, as of January 2005, 235,449 aliens
    were detained at some point during fiscal year 2004. Some of these
    aliens were detained and then released to the community (bond,
    supervision, recognizance, etc). Others were granted voluntary
    departure, or transferred to other law enforcement agencies. Finally,
    some are still in detention for various reasons.
        Question. If a Mexican citizen looking for work can pay a fee to a
    coyote to traverse our border, what is to keep a terrorist that would
    do us harm from doing the same thing?
        Answer. ICE recognizes that criminal organizations operating
    worldwide are responsible for smuggling and trafficking tens of
    thousands of illegal aliens and thousands of pounds of illegal
    narcotics into the United States. These organizations generate millions
    of dollars in illicit profits that are moved through wire services,
    laundered through front businesses and transported out of the country.
    By exploiting vulnerabilities in border integrity, criminal
    organizations, whether they smuggle humans, illegal narcotics, illegal
    arms, or other contraband, are an unquestionable threat to the security
    of the United States.
        ICE has developed a full range of investigation and enforcement
    methodologies to confront the problem at every point--in source and
    transit countries, on the seas, at the Nation's borders and ports, and
    in the U.S. interior. In U.S. embassies throughout the world, ICE
    Attaches work with consular officials and with foreign law enforcement
    to better coordinate investigations, gather intelligence and follow the
    money trail to seize millions of dollars in profits from these
    organizations. ICE is also integrating intelligence and enforcement
    efforts and is mobilizing other governments and international
    organizations in the fight against human smuggling and trafficking.
        ICE has played a significant role in the newly established Human
    Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). The HSTC is a joint initiative
    between the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State,
    the Department of Justice, and members of the national Intelligence
    Community. The HSTC serves as an intelligence fusion center and
    information clearing-house, with the goal of converting intelligence
    into effective action.

            TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM AND BACKLOG ELIMINATION PROGRAM

        Question. I remain very concerned with the so called Temporary
    Worker Program that the President has proposed. Last January, we heard
    about this program and despite the claims to the contrary it seemed a
    lot like amnesty. The only difference I can see is that the illegals
    must have jobs in the United States. Beyond that, these people will be
    given permission to work and stay even if only temporarily, in the
    United States despite the fact that they are under the law, criminals.
    I told you last year that I do not believe in rewarding bad behavior
    and I still feel the same way today. Under this plan, over 8 million
    people would have an instant status adjustment. I find this
    particularly troubling considering the severe backlog of people who are
    following the law and waiting sometimes years to be allowed to come to
    the United States.
        Director, I know you spoke about the efforts to eliminate the
    backlog in your testimony and I do appreciate the progress made, but
    there is much more to be done.
        What are we going to do to rectify these problems?
        Answer. The President has stated a Temporary Worker Program (TWP)
    must be guided by four basic principles: that America must control its
    borders; that immigration laws should serve the economic needs of our
    country; that we must not give unfair rewards to illegal immigrants in
    the citizenship process or disadvantage those who came here lawfully,
    or hope to do so; and, that new laws should provide incentives for
    temporary, foreign workers to return permanently to their home
    countries. In designing such a program, we must remain mindful of these
    principles--and, in doing so, address the common and important concerns
    that you point out.
        The President is also committed to achieving our backlog
    elimination goals by the end of fiscal year 2006, which USCIS is on
    track to achieve. A well designed and managed and funded Temporary
    Worker Program would not adversely affect our backlog elimination
    efforts. To ensure this outcome, the TWP program design must be
    cognizant of a variety of factors, including current benefit
    authorities, options for cost recovery via fees, eligibility criteria,
    employer/government partnership opportunities, and application process
    requirements.
        Question. I understand that the backlog at different service
    centers varies, in some cases by months if not years, what is the
    problem and how do we fix it?
        Answer. USCIS has recently submitted a report to the Congress on
    this subject, which speaks to a staffing analysis recently completed
    that will help guide the distribution of resources to ensure that
    Service Centers can meet and maintain backlog elimination goals.
        Question. I am also painfully aware that my abilities to assist my
    constituents through casework has been greatly hindered since at least
    September of 2003 when the Alabama Delegation contacted the Secretary
    regarding staffing at your Atlanta office. To date, my staff has
    trouble receiving prompt replies to inquiries made in Atlanta. Often we
    can do little more than provide them the information they already have
    available to them through your website. What can we do to ensure that
    congressional inquiries to your service offices are acted on promptly?
        Answer. USCIS places a high priority on effectively serving its
    customers. Members of Congress and their staff often contact the agency
    in order to facilitate the resolution of constituent immigration
    casework. Many times, it is through a congressional inquiry that a case
    that has gone off track is identified and resolved. Often these
    inquiries can help us identify trends where changes in operational
    practices or policies would be appropriate.
        Each USCIS District Office and Service Center has staff dedicated
    to working with congressional staff. USCIS Congressional Relations has
    established national standards for responding to congressional
    inquiries. Telephonic inquiries should be acknowledged or resolved by
    close of business the next business day, written inquiries should be
    responded to within 30 days and email inquiries should be responded to
    within 10 days. Atlanta has been meeting these standards. Still, there
    are extenuating circumstances where the complete resolution may take
    longer or where there may be information identified in national
    security background checks that cannot be disclosed to congressional
    offices on individual applicants in order to ensure that ongoing
    investigations or national security are not compromised.
        When we identify a customer service or operational problem specific
    to a particular field office, a multi-programmatic Field Assessment
    Team is deployed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of operational
    effectiveness and responsiveness identifying areas needing improvement,
    action plans, and specific follow up. In the case of the Atlanta
    District, such a study was conducted and follow up takes place on a
    monthly basis. In addition, USCIS has conducted a field study to
    determine workload and workforce allocation. Through this study, many
    offices were identified as understaffed and new staff is being hired.
    As a result of this study, the Atlanta District will be hiring new
    adjudications staff this year. As new staff come on board and backlogs
    are reduced, the need for congressional inquires should likewise
    diminish. The Atlanta District has informed us that they are current
    with all congressional inquires. If there are any outstanding cases
    within your office we would be happy to work with your staff on
    resolving those cases.

                            IMPORTED SHRIMP INDUSTRY

        Question. I know actions are being taken against the imported
    shrimp industry in response to a dumping determination by the ITC and
    Dept. of Commerce. Can you tell me what efforts ICE and CBP are being
    taken in regards to the dumping of shrimp?
        Answer. Although the Department of Commerce (DOC) and U.S.
    International Trade Commission (ITC) share the joint responsibility for
    antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) orders, the
    responsibility for the administration and enforcement of these orders
    belongs to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (ICE).
        In July 2004, CBP amended its continuous bond guidelines
    specifically for agriculture/aquaculture AD/CVD merchandise as a
    response to the high-risk nature of these imports. A significant number
    of shipments were found to have circumvented the AD/CVD cases through
    incorrect country declarations, undervaluation, and insufficient surety
    bond coverage, thereby preventing CBP to collect the appropriate duties
    and make the proper distributions.
        The first new case affected by these amended guidelines is shrimp
    from China, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Ecuador and Brazil. CBP has
    performed a risk-based analysis on the continuous bonds used by
    importers of this product to identify circumvention schemes and sham
    companies. To date this effort has been successful, with CBP revoking
    over 100 continuous bonds for failing to respond to requests for
    information. CBP has also worked closely with many importers who are
    willing to comply with the new bond guidelines to appropriately set new
    bond amounts to cover the potential financial risk associated with the
    AD/CVD entries. In addition, CBP is also monitoring imports associated
    with this case on a monthly basis to identify new importers, misuse of
    more favorable AD/CVD rates, misdescription of goods, all to avoid
    paying proper AD/CVD duties.
        CBP is also deploying field officers located at Southeast Asian
    attache offices to determine if the production capabilities exist for
    this commodity. When problems are discovered, CBP will make the
    appropriate referral to ICE for further investigation and action.

                             BORDER PATROL VEHICLES

        Question. As you know, the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
    Appropriations conference report calls for a comprehensive border
    patrol vehicle fleet management plan by February 8, 2005. Can you
    please inform the Committee of the status of this report, and
    specifically the findings with respect to extreme terrain border
    regions?
        Answer. CBP has developed a draft comprehensive plan that was
    delivered to the Committee on June 28, 2005. Field implementation of
    the extreme terrain program has begun. The Program consists of four
    steps: (1) terrain mapping; (2) the evaluation and development of an
    off-road vehicle fleet; driver training; and sector management
    orientation. The first step, terrain mapping, involves retrofitting
    severe and enhanced mobility vehicles with specialized equipment to
    measure and pinpoint terrain severity using a global positioning
    system. Agents who have received advanced off-road training operate the
    vehicles in performing their regular duties, and CBP thus obtains
    accurate information about terrain severity that will be used to
    develop the optimal off-road fleet. A total of 10 Border Patrol Sectors
    were selected for the terrain mapping step in this Program. Mapping
    started in San Diego Sector in June 2004, and has been expanded to
    include the El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson Sectors. The following
    additional Sectors are scheduled to begin mapping this fiscal year:
    Marfa, El Paso, El Rio, Laredo, McAllen, and Blaine.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                     VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: FURTHER EXTENSION

        Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
    2002, which President Bush signed into law on May 14, 2002, established
    October 26, 2004, as the deadline by which the 27 existing ``visa
    waiver'' countries must have machine readable passports in order for
    their citizens to enter the United States without a visa. The Congress
    passed legislation last year pushing back that deadline until October
    26, 2005.
        Does the Department believe that additional time is required for
    these visa waiver countries to come into compliance with the machine
    readable passport requirements? If so, has authorizing legislation to
    achieve this goal been introduced?
        Answer. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
    provisions are related to machine-readable passports that are tamper-
    resistant and incorporate biometric and document authentication
    identifiers that comply with applicable biometric and document
    identifying standards established by the International Civil Aviation
    Organization. Last year the Administration requested a 2-year extension
    of the deadline requiring Visa Waiver Program (VWP) nationals to
    present biometric passports. Congress provided a 12 month extension to
    give countries designated to participate in the VWP additional time to
    implement the required passport changes. Given that, DHS and DOS have
    continued to work closely with VWP participants to review the progress
    that has been made toward compliance with the new requirement and
    deadline. We will be able to report on this progress to Congress
    shortly, though there are still concerns with the current deadline. I
    look forward to working with you to determine the best solution to both
    enhance the security of the VWP and enable facilitation of legitimate
    travel.
        Question. Former Secretary Ridge stated in one of his departing
    interviews that the United States most likely should impose the same
    requirements regarding biometric identities on U.S. passports. Has the
    machine readable requirement imposed on foreign visas resulted in
    negative treatment of U.S. travelers abroad?
        Answer. The Visa Waiver Permanent Program (Public Law 106-396)
    imposed a requirement that VWP travelers have machine-readable
    passports (with the biographic, not biometric, data being available in
    a standard manner) for VWP entry on or after October 1, 2007, and that
    participating VWP countries certify that they are issuing machine-
    readable documents no later than October 1, 2003. Public Law 107-56,
    the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 advanced the deadline for use of machine-
    readable travel documents by VWP applicants from October 1, 2007, to
    October 1, 2003, but provided for the Secretary of State to waive the
    requirement until October 2007. In September 2003, the Secretary
    extended the deadline for individuals to present machine-readable
    documents to October 26, 2004. The requirement for nationals of VWP
    countries to present machine-readable passports to enter the United
    States under the VWP after October 26, 2004, has not resulted in any
    reported negative treatment of U.S. travelers abroad.
        Additionally, U.S. visas now contain biometrics (i.e. two
    fingerprints and a digital photograph). European Union nations are
    discussing options for implementing biometric visa programs as well.

              IMPACT OF BUSH AMNESTY ON BACKLOG REDUCTION/WORKLOAD

        Question. Your agency's budget request states that, if Congress
    provides the minimal discretionary funding you are requesting, you are
    on track to meet the goal of reducing to 6 months the processing
    backlog for immigration documents.
        The President continues to advocate for an amnesty for illegal
    aliens already resident in this country under the guise of an
    immigration reform proposal. I am concerned about the impact on your
    meeting these backlog reduction targets of any immigration proposal. We
    discussed this issue at last year's hearing, and you responded that any
    impacts on your agency's goals and operations would depend in large
    part on what Congress did in response to the President's immigration
    ``reform'' proposal. He raised the immigration issue again in his State
    of the Union address. However, we in the Congress continue to await his
    ``proposal''. When will Congress get the President's immigration reform
    proposal and what impact would his immigration ``proposal'' have on
    your backlog reduction proposal?
        Answer. The President has outlined his vision for a Temporary
    Worker Program (TWP) and said that it must be guided by four basic
    principles: that America must control its borders; that immigration
    laws should serve the economic needs of our country; that we must not
    give unfair rewards to illegal immigrants in the citizenship process or
    disadvantage those who came here lawfully, or hope to do so; and, that
    new laws should provide incentives for temporary, foreign workers to
    return permanently to their home countries. The key to processing
    temporary worker petitions quickly and efficiently is simplicity in the
    design. A well designed and managed Temporary Worker Program would not
    adversely affect our backlog elimination efforts. To ensure this
    outcome, the TWP program design must be cognizant of a variety of
    factors, including current benefit authorities, options for cost
    recovery via fees, eligibility criteria, employer/government
    partnership opportunities, and application process requirements.
        Question. Rep. Sensenbrenner has promised to attach his immigration
    bill (H.R. 418) to the Emergency Iraqi War Supplemental. This bill
    includes many of the provisions in the original House draft of the
    Intelligence Reform Act.
        Unlike some rhetorical Bush Administration amnesty, the specifics
    of this legislation are known. If the provisions of this bill are
    included in the Supplemental or some other piece of legislation, what
    impact would it have on your agency's abilities to meet your backlog
    reduction goals?
        Answer. This bill would not impact USCIS' ability to meet backlog
    elimination goals.

                              CIS LOCAL OMBUDSMAN

        Question. Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act called for the
    establishment of at least one CIS ombudsman's office in each state. Has
    CIS complied with the Act? If not, when does the Department plan to do
    so?
        Answer. HSA  452 establishes the Office of the Citizenship and
    Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISO), an entity independent of USCIS
    and reporting directly to the DHS Deputy Secretary. HSA  452(e)(1)(A)
    states that the Ombudsman shall have the responsibility and authority
    ``to appoint local ombudsmen and make available at least one (1) such
    ombudsman for each State.''
        For fiscal year 2005 the CISO is authorized a total of 24 full-time
    employees (FTE), and the majority of these employees are planned to be
    onboard during the third quarter of the fiscal year. For fiscal year
    2004 the CISO was authorized a total of eight (8) FTE. The fiscal year
    2006 Budget maintains the CISO at the 24 FTE level.
        The CISO has established a ``Local Ombudsman Pilot Program'' which
    is partially staffed at present but planned to be fully staffed by
    April 30, 2005. The pilot program is to design and develop a workable
    local ombudsman office which will have specific operational
    responsibilities over a defined geographic area. The pilot program will
    establish personnel certification and training requirements, determine
    liaison responsibilities and limitations, finalize facilities
    requirements and provide a controlled model for future local ombudsman
    office placements. The pilot program will commence upon the arrival to
    CISO of the new hire personnel to complete the staffing of the pilot
    local ombudsman office (``Beta Office''). The pilot program is
    estimated to last for a minimum of 9 months, however that time may
    expand or contract depending on the results attained. The following is
    a list of tasks to be accomplished during the pilot program:
      --Develop personnel job descriptions based on actual job
            requirements.
      --Conduct a task and skill analysis for each job position to
            determine the required skills and knowledge for incumbents, as
            well as to determine individual training requirements for
            incumbents.
      --Design and develop a local ombudsman training and certification
            program.
      --Determine the requisite support equipment necessary for local
            ombudsman operations.
      --Determine the most efficient data transfer arrangement between the
            Beta Office and the Ombudsman Information Management System
            (OIMS) to allow for: (1) inquiries and USCIS actions to be
            received by the Beta Office from OIMS; (2) Beta Office inputs
            to OIMS; (3) and statistical data and analyses provided in both
            directions.
      --Develop and establish inter-office and intra-office liaison
            methodologies and procedures, with particular emphasis on: (1)
            Beta Office to Analysis Branch; (2) Beta Office to Executive
            Officer staff; (3) Beta Office to OIMS staff; (4) Beta Office
            to USCIS office(s) in geographic area of responsibility; and
            (5) Beta Office to individuals/employers as appropriate.
      --Develop reporting vehicles for Beta Office operations and
            productivity.
      --Baseline Beta Office operations, duties and tasks under appropriate
            quality assurance standards.
      --Develop and produce procedural manuals to baseline Beta Office
            operations, duties and tasks.
      --Other tasks to be identified throughout the pilot program duration.

                      NATIONAL BORDER SECURITY ASSESSMENT

        Question. The Heritage Foundation issued a December 13, 2004 report
    entitled ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,''
    which made a number of recommendations. One of them recommended that
    the Department of Homeland Security ``conduct a national assessment of
    the resources required for effective border security.''
        Given the comments by Deputy Secretary Loy and other about the
    threat facing our borders from a variety of groups, including Al Qaeda,
    is the Department actively conducting such an assessment and, if not,
    why not?
        Answer. Under the goal of Prevention within the United States
    Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, one of the primary
    objectives is to: ``Secure our borders against terrorists, means of
    terrorism, illegal drugs and other illegal activity. We interdict
    terrorist activities by targeting unlawful migration of people, cargo,
    drugs and other contraband, while facilitating legitimate migration and
    commerce. The Department will enforce border security in an integrated
    fashion at ports of entry, on the borders, on the seas and before
    potential threats can reach our borders. Through the continued
    deployment of the appropriate balance of personnel, equipment and
    technology we will create ``smart borders.'' Not only will we create
    more secure United States borders, but in conjunction with
    international partners, we will extend our zones of security beyond our
    physical borders identifying, prioritizing and interdicting threats to
    our Nation before they arrive. We will develop and provide resources
    for a cohesive, unified enforcement capability that makes our border
    security effective, smarter and stronger.''
        DHS operating elements all share in this requirement and are
    conducting assessments within their area(s) of responsibility. For
    example, the Border Patrol has developed America's Shield Initiative,
    which will methodically assess the highest risk illegal border crossing
    corridors and, taking into account the topography and other natural
    barriers, allocate an efficient suite of aerial or ground sensors,
    personnel and equipment, to best secure the areas between the ports of
    entry. At the ports of entry, CBP is using and developing enhanced
    targeting systems and personnel to inspect the highest risk cargo,
    people and conveyances. In addition, radiation portal monitors are
    being deployed at our ports to screen cargo for potential weapons of
    mass effect. One of the tools enforcement officers at the border also
    employ is the United States--Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
    Technology (US-VISIT) program which incorporates biometrics (finger
    scans) into entry documentation to ensure we are only letting in those
    visitors with valid visas who have been cleared against terrorist
    watchlists and data bases holding fingerprints for criminals. Our
    national drug control strategy and related annual drug budget also
    contains information on the trans-national drug threat and resources
    devoted to combating this problem which complements our border security
    initiatives. These are a few examples of the family of plans, periodic
    reviews, acquisitions and programs that collectively contain the
    assessments and resource requirements for national border security.
    Annually, those requirements work their way through the budget process
    producing allocations to address the highest priority security
    concerns.

                            IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

        Question. Last year, Congress provided $5 million for a worksite
    enforcement program. For fiscal year 2006, you are requesting $18
    million for the same purpose. How have you used the fiscal year 2005
    funds? Please describe how the requested fiscal year 2006 funds will
    contribute to immigration enforcement.
        Answer. ICE will increase its presence at worksites, concentrating
    on employers in specific industries and geographical areas who
    intentionally violate the law or who have historically hired large
    numbers of unauthorized workers. ICE will also coordinate with
    Citizenship and Immigration Services to improve and expand verification
    services (Basic Pilot Program) to employers nationwide pursuant to the
    Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003.

                               DETENTION BEDSPACE

        Question. For the current fiscal year, Congress provided funding to
    fill 20,660 detention beds--yet the total beds that you are filling
    each week thus far is averaging 2,000 below the funded total. Why are
    these beds not being filled? What types or categories of aliens are not
    being held?
        Answer. ICE Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) is detaining
    within its budget.
        National security cases and criminal aliens are ICE's priority in
    immigration enforcement. Daily, ICE is at 100 percent capacity of its
    available allocated funding for detention bed space, the majority of
    those detained being criminal aliens. This aggressive enforcement
    posture is reflected in last year's record 160,284 alien removals,
    including record 84,400 criminal aliens removed from the United States.
    ICE conducts case-by-case determinations on who will be processed for
    removal and who will be detained or released. ICE must also carefully
    consider the conditions of release and factor in community safety
    especially with regards to criminal aliens. ICE will continue to
    aggressively enforce immigration laws against criminal aliens and other
    aliens who pose security threats to the country and expects to continue
    to achieve increased removals.
        Question. Please provide the cost assumptions ICE would use
    regarding hiring the first year (fiscal year 2006) authorized level in
    the Intelligence Reform Act (800) for ICE investigators as well as the
    fiscal year 2007 annualization of those positions. Also, please provide
    the same information for the costs associated with meeting the first
    year authorized levels for detention bedspace (8,000).
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Budget includes substantial increases
    for increased detention and removal activities. The fiscal year 2006
    Budget includes $90 million for detention beds and additional detention
    and removal officers. This increase will fund 1,920 beds. In addition,
    the Budget provides $1.5 billion for detention and removal activities,
    $236 million (19 percent increase) over the 2005 enacted level. In
    addition, it also includes $39 million for the detention and
    repatriation costs of the Arizona Border Control Initiative. In
    addition, 140 new Special Agents will also be hired.

              INVESTIGATIONS OF ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT VIOLATIONS

        Question. The Department of Justice published revised regulations
    in the November 15, 2004 Federal Register that suggested that DOJ--not
    ICE--will have the lead role in investigations regarding illegal arms
    exports. I understand that in late December, you issued a message which
    stated, in part, ``In recent weeks some media reports have suggested
    that ICE may be ceding some of its authority to investigate violations
    of the Arms Export Control Act, and other export laws. I am writing
    today to inform you that nothing could be further from the truth.''
        This seems to be another troubling example of this new Department's
    willingness to cede authority to other Departments for some of the
    traditional roles played by its component parts over the years. The
    Secret Service had to assert its authority as the primary protector of
    the currency a few years ago and the Department lost some of its lead
    role in terrorist financing when former Secretary Ridge signed a
    Memorandum of Understanding with the former Attorney General. Even the
    Department's central role in coordinating terrorist threat information
    was lost--via Executive Order--almost before the ink was dry on the
    President's signature of the bill creating the Department.
        Please explain for the subcommittee the specific roles played by
    DHS--and ICE in particular--and DOJ in arms export investigations.
        Answer. For over 25 years, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    (ICE), has effectively investigated violations of U.S. export control
    laws. The export control laws enforced by ICE include the AECA, the EAR
    (concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Commerce), the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the
    Enemy Act. ICE uses its border search authority, certified undercover
    operations and U.S. money laundering statutes as additional tools to
    prosecute export violators and to assist in the identification and
    seizure of criminal proceeds of specified unlawful activities. As a
    result, ICE has successfully investigated hundreds of significant
    export violations.
        ICE will continue to vigorously pursue criminal violations of the
    export laws and will work jointly with the FBI in export investigations
    that have a nexus to FCI.

                       IMPACT OF THE ICE BUDGET SHORTFALL

        Question. In the fall of 2003, Congress began calling for the
    Department to respond to the fact that ICE had insufficient resources
    to perform its numerous immigration and other investigative duties. In
    both the fiscal year 2004 and 2005 Appropriations Acts, Congress
    stepped up to the plate and provided Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement with more funds than requested by the President to deal
    with the shortfall.
        Yet even with the full acknowledgement that ICE does not have
    sufficient funding, and that the shortfall has hampered its mission and
    damaged the morale of its agents, the President has refused to request
    supplemental funding to make ICE ``whole'' and to put it on a sound
    financial footing.
        Immigration and Customs Enforcement should be able to move forward,
    secure in the knowledge that it has the funds necessary to robustly
    investigate arms smugglers, terrorists, money launderers, child
    predators, as well as enforce existing immigration laws.
        However, ICE has been forced to take dramatic steps--including
    freezing hiring, stopping training, and limiting travel--for more than
    a year in order to live within its constrained budget. The hiring
    freeze and other spending restraints remain in place nearly 6 months
    into the new fiscal year. And now we are being warned that ICE faces a
    funding gap of nearly $300 million this year.
        Mr. Secretary, will you end fiscal year 2005 with fewer
    investigators than you started with at the beginning of Fiscal year
    2004? How has that reduction impacted your mission?
        Answer. The pending reprogramming will give ICE the ability to end
    fiscal year 2005 with at least the same, if not higher, level than
    fiscal year 2004. While ICE has been working through significant
    challenges during the past 2 years, at the same time, ICE has been
    achieving unparalleled success in its mission areas. During fiscal year
    2005, ICE will continue to work through its challenges and accomplish
    its critical mission.
        Question. Did you seek a supplemental to address the shortfall?
        Answer. The proposed reprogramming submitted on March 12, 2005, is
    sufficient to address the financial requirements of ICE.

          CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE: EXPANSION AND REGULARIZATION

        Question. I have long been a supporter of the Container Security
    Initiative, or CSI. This program stations CBP personnel at
    participating foreign seaports to target and inspect ocean-going
    shipping containers prior to their being loaded on U.S.-bound vessels.
    While it was initially skeptical of the program, and reluctant to
    support the funds the Congress provided to begin its implementation, I
    am pleased that this Administration has embraced the CSI.
        The Administration seeks a modest increase of only $5.4 million for
    the CSI for a total fiscal year 2006 request of almost $139 million.
        During visits to some of these ports, my staff has been impressed
    with the generally cooperative relationships that have been formed
    between the CBP personnel and their host country counterparts. As they
    work together and develop increasing levels of trust, the mutually
    beneficial aspects of the CSI program to both our country and theirs
    become apparent. However, the one constant refrain we heard from both
    CBP and host-country officials was the fact that our people are
    generally sent over on a temporary basis. They are concerned that once
    the relationships have matured during the months that the CBP personnel
    are at a port, they are rotated out and the ``trust-building'' process
    must begin again.
        Could the effectiveness of the CSI be improved by resolving this
    temporary duty situation? What are you and the Department doing to
    ensure that CBP personnel based overseas for CSI implementation are
    able to stay at a port for a healthy period of time? Are there problems
    with our State Department representatives that need to be addressed? If
    so, has this been discussed by Secretary Chertoff with Secretary Rice?
        Answer. CBP is transitioning CSI temporary personnel to permanent
    status. This process requires DHS to coordinate with Department of
    State (DOS) as required by National Security Decision Directive 38
    (NSDD-38). DOS negotiates the placement of permanent personnel at
    foreign duty posts and also negotiates the appropriate level of
    Privileges and Immunities (P&I) that will be granted by the host
    government on behalf of all United States Government agencies.
        CBP is currently working with DOS to secure the placement of CSI
    personnel into a permanent status with the appropriate level of P&I.
    The DOS has placed a high level of priority on assisting CBP with this
    initiative.
        Question. Without naming any ports or countries, my staff has also
    heard that some participating ports are often very reluctant to
    cooperate with our requests for more robust inspection and screening of
    containers. If this is indeed the case, has consideration been given to
    lodging formal complaints with the host government--or even to
    suspending a specific port's participation in CSI?
        Answer. There are currently 35 operational CSI ports. The standard
    operating procedures for these CSI ports are in part governed by a
    jointly signed Declaration of Principles, in which the host government
    agrees to pre-screen containers that pose a risk for terrorism.
        It is also understood that due to host government sovereignty, the
    final decision on container examinations is at the discretion of the
    host government. However, CBP has authority to issue no load order for
    those who refused inspection.
        The CSI program has made significant progress in reaching agreement
    with host government agencies on what constitutes a high-risk container
    warranting an examination.
        Challenges still exist at one CSI location with regard to common
    and agreed upon definition/designation of high-risk containers
    warranting examination(s).
        CBP is confident that with the high percentage of CSI locations
    operating very effectively that continued progress will be made in this
    one location. CBP has, and continues to consult with State Department
    (including the U.S. Embassy in this location) to enhance the CSI
    operation.
        CBP has contemplated the alternatives and is receiving full support
    from all Departments and Agencies in making CSI efficient and
    effective.

              IMPACT OF LATE DUTY COLLECTION ON CRAWFISH INDUSTRY

        Question. As mentioned previously, in the past, U.S. industries
    like the U.S. crawfish industry have discovered only very late in the
    year that millions of dollars of antidumping duties for some reason
    have not been collected in their cases against Chinese imports as
    required by law. And, because CBP's failure to collect these duties has
    been discovered late in the year, the non-collection problem in these
    cases could not be addressed in time to enable the industries to obtain
    their yearly distribution of funds under the Byrd Amendment. As a
    consequence, the U.S. crawfish industry, for example, last year failed
    to receive at least $54.4 million it otherwise would have received in
    duties paid the United States Government by Chinese importers.
        It is my understanding that CBP's Office of Information Technology
    (OIT) is fully capable of running an already existing program much
    earlier in each calendar year, (meaning by the end of March at the
    latest), which would enable both CBP and U.S. industries to learn, much
    earlier, if millions of dollars in duties are not being collected by
    CBP from U.S. importers of foreign, dumped products.
        Why can't CBP's Office of information Technology determine by the
    end of this month if there are cases in which CBP is not collecting
    duties owed the United States Government and make that information
    publicly available as early as possible?
        Answer. CBP has responded to the revenue risk posed by the
    inability to collect certain AD/CVD duties through several means, one
    of which is the monitoring the AD/CVD bills and collections on a more
    regular basis. For the distribution of these funds to take place
    timely, it is necessary not only to monitor the timely collection of
    AD/CVD duties but also to ensure our revenue collection system is
    protected from possible circumvention and corporate solvency schemes
    designed to enter AD/CVD goods into the U.S. market with the intention
    of never paying the proper duties at time of liquidation.
        On a monthly basis, CBP is performing a risk-based review of
    outstanding bills for AD/CVD duties. The information has proven
    effective in identifying high-risk companies for AD/CVD evasion as well
    as improve the timeliness of our reviews. CBP is also focused on the
    long-term issue of the company's financial solvency and their ability
    to pay outstanding AD/CVD bills. The continuous bond guidelines for
    imports of certain agriculture/aquaculture imports were amended in July
    2004, to address just such an issue. Working with the Department of
    Commerce, we are addressing the AD/CVD issues that pose the greatest
    risk.

                     OVERTIME PAY WHILE RECEIVING TRAINING

        Question. I understand that since January 2, 2002, your bureau has
    not compensated CBP officers who train 6 days a week at the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center. In essence, this means that hundreds of
    newly trained CBP officers have had to work 6 days a week for up to 12
    weeks without any compensation for overtime.
        I support your ``One face at the Border'' initiative and
    acknowledge that the merging of certain legacy personnel into a new
    agency requires intensive training. But I think you would concur that
    this should not come at the expense of basic compensation for these
    professionals.
        How do you plan to correct the current overtime pay problem for
    these CBP officers who were trained between January 2002 and October
    2004?
        Answer. CBP is also concerned about equitable compensation for the
    employees who were engaged in training at the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center (FLETC) on a 6-day schedule. As you are aware, the
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) determined that the 6-
    day schedule was a necessity post-September 11 in order to accommodate
    the robust training needs of law enforcement personnel.
        The Government Employee Training Act prohibits the Federal agencies
    from compensating employees with overtime while its employees are
    engaged in training by, in or through government or non-government
    facilities (5 USC, 41). There are only a very few exceptions to this
    broad legislative prohibition, and the CBP has used these, where
    possible, to legally pay our employees so situated.
        Chief amongst these exceptions is a different set of regulations
    that applies to employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
    (FLSA). Legacy INS inspectors, prior to conversion to the CBP Officer
    position and COPRA compensation, were covered by FLSA. We were
    therefore able to retroactively compensate them for the overtime worked
    on the 6 day during the FLETC training; these retroactive payments were
    made in December 2004. Because the agency determined that legacy
    Customs Inspectors were covered by COPRA and therefore exempt from
    FLSA, payment for the 6 day was not appropriate. The different outcomes
    regarding payment of overtime resulted from the fact that these groups
    of employees were covered by different laws at the time that the
    training occurred.
        The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) challenged the agency
    through arbitration concerning this issue, and the agency's legal
    interpretation was sustained by the arbitrator. This is a complex
    matter, and there is litigation still pending. It is also important to
    note that effective October 1, 2004, FLETC returned to a 5-day training
    week

                               CONTAINER SECURITY

        Question. In December 2004, the Department unveiled a draft cargo
    security strategy. This strategy stated that the Department proposes to
    adopt a ``zero-tolerance policy'' regarding the arrival of weapons of
    mass effect at our Nation's borders. I concur that preventing these
    weapons from entering the United States should be a priority. I always
    assumed that it was.
        The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Homeland
    Security Appropriations Act notes that over $200 million has been spent
    over the past 3 years on various projects designed to secure cargo
    containers entering this country. It also calls on the Under Secretary
    for Border and Transportation Security to--among other things--report
    to the Congress no later than February 8, 2005 on which DHS entity will
    have primary responsibility for cargo container security and the
    setting of shipping industry standards. To date we have not received
    this report. I assume your agency was closely involved in the drafting
    of this report.
        How closely were you involved in the drafting of the report and can
    you give us a sense of what it might recommend?
        Answer. In support of the Department's cargo security strategy
    proposal to adopt a ``zero-tolerance policy'' regarding the arrival of
    weapons of mass effect at our Nation's borders, CBP has deployed
    various types of radiation detection technology nationwide with the
    ultimate goal of screening 100 percent of containerized cargo for
    radiation.
        CBP has provided significant input to the draft report on Cargo
    Container Security, including information regarding the current status
    of major CBP initiatives addressing cargo security. In providing
    summary reporting, CBP outlined the desired end state; namely, securing
    and improving operations at existing ports; expanding operations to new
    critical international seaports and encouraging global efforts to
    enhance supply chain security.
        Question. Do you know when the Congress will receive the report
    which is now nearly 1 month overdue?
        Answer. The final report was submitted to the Committee on June 8,
    2005.

                          AMERICA'S SHIELD INITIATIVE

        Question. This Department seems obsessed with selling old wine in
    new bottles. The visa tracking program known for years as ``Entry-
    Exit'' became ``US-VISIT''. The Office for Domestic Preparedness became
    the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
    Preparedness. Now the Border Patrol's Integrated Surveillance
    Information System, or ISIS, has been ``re-branded'' as ``America's
    Shield Initiative''--or ASI. Regardless of the new names for these old
    programs, the fact remains that our borders need to be protected.
        America's Shield Initiative is supposed to implement the Border
    Patrol National Strategy to strengthen U.S. borders to prevent the
    entry into the United States of terrorists and terrorist weapons,
    smugglers and illegal aliens, narcotics and other contraband.
        Our borders are under attack. The President's own experts know and
    are extremely concerned about the threat terrorists pose to our
    borders. In written testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee
    on February 16, Deputy Secretary Loy cited recently received
    information as the reason for his concern about the threat facing the
    Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious situation.''
        Given this threat, why does the request include only $20 million
    for improved technology on our borders, when CBP staff have estimated
    the full cost to be $250-300 million?
        Answer. The total funding for the ASI program in fiscal year 2006
    is $51 million, including $19.8 million for new investments. The fiscal
    year 2006 request for ASI when coupled with investments for additional
    Border Patrol Agents, helicopter replacements, enhancements to Border
    Patrol facilitates and tactical infrastructure will provide CBP with a
    complement of resources that will increase operational control of our
    Nation's borders.

                               IDENT/IAFIS UPDATE

        Question. The integration of the fingerprint databases created,
    maintained, and used by the Department of Homeland Security and the
    FBI--among other Federal agencies--continues to be a priority concern
    for the Congress and the members of this Subcommittee. It is critical
    that we know whether visitors to this country pose a risk to our
    citizens. As you know, the 9/11 hijackers came into the country on
    student and tourist visas.
        Your Border Patrol agents daily compare the fingerprints of illegal
    aliens apprehended at our borders against these databases. And it is
    your inspectors who--at a growing number of ports of entry--compare the
    fingerprints of visa holders and others wishing to enter this country
    against these same databases via the US-VISIT system.
        That is why I was concerned about the latest Department of Justice
    Inspector General report on this subject. It stated that of the 118,000
    visitors daily entering this country who are subject to US-VISIT, an
    average of about 22,350 individuals are referred for secondary
    inspection. According to DHS, by the end of this fiscal year, it
    expects to directly check only about 800 individuals each day against
    the full FBI fingerprint database known as the IAFIS Criminal Master
    File. This is less than 1 percent of the 118,000 daily visitors.
        Why are we checking less than 1 percent of visitors to this country
    against the FBI fingerprint data base?
        Answer. This response contains information considered Law
    Enforcement Sensitive and has been provided to the Committee under
    separate cover.
        Question. According to the Justice Inspector General report, the
    Justice Department will be increasing the FBI's capacity to handle
    fingerprint checks from 8,000 per day to 20,000 per day by October of
    this year. Will you be changing your policies so that CBP is fully
    utilizing that capacity to check the criminal backgrounds of visitors
    coming into this country?
        Answer. DHS and Department of State have found that IDENT achieves
    their counterterrorism, major law enforcement, and border management
    objectives in timeframes that meet operational needs for processing at
    ports of entry. Every day, DHS and DOS run checks on approximately
    115,000-120,000 individuals using IDENT. These checks are returned, on
    average, within 10 seconds at ports of entry for US-VISIT and within 15
    minutes for Department of State. Even if IAFIS increases its capacity
    to 20,000 fingerprint checks per day, it still cannot come close to the
    number of transactions currently generated by the US-VISIT program.
    Additionally, IAFIS returns results, on average, at best within 10
    minutes, most (such as those transmitted by State) within several
    hours. Currently, IAFIS does not have the capacity to meet our
    operational needs for inspecting visitors. However, we are continuing
    to work with the Department of Justice on finding ways to better
    integrate IAFIS with our existing systems, such as the successful
    integration at our Border Patrol stations.

                              COLLECTION OF DUTIES

        Question. Again, two of the problems that CBP has exhibited with
    respect to its administration of the Byrd Amendment are (1) Customs'
    failure to collect duties rightfully owed; and (2) its failure to pay
    duties already collected in a timely fashion to eligible U.S. companies
    and their workers.
        With respect to the second problem, Customs sometimes holds, in
    what are called ``clearing accounts,'' duties that are collected over
    many years--but for which the agency is awaiting final ``liquidation
    instructions'' from the Commerce Department prior to distribution.
    Often, the Commerce Department claims that such instructions have been
    sent, but CBP does not know they have been sent or never receives them.
        It has been proposed that one solution to this problem would be for
    CBP to publish the amount of funds held in CBP's clearing accounts, by
    administrative review period, so that CBP and Commerce can work
    together to determine which funds should have been liquidated and be
    available for distribution to eligible U.S. producers. CBP, in certain
    circumstances, has provided such information to Members of Congress
    upon request, but has refused to provide such information generally.
        Will you commit to identifying (i.e., publishing) the amount of
    funds held in clearing accounts by administrative review period?
        Answer. The CBP program is designed to generate a bill and collect
    the appropriate duties following the liquidation of each entry summary.
    However, importers are provided the opportunity to appeal these
    decisions, which may involve working with the Departments of Commerce
    and Justice to ultimately collect these AD/CVD duties. During this
    time, estimated duties collected on the entry summary are held pending
    the final liquidation and collection of these duties before they may be
    disbursed in accordance with the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act.
        To ensure transactions are not inadvertently held and made
    available for disbursement, CBP initiated a plan to review and
    liquidate entries that may have been inadvertently held in clearing
    accounts. CBP provided extensive data to Commerce regarding entries by
    administrative review period that remain unliquidated. Feedback from
    Commerce on this analysis allowed CBP field offices to finalize 11,000
    old AD/CVD entries whose liquidation makes $12 million eligible for
    disbursement.
        This process also shed light on the cause of the backlog. Over two-
    thirds of old unliquidated entries (10 years old or more) resulted from
    a weakness in communicating liquidation instructions from Commerce to
    CBP. In most instances, CBP is holding old AD/CVD entries with import
    scenarios not covered by any published Commerce instructions. This is
    particularly true where instructions are contingent on a complex mix of
    importer, exporter and/or producer. In fiscal year 2005, CBP is
    concentrating on the liquidation of all remaining AD/CVD entries
    entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended.
        We are committed to working closely with Commerce to ensure that
    CBP promptly receives and acts upon all liquidation instructions
    issued. This will enable CBP to act as promptly as possible to initiate
    liquidation of the affected entries. This could potentially include a
    case-by-case comparison of orders.
        Question. Will you commit similarly to identifying the reasons for
    the lack of liquidation in cases where liquidation has not occurred for
    more than 4 years, and provide specific information with respect to
    those cases showing the amounts that remain unliquidated accompanied by
    an explanation of CBP's understanding of why the amounts have not been
    liquidated?
        Answer. The antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) modules
    within the Automated Commercial System (ACS) do not provide information
    by administrative review periods; therefore, CBP cannot track entries
    this way. Although one module exists to track liquidation instructions
    by review period--the Department of Commerce (DOC), who has sole
    responsibility for the AD/CVD modules, has not consistently provided
    this information.
        A liquidation clean-up project was initiated by CBP in response to
    the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit on CBP's implementation and
    management of the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA). The OIG
    report expressed concern over CBP's unliquidated inventory of 1 million
    entries and states ``clearing up the liquidation backlog should be a
    priority given the substantial dollars involved.'' At present, CBP is
    holding an ``official'' inventory of 2.2 million suspended AD/CVD
    entries covering 593 cases. According to the AD/CVD duty module within
    ACS only 327 of those cases are current, the rest are either revoked
    (once open, but subsequently closed), terminated (investigated, but
    never issued), or in some stage of investigation (prior to a decision
    on issuance). CBP believes that many of these entries can be closed
    out.
        CBP provided extensive data to DOC regarding entries that remain
    unliquidated despite the fact that their associated AD/CVD cases were
    either terminated revoked or did not have instructions issued for a
    specific review period. Feedback from DOC on this analysis allowed CBP
    field offices to finalize 11,000 old AD/CVD entries whose liquidation
    makes $12 million eligible for disbursement pursuant to the Continued
    Dumping Offset Act of 2000.
        The liquidation clean-up project also shed light on the cause of
    the backlog. Over two-thirds of old unliquidated entries (10 years old
    or more) resulted from a breakdown in the liquidation instructions from
    DOC to CBP. In most instances, import specialists are holding old AD/
    CVD entries with import scenarios not covered by any published DOC
    instructions. This is particularly true where instructions are
    contingent on a complex mix of importer, exporter and/or producer. In
    fiscal year 2005, CBP is concentrating on the liquidation of all
    remaining AD/CVD entries entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended.
    Another reason that monies remain in the ``clearing accounts'' and are
    unavailable for distribution via CDSOA are the number of protests on
    bills issued by CBP. Payment of a protested bill is deferred until the
    protest decision is rendered. Currently many protests of AD/CVD
    liquidations are suspended pending the final decision by the Federal
    Appeals Court on International Trade.

                           TRAINING OF CBP INSPECTORS

        Question. With the creation of the CBP Officer position along with
    the ``One Face at the Border Initiative'', how does the CBP plan to
    make sure that one front-line employee can essentially perform job
    functions that were previously done by 3 different inspectors? Does DHS
    plan to create specialty experts for various legacy Customs and INS
    disciplines, or will every officer have to know every detail of both
    Customs and INS laws for both the primary and secondary inspections at
    the border?
        Answer. We are working towards creating an agency-wide law
    enforcement and national security culture, establishing unified primary
    inspections at all United States ports of entry and conducting
    secondary inspections focused primarily on combating terrorism and the
    traditional missions inherited by Customs and Border Protection. To do
    this efficiently and effectively, we have built a comprehensive
    training plan to guide our efforts.
        A very stringent 20-day pre-academy and 73-day basic academy
    training curriculum has been developed for the new CBP Officer. This
    training gives them the foundation needed to work in the primary
    setting upon their return to the port, while also giving them a basic
    understanding of what occurs in the secondary environments. The
    ultimate goal is to train the new CBP Officer to not only be equally
    competent in all of the former, individual areas of responsibility, but
    also to be better able to meet the expanded mission priority of anti-
    terrorism. Their Academy training is then followed by a rigorous 2-year
    on the job training program with approximately 40-45 weeks (depending
    on environment--air, land or sea) of structured training courses. They
    are given training in stages in order to absorb it and be afforded time
    on the job to perform the duties and become proficient.
        A comprehensive 37 module cross-training program has been built for
    those officers who previously performed an Agriculture, Customs or
    Immigration function at the ports. Training is being given to those
    officers on a ``just in time'' basis to perform the job they are being
    asked to do. Instead, CBP has created a curriculum that builds off of
    each previous module.
        CBP does have several courses which are considered to be advanced
    training and they would include those that involve analytical
    capabilities and the counter-terrorism response units in our secondary
    areas. CBP is currently exploring the possibility of having additional
    areas and courses designated as specialized training classes.
        Question. Explain how Customs cargo inspection expertise will not
    be lost in the transition to the new CBP officer position? Will the new
    CBP officer be required to thoroughly understand the massive harmonized
    tariff schedule for goods being imported into the United States as well
    as being responsible for thousands of pages that comprise the 400
    sections of Immigration and Nationality Act, hundreds of pages of INS
    Title 8 Federal Regulations and the full INS operations inspection
    manual?
        Answer. Currently, CBP's Office of Field Operations is developing,
    in conjunction with the Office of Training and Development, three
    separate Cargo cross-training modules for the air, land and sea
    environments. The primary recipients of this training will be the new
    CBP Officers and those legacy Immigration Officers new to the cargo
    environment. The training consists of both classroom instruction on
    cargo processing, and on-the-job cargo training under the supervision
    of an experienced CBP Officer. The training consists of reviewing bills
    of lading, processing all types of entries and conducting cargo
    examinations. Officers will receive this training on a ``just in time''
    basis as they are assigned to cargo primary.
        The expertise on classification using the harmonized schedule still
    resides with the Import Specialists. CBP Officers are introduced to the
    harmonized schedule in some of our Customs Secondary training as well
    as the cargo courses described above. We teach a basic understanding of
    the tariff, how to locate items, and how to do a basic classification/
    duty calculation. Final classification and duty calculations are done
    by the Import Specialist.
        It is expected that our training effort for the CBP Officer and CBP
    Agriculture Specialist will be conducted over the course of many years.
    CBP policy is that no officer may perform a function or a part of an
    assignment without having completed the appropriate training module,
    systems training and on the job training that are associated with those
    duties.
        Question. The Department's ``One Face at the Border Initiative''
    merged over 18,000 inspectors from the Customs Service, Immigration and
    Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal Plant Health Inspection
    Service (APHIS), into one front line inspector position. As you know,
    current legacy Customs, legacy INS and the new CBP officers carry
    weapons and have arrest authority but are NOT considered Federal law
    enforcement officers. With the demands of the Federal law enforcement
    officer having evolved over the last decade, do you not believe that
    including Federal personnel such as Customs and Border Protection
    Officers, who not only protect our border from illegal drugs and
    facilitate lawful trade, but must now defend against weapons of mass
    destruction and terrorism and the risks that come with these added job
    responsibilities, deserve the recognition and benefits that go with
    Federal Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) status?
        Answer. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers are, in many
    important respects, law enforcement officers, because they have the
    responsibility for enforcing laws, making arrests, and performing a
    critical enforcement and security mission. However, the position does
    not meet the current statutory definition for coverage under the
    special retirement provisions, which requires the primary duties to be
    either investigations of crimes or the apprehension and detention of
    criminals or individuals suspected of criminal activity.
        Question. The final personnel regulations greatly reduce the
    circumstances where collective bargaining will occur for CBP employees.
    Can you please tell the committee why the regulations prohibit
    collective bargaining over basic conditions of work, such as employees'
    rotation between different shifts or posts of duty, or scheduling of
    days off, including even post-implementation expedited bargaining? It
    appears the current procedures for bargaining over basic workplace
    matters such as scheduling have not hampered the agency's homeland
    security missions in any way.
        Answer. The successful assignment and deployment of the right
    employees and technology at precisely the right time is critical to the
    accomplishment of CBP's primary mission of preventing terrorists and
    implements of terror from entering the United States through and
    between our ports of entry. As a result, CBP must be able to assign and
    deploy employees, and to introduce the latest security technologies
    without delay. To assist in the facilitation of this requirement, the
    final DHS regulations provide CBP the flexibility to meet operational
    needs in these areas without subjecting such managerial decision to
    protracted negotiations and third party review by individuals or
    organizations who may not have a full understanding of the complexities
    of CBP's anti-terrorism mission and operational requirements.
        However, in order to balance these operational requirements with
    the interests of employees, the final regulations do provide an
    important mechanism for CBP to consult with employee representatives
    regarding the exercise of these flexibilities. Specifically, CBP will
    continue to inform labor organizations of its policies and procedures
    in these areas, to meet and discuss their views, concerns and
    recommendations with regard to the procedures by which these management
    flexibilities are exercised, and to attempt to reach agreement on such
    procedures where possible. Furthermore, where CBP institutes
    significant changes during the life of a collective bargaining
    agreement affecting the working conditions of employees, the final
    regulations provide for negotiations with labor organizations in those
    cases where the change is foreseeable, substantial and significant in
    terms of impact and duration on the whole or significant portion of the
    bargaining unit.
        This new framework for interacting with its labor organizations
    will better support and facilitate the accomplishment of CBP's critical
    national security mission, while providing a viable and streamlined
    avenue for the expression and consideration of employee interests and
    concerns.

                          BORDER PATROL--APPREHENSIONS

        Question. On average for the current fiscal year, how many illegal
    aliens is the Border Patrol apprehending each week? Of those, how many
    are considered to be criminal aliens or who require mandatory detention
    bedspace? Of the non-criminal/non-mandatory aliens, what is the average
    length of their stay in the United States in Border Patrol custody
    prior to be being removed/expelled?
        Answer. The Border Patrol has apprehended 457,900 illegal aliens to
    date in fiscal year 2005 thru March 11, 2005, approximately 19,908 per
    week.
        Of the total apprehensions to date in fiscal year 2005, 6,171 were
    determined to be criminal aliens (which equates to about 268 per week).
    The number of mandatory detention varies widely. Often the determining
    factor whether aliens are detained or released on their own
    recognizance depends on available bed space. The Border Patrol would
    like to detain all criminal aliens and non-Mexican apprehensions, but
    currently this is not feasible. The Border Patrol does not detain any
    aliens beyond 72 hours. Most detainees are turned over to Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement/Detention and Removal Office (ICE/DRO) before
    72 hours. ICE/DRO has advised us that aliens detained for Expedited
    Removal are routinely held for 30+ days. Criminal aliens and those
    required deportation hearings are held from 75-100 days.

                      BORDER PATROL--STATIONING OF AGENTS

        Question. On average, how long does it take to identify, hire,
    perform a background/suitability check and train a new Border Patrol
    agent prior to their being posted on the border?
        Answer. Advance recruitment for entry-level Border Patrol agents is
    done on a regular basis in order to have a nationwide standing
    inventory of eligible candidates who already have passed the written
    and oral exams, completed pre-appointment requirements (including
    background investigation, medical screenings, etc.), and are ready for
    final selection. It generally takes 6 to 8 months following tentative
    selection for a candidate to be added to the hiring queue for job
    placement. A candidate's position in the hiring queue is based on the
    written test score plus any applicable veterans preference points.
        When the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) identifies specific
    positions and locations to be filled, offers are extended to candidates
    in the hiring queue, their starting dates are established, and their
    training is scheduled. This process generally takes 2 to 4 weeks.
    Within a few days of their hire, the trainees are detailed to the
    Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico for 19 weeks of basic
    training. Upon completion of basic training, the agents are returned to
    their home duty stations as certified, credentialed and armed agents.
    Formal post-Academy training continues on the job through the remainder
    of the first year.
        Question. How many Border patrol agents are currently stationed on
    the Southwest and Northern Borders? How many agents were stationed on
    each border on September 11, 2001? Prior to 9/11, what was the average
    placement of BP agents per mile on the Southwest and Northern Borders?
    What are those numbers today?
        Answer. There are currently 10,525 Border patrol agents stationed
    on the Southern and Northern borders with 9,501 on the Southern border
    and 1,024 on the Northern border. There were 9,459 Border patrol agents
    on the border on September 11, 2001, with 9,124 on the Southern border
    and 335 on the Northern border.
        The number of agents on duty per mile varies widely based on risk
    assessments, traffic patterns, deployed technology in an area and
    staffing and personnel changes. For example, the evening and night
    shifts typically have a higher staffing level than the day shift since
    most illegal intrusion attempts occur during the hours of darkness. As
    a result of these variables there is no standard average for agents on
    the border at any given moment.

                                 BORDER PATROL

        Question. Please provide the cost assumptions CBP would use
    regarding hiring the first year (fiscal year 2006) authorized level in
    the Intelligence Reform Act (2,000) for Border Patrol agents as well as
    the fiscal year 2007 annualization of those positions.
        Answer. The Intelligence Reform Act presents an ambitious and
    aggressive goal of doubling the size of the Border Patrol Agent cadre
    over 5 years. For fiscal year 2006, the Act authorizes an increase of
    almost 20 percent to the number of Agents now on-board. There are
    practical limitations to the number of Agents that the Border Patrol
    can efficiently and effectively absorb in a year. These limitations are
    the result of the existing Border Patrol infrastructure (including
    training facilities, Border Patrol stations, support personnel,
    communication systems and vehicle and equipment repair and maintenance
    facilities) and the numbers of agents that can be brought on annually
    without undermining the organizational cohesiveness needed for a law
    enforcement organization like the Border Patrol. Significant
    investments in the Border Patrol infrastructure are required as a
    prerequisite to, or at least concomitant with, the increase in the
    Agent cadre authorized by the Act.
        Assuming that the Border Patrol infrastructure receives
    corresponding budgetary increases, a $697.33 million would be required
    for fiscal year 2006 and $447.41 million will be required in fiscal
    year 2007. This includes to costs to effectively hire, train, equip and
    train each new border patrol agent. In addition, it includes costs for
    support personnel, infrastructure, relocations, and the IT support
    necessary to support such an increase.

                            WAR ON DRUGS--HISTORICAL

        Question. During the 1980s, there was a major focus on the ``War on
    Drugs'' on the Southwest Border. Additional resources were provided to
    the Border Patrol and then-Customs Service to engage in this fight.
    Please provide the total number of Border Patrol agents and Customs
    Service personnel (per year 1980-1990) as well as the number of those
    personnel in each agency who were dedicated to the Southwest Border.
        Answer. Shown below is a chart reflecting the number of Border
    Patrol agents and the number of those agents assigned to the southwest
    border.

                              BORDER PATROL AGENTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Fiscal year ending                       Nationwide
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1980....................................................           2,329
    1981....................................................           2,240
    1982....................................................           2,227
    1983....................................................           2,339
    1984....................................................           2,333
    1985....................................................           3,023
    1986....................................................           3,238
    1987....................................................           3,180
    1988....................................................           4,074
    1989....................................................           3,857
    1990....................................................           3,778
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        CBP does not have access to personnel data for the 1980-1990
    timeframe because the former U.S. Customs Service converted to the
    United States Department of Agriculture's Personnel System in 1992.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye

                  IMMIGRATION OFFICERS IN LOCAL USCIS OFFICES

        Question. Being able to talk to knowledgeable immigration officers
    in local USCIS offices is an important customer service, especially for
    elderly or illiterate USCIS customers. Although InfoPass provides a
    free, easy and convenient alternative to waiting in line, InfoPass has
    caused confusion for a number of Hawaii customers who were turned away
    at the local USCIS office because they did not know how to use
    InfoPass. The InfoPass program assumes that all immigrants are
    literate, have access to a computer, and are able to type on a computer
    keyboard. How is USCIS addressing this problem to enable access for
    elderly or illiterate customers with limited computer access and
    limited ability to use the Internet?
        Answer. USCIS encourages customers who need information about
    citizenship and immigration benefits and services to begin with our
    website, or call the toll-free customer service number. That is because
    many times they can get the information or assistance they need without
    having to make a trip to one of our offices.
        InfoPass is designed to let customers who do need in-person service
    make an appointment to reduce the time they may otherwise have to wait
    to be served once they arrive. USCIS prioritizes customers with
    appointments to try to ensure that they do not have to wait for
    service.
        However, we recognize that not all customers have access to the
    Internet. We do continue to offer very basic services, such as forms
    and standard materials, to customers who do not have an appointment. If
    it is determined that a customer needs a service that we provide by
    appointment, we will look to see if one is available that day. If not,
    and the customer indicates they simply do not have the Internet access
    to be able to make an appointment, we will help them make their
    appointment for another day.

                                    LIFE ACT

        Question. I am aware that the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act
    (LIFE Act) was enacted into law in 2001 to reduce the separation of
    immediate family members of U.S. citizens who are waiting abroad for an
    immigrant visa. The CIS Service Centers were taking approximately 8-12
    months to process immediate relative (form I-130) visa petitions. The
    LIFE Act created a new K nonimmigrant category that allows a spouse or
    child of a U.S. citizen to enter as a nonimmigrant on a K-3/K-4 visa to
    reunite with her family, and then apply for lawful permanent residency
    while in the United States.
        A U.S. citizen can file a K (form I-129F) visa petition for a
    spouse or child with the National Benefits Center once he files an
    immediate relative (form I-130) visa petition and receives a notice of
    receipt from a Service Center. In most cases, the U.S. citizen
    petitioner files both the I-130 and I-129F, assuming that the I-129F
    will be processed faster, due to the USCIS' announced policy to
    implement the LIFE Act. However, petitioners are finding that the
    National Benefits Center is slow to adjudicate K visa petitions and is
    taking approximately 7 months. Currently, three of the four Service
    Centers are processing immediate relative (form I-130) visa petitions
    faster than the National Benefits Center is taking to process the I-
    129F visa petitions (California Service Center=60 days; Vermont Service
    Center=3 months; Texas Service Center=6 months).
        The slowness of K-3 processing suggests that the K-3 program is not
    working as it was intended, which is to expeditiously reunite U.S.
    citizens with their spouses and minor children. Furthermore, U.S.
    citizens submitting K visa petitions waste valuable time and money
    ($165 for each petition) when the program fails to provide them with
    the service and benefits that were intended by Congress. What steps are
    being taken to effectively implement the K visa program?
        Answer. USCIS recently made a processing decision that caused the
    situation that we are now facing with Immediate Relative visa petitions
    and the processing of spousal nonimmigrant visa petitions.
        In reviewing our relative visa petition process, USCIS decided that
    the Service Centers should focus their efforts on relative visa
    petitions submitted by U.S. Citizens. As a result of these efforts, the
    Service Centers have done an outstanding job and have decreased
    processing times for this type of relative visa petitions dramatically.
        At the same time, the National Benefits Center (NBC), which
    processes the K-3 visa petitions, has continued to process K-3
    nonimmigrant spousal cases as quickly as resources will allow. The NBC
    is currently in the process of acquiring more adjudicative staff to
    focus on this workload. In the short term, NBC will realign existing
    staff, including utilization of overtime funds, to reduce the pending
    workload and achieve currency.
        Lastly, it has come to the attention of USCIS that if an applicant
    has both an approved I-130 petition and an approved K-3 petition at the
    same time, some local State Department Consulate offices make the
    decision to give the I-130 petition more weight than the K-3 petition.
    This decision has an impact on the Affidavit of Support and Medical
    requirements the petitioner must meet before State will issue an
    immediate relative visa associated with the I-130. USCIS will work with
    the Department of State to review this situation and identify a remedy
    to ensure that both types of visa categories are processed effectively.

                          F2B PREFERENCE VISA PETITION

        Question. When a petitioner, who originally filed an F2B preference
    visa petition, becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen, his petition is
    automatically given F1 status. For those who file petitions for
    relatives in the Philippines, they are penalized by becoming citizens
    because their beneficiaries' waiting period is extended by several
    years.
        Section 6 of the Child Status Protection Act allows a petitioner to
    opt out of converting to F1 status. The bill was enacted into law
    several years ago, but those individuals who applied to opt out are
    still waiting for the Attorney General to implement Section 6. The
    National Visa Center has informed petitioners that there is no
    timeframe for when this review will be completed. Can you please
    comment as to when can we expect this issue to be resolved?
        Answer. USCIS is in the process of writing a regulation to codify
    the Act. We hope it will be published by this summer. In the interim,
    USCIS has issued a policy memo to provide guidance on adjudicating
    requests tendered pursuant to Section 6 of the CSPA.

                         1-800 CUSTOMER SERVICE NUMBERS

        Question. I have heard from number of comments by USCIS customers
    that when they dialed the 1-800 customer service numbers, they received
    misinformation that led to sometimes fatal errors in their immigration
    application, because the customer service person is reading a script
    but is otherwise inexperienced in immigration procedures. Please
    comment on this customer service problem.
        Answer. All contract customer service representatives must take a
    USCIS approved course, and pass a USCIS approved exam, before they can
    answer phone calls. The course and exam are designed to ensure that
    representatives have an understanding of the terms and language of
    immigration, and can find the appropriate materials to convey
    information or offer services to a caller, before they assist
    customers.
        USCIS' commitment to the accuracy and quality of the assistance we
    offer is reflected in the fact that we require contractors to monitor
    each representative randomly twice a day to measure their performance
    against a set of customer service standards. We also have an
    independent company monitor calls against those standards. USCIS also
    uses a secret shopper program to test and evaluate performance against
    a set of future benchmarks for where we want to be in terms of service
    provision, and each month conduct a random phone survey of callers to
    get feedback about their experience.
        However, as with any verbal interchange we recognize that customers
    may not recall in its entirety a precise explanation or conversation,
    may misunderstand an explanation, or that, for all our controls, a
    representative may not convey the correct or complete answer. We also
    understand that customers searching for information about citizenship
    and immigration benefits, which can lead to life changing events, and
    work to improve our process to ensure that we are giving them all the
    options and information. One of USCIS' goals is to give each customer
    more control over the process, and to give them broader direct access
    to the scripts and other materials which we have available. Thus, we
    plan to put all of the scripts that we use to answer customer questions
    on our website so that customers can do their own research, and can
    print the information to be able to review it rather than just hearing
    it explained to them. In fiscal year 2005, USCIS plans to release
    additional standardized fact sheets and brochures, again to give
    customers direct access and something they can take with them. We plan
    to make this information available on our website, and in addition will
    make them available at our local offices, by phone, and through
    community partners.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

                           PORTS OF ENTRY IN VERMONT

        Question. I understand there are a number of ports of entry in
    Vermont that will be overhauled in the next 5 years. What is the
    current schedule for construction at the each of the major ports in
    Vermont? What, if any, requests has DHS made to GSA for planning or
    construction projects in Vermont? Of all the border crossings
    nationwide, what is the typical length of highway before the actual
    border that is deemed part of the port? How far along the highway do
    the longest 5 extend into the United States?
        Answer. CBP has requested GSA to consider the Ports of Entry at
    Derby Line (I-91), Richford, and Norton, Vermont for construction in
    fiscal year 2007. In addition, CBP has requested GSA to begin design in
    fiscal year 2007 for Richford (Route 139) and Beebe Plain, Vermont with
    construction to follow in fiscal year 2009.
        In regards to the typical distance between the land ports of entry
    (LPOE) and the international boundary, there are several key factors
    carefully considered to ensure the safe passage of traffic and the
    trade while maintaining safety for CBP Officers and the public.
        Key factors used to determine the LPOE location relative to the
    international border are:
      --Line of Sight.--An adequate line of sight (direction, slope,
            elevation, and obstacles) must be maintained between
            operational functions at the LPOE. The distance between the
            LPOE and the international border should be minimized to ensure
            that activity in the area is effectively observable.
      --Alignment of Vehicles.--The alignment of passenger vehicles and
            commercial trucks preparing to enter through Radiation Portal
            Monitors (RPM) and License Plate Readers (LPR) on the way to
            the primary inspection booth is critical. The distance required
            for safe vehicular alignment leading up to the LPR/RPM is 40
            feet for passenger vehicles and 90 feet for commercial trucks.
      --Obstacles.--There should be no obstacles (buildings, vegetation)
            located between the LPOE and the international border that
            would impede the operational effectiveness of the port or
            degrade safety and security for the CBP Officers and traveling
            public.
        The vast majority of our LPOEs boundaries begin within 100 feet or
    less of the international border. We do have several locations where
    the distance is greater as a result of environmental wetlands or other
    considerations that precluded construction closer to the border. At one
    location in Minnesota we are planning to be approximately one-half mile
    from the border but will address security requirements through the use
    of video monitoring systems. It is standard CBP policy to maintain a
    clear line of sight between the operations within the LPOE and the
    international border to ensure that our officers monitor all traffic
    entering and departing the United States.

                           BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINTS

        Question. I have received many complaints and concerns from my
    constituents about the checkpoint that has been established on
    Interstate 91 in Vermont. One of my constituents, a naturalized citizen
    who lives in Vermont and works in New Hampshire, has been stopped
    repeatedly and questioned about his legal status. Other constituents
    have expressed concern that racial profiling is occurring at the
    checkpoint. (A) Is there anything you would be willing to do to prevent
    naturalized citizens from being stopped repeatedly at this checkpoint,
    such as offering a frequent traveler card? (B) What measures do your
    officers take to avoid racial profiling?
        Answer. Border Patrol traffic checkpoints are operated in
    accordance with the Constitution of the United States; governing
    judicial rulings; and the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section
    287(a) (8 U.S.C. Section 1357). The principal court case that affirmed
    Border Patrol authority to conduct traffic checkpoints was U.S. v.
    Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Additional case law references: U.S. v. Gordo-Marin, 497
    F.Supp. 432 (S.D Fla. 1980), and U.S. v. Maxwell, 565 F.2d 596 (9th
    Cir. 1977).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Border Patrol traffic checkpoints, such as the proposed permanent
    facility on Interstate 91, are a critical component of CBP's
    multilayered border security strategy. The Border Patrol maintains over
    50 such traffic checkpoints nationwide. Traffic checkpoints have been
    established to restrict the criminal elements' ability to use our
    highway system to further their entry into the United States. In
    addition, enforcement operations around the checkpoints target those
    attempting to avoid inspection by circumventing the checkpoints
    themselves, further enhancing homeland security. CBP has had
    discussions regarding the integration frequent traveler technology like
    NEXUS and PALS into the design of the permanent Interstate 91
    checkpoint to ensure that regular highway users are impacted to the
    minimum extent possible.
        The Border Patrol does not condone racial profiling, in fact during
    basic training Agents are instructed on how to perform their duties
    without profiling certain classes of people. Any and all allegations of
    racial profiling are taken seriously and are reported to the Office of
    Inspector General for investigation.

                         LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

        Question. In your testimony, you mention that the Law Enforcement
    Support Center's workload increased by 12 percent last year. A number
    of the employees who are making this increase in productivity possible
    are temporary employees who have worked for the LESC for up to 4 years,
    with the expectation they would have the opportunity to become
    permanent employees. What are your plans to convert these temporary
    employees to permanent positions?
        Answer. Law Enforcement Technicians (LETs) serving under term
    appointments have contributed significantly to the overall success of
    the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). ICE recognizes that the
    workload of the LESC is a permanent one and shares the view that the
    staff should be permanent as well. It has been the practice of the LESC
    to convert term appointments to career appointments as permanent
    vacancies become available. It has also been the practice of the LESC
    to regularly extend term appointments up to their maximum duration.
    However, LESC term LETs are serving under term appointments that have a
    maximum duration of 4 years under Federal personnel rules and cannot be
    further extended. The majority of LETs serving under term appointments
    will not reach their 4-year limit until the spring and summer of
    calendar year 2006. Only one will reach the 4-year limit in calendar
    year 2005. The remainder will not reach their 4-year limit until
    calendar year 2007. As term appointments approach their expiration
    dates, ICE will explore all available options consistent with Federal
    personnel rules, budgetary considerations and good management to retain
    these valuable employees.

                             DEBT MANAGEMENT CENTER

        Question. The ICE Debt Management Center is an integral part of the
    financial stability of the bureau. Responsible for collecting debts
    owed to the agency, the center is an important part of balancing the
    books at ICE. Has the bureau wide hiring freeze affected the ability of
    this debt management center and all other financial offices perform
    their duties? Have you considered providing some flexibility from the
    hiring freeze for offices with financial responsibilities? As these
    offices loose individuals from normal attrition, it seems ironic that
    the offices with responsibilities to correct the financial situation
        Answer. As with all of ICE Financial Management operations, the
    Debt Management Center is committed to fully addressing all of its
    financial management responsibilities in a timely manner. If approved
    by Congress, the ICE reprogramming proposal will provide additional
    support to the Debt Management Center (DMC), and the DMC, along with
    ICE's Office of Financial Management is closely monitoring ongoing
    operations to ensure that essential and critical financial management
    requirements are completed in a timely manner.
        The ICE OFM has gone through a re-engineering process, finalized in
    December 2004. The re-engineering format allows the OFM to address
    audit and financial statement activities (abnormal balances, suspense,
    cash reconciliation, trading partners, reconciliation of unliquidated
    obligations, and analysis) as well as specific financial transactional
    activities for our customer base (Debt Management Center, Dallas
    Finance Center, financial system support of FFMS and Travel services).

                           LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAMS

        Question. I have supported and helped to obtain funding for Legal
    Orientation Programs for immigration detainees, with the view that the
    immigration system works better for all parties when detained aliens
    are informed as to whether they have a legitimate legal case to stay in
    the United States. Congress appropriated $1 million for orientation
    proceedings in fiscal year 2003, but DHS has still not transferred that
    money to the Executive Office for Immigration Review so the proceedings
    can take place. Can you tell me when that money will be transferred,
    and why it has taken so long?
        Answer. ICE has provided $3 million to the Executive Office of
    Immigration Review (EOIR) for the Legal Orientation Program covering
    services in fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005. The funding was
    provided in increments of $1million at the following times:
        $1 million to EOIR in late July 2002 (fiscal year 2002).
        $1 million to EOIR in February 2004 (fiscal year 2004).
        $1 million to EOIR in February 2005 (fiscal year 2005).
        As indicated above, the first $1 million was issued very late in
    fiscal year 2002. EOIR used this fiscal year 2002 funding to award a
    contract for legal orientation program services that were provided
    throughout fiscal year 2003. EOIR continued to provide legal
    orientation services based on funding provided in February 2004, and
    currently provides legal orientation program services with an
    additional $1 million provided in February 2005. There have been no
    gaps in providing legal orientation program services because of lack of
    funding.

                  CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES FUNDING

        Question. The President's budget proposes a 50 percent cut in the
    amount of directly appropriated funds for the Bureau of Citizenship and
    Immigration Services (CIS), from $160 million to $80 million. Congress
    has already substantially cut the direct appropriations you receive. At
    the same time, the President has proposed a guest worker program that
    would significantly increase the CIS workload. (A) Why is the President
    proposing a 50 percent cut in an agency whose workload he wants to
    increase dramatically? (B) Are you at all concerned that a system of
    immigration services that is supported almost entirely by user fees--
    including the expansion of ``premium processing'' fees paid to ensure
    faster processing--will be unfair to immigrants of lesser means?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Budget includes $1.854 billion for
    USCIS ($80 million appropriated; $1.774 billion fees), an overall
    increase of $79 million, or 4 percent over the fiscal year 2005 level.
    The fiscal year 2006 Budget is the final year of the President's 5-year
    plan to achieve a 6-month cycle time standard for all immigration
    benefit applications, including a total of $100 million to support
    backlog elimination efforts as well as improvements in application
    processing. This would bring the 5-year total for this aggressive
    initiative to $560 million. Backlog elimination funds are reduced by a
    total of $80 million. $60 million associated with a one-time increase
    in the fiscal year 2005 USCIS budget, and $20 million for Digitization
    efforts appropriated by the Congress, but not specifically requested in
    the President's budget. The fiscal year 2006 Budget will allow USCIS to
    eliminate the backlog by the end of fiscal year 2006.
        USCIS is committed to meeting the President's backlog elimination
    goals. The key to processing temporary worker petitions quickly and
    efficiently is simplicity in the design. Establishing a program that
    involves a high degree of employer/government partnership, thorough
    background checks, and electronic registration and information sharing
    among participating Departments is critical. Based upon the legislation
    that Congress passes, USCIS will use fees to support applicant
    registration, processing and documentation.
        While Federal guidelines require full cost recovery of services
    provided, USCIS does have the ability to waive fees on a case-by-case
    basis. Any applicant or petitioner who has an ``inability to pay'' the
    fees may request a fee waiver. In determining ``inability to pay,''
    USCIS officers will consider all factors, circumstances, and evidence
    supplied by the applicant including age, disability, household income,
    and qualification within the past 180 days for a Federal means-tested
    benefit.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Cochran. We are going to continue to review the
    budget request for fiscal year 2006 for the Department of
    Homeland Security. Our next hearing will be on Wednesday, March
    9, in Room 124 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. At that
    time the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and
    Response, Mr. Michael Brown, and the Acting Director of the
    Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
    Preparedness, Mr. Matt Meyer, will be here to discuss the
    budget request for the programs under their jurisdictions.
        Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
        [Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., Wednesday, March 2, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
    the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 2005

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Gregg, Domenici, Craig, Allard, Byrd,
    Leahy, Kohl, Murray, and Feinstein.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY

                    OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

        Senator Gregg. I call the hearing to order.
        Senator Byrd is the ranking member on this committee, and
    obviously on the full committee, and he will be here a little
    later. And when he arrives we will accord him the opportunity
    of making an opening statement if he should so wish.
        We appreciate Secretary Chertoff coming here today. He's
    just assumed one of the priority responsibilities in our
    government relative to the safety of Americans. He's given up
    an extremely important position to take this position on, and
    it reflects well on him and I think on this administration as
    somebody who has caliber and is willing to do this type of a
    job, and we appreciate it.
        However, the agency he takes over has some very serious
    problems, and this morning before this hearing I was just
    writing down--and I didn't do this with any staff assistance--
    just off the top of my head, the problems that I've seen and
    been reported to me over my brief tenure as chairman of this
    committee, they include things like the border patrol, the fact
    that our borders are not effectively protected anymore, that
    they are not--we have virtually no security along our borders,
    that people are pouring over the borders illegally.
        It's gotten so bad that in Arizona citizen groups are now
    seeking to enforce the borders, which obviously is not good,
    that the border patrol training capabilities are not up to what
    the Congress asked them to be. We asked for 200 agents a year
    to be trained. Maybe they can do 400, 500, if they are
    fortunate. They cannot find people. They cannot hire them.

                                  IMMIGRATION

        In the area of immigration, this is an agency which has had
    a very long history of very significant management issues. Back
    when I chaired the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, and Justice
    before this Department was moved over to DHS; the Department
    had a lot of problems.
        Even under the prior administration, the problems were
    significant and they have continued in the area of management.
    I don't think any member of Congress receives complaints about
    any agency with more consistency than about the immigration
    issues that we get.

                                   IT ISSUES

        We have got the issues of IT. The inability of the
    fingerprint capability at the borders to communicate
    effectively and in real-time with the database of the FBI.
    IDENT is not integrated into IAFIS.
        We have the US VISIT program, which I have serious
    reservations about whether it is going where it is supposed to
    be going as a technology capability.

                                      TSA

        We have the TSA. It has become almost a weekly event now
    that there is some report that comes out about the TSA's
    failures in a variety of areas, from waste and fraud in the
    most recent IG report relative to the construction of its
    facilities for its headquarters to an internal investigation
    which I guess concluded that weapons and contraband were still
    going through the airports with regularity, which was totally
    unacceptable, to what I consider to be an inexcusable situation
    of a large amount of theft being reported from passengers in
    this country.
        The fact that an agency of the Federal Government would
    have thousands upon thousands of reported thefts occurring by
    Federal employees against American citizens makes us look like
    a third-world country. And it still goes on.
        Workman Compensation claims are outrageous. And I think
    anybody who goes through airport security has to ask
    themselves, at least occasionally when going through airport
    security, is this really having an effect on security or is
    this simply mindless when you see some of the actions taken by
    the TSA.

                                  INTELLIGENCE

        The intelligence issue, the agency has ceded intelligence
    over to other agencies when originally it was supposed to be
    the center of basically coordinating of intelligence. And now
    we see that the intelligence decisions are being made outside
    the agency by a conscious decision. And maybe it was the right
    decision, but essentially the IAIP has been raided the last 2
    years from its resources to do other things. And I view
    intelligence as probably the essence of whether or not we win
    this war.
        This is not a war about reacting to events. It is a war
    about getting to those events before they occur. And that
    involves intelligence.

                               PERSONNEL CONCERNS

        The personnel issues, the senior management turnover is
    extraordinary. The number of people in an acting position is
    unacceptable and the number of positions which are unfilled at
    senior management levels is unacceptable.

                    ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ALONG THE BORDER

        The electronic surveillance capability along the border is
    non-existent right now from all I can tell. There has been a
    total breakdown in the camera structures; and the unmanned
    vehicle program has basically been stopped, even though it was
    proving very successful.

                                 OTHER CONCERNS

        Contingent to the agency's responsibility is the issue of
    protecting us against a biological or chemical attack. And
    granted, the HHS has priority here, but the Department has a
    very significant role in making sure that HHS is successful.
    And it is very obvious that in the area of vaccines, Bioshield
    has not produced the results it should have produced, and that
    we have not created a robust vaccine capability in this country
    against very significant disease issues, specifically anthrax,
    botulism, plague, and small pox.
        Container ships, we all know we are not getting anywhere
    near the scrutiny on the container ships. If we look at the
    agency objectively, just on that list you have to say that were
    this agency admitted to an emergency room, it would be
    considered to be in extreme distress.
        The fact is we have not been attacked. And credit on that
    goes to the Department, and I give them credit for that. But
    the fact also is there are very serious, serious problems,
    especially on what I consider to be the three core elements of
    the Homeland Security portfolio, which is protecting us from
    weapons of mass destruction attack, protecting our borders, and
    making sure that they are under control, and making sure that
    we have adequate intelligence capability.
        So the problems exist now. You did not create them, Mr.
    Secretary. They did not come on your watch. You have just
    arrived. I congratulate you for setting up a Department-wide
    review of what is going on and trying to figure out how to
    correct it. But they exist and we have to get our arms around
    them.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

        The budget that has been sent up by this Administration
    presumes that the Congress will pass a significant increase on
    the fees of people who are flying. I do not think you are going
    to see this Congress accomplish that. Certainly, the chairman
    of the Commerce Committee here in the Senate has been more than
    vociferous in opposition to that proposal, and that is his
    authorizing committee, although this appropriating committee
    will play a role.
        But if you take that number out, the budget that was sent
    up is well over a billion dollars less than last year's budget
    to operate this Department. If you put that number in, and
    giving you the benefit of the doubt that we are going to raise
    the fees on travelers in this country by dramatic amounts, even
    though the stated amount is that the budget is up by 7 percent,
    our estimate is that the budget is up by about a $100 million.
        Now it may not be that money solves this problem. In fact,
    I do not think it does. I think a lot of this is an issue of
    management and structure. But we know, for example, in the area
    of border patrol that getting more bodies on the border is
    critical, and that is going to cost money. And there are other
    areas where we know money may make a difference, for example,
    backlogs.
        So I am not sure the budget that has been sent up is
    reflective of the urgency of the problem that this Department
    has relative to different functions that in my opinion are in
    distress.
        So I hate to start this hearing off with a dark cloud, but
    I think honesty is required, and these are not reports which I
    have manufactured. They are restatements of public information.
        So with that, again, I want to emphasize that I feel that
    we are extremely fortunate that you have been willing to take
    this job on. But I think you have been dealt a hand that is
    difficult to play, and I am looking forward to working with you
    to try to improve that hand. And that is the purpose of this
    committee, to constructively work with you to give you the
    resources you need to accomplish the improvements so that a
    year from now we do not have this long list of concerns. With
    that, we will listen to your thoughts.

                         STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF

        Secretary Chertoff. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And
    thank you for welcoming me to this first appearance for this
    subcommittee, which I am looking forward to working with as we
    go forward to improve our performance and make sure we are on
    the right track to, as you point out, protecting the American
    people, and protecting our infrastructure. And then if worse
    comes to worse, appropriately responding.
        If I may, I would like to ask that the subcommittee receive
    my full statement for the record.
        Senator Gregg. Of course.
        Secretary Chertoff. I am going to be very brief so that I
    can be available to answer questions. Let me try in just a
    couple of moments to give you at high altitude the approach
    that I think we are taking in this review we have got going,
    and also in terms of our moving forward with the Department.
        Quite obviously, in creating the Department, Congress
    wanted to do more than assemble 22 organizations in a tent. We
    wanted to create a single organization that could achieve
    outcomes that are important in terms of enhancing our national
    security. So one of the critical tasks I think I have as I
    begin my tenure at the Department is to see what we need to do
    in order to further the process of integration.
        I completely agree that means intelligence, which is the
    driving guide to what we do all across the board. And we need
    to make sure we are appropriately collecting and fusing the
    intelligence we have available within the Department, and then
    contributing that to the community at large and consuming what
    the community has, and operationalizing that.
        So we are looking to enhance our ability across the
    Department to combine our intelligence, combine our operations,
    and combine our policymaking. So we have a Department-wide
    approach to these things.
        Second, as part of the review we are undertaking, I really
    want to be focused on outcome, and to kind of boil the jargon
    away. The example I have given to people when I try to explain
    what I mean, if my car is not running and I take it into the
    shop, and the electrician and the guy who does the transmission
    and everybody else takes a whack at it, and I come in at the
    end of the day to pick the car up, and everybody says, wow, you
    know, we have each done our process exactly right, but the car
    does not run, I do not consider myself a satisfied customer.
        I am concerned about the outcome. I want a car that runs.
    And that is true here, too. We want a Department that produces
    the outcomes we care about, and we ought to focus on how we do
    that without regard to everybody's individual stove pipes. And
    then the alignment of the stove pipes and the alignment of the
    organizations and the operations has to be what fits with
    getting the outcomes.
        The third piece is, we do want to use this risk-management
    philosophy. I think you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in your
    statement, there are a lot of important things, but there are
    some things that are the highest priority. WMD is one example.
    And we have to be disciplined, since we are talking about a
    long-term issue with terrorism and threat, about identifying
    the priorities and figuring out how we go about optimally
    taking what are obviously finite resources and getting them to
    where they have to be. And so that risk management approach is
    going to be our guiding philosophy.
        We are not interested in the Department of Homeland
    Security as simply an opportunity for people to, you know, raid
    the pots of money. We are interested in making sure that we get
    the money and everything we do over our deployment and our
    operations in a risk management, focused manner.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        So with these kind of general observations, again, I am
    delighted to work with the subcommittee. I know it is a very
    challenging position, but I know there is a tremendous amount
    of support with the American public to getting this job done
    right. And that is what I am going to do my level best to do,
    and I look forward to answering questions.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank
    you for the opportunity to address you today, and for your ongoing
    support of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to keep
    America secure and free. I am honored and pleased to appear before the
    Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
    This is my first appearance before this Subcommittee, and I look
    forward to a productive exchange as the Department begins to reassess
    and readjust priorities and policies in accordance with the changing
    threat of terrorism over three and a half years after the September 11,
    2001 attacks.
        For more than 2 years now, the Department of Homeland Security has
    led a national effort to protect our country and our citizens from all
    manner of threats. It has been an honor to join the dedicated men and
    women who carry out this task daily. Ours is a difficult mission--to
    prevent another deadly and catastrophic terrorist attack such as the
    one we experienced on September 11, and if an attack occurs, to respond
    quickly and prevent further damage.
        The 180,000-plus people of the Department carry out this mission
    with unflinching resolve and a driving determination that such an
    attack should never occur on American soil again. Realizing that we can
    make no guarantees, we pursue our mission with a sense of urgency and
    daily diligence, so that this Nation can respond and recover quickly,
    should an incident or attack occur.
        Since its establishment just over 2 years ago, DHS has made great
    strides in its efforts to unify the defense of our homeland. We have
    continued to integrate 22 distinct agencies and bureaus, each with its
    own employees, mission and culture.
        But our security requires even greater coordination and effort
    throughout the Department, across all levels of government, and
    throughout our Nation to create synergy and new capabilities. It
    requires an unwillingness to accept complacency as part of anything we
    do; rather, we know we must apply all effort to tear down stove-pipes
    and coordinate key intelligence, policy, and operational issues across
    DHS and the government.

                              SECOND STAGE REVIEW

        I have therefore initiated a comprehensive review of the
    organization, operations and policies of the Department as a whole.
    This comprehensive review will examine what we are doing and what we
    need to do without regard to component structures and programmatic
    categories.
        We want to understand better what's working and what isn't. We will
    be evaluating every element of our working mission and making sure that
    the Department is best organized to meet the threats--both current and
    future--that face our Nation.
        Old categories, old jurisdictions, old turf will not define our
    objectives or the measure of our achievements because bureaucratic
    structures and categories exist to serve our mission, not to drive it.
        Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson has been charged with overseeing
    this process. The goal of the review is to help me make informed
    decisions as I lead the Department. Deputy Secretary Jackson has
    selected a team of Department officials to look at a number of critical
    cross-cutting issues and determine how departmental resources and
    programs can be most effectively applied to achieve our security goals.
    I have asked them to get back to me by Memorial Day with the bulk of
    their recommendations. I intend to study and act on their
    recommendations.
        What will the review cover? Take an issue such as maritime cargo
    security, which cuts across several departmental components. Customs
    and Border Protection, Coast Guard, Science and Technology, and
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection each address aspects
    of this overall mission. Each might perform its element well, but we
    must go further to ensure that each is performing seamlessly and in
    coordination with the others, that we eliminate any duplication of
    effort, and that we reap the full strength of our wide spectrum of
    capabilities.
        Of course, in executing the initial phase of putting the Department
    together and integrating the different components into a working
    structure, my predecessor and the men and women of Homeland Security
    did a tremendous job. They should be commended.
        Now, as we enter into the second phase of the Department's life, we
    must also take a fresh, creative look at the Department itself--
    including its organization, its operations, and its policies. We are
    not yet fully integrated and our entities are still not always
    coordinated with each other. Now the challenge is to take the advantage
    of 2 years' experience and evaluate the Department to see if there are
    potential structural and operational changes that will improve and
    enhance our capabilities to protect and safeguard this Nation.

                    CROSS-CUTTING FUNCTIONS AND INTEGRATION

        On the most basic level, we need to take a step back and focus on
    the fundamental question: Why was the Department of Homeland Security
    created? It was not created merely to bring together different agencies
    under a single tent. It was created to enable these agencies to secure
    the homeland through joint, coordinated action. Our challenge is to
    realize that goal to the greatest extent possible.
        Let me tell you about three areas where I plan to focus our efforts
    to achieve that goal. First, we need to operate under a common picture
    of the threats that we are facing. Second, we need to respond actively
    to these threats with the appropriate policies. Third, we need to
    execute our various component operations in a unified manner so that
    when we assess the intelligence and we have decided upon the proper
    policies, we can carry out our mission in a way that is coordinated
    across the board.
        My intent is to integrate each of these three areas--intelligence,
    policy, and operations--across the Department, so that each is directed
    from the most senior level of the Department.
        Let me turn to intelligence. Intelligence plays a pivotal role in
    mapping our mission. When the Department was created, 22 separate and
    distinct entities were woven together, a number of which had components
    focused on intelligence-gathering and analysis. One of my top
    priorities is to make sure that these various intelligence components
    function as a cohesive unit, and that our information and analysis is
    coordinated across the Department so that DHS, as a full member, can
    enhance its contribution to the Intelligence Community.
        First, we must organize and combine all intelligence within DHS. To
    do this effectively, we must ensure that our own intelligence
    components are interoperable. The Department has already made progress
    in this area. For example, the Homeland Security Operations Center was
    stood up to help the Department develop a common operating picture and
    facilitate information sharing.
        We must make sure that we are gathering all relevant information
    from the field, communicating with each other, and approaching analysis
    with a mission-oriented focus. We must ask, for example, whether those
    who evaluate the border from the Customs and Border Protection
    perspective are learning from analysts in the U.S. Coast Guard. They
    each look at border security, but from different vantage points. Only
    if they are working together can they fill in key gaps, paint a
    realistic picture, and evaluate all of the different pieces of
    information and intelligence that they are each gathering. We have to
    maximize the fact that all of these components now exist under the same
    umbrella.
        Second, we must make sure that information is being disseminated
    both up and down the ranks of the Department. Strong and effective
    coordination does not just mean that our analysts at DHS headquarters
    are working together. We need to fuse and exploit all the information
    that we learn across the country, so that when a Border Patrol agent in
    Texas learns of a new alien smuggling method, that information is fed
    up to our intelligence analysts, incorporated where appropriate into
    our strategy to combat smuggling, and disseminated across the
    Department to others focused on the same problem. We must build a
    culture in which the disparate pieces of information are being
    transmitted to our analysts so that they, who have the benefit of the
    fuller picture, can properly analyze all of our information and inform
    our decision-making.
        The converse must be true when our intelligence analysts learn of
    new vulnerabilities that terrorists are trying to exploit. That same
    agent in Texas needs to know, on a timely basis, of the threat and what
    he should be looking out for. We have a great many talented individuals
    at the Department. Some gather and analyze intelligence. Others learn
    critical information as they are in the field performing their jobs.
    The opportunities are endless. DHS needs to bring all of these nuggets
    of information together and disseminate them appropriately. We need to
    have the structure and the correct systems and technologies in place to
    take full advantage of them.
        Third, our focus must extend beyond the Department itself. We must
    review and make use of intelligence coming from the Intelligence
    Community and we must play an active role in providing intelligence
    information to the Intelligence Community. As the WMD Commission made
    clear in its report 2 weeks ago, sharing information across the Federal
    Government is critical if we are to succeed. To that end, I am
    committed to making sure that our law enforcement and intelligence
    partners across the Federal Government have appropriate access to the
    Department's information and analysis, to the maximum extent possible
    under the law, while protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties
    of Americans. By the same token, we must sit as full partners at the
    table with full access to others in the Intelligence Community. We must
    work in concert with the Intelligence Community. I will work closely
    with the Director of National Intelligence, whose job it will be to
    make sure that the Intelligence Community is well-coordinated and
    mission-focused.
        In addition, intelligence and information from other Federal
    agencies is critical to our efforts to secure the homeland. The
    development of the terrorism information sharing environment, as called
    for under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, will
    connect the resources (people, systems, databases, and information) of
    Federal, State, and local governments, and the private sector allowing
    users to share information and improve collaboration.
        Finally, we must inform and communicate with our State, local,
    tribal entities, and private sector partners. As I observed just last
    week during TOPOFF, when it comes to securing the Nation, we must
    ensure that these entities are well-equipped both to react to crisis
    and to prevent it. As part of this effort, we must improve our ability
    to operationalize intelligence. As information comes in, we need to
    make sure it is getting out to the right people and in a way that they
    can use to strengthen their efforts and contribute effectively to ours.
    Intelligence in a vacuum is meaningless. We need to explain how our
    outside partners can counter that threat and what we need them to do to
    watch out for it.
        Now, let me address policy development. Development and
    coordination of policy are major responsibilities of this Department.
    The Department has the central mission of securing the homeland, but
    there are many different aspects of that mission with numerous
    contributors. Large elements of DHS include traditional operational
    functions in which we deploy personnel, equipment, planes, ships and
    vehicles. But other elements principally involve planning and rule
    making, and networking with State, local, and tribal entities, and
    private parties. All of these must serve and promote our homeland
    security imperatives.
        Therefore, we need to further enhance our capability to think
    through broad and overarching issues like border security, emergency
    preparedness, transportation security, and cargo security, with a
    Department-wide perspective, rather than just through the lenses of one
    particular component. We need to develop our policies by first looking
    at our missions and asking the comprehensive, result-oriented
    questions, rather than by looking to one particular entity that has the
    lead in driving an issue to conclusion.
        Accordingly, I believe that we should pull together the vast
    expertise and the varying perspectives already at the Department as we
    work toward integrating our many crosscutting functions. For this
    reason, one of the areas that we are closely studying in the Second
    Stage Review is the advisability of creating a department-wide,
    substantial policy office. This office will also be a very important
    focal point for coordinating DHS's policy work with other Federal,
    State, local, and tribal entities.
        Finally, let me discuss operational coordination. Just as with
    intelligence and policy, we need to find new ways to increase our
    operational coordination. Diverse operational components were woven
    together when Congress stood up the Department, each with its own
    history and identity. As I have become acquainted with these various
    components, I have quickly learned that there is a great deal of talent
    within them. Each entity has its own unique focus, but often they
    address the same mission from differing perspectives. But we cannot
    function as a cohesive unit, unless each operational component works
    together in combination to promote common missions.
        This means that our operations must be driven by mission-oriented
    plans. It can no longer be the case that different components tackle
    different problems each in its own way and then later look to see if
    the pieces fit together. Whether it is preventing a potential act of
    terrorism, emergency preparedness, border protection, or countering a
    particular threat, we must first define the mission and second deploy
    all the tools within the Department to effectively execute each
    operation.
        The Department has already begun this process. To take but one
    example, on the Arizona border, we have a cross-cutting initiative to
    protect the border, integrating intelligence gathering, border
    enforcement, and monitoring. It encompasses the efforts of several of
    our agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement, Science and Technology, the Coast Guard, and
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Each plays an
    integral role. The operations themselves involve patrolling the border,
    generating information, and using it to take enforcement actions. The
    genius of the Department of Homeland Security is that we have the
    capability within one department to do all of these things. But we need
    to carry out joint operational activities and have a joint perspective
    on a routine basis, not only when we stand up a special project.
        Operations are also the mechanisms by which we respond to crisis.
    We cannot wait for a crisis, however, to learn, for example, whether
    TSA has the capability to communicate effectively and coordinate with
    FEMA. Nor can we learn in crisis that both are conducting the same
    operations or sending different messages to the private sector. The
    Department has made significant progress in this area. For example, it
    developed the National Response Plan to more effectively map out how to
    handle crisis situations. Now is the time to organize around missions
    rather than old bureaucracies, work through all of these potential
    disconnects in our systems, and operate as one unified Department. But
    integrating ourselves cohesively is not enough.

                              RISK-BASED APPROACH

        I have been saying, and you will continue to hear me say, that we
    need to adopt a riskbased approach in both our operations and our
    philosophy. America is dynamic. Our strength as Americans is the sum of
    every generation that has ever been born in or immigrated to this great
    land. Our wealth and livelihoods are advanced by the inspired ideas and
    innovation of our own people. We prosper through the vast opportunities
    that exist to interact with the global economic community.
        Risk management is fundamental to managing the threat, while
    retaining our quality of life and living in freedom. Risk management
    must guide our decision-making as we examine how we can best organize
    to prevent, respond and recover from an attack. We need to be realistic
    in our prioritization. We must assess the full spectrum of threats and
    vulnerabilities.
        We all live with a certain amount of risk. That means that we
    tolerate that something bad can happen; we adjust our lives based on
    probability; and we take reasonable precautions. So, too, we must
    manage risk at the homeland security level. That means developing plans
    and allocating resources in a way that balances security and freedom
    when calculating risks and implementing protections.
        The most effective way, I believe, to apply this risk-based
    approach is by using the trio of threat, vulnerability, and consequence
    as a general model for assessing risk and deciding on the protective
    measures we undertake.
        Here I inject a note of caution because the media and the public
    often focus principally on threats. Threats are important, but they
    should not be automatic instigators of action. A terrorist attack on
    the two-lane bridge down the street from my house is bad but has a
    relatively low consequence compared, to an attack on a major
    metropolitan multi-lane bridge. At the other end of the spectrum, even
    a remote threat to detonate a nuclear bomb is a high-level priority
    because of the catastrophic effect.
        Each threat must be weighed, therefore, along with consequence and
    vulnerabilities. As consequence increases, we respond according to the
    nature and credibility of the threat and any existing state of
    vulnerabilities. Our strategy is, in essence, to manage risk in terms
    of these three variables--threat, vulnerability, consequence. We seek
    to prioritize according to these variables . . . to fashion a series of
    preventive and protective steps that increase security at multiple
    levels. We must examine the mission and work of all elements of DHS
    through this template of consequence, vulnerability and threat. Have we
    fully defined our missions? How far have we gone in carrying them out?
    What more needs to be done?
        The Department is already working with State, local, and private
    sector partners to further refine the Interim National Preparedness
    Goal to aid the targeting of resources to where the risk is greatest.
    There is much that we are doing. DHS agencies, for example, have
    provided unprecedented level of funding and resources since 9/11 to
    State, local and private sector partners to protect and prepare
    America's communities and individual citizens. We continue to improve
    the ways for first responders across the Nation to be better equipped,
    better trained and more capable of communicating across the public
    safety community. But we must bring even greater focus and discipline
    to our preparedness mission. We need to take a very substantive look at
    how we align our preparedness activities and functions. We need to look
    at how best to configure our organizations, operations, programs and
    policies so that we can think strategically about preparedness.
        What should drive our intelligence, policies, operations, and
    preparedness plans and the way we are organized is the strategic matrix
    of threat, vulnerability and consequence. And so, we'll be looking at
    everything through that prism and adjusting structure, operations and
    policies to execute this strategy.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2005 ACCOMPLISHMENTS

        Before beginning to outline the major themes of the Department's
    fiscal year 2006 Budget request, I would like to highlight a few of the
    Department's accomplishments over the past year, including the
    following:
      --The Department established ``the One-Stop-Shop'' for first
            responder grants which allows a single point of entry to the
            Federal Government for homeland security preparedness
            resources.
      --DHS has provided unprecedented levels of funding and resources to
            State, local and private sector partners to protect and prepare
            America's communities and individual citizens. We continue to
            improve ways for first responders across the Nation to be
            better equipped, better trained and more capable of
            communicating across the public safety community.
      --U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) is on track to
            eliminate the backlog of immigration benefit applications by
            the end of fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2004, the agency
            increased productivity by 21 percent and successfully reduced
            the backlog to 1.3 million cases--down from a high of 3.8
            million cases in January 2004.
      --United States-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US
            VISIT) was successfully implemented at 115 U.S. international
            airports and 14 seaports and immediately demonstrated results
            by preventing individuals with criminal records and immigration
            violations from entering the United States. In addition, US
            VISIT successfully deployed initial capability to the 50
            busiest land border ports of entry in December 2004 and was
            also deployed at pre-clearance airports in Canada, Bermuda, the
            Caribbean and Guam.
      --The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) developed, reviewed, and approved 9,000
            domestic vessel security plans; 3,200 domestic facility plans;
            48 Area Maritime Security Plans and Committees; and verified
            security plan implementation on 8,100 foreign vessels.
      --USCG interdicted nearly 11,000 undocumented migrants attempting to
            enter the country illegally by sea, saved the lives of nearly
            5,500 mariners in distress and responded to more than 32,000
            calls for rescue assistance.
      --Counterdrug efforts remain a top priority for the Department. With
            the passage of the December 2004 Intelligence and Reform Bill,
            the Department's Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement is
            heavily invested in ensuring counterdrug operations and policy
            are synchronized across the Department, and that our components
            are adequately resourced to perform their counterdrug mission.
            In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs
            Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection collectively
            kept 489,870 pounds of cocaine from reaching the streets of our
            Nation.
      --In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom the USCG protected, safely
            secured, and escorted to sea over 200 military sealift
            departures at ten different major U.S. seaports, carrying over
            25 million square feet of indispensable cargo.
      --The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Homeland Security
            Information Network (HSIN) infrastructure to facilitate
            providing Secret level connectivity has been expanded to state
            level Emergency Operations Centers in all 50 States,
            territories, and the District of Columbia.
      --The Department's Information Sharing and Collaboration Office
            (ISCO) is responsible for producing immediate, near-term and
            long-term improved information sharing processes and systems.
            ISCO successfully partnered with DOJ to establish a first ever
            capability to share information between systems supporting law
            enforcement users across the country. The Homeland Security
            Information Network (HSIN), Regional Information Sharing System
            (RISS), Law Enforcement On-line (LEO), and Criminal Information
            Sharing Alliance Network (CISANet) now share information posted
            on each system with the users of the other systems with the
            result that over 7,000 documents are already posted and the
            numbers are growing every day. Users are able to access
            information on any of the four systems through a single sign-
            on, thus eliminating the need to access all four network
            simultaneously.
      --Working closely with importers, carriers, brokers, freight
            forwarders and others, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has
            developed the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
            TPAT) program, which has become the largest government/private
            partnership to arise from September 11.
      --In carrying out its agricultural mission, Customs and Border
            Protection (CBP) Agricultural Specialist conducted 3,559,403
            cargo inspections, 111,416,656 passenger inspections and made
            more than 400,000 interceptions of prohibited meat and animal
            by-products. During the same time period, CBP agricultural
            specialists intercepted more than 96,000 prohibited plant
            materials and found more than 64,000 agricultural pests.
      --The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided $4.9
            billion in aid, including hurricane relief efforts for victims
            and communities affected by disasters. FEMA, with its DHS
            counterparts, responded to 65 major disaster declarations and
            seven emergencies in fiscal year 2004.
      --Passenger screening by the Transportation Security Administration
            (TSA) kept 6,501,193 prohibited items from coming on board
            aircraft during fiscal year 2004.
      --In 2004, TSA screened approximately 600 million checked bags using
            advanced explosive detection technologies and over 31 million
            mail parcels using explosive detection canine teams.
      --Since establishment of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO)
            Program in February 2003, TSA has selected, trained, and armed
            thousands of volunteer flight crewmembers to defend the flight
            decks of commercial passenger and cargo aircraft against acts
            of criminal violence or air piracy. To date, hundreds of
            thousands of flights have been protected by one or more FFDOs
            serving in mission status.
      --A total of 428 million people, including 262 million aliens, were
            processed at land, air and sea ports of entry. Of that number
            643,000 aliens were deemed inadmissible under U.S. law.
      --Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers achieved a 112
            percent increase over the prior year for fugitive apprehensions
            resulting in more than 7,200 arrests. ICE removed more than
            150,000 aliens in 2004.
      --Border Patrol agents apprehended almost 1.2 million illegal aliens
            between our official ports of entry.
      --The Container Security Initiative (CSI), which involves pre-
            screening shipping containers to detect and interdict
            terrorists' weapons and other illegal material, was expanded to
            include 21 countries. CSI is now operational in 34 foreign
            ports in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
      --Approximately 600 million checked bags were screened using advanced
            explosive technologies in 2004.
      --More than 2,500 criminal investigations were conducted involving
            the illegal export of U.S. arms and strategic technology,
            including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
      --The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provided basic
            and advanced law enforcement training to more than 44,750
            students, representing 81 Federal agencies, as well as State,
            local and international law enforcement organizations.
      --Border and Transportation Security (BTS) assumed responsibility for
            visa policy under the Homeland Security Act and implemented
            improvements in visa review times and transparency.
      --The Department planned, designed, and implemented security for five
            events designated as National Security Special Events (State of
            Union Address, G-8 Economic Summit, Former President Ronald
            Reagan Funeral, Democratic National Convention and Republican
            National Convention) as well as the support, integration, and
            coordination of hundreds of national special events not meeting
            the National Security Special Events designation.
      --USSS arrested 30 individuals involved in global cyber organized
            crime, domestically and internationally. Industry experts
            estimate that $1 billion in total fraud loss was prevented.
      --The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has implemented
            initiatives in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
            explosive (CBRNE) countermeasures, cargo security, border and
            transportation security, interoperability, standards for
            emergency responders, and cyber security. These initiatives
            have resulted in improved security of U.S. borders,
            transportation systems and critical infrastructure, and
            resulted in the greater preparedness of our Nation. To date,
            Department officials have visited more than 200 chemical,
            petrochemical, water, energy, (i.e. electricity, oil, liquefied
            natural gas, pipelines, storage, etc.) agriculture, commercial
            assets, national icons, soft targets, and mass transportation
            centers.
      --The Department established the National Cyber Response Coordination
            Group (NCRCG) in partnership with the Department of Justice and
            the Department of Defense, as a forum of 13 principal agencies
            that coordinate intra-governmental and public/private
            preparedness operations to respond to and recover from
            largescale cyber attacks.
      --The Department co-sponsored Blue Cascades II and Purple Crescent
            II, two regional tabletop cyber exercises in Seattle, WA and
            New Orleans, LA. Each exercise brought together more than 200
            government and private sector officials to examine cyber
            security readiness and response procedures, highlight the
            importance of cyber security in critical infrastructure
            protection, and discuss solutions for integrating physical
            security and cyber security. Region-specific coordination and
            communication plans between first responders, the Federal
            Government, and critical infrastructure owners/operators were
            exercised.
      --The Department established the US-CERT Control Systems Center to
            bring together government, industry, and academia to reduce
            vulnerabilities, respond to threats, and foster public/private
            collaboration to improve the security of the data and process
            control systems that operate our Nation's critical
            infrastructures.
      --The Department established the Control Systems Security and Test
            Center (CSSTC) in conjunction with Idaho National Environmental
            and Engineering Laboratory, to provide an opportunity for
            government and industry to collaborate on cyber vulnerability
            enumeration and reduction activities for control systems
            currently in use across critical infrastructure sectors. The
            CSSTC models map the cause and effect relationships of cyber
            attacks on control systems, assess the outcomes of actual
            events in a simulated environment, and provide the US-CERT with
            response and mitigation actions to share with partners in the
            control systems community.
      --DHS and the Germany Ministry of the Interior jointly hosted a
            Multilateral Cyber Security Conference in Berlin, Germany. The
            conference brought together cyber security policymakers,
            managers from computer security incident response teams with
            national responsibility, and law enforcement representatives
            responsible for cyber crime from 15 countries. The conference
            program included a facilitated tabletop exercise and
            interactive discussions on how to develop an international
            framework--as well as near term actionable steps--for watch,
            warning, and incident response.
      --The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
            Directorate has developed and disseminated warning products
            (i.e. warning messages) to Federal, State, territorial, tribal,
            local, private sector, and international partners to protect
            citizens, governments, critical infrastructure, and key assets.
      --IAIP has produced more than 70 ``Common Vulnerability'' reports
            executed over 250 Site Assistance Visits, nearly 600 Buffer
            Zone Protection Plans, and is continuing to build the National
            Asset Database. As of today, more than 80,000 ``assets'' have
            been compiled.
      --Uninterrupted communications are critical for national security and
            emergency preparedness personnel in responding to a crisis. The
            National Communications System (NCS) issued an additional
            17,000 calling cards, further enabling priority wire line phone
            communications and an additional 8,000 cell phones for priority
            wireless communications. In past disasters and crises, these
            capabilities have proved crucial.
      --Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, IAIP is
            coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the
            protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of
            the United States and has distributed the Interim National
            Infrastructure Protection Plan (Interim NIPP) to other Federal
            departments and agencies, the State Homeland Security Advisors,
            and the private sector stakeholder groups (e.g., the Homeland
            Security Advisory Council, Sector Coordinating Council, ISAC
            Councils, National Infrastructure Advisory Council, the U.S.
            Chamber of Commerce, etc.) The Interim NIPP provides a risk
            management framework for integrating and coordinating the
            Nation's infrastructure protection activities that takes into
            account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to manage a
            broad range of risks across the Nation's 17 critical
            infrastructure sectors.
      --These important DHS activities were analyzed where appropriate for
            their impacts on personal privacy and civil liberties.

                        FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

        The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request revolves around
    five major themes: Revolutionizing the Borders; Strengthening Law
    Enforcement; Improving National Preparedness and Response; Leveraging
    Technology; and Creating a 21st Century Department.

                          REVOLUTIONIZING THE BORDERS

        September 11, 2001 demonstrated the sobering reality that the
    United States is no longer immune from catastrophic attack. No longer
    do vast oceans and friendly neighbors provide the buffer against
    aggressive adversaries. In order to maximize the security of our Nation
    against persons determined to undermine the economy of the United
    States, our way of life and the freedoms we enjoy, the Department is
    determined to deter, thwart, and remove any threat to the Nation long
    before it reaches our borders. During fiscal year 2005, we will
    continue to strengthen our border security. For fiscal year 2006, the
    President's Budget includes several initiatives aimed at
    revolutionizing the Borders.
        Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Detection Technology is an
    integral part of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that
    includes a comprehensive strategy to address the threat of nuclear and
    radiological terrorism. The Budget includes $125 million to purchase
    additional Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and pilot advanced next
    generation RPMs to detect both gamma and neutron radiation at our
    borders. In addition, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which
    focuses on pre-screening cargo before it reaches our shores, will have
    a preventative and deterrent effect on the use of global containerized
    shipping of WMD and other terrorist equipment. Egypt, Chile, India, the
    Philippines, Venezuela, the Bahamas and Honduras have been identified
    as expansion locations for this initiative in fiscal year 2006. An
    increase of $5.4 million over fiscal year 2005 is included in Customs
    and Border Protection (CBP) budget for CSI. The total amount in the
    President's Budget for CSI is $138.8 million.
        CBP's America's Shield Initiative (ASI) enhances electronic
    surveillance capabilities along the Northern and Southern land borders
    of the United States by improving the sensor and video surveillance
    equipment deployed to guard against the entry of illegal aliens,
    terrorists, WMDs and contraband into the United States. The Budget
    includes $51.1 million for ASI, an increase of $19.8 million. With
    additional technology investments, the President's Budget proposes to
    increase Border Patrol staffing over current levels to backfill staff
    vacated along the Southwest border, as well as increase staffing levels
    assigned to coastal areas. Since September 11, 2001, some Border Patrol
    agents were shifted to the Northern border in order to increase the
    number of agents assigned there. An increase of 210 positions and $36.9
    million is included in the Budget for the Border Patrol. This increases
    the number of Border Patrol Agents to 10,949.
        The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which
    began in November 2001, is another essential cargo security effort. C-
    TPAT focuses on partnerships along the entire supply chain, from the
    factory floor to foreign vendors to land borders and seaports. The
    President's Budget includes an increase of $8.2 million for this
    effort, bringing total funding for C-TPAT to $54.3 million. These funds
    will be used to enhance our ability to conduct additional supply chain
    security validations.
        In addition to enhancing secure trade programs, the President's
    Budget also seeks to support additional investments in CBP's National
    Targeting System. CBP Targeting Systems aid in identifying high-risk
    cargo and passengers. The Budget includes a total of $28.3 million for
    these system initiatives, of which $5.4 million is an increase over the
    fiscal year 2005 level. Further, US VISIT, which will be consolidated
    within the Screening Coordination Office, will increase from $340
    million to $390 million in the Budget. The increase will provide for
    the accelerated deployment of US VISIT at the land border and enhanced
    access for border personnel to immigration, criminal and terrorist
    information.
        The President's 2006 Budget includes $966 million for the
    Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) to help address the Coast Guard's
    declining readiness trends and to transform the Coast Guard with
    enhanced capabilities to meet current and future mandates through
    system-wide recapitalization and modernization of Coast Guard cutters,
    aircraft, and associated sub-systems. Among other things, the IDS
    request funds production of the third Maritime Security Cutter-Large
    and continues HH-65 helicopter re-engineering to eliminate safety and
    reliability issues in the Coast Guard's operational fleet of short
    range helicopters.
        Finally, within CBP, Long Range Radar technology is used by the
    Office of Air and Marine Operations to detect and intercept aircraft
    attempting to avoid detection while entering the U.S. CBP and the
    Department of Defense will assume responsibility for operating and
    maintaining these systems from the Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA) beginning in fiscal year 2006. CBP's share is $44.2 million in
    the Budget.

                         STRENGTHENING LAW ENFORCEMENT

        Law enforcement is a critical element in preventing terrorism
    across the Nation. Whether at the Federal, State, or local level, law
    enforcement agencies perform this vigilant task. As we know from
    unfortunate first hand experience, the known threats are creative,
    clever, and sophisticated. The Department's law enforcement agencies
    need to stay ahead of the threat. To achieve this, the Budget includes
    funding for numerous key initiatives to maintain and strengthen current
    law enforcement initiatives both within and beyond our borders.
        The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the Nation's leading
    maritime law enforcement agency. The President's Budget seeks
    additional investment in USCG assets to enhance its ability to carry
    out its mission. The President's budget provides $11 million to
    increase port presence and Liquefied Petroleum Natural Gas (LNG)
    transport security, funding additional Response Boat-Smalls and
    associated crews to increase presence for patrolling critical
    infrastructure, enforce security zones, and perform high interest
    vessel escorts in strategic ports throughout the Nation. This
    initiative also provides additional boat crews and screening personnel
    at key LNG hubs such as Baltimore, MD and Providence, RI to enhance LNG
    tanker and waterside security.
        In addition, in the President's Budget, the Armed Helicopter for
    Homeland Security Project increases by $17.4 million. These funds will
    provide equipment and aircraft modifications to establish armed
    helicopter capability at five USCG Air Stations. This will provide the
    USCG and DHS with the tools needed to respond quickly and forcefully to
    emergency maritime threats. A total of $19.9 million is included in the
    Budget for this project. Finally, the Response Boat-Medium Project
    increases by $10 million the effort to replace the USCG's 41-foot
    utility boats and other large non-standard boats with assets more
    capable of meeting all of the USCG's multi-mission operational
    requirements. A total of $22 million is proposed in the Budget for this
    effort.
        U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the largest
    investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
    responsible for identifying and shutting down vulnerabilities in the
    Nation's border, economic, transportation and infrastructure security.
    The President's Budget seeks a 13.5 percent budget increase for ICE,
    including increasing the Detention and Removal program by $176 million.
    For the Temporary Worker program, the Budget seeks to more than double
    the resources available for worksite enforcement including employer
    audits, investigations of possible violations and criminal case
    presentations. An increase of $18 million is proposed in the Budget for
    this effort. The President's Budget seeks a total of $688.9 million for
    ICE's Federal Air Marshal Service. This funding will allow ICE to
    protect air security and promote public confidence in our Nation's
    civil aviation system.
        The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes several other
    funding enhancements for law enforcement, including:
      --The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's (FLETC) budget
            increases by $2.7 million for Simulator Training Technology to
            teach officers and agents how to avoid collisions and reduce
            the dangers associated with pursuit driving.
      --Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO)/Crew Member Self-Defense (CMSD)
            Training is increased by $11 million in fiscal year 2006. This
            allows for the expansion of the semi-annual firearm re-
            qualification program for FFDO personnel and to fund the first
            full year of the CMSD training program. A total of $36.3
            million is included for FFDO/CMSD in the Budget.
      --Enhancing law enforcement training through co-location of the Coast
            Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement Training program with the
            Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, increasing maritime
            law enforcement training throughput and promoting better
            coordination among field activities with other Federal, State,
            and local agencies.

                  IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

        Though the primary mission is to protect the Nation from terrorism,
    the Department's responsibilities are diverse. No DHS effort has a
    greater scope, reach and impact upon the citizens across the United
    States than our efforts to prepare the Nation to respond to major acts
    of terror or natural disaster. This Budget continues to support the
    President's homeland security directives that establish the methods and
    means by which our Nation prepares for and responds to critical
    incidents. Since its establishment, the Department has, and continues
    to provide, an unprecedented level of financial support to the State,
    local, and tribal governments and to certain private sector entities.
    The Budget builds on these efforts and proposes significant resources
    to provide direct financial assistance to our Nation's first
    responders, emergency managers, and citizen volunteers. There are
    several initiatives in the Budget geared towards improving national
    preparedness and response.
        The fiscal year 2006 budget continues to support the Nation's first
    responders and seeks a total of $3.6 billion to support first-responder
    terrorism preparedness grants, administered by the Office of State and
    Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, with better targeting
    to high-threat areas facing the greatest risk and vulnerability. This
    funding will support State and local agencies as they equip, train,
    exercise, and assess preparedness for major emergencies, especially
    acts of terrorism. While there may be gaps in State and local
    capabilities, we believe special emphasis must be given to
    communications interoperability, catastrophic planning, WMD awareness,
    critical infrastructure protection, and cross-jurisdictional/regional
    cooperation and interaction.
        For fiscal year 2006, the President's Budget proposes $20 million
    for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) enhanced
    catastrophic disaster planning. This funding will support catastrophic
    incident response and recovery planning and exercises. FEMA will work
    with States and localities, as well as other Federal agencies to
    develop and implement plans that will improve the ability of Federal,
    State, or local governments to respond to and to recover from
    catastrophic disasters quickly and effectively. FEMA will address the
    unique challenges a catastrophic disaster situation poses, including
    food and shelter, transportation, decontamination and long term housing
    needs.
        On October 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security launched
    the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility designed to help State
    and local public safety practitioners improve communications
    interoperability. The Office of Interoperability and Compatibility
    (OIC), part of the Science & Technology directorate, oversees the wide
    range of public safety interoperability programs and efforts currently
    spread across Homeland Security. These programs address critical
    interoperability issues relating to public safety and emergency
    response, including communications, equipment, training, and other
    areas as needs are identified. The OIC allows the Department to expand
    its leadership role in interoperable communications that could be used
    by every first responder agency in the country. The OIC has currently
    identified three program areas: Communications, Equipment, and
    Training. With $20.5 million in fiscal year 2006, the OIC will plan and
    begin to establish the training and equipment programs, as well as
    continue existing communication interoperability efforts through the
    SAFECOM Program.
        The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget for the Department proposes
    other enhancements to improve our national preparedness and response,
    including:
      --Replacement of the USCG's High Frequency (HF) Communications
            System. Funded at $10 million in the Budget, this system will
            replace unserviceable, shore-side, high power high frequency
            transmitters, significantly improving longrange maritime safety
            and security communications.
      --The Budget increases Cyber Security to enhance the U.S. Computer
            Emergency Preparedness Team (US-CERT), a 24/7 cyber threat
            watch, warning, and response capability that would identify
            emerging threats and vulnerabilities and coordinate responses
            to major cyber security incidents. An increase of $5 million is
            proposed, bringing the program total to $73.3 million.
      --The Rescue 21 project is funded at $101 million in the Budget to
            continue recapitalizing the Coast Guard's coastal zone
            communications network. This funding will complete system
            infrastructure and network installations in 11 regions and
            begin development of regional designs for the remaining 14
            regions.

                             LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY

        Rapid advances in technological capability are allowing the
    Department personnel to protect the homeland more efficiently and
    effectively across many components. To prepare the Nation to counter
    any WMD threat--threats from CBRNE substances--this Budget includes an
    increase for new initiatives that support research and development to
    counter these weapons and their potentially devastating effects.
        First, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is being
    established as a joint national office to protect the Nation from
    radiological and nuclear threats. This office will consolidate
    functions within DHS and establish strong interagency linkages for the
    deployment of a national domestic nuclear detection architecture, the
    conduct of transformational research and development (R&D), and the
    establishment of protocols and training for the end users of equipment
    developed and deployed through the new office. The DNDO will integrate
    domestic nuclear detection efforts undertaken by individual Federal
    agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector and be
    closely linked with international nuclear detection efforts. A total of
    $227.3 million is requested for this effort in fiscal year 2006.
        Second, TSA's emerging checkpoint technology is enhanced by $43.7
    million in fiscal year 2006 to direct additional resources to improve
    checkpoint explosives screening. This request responds to the 9/11
    Commission Report's finding that investments in technology may be the
    most powerful way to improve screening effectiveness and priority
    should be given to explosive detection at airport checkpoints for
    higher risk passengers immediately. This new equipment assures that TSA
    is on the cutting edge, ahead of the development of increasingly well-
    disguised prohibited items. This proposed increase will result in
    investing more than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
    2006 for new technology to ensure improved screening of all higher risk
    passengers.
        In addition, to improve TSA's information technology network, the
    President's Budget includes $174 million to complete installation of
    High Speed Operational Connectivity (Hi-SOC) to passenger and baggage
    screening checkpoints to improve management of screening system
    performance. Within the Screening and Coordination Office, funding is
    sought for the Secure Flight and Crew Vetting programs--an increase of
    $49 million to field the system developed and tested in fiscal year
    2005. The funds will support testing information systems, connectivity
    to airlines and screen systems and daily operations. This also includes
    an increase of $3.3 million for crew vetting.
        Third, the President's Budget also proposes additional funding for
    two critical Department programs--the Homeland Secure Data Network
    (HSDN) and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). For fiscal
    year 2006, the Budget includes $37 million for HSDN. This funding will
    streamline and modernize the classified data capabilities in order to
    facilitate high quality and high value classified data communication
    and collaboration. Funding for the HSOC is increased by $26.3 million,
    bringing its fiscal year 2006 funded level to $61.1 million. This
    includes an increase of $13.4 million for the Homeland Security
    Information Network (HSIN) and an increase of $12.9 million to enhance
    HSOC systems and operations. The funding will provide the HSOC with
    critical tools for sharing both classified and unclassified information
    and situational awareness with Federal, State, local and tribal
    governments.
        Fourth, a key element of the Department's Maritime Security
    Strategy is to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), leveraging
    technology to improve sharing of accurate information, intelligence,
    and knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews and passengers, mitigating
    threats to the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United
    States. The fiscal year 2006 budget funds several key MDA initiatives,
    including $29.1 million for the nationwide Automatic Identification
    System (AIS) and $16.5 million to provide additional maritime patrol
    aircraft flight hours in support of detection, surveillance and
    tracking activities.
        Finally, the Department is seeking additional technology
    investments in other critical areas, such as:
      --$20 million for developing a Low Volatility Agent Warning. This
            system will serve as the basis for a warning and identification
            capability against a set of chemical agents whose vapor
            pressure is too low to be detected by conventional measures;
      --Increasing Counter-Man Portable Air Defense Systems funding by $49
            million to a total of $110 million in the Budget. This program
            will continue to promote the viability of technical
            countermeasures for commercial aircraft against the threat of
            shoulder-fired missiles by improving reliability and
            affordability.

                       CREATING A 21ST CENTURY DEPARTMENT

        The Department has made significant progress in strengthening the
    management of its business processes from inception to implementation.
    The Office of the Under Secretary for Management focuses its efforts on
    the oversight, integration and optimization of the Department's human
    capital, information technology, financial management, procurement and
    administrative operations. Over the past year, this office has made
    strides in designing, planning, and supporting new standards for
    business processes and resource allocation in order to achieve a
    cohesive organization while ensuring maximum return on investment. This
    organization is focused on establishing the overall framework,
    developing management methods, and monitoring the progress of each
    management function.
        Examples of major enterprise initiatives included in the Budget
    that contribute to Creating A 21st Century Department include the
    following:
      --The program for electronically managing enterprise resources for
            government effectiveness and efficiency--or eMerge2--to
            continue implementation of a DHS-wide solution that delivers
            accurate, relevant and timely resource management information
            to decision makers. The Budget includes $30 million for this
            program. By delivering access to critical information across
            all components, the Department will be able to better support
            its many front-line activities. It focuses on the areas of
            accounting and reporting, acquisition and grants management,
            cost and revenue performance management, asset management and
            budget that will be integrated with MAX HR.
      --MAX HR funding of $53 million involves designing and deploying a
            new human resources system. The $53 million is requested to
            support the development and deployment of the new HR personnel
            system as published in the Federal Register on February 1,
            2005. These funds will be used to fund the detailed system
            design for our labor relations and pay-for-performance
            programs, provide appropriate training and communication for
            our managers and employees and to provide proper program
            evaluation and oversight. In this effort, our goal is to create
            a 21st Century personnel system that is flexible and
            contemporary while preserving basic civil service principles
            and the merit system.
      --The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) program will affect
            the policy, procedures, technical, business processes,
            cultural, and organizational aspects of information sharing and
            collaboration, including coordinating ISC policy with other
            Federal agencies, drafting technical and operational needs
            statements, performing policy assessments, and analyzing new
            requirements. The total funding for fiscal year 2006 will be
            $16.482 million.
        These initiatives will help move the Department toward an efficient
    and effective shared services environment, avoiding duplication of
    effort across the program areas.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Two years ago, Congress and the President took on the enormous
    undertaking of creating a new Department whose central mission would be
    to secure the homeland. Under Secretary Ridge's leadership, the
    entities that now comprise the Department of Homeland Security unified
    under this overarching goal. As I have become acquainted with the many
    talented people of the Department, I am impressed by all that they have
    accomplished thus far. But there is no time to pat ourselves on the
    back.
        As the Department initiates our second stage review, organizes
    around missions, eliminates duplications, and adopts a risk-based
    approach, we must identify our crosscutting functions and ensure that
    we are thinking innovatively how to best exploit our intelligence
    capabilities, develop policy functions, execute our operational tasks,
    and implement our long-range preparedness planning.
        I thank the Congress for its support, which has been critical in
    bringing us to this point. I am grateful to be here today to talk about
    the work we are doing to make America a safer home for us, for our
    children and generations to come. Thank you for inviting me to appear
    before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.

                     NUMBER OF BORDER PATROL AGENTS NEEDED

        Senator Gregg. It is hard to know exactly where to begin,
    because there are a lot of issues here. But let me begin with
    some of the higher priority items as I see them. And I
    congratulate you on the risk management approach. I think
    threat is the issue to finding threat and then responding to
    it.
        Clearly, one of the priority issues from the standpoint of
    threat is who is coming into the country and where they are
    when they get here, and who they are when they come across.
    There have been a whole lot of amendments floated this week on
    expanding the number of border patrol agents. I actually asked
    the folks down at border patrol if they had an assessment as to
    how many agents they needed and where they needed them, and I
    was told that, no, they did not.
        I found that to be a startling fact, in the sense that I
    would have presumed that there has been a study done within the
    last 2 years as to where the agents are needed and to what
    numbers are needed. Obviously, there has been a significant
    movement of agents to the northern border.
        I guess my question is: How many border patrol agents do we
    need and where do we need them----
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, again----
        Senator Gregg [continuing]. In comparison to where we are
    today? Congress has, as you know, required an increase of
    agents by 2,000 each year for a 5-year period.
        Secretary Chertoff. I know that in the Intelligence Reform
    Act authorizations were put in place for 2,000, going forward.
    The President's 2006 budget looks for an increase of slightly
    more than 200.
        I can tell you, because I have sat with Border Patrol, that
    we do have a comprehensive picture of where we need to deploy
    our resources. We had an Arizona Border Control Initiative last
    year, which was successful. This year, I guess about a month
    ago, we rolled out a follow-up to that initiative, and in
    talking with Commissioner Bonner and the other leaders of the
    Border Patrol about how to do that, they took a very unified
    approach to figuring out where the sectors of the border where
    we are now seeing the greatest penetration.
        How do we deploy not only Border Patrol at the front line,
    but technology, and also a capability to transport people that
    we apprehend and bring them back in a way that does not pull
    people off the line in order to drive them several hours back
    to Tucson.
        How do we use checkpoints? How do we use investigative
    resources to target organizations? And also, frankly, how do we
    work with the Mexicans on their side of the border to see that
    they are doing things to attack these human trafficking
    organizations.
        So I do think that we have a comprehensive plan about
    dealing with the issue of deploying resources in a unified----

                        TRAINING OF BORDER PATROL AGENTS

        Senator Gregg. But is 2,000 the right number, a year? And
    can you train--how many people can you train--let us say we
    actually funded 2,000, which clearly we are not going to do,
    but we are going to significantly increase the funding. In
    fact, Senator Byrd has a proposal to do that, which I presume
    he is going to offer within the next day or so, and increase
    border patrol agents.

         STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY IN USE ON THE BORDERS AND DETENTION SPACE

        How many agents can you train? And two, what's the status
    of the unmanned vehicle program and did it work? And if it did
    work, why is the line basically being shut down? And three,
    what's the status of the electronic surveillance in the
    cameras? And four, how many detention beds do we need? We hear
    about a lot of people being sent home who are criminals and who
    should probably be detained permanently here to make sure they
    do not come back to commit further criminal acts? How short are
    we on the detention bed area?
        Secretary Chertoff. I might forget all this, so if I do, I
    mean to come back. I'll give you the answer. With respect to
    training, obviously, the President's budget talks about 210. We
    can certainly train and assimilate that. I do not know that
    this is the limiting number in training, but I would also be
    inclined to agree, I doubt we could train 2,000 even if one had
    2,000.
        Certainly, we can train and deploy the 210 that we have
    asked for on top of whatever we are replacing in terms of
    attrition.
        The UAV program, as I understand, did work well. We are
    currently working now to begin the process of procuring UAVs.
    We would like to get that done in a matter of months and start
    to put UAVs up and have them flying over the border.
        Now I don't think we can rely exclusively on UAVs. I think
    that sometimes you need manned vehicles and you need
    helicopters. But I think it was generally viewed as a positive
    program, and we are in the process of getting the RFIs and RFPs
    out in order to make sure that that gets done.
        As far as detention beds are concerned, again, the budget
    contemplates adding some additional beds. I do want, I guess,
    to address an issue which seems to come up a lot when we talk
    about releasing people. The fact of the matter is, we do not
    detain every single illegal person that we apprehend. And
    frankly, I have to say, as a graduate of the criminal justice
    system, neither does the criminal justice system.
        Most people who are arrested in States all over the country
    get released on bond. What everybody does, whether they are
    criminal justice people or people in the immigration areas, is
    prioritize. And I do think we are working very hard to make
    sure that the people who are mandatory detainees are being
    detained and that we have adequate beds to do that.

                            ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

        Senator Gregg. And the camera situation that allows
    electronic surveillance on the borders?
        Secretary Chertoff. I beg your pardon?
        Senator Gregg. The camera situation relative to electronic
    surveillance. I mean there was a contract let that appears did
    not work and now I guess they are trying again. What is the
    status on it?
        Secretary Chertoff. I gather, and I think this is under
    investigation, there was a contract let and there were some
    problems with the procurement process. This goes back a number
    of years. The procurement phase of that contract is over.
    Obviously, we are maintaining.
        My understanding is that as a general rule the surveillance
    stuff does work well. Obviously, we have maintenance issues. We
    are now going to begin the second stage of that, which is the
    America Shield Initiative, where we are sending out RFIs and
    RFPs to begin the process of acquiring technology.
        Obviously, we are going to learn something from the
    procurement problems in the last round that go back several
    years, but again, it is a very good technology. I mean the idea
    of using cameras and remote sensors does work. As long as we
    get, you know, the right contractor and the right equipment,
    and it is handled in a cost-effective manner, I think that is a
    very promising way to go about handling it.
        Senator Gregg. Well, maybe you could have your staff tell
    us whether or not--we know we had the wrong contract. We spent
    a lot of money.
        Secretary Chertoff. Right.
        Senator Gregg. We bought cameras that did not work.
    Supposedly, this has been corrected. We would like to get some
    specifics on that.
        Secretary Chertoff. We will get back to you on it.
        [The information follows:]

             Background on GSA Basic Purchasing Agreement With IMC

        The Remote Video Surveillance project was formed in 1998 to install
    camera systems mounted on poles or towers near the U.S. Border. These
    cameras would transmit video images back to a control room where a Law
    Enforcement Control Agent (LECA) could view the images and dispatch
    Border Patrol agents as necessary.
        The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Office of Information
    Resource Management (OIRM) managed the RVS program. From its beginning,
    the OIRM faced tremendous pressure to get RVS poles installed or face
    losing their funding. At first, the OIRM administered the RVS Project
    through a series of individual purchase orders with various
    contractors. OIRM would give bills of material (BOMB) to NTMI, a GSA
    FAST contractor, for the equipment needed for the installations. NTMI
    would procure the equipment and store it until needed for an
    installation. Chugash was the contractor used to install the poles,
    cameras and monitors. IMC was the contractor used to install the
    microwave transmission equipment.
        A competition was conducted in 1999 in order to increase
    accountability for the installations and to obtain volume discounts for
    the equipment involved. GSA considered four companies for this award:
    the three listed above and Hazmed, a contractor that has assisted OIRM
    in managing the purchase orders for the other three contractors and
    that had core competencies in the area of installing electronics
    systems. IMC was selected as the contractor in March 1999 and given an
    initial task valued at $2 Million.
        In November of 2000, in an effort to optimize procurement
    procedures, OIRM and GSA agreed to convert the GSA schedule award to a
    Blanket Purchasing Agreement (BPA). The rationale for the BPA was that
    it would ``further decrease costs, reduce paperwork, and save time by
    eliminating the need for repetitive individual purchases from the
    Schedule contract.'' \1\ The end result was to ``create a purchasing
    mechanism for the Government that works better and costs less.'' \2\
    The hope was that the reduction of costs would allow for funds to
    accelerate deployment of additional RVS systems.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Immigration and Naturalization Service Integrated
    Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) Equipment and Services Blanket
    Purchase Agreement (BPA) between GSA Federal Technology Service (FTS/
    FAST) Region 5 and the International Microwave Corporation Team,
    GS05KR01BMC0001, dated November 8, 2000, page 2 of 12.
        \2\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Installation of RVS sites was completed in three phases. The first
    phase involved administrative preparation (i.e., environmental
    assessments, rights of entry (ROE), real estate issues, permits, and
    survey activities). Phase I activities generally required between 16
    and 18 months to complete. However, there were often issues with access
    to the land desired for the surveillance site, or environmental
    assessments, which caused greater delays.
        The second phase of the installation involved groundbreaking
    activities such as installing foundations and poles, assembling and
    populating platforms, installing power, aligning equipment and radios,
    and installing equipment shelters. This phase took between 3 and 6
    months.
        The third and final phase lasted approximately 1 month. It involved
    installation of the cameras, transmission lines, consoles, other
    related electronics and the build out of control rooms. Finally, after
    completing build out of the control room and successful integration
    testing, the Border Patrol agents would begin using the RVS system. The
    timeframe for an average RVS installation varied between 20 and 25
    months. $239 Million was allocated to GSA for the RVS BPA.
    Approximately $220 Million was expended by the contractor during its
    term, which ended on September 30, 2004. At that time there were 248
    completed RVS sites. Since that time, six more sites have become
    operational for a total of 254 sites. The Border Patrol is working with
    GSA and the contractor to finalize the credits due back to the
    government for incomplete installations.
        Currently the Headquarters Office of Border Patrol's Integrated
    Project Team is seeking contractor support to complete the installation
    of 21 Phase III RVS sites partially installed by L-3 Communications
    Corporation. Government furnished equipment bought under the terms of
    the BPA will be used to complete the 21 sites. The Headquarters Office
    of Border Patrol projects these 21 sites will be completed by the end
    of calendar year 2005.

        Senator Gregg. I think I have certainly used up my time,
    although this clock does not seem to be working correctly.
        But in any event, Senator Byrd, did you want to make an
    opening statement or pursue questions? It is--obviously, the
    floor is yours.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, you and the
    179,000 employees in your Department are to be commended for
    your efforts to preserve our freedoms and secure our homeland.
    I applaud Chairman Judd Gregg for taking on the challenge of
    chairing this subcommittee.
        His predecessor, Senator Thad Cochran, did a superlative
    job as chairman. Under Chairman Cochran, this subcommittee
    worked on a bipartisan basis to provide the Department of
    Homeland Security with resources to fill critical gaps in our
    security. Of course, you should know, and I am sure you do
    know, Mr. Secretary, that Chairman Gregg brings excellent
    credentials to this task.
        As a former governor, he understands that simply setting a
    policy in Washington does not automatically make that policy a
    success. We have to work effectively with State and local
    governments and with the private sector to protect the
    homeland.
        Years before the tragic events of September 11, Chairman
    Gregg led the way by funding State and local antiterrorism
    programs. He authored provisions for training and equipping
    first responders for chemical and biological attacks.
        In fact, if you want to meet the father of the Office of
    Domestic Preparedness, the predecessor to your office of State
    and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, I am
    sitting right next to him, on my left, today.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our partnership on this
    subcommittee, and I thank you for taking on this assignment.
        I thank you, Mr. Secretary, also. As the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, you are responsible for a critical balancing
    act. We are a Nation that thrives on liberty, but 9/11 taught
    us that we also must invest in our security. I hope that you
    will work with the Congress to make sure as much as possible
    that your Department promotes our security without sacrificing
    our liberty.
        I wrote to you on March 2 to express my dismay that the
    President's budget fails to fund the border security
    investments authorized by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004 which he signed into law on December 17
    of last year.
        That Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new border patrol
    agents per year for 5 years, the hiring of an additional 800
    immigration investigators per year for 5 years to enforce our
    immigration laws, and the funding of 8,000 new detention beds
    for the holding of illegal aliens.

                                BUDGET AMENDMENT

        I urged you to work with the White House to propose a
    budget amendment seeking resources to increase security on our
    borders and to enforce our immigration laws. Despite the
    statements by Secretary of State Rice and former Homeland
    Security Deputy Secretary Loy that al Qaeda is a threat on our
    porous borders, there is virtually nothing in the President's
    budget to provide these additional resources for border
    security.
        According to Former Deputy DHS Secretary James M. Loy, when
    testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
    about threats to the United States, ``Current intelligence
    strongly suggest that al Qaeda has considered using the
    southwest border to infiltrate the United States.'' According
    to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ``we are all concerned
    about terrorists and how they might use our very long and
    porous borders. The terrorists are going to keep trying.
    They're going to keep trying on our southern border. They're
    going to keep trying on our northern border.''
        So, I could not help but be disappointed to read your
    response to my letter yesterday that no budget amendment would
    be forthcoming.
        The threat to our security is clear. The holes in our
    borders are well known. I look forward to hearing from you on
    this and other issues today. I thank you, and I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman. I thank all the Senators.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd, and thank you for
    your generous comments. Did you wish to proceed with questions
    at this time?
        Senator Byrd. Would you please have someone else go and
    then call on me at your leisure.
        Senator Gregg. All right.
        Well, then I think I would turn to Senator Feinstein, I
    believe, was the first member of your party here.
        Senator Byrd. Very Well.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

        Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to say, Judge Chertoff, that at least for this
    Senator you are so far a breath of fresh air, and I am
    delighted to say that. I just want to publicly thank you for
    your response of April 6 in the use of fraudulent passports,
    stolen or lost passports, which is a big problem.
        I know that from the intelligence committee. And your
    letter was no-nonsense, and it set forward very directly what
    the Department is prepared to do. I, for one, will certainly
    hold you to it.
        And I am very pleased that you share my concerns about the
    visa waiver program, and indicated, you know, that you share
    the findings of the critical reports that have been done, and
    that you have established a visa waiver program oversight unit.
    So I look forward to--my understanding is that you are probably
    going to come in asking for another extension on the visa
    waiver program.
        My vote, as you know, is conditioned on getting the
    management act together in that unit, which critical reports
    have said has been in disrepair for some time. So I just wanted
    to say that.

                                 BORDER PATROL

        I want to follow up on what the chairman said on the border
    patrol. The expansion of the border patrol is not really just
    the recommendation of the 9/11 committee. Those of us on the
    judiciary committee have recommended this for a long, long
    time, and specifically, the border reform and visa entry law
    recommended an enhanced border.
        As you know, 600 agents have retired this past year. So on
    a four-to-one basis, whether the 210 additional agents is
    actually going to provide you with a net gain or not, I think,
    is somewhat dubious, and I am really concerned about it. The
    position of the border patrol on 2,000 agents, going back 6
    years, has always been they do not need them, they do not have
    the room to train them. I mean this goes on year after year
    after year. The time has come to fish or cut bait. That is no
    longer, I think, a justifiable response.
        Bills have called for this. The President says he calls for
    it. Although, only 210 will not do it. I would like to get your
    real answer to this, because on the southwest border, other
    than Mexican intrusions have gone from 22,000 in 2002 to 88,000
    in 2004. This clearly indicates that the southwest border is
    being utilized as a point of major penetration into this
    country by other than Mexicans. If you look at the list of
    apprehensions made from countries that are terrorist States,
    there are numbers there as well.
        So I have a hard time, in view of the Minutemen coming on
    the Arizona border, the remonstratives made by this Congress
    over and over and over again as to why there cannot be a net
    large increase in border control. This is something I think we
    are willing to pay for. This is something that I think we would
    be willing to add. And yet, year after year it is the same kind
    of 200, which does not make even for retirements. Could you
    respond, please?

                                  VISA WAIVER

        Secretary Chertoff. Well, first let me begin by just, if I
    can, for a moment go back to your visa waiver point. I mean as
    I think you indicated, Senator, I share your concern. We have
    to look at the border as a whole and make sure we are
    addressing every possible point of entry. And I certainly
    intend to hold the Department to what I have indicated to in
    the letter we need to do to make sure----
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
        Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Our end is up. And I have
    spoken to our foreign partners and talked about the importance
    and I have spoken personally to them about the importance of
    making sure they have their house in order in terms of tracking
    and getting us information on this, and ultimately moving to a
    biometric passport that is resistant to the kind of alteration
    or counterfeiting, which is obviously a vulnerability.

                            SOUTHWEST BORDER CONTROL

        The southwest border, obviously, is a concern as well. As I
    understand it, what we are proposing to do in the budget is a
    net increase of 210 border patrol agents, which would fill
    those that are leaving and fund an additional 210.
        Senator Feinstein. So if I may, that means 810 new border
    agents?
        Secretary Chertoff. I do not----
        Senator Feinstein. Six hundred have retired.
        Secretary Chertoff. I think new. As I understand it, new
    means over and above what we currently have, the funding level
    we have. So that we will wind up at the end of the day with--
    and I cannot do the math in my head, but I guess there is
    approximately 10,800 currently. We would be adding about 200.
    That should include backfilling for positions that are becoming
    vacant. I mean that is keeping the funding level steady and
    then adding 210.
        So that is what we contemplate, in addition to which we
    want to be able to bear the UAVs. As I told Chairman Gregg, we
    want to acquire those and start to put those up. I think that
    was a successful pilot program, no pun intended. And we do want
    to do more with sensors, which, again, notwithstanding the
    contracting issues, apparently, several years ago, we think the
    idea of the sensors and the usefulness of sensors is proven. So
    we have an America Shield initiative and we are in the process
    of setting out RFIs in order to start acquiring that technology
    and deploying it.
        This is obviously an issue that we have to constantly look
    at. I am going to go down to the border at some point in the
    next month or two. I want to see for myself how we are doing
    down there, and what additional things we can do. We have
    redeployed agents down to the Arizona border to deal with the
    issue of a surge of people coming across.
        I totally agree with the principle that this is a paramount
    responsibility of ours, and I am going to be spending a lot of
    personal time focused on it.
        Senator Feinstein. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Craig.

                        STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY CRAIG

        Senator Craig. Mr. Secretary, like all of us, let me
    welcome you to the committee, and let me also speak, as others
    have, about our belief that you are the person who can get the
    job done.
        At the same time, let me not sound like a broken record,
    but let me repeat what has been said here by both our chairman,
    our ranking member, and certainly the Senator from California.
    I am going to focus on our southwestern border again.
        Because I have been a bit outspoken about immigration
    policy and changes in it, and I actually led the Senate in
    debate for the last 2 days on it, I have also been given a lot
    of attention by those who might criticize any form of policy
    change, but most importantly, it has led to a lot of
    conversations about border. And it has allowed me to focus more
    intently on border. Because I will tell you, if we cannot
    control our border, we will never be able to write immigration
    policy that works. We will always be playing catch-up to an
    ever increasing number of illegals in our country.
        The Senator from California and I have discussed this at
    length. Probably every one on this committee today has a
    slightly different opinion about how we handle the problem, but
    I think we are all in concert about how we handle the border.
        So my folks in Idaho say build a fence high and build it
    strong, and spare no cost. Now there are a variety of ways to
    build the fence, and you're exploring all of them, but there
    are also not just the physicalnesses of it and all of the tools
    that we are going to acquire and should acquire to control that
    border.
        There are other issues as to who is there and how they
    handle process and movement. We have got this interesting
    situation. Yuma, Arizona. A lot of folks live on the other side
    of the border, but work across in Yuma. They harvest lettuce.
    Your folks were out there a few weeks ago rounding them all up
    early in the morning to come back across the border, because
    many of them were undocumented illegals. But by 2 o'clock in
    the afternoon they were back in the fields harvesting the
    lettuce.
        The crisis of the harvest was over, but the reality was
    that a great deal of border movement occurred during that day.
    And in that movement, there could have been someone that meant
    to do this country harm, not just to pluck lettuce from the
    fields of Yuma, Arizona. And that is something we have to get
    under control, both sides of that issue.
        So let me give you a dialogue that I had with a young man
    who sought me out because of my position on this committee last
    year, a very frustrated member of the intelligence community.
    He and his group were prevented from apprehending suspects at
    the border because of strict guidelines and the chain of
    command, even though it was his group's responsibility to
    collect the intelligence.
        His group had gathered immediate intelligence regarding
    certain aspects and actions needed to take immediate action.
    However, because of the chain of command and the hamstringing
    that resulted, certain intelligence agents, this intelligence
    officer had to sit and watch while suspects possibly crossed
    the border.
        These were not Hispanics. These, by all appearances, were
    people of Arabic descent. They were believed to be terrorists.
    And yet the outcome still today is who is on first and who is
    second and who is in control. And in that fight, people are
    crossing our borders at an unprecedented rate.
        And while we can talk about the money we have spent, and I
    did on the floor yesterday, billions of dollars, with a ``B,''
    and we apprehended a 1,750,000 or 1.2 million last year, or
    something like that. Big numbers. It demonstrates one thing
    when we are apprehending them, that they got across.
        And I cannot imagine that when someone is illegal, by
    definition, and they are apprehended, that they are turned
    loose. At least take them to the border and shove them across.
    Do not say, ``Well, they will come back.'' They do not come
    back.
        All of us are going to be able to control this process, and
    I am going to keep pushing for changes in the law that are
    realistic and that work. But all of a sudden the Senator from
    California and I are engaged in conversation, and I say my
    proposal will affect 500,000 or 600,000 or 700,000, and she
    says, ``No, it will not. It is millions.''
        I do not know whether she is right or I am right. We may
    both be right in some ways. But we do know there is a huge
    problem. Enough said.
        I guess my question is: Go to the border. Look it over. Get
    to understand it. It is unique in a variety of ways. And
    lastly, I was in Houston, Texas, over the weekend. I was
    visiting with a former State judge, who said to me very
    directly, there is a clear understanding in Texas that the laws
    are not going to be enforced because they are unenforceable.
    And I am talking about border laws.

                                BORDER PROBLEMS

        Now if that is the name of the game along the border, we
    have got a huge problem that you must get your hands around and
    get it under control. I agree with the Senator from West
    Virginia. I am a co-sponsor of his amendment to pull money in
    this emergency supplemental to give you more. Either build the
    fence or we do something that causes that border crossing to
    stop. How do we do it?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, Senator, there are
    a number of things you raise, and I hope I keep them in mind so
    I can address them all. I think it is important, as you say, to
    look at this as a comprehensive issue, not an issue you can
    deal with in terms of individual slices of policy.

                            TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

        Clearly, one piece of this is the issue of what the
    President has advocated addressing through a temporary worker
    program, finding a way to bring some portion of the people who
    come across the border not to do us harm, but to work, to bring
    them within the system.
        Senator Craig. Very important.

                    STEPPED UP ENFORCEMENT ALONG THE BORDER

        Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. So that we have some
    control over them, and also we then reduce the pressure and we
    reduce the demand which gives the trafficking organizations the
    kind of resources they need to bring bad people across the
    border. Now that is one piece of a comprehensive package.
    Another piece has to be stepped up, enforcement along the
    border, including better deployment and more efficient
    deployment of border patrol, use of technology to give us a
    better span of control over who is coming across the border.
        Absolutely, the idea that there are laws that are tacitly
    not going to be enforced is dead wrong, and something certainly
    I do not endorse.
        When you talk about chain of command issues interfering
    with somebody apprehending persons coming across illegally, I
    have to say, I mean if there are bureaucratic obstacles to
    enforce in the law, I want to get rid of those. I have spoken
    to Border Patrol and to Commissioner Bonner about, in fact,
    breaking down the stove pipes that I think used to be. We used
    to have very regionally controlled, border sector controlled
    deployment of resources so that you had seams between the
    regions. Everybody took the view that, hey, I am going to worry
    about my region and that is all I am going to worry about.
        We have now moved away from that. Commissioner Bonner has
    put together a much more nimble program for deploying
    resources, which I think, again, is trying to break down those
    stove pipes. When I hear about these kinds of bureaucratic
    things, I do want to go out and see what the problem is and try
    to fix it.
        This problem has been around for a long time. When I was
    U.S. attorney back in the early Nineties we were talking about
    this. So I know it is not a new problem. I know there is a new
    urgency. And I think although there is a lot to discuss in
    terms of detail, I think there is a general view we have to
    take a comprehensive approach. And I really look forward to
    working with you and with everybody who is interested in this
    in putting together a comprehensive policy.
        Senator Craig. Thank you.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. Senator Murray.

                       STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

        Senator Murray. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. You
    have been handed a very, very difficult job, and I commend
    Senator Gregg for his opening statement and agree we need an
    honest assessment from you of what resources we need for all of
    these difficult challenges.

                                 PORT SECURITY

        I think everybody here shares the same goal of doing
    everything we can to make sure our country is secure and it is
    always difficult when we feel like we are not getting what we
    really need. We have heard a lot about border security. I
    obviously am concerned about the northern border. I know all
    200 of those, plus, are going to the southern border. We know
    that the northern border is a problem, but let me set that
    aside, because I want to focus on port security and cargo
    security, which you and I have had some time to talk about.
        I am very concerned. The Coast Guard commandant testified
    before us that it would take more than $7 billion to implement
    the Maritime Transportation Security Act. So far, Congress has
    provided a little over $500 million of that. I do not think any
    of that was requested by the Administration. That was Congress
    adding those dollars in.
        Now for the past 2 years, about a billion dollars in port
    security grants have come in to your agency, and the American
    Association of Ports Authorities say they need at least $400
    million to help secure port facilities this year.
        From our discussions I know port security is an important
    issue for you. You understand it is not only human life. It is
    economic disaster if we do not secure our ports. But it is
    disconcerting to me that the Administration does not ask for
    the dollars for these port security grants.
        Does the Agency just discount all the intelligence reports
    that tell us our ports are a significant risk, or what can we
    expect on this?
        Secretary Chertoff. No. I mean I do think ports are a very
    significant part of the infrastructure we have to work to
    protect. One thing I want to emphasize: You know, as we go
    through this process of reviewing the entire operation of the
    Department over the next couple of months, I try to look at the
    issue, whether it be ports or rail or aviation, in terms of an
    outcome or an approach.
        In other words, I don't want to know what each agency is
    doing. I want to know what we are doing in combination to deal
    with the issue of ports or rail or aviation, because that gives
    us our total sense of how good we are doing or how well we are
    doing in protecting ourselves.
        There are a number of dimensions to this. First of all,
    there is container security. We have begun a container security
    initiative, which pushes our screening and inspection process
    overseas. That is a very positive----
        Senator Murray. Well, I want to ask you about that
    separately in just a minute. What I want to ask you about first
    of all, is the port security--under the Maritime Transportation
    Security Act, our ports have to harden the ports, and they are
    just not getting the resources to do that.
        Secretary Chertoff. We want to make sure they get adequate
    resources, bearing in mind, again, with the philosophy of risk
    management, that we have to prioritize.
        Senator Murray. But the Administration is not requesting
    any money to do that, despite the fact that the commandant of
    the Coast Guard told us we needed $7 billion to do that.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do think we have money in
    various grant programs that are requested in the budget that
    are available to be used for purposes of strengthening ports.
    We have infrastructure, proposing an infrastructure protection
    program. We have State grants. We have urban assisted--UASI
    grants.
        We have a lot of different kinds of types of grants, but I
    also have to say I think that the issue of how we protect the
    ports has to be looked at comprehensively. Coast Guard plays a
    role in that. Private parties play a role in that, and have----
        Senator Murray. I understand that----
        Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Private obligations.
        Senator Murray [continuing]. But under the Maritime
    Security Act we directed all of these ports to give us a plan
    of how they were going to protect their ports, which they did.
    And they now have to implement it. They are not getting any
    money to do it. And we need a direct targeted program, the Port
    Security Grant program, to do that.
        So I want to work with you on that. I am just disappointed
    every time when the budget comes over with no money for that,
    because as you and I both know, a disaster at one of our ports
    is going to dramatically hurt not only human life, but the
    economy of this country, whether you are in a port city or not.

                                 CARGO SECURITY

        But the other part of that is cargo security. And as you
    know, I have been really pushing to get some kind of
    coordinated port security regime in place. Everyone out there
    is trying their best to move those ports out, to follow our
    cargo from where they are loaded, into our ports here, and
    there is no coordinated approach to that.
        In the committee report from last year, we directed the
    Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Security to help us
    develop a plan for that coordinated approach. It was due
    February 8. We still have not gotten that yet. And I just feel
    like--we need the Administration--I have talked with you about
    this. I have talked with Commissioner Bonner. I have talked
    with a number of folks about it. And all we get is, ``We're
    going to study this.'' I know that you and I agree this is an
    important issue.
        How can we help you come up with a coordinated approach to
    secure our ports, all the cargo that moves through them, and
    the people who work and live there?
        Secretary Chertoff. Of course, I am very sensitive to
    being--you know, not saying we are studying something. So let
    me be a little bit more concrete.
        Senator Murray. Thank you.
        Secretary Chertoff. We need to take the issue of cargo and
    container security to whatever is considered to be the next
    level of systems sophistication. There are people in the
    private world who are very, very good at tracking everything,
    from point of departure to point of arrival. And there are
    processes and technologies that allow us to do that. And that
    is the kind of system we ought to be looking to moving toward
    in our container security initiative.
        CSI is part way towards that. The principle of moving this
    overseas is a good step in that direction. We have been meeting
    with, for example, the private sector, and shipping companies,
    to talk about ways we might, with greater specificity, track
    cargo from the time that it departs the manufacturer to the
    time it gets to the point of arrival, working with the private
    sector to have them build a security envelope.
        And again, through the C-TPAT program, we have got that
    process as a precedent. We do use that kind of process, so that
    eventually what we can do is put as much of the cargo through a
    security envelope from point of departure to point of arrival
    as possible, track it, screen it, have private sector take a
    lot of responsibility within that envelope for maintaining
    security, use technology to make sure we are not getting
    penetrations, and then, again, you are always going to have
    some cargo that does not fit within that envelope.
        We are deploying technologies like VACAS radiation portal
    and our National Targeting Center to focus on that subset of
    cargo that really needs a much tougher regime of screening and
    inspection. So that, I think, this is the way forward. And I do
    think we are working with a lot of diligence and a lot of
    urgency to move into that next level.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        Senator Murray. Well, I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, it
    is a very complex problem. There are a lot of players in it,
    and what I think is most disconcerting to me is that we do not
    have a coordinated approach. Mr. Secretary, I hope we can get
    that report from you that was due February 8 so that we can
    really start moving forward to get that accomplished.
        [The statement follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Senator Patty Murray

        Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you, Senator Byrd, and the
    rest of our colleagues in welcoming Secretary Chertoff to the
    Committee.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with
    me prior to your confirmation. We had a good discussion about many of
    the issues we are going to talk about today.
        I know that you are still new to the job and understand that this
    budget request was formulated before you were nominated.
        I also understand that you have been handed a tough task in a very
    difficult time. But from our private conversations, I know that you are
    committed to keeping our country safe--and I look forward to working
    with you.
        That being said, I fear this Administration--through this budget
    request--is failing in this most important responsibility.
        Mr. Secretary, as you are well aware, the Department you now lead
    faces enormous challenges.
        Concerns that DHS is not meeting the Nation's security challenges
    are growing--in the Congress, and among the American public.
        Don't get me wrong, in fact, I believe Secretary Ridge and Admiral
    Loy did the best they could with the hand they were dealt.
        Merging so many complex entities into one organization was a
    monumental challenge. We all knew success wouldn't come overnight.
        But many of DHS' problems were created by this Administration
    because it didn't request adequate funding.
        Mr. Secretary, the Administration has many priorities--we all do.
        The bottom line is that current White House fiscal policy isn't
    consistent with providing the resources DHS needs to provide the level
    of security the American people deserve.
        To compound this problem, DHS has spent what funding has been
    available in a scattershot way. There appears to be very little rhyme
    or reason to how funding is allocated compared with actual threats.
        And, we are hearing about it on a daily basis.
        Just this morning, we're reading newspaper reports about financial
    mismanagement at TSA. I don't want to get into that now because I know
    you'll have an opportunity to respond this morning.
        But please know that it just makes it harder for us in Congress to
    help DHS succeed.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to work with you to ensure our budget will
    actually deliver the security we both seek for our country.
        But if we are going to work together, we need to be honest about
    what resources are necessary to do your job and let the Congress worry
    about budget priorities.
        For example, adding to what I believe is already an insufficient
    budget request, the Administration assumes user fees that we all
    recognize are not going to be approved.
        In fact--$2 billion of the $2.5 billion increase in the
    Administration's request would come from a 60 percent increase in
    airline passenger fees.
        Fees placed on the back of an industry that we all know is having
    significant financial difficulty.
        Mr. Secretary, these ``proposals''--if not accepted by the
    Committee--only make the funding problem worse.
        As I'm sure you are aware, the Senate has included $276 million for
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations bill.
        This is funding that we all agree your agency desperately needs. In
    fact, many of us have known about this issue for quite some time.
        Last year, I asked Commissioner Bonner and ICE Assistant Secretary
    Garcia about a news report highlighting a budget shortfall that would
    result in a hiring freeze at ICE.
        At that time, I was told the problem was an accounting error
    resulting from combining budgets from legacy agencies.
        Now it's clear that it was a real budget shortfall and the Senate
    was forced to include this as new money--designated as an emergency--to
    enable ICE to lift its hiring freeze.
        Curiously, this money was not part of the Administration's
    supplemental funding request.
        Mr. Secretary, the Senate's action speaks volumes about how much we
    want this agency to succeed, but we need the Administration's help.
        We need realistic annual budget proposals--not reprogramming
    requests and not emergency supplemental requests.
        Mr. Chairman, I don't say this to denigrate the performance of any
    of the hard working men and women who serve us so ably on the front
    line. Like Secretary Chertoff's predecessor, they are doing a
    tremendous job with the tools they are provided.
        But, this Committee--and the Congress--must do a better job of
    providing oversight to this agency because right now we are failing the
    American public.
        Mr. Secretary, I know that you, Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd and
    the rest of our colleagues care about these issues as much as I do.
        And, I don't want to dwell on this too much--but I think it is
    important context for the other specific issues that I'd like to
    discuss here today.
        I'm quite concerned that good intentions are not going to help us:
      --Establish a rigorous port and cargo security regime,
      --Protect our borders, or
      --Train our personnel correctly
        Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your testimony, working with you
    to address these issues, and ensuring our budget will actually deliver
    the security we both seek for our country.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.

        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Allard.

                       STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I also would like to join my colleagues and welcome
    Secretary Chertoff here this morning. I am also new to the
    committee here, Mr. Secretary, and I am looking forward to
    serving under the able chairmanship of Senator Gray.
        I wonder sometimes if maybe we are not looking too much to
    a Federal solution and perhaps should not think a little bit
    more about what the local law enforcement along the borders.
    That is the counties along the borders. It is the States along
    the borders.
        This is homeland security. Everybody is talking about more
    money for Customs and more agents and whatnot, but I happen to
    believe that those people down along the border that form the
    Minutemen organization have some real concerns. I think they
    are really concerned about their property. I think they are
    really concerned about the safety of their families.
        I do not know whether any thought has been in trying to do
    more to support our local law enforcement along the borders.
    They are local elected officials. They know about those things.
    They understand the problems of their community. I wonder if we
    should not do the same thing with the State. The governor is
    elected by that State.
        I wonder if we should not consider targeting those
    counties, share with them more of the technology that we have
    developed at the Federal level, and take citizen groups,
    incorporate them. Deputize them. Have the local sheriff
    deputize them or whatever, or have your National Guard or
    whatever, bringing some responsibility.
        I am not implying that they have not been responsible at
    this particular point in time, but at least bring them under
    some organized law enforcement thing that traditionally has
    relied on citizens. That is why we have deputization process.
    That is why we have the National Guard.
        I wonder how much thought you have given to that, because
    all I am hearing from this committee and all I am hearing so
    far in this discussion is a Federal solution. I think we will
    get a better bang for the buck. I mean they are worth a lower
    salary level. They have more of a commitment in that safety
    because they live there. I wonder if you would comment on that.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, we do work, actually, in the
    Arizona border control initiative, we are working. We have had
    a great working relationship with State and local law
    enforcement officials now.
        I guess depending on what community you are in, some law
    enforcement officials want to be involved and engaged in the
    process of enforcing the laws against illegal immigration. Some
    do not. I do not think we can make them do it.
        Clearly, though, we want to work cooperatively, because
    they are a force multiplier. And when we get well trained and
    we share information, and we get well-trained State and local
    enforcement officials, they are a welcome addition to the
    process of extending our ability to deal with the issue of
    illegal migration across the border.
        Senator Allard. Well, obviously, you have been in
    conversation with local elected officials. I just think we can
    do more. And I think I will be a voice on this committee, at
    least, for pushing you towards more of a local solution than
    something run out of Washington. I do not think we have all the
    answers necessarily here in Washington.

                           VISIT TO ONE OF THE PORTS

        The other thing that I would like to say in a positive way
    is there has been a few million years since we have had a
    coastline in the State of Colorado. So I made a personal
    concerted effort to visit one of our ports. I visited the port
    of Miami. And I will have to tell you, I was pretty impressed.
        And this is the very thing that you talked about in your
    previous testimony, I saw happening there. I saw technology
    developed at the Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico being used
    at that port. And I have to tell you that I feel much better
    about our port security.
        And I think sometimes we are looking at a 100 percent
    solution. I do not think the citizens of this country can
    afford a 100 percent solution. But I think we have to come up
    with some reasonable solutions that work. And I think what I
    saw there at the port, it was efficient, where they could
    handle a fair amount. I saw a lot of dedication there, and I
    was really pleased. I just have to tell you that.

                                AIRPORT SECURITY

        I think sometimes what we see happening in our airports, I
    wonder if maybe we have not gotten off track a little bit and
    expecting too much on security in airports. I think the most
    important thing we did and probably the most cost-effective
    thing is we put a door that was secure between the pilot and
    the passengers. But I do think that we need to take a hard look
    at what is happening at our airports to see if we cannot come
    up with some more common-sense solutions to what I see
    happening. So I think there are some good things happening
    there.

                         RUDENESS OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES

        On the other hand, I have also seen, as I have walked
    through Customs, and particularly in the State of Colorado, and
    I have been appalled at the rudeness of the employees there. I
    come from a State where I want to welcome people to my State as
    tourists. And I have been sort of appalled at some of the
    rudeness that I saw at Customs.
        So hopefully we can kind of improve our bedside manner a
    little bit. Remember that we have visitors coming to our
    country. We have visitors coming to our States.
        Secretary Chertoff. And they are not all criminals.
        Senator Allard. And if that--yes. And they are not all
    criminals. If the Federal employee does not treat them
    respectfully and with a welcome attitude, it hurts our tourism
    in our State. So I just want to call that to your attention.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.

                           STATUS QUO BUDGET REQUEST

        Senator Byrd. In fiscal year 2004, Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE) removed a record 150,000 illegal aliens from
    this country. However, we know that more than 10 million
    illegal aliens reside in this country. Two and a half million
    illegal aliens have overstayed their tourist or work visas.
    There are over 370,000 illegal aliens who have knowingly
    disobeyed orders to leave the country.
        ICE teams, Immigration and Customs Enforcement teams,
    deported 11,000 of them in 2004, but more than 35,000 others
    were added to the list. The system is not working, and this
    budget request does almost nothing to fix it.
        I have a border security amendment pending to the Iraq war
    supplemental, which is currently being debated on the floor of
    the Senate. My amendment is offset, responds to known security
    shortfalls on our borders, and responds to the concerns of many
    Americans, including the self-styled Minutemen who are
    performing a major community watch effort on the Arizona
    border.
        While there are, indeed, slight increases proposed for next
    year, the fact remains that both the Border Patrol and
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement are experiencing
    significant attrition this year. According to your agencies,
    137 Border Patrol agents have left the service since the
    beginning of the fiscal year. By the end of January, ICE had
    experienced a net loss of 299 positions.
        On average, you are filling 2,000 fewer detention beds a
    week than the level for which the Congress provided funds. The
    proposed increases for next year merely backfill the losses you
    are experiencing this year. In short, this is a status quo
    budget request.
        The crisis we are experiencing today on our borders
    deserves more than a status quo budget. Why should we be
    satisfied with a status quo budget, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, Senator, first of all, my
    understanding, again, of what we are proposing to do is that we
    are going to--when we talk about increases, we are talking
    about net increases. In other words, we are going to fund over
    200 additional Border Patrol Agents, 140 additional ICE
    investigators, almost 2,000 additional beds over and above the
    current level.
        Obviously, when people leave, we always backfill those
    positions, so that I think you have to add those numbers
    together. And we are talking about funding that would get us a
    net up-kick in all those categories.
        In fact, in terms of 2005, we have submitted a
    reprogramming to get more money to ICE so that even this year
    we can begin the process of starting to do some hiring to move
    them to the level they need to be.
        There is no question there is a serious issue, this whole
    issue of managing illegal immigration. What we have to do is
    use a comprehensive approach. We have to be able to have more
    people at the border, better technology at the border, all of
    which we are now pushing forward. Better investigative
    capability. Better and more available use of detention beds.
    And we are doing some additional things as well to free up
    beds.

                       REPATRIATION PROGRAM WITH MEXICANS

        For example, we are working with the Mexicans to begin the
    internal repatriation program in the next couple of weeks,
    whereby we transport Mexicans who come in back to interior
    locations so that they do not simply go back across the border,
    connect up with the same trafficking organizations, and then
    come back a couple of days later.

                               EXPEDITED REMOVAL

        We are using other kinds of techniques in terms of
    expedited removal to try to expedite the process of getting
    people that we do apprehend, moving them, again, across the
    border back to Mexico.

          ABSCONDERS AND VIOLATORS OF RELEASE ORDERS AND RETURN ORDERS

        We are now targeting for the first time enforcement of
    people who are absconders or who are violating release orders
    and return orders to make sure we are apprehending them, and we
    are, again, getting them and sending them back across the
    border. And we have to also be vigorous in enforcing the laws
    against people who are removed and then in violation of the law
    come back across the border again. We have not always succeeded
    in getting the kinds of sentences we need from judges in
    keeping those people who are violators, repeat violators in
    prison.
        So we are very concerned about it. We are taking steps to
    move forward on this. I am going to look at this issue. As I
    said previously to Senator Feinstein, I am going to go down to
    the border, I think, within the next 2 months and talk myself
    personally to the local people and our Border Patrol folks down
    there to keep moving forward on this issue.

                      SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO BUDGET

        Senator Byrd. Well, are you satisfied with the status quo
    budget?
        Secretary Chertoff. I am not satisfied with the status quo.
    We need to move forward. We need to be better about keeping our
    borders policed. We need to be better about tracking
    absconders. We need to be better about getting people removed
    efficiently. And I think as we look at the whole issue
    comprehensively, there are a lot of things we can do to get a
    better outcome.
        Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you did not answer my
    question.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think what I----
        Senator Byrd. Are you satisfied with the status quo budget?
        Secretary Chertoff. I think what I am saying, Senator, is I
    think our budget is not a status quo budget. I think it looks
    to net increases, and, therefore, I will tell you, I would not
    be satisfied with a status quo budget or a status quo
    situation.
        Senator Byrd. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would look forward
    to your comprehensive approach. My amendment will provide you
    with real resources to implement your comprehensive approach.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Domenici.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

        Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Byrd, I will follow up on your questions and give
    my own observation after first saying thank you for the job you
    are doing. I look forward to visiting the border with you and
    some of the facilities that we have in our State, such as the
    DOE laboratories, to make sure you understand the competence in
    other departments of the government to help you do your work.
        Senator Byrd, I would say I laud your concern about doing
    more than we are doing, which is an answer to a status quo. We
    cannot stand the status quo. I do not know about a status quo
    budget. But we also cannot stand a status quo with reference to
    our current laws on migration and immigration.
        I mean they are adding to the problem, because it is a mix-
    up and a mumble-jumble of things and agents do not know what
    they are supposed to do. I mean when we catch illegal aliens on
    this side and send them home, what are agents supposed to do
    when they come right back? I mean we did then look at it and
    say they are not doing their job.
        Senator Byrd. I am with you.
        Senator Domenici. It is embarrassing to see that we do not
    have a bill yet on the floor of the Senate on immigration. This
    is not a way to deal with immigration on a supplemental
    appropriation bill. I think you would agree with me. We need to
    debate this issue thoroughly, and it makes them do their job
    better and adds to the propriety of the United States.
        Senator Byrd. I have been singing that song for many years
    now.
        Senator Domenici. It is time. I am telling you, many of us
    agree with you, finally.
        Senator Byrd. Thank you.

           OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Senator Domenci. Now having said that, first, let me say to
    you, people wondered when you got this job what somebody with
    your background was doing. I was at your side all the way,
    because I know what you are capable of doing. I want to laud
    you so far with the job you are doing. I want to give you a
    couple of my observations.
        First of all, you inherited a Department that was put
    together hurriedly. It is consequently a very hodgepodge
    Department. The sooner you yourself find out what was done that
    is not done right, what was done that might even be wrong, you
    ought to be the one finding out about those problems and fixing
    them, because they are going to be determined sooner or later.
    There are many of them up and down the chain of command of your
    Department, and you know that. I do not know how soon you can
    fix them, but I urge that you do so.
        My second observation is: Since we put the Department
    together this way, there is a multiplicity of activities that
    are, even though we thought we are putting them all together,
    that they are not all together, because there are many other
    facilities that do work of the type you need.
        I really urge that even though you have set up in the
    statute a function and thus a piece of your Department, that
    you resist your Department creating a total group of experts in
    every one of those niches. Because many of those experts
    already exist in the government, and you ought to use them. You
    are using them. I think you should just make that a policy.
        Somebody said, this distinguished Senator from Colorado,
    who shames me, he has been to see Miami, and I have not been to
    the border in 6 months, which is my own State. He has been way
    over there in the port of Miami. I ought to go see what is
    happening on my border.
        The problem is that in enforcing our laws, there exists
    terrific capacity in our national laboratories, in our Defense
    Department, and those who are studying unmanned aerial
    vehicles. You do not have to begin every program within your
    Department. Do I make sense?
        Secretary Chertoff. Yes. Absolutely, Senator. I mean I
    really do not want to rediscover the wheel, particularly if we
    have the wheel discovered elsewhere in the Federal Government
    or the State government, and the private sector. I mean we do
    not have the time to do everything ourselves.
        One of the observations I had when I came into the
    Department, two observations. One is completely consistent with
    your advice, that we really need to comprehensively review what
    we are doing. I give a lot of credit to Governor Ridge, and
    Admiral Loy and everybody who stood up in the Department, which
    was an enormous challenge. They did a lot in 2 years. It took
    the Defense Department decades to get to where it is now. And
    we do not have that time. So we should be willing to examine
    where we can adjust and make those adjustments.
        With your second point, Senator, a lot of what we bring to
    the table is a network. Nowadays in business, people talk about
    networking. We do not have to own or employ everybody in
    Homeland Security. We do not and we cannot. What we have to do
    is network with what is out there in our other Federal
    agencies, State and local partners, and figure out a way to
    make everybody work together and to coordinate those things.
        So even in my brief 2 months at the Department I have been
    very clear about saying that we ought to pay as much attention,
    if not more, to that networking function as we do to the actual
    physical assets that we own and the people that we have in our
    Department.

                              IMPACT OF NETWORKING

        Senator Domenici. Well, my time is running out. I am going
    to make one last observation. I will put it two in one.
        First, it seems to me, without question, that what you are
    doing out there in terms of networking is already having a big
    impact. I am not one who continues to carp on the fact that we
    do not have good homeland security, because I contend that
    nothing has happened since 9/11. And that is not an accident.
        I think we are doing a much better job at making it hard
    for terrorists than we give ourselves credit for. Now I do not
    need you to answer that, but if you can, you should. I mean
    everybody is just saying we are not doing anything, but why are
    the terrorists doing nothing? They keep saying they want to get
    America. They have not done anything yet. Thank God. Maybe
    tomorrow they will do it, and Domenici will be crazy. But that
    is one observation.
        And the second one is that it seems to be obvious that even
    though we want to address risks, we nonetheless want money to
    go to the States. And the new bill will do what you suggest,
    and put more money in risks and less in pork projects,
    allegedly. But I submit that this does not mean that all the
    heavily populated States are the harbors of all the risks.
        I mean in my State you have two national laboratories
    filled with nuclear activity, the center of nuclear weaponry.
    That is all I will say. You know what that means. Now you
    cannot expect New Mexico with .005 tenths of a percent of the
    money to assume the risk of the extraordinary activities.
        I would hope that if we give you a law that does what I
    have just said, that you have somebody looking at West Virginia
    and New Hampshire and New Mexico to say what else is there that
    is essential to our country and dangerous. I do not mean a
    football field. That is what people are saying. Every gym and
    football field, because people will assemble, ought to be
    protected. I do not know about that. You decide that.
        But I do know the place where nuclear weapons of the United
    States are in abundance shall not say, ``Well, that's old New
    Mexico. It's a rural State.'' Do you understand what I am
    saying?
        Secretary Chertoff. I absolutely do. As you have said, I
    think risk management is not about size of State or population
    or things of that. It is about individual pieces of
    infrastructure, individual networks of transportation. I mean
    population clearly is an element to be considered, but we have
    to have a much more sophisticated approach. And I think that is
    exactly what we want to drive to, is our risk management
    philosophy.
        Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. Senator Kohl, I appreciate your
    patience. Please take as much time as you think you need.

                         STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERB KOHL

        Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Gregg and Secretary
    Chertoff.
        I would like to talk about airport screening. For those of
    us, and it includes I assume most of the people here in this
    room, we are going through, as you know, a lot more intensive
    airport screening today than we were prior to 9/11. And yet a
    report came out this week which indicates that investigators
    have determined that things like knives, guns, and even fake
    bombs are still being processed through the screeners without
    detection.
        It is almost incomprehensible. I am trying to figure how
    that can be after all of the money and the effort that we have
    put in to trying to improve airport security for travelers.
    They talk about the need for new technology, additional
    technology, which we apparently do not have or have not yet
    been able to spend the money on.
        Can you tell us whether or not it is true that airport
    screening today is about at the level that it was before 9/11,
    and how soon it is that we are going to be able to improve it.
        Secretary Chertoff. I read the IG's report and I just spoke
    with the IG about it, because obviously I was very concerned
    about that. I do not have an independent way of verifying it,
    but I am not going to dispute it either.
        I was very concerned about the question of how do we move
    to the next level. Clearly, there are issues involving training
    and things of that sort, which are important, but I agree with
    the IG that technology is really ultimately what we have to use
    in order to get to the next level.
        We do have some good pilot projects and we do have some
    good technology. We are continuing to fund that, and I think
    that is a very promising development. I have to be completely
    forthright in saying we also have to make some difficult
    decisions about policy in order to decide if we are going to
    capitalize on that technology.

                             BACKSCATTER TECHNOLOGY

        For example, one form of technology that makes it easier to
    detect these kinds of threats is backscatter technology. That
    has certain implications for privacy, because it does
    essentially, in some form, allow you to look to see what
    someone is carrying on them that they may be concealing. And so
    there is sometimes resistance to that.
        I think we have to be prepared to say that we need to start
    to deploy these kinds of technologies and make appropriate
    adjustments for privacy if we are going to get to that next
    level. The technology is out there and it is being used. It is
    a question of the decision to deploy it and to try to balance
    that with legitimate privacy concerns, but not get so caught up
    in an endless debate about it that in 5 years we are still
    sitting there with the technology available and useful and
    helpful, but we have not put it out yet because people are
    still hand wringing about it.
        So I very much want to start to take the step of moving
    that technology out and continuing to press forward on the
    research and development side, but also not letting the perfect
    be the enemy of the good. If we can make things better, let us
    get them better rather than wait for the magic bullet that is
    going to solve everything.

                           IMPROVING AIRPORT SECURITY

        Senator Kohl. Yes, it is very surprising to me and I think
    to every traveler to think that in spite of all the money that
    we spent and the delays that we now go through at airports that
    we did not go through prior to 9/11, some people in the
    position to know are saying that airport security is about at
    the same point that it was then. This, I am sure, is a matter
    of great concern to you, and I hope that we can effect some
    improvements.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I intend to do so. It is
    troubling. I think we do have good capabilities in technology,
    and I think we have to now start to move the process forward.
    And I am very interested in seeing that we do that.

                             FOREIGN STUDENT VISAS

        Senator Kohl. Okay. I would like to talk about foreign
    student visas for a minute. As you probably know, there has
    been a significant increase in the time that it takes for
    foreign students to get their visas to enter this country to
    attend school. And as a result, the number of applications has
    gone down, the number of foreign students who are enrolling
    post-graduate has gone down. And universities all across the
    country are quite concerned about this.
        In 2003, it was indicated that 40 leading research
    universities reported that 621 students missed the start of
    classes because of visa delays. Now certainly we need to do the
    job of checking out, keep out those students who should not be
    here for security reasons, but is there not something we can do
    to increase our level of ability to move people through the
    process and allow them to get enrolled in universities?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, we should. I have talked to
    Secretary Rice about this. We have already taken some steps in
    terms of lengthening the period of time a visa is applicable so
    that at least once we have passed someone through the screen
    they have an ability to spend more time without rechanneling
    themselves through the process. That is a positive development.
        Obviously, we need to do more in terms of our ability to
    vet people in advance, to do it more quickly. And we need to
    also, frankly, send the message out that we want to be
    hospitable in doing those things. So I think we are all
    committed in moving that forward.
        Again, I want to be fair and like I said be blunt in saying
    the schools also have to help, too, because we do encounter
    situations where people come in for schools and they do not
    show up or they leave the program. And, of course, we should
    know about that. The school should report that to us. And
    certain schools get a reputation as being easy marks for people
    who want to come and maybe not to study, but to do something
    else.
        If the schools do not cooperate with us, they make it very
    hard to run the program in a way that helps the entire spectrum
    of universities. So part of what we need to do is make it more
    efficient for people to get their visas, give them longer
    visas, but also make sure the schools live up to their
    obligation to let us know if people are abusing the system. And
    that is part of the tradeoff in order to make this work for the
    best interest of everybody.
        Senator Kohl. I thank you very much and I thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Cochran was not able to join us today, but has
    submitted a statement for the record.
        [The statement follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for accepting the job of chairing this
    important Subcommittee. You have some big shoes to fill, but I know you
    can do it.
        Mr. Secretary, you are off to a great start. We appreciate your
    visit to my State and the way you have moved quickly to identify the
    challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security.
        We need strong leadership in this important job and I know you are
    well-qualified to provide it. The main challenge is to coordinate the
    Nation's resources in this effort. Our greatest strength is the
    ingenuity of our public servants and citizens. With the proper
    leadership, we will meet these challenges.
        Our role on this Subcommittee is to provide you and your Department
    with the resources needed to carry out your responsibilities and we
    will work with you to identify the priorities.

                                      TSA

        Senator Gregg. Let me pick up on your question, because the
    TSA is an issue that I think just every American is a little
    frustrated with sometimes. And I guess my question is this, and
    it is a philosophical one.
        Once we hardened the doors and took away the capacity to
    use airplanes as missiles, private passenger airplanes as
    missiles, we changed the dynamic of the threat fundamentally.
    And yet we have created an agency which has what, 45,000
    people? And here we are on a border where we have 10,000
    agents, and we probably need 20,000 agents to do it right, have
    to be well trained, obviously, and there has to be an
    infrastructure to support them, and all that.
        Are we basically reacting to yesterday's threat? We have
    port security issues. We have border crossing issues. And yet
    we put a huge amount of resources into airport security
    without, it appears, any significant improvement in security
    relative to the ability to get weapons through security, and
    having addressed the fundamental threat, which is an airplane
    used as a missile.
        Secretary Chertoff. I asked myself that question coming
    into this job as well, and if I can just take a minute to break
    it into several different issues.

                               AVIATION SECURITY

        First of all, there is the issue of aviation security in
    itself. Are we optimally focused on what the real threat is?
    And I think you have put your finger on it, Mr. Chairman, when
    you indicated the first thing we have to be really pretty tough
    about is recognizing that there are degrees of consequence that
    we are worried about.
        The aircraft as a missile is the worst consequence. It is
    bad to have an aircraft blown up in midair, too, that may be a
    somewhat less significant consequence. It would certainly have
    tremendous ramifications across the airline system, and then
    there are yet other possible actions. So we have to frame the
    issue that way.
        We do have hardening of cockpit doors. There are other
    steps we can and should take to prevent the aircraft used as a
    missile. That might very well counsel to change or moderate or
    adjust our current levels for screening with respect to certain
    types of items, and increase our screening for other types of
    items.
        Maybe to use the proverbial example of nail clippers, which
    I do not think are being screened for now anyway, but maybe we
    need to be a little less worried about metal cutlery and a
    little more worried about explosives. So that is within the
    issue of aviation, and that is something we are actively
    looking at now.

                                EMERGING ISSUES

        The second issue is making sure our attention is not
    distracted away from emerging issues. We are looking heavily at
    the issue of rail security. We are looking at the issue of
    cargo. We have deployed non-intrusive inspection technologies.
    Those are very good. I have seen them work myself. You may very
    well have it as well. That is a positive step we are paying
    attention to.
        And as I said to Senator Murray, we are looking at this
    whole issue of cargo movement to see how we can use the modern
    supply chain, techniques, and technology to really make sure we
    are doing what we need to do to protect against bad cargo. So I
    am completely on board with the idea of making sure we are not
    distracted by the thing we have already done, spending a lot of
    time on that because we know how to do it and it is
    comfortable, rather than looking at the stuff we have not done
    as well that we need to elevate up.

                             MOVEMENT OF RESOURCES

        Senator Gregg. Yes. I agree. And I am glad you are looking
    at it that way. But I am asking, are we taking it to the next
    step, which is, you know, we are spending, I think, I have
    forgotten the numbers, $3.5 billion, some outrageous number, on
    TSA. But should we be moving that number to border patrol?
    Should we be taking a large percentage of that employee base
    and moving them over, if not as a direct personnel shift, as at
    least a resource shift, reducing the number of personnel at TSA
    and moving people to border patrol where we know we have a
    bigger risk right now relative to the potential threat.
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do not know, Senator, that I
    would do that, because I do not know that I would say that
    there is a bigger risk. I mean I do not want to go to the other
    end and minimize the aviation risk too much. I mean the reality
    is, even putting aside the aircraft as a weapon, if we were to
    have a series of explosions on airlines, or something
    comparable, that would have a humongous effect on the national
    economy and a humongous effect on our ability to move around.
        We want to have a smarter deployment of resources in the
    aviation security area, but we want to have the outcome be
    very, very good security in terms of things we are worried
    about. I do not know that, for a whole host of reasons,
    including training and skill sets, that we could simply move
    TSA people into----
        Senator Gregg. I do not think you could----
        Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
        Senator Gregg [continuing]. Move people, but I am talking
    about the dollars to support those people. I mean the threat to
    the aircraft now is, as you mentioned, an explosive probably
    more than a weapon, because you cannot take control of an
    aircraft with a weapon, theoretically. I mean maybe it is
    possible if you have a big enough weapon on board. But if an
    explosive is the threat, is it not really a technology response
    to that rather than a people response?
        Secretary Chertoff. I think that is right. I think
    ultimately the way to move to the level we need to get is
    technology, because I think there is an inherent limitation.
    People are limited by the technology. I mean you can be the
    best trained and the most well-intentioned person in the world.
    If your detection device does not let you get sufficient
    granularity or make distinctions between types of things,
    between the dangerous and not dangerous, that is limitation. So
    we need to get the technology to where it needs to do.
        That might ultimately allow us to reduce workforce,
    although I do not want to make a prediction that it is going to
    happen in the short term, because I still think there is an
    element of human judgment that you bring to bear that is still
    very important. But there is no question that we have to both
    invest in the technology, but also, as I said, roll out the
    technology we have and start to use it, rather than continuing
    to fuss around, you know, everybody having--I do not want to
    minimize privacy concerns. I have them as well. But we need to
    come to grips with them, we need to adjust for them, we need to
    reach a decision about how to accommodate them, and then we
    need to start to move forward.

                        THEFTS OF LUGGAGE OF PASSENGERS

        Senator Gregg. The problem I see coming here--well, this is
    just one element of the issue, but relative to TSA--is that
    with a report of literally thousands of thefts occurring in
    luggage of travelers, and it appears that a high percentage of
    those thefts are the responsibility or the actions of Federal
    employees of TSA, that we are probably going to have to
    institute a major camera program or something to monitor the
    search of luggage by employees. And so we are going to end up
    spending significant resources to protect ourselves from the
    employees who are supposed to be protecting us from damage on
    the planes. As a taxpayer I find that uniquely frustrating. And
    as a policymaker, I find it to be a terrible waste of
    resources.
        Secretary Chertoff. I agree. I mean, obviously, pilferage
    is completely unacceptable. And it is a bad State of affairs if
    we have to spend money protecting ourselves from people who are
    protecting us.
        I am convinced, of course, the majority of screeners are
    terrific and ethical and----
        Senator Gregg. I am sure that is true.
        Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Things like that. But you
    are right.
        Senator Gregg. The track record, unfortunately, is that
    there is a large amount of--there is a big problem here.
        Secretary Chertoff. And that is why--I agree with you. The
    technology is really the way forward in terms of getting
    ourselves to where we need to go.

                             DHS INTELLIGENCE ROLE

        Senator Gregg. In the area of intelligence, I am not sure I
    understand, and I am new to this. Since the issue was moved out
    of CJS, and I am new to this committee, I am not sure I
    understand what the Department sees as its role in intelligence
    right now. It is clear that there was a conscious decision to
    give up the actual collection and analytical effort to other
    Federal agencies. You got IAIP, which I guess is stood up, but
    it seems to continually to be raided for its revenues.
        What do you see as the intelligence function of Homeland
    Security, of the Agency, in relationship to these other
    agencies and internally?
        Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, I think we are
    definitely in the business of collection. Let me explain what I
    mean by collection. We have thousands of interactions every day
    at the border and investigations with ICE agents at the
    airport. And many of those yield information which I would
    consider to be of intelligence value.
        We are in the process now of increasing our use of that
    intelligence and our collection of that intelligence, doing a
    number of different things. For the first time, we are putting
    reports officers into the operational units, meaning people who
    will look at the operational flow of information and say, wait
    a second, this is not just a trivial interaction. This is a
    piece of information that is useful from an intelligence
    standpoint. Let us make sure we capture it and send it up to
    our information analysis section so it can be fused and
    collected and then ultimately transmitted to the community.
        We have started to do that. I have seen the results. The
    Federal Air Marshals actually use modern technology to in real-
    time report things they see on airplanes that could have
    intelligence value in terms of suspicious behavior, so we get
    identification of people that we need to be on the lookout for
    and we can then put that into a system that all of law
    enforcement can have access to. So we have a tremendous
    potential to be collectors, which I want to make sure we are
    fully exercising.
        The second piece of that is, once we get ourselves to where
    we need to be in collection and we continue this process, we
    can contribute to the whole community by putting that into the
    NCTC, which is the counter-terrorism center. And that was set
    up by Congress in the Intel Reform bill as the kind of fusion
    point for counter-terrorism intelligence.
        By putting that information in there, we are sharing with
    the community. We are also contributing. And my experience is
    that when you contribute as a partner, you then get full
    partnership. So I view that as a very critical piece of what we
    need to do to make sure we are sitting at the table with
    respect to everything else that comes in from the other parts
    of the intel community--overseas stuff, signals intelligence,
    human intelligence in other countries.
        The third piece is, as partners at the table, we need to be
    able to look at all that stuff and operationalize it. And right
    now in the Department we are talking about how we want to
    enhance the ability of IA, of information analysis, to collect
    all this from the central pool that we have at the NCTC, to
    translate into operational mandates to make sure we make
    adjustments at the border and other adjustments so that we
    actually make use of this intelligence.
        So that is my vision of where we are going. I have met with
    the acting head of NCTC. I have met with other main players in
    the community, and I have expressed my very strong personal
    interest in seeing that we get this done.

                        USE OF IDENT, IAFIS AND US VISIT

        Senator Gregg. Where do you see the technology situation
    relative to IDENT, IAFIS, and also relevant to US VISIT.
        Secretary Chertoff. As you know, Senator, IDENT was, I
    guess, the system that was stood up under the old INS, pre-9/
    11. IAFIS is a system the FBI set up. Right now, as I
    understand it, we have the ability at ports of entry, at
    Customs and border-patrolled posts, to access both of those
    databases at the same time. They are separate databases, but we
    can run prints against both of those databases.
        Now IAFIS is a ten-print database. So ultimately there is a
    decision which we need to reach about implementing a way to get
    to making effective use of a ten-print database. And I think
    there is a technological challenge there and there are some
    policy decisions that we are in the process of making.
        I think we made a lot of progress in making both databases
    accessible at a single point at the border and at our border
    and customs stations. We have not fully exploited the
    technology. We need to continue the process of building an
    architecture that lets us get the maximum use out of our
    biometric data that we capture and run it against the maximum
    number of databases.
        Senator Gregg. US VISIT.
        Secretary Chertoff. We have deployed it at our airports. We
    have deployed it at seaports. We have deployed it at our 50
    most significant land border entry points. We are starting to
    pilot it at the exit points.
        It has been very successful. I have seen it operate. It is
    fast. We have captured people on it that we should not be
    letting in the country and we have been able to turn them away.
        You know, it can be improved, and we can make better use of
    it. But it is, I think, the key to the next generation of
    keeping our borders secure.

                       PREPARATION FOR BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

        Senator Gregg. What do you see your success relative to
    preparation for an attack that might be biological?
        Secretary Chertoff. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we just
    finished TOPOFF III, which was a massive exercise done
    internationally and in two States, which had a hypothetical
    biological attack. I have met with Secretary Levitt. We have
    talked about some preliminary lessons learned. We are doing a
    very comprehensive review of that to make sure that we have the
    following things in place.
        First of all, we have an adequate stockpile of the kinds of
    antidote where we have them or vaccinations where we can have
    them against the likely agents; that we have very particular
    plans in place for distributing that type of vaccine or that
    type of antidote, if we should have an attack; and that we are
    fully integrated across the board in terms of our standards for
    reporting biological incidents.
        You know, we had that anthrax false scare about a month
    ago. We did a very vigorous review of that. We have made some
    changes now with the Defense Department as well as with our
    Department in making sure we are operating with the same set of
    standards. And we are now working across the Federal Government
    to test to make sure everybody has got the same template for
    what we are sensing, what constitutes a positive finding, when
    do we get to the point that we need to take steps to get people
    inoculation or antidote.
        Again, we have got progress to make. I think we have
    learned a lot of lessons, both recently and going back, and I
    think we have a program in place to start to move ourselves to
    a position of readiness for what, I agree with you, is one of
    the two or three worst-case scenarios that we have to be
    prepared for.

                                TOPOFF EXERCISE

        Senator Gregg. It is interesting. When I was on the
    Commerce and Justice Committee, when I was chairman of that, we
    began the TOPOFF exercise program over the strong resistance,
    ironically, of almost every Federal agency. We simply insisted
    we do it. It has now turned into a very successful program.
        But I was interested when I was at the TOPOFF exercise this
    year that neither New York City nor Los Angeles were--I guess
    Washington, marginally, participated in the major TOPOFF
    exercises there. I guess that is because they have not been
    asked to do it, or agreed to do it.
        It would seem since they are priority areas, that we would
    want in our TOPOFF exercises to go to places where the actions
    may actually most likely occur.
        Secretary Chertoff. I was not involved in, I guess, the
    selection for 2003 and I guess the selection for the next one
    was made before I came on. I know people do apply and then a
    decision is made.
        I know Chicago did the last one, I think, TOPOFF II.
    Northern New Jersey and Connecticut are part of the New York
    metropolitan area, so we did exercise some pieces of this.
        I agree, at the end of the day--by the way, we should be
    doing tabletop exercises, meaning not maybe the full TOPOFF,
    but something all across the board. I wondered myself how
    valuable it was, and I have to say I was convinced that it was
    of tremendous value.
        I learned a lot and I think a lot of people learned a lot
    by testing the system. So I am in favor of doing at least some
    kind of exercise as an important part of our preparedness.
        Senator Gregg. Well, I would hope that the Department would
    take a look at whether or not we should not do them to some
    degree based on the threat criteria versus just the willingness
    of a governor to participate or a State to participate.
        Well, I appreciate your time. I have two last questions.

                       STABILIZATION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT

        There is a large amount of open slots and acting slots.
    What do you see relative to senior management getting it up and
    stable?
        Secretary Chertoff. I am concerned, obviously, as a
    secretary who does not want to have to do every job himself, to
    make sure we have very good people. I am pleased to say we have
    filled some of those spots. We have got others where we have
    nominations pending before the Senate. Obviously, the more
    quickly we can fill those spots the better.
        We want to get the right people. We want to get people who
    have the energy and the creativity to make the Department what
    I think it can be, going to the next level. And part of what we
    are trying to do, frankly, is to recruit and bring people in to
    top slots that bring a variety of different perspectives.
        I think it is good to have people with military
    backgrounds, people with law enforcement backgrounds, people
    with business backgrounds, people with first responder
    backgrounds, because ultimately our success involves merging
    functions, and that means merging skills.
        So we are actively out there finding the right people. The
    President has got some nominations in and has made some
    appointments already. And I am, for personal as well as
    professional reasons, very eager to get this process done as
    quickly as possible.

              NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE

        Senator Gregg. And lastly, beyond approving your budget,
    which I suspect we will do and actually probably do more than
    your request, is there anything this committee can do to be
    helpful in the legislative or other areas?
        Secretary Chertoff. There may well be as we complete this
    process of second-stage review that we will have some
    recommendations to make for some legislative action that would
    align us better in terms of what we need to be able to generate
    for outcomes. And I will look forward to when we get to a point
    that we can, I think, have some recommendations sitting down
    with you and the other members of the subcommittee and talking
    about those, and trying to adjust as much as possible.
        One thing I do want to thank you for is the subcommittee's
    commitment to make sure that we get real discretion in terms of
    using risk management as a way of handling issues like funding
    and all of our functions, as opposed to--I know from what I
    read in the paper that the lobbyists continue to view DHS as a
    wonderful--I think one used in a newspaper article the term
    ``pots of money'' for the clients.
        I do not view us as pots of money. I view us as having an
    obligation, both as stewards of the public money and as
    stewards of the public safety to make sure that what we do with
    our money that Congress appropriates for us is based on sound
    judgment and risk management, not based on lobbyists trying to
    get their clients into the pots of money.
        Senator Gregg. Well, I agree with you. In this issue, first
    off, funds should be distributed on the basis of threat; and,
    secondly, earmarks should be used only in the extreme situation
    where Congress has a very legitimate policy reason that feels
    that the Administration is not pursuing. So I presume that will
    continue to be this committee's approach.
        Secretary Chertoff. Right. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for all your time.
    I appreciate your courtesy.
        Secretary Chertoff. Thank you.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        Senator Gregg. There may be members who wish to submit
    questions to the Department. As is typical, we presume they
    will be answered in a prompt way.
        Secretary Chertoff. Absolutely.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

                     COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT

        Question. Secretary Chertoff, in your first speech after being
    confirmed Secretary of Homeland Security; you announced that you had
    initiated a 60 to 90 day comprehensive review of the organization,
    operations and policies of the Department as a whole. You discuss that
    review more fully in the prepared statement which you have submitted to
    the Committee.
        You are now some 30 days into that review. Can you share any of
    your preliminary findings with us at this point, including any
    preliminary conclusions you may reach on what's working and what is
    not?
        Answer. The comprehensive review of the Department is complete. I
    gave a speech on this topic on July 13 where I outlined our preliminary
    conclusions, the text of which can be found at the following website:
    http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597.
        Question. You indicate that the Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson is
    overseeing this review and has selected a team of Department officials
    to look at cross-cutting issues and determine how departmental
    resources and programs can be effectively used to achieve our security
    goals. Do you intend to involve others outside of the Department in
    this review?
        Answer. Other Federal agencies were included in this effort where
    appropriate. Moreover, while the committee was comprised exclusively of
    DHS employees, we considered recommendations from our state, local,
    tribal, and private sector partners, among others.
        Question. What cross-cutting issues are you looking at? How were
    those determined?
        Answer. We looked at all areas to examine the mission and work of
    all DHS elements to ensure that we have the best organization,
    operations, and policies possible to most effectively protect and
    safeguard this Nation. Notable examples of areas in need of greater
    cross-cutting included maritime cargo security, information sharing,
    and immigration policy. As a matter of process, the senior leadership
    of the Department was asked to identify the key issues that should be
    evaluated as part of the comprehensive review. The issues were then
    reviewed by me and the Deputy Secretary to identify further and refine
    cross-cutting topics that encompassed the key issues identified by the
    senior leadership.
        Question. As you are aware, we are fast-approaching the time when
    the Committee will make decisions on the Department's appropriations
    for fiscal year 2006. The budget request now before us is based on the
    Department's current structure and operations. Therefore, we are very
    interested in staying abreast of what changes are being contemplated
    and recommended.
        What is your time frame for concluding the review and for making
    any changes you determine are necessary, including those that might be
    done through your reorganization authority or require the submission of
    a legislative proposal or fiscal year 2006 budget amendment to the
    Congress for consideration?
        Answer. The comprehensive review of the Department is complete. I
    gave a speech on this topic on July 13 where I outlined our preliminary
    conclusions, the text of which can be found at the following website:
    http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597.
        We have also outlined our reorganization plan in detail in our
    Homeland Security Act Section 872 report, which was submitted to
    Congress after we completed the Second Stage Review (2SR). Further, a
    few of our recommendations will require congressional action. We have
    submitted legislation accompanying the 2SR Report that, once passed,
    will effectuate the reorganization changes we believe are necessary for
    the Department's success. It is important that our draft legislation be
    passed in its current form.

                           INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

        Question. How will the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
    America announced last month promote and foster a mutually beneficial,
    common security system along our borders?
        Answer. On June 27, in Ottawa, Canada, U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff and Department of Commerce
    Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and their government counterparts in Mexico
    and Canada released the first report of the Security and Prosperity
    Partnership (SPP) of North America that identifies initial results, key
    themes and initiatives, and work plans that further promote the
    security and prosperity of North America. The SPP countries agreed to
    these, and other, North American security goals:
      --North American Trusted Traveler Program.--All three countries have
            agreed to create a single, integrated program for North
            American trusted travelers by 2008. Individuals applying for
            trusted traveler status would be able to apply for the program
            and pay relevant fees in one transaction. Enrolled participants
            would have access to all established trusted travel lanes at
            land crossings, airports and marine programs. A single North
            American Trusted Traveler Program embodies the intent of the
            SPP to establish optimum security goals while accelerating
            legitimate cross-border trade and travel. The United States
            will also be working cooperatively to identify Western
            Hemisphere travel document standards required under the
            Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
            (IRTPA).
      --Preparedness and Incident Management Systems Integration.--The
            United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to transform North
            American preparedness for response to large-scale incidents by
            establishing protocols for incident management that impact
            border operations within 12 months. Protocols will also address
            maritime incidents, cross-border public health emergencies and
            cross-border law enforcement response. The SPP countries have
            also committed to ensure interoperable communications systems
            and to participate in preparedness exercises that will
            strenuously test these protocols. In addition, the three
            countries will participate in a preparedness exercise in
            anticipation of the 2010 Vancouver/Whistler Winter Olympics.
      --Border Enforcement.--The United States and Mexico will form joint
            intelligence-sharing task forces along the U.S.-Mexico border
            to target criminal gang and trafficking organizations and
            reduce violence along the border. The United States and Canada
            will coordinate maritime enforcement programs to address the
            huge volume of boat traffic in our shared waterways.
      --Facilitated Flow of Legitimate Cargo and Travel Across Land
            Borders.--The United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to
            review our transportation and border facility needs, in
            partnership with stakeholders, and develop a plan to prioritize
            future port-of-entry-related infrastructure investments. All
            three countries are considering programs to reduce transit
            times and border congestion by expanding trusted traveler
            programs to additional ports of entry and partnering with
            public and private sector stakeholders to establish ``low-
            risk'' ports of entry for the exclusive use of those enrolled
            in our trusted trade and traveler programs. The United States
            and Canada, along with local stakeholders, are working to
            reduce the transit times by 25 percent at the Detroit-Windsor
            gateway within 6 months, and all three countries are exploring
            ways to expand this innovative 25 Percent Challenge to other
            North American land border crossings within the next 18 months.
            By December of this year, the United States and Canada
            governments expect to complete an agreement on a pre-clearance
            pilot program at the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, NY, contingent on
            Canadian legislative amendments. Within 6 months, both
            countries will also develop a plan to expand the Vancouver
            NEXUS-Air pilot program to other United States air pre-
            clearance sites in Canada and examine the feasibility of
            expanding the eligibility for NEXUS-Air to include Mexican
            nationals.
      --Shared Watchlists and Integrated Traveler Screening Procedures.--
            The United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to strengthen
            information sharing related to terrorists and criminals.
            Effective information exchange among North American countries
            is essential to strengthening our capability to prevent acts of
            terror within and outside North America. The United States,
            Canada and Mexico have also agreed to establish compatible
            screening standards for land, sea and air travel to identify
            and prevent high risk travelers and cargo before they depart
            for North America. Additionally, recommendations will be made
            on the enhanced use of biometrics in screening travelers
            destined to North America. On an ongoing basis, the SPP will
            enable all three countries to address and resolve gaps in
            cross-border information sharing. Ultimately, all travelers
            arriving in North America will experience a comparable level of
            screening.
      --Maritime and Aviation Security.--The SPP countries will also be
            working toward comparable standards for hold baggage and
            passenger screening, implementing no-fly programs throughout
            North America, and developing new protocols for air cargo
            inspection. Likewise, we will also be working to develop
            compatible maritime regulatory regimes and to strengthen
            information sharing and coordinated operations in the maritime
            domain.
        Question. What role will the Department have in this initiative?
        Answer. The Department is taking a lead role in implementing the
    SPP's Security Agenda, in cooperation with other Federal agencies. The
    Department has been tasked with convening working groups with Canada
    and Mexico to develop and implement concrete work plans and specific
    timetables to meet the broader goals associated with the SPP's Security
    Agenda. Additionally, the Department is continuing to work with the
    Department of Commerce, which is taking a lead role in the development
    and negotiation of a complementary Prosperity Agenda, and the State
    Department, who is taking a coordinating role to best align efforts.
        Question. Under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative recently
    proposed, how will the Department ensure that NEXUS is universally
    available on the Northern Border by the time the new document
    requirements are imposed at land ports of entry?
        Answer. To keep pace with the potential impact of the WHTI, DHS
    plans to expand the enrollment process as well as potentially opening
    additional ports of entry with regards to NEXUS program along the
    Northern Border. Concurrently, we are also examining potential resource
    needs to accommodate additional demands of these programs as a result
    of the WHTI. As part of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
    (WHTI), DHS will be issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    (ANPRM) to solicit comments from the public and affected entities
    regarding the requirements and alternative documents that may be
    designated by the Secretary to demonstrate citizenship and identity for
    entry. As required by the President, we are and will continue to
    examine, in response to comments on the ANPRM, other potential
    documents that may be designated for the land border environment in
    advance of the January 1, 2008, deadline.
        Question. How is the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative going to
    work with US VISIT, since US VISIT is implementing the tracking of
    entries and exits across our borders?
        Answer. The Department will coordinate the implementation of the
    Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative with US VISIT enrollment to
    facilitate travel and to ensure security at our Nation's borders.
        Question. Will US VISIT manage this initiative?
        Answer. US VISIT is playing an active role in this initiative.

                            MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

        Question. Executive agencies need to rely on a stable bureaucracy
    to keep things running during leadership transitions. The Department
    has significant vacancies in top leadership positions and significant
    turnover in senior- and mid-level managers.
        Mr. Secretary, what is your time frame for putting your management
    team together?
        Answer. I agree that we do not want any unnecessary delays in
    filling these vacancies. At the same time, however, we want to make
    sure we get the right people to fill these positions. We want to bring
    people on board who have the energy, creativity, and a variety of
    perspectives to further the Department's mission and enable us to move
    to a next level of achievement. The President has forwarded several
    nominations to the Senate for consideration, and we will move as
    quickly as possible to fill remaining vacancies.
        Question. What disruptions are the current vacancies in confirmed
    leadership positions having on the Department?
        Answer. For every vacancy in a leadership position, an employee has
    been identified to serve in an Acting capacity until a person is
    confirmed to fill the position. While we are striving to fill vacancies
    as quickly as possible, these dedicated employees have risen to the
    challenge of fulfilling the requirements and obligations of these
    leadership positions and have maintained the Department's activities
    and efforts.
        Question. What is your assessment of the difficulties the
    Department has experienced attracting, hiring or keeping qualified
    personnel and what is being done to correct this situation?
        Answer. DHS faces many of the same problems with recruitment and
    retention that plague most Federal agencies--cumbersome recruitment and
    hiring processes, lack of competitive salaries, and poor performance
    management and recognition programs. Fortunately, our mission is
    inspiring to many, and we usually are able to attract well-qualified
    candidates in spite of these impediments. However, we need to continue
    to improve to stay competitive for the very best candidates.
        DHS has a Human Capital Strategic Plan that aggressively addresses
    effective recruitment, development, compensation, succession
    management, and leadership issues. A major priority in this Plan has
    been streamlining the DHS hiring processes to meet the Federal standard
    of 45 days. A common DHS recruitment brand with state-of-the-art
    recruitment materials has been established to ensure effective and
    consistent external representation of DHS in the hiring process. These
    initiatives will enable DHS to maintain viable recruitment networks,
    particularly in mission critical occupations.
        A consolidated DHS Workforce Plan was completed in March 2005 that
    establishes a baseline for workforce trend analysis for mission
    critical occupations. This Plan also enables component organizations to
    plan well in advance for upcoming recruitment needs. Where potential
    occupational gaps exist, human capital strategies will be identified
    and implemented.
        MAX, the new human resource system for DHS, will have both market-
    sensitive pay and a robust performance management process, which will
    enable DHS to be more competitive in its recruitment process and more
    effective in retaining and motivating employees.

                          DEPARTMENTAL REORGANIZATION

        Question. Reorganizing seems to be a sport within the Department
    these days. At what point does continued reorganization impede the
    ability of the Department to get its job done?
        Answer. The Department's reorganization plan will significantly
    enhance, not impede, our ability to meet our current and future
    objectives. The Department recently passed its 2 year anniversary mark.
    In that short time, 22 separate agencies were brought together, and the
    work of integrating those agencies into a working structure began. We
    are now taking advantage of 2 years of experience, an opportunity
    unavailable to our predecessors, to implement a reorganization plan
    that takes the Department to the next level, best positions us to
    manage our current and future responsibilities, and helps us better
    adapt to current and future threats and disasters.
        Question. On the other side of this issue is the continued
    viability of the current organization of the border management
    agencies. DHS has moved organizations into ICE; it has moved
    organizations out of ICE. We have poured almost $800 million in
    additional resources into ICE over the last 2 years, including $276
    million in the Senate-reported fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental.
    Is ICE a viable stand-alone organization or should it be broken up and
    have its responsibilities merged into other parts of the Department of
    Homeland of Security such as CBP?
        Answer. As you know, the Department looked at a variety of
    organizational issues as part of the second-stage review process, which
    helped clarify where the Department needs to be organizationally to
    ensure effective implementation of our critical missions. We considered
    whether ICE should remain a stand-alone entity, and decided that it
    should. We believe it's in the Department's best near and long-term
    interest that ICE not be merged with another component, CBP in
    particular. To reach this decision, we focused on the operational
    mission needs of both CBP and ICE, not on the near-term management
    challenges. I take seriously the challenges the Department has faced
    concerning ICE and appreciate the difficult but necessary choices
    Congress has made in providing new funding to address its needs. I am
    confident, however, that ICE has made substantial improvements in
    financial management this year. Not only have substantial new resources
    been provided, but a new management team is taking shape.

                          HOMELAND SECURE DATA NETWORK

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 President's budget contains the
    first request to the Appropriations Committees regarding the Homeland
    Secure Data Network (HSDN). Why should funds be appropriated for HSDN
    now when the Department has seen fit to absorb $79 million in the past
    2 years and not seek proper appropriated dollars for this purpose?
        Answer. Anticipating the need to share intelligence and other
    information securely to fulfill its homeland security mission and to
    ensure efficient and effective use of scarce funds, the DHS CIO
    streamlined and merged disparate classified SECRET network initiatives
    within the Department into a single secure network called the Homeland
    Secure Data Network (HSDN). Existing agency funds for these initiatives
    were used to stand up this critical infrastructure. However, the fiscal
    year 2006 funding request is needed to use the additional funds to
    expand HSDN into a major, secure information thoroughfare joining
    together intelligence agencies, law enforcement, disaster management,
    and front-line disaster response organizations in the common goal of
    protecting our Nation and its citizens. An expanded HSDN will provide
    Secret connectivity and the required efficient information sharing
    capability to the non-DOD government community.
        Question. Does DHS have the ability to share classified information
    today? If yes, why does a stand-alone system need to be built for DHS?
        Answer. Today only a few Homeland Security components have the
    ability to share classified information over the DOD's SIPRNet. The
    present HSDN capabilities currently support over 30 DHS sites and will
    expand classified connectivity to 60 DHS sites in the next 2 months.
    DHS, and the non-DOD, government sector (including other Federal,
    State, local and tribal government) require the infrastructure and the
    processes and procedures to share classified information wholly
    effectively. The HSDN is an essential step that will allow the
    efficient sharing of classified information required for the mission of
    protecting the homeland. DOD policy in the wake of September 11, 2001,
    has been to migrate non-Defense, homeland security classified
    communications off SIPRNet and onto the HSDN. The DOD policy is based
    on the desire to ensure the SIPRNet can effectively support the war-
    fighting mission. DOD and DHS have established a joint, controlled
    interface between SIPRNet and DHS to provide for several levels on
    connection between HSDN and SIPRNet based on policy.
        Question. Why isn't the budget for this project consolidated? Why
    is it being funded by specific organizations of the Department?
        Answer. HSDN has rapidly evolved from an initially conceived agency
    specific network to a presently deploying DHS-wide network based on
    mission needs. HSDN is funded by charging each agency based upon the
    HSDN usage by that agency during a yearly time period. The working
    capital fund has served as a method to consolidate organizational
    element funding to support a single HSDN capability. The specific
    organization funding level will be adjusted as the usage requirements
    of each agency change over time.
        Question. What is the rationale for how much each agency is being
    charged for HSDN?
        Answer. The HSDN rationale for charging each agency is based upon
    the HSDN usage by each agency during a yearly time period. Presently, a
    formula has been developed that charges an agency based on its HSDN
    participation. Basically, this formula develops a percentage by agency
    based on the number of locations (sites) and the number of terminals
    (workstations) installed. The number of sites (large, medium and small)
    and seats is a usage-based cost model. Site size is an industry
    standard such applied by an internet service provider who charges are
    based on the size of your site (bandwidth of the connection). The usage
    is also determined by the number of seats. While some sites will allow
    multiple users for a single workstation, the number of seats sets the
    usage level at the site.
        Question. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate has in its budget the Information Sharing and Collaboration
    program. One of its responsibilities is ``fostering collaboration among
    various levels of government and the private sector through the
    creation of a secure information sharing environment capitalizing on
    existing opportunities''. How does this project relate to HSDN? Are
    these duplicative or complementary efforts?
        Answer. These are complementary efforts. In May 2004, my
    predecessor, Secretary Ridge, created the Information Sharing and
    Collaboration (ISC) initiative to coordinate and facilitate efforts
    throughout the Department and with our customers and partners,
    particularly the Federal, State, tribal and local governments, and the
    private and international sectors, to affect change and improve
    information sharing and collaboration to secure the homeland. Since
    then, the importance of information sharing has been made more evident
    through the publication of numerous reports (such as the 9/11
    Commission Report, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of
    the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and GAO
    studies), the issuance of new Executive Orders (for example, E.O.
    13356), and a new public law, Public Law 108-458, the Intelligence
    Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 1016 calls for the
    creation of an Information Sharing Environment, which will require the
    sharing of information at levels including unclassified, sensitive but
    unclassified, SECRET, and perhaps higher.
        Anticipating this need to share intelligence and other information
    securely to fulfill its homeland security mission, DHS is streamlining
    and merging disparate classified SECRET networks into a single,
    integrated network called HSDN. We envision that HSDN will become a
    major, secure information thoroughfare joining together intelligence
    agencies, law enforcement, disaster management, and front-line disaster
    response organizations in the common goal of protecting our Nation and
    its citizens. The ISC does not build systems or operate networks, such
    as the HSDN. The ISC initiative ensures system and network investments
    support DHS' information sharing mission.

                OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

        Question. The President's budget proposes to create the Office of
    Screening Coordination and Operations, or SCO, within the Border and
    Transportation Security Directorate. How do you see this new office
    contributing to the Department's ability to implement the 9/11
    Commission recommendation regarding a comprehensive screening system
    with system-wide goals?
        Answer. I support the concept of a Screening Coordination and
    Operations (SCO) Office, and developed plans through the 2SR process to
    meet the goals of the office. Consistent with the 9/11 Commission
    recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO office will develop a
    more unified, comprehensive and efficient system for the screening,
    credentialing, and redress for passengers and leverage current
    investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO will harmonize IT
    architecture, uniform redress policies, and provide coordinated or
    shared services such as card production, biometric/biographic
    databases, as well as set DHS standards for information technology
    enterprise architecture and global enrollment systems/processes. The
    SCO office will develop a consistent approach for outreach in the areas
    of privacy, civil rights, and will coordinate R&D efforts. DHS will set
    up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006, as reflected in the Department's
    revised fiscal year 2006 request.
        Question. Should the SCO have actual operational authority for
    various screening programs as proposed, or should it focus on the
    integration and coordination function, for example the development of
    the Department-wide credentialing standards necessary across so many
    programs involved in this activity?
        Answer. I support the concept of a SCO Office, and developed plans,
    through the 2SR process, to meet the goals of the office. Consistent
    with the 9/11 Commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO
    office will develop a more unified, comprehensive and efficient system
    for the screening, credentialing, and redress for passengers, while
    leveraging investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO will
    harmonize IT architecture, establish uniform redress procedures, and
    provide coordinated or shared services such as card production,
    biometric/biographic databases, common DHS standards for information
    technology architecture, and global enrollment systems/processes. The
    SCO office will develop a consistent approach for outreach in the areas
    of privacy, civil rights, and helping to ensure coordinated R&D
    efforts. DHS plans to set up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006.
        Question. At the same time that significant programs are being
    proposed to be moved from Customs and Border Protection and the
    Transportation Security Administration, the President's budget does not
    propose moving the operational responsibility for any of the programs
    that incorporate screening of applicants out of U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services (CIS). In order to ensure that there is the
    closest possible coordination across screening programs, should CIS
    screening programs also be moved to the SCO? Why wasn't CIS included?
        Answer. I support the concept of a SCO Office, and developed plans
    through the 2SR process to meet the goals of the office. Consistent
    with the 9/11 Commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO
    office will develop a more unified, comprehensive and efficient system
    for the screening, credentialing, and redress for passengers and
    leverage current investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO
    will harmonize IT architecture, uniform redress policies, and provide
    coordinated or shared services such as card production, biometric/
    biographic databases, as well as set DHS standards for information
    technology enterprise architecture and global enrollment systems/
    processes. The SCO office will develop a consistent approach for
    outreach in the areas of privacy, civil rights, and will coordinate R&D
    efforts. DHS will set up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006, as
    reflected in the Department's revised fiscal year 2006 request.

                                    US VISIT

        Question. How do you plan on addressing the issue of integration of
    the two fingerprint systems--IDENT at the Department of Homeland
    Security and IAFIS at the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
        Answer. The US VISIT Program, working closely with CBP and ICE, and
    the Departments of Justice and State, leads the IDENT/IAFIS integration
    efforts. DHS' systems receive daily updates from the FBI with
    information from a variety of criminal and threat-related databases.
    There are several different ongoing efforts to bring about
    interoperability between the IDENT and IAFIS.
      --DHS (US VISIT) established an integrated project team (IPT) with
            the FBI (Criminal Justice Information Services or CJIS) to
            address the policy, business requirements, and technical
            aspects of integrating IDENT and IAFIS. This IPT has made
            significant progress in resolving many of the long-standing
            issues in the DOJ Office of the Inspector General's report. A
            report, describing plans for interoperability, was submitted to
            Congress on August 18, 2005.
      --Integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstations will be deployed to sites that
            will have US VISIT--115 airports, 15 seaports, and 165 land
            border ports of entry--as well as to specific ICE field office
            locations, by the end of calendar year 2005.
      --DHS and DOJ have completed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to
            resolve data access and privacy issues concerning FBI usage of
            US VISIT data.
        Question. Are there any DHS/FBI jurisdiction issues hampering the
    integration effort?
        Answer. DHS and DOJ/FBI have achieved an effective working
    relationship on integration. As noted above, DHS (US VISIT) and FBI
    (Criminal Justice Information Services or CJIS) have established an
    integrated project team (IPT) to address the policy, business
    requirements, and technical aspects of integrating IDENT and IAFIS.
    This IPT has made significant progress in resolving many of the long-
    standing issues originally referenced by the DOJ Office of the
    Inspector General. A report, describing plans for interoperability, was
    submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.

                          GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

        Question. Mr. Secretary, in your written testimony you used cargo
    container security as an example of an area where the Department could
    do a better job coordinating across all departmental efforts. What
    impact have the various programs the Department is running had on cargo
    container security so far? What can be done better?
        Answer. Since September 11, 2001, the various cargo security
    programs now operated by the Department have made great strides in
    moving us towards a system of security that prevents the use of the
    supply chain in a terrorist attack while enhancing supply chain
    efficiency and reliability. Before September 11, most cargo security
    efforts were centered at the port and based on local perceptions of
    risk. Today we have improved data reporting through the 24 Hour Rule
    supported by centralized targeting at National Targeting Center. This
    capability coupled with the Container Security Initiative has allowed
    us to revolutionize the customs function by allowing us to interdict
    threats before they leave for the United States.
        Our current programs and capabilities have laid the foundation for
    a truly 21st century international trade system, one that will support
    growth in international trade and our security interests. Other
    efforts, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Advanced Container
    Security Device program and the Advance Trade Data Initiative, will
    provide us with the knowledge and tools to help us get there. To that
    end, I am reviewing the status of DHS's cargo security efforts, how
    they can be further strengthened and how we can further transform the
    system to ensure the United States security and economic needs are met.
        Question. What is the status of the final report on Operation Safe
    Commerce, and when will it be submitted to this Committee?
        Answer. The report on Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) requires
    submission of program information from OSC's three participating load
    centers. One participant's input was behind schedule but has recently
    been received. This information will be integrated into a report and
    distributed for review by relevant experts. We expect the report to be
    issued by the end of December 2005.
        Question. What more should be done in this area?
        Answer. I am reviewing the status of DHS's cargo security efforts,
    how they can be further strengthened and how we can further transform
    the system to ensure the United States security and economic needs are
    met.

                            AGRICULTURAL INSPECTIONS

        Question. The April 14, 2005, U.S. Department of Agriculture,
    Office of Inspector General Report regarding coordination between the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Agriculture
    indicates that coordination has been less than adequate for the last 2
    years. Specifically, the report mentions APHIS personnel being denied
    entry to ports-of-entry to conduct its required regulatory reviews.
    What are you doing to change this situation?
        Answer. CBP and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal
    and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) signed in February 2005
    Appendix 8 to Article 8 of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between
    DHS and the USDA. The MOA establishes and enhances coordinated actions
    and operations between the two agencies and responds to many of the
    issues raised in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report.
        CBP and USDA APHIS have forged a new working relationship and
    resolved many of the earlier port access issues. CBP, in conjunction
    with APHIS, has entered into several programs, such as the targeted
    program for imported cut flowers to apply inspection resources on a
    risk managed basis (i.e., focus on commodities that pose a higher risk
    to American Agriculture). Also, CBP and APHIS have worked together in
    numerous ways to synchronize and verify information and data collected
    about inspections such as the Joint Quality Assurance Program, which
    provides a quality assurance team to conduct port reviews. CBP and USDA
    employees are working together cooperatively and sharing information.
    CBP has worked with USDA to achieve the appropriate level of access to
    the ports of entry for APHIS personnel. As Congress has provided, the
    inspectional functions were transferred from USDA to CBP. CBP has set
    forth procedures that have facilitated USDA access to the ports to
    perform their functions.
        Question. The OIG report includes information of the lengthy time
    that was required to negotiate and sign official agreements between
    APHIS and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Several of these have
    taken more than 12 months. Additionally, APHIS reported that attempting
    to elevate issues within the Department of Homeland Security was not
    productive due to high turnover in the policy-making levels of DHS. The
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 split the agriculture responsibilities
    between these two agencies. If this is not working, should this
    situation be reevaluated?
        Answer. Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the Act)
    transferred to DHS the inspectional functions of APHIS relating to
    agricultural import and entry inspection. By the provisions of the Act,
    the Secretary of USDA and the Secretary of DHS were required to execute
    a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cover this transfer in more
    detail. The MOU was signed on February 28, 2003.
        Under the provisions of the MOU, the two agencies would work out
    further details of this relationship by the means of appendices to
    particular articles in order to allow for the development of procedures
    that would work for both agencies. To date CBP and APHIS have signed
    appendices to all the articles except for Article 4 that involves
    training in order to allow for the development of procedures that would
    work for both agencies. The time spent in developing the correct
    procedures has been well worth the delay as the training functions
    between the two agencies are working effectively. A completed Appendix
    for Article 4 is expected to be signed in early summer 2005.
        We have also developed procedures and mechanisms to work through
    issues as they arise in the future. The time taken to draft, negotiate
    and finalize these appendices has been a necessary part of a growing
    partnership between these two agencies. The organizational and
    functional task allocations are working. The agricultural program is
    being strengthened through training and cross training.

                           NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

        Question. The Administration released the Interim National
    Preparedness Goal (the Goal) on March 31, 2005. States are required to
    update their State Homeland Security Strategies, by October 1, 2005,
    with an assessment of what gaps remain in each state's ability to meet
    the tasks and capabilities laid out in the Goal. The proposal put forth
    by the fiscal year 2006 President's budget would prioritize Federal
    funding received by State and local governments for first responders
    not just by threat and vulnerability, but also by ``essential
    capabilities'' as defined in the Goal. Each State is required to file
    an addendum by October 1, 2005, to its State Homeland Security Strategy
    to reflect how it will address the seven national priorities. Is this
    enough time for the States to do a thorough evaluation of what
    capabilities each has now?
        Answer. Yes, DHS believes that there is enough time for the States
    to complete a thorough evaluation of their current capabilities.
    Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, during year 1 of the implementation
    of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, States and urban
    areas are required to update their existing homeland security
    strategies. To meet this requirement, the Department is asking States
    and urban areas to review their existing strategic goals and objectives
    and bring them into alignment with the seven National Priorities
    outlined in the National Preparedness Goal by September 30, 2005. (The
    seven National Priorities are: (1) Implement the National Incident
    Management System and National Response Plan; (2) Expand Regional
    Collaboration; (3) Implement the Interim National Infrastructure
    Protection Plan; (4) Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration
    Capabilities; (5) Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities;
    (6) Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination
    Capabilities; and (7) Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis
    Capabilities.) This first step in HSPD-8 implementation will not
    require States or urban areas to conduct a wholesale rewrite of their
    strategies, nor will they have to complete another risk and
    capabilities assessment as they did in fiscal year 2003. DHS completed
    guidance on completing this strategy in June 2005. More detailed
    information on this requirement was presented to State and urban area
    representatives at three National Preparedness Goal rollout conferences
    throughout April and May 2005. Additional details are also available to
    State and urban area representatives through their designated
    Preparedness Officers within the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
    in the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
    Preparedness (OSLGCP).
        Question. An important aspect of the National Preparedness Goal has
    not been defined, the levels of capabilities for differently sized
    jurisdictions. How are Manchester, NH, and New York, NY, supposed to
    know what different types of capabilities that each should have for a
    chemical incident?
        Answer. The Interim National Preparedness Goal establishes the
    national vision and priorities that will guide DHS' efforts, in
    conjunction with appropriate stakeholders, to set measurable readiness
    benchmarks and targets to strengthen the Nation's preparedness. The
    Target Capabilities List is a set of 36 essential capabilities that
    should be developed and maintained, in whole or in part, by various
    levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
    recover from terrorist attacks and major disasters. DHS, working with
    stakeholders, is currently developing national target levels for the
    capabilities and the role of Federal agencies, states, local
    jurisdictions, the private sector and non-governmental organizations in
    building and maintaining the network of capabilities across the country
    required for large-scale incidents. Local jurisdictions will be
    expected to build and maintain levels of capability appropriate to
    their risk. DHS has invited Federal agencies, State representatives,
    and national associations to participate in a series of workshops to
    set the target levels.
        Question. How will you encourage States to be thorough in their
    assessment of their capabilities?
        Answer. In out-year implementation of HSPD-8, States will be
    required to assess their current capabilities against target levels of
    capability that will be defined in the Target Capabilities List.
    However, in fiscal year 2005, the capability assessment will be
    conducted through a representative sampling of States and/or sub-state
    regions to test and validate the assessment process prior to nationwide
    implementation. As part of this representative sampling of
    capabilities, DHS will develop user-friendly tools based on the Target
    Capabilities List to ensure that both States and multi-disciplinary
    subject-matter expert teams conducting the assessments are thorough in
    their evaluation of capabilities. In addition, DHS will provide
    customized reports to States that link their existing capabilities and
    grant expenditure data to the National Priorities outlined in the
    National Preparedness Goal in order to assist States as they begin to
    implement HSPD-8.
        Question. What is the incentive for a State to close a gap if doing
    so results in less funding for that State?
        Answer. The Department believes there are sufficient incentives for
    States to build both regional and statewide capabilities and close
    identified gaps in overall preparedness. Enhanced preparedness to
    protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of a national
    emergency, including terrorism, will ultimately result in minimizing
    the adverse impact on lives, property, and the economy that are
    inherent to a catastrophic event. The protection of citizens, critical
    infrastructure, businesses, and communities is a shared goal, requiring
    Federal, State, local, international, and private sector partnerships.
    Throughout the Nation, States are embracing this goal as the ultimate
    incentive, as they work to implement the National Preparedness Goal.
    Finally, the extent of ``unmet gaps'' will not be the sole determinant
    of DHS grant allocations.
        Question. How exactly does the Administration envision this
    working?
        Answer. The Interim National Preparedness Goal includes a vision,
    which is ``to engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their
    private and non-governmental partners, and the general public to
    achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent,
    protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to
    minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.''
        The Interim National Preparedness Goal and companion National
    Preparedness Guidance outline how the Nation will achieve this vision.
    The Guidance outlines a 10-step national process for Capabilities-Based
    Planning that will be used to identify target levels of capability,
    achieve them, and assess preparedness from the local to the national
    level. The Goal and Guidance establish seven National Priorities
    focused on developing some of the more critical capabilities from the
    Target Capabilities List for which the Nation is currently the least
    prepared (Information Sharing and Collaboration; Interoperable
    Communications; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
    Explosive (CBRNE) Detection, Response, and Decontamination; and Medical
    Surge and Mass Prophylaxis) and overarching initiatives (to implement
    the National Incident Management System, National Response Plan,
    Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and expand regional
    collaboration) that will facilitate those efforts. The Guidance
    highlights existing Federal program efforts that support the seven
    National Priorities and describes a schedule of activities for States
    and urban areas to update assessments and strategies with Federal
    assistance.
        The process is collaborative, iterative, and risk-based. Homeland
    security is a shared responsibility and depends upon shared efforts.
    This approach will be implemented through multi-agency and multi-
    discipline working groups at the national and regional (or multi-
    jurisdiction) level. Federal preparedness assistance will explore ways
    to offer incentives and rewards for collaboration. This approach
    involves a continuous cycle of activity to refine our assumptions and
    planning tools and share best practices and lessons learned. This
    approach recognizes that while all jurisdictions are subject to some
    degree of risk, the capabilities and levels of capability that are
    needed to manage risk vary considerably across the Nation. Annual
    status reports will provide a more meaningful assessment of national
    preparedness. Data collection will simplify over time as tools are
    refined and consolidated. This approach will provide a sound basis for
    decisions at all levels of government to allocate resources based upon
    risk and need.
        Question. Will ``essential capabilities'' as defined by the
    National Preparedness Goal be considered equal to threat information,
    population density, or other factors?
        Answer. The development of the target capabilities, or ``essential
    capabilities,'' by Federal, State, local, and tribal entities and the
    private sector will be driven by relevant threat information,
    population size and density, critical infrastructure, and other
    factors. DHS is working with Federal, State, local, tribal, private
    sector, and non-governmental stakeholders to refine the Target
    Capabilities List (TCL) for re-issuance on October 1, 2005. This new
    version of the TCL will assign the capabilities by level of government
    and tiers (groupings of local jurisdictions). The primary purpose of
    the tiers is to account for reasonable differences in target levels of
    capability (or system-specific elements of capability) among groups of
    jurisdictions based on differences in risk factors such as total
    population, population density, and critical infrastructure.
        Question. Once a State obtains certain capabilities, how do we
    sustain that effort? Should the States be responsible for sustainment
    costs?
        Answer. As we have barely begun to assess current capabilities, it
    is premature to speculate about future funding requirements once the
    most significant gaps are closed. While maintenance of effort will
    largely be State and local responsibility, DHS will continue to assist
    States in building and sustaining the target capabilities.
    Additionally, every State and locality will have a role in achieving
    and sustaining the 36 capability target levels. However, the target
    capabilities are a planning tool, not a funding formula. Implementing
    Capabilities-Based Planning is a long-term effort that will help the
    Nation to achieve the capacity to perform all 36 target capabilities at
    the levels needed to effectively prevent, protect against, respond to,
    and recover from major events, especially terrorism. Not until States
    and urban areas have assessed and realigned their homeland security
    strategies and plans will DHS be able to fully determine which of the
    36 target capabilities will require additional funding.

                          FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

        Question. Just in the last few weeks national news reports have
    questioned the use of first responder grants in relation to homeland
    security. In January of 2005, the Department of Homeland Security
    Office of Inspector General issued a report questioning how the
    Department prioritized port security grants.
        Given all of this, how confident are you that every dollar that has
    been allocated for homeland security grants has been well spent?
        Answer. In general, homeland security port security grants have
    been well spent. Recognizing that issues emerged with some projects,
    the Department disagreed and non-concurred with the IG's finding that
    projects received funding despite ranking ``average to worse'' during
    the evaluation process. Following TSA's second round of grant awards in
    2003, ODP made $75 million available for port security grants under the
    Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). ODP, in consultation with TSA
    and SLGCP, utilized a risk-based approach, which differed from the
    program's original competitive process to select 14 eligible port areas
    and the corresponding funding amounts for each area. TSA then provided
    unfunded applications from its second round to ODP, which in turn,
    funded 86 projects. TSA provided what they considered to be the next
    projects that had been evaluated from the previous round that deserved
    funding. All of the 86 projects were funded based on TSA's
    recommendations.
        The Department has made significant efforts to improve the Port
    Security Grant Program in light of the Inspector General's (IG) report.
    The report recommended that the Department accelerate the acquisition
    of more information from applicants about the scope of their projects
    in an effort to expedite the spending of grant awards. We concur with
    this recommendation and will ensure that appropriate guidance on the
    submission of relevant information within specified timeframes is
    included in the application kit for the forthcoming fiscal year 2005
    Port Security Grant Program. Additionally, the IG report recommended
    that the Department ensure that the program has sufficient operational
    expertise to administer the program after the award is made. We concur
    with this recommendation as well, and have established a Transportation
    Infrastructure Security Division (TISD) within SLGCP to administer the
    fiscal year 2005 Port Security Grant Program. Given the reforms in
    response to the IG report, DHS port security grants will be managed
    even more effectively under the fiscal year 2005 Port Security Grant
    Program. Additionally, SLGCP has developed mechanisms intended to
    increase accountability of all grant programs, an effort recognized in
    a recent GAO Report entitled, ``Management of First Responder Grants
    Has Improved, but Challenges Remain'' (#05-121).
        Question. The Senate and the House Appropriations Committees asked
    for a report on homeland security grant spending. This report is to
    include information on what has been purchased with all of the grant
    dollars from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, whether these purchases
    complied with the State Homeland Security Strategies, and an
    explanation as to how this spending has enhanced the Nation's security.
    That report was due March 31, 2005, but it has not yet been submitted.
    When can we expect it?
        Answer. The congressional report on ``State and Local Government
    Preparedness and Funding for Fiscal Year 2002-Fiscal Year 2004'' was
    delivered to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on May 6,
    2005.
        Question. If the Department goes to a completely threat-based
    formula, are you comfortable with how threats are determined now? I
    know we can't talk in detail in an open forum--but what, if anything,
    would you change?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget proposes a risk-
    based homeland security funding process, of which threat is one
    component along with consequence and vulnerabilities. DHS will consider
    risk factors such as threat, presence of critical infrastructure,
    vulnerability, population and population density, international
    borders, and ports of entry in making final award determinations. This
    process will be modeled on the fiscal year 2005 UASI program, which
    combined five variables designed to objectively prioritize funding for
    high-threat, high density urban areas. A threat estimate index
    developed from an estimate of credible threats and incidents as well as
    an index that considered law enforcement investigative activity and
    enforcement will be used. The difficulty of determining which States
    and urban areas most are at risk is subjective to some degree because
    of the nature of most intelligence information and the scarcity of data
    specifically identifying targeted states, cities and infrastructure.
    Therefore, the current allocation methodologies that consider threat
    information represent the best available combination of data, current
    understanding of threats, and expert judgment.
        Question. What restrictions are placed on the use of these grant
    funds?
        Answer. DHS released detailed guidance for the use of grant funds
    contained in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program
    (HSGP). Specific guidelines on intended purpose and the allowance of
    certain types of expenditures vary between the six different programs
    contained in the HSGP. HSGP allowable costs are divided into planning,
    organization, equipment, training, and exercise categories. Management
    and administrative and certain operational costs are also allowed under
    certain programs. Allowable equipment categories for the fiscal year
    2005 HSGP are listed on a web-based Authorized Equipment List on the
    Responder Knowledge Base, which is sponsored by ODP and the Oklahoma
    City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism at
    http://www.rkb.mipt.org.
        The fiscal year 2005 HSGP guidance also details certain
    restrictions placed on the use of grant funds, which vary by program.
    For example, funding in the UASI and Law Enforcement Terrorism
    Prevention Program programs may not be used for overtime to supplant
    ongoing, routine public safety activities of State and local emergency
    responders, and may not be used to hire staff for operational
    activities or backfill. However, these programs do allow up to 25
    percent of the awards to be used for operational expenses and overtime
    for periods of heightened alert, for personnel to participate in
    information, investigative and intelligence sharing activities related
    to homeland security, and finally, in the hiring of contractors/
    consultants for participation in information/intelligence sharing
    groups. Another example of restriction on funds involves construction
    and renovation. Use of HSGP funds for construction is generally
    prohibited and is allowable only when it is a necessary component of
    (1) a security system at critical infrastructure facilities or (2) an
    emergency operations center (EOC). Details on other restrictions for
    certain types of equipment, training, and exercises are provided in the
    fiscal year 2005 HSGP guidance.
        Question. What audits have been done, or are underway, to ensure
    that these grant funds are used appropriately? What other controls does
    the Department have at its disposal to oversee the use of grant funds?
        Answer. During calendar year 2004, SLGCP was a part of over 14
    governmental audits, ranging from the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) to the DHS Inspector General to the House Appropriations Survey &
    Investigations Staff (S&I). Many of these audits looked at the
    expenditure of grant funds by the States and territories. Some of these
    audits have provided final reports, and most of those reports reflect
    SLGCP's ability to efficiently process the grant, as well as provide
    programmatic assistance and oversight to the states. A recent GAO
    Report entitled, ``Management of First Responder Grants Has Improved,
    but Challenges Remain'' (#05-121) credits SLGCP with developing
    requirements intended to hold States and localities accountable for how
    grant expenditures were planned, justified, expended, and tracked.
        In order to assure fiscal and programmatic oversight, ODP
    Preparedness Officers have robust monitoring and reporting tools
    through which they can monitor expenditures by grantees. The Initial
    Strategy Implementation Plan and the Biannual Strategy Implementation
    Report provide detailed expenditure information by discipline, solution
    area (such as equipment or training) and project area. These reports
    require grantees to tie any expenditure of homeland security funds to
    goals and objectives outlined in their State or Urban Area Homeland
    Security Strategy. They also provide important data on what projects
    are being accomplished by States and localities. In addition to the
    almost daily contact with grantees, Preparedness Officers also perform
    a formal on-site monitoring visit to their States at least once a year,
    in accordance with program office protocols. This visit allows for both
    programmatic and financial compliance monitoring. The Department of
    Justice's Office of the Comptroller (OC) also performs random, risk-
    based financial audits of SLGCP grantees. Each State Administrative
    Agency (SAA) also is subject to its own State audits. The combination
    of these external and internal inspections provides the required
    oversight over the use of SLGCP grant funds.

                          INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

        Question. The Federal Government has been working for many years to
    crack the nut of moving more quickly towards true interoperability. Do
    you see the creation of the Office of Interoperability and
    Compatibility as helping move towards that goal? Is this just another
    Office that will put forth a lot of effort and get very little
    advancement?
        Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Office for
    Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) has made significant
    achievements in helping the Federal Government move more quickly
    towards interoperability. The OIC was created to address critical
    interoperability issues relating to public safety and emergency
    response, including communications (the SAFECOM Program), equipment,
    training and other areas as needs are identified.
        Since its inception OIC has:
      --Released Version 1.0 of the first ever comprehensive Public Safety
            Statement of Requirements (SoR) for Communications and
            Interoperability (SoR), which defines the functional
            requirements for public safety practitioners to communicate and
            share information when needed, where needed, and when
            authorized.
      --Developed the Interoperability Continuum, a tool designed to help
            the public safety community and local, tribal, State, and
            Federal policy makers address critical elements for success as
            they plan and implement interoperability solutions. The
            critical elements include governance, standard operating
            procedures, technology, training/exercises, and usage of
            interoperable communications.
      --Created the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning
            (SCIP) Methodology, based on lessons learned from assisting the
            Commonwealth of Virginia in developing a strategic plan for
            improving statewide communications interoperability. The SCIP
            Methodology serves as a guide for States to consider as they
            initiate statewide communications planning efforts.
      --Developed coordinated grant guidance which provides the public
            safety community with consistent guidance, coordinated
            application processes, similar requirements across grant
            programs, and general guidelines for implementing a successful
            wireless communications system. This guidance was incorporated
            in the fiscal year 2003 FEMA and fiscal year 2003/fiscal year
            2004 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant awards,
            as well as ODP grant packages in fiscal year 2004.
      --Drafted a report as required by the Intelligence Reform and
            Terrorism Prevention Act that discusses DHS plans for
            accelerating voluntary consensus standards for interoperable
            communications.
      --Managed the RapidCom initiative, in which the Office worked with
            ten urban areas to provide requested assistance to help improve
            incident level interoperability capabilities and developed a
            methodology for a communications table top exercise that is
            replicable across urban areas.
      --Awarded a contract to develop and execute the nationwide
            interoperability baseline study in January 2005. The purpose of
            the study is to quantify the extent to which the Nation's
            public safety first responders are interoperable technically
            and operationally.
        With respect to other critical interoperability issues, the OIC has
    done the following:
      --Created the Risk Assessment Policy Group (RAP) from representatives
            within DHS to address and resolve discrepancies in risk
            assessment criteria and methodologies. RAP hosted a workshop
            with stakeholders from the Department to clearly define the
            scope of the risk assessment problem and to develop a strategy
            for addressing the problem.
      --Created the Joint Evaluation and Testing Program (JET) to
            coordinate Federal programs that conduct testing and evaluation
            of public safety technologies. JET hosted a planning meeting
            with representatives from DHS, the National Institute of
            Standards and Technology, and the Department of Justice to
            define the scope of the JET program.
        Question. The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
    Preparedness reports that in fiscal year 2004 more than $890 million of
    the grants given to States and locals were used in some way for
    interoperable communications, equipment, studies, etc. What is being
    done to help States and locals today to make better decision about
    investments in interoperable communications?
        Answer. SLGCP has leveraged the S&T Directorate's SAFECOM program's
    development of standards and grant guidance to help create the
    Interoperable Communication Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP). ICTAP
    is a technical assistance program designed to enhance interoperable
    communications between local, State, and Federal emergency responders
    and public safety officials. The goal of the ICTAP program is to enable
    local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond
    to a WMD attack. The ICTAP program provides free, on-site support using
    a systems engineering approach. The ICTAP technical assistance team
    works closely with the UASI site's Urban Area Working Group to assess
    the current communications infrastructure for gaps and to translate
    operational requirements into technical requirements that can be used
    to design an interoperable communications system.

                               AIR CARGO SECURITY

        Question. Does the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    have any cost estimates for screening 100 percent of the baggage and
    cargo on passenger planes?
        Answer. The total amount of cargo transported on passenger aircraft
    represents less than 25 percent of the total air cargo volume
    transported in the United States. TSA completed a study in 2002, ``The
    Air Cargo Security Scenario Analysis Report,'' that indicated that the
    cost of screening 100 percent of the cargo transported on passenger
    aircraft at the top 42 airports, which handle 95 percent of the total
    volume of air cargo transported in the United States, would cost $500
    million in the first year and $3.8 billion over 10 years.
        Question. Though you cannot deter every threat, do you believe 100
    percent screening of high-threat of bags and cargo is the best use of
    our Federal resources?
        Answer. TSA has taken a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air
    cargo screening. This approach helps the agency appropriately target
    screening efforts with the resources available. TSA believes that all
    cargo should be pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program
    or the Indirect Air Carrier Program, and that 100 percent of cargo that
    is identified as elevated-risk should be screened using appropriate
    technology and methods. Random inspections play an important,
    complementary role in the layered systems approach by managing risk
    without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.
        Currently all cargo that will be transported on passenger aircraft
    is pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program. Passenger
    air carriers, Indirect Air Carriers (IACs, or freight forwarders), and
    all-cargo carriers who transfer cargo to passenger planes all use the
    Known Shipper Program. TSA's Known Shipper Database has centralized the
    collection of data on about 450,000 known shippers and enabled vetting
    against government databases. To supplement the Known Shipper pre-
    screening, air carriers are also required to conduct random screening
    of a certain percentage of air cargo.
        In 2005, TSA has developed an Air Cargo Security Roadmap that
    integrates many policy, operations, system, and regulatory enhancements
    to air cargo security. The cornerstone of this effort is the Freight
    Assessment System (FAS), which would enable TSA to better and more
    efficiently identify elevated-risk cargo for inspection. FAS will
    employ a sophisticated risk assessment engine to identify elevated-risk
    air cargo for inspection.
        Additionally, TSA has published a robust Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking (NPRM) for air cargo security. This NPRM is currently being
    developed into a final rule, which implements major security
    enhancements for indirect air carriers (IACs), all cargo carriers,
    passenger carriers, and airports.
        Finally, TSA oversees compliance with security requirements through
    a robust regulatory compliance program, which includes more than 900
    aviation security inspectors located throughout the United States.
        Question. How can we better tackle the issue of cargo security?
        Answer. TSA continues to make incremental and measured progress in
    the air cargo arena, among other things by prohibiting cargo from
    unknown shippers, significantly increasing the number of physical
    inspections of air cargo on passenger and all cargo aircraft,
    increasing its air cargo inspections workforce, strengthening the
    criteria for consideration as a known shipper, automating the
    validation of known shippers and indirect air carriers, and expediting
    research and development efforts to identify potential new
    technological solutions for the inspection of air cargo on passenger
    aircraft. TSA is also working closely with CBP to develop a targeting
    tool which will permit effective identification of elevated risk cargo
    with the ultimate goal of requiring the inspection of all such elevated
    risk cargo.
        Question. What is the right mix of screeners and technology when
    dealing with air cargo and how does the Department determine which
    resources to apply?
        Answer. TSA has taken a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air
    cargo screening. This approach helps the agency appropriately target
    screening efforts with the resources available. TSA believes that all
    cargo should be pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program
    or the Indirect Air Carrier Program, and that 100 percent of cargo that
    is identified as elevated-risk should be screened using appropriate
    technology and methods. Random inspections play an important,
    complementary role in the layered systems approach by managing risk
    without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.
        TSA employees do not conduct the screening of air cargo. Rather,
    the screening is performed by air carriers and overseen by TSA. TSA
    issues regulatory requirements to air carriers in this area, and TSA's
    inspectors provide oversight and work to ensure that carriers are
    meeting their regulatory requirements.
        Question. What other means is TSA using to achieve more secure
    cargo-holds in passenger carriers?
        Answer. TSA is continuing efforts to design blast resistant cabin
    and cargo liners, as well as overhead bin mitigation technological
    solutions. The agency has completed initial feasibility studies for
    both passenger cabin and cargo hold liners. The results of the studies
    are promising. The agency is working on preliminary designs, and a
    prototype is expected by the end of calendar year 2005. TSA is also
    partnering with the FAA and aircraft manufacturers to determine which
    solutions are best suited for retrofitting existing aircraft with this
    new technology.
        Additionally, TSA is conducting a pilot program to evaluate the use
    of blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger
    aircraft to fulfill the requirements of Section 4051 of Public Law 108-
    458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The
    objective of the hardened unit load device (HULD) pilot program is to
    determine the feasibility, including operational impact, durability,
    cost, maintenance, training, blast containment, and logistics, of an
    HULD solution. The pilot program began in June 2005, and the data
    collection will last approximately 18 months from the start date.
        Question. How difficult is it for TSA to secure the air cargo
    processing ``footprint'' at the airports from the time of entry into
    the system maintaining a chain of custody until the moment of its
    loading onto a plane?
        Answer. Regulated airports already secure their air cargo
    processing ``footprint'' through security measures specified within
    their airport security program which identifies a portion of the
    airport as Secured Area, Security Identification Display Area, and
    Sterile Area. These security procedures are designed to prevent
    unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and ground
    vehicles within the air operations area. Current procedures require a
    personnel identification system which allows different levels of
    access, subjects individuals to employment history verification checks,
    and provides individual training.
        Question. What are other countries doing to address this issue?
        Answer. The United Nations' International Civil Aviation
    Organization (ICAO) establishes International Standards, Recommended
    Practices and Procedures covering the technical fields of aviation,
    including air cargo security.
        Countries or States, as commonly referred to by ICAO, are afforded
    a great deal of discretion to establish and implement measures to
    comply with standards directly related to air cargo security. The
    substance of ICAO's air cargo standards are as follows:
      --States shall ensure the implementation of measures at airports
            serving international civil aviation to protect cargo and
            baggage moved within an airport and intended for carriage on an
            aircraft to safeguard such aircraft against an act of unlawful
            interference.
      --States shall establish measures to ensure that cargo intended for
            carriage on passenger flights are subjected to appropriate
            security controls.
      --States shall establish measures to ensure that operators do not
            accept consignment of cargo for carriage on passenger flights
            unless the security of such consignments is accounted for by a
            regulated agent or such consignments are subjected to other
            security controls.
        The ICAO Security Manual provides guidance on how an ICAO Member
    State might comply with the standards. The methods of compliance
    provided in the guidance material are based on generally recognized
    practices and procedures common within the international civil aviation
    industry, but they are not the only means of compliance. ICAO
    recognizes that other methods of compliance may be equally appropriate.

                               TSA PASSENGER FEES

        Question. The President's budget request proposes increasing the
    passenger security fee by $3.00 from $2.50 to $5.50 for the first leg
    of an airline trip. Has TSA or the Department conducted any studies to
    determine what the flying public would pay in exchange for better
    aviation security?
        Answer. Yes. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA),
    enacted in November 2001, anticipated that the aviation industry, not
    the general taxpayer, would pay for airline security costs. To estimate
    the passengers' willingness to pay the additional cost of air
    transportation, TSA conducted an analysis that included comparing year-
    to-year revenue collections, reviewing Department of Transportation
    data reported by the airlines themselves to estimate industry growth,
    utilizing the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aviation industry
    forecast, and accessing major research studies that outline issues from
    airline fare structure to passenger demand and willingness to pay.
        TSA also conducted a review of current research on air passengers'
    willingness to pay for aviation security. Of particular interest to TSA
    was a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Corporation in
    August 2002 of airline passengers for the American Automobile
    Association (AAA). In that survey, approximately nine out of ten
    respondents indicated that they were willing to pay something more than
    the current passenger security fees. AAA's conclusion is as follows:
    ``Americans remain committed to aviation security. It's one thing to
    demand increased security and to be unwilling to pay for it. No one
    likes to pay more for the goods or services we buy. But what this
    survey seems to say is that Americans not only want to feel secure when
    they fly, they are willing to pick up some of the cost, if necessary.''
        Question. What is the impact to the industry?
        Answer. TSA believes that the modest fee increases of this proposed
    budget should not undermine passenger traffic nor worsen the industry's
    health. U.S. air traffic reported for 2004 by the Department of
    Transportation (DOT) is near or above the year 2000 levels. Despite the
    re-imposition of fees after a 4 month suspension under the Emergency
    Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11), the
    DOT domestic passenger traffic statistics showed an increase from a
    total of 588 million in 2003 to 630 million in 2004--a 7.2 percent
    increase.
        TSA researched the impact the fee increase might have on airline
    profitability. TSA was unable to locate any study that conclusively
    linked a passenger fee increase, applicable to all airlines, with a
    measurable decline in airline profitability. The September 11 Security
    Fee is a uniform fee imposed on the passengers of all similar air
    carrier operations and flights. Consequently, the fee should not put
    individual airlines in a competitive disadvantage with one another. In
    fact, the security and other aviation fees comprise a larger percentage
    of the ticket price for low cost carriers, yet the low cost carriers
    are currently the most profitable among the domestic airlines.
        TSA regularly monitors the state of the aviation industry,
    including the level of operations and the financial status of the
    airlines. Here are two examples of informational sources TSA uses in
    order to accomplish this goal:
      --Various publications of the DOT Airline Fares Consumer Report were
            analyzed, and it was found that the answer depends upon various
            factors such as market size, number of carriers, and market
            structure. The data shows that competition within the aviation
            industry has a stronger influence on base fares than security
            fees.
      --Canada has extensively researched the economic impact of its
            passenger security fee called Air Travelers Security Charge.
            Using both Canadian and U.S. data, the researchers concluded
            that markets with traffic levels over 100,000 passengers are
            relatively price inelastic (an increase in price results in
            either no or virtually no reduction in demand.). The research
            results did not find that the September 11 Security Fee impacts
            airline profitability.
        Question. Does the passenger fee proposal require legislation or
    are there other options?
        Answer. The passenger security service fees were authorized by the
    Aviation and Transportation Security Act and codified at 49 U.S.C.
    44940. Currently, 49 U.S.C. 44940(c) limits the passenger fee to $2.50
    per enplanement, not to exceed $5 per one-way trip. The proposal to
    increase the passenger fee would require 49 U.S.C. 44940(c) to be
    modified to set the new fee level at $5.50 per enplanement, not to
    exceed $8 per one-way trip.
        Question. The budget requests that this fee change be legislated on
    an appropriations bill. However, this should properly be submitted to
    the authorizing committees of jurisdiction. Has the President
    transmitted the proposed legislation to Congress for consideration and
    if not, why?
        Answer. The President provided a legislative proposal to modify
    this fee authority in the fiscal year 2006 budget. In Title V--General
    Provisions of the Appendix (page 526), the proposal states: ``SEC. 517.
    In Chapter 449 of title 49, United States Code, section 44940(c) is
    amended by striking `$2.50' and replacing it with `$5.50', and striking
    `$5.00' and replacing it with `$8.00'.'' This modification to the fee
    authority would allow TSA to implement the fee increases sought in the
    President's fiscal year 2006 Budget.
        Question. What will be the impact on DHS' programs and activities
    if this legislative proposal is not enacted as a general provision of
    the Appropriations Act or by the appropriate authorizing committee?
        Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry,
    passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is
    sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity
    of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is
    intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from
    the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work
    with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.
        Question. When would such a fee request have to be enacted to fund
    fiscal year 2006 activities?
        Answer. TSA estimates that if the fee were to be enacted in time to
    be effective at the beginning of fiscal year 2006, the agency will be
    able to raise as much as $1.879 billion in additional fees. If the
    proposal is enacted after October 1, the delay involved in providing
    the necessary updates in fees and guidance to the industry could result
    in reduced collections.
        Question. What new aviation security measures would you put in
    place utilizing the increased revenues or will these resources be used
    throughout the Department?
        Answer. The purpose of the fee increase is not to fund new
    activities. Rather, it is to offset funding from the general fund with
    fee revenue. Compared to the past and current level of 50 percent or
    less, the fee would contribute to offsetting nearly the full amount of
    TSA screening costs.
        These costs represent the vast majority of TSA's aviation security
    screening costs. TSA does not have the authority to offset any other
    costs with the aviation security fee collections. The increased fees on
    passengers, the users of the security screening, will ensure fee levels
    approaching near full recovery of the Federal cost to operate the
    system.

                         TSA AIR CARRIER SECURITY FEES

        Question. At the direction of the Committee, GAO has completed a
    review in order to validate the air carrier's estimates of their
    security costs in 2000. GAO found that the estimates, currently the
    foundation for the fees paid to the Department by the airlines, are
    $127 million too low. Due to these findings, Mr. Secretary, will you
    take action to collect the additional fees from the airlines?
        Answer. In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, (Public
    Law 108-334) Congress directed the GAO to determine how much air
    carriers spent on security screening in 2000--the basis for the fee
    imposed on airlines. GAO completed its review and issued a report on
    April 18, 2005. The report concludes that the amount of the industry-
    wide passenger and property screening costs was between $425 million
    and $471 million, with a midpoint estimate of $448 million. The
    midpoint difference between what is collected now and what GAO
    indicates should be collected is $129 million. However, GAO's estimate
    did not include certain cost categories (e.g.; real estate, CAPPS, and
    positive bag match) due to the unavailability of information within the
    timeframe provided. The cost of these items could be significant. TSA
    is currently reviewing all the findings of the. Once TSA completes its
    review, the agency will proceed as quickly as practicable to address
    the issue.
        Question. Will TSA require legislation to change the air carriers'
    charges or can this be done through regulation?
        Answer. No legislation is required. The fiscal year 2005 Homeland
    Security Appropriations Act and the Aviation and Transportation
    Security Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 44940, provide sufficient
    authority for TSA to collect additional amounts from the air carriers.
    However, changes to the air carriers' fees would require changes to
    regulations currently in effect at 49 CFR Part 1511.
        Question. When must the regulation be in place in order to generate
    enough revenues to cover your costs in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. To collect the air carrier fee at the current level of
    approximately $315 million in fiscal year 2006, no new or changes in
    the regulation would be required. The $350 million estimated in the
    President's budget captures costs that are currently disputed or not
    reported altogether by air carriers due to bankruptcies. TSA is in the
    process of pursuing the amounts under dispute. The unreported and
    disputed costs will be determined and charged when TSA implements the
    new structure for the air carrier fee, for which rulemaking is
    currently in progress. Additionally, TSA is currently reviewing GAO's
    findings that the aviation security costs self-reported by the air
    carriers should be $448 million, $129 million more than originally
    reported by the industry.
        Question. Will your regulatory proposal focus on changing the basic
    structure of how airlines are charged for security costs or is it
    intended to focus on the difference between the actual revenue
    generated, $350 million, and TSA's target last year of $750 million?
        Answer. TSA is evaluating the current regulatory approach to
    determining if change is needed.
        Question. For fiscal year 2005, there are some that estimate the
    air carrier fee will generate only $315 million, not $350 million. What
    are you planning to do to address any shortfall?
        Answer. The $315 million represents a total rounded year 2000 cost
    figure reported by all carriers to TSA. The $350 million estimate
    captures costs that are currently disputed or not reported altogether
    by air carriers due to bankruptcies. TSA is in the process of pursuing
    the amounts under dispute. The unreported and disputed costs will be
    determined and charged when TSA implements the structure for the air
    carrier fee, for which rulemaking is currently in progress.
        Question. What activities will go unfunded or deferred as a result
    of the funding gap?
        Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry,
    passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is
    sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity
    of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is
    intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from
    the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work
    with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.

                             TSA CONTRACT SCREENERS

        Question. What analysis has the Department done to determine
    whether contracting for private screeners is cost-effective and equally
    or more effective in terms of security than a federalized force?
        Answer. TSA commissioned an independent evaluation of the five
    pilot airport passenger screening programs that was completed in April
    2004. The evaluation utilized a methodology that included the
    following:
        Evaluation Categories:
      --Security effectiveness: covert test results, Threat Image
            Protection (TIP), and re-certification scores;
      --Customer/stakeholder satisfaction: customer surveys, stakeholder
            surveys, and customer complaints; and
      --Cost: total cost the contractor charged for screening services
            (including only contract payments and costs borne by TSA)
            compared to estimates on how much would have been spent by TSA
            had the agency conducted the screening operations at those
            airports.
        The evaluation concluded that there was no statistical difference
    in any of the three evaluation categories between private and Federal
    screeners. In addition, as more airports transition to the Screener
    Partnership Program (SPP), TSA plans to continue to measure costs of
    Federal screening operations compared to private screening companies.
        TSA also commissioned an activity-based cost (ABC) study to provide
    improved visibility into the costs of specific business processes and
    activities, and the associated resources (e.g., people, technology)
    consumed by those processes and activities (i.e., cost per bag or
    person screened). The ABC study included ten randomly selected airports
    that utilize TSA screeners and the five pilot airports. The study will
    better enable TSA to identify and collect the cost and performance
    metrics needed to establish a successful, ongoing cost and performance
    management framework at TSA. The results of the ABC study will provide
    another means for TSA management to assess screening operations by
    airport.
        Question. Is TSA establishing a cost benchmark and collecting the
    right kind of information in order to evaluate the costs of providing
    Federal screeners vs. the costs of having contract screeners?
        Answer. TSA plans to develop a cost baseline for each airport that
    applies to participate in the SPP. This cost baseline will be used to
    evaluate cost proposals from private screening companies. The results
    of the TSA activity-based cost study will also support development of
    these baselines.
        Question. In what ways is it more effective for the government to
    use contract screeners?
        Answer. An independent evaluation concluded that there was no
    statistical difference between private and Federal screeners. TSA
    believes that the independent evaluation, along with the activity-based
    cost study, confirms that TSA has been successful in administering an
    effective private screening program that is capable of providing
    security screening services at levels required by the ATSA.
        Question. What incentives do you have in place and what are you
    doing to address the private sector's concerns about security liability
    related to the private screener workforce?
        Answer. In directing TSA to establish a contract screening pilot
    program (PP5), the ATSA required that the level of screening services
    and protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal to or greater than
    the level provided at an airport with Federal screeners. Consequently,
    as airports consider whether to continue with Federal screening or to
    apply to the SPP, their decisions can be based on their own preferences
    and criteria rather than considerations of security, resources, or
    level of service.
        ATSA states that TSA shall allow an airport operator to submit an
    application to have screening carried out by the screening personnel of
    a qualified private screening company. TSA is committed to developing a
    fair, balanced program that does the following:
      --Meets ATSA standards
      --Ensures security
      --Seeks to establish a strong public/private partnership
      --Provides significant opportunity for innovation, efficiency, and
            cost savings to the taxpayer
      --Provides decentralized management
      --Incorporates best practices and lessons learned from recent studies
            of the Pilot program, and continues to evaluate and learn on an
            on-going basis
      --Is performance-based
      --Does not restrict airport participation
      --Respects Federal and private sector workforces
        Under ATSA, the decision to apply for private screening services
    lies with individual airport operators. However, should TSA approve the
    application, TSA will continue to oversee airport security, whether an
    airport has private contract screeners or Federal screeners.
        TSA does not provide specific liability limitations for private
    passenger and baggage screening services. However, vendors can apply
    for protections under the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
    Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act). Enacted as part of the Homeland
    Security Act of 2002, the SAFETY Act provides incentives for the
    development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating a
    system of risk and liability management. The purpose of the Act is to
    ensure that the threat of liability does not deter potential
    manufacturers/sellers from making anti-terrorism technologies
    available. The Act provides two types of benefits: (1) Designation as a
    Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (``QATT''), which among other
    benefits limits the seller's liability to the amount of available
    insurance, and (2) Certification as an Approved Product for Homeland
    Security, which allows the seller to assert the Government Contractor
    Defense. Sellers must apply for SAFETY Act protections and are
    evaluated in accordance with the statutory criteria. Protections under
    the SAFETY Act only apply when a QATT has been deployed in defense
    against, response to, or recovery from an act of terrorism. The Act
    contains a very broad definition of technology, which includes both
    tangible products and services as long as they designed, developed,
    modified, or procured for the specific purpose of preventing,
    detecting, identifying, or deterring act of terrorism.
        TSA is working with the S&T Directorate, which is charged with
    making determinations regarding the SAFETY Act. TSA understands that
    two of the private contract screening companies under the PP5 program
    have been granted designation under the SAFETY Act. TSA will also
    continue to work closely with DHS and the S&T Directorate regarding any
    decision DHS makes concerning the potential legal exposure of all
    entities participating in the Screening Partnership Program.
        Question. How well have the privatized screeners at the 5 pilot
    airports worked?
        Answer. TSA believes that private screeners and Federal screeners
    perform equally as well in screening passengers.
        Question. A recent article in Government Security News reports that
    the traveling public is more satisfied with the private screeners than
    the Federal screeners. Is this an accurate statement?
        Answer. This is not an accurate statement. TSA's annual customer
    service survey showed that for the second year in a row there was very
    little difference in the high degree of confidence and satisfaction air
    travelers have in TSA-trained screeners--Federal or private. For the
    second year in a row, air travelers gave consistently high marks to
    TSA's security screeners. Between 80 and 95 percent of passengers gave
    positive responses when asked about seven aspects of the Federal
    security screening process, which included thoroughness and courtesy of
    screeners as well as confidence in TSA's ability to keep air travel
    secure. In addition, TSA is meeting or exceeding passenger expectations
    for security line wait times.
        Question. This past November TSA opened the Program Management
    Office to assist airports in privatizing their screener workforce. How
    many applications for private screeners has this office received?
        Answer. As of May 2005, TSA has received seven applications from
    airport operators seeking to participate in the SPP. All five of the
    airports that participated in the private screening pilot program (PP5)
    have applied (San Francisco, Kansas City, Rochester, Jackson Hole, and
    Tupelo), along with two new airports (Elko, Nevada and Sioux Falls,
    South Dakota).
        Question. How many applications for private screeners at airports
    do you anticipate receiving?
        Answer. The decision on whether to apply to the SPP rests solely
    with the airport. Therefore, although several airports have expressed
    interest in participating in the program, TSA cannot speculate on how
    many will actually apply.
        Question. How did you determine the level of screening service to
    be provided at these 5 airports?
        Answer. The ATSA requires that the level of screening services and
    protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal to or greater than the
    level provided at an airport with Federal screeners. TSA will continue
    to set one standard for security for the entire commercial aviation
    system, whether an airport has Federal screeners or private screeners.
    TSA will ensure that standards are met through TSA security protocols,
    extensive contract oversight, conducting covert testing, and continuous
    oversight by Federal Security Directors and their staff in both Federal
    and SPP airports.
        Per ATSA, TSA is also required to supervise private screening
    services at each SPP airport. Private screeners must perform at the
    same or better level as Federal screeners and comply with Federal
    passenger and baggage screening standard operating procedures.
        ATSA also gives TSA the ability to terminate a contract with a
    private screening firm for repeatedly failing to perform. TSA will not
    hesitate to take action against airports using contract screeners if
    they fall below Federal security standards, and TSA will vigorously
    enforce the contract requirements.
        Question. Are the screening standards for the privatized airports
    negotiated or does TSA establish them?
        Answer. TSA applies the same rigorous security standards, referred
    to officially as Standard Operating Procedures, to private screeners as
    it does to the Federal screeners. Passenger and baggage security
    screening standards are non-negotiable.
        Question. Does the contract include paying for the annual
    recertification of screeners by the contractor as well as compensation
    and benefits?
        Answer. Yes. Screener annual re-certification training is conducted
    by and paid for by TSA. Private screener compensation and benefits are
    also funded by TSA up to the point required by the ATSA which mandates
    that private screeners receive compensation and benefits are not less
    than the compensation and benefits for Federal screeners.
        Question. Does the private screener workforce have access to
    Federal benefits or is this just strictly a contract for services
    provided?
        Answer. No, private screener workforce employees do not have access
    to Federal benefits. While the ATSA mandates that private screeners
    receive compensation and benefits that are not less than the
    compensation and benefits for Federal screeners, those benefits are not
    provided by the Federal Government. Screeners employed by private
    screening companies do receive benefits, and TSA monitors the overall
    pay and benefits package provided by private screening companies to
    ensure that the ATSA-mandated minimum is attained.
        Question. What changes would you recommend to the contract screener
    program?
        Answer. At the present time, TSA is not seeking changes to the ATSA
    regarding provisions to this program. TSA is open to and welcomes
    dialogue with airports and Congress on any improvements that could be
    made to the SPP. Some of the changes airports have indicated that they
    would like to see include the following:
      --Change ATSA's requirement that private screening compensation and
            benefits be equal to or greater than Federal compensation and
            benefits
      --Allow airports to share in any savings realized. For example, cost
            savings realized at an airport with private screeners would be
            used to enhance security screening at that airport
      --Investigate pooling worker's compensation insurance to reduce costs
            through economies of scale
      --Investigate broadening the private screening contractor's scope of
            responsibility to include other non-screening functions that
            impact security screening (e.g., document checkers, baggage
            handlers, bin runners, equipment maintenance, etc.)

                             TSA SCREENER TRAINING

        Question. How many hours of training does the average screener
    receive?
        Answer. The ATSA requires that all screeners complete a minimum of
    40 hours of classroom training and 60 hours of On-the-Job (OJT)
    training. In addition to this basic training requirement, TSA Federal
    Security Directors (FSD) also use a standard of 3 hours per week
    (measured on average over a calendar quarter) of scheduled duty time,
    per screener, to accomplish recurrent, administrative, and professional
    development training. The FSD must create a training schedule that
    meets the goal of the 3 hours per week standard as well as the specific
    performance and developmental needs of each individual screener. In
    addition, TSA provides screeners with additional skills directly
    related to specific screener duties. An example is the On-screen Alarm
    Resolution Protocol (OSARP) Training. OSARP allows screeners to
    evaluate items causing an alarm and to potentially clear those items
    without subjecting the bag to a secondary search. The training for
    OSARP totals 19.5 hours and includes classroom training, small group
    simulator training, hands-on individual simulator training, and OJT
    training.
        Question. Who conducts the training?
        Answer. Basic screener training is overseen by TSA's Office of
    Workforce Performance and Training (WPT). The training is provided by
    instructors under contract with TSA or by local TSA Approved
    Instructors (TAIs) when possible. On-the-Job, cross-over, recurrent,
    and specialized training is conducted by local TSA personnel (i.e.,
    TAIs, Training Coordinators, Screener Supervisors) and via the Online
    Learning Center. Advanced training is initially provided by WPT
    contractors and then sustained by TAIs.
        Question. Does this training include anything regarding ethics and
    baggage theft?
        Answer. During the initial 100 hours of basic training, TSA
    requires all screeners to review and sign a Code of Conduct. This Code
    of Conduct emphasizes such issues as public trust and honesty. Once
    initially trained, screeners continually receive recurrent professional
    ethics training including the ``Customer Service Web-Based Training,''
    which reinforces TSA's customer service principles and gives the
    screener training in various scenarios requiring effective customer
    service responses. Screeners are also provided the ``TSA Pledge to
    Travelers,'' which emphasizes TSA's dual mission of providing World
    Class Security and World Class Customer Service, assures the traveling
    public that they are entitled to a security screening experience that
    is professional and courteous, and that any experience to the contrary
    should be reported back to TSA. In addition, TSA has sent several
    communications to all employees (not just screeners) of their
    responsibilities on ethical conduct, including the restrictions under
    the Hatch Act related to the acceptance of gifts by Federal employees.
    All employees also receive a copy of and are required to sign TSA HRM
    Letter No. 735-1, Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and
    Conduct, which contains many of the Standards of Conduct provisions.
    Finally, to remind screeners of the consequences of unethical behavior,
    TSA has disseminated Management Directive 1100.75-3 informing screeners
    of the policies and procedures for disciplinary actions that could be
    taken against them.
        TSA is committed to providing comprehensive ethics training and is
    currently developing a general ethics course that is expected to be
    available via the Online Learning Center by the end of the third
    quarter of fiscal year 2005. This course will cover topics such as
    principles, misuse of position, gifts, and outside activities.
        Question. What is your response to the OIG's report regarding
    baggage theft by screeners?
        Answer. TSA's responses to the specific recommendations in the
    Inspector General's report are as follows:
        Recommendation 1.--Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the
    physical layout of inspection stations, and the feasibility of
    installing electronic surveillance techniques near inspection stations.
        TSA continuously reviews procedures related to the screening of
    baggage including supervision of personnel, physical layout, and
    electronic surveillance techniques. The agency will continue to do so
    by implementing the congressional requirements of the Intelligence
    Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act concerning checked baggage
    screening area monitoring, which requires the Under Secretary for
    Border and Transportation Security to provide assistance, subject to
    the availability of funds, to public airports that have baggage
    handling areas that are not open to public view in the acquisition and
    installment of security monitoring cameras for surveillance of such
    areas in order to detect theft from checked baggage and to aid in the
    speedy resolution of liability claims against TSA.
        TSA's Office of Aviation Security Programs is working closely with
    the Office of the Chief Information Officer to plan and execute a
    program for the installation of electronic surveillance systems (ESS)
    to deter and detect incidents of baggage pilferage and claims arising
    from such incidents. $14 million has been made available for ESS
    systems in fiscal year 2005 and plans are being developed to either
    install ESS where none existed before or make use of or supplement
    existing airport systems to leverage available resources. TSA is
    working in partnership with airports to find the most cost effective
    means to install and maintain current and future ESS systems.
        Searching checked baggage in view of the passenger obviously
    mitigates incidents of pilferage, but as inspection stations move away
    from lobbies and into airport baggage handling areas, ESS will rise in
    importance as will emphasis on proper supervision of such areas.
        Recommendation 2.--Include a module on professional ethics in its
    screening training curriculum.
        A general ethics course is under development and should be
    available on the Online Learning Center in the next 4-6 weeks. This
    course will be mandatory for all TSA employees, with a second component
    required for all supervisors available during the same timeframe. New
    employees will have 90 days to complete this course. For existing
    employees, the training will be required within 6 months.
        On pages six and seven of the draft report, there is discussion of
    previous cases of prosecution against TSA screeners based on ``sting''
    or surveillance evidence. The Office of Workforce Performance and
    Training will incorporate the occurrence of such incidents into an
    existing lesson that is currently taught in all three of the basic
    screener training courses (Dual Function Screener, Passenger, and
    Baggage).
        Currently, TSA screeners do receive some ethics training though
    they are not required to receive annual ethics training because they do
    not file financial disclosure reports. The field attorneys at the
    Office of Chief Counsel often make annual ethics training sessions for
    financial disclosure filers at their airports available to the screener
    workforce as well. TSA screeners received the TSA Guide to Major Ethics
    Rules as new employees. Also, all employees must sign the TSA HRM
    Letter No. 735-1, Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and
    Conduct, which contains many of the Standards of Ethical Conduct
    provisions. Field attorneys have also displayed ethics posters in TSA
    offices and breakrooms.
        Additionally, in 2003 and 2004, several articles in The Sentinel
    were published on ethics issues, including the 14 Principles of Ethical
    Conduct, gifts, buddy passes, and the Hatch Act. The Sentinel is a
    newsletter distributed to the entire TSA workforce.
        Recommendation 3.--Resume negotiating an agreement with the airline
    industry on shared liability for lost or stolen baggage claims.
        TSA recently resumed discussions with the airline industry based on
    the following set of objectives: (1) improve customer service,
    including communication to the passengers about where to file claims;
    (2) enhance detection of fraud, including duplicative claims; (3)
    facilitate cooperation in resolving exceptional claims when necessary;
    and (4) develop open channels of communication between the Claims
    Management Office and airline claims offices.
        At a meeting on January 11, 2005, the airlines were receptive to
    these proposed goals, and TSA provided a white paper to the airline
    community describing our proposed goals in June 2005. The airline
    associations will then share this paper with their members and provide
    feedback to TSA. The goal is to have a memorandum of cooperation that
    all domestic airlines are able to sign by late summer 2005.
        General Comment to the Report.--The topic of property inadvertently
    left out of bags is discussed on page 7 of the OIG report. TSA
    recognizes that this is a problem and has advised that this property be
    handled as lost and unclaimed property. Under lost and unclaimed
    procedures, property recovered after checked baggage has been screened
    will be inventoried and held for at least 30 days to provide the owner
    an opportunity to reclaim the property. Should it be unfeasible or
    impractical for the owner to reclaim the property in a timely fashion,
    and he or she has evidence that TSA opened his or her baggage through
    such means as a Notice of Inspection, the passenger may submit a claim
    for the missing property.
        Question. How do you track a screener's progress in terms of
    consistently utilizing the skills and delivering the appropriate and
    acceptable service and security they've been trained to deliver?
        Answer. As mandated in a February 2004 TSA Management Directive,
    all training accomplishments must be documented in TSA's centralized
    Online Learning Center (OLC). TSA management routinely monitors
    compliance with mandatory training requirements and recurrent training
    guidelines. Federal Security Directors (FSD) are responsible for
    ensuring compliance locally on an individual basis.
        The aforementioned management directive has been updated as part of
    the routine annual review cycle and was circulated for comment within
    TSA in May 2005. This update includes clear language on the
    responsibility of the training administrator to document all required
    training within 30 days (7 days for screener basic training), the
    supervisor's responsibility to ensure their employees have completed
    all required training, and the role of the course sponsor to monitor
    national compliance with program requirements. TSA intends to ensure
    that all employees complete the required amount of training by
    incorporating this requirement into the fiscal year 2006 Performance
    Agreements of all TSA supervisors.
        In May 2005, the OLC was enhanced to include a much more robust
    reporting engine that will provide Training Administrators and Course
    Sponsors with detailed accountability reports.
        Additionally, screeners must undergo re-certification each year.
    The re-certification program for 2004-2005 includes three separate
    paths: passenger, dual function, and baggage. Passenger screeners must
    pass three modules. Module 1 is a job knowledge, Standard Operating
    Procedures (SOP)-specific test. Module 2 is an image test. Module 3
    contains practical skills demonstrations. Dual function screeners take
    both job knowledge tests for passenger and baggage screeners, an image
    test, and practical skills demonstrations. Baggage screeners must pass
    two modules, a job knowledge, SOP-specific test and practical skills
    demonstrations.
        To be re-certified, screeners have to pass all applicable modules
    of the Knowledge and Skills Assessment Program and achieve a rating of
    meets or exceeds' standards on their annual Personal Performance
    Assessment. Screeners are afforded one opportunity for remediation and
    retest. Following a retest, those screeners who fail to re-certify are
    terminated.
        Question. How do you hold the screeners accountable for
    inappropriate behavior?
        Answer. The responsibility and accountability for employee conduct
    issues rests with the Federal Security Directors at airports. TSA has
    implemented a leadership model that requires managers to address
    behaviors that fail to support the TSA mission and to work with
    employees to engage in appropriate behaviors or face consequences for
    continued patterns of misconduct. TSA has also implemented policies to
    implement single step termination procedures for high-risk offenses
    such as illegal drug use, alcohol on duty, and theft. TSA regards the
    commission of such offenses as posing a potential security risk. TSA is
    always mindful of ensuring that due process protections for employees
    are maintained and has appropriate appeal mechanisms for conduct
    matters to include the Disciplinary Review Board, the Agency Grievance
    process and appeals to the Office of Civil Rights. In addition, TSA has
    a Professional Review Board at headquarters to review and take
    appropriate action for misconduct involving senior level employees.
        Question. What are the penalties for poor performance?
        Answer. The penalties for poor performance range from counseling to
    removal depending upon the nature, cause, and severity of the
    performance deficiency. Additionally, screeners must undergo re-
    certification each year. Failure to re-certify may result in
    termination or, in special cases, retraining.
        Question. In the worst case what is the threshold for removal from
    work?
        Answer. TSA has established mandatory termination procedures for
    offenses such as illegal drug use, alcohol on duty, and theft. TSA
    regards the commission of such offenses as posing a potential security
    risk. In addition, TSA has established policies for first offense
    terminations for matters affecting integrity and security at the
    airport such as sleeping on duty, violations of Standard Operating
    Procedures, security breaches, and criminal conduct.
        Question. With such a high workmen's compensation number--one of
    the highest of the Federal workforce--is there specialized training in
    place to address this?
        Answer. In early fiscal year 2003, TSA met Congressional deadlines
    to hire Federal airport passenger screeners and achieve checked baggage
    screening using Explosive Detection Systems. As the TSA screening
    workforce was deployed, it became apparent that injuries caused by
    lifting and quickly moving baggage were a serious problem. TSA
    initiated a safety program in the second quarter of fiscal year 2003 to
    address the high rate of injuries.
        Fiscal year 2004's rate increase from fiscal year 2003 is
    attributed, in part, to the processing of backlogged claims from
    incidents that actually occurred in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year
    2004, TSA began implementation of an Occupational Safety and Health
    program aimed at lowering TSA's injury and illness rate. By the
    midpoint of fiscal year 2004, a decrease in the number of claims could
    be seen, and the decrease appears to be continuing into fiscal year
    2005. Training, guidance, a nurse intervention program, and the
    availability of field safety support have contributed significantly to
    the decrease. For example, in the first 15 weeks of operation, the
    nurse intervention program at 21 pilot airports yielded savings of over
    $2.2 million.
        It is important to emphasize that airline baggage handling is among
    the most injury prone occupations in the private sector. TSA is
    committed to the well-being of its employees and is taking the steps
    necessary to reduce screener injuries by improving working conditions
    and appropriately managing the claims process.
        TSA has also distributed a safety awareness Web-Based Training
    (WBT) course both as a CD and via the Online Learning Center. This
    safety awareness WBT course covers such topics as proper lifting
    techniques, heat injury prevention, and checkpoint and checked baggage
    safety. In addition, training on radiation safety awareness is being
    developed.

                       TSA ``NO FLY'' LISTS/SECURE FLIGHT

        Question. How does one get on the ``no fly list'', and more
    importantly, how does someone get off the list?
        Answer. U.S. Government intelligence and law enforcement agencies
    collect, analyze, and evaluate data used to nominate subjects to the
    No-Fly List. Intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers within
    these organizations carefully review nominations based on the No-Fly
    List criteria and thoroughly evaluate the information during each step
    of the process. Watch List nominations often contain classified and/or
    sensitive law enforcement investigative information. Nominations that
    meet the established criteria are forwarded to the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center for
    inclusion in the TSC Data Base (TSDB) and for addition to the No-Fly
    List. Time sensitive nominations may be routed directly to the TSC if
    required.
        If it is determined that a person on the No-Fly List should no
    longer be identified as a No-Fly subject, they will be removed from the
    list. If additional intelligence data is developed or a subject has
    been interviewed by U.S. Government officials and deemed no longer a
    threat, an official request for removal must be submitted to the agency
    that placed the individual on the list. The original nominating agency
    will evaluate the data and determine whether the person stays on or is
    removed from the No-Fly List. The nominating agency will then make a
    formal request through the nomination chain requesting that the person
    be removed from the No-Fly List. In some cases, a review of the
    derogatory information associated with a No-Fly nomination may result
    in the subject being downgraded to the TSA Selectee List.
        The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is currently
    developing a redress process for addressing any situation where
    passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out
    for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This
    process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously
    placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with
    the nominating agency to review the derogatory information. The redress
    process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as
    appropriate.
        TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons
    who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity of their
    names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists.
    A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a
    completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA
    will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these
    procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a
    boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as
    other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the
    following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
    display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
        However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the
    watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers
    from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and
    identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This
    information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required
    identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly
    determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose
    name is actually on the watch lists.
        In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her
    inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after
    the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
        Question. What is TSA doing to address the fact that people are
    erroneously placed on the list or have mistaken identities?
        Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for
    persons who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity
    of their names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the
    watch lists. A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by
    submitting a completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA
    headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a determination
    of whether these procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-
    in process for a boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification
    Form, as well as other information, has been posted on TSA's public
    website at the following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
    display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
        However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the
    watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers
    from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and
    identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This
    information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required
    identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly
    determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose
    name is actually on the watch lists.
        In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her
    inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after
    the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
        The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is currently
    developing a redress process for addressing any situation where
    passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out
    for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This
    process will also allow passengers who feel they have erroneously been
    placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with
    the nominating agency to review the derogatory information.
        Question. What's the appeal process for these people? Is it within
    or outside TSA?
        Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for
    persons who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity
    of their names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the
    watch lists. A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by
    submitting a completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA
    headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a determination
    of whether these procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-
    in process for a boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification
    Form, as well as other information, has been posted on TSA's public
    website at the following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
    display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
        However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the
    watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers
    from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and
    identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This
    information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required
    identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly
    determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose
    name is actually on the watch lists.
        In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her
    inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after
    the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
        Question. Is there legal recourse for those mistakenly put on the
    list?
        Answer. The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is
    currently developing a redress process for addressing any situation
    where passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled
    out for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program.
    This process will also allow passengers who feel they have erroneously
    been placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work
    with the nominating agency to review the derogatory information.
        Question. What is the Department doing to address the serious
    concerns about privacy and the use of personal passenger information?
        Answer. To protect passengers' personal information and civil
    liberties, TSA and the Secure Flight program will:
      --Limit the collection of personal information to only what conforms
            to the relevant and necessary standard according to The Privacy
            Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552 (a));
      --Limit access to the information to only those TSA employees and
            contractors who have a ``need to know'' clearance in order to
            perform their duties associated with Secure Flight operations;
      --Ensure that each employee and contractor associated with the Secure
            Flight program has completed the TSA mandatory privacy training
            prior to beginning work on the program;
      --Limit sharing of personal information to the Federal Bureau of
            Investigation (FBI) and intelligence agencies that need the
            information for investigatory purposes related to aviation
            security, in accordance with TSA's Privacy Act System of
            Records Notice published for the program;
      --Include a built-in auditing mechanism to detect unauthorized access
            to the personal information stored for the program;
      --Limit the retention of the data. TSA has requested that the
            National Archives and Records Administration approve a 72-hour
            retention period for the information collected and used for the
            Secure Flight program unless a longer retention period is
            requested by the passenger for redress; and
      --Include robust redress mechanisms to enable passengers to work with
            TSA to resolve instances in which they think they are being
            inappropriately selected for secondary screening or they are
            having a difficult time obtaining boarding passes.
        Question. TSA has a program under development, called Secure Flight
    which takes personal passenger information and compares it to the ``no
    fly list'' in an effort to identify suspected terrorists traveling by
    air. How do you respond to concerns raised by both the DHS OIG and the
    GAO about the Department's handling and use of the personal passenger
    information related to Secure Flight? What are you doing to remedy the
    situation?
        Answer. To protect passengers' personal information and civil
    liberties, TSA and the Secure Flight program will:
      --Limit the collection of personal information to only what conforms
            to the relevant and necessary standard according to The Privacy
            Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552 (a));
      --Limit access to the information to only those TSA employees and
            contractors who have a ``need to know'' clearance in order to
            perform their duties associated with Secure Flight operations;
      --Ensure that each employee and contractor associated with the Secure
            Flight program has completed the TSA mandatory privacy training
            prior to beginning work on the program;
      --Limit sharing of personal information to the FBI and intelligence
            agencies that need the information for investigatory purposes
            related to aviation security, in accordance with TSA's Privacy
            Act System of Records Notice published for the program;
      --Include a built-in auditing mechanism to detect unauthorized access
            to the personal information stored for the program;
      --Limit the retention of the data. TSA has requested that the
            National Archives and Records Administration approve a 72-hour
            retention period for the information collected and used for the
            Secure Flight program unless a longer retention period is
            requested by the passenger for redress; and
      --Include robust redress mechanisms to enable passengers to work with
            TSA to resolve instances in which they think they are being
            inappropriately selected for secondary screening or they are
            having a difficult time obtaining boarding passes.
        Question. Why did you discontinue development of Secure Flight's
    predecessor CAPPS II?
        Answer. On September 24, 2004, DHS announced its intent to
    implement a next generation aviation passenger pre-screening program
    called Secure Flight. Unlike CAPPS II, Secure Flight will focus only on
    identifying potential terrorist threats (those people on watch lists)
    and, if a decision is made to use commercial data, it will be utilized
    in a focused and limited manner. Under Secure Flight, TSA will take
    over from the air carriers responsibility for the comparison of
    domestic airline Passenger Name Record (PNR) information against
    terrorist watch lists. Secure Flight will meet DHS' goals of improving
    the security and safety of travelers on domestic flights, reducing
    passenger airport screening time, and protecting privacy and civil
    liberties. Consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
    Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), TSA will begin implementing Secure
    Flight in August 2005.
        TSA recently concluded initial system effectiveness testing for
    Secure Flight. The commercial data testing began on March 18, 2005, and
    preliminary test results for the commercial data testing are expected
    later in 2005.
        Secure Flight is designed to improve the efficiency of the
    prescreening process and reduce the number of people selected for
    secondary screening. TSA will compare domestic flight PNR information
    against records contained in the consolidated watch lists contained in
    the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB), including the expanded No Fly
    and Selectee lists. Consolidating these checks within the Federal
    Government will allow TSA to automate most watch list comparisons and
    apply more consistent, internal analytical procedures when automated
    resolution of initial ``hits'' is not possible. Secure Flight will help
    eliminate false positive watch list matches, improve passengers'
    experience under the existing system by helping move passengers through
    airport screening more quickly, reduce the number of individuals
    selected for secondary screening, and allow for more consistent
    response procedures at airports for those passengers identified as
    potential matches. Consequently, TSA will be able to concentrate its
    screening resources more efficiently.
        Finally, Secure Flight will only pre-screen travelers on domestic
    flights, while CBP will continue to vet passengers on international
    flights.

                           AIR TRAVELER SATISFACTION

        Question. TSA is one of DHS' most visible agencies since they
    interact with the air traveling public on a daily basis. What is the
    most common complaint TSA receives?
        Answer. TSA captures complaints reported at airports using TSA's
    web-based Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS). In April
    2005, the most common complaint recorded by TSA's PMIS was the addition
    of butane lighters to TSA's Prohibited Items List, which was required
    by IRTPA (Public Law 108-458), Section 4025.
        The most common complaint currently received by the TSA Contact
    Center (TCC) and recorded in the Inquiry Management System (IMS)
    involves the delays passengers experience during the airport check-in
    process as a result of having a name similar to, or the same as,
    individuals who are on a Federal watch list.
        Question. Recently, TSA completed a customer satisfaction survey,
    what did it find?
        Answer. The TSA developed the Customer Satisfaction Index for
    Aviation (CSI-A), which is a performance measure of our aviation
    screening program. The CSI-A score represents the customer satisfaction
    response based on a scale of zero to 100 percent where zero represents
    ``very dissatisfied'' and 100 percent represents ``very satisfied''.
    The CSI-A provides customer service and maintains public confidence
    while maintaining a high level of security. There are three components
    of the CSI-A: passenger surveys conducted at airports, national poll
    results conducted by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), and
    complaints and compliments received by TSA.
        The CSI-A score for fiscal year 2005 is 79 percent. The following
    scores reflect the breakout of each component:
      --Passenger surveys conducted at airports=79 percent
      --National poll results=75 percent
      --Trend of complaints and compliments received by TSA=no significant
            change in trends
      --The change in trends indicate the changes in feedback (complaint
            and compliments) received by TSA via the Performance
            Measurement Information System and the TSA Call Center. The
            aforementioned trend indicated the changes in feedback against
            time for fiscal year 2004.
        Highlights of the 2005 passenger satisfaction survey are as
    follows:
      --91 percent of passengers were satisfied with their overall
            experience at the passenger checkpoint;
      --89 percent of passengers thought security was adequate, as opposed
            to excessive; and
      --82 percent of passengers have confidence in TSA's ability to keep
            air travel secure.
        Question. What other means are you using to validate the customer
    feedback findings of the survey?
        Answer. TSA collects customer feedback on a daily basis. Customers
    have two means through which to provide feedback on their experience--
    providing the feedback while at the airport or contacting the TCC.
    Feedback received at airports is recorded using the web-based system
    known as the PMIS. PMIS enables TSA personnel at airports to record the
    feedback received from customers on a daily basis. In addition, PMIS
    offers airports the ability to record the number of compliments and
    complaints received according to a variety of categories. The
    categories are the same as those used by the TCC. Examples of
    categories include, but are not limited to: discourteous treatment,
    slow processing, and improper handling of property. This data in
    addition to the data from the TCC contributes to one of the three
    components of the Customer Satisfaction Index for Aviation.
        Question. What role does the TSA Contact Center play regarding
    customer service?
        Answer. The TCC serves as TSA's central customer service point of
    contact for all non-media public inquiries. These inquiries can be made
    to the TCC via telephone, facsimile, correspondence, and e-mail. The
    inquiries usually take the form of compliments, complaints, or requests
    for information on a particular issue or problem. For example, an
    individual may have a question regarding whether a particular item is
    prohibited in either checked or carry-on luggage and the Customer
    Service Representative (CSR) or agent will respond accordingly. If an
    individual has a complaint, the CSR will either attempt to resolve the
    matter or, if appropriate, refer the matter to a Customer Support and
    Quality Improvement Manager at the airport for appropriate action and
    follow-up with that individual. In addition, given the nature of the
    contact, a matter may need to be elevated to TCC management and/or
    referred to a program office within TSA for assistance. Furthermore,
    based on investigation or analysis of complaints and inquiries made to
    the TCC, recommendations are made to improve agency policies,
    procedures and practices.
        The TCC also performs a security role in protecting the Nation's
    transportation systems. For example, the TCC forwards to TSA's
    Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) any communications or
    contacts mentioning, referencing, or alleging threats or security
    vulnerabilities. The TSOC will then take appropriate action to resolve
    the issue.
        Question. What progress and improvements has TSA made using both
    the survey and the Center's feedback?
        Answer. All feedback received by the passengers is used to make
    management decisions. Trend analyses, such as review of the top three
    complaints, are provided and reviewed by senior leadership on a monthly
    basis. Specific issues that are the result of recent policy changes are
    also addressed, such as recent complaints on pat-down searches and the
    amended Prohibited Items List. TSA headquarters is also rolling out a
    pilot program at ten airports to test a standardized customer comment
    card. The card is designed to provide a means for convenient and quick
    feedback at the airport level.
        Question. How do you respond to the recent Government Security News
    article that passengers prefer private screeners' treatment of the
    passengers being screened?
        Answer. The TSA annual customer service survey showed that for the
    second year in a row there was very little difference in the high
    degree of confidence and satisfaction air travelers have in TSA-trained
    screeners--Federal or private. For the second year in a row, air
    travelers gave consistently high marks to TSA's security screeners.
    Between 80 and 95 percent of passengers gave positive responses when
    asked about seven aspects of the Federal security screening process,
    which included thoroughness and courtesy of screeners as well as
    confidence in TSA's ability to keep air travel secure. In addition, on
    average TSA is meeting or exceeding passenger expectations for security
    line wait times.
        Question. How are your wait times and your wait time web page
    working for TSA?
        Answer. TSA continually seeks to evaluate and understand factors
    that increase wait times and how our service and staffing models can
    decrease wait times and improve the screening process for passengers.
    All airports collect and report wait time data each hour of each day
    and on the half hour during peak hours of the day. This allows TSA to
    monitor the customer experience in order to ensure the traveling public
    is not overburdened with lengthy wait times while not compromising
    security. The wait time data is used to make improvements to checkpoint
    configurations and appropriate staffing levels.
        Since collection of wait time data, the national average wait time
    has decreased to less than three minutes. Similarly, the average wait
    time during peak periods has decreased by almost four minutes since
    January 2004.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Nationwide      Nationwide
                      Month                    average wait    average peak
                                                   time          wait time
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    January 2004............................    3.35 minutes    14.0 minutes
    April 2005..............................    2.95 minutes    10.1 minutes
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In addition to using wait time internally to assist in identifying
    areas for improvement, TSA posts the wait time data on a public
    internet site available to travelers and the media. The URL can be
    found at http://waittime.tsa.dhs.gov/index.html. The web site provides
    the traveling public rolling average wait time by hour, by airport
    checkpoint, and by day of the week.
        Question. What recourse do complainants have?
        Answer. The recourse for complainants varies depending on the
    nature of the complaint. In the majority of cases, the matter is
    resolved by the Customer Service Representative (CSR) or agent who
    initially handles the inquiry by providing the individual with
    information as to why a particular action was taken or about processes
    currently in place. For example, in some cases, a TSA representative
    explains the redress process, usually used with claims or watch list
    issues, and provides the necessary forms. Unusual or less common
    complaints may need to be elevated to management and/or referred to the
    appropriate program office. This process ensures that TSA responds in a
    timely manner to inquiries received, while at the same time giving
    proper attention to any new trends or issues concerning TSA services.
    When an issue involves a particular airport, TSA refers the issue to a
    Customer Support and Quality Improvement Manager at the airport for
    appropriate action and follow-up with the complainant. The TSA Contact
    Center (TCC) is another vital tool and serves as TSA's central customer
    service point of contact for all non-media public inquiries. TSA
    headquarters is rolling out a pilot program at ten airports to test a
    standardized customer comment card. The card is designed to provide a
    means for convenient and quick feedback at the airport level.
    Additionally, TSA leadership contact information is on the website for
    program-related issues.
        Question. How many complaints does TSA receive and what's the
    average time for complaints to be resolved?
        Answer. At present, there is no single mechanism that captures all
    customer complaints, compliments, and inquiries. Currently, the system
    is not structured in a manner that separately breaks out numbers of
    compliments, complaints, and requests for information within any given
    subject matter category.
        The TCC handles approximately 40,000 non-media inquiries or
    contacts from the traveling public, including complaints, on a monthly
    basis. In addition, TSA receives complaints, as well as other types of
    contacts, through other channels. For example, the Claims Management
    Office (CMO) receives approximately 2,400 claims on a monthly basis.
    Customer comments also come into TSA through Customer Support and
    Quality Improvement Managers at airports. At this time, there is no
    system that centrally tracks the complaints received by TSA through its
    various channels.
        The time it takes to resolve any particular complaint varies
    depending on the nature of the complaint. In the majority of cases, the
    matter is resolved by the CSR or agent who initially handles the
    inquiry by providing the individual with information as to why a
    particular action was taken or about processes currently in place and
    the average talk time for these calls is approximately four minutes.
    The TCC does not currently track how long it takes to resolve a matter
    when an agent needs to elevate a call to a particular program office or
    the field for resolution.
        Question. Is there a customer service function in TSA to take
    complaints at each airport and if so what types of training do these
    employees receive?
        Answer. Many airports have a staff person assigned to manage the
    customer service function. The staff position is called Customer
    Support and Quality Improvement Manager (CSQIM). The CSQIM works
    closely with TCC to receive and respond to complaints and inquiries at
    the airport level.
        Some airports have forms available for customer comments at the
    checkpoints. TSA headquarters is rolling out a pilot program at ten
    airports to test a standardized customer comment card. The card is
    designed to provide a means for convenient and quick feedback at the
    airport level.
        Customer service courses are offered to CSQIM employees via the TSA
    online training center. Five customer service courses are now available
    (see descriptions below). An in-service training program, designed
    specifically for CSQIM employees, is being researched for future
    implementation.
        Excellence in Service.--Fundamentals for Managers will help you
    develop the skills needed to effectively relate to customers, fulfill
    their basic needs, and exceed their expectations. You will be provided
    with opportunities to differentiate between internal and external
    customers, take ownership for customers' needs, and make sure your
    customers are completely satisfied.
        In ``Excellence in Service.--Working with Upset Customers,'' you
    will learn how to successfully serve upset customers, calm upset
    customers, and deal with abusive customers. In addition, you will learn
    how to control your own emotions and reduce your level of stress.
        In ``Excellence in Service.--Communicating with Your Customers,''
    you will learn how to build rapport with your customers, and discover
    how non-verbal communication is interpreted by customers. In addition,
    you will learn telephone skills, including how to project
    professionalism and how to provide quality customer service over the
    telephone. Finally, you will learn how to communicate effectively with
    your customers through e-mail.
        In ``Excellence in Service.--Providing Superior Customer Service,''
    you will learn how to develop and maintain a positive attitude, show
    extra attentiveness to your customers, and use customer-friendly
    language. In addition, you will learn how to effectively solve
    customers' problems and benefit from their complaints.
        In ``Excellence in Service.--Establishing Service Standards,'' you
    will learn what customers really want from your organization and how
    they evaluate your service, as well as how to create and implement
    effective service standards. In addition, you will learn how to monitor
    your service standards and how to correct problems that cause service
    to fall below the standards.
        Question. Do you find that the complaints are related to TSA's
    security measures and the navigation through the airports or is it
    related to interactions with the airlines?
        Answer. The TCC is responsible for handling all non-media inquiries
    from the traveling public. Each contact is assigned a subject category
    based upon the nature of the call. Among the available subject
    categories, one captures ``Airline Issues'' and another captures
    ``Airport Issues.'' Airline issues generally involve matters related to
    proper identification, gate and boarding passes, baggage match and
    weight/size allowance, airline employee/service complaints, and refunds
    (airline tickets, lodging). Airport issues generally involve matters
    related to airport grounds, parking, checkpoint, configuration and
    limitations. Other categories capture a variety of TSA-related topics.
    In March 2005, the TCC handled 2,245 contacts involving airline issues,
    which represents approximately 5 percent of the total contacts handled.
    With respect to airport issues, 179 contacts were handled in March
    2005, less than 1 percent of the total contacts. In addition to airline
    issues and airport issues, the TCC handled 9,106 contacts involving the
    No Fly list during March 2005.

                               R&D CONSOLIDATION

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget proposes to consolidate all
    research and development of the Department of Homeland Security into
    Science and Technology, with the exception of the Domestic Nuclear
    Detection Office (DNDO). Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the
    driving force is behind this consolidation?
        Answer. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequent
    legislation, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology has been
    tasked with coordinating and integrating all research, development,
    demonstration, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities of DHS and
    also to consolidate all Departmental research and development funding
    within the science and technology programs. The coordination and
    integration of RDT&E will: maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of
    the Department's RDT&E capacity; develop and expand synergistic RDT&E
    programs that cut across the Department's activities; create a world-
    class RDT&E capability; allow the other Directorates and organizational
    elements to eliminate within them the specialized management
    infrastructure required to manage organic RDT&E; and allow the other
    Directorates and organizational elements within DHS to focus on their
    operational missions.
        Question. What savings do you hope to realize as a result of the
    consolidation?
        Answer. This consolidation will bring under a single accountable
    authority the scientific and engineering personnel and other RDT&E
    resources of the Department. Coordination and integration of RDT&E will
    contribute to a synergistic environment wherein knowledge,
    capabilities, and initiatives can be leveraged and effectiveness and
    efficiencies can be enhanced.
        Question. How will the consolidation change the way in which
    research and development is carried out within the Department today?
        Answer. Consolidation will contribute to: maximize the efficiency
    and effectiveness of the Department's RDT&E capacity; develop and
    expand synergistic RDT&E programs that cut across the Department's
    activities; create a world-class RDT&E capability; allow the other
    Directorates and organizational elements to eliminate within them the
    specialized management infrastructure required to manage organic RDT&E;
    and allow the other Directorates and organizational elements within DHS
    to focus on their operational missions.
        Question. What assurances can the Department provide to the
    Committee that the traditional mission of the Coast Guard will continue
    to flourish in the new consolidated research and development structure?
        Answer. Authorities for the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) RDT&E will rest
    within USCG, but the USCG RDT&E program will be coordinated with the
    overall departmental RDT&E program to maximize efficiency and minimize
    duplication of effort. There are significant efficiencies to be gained
    with an integrated RATE effort for the Department under a single
    accountable authority. The S&T Directorate is committed to and
    responsible for supporting the research, development, testing, and
    evaluation requirements to ehnance the USCG homeland and non-homeland
    security mission performance.
        Question. Why isn't the DNDO research and development included in
    this consolidation, would it not benefit as well?
        Answer. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) serves as a
    unique entity within the Department to consolidate all nuclear-
    detection related activities, allowing for the development of an
    integrated office that will be responsible not only for research and
    development, but also for developing a global nuclear detection
    architecture and developing and implementing a domestic detection
    system, to include acquisition programs for detection assets and
    operational support functions. This integration, as well as
    coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will
    allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection
    architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport
    a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for
    illicit use.
        DNDO will continue to closely interface with the S&T Directorate on
    joint projects, as appropriate, for the development of technologies
    that may provide countermeasures against multiple threat types. The
    separation of the DNDO nuclear detection RDT&E from the RDT&E conducted
    within the S&T Directorate will be conducted so as to not have any
    detrimental effect on potential collaborative efforts that would be
    gained through the S&T consolidation effort. The goal is to make sure
    that this Nation maintains a preeminent research and development
    program to address the technical challenges in radiation detection
    science and technology, while at the same time capitalizing on the
    benefits of integrating this program with larger acquisition and
    operational support efforts.

                       DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

        Question. Mr. Secretary, I understand from recent news reports that
    you established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 2 days after your
    arrival at the Department. Further, I understand this office was
    operational prior to your reorganization notification pursuant to the
    Homeland Security Act establishing this office directly under the
    Office of the Secretary. The Committee has also just received a
    reprogramming request to provide fiscal year 2005 resources to support
    this office. Where did you get the initial resources and staff to stand
    up this office?
        Answer. The DNDO is a part of a natural evolution of the DHS S&T
    Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio, which was
    appropriated $122.6 million in fiscal year 2005. Of this appropriation,
    $92.5 million was to be used to manage programs that directly fall
    within the mission space of the DNDO, as currently envisioned. The
    programs that currently are managed through this appropriation, along
    with the associated staff, will ultimately fall under the management of
    DNDO. Additionally, a number of other departments and DHS components
    have provided staff, on a non-reimbursable basis, to the DNDO
    transition team, which will eventually form the initial staff for the
    office.
        The defense of this Nation against a terrorist nuclear attack is
    one of the top priorities of the Department, and the attention that I
    gave this matter immediately upon my arrival should be indicative of
    that. I sent out a memo to the Department on March 16, outlining my
    intention to establish the DNDO, and directing senior members of the
    Department to support the transition and establishment of the office.
    This is a process that is still underway, rather than one that has been
    concluded. As part of this process, the Committee was notified, on
    April 13, of a single funding reprogramming to use existing DHS S&T
    funds, as appropriated, to cover operating costs of the new office for
    the remainder of fiscal year 2005. Simultaneously, I submitted, in
    accord with Sec. 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law
    107-296), notification to Congress of the intent to establish the DNDO
    within the Department. On April 15, the President issued National
    Security Presidential Directive-43/Homeland Security Presidential
    Directive-14, ``Domestic Nuclear Detection,'' directing the
    establishment of DNDO within the Department.
        Question. The Department is required to come before the Committee
    and receive advance approval for new initiatives, why wasn't the
    Committee notified in advance of the Office's establishment?
        Answer. On April 13, DHS submitted both an 872 notice and an fiscal
    year 2005 Reprogramming Report to appropriate Authorization and
    Appropriations Committee members. In anticipation of the notification
    to Congress, I previously announced to the Department my intent to
    create the office and established an acting director with authority to
    begin staffing the office from DHS and the other agencies involved, and
    to take necessary steps to be functional as soon as possible.
        Question. Can you tell the Subcommittee what has changed in the
    last year to warrant the creation of this office immediately; is it new
    intelligence, new authorities granted to Homeland, or new
    vulnerabilities uncovered?
        Answer. While there is currently no specific intelligence
    indicating when or where a nuclear attack might occur, it is expected
    to take several years to continue to develop and test effective,
    sustainable countermeasures and deploy and operate systems to interdict
    an attempted attack by our adversaries. With this in mind, it is
    important to take steps proactively to strengthen and consolidate
    efforts to be prepared if and when an attempt should come.
        Accordingly, acting now provides the Department with an opportunity
    to consolidate all nuclear-detection related activities and proceed
    with a fully integrated approach that will include not only research
    and development, but also the development of a global nuclear detection
    architecture and development and implementation of a domestic detection
    system, including acquisition programs for detection assets and
    operational support functions. This integration, as well as
    coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will
    allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection
    architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport
    a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for
    illicit use.
        Question. The Department is taking great pains to consolidate the
    research and development of the Department under the Science and
    Technology Directorate. Would you explain the rationale behind why
    DNDO's research and development should remain separate?
        Answer. The DNDO serves as a unique entity within the Department to
    consolidate all nuclear-detection related activities, allowing for the
    development of an integrated office that will be responsible not only
    for research and development, but also for developing a global nuclear
    detection architecture and developing and implementing a domestic
    detection system, to include acquisition programs for detection assets
    and operational support functions. This integration, as well as
    coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will
    allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection
    architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport
    a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for
    illicit use.
        DNDO will continue to closely interface with the S&T Directorate on
    joint projects, as appropriate, for the development of technologies
    that may provide countermeasures against multiple threat types. The
    separation of the DNDO RDT&E from the RDT&E conducted within the S&T
    Directorate will be conducted so as to not have any detrimental effect
    on potential collaborative efforts that would be gained through the S&T
    consolidation effort. The goal is to make sure that this Nation
    maintains a preeminent research and development program to address the
    technical challenges in radiation detection science and technology,
    while at the same time capitalizing on the benefits of integrating this
    program with larger acquisition and operational support efforts.

                   ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

        Question. As you step into the role of Secretary, Mr. Chertoff, how
    well do you think S&T is carrying out its strategic mission?
        Answer. Over these last few months I have closely reviewed the work
    of the S&T Directorate and believe it is doing very well in carrying
    out its mission. The most important mission for the S&T Directorate is
    to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and new capabilities so
    that the dedicated men and women who serve to protect and secure our
    homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently. The
    S&T Directorate uses a risk-based approach to prioritizing and
    planning, and identifies critical capability gaps before attempting to
    identify or develop technology solutions. The S&T Directorate then
    addresses the highest priorities that address the broad threat spectrum
    as well as supporting the needs of the Department's organizational
    elements.
        Question. During your short tenure, what are the areas of greatest
    concern to you?
        Answer. As I emphasized in my recent 2SR speech, the Department's
    success in meeting its strategic objectives requires a coordinated
    risk-based approach to planning and prioritizing its activities, and
    this approach is being implemented across the Department. Thus, the
    development and implementation of effective and efficient counter-
    measures to biological, chemical and explosive threats continues to be
    an area of emphasis for the Department. Within the Department, the S&T
    Directorate has the lead in developing effective countermeasures for
    biological, chemical, radiological/nuclear, and explosives threat
    agents as well as providing support to the Department's organizational
    elements. The DNDO has the lead role in radiological/nuclear detection
    capabilities. Both the S&T Directorate and DNDO are committed to
    ensuring that the Nation is safer from these threat areas.
    Additionally, the S&T Directorate remains committed to providing the
    nation's emergency responders, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and other
    members of the responder community with innovative, affordable
    technologies.
        Question. How do we have any confidence that the Department, and
    S&T specifically, is heading in the right direction? Recent reports
    indicate that S&T has made little if any progress in actually
    increasing our security through research and strategic management of
    our limited research dollars.
        Answer. Clearly, the S&T Directorate works to ensure that the
    nation's Federal, State and local operational end-users have the
    necessary technological tools to protect and secure our homeland. The
    S&T Directorate acknowledges and accepts that technology research and
    development is not a 6 month process but rather a long-term investment
    of 18 months to 4 years for the technology to mature. The Directorate
    tends to aim further down the road to ensure that the research and
    development being conducted today is capable of dealing with emerging
    threats in the future. All of the S&T Directorate's programs began at
    the same time, March 2003 or soon thereafter, therefore the S&T
    Directorate has not yet reached full maturity in many of its critical
    ongoing efforts.
        The S&T Directorate also recognizes the need for technology
    solutions in the near term. The S&T Directorate's efforts to date have
    resulted in numerous products that are increasing our security.
    Included in these are:
      --BioWatch, a biological agent detection system, which protects the
            nation's major population centers from the threat and
            ramifications of a bioterrorist attack. BioWatch also provided
            support during the G8, Democratic National Convention and
            Republican National Convention;
      --Developed and transitioned PROTECT, a chemical detection system, to
            the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for use in
            the Washington subway system. PROTECT was also deployed to
            Boston and New York for the Democratic and Republican National
            Conventions and remains in the New York subway system;
      --Delivered the Threat Vulnerability Integration System (TVIS) and
            the Threat-Vulnerability Mapper (TVM), to the Information
            Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate;
      --Developed the BTS Technology Vision which include Border Watch,
            Transportation Watch and Border Net which significantly
            improves our ability to provide the information necessary to
            secure our borders;
      --Selected four urban areas for the pilot of the Regional Technology
            Integration (RTI) Initiative;
      --Developed a joint port and coastal surveillance prototype
            designated HAWKEYE with the United States Coast Guard; and
      --Developed a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision
            Support System (DSS) focused on prioritizing investment,
            protection, mitigation, response, and recovery strategies
            related to Critical Infrastructure Protection.
        Question. How is S&T assisting in the protection of our critical
    infrastructure and what relation does that have to the Department's
    efforts of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    office?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate supports the Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate in the technical aspects
    of assessing threats to the nation's critical infrastructure. Through
    RDT&E, the S&T Directorate is providing specialized technical tools for
    intelligence analysis and knowledge synthesis. Analytical tools include
    software algorithms for data extraction, pattern discovery, semantic
    graph representation, visualization, and modeling and simulation. To
    support these tools, the S&T Directorate also provides tools to the
    IAIP Directorate, such as the Threat Vulnerability Integration System.
        Terrorist capability assessments, which are being performed by the
    national laboratories, also provide expert scientific data and
    background information analyses to the IAIP Directorate. The specially
    developed tools greatly extend the capabilities of the commercially
    available analytical products that are used by the IAIP Directorate.
    They are designed to work on massive, multimodal, and distributed data
    sets and to provide real-time, higher accuracy visualization and
    modeling capabilities.
        The S&T Directorate is also developing scientifically based,
    rational approaches for prioritizing critical infrastructure protection
    strategies, protection requirements, and resource allocations using
    modeling, simulation, and analyses to assess vulnerabilities,
    consequences, and risks; developing and evaluating protection,
    mitigation, response, and recovery strategies and technologies; and
    providing real-time support to decision makers during crises and
    emergencies.
        There are several significant examples of this partnership.
        For example, the S&T Directorate provides assistance to IAIP in
    evaluating the scientific and technical capabilities of terrorist
    groups and organizations to develop and deploy all WMD agents. This is
    an excellent example of a reciprocal supporting relationship, in that
    the IAIP Directorate needs S&T Directorate insight into technical
    issues, while the S&T Directorate needs IAIP Directorate insight into
    emerging threats. This ``swap'' of insight allows the S&T Directorate
    to meet its responsibility for the coordination of RDT&E needed to
    address those emergent threats.
        In addition, countermeasures for WMD (such as chemical, biological,
    radiological and nuclear threats) are addressed within the S&T
    Directorate--however this work supports and is developed in
    coordination with all of the operational elements of DHS including the
    IAIP Directorate.
        Furthermore, the S&T Directorate is developing the Critical
    Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System (CIP-DSS) in
    collaboration with several units of the IAIP Directorate and working
    with the IAIP Directorate's National Infrastructure Simulation and
    Analysis Center (NISAC) to validate and mature the model.
        The S&T Directorate has also developed the annual National Critical
    Infrastructure Protection (NCIP) R&D Plan in close coordination with
    the IAIP Directorate. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan
    (NIPP), developed by the IAIP Directorate, and the NCIP R&D Plan are
    complementary documents, mutually supportive and coordinated.
        Finally, the S&T Directorate, in coordination the IAIP Directorate,
    is leading RDT&E efforts that will improve the security of the existing
    cyber infrastructure and provide a foundation for a more secure
    infrastructure. To protect these infrastructures, we must improve the
    security of the protocols that underlie Internet communications.
    Technological advances are necessary to protect against, detect, and
    respond to attacks on the nation's information infrastructure.
        The S&T Directorate has a number of cooperative programs with the
    IAIP Directorate linking cyber security research to critical
    infrastructure protection:
      --Process Control System Forum (PCSF).--This forum was established to
            accelerate the development of technology that will enhance the
            security, safety and reliability of process control system
            (PCS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
            systems.
      --Control System Security Test Center (CSSTC).--In collaboration with
            the Department of Energy and its resources and testing
            facilities, this program focuses on developing procedures for
            enumerating the vulnerability of process control systems to
            cyber attack and finding solutions to correct these weaknesses.
      --Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Awards.--In fiscal year
            2004, 13 Phase I SBIR projects were awarded in the area of
            process control system security. In fiscal year 2005, Phase II
            SBIRs were awarded to a subset of the Phase I performers, on
            the following topics: Advanced Security for SCADA Systems,
            Protection of SCADA Systems Using Physics Based Authentication
            and Location Awareness, Improved Security Information
            Management for SCADA Systems, A Robust Secure Management System
            for SCADA/EMS Operations, and A Toolkit for Next Generation
            Electric Power SCADA Security Protection and Research.
        The Science and Technology Requirements Council is one process by
    which the IAIP Directorate and the other component units in DHS convey
    their RDT&E requirements to the S&T Directorate. Representatives from
    the IAIP Directorate also are members of the S&T Directorate's
    Integrated Product Teams, a key mechanism for coordination and planning
    of DHS RDT&E efforts.
        Question. What is on the horizon in terms of the newest threats and
    related countermeasures under development?
        Answer. The Department is working in close collaboration with the
    DOD, the FBI, members of the Intelligence Community and others to
    identify potential new threats, assess the nations vulnerabilities to
    these potential new threats, and the consequences if these potential
    new threats were successfully used against us. The S&T has the
    responsibility within the Department to incorporate the risk of these
    potential new threats into our overall RDT&E process and the
    development of appropriate countermeasures. Although details can not be
    provided herein, the S&T Directorate is addressing, for example,
    potential threats from genetically modified biological organisms and
    certain types of non-traditional chemical warfare agents to develop
    appropriate countermeasures.
        Question. Can you tell us how S&T has had a direct role in
    improving the security of the country?
        Answer. The nation's advantage in science and technology is a key
    element in securing the homeland. The most important mission for the
    S&T Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and
    new capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who serve to
    protect and secure our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively
    and efficiently. However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse
    and daunting. The S&T Directorate constantly monitors current and
    emerging threats and assesses our vulnerabilities to them, develops new
    and improved capabilities to counter them and mitigate the effects of
    terrorist attacks should they occur. The S&T Directorate also enhances
    the conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide
    assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law
    enforcement needs, and other activities such as maritime search and
    rescue. Basically the S&T Directorate assists in making DHS operations
    science-based, intelligence-informed and technology-enabled.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, in the President's fiscal year 2006
    request is $110 million for the counter man-portable air defense
    systems, or Counter MANPADS. Can you give us an update on the status of
    this program?
        Answer. DHS is still on schedule to complete Phase II of the
    Counter MANPADS program and to provide its report to Congress and the
    Administration at the end of January 2006. This report will include a
    Concept of Operations, a maintenance approach, data on system
    effectiveness and reliability, options on how the system may be
    deployed, restrictions or regulatory changes required to comply with
    International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), and Life Cycle and
    Total Ownership cost estimates. BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman are
    scheduled to complete their system designs, including Critical Design
    Reviews in early summer of 2005. Following the review, the contractors
    will fabricate, install, and test their prototypes on commercial
    aircraft (late summer and fall of 2005).
        By the end of January 2006, each contractor will have delivered two
    complete units and demonstrated system performance, including the
    results of studies emphasizing the operational suitability and cost of
    its systems. They also will have integrated their equipment onto
    aircraft, and obtained FAA Supplemental Type Certifications for
    aircraft airworthiness with the countermeasure system installed.
        In addition, the requested $110 million provides for a Phase III
    program to improve operational, affordability, and maintainability
    issues. Based on interaction with airline stakeholders, an objective
    was established for system reliability that fits within the commercial
    airline heavy maintenance or major overhaul schedule of approximately
    3,000 flight hours (depending on commercial airplane types).
        A primary objective of the Phase III effort is to increase the
    reliability of the current countermeasure equipment by fielding a
    number of operational units and conducting laboratory reliability
    growth testing. DHS S&T estimates that the Phase III efforts will
    double current countermeasure equipment reliability to achieve the
    3,000 hour threshold across airplane types. Additionally, operational
    and maintenance concepts have been developed, including reducing the
    requirements of Minimal Equipment List (MEL) and commercial supply
    chain management practices, that will be evaluated during Phase III.
    Based on the results of Phase III operational fielding, reliability
    testing, and evaluation of operational and maintenance procedures,
    system design alterations will be developed with ITAR considerations in
    mind that will make fleet-wide fielding much more affordable and
    commercially viable.
        Question. Are there areas within S&T where the strategic placement
    of dollars would be most efficiently used?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate uses a risked-based approach to
    prioritizing and planning and identifies critical capability gaps
    before attempting to identify or develop technology solutions. The S&T
    Directorate then addresses the highest priorities across the broad
    threat spectrum as well as supporting the needs of the Department's
    organizational elements. The Directorate's R&D activities reflect the
    prioritization of efforts among the many possible threat agents and
    targets as well as technology development for supporting the
    organizational elements of the Department and the emergency responder
    community.

                       S&T UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

        Question. How does the University partnership effort improve DHS'
    ability to carry out its mission?
        Answer. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, looks to the
    university community to stimulate, coordinate, leverage and utilize its
    unique intellectual capital to address current and future homeland
    security challenges. To maximize the benefits of engaging the multi-
    disciplinary research capacity of universities and to access current
    and future generations of researchers and practitioners, a number of
    focused activities have been established. These include multi-
    institutional Centers of Excellence built around mission-critical
    homeland security areas; cooperative research activities with other
    Federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities; support of
    undergraduate, graduate and postdoctoral students to develop a cadre of
    talent committed to homeland security programs; and outreach to the
    broader education community. These activities will help ensure that DHS
    will have the scientific knowledge and talent to successfully address
    homeland security challenges.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, what unique role does S&T play with regard
    to university research and why is it important?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate continues to identify knowledge and
    capability gap areas that need to be addressed to deal with current and
    future homeland security threats and the development of countermeasures
    to those threats. Many of these areas are well suited to university
    research, development and educational capabilities. Universities
    provide state-of-the-art research experts experienced and successful in
    cross- disciplinary programs, access to national and local talent pools
    and a neutral setting to consider important policy issues. These
    capabilities and ensuing cross fertilization directly benefit the
    operational responsibilities of the S&T Directorate.
        Question. Are these projects that receive funding chosen by peer
    review and what does the Department gain by having funded a specific
    project?
        Answer. All projects funded within University Programs are the
    result of a rigorous and competitive peer and relevancy review process.
    This includes all research and educational programs. With regard to the
    Centers of Excellence, in selecting research areas, the S&T Directorate
    seeks input from a variety of sources. These sources include the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended; the National Research
    Council (NRC); the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs);
    other DHS directorates; and subject matter experts. DHS personnel
    interact extensively with the funded Centers of Excellence by serving
    on their review committees, attending workshops and exploring joint
    research initiatives. In this manner, DHS stays aware of their mission-
    critical research.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, contained in the President's fiscal year
    2006 budget request is $22.9 million for the National Bio and
    Agrodefense Facility. What is the mission of this facility and why
    isn't it in the Center for Disease Control's or U.S. Department of
    Agriculture's budget request?
        Answer. HSPD-9 (``Defense of United States Agriculture and Food'',
    paragraph 24) states: ``The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland
    Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-
    art agriculture bio-containment laboratories that research and develop
    diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.'' The
    S&T Directorate currently has responsibility for one such facility, as
    the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the ``assets and
    liabilities'' of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) from
    USDA to DHS as of March 1, 2003. PIADC is currently the nation's only
    Bio-Safety Level 3 facility (BSL-3Ag) for research and diagnostic
    programs on foreign animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease
    (FMD). The bio-containment laboratories and animal facilities at PIADC
    are aged well beyond their originally designed life expectancy, and are
    in immediate need of re-capitalization or replacement. There is no BSL-
    4 livestock capable laboratory at PIADC or elsewhere in the United
    States to work on high consequence zoonotic diseases in host livestock
    species. Therefore, planning for the National Biological and
    Agriculture Facility is the top S&T Directorate priority for bio-
    containment facilities, and impacts ongoing and planned programs for
    biological countermeasures for foreign animal diseases (including
    assays and diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics, and forensics).
        Recognizing the needs described above, the President requested $23
    million in fiscal year 2006 for the design and initiation of a National
    Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF). In preparation for this, we have
    undertaken a conceptual design study to better characterize the key
    programmatic requirements driving the NBAF design and to explore the
    cost benefit tradeoffs associated with each of these drivers. This
    conceptual design will explore three major NBAF options of increasing
    capability:
      --Keeps the scope the same as the current PIADC mission but builds
            the facilities required to meet the needs of the first half of
            the 21st century;
      --Expands the scope to include additional agriculture biocontainment
            laboratories for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases as called
            for in HSPD-9 above; and
      --Adds expanded test and evaluation facilities to support clinical
            testing of medical countermeasures by the Department of Health
            and Human Services (HHS).
      --DHS is committed to working with Congress, stakeholders, and
            partner Federal Departments and agencies (e.g. USDA and HHS) in
            the development of this new facility.

                            DHS INTELLIGENCE MISSION

        Question. Mr. Secretary, your written testimony states that you
    will work closely with the intelligence community and the Director for
    National Intelligence. Given that, what is Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate's role in the intelligence
    world since the enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act?
        Answer. This role is evolving. The Department makes many
    contributions to the Intelligence Community and we will continue to
    enhance those contributions. Systematic intelligence lies at the heart
    of everything that the Department does. Understanding the enemy's
    intent and capabilities affects how we operate at our borders, how we
    assess risk in protecting infrastructure, how we discern the kind of
    threats for which we must be prepared to respond. We are enhancing our
    ability to fuse that information and combine it with information from
    other members of the Intelligence Community, as well as information
    from our State and local and international partners.
        As I announced on July 13, 2005, I have proposed that the Assistant
    Secretary of Information Analysis become the Chief Intelligence Officer
    for the Department. My proposal is for the Chief Intelligence Officer
    to head a strengthened Intelligence and Analysis division that will
    report directly to me. This office will ensure that intelligence is
    effectively coordinated, fused and analyzed within the Department so
    that we have a common operational picture. It will also provide a
    primary connection between DHS and the Intelligence Community as a
    whole, and a primary source of information for state, local and private
    sector partners. The Department's unique access to information from our
    components, as well as our robust relationship with State, local, and
    tribal governments, as well as with the private sector, makes our
    enhanced contribution to the IC critical as we move forward.
        In addition, since the creation of the Director of National
    Intelligence, IAIP, through the Office of Information Analysis, has
    collaborated with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
    (ODNI) on a number of initiatives. IA works closely with the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Among other things, we have provided IA
    intelligence analyst detailees to the NCTC, who are in a unique
    position to understand both intelligence information derived from our
    components and its impact on State and local governments, as well as
    the private sector. We also work closely with the NCTC to provide data
    and fuse critical information. We also participate in the WMD Working
    Group, (an outgrowth of the WMD Commission), the National Framework for
    Analytical Production working group, which is responsible for
    developing a national production framework for the IC, and on work
    dealing with human resource issues. IA will continue to develop a close
    working relationship with the ODNI as it strives to improve existing
    programs and put in place new initiatives that will further strengthen
    and protect our homeland.
        Question. Is it the opinion of the Department that IAIP's functions
    are enhanced or minimized by the Act?
        Answer. Greater integration of the Intelligence Community and a
    heightened emphasis on information sharing as a result of Public Law
    108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
    (IRTPA), will strengthen the ability of DHS's Office of Information
    Analysis to carry out its mission. We are optimistic that these reforms
    will lead to greater collaboration in analysis and greater ease of
    exchanging information across all levels. The continued emphasis on
    information sharing directed by IRTPA, for example, will improve DHS
    IA's ability to carry out its mission to fuse and lead the Department's
    intelligence activities and to share and receive critical threat
    information with and from state, local, territorial, and tribal
    governments and the private sector.
        Question. Can you tell the Subcommittee how the Homeland Security
    Operations Center's (HSOC) daily activities are changed by the
    Intelligence Reform Act?
        Answer. The daily activities of the HSOC are not changed by the
    Intelligence Reform Act. The HSOC will continue to provide general
    domestic situational awareness, a common operational picture, and
    support to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) and DHS
    Leadership, as well as act as the primary conduit for the White House
    Situation Room and IIMG for domestic situational awareness. HSOC
    collects domestic related suspicious activity reports throughout the
    United States and shares that information with DHS stakeholders.
        Question. How will the HSOC perform its mission in light of this
    new Act?
        Answer. HSOC will continue to perform its core missions as it has
    in the past.
        Question. How has the Homeland Security Operations Center
    interfaced with the Terrorist Tracking Information Center which has
    been absorbed into the National Counterterroism Intelligence Center?
        Answer. The HSOC provides general domestic situational awareness, a
    common operational picture, and support to the IIMG and DHS Leadership,
    as well as acting as the primary conduit for the White House Situation
    Room and IIMG for domestic situational awareness. The HSOC will
    continue to collect domestic related suspicious activity reports, look
    at domestic terror threats and natural disasters, focusing efforts
    domestically. HSOC is the lead conduit to State and local agencies.
    HSOC anticipates being the primary conduit to NCTC for domestic
    situational awareness.
        Question. How will the Homeland Security Operations Center fit into
    the new intelligence community structure?
        Answer. The advent of the new intelligence community structure does
    not significantly change the daily activities of the HSOC. The HSOC
    acts as the ``ingest'' point for threat traffic and suspicious activity
    reporting to DHS, so it is integral that the information captured and
    exploited by the Office of Information Analysis (IA) staff in the HSOC
    is shared with the Federal Intelligence Community. This occurs on a
    constant basis through video teleconference (0100 Production Meeting
    hosted by NCTC, the 0800 and 1500 SVTC), telephone, JWICS email and
    fax. The IA staff in the HSOC works closely with the NCTC Operations
    Center/FBI Counterterrorism Watch to develop emergent traffic
    containing a domestic nexus. Additionally, the IA staff in the HSOC is
    prepared to provide situational awareness to the DNI Operations Center
    when it is operational.
        Question. Do you think the Department should have an Under
    Secretary of Intelligence to elevate its role within the intelligence
    community?
        Answer. As I announced on July 12, 2005, after conducting 2SR, I
    believe that the current Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
    should become the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department, and
    that this component should report directly to me. I am confident that
    these changes will ensure an enhanced role for the Department's
    intelligence functions within the Intelligence Community.

                       CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

        Question. The Department recently released an interim report on the
    Nation's critical infrastructure, the purpose of which is to provide an
    outline for integrating critical infrastructure protection at the
    national level. How does this interim report lead to better protection
    of the Nation's critical infrastructure?
        Answer. DHS is coordinating, for the first time, the overall
    national effort to protect critical infrastructure. The Interim
    National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) describes a risk
    management framework that takes into account threats, vulnerabilities,
    and consequences to prioritize the nation's critical infrastructure and
    key resources (CI/KR). The NIPP delineates roles and responsibilities
    among Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal entities; as well as
    private sector stakeholders in carrying out infrastructure protection
    activities within and across the 17 CI/KR sectors established by HSPD-
    7. The Interim NIPP is intended to foster sector-specific protective
    strategies and provides a mechanism for coordinating protective actions
    across sectors. It builds on the nation's existing critical
    infrastructure protection knowledge base while acknowledging the need
    to expand dialogue and partnerships with key public and private sector
    stakeholders to create an integrated, national critical infrastructure
    protection program.
        Question. My concern is that although the exercise is useful in
    developing a framework, when it gets down to the details, the momentum
    is lost and there never seems to be any achievements. How do you intend
    to use the interim report to translate into actual outcomes?
        Answer. The interim NIPP outlines the foundation, processes, and
    methodologies of the risk management framework. The interim NIPP will
    be replaced by the final version of the NIPP, which will include
    sector-specific plans with performance measures.
        Question. Did you seek the advice of States, locals and the private
    sector in the writing of this report?
        Answer. Yes, as part of the comment period during July and August
    of 2004, the preliminary draft NIPP was shared with State and
    Territorial Homeland Security Advisors and individual members of the
    private sector for review and comment. The comments from the review
    were taken into consideration during the development of the Interim
    NIPP. The period of time dedicated to reviewing the Interim Plan will
    include additional private sector and stakeholder engagement.
        Question. How does this report enable the Department to better
    identify which infrastructure is critical and what are the criteria for
    that determination?
        Answer. The NIPP risk management framework sets over arching
    security goals. Once security goals are set, the next step in the
    framework is to develop and maintain an inventory of the nation's
    assets. After an asset is identified and basic information on it is
    collected, DHS employs an initial screening methodology to determine
    whether or not it is of national consequence. Priority is given to
    those assets that, if attacked, could have a nationally significant
    effect.
        Question. How do you plan to get this report out to the public? Are
    you planning on doing town hall meetings, news articles or another
    forum?
        Answer. The success of the national infrastructure protection
    program, as framed and articulated in the Interim NIPP, is highly
    dependent on obtaining buy-in and participation from all audiences. DHS
    is responsible for leading and coordinating the national infrastructure
    protection program, while the responsibility for carrying out the
    protective activities is shared among Sector-Specific Agencies, asset
    owners/operators, and state, local, and tribal governments.
        State, local, and tribal entities and private sector stakeholders
    have an important role to play in protecting the nation's CI/KR. To
    ensure that assets within these areas are covered within the engagement
    and outreach process, these stakeholders must be aware of, and
    participate in, the implementation and the refinement of the Interim
    NIPP. The initial approach to engage state, local, and tribal entities
    and private sector stakeholders will be carried out by DHS, in
    coordination with the Sector Specific Agencies.
        Stakeholder outreach and engagement tactics differ greatly by
    audience and focus on each stakeholder's interests and role in the
    implementation of a national infrastructure protection program.
    Accordingly, the Interim NIPP engagement process is organized by
    audience group, specifically: intra-Federal stakeholders; state, local,
    and tribal stakeholders; private sector stakeholders; and the media and
    public.

                           IAIP HIRING DIFFICULITIES

        Question. Of concern to me is the amount of time it takes IAIP to
    hire and put in place new personnel. These are people who are charged
    with the intelligence and infrastructure protection functions of the
    Department. Why is it taking so long, and what can the Subcommittee do
    to help improve this situation?
        Answer. As a result of the competitive market for the cleared
    community and the unique skills and abilities needed in IAIP, an
    aggressive recruitment of these talented candidates has been necessary
    to drive toward our hiring goals. As noted, these candidates are
    filling important intelligence and infrastructure protection functions.
    The process of recruiting, selecting, and hiring candidates to meet the
    Directorate's needs is lengthy because of the multiple steps involved
    in this process to ensure a complete and thorough evaluation of
    candidates. However, over the past year IAIP has been successful in
    implementing improvements to shorten this process.
        Working closely with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
    improvements include the development of position descriptions and
    vacancy announcements that define the minimum requirements for each
    position. Once the position is posted and an applicant pool is created,
    a list of qualified candidates is then forwarded by OPM to hiring
    managers for comprehensive interviews and assessments. Once a selection
    has been made, a tentative offer is extended to the candidate
    contingent upon the successful completion of a security investigation.
        IAIP hiring managers take the time necessary in the selection
    process in order to ensure the specialized needs of the Directorate are
    met, particularly since many of the vacancies are highly sensitive
    positions.
        Even faced with the competitive market for qualified candidates and
    the time it takes to on-board candidates, IAIP has been successful in
    hiring 517 of the 803 FTE allotments to date and will continue to
    aggressively recruit to meet its hiring target.
        The Subcommittee has been very supportive in working with IAIP to
    understand the implications and expectations required to staff a highly
    qualified team. The approval to allow direct hiring authority has been
    instrumental in allowing us to aggressively identify, assess, and hire
    key staff. The continued active support of the Subcommittee is
    appreciated as IAIP works to achieve this target hiring goal.
        Question. Is the hiring time dependent on another agency to process
    background checks and clearances?
        Answer. Historically, DHS contracted collateral (SECRET and TOP
    SECRET) as well as TS/SCI security investigations through traditional
    venues such as Office of Personnel Management and Defense Security
    Systems (DSS). These venues also provide support to Federal, military
    and intelligence agencies. Due to high demand, they have continuously
    experienced severe backlogs, adversely impacting the timely processing
    of DHS requests.
        However, DHS has recently acquired a new venue for security
    investigations through CBP. CBP now processes TS/SCI clearances for DHS
    and, due to a smaller workload, has cut down the average time for a
    security background investigation (with no previous clearance) from 12-
    18 months to as little as 6-8 weeks. This timeframe is competitive or,
    in many cases, faster than industry averages within the cleared
    community.
        Under the current projected timeline of the hiring process, the
    security clearance process accounts for 25 percent of the total hiring
    process cycle time on average. This is a significant reduction from
    previous projections (50-60 percent), and is attributed to recent
    changes in the sourcing of investigations to a new contractor agency.
        Question. Is the Department doing anything to help IAIP recruit
    qualified candidates for such a crucial role?
        Answer. DHS has been fully supportive of IAIP recruitment efforts
    and has included the Directorate in a variety of Department-wide
    recruitment events to attract qualified candidates. For example, the
    Department was successful in obtaining direct-hire authority for IAIP's
    hard to fill positions and the Equal Opportunity Office has partnered
    with IAIP to attend a Disability Career Fair and Asian Pacific American
    Federal Career Advancement Summit. IAIP also participated in a DHS-wide
    career fair at Walter Reed Army Medical Center to recruit disabled
    veterans in conjunction with the Department of Defense, as well as a
    DHS-wide Presidential Management Fellows job fair at the Washington
    Convention Center during the last week in March of this year.
        Question. Can you please submit your strategy to the Subcommittee
    on how you intend to address this problem?
        Answer. IAIP is working to implement new ways to improve the
    candidate selection process to support surge hiring efforts. These
    include:
      --Posting All Remaining Vacancies.--Work with hiring managers to
            expedite the posting of all vacancies on the USAJOBS website;
      --Making Multiple Selections.--Encourage the practice of making
            multiple selections from Cert Lists whenever possible;
      --Sharing Cert Lists.--Facilitate the sharing of Cert Lists are
            shared among managers with similar hiring needs;
      --Supporting the Recruitment Campaign.--Encourage managers to attend
            recruitment events; and
      --Conducting Panel Interviewing.--Identify Subject Matter Experts to
            screen qualified candidates for hiring manager review and
            selection.
        Through these efforts, IAIP will institute a systematic process for
    identifying volume hiring needs, matching those needs with available
    candidates, and mobilizing hiring managers to make multiple selections
    in a timely manner. In support of this strategy, IAIP is continuing
    efforts to broaden the candidate pool through an active recruiting
    campaign targeting specific hiring needs and an aggressive advertising
    campaign to publicize opportunities at IAIP.
        Question. Is the housing of IAIP personnel still an issue today?
        Answer. Yes, housing remains an issue for IAIP, but we are working
    to overcome them. Among the challenges faced by IAIP is the lack of
    permanent space. On any given day, there are more than 90 IA employees
    without a dedicated seat. Staff have been doubling, tripling, and
    quadrupling up in seats, working shifts and staggered hours to
    compensate for the deficit of Sensitive Compartmented Information
    Facility (SCIF) seating.
        To address its facilities situation, IAIP has developed a plan
    through fiscal year 2006 to place staff in swing and permanent seats on
    the NAC, and five floors of leased space at an office building in
    Arlington, VA. The Arlington location is currently partially occupied
    as swing space while floors are permanently constructed in a planned
    series. Two floors are nearing completion of permanent construction,
    with furniture and IT installation to follow. The entire project is
    scheduled for completion at the end of 2005. The location will
    eventually have 440 seats, and will house primarily the Office of
    Infrastructure Protection (IP).
        On the NAC, IAIP will occupy part of Building, all of Building 19,
    and the first and second floors of Building 17. Ultimately, all of
    Building 19 will be SCIF and will house IA (to include seating for the
    positions requested in 2006) and the Office of the Under Secretary.
    Floors one and two of Building 19 are under demolition/power upgrade
    prior to renovation, which is currently scheduled to be completed in
    Winter of 2005, with the renovation beginning in the Summer of 2005 and
    continuing into the Spring of 2006.
        IAIP's total SCIF requirement will be met once the Building 19
    renovation is completed.

                        IAIP COORDINATION OF PROTECTION

        Question. How does the Department plan to get the necessary support
    of State and local governments and private sector to protect our
    critical infrastructure when dollars are tight?
        Answer. DHS relies on strong and cooperative relationships with
    State and local governments and private sector partners to advance
    overall National protective strategies. The Department understands that
    local law enforcement, first responders, and the overall readiness and
    response community have the day-to-day responsibility to protect our
    citizens and infrastructures. The Federal Government must continue to
    partner with State and local officials and key leaders in the private
    sector to ensure available funding is appropriately allocated and
    correct policies and procedures are in place.
        The Department will continue to cultivate and expand its outreach
    and information sharing components to enhance its relationships with
    state/local and private sector partners. By continuing to build upon
    these vital relationships, the Department plans to continually provide
    the information, policy guidance and risk assessment methodologies
    necessary to help owners and operators bolster physical and cyber
    security plans.
        Question. How does the Department coordinate with all other efforts
    by the Federal Government and State and locals, including
    municipalities to ensure that each entity is putting in place the most
    effective security measures for a specific piece of infrastructure?
        Answer. As part of an ongoing, government-wide effort to protect
    national infrastructure, DHS is working on several initiatives with
    other Federal departments, state, local, and tribal governments, and
    the private sector. These initiatives are designed to protect against
    known and potential threats; reduce critical infrastructure
    vulnerabilities in a comprehensive and integrated manner; maximize
    efficient use of resources for infrastructure protection; build
    partnerships among Federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and
    international stakeholders; and continuously track and improve national
    infrastructure protection.
        In the first of these initiatives, the Department is providing the
    private sector, law enforcement entities, and State homeland security
    personnel with technical and material assistance to develop and
    implement Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs) around critical
    infrastructure and key assets. To formulate these plans, owners and
    operators and local law enforcement work together to identify asset
    vulnerabilities, gaps in protection, and means of mitigating these
    vulnerabilities.
        The Department is also in the process of deploying all 68
    Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) to 60 metropolitan areas throughout
    the United States. These security specialists serve as DHS
    representatives permanently assigned in the field. The mission of the
    PSA is to represent the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) in
    local communities throughout the United States, serving as a liaison
    between DHS, the private sector, and Federal, state, local, and tribal
    entities; acting as IP's on-site critical infrastructure and
    vulnerability assessment specialist; providing expertise and support to
    the Principal Federal Official(s) responsible for National Special
    Security Events; and providing real-time information on facility
    significance and protective measures. PSAs continue to assist local
    entities in putting in place the most effective security measures for
    specific pieces of infrastructure.
        DHS is also providing terrorism prevention training to private
    sector, law enforcement entities, and State homeland security
    personnel. To date, over 5,600 security personnel have participated in
    the training courses. Courses relate terrorist threats and tactics to
    one of several different topics including buffer zone protection plans,
    soft targets, bombs, underwater hazardous devices, police S.W.A.T. team
    response, and counter surveillance and emerging threats. This training
    program provides baseline knowledge for a law enforcement protecting
    critical infrastructure.
        Finally, Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs) are groups being
    established for each sector that consist of Federal representation
    involved in the security of all 17 sectors defined by the National
    Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The GCCs will serve as a
    counterpart to industry-sponsored Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC).
    GCCs, which include a number of agencies with sector infrastructure
    protection responsibilities, will coordinate with the SCC and work to
    ensure the implementation of effective sector strategies and
    initiatives to support the nation's homeland security mission.
        Question. What are IAIP and the Department doing about
    cybersecurity, particularly when it is not governed by any one actor
    but affects everyone?
        Answer. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) of IAIP's
    Office of Infrastructure Protection was created to address cyber
    security issues and the priorities laid out in the National Strategy to
    Secure Cyberspace. In addition, HSPD-7 called upon the Department to
    establish a national focal point for cyber security, which is the
    mission of NCSD. Both the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and
    HSPD-7 recognize that cyber security is not just one entity's concern
    or jurisdiction, and both call upon DHS to be a focal point and work
    with partners in other Federal agencies, academic institutions, the law
    enforcement and intelligence communities, the private sector, and the
    general public to improve our cyber security posture.
        NCSD's mission, in cooperation with public, private, and
    international entities, is to secure cyberspace and America's cyber
    assets. In order to fulfill that mission, NCSD has laid out goals that
    reflect and guide its priorities and programs, as follow:
      --Goal 1.--Establish a National Cyber Security Response System to
            prevent, predict, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly
            after cyber incidents.
      --Goal 2.--Work with public and private sectors to reduce
            vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks.
      --Goal 3.--Promote a comprehensive national awareness program
            empowering all Americans to secure cyberspace.
      --Goal 4.--Foster adequate training and education programs to support
            the nation's cyber security needs.
      --Goal 5.--Coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement
            communities to identify and reduce threats to cyberspace.
        In addition to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Homeland
    Security Presidential Directives, National Security Presidential
    Directives, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
    provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of
    information security controls over information resources that support
    Federal operations and assets; recognizes the highly networked nature
    of the current Federal computing environment and provides effective
    government wide management and oversight of the related information
    security risks, including coordination of information security efforts
    throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement
    communities; provides for development and maintenance of minimum
    controls required to protect Federal information and information
    systems; provides a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency
    information security programs; acknowledges that commercially developed
    information security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and
    effective information security solutions, reflecting market solutions
    for the protection of critical information infrastructures important to
    the national defense and economic security of the Nation that are
    designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and recognizes
    that the selection of specific technical hardware and software
    information security solutions should be left to individual agencies
    from among commercially developed products. Each agency operating or
    exercising control of a national security system shall share
    information about information security incidents, threats, and
    vulnerabilities with the Federal information security incident center
    US-CERT to the extent consistent with standards and guidelines for
    national security systems, issued in accordance with law and as
    directed by the President.
        FISMA, Section 3546 states that the Federal information security
    incident center, US-CERT, will perform the following functions:
      --Provide timely technical assistance to operators of agency
            information systems regarding security incidents, including
            guidance on detecting and handling information security
            incidents;
      --Compile and analyze information about incidents that threaten
            information security;
      --Inform operators of agency information systems about current and
            potential information security threats and vulnerabilities; and
      --Consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology,
            agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national
            security systems (including the National Security Agency), and
            such other agencies or offices in accordance with law and as
            directed by the President regarding information security
            incidents and related matters. In accordance with DOD Directive
            O-8530-1, all DOD services and agencies are to report incidents
            to the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO),
            which will, in turn, coordinate directly with the US-CERT.
        The DHS approach to cybersecurity is one of coordination and
    collaboration. Therefore, in each of its cybersecurity efforts, DHS
    works with key stakeholders and subject matter experts, both within the
    Department and with external constituencies on a Federal, State, local,
    and international level.

                               OFFICE OF SECURITY

        Question. What is the Department doing to streamline the process of
    security clearances to prevent a backlog?
        Answer. The Department grants access to classified information in a
    timely manner. There is no adjudicative backlog in the granting of
    security clearances at the present time.
        The Department is continually working to improve the process of
    conducting and adjudicating background investigations and granting
    security clearances. DHS is coordinating with other departments and
    agencies in the personnel security community to accomplish this goal.
        Reciprocity.--DHS, like other Executive Branch Departments and
    agencies, complies with the requirements of Executive Order 12968,
    which establishes a uniform Federal personnel security program for
    employees who require access to classified information. The
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and Executive Order
    12968 require that background investigations and eligibility
    determinations should be mutually and reciprocally accepted by Federal
    agencies. Since its inception, DHS has conformed to this reciprocity
    requirement.
        Interim Secret Security Clearances.--The Department grants interim
    access to certain classified information following favorable completion
    of a preliminary investigation. This interim Secret clearance permits
    DHS employees to begin their service expeditiously. In addition, the
    Department is working diligently with the Office of Personnel
    Management to accelerate the investigative process for Top Secret
    security clearances by obtaining delegations of authority and
    prioritizing cases.
        Certain Investigative Authority.--DHS has obtained certain
    investigative authority that expedites background investigations and
    re-investigations for Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented
    Information (SCI) security clearances. The Department has utilized the
    personnel security services of CBP in the Border and Transportation
    Security Directorate to conduct these background investigations for DHS
    Headquarters applicants. In this way, DHS has been able to avail itself
    of process improvements, technological advances, and other management
    efficiencies.
        Additional Adjudicators.--The DHS Office of Security (OS) is hiring
    additional Federal employees as security clearance adjudicators to meet
    the Department's growing needs.
        Streamlining the Process.--In addition, DHS has taken the following
    steps to streamline and improve the quality of the security clearance
    process:
      --The Department is focusing its background investigations on the
            areas most relevant to the current threats facing the country
            and the Department;
      --The Department is applying resources in the early phases of the
            investigation to maximize limited investigative resources and
            minimize wasteful expenditure on candidates unlikely to be
            favorably adjudicated;
      --The Department is strategically placing employees to assist other
            Federal agencies at key points of the investigative process;
      --The Department is automating many aspects of the personnel security
            process, including the deployment of Electronic Questionnaires
            for Investigations Processing (EQIP), an automated tool that
            allows applicants to complete the form online, thus reducing
            the processing time and minimizing the error rate; and
      --A team of human capital and personnel security experts are working
            to increase efficiency by educating managers and prospective
            employees about the requirements of the security clearance
            process.
        Question. A pending fiscal year 2005 reprogramming request proposes
    to transfer $6.6 million from the Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection Directorate to the Office of Security. Will
    the fiscal year 2006 request of $39.4 million for the Office of
    Security fully fund the Office of Security so that it does not require
    transfers from other DHS components to carryout its important
    operations?
        Answer. It is projected that the increase of $39.445 million for
    fiscal year 2006 will be sufficient for the currently-anticipated
    requirements of the Office of Security. It should be noted, however,
    that the proposed House version of the fiscal year 2006 Homeland
    Security Appropriations Bill cut of $10 million would have a drastic
    effect on important operations. If this occurs, the Office of Security
    will again require a transfer of funds from other components or be
    forced to cut services.
        Question. How will the Office of Security assist with the
    Department's efforts to improve information sharing with State and
    local governments and private industry?
        Answer. The Office of Security (OS) aims to facilitate the sharing
    process, while ensuring that the dissemination of information is
    conducted through secure processes and channels to trustworthy
    individuals. OS continues to play an integral role in the Department's
    efforts to improve information sharing at all levels through a number
    of initiatives.
        OS has assisted in the following ways:
      --Security Clearances.--OS has established and implemented processes
            to facilitate the issuance of security clearances to state,
            local and private sector personnel, in coordination with the
            SLGCP and the Infrastructure Coordination Division of the IAIP
            Directorate.
      --Communications Security.--OS has developed standards and a process
            for the deployment of secure communications equipment, in
            coordination with SLGCP and the DHS Chief Information Officer;
      --Computer Security Standards.--OS has developed and implemented
            standards that support the deployment of computer equipment for
            classified information disseminated to selected State and local
            government locations;
      --Security Policy Guidance.--OS has issued policy and procedural
            guidance to support the sharing of information and encourage
            secure dissemination to the intended audience; and
      --Security Training.--OS has prepared and distributed educational and
            awareness products to designated State and local government
            personnel and private-sector officials.
        OS has played a significant role in the creation of proposed
    national standards for the sharing and safeguarding of homeland
    security information.
        Question. What coordination will take place between the Office of
    Security, the Chief Information Officer, and the Information Analysis
    and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to ensure that sensitive
    security materials do not fall into the wrong hands?
        Answer. The Office of Security (OS) continues to coordinate with
    the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the IAIP Directorate to
    ensure that information shared with state, local and private sector
    partners is afforded the appropriate protections commensurate with the
    level of sensitivity.
        In addition to the five areas listed in the previous response, OS
    has: (1) contributed to the development of policies and procedures for
    the deployment of the HSDN and is an active participant in the Homeland
    Security Accreditation Working Group, developing guidelines regarding
    appropriate physical security standards, security clearance
    verifications, and security training for the HSDN program; (2) provided
    guidance regarding the ``Need to Know'' requirements for the network.
    In addition, OS has contributed to the creation of a Homeland Security
    Information Network-Secret (HSIN-S) Users Manual to ensure proper
    security standards for information disseminated through the system; (3)
    involved in a comprehensive review of information sharing laws,
    Executive Orders, regulations and guidance, and it has participated in
    the creation of national standards for the protection of sensitive and
    classified homeland security information; and (4) participated in
    weekly meetings with the IAIP Information Sharing and Collaboration
    Office, a program established to coordinate and facilitate information
    sharing throughout DHS and with its partners.

                               REGIONS INITIATIVE

        Question. Why has the report required by section 706 of the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 not been submitted to Congress?
        Answer. The report required by section 706 of the Homeland Security
    Act of 2002 was submitted in February 2004 as requested.
        Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget justification proposes a
    traveling cadre from the Office of Security that will provide security-
    related support to regional offices. However, there is no funding
    identified for this activity. How will the Office of Security provide
    assistance to these offices without funding?
        Answer. The Office of Security is requesting a total of $168,131
    for travel in the line item fiscal year 2006 budget. This money will be
    used by Office of Security personnel to support all travel requirements
    within the office.

                                    I-STAFF

        Question. The Operational Integration Staff and the proposed Office
    of Policy, Planning, and International Affairs appear to be working
    toward the same goal of developing cohesiveness among DHS components.
    How are the roles of the integration staff distinguished from those of
    the proposed Office of Policy, Planning, and International Affairs?
        Answer. The new Office of Policy will lead the Department in both
    strategic policy development and oversight of all program policy
    efforts, while consolidating programs with significant policy
    responsibilities into one cohesive office. The new Office of Operations
    will provide the Department with a coordinated cross-cutting operation
    function. The Operation Integration Staff, consequently, will no longer
    be needed, and most of its current employees will be merged into the
    Offices of Policy or Operations
        Question. The Department has placed the Operational Integration
    Staff in charge of coordinating the security plans for homeland
    security events that are not designated National Special Security
    Events (NSSEs). Please provide an overview of the plan for operational
    command and control for such events?
        Answer. Special Event security is the responsibility of law
    enforcement agencies with jurisdiction at the event location. The lead
    agency will normally be the local law enforcement agency. However, a
    Federal agency may assume the lead role, as with an event at a national
    park. Generally, because multiple agencies and jurisdictions are
    involved, a coordinated and integrated approach to event security is
    involved. As directed by both the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
    HSPD-5--``Management of Domestic Incidents,'' the Department of
    Homeland Security promulgated the National Incident Management System
    (NIMS). The NIMS provides a command and control framework within which
    government and private entities at all levels can work together across
    each phase of incident management: prevention, preparedness, response,
    recovery, and mitigation. Specifically, the NIMS requires the formation
    of a Unified Command to facilitate coordination for incidents and
    potential incidents involving multiple agencies with independent
    jurisdictional authority. The Unified Command allows agencies with
    different legal and functional authorities and responsibilities to work
    together in an integrated fashion without affecting individual agency
    authority, responsibility, or accountability. For Special Events below
    the NSSE threshold, the responsibility for security planning resides
    entirely within this Unified Command.
        The NIMS also recognizes the need for support and coordination for
    an event and establishes a multi-agency coordination system comprised
    of local and State Emergency Operations Centers and coordination
    entities. Under normal circumstances, there is no similar standing
    Federal coordination entity at the local level, but certain special
    events below the NSSE threshold create a significant need for Federal
    interagency coordination. In such cases, the Secretary of Homeland
    Security appoints a Federal Coordinator to serve as the principal
    Federal point of coordination. As requests for Federal assistance are
    answered and as Federal agencies adapt their independent authorities,
    the Federal Coordinator captures this integrated strategy in the form
    of a Special Event Integrated Federal Support Plan. The Federal
    Coordinator then coordinates support and information sharing at the
    special event and responds to unforeseen support needs and events.
        The NIMS protocol does not change the existing command and control
    architecture at the Unified Command level for agencies supporting the
    Unified Command, or for agencies forced to adapt their independent
    operations as a result of an event.
        Question. What role (if any) will the Secret Service have in non-
    NSSE events?
        Answer. For non-NSSE events, i.e., DHS-established levels of
    Special Events Homeland Security (SEHS), the role of the Secret Service
    will vary dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the particular
    event. For events that receive a designation of Level I or Level II and
    have a traditional protectee of the Secret Service in attendance, the
    Secret Service will implement appropriate protective protocols and may
    serve as the Federal Coordinator. For events that receive a designation
    of Level I or II that do not have a traditional Secret Service
    protectee in attendance, the Secret Service may offer available
    protective assets, as appropriate.
        When the event receives a lower designation and a protectee will
    attend, the Secret Service will implement appropriate protective
    protocols; in those instances when no protectee will attend, the Secret
    Service may offer protective event management training, as appropriate.
        Question. What is the budget for the Operational Integration Staff
    for fiscal year 2005? Where are those funds coming from?
        Answer. As directed by the language in the Emergency Supplemental
    Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
    Relief Act, 2005, further funding is not available for the Operational
    Integration Staff in fiscal year 2005 unless funds are reprogrammed.
    Travel and incidental costs were borne by the components of those on
    detail to these efforts.

                                HUMAN RESOURCES

        Question. In developing a human resources system that is mission-
    centered and performance-focused, how will the creation of open pay
    ranges and performance pay pools assist the Department in meeting its
    operational needs?
        Answer. A major objective of open pay ranges is to provide DHS
    management with the flexibility to compete with other employers
    (private, Federal, State and local), and to attract, hire, and retain
    the best candidates for positions within the Department. DHS management
    will have increased flexibility in negotiating employee salaries. Under
    a pay-for-performance system, the objective is to truly compensate
    those employees who have made significant contributions to
    accomplishing the agency's mission. Employees will play a major role in
    determining their eligibility for performance adjustments based upon
    their work performance. The intent is to motivate employees to perform
    their very best; as a result, this incentive should assist
    significantly in enhancing agency effectiveness and employee retention.
        Question. A total of $53 million is included for Max HR in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget request. What is the total projected cost of
    the Max HR system?
        Answer. The total anticipated cost for the period fiscal year 2005-
    2008 is $250 million. This amount is broken down as follows:
        The total funding includes $43 million for training 100,000
    employees, which is essential to ensure that the new HR flexibilities
    achieve the desired results. This funding will train all Department
    executives, managers, supervisors, and employees on all aspects of the
    new system and their responsibilities as leaders in the DHS
    environment, and to provide the framework for all of the components to
    work together as one Department of Homeland Security. Comprehensive
    training also will be provided for HR professionals throughout DHS
    whose roles and responsibilities are impacted by implementation of the
    new HR provisions.
        Additionally, $56 million in funding will be used for detailed
    systems design and implementation support and to provide access to
    experts who are assisting in designing the new DHS performance
    management system, job evaluation system (including the creation of job
    clusters), compensation system (including new pay ranges and market pay
    processes), and linkages for pay and performance. This in-depth
    expertise is required to ensure DHS creates a program that
    appropriately links pay, competencies, performance, and labor market,
    and through this linkage, improves DHS' mission performance and
    accountability.
        $100 million will be required to fund the initial conversion of
    over 90,000 employees from the General Schedule pay system to newly
    created market-based pay ranges. This amount will cover one-time
    conversion costs for employees included in three implementation phases.
    Phase 1 of the DHS pay conversion, which is scheduled for January 2006,
    covers employees in DHS HQTRS, S&T, IAIP, OS, U/S MGMT, U/S BTS, FLETC,
    and EP&R, and is estimated to cost $10 million. Phase 2, which will
    occur in January 2007, will include U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Coast
    Guard (civilians). Phase 3, the largest phase covering CIS, CBP, and
    ICE, will occur in fiscal year 2008.
        A total of $9 million is required to fund the new Homeland Security
    Labor Relations Board (HSLRB) in fiscal year 2005 and 2006. The Board
    has been established in fiscal year 2005 as an independent entity that
    will report to the Office of the Secretary. The HSLRB resolves labor-
    management disputes and is integral to the deployment of the labor
    relations section of the regulations. $42 million for program
    management funding is required for program evaluation and to manage
    appropriate cost, schedule, and control activities at the Departmental
    level, ensuring that the system investment is managed appropriately and
    at a good value. Program management funding will provide for earned
    value management assessments and risk management. This funding will
    also ensure the development of a robust metrics and program management
    evaluation framework that will be used to gauge overall program
    success. In addition, department-wide communications about MAXHR will
    be funded from the program management account.
        Question. The budget request for fiscal year 2006 includes $10
    million to fund the initial conversion of some Homeland Security
    employees from the General Schedule to newly created market-based pay
    ranges. Does the Department expect any delays in this conversion to the
    new system?
        Answer. We expect to be on schedule in converting to the new
    system. DHS employees will be converted to the new pay system in three
    phases. Phase 1 occurs in January 2006; Phase 2 occurs in January 2007
    and Phase 3 occurs in January 2008.

                                      NAC

        Question. The budget request provides $26.1 million to continue
    expansion of the Department's presence at the Nebraska Avenue Complex.
    What is the Department's estimated timeline for standing up a fully
    operational Nebraska Avenue Complex?
        Answer. We expect to be 70 percent to 80 percent occupied at the
    NAC within 6 to 9 months of the U.S. Navy vacating the site based on
    minor renovations to the site as planned and barring any significant
    infrastructure changes as found during earlier moves within the NAC.
    The U.S. Navy is expected to vacate the site by December 31, 2005, so
    we would expect to be 70 percent to 80 percent occupied between May
    2006 and August 2006.
        We expect to be 100 percent occupied at the NAC within 18 to 24
    months (May 2007-October 2007) of the U.S. Navy vacating the site based
    on the planned major renovations of several buildings at the NAC.
        Question. Is there a timeline for the United States Navy to be
    completely relocated to another facility?
        Answer. Yes, December 31, 2005.
        Question. Are there projected cost estimates on what the Department
    will be required to pay for relocation of Navy activities?
        Answer. Yes, the original U.S. Navy relocation cost estimates were
    established between GSA, U.S. Navy, and DHS with OMB review. DHS' share
    to relocate the U.S. Navy was estimated to be approximately
    $30,800,000. Of this amount, $12,500,000 was obligated for this purpose
    in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. DHS obligated $12,000,000
    year to date in fiscal year 2005 and expects to obligate the remaining
    $6,300,000 in fiscal year 2005 for a total obligation of 18,300,000 in
    fiscal year 2005.

                       FINANCIAL AND PROCUREMENT CONTROLS

        Question. What is included in the fiscal year 2006 budget request
    to improve the CFO's oversight and controls of the Department's
    bureaus?
        Answer. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) fiscal
    year 2006 budget request includes substantial increases that will
    enable OCFO to increase its level of oversight and control of the DHS
    components. OCFO has requested two additional FTEs and $305,000 to
    increase budget execution oversight of the components. Whereas OCFO
    conducted mid-year budget execution reviews of the components in fiscal
    year 2005, the additional staff will allow us to conduct quarterly
    reviews in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. More staff in the OCFO budget
    division will allow a redistribution of desk officer portfolios;
    reduced portfolio sizes will allow all OCFO budget desk officers to
    work more closely with component budget personnel and to intensify
    oversight of the components' budget execution. This will allow for more
    timely identification and resolution of problems in components that
    require additional oversight. One additional FTE and $152,000 will
    augment the OCFO's appropriations liaison staff and ensure timelier
    fulfillment of the appropriations committees' requests.
        The request for OCFO also includes five additional FTE and
    $763,000, and $4,000,000 for technical assistance to implement the DHS
    Financial Accountability Act. In order to implement the Act, the DHS
    OCFO will design and implement DHS-wide policy, procedures, and
    internal controls. The goals of the Act imply that DHS must accelerate
    consolidation of financial operations. Additional FTE and funding will
    enable the OCFO to increase financial policy guidance and for OCFO
    financial analysts and contractors to work closely with the components'
    financial operations on internal control and standardization projects.
    Increased interaction will lead to more consistent and better financial
    performance at DHS.
        Question. The budget request proposes funding of $9 million, an
    increase of $1 million, for the Chief Procurement Officer. As the
    majority of the funds for this office have been proposed through the
    Working Capital Fund, are there sufficient funds for the Procurement
    Office in the fiscal year 2006 budget request?
        Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2006 increase of $1 million for the
    Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) is sufficient. The OCPO
    provides acquisition policy, oversight, strategic sourcing, competitive
    sourcing, integrated systems, and grants policy support for the entire
    Department. The Office of Procurement Operations, a direct report to
    the OCPO, is funded separately through the working capital fund and
    provides operational contracting support to 35 major organizational
    components including S&T, IAIP, the Offices of the Secretary and Deputy
    Secretary, and the Under Secretary for Management.
        Question. The Department's organizational structure places the
    Chief Procurement Officer under the Office of the Under Secretary for
    Management, while other offices like the Chief Financial Officer are
    funded separately. Would altering this structure to make the Chief
    Procurement Officer a direct report to the Secretary of Homeland
    Security help to improve this office's ability to provide oversight to
    all Department procurements?
        Answer. To ensure the administrative functions of the Department
    are properly integrated, the OCPO should continue to report directly to
    the Under Secretary of Management and the OCPO's budget should remain a
    part of the USM budget. Changing the OCPO's reporting structure and/or
    segregating the OCPO's budget would have no material impact on the
    Department's ability to provide oversight of the procurement program.

                                   DEEPWATER

        Question. Mr. Secretary, the Coast Guard has submitted to Congress
    a revised baseline of its Deepwater acquisition plan. How confident are
    you that the Coast Guard has accurately reestimated the use of its
    assets in this post 9/11 environment?
        Answer. The original Deepwater System contracted in 2002 was based
    on the Coast Guard's 1998 mission demand. I am confident that the
    revised Deepwater implementation plan reflects the changed requirements
    of the Deepwater system needed in the post-September 11 environment.
        We revised the Deepwater implementation plan based on a
    comprehensive performance gap analysis that identified new capabilities
    that the Coast Guard needed to carry out its responsibilities under the
    DHS Strategic Plan. The original, pre-September 11 Deepwater Program
    was then modified to incorporate these improved post-September 11
    capabilities. The revised plan includes retaining, upgrading, and
    converting aviation legacy assets as part of the final asset mix and
    adjusting the program's overall asset delivery schedule to align with
    operational priorities. The revised plan also includes those
    capabilities necessary to provide maritime domain awareness and operate
    successfully in the post-September 11 threat environment. To help
    ensure the new plan meets broader national and departmental maritime
    homeland security and interoperability requirements, my staff carefully
    reviewed and analyzed the revised baseline prior to its approval by the
    DHS Investment Review Board (IRB). The Department's Joint Requirements
    Council and IRB also reviewed and approved the plan. The level of
    analysis and critical thinking that is reflected in the revised
    Deepwater plan exceeds that of any project that the Department has ever
    undertaken. For these reasons, I am confident that it will deliver the
    post-September 11 capabilities needed.
        Question. Do you believe there will be further revisions to this
    plan? If so, why?
        Answer. The revised implementation plan provides us with the right
    mix of assets to ensure its readiness to address current threats.
    However, the implementation schedule and the planned acquisitions will
    necessarily adapt to changes in annual appropriation levels and changes
    in other variables, such as technology upgrades and legacy asset
    conditions. The revised capabilities and capacities presented within
    the revised implementation plan are the result of nearly 2 years of
    analysis, gap assessment, and third party validation after September
    11, 2001.
        Question. A review of the fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006
    budgets indicates that the percent of Deepwater funds spent to sustain
    legacy ships, aircraft and communications systems climbed each year
    from 7 percent in the fiscal year 2003 budget to 25 percent in the
    fiscal year 2006 budget. This is very troubling given that the
    objective of the program is to reduce the cost of maintaining legacy
    assets within the Deepwater system. What can be done to reverse this
    trend and bring new ships and aircraft into the fleet sooner?
        Answer. Full support of the President's fiscal year 2006 Deepwater
    budget request is critical to ensuring urgent legacy asset projects,
    such as HH-65 re-engining, are funded to immediately correct existing
    deficiencies while providing significant recapitalization funding for
    procurement of assets to replace those that are rapidly declining.
        The Department is taking steps to mitigate legacy asset costs
    through advancing recapitalization of certain asset classes within the
    Deepwater program. For example, the fiscal year 2006 Deepwater request
    includes $108 million to advance acquisition of the Offshore Patrol
    Cutter by completing the design and purchase of long lead materials for
    the first cutter. The revised Deepwater plan also advances the
    acquisition of the Fast Response Cutter.
        In addressing legacy asset maintenance issues, the Department has
    to balance four factors: operational needs, legacy fleet status,
    current Deepwater acquisition priorities, and available funds. Through
    sound resource planning and performance assessments we will invest the
    necessary resources to sustain operational assets until they can be
    replaced/recapitalized through the Deepwater project.
        Question. Is it true that the Coast Guard's major cutters and much
    of your aircraft fleet are simply beyond their reasonable service life?
        Answer. Many Coast Guard legacy assets are aging, technologically
    obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The majority of
    these assets will reach the end of their planned service life by 2010.
    Coast Guard cutters and aircraft are failing at an alarming rate.
    However, with proper maintenance and sustainment support, the Coast
    Guard plans to sustain legacy assets at a level that will allow them to
    capably perform their missions until they are replaced by their
    Deepwater counterparts.
        The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget requests $966 million for
    the Deepwater program, which includes critical funding necessary to
    address immediate legacy asset sustainment issues that threaten the
    performance of Coast Guard missions, including HH-65 re-engining and
    the Medium Endurance Cutter Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP). Full
    support of the President's Budget is critical to sustaining Coast Guard
    operational performance.
        Question. Two years ago, at Congress' request, the Department
    provided an assessment of the feasibility of accelerating the Deepwater
    program. At the proposed fiscal year 2006 funding level of $966 million
    can we expect to accelerate the program?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Deepwater budget request
    of $966 million represents a 33 percent increase over the fiscal year
    2005 enacted funding level of $724 million. It advances the delivery of
    the Fast Response Cutter by 10 years and the Offshore Patrol Cutter by
    5 years, while beginning the conversion of legacy assets to meet post-
    September 11 mission requirements. Because of the additional
    capabilities and revised asset mix included in the revised Deepwater
    implementation plan, the total program is planned for completion
    completed in 25 years.
        Question. What funding level would be required in fiscal year 2006
    and future years to complete the plan within 10 years?
        Answer. The President's Budget and the Department support the
    revised Deepwater implementation plan and the funding stream that
    acquires it in 25 years at $24 billion. To complete the plan within the
    next 10 years would require an annual funding stream between $1.7
    billion to $2.2 billion per year.
        Question. What, if any, improvements in operational effectiveness
    do you expect once Deepwater is fully implemented?
        Answer. The post-September 11 Deepwater system will significantly
    enhance the Coast Guard's operational effectiveness. The initial
    Deepwater implementation plan was designed to meet the Coast Guard's
    missions in 1998. The post-September 11 asset capabilities included in
    the revised Deepwater implementation plan not only ensure the Coast
    Guard can meet its new maritime homeland security missions, but also
    enhance the Coast Guard's ability to meet its traditional mission
    requirements. Specific operational enhancements contained in the
    revised Deepwater plan include:
      --Improved maritime security capabilities on selected Deepwater
            cutters, including greater speed, larger flight deck, and
            automated weapons systems to reduce maritime risk and enhance
            response to terrorist threats;
      --Network-centric command, control, computer, intelligence,
            surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems to improve
            maritime domain awareness and interoperability;
      --Helicopter airborne use of force and vertical insertion
            capabilities to provide warning and or disabling fire at sea
            and in ports, waterways, and coastal regions and to enable the
            delivery of boarding teams to board and take control of non-
            compliant vessels;
      --Improved long-range surveillance capability to support maritime
            domain awareness and reduce the maritime patrol aircraft flight
            hour gap;
      --Enhanced all-weather self-defense capabilities on select assets;
            and
      --Improved Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear/Explosive
            threat response on select Deepwater assets.

                          HH-65 HELICOPTER RE-ENGINING

        Question. What is the status of the HH-65 re-engining project? Be
    specific in terms of how many engines have been replaced.
        Answer. In August 2004, the first re-engined HH-65 was delivered to
    the Coast Guard at Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, for operational
    testing and evaluation. As of the September 1, 2005, 10 re-engined HH-
    65Cs had been delivered for full operational status to Air Station
    Atlantic City, NJ, (5), Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, (1), and
    Air Station Savannah, GA, (4). To accelerate the HH-65 re-engining
    project the Coast Guard and its contractor, Integrated Coast Guard
    Systems (ICGS), have examined the quality and suitability of a second
    re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. In August 2005, this
    facility delivered its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast Guard.
    This aircraft was determined to meet needed quality and suitability
    parameters and the Coast Guard contracted with ICGS to re-engine an
    additional 11 aircraft at the Columbus facility. The Coast Guard plans
    to have all 84 operational aircraft re-engined in early 2007.
        Question. Can all the engines be recapitalized within the specified
    timeframe given the current capacity at Elizabeth City, NC?
        Answer. Given the current capacity at Elizabeth City, NC, the re-
    engining project cannot be completed within the specified timeframe. In
    order to complete re-engining the operational fleet of 84 helicopters
    by February 2007, the Coast Guard's Deepwater contractor, Integrated
    Coast Guard Systems, will rely upon a second re-engining facility at
    Columbus, MS.
        Question. What will have to be done by the Coast Guard to meet the
    Congressional direction to re-engine the entire fleet within that
    required 24 month time period?
        Answer. Provided the President's request of $133.1 million for HH-
    65 re-engining in the fiscal year 2006 budget is fully funded, the
    Coast Guard plans to complete re-engining of the operational fleet of
    84 aircraft by February 2007. This is the fastest possible timeline
    based on the availability of engine kits and parts, increased
    production at the Coast Guard's Aviation Repair and Supply Center, and
    additional production capacity at a second facility. ICGS is assessing
    the quality and suitability of a second facility in Columbus, MS. That
    facility is now re-engining a single aircraft that is scheduled to be
    completed in September 2005.
        Question. Will a second line be required?
        Answer. In order to finish re-engining as quickly as possible and
    to meet the February 2007 timeline, a second line will be required.
        Question. What lessons have been learned from the test helicopter
    currently being re-engined at the second line which the subcontractor
    has established at its site?
        Answer. It is too early in the process to assess lessons learned.
    To accelerate the HH-65 re-engining project, the Coast Guard and its
    contractor, ICGS, are examining the quality and suitability of a second
    re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. This facility is expected
    to deliver its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast Guard in
    September, 2005. Before making a final determination on the suitability
    of the facility the Coast Guard is evaluating the second facility's
    capabilities to control cost, meet schedule requirements, and employ
    standardized industrial processes.
        Question. What value do you see in having a second line outside the
    Coast Guard's depot-level maintenance facility?
        Answer. Using a second production facility will allow completion of
    the re-engining of all 84 operational HH-65s by February 2007.
        Question. What are the challenges of a second line?
        Answer. The second facility has not yet been certified as providing
    a quality product at a reasonable price. Also, as in any lead asset
    production, there is a substantial learning curve. Other challenges
    include:
      --Validation of capability;
      --Cost control;
      --Avoidance of schedule delays;
      --Parts availability; and
      --Standardized industrial process.

                               COAST GUARD/C-130

        Question. In the past, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
    funded the acquisition of 6 new C130Js, which are the next generation
    beyond the C-130Hs, and began funding to missionize these planes in
    fiscal year 2005. The President's budget proposes missionization costs
    to be borne by the Coast Guard in fiscal year 2006. The cost of these
    planes has been outside the original Deepwater plan, but now the
    associated missionization costs are included in the revised Deepwater
    plan.
        What legacy sustainment issues are you experiencing with the C-130H
    fleet?
        Answer. On April 20, 2005, the Coast Guard submitted a legacy asset
    report to Congress, as directed in the Conference Report accompanying
    the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Bill. This report includes the
    HC-130H AC&I projects that the Coast Guard has included in the fiscal
    year 2006 budget request and anticipates requesting in future budget
    submissions. The primary HC-130H sustainment issues are as follows:
        APS 137 Surface Search Radar ($75M, cost reflects conversion on 27
    aircraft). The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 Deepwater budget includes
    $9 million to start the replacement effort for the HC-130H's APS 137
    search radar
        Avionics Modernization and Rewiring ($144M, cost reflects 16
    aircraft). The HC-130H requires a modernized and supportable cockpit.
    This cockpit modernization will prepare the aircraft for the inevitable
    U.S. Airspace restrictions due to increased traffic and the Open Skies
    policy of route traffic control. Logistically, the aircraft's current
    cockpit instrumentation will become unsupportable within this decade.
    With plans for the HC-130H to operate until 2033, this will be a
    necessary upgrade. Over 500 other DOD aircraft are conducting the same
    modification. DOD modernization plans will significantly reduce the
    availability and or support of older parts, resulting in increased
    repair costs of the existing system.
        Center Wing Box Structural Issues. In March 2005, the C-130
    manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Aero (LMA), changed the inspection
    guidelines for C-130 wing boxes based on cracking found in Air Force C-
    130s of about the same age as some of the Coast Guard HC-130Hs. The
    wing box problem is not unique to the Coast Guard, but applies to all
    C-130's world wide. As a result of flight hour limitations and or
    restrictions identified in LMA Service Bulletin (SB1), the five Coast
    Guard 1500 series airframes are limited to restricted operations until
    they are properly inspected over the next 6 months. A second service
    bulletin is due this month from LMA that will provide the inspection
    criteria. The estimated cost of completing the 1500 series inspections
    is $2 million total. The remaining 22 aircraft are newer and will be
    due for inspections over the next 2 years.
        Question. Now that the missionization of the Coast Guard's C-130
    fleet is included in the Deepwater plan, what are the future costs to
    complete this undertaking?
        Answer. The Coast Guard plans to have all six C-130J aircraft
    missionized and available for maritime patrol aircraft work by the end
    of 2008 at a cost not to exceed $120 million. Funds to complete this
    missionization were previously provided outside of Deepwater.
    Additional missionization costs within Deepwater are not currently
    anticipated. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request also
    includes $5 million to fund the Aircraft Project Office, which manages
    the C-130J pilot and air crew training, logistics use, and
    missionization oversight while the aircraft are transitioning to full
    operational use. As indicated in the fiscal year 2006-2010 Capital
    Investment Plan (page 116 of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006
    Congressional Justifications), this cost will recur at $5 million per
    year through project completion in fiscal year 2008.
        Question. Why were these costs omitted in the original Deepwater
    plan?
        Answer. The Congressional Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-710) of
    June 2000 stated ``That the procurement of maritime patrol aircraft (C-
    130J funded under this heading) shall not, in any way, influence the
    procurement strategy, program requirements, or down-select decision
    pertaining to the Coast Guard's Deepwater Capability Replacement
    Project.'' Based on this direction the Coast Guard did not include the
    C-130J in the original Deepwater plan.
        Question. Since the acquisition and initial missionization costs of
    the C-130Js were incurred by the Department of Defense, do you believe
    that any future costs should also be borne by that Department?
        Answer. Department of Defense funding already received in past
    years is sufficient to complete missionization of the C-130J aircraft.
    The President's 2006 budget includes a request for $5 million for the
    Coast Guard to fund the Coast Guard Aircraft Project Office, which will
    manage the C-130J pilot and crew training, logistics use, and
    missionization oversight while the aircraft are transitioning to full
    operational use.
        Question. Why shouldn't the Department of Defense continue to
    complete this effort?
        Answer. Funding to acquire and fully missionize the Coast Guard's
    six C-130J aircraft has already been provided through Department of
    Defense appropriations. The remaining funds required to complete the
    project, as outlined on page 116 of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006
    Congressional Justifications, should be borne by DHS appropriations
    since they will be used to train Coast Guard C-130J pilots and crews,
    fund Coast Guard logistics support, and transition the aircraft to
    operational use for Coast Guard missions.

                            RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

        Question. Has the Coast Guard R&D program been able to successfully
    support the Coast Guard's traditional mission areas since the Coast
    Guard is now an entity under the Department of Homeland Security?
        Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard Research and Development program has
    been able to continue research in non-homeland security (traditional)
    mission areas. Presently, the Coast Guard is concentrating much of the
    traditional mission R&D effort on aquatic nuisance species remediation.
    The Coast Guard is also continuing research and development in other
    non-homeland security mission areas such as Aids to Navigation, Search
    and Rescue, Maritime Safety, and Marine Environmental Protection.
        Question. How successful has the Coast Guard R&D program been in
    competing for DHS Science and Technology funding in addition to its own
    R&D budget?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has been successful in competing for DHS
    S&T funding for homeland security-related projects. In accordance with
    established S&T protocols, the Coast Guard Portfolio Manager at S&T
    submits the Coast Guard Maritime Security requirements to the DHS S&T
    Executive Review Team for evaluation and funding. To date, the Coast
    Guard has received over $6.5 million of funding from the S&T
    Directorate in fiscal year 2005.
        Question. Do you have any concerns about having this program
    transferred to the Science and Technology Directorate?
        Answer. No, a collaborative relationship between the Coast Guard
    and the S&T Directorate is both viable and valuable. Integration of
    funding and research requirements will maximize the effectiveness of
    both homeland and non-homeland security research.
        Question. How can you ensure those Members with concerns about
    traditional mission research that the Science and Technology
    Directorate (S&T) will place the same level of consideration on those
    areas of research as the Coast Guard does?
        Answer. Retaining the Coast Guard's capabilities in both homeland
    and non-homeland security mission areas is of critical importance to
    DHS. Equally important is the retention of the Coast Guard's research
    and development capability in both homeland and non-homeland security
    (traditional) missions. The S&T Directorate is committed to and
    responsible for supporting the research, development, testing, and
    evaluation requirements for the entire Department, which includes
    enhancing the Coast Guard's homeland and non-homeland security mission
    performance. For example, to date the S&T Directorate has provided
    $7.56 million toward Project Hawkeye, an initiative that will enhance
    performance across the entire spectrum of Coast Guard missions by
    improving Maritime Domain Awareness.
        Question. If Coast Guard R&D is transferred into S&T, what role
    does the Department plan for the Coast Guard Research and Development
    Center in Connecticut to continue to play in the future?
        Answer. The Coast Guard R&D Center is the sole Government entity
    performing research and development in the area of Aids to Navigation,
    Search and Rescue, Maritime Safety, and Marine Environmental
    Protection. The Coast Guard R&D Center will continue to be the critical
    link to ensure the Coast Guard has the essential research, development,
    testing, and evaluation requirements to succeed in both its homeland
    and non-homeland security mission areas.
        Question. What follow-on actions is the Coast Guard taking in
    response to the Congressionally-mandated study of Coast Guard R&D?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is taking several of the study's
    recommendations for action. Key items include: the development and
    implementation of an overarching Research and Development strategy;
    continued outreach to other government agencies, industry and academia
    to establish partnerships; and improved alignment with the Coast Guard
    Acquisition Program.

                     COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

        Question. Why has Rescue 21 been delayed so significantly? The GAO
    has been very critical of the Coast Guard's acquisition management team
    known as Deepwater. Isn't this just another example of the Coast Guard
    not being able to manage large acquisitions?
        Answer. Rescue 21's delay in achieving initial operating capability
    (IOC) is due to problems experienced by General Dynamics C4 System
    (GDC4S). Those problems have been twofold in: (a) completing software
    development needed to integrate the multiple commercial items into a
    consolidated control interface and (b) resolving performance issues
    stemming from System Integration Testing (SIT). Software integration
    and SIT issues have been resolved and the project is ready to enter
    full rate production upon approval.
        The Coast Guard does not consider this delay a result of
    mismanagement as it has closely followed Coast Guard and DHS
    acquisition processes, as highlighted by the GAO Report 03-1111 Coast
    Guard's Rescue 21 Faces Challenges. GAO noted that the Coast Guard has
    developed key documentation used for managing system requirements and
    that the Coast Guard has a system in place for identifying,
    prioritizing, and minimizing risks.
        The Coast Guard has successfully managed and executed several
    comparable acquisitions in the past. Recent projects such as Seagoing
    Buoy Tenders ($618 million), Coastal Patrol Boats ($327 million), and
    the Great Lakes Icebreaker ($140 million) were each remarkably
    successful. The Coast Guard will continue to seek out process
    improvements and apply past lessons learned to manage the Rescue 21
    acquisition.
        Question. Please provide an update on achieving full operating
    capability. What capabilities will Rescue 21 have at the end of fiscal
    year 2006?
        Answer. Provided Rescue 21 is funded consistent with the Coast
    Guard's Capital Investment Plan outlined on page 116 of the Coast
    Guard's fiscal year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification, the Coast
    Guard expects Rescue 21 to reach full operating capability in fiscal
    year 2007. At the end of fiscal year 2006, deployment of Rescue 21 to
    all continental U.S. coastal regions will be complete.
        Question. When will Rescue 21 transition to replace the National
    Response Distress System (NRDS), which is being supplanted by Rescue
    21?
        Answer. The Rescue 21 system will be deployed incrementally in all
    Coast Guard Sector/Group Regions. Following deployment and testing
    within each Coast Guard Sector/Group Region, the legacy NDRS in the
    affected region, will be removed and the Rescue 21 system will become
    operational. Nationwide deployment is expected to be complete in fiscal
    year 2007.
        Question. When is NRDS expected to come offline?
        Answer. The Rescue 21 system will be deployed incrementally in all
    Coast Guard Sector/Group Regions. Following deployment and testing
    within each Coast Guard Sector/Group Region, the legacy NDRS, in the
    affected region, will be removed and the Rescue 21 system will become
    operational. Nationwide deployment is expected to be complete in fiscal
    year 2007.
        Question. Please provide an update of your planned Vessel Tracking
    System installation recapitalization schedule. When will the project be
    completed?
        Answer. The Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS) installation/
    recapitalization has been completed in five ports with two additional
    ports to be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005,
    pending completion of remote site leases. Project closeout and
    transition of all systems to long-term operations and support will
    occur by the end of fiscal year 2006. Automatic Identification System
    (AIS) capability, which is an integral part of PAWSS, has been
    installed in all nine scheduled Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) ports.
        Question. How will funding interruptions affect the project
    schedule, for instance, if funding is not provided in fiscal year 2006
    what will not get done?
        Answer. VTS systems in Puget Sound and San Francisco will not be
    recapitalized with funding provided to date. The Coast Guard's fiscal
    year 2006 Unfunded Priorities List includes $17 million for the PAWSS,
    the funding required to complete VTS recapitalization in these ports.
        Question. Please provide an update on the progress/status of
    implementation of the nationwide Automated Identification System (AIS),
    especially as it relates to the maintenance of the Coast Guard's common
    operating picture.
        Answer. The Nationwide AIS project has been approved and chartered
    by the DHS. The project is in the requirements and planning phase of
    the acquisition process.
        Concurrently, numerous initiatives are underway to provide
    prototype and interim AIS capability to provide AIS data to the
    National Maritime Common Operational Picture (COP). The progress to
    date includes:
      --Installation of AIS capability at all Vessel Traffic Services (9
            sites).
      --Deployment of receive-only AIS sites in key locations in Alaska (8
            of 11 AIS sites).
      --Deployment of 4 prototype AIS receivers on National Oceanic
            Atmospheric Administration weather buoys to provide AIS
            tracking of vessels offshore of the United States.
      --AIS receiver installations for research & development purposes:
      --On Oahu that provides extensive coverage of the major Hawaiian
                Islands;
      --In San Francisco Bay, CA;
      --In Miami, Port Everglades and Key West, FL; and
      --In Long Island Sound, Cape May NJ, and the Cape Cod Canal.
      --Installation of AIS sites on offshore platforms in the Gulf of
            Mexico to monitor traffic inbound to Gulf ports (3 of 4 planned
            AIS sites installed).
      --Deployment of AIS receiver as part of a concept validation on a low
            earth orbit satellite for long-range AIS vessel tracking to be
            launched in the second and third quarter fiscal year 2006.
        Question. How does AIS implementation fit with Ports and Waterways
    Safety System (PAWSS) and Rescue 21?
        Answer. The Coast Guard, thru the PAWSS project, has deployed AIS
    capability in all nine VTS areas. Rescue 21 replaces the Coast Guard's
    antiquated short range command and control communications systems and
    it does not include AIS. The Nationwide AIS project will share
    infrastructure with Rescue 21 wherever site and technical compatibility
    will allow, e.g., towers.
        Question. How is it different from PAWSS?
        Answer. The AIS is a cooperative vessel tracking system whereby
    vessels transmit their position, identification, speed, course, cargo,
    and other information to vessels in their area and shoreside receivers
    within range of the system. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of
    2002 specifies AIS carriage requirements for certain vessels navigating
    U.S. waters. The Nationwide AIS project will implement necessary
    infrastructure to receive AIS transmissions from shipboard systems and
    distribute this data to the Coast Guard's Common Operational Picture to
    enhance maritime domain awareness.
        The PAWSS project was established to build new Coast Guard Vessel
    Traffic Service (VTS) systems and to modernize and recapitalize
    existing ones. The Coast Guard operates VTS in nine U.S. ports to
    provide traffic information, traffic organization, and navigation
    assistance services necessary to fulfill the Coast Guard's statutory
    maritime safety and environmental protection responsibilities under the
    Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. PAWSS/VTS employ AIS, among
    other surveillance systems to monitor and access information on vessel
    movements within a VTS area.
        A table highlighting the basic tenants of each project is provided
    below:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Compare/Contrast            Nationwide AIS           PAWSS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ACRONYM.........................  Automatic           Ports and
                                       Identification      Waterways Safety
                                       System.             System
    Primary User....................  U.S. Coast Guard,   U.S. Coast Guard,
                                       Commercial          Commercial
                                       vessels.            vessels
    Focus...........................  Pre-9/11--Safety:   Pre-9/11--Safety
                                       for ship to ship   Post-9/11--Safety
                                       to communicate      and Security
                                       rules of the road.  (Maritime Domain
                                      Post-9/11--Safety    Awareness)
                                       and Security--
                                       Maritime Domain
                                       Awareness (MDA).
    Purpose.........................  Track vessels       Manage vessel
                                       approaching,        traffic in nine
                                       entering, and       U.S. ports
                                       transiting U.S.
                                       navigable waters.
    Project.........................  Enhance the         Provide Vessel
                                       nation's maritime   Traffic Service
                                       domain awareness,
                                       safety, and
                                       security.
    Line of Sight Transmissions.....  Send and receive:   Send and Receive
                                       Data, ship-to-      (& share): Voice
                                       ship, ship-to-      & Data, AIS-
                                       shore, shore-to-    based; radar &
                                       ship.               cameras
    Location........................  Ports, waterways    9 U.S. ports: one
                                       and coastal areas   each in AK, NY,
                                       out to 2000         MI, CA, WA; two
                                       nautical miles      each in LA and TX
                                       via towers,
                                       buoys, off-shore
                                       platforms, e.g.,
                                       oil rigs, &
                                       satellite(s).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Is PAWSS still needed or is it being phased out?
        Answer. The PAWSS, as an acquisition project, is being phased out.
    The Coast Guard established PAWSS as an acquisition project to build
    new Coast Guard VTS and modernize existing systems. The PAWSS project
    resulted in two new VTS's, recapitalized five of the existing VTS's
    completely, and partially modernized two others (Puget Sound, WA and
    San Francisco, CA).
        While there will be no more acquisitions completed through the
    PAWSS project, the Coast Guard VTS will still operate, providing
    navigation services and ensuring safety and environmental protection of
    U.S. waters as required by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
        Question. How is AIS different from Rescue 21?
        Answer. The AIS is a cooperative vessel tracking system whereby
    vessels transmit their position, identification, speed, course, cargo,
    and other information to vessels in their area and shoreside receivers
    within range of the system. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of
    2002 specifies AIS carriage requirements for certain vessels navigating
    U.S. waters. The Nationwide AIS project will implement necessary
    infrastructure to receive AIS transmissions from shipboard systems and
    distribute this data to the Coast Guard's Common Operational Picture to
    enhance maritime domain awareness.
        The Rescue 21 project will replace the existing and obsolete
    National Distress and Response System (the system used by the boating
    public to hail the Coast Guard when in distress) and provide the Coast
    Guard with a modern coastal command, control, and communications
    system. Rescue 21 will be capable of monitoring the international VHF-
    FM distress frequency to improve search and rescue response operations
    and communications with Coast Guard and other Federal, state, and local
    first responders and commercial recreational boats.
        A table highlighting the basic tenants of each project is provided
    below:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Compare/Contrast            Nationwide AIS         Rescue 21
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ACRONYM.........................  Automatic           Formerly: National
                                       Identification      Distress and
                                       System.             Response System
                                                           (NDRS)
    Primary User....................  U.S. Coast Guard,   U.S. Coast Guard,
                                       Commercial          commercial,
                                       vessels.            boating public
    Focus...........................  Pre-9/11--Safety:   Pre-9/11--Primary--
                                       for ship to ship    Safety
                                       to communicate     Secondary--support
                                       rules of the road.  all other CG/DHS
                                      Post-9/11--Safety    missions
                                       and Security--     post-9/11--same
                                       Maritime Domain
                                       Awareness (MDA).
    Purpose.........................  Track vessels       Command, control,
                                       approaching,        and communication
                                       entering, and       system to allow
                                       transiting U.S.     USCG to hear and
                                       navigable waters.   locate mariners
                                                           in distress
    Project.........................  Enhance the         Modernize the
                                       nation's maritime   USCG's legacy
                                       domain awareness,   NDRS
                                       safety, and
                                       security.
    Line of Sight Transmissions.....  Send & receive:     Send and receive:
                                       Data, ship-to-      Voice and Data
                                       ship, ship-to-
                                       shore, shore-to-
                                       ship.
    Location........................  Ports, waterways    Towers and vessels
                                       and coastal areas   in 46 regions
                                       out to 2000         throughout the
                                       nautical miles      United States,
                                       via towers,         including Guam
                                       buoys, off-shore    and Puerto Rico
                                       platforms, e.g.,
                                       oil rigs, &
                                       satellite(s).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC)

        Question. Mr. Secretary, as you complete your top to bottom review
    of the Department, what emphasis will you place on the need to provide
    basic and advanced training to law enforcement personnel at the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center?
        Answer. Standardized, high quality training is an exceptionally
    critical component in the success of the DHS responsibilities. The
    Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is the government's
    principal provider of interagency law enforcement training and is DHS's
    primary source for intradepartmental law enforcement training. FLETC
    already has accelerated the number and types of training programs being
    offered in concert with its Partner Organizations since the September
    11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While basic training continues to be the
    first scheduling priority for FLETC, there has been a greater emphasis
    placed upon relevant advanced training to meet the post-September 11
    focus on security of the homeland. FLETC has undertaken an initiative
    for Counterterrorism and Practical Applications Training, which
    provides hands-on experience for trainees at all levels to handle first
    responder situations, prevention and appropriate follow-up
    investigative measures. Further, FLETC has a major role in
    international, State and local training with an emphasis on
    strengthening coordination with Federal law enforcement entities, to
    include intelligence sharing training. Under DHS's auspices, the
    Department anticipates relying heavily upon the enhanced and innovative
    training and increased physical plant capacities now available at the
    four FLETC sites in Charleston, SC; Cheltenham, MD; Artesia, NM and
    Glynco, GA.
        Question. Do you anticipate opportunities for cross-training of law
    enforcement personnel?
        Answer. One of the principal reasons for the creation of DHS is to
    continuously improve the overall cooperation, coordination information
    sharing and interoperability of law enforcement components at all
    levels related to security for the United States. To help bring about
    this improvement, DHS is encouraging greater measures that are intended
    to breakdown traditional organizational and cultural barriers. Cross-
    training and shared training experiences of multiple agencies is
    becoming more the norm. FLETC's approach to consolidated training,
    which emphasizes common understanding and cooperation through mixed
    class association, affords agencies the opportunity to benefit from
    mutual experiences. Many of FLETC's basic and virtually all of its
    advanced programs are scheduled to accommodate multiple training
    organizations. In the area of counterterrorism training, subjects such
    as weapons of mass destruction, critical infrastructure, crisis
    management and land and seaport security are open to all agencies with
    those needs. These include DHS, Department of Justice, Department of
    Defense and many others across the spectrum of law enforcement. DHS
    expects to expand and enhance training that is relevant and
    contemporary to the evolving needs of all agencies that are involved
    with the homeland security.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, will your assessment examine the various
    training facilities owned or used by Departmental entities to ensure
    that they are being fully utilized and not duplicative of each other?
        Answer. Training facilities, per se, were not themselves a specific
    focus of the review. Training has several different elements in DHS,
    from the general training of our employees, to our law enforcement
    academy, and to our training centers for first responders. Our plan
    brings together DHS' key preparedness programs, including first
    responder training programs. The U.S. Fire Administration and the Noble
    Training Center are moved into a new Preparedness Directorate, along
    with the training programs such as those at Ft. McClellan. The purpose
    for creating this Directorate, and for pulling these programs together,
    is to give our existing preparedness efforts--including training and
    exercises--a focused direction. With these programs in one Directorate,
    DHS will be in a better position to ensure that they are being fully
    utilized without being duplicative.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, the war on terror requires a new approach
    to training law enforcement personnel. Do you foresee the need to
    provide new types of training infrastructure or counterterrorism
    training facilities that mirror our existing vulnerabilities?
        Answer. Yes, the future operating environment of DHS will include
    continuing and increasingly sophisticated terrorist threats to our
    nation. Post-September 11, the FLETC, the primary law enforcement
    training organization for the DHS, began vigorously reviewing its
    training programs and developing and/or revising programs and
    facilities as appropriate to better prepare agents and officers in
    executing their duties in the Global War on Terrorism. The FLETC
    developed a plan and is currently in the planning design and execution
    construction phase for this type of infrastructure. The practical
    application counterterrorism training facility design is based on the
    FLETC and its Partner Organizations expertise on anti/counterterrorism
    operations and related training requirements to defeat terrorism. The
    FLETC offers the most current law enforcement training curricula
    available anywhere and has the instructional experience and expertise
    to meet the challenges set forth by our adversaries. However, to
    accentuate our training and meet these challenges, we continually
    upgrade our tactical facilities and construct training facilities that
    are responsive to the stated needs of the agencies engaged in the war
    on terrorism. The FLETC trains officers and agents from 81 Partner
    Organizations. It is imperative that we attempt to replicate the types
    of environments that our officers will surely encounter, to enhance
    their probability of survival and the success of guarding our homeland.
        Consolidated training, the concept on which the FLETC was
    established, allows agencies with divergent missions to train together,
    in a consistent manner. This proposed training facility will meet the
    Department's primary goals to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce
    America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and
    recover from attacks that do occur. This initiative represents the
    proactive ``imagination,'' cited in the 9/11 Commission's report,
    needed to combat terrorism effectively.
        The FLETC and DHS have been called upon by the Military to provide
    up-to-date Counterterrorism training. As the Military's mission
    changes, they have been expected to perform more like a Law Enforcement
    Officer rather than a soldier. The urban environments and circumstances
    that our soldiers face replicate the Use of Force decisions that our
    police officers face everyday. This mission change has forced the
    necessity for greater interaction between Law Enforcement and the
    Military. The FLETC has and continues to be a willing partner in
    meeting these challenges.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                               AVIATION SECURITY

        Question. The Department's inspector general released a report
    yesterday stating that there has been a lack of improvement over the
    last year in detecting dangerous items--including guns, knives,
    explosives--at airport security checkpoints. What role will next
    generation detection systems play in improving airport security?
        Answer. TSA has designed its passenger checkpoint technology
    portfolio to incorporate solutions that will help improve explosives
    and weapons detection at its checkpoints. The next generation of
    checkpoint technology will automate the detection of explosives that
    might be concealed on an individual's body, as well as within the
    carry-on baggage/items they are carrying. Additionally, TSA is
    exploring body imaging technologies that will allow screeners to detect
    weapons (metallic and non-metallic) and explosives that an individual
    might attempt to hide on their person.
        Question. Pilot programs at our airports play a critical role in
    moving technology from the research stage to practical deployment. What
    is the status of pilot programs for aviation security checkpoint
    detection technology, and when will these pilot programs begin?
        Answer. TSA has initiated a number of operational testing and
    evaluation pilot projects involving the next generation of checkpoint
    technologies to expand TSA's explosives detection capabilities.
    Highlights from ongoing pilot programs are as follows:
        Explosive Trace Portals (ETP).--TSA has deployed 15 ETPs to 14
    airports nationwide to evaluate their operational efficiency and
    effectiveness for screening passengers for explosives. These pilots
    have been initiated at the following airports and are scheduled to
    continue through summer 2005: Rochester, NY; JFK, NY; Gulfport, MS;
    Baltimore, MD; Jacksonville, FL; Phoenix, AZ ; Miami, FL; Providence,
    RI; Las Vegas, NV (2 units); Los Angeles, CA; San Francisco, CA;
    Boston, MA; Tampa, FL; and San Diego, CA. TSA has allocated $28.3
    million for the purchase and installation of additional trace portals
    in fiscal year 2005.
        Explosive Trace Detection Document Scanners.--TSA is operationally
    testing and evaluating an explosives detection document scanner at 4
    airports: Ronald Reagan Washington National (DCA), Los Angeles
    International (LAX), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and Chicago
    O'Hare International (ORD). The current technology requires that the
    screener manually handle the travel document to obtain the sample
    needed for analysis to determine if traces of explosives are present.
    Based on the preliminary results of the pilot at the four airports, TSA
    has determined that an automated solution better suits operational and
    security needs. Consequently, the project has been refocused to develop
    a technology solution that will meet those needs. A pilot project for
    the automated prototype will be scheduled as soon as that product is
    determined ready for an operational test and evaluation.
        Question. There is a critical need to identify new and emerging
    technology, in addition to explosive detection systems, to provide
    enhanced security protections at our nation's airports. Could you tell
    us what other progress the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    has made in identifying appropriate technology to improve the security
    and efficiency of the current airport passenger screening process?
        Answer. In addition to the operational test and evaluation pilots
    underway using explosives detection trace portals and explosives
    detection document scanners, TSA has a number of R&D projects underway
    to expand both weapons and explosives detection capabilities. These
    projects include, but are not limited to:
      --Whole Body Imaging Technology.--TSA continues to examine the
            feasibility of using a whole body imaging technology to improve
            the detection of explosives and prohibited items on persons.
            Ongoing efforts with two vendors has led to the development of
            a device that is capable of producing a generic body image that
            effectively highlights security threats on persons while not
            unduly infringing on their privacy. TSA is currently working on
            the details for the pilot phase, including vendor capabilities
            to support a timetable, selection of the pilot locations, and
            the operating policy for screening with this technology.
      --Explosives Detection System (EDS) for carry-on baggage.--TSA has
            conducted preliminary evaluations of an automated EDS for
            carry-on baggage and is currently collecting engineering data
            with the unit to promote further development. This technology
            will automate the detection of explosives in carry-on baggage,
            similar to the capabilities TSA has achieved for checked
            baggage screening. Simultaneously, we have a robust ongoing R&D
            project to develop a technology that will automate the search
            not only for explosives in carry-on baggage, but for weapons as
            well.
      --Cast and Prosthetic Device Scanner.--TSA is working to develop a
            technology solution to more effectively screen cast and
            prosthetic devices for weapons and prohibited items. TSA
            expects to pilot the technology in the first quarter of fiscal
            year 2006.
      --Explosives Detection Bottle Scanners.--TSA is working with industry
            to evaluate the effectiveness of bottle scanners to screen for
            liquid explosives. TSA has issued a solicitation to industry to
            submit products for lab evaluation.

        NATIONAL CENTER FOR CRITICAL INFORMATION PROCESSING AND STORAGE

        Question. The National Center for Critical Information Processing
    and Storage at Stennis Space Center performs the important function of
    providing a secure and reliable system to process, manage, and secure
    data for the Federal Government. Could you update us on the status of
    that project?
        Answer. Construction of the DHS data center at Stennis Space Center
    has been delayed. The Naval Oceanographic Office had been experiencing
    difficulties issuing a construction contract prior to Hurricane
    Katrina. The Naval Oceanographic Office now reports that, due to
    Hurricane Katrina, work crews are not available for the limited
    construction effort that is under contract (demolition and roofing).
    The delay to the project is not yet fully quantifiable. The DHS
    construction effort must now compete for resources with regional
    reconstruction efforts.
        Question. Specifically, when will the additional $30 million of
    fiscal year 2005 be available for build-out and construction at
    Stennis?
        Answer. The Stennis Procurement Package was released by DHS on May
    13, 2005.
                                     ______

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

         TRANSPORTATION OF BUTANT STOVES (WITHOUT BUTANE) ON AIRPLANES

        Question. Constituents have contacted me to complain about TSA.
    Alaskans have attempted to carry on butane stoves onto airplanes within
    their luggage. The stoves, although no butane was present, were
    confiscated by TSA. These stoves are used for camping and general use
    in rural Alaska; the stoves do not pose a threat to anyone on a plane.
        Why is TSA disallowing passengers from carrying butane stoves,
    without butane, in their luggage?
        Answer. Under regulations issued by the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA), there are restrictions in place on the transport
    of hazardous materials on board any aircraft. With regard to the
    transportation of butane stoves as checked baggage, in accordance with
    the baggage screening standard operating procedure (SOP), if a TSA
    screener finds a stove that potentially has fuel inside, an airline
    employee is notified so that a determination may be made regarding the
    contents of the stove. Typically, the airline employee removes the fuel
    bottle(s) from the stove, after which the stove can be transported in
    checked baggage. If the fuel bottle cannot be removed, in general, it
    will not be allowed to be transported. In some small locations in
    Alaska where the transport of camp stoves is prevalent and it is
    relatively easy to contact the passenger, the airline employee will
    contact the passenger and give that person the option to empty and
    clean the bottle before accepting the stove for transport. However, an
    unused camp stove still in the box with no fuel or emanating fumes
    should not be refused transport.

                             FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT

        Question. I'm informed the Coast Guard plans to deploy C-130s to
    Shemya or Galena to increase surveillance and enforcement of fisheries
    laws inside the Maritime Boundary Line. A report issued in 2004
    indicated the Coast Guard could not render its deployment throughout
    the high threat season because of the lack of facilities in the
    Aleutians. Last year, I included language in the Homeland bill to
    direct the Coast Guard to include in its budget submission the funds
    necessary to provide support facilities for Shemya, Galena, Cold Bay
    and other western Aleutian Islands. The Coast Guard was not able to
    follow Congressional direction and the costs were not included in the
    budget submission.
        What are the costs estimates associated with this problem?
        Answer. Increased regulation and management on the Russian side of
    the Maritime Boundary Line (MBL) have significantly decreased the need
    to forward deploy C-130 aircraft for MBL patrols. MBL enforcement
    flights originating from Air Station Kodiak are proving effective. At
    the same time, the need for forward-deployed HH-60's appears to be
    increasing to meet search and rescue and fisheries enforcement mission
    needs in Western Alaska waters.
        HH-60 forward deployments often occur from locations such as Dutch
    Harbor, Cold Bay and St. Paul Island. Although highly effective, these
    forward deployments often present our crews with challenging conditions
    because of sub-standard facilities--and inadequate commercial
    infrastructure to properly support these deployments. Addressing these
    deficiencies is a Coast Guard priority.
        The Coast Guard recently initiated a formal planning effort to
    develop alternatives and identify resources needed to respond to these
    changing mission needs. Most of these facilities are not Coast Guard-
    owned, so innovative public-private partnerships may be necessary to
    allow infrastructure improvements. The Coast Guard will keep the
    Committee advised of progress on this planning effort. The Coast Guard
    can not accurately predict costs at this early stage in the planning
    process.

                                      UAVS

        Question. What are the Coast Guard's plans for using Predator
    medium endurance unmanned aerial vehicles for fisheries enforcement and
    search and rescue activities in Alaska?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has no immediate plans to use Predator
    unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for operational service in Alaska. The
    recent proof of concept exercise demonstrated promise for a maritime-
    configured UAV, but identified shortcomings must be addressed to make
    this a Coast Guard mission capable asset. Among the technical
    challenges that still must be resolved are reliable communications and
    aircraft control at high latitudes, integration of on-board sensors,
    limited all-weather operations (including icing and crosswind limits),
    and compliance with Federal Aviation Administration air control
    requirements.
        UAVs remain a critical future element of the Coast Guard's
    Deepwater program. The Coast Guard is partnering with other DHS and DOD
    agencies to carry out further evaluation programs and take advantage of
    technology improvements that will ultimate make UAVs suitable for use
    in the maritime environment.
        Question. Does the Department plan to utilize the two previous
    Alaskan UAV demonstrations for further testing in Alaska or Hawaii?
        Answer. DHS is working with the DOD to plan additional UAV testing
    in all operational environments to demonstrate the UAV concept to
    support a variety of missions. A cooperative effort between the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Coast
    Guard to test UAV use in Hawaii, combining scientific research with
    maritime sensor validation, was recently cancelled due to lack of NOAA
    funding. The Coast Guard will continue to establish partnerships that
    may yield opportunities for future Hawaii-based testing.
        Further demonstrations in Alaska can be planned when UAV technology
    matures to resolve the key issues of reliable communications and
    aircraft control at high latitudes and all-weather operations
    (including icing and crosswind limits). Prior Coast Guard UAV testing
    in Alaska has demonstrated that these limitations restrict UAV
    operations in Alaska.
        Question. Does the Department have any plans to use UAV's to help
    TSA provide surveillance to non-aviation modes of transportation such
    as the Trans Alaska Pipeline System?
        Answer. UAVs offer a range of capabilities that are suitable
    throughout DHS. The UAV capability for 24-hour, all weather
    surveillance is particularly useful in border security applications,
    critical infrastructure protection, transportation security, or in
    support of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maritime domain awareness missions.
    In April 2004, the DHS/UAV working group submitted a report to Congress
    addressing the applicability of UAVs in various homeland security
    applications.
        As part of a USCG Predator 2 UAV demonstration in July 2004, TSA
    coordinated with the USCG to fly over designated sites on the Trans
    Alaska Pipeline (TAPS). The purpose of the TAPS demonstration was to
    evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of the UAV and associated
    sensors for pipeline surveillance. This effort provided additional
    evidence of the utility of UAVs as part of a layered surveillance
    effort. TSA will continue to evaluate the use of UAVs with regard to
    pipeline surveillance and looks forward to working with Congress on the
    issue.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

                   BORDER NEEDS--SECURITY UPDGRADES AT PORTS

        Question. America has 197 land ports of entry, and it has been
    almost 20 years since we launched a major effort to upgrade
    infrastructure at those ports. That last effort occurred in 1986, when
    former Senator DeConcini and I developed the Southwest Border
    Improvement Program to improve border infrastructure so that States
    could better take advantage of commerce and trade opportunities with
    Mexico. That was almost 15 years prior September 11, 2001.
        Since September 11, we have placed increasing emphasis on upgrading
    security for our airports, seaports, and critical infrastructure. It is
    imperative that we also improve land port security. To that end, I will
    introduce a bill authorizing additional funds for investment in our
    nation's border crossings.
        Have you considered what kinds of improvements are necessary at our
    land ports of entry and how much these upgrades might cost?
        Answer. DHS is in the midst of a systems-level review of its border
    control architecture to identify the right mix of personnel, technology
    and infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the border. DHS
    will identify a program manager to oversee the development of a
    specific set of border security plans. The Department will be in a
    better position to comment on this question following the conclusion of
    this review.
        Question. Specific improvements are needed at the Columbus port of
    entry in New Mexico, and the General Services Administration (GSA) has
    proposed construction on the Columbus project to begin in 2007 or 2008.
    Do you support GSA's recommendation and will you make every effort to
    keep the project on track for construction?
        Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level
    review of its border control architecture. This review is intended to
    help the Department identify the right mix of personnel, technology and
    infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the border. The
    Department will be in a better position to comment on this question
    following the conclusion of this review.

                          BORDER NEEDS--UAV TECHNOLOGY

        Question. In last year's intelligence reform bill, I called for the
    Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan for using Unmanned
    Aerial Vehicles (``UAVs'') on America's southwest border.
        In New Mexico, we have some experience with UAVs because our
    university near the southwestern U.S. border operates a UAV validation
    and test facility sponsored by the Department of Defense. Because of
    the established presence of UAVs at New Mexico State University, and
    because of our location as a border state, I believe New Mexico would
    be an asset in the use of UAVs for surveillance.
        What are your views concerning the use of UAVs for securing remote
    areas of our borders?
        Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level
    review of its border control architecture. DHS is also currently
    working to begin the process of procuring UAVs. The Department's
    objective is to get that done in a matter of months and start to deploy
    UAVs and have them flying over the border. That said, DHS cannot rely
    exclusively on UAVs, and manned vehicles and helicopters will also play
    a role.
        Question. How many UAVs does DHS currently own?
        Answer. As of August 20, DHS currently does not own any UAVs.
        Question. Where are these UAVs stationed?
        Answer. As of August 20, DHS currently does not own any UAVs.
        Question. Will your staff evaluate evaluate the existing UAV
    facility at New Mexico State University and the Las Cruces
    International Airport as a potential home for the Department's UAV
    program?
        Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level
    review of its border control architecture. The Department will be in a
    better position to comment on this question following the conclusion of
    this review.

                           BORDER PERSONNEL--MANPOWER

        Question. As you know, adequate staffing at our nation's land ports
    of entry is essential for the safety of parties involved in the flow of
    traffic across the border and for efficient commerce.
        Last year's legislation that reorganized our intelligence community
    called for an increase in border patrol agents, and President Bush's
    fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds to hire an additional 210
    agents.
        Have you studied where placing these agents would be most
    beneficial?
        Answer. Emergency Supplemental Legislation and President Bush's
    fiscal year 2006 Budget call for the hiring of an additional 710 agents
    by the end of fiscal year 2006, and CBP is taking aggressive steps to
    recruit, hire and train candidates to fill these spots. The hiring of
    these new agents comes in addition to the standard attrition hires that
    supplement the several hundred agents who retire, transfer, or leave
    for medical reasons over the course of a year. New agent positions will
    be allocated based on risk-based priorities.
        Question. When might these new agents be hired and put in place?
        Answer. There is currently an open recruiting announcement to
    obtain additional potential new employees.
        Question. How can we better retain existing border patrol officers
    so that as we place these new agents along our borders, we are not
    losing agents with experience?
        Answer. CBP is currently examining methods that can be used to
    retain seasoned agents. The current attrition rate for experienced
    agents (GS-9 and higher) is less than 5 percent.

                      BORDER PERSONNEL--TRAINING AT FLETC

        Question. One of the Federal Government's premier training sites
    for law enforcement officers is located in New Mexico. Many Federal law
    enforcement officers have trained at the Federal Law Enforcement
    Training Center in Artesia (FLETC-Artesia), including Air Marshals and
    Federal Flight Deck Officers.
        Additionally, both basic and advanced training for Border Patrol
    Agents is now conducted at FLETC-Artesia. I lauded the Department's
    decision to consolidate border patrol training in Artesia because it
    makes sense to have all training at one facility. Additionally,
    training border patrol officers in a border State gives trainees a
    first-hand look at the area they are charged with protecting.
        What, if anything, does the Department need from FLETC-Artesia?
        Answer. FLETC is proceeding to put into place the temporary
    structures and staffing directed in the recently enacted fiscal year
    2005 Supplemental. As more information and details are developed on
    additional training needs we will keep the Congress apprised.
        Question. Has DHS considered taking border patrol trainees to the
    Mexico border as part of their overall training?
        Answer. FLETC uses scenario base training utilizing Spanish
    speaking role players in a controlled environment identical to that
    seen on the southwest border. This scenario based training affords
    trainees the opportunity to correct mistakes and become comfortable
    with assigned duties prior to assignment in a U.S. Border Patrol
    sector. This system of training is more flexible and less costly than
    providing visits during basic training to border sites. The Border
    Patrol also employs a system of supervision and on-the-job experience
    for newly graduated agents.
        Question. If new facilities were constructed at FLETC-Artesia,
    would you support legislative language to streamline the design,
    engineering and construction of those facilities?
        Answer. The Department is always open to considering legislative
    methods that streamline and improve our processes while promoting full
    and open competition.

                  NEW MEXICO CAPABILITIES--TRAINING AT PLAYAS

        Question. Secretary Chertoff, last fall New Mexico Tech opened the
    Playas Training Center. DHS played an integral part in this center by
    providing the funding for New Mexico Tech to purchase Playas, a small
    town in Southwest New Mexico that was virtually abandoned when the
    copper smelting operation in the area was shut down in 1999.
        Playas' remote location and open space makes it an ideal place for
    New Mexico Tech to develop a wide range of research and training
    activities to support homeland security efforts nationwide.
        What new training activities could DHS use at Playas?
        Answer. It is my understanding that Playas will be jointly
    developed by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and the
    New Mexico State University. As you are aware, ODP has funded the New
    Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology since fiscal year 1998 as
    part of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. As part of the
    Consortium, the New Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology supports
    ODP's mission of assisting State and local governments plan and prepare
    for incidents of domestic terrorism by providing critical training to
    the Nation's first responders. The State of New Mexico used State funds
    rather than Federal homeland security funds to purchase the Playas
    Training Center. Nevertheless, ODP does have a use agreement in place
    with New Mexico Tech to use the Playas Training Center over a 5-year
    period. As the Playas Training Center is further developed, the
    Department's ODP will coordinate with New Mexico Tech officials to
    determine the types of training initiatives that could be supported by
    the Playas Training Center.
        Question. How much is included in the President's fiscal year 2006
    budget for training first responders?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget request for SLGCP
    includes over $83 million for the State and Local Training Program.
    Through this funding, SLGCP will continue to develop and deliver state-
    of-the-art training programs through its coalition of ``Training
    Partners.'' This coalition, comprised of government facilities,
    academic institutions and private organizations provide a variety of
    specialized training for emergency responders across the country. The
    fiscal year 2006 funding request will support SLGCP's Continued and
    Emerging Training Program, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and
    the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. In addition, a portion
    of SLGCP grants to States and urban areas are also devoted to training.
        FEMA also conducts an extensive array of training for emergency
    personnel through the National Fire Academy, the Emergency Management
    Institute, and the Noble Training Center with a budget that totals
    approximately $15 million. Other DHS components, such as the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center, also provide training for selected
    State and local personnel.
        Question. What are your thoughts on providing standardized training
    for all first responders, at both the Federal and local level, in a
    facility like the one at Playas?
        Answer. The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology,
    including its training facility at Playas, already supports ODP's
    training efforts through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.
    As such, these facilities will comply with all training standards
    required for ODP training.
        Standards for training encompass the instructional design of the
    training, the quality of training content, the effectiveness of the
    instructors, as well as successful knowledge transfer measured through
    student evaluation. With respect to development of training programs,
    the ODP Training Division has adopted the industry standard
    instructional systems design approach of analysis, design, development,
    implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) as detailed in the ODP Strategy
    for Blended Learning. The ADDIE approach for instructional design
    ensures a valid training need is identified, the most effective
    methodology for instruction is identified, and training content is
    monitored for accuracy and effectiveness throughout the process.
        The development of training content based on effective needs
    analysis is also based upon performance standards. DHS efforts in this
    area related to training for emergency responders began with the ODP
    Training Strategy developed in 2002, which provided guidance on who
    should be trained to perform what tasks, using what methodologies to
    maximize training efficiencies. The strategy further addressed
    effective methods for evaluating competency and performance after
    training was completed and what gaps needed to be remedied. This work
    led to the ODP-developed Emergency Responder Guidelines, which were
    promulgated in August 2002. These are currently undergoing revision to
    reflect a broader range of response disciplines and the private sector.
        Additionally, as the executive agent for the development and
    implementation of HSPD-8, ``National Preparedness,'' SLGCP has
    developed and promulgated an Interim National Preparedness Goal (NPG).
    The Interim NPG, which was released on March 31, 2005, was developed
    using capabilities-based planning. Capabilities are combinations of
    resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome
    resulting from performance of one or more critical tasks, under
    specified conditions and performance standards. The Target Capabilities
    List identifies 36 Target Capabilities and is currently available.
        ODP's Training Division, along with our training partners, is in
    the process of examining the capabilities associated with the national
    priorities included in the Interim National Preparedness Goal to align
    training curricula to these national priorities and the related
    capabilities. It is the Department's goal and expectation to have its
    training courses aligned with the national priorities in fiscal year
    2006.
        Further, with respect to professional standards, ODP requires its
    training partners, State Administering Agencies, and Federal partners
    to adhere to and incorporate the following professional standards in
    training curricula to which they are applicable:
      --29 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR)1910.120, Hazardous Waste
            Operations and Emergency Response;
      --29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection;
      --National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 471, Recommended
            Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents;
      --NFPA 472, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous
            Materials Incidents;
      --NFPA 473, Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to
            Hazardous Materials Incidents;
      --NFPA 1006, Standard for Rescue Technician Professional
            Qualifications;
      --NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
            Continuity Programs 2004, specifically Chapter 5, section 5.12;
            and
      --NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue
            and Search Incidents.
        Question. Will the Department work to make State homeland security
    directors aware of the Playas Training Facility in an effort to help
    local first responders receive adequate training?
        Answer. ODP is undertaking a web-based information portal
    initiative, the First Responder Training portal, that will be the
    primary location for information and resources serving the first
    responder community in support of the DHS strategic goal of improving
    the nation's ability to prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond to, and
    recover from emergency situations and events. The portal will create a
    functional tool to support the development and delivery of efficient,
    effective and consistent first responder training. Registered under the
    domain name of firstrespondertraining.gov, the website will provide a
    single, authoritative link for the first responder community and will
    include collaboration tools and information on training, grants,
    equipment, and standards.
        This portal will complement FEMA/U.S. Fire Administration's (USFA)
    existing on-line training portals, the Emergency Management Institute's
    Independent Study website, and the USFA National Emergency Training
    Center (NETC) Virtual Campus, which together offer more than 60 courses
    for emergency personnel and has registered more than 350,000 course
    completions already this fiscal year. The NETC Virtual Campus courses
    are intended for Federal, state, and local officials including
    emergency management personnel, fire service personnel, police, public
    works, health officials and first responders, and also DHS personnel,
    and the general public.
        The ODP First Responder Training portal and FEMA's on-line training
    facilities will provide consistent delivery of training to large
    audiences and will be used as a delivery mechanism by our partners to
    continue to enhance the capacity of the emergency responder community.
    Additionally, this web-based training will: accommodate students with
    disabilities by use of assistive technologies; be designed to support
    small group work and collaboration; provide multi-purposed training and
    resources; have the capability to restrict access to only authorized
    users; offer students the opportunity to remediate materials until
    proficient or ``opt out'' of content they have already mastered; and be
    linked through other initiatives currently underway to track user
    activity and accurately provide student transcripts.
        The framework and inter-workings of the overall system are nearing
    completion. A pilot test, testing functionality and usability for
    internal users/developers (training partners) and external users
    (students from the first responder communities), will begin in June
    2005. Results from the pilot test will be used to make improvements to
    the system and to determine the effectiveness of the technology in
    support of ODP's National Training Program.
        Prior to the development of the First Responder Training portal,
    ODP developed a Training Course Catalog, as well as comprehensive
    guidelines associated with attending ODP-sponsored training courses.
    This information is available to the Nation's first responder community
    through a number of different means, including ODP's publicly-available
    website (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp) as well as through routine
    interaction with ODP's State Preparedness Officers and the nation's
    first responder community. As New Mexico Tech develops training courses
    at Playas Training Center, ODP will make this information available
    through its various outreach mechanisms, including the First Responder
    Training portal.
        New Mexico Capabilities--Dirty Bomb Training
        Question. New Mexico Tech has also joined with New Mexico State
    University (``NMSU'') to propose an expansion of the anti-terrorism
    training program for first responders. This expansion would include a
    course about radiological dispersal devices (also known as dirty
    bombs).
        I believe this proposal has merit because the aftermath of a dirty
    bomb attack is one of our gravest anticipated terrorist attacks, and
    our first responders need appropriate training to respond to such a
    threat. New Mexico Tech and NMSU's Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring
    and Research Center have the scientific expertise, radiological
    handling capabilities, radioactive material license, and trained staff
    to address both the scientific and training aspects of dirty bombs, and
    collaboration between these universities and New Mexico's national
    nuclear weapons labs could provide ideal training first responders to
    counter dirty bomb risks.
        What dirty bomb training do Federal first responders currently
    receive?
        Answer. FEMA/USFA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI), as well
    as the National Fire Academy, offers a full range of courses that
    prepare state, local, and tribal emergency personnel to deal with the
    aftermath of all types of events involving radiological materials. EMI
    courses such as ``Radiological Emergency Response Operations'' and
    ``Advanced Radiological Incident Operations'' and the NFA's Command and
    Control of Emergency Incidents provide specific instruction in how to
    prepare for such events.
        Although there is no specific course dedicated to radiological
    dispersal devices, several courses delivered by members of the National
    Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) cover radiological dispersal
    devices in their course curriculum. The extent to which radiological
    dispersal devices are covered in the various courses ranges from a five
    minute overview to a detailed 2.5 hour block of instruction. States,
    territories, and urban areas may use SLGCP-certified training to
    enhance the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness and
    response personnel as it adheres to the State's Homeland Security
    Strategy. The target audience for SLGCP-certified training courses
    includes State and local emergency preparedness, prevention and
    response personnel; emergency managers; and public/elected officials
    within the following disciplines: fire service, law enforcement,
    emergency management, emergency medical services, hazardous materials,
    public works, public health, health care, public safety communications,
    governmental administrative, cyber security, and private security
    providers.
        Question. Could New Mexico Tech's training facility in Playas, New
    Mexico be the ideal place to base such training?
        Answer. As you are aware, ODP has funded the New Mexico Institute
    of Mining and Technology since fiscal year 1998 as part of the National
    Domestic Preparedness Consortium. As part of the Consortium, the New
    Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology supports ODP's mission of
    assisting State and local governments plan and prepare for incidents of
    domestic terrorism by providing critical training to the nation's first
    responders. ODP periodically reviews its training requirements and
    builds on the strengths of its training partners. Currently, nuclear
    and radiological training primarily falls under the Department of
    Energy's Nevada Test Site (NTS). However, ODP will review any unique
    capabilities the Playas Training Center may offer.

                       RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY--GENERALLY

        Question. The Department of Homeland Security has used many
    different resources to implement innovative protective measures across
    the country. We have improved security nationwide through the
    Department's Science and Technology Directorate, the Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, Centers of Excellency, and similar divisions and
    initiatives.
        The Department's leadership in developing innovative tools and
    technologies to protect our Nation is one of the most important roles
    the Department plays. However, with so many groups working on
    developing new technologies, it may prove difficult to select the best
    technology available.
        How does DHS intend to most effectively integrate and leverage
    existing efforts and capabilities to ensure that the best technologies
    available are utilized?
        Answer. Last year, the S&T Directorate developed and documented a
    robust RDT&E process. The goal of the RDT&E process is to provide a
    clearly defined, repeatable method for assessing needs and risk,
    planning, allocating resources and executing programs to produce high-
    impact, cost-effective and critically needed homeland security
    technology solutions.
        The S&T Directorate's RDT&E process uses a risked-based approach to
    planning and identifies critical capability gaps before attempting to
    identify or develop technology solutions. In developing solutions, the
    process engages the end-user throughout requirements definition,
    development, testing and transition. The process considers the product
    life cycle from the outset, including planning and budgeting for
    production, deployment, operations and support. It is this process
    which allows us to prioritize both within and across fields.
        Integration of existing efforts and capabilities occurs in several
    key areas. For example, the S&T Directorate collaborates with academia
    through the Centers of Excellence program and its associated Integrated
    Network of Centers, which is establishing a national network of
    affiliated universities. Additionally, the S&T Directorate has a
    sizeable number of interactions and programs with individual
    universities on specific research topics and needs.
        The S&T Directorate also maximizes and leverages the existing
    capability base of the national laboratory complex. The Directorate
    engages all the national laboratories on a case-by-case basis, to tap
    into unique technical expertise that is critical to accomplishing
    portfolio objectives and goals. The Directorate also relies on national
    laboratory technical experts as needed throughout the RDT&E processes
    based on their years of experience applying technologies and processes
    to field applications. This technical and practical expertise is used
    to accelerate spiral development of technologies for transitioning
    capabilities to operational end-users.
        The S&T Directorate solicits proposal from industry and uses a full
    range of contracting vehicles and its authority under the Homeland
    Security Act to engage businesses (large and small), Federally funded
    research and development centers, universities, and other entities in
    development of advanced technologies for homeland security. The
    contracted research and development work now underway is the S&T
    Directorate's main form of collaboration with industry and academia.
        Question. Under your leadership, how will the Science and
    Technology Directorate collaborate with academia, industry and our
    national labs?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate collaborates with academia through the
    Centers of Excellence program and its associated Integrated Network of
    Centers, which is establishing a national network of affiliated
    universities. Additionally, the S&T Directorate has a sizeable number
    of interactions and programs with individual universities on specific
    research topics and needs.
        The S&T Directorate solicits proposals from industry and uses a
    full range of contracting vehicles and its authority under the Homeland
    Security Act to engage businesses (large and small), Federally funded
    research and development centers, universities, and other entities in
    development of advanced technologies for homeland security. The
    contracted research and development work now underway is the S&T
    Directorate's main form of collaboration with industry and academia.
        The S&T Directorate maximizes and leverages the existing capability
    base of the national laboratory complex. The Directorate engages all
    the national laboratories on a case-by-case basis, to tap into unique
    technical expertise that is critical to accomplishing portfolio
    objectives and goals. The Directorate also relies on national
    laboratory technical experts as needed throughout the RDT&E processes
    based on their years of experience applying technologies and processes
    to field applications. This technical and practical expertise is used
    to accelerate spiral development of technologies for transitioning
    capabilities to operational end-users.
        The S&T Directorate engages all the national laboratories on a
    case-by-case basis, to tap into unique technical expertise that is
    critical to accomplishing portfolio objectives and goals. The
    Directorate also relies on national laboratory technical experts as
    needed throughout the RDT&E processes based on their years of
    experience applying technologies and processes to field applications.
    This technical and practical expertise is used to accelerate spiral
    development of technologies for transitioning capabilities to
    operational end-users.
        For example, the Countermeasures Test Beds (CMTB) program operates
    in close partnership with a number of Federal and national laboratories
    to execute its mission of testing and evaluating all threat
    countermeasures and systems. The following national labs participate in
    all CMTB Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E) efforts and enable
    deployments in response to heightened alert conditions as necessary.
    Multi-lab teams are encouraged to ensure objectivity and a healthy
    interchange of ideas.
        As another example, the Office of Interoperability and
    Compatibility (OIC) is currently leveraging the resources of Eastern
    Kentucky University in developing effective test methodologies for
    equipment and to provide technical assistance to States and localities
    under the SAFECOM Program. At the same time, OIC has enlisted a
    consortium of well over one hundred universities and colleges to
    support the annual conference on Technologies for Public Safety in
    Critical Incident Response, jointly sponsored by DHS and the DOJ.
    Industry associations participate in SAFECOM Program activities,
    especially in standards development efforts. OIC has established a
    monthly vendor process which allows for constant communication and
    collaboration with our industry partners. Additionally, OIC/SAFECOM
    will be conducting an industry summit in late fall to allow for ever
    greater collaboration.
        Additionally, the BioSecurity program currently works closely with
    academia, industry and the national labs to fulfill its national
    mission.
        Question. How will you allocate funding to national laboratories,
    universities, and industry in a competitive and transparent manner?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate supports seeking the best sources to
    accomplish DHS RDT&E goals through full and open competition.
        Individual national laboratories have recognized expertise in
    specific technical fields built up from years of experience in national
    defense technology development. Recognizing those areas of expertise,
    integrated technical programs have been formed from multiple
    laboratories to solve problem sets related to their expertise. The
    laboratories assist in leading the formation of the technical teams
    addressing specific problem sets. The S&T Directorate uses a
    performance based approach to ensuring quality programs. As such,
    annual external reviews are conducted with subject-matter experts and
    end-user reviewers to evaluate the performance and outcomes of
    individual programs. Results from these reviews are documented and used
    to inform decisions on the next fiscal year's program execution plans.
        All funds allocated by University Programs to universities and
    individuals at universities are the product of a highly competitive
    merit-based selection process. A large number of subject matter experts
    from government, industry and academia use well-established and
    documented peer review selection procedures in making funding
    recommendations.
        All S&T Directorate Broad Agency Announcements and Small Business
    Innovation Research solicitations are public and competitive. All are
    published on the official Federal Government procurement website (and
    simultaneously on the S&T Directorate's HSARPA websites) and each
    contains explicit instructions on how to submit white papers and
    proposals. The criteria by which these submissions will be evaluated
    for technical merit are published in each solicitation. The source
    selection plan which guides the panel of experts who evaluate the
    submissions is approved at the same time the solicitation is published
    and records of their final decisions are retained. Selections for
    funding are typically made on technical merit, relevance to DHS
    mission, available funding, and programmatic considerations by a source
    selection authority.
        Also, the S&T Directorate works to ensure all of its program
    offices allocate funding to national and Federal laboratories,
    universities, and industry where appropriate, following the competitive
    guidelines outlined in the Federal Acquisition Requirements. The S&T
    Directorate continually monitors all program aspects to determine best
    value and cost effectiveness. As the S&T Directorate works to mature
    and transition mature technologies to the user community, a competitive
    process is used.

                         RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY--NISAC

        Question. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
    Center, or NISAC, is funded by DHS to evaluate the effects of
    disruptions to America's infrastructure, and much of NISAC's work is
    done by New Mexico's two National Laboratories: Sandia and Los Alamos.
        I strongly believe in NISAC's efforts and capabilities, but I do
    not believe the program is being used by the entire Department of
    Homeland Security to its full extent.
        What are your plans to coordinate the Department's Directorates so
    NISAC is utilized by the entire Department?
        Answer. The Department's National Infrastructure Simulation and
    Analysis Center (NISAC) is a program in the DHS IAIP Directorate. Since
    its inception, NISAC has had the mission to provide comprehensive
    modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of critical
    infrastructures, their interdependencies and complexities, and the
    consequences of disturbances. This mission and NISAC's expertise
    directly support the modeling, simulation, and analysis initiatives of
    DHS. For fiscal year 2005, IAIP will continue to expand NISAC's
    operational development of a suite of infrastructure modeling,
    simulation and analytic capabilities with an emphasis on
    interdependencies and consequences of infrastructure disruptions for
    the Nation as a whole.
        At present, IAIP is coordinating ongoing NISAC work with the S&T
    Directorate, the Coast Guard, FEMA, BTS, and TSA, as well as with the
    Departments of Transportation and Energy, on multiple projects that
    concern the nation's infrastructure. The NISAC program office will
    continue its efforts to broaden the awareness of the NISAC program
    throughout DHS to ensure this national resource is properly tasked with
    the most urgent and complex problems concerning infrastructure
    dependencies and interdependencies. IAIP will continue to fully
    utilize, and if warranted expand, the existing capabilities of NISAC
    with IAIP acting as the central coordinator for NISAC efforts in
    keeping with IAIP's national charter of coordinating and leading
    efforts for the understanding and protection of the nation's
    infrastructure. Moreover, as the Department's ability to execute risk
    assessment continues to mature, NISAC will become more and more
    integrated into the full range of Federal risk management programs.
        Question. How will you work with the Director of National
    Intelligence to make NISAC's capabilities available to the intelligence
    community through a formal relationship, as required by last year's
    intelligence reform bill?
        Answer. IAIP is continually improving the integration between the
    organizations that develop the three components of our Strategic Risk
    Analysis; which are consequence, vulnerability and threat or
    attractiveness. A prime example of this effort is ensuring that the
    intelligence component of DHS, the Office of Information Analysis,
    currently in IAIP, is aware of NISAC's capabilities and, as a
    byproduct, the resident expertise at the national laboratories. As the
    NISAC products are more fully developed and matured, this integration
    will increase.
        As a continuation of this integration, we will engage with the
    Director of National Intelligence to make him aware of a variety of
    efforts the Department has underway that will benefit from his efforts,
    NISAC included. We will seek a formal relationship for information and
    capability sharing as warranted, between non-DHS elements of the
    intelligence community and the Department, including the NISAC.
        Question. What do you need from Congress to fully implement NISAC's
    capabilities?
        Answer. Congress's continued support for all of the Department's
    programs that seek to reduce the risk of terrorism to the Nation are
    greatly appreciated. All of these programs are essential, including the
    Department's National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center.
       research and technology--domestic nuclear detection office (dndo)
        Question. The Department has a new office tasked with deploying
    radiation detection technologies and systems designed to detect
    attempts to smuggle nuclear materials or weapons into the United
    States. As such, the Domestic Nuclear Detention Office, is likely to
    play a critical role in testing and evaluating current and next
    generation technologies to assure that DHS agencies have the most
    effective and accurate tools.
        How does DNDO intend to balance the needs between rapidly deploying
    detection systems and developing technologies that can best fulfill its
    mission?
        Answer. The DNDO will include, as part of its staff, an Office of
    Systems Engineering, which will be dedicated to development of the
    global systems architecture, as well as a comprehensive systems
    engineering capability. This office will be tasked with providing
    quantifiable analysis of issues such as this and providing cost-benefit
    analysis, when appropriate, to determine the relative advantages gained
    by deploying current technologies or developing additional
    capabilities.
        Additionally, beyond the DNDO office structure, the DNDO will also
    utilize the Department's robust, two-tiered validation process for
    large-scale programs, consisting of a Joint Requirements Council and an
    Investment Review Board, which have final approval to authorize
    deployment or development programs.
        Question. How do you plan to develop and support the nuclear
    facilities and infrastructure needed to test and evaluate evolving
    technologies, missions, and operational concepts?
        Answer. The DNDO will continue to proceed with the design and
    construction of the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and
    Evaluation Complex (RadNucCTEC) at the Nevada Test Site. The
    construction of this facility, begun within the DHS S&T Radiological
    and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio, will bridge the gap between
    ``bench-top testing'' performed by developers and operational field
    testing conducted during pilot deployments, providing the unique
    capability to test systems in a near real-world environment against
    actual special nuclear materials in authentic configurations.
    Construction is expected to begin in June 2005 and be completed by the
    end of fiscal year 2006.
        Additionally, DNDO will continue to utilize the DHS S&T
    Countermeasures Test Bed (CMTB) for operational testing and evaluation.
    CMTB will provide a critical, objective testing environment to evaluate
    technologies and concepts of operation for nuclear and radiological
    detection in key operational venues.
        Question. With the creation of DNDO, will the efforts to prevent
    and respond to radiological dispersion devices be retained in the
    Science and Technology Directorate, moved into DNDO, or shared between
    these two DHS divisions?
        Answer. Many experts consider a nuclear attack to be less likely
    than the release of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). However, a
    nuclear attack would be many times more devastating than one employing
    an RDD, both in terms of economic impact and casualties. While the
    primary focus of DNDO is, therefore, to develop and acquire systems and
    capabilities for the detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and
    nuclear devices, most nuclear threat detection systems will also detect
    radiological threats, because of the similarity in nature of
    radioactive signatures of special nuclear materials nuclear devices and
    radiological materials usable in an RDD.
        As such, the division of responsibilities for prevention and
    response for RDDs between DNDO and the S&T Directorate is the same as
    that for nuclear devices or materials. DNDO will be responsible for the
    development of the detection architecture, as well as the systems to be
    deployed, for the prevention of an attack. Additionally, DNDO will be
    responsible for the development of training and response protocols in
    the event of an alarm. However, DNDO will not be responsible for the
    development of incident management or decontamination technologies;
    these programs will remain in the S&T Directorate.
        Question. What role will national weapons labs play in DNDO?
        Answer. DNDO will continue to work with the Office of National
    Laboratories in the S&T Directorate to make sure that work is properly
    coordinated and that all of the national laboratories, including the
    weapons labs, receive clear guidance and direction on efforts they
    conduct with DNDO or the S&T Directorate.
        DNDO recognizes that the national weapons laboratories have long
    been one of this nation's preeminent sources of critical nuclear
    expertise. That expertise, along with the expertise found in academia
    and industry, will be vital to responding to the threat posed by
    nuclear and radiological weapons or materials and in developing
    transformational capabilities to significantly enhance the U.S.
    capability to protect against this threat.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                                drug trafficking

        Question. The President has said, ``trafficking in drugs finances
    the work of terrorists, sustaining terrorists and that terrorists use
    drug profits.'' Given the President's view, I am surprised that he has
    included almost no initiatives in your budget to disrupt the drug
    trade. Why?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget includes $3.455
    billion that affects or may affect the counternarcotics activities of
    the Department or any of its subdivisions, or that affects the ability
    of the Department or any subdivision of the Department to meet its
    responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United
    States.
        Within that $3.455 billion total, approximately $2.937 billion has
    been identified as National Drug Control Budget Funds--funds for those
    Department programs and initiatives that directly support Priority III
    of the President's National Drug Control Strategy (Disrupting the
    Market: Attacking the Economic Basis of the Drug Trade). This funding
    will provide the Department with resources to strengthen and focus its
    illegal drug market disruption efforts while, at the same time,
    dedicating new resources for emerging threats. In addition to these
    funds, approximately $480.5 million has been identified as other
    potential expenditures that also may affect the counternarcotics
    activities of the Department.
        These funds support counternarcotics programs and counternarcotics-
    related activities that can build on the Department's many
    accomplishments towards stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the
    United States.

                                 lobbying rules

        Question. On November 23, the Office of Government Ethics, in
    response to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) request, relaxed
    lobbying prohibitions for former ``senior employees'' of the
    Department. Up until November 23 of this year, any former ``senior
    employee'' of DHS was barred from lobbying any individual or office in
    DHS for 1 year. A senior employee is any individual whose rate of basic
    pay is equal or greater than 86.5 percent of the rate for level II of
    the Executive Schedule. The 2004 salary for an Executive Level II
    employee is $158,100, 86.5 percent of which is $136,756.
        The revised rule by the Office of Government Ethics designates
    seven distinct and separate components in DHS for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
    207(c), which covers conflict of interest restrictions for senior
    Federal officials in post-employment. The components designated are:
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Coast Guard; Secret
    Service; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Science &
    Technology (S&T) Directorate; Information, Analysis & Infrastructure
    Protection (IAIP) Directorate; and Emergency Preparedness & Response
    (EP&R).
        By designating seven distinct and separate components in DHS, any
    former official who worked in one of those seven components is now
    permitted to immediately lobby anywhere in DHS except for the component
    for which they were employed. It also allows senior officials who
    worked for DHS, but not in one of the seven designated components, to
    immediately lobby anyone in those components designated as distinct and
    separate. For instance, a senior employee who worked in the Office of
    the Secretary for Tom Ridge can immediately lobby any of the DHS
    organizations cited above. Those seven components alone comprise over
    $19 billion and nearly 60 percent of the Department's funding.
        Why did DHS request this change to the lobbying rules?
        Answer. The recommendations were made to appropriately tailor the
    application of the 1-year cooling-off restriction to the circumstances
    existing within the newly created Department of Homeland Security.
    Section 207 of title 18 of the United States Code is not intended as a
    blanket bar to former employees from dealing with the Government after
    separation. Rather, it represents a carefully crafted balance between
    preventing improper peddling of influence in the government by former
    government officials on the one hand, and permitting the continued
    availability to the government of the experience and training of former
    government officials. In a dynamic, forwarding leaning agency such as
    DHS, with a mission to protect the homeland, it is essential that the
    agency attract top notch people who are facile and knowledgeable about
    innovative technology. The DHS mission requires that these leaders in
    the fields populate the whole of DHS Headquarters and its components.
        The statute is composite of a series of very fact specific
    prohibitions based on conclusions of improper over-reaching as
    determined though the lens of that balancing. Congress recognized the
    potential subsection 207(c) has to unduly restrict appropriate post-
    Government-service interaction by former employees with the government
    by carving out exceptions to it, i.e., subsection 207(c)(2)(B)(in the
    cases of special government employees), subsection 207(c)(2)(C)(in
    cases of difficult-to-fill positions), subsection 207(h)(in cases of
    elements of an agency where there exists ``no potential for use of
    undue influence or unfair advantage based on past Government
    service''), and subsection 207(j)(Exceptions).
        The recommendations that DHS made to the Director, Office of
    Government Ethics, in December 2003, were based on the following:
      --OGE criteria for making such recommendations;
      --how the Department was structured and operating;
      --how the legacy agencies had treated the organizational elements
            previously; and
      --how subsection 207(c) is applied generally through the Executive
            Branch.
        Several features of the Department were clear for the purposes of
    these recommendations. United States Secret Service, the United State
    Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Agency, and the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center were focused on discrete independent
    missions of the Department, most statutorily so, and had extensive
    independent administrative structures. The three directorates, Science
    and Technology, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and
    Emergency Preparedness and Response, posed a more nuanced picture, but
    presented the same distinct, self-contained mission focuses.
        Equally clear in the opposite direction was that the significance
    of the missions entrusted to the Border and Transportation Security
    Directorate and its subordinate elements and the extensive vertical and
    horizontal interaction between them made them so inter-related and
    inter-dependent as to foreclose designating them as separate.
        Given those conclusions and comparing how other agencies treated
    their components, we recommended the designation of those seven
    components as separate for the purposes of the 1-year cooling-off
    period.
        Question. How is this change beneficial to the Department, the U.S.
    taxpayers, and our national security?
        Answer. The Department's exercise of this statute greatly enhances
    national security, benefits the taxpayers of the United States, and is
    invaluable in the accomplishment of the Department's mission. Detection
    of threats by passage of people and cargo into the United States by
    air, sea, or land is dependent upon innovative human and technological
    systems that are used by components throughout the Department. These
    systems were developed by career and non-career Federal employees
    working as a team. The career employees contribute their expertise and
    experience in government operations and the non-careerist often
    contribute their expertise and experience in technology developed in
    the private sector. It is a proven successful synergy, not quite
    perfect, but the best in the world.
        Our nation's security and the taxpayer will be the ultimate losers
    if the country's professionals and leaders are kept from joining
    Federal agencies initially or, upon return to the private sector, are
    precluded from bringing their skills and experience to bear on these
    important issues because of a failure to appropriately tailor the post-
    Government-service restriction. The departing leaders take with them an
    understanding of the threat, what is needed to combat the threat, and
    how the Department is working to counter the threat. The threat is not
    stagnant, and it is counterproductive to overly restrict the work of
    those who are among the most able to ensure close cooperation and
    understanding between the Federal and non Federal entities to make our
    country safe.
        We believe that the combination of the relaxation of the
    restriction imposed by section 207(c) granted by the designation of
    separate components and the existence of the additional restriction
    applicable to very senior personnel, the inapplicability of separate
    component designation to our former employees who were paid pursuant to
    the Executive Schedule, and the application of subsection 207(d), we
    have achieved the balance that was desired by the drafters of section
    207. Of course, we must certify annually to the Director, United States
    Office of Government Ethics, that our designations remain appropriate.

                                dhs headquarters

        Question. In addition to the $25 million GSA is requesting to
    locate CG headquarters at St. Elizabeth's campus in Anacostia, there is
    a $13 million request for ``St. Elizabeths West Campus
    Infrastructure''. The West Campus alone has 182 acres and includes 61
    buildings. The justification says ``the site is aptly suited to provide
    a high security campus for Federal agencies.''
        What are the Department's plans for the St. Elizabeth site?
        Answer. The Department's plans for the St. Elizabeth site are to
    ensure that the Coast Guard headquarters is properly planned and
    executed to provide additional expansion capability should the need
    arise for additional occupancy.
        Question. How are these plans related to the current efforts to
    outfit the Nebraska Avenue complex?
        Answer. The requirements for adjacency and mission needs being
    established at the NAC would be utilized should the opportunity for
    expansion be available at the St. Elizabeth site.

                          avoiding future fund lapses

        Question. Why did the Department Management account allow $9.3
    million to lapse at the end of fiscal year 2004 and what specific
    systems have been put in place to make sure that this does not happen
    again?
        Answer. The Department did not intentionally allow funding to lapse
    in fiscal year 2004. The fiscal year 2004 unobligated balance for the
    Departmental Management account was due primarily to slower than
    anticipated hiring, resulting in personnel lapse. In fiscal year 2004,
    the infrastructure and organization to manage budget execution for
    Departmental Management was not fully developed. The transition to a
    new accounting system and financial services provider in fiscal year
    2004 created additional challenges and complexities, along with a
    learning curve, which made it difficult for financial managers to track
    spending during the year. In fiscal year 2005, we now have more staff
    and contractors onboard to perform budget execution activities for the
    Departmental Management account and can provide more useful data to
    managers to manage their budgets more efficiently and effectively.
        Question. Do you plan to seek authority to reprogram the lapsed
    funds?
        Answer. The Department submitted a request as part of the ICE
    reprogramming package to use the lapse authority under Section 504 to
    transfer $2.8 million from fiscal year 2004 lapsed funding from the
    Departmental Management account to ICE for its funding shortfall. This
    reprogramming request was overtaken by the fiscal year 2005 Emergency
    Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
    Terrorism and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268 recent Supplemental that was
    passed that rescinded a total of $3.8 million from Departmental
    Management that was proposed in the ICE programming, including the $2.8
    million from the fiscal year 2004 lapsed monies.

                      classified vs. sensitive information

        Question. Late last year there were articles in various papers,
    including The Washington Post, regarding how the Department handles
    information it determines to be ``sensitive'' versus actually
    ``classified'' material. It has required Federal Government employees,
    including congressional staff with ``Top Secret'' clearances, to sign
    confidentiality documents demanding that these previously cleared
    personnel not reveal information that, technically, is not
    ``classified''. Most recently, on December 13, 2004, the Heritage
    Foundation released a report entitled, ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the
    Department of Homeland Security''. One of its conclusions calls for the
    Department to develop a ``consistent policy and legislation that
    encourages the sharing of unclassified but security-relevant
    information between the private sector and the government.'' This might
    also include the dropping or reconsideration of the documents security
    classification known as ``Sensitive Security Information.''
        What public law created the classification known as ``Sensitive
    Security Information''?
        Answer. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on
    September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation
    Security Act (ATSA), Public Law 107-71 (November 19, 2001), which
    established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). ATSA
    transferred the responsibility for civil aviation security from the
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to TSA. Among the statutory
    authorities previously administered by FAA that ATSA transferred to
    TSA's purview was the authority in 49 U.S.C.  40119, governing the
    protection of certain information related to transportation security.
        On February 22, 2002, TSA published a final rule transferring the
    bulk of FAA's aviation security regulations to TSA, including FAA's SSI
    regulation, which now is codified at 49 CFR Part 1520.
        In addition, on November 25, 2002, the President signed into law
    the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Public Law 107-296, which
    transferred TSA to the newly established DHS. In connection with this
    transfer, the HSA transferred TSA's SSI authority under 49 U.S.C.
    40119 to 49 U.S.C.  114(s), and amended section 40119 to vest similar
    SSI authority in the Secretary of DOT. [See Section 1601 of the HSA.]
        It should also be noted that Sensitive Security Information (SSI)
    is not a classification, and information designated as SSI is not
    considered as classified national security information.
        Question. Is the Department, as part of your overall review of its
    operations, actively considering the Heritage Foundation
    recommendations on protecting sensitive information? If not, why not?
        Answer. Yes. The Department has carefully reviewed a number of
    recommendations and proposals regarding information sharing, and it is
    working to develop and establish a consistent prudent strategy on the
    subject. The guiding principle must balance the need to share
    information with appropriate individuals, while still protecting the
    sensitive nature of the underlying information.

                             contracting out report

        Question. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation Omnibus (H.R. 2673)
    Division F--Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and Independent
    Agencies, Title VI Section 647(b), contained the following reporting
    requirement: ``Not later than 120 days following the enactment of this
    Act and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the head of
    each executive agency shall submit to Congress a report on the
    competitive sourcing activities on the list required under the Federal
    Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 31 U.S.C.
    501 note) that were performed for such executive agency during the
    previous fiscal year by Federal Government sources.
        The Committee received this report on February 3, 2005. The report
    states that two public-private competitions, which were started in
    September of 2004, are scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2005. In
    addition, the report states that additional competitions are scheduled
    to be held in fiscal year 2005 which will involve up to 1,397 FTE.
        Please provide the Committee an updated report containing the most
    recent fiscal year 2005 information as well as any plans for public-
    private competitions in fiscal year 2006.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2005, DHS is currently completing the
    competitions involving 357 FTE. This includes competitions being
    conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), CBP, and the FLETC. DHS is
    currently reviewing proposals for the completion of competitions in
    fiscal year 2006.
        The DHS's annual Reports to Congress, as required by Section 647(b)
    of Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, fiscal year 2004
    (Public Law 108-199) are available on our web-site at: http://
    www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=37&content=3933
        Question. For fiscal year 2004 (actual), fiscal year 2005
    (estimate), and fiscal year 2006 (request), how many positions in the
    Department (broken down by agency) were competed and how much did the
    competitions cost.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2004, DHS completed three public-private
    competitions, in accordance with the OMB Circular A-76, involving 144
    FTE at the USCG. Two DHS competitions that were scheduled for
    completion in fiscal year 2004 were cancelled in fiscal year 2004:
      --The USCG's competition of its military travel support function (36
            FTE) was cancelled due to the development of E-Travel
            technologies that will obviate the current approach to this
            service requirement;
      --The Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) competition of its
            Immigration Information Officer (IIO) function (1,350 FTE) was
            cancelled to give more time and resources to the elimination of
            immigration service backlogs and, as a matter of law. DHS
            announced two ICE competitions for completion in fiscal year
            2005. These competitions involved 97 FTE, but were also
            cancelled due to funding shortages.
        Savings generated by the three completed fiscal year 2004 USCG
    competitions are estimated at $12.3 million over a 5 year period. All
    three competitions were retained in-house. The incremental cost of
    conducting these USCG studies is estimated at $1.3 million and reflects
    the costs incurred in gearing up the competition program in the USCG.
    In addition, four FTE are associated with DHS' fiscal year 2004 fixed
    costs--spread across the agency--and are estimated at $450,000 per
    year. The DHS fixed program cost estimate includes dedicated resources
    to provide central policy, planning, and implementation oversight, yet
    excludes annual FAIR Act inventory costs. The estimated one-time DHS
    cost of conducting the fiscal year 2005 competitions involving 356 FTE
    is $1.9 million, with expected annual savings in excess of $5 million.
    The estimated one-time cost of conducting the fiscal year 2006
    competitions is not known, as we have not yet finalized those plans.
        Question. How many positions were subsequently contracted out as a
    result of the competition?
        Answer. While there have been significant efficiency and quality of
    service gains on the part of the government as a result of engaging in
    the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 competitions, to date no
    positions have been converted to contract performance.

                          detailees to the white house

        Question. How many DHS employees (including the component agencies)
    are currently detailed to the White House (including all Executive
    Office of the President agencies)? Provide the committee a list
    containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
    salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
    dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if the agency is
    reimbursed.
        Answer.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                               Detail     Detail End                            Reimbursable
                 Detailed To                 Originating Agency      Grade/Step or Salary    Start Date      Date         Purpose of Detail          Y/N
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NSC.................................  DHS/IAIP...............  GS 12-01 ($62,886).....    3/20/2004   12/30/2005  Communications and Media           N
                                                                                                                       Relations. Was part of
                                                                                                                       GSA technology office
                                                                                                                       that was absorbed by
                                                                                                                       DHS in early 2003.
    NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    6/14/2004    6/13/2006  White House Situation              N
                                                                                                                       Room Duty Officer.
    NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    6/21/2004    6/20/2005  Counternarcotics........           N
    NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    10/6/2003    6/10/2005  White House Situation              N
                                                                                                                       Room Duty Officer.
    NSC.................................  USSS...................  GS 14-02 ($91,315).....    4/18/2005    4/17/2006  Combating Terrorism.....           N
    ONDCP...............................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    7/15/2004    7/15/2005  Office of Supply                   N
                                                                                                                       Reduction.
    WHO.................................  DHS/TSA................  K-00 ($111,038)........    5/21/2004    9/30/2005  Support the WHO mission.           N
    WHO.................................  DHS....................  .......................    7/24/2004    1/19/2006  Support the WHO mission.           N
    WHO.................................  DHS/USSS...............  GS 14-04 ($97,206).....    6/22/2004    9/30/2005  Support the WHO mission.           N
    WHO.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    9/22/2004    1/19/2006  Support the WHO mission.           N
    OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    5/17/2005    7/15/2007  Military Aide to the               N
                                                                                                                       Vice President.
    OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    6/16/2003     7/1/2005  Special Advisor,                   N
                                                                                                                       Homeland Security.
    OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    4/22/2003    6/29/2005  Military Aide to the               N
                                                                                                                       Vice President.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          detailees to the department

        Question. How many employees of DHS component agencies are
    currently detailed to the Department? Provide the committee a list
    containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to;
    salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end
    dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if this agency is
    reimbursed.
        Answer. The table below provides the requested data, which is a
    snapshot of detailees on-board as of March 31, 2005. This data
    submission was done in April 2005 and projected end dates that could
    have ended by the time this report was submitted.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Grade/Step     Detail     Detail End                                                                              Reimbursable
                 Detailed To                  Originating Agency      or Salary    Start Date      Date                                  Purpose of Detail                                   Y/N
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USM/CIO..............................  BTS.....................     $117,809     6/1/2004     6/1/2005  DHS Infrastructure trans support..........................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $149,200    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  BTS.......................................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $121,274     9/2/2003     9/2/2005  Cargo/Trade Policy........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809     9/7/2004     9/6/2005  Border Patrol Liaison.....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    2/23/2003      ( \1\ )  Counternarcotics Projects.................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $100,152    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  CIO Assistant.............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................      $94,260    12/6/2004    12/7/2005  Agency Liaison Officer....................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    10/7/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    5/15/1995      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     9/2/2003     9/2/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651     5/1/2004     5/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/18/1998  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    10/1/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/16/1993  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    5/16/2004    5/16/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   11/19/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/13/1998  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651   10/27/2003   10/27/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    11/6/1990  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/25/2000  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    3/22/2004    3/22/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   12/23/2000  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     6/1/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/29/1997  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    1/25/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    2/24/2004      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    7/30/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/27/2001    8/27/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $57,280    4/15/2002    4/15/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    7/14/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................     $131,671    10/1/2004      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    1/10/2005    7/10/2005  Terrorist Screening Ctr...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   11/28/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $73,364   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $75,460   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $62,886   11/17/2003    5/31/2005  Support to IAIP Terrorist Screening Center................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    9/12/2003      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   12/12/2004    6/14/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    3/20/2005    3/20/2006  COMSEC....................................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $52,468    3/21/2005    3/21/2006  Visa Security Program.....................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $124,274     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $43,724    11/1/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $61,213   10/23/2004    3/31/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $97,213     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    9/20/2004     6/1/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $68,209   11/17/2004    4/29/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    12/7/2004          TBA  Assist ICE HR Officer.....................................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $62,886    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $57,715    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $64,981    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OPA..................................  CBP.....................     $128,205    1/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs............................................................           N
    USCG.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274     8/4/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to USCG...........................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $114,344     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  OCFO......................................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $103,947   10/20/2003   10/19/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $106,044    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  CBP.....................     $100,152    4/28/2004      ( \1\ )  New HR system: communications team........................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $100,152     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Infrastructure Transformation Office......................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $117,344   11/10/2003    6/30/2005  Program manager--HSDN.....................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $149,200    10/6/2004    7/31/2005  CIO.......................................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................      $43,365    11/9/2004    9/15/2005  CIO support...............................................................           N
    S&T..................................  CG......................      $84,751    6/30/2004    6/30/2007  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................      $89,736     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..........................................................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $100,152    2/22/2005    6/21/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................      $59,464    11/1/2004    6/30/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $117,809    1/14/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/NAC.................     $100,152    1/31/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    NCR..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $135,136      Unknown      ( \1\ )  Nat Cap Reg mission support...............................................           N
    OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................      $84,751     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
    OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................     $100,152     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $117,809     2/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $117,809    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,152    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600     3/1/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    FLETC................................  Federal Air Marshal           $96,474     2/7/2005     2/7/2006  On the job Training.......................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    10/1/2003    10/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651   10/20/2003   10/20/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    11/1/2003    11/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    IAIP.................................  FEMA....................     $114,882  ...........  ...........  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  FEMA....................     $135,136  ...........  ...........  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    OSLGC................................  FEMA....................         13/3    1/27/2003          TBD  Support to State and Local Coordination and Outreach......................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  FEMA....................     $100,152     8/1/2004     5/1/2005  Support GAO/IG Liaison Office.............................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  FEMA....................      $84,751     5/3/2004    1/31/2005  Design of new DHS Personnel HR management system..........................           N
    ODP..................................  FEMA/Region III.........      $82,259    7/11/2004      ( \1\ )  Implementation of ODP Program into DHS--move from FEMA Citizen Corp         ............
                                                                                                             Assistance.
    BTS..................................  FLETC...................     $100,152     8/1/2003     8/1/2005  FLETC Liaison.............................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  FLETC...................     $100,152     2/1/2005     2/1/2006  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    4/12/2004    4/12/2006  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    3/10/2003      ( \1\ )  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145   11/30/2004      ( \1\ )  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $44,495   10/22/2003      ( \1\ )  Scheduling Support for Under Secretary....................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $69,000    3/14/2005    9/15/2005  FAMS Liaison..............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     9/2/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003      ( \1\ )  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145    2/27/2005    6/25/2005  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/3/2004     8/3/2005  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003      ( \1\ )  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  Setting up office w/detailees from bureaus (Office of Screening and         ............
                                                                                                             Coordination).
    CBP..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2005      ( \1\ )  Liaison to NTC............................................................           N
    CBP..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751   12/15/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    CIS..................................  ICE.....................      $59,464     4/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Long-term detail to provide paralegal services............................           N
    DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  DHS/CFO...................................................................           N
    DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Rep to Interpol as Dep Dir for OIA........................................  ............
    FEMA.................................  ICE.....................      $49,145     8/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    9/19/2004    9/19/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/15/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    5/20/1996      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/1988      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2004     9/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    3/10/2002     3/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/23/2003    12/6/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    11/4/2001    11/4/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/8/2003     9/7/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FTTTF................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Liaison; NSEERS Tracking..................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/12/2004      ( \1\ )  Serve as ICE rep and subject matter expert................................  ............
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE/BTS Liaison...........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/11/2004      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     6/1/2004     6/1/2006  ICE Liaison...............................................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    Jan. 2000      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--DOS Liaison......................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $69,000     7/4/2005      ( \1\ )  Intelligence Sharing HSOC.................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003     3/1/2006  Support to IAIP mission--DHS Liaison to FBI...............................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    2/19/2002      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC.............................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC desk officer................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    ICE..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     3/1/2002      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    OLA..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Leg Affairs liaison to Immigration........................................           N
    OPA..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to Public Affairs.................................................           N
    USCG.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Coast Guard Liaison.......................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................  ...........      7/12/04       7/8/05  Provide on-site geospatial technical support..............................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $100,152    12/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Program management and acquisition support................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $117,809    10/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Director, Infrastructure Transformation Office............................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $56,600     6/7/2004     6/7/2005  Provides admin support services to the AA at BTS..........................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................        SW-02     2/1/2004      ( \1\ )  BTS Deputy Chief of Staff.................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    2/17/2004      ( \1\ )  Transportation Security Policy Advisor....................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/13/2004   12/13/2005  TSA Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/31/2004   12/13/2005  Serves as TSA liaison to BTS..............................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    7/26/2004     4/2/2005  Provides legislative policy assistance to AA..............................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $38,900    2/28/2005    10/4/2005  Correspondence Analyst....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    8/11/2003    8/11/2006  International Affairs.....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    3/23/2003      ( \1\ )  National Counter Terrorist Center on SpecialProject.......................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $46,400     2/2/2004      ( \1\ )  Speech Writer.............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Special Asst to Under Secretary...........................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    9/26/2004    9/26/2005  Establishing the Office of Screening Coordination for DHS/BTS.............           N
    DHS-OPL..............................  TSA.....................      $84,150    2/13/2005    6/13/2005  Serves as a special assistant for senior level officials TOPOFF3 Program..           N
    IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    10/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Task force to review ICE budget...........................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Assisting with ICE budget audit...........................................           N
    OGC..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     8/8/2005     8/8/2007  Provide legal advice concerning border and transportation security issues            N
                                                                                                             especially as they involve TSA.
    OPA..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/3/2003      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs assisting on special project (requested by Dennis Murphy)..           N
    Security.............................  TSA.....................     $100,600   12/12/2004     4/2/2005  Requested for special project on security initiatives at the Chief                   N
                                                                                                             Security Office.
    USM..................................  TSA.....................     $120,250   12/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Acting Deputy Director Business Transformation office--Selected for DHS              N
                                                                                                             position, awaiting clearance through security process.
    USM..................................  TSA.....................     $158,568    8/30/2004    9/30/2005  Acting Dir, Business Transformation Off...................................  ............
    USM/CFO..............................  TSA.....................     $100,152    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $149,200     4/3/2005      ( \1\ )  Support Solutions Engineering COE.........................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $152,824    7/13/2003     4/1/2005  Acting Deputy CIO.........................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,844    7/13/2003      ( \1\ )  DHS/BTS Integration.......................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $110,278     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $145,482   10/27/2004      ( \1\ )  TSA representative to the Information Technology Officer..................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $138,093     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,454    7/13/2003      ( \1\ )  INFRASTRUCTURE program support............................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USCG....................     $136,490    9/19/2003    9/19/2005  HSC Watch Augmentation....................................................           N
    OGC..................................  USCG....................      $82,937     3/1/2005     3/1/2007  Assist with international issues and with Team Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.           N
    Security.............................  USCG....................      $56,128    12/1/2004      Ongoing  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
    Security.............................  USCG....................      $82,937    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
    Security.............................  USCG....................      $71,269    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
    Security.............................  USCG....................      $74,560    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
    USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................     $101,613     8/1/2004     8/1/2005  Support Budget Office.....................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................      $82,937     1/5/2005     4/1/2005  ICE Tiger Team............................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  USCG....................     $156,886  ...........      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Operations Center............................           N
    IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Information Analysis Section.................           N
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $87,244     1/3/2005      ( \1\ )  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications--detail           N
                                                                                                             lasts until this case goes to trial.
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $75,460     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraudinvestigation).
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $41,361     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $64,981    3/14/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    BTS..................................  USSS....................      $97,206    2/21/2004    8/21/2005  Border & Transp. Security.................................................           N
    DHS/IAIP.............................  USSS....................      $91,315     6/1/2004    12/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    FEMA.................................  USSS....................      $91,315   10/17/2004    4/17/2005  DEST Program..............................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     8/1/2003    8/10/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    3/20/2005    3/20/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     1/1/2003     1/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $58,564     6/1/2000     6/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/1/2003     2/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $63,040    1/12/2004    1/12/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/9/2004     2/9/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    10/6/2002    12/6/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751   10/19/2003    5/29/2005  Nat. CounterTerrorism Ctr.................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      UND--LT     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $77,274    3/13/2005    6/11/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $114,344     5/7/2004    7/10/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $40,179     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     UND--Off     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    11/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     5/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $97,206     2/8/2004     8/8/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $103,947     9/1/2004     9/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $87,244    2/27/2005    5/28/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $110,878     6/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission--Investigations...................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $36,157     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $74,782     3/6/2005     6/4/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $79,766     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152    10/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    OSLGC................................  USSS....................      $88,000    10/3/2004     4/3/2005  Law Enforcement Liaison...................................................           N
    S&T..................................  USSS....................     $100,152     2/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           N
    S&T..................................  USSS....................      $97,206     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Providing technical expertise to S&T--Protective Research (INT)...........           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $97,206    7/21/2003    7/21/2005  Counter Intelligence......................................................           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $88,000     2/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Provides physical security to DHS facilities..............................           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $94,000    2/23/2003    8/23/2005  Phy. Sec & Access Ctrl....................................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $91,315    3/10/2004     4/1/2005  New HR system: pay and performance team...................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $82,259     2/1/2005    5/16/2005  Hiring and transition response team.......................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  BTS.....................     $117,809     6/1/2004     6/1/2005  DHS Infrastructure trans support..........................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $149,200    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  BTS.......................................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $121,274     9/2/2003     9/2/2005  Cargo/Trade Policy........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809     9/7/2004     9/6/2005  Border Patrol Liaison.....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    2/23/2003      ( \1\ )  Counternarcotics Projects.................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $100,152    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  CIO Assistant.............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  CBP.....................      $94,260    12/6/2004    12/7/2005  Agency Liaison Officer....................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    10/7/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    5/15/1995      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     9/2/2003     9/2/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651     5/1/2004     5/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/18/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    10/1/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/16/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    5/16/2004    5/16/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   11/19/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/13/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651   10/27/2003   10/27/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    11/6/1990      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/25/2000      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    3/22/2004    3/22/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   12/23/2000      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     6/1/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/29/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    1/25/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    2/24/2004      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    7/30/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/27/2001    8/27/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $57,280    4/15/2002    4/15/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    7/14/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................     $131,671    10/1/2004      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    1/10/2005    7/10/2005  Terrorist Screening Ctr...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   11/28/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $73,364   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $75,460   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $62,886   11/17/2003    5/31/2005  Support to IAIP Terrorist Screening Center................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    9/12/2003      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   12/12/2004    6/14/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    3/20/2005    3/20/2006  COMSEC....................................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $52,468    3/21/2005    3/21/2006  Visa Security Program.....................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $124,274     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $43,724    11/1/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $97,213     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    9/20/2004     6/1/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $68,209   11/17/2004    4/29/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
    ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    12/7/2004          TBD  Assist ICE HR Officer.....................................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $62,886    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $57,715    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $64,981    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
    OPA..................................  CBP.....................     $128,205    1/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs............................................................           N
    USCG.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274     8/4/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to USCG...........................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $114,344     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  OCFO......................................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $103,947   10/20/2003   10/19/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $106,044    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  CBP.....................     $100,152    4/28/2004      ( \1\ )  New HR system: communications team........................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $100,152     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Infrastructure Transformation Office......................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $117,344   11/10/2003    6/30/2005  Program manager--HSDN.....................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $149,200    10/6/2004    7/31/2005  CIO.......................................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................      $43,365    11/9/2004    9/15/2005  CIO support...............................................................           N
    S&T..................................  CG......................      $84,751    6/30/2004    6/30/2007  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           Y
    OGC..................................  CIS.....................     $110,878     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS OGC, focusing on issues             N
                                                                                                             relating to immigration benefits and related USCIS issues.
    USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................      $89,736     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..........................................................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $100,152    2/22/2005    6/21/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................      $59,464    11/1/2004    6/30/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
    S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $117,809    1/14/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/NAC.................     $100,152    1/31/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................      $84,751     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
    OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................     $100,152     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $117,809     2/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $117,809    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,152    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600    1/10/2005   Indefinite  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600     3/1/2005   Indefinite  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
    FLETC................................  Federal Air Marshal           $96,474     2/7/2005     2/7/2006  On the job Training.......................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    10/1/2003    10/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651   10/20/2003   10/20/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    11/1/2003    11/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                            Service.
    OSLGC................................  FEMA....................         13/3    1/27/2003          TBD  Support to State and Local Coordination and Outreach......................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  FEMA....................     $100,152     8/1/2004     5/1/2005  Support GAO/IG Liaison Office.............................................           N
    ODP..................................  FEMA/Region III.........      $82,259    7/11/2004   Indefinite  Implementation of ODP Program into DHS--move from FEMA Citizen Corp                  N
                                                                                                             Assistance.
    BTS..................................  FLETC...................     $100,152     8/1/2003     8/1/2005  FLETC Liaison.............................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  FLETC...................     $100,152     2/1/2005     2/1/2006  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    4/12/2004    4/12/2006  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    3/10/2003   Indefinite  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145   11/30/2004   Indefinite  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $44,495   10/22/2003   Indefinite  Scheduling Support for Under Secretary....................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $69,000    3/14/2005    9/15/2005  FAMS Liaison..............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     9/2/2003   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003   Indefinite  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145    2/27/2005    6/25/2005  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/3/2004     8/3/2005  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003   Indefinite  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
    BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  Setting up office w/ detailees from bureaus (Office of Screening and                 N
                                                                                                             Coordination).
    CBP..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2005   Indefinite  Liaison to NTC............................................................           N
    CBP..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751   12/15/2003   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    CIS..................................  ICE.....................      $59,464     4/1/2004   Indefinite  Long-term detail to provide paralegal services............................           N
    DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  DHS/CFO...................................................................           N
    DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Rep to Interpol as Dep Dir for OIA........................................           N
    FEMA.................................  ICE.....................      $49,145     8/1/2004   Indefinite  Protective detail.........................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    9/19/2004    9/19/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/15/2003   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    5/20/1996   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/1988   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/2001   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2004     9/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    3/10/2002     3/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/23/2003    12/6/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    11/4/2001    11/4/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/8/2003     9/7/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/12/2004   Indefinite  Serve as ICE rep and subject matter expert................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003   Indefinite  ICE/BTS Liaison...........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/11/2004   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     6/1/2004     6/1/2006  ICE Liaison...............................................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    Jan. 2000   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--DOS Liaison......................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $69,000     7/4/2005   Indefinite  Intelligence Sharing HSOC.................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003     3/1/2006  Support to IAIP mission--DHS Liaison to FBI...............................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    2/19/2002   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC.............................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC desk officer................................           N
    IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    ICE..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     3/1/2002   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
    OLA..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Leg Affairs liaison to Immigration........................................           N
    OPA..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to Public Affairs.................................................           N
    USCG.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/1/2004   Indefinite  Coast Guard Liaison.......................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................  ...........      7/12/04       7/8/05  Provide on-site geospatial technical support..............................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $100,152    12/1/2003   Indefinite  Program management and acquisition support................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $117,809    10/1/2003   Indefinite  Director, Infrastructure Transformation Office............................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $56,600     6/7/2004     6/7/2005  Provides admin support services to the AA at BTS..........................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................        SW-02     2/1/2004   Indefinite  BTS Deputy Chief of Staff.................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    2/17/2004   Indefinite  Transportation Security Policy Advisor....................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/13/2004   12/13/2005  TSA Liaison...............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/31/2004   12/13/2005  Serves as TSA liaison to BTS..............................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    7/13/2003    1/22/2005  Operations Executive Assistant............................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    7/26/2004     4/2/2005  Provides legislative policy assistance to AA..............................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $38,900    2/28/2005    10/4/2005  Correspondence Analyst....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    8/11/2003    8/11/2006  International Affairs.....................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    3/23/2003   Indefinite  National Counter Terrorist Center on special project......................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $46,400     2/2/2004   Indefinite  Speech Writer.............................................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/7/2005   Indefinite  Special Asst to Under Secretary...........................................           N
    BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    9/26/2004    9/26/2005  Establishing the Office of Screening Coordination for DHS/BTS.............           N
    DHS-OPL..............................  TSA.....................      $84,150    2/13/2005    6/13/2005  Serves as a special assistant for senior level officials TOPOFF3 Program..           N
    IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    10/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Task force to review ICE budget...........................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
    ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Assisting with ICE budget audit...........................................           N
    OGC..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     8/8/2005     8/8/2007  Provide legal advice concerning border and transportation security issues            N
                                                                                                             especially as they involve TSA.
    OPA..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/3/2003   Indefinite  Public Affairs assisting on special project(requested by Dennis Murphy)...           N
    Security.............................  TSA.....................     $100,600   12/12/2004     4/2/2005  Requested for special project on security initiatives at the Chief                   N
                                                                                                             Security Office.
    USM..................................  TSA.....................     $120,250   12/26/2004   Indefinite  Acting Deputy Director Business Transformation office--Selected for DHS              N
                                                                                                             position, awaiting clearance through security process.
    USM..................................  TSA.....................     $158,568    8/30/2004    9/30/2005  Acting Dir, Business Transformation Off...................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  TSA.....................     $100,152    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $149,200     4/3/2005   Indefinite  Support Solutions Engineering COE.........................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $152,824    7/13/2003     4/1/2005  Acting Deputy CIO.........................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,844    7/13/2003   Indefinite  DHS/BTS Integration.......................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $110,278     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $145,482   10/27/2004   Indefinite  TSA representative to the Information Technology Officer..................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $138,093     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
    USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,454    7/13/2003   Indefinite  INFRASTRUCTURE program support............................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USCG....................     $136,490    9/19/2003    9/19/2005  HSC Watch Augmentation....................................................           N
    OGC..................................  USCG....................      $82,937     3/1/2005     3/1/2007  Assist with international issues and with Team Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.           N
    USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................     $101,613     8/1/2004     8/1/2005  Support Budget Office.....................................................           N
    USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................      $82,937     1/5/2005     4/1/2005  ICE Tiger Team............................................................           N
    USM/CIO..............................  USCG....................     $156,886  ...........   Indefinite  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Operations Center............................           N
    IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Information Analysis Section.................           N
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $87,244     1/3/2005   Indefinite  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications--detail           N
                                                                                                             lasts until this case goes to trial.
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $75,460     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $81,747    2/28/2005     3/4/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $41,361     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $64,981    3/14/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                             year asylum fraud investigation).
    BTS..................................  USSS....................      $97,206    2/21/2004    8/21/2005  Border & Transp. Security.................................................           N
    DHS/IAIP.............................  USSS....................      $91,315     6/1/2004    12/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    FEMA.................................  USSS....................      $91,315   10/17/2004    4/17/2005  DEST Program..............................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     8/1/2003    8/10/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    3/20/2005    3/20/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     1/1/2003     1/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $58,564     6/1/2000     6/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/1/2003     2/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $63,040    1/12/2004    1/12/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/9/2004     2/9/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    10/6/2002    12/6/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
    FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751   10/19/2003    5/29/2005  Nat. CounterTerrorism Ctr.................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      UND--LT     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $77,274    3/13/2005    6/11/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $114,344     5/7/2004    7/10/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $40,179     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     UND--Off     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    11/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     5/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $97,206     2/8/2004     8/8/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $103,947     9/1/2004     9/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $87,244    2/27/2005    5/28/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $110,878     6/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission--Investigations...................................           Y
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $36,157     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $74,782     3/6/2005     6/4/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $79,766     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152    10/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
    OSLGC................................  USSS....................      $88,000    10/3/2004     4/3/2005  Law Enforcement Liaison...................................................           N
    S&T..................................  USSS....................     $100,152     2/1/2003   Indefinite  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           N
    S&T..................................  USSS....................      $97,206     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Providing technical expertise to S&T--Protective Research (INT)...........           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $97,206    7/21/2003    7/21/2005  Counter Intelligence......................................................           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $88,000     2/1/2003   Indefinite  Provides physical security to DHS facilities..............................           N
    Security.............................  USSS....................      $94,000    2/23/2003    8/23/2005  Phy. Sec & Access Ctrl....................................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $91,315    3/10/2004     4/1/2005  New HR system: pay and performance team...................................           N
    USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $82,259     2/1/2005    5/16/2005  Hiring and transition response team.......................................           N
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Indefinite.
    \2\ N/A.
    \3\ Ongoing.

                               hiring journalists
        Question. In January 2005, President Bush ordered his Cabinet
    secretaries not to hire columnists to promote their agendas. At a news
    conference President Bush said, ``All our Cabinet secretaries must
    realize that we will not be paying commentators to advance our agenda.
    Our agenda ought to be able to stand on its own two feet.''
        Are all DHS agencies in compliance with the Administration's policy
    and the legal prohibitions on using appropriations for contracting with
    journalists to promote legislation or policy?
        Answer. Yes, all DHS Agencies are in compliance.
                    intelligence reform bill authorizations
        Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
    authorized substantial enhancements to a variety of DHS programs,
    including immigration enforcement, aviation security, and other
    provisions. Identify the funding requested in the President's fiscal
    year 2006 budget for each of the following authorizations contained in
    the Act. In your response, include a chart which compares the funding
    authorized, by section of the bill, to the funding included in the
    President's fiscal year 2006 budget.
    Immigration Enforcement
      --Section 5202 & 5203.--Authorizes, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal
            year 2010 subject to the availability of appropriations, an
            increase of 10,000 additional Border Patrol Agents (2,000 per
            year) and an increase of 4,000 Immigration and Customs
            Enforcement (ICE) investigators (800 per year).
      --Section 5204.--Authorizes, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year
            2010 subject to the availability of appropriations, an increase
            of 40,000 beds (8,000 per year) available for immigration
            detention and removal.
      --Section 5101 through 5104.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may
            carry out a pilot program to improve border security between
            ports of entry along the northern border. Required features of
            this pilot project include the use of advanced technologies to
            improve border security.
      --Section 5201.--Within 6 months of enactment of this Act, the
            Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a comprehensive
            plan for the systematic surveillance of the southwest border of
            the United States by remotely piloted aircraft.
      --Section 7210 & 7206.--The bill amends the Immigration and
            Nationality Act by mandating by January 1, 2008 pre-inspection
            stations are established in at least 25 additional foreign
            airports and by December 31, 2006 at least 50 airports shall be
            selected for assignment of immigration officers to assist air
            carriers detect fraudulent documents at foreign airports. $25
            million is authorized in fiscal year 2005 and $40 million in
            fiscal years 2006 and 2007 respectively for this purpose.
    Aviation Security
      --Section 4013.--$250 million for research, development, and
            installation of detection systems and other devices for the
            detection of biological, chemical, radiological, and explosive
            material.
      --Section 4024.--$100 million for research and development of
            improved explosive detection systems.
      --Section 4052.--$200 million for each of fiscal years 2005-2007 for
            improving aviation security related to the transportation of
            cargo on passenger and cargo aircraft.
      --Section 4052.--$100 million for each of fiscal years 2005-2007 for
            research and development in advancing cargo security
            technology. Within these funds, the Secretary shall also
            establish a competitive grant program to encourage the
            development of advanced air cargo security technology.
      --Section 4014.--Up to $150 million for each of fiscal years 2005 and
            2006 to set up a pilot program (minimum 5 airports) to deploy
            and test advanced airport checkpoint screening devices and
            technology as an integrated system.
      --Section 4019.--Increases the statutory allocation for expiring and
            new Letters of Intent (LOIs) from $250 million to $400 million.
      --Section 4011.--$20 million for research and development of advanced
            biometric technology applications to aviation security,
            including mass identification technology.
      --Section 4011.--$1 million for the establishment of a competitive
            center of excellence to expedite the use of biometric
            identifiers.
      --Section 4011.--Directs that a law enforcement officer travel
            credential be created that incorporates biometric identifier
            technology that is uniform for all law enforcement officials
            seeking to carry a weapon on board an aircraft. The bill
            authorizes such sums as may be necessary to carry out this
            directive.
      --Section 4020.--Directs DHS to provide, subject to the availability
            of funds, monitoring cameras for surveillance at airports that
            have checked baggage screening areas that are not open to
            public view in order to deter theft from checked baggage and to
            aid in the speedy resolution of liability claims against the
            Transportation Security Administration.
      --Section 4051.--$2 million for TSA to carry out a pilot program to
            evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and
            baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects
            of detonation of an explosive device.
      --Section 4016.--$83 million for the 3 fiscal-year period beginning
            with fiscal year 2005 to increase the number of Federal air
            marshals.
      --Section 4012.--Directs TSA to begin to assume the function (not
            later than 180 days after testing the system is completed) of
            comparing passenger information to no fly lists, utilizing all
            appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated
            terrorist watchlist, including international flights.
    Other Provisions
      --Section 7303.--Authorizes the Secretary of DHS to provide $22.1
            million in fiscal year 2005, $22.8 million in fiscal year 2006,
            $23.5 million in fiscal year 2007, $24.2 million in fiscal year
            2008, and $24.9 million in fiscal year 2009 to enhance public
            safety interoperable communications at all levels of
            government. The Secretary may establish an Office for
            Interoperability and Compatibility within the Science and
            Technology Directorate to carry out these duties.
      --Section 7304.--Directs DHS to establish a minimum of 2 pilot
            projects in high threat urban areas or regions for the purpose
            of developing a regional strategic plan to foster interagency
            communication and to coordinate the gathering of all Federal,
            State, and local first responders in that area.
      --Section 7407.--Amends the Homeland Security Act requirement related
            to counternarcotics enforcement. Instead of having one senior
            official in the Department coordinating counternarcotics
            policy, an ``Office Counternarcotics Enforcement'' is created
            with an authorization of $6 million.
      --Section 7215.--Directs the Secretary to establish a terrorist
            travel program to oversee the analysis, coordination, and
            dissemination or terrorist travel intelligence and operation
            information.
      --Section 4071.--Directs the Secretary to implement a system for
            screening the names of cruise ship passengers and crew against
            Federal terrorist watch lists.
        Answer.

      INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 IMPLICATIONS
                     FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Authorized Funding    2006 Budget Funding
            Subject area                  Level                 Level
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AVIATION:
        Law enforcement officer   Directs that a law    The fiscal year 2006
         uniform biometric         enforcement officer   Budget does not
         travel credential         travel credential     request any
         (Section 4011(a)).        be created that       dedicated funding
                                   incorporates          for this specific
                                   biometric             purpose. Necessary
                                   identifier            resources would be
                                   technology that is    provided with
                                   uniform for all law   existing funds or
                                   enforcement           through fees.
                                   officials seeking    This activity is a
                                   to carry a weapon     sub-set of the
                                   on board an           Registered Traveler
                                   aircraft. The bill    pilot and funds
                                   authorizes such       were identified
                                   sums as may be        within the
                                   necessary to carry    Registered Traveler
                                   out this directive.   program in fiscal
                                                         year 2005 to begin
                                                         the Registered
                                                         Armed LEO pilot.
                                                         The fiscal year
                                                         2005 enacted
                                                         appropriations
                                                         funded Registered
                                                         Armed LEO
                                                         activities, and TSA
                                                         anticipates using
                                                         the results of the
                                                         pilot as a platform
                                                         for the final LEO
                                                         biometric travel
                                                         card. Results of
                                                         the pilot will be
                                                         considered to
                                                         evaluate resources,
                                                         needs, and funding
                                                         options as the
                                                         program moves
                                                         forward.
        Biometric technologies    $20 million for       The fiscal year 2006
         for aviation--R&D         research and          Budget does not
         (Section 4011(b)).        development of        request any
                                   advanced biometric    dedicated funding
                                   technology            for this specific
                                   applications to       purpose within
                                   aviation security,    broader R&D request
                                   including mass        levels.
                                   identification
                                   technology.
        Biometric Center of       $1 million for the    The fiscal year 2006
         Excellence (Section       establishment of a    Budget does not
         4011(d)).                 competitive center    request any
                                   of excellence to      dedicated funding
                                   expedite the use of   for a Biometric
                                   biometric             Center of
                                   identifiers.          Excellence.
        Airline Passenger         Directs TSA to begin  The fiscal year 2006
         Screening (Section        to assume the         Budget requests $81
         4012).                    function (not later   million for the
                                   than 180 days after   development of the
                                   testing the system    Secure Flight
                                   is completed) of      prescreening
                                   comparing passenger   system.
                                   information to no
                                   fly lists,
                                   utilizing all
                                   appropriate records
                                   in the consolidated
                                   and integrated
                                   terrorist
                                   watchlist,
                                   including
                                   international
                                   flights.
        Checkpoint portal         $250 million for      The fiscal year 2006
         detection systems--R&D    research,             Budget for
         and deployment (Section   development, and      explosives
         4013).                    installation of       detection as a
                                   detection systems     countermeasure
                                   and other devices     against aviation,
                                   for the detection     suicide and vehicle
                                   of biological,        bombs: $88 million
                                   chemical,             of the $124 million
                                   radiological, and     (Research and
                                   explosive material.   Development (R&D)
                                                         consolidation
                                                         budget + Science
                                                         and Technology
                                                         (S&T) Explosives
                                                         Countermeasures
                                                         portfolio budget),
                                                         but nothing
                                                         specific for
                                                         ``checkpoint portal
                                                         detection
                                                         systems''.
        Integrated checkpoint     Up to $150 million    The President's
         screening system pilots   for each of fiscal    fiscal year 2005
         (Section 4014).           years 2005 and 2006   Budget included
                                   to set up a pilot     $28.3 million for
                                   program (minimum 5    fielding emerging
                                   airports) to deploy   technology
                                   and test advanced     equipment at
                                   airport checkpoint    checkpoints. As a
                                   screening devices     result of this
                                   and technology as     funding, 147 static
                                   an integrated         trace portals
                                   system.               (which are
                                                         passenger screening
                                                         sub-systems using a
                                                         whole body portal
                                                         to inspect
                                                         passengers for
                                                         concealed
                                                         explosives using an
                                                         automated, non-
                                                         contact trace
                                                         sampling and
                                                         processing system)
                                                         will be deployed in
                                                         fiscal year 2006 at
                                                         approximately 40
                                                         airports. The
                                                         fiscal year 2006
                                                         request includes
                                                         $43.7 million in
                                                         additional funds to
                                                         complete the
                                                         fielding of this
                                                         capability, which
                                                         will total $100
                                                         million to address
                                                         this activity over
                                                         the 2-year period.
        In-line checked baggage   Increases the         The fiscal year 2006
         screening (Section        statutory             Budget includes
         4019).                    allocation for        $260.5 million to
                                   expiring and new      support the eight
                                   Letters of Intent     existing Letters of
                                   (LOIs) from $250      Intent (LOI)
                                   million to $400       airports. Of this
                                   million.              amount, $240.5
                                                         million is for
                                                         direct
                                                         reimbursements and
                                                         $20 million is for
                                                         equipment and
                                                         installation. The
                                                         fiscal year 2006
                                                         request proposes to
                                                         continue sourcing
                                                         LOIs from the $250
                                                         million
                                                         appropriated from
                                                         the Aviation
                                                         Security Capital
                                                         Fund at a 75
                                                         percent Federal
                                                         cost share rate.
                                                         Additionally, the
                                                         request includes
                                                         $134 million to
                                                         purchase and
                                                         install Explosive
                                                         Detection Systems
                                                         and Electronic
                                                         Trace Detection
                                                         equipment at non-
                                                         LOI airports, for a
                                                         total expenditure
                                                         of $394 million.
        Checked Baggage           Directs DHS to        The fiscal year 2006
         Monitoring Area           provide, subject to   Budget includes
         (Section 4020).           the availability of   $10.1 million to
                                   funds, monitoring     provide assistance
                                   cameras for           to airports to
                                   surveillance at       install security
                                   airports that have    monitoring cameras
                                   checked baggage       for surveillance of
                                   screening areas       checked baggage
                                   that are not open     screening areas
                                   to public view in     that are not open
                                   order to deter        to public view. The
                                   theft from checked    Transportation
                                   baggage and to aid    Security
                                   in the speedy         Administration
                                   resolution of         (TSA), in
                                   liability claims      partnership with
                                   against the           airports, generally
                                   Transportation        provides for
                                   Security              purchase and
                                   Administration. The   installation of a
                                   bill and current      camera system, with
                                   policy provides       the partnering
                                   ``such sums''.        airport agreeing to
                                                         maintain the
                                                         installed system.
        Aviation explosives       $100 million for      The S&T Directorate
         detection equipment R&D   research and          has an fiscal year
         (Section 4024(b)).        development of        2006 budget request
                                   improved explosive    of $45.9 million
                                   detection systems.    for the TSA budget
                                                         line for next
                                                         generation
                                                         explosives
                                                         detection systems.
                                                         The S&T Directorate
                                                         will coordinate
                                                         with TSA regarding
                                                         the development of
                                                         the next generation
                                                         of explosives
                                                         detection systems.
        Blast Resistant Cargo     $2 million for TSA    The fiscal year 2006
         Containers (Section       to carry out a        Budget requests
         4051).                    pilot program to      $4.4 million.
                                   evaluate the use of
                                   blast-resistant
                                   containers for
                                   cargo and baggage
                                   on passenger
                                   aircraft to
                                   minimize the
                                   potential effects
                                   of detonation of an
                                   explosive device.
        Air cargo security        $200 million for      The fiscal year 2006
         activities (Section       each of fiscal        Budget includes $40
         4052).                    years 2005-2007 for   million for air
                                   improving aviation    cargo security,
                                   security related to   which will allow
                                   the transportation    the Transportation
                                   of cargo on           Security
                                   passenger and cargo   Administration
                                   aircraft.             (TSA) to continue
                                  $100 million for       making incremental
                                   each of fiscal        and measured
                                   years 2005-2007 for   progress toward our
                                   research and          air cargo security
                                   development in        goals.
                                   advancing cargo      The S&T Directorate
                                   security              has an fiscal year
                                   technology. Within    2006 budget request
                                   these funds, the      of $29.578 million.
                                   Secretary shall       The budget request,
                                   also establish a      although not
                                   competitive grant     developed by the
                                   program to            S&T Directorate,
                                   encourage the         was agreed upon by
                                   development of        the S&T Directorate
                                   advanced air cargo    as the amount
                                   security technology.  moving forward for
                                                         air cargo RDT&E.
                                                         The S&T Directorate
                                                         will continue to
                                                         award grants under
                                                         a competitive
                                                         process to further
                                                         aviation
                                                         consolidated cargo
                                                         screening RDT&E.
        Federal Air Marshals      $83 million for the   The President has
         (FAMS) staffing           3 fiscal-year         requested $9.86
         (Section 4016).           period beginning      million in new
                                   with fiscal year      funding in fiscal
                                   2005 to increase      year 2006 to enable
                                   the number of         the hiring of
                                   Federal air           additional Federal
                                   marshals. Subject     Air Marshals to
                                   to the availability   provide even
                                   of appropriations.    greater coverage of
                                                         targeted critical
                                                         flights and to
                                                         otherwise increase
                                                         mission
                                                         capabilities. The
                                                         total budget for
                                                         FAMS is $689
                                                         million.
        Pre-clearance Stations    The bill amends the   There are currently
         and Immigration           Immigration and       14 pre-clearance
         Security Initiative       Nationality Act by    stations funded in
         (Section 7210 & 7206).    mandating by          the fiscal year
                                   January 1, 2008 pre-  2006 Budget. The
                                   inspection stations   fiscal year 2006
                                   are established in    Budget request is
                                   at least 25           $2 million
                                   additional foreign
                                   airports and by
                                   December 31, 2006
                                   at least 50
                                   airports shall be
                                   selected for
                                   assignment of
                                   immigration
                                   officers to assist
                                   air carriers detect
                                   fraudulent
                                   documents at
                                   foreign airports.
                                   $25 million is
                                   authorized in
                                   fiscal year 2005
                                   and $40 million in
                                   fiscal years 2006
                                   and 2007
                                   respectively for
                                   this purpose.
    MARITIME:
        Vetting of cruise ship    Directs the           The fiscal year 2006
         passengers (Section       Secretary to          Budget does not
         4071).                    implement a system    request any
                                   for screening the     dedicated funding
                                   names of cruise       for this specific
                                   ship passengers and   purpose. Necessary
                                   crew against          resources are
                                   Federal terrorist     provided with
                                   watch lists. No       existing funds.
                                   specific funding     On April 7, 2005,
                                   authorization is      CBP published the
                                   provided.             Advance Passenger
                                                         Information System
                                                         (APIS) Final Rule
                                                         within the Federal
                                                         Register (70 FR
                                                         17820). The CBP
                                                         Final Rule
                                                         incorporates
                                                         passenger and crew
                                                         manifest
                                                         requirements from
                                                         CBP with the Notice
                                                         of Arrival
                                                         requirements of the
                                                         United States Coast
                                                         Guard (USCG). The
                                                         CBP Final Rule
                                                         requires that sea
                                                         carriers
                                                         electronically
                                                         submit certain data
                                                         on all passengers
                                                         and crew members
                                                         prior to entry to
                                                         or departure from
                                                         the United States.
                                                         The data that must
                                                         be provided
                                                         includes
                                                         biographical data
                                                         and vessel
                                                         information for
                                                         each passenger or
                                                         crewmember. Working
                                                         with the USCG, CBP
                                                         developed the
                                                         Electronic Notice
                                                         of Arrival/
                                                         Departure System
                                                         (eNOA/D), an
                                                         Internet portal
                                                         available on the
                                                         National Vessel
                                                         Movement Center
                                                         (NVMC) web site.
                                                         Using this portal,
                                                         commercial vessel
                                                         owners, operators
                                                         or agents can
                                                         transmit one
                                                         electronic message
                                                         and comply with the
                                                         CBP APIS
                                                         requirement for
                                                         passengers and crew
                                                         and the USCG Notice
                                                         of Arrival
                                                         requirements for
                                                         vessels. eNOA/D
                                                         became operational
                                                         and available to
                                                         the industry during
                                                         February 2005.
                                                         CBP's efforts on
                                                         the eNOA/D system
                                                         have been
                                                         accomplished with
                                                         existing funds.
    BORDER PROTECTION:
        Advanced Technology       The Secretary of      The fiscal year 2006
         Northern Border           Homeland Security     Budget does not
         Security Program          may carry out a       request any
         (Section 5101-5104).      pilot program to      dedicated funding
                                   improve border        for a specific
                                   security between      pilot. Necessary
                                   ports of entry        resources will be
                                   along the northern    provided with
                                   border. Required      existing funds. The
                                   features of this      fiscal year 2006
                                   pilot project         Budget requested
                                   include the use of    funding for $19.8
                                   advanced              million added to
                                   technologies to       the base funding of
                                   improve border        $31.3 million to
                                   security. There is    improve border
                                   authorized to be      security using
                                   appropriated ``such   advanced
                                   sums as may be        technologies on
                                   necessary to carry    both the northern
                                   out the pilot         and southern land
                                   program''.            borders. Also
                                                         included in the
                                                         fiscal year 2006
                                                         CBP budget are $20
                                                         million for
                                                         aircraft
                                                         recapitalization,
                                                         $10 million in base
                                                         funding for UAVs,
                                                         and funding for
                                                         technical
                                                         infrastructure. The
                                                         America's Shield
                                                         Initiative (ASI)
                                                         program will
                                                         evaluate and
                                                         determine the
                                                         optimal mix of
                                                         technology for
                                                         meeting security
                                                         requirements of
                                                         both land borders.
        Border surveillance       Within 6 months of    The fiscal year 2006
         (Section 5201).           enactment of this     Budget requests $10
                                   Act, the Secretary    million for
                                   of Homeland           unmanned aerial
                                   Security shall        vehicles.
                                   submit a
                                   comprehensive plan
                                   for the systematic
                                   surveillance of the
                                   southwest border of
                                   the United States
                                   by remotely piloted
                                   aircraft. The
                                   Secretary of
                                   Homeland Security
                                   shall implement the
                                   plan as a pilot
                                   program as soon as
                                   sufficient funds
                                   are appropriated
                                   and available for
                                   this purpose.
        Border Patrol agents      Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
         (Section 5202).           fiscal year 2006 to   Budget requests 210
                                   fiscal year 2010      new agents and
                                   subject to the        $36.9 million.
                                   availability of
                                   appropriations, an
                                   increase of 10,000
                                   additional Border
                                   Patrol Agents
                                   (2,000 per year).
    ENFORCEMENT:
        Immigration and Customs   Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
         Enforcement               fiscal year 2006 to   Budget requests 150
         investigators (Section    fiscal year 2010      agents and $18
         5203).                    subject to the        million.
                                   availability of
                                   appropriations, an
                                   increase of 4,000
                                   Immigration and
                                   Customs Enforcement
                                   (ICE) investigators
                                   (800 per year).
                                   Subject to the
                                   availability of
                                   appropriations.
        Detention bed space       Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
         (Section 5204).           fiscal year 2006 to   Budget includes an
                                   fiscal year 2010      increase of $90
                                   subject to the        million for
                                   availability of       detention beds and
                                   appropriations, an    detention and
                                   increase of 40,000    removal officers.
                                   beds (8,000 per       This increase will
                                   year) available for   fund 1,920 beds.
                                   immigration           Overall, the fiscal
                                   detention and         year 2006 Budget
                                   removal. Subject to   provides $1.5
                                   the availability of   billion for
                                   appropriations.       detention and
                                                         removal activities.
                                                         The budget also
                                                         includes an
                                                         enhancement of $39
                                                         million for the
                                                         detention and
                                                         repatriation costs
                                                         of the Arizona
                                                         Border Control
                                                         Initiative.
    OTHER:
        Public Safety             Authorizes the        The fiscal year 2006
         Interoperable             Secretary of DHS to   Budget requests
         Communications (Section   provide $22.1         $20.5 million for
         7303).                    million in fiscal     the S&T
                                   year 2005, $22.8      Directorate's
                                   million in fiscal     Office of
                                   year 2006, $23.5      Interoperability
                                   million in fiscal     and Compatibility
                                   year 2007, $24.2      (OIC) to enhance
                                   million in fiscal     public safety
                                   year 2008, and        interoperable
                                   $24.9 million in      communications.
                                   fiscal year 2009 to
                                   enhance public
                                   safety
                                   interoperable
                                   communications at
                                   all levels of
                                   government. The
                                   Secretary may
                                   establish an Office
                                   for
                                   Interoperability
                                   and Compatibility
                                   within the Science
                                   and Technology
                                   Directorate to
                                   carry out these
                                   duties.
        Regional Strategic Plan   Directs DHS to        The fiscal year 2006
         (Section 7304).           establish a minimum   Budget requests
                                   of 2 pilot projects   $20.5 million for
                                   in high threat        the Department of
                                   urban areas or        Homeland Security's
                                   regions for the       S&T Directorate's
                                   purpose of            OIC to enhance
                                   developing a          public safety
                                   regional strategic    interoperable
                                   plan to foster        communications
                                   interagency           through SAFECOM, a
                                   communication and     program of OIC.
                                   to coordinate the
                                   gathering of all
                                   Federal, State, and
                                   local first
                                   responders in that
                                   area.
        Counternarcotics          Amends the Homeland   The fiscal year 2006
         Enforcement (Section      Security Act          request for the
         7407).                    requirement related   Office of
                                   to counternarcotics   Counternarcotics
                                   enforcement.          Enforcement is
                                   Instead of having     $1.86 million.
                                   one senior official
                                   in the Department
                                   coordinating
                                   counternarcotics
                                   policy, an ``Office
                                   Counternarcotics
                                   Enforcement'' is
                                   created with an
                                   authorization of $6
                                   million.
        Terrorist Travel Program  Directs the           The fiscal year 2006
         (Section 7215).           Secretary to          Budget does not
                                   establish a           request any
                                   terrorist travel      dedicated funding
                                   program to oversee    for this specific
                                   the analysis,         purpose. Necessary
                                   coordination, and     resources would be
                                   dissemination or      provided with
                                   terrorist travel      existing funds.
                                   intelligence and
                                   operation
                                   information.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD (MSPB)

        Question. The final regulation restricts the ability of the MSPB to
    mitigate penalties selected by DHS. The final rule says, ``Our intent
    is to explicitly restrict the authority of MSPB to modify those
    penalties to situations where there is simply no justification for the
    penalty. MSPB may not modify the penalty imposed by the Department
    unless such penalty is so disproportionate to the basis for action as
    to be wholly without justification.'' This standard is exceptionally
    high. Why was such a departure from the current authorities of the MSPB
    necessary?
        Answer. Under current MSPB case law, penalties can be mitigated
    down if they are ``unreasonable.'' Problems with this include that it
    is subjective and it may result in many employees returning to the
    workplace after the MSPB ``suspension'' instead of being removed as
    recommended by management.
        DHS believes that management decisions should be given great
    deference with regard to discipline, especially with removals, because
    an undesirable employee returning to the workforce creates morale
    problems at the least; at the worst, a returning employee interferes
    with the agency's mission to protect the homeland.
        MSPB's ability to mitigate a penalty only if the punishment is ``so
    disproportionate as to be wholly without justification'' is a
    compromise because it gives greater deference to DHS, still protects
    employee due process, and ensures that disciplinary actions are not
    initiated irresponsibly.
        Question. Is the Department concerned that these extreme measures
    will adversely affect employee morale and reduce employee confidence
    that they will be treated fairly?
        Answer. DHS understands that many employees are wary of the unknown
    and is currently in the process of rolling out significant training
    efforts aimed at communicating with employees, training managers, and
    executives on the new human resource system and the expectations for
    those managers regarding the system. Fair treatment is critical to the
    success of the new system and is a key component of our implementation
    and ongoing evaluation processes.
        Question. What evidence is there that the existing MSPB authorities
    have adversely affected agency missions?
        Answer. The Department's priority homeland security mission
    requires that it maintain an exceptionally high degree of order and
    discipline in the workplace. This order and discipline is undermined
    when disciplinary decisions are mitigated by MSPB judges on the
    existing ``reasonableness'' standard. Indeed, the mere threat of such a
    low standard for mitigation causes agency managers to second guess
    themselves and hesitate to discipline employees even when such
    discipline is clearly warranted. The Department has therefore
    instituted a higher standard for mitigation of penalties aimed at
    providing managers with the confidence to institute disciplinary
    actions where required in support of the agency's homeland security
    mission. To allow very poor performers to continue in the workplace is
    unacceptable and can negatively affect all agency operations.

                             CONCERNS OF EMPLOYEES

        Question. A number of DHS employees have strong concerns about the
    final DHS personnel regulations, which were published in the Federal
    Register on February 1, because the regulations diminish employees due
    process rights and restrict collective bargaining. What is the
    Department's opinion on the objections raised by the front line DHS
    employees, and what will the Department do to address the concerns
    expressed by these Federal employees?
        Answer. The new HR system does maintain due process and is
    consistent with the Homeland Security Act's promise to preserve
    collective bargaining rights. It also is responsive to DHS' unique
    mission needs. DHS understands that employees have concerns about the
    new human resources systems and has embarked on robust efforts to
    inform employees and train managers about the new system, including
    through continuing collaboration with DHS labor unions. Through focus
    groups, the ``Ask MAX'' question response system and employee surveys,
    DHS is keeping a close watch on employee opinions and through the
    formal program evaluation process will be measuring the results and
    outcomes of the new system. If necessary, the system can be fine-tuned
    to make mid-course corrections.

              INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DISPUTES

        Question. As part of the new personnel regulations, the
    responsibility for deciding collective bargaining disputes will lie
    with a three-member internal DHS Labor Relations Board appointed by the
    Secretary. Currently, throughout the Federal Government, collective
    bargaining disputes are decided by the Federal Labor Relations
    Authority (FLRA), an independent body appointed by the President and
    confirmed by the Senate. How does DHS/OPM believe that the internal
    labor relations board meets the statutory mandate of the Homeland
    Security Act that DHS employees may, ``organize, bargain collectively,
    and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in
    decisions which affect them'' ?
        Answer. The Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB) is an
    independent Board similar to the FLRA, but appointed by the Secretary
    with nominees recommended by the DHS labor organizations. All nominees
    must be independent citizens who are known for their integrity and
    impartiality in addition to having expertise in labor relations, law
    enforcement, or national/homeland or other related security matters.
    The HSLRB hears cases involving the duty to bargain and the DHS
    homeland security mission, with the FLRA hearing all other cases (for
    example, appropriate unit determinations and unfair labor practice
    charges involving exercise of employee rights) and reviewing the
    HSLRB's substantive decisions. The FLRA review is then subject to
    judicial review. These substantive and procedural attributes of the
    HSLRB ensure that DHS, DHS employees and DHS labor organizations obtain
    an impartial adjudication of labor relations cases while recognizing
    the Department's priority homeland security mission.

                  MANDATORY TERMINATION WITH NO OUTSIDE REVIEW

        Question. The final regulations provide the Secretary with
    discretion to create a list of Mandatory Removal Offenses (MRO) that
    will only be appealable on the merits to an internal DHS Mandatory
    Removal Panel (MRP) appointed by the Secretary. In addition, the
    regulations provide the Secretary with the sole discretion to mitigate
    a removal penalty. How can the agency expect front line employees to
    have any confidence in a personnel system where the most serious
    matters are charged and adjudicated by the Secretary and his appointed
    ``Removal Panel''?
        Answer. Currently DHS is taking no action to implement MROs. On
    August 15, 2005, Judge Collyer of the District Court for the District
    of Columbia requested that DHS and OPM delay implementation. On August
    12, 2005, Judge Collyer issued an order enjoining one provision within
    the appeals subpart of the regulations but permitting DHS to move
    forward with the rest of the adverse actions and appeals provisions.
    The Department and OPM are currently working to set a revised timeline
    for making the adverse actions and appeals subparts operative in light
    of the ruling.

                           TASKING THE FLRA AND MSPB

        Question. What particular statutory authority enabled the final
    regulations to give the FLRA and the MSPB new duties and rules of
    operation? The FLRA and the MSPB are independent agencies.
        Answer. The Homeland Security Act provided an amendment to Title 5,
    United States Code, that authorized the Secretary of DHS and the
    Director of OPM to establish a human resources management system for
    DHS that waives or modifies certain provisions of Title 5. Included
    among the provisions that can be waived or modified are chapters 71 and
    77, which prescribe the operations of the FLRA and MSPB respectively.
    After consulting with FLRA and MSPB, the Secretary and the Director
    relied upon this grant of authority, found in 5 U.S.C. 9701, to
    promulgate regulations that modify chapters 71 and 77 and alter the way
    the FLRA and MSPB handle DHS cases.

                            TRAINING OF SUPERVISORS

        Question. One of the continuing concerns surrounding the final DHS
    personnel regulations is the fact that many personnel decisions,
    especially pay, will now be based on factors under the control of local
    supervisors and directors. How does DHS plan to address the concerns of
    front line officers that supervisors, who will be granted a tremendous
    amount of pay and performance evaluation discretion under the new
    personnel regulations, will be properly trained to ensure transparency
    and fairness for all front-line personnel?
        Answer. Performance ratings will continue to be determined by local
    supervisors, just as it occurs in today's performance management
    process. The concept of a second level reviewing official has been
    retained as an inherent check and balance. A comprehensive training
    program will be undertaken to train supervisors and managers to make
    meaningful distinctions in performance and, just as important, to
    articulate clear performance expectations, which will be used to track
    performance. An automated performance management system will make the
    administration of the system more transparent to employees and will
    facilitate self-assessment and peer review capabilities that can serve
    as important information sources for the supervisor's consideration.
    Additionally, we envision that performance pay pools will be centrally
    established and managed at higher organizational levels, thus
    mitigating the influence of a single supervisor on the pay side of the
    process. A Department-level Compensation Committee, including DHS union
    representation, also will have considerable influence on the pay for
    performance program and its administration.
        Question. In addition, this system will take more training and
    administrative time. How will those increased administrative costs be
    paid for?
        Answer. The vast majority of administrative costs associated with
    training will be funded through requested appropriations specified for
    implementation of the new HR system and managed by the DHS Chief Human
    Capital Office for the Department-wide training initiative. As part of
    the new system, DHS will provide automated tools, e.g., a new
    electronic performance management system, to assist management
    officials in program administration.
        Question. Won't resources be taken from frontline Homeland Security
    positions?
        Answer. The expectation is that resources will be provided in
    requests for appropriations specifically identified to support
    implementation of the new HR system. Individual Department components'
    mission budgets are not expected to be impacted. We believe time spent
    in training on effective performance management and in coaching and
    providing feedback to employees is time well spent that generates
    positive returns in overall agency effectiveness.

                              PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

        Question. As you know, DHS employees' pay will be shifting from the
    current GS-scale pay system to a pay-for-performance system under the
    new DHS personnel regulations. How can a credible pay-for-performance
    pay system work in an agency, such as DHS, that requires a tremendous
    amount of teamwork to successfully accomplish agency missions?
        Answer. Performance work plans will contain measurable performance
    elements that specifically address teamwork or similar concepts for
    those occupations requiring such attributes. Employees in those
    occupations will know that performance that demonstrates teamwork will
    be rewarded.
        Question. Is the Department aware of any large scale pay-for-
    performance system that has been successfully implemented in a law-
    enforcement environment?
        Answer. While we are unaware of a large scale pay-for-performance
    system in a law enforcement environment, that certainly does not
    prevent us from developing one. Pay-for-Performance is the concept of
    providing a pay increase based on ``performance'' (e.g. achievement of
    a performance goal or positive performance appraisal rating).
    Organizations tie pay to performance in various ways. They may base pay
    on measures of individual, team, or organizational performance. We feel
    this concept can work well in a law enforcement environment. Research
    involved in designing the system entails review and evaluation of
    private, other Federal, State and local systems that have such
    programs. Our design work includes program evaluation aspects in order
    to periodically monitor, evaluate, and revise the system, as warranted
    to ensure that objectives are being attained.
              security and prosperity partnership of north america
        Question. On March 23, President Bush held a press event in Waco,
    Texas with Mexican Pres Foxx and Canadian Prime Minister Martin where
    he announced a grant program for the Security and Prosperity
    Partnership of North America.
        The parties to the partnership were tasked to set specific,
    measurable, and achievable goals and implementation dates to develop a
    common security strategy to further secure North America, including
    preventing and responding to threats within North America and
    streamlining the secure and efficient movement of legitimate and low-
    risk traffic across our shared borders.
        Will we be receiving a budget amendment to provide the resources
    for Customs and Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement to implement this partnership or was this
    announcement an exercise in public relations?
        Answer. On March 23, 2005, in Waco, Texas, President Bush, along
    with Canadian Prime Minister Martin and Mexican President Fox, unveiled
    the Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America (SPP), a
    blueprint for a safer and more prosperous continent. The three leaders
    instructed each nation to establish ministerial-level SPP working
    groups. I chair the security component, and the prosperity component is
    chaired by Department of Commerce Secretary Gutierrez. Department of
    State Secretary Rice is working to ensure the two components are
    integrated and that the SPP advances U.S. foreign policy goals and
    enhances our strong relationships with Canada and Mexico.
        The SPP will complement, rather than replace, existing bilateral
    and trilateral fora and working groups that are performing well. The
    issues of immigration and trade disputes will be dealt with outside the
    SPP through existing treaties and congressional action.
        Following the March 23 announcement, DHS and Commerce conducted a
    series of Congressional briefings and other stakeholder outreach
    sessions.
        On June 27, I and Gutierrez and our government counterparts in
    Mexico and Canada released the first report of the SPP that identifies
    initial results, key themes and initiatives, and work plans that
    further promote the security and prosperity of the continent.
        At this time, DHS anticipates accomplishing the fiscal year 2006
    initiatives contained in the SPP within available resources. We would
    like to reserve the opportunity to address some longer term priorities
    as part of the normal budgeting process in the future. We continue to
    be interested in input from the Congress, industry and other
    stakeholders as we implement the SPP.

                                DHS REPORTS DUE

        Question. In the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations
    Act and associated reports, Congress directed the Department to report
    to the Committee on a number of important issues. To date, 70 percent
    of the reports currently due to the House & Senate Committees on
    Appropriations have not yet been received. What is the Department's
    plan for increasing the rate of timely submission of Congressionally
    required reports?
        Answer. The Department continues to place a significant priority on
    providing timely information and reports to Congress. Of the reports
    mentioned above, approximately 40 percent of those outstanding reports
    are past due, and the Department has been working diligently to
    expedite transmittal of those reports. Since the hearing on April 20th
    through July 13th, the Department has reduced the overall number of
    outstanding reports by approximately 30 percent. As of July 13, the
    Department has submitted 143 reports for fiscal year 2005 to the
    Congressional Appropriation Committees.
        The status of reports is constantly monitored and regular progress
    is tracked and evaluated. Furthermore, Congressional reports are
    discussed regularly at several high-level management meetings,
    including the DHS Management Council, Chief Financial Officers Council,
    and Budget Officer meetings. In addition, the Department has reviewed
    and implemented strategies to streamline and improve the clearance
    process.

                           CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

        Question. From the fiscal year 2004 enacted budget to the fiscal
    year 2006 President's request, the CIO's budget has increased
    substantially. The President's budget for fiscal year 2006 requests
    $303.7M for this office. What safeguards has the Department put in
    place to ensure that this funding has the proper government management
    and oversight?
        Answer. The Department is using two parallel processes to ensure
    proper governance and management of its funding, the Planning,
    Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, mandated by
    Management Directive (MD) 1330, and the Investment Review Process
    (IRP), mandated by MD 1400.
        The PPBE process has four steps:
      --Planning.--The Office of the CIO (OCIO) develops information
            technology (IT) strategic plans and these plans are reviewed to
            ensure alignment with the Department's overall strategic plan.
      --Programming.--The OCIO enters its budget year plus 4 years funding
            requirements into the Future Years Homeland Security Program
            (FYHSP) system for review, program evaluation, and analysis by
            Departmental management.
      --Budgeting.--The OCIO budget is reviewed and the OCIO enters budget
            justification information for all of its IT investments into
            the Investment Management System (IMS) for scoring and
            portfolio review by Departmental management.
      --Execution.--All spending plans are reviewed before and during the
            execution year by Departmental management. Also, each
            individual expenditure is reviewed at multiple Levels within
            the OCIO and by Departmental management before execution, and
            is tracked through the Federal Financial Management System
            (FFMS) and the Procurement Request Information Management
            System (PRISM).
        The Investment Review Process (IRP) consists of a layered review
    process, depending on the Level and life cycle phase of the investment.
    Specifically, the IRP consists of the following:
      --Investment Review Board (IRB).--The IRB provides decision authority
            for Level 1 investments that have an acquisition cost of over
            $100 million and IT investments with a life cycle cost of over
            $200 million.
      --Joint Requirements Council (JRC).--The JRC provides decision
            authority for Level 2 investments that have an acquisition cost
            between $50 million and $100 million, and IT investments with a
            life cycle cost between $100 million and $200 million.
      --Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB).--The EAB conducts a full
            review of Level 3 IT investments with an acquisition cost
            between $5 million and $50 million, and a life cycle cost
            between $20 million and $100 million and conducts a limited
            review of Level 4 IT investments (investments with an
            acquisition cost below $5 million and a life cycle cost below
            $20 million). The EAB operates within the OCIO and ensures the
            existence of an effective IT governance process in accordance
            with DHS architecture principles. As part of its overall
            governance strategy, the EAB conducts milestone reviews of
            investment initiatives to help manage architectural alignment
            within DHS and serve as the conduit for receiving, analyzing,
            and disseminating information. This process also supports the
            DHS CPIC (Capital Planning and Investment Control),
            acquisition, and budget processes, and serves to identify,
            evaluate, select, align, and approve investments, technologies,
            and policies for use in DHS.

                              MEETING WITH UNIONS

        Question. During your confirmation hearing on February 2, 2005, you
    testified that you would meet with the representatives of the various
    union members working in the Department. Have you met with the unions?
        Answer. Yes. In April, I met with the President of the National
    Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the President of the American
    Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). These are the two largest
    unions represented in DHS, and the only two with national consultation
    rights at the Department.

                          HEARINGS ON THE PATRIOT ACT

        Question. The PATRIOT Act was enacted in haste, with minimal
    debate, in a time of crisis.
        Legislation called the SAFE Act has been introduced by Senators
    Feingold, Craig, Durbin and others to modify certain provisions of the
    PATRIOT Act. While I support review of the provisions referenced in the
    SAFE Act, I would prefer that all provisions of the law be subject to
    examination in hearings held by all relevant committees of jurisdiction
    in the House and Senate. This law was never subject to substantial
    debate. In prior meetings with you, you have assured me that you would
    support hearings on the Patriot Act.
        Do you continue to support broad ranging hearings to examine, in
    depth, the provisions of the PATRIOT Act?
        Answer. The USA PATRIOT Act provides invaluable tools for
    protecting Americans from terrorist attacks while safeguarding civil
    liberties and preserving the important role of congressional and
    judicial oversight. The USA PATRIOT Act has been the subject of
    numerous hearings in the Congress. I am committed to working with
    Congress on all issues that relate to the Department, including
    matters, like the USA PATRIOT Act, that are crucial to terrorism
    prevention.

                     INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PATRIOT ACT

        Question. As you know, when the PATRIOT Act was enacted, the
    Congress included sunsets on certain surveillance powers so the
    Congress could evaluate how those powers had been used before deciding
    wether to extend them or make them permanent. Some of those provisions
    scheduled to expire at the end of this year are not controversial.
    Other provisions are controversial, and some that are not even subject
    to sunset have been criticized for infringing on the privacy rights and
    civil liberties of law-abiding American citizens.
        Are you committed to working with the Congress to ensure that we
    have the information we need from the Administration and the Department
    of Homeland Security in particular, so the Congress may make an
    informed decision about whether to renew those provisions that will
    expire at the end of this year or make other changes to the PATRIOT
    Act?
        Answer. I am committed to ensuring that the Department continues to
    provide Congress with the appropriate information it needs.

                            CONSULTING WITH CONGRESS

        Question. Attorney General Ashcroft engaged in minimal consultation
    with the Congress and members on both sides of the aisle on the PATRIOT
    Act and other key pieces of legislation considered in the wake of 9/11.
    A full draft bill, known as PATRIOT II, became public before any
    discussions with interested Members of Congress had taken place, and
    while the proposed bill was later disavowed as merely a draft, many of
    the proposals contained in it were subsequently included in other
    Administration proposals.
        Now that you have been confirmed, will you continue to consult
    closely with Congress and Members on both sides of the aisle before
    rolling out new legislative proposals to expand Federal law
    enforcement, surveillance, and other powers that might curtail
    constitutional rights and protections?
        Answer. I will continue to engage actively in the consultation
    process as we seek to offer new programs and legislative proposals.
        Question. What actions are you taking in your role as head of the
    Department of Homeland Security to ensure that such consultation
    occurs?
        Answer. I have conveyed to the DHS Senior Leadership and the
    appropriate offices within the Department of the importance of
    consulting with Congress and keeping Members informed of programs,
    policy, and operational activities within the Department. My
    expectation is that they will do so in a timely fashion.

                                 SECURE FLIGHT

        Question. On March 28, 2005, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) released a report entitled, ``Secure Flight Development and
    Testing Under Way, but Risks Should be Managed as System Is Further
    Developed''. The GAO was mandated to do this report by the fiscal year
    2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. In essence, the report found
    that Secure Flight is not ready for primetime. Only one of the ten
    specific aspects of the development and implementation of Secure Flight
    has been met.
        Mr. Secretary, I want to make the skies safer for all passengers
    who fly on commercial aircraft. But I also want to ensure that those
    individuals who fly have their legitimate privacy rights and civil
    liberties protected. And I want to ensure that whatever pre-screening
    system is developed is safe from abuse by outside or unauthorized
    entities. My main concern with Secure Flight--and its predecessors--is
    that I have not yet been convinced that these protections are in place.
    Indeed, the GAO has not yet been convinced either. Four of the ten
    areas the Congress mandated the GAO review are specifically focused on
    privacy, safety and redress. The best that the GAO can say about the
    status of these items is that they are ``under way''.
        It is not yet clear that the new Secure Flight program will create
    a redress process for passengers to correct erroneous information, nor
    is it clear that it will include security measures to protect the
    system from unauthorized access.
        Over $130 million and more than 3 years have been spent to date on
    Secure Flight and its predecessors. I understand your plan is to begin
    initial testing of this program late this summer using passenger data
    from two airlines. If in April 2005 the best that can be said of the
    program is that it is ``under way'', what will be the likelihood that
    Secure Flight will truly be ``under way'' in August 2005?
        Answer. As we have stated, TSA intends to have Secure Flight
    underway later in 2005. At the request of the air carriers, TSA shifted
    its planned August launch date to September to account for the busy
    Labor Day holiday travel weekend. In addition, TSA made further
    adjustments to the implementation plan for Secure Flight to ensure that
    all regulatory and privacy documents comply with all applicable
    statutes and guidelines, as well as airline requests regarding
    technical guidance. In addition, the decision not to include commercial
    data in the initial rollout of Secure Flight caused further adjustments
    in the schedule, as did the ongoing uncertainty regarding the program's
    budget for fiscal year 2006. Under the revised implementation schedule,
    TSA expects to be in compliance with the requirement of the
    Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to
    implement passenger prescreening within 180 days of completion of
    testing.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, can you commit to us that Secure Flight
    will not be deployed until all ten of these areas of concern are
    addressed?
        Answer. TSA is working to meet the deadline in the IRTPA to begin
    to assume the watch list screening function from air carriers. As we
    move forward, TSA is continuing to cooperate with GAO to address the
    outstanding policy and operational items the agency is required to
    resolve under the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public
    Law 108-334), prior to implementation. TSA will show that it has
    addressed those items, as well as each of the additional GAO
    recommendations in its March 2005 report, prior to deployment of the
    program.
        Question. In recent weeks, data storage systems for major companies
    which track and store commercial data on individual citizens have been
    compromised. Both ChoicePoint and LexisNexis have admitted that their
    databases have been accessed by unauthorized, outside entities--
    potentially exposing hundreds of thousands of Americans to identity
    theft. I have long been concerned about the privacy implications for
    citizens by the possible use of commercial databases for passenger
    screening activities. These unauthorized intrusions by outside hackers
    and other unscrupulous individuals only serve to enhance my concerns.
    The GAO has noted that Secure Flight's system safeguards and other
    protections from unauthorized access have not yet been developed nor
    tested. However, I understand that the use of commercial databases,
    such as these, remain under consideration for the purpose of verifying
    a potential traveler's identity.
        Given these recent incidents, are you reconsidering the use of
    commercial databases?
        Answer. TSA conducted a very limited test to determine whether the
    use of commercial data could improve the effectiveness of the watch
    list comparisons undertaken in the Secure Flight program as well as to
    assist with the identification of passenger information that is
    incorrect or inaccurate.
        In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-
    334, Section 522(d)), Congress mandated that prior to commercial data
    testing, TSA would be required to develop measures to assess the impact
    of using commercial data on aviation security, and that the GAO is to
    review those measures. TSA is complying with all Congressional requests
    on this issue and the GAO will continue to evaluate TSA's development
    of performance measures throughout the test phases.
        TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by privacy
    and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on the use
    of any passenger information provided by commercial data sources. TSA
    will not incorporate the use of commercial data into Secure Flight
    unless testing confirms that:
      --it enhances security;
      --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any
            category of persons; and
      --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put
            in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain
            wrongful access to or use passenger personal information
            inappropriately.
        TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure
    Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of
    results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new
    System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the
    use of commercial data.
        Results of the testing, the comparisons of Passenger Name Record
    (PNR) information against names in the Terrorist Screening Database and
    the use of commercial data, will be as publicly transparent as possible
    without compromising national security. Testing and eventual
    implementation will be governed by strict privacy protections including
    passenger redress procedures, data security mechanisms, and limitations
    on use.
        Question. What can be done to ensure the security of these
    databases and the integrity of the system?
        Answer. TSA conducted a very limited test to determine whether the
    use of commercial data could improve the effectiveness of the watch
    list comparisons undertaken in the Secure Flight program as well as to
    assist with the identification of passenger information that is
    incorrect or inaccurate.
        TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by privacy
    and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on the use
    of any passenger information provided by commercial data sources. TSA
    will not incorporate the use of commercial data into Secure Flight
    unless testing confirms that:
      --it enhances security;
      --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any
            category of persons; and
      --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put
            in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain
            wrongful access to or use passenger personal information
            inappropriately.
        TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure
    Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of
    results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new
    System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the
    use of commercial data.
        Results of the testing, the comparisons of PNR information against
    names in the Terrorist Screening Database and the use of commercial
    data, will be as publicly transparent as possible without compromising
    national security. Testing has been governed by strict privacy
    protections including data security mechanisms, and limitations on use.
    Secure Flight has a written data control policy for this very purpose.
    All personnel who handle passenger data are required to sign a Non
    Disclosure Agreement (NDA) specific to the Secure Flight program and
    must successfully complete a privacy training course. Accountability
    for data is accomplished by assigning a control number to each disk,
    tape, or document on which the data is stored. In addition, a Chain of
    Custody process is in place to record and track data transfers by hand
    receipt. Finally, stand alone Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) has
    been identified to be used on this project. Authorization to load/
    install/read any PNR data is restricted to GFE designated and
    documented to process PNR data, and none of those machines is capable
    of transmitting data outside of the facility.
        The Commercial Data Test also required the contractor to comply
    with the security requirements, regulations, and privacy protections
    for all records used, accessed, or contacted, as well as the data
    handling procedures in the Security Standard Operating Procedures and
    the Data Security and Control Policy. The contractor is required to
    comply with security requirements to maintain their Secure Facility
    Clearance.
        Finally, the Secure Flight system will be subject to certification
    and accreditation prior to achieving Authority to Operate (ATO) in
    early fall 2005. TSA and DHS Chief Information Security Officers
    require all information and system security is in working order prior
    to ATO of the initial operating capability with initial air carriers.

                         SECURE FLIGHT--MOVEMENT TO SCO

        Question. What impact will moving the operation of Secure Flight to
    the proposed Screening and Credentialing Operations office have on its
    implementation?
        Answer. We support the concept of a Screening Coordination and
    Operations (SCO) Office, and requested, through the 2SR process,
    recommendations to best meet the goals of the office. Consistent with
    the 9-11 commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO
    office would support the development of a more unified, comprehensive
    and efficient system for the screening, credentialing, and redress for
    passengers, while leveraging and optimizing investments in screening
    systems and tools. The SCO would be supported by a management approach
    that would lead to harmonized IT architecture, uniform redress, and
    provision of coordinated or shared services such as card production,
    biometric/biographic databases, and global enrollment systems/processes
    that adhere to standards set by DHS with close linkage to policy
    decisions and overall information technology enterprise architectures.
    The SCO office would also ensure a consistent approach also for
    outreach in the areas of privacy, civil rights, and helping to ensure
    coordinated R&D efforts. DHS plans to set up the SCO office in fiscal
    year 2006.
        Question. Do you have concerns that further rearranging the
    organizational chart will further slow the development and operation of
    Secure Flight?
        Answer. The exact roles, responsibilities, and composition of the
    SCO are currently under review and further definition and refinement of
    the SCO concept will be developed based on that review. An
    implementation and transition plan for the SCO will also be developed
    based on that review.
        Question. If it is moved, who will actually maintain and operate
    the system--the SCO or TSA?
        Answer. The exact roles, responsibilities, and composition of the
    SCO are currently under review and further definition and refinement of
    the SCO concept will be developed based on that review.
        Question. Have you experienced any delays in receiving timely
    security information from the Terrorist Screening Center (which is run
    by the FBI) for Secure Flight or your other screening programs?
        Answer. No, TSA has not.

                           SECURE FLIGHT AND PRIVACY

        Question. Mr. Secretary, I'm concerned about reports from February
    and the end of March in which TSA officials, including a TSA
    spokesperson, declared that Secure Flight will be implemented in August
    with two airlines nationwide. That implementation would appear to
    violate the law as mandated by  522 of the fiscal year 2005 Department
    of Homeland Security Appropriations Act that prohibits the spending of
    any sums appropriated on other than a test basis for Secure Flight
    unless and until the GAO certifies to Congress that 10 criteria are
    met. Is that implementation with two airlines scheduled to end at a
    certain time so that it can be evaluated?
        Answer. TSA is proceeding with demonstrating initial operating
    capability for Secure Flight later this year. This timeframe is
    consistent with the requirements laid out in IRTPA. In addition, TSA
    intends to provide proof that each of the ten identified areas of
    concern and the six GAO recommendations have been addressed before the
    planned initial operating capability is implemented. Evaluations of the
    performance of the program with the launch carriers will be conducted
    prior to the program integrating additional airlines. A specific
    timeline is still under development to ensure that all appropriate
    evaluation takes place.
        Question. Will the passengers flying those two airlines come late
    August be able to distinguish between a test run of Secure Flight and
    the real thing?
        Answer. The passengers flying on the initial airlines will not be
    able to distinguish between the test run of Secure Flight and the
    ``real thing.'' During the first phase of implementation, the carriers
    will continue their normal vetting activities and a parallel operations
    activity will be running in conjunction with TSA to confirm the
    effective processing of related data without disruption to ongoing
    business operations. Once the systems have performed in parallel for a
    period of time, and the acceptable stabilization has occurred, TSA will
    work with the carriers to ensure a smooth transition in taking over
    from them the full watch list vetting function.
        Question. Do you anticipate that the Secure Flight program will,
    when finally implemented, use private companies to aggregate data on
    passengers and perform verification checks?
        Answer. This is undetermined. TSA conducted a very limited test to
    determine whether the use of commercial data could improve the
    effectiveness of the watch list comparisons undertaken in the Secure
    Flight program as well as to assist with the identification of
    passenger information that is incorrect or inaccurate.
        In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-
    334, Section 522(d)), Congress mandated that prior to commercial data
    testing, TSA would be required to develop measures to assess the impact
    of using commercial data on aviation security, and that GAO is to
    review those measures. TSA is complying with all Congressional requests
    on this issue; GAO will continue to evaluate TSA's development of
    performance measures throughout the test phases. The limited commercial
    data testing concluded in July 2005.
        TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by strict
    privacy and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on
    the use of any passenger-provided information by commercial data
    providers. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into
    Secure Flight unless testing confirms that:
      --it enhances security;
      --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any
            category of persons; and
      --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put
            in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain
            inappropriate access to or use passenger personal information
            inappropriately.
        TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure
    Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of
    results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new
    System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the
    use of commercial data.
        Results of the testing, both of the comparisons of PNR information
    against names in the Terrorist Screening Database and the use of
    commercial data, will be as publicly transparent as possible without
    compromising national security. Testing and eventual implementation
    will be governed by strict privacy protections including passenger
    redress procedures, data security mechanisms, and limitations on use.
        Question. How many companies could provide the data broker and data
    aggregation function to accomplish Secure Flight passenger
    verification?
        Answer. This is undetermined at this point. TSA will not
    incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure Flight program
    prior to the completion of testing, assessment of results, final
    approval by the Administration, and publication of a new System of
    Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the use of
    commercial data.
        Question. Will you examine whether the private companies bidding
    for this work have had data spills, or data breaches caused by identity
    thieves?
        Answer. This is undetermined at this point. However, as with all
    contracts, TSA would set standards, establish program priorities and
    direction, establish policies, make program decisions, and monitor
    contractor performance. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial
    data into the Secure Flight program prior to the completion of testing,
    assessment of results, final approval by the Administration, and
    publication of a new System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact
    Assessment announcing the use of commercial data.
        Question. What penalties will the Secretary impose on the company
    DHS and TSA eventually contracts with to perform passenger verification
    for Secure Flight if that company fails to properly safeguard data
    transferred as part of Secure Flight?
        Answer. This is undetermined at this point. However, as with all
    contracts, TSA would set standards, establish program priorities and
    direction, establish policies, make program decisions, and monitor
    contractor performance. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial
    data into the Secure Flight program prior to the completion of testing,
    assessment of results, final approval by the Administration, and
    publication of a new System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact
    Assessment announcing the use of commercial data.
        Question. I am concerned about recent GAO reports that show a lack
    of progress regarding establishing a transparent, concrete and workable
    system of due process and redress for passengers wrongly selected for
    extra scrutiny who might miss a flight and those who are wrongly put on
    a no fly list.
        Mr. Secretary, please share with us what efforts you will take to
    ensure that the government's own watch lists and databases used for
    Secure Flight contain accurate information about would-be passengers.
        Answer. U.S. Government intelligence and law enforcement agencies
    collect, analyze, and evaluate data used to nominate subjects to the
    No-Fly List. Intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers within
    these organizations carefully review nominations based on the No-Fly
    List criteria and thoroughly evaluate the information during each step
    of the process. Watch List nominations often contain classified and/or
    sensitive law enforcement investigative information. Nominations that
    meet the established criteria are forwarded to the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)
    for inclusion in the TSC Data Base (TSDB) and for addition to the No-
    Fly List. Time sensitive nominations may be routed directly to the TSC
    if required.
        If it is determined that a person on the No-Fly List should no
    longer be identified as a No-Fly subject, they will be removed from the
    list. If additional intelligence data is developed or a subject has
    been interviewed by U.S. Government officials and deemed no longer a
    threat, an official request for removal must be submitted to the agency
    that placed the individual on the list. The original nominating agency
    will evaluate the data and determine whether the person stays on or is
    removed from the No-Fly List. The nominating agency will then make a
    formal request through the nomination chain requesting that the person
    be removed from the No-Fly List. In some cases, a review of the
    derogatory information associated with a No-Fly nomination may result
    in the subject being downgraded to the TSA Selectee List.
        The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is developing a
    redress process that will address any situation where passengers
    believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out for
    additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This
    process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously
    placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. The Office of
    Transportation Security Redress will work to ensure that passengers
    erroneously placed on the watch lists are in fact provided relief. The
    redress process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as
    appropriate.
        TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons
    who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity of their
    names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists.
    A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a
    completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA
    will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these
    procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a
    boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as
    other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the
    following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
    display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
        However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the
    watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers
    from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and
    identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This
    information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required
    identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly
    determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose
    name is actually on the watch lists.
        In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her
    inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after
    the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
        Question. And tell us what concrete redress policies you envision
    for passengers wrongly detained for additional screening who might miss
    a flight or those wrongly placed on a no-fly list.
        Answer. The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is
    developing a redress process that will address any situation where
    passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out
    for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This
    process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously
    placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with
    the nominating agency to review the derogatory information. The redress
    process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as
    appropriate.
        TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons
    who are flagged for additional screening due the similarity of their
    names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists.
    A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a
    completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA
    will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these
    procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a
    boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as
    other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the
    following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
    display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
        It is important to keep in mind that this clearance process will
    not remove a name from the watch lists. Instead, this process
    distinguishes passengers from persons who are in fact on the watch
    lists by placing their names and identifying information in a cleared
    portion of the lists. This information is transmitted to the airlines.
    Airline personnel can then more quickly determine when implementing
    TSA-required identity verification procedures that these passengers are
    not the person of interest whose name is actually on the watch lists.
        In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her
    inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction, after
    the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.

             US VISIT: WHEN WILL WE HAVE A REAL ``EXIT'' COMPONENT?

        Question. The former DHS Under Secretary, Asa Hutchison, announced
    with great fanfare meeting the December 31, 2004 deadline to have the
    foreign visitor visa entry-exit system, known as US VISIT, up and
    running at the 50 largest land-border ports of entry. This is a
    positive accomplishment and I am pleased that the Department has taken
    seriously our mutual interest in knowing who is entering this country
    and in keeping out those who should not be allowed entrance.
        However, I remain concerned that very few taxpayers know that while
    we may know who is entering the United States at our airports,
    seaports, and some land border ports, we continue NOT to know who is
    exiting the United States. That's right--there is almost no ``exit'
    component to the US VISIT system--a system which used to be called
    ``entry-exit''. We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on this
    system--and another $390 million is requested for US VISIT in the
    President's fiscal year 2006 budget, and yet we still are not able to
    capture data on which visitors are exiting the country.
        How can we know if someone has overstayed their permitted time in
    this country if we do not know that they have left?
        Answer. US VISIT is exploring different departure confirmation
    alternatives where biometrics are collected on exit, in addition to the
    biographic information, at 12 air and 2 sea port pilot locations. After
    evaluating these exit procedures, DHS will select the most effective
    process(es) and technologies to implement at airports and seaports
    nation-wide.
        Currently the US VISIT system collects both biographic and
    biometric data on eligible (nonimmigrant) alien arrivals and departures
    and stores the data in the Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS).
      --Biographic data is primarily collected through the submission of
            passenger manifests by the transportation carriers, with
            additional arrival and departure information collected by
            officers at U.S. ports-of-entry.
      --Biometric data (digital fingerscans and photographs) are collected
            at consular posts during visa interviews, at U.S. air and sea
            ports-of-entry during admission, and at a limited number of
            pilot locations at air and sea ports during departure.
      --US VISIT analyzes the data in ADIS to prepare the Annual Report on
            Integrated Entry and Exit Data System, as required by the Data
            Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-215) and the
            Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106-396). The
            report is due on December 31 each year. The report for 2004 was
            transmitted to the Hill on August 19, 2005.
      --During the last 3 months of the reporting period ending in
            September 2004, the system consistently matched 90 percent of
            exit records to entry records using biometrics due to the
            increased number of visitors enrolled in US VISIT at the time
            of admission. The system successfully matched approximately 10
            percent more exit records than when using biographic data
            alone.
      --US VISIT then analyzes those remaining records to determine if
            stays were legally extended, there were approved changes in
            status, or information existing in other systems that would
            indicate that the individual did not overstay.
      --Once US VISIT reviews all the information, those who are
            ``confirmed overstays'' are referred to ICE's Compliance
            Enforcement Unit for further vetting. Based on the outcome of
            its analysis, ICE may refer unresolved cases to the field for
            investigation. From January 2004 through August 2005, ICE has
            arrested almost 70 individuals based on overstay information
            provided by US VISIT.
      --DHS also will leverage new technology in the land environment to
            capture information about and departures. Our first proof of
            concept using this new technology, radio frequency
            identification (RFID), began August 4, 2005, at three land
            border ports of entry along the Northern and two along the
            Southern borders. This technology can detect a visitor at a
            distance and provide primary inspection officers with entry
            information as well as provide a mechanism for an accurate and
            timely record of exits. The proof of concept testing at the
            ports of Nogales East and Nogales West in Arizona, Alexandria
            Bay in New York, and the Pacific Highway and Peace Arch in
            Washington will continue through 2006.
        Question. What are the threats from not knowing who left?
        Answer. These threats are difficult to measure. Where we develop a
    lead that someone is associated with a terrorist group after that
    person has entered the country ICE coordinates its investigative
    activity with necessary entities to take appropriate action. In
    addition, one of the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    (INA) is to exclude and remove criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers,
    and those who would work and live in United States illegally, from the
    United States. Individuals who overstay their visas contribute to the
    denigration of the integrity of our immigration system--that is why US
    VISIT works with ICE to locate and apprehend these immigration
    violators.
        Question. When will we have a robust ``exit'' capability at our
    airports and at our land borders?
        Answer. US VISIT is exploring different biometric departure
    confirmation alternatives at 12 airports and two seaports. The exit
    pilots require foreign visitors to check out at an exit station or with
    a US VISIT exit attendant at the departure gate at the port. After
    evaluating these exit procedures, DHS will select the most effective
    process(es) and technologies to implement at airports and seaports
    nationwide.
        Question. How much more will this cost and when will this system be
    completed?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2005 investment includes resources to
    modernize our immigration and border management systems and provide
    greater interoperability for immigration and border management data. In
    fiscal year 2005, we will increase interoperability technology and
    introduce basic common service-oriented architecture functionality to
    enable delivery of expanded person-centric view capabilities. We are
    currently developing the business requirements for the first phase of
    this strategy.
        The fiscal year 2006 request includes resources to improve our
    immigration and border managements systems, as well as the continued
    deployment of US VISIT at our land borders. The fiscal year 2006
    request includes operation and maintenance of current and 2005
    investments, including: initial implementation of the entry and exit
    solution at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs); implementation and
    integration of border technology to the busiest land POEs; and
    deployment of biometric travel document readers at air, sea, and land
    POEs.

                                    US VISIT

        Question. In the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
    reprogramming request submitted to Congress on March 11, 2005, the
    Department offered up as a ``bill payer'' a portion of the US VISIT
    ``management reserve.'' The US VISIT program office had vociferously
    advocated for this reserve. The Department suggested that this reserve
    could be reduced by $17 million to meet the ICE funding shortfalls
    which had been known by the Department for sometime.
        Does this mean that the US VISIT management reserve is a lower
    priority to the Department? Will we see this reflected in the next US
    VISIT spend plan we expect to see regarding the fiscal year 2006 funds?
        Answer. All components within DHS were asked to review their
    budgets to determine if they could help address ICE funding needs.
    Management reserve within US VISIT exists to address unforeseen funding
    issues as they arise. This helps reduce program risk. Because of the
    nature of the purpose of management reserve, it is difficult to
    determine with certainty how much is needed in any given year. To
    reduce programmatic risk on ICE programs, it was appropriate to propose
    to accept temporary higher risk for US VISIT. However, a normal level
    of management reserve must be an integral part of the program into the
    future.
        The recently enacted fiscal year 2005 supplemental for ICE
    eliminated the need to reprogram funding from US VISIT for this
    purpose.

                          TWIC PROGRAM--WHY THE DELAY?

        Question. During his confirmation hearing before the Senate
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on March 8, 2005,
    then Deputy Secretary-nominee, Michael Jackson, said he did not
    understand why it was taking so long to get the Transportation Worker
    Identification Credential (TWIC) program up and running. He said,
    ``It's not rocket science.'' A number of states, notably Florida, have
    already moved forward with their own credentialing programs for their
    State workers. Mr. Secretary, if this program is not ``rocket
    science'', what is causing the delay? Congress has provided upwards of
    $65 million towards the program, pilot projects are underway, and
    thousands of workers are waiting. Why the delay? Is this delay the
    result of resource-constraints, policy decisions, privacy protections
    (or lack of clarification of privacy protections) decisions, some
    combination all of these, or something else?
        Answer. TSA acknowledges that the TWIC prototype has proceeded
    slower than expected. Technical and contractual issues have delayed
    rollout of the final TWIC card model and installation of final version
    biometric access control readers. Those issues are now solved.
    Enrollments and card production are ramping up at East and West Coast
    sites. The Florida rollout has been slowed as the State of Florida's
    team worked to resolve issues unique to Florida due to the need to
    comply fully with the Florida Uniform Port Access Credential (FUPAC)
    Act. Working with both State personnel and the prototype contractor the
    program has been successful in addressing and solving these problems.
    The ability to discover and resolve problems during the prototype phase
    rather than during implementation has been a welcome and valuable
    result and will benefit the program as it moves forward.
        The TWIC Program achieved initial operating capability (IOC) for
    each region on November 17, 2004. IOC was defined as having functional
    enrollment capability and at least one operational TWIC reader at one
    or more sites within the region. Presently, TWIC is in Phase III-
    Prototype whereby TSA is evaluating a full range of business processes,
    policies and requirements for an end-to-end solution that includes
    sponsorship, claimed identity verification, criminal history records
    checks (in the State of FL only) and card production, personalization,
    and issuance as well as revocation. Once Phase III-Prototype is
    complete, TSA will conduct further analysis and make recommendations
    regarding the nature and scope of Phase IV-Implementation.

                     EXPEDITED TRAVELER EXPANDING OVERSEAS

        Question. The Department announced the creation of pilot expedited
    traveler program at Schipol Airport in Amsterdam, yet there has been no
    decision made on expanding or making permanent the limited pilot tests
    of the Registered Traveler program here in the United States. Why is
    there a delay with expanding the domestic Registered Traveler program?
        Answer. While both programs enhance the security of civilian
    aviation, the two programs serve different purposes. The International
    Register Traveler Program is intended to enhance the already-existing
    requirement that CBP inspect and interview travelers seeking to enter
    the United States, and the program enhances CBP's ability to make
    admissibility decisions by separating out low-risk travelers. It builds
    on legacy trusted traveler programs--e.g., SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST, INS
    PASS. The domestic registered traveler program, by contrast, is a pilot
    program to improve the aviation security screening process by helping
    TSA align screeners and resources with potential risks.
        Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has been
    aggressively testing the Registered Traveler (RT) concept of running
    threat assessment and identity verification checks on eligible
    volunteers in order to provide them with an expedited clearance through
    security checkpoints. TSA is currently running pilot programs at five
    Federally managed sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and
    Washington, D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September
    2005. TSA has also worked with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority
    (GOAA) to launch a pilot at Orlando International Airport that is
    assessing the feasibility of incorporating a private sector component
    into the RT concept.
        Results of these pilots will be analyzed to determine the program's
    effect on security and service, enabling the Department to make
    decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and
    deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be
    linked to the Department's decision.
        Question. If we're not sure the domestic program is going to work--
    or how exactly it should be structured--why are you starting an
    international version at this time?
        Answer. While both programs enhance the security of civilian
    aviation, the two programs serve different purposes. The International
    Register Traveler Program is intended to enhance the already-existing
    requirement that CBP inspect and interview travelers seeking to enter
    the United States, and the program enhances CBP's ability to make
    admissibility decisions by separating out low-risk travelers. It builds
    on legacy trusted traveler programs--e.g., SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST, INS
    PASS. The domestic registered traveler program, by contrast, is a pilot
    program to improve the aviation security screening process by helping
    TSA align screeners and resources with potential risks.
        Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has been
    aggressively testing the Registered Traveler (RT) concept of running
    threat assessment and identity verification checks on eligible
    volunteers in order to provide them with an expedited clearance through
    security checkpoints. TSA has run pilot programs at five Federally
    managed sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and
    Washington, D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September
    2005. TSA has also worked with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority
    (GOAA) to launch a pilot at Orlando International Airport that is
    assessing the feasibility of incorporating a private sector component
    into the RT concept.
        Results of these pilots are being analyzed to determine the
    program's effect on security and service, enabling the Department to
    make decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and
    deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be
    linked to the Department's decision.

                      LACK OF FUNDING FOR BORDER SECURITY

        Question. During the hearing, you stated that the President's
    budget for fiscal year 2006 both hires 210 new Border Patrol agents,
    hires more immigration investigators and provides 1,920 new detention
    bed spaces and, at the same time, provides sufficient funds to backfill
    and hire the positions that were lost during the current fiscal year.
        Are you guaranteeing that the budget request hires both all fiscal
    year 2005 attrited Border Patrol positions and 210 new Border Patrol
    agents?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2005 Emergency Supplemental provides
    funding for 500 additional Border Patrol agents. CBP has until the end
    of fiscal year 2006 to fill these positions. However, CBP plans to hire
    these positions aggressively. For fiscal year 2005, CBP will backfill
    its fiscal year 2005 attrited positions and hire approximately 400 (of
    the 500) additional agents.
        For fiscal year 2006, the President's Budget requests 210
    additional Border Patrol agents. Both House and Senate Appropriations
    bills add 790 Border Patrol agents on top of this (for a total of
    1,000). If enacted, CBP would hire these positions and backfill
    estimated attrition (approximately 600 positions).
        With that said, the total impact of the fiscal year 2005
    Supplemental and the anticipated fiscal year 2006 budget will result in
    1,500 new Border Patrol agents by the end of fiscal year 2006. CBP will
    also hire for the backfill of attrition. CBP has the capacity to hire
    and train this level.
        With respect to ICE, the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget, when
    combined with projected carryover balances from the fiscal year 2005
    Emergency Supplemental, contains sufficient funding to support 376
    fiscal year 2005 attrition hires. In addition, the fiscal year 2006
    President's Budget includes an increase of $90 million to support 1,920
    beds.
        Question. And at what point in fiscal year 2006 will the Border
    Patrol have hired and trained the same staffing level at the start of
    fiscal year 2005 positions, plus the 210 new agents?
        Answer. CBP ended fiscal year 2004 with 10,817 Border Patrol (BP)
    agents. For fiscal year 2005, CBP plans to maintain that staffing level
    as well as beginning to add the 500 new agent positions provided in the
    fiscal year 2005 supplemental. For fiscal year 2006, CBP plans to add
    the 210 new agents in the President's Budget and replace all attrition
    positions. Hiring for the additional BP agents is a high priority.

                                BORDER SECURITY

        Question. The Heritage Foundation's December 13, 2004 report
    recommends that the Department ``conduct a national assessment of the
    resources required for effective border security.'' Is this
    recommendation a part of your comprehensive review of the Department
    and its priorities?
        Answer. The Department has been working aggressively outside of the
    Second Stage Review process to assess our long-term border needs,
    including the resources needed to secure substantial improvement in
    control of our borders. Complimentary Second Stage Review efforts
    examined needs in such areas as cargo security and passenger screening.
    The Department also is developing a plan for an independent, outside
    entity to examine border resource needs. All of our efforts will
    coalesce into the development of a long-term border security and
    immigration reform plan.

                IMPACT OF REAL ID ON BACKLOG REDUCTION/WORKLOAD

        Question. The House attached Rep. Sensenbrenner's REAL ID
    immigration bill (H.R. 418) to the Emergency Iraqi War Supplemental.
    This bill includes many of the provisions in the original House draft
    of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
        Unlike some rhetorical Bush Administration amnesty, the specifics
    of this legislation are known. The Administration supports the REAL ID
    legislation.
        If the conferees decide to include the provisions of this bill in
    the Supplemental, what impact would it have on Citizenship and
    Immigration Service's abilities to meet its backlog reduction goals and
    what resources would be required to implement the Act?
        Answer. Based upon our review, the Real ID legislation should have
    no impact on the backlog elimination plan. The additional fee revenues
    as a result of this legislation ensure the timely processing of these
    cases.
        The verification and adjudications functions of USCIS are
    organizationally separate. The verification workload is handled by
    Immigration Status Verifiers (ISVs) in the USCIS Records program, who
    are dedicated and specially trained for that function. USCIS does not
    intend to divert adjudications resources to implement the REAL ID Act.
    Therefore, backlog elimination goals will not be impacted.

                                PASSPORT PRIVACY

        Question. As the State Department is looking into the issue of
    possibly embedding personal data in the next generation of U.S.
    passports, what if any discussion has the Department's Privacy Officer
    had with State Department officials about the protection of the privacy
    of U.S. citizens?
        Answer. The Chief Privacy Officer for DHS has a very good working
    relationship with officials from the Department of State on matters of
    mutual concern, including lost and stolen passports and appropriate
    privacy notices for international travelers. While the Privacy Officer
    has made her views known to the State Department on numerous privacy
    matters, the precise question of how to protect personal information in
    the next generation of U.S. passports is one that is being worked on
    primarily by the Department of State, which has the lead authority for
    matters pertaining to passports. Of course, the DHS Chief Privacy
    Officer will work collaboratively with the State Department to ensure
    that implementation of any decisions protect the privacy of U.S.
    citizen's information.

                            CARGO CONTAINER SECURITY

        Question. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005
    Appropriations Act notes that over $200 million has been spent over the
    past 3 years on various projects designed to secure cargo containers
    entering this country. It also calls on the Under Secretary for Border
    and Transportation Security to report to the Congress no later than
    February 8, 2005 on which DHS entity will have primary responsibility
    for cargo container security and the setting of shipping industry
    standards. To date we have not yet received that report. When can we
    expect to see it?
        Answer. This report was submitted to Congress on May 31, 2005.
        Question. Are funds included in the President's budget request to
    achieve this goal?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes $138
    million for the Container Security Program.

                      SUPPLY CHAIN AND CONTAINER SECURITY

        Question. We received part one of the Supply Chain and Container
    Security report required by House Report 108-541. It states that the
    Container Security Initiative Division in headquarters ``is staffed
    with a majority of CBP employees and a small number of ICE Special
    Agents.
        Please provide the total number of the CSI Division headquarters
    staff and the number of those who are ICE Special Agents. Also, at
    which--if any--of the overseas CSI ports do we have both an ICE and a
    CBP attache?
        Answer. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) Division
    headquarters staff consists of 52 full time employees, four of which
    are ICE Special Agents. At this time, there are no CSI ports with both
    an ICE and a CBP Attache.

                              MERGING CBP AND ICE

        Question. You currently are conducting a ``top to bottom'' review
    of the Department, its structure, and its operations. Recent reports,
    including a December 13, 2004 Heritage Foundation report, bemoan the
    artificial division of Customs and immigration inspectors from Customs
    and immigration agents and recommend that CBP and ICE be merged. What
    is the status of the Department's discussion on these recommendations?
    When will the Congress learn of your intentions, if any, in this
    regard?
        Answer. We are not merging ICE and CBP; however, we do see the need
    to ensure that these organizations coordinate better. We will continue
    to work closely with the leaders of ICE and CBP to improve cooperation
    and coordination between these agencies. In deciding to not merge the
    two agencies, we considered view points from a variety of sources,
    including think tanks, as well as the Department's Inspector General,
    Members of Congress, and other valuable stakeholders.
        As you know, the Department looked at a variety of organizational
    issues as part of the Second-Stage Review process, which helped clarify
    where the Department needs to be organizationally to ensure effective
    implementation of our critical missions. We considered whether ICE
    should remain a stand-alone entity, and decided that it should. We
    believe it's in the Department's best near and long-term interest that
    ICE not be merged with another component, CBP in particular. To reach
    this decision, we focused on the operational mission needs of both CBP
    and ICE, not on the near-term management challenges. I take seriously
    the challenges the Department has faced concerning ICE and appreciate
    the difficult but necessary choices Congress has made in providing new
    funding to address its needs. I am confident, however, that ICE has
    made substantial improvements in financial management this year. Not
    only have substantial new resources been provided, but a new management
    team is taking shape.

                                  IDENT/IAFIS

        Question. The integration of the fingerprint databases created,
    maintained, and used by the Department of Homeland Security and the
    FBI--among other Federal agencies--continues to be a priority concern
    for the Congress and the members of this Subcommittee. Border Patrol
    agents daily compare the fingerprints of illegal aliens apprehended at
    our borders against these databases. And Customs and Border Protection
    inspectors--at a growing number of ports of entry--compare the
    fingerprints of visa holders and others wishing to enter this country
    against these same databases via the US VISIT system.
        That is why I was concerned about the latest Department of Justice
    Inspector General report on this subject. It stated that of the 118,000
    visitors daily entering this country who are subject to US VISIT, an
    average of about 22,350 individuals are referred for secondary
    inspection.
        According to DHS, by the end of this fiscal year, it expects to
    directly check only about 800 individuals each day against the full FBI
    fingerprint database known as the IAFIS Criminal Master File. This is
    just 0.7 percent of the 118,000 daily visitors. The vast majority of
    the visitors, 99.3 percent, will be checked only against the US VISIT
    watch list. These persons will not be checked directly against the full
    IAFIS Criminal Master File. Why is that the case? Why are so few people
    being run against these valuable investigative tools?
        Answer. The Department continues to work closely with the
    Department of Justice to improve the integration and interoperability
    of our fingerprint databases and we have established an integrated
    project team. Currently, the FBI updates DHS' records with information
    from a variety of criminal and threat-related databases. Based on
    updates to the US VISIT system during the time period between January
    2004 and the end of August 2005, officers have taken adverse action
    against more than 800 individuals during US VISIT processing on entry.
    In addition, integrated DHS Automated Biometric Identification System
    (IDENT) and FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
    (IAFIS) workstations will be deployed to all POEs with significant
    passenger volume, as well as to ICE locations by the end of calendar
    year 2005. A report, describing plans for interoperability, was
    submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.
        On July 13, 2005, I announced a decision that first-time visitors
    to the United States will be enrolled in the program by submitting ten
    fingerscans--a key step to achieving interoperability between IDENT/
    IAFIS. We have worked with the Departments of State and Justice to
    develop an implementation plan for the Initial Transition to 10 Print
    Plan which addresses interoperability as well as migration to 10
    fingerscans. In addition, the capability to capture 10 fingerscans will
    allow us to increase accuracy for matching individuals against watch
    lists and previous enrollment records; improve DHS's ability to match
    enrollees against latent prints; and allow DHS to focus more time and
    attention on individuals who might be potential risks to the country.
        Question. The Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 2005
    Homeland Security Appropriations Act directs the Department to fund the
    full cost associated to achieve real time interoperability with the US
    VISIT system. Yet there does not appear to be any funding in the budget
    to either establish real time interoperability of the DHS and Justice
    fingerprint databases, or an expansion of the current DHS system of
    capturing 2-fingerprints versus movement towards a 10-print system.
        Why is there no specific funding in the budget to improve the
    interoperability of IDENT/IAFIS and US VISIT?
        Answer. On July 13, 2005, I announced a decision that visitors to
    the United States will be enrolled in the US VISIT program by
    submitting 10 fingerscans. DHS is working with the Departments of State
    and Justice to develop an implementation plan that will address
    interoperability as well as migration to 10 fingerscans and cost
    estimates.
        There are several different ongoing efforts to bring about
    interoperability between the IDENT/IAFIS systems. Integrated IDENT/
    IAFIS capabilities were deployed to all Border Patrol stations ahead of
    schedule in fiscal year 2004 and additional deployment to all POEs with
    significant passenger volume and ICE offices will be completed by the
    end of calendar year 2005. The US VISIT program will use $9.3 million
    of fiscal year 2005 resources to complete the deployment of IDENT/IAFIS
    access configuration at 115 airports, 15 seaports, and 165 land border
    POEs, as well as to specific ICE locations.
        The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes resources for improved
    interoperability and the integrated project team will develop cost
    estimates for primary integration and development associated with
    IDENT/IAFIS interoperability as it develops its plan.

                            IDENT/IAFIS INTEGRATION

        Question. In the Department's ``2004 Year End Review'', it is noted
    that the Integrated Automated Fingerprint System (IAFIS) was
    operational at all Border Patrol stations 3 months ahead of schedule.
    This is a positive first step. However, nowhere in the report does the
    Department discuss the progress at fully integrating the IAFIS and
    IDENT fingerprint databases. The statement of managers accompanying the
    conference report on the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act discusses
    at length the strong congressional interest having these databases
    fully integrated. In fact, this was a topic that generated much
    bipartisan discussion during one of our hearings last year. Chairman
    Gregg again stressed its importance during our hearing with you this
    year.
        Integration has also been the subject of at least three Department
    of Justice inspector general reports.
        Who in the Department has the lead on this subject?
        Answer. The US VISIT Program, working closely with DHS components
    such as CBP and ICE, and the Departments of Justice and State, leads
    the efforts for full IDENT/IAFIS interoperability within the
    Department.
        Question. What is the timeline for accomplishing this integration
    and how much will it cost?
        Answer. DHS (US VISIT) and FBI/CJIS have established an IPT to
    address the policy, business requirements, and technical aspects of
    integrating IDENT and IAFIS. This IPT has made significant progress in
    resolving many of the long-standing issues originally referenced by the
    DOJ Office of the Inspector General. A report, describing plans for
    interoperability, was submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.
        Question. Are sufficient/any funds included in the President's
    budget request for this activity?
        Answer. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice will
    develop future budgets to support any necessary level of funding for
    IDENT/IAFIS interoperability.

                        VEHICLE FLEET MANAGEMENT REPORT

        Question. Senate Report 108-280 required the submission by February
    8, 2005 of a vehicle fleet management report. That report has yet to be
    submitted. It is difficult for the Congress to provide funds for new
    and replacement vehicles when we have little confidence that decisions
    to purchase these vehicles are being made in a methodical and reasoned
    manner. When can we expect to receive this overdue report? Also, please
    break out by type/category of vehicle the funds requested in the budget
    for new and replacement vehicles for the various CBP entities.
        Answer. The requested report is now being reviewed and will be
    submitted to Congress as soon as possible. The type and number of
    vehicles to be purchased will be based on the operational priorities of
    the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2006.

                          AMO FLEET MODERNIZATION PLAN

        Question. House Report 108-541 required submission of a report on
    the costs and benefits associated with a service life extension program
    of the P-3 Orion aircraft 30 days after enactment of the act. To date
    we have not received this report. Please provide us with this report as
    well as the status of Air and Marine Operations long-term procurement
    plan for new and replacement air and marine assets, including P-3.
        Answer. A technical and operational review of responses received in
    reply to the CBP Request for Information (RFI) issued on February 28,
    2005, has been completed. This review concluded that while there are
    viable alternatives to either replace or remanufacture the CBP/AMO P-3
    fleet, this effort should be part of a formal acquisition process
    associated with CBP/AMO's overall modernization initiative. CBP's long-
    term modernization plan will be developed as a component of the CBP air
    asset integration study to be completed in the summer of fiscal year
    2005.

                         APHIS--FOOD SAFETY INSPECTORS

        Question. Since the announcement of the creation of the Department,
    I have been concerned that ``core'' missions of the various legacy
    agencies would get lost because of the new Department's primary focus
    on homeland security. One area of concern is agriculture inspection
    operations at our borders.
        Border inspection responsibilities, including 2,500 frontline
    inspectors, were transferred from the Animal and Plant Health
    Inspection Service (APHIS) to DHS in March of 2003.
        According to a recent U.S. Department of Agriculture Inspector
    General report, APHIS could not assure that the DHS process for
    agriculture inspection operations contains adequate controls to
    safeguard U.S. Agriculture against entry of foreign pests and disease.
    It also noted that there was a reported 32 percent drop in the number
    of pest inspections following the transfer to DHS. What is the
    Department doing to correct this?
        Answer. The effort to bring up the number of CBP agricultural
    specialists to the level transferred from APHIS is a priority and CBP
    has made significant progress. According to the Determination Order
    that actually transferred personnel from APHIS, 1,872 agricultural
    specialists including canine were sent to DHS CBP. Of these positions,
    316 were vacancies. In fiscal year 2005, the hiring of additional
    Agriculture Specialists is a priority. The USDA Professional
    Development Center (PDC), the APHIS entity responsible for training new
    CBP agricultural specialists, has scheduled 20 classes from May 2004
    through February 2006. Seven classes have graduated as of April 22,
    2005, with 203 graduates deployed to 62 POEs. It is projected that CBP
    will have 500 graduates by February 2006.
        In addition to training more agricultural specialists, under CBP's
    ``One Face at the Border'' initiative, all CBP Officers at the POEs are
    used to perform the vast number of functions that CBP is charged with
    carrying out. In terms of agricultural inspections, CBP officers are
    being cross-trained, learning basic agriculture procedures for the land
    border, mail, cargo, maritime, and air passenger pathways to increase
    the value of referrals and supplement the work of the Agriculture
    specialists.
        CBP has noticed that several positive developments have resulted in
    a greater level of compliance in agricultural importations. Offshore
    mitigation strategies by APHIS to minimize the number of pests even
    reaching the United States are working. CBP, in conjunction with APHIS,
    has entered into several programs, such as a targeted program for
    imported cut flowers that decreased the number of inspections because
    the scientific data indicates that such commodities pose a much lower
    risk to American agriculture. During the same period, interceptions of
    prohibited animal by-products went up by 26 percent and prohibited meat
    and poultry by 6 percent.
        In summary, as the vacancies are filled with newly trained
    specialists, CBP will create a sufficient workforce of agricultural
    specialists to target and intercept prohibited material, and report all
    insects found in CBP seizures. When this occurs, the interception rate
    will more precisely reflect the true level of CBP efforts. CBP has
    asked USDA to supply additional insect pest detection training at POEs
    based on the specific pest pathways of concern.
        Question. Is the Department working with APHIS to establish a
    method to coordinate information regarding inspections?
        Answer. DHS-CBP has been working with and coordinating with USDA-
    APHIS in numerous ways to synchronize and verify information and data
    collected about inspections. The following are some of the ways CBP and
    APHIS have worked together.
    Joint Quality Assurance (QA) Program
      --CBP and APHIS have formed a joint QA team and began conducting port
            reviews together.
      --QA reviews will assist the Directors, Field Operations and improve
            our credibility among agricultural stakeholders.
      --CBP's Agricultural Inspections Policy and Programs (AIPP) conducted
            successful Joint APHIS QA reviews at the Port of Philadelphia,
            December 7 and 8, 2004, and the Port of Miami, April 18-22,
            2005.
      --Plans and dates are being developed to conduct Joint QA reviews
            once a month for the remainder of fiscal year 2005.
      --The QA team produces recommendations that are conveyed to CBP
            management for consideration and action.
    Creation of selectivity criteria and rule sets for agricultural
            targeting
      --CBP AIPP and APHIS are working together to develop rule sets for
            targeting and prevention of Agro/Bio Terrorism.
      --Plans are in place to hire two CBP Agriculture Specialists to be
            assigned to the National Targeting Center (NTC).
      --CBP assisted APHIS in the placement of one employee at the NTC to
            target and help prevent Agro/Bio Terrorism.
      --CBP has engaged and included APHIS in discussions about developing
            selectivity criteria for agricultural products.
    USDA access to CBP databases
      --CBP has been instrumental in negotiating an agreement with USDA to
            share data and databases between the agencies.
      --CBP has granted access for certain USDA offices to relevant CBP
            databases.
      --The combination of USDA databases and CBP databases and electronic
            systems will add to our capability to measure agricultural risk
            worldwide, target, develop new rule sets, and build CBP's
            expertise and capacity for early threat detection.
    Communications within CBP
      --CBP is making efforts to redesign and improve the Agriculture
            Inspection section of the cbp.gov website to be an effective
            means of communication within CBP.
      --The intranet site, cbp.net, is being redesigned to highlight joint
            actions and important efforts with USDA/APHIS.
      --CBP uses a system of alerts and musters as well as other CBP
            systems to notify the ports of issues of immediate concern.
    Joint Operations with USDA--Measurement Driven Special Operations
            (MDSO)
      --Fifty joint MDSO's are proposed for the remainder of fiscal year
            2005.
    Management Inspection Division (MID)
      --CBP used the MID to establish audit protocols that target mission
            critical agriculture functions.
      --Planning inspections at JFK, Miami, Los Angles and Newark
            International Airports: International Mail, Pest Interceptions
            (Cargo), Pest Interceptions (PAX), Cargo Control (Agriculture),
            Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM).
      --Proposed MID Inspections at Port Elizabeth, Baltimore, and Buffalo:
            AQIM.
      --Proposed MID Inspections Nogales, El Paso, Blaine, and Puerto Rico:
            AQIM.
    Self-Inspection Reporting System (SIRS)
      --CBP AIPP also uses the SIRS to monitor the agricultural program and
            to identify areas for improvement.
      --CBP AIPP has developed self-inspection worksheets based on Office
            of Field Operations (AIPP) policies based on USDA regulations,
            rules, policies, and needs.
      --For example, worksheets target Data Management, Cargo Control, Pest
            Exclusion, International Mail, and Clearance of Conveyances.
        Question. The report claims that the Department has denied APHIS
    access to port locations when access was requested, even to perform
    duties for which APHIS still has regulatory responsibility. Is this
    true and, if so, why was this access denied?
        Answer. CBP and USDA-APHIS have forged a new working relationship
    and resolved many of the earlier port access issues. CBP and USDA
    employees are working together cooperatively and sharing resources. CBP
    has worked with USDA to achieve the appropriate level of access to the
    POEs for their personnel. As Congress has provided, the inspectional
    functions were transferred from USDA to CBP. CBP has set forth
    procedures that have facilitated USDA gaining access to the ports to
    perform their functions.
        CBP and USDA-APHIS signed in February 2005 Appendix 8 to Article 8
    of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DHS and the USDA. The MOA
    establishes and enhances coordinated actions and operations between the
    two agencies and responds to many of the issues raised in the OIG
    report.
        Question. The report also states that APHIS and the Food Safety and
    Inspection Service (FSIS) do not require DHS to notify FSIS of all
    incoming shipments, which could allow the shipments to bypass FSIS re-
    inspection. Is this correct and, if so, why?
        Answer. DHS and USDA are currently developing a MOA to address the
    data needs of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) as well as
    other USDA agencies.
        In conjunction with FSIS, CBP has developed rule sets within our
    targeting systems to assist with the notification process. CBP and FSIS
    meet once a week to discuss food safety issues and FSIS has assigned an
    employee to work at CBP 2 days a week as a liaison. CBP is working very
    closely with FSIS to make sure that they are properly notified about
    arriving meat shipments. USDA and FSIS are also working together to
    update USDA manuals that would require notification of such shipments
    to FSIS.
        Question. Has the Department provided adequate data on staffing
    levels and deployment of agriculture inspectors to APHIS for
    evaluation?
        Answer. We are unaware of any formal APHIS request for such
    information nor what type of evaluation is contemplated by the
    question. However, CBP shares data concerning staffing levels and
    deployment of CBP agriculture inspection personnel with APHIS regarding
    training needs for newly hired CBP agriculture specialists in
    cooperation with CBP and is thus aware of the numbers of new hires.
        CBP and APHIS also conduct joint QA port reviews that explore
    staffing as a standard element. APHIS has identifiers and other
    personnel at the ports that can verify the staffing levels.

                          PULSED FAST NEUTRON ANALYSIS

        Question. On April 13, 2005, my staff received a report regarding
    the PFNA program called for by House Report 108-280. This overdue, four
    paragraph report stated that the contractor testing of this program,
    which was supposed to have begun in June 2004, been completed by
    October 2004, with a report issued by December 2004, has ``set a firm
    date of April 18, 2005, for the test to begin.'' That date has now
    passed. Did the test start on April 18, 2005? If not, when did or will
    the test begin? Can you confirm that ``the testing will be completed by
    August 19, 2005, and (that) the test report should reach Congress by
    November 2005''?
        Answer. The operational evaluation of the Pulsed Fast Neutron
    technology commenced on May 2, 2005, and is scheduled to run for 4
    months. An evaluation of the test is expected to be issued in November
    2005.

                        USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

        Question. I understand that the Department has issued a Request for
    Information to private industry to determine the capability and
    availability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems for use in border
    control and enforcement. What is the deadline for industry response?
        Answer. The RFI for the UAVs was issued on April 13, 2005, and
    responses were due on April 29, 2005. CBP received 14 responses.
        Question. Have you engaged in a dialogue with the private sector
    about your needs and requirements in this area?
        Answer. As noted above, CBP initiated dialogue with the private
    sector on UAV capabilities and CBP performance requirements through the
    RFI.
        Question. Do you plan to engage in down select and fly-off between
    competing systems?
        Answer. We do not plan to engage in fly-offs between competing
    systems during down select for the following reasons: the time
    constraint to establish an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in fiscal
    year 2005 does not allow for this, market research resulted in a
    decision to procure mature commercial off the shelf technology, the
    development of a refined CBP UAV Performance Specification clearly
    outlines system requirements, and the RFI included the CBP Performance
    Specification.
        Question. When do you expect a Request for Proposal to come forward
    and what is the target date to begin acquisition of a system?
        Answer. CBP released a Pre-solicitation notice on May 10, 2005,
    that was followed by an RFP on June 21, 2005, which closed on July 20,
    2005. CBP is in the process of evaluating proposals and anticipates a
    contract award on or about August 29, 2005.
        Question. During the period June through September, 2004, there was
    a pilot program that successfully demonstrated the value of UAVs under
    the Arizona Border Control Initiative. What were the results of that
    demonstration and will the lessons learned be incorporated into the
    Department's long-term acquisition strategy?
        Answer. The pilot program demonstrated that the UAVs had some
    operational effectiveness, but will require further evaluation to
    determine its optimal deployment. Some of the evaluation criteria were
    incorporated into the Request for Proposals issued for the purchase of
    UAVs for CBP. Lessons learned have been incorporated into both the
    present and long-term DHS acquisition strategies.
        Question. I understand that one of the lessons learned from last
    summer's pilot program was that the initial speed to ``get something
    flying'' resulted in some inefficiencies in operation of the system
    (such as the location of where it was operated and the limited hours it
    was able to fly) which might have been avoided with proper planning.
    Are things like this being taken into consideration as you move forward
    with the program?
        Answer. Yes, the lessons learned from the pilot program are being
    considered as we move forward with the present acquisition. Much
    attention is being focused on system acquisition, operational
    procedures and UAV basing to afford DHS the best solution to
    effectively meet our requirements.
        Question. In view of the continuing flood of illegal aliens across
    the Southwestern Border and the reported success demonstrated with the
    2004 UAV program, why hasn't the Department used the $10 million
    Congress appropriated for UAVs in fiscal year 2005 to restart the
    demonstration program as an effective enforcement and learning tool
    while the long term UAV program is developed?
        Answer. The Department has evaluated the lessons learned from the
    two prior UAV deployments and has established UAV requirements that,
    although mindful of other DHS users, meet CBP's specific needs. A
    request for proposals was issued in June 2005, and follows the request
    for information that closed on April 29th. The $10 million in fiscal
    year 2005 is to be used for a UAV acquisition and subsequent deployment
    of a UAV system that will serve as the DHS UAV initial operating
    capability along the Southern border this fiscal year. In the interim,
    CBP has deployed a Cessna 206 and two Piper Cheyenne airplanes (all
    equipped with electro optical and infrared sensors) to the Arizona
    desert to adequately provide aerial surveillance until CBP can acquire
    and field its own UAVs.
        As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level review of
    its border control architecture to identify the right mix of personnel,
    technology and infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the
    border.
        Question. If it chose to do so, how soon could the Department
    restart that demonstration?
        Answer. Since all necessary support requests have since expired,
    CBP would have to re-negotiate Letters of Procedure with all other
    airspace managers, a Request for Assistance from the Department of
    Defense (DOD) to allow us the use of Ft. Huachuca's facilities and
    logistics, and a Certificate of Authorization issued by the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) to allow UAVs to operate in the National
    Airspace System. The earliest the demonstration could be restarted is
    60 days from deciding to do so.

                         DHS ``BRANDING'' NOT COMPLETED

        Question. The Department claims great success with some of its
    systems integration, including that of its legacy e-mail systems.
    However, my staff was surprised to learn that one legacy agency--the
    Federal Protective Service (which transferred over in its entirety from
    the General Services Administration)--still uses ``gsa.gov'' for its e-
    mails as opposed to the DHS ``branded'' ``dhs.gov''. What is most
    troubling is that the FPS must continue to pay GSA for its e-mail
    services while also being billed by DHS (or ICE) for these same
    services--which it is not receiving. Why is there a delay in fully
    integrating FPS into the Department's operations?
        Answer. Fiscal year 2005 resources were committed early in the year
    to expedite the conversion, which was over 80 percent complete as of
    March 31, 2005. The remaining Federal Protective Service (FPS)
    locations were converted by August 19, 2005.
        Question. How much has FPS had to pay to GSA for this service this
    fiscal year to date?
        Answer. Fiscal year 2005 GSA charges for FPS information technology
    support through August 1, 2005, totaled $5,837,498. All FPS offices
    with the exception of FPS HQ have been converted to the DHS Network.
    FPS Headquarters is scheduled to relocate from GSA (18th/F) to ICE
    Headquarters as of August 22, 2005. FPS will reimburse ICE OCIO for
    services provided.
        Question. Since the Department has made claims that all agencies
    are on the same e-mail system, will the FPS be ``made whole'' or
    otherwise reimbursed as a result of these double payments?
        Answer. The FPS will fund conversion costs to the DHS email system.
    FPS has not made, nor will it make, double payments.

                                     C-TPAT

        Question. In your statement for the record you say that C-TPAT is
    due for an increase of $8.2 million and that these funds ``will be used
    to enhance our ability to conduct additional supply chain security
    validations.'' Is that the sole purpose for the increase, or will the
    program also be expanded with these funds?
        Answer. CBP intends to use these funds to support the validation
    process.
        Staffing for this program was significantly increased in fiscal
    year 2005 (120 new positions provided for conducting validations),
    which will allow CBP to conduct validations of all high-risk supply
    chains. An aggressive hiring drive to recruit permanent Supply Chain
    Specialists (SCSs) is underway, and CBP anticipates having 100
    permanent SCSs on board at the end of fiscal year 2005. Additionally,
    CBP has trained 38 field officers to help with the initiation of
    validations.
        As of August 15, 2005, the C-TPAT program has completed validations
    of 16 percent of certified members, and has validations underway on
    another 36 percent of certified members.
        As of August 15, 2005, the C-TPAT program has over 9,700
    applicants, of which 5,174 have been accepted and are certified. With
    an average of 2,000 to 3,000 new applicants each year, C-TPAT
    anticipates continued program growth and expansion through fiscal year
    2006 and beyond.
        Question. Please describe the ``security validations'' that will be
    conducted with the proposed increase.
        Answer. Validations begin with a domestic corporate meeting.
    Foreign site visits typically include a corporate meeting with foreign
    manufacturer corporate personnel, and a tour of appropriate
    manufacturing, shipping/consolidation and port facilities. Validations
    conclude with a close out meeting between CBP SCSs and the certified
    member's Point(s) of Contact(s). The Validation Report issued by the
    CBP SCS contains sections on Findings, Recommendations and Best
    Practices.
        CBP initiates validations based on risk, using a quantitative risk
    assessment tool to identify certified members with high-risk supply
    chains. CBP uses a validation selection methodology that relies upon
    quantifiable data coupled with an objective assessment of the submitted
    security profile to determine the top priorities for validations.
    Validation resources are then directed accordingly.
        CBP uses a risk-based approach to validate the security
    enhancements that have been committed to by C-TPAT members, to evaluate
    the status and effectiveness of key security measures in the
    participant's profile, and make recommendations where appropriate. In
    particular, CBP is placing emphasis on the importer and carrier
    sectors, and has modified its validation approach to maximize resources
    and increase efficiencies, such as validating multiple foreign
    suppliers within a geographic proximity.
        Moreover, CBP has enhanced its ability to record and measure
    validation results by developing the Automated Validation Assessment
    Tool, which is an electronic questionnaire that automatically scores
    and weighs the findings of the Supply Chain Specialist to produce an
    overall assessment of the supply chain security measures in place. Any
    identified weaknesses must be corrected in order to retain program
    benefits.
        Once the Validation is completed, the C-TPAT partner's role in the
    process continues as follows:
      --Communication on supply chain security issues continues with CBP
            and the assigned SCS;
      --Continual self-assessments of supply chain and security processes
            and procedures are performed;
      --A pro-active approach is maintained with regard to supply chain
            security and membership in C-TPAT.

                              ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

        Question. I am concerned that illegal immigrants continue to find
    new ways into this country. I understand that since the Navy stopped
    training and steaming in Vieques, Puerto Rico that there has been a
    surge of illegal immigrants coming to the United States through the
    Eastern Caribbean into Puerto Rico. What are you doing to close this
    gap?
        Answer. CBP arrest statistics do not substantiate a surge of
    illegal immigrants through the Eastern Caribbean.
        The Office of Border Patrol has one Station and Sector located in
    Ramey, Puerto Rico. This Sector and Station are located on the Western
    side of Puerto Rico and respond to their primary threat, which is
    illegal smuggling through the Mona Passage from the Dominican Republic.
    Ramey Sector has integrated its Intelligence Unit with other DHS
    partners to monitor traffic in its area of operation. The Ramey Border
    Patrol Sector enjoys a cooperative relationship with the U.S. Coast
    Guard and local Puerto Rican Maritime Police Forces (FURAS). The Coast
    Guard, Puerto Rican Police, CBP's Air and Marine Office all cooperate
    on interdictions and landings and share intelligence in a timely
    manner.
        Question. Has there been an increase in the number of illegal alien
    interdictions or other evidence of an increased flow of illegal aliens
    to Puerto Rico or Florida from the Eastern Caribbean?
        Answer. As noted above, CBP arrest statistics do not indicate that
    there is an increase in alien apprehensions from countries located in
    the Eastern Caribbean area or an increase in the flow of illegal aliens
    from the Eastern Caribbean to Puerto Rico and Florida.
        Question. What is the status of discussions to open a Border Patrol
    Substation in the U.S. Virgin Islands?
        Answer. CBP's priority mission is to prevent the entry of
    terrorists and terrorist weapons into the United States, and agency
    resources are allocated on the basis of risk assessment. The Northern
    Border represents a significant terrorist risk due to the presence of
    terrorist groups within Canada. In addition, aliens from special
    interest countries have been apprehended crossing the Southern Border
    using traditional alien smuggling routes. These indicators have to date
    not been manifested in the Caribbean. Therefore, although CBP continues
    to work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard to detect and interdict alien
    and drug smuggling activity in the Caribbean, CBP has not deployed
    additional resources in the area. CBP's Office of Intelligence is
    currently conducting a comprehensive risk analysis of the Caribbean,
    which will form the basis for making a future decision regarding the
    location of Border Patrol stations in the region.

              COLLECTION OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

        Question. Senate Report 108-280 included specific language that
    directed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to submit a report to the
    House and Senate Appropriations Committees by February 8, 2005. The
    report was to provide a coordinated plan, including legislative or
    regulatory changes proposed by CBP, if necessary, to increase CBP's
    collection of antidumping and countervailing duties owed to the United
    States. The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet received that
    report. Will the report be delivered prior to the Subcommittee marking
    up the fiscal year 2006 bill in June?
        Answer. The report was sent to the Committee on July 7, 2005.
        Question. On December 17, 2004, Customs and Border Protection
    issued its regular Annual Report on the Combined Dumping and Subsidy
    Offset Act (CDSOA). The Annual Report described how hundreds of
    millions of dollars in duties are not being collected by Customs, and
    the agency has been unable to explain why it cannot collect these
    funds. In fiscal year 2003, the agency failed to collect $130 million
    in duties owed the United States under the U.S. antidumping and
    countervailing duty laws, and CBP failed to collect an additional $260
    million in fiscal year 2004. The majority of that $390 million is the
    result of uncollected duties on goods imported from China.
        What is CBP doing to solve this problem?
        Answer. CBP disburse annually all antidumping duties available from
    entries that have been finally liquidated to domestic petitioners. The
    disbursements are made within 60 days of the end of the fiscal year.
        CBP recognizes that imports of antidumping merchandise pose a
    financial risk to domestic industry. We share the concern regarding the
    lack of funds available for disbursement to domestic petitioners of
    antidumping duties. Therefore, CBP has instituted several aggressive
    actions to mitigate the collection risks going forward. We have a high
    degree of confidence that for entries received after the initiation of
    these new measures, the collection rate will improve.
      --Amendment to the Continuous Bond Guidelines.--As of July 9, 2004,
            CBP has increased the continuous bond amount for importers of
            agriculture/aquaculture products subject to antidumping cases.
            The bonds will be set at a much higher rate, providing
            additional coverage in the event that an importer defaults. The
            new and proactive approach by CBP will provide the highest
            level of protection against default and directly addresses
            instances where the final liquidation rate is much higher than
            the initial deposit rate made at time of entry.
      --Integration With Other Agencies.--CBP has recently begun working
            with the Department of Treasury to address the financial risks
            associated with sureties. Treasury conducts quarterly solvency
            evaluations of sureties and provides approval of the sureties
            to write customs bonds. By working together, we have developed
            a mechanism by which CBP can provide Treasury with data about
            sureties that are heavily weighted in ``high-risk''
            transactions, such as antidumping. Treasury will incorporate
            this information in their solvency evaluation to mitigate the
            risk of surety bankruptcy. In addition, CBP is closely working
            with the Department of Commerce to find workable solutions to
            the challenges we face in collecting antidumping duty.
      --Increased Monitoring of Imports.--CBP has taken measures to
            increase the monitoring of entries of agriculture/aquaculture
            products subject to antidumping duties. This monitoring
            provides a means to ensure compliance with bonding
            requirements, aids in the identity of surety risks, and helps
            thwart circumvention attempts. The closer scrutiny allows CBP
            to quickly identify new importers, particularly sham or shell
            companies. The monitoring provides CBP with the opportunity to
            raise bonds on these entities at once. By stepping up the
            monitoring of agriculture/aquaculture imports, CBP is also in a
            position to recognize shifts in patterns that may indicate
            circumvention attempts.
        We believe that the new bonding methodology, working with other
    agencies, and closely monitoring imports will have a positive impact on
    the collections of antidumping duty, making more funds available for
    disbursement to the domestic industry.
        CBP has taken a number of steps to ensure that the appropriate
    antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) revenue is collected.
    CBP has initiated centralization of all AD/CVD continuous bond activity
    for the bond program under the Revenue Division, Office of Finance,
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection in Indianapolis, Indiana. This
    establishes more uniform, consistent and effective management of
    continuous bonds involving AD/CVD. Also, AD/CVD bond formulas have been
    amended with an objective to minimize AD/CVD revenue losses as a result
    of bond insufficiency. The first commodity subject to this new bonding
    formula is shrimp.
        Question. Why is this problem of non-collection growing, and what
    is CBP doing to address it?
        Answer. Final liquidation for AD/CVD occurs several months,
    sometimes years after actual entry of the merchandise. The significant
    increase in uncollected antidumping duties seen in fiscal year 2003
    reflected the first series of liquidation instructions for cases
    covering the types of merchandise we now understand to be problematic
    for collection; agriculture/aquaculture merchandise. These liquidation
    instructions covered entries going back as far as 1997 and 1998. The
    increase in uncollected antidumping duties in fiscal year 2004 reflects
    the growth in imports that was seen in years after the initiation of
    the cases, particularly the crawfish case. CBP is confident that
    collection rates will increase for entries received after the
    implementation of the measures highlighted in above.
        CBP has taken several measures to maximize collection of AD/CVD
    revenue. Continuous bonds covering new AD/CVD merchandise are being
    managed as a part of the overall centralization of continuous bonds at
    the Revenue Division, Office of Finance, U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection in Indianapolis, Indiana. Also, AD/CVD bond formulas have
    been amended with an objective to minimize AD/CVD revenue losses from
    bond insufficiency. However, uncollected revenue will occur as a result
    of entry activity during years prior to affecting these new measures.
    As an example, although the Revenue Division has processed over 25,000
    continuous bonds from the beginning of the centralization effort that
    began August 12, 2003, not one bond has been subject to a collection
    action. Collection action is dependent on liquidation of the formal
    entry summaries covered by the bond. Liquidations may occur up to
    several years following the initial entry date. In addition, the
    amended AD/CVD bonding formula currently covers only shrimp.
        Question. In past correspondence with my office, Commissioner
    Bonner indicated that CBP supported legislation that Senator Cochran
    and I introduced in the last Congress--and that we have reintroduced in
    the 109th Congress--to solve this problem of non-collection. That
    legislation, which passed the Senate unanimously last year, would
    require cash deposits instead of bonds in certain antidumping reviews.
    Would you be willing to express your support for this legislation
    directly to House Ways & Means Chairman Bill Thomas and other Members
    of the Congress, including the House leadership?
        Answer. The Department and CBP are taking steps necessary to
    collect appropriate duties and provide appropriate funds to U.S.
    companies and workers through the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act
    (CDSOA) disbursements. We agree that cash deposits in lieu of single-
    entry bonds may provide greater coverage and are less of an
    administrative burden. We are taking steps to provide greater security
    for the collection of AD/CVD within the framework of existing
    legislation, and are working with the Department of Commerce to apply
    more innovated methods to address these and other risks from imports
    subject to antidumping and countervailing orders. We look forward to
    continuing to work with Congress on ways to improve our performance in
    this area.
        Question. As mentioned previously, in the past, U.S. industries
    like the U.S. crawfish industry have discovered only very late in the
    year that millions of dollars of antidumping duties for some reason
    have not been collected in their cases against Chinese imports as
    required by law. And, because CBP's failure to collect these duties has
    been discovered late in the year, the non-collection problem in these
    cases could not be addressed in time to enable the industries to obtain
    their yearly distribution of funds under the CDSOA. As a consequence,
    the U.S. crawfish industry, for example, last year failed to receive at
    least $54.4 million it otherwise would have received in duties paid the
    U.S. Government by Chinese importers. It is my understanding that CBP's
    Office of Information Technology (OIT) is fully capable of running an
    already existing program much earlier in each calendar year, (meaning
    by the end of March at the latest), which would enable both CBP and
    U.S. industries to learn, much earlier, if millions of dollars in
    duties are not being collected by CBP from U.S. importers of foreign,
    dumped products.
        Why can't CBP's OIT determine by the end of this month if there are
    cases in which CBP is not collecting duties owed the U.S. Government
    and make that information publicly available as early as possible?
        Answer. CBP has responded to the revenue risk posed by the
    inability to collect certain AD/CVD duties through several means, one
    of which is the monitoring the AD/CVD bills and collections on a more
    regular basis. For the distribution of these funds to take place
    timely, it is necessary not only to monitor the timely collection of
    AD/CVD duties but also to ensure our revenue collection system is
    protected from possible circumvention and corporate solvency schemes
    designed to enter AD/CVD goods into the U.S. market with the intention
    of never paying the proper duties at time of liquidation.
        On a monthly basis, CBP is performing a risk-based review of
    outstanding bills for AD/CVD duties. The information has proven
    effective in identifying high-risk companies for AD/CVD evasion as well
    as improves the timeliness of our reviews. CBP is also focused on the
    long-term issue of the company's financial solvency and their ability
    to pay outstanding AD/CVD bills. The continuous bond guidelines for
    imports of certain agriculture/aquaculture imports were amended in July
    2004 to address just such an issue. Working with the Department of
    Commerce, we are addressing the AD/CVD issues that pose the greatest
    risk.
        Question. Again, two of the problems that CBP has exhibited with
    respect to its administration of the CDSOA are (1) CBP failure to
    collect duties rightfully owed; and (2) its failure to pay duties
    already collected in a timely fashion to eligible U.S. companies and
    their workers. With respect to the second problem, CBP sometimes holds,
    in what are called ``clearing accounts,'' duties that are collected
    over many years--but for which the agency is awaiting final
    ``liquidation instructions'' from the Commerce Department prior to
    distribution. Often, the Commerce Department claims that such
    instructions have been sent, but CBP does not know they have been sent
    or never receives them. It has been proposed that one solution to this
    problem would be for CBP to publish the amount of funds held in CBP's
    clearing accounts, by administrative review period, so that CBP and
    Commerce can work together to determine which funds should have been
    liquidated and be available for distribution to eligible U.S.
    producers. CBP, in certain circumstances, has provided such information
    to Members of Congress upon request, but has refused to provide such
    information generally.
        Will you commit to identifying (i.e., publishing) the amount of
    funds held in clearing accounts by administrative review period?
        Answer. The AD/CVD modules within the Automated Commercial System
    (ACS) do not provide information by administrative review periods;
    therefore, CBP cannot currently track entries in this manner. CBP has
    provided information of this type in certain circumstances through a
    manual review process. CBP is working towards including functionality
    in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) to identify and track AD/
    CVD data to ensure timely and accurate liquidation.
        The OIG expressed concern about approximately one million entries
    suspended by CBP. As a result of this finding, CBP developed a plan to
    isolate those suspended entries that were beyond the normal timeframes
    of an AD/CVD case. Once identified, CBP worked with the Department of
    Commerce (DOC) to obtain liquidation instructions for these entries. To
    date, CBP has reduced the national inventory by 80,000 entries. CBP
    plans to continue to work with DOC to reduce the inventory
    substantially.
        In fiscal year 2005, CBP is concentrating on the liquidation of
    remaining AD/CVD entries entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended.
    This action will remove approximately 50,000 entries representing over
    $46 million in deposits on 222 cases from the ``official'' inventory.
    By the middle of fiscal year 2006, CBP plans to liquidate the remaining
    50,000 or so entries.
        Another reason that monies remain in the ``clearing accounts'' and
    are unavailable for distribution via CDSOA is the number of protests on
    bills issued by CBP. Payment of a protested bill is deferred until the
    protest decision is rendered. Currently, many protests of AD/CVD
    liquidations are suspended pending the final decision by the Federal
    Appeal Court on International Trading.
        Question. Will you commit similarly to identifying the reasons for
    the lack of liquidation in cases where liquidation has not occurred for
    more than 4 years, and provide specific information with respect to
    those cases showing the amounts that remain unliquidated accompanied by
    an explanation of CBP's understanding of why the amounts have not been
    liquidated?
        Answer. Again, the AD/CVD modules within the ACS do not provide
    information by administrative review periods; therefore, CBP cannot
    track entries this way. This functionality will be programmed into the
    ACE and should be available by the end of fiscal year 2007.

                                    STAFFING

        Question. What was the CBP on-board strength (including AMO) on
    September 30, 2004? What was it on March 31, 2005? Provide the same
    data for the Border Patrol.
        Answer. Air and Marine Operations employees were not transferred to
    CBP until October 31, 2004. The attached chart therefore provides on-
    board strength at two snapshots in time to reflect this transfer.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                October 2,
                                                   2004        April 2, 2005
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Total CBP staffing

    CBP total...............................          40,934          41,717

          Border patrol agent staffing

    Border patrol Agents total \1\..........          10,817          10,859
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These amount are also included in the CBP totals above.

                              DETENTION FACILITIES

        Question. One of the primary functions of the Bureau of Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is to serve as this country's interior
    line of defense by apprehending illegal entrants and detaining them
    pending the outcome of an administrative determination of their status.
    However I understand that ICE is considering closing the only secure,
    non-criminal detention center in New York City--the very site of the
    2001 terrorist attacks--because of an apparent decision to focus the
    bulk of the agencies efforts on only identified criminal aliens and
    other high-risk illegal immigrants. This concerns me greatly because I
    understand that the vast majority of the individuals detained at this
    New York City detention facility would be released on their own
    recognizance into the New York City area.
        Why is DHS proposing to close this detention facility in New York
    City? Is this because of a lack of funds? Are there not enough aliens
    needing to be detained which necessitates the closure of this facility?
        Answer. In a continuing effort to consolidate detention capacity
    where possible in order to increase operational efficiency, ICE has
    decided not to exercise the next available option to extend contract
    performance at the Queens CDF.
        The current contract was awarded to GEO on March 27, 2002. The
    Queens CDF provides detention housing and transportation of non-
    criminal detainees in the custody of ICE. A significant population
    designated to the Queens CDF is comprised of asylum seekers apprehended
    at POEs in the New York area.
        The indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract includes a
    guaranteed minimum detainee population of 150 ($219.02 per manday) and
    a maximum capacity of 200 ($9.17 per manday exceeding 150 beds). The
    contract consists of a base year and 4-1 year options, exercised at the
    unilateral discretion of the government. The contract is currently
    performing within Option Year 2.
        A recent assessment determined that a substantial number of the
    population routinely designated to the Queens CDF could be adequately
    managed through a combination of bonds, orders of own recognizance,
    and/or the increased use of alternatives to detention (e.g., electronic
    monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.). All non-detention options will
    be applied based on established ICE standards. The remaining population
    requiring detention can be consolidated into substantially lower cost
    detention capacity available to ICE via commercial contracts and
    agreements with local government service providers. Other efficiencies
    will accrue from the consolidation of detainees, staff, the
    administrative hearing process, support programs, etc. These increased
    efficiencies will permit ICE to apply funds toward detaining higher
    priority cases.
        It should also be noted that various non-governmental organizations
    have previously expressed concern regarding conditions of confinement
    at the Queens facility (See February 8, 2005 CIRF report, ``Report on
    Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal).
        Utilizing all available options to manage the non-criminal alien
    population apprehended in the New York area and consolidating the
    population requiring detention into lower cost facilities, will result
    in improved efficiency in the ICE detention program.
        Question. I understand that ICE makes an initial determination as
    to the level of risk of the illegal alien and that such a determination
    often is conducted at the point of entry which, in the case of this
    facility, is JFK International Airport.
        How often does ICE make an initial determination that an individual
    is a ``low-risk'' illegal immigrant and then, after further
    investigation, determine that the individual should have been
    classified as ``high-risk?''
        Answer. The law enforcement databases used to track alien detention
    do not allow for us to determine the number of aliens who were
    initially considered ``low risk'' and are then later considered ``high
    risk''. These categories are used as guidelines in making the detention
    decision, but are not recorded as such in these databases.
        Question. I believe these non-criminal detention facilities serve
    several purposes, one of the most important of which is holding those
    potentially high-risk individuals who fall through the cracks during
    the initial screening and who initially are misclassified as low-risk.
    Furthermore, I believe that facilities such as the one in New York City
    serve a very important deterrent effect. I understand that JFK Airport
    was a popular entry point for illegal immigrants prior to the opening
    of this New York City detention facility.
        Does DHS believe that these types of facilities serve a deterrent
    effect and, more importantly, serve to catch high-risk individuals who
    might slip through the initial screening process?
        Answer. Detention and removal are deterrents to illegal
    immigration. However, detention resources must be effectively managed
    to ensure that secure capacity is available to accommodate cases
    according to our detention priority continuum. It has been determined
    that a substantial number of the population routinely designated to the
    Queens CDF could be adequately managed through a combination of bonds,
    orders of own recognizance, and/or the increased use of alternatives to
    detention (e.g., electronic monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.).
    All non-detention options will be applied based on established ICE
    standards. The remaining population requiring detention will be
    consolidated into substantially lower cost detention capacity available
    to ICE via commercial contracts and agreements with local government
    service providers. Other efficiencies will accrue from the
    consolidation of detainees, staff, the administrative hearing process,
    and support programs. These increased efficiencies will result in
    savings that can be applied to other immigration enforcement
    activities.
        Question. Given the importance of these types of facilities, how
    can DHS justify their closure in New York City, especially when the
    only other facility in the general vicinity is designed to hold
    criminal aliens and which I understand operates at or near capacity?
        Answer. A recent assessment determined that a substantial number of
    the population routinely designated to the Queens CDF can be adequately
    managed through a combination of bonds, orders of own recognizance,
    and/or the increased use of alternatives to detention (e.g., electronic
    monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.). All non-detention options will
    be applied based on established ICE national standards. The remaining
    population requiring detention can be consolidated into substantially
    lower cost detention capacity available to ICE via commercial contracts
    and agreements with local government service providers. All cases
    requiring detention will be designated to appropriate conditions of
    confinement. Efficiencies will accrue from the consolidation of
    detainees, staff, the administrative hearing process, and support
    programs. ICE can use the savings from these increased efficiencies to
    detain higher priority cases.

                        MEASURES FOR DETERMINING BUDGETS

        Question. What is the ratio or other measurement by which ICE
    determines how many detention beds are required in a given year? For
    instance, is there a ratio or determination made such that if one
    assumes that one Border Patrol agent is responsible for x apprehensions
    of illegal aliens then there is a need for y detention beds? And is
    there a similar ratio or measurement between the amount of bed space
    required because of the investigation success rate of ICE immigration
    investigators?
        Answer. The Department is working aggressively to develop a
    comprehensive border control strategy that responds more effectively to
    alien apprehensions and the overall flow of illegal crossings. As
    fundamental improvements to the system are implemented through this
    strategy, we will implement systematic modeling that can more
    accurately link resources with apprehensions and other measures of
    demand.

                              WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

        Question. For Worksite Enforcement, how does ICE determine how it
    will focus its resources? For example, which areas or industries will
    be targeted?
        Answer. Since September 11, 2001, ICE Worksite Enforcement
    activities have focused primarily on removing unauthorized workers from
    critical infrastructure facilities to reduce the risk of terrorist
    attack from insiders. ICE Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
    operations are generally initiated at the local level and are based
    upon factors such as the type and number of infrastructure facilities
    present in each Special Agent-in-Charge jurisdiction (seaports,
    airports, military bases, defense contractors, nuclear plants, etc.)
    and upon specific or general threat information received from various
    intelligence sources, the general public, and from other law
    enforcement agencies.
        ICE Worksite Enforcement activities also target criminal employers
    whose violations have a nexus to human smuggling, immigration document
    or benefit fraud, and worker exploitation. The authorities being
    enforced generally include one or more of the civil and/or criminal
    provisions of INA 274A (Unlawful Employment of Aliens). Many criminal
    employer investigations also result in the charging of violations
    relating to harboring, smuggling, and document fraud. The fiscal year
    2006 Budget includes an increase of $18 million and an additional 140
    agents to support the Temporary Worker Program.

                                  CYBER CRIMES

        Question. For fiscal year 2005, Congress provided $4.2 million for
    additional cyber crime forensic infrastructure and expansion of the
    Cyber Crime Center to ICE field offices. What is the status of this
    effort?
        Answer. This funding provides for the creation of a wide area
    storage network for the ICE Computer Forensic Program. Upon award, disk
    storage arrays will be installed in four or five (final numbers are
    contingent upon final pricing) ICE field offices to provide storage for
    digital evidence under examination.
        The ICE Cyber Crime Center has conducted a thorough market and
    technical analysis and is in the final stages of making a vendor
    selection.
        An inter-agency agreement has been established with the U.S. Bureau
    of Public Debt (BPD) to utilize their existing IT procurement vehicle
    to make the contract award. The statement of work and performance work
    standard documents have been forwarded to BPD on August 18, 2005. It is
    anticipated that the contract will be awarded to TKC Communications of
    Fairfax, VA, an Alaskan native corporation, shortly. Once awarded, site
    surveys, selection, and installations will begin in earnest.
        Question. Have any of these funds been obligated?
        Answer. None of the $4.2 million has been obligated.
        Question. Have any additional personnel been hired?
        Answer. No additional personnel will be hired with the $4.2
    million.
        Question. To which field offices, if any, will the Center expand?
        Answer. This answer contains infomrmation considered Law
    Enforcement Sensitive and has been provided to the Committee under
    separate cover.

                               PASSENGER AIR FEES

        Question. The Administration's budget for DHS proposes a
    significant increase to the security fee passengers pay by more than
    doubling the cost for the first leg of a flight from $2.50 to $5.50.
    These fee collections, if approved, would be used to pay for
    approximately 83 percent of the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the
    Transportation Security Administration. According to the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO), this proposal would generate $1.680 billion in
    additional funding for fiscal year 2006.
        Will a legislative proposal be sent to the authorizing committees
    with jurisdiction over this issue, and if so, when?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget provided a
    legislative proposal to modify this fee authority. In Title V--General
    Provisions, the proposal states, ``SEC. 517. In Chapter 449 of title
    49, United States Code, section 44940(c) is amended by striking `$2.50'
    and replacing it with `$5.50', and striking `$5.00' and replacing it
    with `$8.00'.'' This modification to the fee authority would allow TSA
    to implement the fee increases sought in the President's fiscal year
    2006 Budget. TSA will work with the Appropriations Committees of the
    House and the Senate, as well as the appropriate authorizing committees
    in both bodies, to ensure enactment of the proposed security service
    fee increase.
        Question. Second, if the proposed fee is not approved, will the
    Secretary urge the President to submit a budget amendment to fill the
    $1.7 billion funding gap?
        Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry,
    passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is
    sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity
    of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is
    intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from
    the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work
    with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.
        Question. Finally, what programs and activities does the Department
    propose be cut if the fee increase is not authorized by Congress?
        Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry,
    passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is
    sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity
    of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is
    intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from
    the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work
    with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.

                                   AIR CARGO

        Question. Public Law 108-458, which was signed into law by the
    President on December 17, 2004, included an authorization for $100
    million in fiscal year 2006 to accelerate the development of
    technologies to screen air cargo. The Administration's budget proposes
    that air cargo screening technology development be funded through the
    Science and Technology directorate, but funding is cut by $45 million
    from last year and funding is $70 million below the amount authorized
    in the Intelligence Reform Act. How is a cut of this magnitude
    justified? Has there been a break through in the development of
    detection technology for air cargo that justifies the proposed cut?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget transfers $109
    million in R&D funds from TSA to the S&T Directorate. Of this amount,
    $29.578 million is dedicated to projects that will address air cargo
    screening capabilities. TSA retains $23 million in its fiscal year 2006
    request to continue analyzing EDS products emerging from the Phoenix
    Phase II R&D program, piloting passenger screening projects, including
    next generation trace portal and automated checkpoint EDS, continuing
    EDS cargo break bulk evaluation, and conducting cargo technology field
    evaluations for field experiments.
        The S&T Directorate does not plan to fund consolidated air cargo
    technology development outside those efforts captured by our broad R&D
    program, or captured in other efforts within the directorate, such as
    RFID technology, unless air cargo pilots demonstrate the need and
    utility in specific cases, and focus instead on break-bulk inspection.
    Given a break-bulk inspection paradigm, the same technologies being
    explored for package or luggage inspection apply to cargo screening--
    and thus it is straightforward to include consideration of any specific
    requirements, e.g., size and throughput, into our broad R&D program.
        With the fiscal year 2006 R&D funds, the S&T Directorate plans to
    conduct broad R&D that is applicable across the spectrum of baggage,
    package, and cargo screening. The S&T Directorate estimates that the
    funding required in fiscal year 2006 to complete the assessment of the
    efficacy of specific existing methodologies for particular cargo
    commodities, and to test screening procedures in the laboratory would
    be approximately $5 million. The Phoenix project is aimed at reducing
    false alarm probabilities in EDS systems, which is clearly beneficial
    to both baggage and package inspection. Other relevant RDT&E efforts
    within the aviation explosives detection efforts include
    nanotechnology-based sensors, CT array-based imaging (as opposed to
    rotating scans), and improved trace systems. Some of the TSA R&D
    projects funded in fiscal year 2005 will continue into fiscal year 2006
    through completion of prototypes. These projects may continue to be
    funded by the S&T Directorate if they meet certain criteria,
    particularly in the area of break-bulk inspections.
        Question. Public Law 108-458 authorizes $200 million per year for
    TSA to improve aviation security related to the transportation of cargo
    on both passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft. Why doesn't the
    fiscal year 2006 request include additional funding for air cargo
    security?
        Answer. TSA's request for air cargo resources is at an appropriate
    level to ensure air cargo security and recognizes non-recurring system
    development costs while at the same time meeting all of the necessary
    transportation security priorities.
        Question. Are there plans to increase the number of inspectors?
        Answer. TSA currently employs 196 cargo inspectors. Three others
    have been selected and are in the final stages of the hiring process.
        Question. Is TSA satisfied with 200 air cargo inspectors?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request is a
    reflection of the resources required to ensure air cargo security and
    recognizes non-recurring system development costs while at the same
    time meeting all of the necessary transportation security priorities.
    Going forward, TSA will evaluate the needs and resources available to
    determine whether additional inspectors would be appropriate.

                               PRE-PACKAGED NEWS

        Question. On March 16, the Washington Post printed an editorial
    entitled Viewer Beware. The editorial questioned the use of government-
    packaged and government funded news reports to look and sound like
    regular television reports. The editorial stated ``Although this
    Administration apparently isn't the first to use video news releases,
    it seems more enamored of them than its predecessors. For example: A
    spot commissioned by the Transportation Security Administration lauds
    ``another success'' in the Bush Administration's drive to strengthen
    aviation security,'' which the reporter describes as ``one of the most
    remarkable campaigns in aviation history.'' Unbeknownst to the viewer,
    the so called reporter was no reporter at all. She was a contractor
    hired by TSA. This type of pre-packaged reporting has occurred in other
    agencies as well, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy
    (ONDCP) and the Department of Health and Human Services.
        In every year since 1951, Congress has included a provision in the
    general government appropriations act which states the following: ``No
    part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be
    used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not
    heretofore authorized by Congress.''
        In recent cases involving prepackaged news stories by ONDCP and the
    Department of Health and Human Services, GAO concluded that those
    prepackaged news stories violated the publicity or propaganda
    prohibition. GAO did not receive a request to review the TSA story, but
    it was developed in a similar manner.
        The Senate recently approved by a vote of 98-0 an amendment to the
    emergency supplemental to prohibit Federal funding of pre-packaged news
    stories unless the story includes a notification that it was created
    and funded by a Federal agency.
        Do you agree that pre-packaged news segments produced by any DHS
    office should include a clear notification to the audience that the
    story was prepared or funded by that Federal agency?
        Answer. DHS has a unique responsibility to provide Americans with
    important information they can use to be prepared for disasters,
    terrorist attacks or even to better navigate security procedures at our
    airports and ports-of-entry. Video news releases can serve as one tool
    for accomplishing this objective. We agree with the Administration's
    previously articulated position that Federal agencies should be open
    about their activities and that DHS-produced Video News Releases (VNRs)
    should be clearly marked.

                        SCREENING WORKFORCE PERFORMANCE

        Question. The DHS Inspector General recently released results of an
    audit on Transportation Security Administration screener performance.
        The IG's audit indicated that the problems will most likely persist
    without greater use of new technology. The IG recommended that the TSA
    administrator aggressively pursue the development and deployment of
    innovations and improvements such as the backscatter x-ray and
    explosive trace detection portals to help the screener workforce better
    detect weapons and explosives. However, the Department's fiscal year
    2006 budget actually reduces the amount of money included for Next-
    Generation explosive detection systems from $54 million to $49 million
    and significantly below the $100 million authorized in the Intelligence
    Reform Act.
        In light if the sobering results of the IG audit, how can you
    justify reducing the amount of funding for the development and
    deployment of innovative detection technologies?
        Answer. The TSA recognizes that additional resources must be
    devoted to address this critical vulnerability and improve the
    effectiveness of checkpoint screening. As it relates to deployment, TSA
    will have the ability to screen elevated risk passengers for explosives
    at all passenger checkpoints by January 2006. TSA will devote a total
    of $100 million to this initiative in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In
    fiscal year 2005 TSA received $28.3 million to field emerging
    technology equipment at checkpoints. For fiscal year 2006, TSA is
    requesting a total of $72 million (an increase of $43.7 million over
    the fiscal year 2005 base amount) for emerging checkpoint explosives
    technology. In fiscal year 2005, TSA devoted $54 million for research
    and development (R&D) on Next Generation Explosives Detection Systems
    (EDS). The fiscal year 2006 Budget proposes to transfer TSA's R&D
    function to the S&T Directorate.

                              TSA SPENDING ABUSES

        Question. The DHS Inspector General recently released a report that
    highlighted a laundry list of disturbing financial purchases relating
    to the creation of the Transportation Security Operations Center. For
    instance, $252,000 was spent on artwork, $30,000 was spent on expensive
    silk plants, money was used to buy leather brief cases and coffee pots,
    and over $83,000 in overpayments remains unaccounted for. There are
    even seven kitchens in the building for just 79 Federal employees
    located there. This report follows on the heels of the IG's findings
    last year that TSA provided excessive bonuses to its executives.
        In response to these findings, A TSA spokesman said that ``a new
    management structure'' has been put in place ``to strengthen its
    acquisition program to ensure responsible stewardship of taxpayer
    dollars.'' Please explain in detail what steps have been taken to
    change TSA's management structure to prevent such abuses from
    continuing.
        Answer. Since its inception, TSA has worked to develop and
    implement a more responsive and robust acquisition program based on
    sound business management practices. The elevation of the Office of
    Acquisition within the agency is a key indicator of our commitment.
    Since the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) lease
    process was initiated, the Office of Acquisition has been elevated to
    the Assistant Administrator level, equivalent to the Chief Financial
    Officer (CFO) rather than as a sub-program within the CFO's office. In
    late 2003, the Office of Acquisition stood up an Acquisition and
    Program Management Support division to focus on certifying, training,
    and providing day-to-day assistance to and for TSA's program managers.
    Well over 1,200 TSA employees have been trained to date in key
    acquisition topics and the Program Management certification program is
    robust.
        At the beginning of fiscal year 2005, TSA took the following steps
    to help strengthen and mature its acquisition program in four key
    areas.
      --Continue to support the TSA mission with efficient, expeditious,
            and accurate contracts. TSA recognizes that the agency's
            ability to attract, recruit, and retain qualified acquisition
            personnel to support contracts is critical to fulfilling its
            mission. Initial staffing in the Office of Acquisition was
            barely adequate to award contracts in time to meet
            Congressional deadlines, much less commence good business
            processes. Over the past year, TSA has raised the Office of
            Acquisition's staff ceiling by nearly 30 percent. Additionally,
            a percentage of TSA's budget has been earmarked for contract
            oversight, which includes support from the Defense Contract
            Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Command, and
            independent contractor support.
      --Significantly improve acquisition and program planning. The Office
            of Acquisition is focused on strengthening the program planning
            function. The office developed and now coordinates an
            Investment Review Board process that drives successful program
            decisions by providing direct subject matter expert support to
            program managers. Additionally, the office provides direct
            support to program offices to assist them in developing sound
            acquisition and program strategies.
      --Significantly improve program management and administration. Well-
            trained, certified program managers are fundamental to robust
            acquisition programs. These managers were, initially, in short
            supply at TSA. To address immediate knowledge gaps in key
            areas, the Office of Acquisition rolled out a set of workshops
            in October 2003. In early 2004, TSA worked with DHS to
            implement a Program Management certification program and the
            first TSA applications were received in June of 2004. Moreover,
            the Office of Acquisition developed a Management Directive
            regarding acquisition planning, review, and reporting that
            significantly tightens up the overall process.
      --Build and mature the TSA acquisition infrastructure. TSA is focused
            on these two infrastructure areas: human resources and systems.
        Human Resources.--In addition to increased staff, the Office of
    Acquisition is developing a longer-term strategic human capital plan to
    manage recruitment and retention issues, provide for career
    development, and succession planning. The plan will provide a roadmap
    for strengthening the current workforce (training, communication,
    professional development), as well as outline strategies to recruit
    highly qualified individuals and manage attrition. Simply put, the
    strategy will outline a plan to develop the right people with the right
    knowledge and skills for each of TSA's acquisition programs.
        Systems.--On the systems level, TSA is implementing PRISM, an
    integrated finance and procurement system which will streamline and
    strengthen our processes and integrate acquisition with finance and
    asset management.

                                AIR CARRIER FEES

        Question. The Government Accountability Office recently estimated
    that 2000 passenger and property screening costs incurred by air
    carriers was $448 million, $129 million less than what the air carriers
    paid to TSA. What plan of action will be taken by TSA as a result of
    GAO's estimates?
        Answer. In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, (Public
    Law 108-334) Congress directed the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) to determine how much air carriers spent on security screening in
    2000--the basis for the fee imposed on airlines. GAO completed its
    review and issued a report on April 18, 2005. The report concludes that
    the amount of the industry-wide passenger and property screening costs
    was between $425 million and $471 million, with a midpoint estimate of
    $448 million. The midpoint difference between what is collected now and
    what GAO indicates should be collected is $129 million. However, GAO's
    estimate did not include certain cost categories (e.g.; real estate,
    CAPPS, and positive bag match) due to the unavailability of information
    within the timeframe provided. The cost of these items could be
    significant. The TSA is currently reviewing all the findings of the
    report and developing a suitable overall implementation strategy for
    the air carrier fee.

                           SECTION 605 OF VISION 100

        Question. The TSA budget proposes to defer use of allocation
    formulas required by Section 605 of Vision 100. Please provide a list,
    by airport, of all requests for assistance under the allocation formula
    program versus funding provided via Section 605. This list should
    distinguish between large hub airports, medium hub airports, and small
    hub airports.
        Answer. TSA has received a number of requests from airports for
    funding to support construction of, or reimbursement for, in-line
    checked baggage screening solutions. Below is a list of the airports
    that have made these requests:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Airports that have requested
                                               funding for an Inline System   Category              Notes
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BWI......................................  Baltimore-Washington                  L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    DCA......................................  Ronald Reagan Washington              L   ...........................
                                                National Airport.
    DTW......................................  Detroit International                 L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    EWR......................................  Newark International Airport          L   ...........................
    FLL......................................  Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood              L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    HNL......................................  Honolulu International                L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    IAD......................................  Washington-Dulles                     L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    IAH......................................  George Bush Houston                   L   ...........................
                                                Intercontinental Airport.
    JFK......................................  John F. Kennedy                       L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    LGA......................................  LaGuardia Airport...........          L   ...........................
    MCO......................................  Orlando International                 L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    MDW......................................  Chicago Midway International          L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    MIA......................................  Miami International Airport.          L   ...........................
    MSP......................................  Minneapolis-St. Paul                  L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    OAK......................................  Metropolitan Oakland                  L   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    ORD......................................  Chicago O'Hare International          L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    PHL......................................  Philadelphia International            L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    SAN......................................  San Diego International               L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    SFO......................................  San Francisco International           L   ...........................
                                                Airport (reimbursement).
    SLC......................................  Salt Lake City International          L   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    TPA......................................  Tampa International Airport.          L   Current in-line system
    ANC......................................  Anchorage International               M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    BDL......................................  Bradley International                 M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    BNA......................................  Nashville International               M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    CLE......................................  Cleveland-Hopkins                     M   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    MCI......................................  Kansas City International             M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    MKE......................................  General Mitchell Milwaukee            M   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    OGG......................................  Kahului Airport Maui........          M   ...........................
    PDX......................................  Portland International                M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    PVD......................................  Providence T F Green State            M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    RSW......................................  Southwest Florida Fort Myers          M   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    SAT......................................  San Antonio International             M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    SJC......................................  San Jose International                M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    SMF......................................  Sacramento International              M   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    SNA......................................  Orange County John Wayne              M   Current in-line system
                                                Airport.
    BIS......................................  Bismark Municipal Airport...          N   ...........................
    LNK......................................  Lincoln Municipal Airport...          N   ...........................
    ACY......................................  Atlantic City International           S   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    GEG......................................  Spokane International                 S   ...........................
                                                Airport.
    GPT......................................  Gulfport-Biloxi                       S   ...........................
                                                International Airport.
    MDT......................................  Harrisburg International              S   Current in-line system
                                                Airport.
    PSP......................................  Palm Springs International            S
                                                Airport.
    TLH......................................  Tallahassee Regional Airport          S   ...........................
    VPS......................................  Okaloosa Regional Airport...          S   ...........................
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Category: small (s), medium (m), large (l) or non-hub (n).

                                 BASE DECREASES

        Question. On page 38 of the TSA budget request, there is a
    reduction of $15.9 million for ``management and technology
    efficiencies'' and a reduction of $53.9 million for a ``base
    realignment adjustment.'' There is no additional justification or
    information relating to those reductions. Provide a detailed
    justification for those decreases including a list of all management
    and technology efficiencies and how realigning the base saves $53.9
    million.
        Answer. The attached spreadsheet provides a detailed explanation of
    program reductions and base adjustments that resulted in $53.9 million
    in savings.

                   EMERGING CHECKPOINT EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY

        Question. For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, provide a deployment
    schedule, including the identification and cost of the technology
    acquired, the manufacturer of the technology, and the airports at which
    the technology has been or will be deployed.
        Answer. The following list of airports (Fig. 1) will have
    checkpoint Explosives Detection Trace Portals deployed by January 2006.
    TSA is deploying the systems concurrently, therefore the list does not
    reflect any sort of priority. The timing for deployment between now
    through January 2006 will depend on the results of site surveys that
    are currently underway and the production capabilities of the vendor.
        TSA will be purchasing two different portals, the GE Ion Track
    Entry Scan and the Smiths Sentinel, and the results of the site surveys
    will help TSA determine which of the two technologies is best suited
    for each of the airports listed. TSA is planning to purchase equal
    numbers of each of the two products.
        In fiscal year 2005, TSA received $28.3 million to field emerging
    technology equipment at checkpoints. For fiscal year 2006, TSA is
    requesting a total of $72 million (an increase of $43.7 million over
    the fiscal year 2005 base amount) for emerging checkpoint explosives
    technology.
        In support of checked baggage screening, the following list of
    airports (Fig. 2) will have the Reveal Technologies CT-80 deployed by
    January 2006. Like the checkpoint Explosives Trace Detection Portal,
    TSA's intent is to deploy the CT-80s concurrently, therefore this list
    does not reflect any sort of priority. The timing for deployment
    between now through January 2006 will depend on the results of site
    surveys that are currently underway and the production capabilities of
    the vendor. Consistent with the direction provided in the Homeland
    Security Appropriations Act, 2005, $30 million will be spent for
    purchase and installation of this capability.

                    FIG.1--EXPLOSIVES DETECTION TRACE PORTALS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Airport
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ATL.......................................  Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
                                                 International
    BOS.......................................  Boston Logan International
    BWI.......................................  Baltimore/Washington
                                                 International
    CLE.......................................  Cleveland-Hopkins
                                                 International
    CLT.......................................  Charlotte/Douglas
                                                 International
    CMH.......................................  Port Columbus International
    CVG.......................................  Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
                                                 International
    DCA.......................................  Ronald Reagan Washington
                                                 National
    DEN.......................................  Denver International
    DFW.......................................  Dallas/Ft. Worth
                                                 International
    DTW.......................................  Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
                                                 County
    EWR.......................................  Newark Liberty International
    FLL.......................................  Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood
                                                 International
    HNL.......................................  Honolulu International
    IAD.......................................  Washington Dulles
                                                 International
    IAH.......................................  Houston Intercontinental
    IND.......................................  Indianapolis International
    JFK.......................................  John F. Kennedy
                                                 International
    LAS.......................................  McCarran International
    LAX.......................................  Los Angeles International
    LGA.......................................  LaGuardia International
    MCI.......................................  Kansas City International
    MCO.......................................  Orlando International
    MDW.......................................  Chicago Midway International
    MIA.......................................  Miami International
    MSP.......................................  Minneapolis-St. Paul
                                                 International
    OAK.......................................  Metropolitan Oakland
                                                 International
    ORD.......................................  Chicago O'Hare International
    PBI.......................................  Palm Beach International
    PDX.......................................  Portland International
    PHL.......................................  Philadelphia International
    PHX.......................................  Phoenix/Sky Harbor
                                                 International
    PIT.......................................  Pittsburgh International
    RDU.......................................  Raleigh-Durham International
    SEA.......................................  Seattle-Tacoma International
    SFO.......................................  San Francisco International
    SJU.......................................  Luis Munoz Marin
                                                 International
    SMF.......................................  Sacramento International
    SNA.......................................  John Wayne Airport-Orange
                                                 County
    STL.......................................  Lambert-St. Louis
                                                 International
    TPA.......................................  Tampa International
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      FIGURE 2.--REVEAL TECHNOLOGIES CT-80
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Airport
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ABE.......................................  Lehigh Valley International
    ACY.......................................  Atlantic City International
    ALB.......................................  Albany International
    BGR.......................................  Bangor International
    BIL.......................................  Billings Logan International
    BTV.......................................  Burlington International
    CHS.......................................  Charleston AFB/International
    ELP.......................................  El Paso International
    EYW.......................................  Key West International
    FAI.......................................  Fairbanks International
    GPT.......................................  Gulfport-Biloxi
                                                 International
    GSP.......................................  Greenville-Spartanburg
                                                 International
    HGR.......................................  Hagerstown Regional-Richard
                                                 A Henson Field
    HPN.......................................  Westchester County
    HSV.......................................  Huntsville International-
                                                 Carl T Jones Field
    ISP.......................................  Long Island MacArthur
    LGB.......................................  Long Beach/Daugherty Field
    MRY.......................................  Monterey Peninsula
    OMA.......................................  Eppley Airfield
    ORF.......................................  Norfolk International
    PIE.......................................  St. Petersburg-Clearwater
                                                 International
    RNO.......................................  Reno/Tahoe International
    ROC.......................................  Greater Rochester
                                                 International
    SWF.......................................  Stewart International
    SYR.......................................  Syracuse Hancock
                                                 International
    TYS.......................................  McGhee Tyson
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Has the checkpoint technology that has been deployed been
    verified by the Science & Technology Directorate?
        Answer. TSA works closely with the S&T Directorate and discusses
    its ongoing R&D efforts to ensure the S&T Directorate is not only aware
    of but supports TSA's efforts related to technology development.
        hazardous materials endorsement for commerical driver's license
        Question. On January 13, 2005 a final rule was published in the
    Federal Register which established a fee for individuals who apply for
    or renew a hazardous materials endorsement for a commercial driver's
    license. According to the final rule, TSA intends to use fees collected
    under this rule to pay for the costs of the security threat assessments
    and the costs of collection and transmission of finger prints and
    biographical information.
        Please provide the committee with an estimate of the amount of
    money these new fees are expected to bring in.
        Answer. By law, the fees for individuals who apply for or renew a
    hazardous materials endorsement for a commercial driver's license
    cannot be collected in excess of the expenses to run the program.
    Accordingly, the program is expected to cost about $9 million in fiscal
    year 2005 and approximately $28 million in fiscal year 2006. The
    original fiscal year 2006 estimate of $44 million was adjusted mainly
    due to the change in the estimated HAZMAT applicant population.

                               PRIVATE SCREENERS

        Question. The budget proposes an increase of $15 million to
    continue the privatized screening contracts at the current service
    levels. Explain why an additional $15 million is necessary when,
    currently, only one airport has applied for a private screening
    workforce. Does TSA still anticipate the current number of airports
    participating in privatized screening contracts to remain the same?
        Answer. As of May 2005, the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) had
    received a total of seven applications, which includes the original
    contract screening pilot program (PP5) airports (San Francisco, Kansas
    City, Rochester, Jackson Hole and Tupelo), and two new airports (Elko,
    Nevada and Sioux Falls, South Dakota).
        In directing TSA to establish PP5, ATSA required that the level of
    screening services and protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal
    to or greater than the level provided at an airport with Federal
    screeners. Similarly, contract screeners must receive compensation and
    other benefits that are not less than the compensation and other
    benefits provided to Federal personnel. In accordance with these
    requirements, TSA strives for a level playing field between airports
    with private contract screeners under PP5 and the SPP and airports with
    Federal screeners. Consequently, as each airport considers whether to
    continue with Federal screening or to apply for the SPP, it can base
    its decision on its own preferences and criteria rather than
    considerations of security, resources, or level or service.
        The additional $15 million requested is reflective of the increased
    cost of providing screening services at the levels required under ATSA.
    TSA is not funding services in addition to those provided in previous
    years except where consistent with changes in the Standard Operating
    Procedure made effective throughout the Nation's commercial aviation
    system.
        In fiscal year 2005, a reprogramming increase of $23 million was
    made to support the cost of providing PP5 airports with the level of
    screening required for all commercial airports under ATSA. This
    reprogramming supported increased insurance premium costs for worker's
    compensation, terrorism and health insurance premiums, ATSA-guaranteed
    screener pay parity, and operational requirements relating to
    flexibilities granted to contractors in the areas of recruitment,
    hiring, and training.
        Question. Are any of the airports currently participating planning
    or considering opting out of the private screening program?
        Answer. TSA has received applications from all five private
    screening pilot airports to participate in the SPP.
        Question. Are other airports not currently participating in the
    program planning to opt in?
        Answer. While several airports have expressed interest to TSA about
    participating in the SPP, to date, only Elko Regional Airport and Sioux
    Falls Regional Airport have formally applied.

                FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REPAIR STATION INSPECTIONS

        Question. The budget request includes $6 million for Foreign and
    Domestic Repair Station Inspection Operations. Does TSA have a schedule
    to inspect the 664 Foreign and Domestic Repair Stations? If so, provide
    the schedule to the Committee.
        Answer. TSA has developed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
    that will increase security at both foreign and domestic repair
    stations. The NPRM is currently under Departmental review and is
    expected to be released for public comment in late summer of 2005. The
    agency has not yet developed a firm schedule for auditing all foreign
    repair stations. TSA is currently developing a survey document that
    will be sent to repair stations to assess their operations. This effort
    will assist in determining which repair stations pose the greatest
    potential risk and should be given priority for audits. TSA is also
    developing the necessary assessment tools for use by the inspectors
    during their visits to repair stations.
        TSA fully expects to have developed the assessment tools necessary
    for the auditing effort by the time the final rule for repair station
    security is released, which TSA expects to occur by spring 2006. The
    actual schedule of audits will be dependent upon the initial survey of
    repair stations, which will begin as soon as the final rule is
    released.
        Question. Is $6 million and 31 FTE the full amount necessary to
    inspect all Foreign and Domestic Repair Stations and the domestic
    maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities in the United States? If
    not, how much is needed to comply with ``Vision 100?''
        Answer. TSA would like to note that the $6 million and 31 FTE are
    earmarked solely for audits of foreign repair stations, of which there
    are approximately 650. There are approximately 4,500 repair stations in
    the United States, and current plans are to cover domestic audits with
    the existing force of Aviation Security Inspectors (ASI). Approximately
    950 ASIs are presently assigned to geographical areas across the United
    States and inspect all facets of regulated aviation assets, not just
    repair stations.
        The hiring projection with the $6 million requested in the fiscal
    year 2006 Budget is 12 inspectors, one program manager, and one program
    analyst. It is anticipated that additional foreign repair station
    inspectors, plus a manager and analyst, will be hired over a three-year
    time period. The hiring and operating projection costs of the program
    for its second and third years will be more accurately approximated
    after TSA assesses the costs of the initial year of the program.

                                    TSA R&D

        Question. The budget proposes to consolidate TSA R&D activities
    within the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. However, only $109
    million is proposed for fiscal year 2006 within the S&T budget. TSA's
    budget maintains $23 million for operation R&D activities, such as
    pilot projects. Please explain why the program is proposed to be cut by
    $46 million and what impact that would have on ongoing R&D activities
    and those planned prior to the transfer proposal.
        Answer. The $46 million consists of the following reductions: $25
    million from Air Cargo R&D and $21 million from Explosives Detection
    Equipment (EDS) R&D. The reductions are appropriate given maturing
    technology in both areas, which, for example, will result in the
    deployment of Explosive Detection Trace Portals to 41 airports by the
    end of January 2006.
        Overall, the reductions will have minimal effect on the R&D
    activities that would have been undertaken by TSA because those
    activities were budgeted by TSA and included in the proposed amount of
    $109 million.

                              REGISTERED TRAVELER

        Question. Last year, TSA indicated that, assuming there was
    sufficient national interest in the program, the $15 million provided
    in fiscal year 2005 would be used for start-up operational costs and
    future funding would be generated by fees incurred by participants.
    What is the amount anticipated in fiscal year 2006 from offsetting
    collections?
        Answer. TSA envisions a fully operational RT Pilot Program to be
    fee funded. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget proposal includes
    $22.5 million from potential offsetting collections for RT, which was
    consolidated into the proposed SCO. However, TSA will need to implement
    a fee rule to accept fees for RT.
        Question. What is the timeline and deployment schedule for
    implementing this program beyond the pilot stage?
        Answer. Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has
    been aggressively testing the RT concept of running threat assessment
    and identity verification checks on eligible volunteers in order to
    provide them with an expedited clearance through security checkpoints.
    TSA is currently running successful programs at five Federally managed
    pilot sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and Washington,
    D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September 2005. TSA is
    concurrently working with the GOAA to launch a sub-pilot at Orlando
    International Airport in summer 2005 that will assess the feasibility
    of incorporating a private sector component into the RT concept.
        Results of these pilots will be analyzed to determine the program's
    effect on security and service, enabling the Department to make
    decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and
    deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be
    linked to the Department's decision.

                                DEEPWATER BUDGET

        Question. Virtually the entire increase requested for Deepwater in
    fiscal year 2006 is just to sustain legacy assets. The revised
    Deepwater plan indicates that the lifecycle costs to sustain legacy
    assets could cost anywhere between $828 million and $1.8 billion. Why
    is there such a large difference between these two amounts?
        Answer. The difference the two amounts is a function of time and
    money. The lower number reflects a lower total acquisition cost ($19
    billion) over a shorter implementation period (20 years). The higher
    legacy asset funding amount reflects a higher total acquisition cost
    ($24 billion) over a longer implementation period (25 years). The
    shorter plan invests less funding in legacy sustainment, decommissions
    legacy assets sooner, but commissions fewer new assets. The longer plan
    invests more in legacy sustainment to keep the assets in commission
    longer, invests more in technology refresh/obsolescence prevention
    (i.e. life cycle costs), and delivers more new assets. Earlier
    decommissioning of legacy assets translates into lower legacy
    sustainment costs, but equates to a lower number of assets to perform
    Coast Guard missions both during build out and upon completion.
        Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to better plan and prepare
    for legacy asset sustainment?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has a detailed plan for maintaining its
    legacy cutters and aircraft. Coast Guard men and women are well trained
    to maintain and continually upgrade Coast Guard aviation, surface, and
    shore infrastructure assets. A mature project planning and execution
    program exists within the Coast Guard to provide routine unit-level and
    depot-level maintenance. Where expertise or infrastructure doesn't
    exist organically within the service, the Coast Guard uses contracted
    resources to provide the requisite maintenance support. Maintaining a
    high proficiency level amongst the Coast Guard's ``maintainers'' is
    critical to the long-term health of the service. One of the service's
    guiding principles is to maintain a core competency of maintenance
    expertise amongst Coast Guard (military and civilian) members to ensure
    service readiness, especially during periods of national emergency.
        The Coast Guard maintains its legacy aircraft and vessels using
    organic maintenance and repair infrastructure in conjunction with
    contracted depot-level maintenance activities. These operating expense
    (OE) funded maintenance efforts are complemented by periodic
    Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) projects which either
    enhance/sustain asset capabilities and extend asset service lives, or
    replace assets.
        On April 20, 2005, the Coast Guard submitted a legacy asset report
    to Congress, detailing the Coast Guard's legacy asset issues. This
    report reflects legacy cutter and aviation AC&I projects that the Coast
    Guard has included in the fiscal year 2006 Budget request and
    anticipates requesting in future budget submissions.
        Question. The Coast Guard's capital investment plan indicates that
    the Deepwater budget will be decreased by $214 million in fiscal year
    2007. How can you propose such a cut in light of increasing mission
    demands and the ``declining readiness'' of existing assets?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget requests $966
    million for Deepwater, $242 million above the fiscal year 2005 enacted
    levels, to fund critical modernization initiatives such as production
    of the third National Security Cutter and design and long lead material
    purchase for the Offshore Patrol Cutter while addressing immediate
    legacy asset issues such as HH-65 re-engining and Medium Endurance
    Cutter mission effectiveness programs. The Coast Guard's fiscal year
    2006-2010 Capital Investment Plan contains $752 million for Deepwater
    in 2007 to highlight the one-time nature of several of these
    investments in legacy asset conversions and sustainment projects.
        Question. The GAO recently testified that the Coast Guard has
    acknowledged that it needs to develop condition measures that more
    clearly demonstrate the extent to which asset conditions affect mission
    capabilities, but such measures have not been finalized or implemented.
    What is the Coast Guard's schedule for putting such measures in place?
        Answer. To track the condition of the its cutters, the Coast Guard
    currently measures a Percent of Time Free (POTF) of major casualties
    measure that shows the general decline in condition of Deepwater legacy
    assets between 2000 and 2004. To track the condition of the its
    aircraft, the Coast Guard currently measures aircraft availability
    rates. However, as GAO has pointed out, ``the Coast Guard's available
    condition measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the
    decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of
    precision.'' and Justice Issues, testified to the House Committee on
    Transportation and Infrastructure that, ``Other evidence we gathered,
    such as information from discussions with maintenance personnel, point
    to conditions that may be more severe than the available measures
    indicate.''
        The Coast Guard acknowledges that it needs better condition
    measures to more accurately depict the condition of its assets. To
    address this issue, the Coast Guard is developing condition measures
    that more clearly link cutter condition to mission capability. This
    effort is scheduled for completion by the end of fiscal year 2005.
        In fiscal year 2004, a team of personnel was assembled from
    engineering support activities in both Atlantic and Pacific Areas to
    work with Coast Guard Headquarters to construct an asset condition
    matrix that incorporates engineering casualty reporting (CASREP) data
    and performance data maintained in the Coast Guard's Readiness
    Management System (RMS). To do so, the team is identifying/linking
    thousands of shipboard engineering subsystems across every cutter class
    and their direct impact/contribution to each Coast Guard mission.
        By establishing a clear relationship between engineering subsystems
    and mission performance, the Coast Guard will be better able to
    identify return on its maintenance investments and determine the best
    use of limited maintenance resources.
        The Coast Guard is currently working to develop a comparable
    measure for its aviation assets; however, it has not established a
    timeline for implementation.
        Question. The GAO report also noted that certain legacy costs, such
    as maintaining the 378-foot class through 2016 instead of 2013 as
    originally planned, is not addressed in the revised Deepwater budget
    baseline. How much funding will this require and are there other legacy
    assets that need further maintenance but are not included in the
    revised Deepwater plan?
        Answer. Legacy asset sustainment is a Coast Guard stewardship
    priority that requires judicious balancing of current and future
    demands on limited AC&I investment resources. One of the primary
    determining factors is how long the asset class will remain in service.
    The 378-foot High Endurance Cutters (WHEC) are the first legacy cutters
    expected to be removed from service as the National Security Cutters
    (NSCs) are deployed. Therefore, the Department and the Coast Guard have
    invested AC&I funds toward acquisition of NSCs vice sustaining WHECs.
    Until they are decommissioned, WHECs will be sustained through routine
    depot level maintenance funded within the Coast Guard's Operating
    Expense Appropriation. The 210-foot and 270-foot medium endurance
    cutters are projected to remain in service longer, therefore
    substantial AC&I investments are being made in these classes in the
    form of Mission Effectiveness Program funds sought in fiscal year 2006
    and in the out-years. Similar legacy sustaining initiatives are funded
    in the Deepwater implementation plan for aircraft that will remain in
    the Coast Guard's final Deepwater inventory. Additional details on the
    Coast Guard's plan to sustain its legacy assets are provided in a
    report that was submitted to Congress on April 20, 2005.
        Question. What measures have the Coast Guard put in place to ensure
    that competition is built into Deepwater acquisition decisions?
        Answer. From the beginning of the acquisition process, the Coast
    Guard has ensured competition has been built into the Deepwater
    program. The GAO recently reported that all assets originally planned
    for the first five years of the contract were properly competed through
    the initial contract award process that resulted in selection of
    Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) as the Deepwater contractor.
    Beyond the initial contract award process, the Coast Guard has taken
    several steps, including implementing GAO recommendations to ensure
    acquisitions decisions are adequately competed. There are many examples
    of competition in subcontracts that can be provided, if desired. For
    example, where changes to the original proposal have been introduced
    into the acquisition, the Coast Guard ensures that a competitive price
    determination is made. The price of this change order must be
    determined to be fair and reasonable before the Coast Guard will
    approve ICGS action. The Coast Guard monitors ICGS' use of the open
    business model as required by their internal procedures for second-tier
    subcontractors. ICGS also requires the first-tier subcontractors to
    encourage 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers to promote competition.
        Question. What is the cost comparison of re-engining the existing
    fleet of HH-65 aircraft versus the procurement of a new aircraft
    outfitted to perform the same mission?
        Answer. Re-enginging an HH-65 helicopter costs approximately $3
    million. It would cost approximately $19 million to buy a new,
    commercial aircraft capable of performing the missions of a re-engined
    HH-65. Under the revised Deepwater implementation plan, HH-65
    helicopters will receive additional upgrades to become multi-mission,
    cutter helicopters. The total cost of the re-engining and the upgrade
    to Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) is slightly less than $7
    million per unit. To replace the entire HH-65 fleet would cost $1.8
    billion vice $636 million for upgraded HH-65s, three times as much. It
    should also be noted that when the Coast Guard made the decision to re-
    engine the HH-65s it was in the face of a crisis in engine safety and
    reliability. Timely resolution of that crisis did not allow for
    acquisition of a replacement fleet. Further, HH-65 re-engining was
    already planned as part of the Deepwater solution. Re-engining was the
    most timely, cost-effective short and long-term solution.
        Question. What is the status of the HH-65 re-engining process?
        Answer. In August 2004, the first re-engined HH-65 was delivered to
    the Coast Guard at Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, for operational
    testing and evaluation. As of the first of September 2005, 10 re-
    engined HH-65Cs had been delivered for full operational status to Air
    Station Atlantic City, NJ, (5), Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL,
    (1), and Air Station Savannah, GA, (4). To accelerate the HH-65 re-
    engining project the Coast Guard and its contractor, Integrated Coast
    Guard Systems (ICGS), have examined the quality and suitability of a
    second re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. In August 2005,
    this facility delivered its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast
    Guard. This aircraft was determined to meet needed quality and
    suitability parameters and the Coast Guard contracted with ICGS to re-
    engine an additional 11 aircraft at the Columbus facility. The Coast
    Guard plans to have all 84 operational aircraft re-engined in early
    2007.
        Question. Will the 24 month schedule be met?
        Answer. Provided the President's fiscal year 2006 request of $133.1
    million for HH-65 re-engining is fully funded, the Coast Guard's plan
    is to complete re-engining the operational fleet of 84 helicopters by
    February 2007. This is the fastest possible production schedule based
    on the availability of engine kits and parts, maximum production at
    Coast Guard Aviation Repair and Supply Center, additional production
    capacity that may become available at a second facility, and number of
    aircraft that can be removed from operational service at any given
    time.
        Question. What is the current timetable?
        Answer. The first re-engined HH-65 was delivered for operational
    test and evaluation in August 2004. Regular production delivery of
    operational HH-65 began in April 2005, when the second HH-65 was
    returned to operational status at Air Station Atlantic City, NJ. Four
    others are scheduled for delivery in May 2005. In fiscal year 2005, a
    total of 29 conversion starts are planned. In fiscal year 2006, 51
    conversion starts are planned. All 84 operational aircraft are
    scheduled for completion early in fiscal year 2007. Re-engining of all
    95 HH-65s is scheduled to be completed in 2007.
        Question. What barriers exist that could the Coast Guard from
    meeting this schedule?
        Answer. The current timetable, resulting in completing the re-
    engining of the Coast Guard's operational fleet of 84 HH-65
    helicopters, is based on the best outcome of a number of variables. To
    achieve this schedule there must be:
      --Full support of the President's Budget request for $133.1 million
            in fiscal year 2006 funding for re-engining;
      --Maximum availability of engine kits and parts;
      --Effective mitigation of operational needs to maximize the number of
            aircraft that can be removed from operational service at any
            given time;
      --The highest possible production at Coast Guard Aviation Repair and
            Supply Center; and
      --Additional production capacity at a second facility.
        If any of these variables are not optimal, then the schedule will
    not be met.

                          DEEPWATER PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

        Question. For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, provide a detailed spend
    plan for program costs for ICGS Management and Government program
    management/ICGS.
        Answer.

                    SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION BUDGET
                              [Dollars in millions]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                    Activity                       2005            2006
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Systems Engineering:
        Performance Engineering (Measurement               6               6
         & Modeling) \1\....................
        Engineering and Process Management                15              16
         \2\................................
    Integration Management:
        Systems Operations Management \3\...              17              17
        Data Management \4\.................               2               2
    Award Fee Pool..........................               3
                                             -------------------------------
          Total.............................              43              45
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Performance Engineering.--In accordance with Deepwater's performance-
      based acquisition, Performance Engineering includes the efforts
      required to measure the degree to which the Integrated Deepwater
      System achieves the overarching goals of maintaining and improving
      operational performance while managing total ownership costs within an
      aggressive baseline. Risk reduction is achieved through modeling,
      simulation, and analysis coupled with test & evaluation to assess the
      appropriate mix and capabilities of Deepwater assets to achieve the
      desired operational performance.
    \2\ Engineering and Process Management.--Engineering Management consists
      of the overarching technical management team responsible for
      translating Coast Guard operational and performance requirements into
      a cohesive Implementation Plan and managing all the technical efforts
      required to develop, deliver, deploy, and maintain the Deepwater
      assets critical to achieving the Implementation Plan. Correspondingly,
      Process Management is responsible for leading the identification,
      evaluation, implementation and improvement of Deepwater technical
      engineering processes deemed critical to the successful execution of
      the Implementation Plan.
    \3\ Systems Operations Management.--The Systems Operations Management
      effort includes the industry program management tasks required to
      direct and control all organizational functions including engineering,
      business management, contract management, quality management,
      configuration management, and data management. An Integrated Deepwater
      System Program Management Team (including C4ISR, Surface, Aviation,
      and Integrated Logistic Systems management teams) ensures effective
      cost control, schedule, and technical performance required to maintain
      the System-Of-Systems approach necessary for the Coast Guard to
      perform its specified missions.
    \4\ Data Management.--The Data Management effort includes tasks required
      to provide configuration control infrastructure for all data across
      the program. A program-wide Integrated Product Data Environment is
      utilized to integrate the efforts of geographically-separated
      engineering teams using a common toolset to enable rapid collaboration
      and sharing of consistent information.
    Deepwater Program management funds are used for technical support from
      private sector and other government agencies not available within the
      Coast Guard.

                      GOVERNMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BUDGET
                              [Dollars in millions]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                    Activity                       2005            2006
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Performance Support:
        Technical Engineering Support \1\...            19.1            20.1
        Operational Tests and Evaluation \2\             3.8             4.0

    Program Management Support:
        Financial Management \3\............             3.0             3.1
        Transition Support \4\..............             4.6             4.9
        Management Support \5\..............             2.6             2.7
        Performance Metrics/Measurement                  2.2             2.3
         Support \6\........................
        Information Technology \7\..........             2.7             2.9
                                             -------------------------------
          TOTAL.............................            38.0            40.0
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Technical Engineering Support.--Aeronautical, electronics and naval
      engineering; logistic systems, Command and Control, weapons system
      certification, and other expertise not available from Coast Guard
      resources.
    \2\ Operational Tests and Evaluation.--Navy's Commander Operational Test
      and Evaluation Forces is the technical advisor to the Coast Guard
      responsible for management of independent tests for the early review
      and assessment of Integrated Deepwater System asset operational
      performance.
    \3\ Financial Management.--Includes independent analysis and support of
      the Defense Contract Auditing Agency, other Defense Contract support,
      performance/risk management, financial systems management provided to
      asset level Program Management Representative Offices for independent
      cost analysis and pricing.
    \4\ Transition Support.--Augments Coast Guard teams for delivery of new
      assets, existing infrastructure changes, developing document
      configuration and management, graphics support, and support for
      training infrastructure analysis, manpower analysis, operations
      doctrine development, architecture analysis.
    \5\ Management Support.--Provides for program specific training, project
      management and outreach initiatives as recommended by Government
      Accountability Office.
    \6\ Performance Metrics/Measurement Support.--Modeling, simulation, and
      analysis of various inputs to include Total Ownership Cost,
      Operational Performance, and Earned Value Management Processes.
    \7\Information Technology.--Specialized information technology to
      support Deepwater Program management.

              MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION

        Question. On July 1, 2004, port facilities and vessels were
    required to submit security plans to the Coast Guard and to be in
    compliance with those plans. The Coast Guard has now inspected
    approximately 2,900 regulated facilities. The Government Accountability
    Office (GAO) recently concluded that it is unclear if the Coast Guard's
    inspection process has been effective or not. Can you describe what the
    Coast Guard is doing to ensure that these facilities are following
    through on their security plans?
        Answer. The Coast Guard ensures that facilities operate in
    accordance with their approved security plans through annual exams and
    spot checks. The Coast Guard continues to work constructively with GAO
    to insure Coast Guard requirements and procedures are sustainable and
    that they make a positive impact on the security of the maritime
    transportation system. The requirement for an evaluation of vessel and
    facility security plans is one tool to reduce vulnerabilities in this
    critical system--the vast majority of which is owned and operated by
    the private sector. To ensure that regulatory and inspection frameworks
    continue to serve the intended objectives, regular evaluations and
    performance metrics are being developed to assess their effectiveness.
    For example, the Coast Guard plans to begin an evaluation of its
    facility inspection efforts in June 2005, complete the field portion of
    the evaluation in September 2005, and produce a final evaluation in
    December 2005.
        Question. Last year, GAO reported that many facility and vessel
    owners said it would be difficult to obtain the financial resources to
    fully mitigate their known vulnerabilities. GAO reported that one
    official at a major port indicated that some security vulnerabilities
    were not included in its facility plan because funding was not
    available to address them. What is the Coast Guard doing to ensure that
    the inspection process is just not a ``paper exercise'' and one that
    addresses vulnerabilities?
        Answer. The Coast Guard has several policies in place that provide
    for a meaningful inspection process and ensure facilities fully address
    vulnerabilities.
        Prior to final Facility Security Plan (FSP) approval, Coast Guard
    Captains of the Port review and evaluate each submitted Facility
    Security Assessment (FSA), ensuring the FSPs identify and addressed all
    vulnerabilities. This evaluation includes an on-site survey by the
    Coast Guard.
        After approving the FSP, the Coast Guard annually inspects each
    facility for MTSA compliance. The Coast Guard developed specific
    inspection policies to ensure that:
      --The facility complies with its FSP;
      --The approved FSP adequately addresses the performance-based
            criteria outlined in the regulations;
      --The adequacy of the FSA and the Facility Vulnerability and Security
            Measures Summary (CG-6025); and
      --Measures in place adequately address the vulnerabilities.
        To carry out the inspections, qualified Coast Guard facility
    inspectors use a published, comprehensive inspection guide to identify
    deficiencies and any vulnerability not previously disclosed.
        Question. With no port security grant program, how can ports know
    that resources are available to implement the MTSA?
        Answer. DHS has administered a total of four port security grant
    rounds since fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard has played a significant
    role in all four grant rounds, participating at every step of the
    process, from field recommendations to the grant awards--which have
    totaled over $560 million since September 11, 2001.
        In 2004, Secretary Ridge designated the Office of State and Local
    Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) as the Department's
    ``one-stop shop'' to centralize State and local terrorism preparedness
    and grant administration with other emergency preparedness grant
    programs, including the Port Security Grant Program previously
    administered by the TSA. The centralization will provide better service
    to key stakeholders and provide a more effective overall homeland
    security grant program. The Coast Guard will maintain an important and
    active role in the port security grant process. $150 million was
    appropriated for fiscal year 2005 (Round 5) port security grants. A
    fact sheet regarding round 5 is available upon request. Additional
    information on the port security grant program can be found at the
    following internet address:

        https://www.portsecuritygrants.dottsa.net/tsadotnet/default.aspx
                                requirements gap

        Question. The Coast Guard's budget references a July 2004 ``Call to
    Action'' from the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. That report noted that
    actionable intelligence has never been better but the United States is
    frequently unable to pursue identified interdiction opportunities. An
    example of this is the amount of operational hours that are available
    for the Coast Guard's Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
        To meet the operational requirements cited in the Coast Guard's MPA
    requirements study, the Coast Guard would have to double the amount of
    maritime patrols from the current capability of 32,000 hours. Your
    budget includes an increase of only 1,500 maritime patrol hours for
    homeland security, counter-drug, and other mission areas. Why does such
    a large gap in requirements exist and what will it take to close it?
        Answer. The Coast Guard fixed wing requirements were determined by
    calculating the post-September 11 mission needs above the 1998 Coast
    Guard multi-mission baseline. The 1998 baseline was 44,400 hours. The
    additions are: 5,139 hours for counter-drug (CD) hours based on Joint
    Inter-Agency Task Force South analysis of the Department of Defense and
    multi-national drawdown in CD forces; 18,195 hours for maritime
    security long range surveillance under moderate, high and imminent
    threat periods; and 285 hours for Coast Guard Strike Force and Maritime
    Safety and Security Team transport. Given that 32,400 flight hours are
    available from Coast Guard fixed wing aircraft in fiscal year 2005,
    this leaves a gap of 34,454 hours.
        The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget includes several
    initiatives to help mitigate the current Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)
    shortfall:
      --$16.5 million is requested for C-130H augments, providing an
            additional 1,500 annual C-130H MPA flight hours. Funding will
            also provide for dedicated aviation sensor personnel and
            enhanced sensors to improve effectiveness in high-threat zones,
            and permanently establish forward operating and logistics
            support for MPA operating in the Central/South American region
            to maximize time ``on station'' and reduce aircraft downtime
            due to unscheduled maintenance.
      --$12.6 million is requested for 1200 additional annual operations
            flight hours for C-130Js to conduct proficiency training and
            logistics flights--freeing up missionized C-130Hs to conduct
            MPA missions.
      --$5 million is requested to continue the missionization of the 6 C-
            130Js, through operation of the Aircraft Project Office, which
            are estimated to be completely missionized by 2008.
      --$8.7 million is requested to staff and support the first two CASA
            aircraft in advance of delivery and full operating capability
            anticipated in 2007.
        The MPA gap will likely persist until the Deepwater system
    (including the CASAs, C-130s, and unmanned aerial vehicles) is fully
    built out.
        Question. What other major Coast Guard assets have a gap between
    capabilities and mission requirements?
        Answer. The significant capability gaps faced by the Coast Guard's
    major assets in the post-September 11 environment were the catalyst for
    the Deepwater Performance Gap Analysis and subsequent Mission Need
    Statement and the revised Deepwater Implementation Plan. These gaps are
    quantified both under capability--the attributes of individual assets,
    and capacity--force structure/fleet size. The following table depicts
    the capabilities and capacity for the Deepwater fleet to begin to close
    these gaps.
        In addition to the MPA gap, a capacity gap exists with the patrol
    boat fleet. Considering available 110-foot and 123-foot patrol boats
    and 179-foot patrol coastals on loan from the U.S. Navy, total patrol
    boat available hours reached it lowest point of approximately 75,000 in
    2004. This is considerably lower than the 1998 baseline of
    approximately 100,000 hours, and is a result of having cutters deployed
    to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and cutters out of service for the 110-123
    foot conversion program. With the advancement of the fast response
    cutter design and construction, the Coast Guard should reach the 1998
    baseline again between 2013 and 2015.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Original Mission Needs                                     Revised Mission Needs
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Fleet                                                      Fleet
                   Asset                   Size                     Capabilities                      Size                     Capabilities
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    National Security Cutter (NSC)/             8  Deepwater Interoperability....................          8  DHS/DOD/Rescue 21 (R21) Interoperability
     Maritime Security Cutter, Large               Basic CG Command and Control (C2) Feed........             Remote/Integrated Anti-Terrorism/Force
     (WMSL).                                       Forward Looking Infrared......................              Protection (AT/FP) Weapons
                                                                                                              Redundant/Hardened/Improved C2
                                                                                                              Underwater Detection
    Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)/              25  Deepwater Interoperability....................         25  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
     Maritime Security Cutter, Medium              22 kt Speed...................................             CG COP Connectivity
     (WMSM).                                       Standard Flight Deck..........................             ..............................................
                                                                                                              Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                        .........  Threat Receiver...............................  .........  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear &
                                                   30mm Gun......................................              Explosive (CBRNE) Detection
                                                   Manual Small Arms.............................             Enhanced Maritime Patrol Surveillance
                                                                                                               Capability
                                                                                                              Nation-wide DHS Strategic Lift
    Fast Response Cutter (OPC)/                58  Deepwater Interoperability....................         58  DHS/DOD/R21 interoperability
     Maritime Patrol, Coastal (WPC).               30mm Gun......................................             Remote Weapons & AT/FP Suite
                                                   Baseline C4 Suite.............................             Redundant, Hardened C4
                                                   Threat Receiver...............................             Defense Survivability
                                                   20-yr Steel Hull..............................             40-yr Composite Hull
                                                                                                              CBRNE Detection & Defense
                                                                                                              Underwater Detection
    Short Range Prosecutor (SRP)......         42  Deepwater Interoperability....................         33  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
    Long Range Interceptor (LRI)......         82  Deepwater Interoperability....................         91  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
    Long Range Surveillance Aircraft            6  Deepwater Interoperability....................         22  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
     (LRS)/ HC-130H/J.                             Basic CG C2 Feed..............................             CG COP Connectivity
                                                   Forward Looking Infrared......................             Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                              CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                              Enhanced Maritime Patrol Surveillance
                                                                                                               Capability
                                                                                                              Nation-wide DHS Strategic Lift
    Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter            93  Deepwater Interoperability....................         95  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
     (MCH)/HH-65C.                                                                                            CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                              CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                              Airborne Use of Force
                                                                                                              Vertical Insertion/Delivery
    Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft         35  Deepwater Interoperability....................         36  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
     (MRS)/CASA CN-235.                                                                                       CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                              Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                              CBRNE Detection
    Medium-Range Recovery Helicopter           42  Deepwater Interoperability....................         42  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
     (MRR)/MH-60T.                                                                                            CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                              Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                              CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                              Airborne Use of Force
                                                                                                              Vertical Insertion/Delivery
    Vertical Take-off & Landing UAV            69  ..............................................         45  CBRNE Detection
     (VUAV).
    High Altitude & Endurance UAV               7  ..............................................          4  ..............................................
     (HAEUAV).
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

        Question. In the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental, Public Law 108-11,
    Congress appropriated $38 million to conduct vulnerability assessments
    at all tier I strategic seaports. Of that amount, $16.8 million remains
    unobligated. Why hasn't this funding been spent?
        Answer. Prior to enactment of Public Law 108-11, the Coast Guard
    received supplemental funding and was able to conduct Port Security
    Assessments (PSAs) at 13 of the 55 strategic ports. The average cost of
    these assessments was $900,000 per port. The $38 million appropriation
    was to complete remaining port assessments based on this per-port
    average.
        In response to various maritime security initiatives, such as the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard revised
    the PSA methodology to ensure that the PSAs provided the greatest value
    to the port without being redundant to the other initiatives and
    programs. This updated methodology resulted in a reduction of costs
    from $900,000 to approximately $300,000 per port.
        As of September 14, 2005, the Coast Guard has expended $22.9
    million for the completion of PSAs of the Coast Guard's 55 militarily
    and economically strategic ports, as well as for important port
    security initiatives such as special technical assessments, development
    of a Geographic Information System (GIS) viewer, Coast Guard
    participation in the Comprehensive Review of nuclear power plants, and
    PSA Program operational costs. The remaining $16.6 million will be
    expended during the remainder of fiscal year 2005 and 2006 to continue
    refining port security assessments and our knowledge of port-specific
    vulnerabilities through specific technical or infrastructure
    assessments (bridges, tunnels, dangerous cargo, etc.). This additional
    work is critical to address needs that were identified in the course of
    the initial port assessments. It will provide important amplifying
    information to Coast Guard Captains of the Port and the Area Maritime
    Security Committees allowing them to address effectively port-specific
    vulnerabilities that have been identified.
        Question. How many assessments of tier I ports have been completed
    to date and what is the schedule to complete all Tier I ports?
        Answer. All Tier I PSAs are complete. The Coast Guard has completed
    PSAs at each of the previously identified 55 militarily and
    economically strategic U.S. ports, of which ``Tier I'' ports are a
    subset.

                            PORT SECURITY ESTIMATES

        Question. Last year, in response to a question for the record on
    port security, the Committee was told that Department of Homeland
    Security spending on port security increased by $224 million (13
    percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661 million in 2004 to
    $1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is $1,675 million for
    Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security activities, including
    over $100 million for expenses related to the Maritime Transportation
    Security Act (MTSA). How was that funding level determined?
        Answer. The $1,675 million for Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and
    Coastal Security (PWCS) activities in fiscal year 2005 was incorrectly
    stated in last year's question. The 2005 operating expense budget
    estimate for PWCS activities estimated in the Coast Guard's 2005 Budget
    congressional justifications as $1,501 million. The Coast Guard
    develops estimates of mission-specific spending using an activity based
    Mission Cost Model. The $101 million increase to implement MTSA
    attributable to PWCS was included in the $1,501 million estimate.

                          PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

        Question. The Coast Guard authorization Act for 2005, which was
    signed into law by the President on August 9, 2004, authorized $35
    million for the Secretary to fund pilot programs and award grants to
    investigate new methods and technologies to better secure our ports.
    The law specifically cites the need to examine new technologies such as
    those that can accurately detect explosives, chemical or biological
    agents, and nuclear materials. The law calls for the examination of new
    methods for securing our ports such as the use of satellite tracking
    systems and tools to mitigate the consequences of a transportation
    security incident. The fiscal year 2006 request does not include
    funding for this program. What intelligence led the Coast Guard to
    believe that such a program was unnecessary?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is aggressively moving to implement new
    technologies in order to better secure our ports. Rather than pilot
    programs or grants, the Coast Guard believes it more prudent in the
    near term to expend limited resources on the deployment of important
    proven technologies while other DHS components responsible for
    development of cross-cutting technologies and private sector grant and
    research programs administer pilot and grant programs, notably the S&T
    Directorate and SLGCP. S&T, in particular, has a wealth of research and
    development expertise as well as an active university research program
    to pursue technology enhancements across all homeland security
    requirements. Concurrently, SLGCP is overseeing the administration of a
    port security grant program that has awarded over $560 million in port
    security grants already, and will award another $150 million in fiscal
    year 2005.
        In the near term, the Coast Guard is focused on enhancing Maritime
    Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is defined as ``the effective understanding
    of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could
    impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United
    States.'' Effective MDA is a critical enabler to national maritime
    security strategies and supports the full range of Coast Guard
    missions.

                          COVERT SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

        Question. What is the Coast Guard's definition of a ``covert
    surveillance aircraft''?
        Answer. The 2005 DHS Appropriations Act conference report defines
    the manned covert surveillance aircraft as a ``medium to short range,
    fixed wing surveillance aircraft.'' In the context of the Coast Guard's
    Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft (MCSA) acquisition project,
    ``covert'' is defined as ``the capability to operate quietly and
    surreptitiously enough to enable the surveillance, detection,
    classification and identification of a maritime target without the
    target's inhabitants becoming aware of the aircraft's presence.''
        Question. How will a covert surveillance aircraft serve the Coast
    Guard's mission?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is developing the operational requirements
    documents that will define the missions and operating parameters for a
    manned covert surveillance aircraft. The Coast Guard is also examining
    how this aircraft will fit into the Deepwater system, given that the
    Deepwater implementation plan accounts for the service-standard fixed,
    rotary wing and unmanned aircraft necessary to meet projected Coast
    Guard mission needs documented in the revised Mission Needs Statement.
        Question. How much does the Coast Guard estimate the cost of a
    covert surveillance aircraft to be?
        Answer. The rough order of magnitude acquisition cost of a fully
    missionized, FAA-certified manned covert surveillance aircraft is
    estimated to be $8 million.
        Question. What is the timeline for acquiring a covert surveillance
    aircraft or aircrafts for operational use?
        Answer. The procurement timeline is currently being constructed
    with the Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft acquisition team. The
    following table provides the best estimate of initial operating
    capability (IOC).

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operational Requirements Document Written   July 2005
     & Approved.
    Release of Request for Proposal...........  September 2005
    Aircraft Award............................  January 2006
    Airworthiness Certification Test/           January 2007
     Evaluation Commencement.
    Initial Operating Capability..............  January 2006
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Are there existing platforms available on the commercial
    market that would meet the Coast Guard's specifications for a covert
    surveillance aircraft? If so, please describe them.
        Answer. Currently, the Coast Guard is developing the operational
    requirements and specifications for the Manned Covert Surveillance
    Aircraft. Once these are defined and approved, the Coast Guard will
    conduct a formal market survey and or request for proposal to determine
    the availability of any suitable aircraft in the commercial market that
    meets its requirements.

                        AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

        Question. The Coast Guard has obligated $7.5 million to a contract
    with a commercial low earth orbit satellite communications provider for
    the installation of AIS capability on a concept validation satellite
    and design for installation on future satellites. What type of coverage
    does this provide to the Coast Guard?
        Answer. The deployment of a concept validation payload aboard a
    commercial low earth orbit satellite is a prototype for the receipt of
    AIS signals via satellites from vessels within 2000 nautical miles of
    the U.S. coast.
        Question. The AIS budget provides for approximately $30 million per
    year over the next five fiscal years (including fiscal year 2006).
    Could this acquisition program be accelerated if additional funding
    became available?
        Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006-2010 Capital Investment
    Plan calls for project completion in 2011; however, the project could
    be completed sooner if additional funding is provided.
      coast guard support of nsf research operations in the polar regions
        Question. The budget request for the National Science Foundation
    includes $48 million in budget authority to operate and maintain the
    399 foot Polar Icebreakers. This amount does not include funding such
    as extraordinary maintenance costs. In fiscal year 2005, these
    extraordinary maintenance costs are estimated to be $18 million. The
    budget indicates that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is being
    discussed to address these additional costs. What is the status of the
    MOU between the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Coast
    Guard?
        Answer. The Coast Guard and NSF are currently negotiating to
    conclude an MOU for fiscal year 2006.
        The $48 million NSF budget authority represents the base funding to
    operate and maintain the 399 foot POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA and the 420
    foot HEALY. The MOU will reflect an agreement between NSF and Coast
    Guard for NSF to pay for all personnel, maintenance and operational
    funds necessary to manage the polar icebreaking program.
        The Administration plans to maintain current polar icebreaker fleet
    capabilities at least until a new national polar icebreaker
    requirements policy decision is made.
        Question. Please provide a historical breakdown, by fiscal year, of
    the costs to support the NSF's scientific and operational programs in
    the Polar Regions, including maintenance costs, and how much the NSF
    reimbursed for those costs in each fiscal year.
        Answer. In recent years, the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet has
    devoted, on average, 82 percent of its operational time in support of
    the NSF. The chart below attributes NSF's percentage of operational
    time to the total annual funding for the icebreakers (including
    maintenance costs).
        The following table provides a historical breakout of Coast Guard
    polar icebreaking support costs, those costs attributable to NSF
    activities, and the amounts reimbursed by NSF to the Coast Guard per
    the MOA between the two agencies.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Total Costs       Percent
                                                       Reimbursement    required to     Operational       Cost to
                       Fiscal year                      Amount from       support      time devoted     support NSF
                                                            NSF         cutters \1\       to NSF         programs
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1999............................................      $2,711,732     $31,397,056              76     $24,004,075
    2000 \2\........................................       2,145,242      40,971,438              80      32,777,150
    2001............................................       4,966,672      41,899,046              64      26,839,661
    2002............................................       5,961,684      49,195,000              93      45,643,381
    2003............................................       8,165,647      50,501,309              91       45,925531
    2004............................................      12,422,190      57,585,544              89      51,189,137
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Note: Costs include actual unit level operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs, depot level maintenance
      costs, and personnel costs for the salaries and benefits attributable to the people assigned to the cutters.
      These costs have grown to exceed budgeted amounts due to extraordinary maintenance costs required to sustain
      the polar icebreaking fleet. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposes transfer of the Coast Guard's
      base funding (using budgeted amounts) to support operation and maintenance of these cutters.
    \2\ Reflects the addition of the HEALY as the third Coast Guard icebreaker.

        Question. If a Memorandum of Understanding is not reached and the
    NSF decides to contract out for their icebreaking needs in the polar
    region, would the Coast Guard need to maintain the Polar Sea and the
    Polar Star icebreakers?
        Answer. On August 8, 2005, the Coast Guard signed an MOU with NSF
    to ensure that the polar icebreaking fleet will be operated and
    maintained in fiscal year 2006.
        Question. If so, what functions would they serve and what would be
    the costs in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. The polar class icebreakers (POLAR SEA and POLAR STAR) have
    been and will continue to primarily support the U.S. Antarctic Program
    re-supply effort (Operation Deep Freeze) each year. Due to Antarctic
    ice conditions, the age of the vessels and the breakers' increasing
    maintenance needs since 2001, these two vessels are no longer able to
    support simultaneously the U.S. Antarctic Program. Pending additional
    funding from the NSF in fiscal year 2006, POLAR SEA will continue the
    second year of a 2-year maintenance availability to ensure readiness
    for the Operation Deep Freeze 2007 deployment to Antarctica. POLAR STAR
    is currently scheduled to support the 2006 Operation Deep Freeze
    mission. HEALY is scheduled to support Arctic research, typically
    lasting from May to November of each year. The fiscal year 2006 base
    funding and overall costs are outlined below:

                               FISCAL YEAR 2006 COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER BASE FUNDING
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Fiscal year
                   Projected costs AFC                  Cost center      POLAR SEA      2006 POLAR         Total
                                                           HEALY                           STAR
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Training & Recruiting...........................        $210,512        $355,244        $355,244        $921,000
    Military Personnel..............................       5,936,630       9,547,685       9,547,685      25,032,000
    Depot Level Maintenance.........................       4,498,926       4,493,037       4,493,037      13,485,000
    Operating and Maintenance.......................       3,586,000       2,000,000       2,000,000       7,586,000
    Central Accounts................................         109,000         183,500         183,500         476,000
                                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------
          Grand Total...............................      14,341,068      16,579,466      16,579,466      47,500,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        FISCAL YEAR 2006 PROJECTED COSTS REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN POLAR ICEBREAKER FLEET ABOVE THE BASE FUNDING LEVEL
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Fiscal year
                   Projected costs AFC                  Cost center      POLAR SEA      2006 POLAR         Total
                                                           HEALY                           STAR
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Depot Level Maintenance.........................      $7,100,000      $9,700,000        $500,000     $17,300,000
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. If not, what would be the cost for the Coast Guard to
    mothball or dispose of the two icebreakers?
        Answer. The Coast Guard estimates that the cost to mothball or
    dispose of each Polar Class Icebreaker is $750,000 per hull, for a
    total of $1.5 million.
        The estimated personnel transfer cost if the two icebreakers are
    decommissioned is $700,000.
        Question. What are the long-term costs to maintain the Coast
    Guard's Polar Icebreakers?
        Answer. The two heavy polar icebreakers are nearing the end of
    their service lives and require major systems overhauls to continue to
    operate in a cost-effective manner. The Coast Guard has not developed
    detailed analyses of the costs associated with the long-term costs of
    recapitalizing the heavy polar icebreaking fleet. As the national needs
    for heavy polar icebreaking are more thoroughly studied by the National
    Academies of Sciences (NAS), the Coast Guard will inevitably be
    involved in developing long-term cost estimates for heavy polar
    icebreaking.
        Since the Healy medium-duty polar icebreaker is a relatively new
    vessel, there are no significant long-term maintenance costs above the
    budgeted base amounts for that ship.
        Question. What efforts are underway to fund a replacement vessel or
    overhaul one or more of the existing vessels to support the long-term
    needs of the scientific community?
        Answer. There are no plans to replace or overhaul CGC HEALY, which
    was commissioned in 2000.
        In accordance with the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
    Appropriations Bill Conference Report, the NAS will be conducting a
    polar icebreaker study, with an interim report expected during November
    2005 and completion of the final report anticipated during July 2006.
    The NAS study report could be used as the basis for an update of the
    1990 Presidential Decision Determination on national polar icebreaker
    requirements policy.
        Question. What would the cost be and the amount of time necessary
    to acquire a new polar icebreaker?
        Answer. Initial rough estimates indicate that one new polar
    icebreaker, with the equivalent heavy icebreaking capabilities as the
    Polar Class icebreakers, would cost approximately $600 million and
    would require 6 years to construct.
        Question. The Coast Guard is absorbing roughly $9 million in fiscal
    year 2005 to meet key milestones in the maintenance of the Polar Sea.
    Is critical maintenance in other areas being delayed or canceled to
    meet the needs of the Polar Sea?
        Answer. Yes, the $9.2 million for extraordinary maintenance of the
    POLAR SEA will be absorbed within the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005
    maintenance funds, requiring deferral of critical maintenance in other
    areas, such as replacement of aging and obsolete subsystems onboard
    Coast Guard legacy cutters.
        Question. If so, please describe those delays and the impact they
    will have on the Coast Guard fleet.
        Answer. As the end of fiscal year 2005 approaches, and the level of
    fleet-wide unscheduled maintenance activity becomes clearer, specific
    maintenance activities will be identified for deferral by Coast Guard
    maintenance managers as they shift resources to deal with their most
    immediate fleet maintenance challenges.
        Question. Section 888 of Public Law 107-296 ensures that Coast
    Guard ``functions and capabilities be maintained intact and without
    significant reduction.'' Under what authority does the proposal to
    transfer funding for icebreaking operations to the NSF fall under?
        Answer. Subsection 888(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
    provided that: ``the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the
    Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and
    without significant reduction after the transfer of the Coast Guard to
    the Department, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
        The proposed shift of appropriations for polar icebreaking, if
    enacted, does not remove any of the authorities, functions, or
    capabilities of the Coast Guard. Since NSF and the Coast Guard have a
    signed MOU ensuring funding for the icebreaking program in fiscal year
    2006, the Coast Guard will continue to perform its polar icebreaking
    mission. Furthermore, the proposed shift of appropriations, if enacted,
    would be the result of a ``subsequent act'' of Congress, in the terms
    of Subsection 888(c).

                                   RECRUITING

        Question. What is the Coast Guard's goal for recruiting active duty
    personnel in fiscal year 2006? Provide a chart showing the total number
    of recruits in each of the past 10 years for active duty personnel and
    reserves and compare them against the Coast Guard's targets for those
    years.
        Answer. The following tables show the total number of Coast Guard
    active duty and reserve recruits in each of the past 10 years compared
    with the Coast Guard's targets for those years.

                       COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY RECRUITING
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Year                        Targets        Accessed
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1996....................................           3,300           3,299
    1997....................................           3,900           3,697
    1998....................................           4,464           3,962
    1999....................................           4,150           4,159
    2000....................................           4,700           4,721
    2001....................................           4,300           4,332
    2002....................................           4,800           5,169
    2003....................................           4,475           4,488
    2004....................................           3,800           3,809
    2005....................................           4,110       \1\ 4,110
    2006....................................       \1\ 4,200       \1\ 4,200
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Projected.

                         COAST GUARD RESERVE RECRUITING
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Year                        Targets        Accessed
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1996....................................             350             229
    1997....................................             430             303
    1998....................................           1,313             554
    1999....................................             900             801
    2000....................................             900             692
    2001....................................             700             424
    2002....................................             718             585
    2003....................................           1,150             880
    2004....................................             940             911
    2005....................................             950         \1\ 800
    2006....................................         \1\ 900         \1\ 900
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Projected.

                                    C-130JS

        Question. In March, the Coast Guard placed interim limitations on
    the HC-130H 1500 series aircraft. What is the status of these
    restrictions?
        Answer. The HC-130H 1500 series aircraft are operationally
    restricted/limited based on potential cracking in the center wing box
    based on effective wing age. The restrictions on the five Coast Guard
    1500 series aircraft are similar to restrictions imposed on United
    States Air Force aircraft of similar vintage and use rate. The
    restrictions are designed to limit wing loading by limiting fuel, cargo
    and airspeed under certain conditions. These restrictions will remain
    in place until Lockheed Martin Aero (LMA) Service Bulletin (SB2) is
    developed and the required inspections are completed. SB2 is expected
    on May 30. Each aircraft inspection will take approximately 1 month to
    complete. If serious structural cracking is found during inspections,
    the Coast Guard will determine whether to refurbish the affected
    aircraft to keep them in service well into the future or if there are
    other alternatives.
        Question. What impact have these restrictions had on the Coast
    Guard?
        Answer. The restrictions currently impact only the five 1500-series
    C-130s at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City and have resulted in
    some degradation of the unit's ability to perform long-range search and
    rescue, maritime patrol, logistics and International Ice Patrol
    missions. These operational restrictions are based on reduced fuel and
    cargo loads similar to those imposed on United States Air Force
    aircraft of similar vintage and use rate. The restrictions reduce the
    maximum endurance of the aircraft from 12 to 7.5 hours, reduce the
    maximum cargo capacity from 45,000 to 10,000 lbs, require slower
    airspeed when in the vicinity of turbulence and require greater fuel
    reserves. These restrictions have been mitigated by incorporating more
    refueling stops and or using newer 1700-model C-130s without
    restrictions.
        Question. What are the Coast Guard's plans to remedy the structural
    problems, including necessary funding?
        Answer. There are no known structural problems to be remedied. The
    1500 series aircraft are operationally restricted/limited based on the
    potential of cracks in the center wing box based on effective wing age.
    LMA is currently developing the procedures to inspect the wings to
    determine if cracks exist. If inspections find no evidence of
    structural cracking, the operational restrictions will be adjusted or
    removed. If serious structural cracking is found during inspections,
    the Coast Guard will determine whether to refurbish the affected
    aircraft to keep them in service or if there are other alternatives.
    Cost estimates to effect necessary repairs will be based on the results
    of the inspections.

                                    SIPRINET

        Question. The Coast Guard is in the process of increasing its
    SIPRNET presence to include all of its major shore side operational
    units (Areas, Districts, Sectors, & Air Stations). Approximately half
    of the planned shore side Coast Guard units (80 out of 156) currently
    have SIPRNET connectivity. What is the funding level for this activity
    in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. The Coast Guard SIPRNET Program is fiscal year 2006 base of
    funds is $9.5 million. This includes funding for recurring circuit
    costs, contract labor costs, new installations, and equipment
    recapitalization.
        Question. What is the current schedule to provide connectivity to
    the remaining units?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is currently planning to fund the
    installation of 23 new sites during fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard
    anticipates completing SIPRNET installations at all 152 sites by fiscal
    year 2009.
        Question. Could the schedule be accelerated if additional funding
    became available in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. Additional funding in fiscal year 2006 would not accelerate
    the installation schedule. The installations are currently scheduled at
    maximum install rate due to the time required to build the facilities
    and installation contractor resource capabilities.

               MARITIME SECURITY CUTTER--LARGE OPERATIONAL COSTS

        Question. The Coast Guard is expecting the first WMSL to be
    delivered in May 2007. Please provide a spend plan and timeline related
    to the funding necessary for pre-commissioning familiarization and
    training for core personnel.
        Answer. The timeline for pre-commissioning training and
    familiarization is as follows:
      --Phase I: Winter/Spring 2005.--Five crewmembers reported to
            Pascagoula for pre-arrival training, ship engineering
            familiarization, and doctrine development. Cost: $151,352
      --Phase II: Summer/Fall 2006.--96 crewmembers report to Alameda (the
            ship's homeport) to conduct pre-arrival training, which is
            provided at various government and commercial facilities around
            the country. Following pre-arrival training, these crewmembers
            will proceed to Pascagoula for pre-commissioning
            familiarization. Cost: $1,830,816
      --Phase III: Winter/Spring 2007.--Remaining 61 crewmembers report to
            Alameda then immediately proceed to Pascagoula for pre-
            commissioning familiarization. Cost: $1,063,930
      --May 2007.--First National Security Cutter/Maritime Security Cutter
            Large (WMSL) is delivered to the Coast Guard.
        The travel and subsistence cost for crewmembers to complete the
    initial pre-arrival and pre-commissioning training is estimated at $3.1
    million.

                             RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

        Question. Section 888 of Public Law 107-296 ensures that Coast
    Guard ``functions and capabilities be maintained intact and without
    significant reduction.'' Under what authority does the proposal to
    shift Cost Guard R&D functions to the S&T Directorate fall under?
        Answer. Subsection 888(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
    provided that: ``the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the
    Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and
    without significant reduction after the transfer of the Coast Guard to
    the Department, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
        The proposed shift of appropriations for Research, Development,
    Test and Evaluation from the Coast Guard to the S&T directorate, if
    enacted, would be the result of a ``subsequent Act'' of Congress, in
    the terms of Subsection 888(c).
        Question. How would the proposed transfer improve the ability of
    the Coast Guard to accomplish its missions?
        Answer. The consolidation of Research and Development (R&D) funding
    at the Department level will maximize effectiveness of R&D activities
    across the Department by minimizing redundancies. Through the Coast
    Guard portfolio manager at S&T, the Coast Guard will continue to
    develop and provide homeland and non-homeland security research
    requirements which support all of the Coast Guard's homeland and non-
    homeland mission programs.

                                 ATTRITION RATE

        Question. What is the current attrition rate for Secret Service
    agents and Uniformed Division Officers?
        Answer. In fiscal year 2004, the attrition rate for special agents
    was 6.28 percent, and for Uniformed Division officers 7.6 percent. The
    Secret Service expects that the attrition rate for fiscal year 2005 for
    special agents will be 5.2 percent, and for Uniformed Division officers
    8.5 percent.

                                 OVERTIME RATE

        Question. What is the current monthly overtime rate for Secret
    Service agents?
        Answer. The current average monthly overtime rate for Secret
    Service agents is 71 hours.

                                  PAY INCREASE

        Question. The budget includes funding for a 2.6 percent pay
    increase for Secret Service employees in 2006, but the Administration
    requested a 2.1 percent across the board pay increase for Federal
    employees. Why is the Secret Service budgeting for a higher pay
    increase?
        Answer. The Secret Service's fiscal year 2006 budget includes
    funding for a 2.3 percent pay increase for Federal employees. This is
    the same percentage increase proposed by the Administration.
        Question. What is the cost difference between a 2.1 percent pay
    increase and a 2.6 percent pay increase?
        Answer. A 2.1 percent pay increase would require $11,752,000, and a
    2.6 percent pay increase would require $14,550,000, a difference of
    $2,798,000. The Secret Service request was $12,871,000 or 2.3 percent.

                                WHITE HOUSE MAIL

        Question. The budget includes $16.365 million to process White
    House mail. What is the status of the Department's efforts to develop a
    long-term plan for a fully operational White House Mail facility?
        Answer. In the summer of 2004, the U.S. Secret Service and the
    General Services Administration (GSA) initiated the planning of a
    permanent White House mail facility.
        The stakeholders utilized two previous studies in order to begin
    their effort. In 2003, the Secret Service commissioned Science
    Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to develop a full-scale
    mail screening facility in concept. In addition, GSA conducted a site
    selection study in which they identified four feasible locations in the
    Washington, D.C. metropolitan area for a White House mail facility.
        In October 2004, GSA procured the services of HDR, an architectural
    engineering and consulting firm, to complete a Program Development
    Study (PDS). The PDS, which was completed in February 2005, reflects
    the efforts of the team to define the feasibility, analyze needs,
    prepare cost analysis and program requirements for the program. A mail
    screening facility proposal was defined by the PDS. Three sites located
    at the Anacostia Naval Annex were selected as most feasible. The PDS
    estimated the cost for construction at $33.5 million.
        Since the completion of the PDS, the development team has worked
    closely with GSA to identify a potential future site for the White
    House mail screening facility. GSA is working with the Navy Real Estate
    Office to assess the availability of property at the Anacostia Naval
    Annex, in Washington, D.C. adjacent to other White House support
    facilities for this purpose. Upon identification of available Federal
    property, GSA will conduct environmental and design studies of the
    potential site. This information will be used to determine the GSA
    facility acquisition plan (lease/build) and project the new facility's
    operational costs.
        Question. What is the percentage of mail addressed to the White
    House that doesn't reach its destination?
        Answer. For the 14-month period beginning in March 2004 and ending
    April 2005, the White House mail screening facility received
    approximately 1,730,000 pieces of mail, flats or parcels. Of these,
    288,800 items (or 16 percent) were classified as junk mail and,
    therefore, not processed at the facility. Of the remaining 1,441,200
    processed mail pieces, 1,441,000 (or 99.9 percent) pieces were
    delivered to the complex.
        The two hundred pieces of mail (or less than 1 percent) not
    delivered to the complex were identified by the facility as containing
    an unknown substance or an overt threat and were referred to the Secret
    Service Intelligence Division for investigation. In addition, 29
    referrals were made to Secret Service field offices due to items
    received at the facility and two arrests were made.

                            EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

        Question. The latest report (date) from OMB on the status of the
    $40 billion Emergency Response Fund, enacted 3 days after 9/11, shows
    that the Secret Service has an unobligated balance of $6 million. Why
    have the funds not been used and what are your plans for the
    unobligated funds?
        Answer. As of October 2004, the Secret Service had no unobligated
    balance from the Emergency Response Fund.

                           NATIONAL RESPONSE PLANNING

        Question. DHS has recently released the National Incident
    Management System Plan, the Nation Preparedness Goal and begun the roll
    out of the National Response Plan which will better guide the spending
    of Federal resources like the over $11 billion Congress has
    appropriated for first responders programs. With this additional
    guidance, what changes have you seen/do you expect to see in the local
    requests for projects that will prevent wasteful spending?
        Answer. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) integrates
    effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a
    comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS will
    enable responders at all levels to work together more effectively to
    manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size or complexity.
    The Department is requiring that states and territories begin work on
    compliance with the NIMS as part of their fiscal year 2005 grant
    funding.
        The National Response Plan (NRP) establishes a comprehensive all-
    hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage
    domestic incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures
    from incident management disciplines--homeland security, emergency
    management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health,
    responder and recovery worker health and safety, emergency medical
    services, and the private sector--and integrates them into a unified
    structure. It forms the basis of how the Federal Government coordinates
    with State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during
    incidents.
        The National Preparedness Guidance, issued on April 27, 2005,
    addresses the implementation of the NIMS and the NRP, as one of the
    overarching national priorities. DHS is now beginning to work with
    states, territories, and urban areas to update their existing State and
    urban area homeland security strategies to bring them into alignment
    with the seven national priorities. This alignment with the national
    priorities will enable States and territories to continue expending
    funds in accordance with the goals and objectives already outlined in
    the strategies. With this, DHS expects a greater emphasis on training
    and exercises to further implement the NRP and NIMS within the States
    and territories. Historically, there has been a higher trend towards
    the purchase of specialized equipment, but DHS believes that the States
    are undertaking training and exercise programs that typically require
    longer-term planning.
        Question. How have the State and local entities reacted to the
    changes?
        Answer. State and local entities have had many questions about the
    publication of all three of these documents. Understandably, they do
    not always clearly understand the intent of the documents and how they
    are related to the grant funding that they receive. Likewise, they are
    concerned about the resources they will need at the State level to
    ensure compliance. Anticipating such concerns, DHS created on-line
    training materials through FEMA/USFA's Emergency Management Institute
    and National Fire Academy's Distance Learning Programs that cover both
    NIMS and the NRP. To date, more than 200,000 personnel have completed
    these training courses. In order to further articulate these
    requirements, the Department has scheduled several rollout conferences
    for the NIMS and NRP across the country to educate the State and local
    stakeholders. The NIMS Integration Center (NIC) is responsible for
    orchestrating NIMS implementation and NIMS compliance. Through
    training, exercises, and technical assistance, the NIC is working to
    ensure that our state, local, and tribal partners understand NIMS and
    take the appropriate steps to implement it in their communities. In
    addition to the NIMS and NRP outreach, the Office for Domestic
    Preparedness (ODP), within SLGCP, has scheduled three additional
    meetings on the National Preparedness Guidance so that States and
    territories understand the imbedded requirements. We also are offering
    technical assistance packages that are customized to each State and
    territory. ODP is committed to providing additional education and
    outreach to our grantees as we move forward in implementing the seven
    national priorities codified in the National Preparedness Guidance.

                        SLOW PACE OF GRANT DISTRIBUTIONS

        Question. On October 18, 2004, the President signed into law the
    fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. The majority of
    the grants funds have just recently been made available for application
    this month: 6 months since the Act was signed into law. Rail security
    funds were made available on April 5, 2005. Transit security funds were
    also just made available on April 5, 2005. Port security funds, as of
    April 20, 2005, still have not been made available for application. The
    State Homeland Security Grant Program is the only program that has
    awarded funding and that is because the Congress required it by law.
    None of the other fiscal year 2005 homeland security grant funds have
    actually been distributed.
        Why is it taking so long to get the money out the door?
        Answer. The responsibility for most non-aviation grant programs was
    transferred from the TSA to SLGCP during fiscal year 2004. This
    resulted in a transition period while programs and staff adapted to
    different processes and new automation. More importantly, the
    Department has used this time to work with Federal partnering agencies
    and applicable state, local, and private sector stakeholders to
    redesign these programs to include a more risk-based approach to
    allocation of funding that aligns with Administration priorities as
    described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 and the
    recently released National Preparedness Goal. The Department is
    committed to awarding grants earlier in the year while maintaining
    effective oversight.
        Question. What steps are being taken to expedite the process?
        Answer. Completion of the programmatic redesign process coupled
    with automation of the application submission, reporting, and payment
    processes for these programs will result in greatly enhanced processing
    capabilities for future program funding. In addition, SLGCP has
    established the Transportation Infrastructure Security Division to
    manage these programs. The Division is in the process of filling
    remaining vacancies and consequently will be in a greatly strengthened
    position for management and administration of future grant programs.
        Question. When will funding be awarded for Intercity Passenger Rail
    Security, Transit Security, Intercity Bus Security and Port Security
    grants?
        Answer. The current schedule for each program is as follows:
    Intercity Passenger Rail Security Program--awarded July 18, 2005;
    Transit Security Grant Program--awarded July 15, 2005; Intercity Bus
    Security Grant Program--first round of awards were awarded on August 9,
    2005, and the final round of awards will be awarded on September 30,
    2005; Port Security Grant Program--awarded September 1, 2005.
        Question. As part of your Department review, will you commit to
    expediting the grant making process so that money that is supposed to
    make Americans safer does not sit in the Treasury in Washington, DC?
        Answer. The Department takes its responsibility very seriously for
    protecting Americans and the critical transportation infrastructure
    they depend on. As stated previously, the recent redesign of these
    programs, coupled with the newly instituted SLGCP Transportation
    Infrastructure Security Division and automation of the application,
    reporting, and payment processes for these programs will result in
    significantly enhanced capabilities relative to the management and
    administration of these programs. In addition, SLGCP is also in the
    process of establishing an Office of Grants Operations that will
    further streamline financial management activities associated with
    these grants.

                               PORT/RAIL/TRANSIT

        Question. According to the American Public Transportation
    Association, there are approximately 9.6 billion transit trips annually
    and people use public transportation vehicles over 32 billion times
    each workday. This is more than 16 times the number of aviation
    passengers, and yet the Department continues to spend less than 10
    percent of its transportation security resources on non-aviation
    security. The President's Budget Request proposes that individual grant
    programs for port, rail/mass transit, bus, and truck security grant
    programs be eliminated and collapsed into a new grant program called a
    ``Targeted Infrastructure Protection Grants'' program. Because none of
    the previous individually appropriated grant programs are specified in
    this new account--ports will compete against rail and mass transit, and
    other infrastructure for $600 million. For mass transit security alone,
    the American Public Transportation Association estimates a need for $6
    billion in transit security. Not only does this insufficient request
    show a lack of support for modes of transportation other than air
    travel security but it further frustrates the officials responsible for
    securing people's safety on these modes by pitting them against each
    other for scarce resources. We currently spend $5 billion on aviation
    security. This proposal continues a disturbing pattern by the
    Department of focusing on the last battle--aviation security--and less
    on non-aviation modes of transportation.
        How does the agency really expect that this request furthers the
    mission of homeland security when we are only as strong as our weakest
    link?
        Answer. Enhancing the security of the Nation's critical
    infrastructure, including transportation, continues to be a high
    priority for the Department, which is why the Department proposed the
    development of a Targeted Infrastructure Protection (TIP) Program. This
    program would consolidate Port Security, Rail/Transit Security,
    Intercity Bus Security, and Trucking Industry Security grant programs
    into a single larger program. Because it is unrealistic to anticipate
    infrastructure threats and protection needs nearly 12 months in
    advance, the Secretary requires flexibility to target valuable TIP
    resources to address emerging needs, risks, and national priorities.
    Moreover, funds for this program will also allow the Department to
    build on and leverage partnerships with other Federal agencies and
    industry that seek to advance the State of the Nation's preparedness
    through better security solutions and information sharing approaches.
    Because the program is designed to provide us with maximum flexibility
    at the appropriate time, the Department is confident that the TIP will
    help further the mission of securing the homeland. The Administration
    requested a nearly 50 percent increase in total infrastructure funding
    in order to reduce concerns about ``competition'' among various
    sectors.

                                  ALL-HAZARDS

        Question. The fine men and women of FEMA have recently responded to
    wildfires in Alaska, mudslides in California, and hurricanes in Florida
    in an unprecedented period of activity. As the backbone of the nation's
    all-hazards emergency management system the Emergency Management
    Performance Grants (EMPG) Program, now administered by the Office of
    State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, is the only
    direct source of Federal funding to assist State and local governments
    with planning and preparedness activities associated with natural
    disasters. Congress saw fit last year to reject the President's
    proposal to cap allowable salary expenses and to shift the program away
    from its all-hazards philosophy. Secretary Chertoff said on March 2 of
    this year ``while fighting terrorism was the reason for the
    department's creation, it is not our sole function,'' which implies
    that all-hazards prevention, preparedness, response and recovery is a
    priority of DHS. Yet, a proposed $10 million cut in the EMPG program
    appeared in the Budget Request.
        Why is it that the President proposes a $10 million cut in this
    program?
        Answer. The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request of $170
    million for the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) Program
    remains consistent with the fiscal year 2005 request and demonstrates a
    continued strong commitment and support to the nation's emergency
    prevention and response community through an all-hazards approach. In
    fiscal year 2006, EMPG will provide support for State and local
    emergency management departments and agencies based on identified needs
    and priorities for strengthening their emergency management
    capabilities, while addressing homeland security concerns. Further, the
    integration of EMPG into the Homeland Security Grant Program umbrella
    results in synergies with other related homeland security assistance
    programs. In addition, this integration also has facilitated efforts by
    states/local jurisdictions to leverage homeland security assistance to
    accomplish goals and objectives in their homeland security strategies.

                               FIRE GRANT FUNDING

        Question. Each day firefighters put themselves in harm's way to
    protect property and help citizens in time of need. There are currently
    over 1 million active firefighters in the United States, and about 73
    percent of those volunteer. According to the U.S. Fire Service, many
    fire departments report shortfalls in facilities, equipment, and
    training of personnel particularly volunteer companies in rural
    communities. An estimated one-third of firefighters per shift are not
    equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus. In communities under
    10,000 in population that have at least one building 4 stories high or
    higher, 10 percent are estimated to have no ladder or aerial apparatus.
    The assessment also found that overall fire departments can only equip
    about half of the emergency responders on a shift with portable radios.
    Additionally, 21 percent of fire departments, nearly all of them
    predominately volunteer departments, have four or fewer firefighters
    available in a mid-day fire house which means it is likely that the
    departments fail to deliver the minimum of 4 firefighters needed to
    safely initiate an interior attack on a fire. Fiscally stressed
    communities make every effort to support public servants but State and
    local funding simply is not there. Yet, the President proposes to
    reduce firefighter grants from $715 million to $500 million. In
    addition, he proposes to eliminate funding for the SAFER program, which
    Congress authorized to help communities hire firefighters.
        Please explain how the President's proposed 30 percent cut in
    funding helps fill these gaps.
        Answer. The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request reflects a
    strong commitment to our nation's fire service by providing $500
    million for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. This request
    is consistent with the Administration's budget request since fiscal
    year 2003 and reflects the appropriate balance of funding priorities
    among DHS grant programs. Further, this program has been in existence
    for 5 years and has 4 years of grant experience. In its
    reauthorization, Congress directed that an update to an assessment of
    the needs of the fire service be done, as the prior assessment does not
    reflect the impact of more than $2 billion in grant funding that DHS
    has provided to the nation's fire service over the last 3 years, both
    through Assistance to Firefighter Grants and Homeland Security Grants.
    In fact, the nation's fire service has received more DHS grant funding
    than any other public safety discipline. This report is expected to be
    completed in February or March 2006. In addition, Firefighting
    Operations and Support for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and
    other emergencies is among the national target capabilities identified
    in the forthcoming National Preparedness Goal. Finally, it is important
    to note that there is significant funding available for similar
    purposes included in other programs, such as the State Homeland
    Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
        Question. Also, please explain why the President proposes to
    terminate the SAFER firefighter hiring program.
        Answer. The Administration has requested significant funds over
    several years to support public safety preparedness at the State and
    local levels of government. Over the last 3 years, Congress has
    appropriated and DHS has granted over $12 billion to support training,
    exercising, and equipping public safety personnel, including
    firefighters, across the nation. The Administration maintains that
    hiring firefighters should remain a local responsibility, as local
    resources will eventually be needed to retain newly hired personnel. To
    that end, Federal support should focus on enhancing local capacities
    through training, equipment, and exercises; and not building inherently
    local capacities.

                        INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS

        Question. Over $800 million in grant funding has been distributed
    for interoperability projects. The next largest specific first
    responder category--at less than half of that--is regional response
    teams funding. The Intelligence Reform Act authorizes a new DHS grant
    program for interoperability as well as a pilot program and the ability
    to establish and Office of Interoperability and Compatibility.
        What lessons learned or best practices has the agency gleaned from
    the fiscal year 2003 demonstration with COPS and FEMA?
        Answer. The ``fiscal year 2003 demonstration'' refers to the
    competitive grant program that COPS, FEMA, and SAFECOM collaborated on
    to maximize the funding available for interoperable communications
    equipment. The program provided competitive funding to local
    jurisdictions to demonstrate effective solutions for achieving
    interoperability. The lessons learned from this program have been
    incorporated into SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance.
        SAFECOM, a program of the S&T Directorate's Office for
    Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), is the umbrella program
    within the Federal Government that oversees all initiatives and
    projects pertaining to public safety communications and
    interoperability. SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance provides the
    public safety community with consistent guidance, coordinated
    application processes, similar requirements across grant programs, and
    general guidelines for implementing a successful wireless
    communications system. This guidance seeks to incorporate best
    practices and lessons learned from the fiscal year 2003 demonstration
    program. The guidance was incorporated in the fiscal year 2003 FEMA and
    fiscal year 2003/fiscal year 2004 COPS grant awards, as well as ODP
    grant packages in fiscal year 2004. Examples of the lessons learned
    which are incorporated into the grant guidance include:
      --General criteria relating to public safety communications grants;
      --Criteria specific to block grants allocated to states;
      --Additional criteria based on the lifecycle of public safety
            communications projects;
      --Additional guidelines, examples, and resources for improving public
            safety communications and interoperability, and implementing a
            wireless communication system; and
      --A thorough list of questions that applicants can use to help ensure
            that they have taken into account the needs of public safety,
            potential partners, and considered short and long-term goals.
        SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance is available at
    www.safecomprogram.gov.
        Question. Outside of equipment acquisition what are the obstacles
    to interoperability?
        Answer. While equipment acquisition is a substantial obstacle,
    there are many other significant challenges to achieving
    interoperability. In a February 2003 report, the National Task Force on
    Interoperability identified five key challenges facing the development
    of interoperability, including: limited and fragmented radio spectrum,
    lack of coordination and cooperation, limited and fragmented funding,
    incompatible and aging communications equipment, and limited and
    fragmented planning.
        DHS understands the complexity of the problem of interoperability.
    The OIC, through SAFECOM--the umbrella program within the Federal
    Government that oversees all initiatives and projects pertaining to
    public safety communications and interoperability--has developed the
    Interoperability Continuum to serve as a framework for addressing the
    obstacles to interoperability, beyond just equipment. The Continuum
    helps the public safety community and local, tribal, state, and Federal
    policy makers address critical elements for success as they plan and
    implement interoperability solutions. These elements include
    governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training/
    exercises, and usage of interoperable communications. Making progress
    in each of the five critical elements is crucial to the Department
    providing guidance to overcome the obstacles to interoperability.

                           INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS

        Question. What is the status of national standards for
    interoperable communication?
        Answer. DHS has made significant strides in the development of
    national standards and requirements for interoperable communications
    through SAFECOM. SAFECOM has developed accelerated standards for public
    safety interoperable communications, and drafted a report as required
    by IRTPA that discusses DHS plans for accelerating standards. This
    report includes a schedule of milestones and achievements. The report
    is moving through the clearance process and will be sent to Congress
    immediately therafter.
        DHS recognizes that the development of standards can only occur
    within the context of an architectural framework. The SAFECOM process
    for identifying and developing standards begins with development of a
    practitioner-accepted statement of requirements which then drives the
    development of a Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF). SAFECOM
    released Version 1.0 of the first comprehensive Public Safety
    Communications and Interoperability Statement of Requirements (SoR) in
    2004. Developed with public safety practitioner input, the SoR defines
    the functional requirements for public safety practitioners to
    communicate and share information when it is needed, where it is
    needed, and when authorized. SAFECOM, in cooperation with the National
    Institute of Standards Technology's (NIST) Office of Law Enforcement
    Standards (OLES), completed a draft of the PSAF, currently being
    reviewed for publication. The architectural framework outlines what the
    overall structured approach is for facilitating interoperability and
    indicates how the architecture will operate through the development of
    interface standards.
        Since the release of v1.0 of the Public Safety Communications and
    Interoperability SoR, SAFECOM has undertaken the development of v1.1 of
    the SoR. SoR v1.1 will reorganize the requirements contained within
    v1.0 into a layered structure, reclassifying the requirements into
    Network Functional Requirements, Device Functional Requirements, and
    Application/Services Functional Requirements. SAFECOM is currently
    vetting v1.1 of the SoR with the public safety practitioner community
    and anticipates releasing v1.1 to the public upon completion of that
    vetting process.
        Development of v2.0 of the SoR is currently underway. SoR v2.0 will
    add additional quantitative values to the functional requirements
    contained in v1.1, as well as address NIMS compliance. SAFECOM
    anticipates that it will be able to vet the draft of this version with
    the public safety community beginning in early 2006.
        Question. What other equipment does DHS plan to publish standards
    for and when will those standards be published?
        Answer. The Standards Portfolio in the S&T Directorate is working
    with voluntary consensus standards organizations and the National
    Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop standards in
    many areas of homeland security. In the CBRNE area, standards should be
    published in fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2006 for: radiation detection
    (portal monitors, neutron detectors, training and data format);
    suspicious powder protocols, trace explosive detection; and chemical
    agent vapor detection. Standards for CBRNE personal protective
    equipment for emergency responders are being developed for: powered air
    purifying and self contained breathing respirators; chemical/biological
    hot and warm zone ensembles; personal alert safety systems; thermal
    exposure measurement; law enforcement PPE; and a bomb suit. Standards
    are also in development for biometric evaluation protocols, user
    interface guidelines, image quality. Standards efforts are in progress
    for: building security personal identity verification and access
    control; gaseous air cleaning; economic standards for security-related
    issues; and design/economics for structural integrity. Check lists for
    security of information technology products and PDA forensic tools have
    been published. Finally, SAFECOM is working with NIST's OLES and other
    Federal partners to accelerate the publishing of relevant radio
    standards for public safety interoperable communications in fiscal year
    2006-fiscal year 2007. Standards for the Inter-Sub-System-Interface,
    Console Interface, and Fixed Station Interface will pave the way for
    future seamless communications. Standards for basic functionality will
    be published by the second quarter of fiscal year 2006, with the
    balance of the functions being published by the second quarter of
    fiscal year 2007.

                            NON-PROFIT GRANT FUNDING

        Question. In fiscal year 2005, $25 million was provided for non-
    profits for security at high-threat facilities. Who have these awards
    been distributed to, for how much and for what purpose?
        Answer. The $25 million was provided to protect nonprofit
    organizations located in the top 18 urban areas receiving funds in the
    fiscal year 2005 UASI program. These funds are to be used for target
    hardening, which includes the acquisition and installation of security
    equipment in real property (including buildings and improvements) owned
    or leased by a nonprofit organization, specifically in response to a
    risk of terrorist attack. Specific allocations for urban areas are
    available in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program
    (HSGP) program guidelines and application kit, which can be found at
    the following website address: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm
        Question. Do funds remain available for obligation? If so, how
    much?
        Answer. Upon receipt of fiscal year 2005 funds awarded through the
    HSGP, States were required to issue a solicitation within 60 days of
    the award date for organizations to apply for funds allocated for
    nonprofit organizations. States are currently in the process of
    finalizing these awards.

                          EMS FIRST RESPONDER FUNDING

        Question. In response to a request of the Appropriations Committee,
    the Department recently submitted a report entitled, ``Support for EMS
    Provided by the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination
    and Preparedness'' which indicates that under the funding provided for
    our first responders, the Emergency Medical Services only receives
    about 4 percent of the total.
        What information does the Department have that tells us whether 4
    percent is an adequate share to prepare the professionals who will
    provide emergency medical care to victims at the scene of a potential
    attack or terrorist event?
        Answer. SLGCP provides training, funds for the purchase of
    equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises,
    technical assistance, and other support to assist states, urban areas,
    and local jurisdictions in preventing, planning for, and responding to
    acts of terrorism. SLGCP established and maintains several programs
    that provide these services to emergency responders, including the
    HSGP, the UASI, and the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. SLGCP
    grant funds can be used to enhance emergency responder capabilities,
    including EMS, in accordance with the goals and objectives identified
    in the State or urban area's homeland security strategy. Additionally,
    fire department-based EMS providers have been, and continue to be,
    eligible for assistance under the Assistance to Firefighters Grant
    Program.
        The readiness of EMS is vital to ensuring prompt and appropriate
    emergency care and transportation as a component of the overall
    response to a terrorist incident. Therefore, it is essential that EMS
    agencies receive support and assistance from the States and be
    integrated into planning efforts and working groups to enhance the
    overall preparedness of state, urban area, and local public safety
    personnel to prevent, respond to and assist in the recovery from
    terrorist incidents. SLGCP funds for EMS agencies are allocated through
    the state's State Administrative Agencies (SAA), in accordance with
    each state's homeland security strategy. These strategies are based
    upon comprehensive assessments that address the specific
    vulnerabilities, threats, capabilities and needs in each state. In
    recognition of each state's unique threat, need, and vulnerability
    assessments, the Department does not dictate a specific percentage of
    funds that should be allocated to supplant EMS services. Instead, the
    Department supports a distribution strategy capable of addressing the
    distinctive needs of EMS agencies by allowing specific allocation
    amounts to be determined at the discretion of each state. However, in
    recognition of the important role played by EMS providers, the
    Department issued an Information Bulletin on May 6, 2004. The
    Information Bulletin reminded States that EMS providers are eligible to
    receive funding under the State HSGP and UASI programs.

                        PORT SECURITY GRANT COORDINATION

        Question. What coordination is occurring among states, local port
    authorities and the Captains of the Port, to ensure all vested parties
    are aware of grant determinations and that the limited resources are
    maximized when port security grants are made to independent terminal
    operators?
        Answer. As part of the transition of the Port Security Grant (PSG)
    Program from TSA to SLGCP, the Department has completely redesigned the
    process to focus on the risk-based prioritization of ports and
    allocation of the funds to address specific national port security
    priorities from a port-wide perspective. Redesign of the program was a
    collaborative process between SLGCP, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP),
    the Maritime Administration (MARAD) within DOT, and the American
    Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), among others. As part of this
    process the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) will coordinate a field
    review of all projects submitted for funding consideration. This field
    review will be conducted in coordination with the MARAD Region
    Director, the SAA responsible for the state's Homeland Security
    Strategy, and appropriate members of each port area's Area Maritime
    Security Committee (which includes representatives of the local port
    authorities) to ensure that a port-wide approach to risk reduction is
    taken and that scarce resources are maximized. Lastly, when
    determinations of funding have been made, a consolidated list of
    projects for each port area will be provided to the COTP, MARAD Region
    Director, SAA, and relevant members of the Area Maritime Security
    Committee.

                              TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

        Question. How much of the $50 million appropriated for the
    Technology Transfer Program has been awarded, to whom and for what
    projects?
        Answer. The Technology Transfer Program is known as the Commercial
    Equipment Direct Assistance Program (CEDAP). The legislation set aside
    $10 million for testing and evaluation of commercially available
    equipment to determine appropriateness for inclusion in the CEDAP
    program. The remaining $40 million was dedicated to the CEDAP program.
        On March 22, 2005, SLGCP officially opened the CEDAP to
    applications. The applications are competitive and must be consistent
    with the State homeland security plan. This first pilot test of the
    program ended May 5, 2005, with applications from 1,500 agencies for
    $34.4 million in equipment. The first award to 214 agencies of $2.0
    million in equipment and training will take place June 15, 2005. (See
    table below.)
        Phase II of the CEDAP program will begin with the opening of the
    application process in the summer of 2005. Award of the equipment and
    hands on training for the accepted applicants will take place early in
    the fall of 2005.

                                         CEDAP AWARDS, ROUND #1--AGENCY BY STATE
                                                  [Total Agencies: 214]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              State/Agency                    City               Technology              Type            Unit Cost
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alabama:
        Alexander City Fire           Alexander City.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...      $12,500.00
         Department.
        Atmore Police Department....  Atmore.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Brick Hatton Volunteer Fire   Town Creek.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Calera Fire Department......  Calera.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Calera Police Department....  Calera.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Cherokee Rescue Squad.......  Cherokee...........  Search Camera Victim   Emergency Medical        14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.        Services.
        Cherokee Volunteer Fire       Cherokee...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Fighters.
        Choctaw County Emergency      Butler.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
         Management Agency.                                                        Management.
        Cottonwood Police Department  Cottonwood.........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Daphne Police Department....  Daphne.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Georgiana Police Department.  Georgiana..........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Guntersville Fire/Rescue....  Guntersville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Jasper Police Department....  Jasper.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Margaret Fire and Rescue....  Margaret...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Phoenix City Police           Phoenix City.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Russell County Sheriff's      Phoenix City.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
         Department.
    Alaska:
        Kodiak Police Department....  Kodiak.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Arizona:
        Safford Police Department...  Safford............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
    Arkansas:
        Clinton Police Department...  Clinton............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Ouachita County Sheriff's     Camden.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Sherwood Police Department..  Sherwood...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
    California:
        Greenfield Police Department  Greenfield.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Humboldt County Sheriff's     Eureka.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Mariposa County Sheriff's     Mariposa...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        Monterey Peninsula Airport    Monterey...........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
         Police.                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        San Rafael Police Department  San Rafael.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Colorado:
        Idaho Springs Police          Idaho Springs......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Manitou Springs Police        Manitou Springs....  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    Connecticut:
        Mohegan Tribal Fire           Uncasville.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
         Department.
        Putnam Police Department....  Putnam.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Torrington Police Department  Torrington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Town of Stafford............  Stafford...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Delaware:
        Elsmere Bureau of Police....  Elsmere............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        New Castle Police Department  New Castle.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Florida:
        Florida Gulf Coast            Fort Myers.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         University Police.
        Havana Police Department....  Havana.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Kissimmee Police Department.  Kissimmee..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Winter Springs Police         Winter Springs.....  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    Georgia:
        Austell Police Department...  Austell............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Jackson County Sheriff's      Jefferson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
    Idaho:
        Madison County Sheriff's      Rexburg............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Rexburg Police Department...  Rexburg............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Illinois:
        Elkville Volunteer Fire       Dowell.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Homewood Police Department..  Homewood...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Olney Fire Department.......  Olney..............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Indiana:
        Francesville Volunteer Fire   Francesville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Hudson Marshal's Office.....  Hudson.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Wayne County Sheriff's        Richmond...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
    Iowa:
        Cedar Falls Police            Cedar Falls........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
         Department.                                        Locator System.
        Eldridge Volunteer Fire       Eldridge...........  CEDAP Personal         Fire Department...        4,140.00
         Company, Inc..                                     Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Marion County Sheriff's       Knoxville..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        Poweshiek County Emergency    Grinnell...........  CEDAP Personal         HAZMAT............        4,140.00
         Management Agency.                                 Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Scott County Sheriff's        Davenport..........  Thermal Imager.......  Public Safety.....       12,500.00
         Office.
        Sheldon Police Department...  Sheldon............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Kansas:
        Rose Hill Police Department.  Rose Hill..........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Washington County Sheriff's   Washington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
    Kentucky:
        Bourbon County Sheriff's      Paris..............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Office.
    Louisiana:
        District 8 Fire Department..  Rayville...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Grant Parish Sheriff's        Colfax.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
         Office.                                            Locator System.
        Jackson Parish Sheriff's      Jonesboro..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Lincoln Parish Sheriff's      Ruston.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Richland Parish Sheriff's     Rayville...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        Rosepine Police Department..  Rosepine...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        St. James Parish Sheriff's    Vacherie...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
         Office.                                            Locator System.
        West Monroe Police            West Monroe........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
    Maine:
        Ashland Police Department...  Ashland............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Westbrook Fire Rescue         Westbrook..........  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
         Department.                                        Locator System.
    Massachusetts:
        Burlington Police Department  Burlington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Fairhaven Police Department.  Fairhaven..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Gardner Police Department...  Gardner............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Granby Police Department....  Granby.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Nantucket Fire Department...  Nantucket..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Norwood Fire Department.....  Norwood............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Plymouth Police Department..  Plymouth...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Saugus Emergency Management   Saugus.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
         Agency.                                                                   Management.
        Wayland Police Department...  Wayland............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Michigan:
        Gogebic County Emergency      Bessemer...........  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
         Management.                                                               Management.
        Grosse lle Police Department  Grosse Ile.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Hampton Township Fire         Essexville.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Harper Woods Police           Harper Woods.......  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
         Department.                                        Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Kent County Sheriff's         Grand Rapids.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
    Minnesota:
        Annandale Fire Department...  Annandale..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Cleveland Police Department.  Cleveland..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Douglas County Sheriff's      Alexandria.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Elk River Police Department.  Elk River..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Hector Police Department....  Hector.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Mentor Volunteer Fire and     Mentor.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Fire Department...        3,700.00
         Rescue.
        Nicollet County Sheriff's     St. Peter..........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
         Office.                                            Locator System.
        Red Lake County Sheriff's     Red Lake Falls.....  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office/OEM.
        Winona County Sheriff's       Winona.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Winona Police Department....  Winona.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
    Mississippi:
        Clarkdale Fire & Rescue.....  Meridian...........  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        North Haven Volunteer Fire    New Albany.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Tippah County Sheriff's       Ripley.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    Missouri:
        Buchanan County Sheriff's     St. Joseph.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        JasCo Metropolitan Police     Oronogo............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Jonesburg Police Department.  Jonesburg..........  Advanced Portable      Law Enforcement...       10,200.00
                                                            Detector.
        Kelso Police Department.....  Kelso..............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Madison County Sheriff's      Fredericktown......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Park Hills Police Department  Park Hills.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Sni Valley Fire Protection    Oak Grove..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         District.
        Terre du Lac Fire and Rescue  Bonne Terre........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Nebraska:
        Cuming County Sheriff's       West Point.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Grand Island Police           Grand Island.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Hall County Sheriff's         Grand Island.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Hay Springs Police            Hay Springs........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Keith County Sheriff's        Ogallala...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Platte County Sheriff's       Columbus...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Wayne County Sheriff's        Wayne..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
    New Hampshire:
        Allenstown Police Department  Allenstown.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Durham Police Department....  Durham.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
    New Jersey:
        Cinnaminson Township Police   Cinnaminson........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Clark Police Department.....  Clark..............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Franklin Township Police      Pittstown..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Glen Ridge Police Department  Glen Ridge.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Magnolia Police Department..  Magnolia...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Ridgefield Police Department  Ridgefield.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Sea Girt Borough Police and   Sea Girt...........  Advanced Portable      Other.............       10,200.00
         Fire Departments.                                  Detector.
        Washington Township Police    Robbinsville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Waterford Township Fire       Atco...............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Waterford Township Police     Atco...............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
    New York:
        Harriman Police Department..  Harriman...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Melrose Fire District.......  Melrose............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        New Windsor Police            New Windsor........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    North Carolina:
        Beaufort Police Department..  Beaufort...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Forest City Fire Department.  Forest City........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        McDowell County Emergency     Marion.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
         Management.                                                               Management.
        Rocky Mount Police            Rocky Mount........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Rutherfordton Fire            Rutherfordton......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Trent Woods Police            Trent Woods........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
    North Dakota:
        New England Fire Department.  New England........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Stark County Sheriff's        Dickinson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    Ohio:
        Akron Police Department.....  Akron..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Beavercreek Police            Beavercreek........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Northwest Ambulance District  Geneva.............  Advanced Portable      Emergency Medical        10,200.00
                                                            Detector.              Services.
    Oklahoma:
        Enid Fire Department........  Enid...............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Marlow Police Department....  Marlow.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Owasso Fire Department......  Owasso.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Woodward Police Department..  Woodward...........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
    Oregon:
        Cascade Locks Fire &          Cascade Locks......  Thermal Imager.......  Other.............       12,500.00
         Emergency Medical Services.
        Hubbard Police Department...  Hubbard............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Illinois Valley Fire          Cave Junction......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         District.
        Malheur County Sheriff's      Vale...............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Oakland Rural Fire District.  Oakland............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Turner Police Department....  Turner.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                            Protective Equipment
                                                            Kit.
        Turner Rural Fire Protection  Turner.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         District.
    Pennsylvania:
        Bristol Township Police       Bristol............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Millersville Borough Police   Millersville.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Wilkes-Barre Police           Wilkes-Barre.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Wilkes-Barre Township Police  Wilkes-Barre.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
    Rhode Island:
        Bristol Police Department...  Bristol............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Cumberland Hill Fire          Cumberland.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         District.
        North Smithfield Fire &       North Smithfield...  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Rescue Service.
        Pawtucket Fire Department...  Pawtucket..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    South Carolina:
        Hardeeville Fire/Rescue.....  Hardeeville........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Tennessee:
        Lenoir City Police            Lenoir City........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Martin Fire Department......  Martin.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Milan Police Department.....  Milan..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Texas:
        Arp Marshal's Office........  Arp................  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
                                                                                   Management.
        Bosque County Constable's     Meridian...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office--Precinct 1.
        Brownsboro Police Department  Brownsboro.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Clifton Volunteer Fire        Clifton............  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
         Department.                                        Locator System.
        Cockrell Hill Police          Dallas.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Conroe Fire Department......  Conroe.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Crims Chapel Volunteer Fire   Henderson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Gainesville Police            Gainesville........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Hillsboro Fire/Rescue.......  Hillsboro..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Jacksboro Police Department.  Jacksboro..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Marietta Volunteer Fire       Marietta...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Meridian Fire Department....  Meridian...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Valley Mills Police           Valley Mills.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Victoria Police Department..  Victoria...........  Advanced Portable      Law Enforcement...       10,200.00
                                                            Detector.
        Wichita County Texas          Wichita Falls......  Search Camera Victim   Emergency                14,620.00
         Emergency Management.                              Locator System.        Management.
        Winters Police Department...  Winters............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Utah:
        Cedar City/Iron County Fire   Cedar City.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Emery County Sheriff's        Castle Dale........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        Helper Police Department....  Helper.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Morgan County Sheriff's       Morgan.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
    Virginia:
        Amherst County Sheriff's      Amherst............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Buena Vista Police            Buena Vista........  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
         Department.
        Cumberland County Sheriff's   Cumberland.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Emporia Police Department...  Emporia............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Henry County Sheriff's        Martinsville.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        King George Sheriff's Office  King George........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Washington:
        Bainbridge Island Police      Bainbridge Island..  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Department.
        Chelan County Sheriff's       Wenatchee..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Columbia County Sheriff's     Dayton.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Office.
        Colville Police Department..  Colville...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Colville Tribes Fire Rescue.  Nespelem...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Jefferson County Sheriff's    Port Hadlock.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
         Office.
        Kettle Falls Police           Kettle Falls.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Lakewood Police Department..  Lakewood...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Pierce County Fire District   Orting.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         18.
        San Juan County Sheriff's     Eastsound..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Fire Department...        3,700.00
         Office.
        San Juan Fire District 3....  Friday Harbor......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Stevens County Fire District  Hunters............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         2.
        Stevens County Fire           Clayton............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Protection District 1.
        Stevens County Sheriff's      Colville...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Emergency Medical         3,700.00
         Ambulance.                                                                Services.
        Sumas Police Department.....  Sumas..............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Tumwater Police Department..  Tumwater...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Walla Walla Police            Walla Walla........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
         Department.                                        Locator System.
    Wisconsin:
        Auburndale Joint Fire and     Auburndale.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Rescue Department.
        Chippewa Falls Fire and       Chippewa Falls.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
         Emergency Services.
        Chippewa Falls Police         Chippewa Falls.....  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Chippewa Fire District......  Chippewa Falls.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
        Cottage Grove Police          Cottage Grove......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Fox Valley Metro Police       Little Chute.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Department.
        Germantown Police Department  Germantown.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        McFarland Police Department.  McFarland..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Mishicot Police Department..  Mishicot...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Park Falls Police Department  Park Falls.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
        Sharon Police Department....  Sharon.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
        Stanley Fire Department.....  Stanley............  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
                                                            Locator System.
        Vernon County Emergency       Viroqua............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
         Management.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. What success have come out of the technology transfer
    program?
        Answer. The first award to 214 agencies of $2.0 million in
    equipment and training took place on May 19, 2005. The second award
    will take place in the coming weeks. A detailed evaluation is under
    development to determine the impact and cost effectiveness of the CEDAP
    program.

                                 CITIZENS CORP

        Question. For what, specifically, will the increase of $35 million
    for Citizens Corp in the fiscal year 2006 President's Request be used?
        Answer. The Citizen Corps Program (CCP) is the Department's grass-
    roots initiative to actively involve all citizens in hometown security
    through personal preparedness, training, and volunteer service. CCP
    funds support Citizen Corps Councils with efforts to engage citizens in
    preventing, preparing for, and responding to all hazards, including
    planning and evaluation, public education and communication, training,
    participation in exercises, providing proper equipment to citizens with
    a role in response, and management of Citizen Corps volunteer programs
    and activities. State and local governments have embraced the concept
    of Citizen Corps. They are developing the management capacity of the
    Councils, conducting public education, providing training for citizens,
    and engaging citizens through volunteer programs. However, there is a
    need to expand this effort to ensure that citizens are integrated in
    all aspects of State and local government preparedness, response and
    recovery and to support more significant community outreach through
    schools, private and public sector worksites, faith-based
    organizations, recreational outlets, and local media. The requested $50
    million is critical to meet the demand and build the capacity of
    preparing, training, and involving citizens. In the end, this will
    result in the development of a fully-prepared community, with citizens
    who are fully aware, trained and practiced on how to detect, deter,
    prepare for, and respond to all hazards and threats.

                                 BEST PRACTICES

        Question. As the Office of State and Local Government Coordination
    and Preparedness discovers lessons learned and best practices across
    the Nation regarding procurement and allocation of grant funding, are
    those practices being collected and made available for State and local
    governments to benefit?
        Answer. SLGCP currently has several avenues to identify and share
    grant-related best practices and lessons learned with its State and
    local grantees.
      --The office has analyzed the states' and territories' narrative on
            management capabilities responses included in the fiscal year
            2005 HSGP applications, including information on allocation of
            grant funding. SLGCP will provide each respondent with a
            written overview summary analysis that highlights best
            management practices and lessons learned. This overview will
            allow States to learn about approaches that are working
            successfully in other states. In addition to the overview,
            SLGCP will also provide a state-specific analysis of the
            management capabilities outlined in the applications.
      --SLGCP is developing a Program Management Handbook that includes
            guidelines for building strong program management
            infrastructures. These guidelines have been written to provide
            a common, flexible framework with potential for customization
            at the state, regional, and local levels. Best practices in
            program management will be collected and disseminated to
            support the implementation of the capabilities outlined in the
            Handbook.
      --ODP is exploring ways to provide procurement assistance including
            identification and dissemination of procurement best practices
            to help States develop streamlined procurement practices.
            Currently under development is procurement technical assistance
            including informational materials, tools and templates, and
            customized on-site guidance.

                  AIRBORNE RAPID IMAGING FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT

        Question. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on
    the World Trade Center, the State of New York utilized a technology
    that provided maps to first responders showing location, elevation, and
    temperature ranges of features on the ground within 8-10 hours after
    data collection. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of State
    and local Government Coordination and Preparedness provided $3 million
    in 2004 to demonstrate and further improve this technology by reducing
    turn around time through a system called the Airborne Rapid Imaging for
    Emergency Support (ARIES).
        What were the results of the ARIES flight demonstration that was
    conducted last November?
        Answer. The Airborne Rapid Imaging for Emergency Support (ARIES)
    program was a DHS-funded initiative to explore the technical
    feasibility of providing near real-time map-quality imagery for first
    responders in the event of a crisis. The program began in the spring of
    2004 and culminated with a technical demonstration on November 17, 2004
    at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey. The objectives of the demonstration
    were as follows:
      --Demonstrate the capacity to obtain digital imagery rapidly using
            commercial aircraft in a simulated emergency event.
      --Downlink this imagery directly from the aircraft to a receiving
            station using micro millimeter wave technology.
      --Process the raw, uncorrected imagery in a portable environment for
            use by existing DHS systems within 3 hours of acquisition.
      --Distribute the imagery to multiple agencies for emergency needs.
      --Provide on-site visualization, tracking, and information gathering
            capabilities to assist with any emergency response
            requirements.
        The demonstration satisfied the technical criteria for four of the
    five components. Distribution of the imagery was not successfully
    demonstrated. This was a technical demonstration that did not address
    the utility of ARIES' orthorectified imagery products to emergency
    responders.
        Overall, the ARIES program proved the technical feasibility of the
    concept. A final program report including a costing analysis of the
    ARIES concept was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis. The
    report is in the final review process and will be made available upon
    completion.
        Question. What is the current capability in Federal, state, or
    local government organizations or private industry to provide
    integrated digital imagery, lidar, and thermal information to first
    responders?
        Answer. Many types of imagery, acquired for particular uses, are
    available commercially to support first responders. The capability of
    various organizations to deliver this imagery directly to first
    responders varies significantly from State to state. However, the
    capability of first responders to receive it and do sophisticated
    analysis is limited because there is no end-to-end system in place to
    acquire process and deliver imaging products to the first response
    community. The DHS Geospatial Management Office (GMO) is currently
    conducting pilot programs to demonstrate delivery of geospatial
    products to first responders using wireless hand held devices.
        Question. What is the Department's need and plan to advance and
    utilize this technology?
        Answer. According to the DHS GMO, the simultaneous collection,
    processing and integration of Digital Electro-optical (EO) Imagery,
    Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) elevation data and Thermal Infrared
    (TIR) Imagery from a single aerial platform was demonstrated in the
    ARIES pilot. The ARIES demonstration provided a unique capability
    determined to be necessary in the aftermath of September 11. Imaging
    technologies are collected and used by Federal, State or local
    organizations in a variety of mapping applications or special studies.
    Currently, however, the acquisition, dissemination and use of airborne
    and space-borne sensor information for emergency response are mostly
    uncoordinated among levels of government, across jurisdictions and
    between mission areas.
        The DHS GMO is responsible for providing leadership and
    coordination in meeting the geospatial information requirements of
    those responsible for planning, prevention, mitigation, assessment and
    response to emergencies, critical infrastructure protection, and other
    functions of the Department. The GMO is working with the DHS components
    as well as other Federal, State and local organizations to understand
    the geospatial information needed to support their missions. The GMO
    developed the Geospatial User Needs Assessment Report which identified
    many of the needs. The GMO has also produced and is maintaining the
    Geospatial View of the Geospatial Enterprise Architecture which is a
    current view of the as-is and target geospatial information technology
    architecture for DHS. The DHS Geospatial Architecture view is
    referenced in the fiscal year 2005 HSGP and is being used as a model
    for the emerging Geospatial Profile. As the DHS and HLS architecture
    mature, rapid geospatial imagery acquisition requirements will be
    identified and services will be acquired.

                               HAZARD MITIGATION

        Question. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program provides critical
    funding to States following a declared natural disaster to assist them
    in reducing future disaster losses. The funding is an amount equivalent
    to a percentage of eligible FEMA funds. The funds provided are 75
    percent Federal and 25 percent local or State. Since the passage in
    December 2000 of the Disaster Mitigation Act which amended the Stafford
    Disaster Relief Act, FEMA has encouraged States to put forth the
    additional effort required to obtain an approved enhanced plan. Those
    with an enhanced plan would be eligible for an amount equivalent to up
    to 20 percent of eligible FEMA funds. Based on this incentive numerous
    States are working to obtain this goal. The fiscal year 2006
    President's Budget proposes language to reduce the percentage to up to
    12.5 percent.
        Since this incentive has been in the law for 4 years, why are you
    requesting this change now that some States have put forth significant
    commitment of already overburdened resources to achieve enhanced
    status?
        Answer. The President's Budget request preserves the 5 percent
    incentive for developing enhanced mitigation plans. The Hazard
    Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) now uses a 7.5-percent multiplier to
    calculate the amount of mitigation money available to a State after a
    disaster declaration, when the State has an approved basic mitigation
    plan. When the State has an approved enhanced mitigation plan, it is
    eligible for up to 12.5 percent. Both the Administration and Congress
    agreed to the 7.5 percent basic formula, which was changed from 15
    percent when Congress created the Pre-disaster Mitigation (PDM) program
    to provide additional funding for mitigation activities on a nationally
    competitive basis.
        The incentive was 5 percent when the program used a 15 percent
    baseline and when HMGP represented the primary means for States to
    receive Federal mitigation funds. The incentive remains 5 percent now.
    Under the old plan, only the States in which a disaster was declared
    were eligible. However, the availability of PDM grant funds allows the
    States to compete for mitigation funds without a Presidential disaster
    declaration. The budget request of up to 12.5 percent HMGP for the
    States with enhanced mitigation plans preserves the 5 percentage point
    incentive authorized in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
        Question. Which States have approved plans and which States are in
    the process of working on enhanced plans?
        Answer. All 50 States now have approved State Mitigation Plans. In
    addition, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin
    Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
    Islands, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands have approved state-
    level mitigation plans. (The Federated States of Micronesia is the only
    non-Tribal jurisdiction without an approved plan. FEMA Region IX
    expects to be able to approve it soon.)
        There are currently four States with approved enhanced mitigation
    plans: Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington. FEMA has recently
    reviewed enhanced plans from Maryland and Pennsylvania; however, they
    require revision prior to approval. The following States have advised
    FEMA that they may submit enhanced plans for review and approval within
    the next 6 months: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana,
    Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and
    Wisconsin. Arizona, California, Delaware, North Dakota, and Utah have
    expressed interest in developing enhanced mitigation plans, but, to
    date, such plans have not been received.
        Question. Were the States advised that you intended to reduce the
    incentive?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget is the first time
    that a specific percentage, other than 20 percent, has been
    communicated to the States working on enhanced plans. The incentive for
    an enhanced plan, however, remains 5 percent.

                            FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION

        Question. What is the schedule, by state, for implementation of the
    Flood Map Modernization Program?
        Answer. The schedule varies from State to State and changes from
    year to year. FEMA has developed a strong business planning process in
    which it works with the States and with other significant mapping
    partners to identify and schedule mapping projects jointly. FEMA then
    works with its partners to execute the plan based on the funding
    appropriated and makes adjustments twice a year to align schedules with
    current realities. FEMA balances stakeholder input with national and
    regional flood mapping needs to develop a nationwide plan for flood map
    update schedules and anticipated budgets. FEMA used stakeholder input
    to develop the initial plan, and received additional feedback on the
    plan that will be addressed in future updates. The current Multi-year
    Flood Hazard Identification Plan (MHIP), detailing the 5 year schedule
    and budget for developing the updated flood hazard data and maps, can
    be accessed online at http://www.fema.gov/fhm/mh_main.shtm.
        Question. Are we on track to complete this project within the
    projected timeframe of completion in fiscal year 2008 within the budget
    that has been appropriated and requested?
        Answer. FEMA is on track to complete the project by 2010, should
    the funding requested through 2008 be provided. That is, studies funded
    in 2008 are expected to be complete by 2010. The digital flood hazard
    data will meet quality standards contained in the MHIP. However,
    stakeholders have identified additional engineering requirements beyond
    what can be accomplished within this project. Data on these additional
    engineering requirements are being collected as FEMA coordinates with
    States and communities during the nationwide mapping effort. These data
    will provide the basis for evaluating future resource needs.
        Question. What sort of cooperation is happening with State and
    local governments?
        Answer. The map modernization effort is built upon constant
    collaboration between FEMA Headquarters and FEMA Regions I-X, the
    States and local entities, and the business planning process
    facilitates this collaboration. Many FEMA mapping partners are
    contributing not only to the flood map production process, but to the
    planning process as well. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004,
    FEMA provided more than $92 million directly to its Cooperating
    Technical Partners (CTPs) to develop flood map data in support of map
    modernization. Also, in 2002, as part of its broader effort to
    incorporate local, state, and regional involvement in flood mapping,
    FEMA asked the states, territories, and some CTPs with multi-
    jurisdictional responsibility for floodplain management to prepare map
    modernization plans. The plans included extensive flood mapping needs
    assessments that were developed pursuant to FEMA and other criteria. In
    early fiscal year 2004, FEMA made funds available through the Flood Map
    Modernization Management Support (FMMMS) program to these same entities
    to upgrade and update their plans. FEMA received a total of 55 plans
    covering 48 States and four of the five water management districts in
    Florida. FEMA also received plans from the District of Columbia and two
    Territories.
        The FMMMS program, with more than 50 partners, provides a means to
    ensure that partners can support Flood Map Modernization through
    administration and management activities. These activities, although
    not directly resulting in the production of a flood map, increase
    partners' investment and capability to manage their flood hazard data,
    strongly bolster the efforts of mapping partners, and ensure a
    tailored, local focus within a national program. Two of the most vital
    outcomes of FMMMS are the partners' ability to review program planning
    policy and guidance and their identification of needs as a part of
    their business planning process.
        Question. What will the maintenance cost of this program be once
    the modernization piece is completed?
        Answer. FEMA is currently estimating maintenance costs and will
    provide this information to the Office of Management and Budget as
    scheduled. The strong partnerships, business planning processes, and
    flood mapping technologies deployed as part of Flood Map Modernization
    will allow FEMA to improve its estimated maintenance costs as the
    program draws to completion. FEMA will continue to work with the States
    and communities to define the most efficient and effective approach for
    providing and maintaining up-to-date flood hazard information for the
    nation.

                            CERRO GRANDE FIRE CLAIMS

        Question. What is the unobligated balance of the Cerro Grande fire
    claims fund?
        Answer. As of April 30, 2005, the unobligated balance of the Cerro
    Grande fire claims fund is $36,559,305.
        Question. Is there a deadline for claims? If so, what is it?
        Answer. The deadline for filing claims (other than mitigation
    claims) with the Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims was August 28,
    2002. The deadline for filing mitigation claims was August 28, 2003.
        Question. If it has passed, what is the remaining balance of the
    fund?
        Answer. As of April 30, 2005, the remaining unobligated balance of
    the Cerro Grande fire claims fund is $36,559,305.
        Question. How many claims totaling how much are left to be resolved
    and what is the timeline for resolving those claims?
        Answer. FEMA has successfully processed 21,453 claims, including
    all administrative appeals. There are two claims left to be resolved.
    Those claims, totaling $5,249,866, were filed in the United States
    District Court for New Mexico. The resolution of these two cases
    depends on the schedule of the United States District Court. All of the
    4,529 subrogation claims have been processed, and 70 percent of each of
    those claims has been paid, leaving $34,509,270 as the remaining
    subrogation liability. The subrogation claims will be paid with funds
    remaining after the adjudication of the two claims in Federal Court.

                         PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANTS

        Question. Last year the Conferees expressed concern over the slow
    progress in awarding fiscal year 2003 Pre-disaster Mitigation Grants
    and over the unobligated balances that remained in the program. How
    much fiscal year 2004 funding has been released to date and how much
    remains unobligated in the program?
        Answer. To date, FEMA has not released any fiscal year 2004
    competitive grant funding ($131 million). Since the PDM funds are
    available until expended, FEMA is combining the remaining fiscal year
    2003 funds with the fiscal year 2004 funds and with the fiscal year
    2005 appropriation into a streamlined fiscal year 2005 PDM competitive
    grant program. Of the fiscal year 2004 appropriation of $149 million, a
    total of $137 million (competitive grants, administrative, and
    miscellaneous funding) remains unobligated.
        Question. For fiscal year 2005 funds, why is it taking so long to
    distribute the funds and how can the program be expedited?
        Answer. After completing the first competitive PDM process, FEMA
    began awarding the fiscal year 2003 grants in April 2004. The fiscal
    year 2003 appropriation, authorized in February 2003, directed FEMA to
    implement a PDM grant program in three parts: (1) a nationally
    competitive PDM grant program for state, territory, local government,
    and Indian tribal government projects and plans; (2) a nationally
    competitive PDM grant program for disaster-resistant university
    projects and plans; and (3) a one-time planning grant allocation to the
    states and territories. The PDM grants are awarded based on the results
    of a three-phase competition--eligibility and completeness review,
    technical evaluation, and national evaluation team review. The
    applications are ranked and announced, and subsequently, the applicants
    are notified that their application has been selected for funding. Once
    this takes place, the grant award process can begin. The majority of
    the fiscal year 2003 funds have been awarded; however, an additional
    $18.5 million will be awarded when ongoing Federally required
    environmental and historic preservation compliance reviews are
    complete. FEMA anticipates that this will be no later than the end of
    fiscal year 2005. At that point, FEMA will have funded all eligible
    fiscal year 2003 grant applications and approximately $11 million in
    fiscal year 2003 funds will remain.
        In response to the announcement of funds available for fiscal year
    2005, FEMA received 821 applications totaling nearly $517 million. FEMA
    conducted eligibility and completeness reviews in March 2005. Technical
    reviews in the areas of engineering, cost effectiveness, and
    environmental and historic preservation were conducted in March and
    April 2005. The National Evaluation will be conducted May 17-June 3,
    2005. Representatives from 27 states, 3 tribes, and 1 territory will
    participate in the National Evaluation process.
        Based on the eligibility, completeness, and technical reviews
    completed to date, FEMA expects that the selection of grants for award
    will be completed in June, after which pre-award activities and the
    obligation of grant awards will begin. Grants will be selected so that
    ultimately, all funds from fiscal year 2005 and prior years will be
    obligated.
        Federal environmental and historic preservation compliance
    requirements for project grants, as well as state-level grant
    processing requirements, are significant factors that can delay the
    obligation of grant funds to selected grantees. FEMA will work with
    grantees to complete these requirements expeditiously; however, for
    those grants that cannot be obligated in fiscal year 2005, FEMA will
    work to complete the requirements and to obligate the grant funds as
    early as possible in fiscal year 2006.

                                 FEMA PERSONNEL

        Question. Recently FEMA has experienced a large number of
    vacancies. In fiscal year 2004 and to date in fiscal year 2005 how many
    vacancies has FEMA experienced in headquarters and in the regions?
        Answer. At the end of fiscal year 2004, there were approximately
    357 vacancies agency-wide (not including Stafford Act employees). By
    mid-year of fiscal year 2005, FEMA had approximately 342 vacancies
    agency-wide.
        Question. Were any of those vacancies eliminated or transferred to
    other parts of DHS?
        Answer. Yes, some of the vacancies were transferred to the SLGCP at
    the start of fiscal year 2005.
        Question. Is so, what is the total number eliminated, and the total
    number transferred and to where?
        Answer. Sixteen vacancies were transferred to SLGCP at the start of
    fiscal year 2005.
        Question. How many vacancies does FEMA have as of April 20, 2005?
        Answer. As of April 20, 2005, FEMA has approximately 342 vacancies.
        Question. What is the current plan at FEMA for filling vacancies?
        Answer. FEMA will continue to fill vacancies and to maintain
    staffing levels sufficient to sustain its mission.
        Question. How has the vacancy of so many positions affected the
    ability to prepare and respond to disasters?
        Answer. FEMA still is able to maintain its mission capability.

                      IA'S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

        Question. In February 2004, the DHS IG noted that the mission of
    the IAIP Risk Assessment Division (RAD) overlaps in many ways with the
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), now called the National
    Counterterrorism Center. The TTIC was created through executive order
    in 2003. In August 2004, the IG noted that DHS is not playing a lead
    role in consolidating terrorist watch list information even though the
    Homeland Security Act called for DHS to play a major role in watch list
    consolidation. In December of 2004, the Intelligence Reform and
    Terrorism Prevention Act was signed by the President making sweeping
    changes in the intelligence community.
        With the Intelligence Reform Act and other executive orders
    stripping away most of the responsibilities of IA and placing them with
    the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening
    Center, what role does IA play in the intelligence community?
        Answer.
    The Role of DHS Office of Information Analysis in the Intelligence
            Community
        DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA) plays a leading role in the
    intelligence community for homeland security intelligence. The Office
    provides border, infrastructure, maritime and domestic threat analysis;
    fuses unique information from our components and our non-traditional
    stakeholders; and serves as the primary intelligence information
    provider to state, local, territorial and tribal governments and the
    private sector, as well as their advocate for intelligence information
    within the intelligence community. As I announced on July 12, 2005, I
    am committed to enhancing this role.
        DHS IA's role as a leader of homeland security intelligence within
    the intelligence community is likewise enhanced by the IRTPA 2004 and
    other executive orders; the greater integration of the intelligence
    community as a result of IRTPA 2004 will strengthen the ability of DHS
    IA to carry out its mission.
    IRTPA 2004 and the Integration of the Intelligence Community
        DHS IA is aggressively integrating into the intelligence community
    to ensure we can maximally contribute to the nation's security,
    especially in our unique areas of expertise (producing unique analysis
    and providing unique information), and to ensure we are able to most
    effectively leverage the expertise and support of the intelligence
    community on behalf of the Homeland Security mission and its
    stakeholders, especially those non-traditional stakeholders such as
    State, local, territorial, and tribal governments and the private
    sector (with whom we have unique partnerships).

    Integrating DHS IA Unique Analytic Expertise into the Intelligence
            Community
        DHS IA has ``forward deployed'' DHS intelligence analysts to our
    intelligence community partners, to include the National
    Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
    and to non-intelligence community members such as the TSC.
        These seasoned analysts are able to ensure our intelligence
    community partners have the benefit of our unique DHS analytic
    expertise in Border Security Intelligence, Infrastructure Security
    Intelligence, Maritime Security Intelligence (esp. through our Homeland
    Infrastructure Threat and Risk Assessment Center), and Domestic Threat
    Intelligence.
        We frequently collaborate with our partners when expertise is
    required in our unique analytic areas and we are fully engaged in
    ongoing community efforts to develop community production plans
    reflective of an efficient application of the community's resources.
    For example, DHS IA is fully participating in the NCTC led effort to
    develop a communitywide counterterrorism production plan; we are taking
    the lead in those areas that make use of our unique DHS analytic areas
    (borders, infrastructure, maritime and domestic threat, as appropriate)
    and partnering with other organizations on those topics that will be
    strengthen by including our experts' input.

    Working with NCTC and TSC on Analysis
        DHS IA has been a strong partner in NCTC since its inception as the
    Terrorist Threat Integration Center in January 2003. On a daily basis
    we levy the expertise resident in the NCTC to answer the needs of our
    customers--we focus on ensuring the best counterterrorism analysis in
    the government is put into a form, context and classification that is
    useful for our state, local, territorial and tribal governments and
    private sector partners. At the same time, we provide our substantial
    expertise to the NCTC on areas where we are the experts: borders,
    infrastructure, maritime, and domestic threat analysis. The result of
    this partnership is that we work together on many joint products--
    bringing the best expertise in the government to bear on behalf of our
    customers.
        DHS IA took a lead role in helping stand up the TSC, providing
    staff and support (to include a senior manager). Our experienced
    analysts in the TSC help ensure the success of its vital work in
    watchlist consolidation.
        DHS IA also conducts a valuable alternative analysis program; our
    Red Cell provides alternative analytic perspective to complement--and
    challenge--NCTC and others findings. Our Red Cell has received
    compliments for its insightful and adventurous thought--and this work
    is an essential component of the alternative analytic capability
    required under IRTPA 2004.

    Integrating DHS IA Unique Information into the Intelligence Community
        In parallel with our efforts to integrate DHS unique analytic
    expertise into the intelligence community, we are also moving forward
    in ensuring our vast DHS unique information holdings are made available
    to the intelligence community through direct access and quality
    reporting.
        DHS has vast information holdings, unique to this department,
    either as a result of our operational elements' investigations and
    enforcement operations or as a result of our unique position as the
    primary interface between the Federal Government and the State, local,
    territorial and tribal governments and private sector.
        DHS IA is working to ensure analysts throughout the intelligence
    community have access to our information holdings, while respecting the
    privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. In several cases, the
    Department has made operational elements' data holdings directly
    available to partner organizations in the intelligence community. In
    addition, DHS IA is establishing a reports officer program, focused on
    drawing information out of the department's information holdings and
    placing them into traditional intelligence community channels, through
    the Intelligence Information Reports vehicle. DHS IA has deployed
    trained reports officers into key departmental operational nodes to
    report counterterrorism information derived from border enforcement
    efforts and immigration investigations to the intelligence community.
    In the future, DHS IA will deploy trained reports officers throughout
    the components--and out into State and Local Fusion Centers--to ensure
    the all the department's relevant information is made available to
    those who need it, in a timely manner and in the channels analysts in
    the intelligence community are comfortable with and expect to receive
    reporting.

    Integrating DHS IA Unique Partnerships into the Intelligence Community
        DHS IA has been charged to be the primary Federal Government
    intelligence information provider to the State, local, territorial, and
    tribal governments and the private sector (a responsibility re-
    emphasized by IRTPA 2004)--and to be their advocate within the
    intelligence community. On a daily basis we are integrating our support
    for these customers into the larger intelligence community by working
    to ensure the free flow of information and products from the
    intelligence community out to our customers, by providing actionable
    intelligence, and by contextualizing intelligence to explain the
    product to our customers in terms they understand and working with our
    partners to produce the reports at the classification levels our
    stakeholders can use.
        We are also continually working to ensure our customers'
    requirements--whether they are for information or for finished analytic
    production--are represented in the intelligence community requirements
    statements, collection decks, and production plans. Our work in
    integrating the homeland security intelligence requirements of the
    state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and the private
    sector into the intelligence community requirements system is the first
    time these requirements have been systematically included and advocated
    for in the intelligence community.

    IRTPA 2004 and DHS IA Departmental Responsibilities
        In addition to our lead role for homeland security intelligence
    within the intelligence community, DHS IA maintains several key
    departmental support responsibilities--including a new role of leading
    and managing the departmental intelligence activities.
        Some of these key departmental roles include:
      --Providing direct support to the Secretary and department senior
            staff for policy, programmatic, and operational decision
            making.
      --Developing the plans, programs and policies required to build a
            unified, integrated DHS intelligence capability, which the
            Secretary has said will lie at the heart of the department's
            risk-based approach to securing the homeland.
      --Supporting the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). IA will
            continue to provide specific intelligence to the Secretary and
            the White House to enable timely changes in the threat level
            and support dissemination of this information to stakeholders.
            We will contribute to the function of Indications & Warning
            (I&W) in partnership with the HSOC.
      --Building out of the intelligence infrastructure for DHS
            headquarters.
      --Developing an Education, Training, and Career Workforce Management
            Program for DHS analysts and intelligence professionals.
        Finally, early reviews by the DHS OIG and concerns resulting from
    the changing roles and responsibilities of the NCTC and other
    organizations due to IRTPA 2004 and other executive orders are not
    reflective of the successes DHS IA has demonstrated as a leader within
    the intelligence community for homeland security intelligence. As
    stated above, our value added comes in our unique data and analytic
    expertise (border, infrastructure, maritime, and domestic threat
    analysis--analysis that has distinguished itself on several occasions
    and led the community toward the appropriate threat characterization),
    in providing our unique information (information never before available
    to the intelligence community and by which we have already contributed
    to successes in other agencies), and in partnering with our
    stakeholders--especially in our unique role as the primary Federal
    Government intelligence information provider to the state, local,
    territorial, and tribal governments and the private sector and in our
    role as their advocate within the intelligence community.
        We remain focused on our mission of leading the DHS intelligence
    activities in support of the department and its components, and for the
    full benefit of the state, local, territorial, and tribal governments
    and the private sector, to secure the homeland, defend our citizenry,
    and protect our critical infrastructure.
        Question. What role does the Homeland Security Operations Center
    (HSOC) serve in comparison to the NCTC?
        Answer. In contrast to the NCTC, the HSOC provides general domestic
    situational awareness, a common operational picture, and support to the
    IIMG and DHS Leadership, as well as acting as the primary conduit for
    the White House Situation Room and IIMG for domestic situational
    awareness. The HSOC will continue to collect domestic related
    suspicious activity reports, look at domestic terror threats and
    natural disasters, focusing efforts domestically. HSOC is the lead
    conduit to State and local agencies.
        Question. The FTE levels authorized for IAIP appear to be based on
    the larger role in intelligence gathering and analysis that was
    envisioned when IAIP was established. What is the justification to
    carry such a high number of FTE for intelligence analysis now that many
    functions envisioned by the Homeland Security Act have been placed at
    other agencies?
        Answer. IAIP's mission is an entirely new one, and it is a
    manpower-intensive effort owing to the vast size and scope of the
    threats to the homeland. IAIP is performing an intelligence mission
    never before attempted, and it is a mission that includes Federal,
    state, local, tribal entities as well as privately-held interests.
    Additionally, IAIP is responsible for intelligence pertaining to
    securing the borders of the United States, which is in itself an
    enormous undertaking. DHS and IAIP have been given the mission of
    producing intelligence analysis and products that simply did not exist
    before, and to do so with a ``target set'' that is staggering in its
    size and complexity. While the need to conserve resources is clear, the
    need to perform the analyses needed to ensure that our Homeland is
    prepared to detect, intercept, withstand, and, if necessary, recover
    from a terrorist attack is even more vital.

                               CHEMICAL SECURITY

        Question. Last year, I asked Secretary Ridge about his plans to
    address security at chemical plants and he told me that the private
    sector was taking care of it. Yet, the Department has no benchmarks to
    determine whether the private sector is taking steps to secure its
    facilities. In response to this apparent gap in our security, last
    year, I asked GAO to determine what steps are being taken by the
    private sector to protect the American people. The GAO concluded that
    for 93 percent of the industry, it is uncertain whether facilities are
    improving security at all. Only 1,100 of the 15,000 chemical facilities
    identified by the Department of Homeland Security are known to adhere
    to voluntary industry security procedures.
        It has been more than 2 years since the GAO urged the EPA and DHS
    to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of our chemical
    plants. Yet, little has been done.
        What are your plans to enhance security for the chemical sector?
        Answer. As part of the development of the NIPP, the Office of
    Infrastructure Protection (IP) has been tasked with authoring the
    Chemical Sector Specific Plan (SSP), which will outline the strategic
    guidance for securing the Chemical Sector.
        While the Chemical SSP is being developed, DHS continues to work
    within the Chemical Sector to enhance overall protective capability
    through several ongoing initiatives. To help guide the resource
    targeting of these initiatives, the Department is applying a risk
    management process that examines the likelihood of a given event and
    its potential consequences. This approach allows for the Department's
    protective efforts to be directed at those chemical facilities posing
    the greatest potential danger to the American public. Examples of these
    protective efforts include the following:
      --Site Assistance Visits (SAVs).--SAVs are visits to critical
            infrastructure facilities by DHS protective security
            professionals in conjunction with subject-matter experts and
            local law enforcement (LLE) to assist asset owner/operators in
            assessing vulnerabilities at their facilities. To date, SAVs
            have been conducted at 38 chemical facilities.
      --Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs).--BZPPs identify and recommend
            security measures for the area surrounding a facility (the
            ``Buffer Zone''), making it more difficult to plan or launch an
            attack. DHS trains LLE personnel on how to assess Buffer Zone
            security and provides a standardized template for use in the
            creation of a BZPP. To date, DHS has received BZPPs for 111
            chemical facilities, with BZPPs expected to be completed for
            the 289 highest-risk chemical facilities by the end of fiscal
            year 2005. In conjunction with the BZPP program, $14.5 million
            in grants have been provided to first preventers responsible
            for the protection of chemical facilities
      --Educational Reports.--Based on data gathered from SAVs and BZPPs,
            DHS has developed three types of educational reports for use by
            LLE and asset owner/operators to learn how to better secure CI/
            KR assets. Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities reports
            (CVs) identify common characteristics and vulnerabilities at
            specific types of CI/KR. Potential Indicators of Terrorist
            Activity reports (PIs) provide information on how to detect
            terrorist activity in areas surrounding CI/KR. Protective
            Measure (PM) reports identify best practices and other
            protective measures for use at specific CI/KR types. CVs and
            PIs have been developed for Chemical Facilities, Chemical
            Storage Facilities, and Chemical and Hazardous Materials
            Transportation. A PM report has been developed for the Chemical
            and Hazardous Materials Industry.
      --Facility Security Assessments/Facility Security Plans (FSAs/
            FSPs).--Pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
            2002 (MTSA), owners of chemical facilities located along
            waterways are required to complete FSAs and FSPs and submit
            them to the USCG for review and approval. FSPs must include
            security measures and procedures for responding to security
            threats. To date, USCG personnel have visited over 230 chemical
            facilities under the MTSA.
      --Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
            (RAMCAP).--DHS, in conjunction with the American Society for
            Mechanical Engineers, is developing the RAMCAP, a risk
            assessment methodology that will allow asset owners/operators
            to assess the security of their critical assets. Results from
            RAMCAP assessments will allow comparison of assets from across
            sectors, allowing for better prioritization of national CI
            protective efforts. The Chemical Sector module will be
            completed by the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2005.
      --Webcams.--Web-based cameras have been installed at ten high-risk
            chemical facilities in order to enable LLE and DHS to conduct
            remote surveillance of the buffer zone surrounding each
            facility during elevated threat levels.
      --Tabletop Exercises.--As part of DHS-IP's Exercise Program, tabletop
            exercises have been conducted at six chemical facilities. The
            findings from these exercises are compiled in After Action
            Reports which serve as a basis for planning future exercises;
            upgrading security plans and operating procedures; and taking
            corrective actions.
      --TIH Rail Security.--DHS, in conjunction with DOT, is supporting a
            variety of efforts to improve security for Toxic-by-Inhalation
            Hazards (TIH) rail shipments. These efforts include studying
            ways to make HAZMAT rail cars less identifiable; conducting
            vulnerability assessments for the high-risk urban areas where
            the largest quantities of TIH chemicals move by rail; a DC Rail
            Pilot Project involving a ``virtual fence'' with various
            sensors and monitors to help secure the DC rail corridor from
            potential incidents involving HAZMAT; and establishing TIH
            HAZMAT teams in the DC area.
      --Training.--DHS provides various training courses to asset owner/
            operators, State and local government officials, and LLE
            agencies responsible for the protection of chemical facilities.
            Such courses include: Terrorism Awareness and Prevention;
            Advanced Bomb Technician Training; Surveillance Detection; SWAT
            Operations; and Underwater Hazardous Device Search Training.
      --Private Sector Initiatives.--In addition to protective activities
            led by DHS or other Federal entities, asset owner/operators in
            the Chemical Sector are voluntarily undertaking a variety of
            security initiatives. Chief among these is performance of self-
            assessments using the Responsible Care Security Code (Security
            Code). This code, developed by one of the Chemical Sector's
            largest trade associations, is designed to help chemical
            facilities improve their security using a risk-based approach
            to identify, assess, and address vulnerabilities; prevent or
            mitigate incidents; and enhance training and response
            capabilities. Implementation of the Security Code is a
            prerequisite for membership in some of the sector's largest
            industry associations. Recently, DHS reached a tentative third
            party verification agreement with two of these associations
            (the American Chemistry Council and the Chlorine Institute).
        Question. Will legislation be proposed to Congress that sets
    security standards across the industry?
        Answer. At this time, our non-regulatory partnerships with industry
    are producing results. However, DHS has concluded that the existing
    patchwork of authorities does not permit us to regulate the industry
    effectively. Accordingly, DHS has agreed to work with Congress to
    assess the need for a carefully measured, risk-based regulatory regime
    in the chemical sector designed to close the existing gaps and develop
    enforceable performance standards to reduce risk across the chemical
    sector.
        Question. Do you agree that the Department must establish
    benchmarks to assess both the private sector's and Federal Government's
    role in securing the chemical sector?
        Answer. DHS believes facility chem site security should be based on
    reasonable, clear, equitable performance standards. Enforceable
    performance standards should be based on the types and severity of
    potential threats posed by terrorists, and facilities should have the
    flexibility to select among appropriate site-specific security measures
    that will effectively address those threats.

                          BUFFER ZONE PROTECTION PLANS

        Question. DHS recently released $92 million in Buffer Zone
    Protection Plan grants. Of the 1,849 grants, provide a chart that shows
    the distribution of grants and the funding by critical infrastructure
    sector.
        Answer. Please see table below.

                                 BREAKDOWN OF BZPPS BY SECTOR FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004-2005
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Number of      Percent of        Approx.
                                 SECTOR                                  sites \1\         sites        funding \2\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Agriculture & Food..............................................               5            0.27        $250,000
    Banking & Finance...............................................              41            2.20       2,050,000
    Chemical & Hazardous Materials Industry.........................             272           14.62      13,199,870
    Commercial Assets...............................................             880           47.29      43,592,631
    Dams............................................................               7            0.38         350,000
    Defense Industrial Base.........................................               6            0.32         300,000
    Emergency Services..............................................               5            0.27         202,975
    Energy..........................................................             213           11.45      10,550,954
    Government Facilities...........................................             142            8.28       7,100,000
    Information Technology..........................................               5            0.27         250,000
    National Monuments & Icons......................................              10            0.54         500,000
    Nuclear Power Plants............................................              92            4.94       4,423,802
    Postal Shipping.................................................               2            0.11         100,000
    Public Health...................................................              23            1.24       1,117,506
    Telecommunications..............................................               5            0.27         250,000
    Transportation..................................................              98            5.27       4,836,168
    Water...........................................................              43            2.31       2,150,000
                                                                     -----------------------------------------------
          TOTALS....................................................           1,849          100.00     $91,223,906
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The exact composition of the fiscal year 2004-05 BZPP list is still evolving; the current sector breakout is
      a snapshot, but will not change substantially.
    \2\ Subject to prioritization decisions of 18 States and 1 territory that have elected to prioritize their
      assets, an exact sector breakdown is not currently available. A total of $91,315,793 is available under the
      grant program.

        Question. Does DHS plan to broaden the criteria for receiving
    grants to include the gross consequence of an attack and other
    vulnerabilities?
        Answer. In determining where to target its protection resources,
    DHS applies a risk management process that examines the likelihood of
    attack and its potential consequences. This approach allows the
    department's protective efforts to be directed at those facilities
    posing the greatest potential danger to the public. DHS is continuing
    to improve data collection in support of risk analysis, and to refine
    our risk assessment methodologies to ensure resources are being spent
    where they are most needed.

                          MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

        Question. The fiscal year 2006 congressional justification shows
    that $1 million will be spent on ``Purchases from Government Accounts''
    and $19 million for fiscal year 2006. In response to reprogramming
    questions, IAIP adjusted the number for ``Purchases from Government
    Accounts'' to $20.2 million. Provide a detailed chart on what the $20.2
    million will buy in fiscal year 2005 and what the $19 million will buy
    in fiscal year 2006.
        Answer. In fiscal year 2005, the reprogramming of $20.2 million
    into ``Purchases from Government Accounts'' includes funding for
    facilities, Project Management Office, and IT costs. In fiscal year
    2006, the $19 million in ``Purchases from Government Accounts'' will
    fund the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN).

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year 2005:
        Homeland Secure Data Network........................      $7,500,000
        Shared Services.....................................       2,000,000
        Facilities..........................................       4,500,000
        WCF Contribution....................................       7,700,000
        IT NCR ops..........................................         500,000
                                                             ---------------
          Total.............................................      22,200,000
                                                             ===============
    Fiscal year 2006: Homeland Secure Data Network..........      19,400,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Explain the large increases in fiscal year 2006 for
    equipment and land and structures.
        Answer. The $38 million funding request does not support the design
    and construction phases of facilities projects. Department Operations
    requests funds for the facilities design, basic tenant improvements
    (construction/renovation), physical security upgrades, and emergency
    power requirements for facilities IAIP will occupy at the Nebraska
    Avenue Complex (NAC). The IAIP facilities funding is requested to
    support the costs of occupying facilities, both on and off the NAC,
    once they are ready, including fit out costs such as furniture,
    computers and other Information Technology (IT), and the operations and
    maintenance costs (rent, security, IT support) associated with occupied
    facilities. Specifically, the operations and maintenance portion of the
    IAIP facilities funding covers electric costs for additional air
    conditioning required due to the technology requirements in IAIP spaces
    (HSOC and server requirements), maintenance for the secure, up to date
    unclassified and classified Local Area Networks, IT desktop services,
    as well as required janitorial services. The tenant improvement portion
    of this funding covers the mentioned fit out costs and ensures
    facilities capable of meeting both the classified and unclassified
    space and technology requirements in recognition of the fact that IAIP
    is an IT and security intensive tenant. These costs include IT
    infrastructure and cabling, IT equipment, security, IT certification
    and accreditation, furniture, data migration and relocation costs. The
    request does not pertain to land, as IAIP is a tenant in GSA-controlled
    facilities.

                               CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

        Question. In response to fiscal year 2005 reprogramming inquiries,
    IAIP reported that there are 564 contractors supporting the program
    function of IAIP, 138 of which are funded through the Management &
    Administration account and 426 through the Assessments and Evaluations
    Account.
        Of the 426 in the A&E account, what is the distribution of contract
    support by portfolio?
        Answer. Please see chart below.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Contract
                             Account                              support
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Management & Administration.............................             138
                                                             ===============
    Assessments and Evaluations.............................             426
        Homeland Security Operations Center.................              32
        Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnerships...              74
        Cyber Security......................................              78
        NS/EP Telecommunications............................              32
        National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis                   24
         Center; Protective Actions; Critical
         Infrastructure; Identification and Evaluation;
         Biosurveillance....................................
        Threat Determination and Assessment; Evaluations and             186
         Studies; Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk
         Assessment.........................................
                                                             ===============
          Total.............................................             564
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. What makes these positions not inherently governmental
    positions?
        Answer. The support personnel listed against the programs are
    performing services consistent with Appendix B to Office of Federal
    Procurement Policy (OFPP) policy letter 92-1. On-site contractor
    personnel only perform support functions to IAIP and do not perform any
    activities that are considered inherently governmental. IAIP is
    currently covering significant portions of the workload associated with
    open authorized FTE positions (which are inherently governmental)
    through significant workload sharing of on-board FTE and use of
    contractors to support non inherently governmental functions of those
    same FTEs. The mix of contractor support staff will change as programs
    progress and as new tasks are levied, and workloads will redistribute
    to more logical and efficient workflows as FTEs come on-board. Although
    the current work flow arrangements are difficult, they are working due
    to the dedication and professionalism of the current FTE workforce.
    IAIP is aware of its responsibilities under the FAIR Act (A-76) and we
    annually review functions for inherently governmental versus commercial
    activities.

                          ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS

        Question. The budget request shows--$137.404 million in Adjustments
    to Base. For each adjustment on page 76 of the congressional
    justification for IAIP, explain the reduction or increase.
        Answer. Please note that all dollars are in thousands.

              CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A decrease of $4,789 is due in part to contractor               ($4,789)
     savings created by the increased number of FTE
     positions for Field Security Detachments.
     Additionally, further savings are garnered by the
     joint funding of Protective Security Task Forces
     (PSTFs) between Critical Infrastructure Identification
     and Evaluation (CIIE) and Public Actions (PA). There
     are elements of the PSTF program that align with CIIE
     such as the identification of critical infrastructure
     and the CI/KR expertise of the PSTF team members.
     However, the overarching emphasis of the PSTF mission
     is the implementation of protective measures at high
     priority CI/KR in light of emerging threats. In fiscal
     year 2006 the program will be funded jointly between
     CIIE and PA, but the entire program will be
     transitioned to PA in fiscal year 2007. This is an
     attempt of IP to better align our programs with the
     budget structure......................................
    A decrease of $899 will be transferred to S&T to                   (899)
     support Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
     Testing within Cyber Security, responsible for
     securing the U.S. industrial systems that have become
     increasingly dependent on powerful, electronic
     communications tools, the internet, and supervisory
     control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems..........
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................          (5,688)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

      NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER ADJUSTMENTS TO
                                      BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Travel, includes all costs of transportation of                     ($5)
     persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental
     travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel
     regulations. In fiscal year 2004 travel for
     Headquarters personnel was funded from M&A, but has
     been transferred to A&E for fiscal year 2005 and
     fiscal year 2006......................................
    Advisory and Assistance Services; the fiscal year 2006           (3,995)
     request includes decreases due to decreases in program
     advisory services and transfers of shared service
     expenses from A&E back to M&A.........................
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................          (4,000)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       BIOSURVEILLANCE ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Adjustments...................................            $147
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................             147
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fiscal year 2006, the PA program is reduced by              ($53,000)
     $53,000 to establish the new TIP program administered
     by the SLGCP. TIP grants will be used by state/local/
     territorial/tribal entities to procure goods and
     services determined necessary by IAIP's BZPP process.
     Previously, these goods and services which reduce the
     vulnerability to terrorist threats around certain high
     vulnerability critical infrastructures and key assets
     within the state/local/tribal jurisdiction were funded
     by assistance from IAIP. The TIP program will also
     result in a $3,000 savings in program consultation
     support costs.........................................
    A decrease of $41,500 for Emerging Pilot Projects and    ...............
     Technology Application Pilots saving initiative.......
    Technology pilots will be a cooperative effort with S&T  ...............
     for the development of new technologies for protective
     measures. This effort is funded within S&T............
    Emerging Pilot Projects has evolved into the Protective  ...............
     Measures Demonstration Pilots project which takes
     advantage of innovative uses of existing protective
     methods and commercially available equipment and
     technology to enhance the security of CI/KA...........
    A pilot project would take technology already developed  ...............
     for a specific use and apply it to fill gaps in
     protective security and evaluate the effectiveness and
     benefits in ``real life'' or field environments as
     they relate to IP objectives and priorities.
     Protective Security Pilots are developed from gaps and
     protection shortfalls identified in interdependency
     analysis and consequence of attack analysis as
     directed by the NIPP, and also from BZPPs, SAVs, and
     needs identified by Sector Specific Agencies. Pilots
     are meant to demonstrate solutions for vulnerabilities
     that cross sectors and stakeholders. Once the means of
     mitigating the vulnerability is established and
     proven, the solution is disseminated to all entities
     that have similar vulnerabilities so that the
     strategies can be integrated in their respective risk
     management strategies.................................
    IP is the Sector Specific Agency for 3 sectors                  (41,500)
     (chemical, nuclear, and commercial assets) and is also
     responsible for cross-sector protection as detailed in
     the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. IP is
     responsible for increasing the general level of
     protection for CI/KR sites absent of specific threat
     and is also responsible for addressing specific threat
     events. PSD's intention in fiscal year 2006 is to
     address the most critical vulnerabilities identified
     by vulnerability assessments and BZPPs in fiscal year
     2005 within the sectors that IP is directly
     responsible for, including chemical, nuclear and
     commercial sectors. Other individual sectors and cross-
     sector vulnerabilities will also be addressed with the
     demonstration of pilot protective measures based on
     intelligence and threat information. As directed by
     the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and
     HSPD-7, demonstration pilots are also taken on by PSD
     to mitigate specific vulnerabilities across sectors as
     the dynamic threat environment changes................
    A Decrease of $9,800,000 for Regional Protective         ...............
     Actions...............................................
    Pilot programs to establish regional centers for use by          (9,800)
     local law enforcement entities will not be continued
     in fiscal year 2006. The performance impact will be
     negligible as PSD will maintain close contact with
     local police and protective security agencies through
     the use of the outreach program, training programs,
     Site Assistance Visits, the BZPP program and visits by
     Protective Security Advisors and other DHS personnel.
     DHS also conducts seminars and conferences in order to
     maintain contact with State and local agencies. PSD
     has developed close working relationships with local
     police agencies and will continue to foster and
     maintain these relationships in the future............
    Technical Adjustments..................................           4,052
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................        (100,248)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

      CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OUTREACH AND PARTNERSHIPS ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Adjustments..................................            $885
    The cost of maintaining the data center which was               (35,000)
     funded in fiscal year 2005, in the CIOP program, and
     initiated under the direction of the Department's CIO
     is not requested in fiscal year 2006..................
    A $13,800 reduction in CIOP results from a                      (13,800)
     restructuring and completion of analytical tasks,
     institutionalization of partnership relationships, and
     implementation of management efficiencies.............
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................         (47,915)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       CYBER SECURITY ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Adjustments...................................            $969
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................             969
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  NS/EP TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Advisory and assistance services includes services to             $1,807
     support Executive Order 12472, which provides authority
     for the National Communications System (NCS) to
     initiate telecommunications service priority programs
     such as Wireless Priority Service (WPS) and Government
     Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS). GETS and
     WPS are essential telecommunications services to
     support restoration and recovery following catastrophic
     events.................................................
    Travel..................................................              57
    Technical Adjustments...................................              14
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................           1,878
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

             THREAT DETERMINATION AND ASSESSMENT ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Information can be provided under separate cover upon           ($2,043)
     request...............................................
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................          (2,043)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

      INFRASTRUCTURE VULNERABILITIES & RISK ASSESSMENTS ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Information can be provided under separate cover upon             $3,267
     request................................................
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................           3,267
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

             COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Information can be provided under separate cover upon           ($4,000)
     request...............................................
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................          (4,000)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   EVALUATIONS AND STUDIES ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Information can be provided under separate cover upon            $20,139
     request................................................
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................          20,139
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

             HOMELAND SECURITY OPERATIONS CENTER ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Description                           Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Adjustments..................................           ($192)
                                                            ----------------
          Total Adjustments to Base........................            (192)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

            INFORMATION SHARING AND COLLABORATION ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Description                          Adjustment
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Technical Adjustments...................................            $282
                                                             ---------------
          Total Adjustments to Base.........................             282
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. The budget proposes a decrease of $41.5 million for
    Emerging Pilot Projects and Technology Application Projects with the
    understanding that ``this effort is funded within S&T.'' There is no
    budget transfer into S&T for this purpose. Is this just a simple
    reduction in this area?
        Answer. The Emerging Pilot Projects and Technology Application
    Projects are designed to review existing technologies and help get
    appropriate protective measures in the field in a usable manner. These
    pilots and projects identify commercially available or emerging
    technologies and determine if they can be successfully used to
    eliminate existing vulnerabilities in a real-world situation. These
    projects will allow DHS to expand the potential protective measures
    that can be deployed and to fill existing identified operational gaps.
    The Technology Application Projects identify commercially available
    technology and determine if the technology can be applied in the field
    to fill real needs. The Emerging pilots are required to ensure that any
    new technology is deployed to the field with appropriate methods and
    restrictions to allow the state, local, or commercial operators to
    successfully implement the new technologies. Aspects for successfully
    technology deployment require: pilots to determine the usefulness of a
    technology under various conditions; personnel training for deployment
    and effective use; monitoring methods or personnel required; required
    response time; technology calibration information; maintenance cycle
    and manuals, etc.

                              NOAA WEATHER RADIOS

        Question. Virtually none of the funding appropriated for NOAA
    radios as been obligated by IAIP. Why does this funding remain
    unobligated?
        Answer. IAIP has obligated the procurement and shipment of NOAA
    ``All Hazard'' radios to schools across the country. Specifically, a
    $500,000 pilot program has been funded to disseminate these radios to
    all the K-12 public schools in certain UASI cities and two rural
    states. The radios will arrive in September, which coincides with the
    start of the school year and National Preparedness Month. These radios
    regularly disseminate weather related information and can now broadcast
    official DHS alert and warning information. (DHS/IAIP and Commerce/NOAA
    entered into a MOA in 2004 that provides for DHS message dissemination
    over NOAA's All Hazard Radio and also over FEMA's local Emergency Alert
    System.) IAIP, NOAA, Department of Education, DHS Citizen Corps, DHS
    Procurement, DHS Grants Office, and other DHS entities have been in
    regular contact regarding this effort for over a year. After lessons
    have been learned from this initial pilot, additional IAIP alert and
    warning funds ($1.5 million) will be used for radio procurement for
    other schools across the country. This $2 million obligation for the
    radios and the $18 million transferred to FEMA for program management
    of other alert and warning projects represent all IAIP funding to
    improve alert and warning for the general public.

                      VIOLATING THE DHS APPROPRIATIONS ACT

        Question. Congress and this Committee take very seriously the
    constitutional powers bestowed on the legislative branch to enact laws.
    Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 States that ``No money shall be drawn
    from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.''
        Since the beginning of fiscal year 2005, the Department, on several
    occasions, has violated legislative provisions set forth in the fiscal
    year 2005 Homeland Security Act. For example, Section 503 of the Act
    sets strict reprogramming and transfer guidelines restricting the
    ability of the Department to reallocate appropriated dollars from one
    program to another without congressional notification. In fiscal year
    2005, DHS has violated that provision on more than one occasion. In one
    instance, DHS stood up a brand new office, called the Domestic Nuclear
    Detection Office, which has been reporting directly to the Secretary.
    The start-up costs for this office were taken from funds appropriated
    to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. Within the
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Office, the
    Department reallocated funding from an appropriation that pays salaries
    to its employees to start a new program called Information Sharing and
    Collaboration. Section 507 of the fiscal year 2005 Act requires DHS to
    notify Congress on any contract or grant in excess of $1 million 3
    business days before it is announced. This provision is an important
    tool for Congress to keep track of the vast amount of contract and
    grant funding appropriated to the Department. On several occasions, the
    Committee has become aware of grants or contracts through the press
    after the award had been made and without a notification to Congress.
    In addition, the S&T Directorate spends the majority of its $1 billion
    annual appropriation on R&D contracts and grants. Through January 31 of
    this year, the S&T Directorate expended nearly $120 million, yet the
    Committee has received only 1 grant notifications and 1 contract
    notification.
        Mr. Secretary, I don't expect that you were apprised of these
    violations nor will you be able to comment on them today. My questions
    is however, will you look into this pattern of negligence and develop a
    plan within your office to ensure that the Department will follow the
    letter of the law as enacted by the U.S. Congress and signed by the
    President of the United States? As part of your transition review, will
    you develop a plan to avoid other violations similar to the examples I
    described?
        Answer. The Department takes seriously its responsibility to adhere
    to the reporting requirements referred to in this question. One of the
    key imperatives that will drive this Department is to improve DHS'
    stewardship, particularly with respect to financial management.
    Likewise, improving communications with Congress, including the timely
    provision of information such as reports and reprogrammings are
    important, and will be improved. The Department has already put in
    place new mechanisms to better track and more aggressively manage
    reports assigned to DHS by Congress. DHS considers this an important
    priority and is dedicating significant focus and attention toward
    ensuring reports are sent to Congress in a timely manner. With respect
    to the DNDO, the Department provided a reorganization notification and
    a reprogramming notification, and withheld spending resources for any
    DNDO activities, including the setting up a DNDO, during the required
    waiting period. Congress repeated this message in its action on the
    supplemental in May, and the Department has abided by the requirements
    and deadlines in that bill and report.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

                      IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

        Question. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been
    plagued by budget problems basically since the creation of your
    department. ICE has had a hiring freeze in place since last year and it
    is unclear when it will be lifted, and only a significant reprogramming
    request allows it to balance its books for the current fiscal year. Of
    course, these funding problems are occurring while members of Congress
    from both parties have emphasized the importance of enforcing our
    immigration laws in the interior.
        How will you ensure that ICE has the funding it needs to perform
    its mission?
        Answer. I am committed to ensuring that ICE has the funding it
    needs to perform its mission. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget,
    which includes $205 million to address base requirements within the
    agency, along with fiscal year 2005 supplemental funding, will assure
    that ICE has the necessary funding.
        Question. Does the Administration's fiscal year 2006 request
    provide sufficient funds to avoid another large reprogramming request
    next year?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2006 request provides sufficient funds to
    avoid another large reprogramming request in fiscal year 2006.

                               ALL-STATE MINUMUM

        Question. I was disappointed that President Bush' proposed budget
    for fiscal year 2006 reduces from 0.75 percent to 0.25 percent the all-
    state minimum formula, which I authored, in applying it to the programs
    under the State Homeland Security Grant Program. This formula assures
    that each State receives a minimum of 0.75 percent of those grants to
    help support their first responders' basic preparedness needs.
        Not only would this change result in the loss of millions in
    homeland security funding for the fire, police and rescue departments
    in small- and many medium-sized states, but also deal a crippling blow
    to their efforts to build and sustain their terrorism preparedness.
        Mr. Secretary, does this Administration want to shortchange rural
    states, rolling back the hard-won progress we have begun to make in
    homeland security by slashing the protections provided to us by the
    all-state minimum?
        Answer. For fiscal year 2006, DHS proposes to redesign the homeland
    security funding process to award State HSGP funds based on an
    evaluation of risk and needs. The intent of this approach is to change
    the way DHS invests its limited homeland security resources in order to
    achieve the greatest return on investment for our nation's homeland
    security. This is consistent with recommendations from the 9/11
    Commission, which contends that Federal homeland security assistance
    should supplement State and local resources based on the risks or
    vulnerabilities that merit additional support. As proposed, fiscal year
    2006 awards will be based on a relative evaluation of risk and
    application-based review of need with no State receiving less than 0.25
    percent. DHS will consider risk factors such as threat, presence of
    critical infrastructure, vulnerability, population and population
    density, international borders, and ports of entry in making final
    award determinations. In the consideration of need, DHS will undertake
    an assessment with the States and territories to identify their
    capabilities and gaps consistent with the capabilities and tasks
    identified under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8. In
    addition, at least 20 percent of funds awarded will be dedicated to
    support law enforcement terrorism prevention activities. Overall, this
    approach will result in the achievement of the highest possible
    readiness to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
    major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and
    the economy.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, would you agree that homeland security is
    a national responsibility shared by all states, regardless of size?
        Answer. Yes, DHS strongly believes that homeland security is not
    only a Federal responsibility, but it requires collective national and
    even international action. The protection of our citizens, our critical
    infrastructure, our businesses, and our communities is a shared
    responsibility, requiring Federal, state, local, international, and
    private sector partnerships. The partnership required to protect the
    homeland involves sharing information as well as responsibility. For
    that reason, allocation of State and local grant funding should reflect
    the best available data and analysis of the threats, risks, and unmet
    needs--not static formulas.
        Question. Mr. Secretary, do you agree that each State has basic
    terrorism preparedness needs and, therefore, a minimum amount of
    domestic terrorism preparedness funds is appropriate for each state?
        Answer. The President's Request proposes a 0.25 percent allocation
    to be provided to each State as a supplement to State and local
    resources allocated to domestic preparedness. DHS resources should be
    used to enhance basic levels of preparedness and not to supplant State
    and local responsibilities. In addition, the Department believes that
    States and urban areas should focus on a set of collective capabilities
    needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from a
    terrorist attack or catastrophic event. Through the newly-developed
    Interim National Preparedness Goal and the accompanying National
    Planning Scenarios and Target Capabilities List, the Nation will begin
    to implement a coordinated approach to national preparedness, utilizing
    a risk-based and regional methodology.
        Question. If you do not support applying the 0.75 percent minimum
    to the State Formula Grants Program, what compromise between 0.75
    percent and 0.25 percent for the distribution of funds would you
    support?
        Answer. The DHS proposal to reduce the minimum State allocation
    from 0.75 percent to 0.25 percent is based on the redesign of the
    homeland security program to support a risk and need-based approach to
    funding. Factors such as threat, presence of critical infrastructure,
    vulnerability, population, borders, and POEs will be used to make final
    award determinations. An increase in the base percentage allocation
    would result in a reduction in resources available for those States
    with the greatest risk and needs. Therefore, DHS believes that raising
    the minimum allocation is not conducive to maintaining maximum
    readiness.

                           FIRST RESPONDERS (GENERAL)

        Question. President Bush often says that he wants to ensure that
    our State and local first responders receive the resources necessary to
    do the job the American public expects them to do. I find that hard to
    believe, though, when I read that he proposes a $455 million overall
    cut in funds for State Homeland Security Grant Program, Law Enforcement
    Terrorism Prevention Program, Emergency Management Performance Grants
    and other programs SLGCP Office that directly benefit police, fire and
    medical rescue units. The Administration argues this is justified
    because it does not believe those funds are ``targeted'' to homeland
    security capabilities.
        I believe, however, that the current Administration has failed to
    make first responders a high enough priority by consistently
    underfunding homeland security efforts of every state.
        The Hart-Rudman Terrorism Task Force Report argued that our Nation
    will fall approximately $98.4 billion short of meeting critical
    emergency responder needs through this decade's end if current funding
    levels are maintained. Clearly, the domestic preparedness funds
    available are still not enough to protect from, prepare for and respond
    to future domestic terrorist attacks anywhere on American soil.
        Would you agree, Mr. Secretary, that to be truly protected from,
    prepared for and able to respond to terrorist attacks we must look to
    increase the funds to our Nation's State and local first responders,
    rather than decrease them, as proposed by the President?
        Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request includes
    $3.6 billion for SLGCP to continue our strong commitment and support to
    the nation's emergency prevention and response community. Of this
    amount, $1.02 billion is for the State HSGP, which has been
    significantly redesigned to award funds based on risk and need, while
    aligning with national priorities. An additional $1.02 billion is for
    the continuance of the UASI, which targets funds to the nation's
    highest risk urban areas. Further, the President's request provides
    $600 million for a new TIP Program to supplement state, local, and
    private sector infrastructure protection efforts based on critical
    vulnerabilities. The fiscal year 2006 request also includes a strong
    commitment to our nation's fire service by providing $500 million for
    the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. The request includes $50
    million the CCP and $170 million for the EMPG. For continuation of our
    commitment to training our nation's first responders, the request
    includes $94.3 million for SLGCP's State and Local Training Program.
    The request also includes $59 million for the National Exercise
    Program, which includes support for State and local exercises and for
    the National Top Officials exercise series. Finally, the request
    includes $10.6 million for technical assistance initiatives for State
    and local agencies and $14.3 million for program evaluation and
    assessments. Between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2004 the SLGCP
    awarded homeland security grants totaling $6.1 billion. In fiscal year
    2005, SLGCP anticipates awarding an additional $3.64 billion in grants.
    We believe, at this point, that funding provided to our nation's first
    responders has been sufficient to address their critical needs.

                                 BORDER PATROL

        Question. The intelligence reform bill Congress passed and the
    President signed last December mandated an increase of 2,000 Border
    Patrol agents in fiscal year 2006, with an increase of 400 agents at
    the Northern Border. The President's budget for DHS would pay for an
    increase of slightly more than 200 agents, or about 10 percent of what
    Congress called for. None of these new agents would be deployed on our
    Northern Border.
        Why does the Administration believe that an increase of about 200
    agents is sufficient to secure our borders?
        Answer. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
    CBP Border Patrol has accelerated its efforts in increasing its
    enforcement presence along the northern border to achieve the
    definitive goal of operational control, and the number of agents
    allowing the northern border more than tripled. DHS is completing work
    on comprehensive immigration reform, which calls for additional new
    hires. We have supported additional agents in fiscal year 2006
    consistent with both House and Senate appropriation marks for CBP
    hiring.
        Question. Would additional agents beyond the number proposed by the
    President be useful to the Department's efforts to prevent illegal
    entry into the United States?
        Answer. The Department appreciates the 500 additional agents funded
    in the Emergency Supplemental. As noted above, the Department is in the
    midst of a systems-level review of its border control architecture.

                                 ICE/CBP MERGER

        Question. As you know, there has been substantial discussion in
    recent months about a possible merger of Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement with Customs and Border Patrol. Do you support such a
    merger?
        Answer. I do not support a merger at this time. ICE and CBP were
    formed just two and a half years ago and the transition to the current
    structure has been challenging. I am concerned about embarking on yet
    another far reaching transition affecting these organizations. Most
    importantly, however, it is too soon to say that the current structure
    will not effectively serve our border missions. As we move forward with
    comprehensive reforms and improvement to our border security and
    immigration system, I am confident that both ICE and CBP can operate in
    an effectively coordinated manner without being merged.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Patty Murray

                                 PORT SECURITY

        Question. Mr. Secretary, one of my greatest concerns--as a Senator
    from a State that depends on its seaports for its livelihood--is that
    we have a cohesive port security plan that protects our communities and
    our economy from potential threats.
        Yet the Administration's budget request again seeks to eliminate
    the Port Security Grant program.
        Mr. Secretary, as I've mentioned before, the Coast Guard Commandant
    testified that it would take more than $7 billion to implement the
    Maritime Transportation Security Act. To date, we have provided a
    little more than $500 million toward this $7 billion--most of which was
    not requested by the Administration. Mr. Secretary, for the past 2
    years, nearly $1 billion in port security grant requests came to DHS
    annually. And, the American Association of Ports Authorities has
    estimated that there is a need of at least $400 million to help secure
    our port facilities this year. From our discussions, I know that
    securing our ports is a priority for you. And, again, I realize you did
    not draft this budget--but you've been sent here to defend it.
        I must ask--is this a budget game the Administration is playing, or
    does the White House discount all of the intelligence reports that tell
    us our ports are a significant risk?
        Answer. Enhancing the security of the nation's critical
    infrastructure, especially its ports, continues to remain a high
    priority for the Department. For fiscal year 2006, DHS is proposing to
    consolidate the Port Security, Rail/Transit Security, Buffer Zone
    Protection (BZP) Program and Trucking Industry Security grant programs
    into the single TIP Program. Combined resources for the fiscal year
    2005 distinct programs totaled $315 million. The DHS fiscal year 2006
    request for the TIP Program is $600 million, almost double the amount
    of fiscal year 2005 available resources for the distinct fiscal year
    2005 programs. With that being said, funds provided through TIP will
    directly enhance the ability of the owners and operators of key port
    assets and transit systems to prevent and respond to large scale
    incidents. In fiscal year 2005, DHS shifted to a more risk-based
    allocation of funding across sectors, as well as integration of these
    programs with regional homeland security planning efforts, such as
    those required by the UASI. The fiscal year 2005 program also considers
    intelligence and threat data to set specific security enhancement
    priorities. The fiscal year 2006 TIP Program will continue to build on
    these enhancements by shifting to a discretionary approach for all
    program elements, allowing DHS to better supplement state, local and
    private sector infrastructure based on risk. Additional priorities for
    the fiscal year 2006 program include further enhancing the linkages
    between critical infrastructure protection and regional planning
    efforts, and a continued emphasis on security investment at ports and
    transit agencies based on relevant intelligence and threat data. In the
    end, this will result in a more agile and responsive program based on
    risk.

                                 CARGO SECURITY

        Question. Mr. Secretary, I know we both agree the agencies involved
    in securing these seaports are doing an admirable job--they are working
    through a difficult problem.
        Yet, they aren't being given the proper tools, resources, and
    guidance to knit together a coordinated port security regime for our
    nation.
        Last year, I added language into the fiscal year 2005 Committee
    Report that directed the Under Secretary of Border and Transportation
    Security to develop a plan to create that coordinated approach to port
    security. That report was due--quote--no later than February 8, 2005.
    Yet, we have not received that report. Unfortunately, the message that
    the Administration has sent is that the White House is not willing to
    take the responsibility for developing and implementing such a plan.
        Mr. Secretary, I've discussed this issue at great length with you,
    Deputy Secretary Jackson, Commissioner Bonner, your predecessors--
    anyone who might listen.
        I've talked about legislation and additional funding but all we
    have seen from the Administration is a directive that appointed a new
    Commission to study the issue.
        Mr. Secretary, I know we agree this is an issue of importance. What
    do you believe we need to do--how can we help you come up with a
    coordinated approach to secure our ports, the cargo moving through them
    and the people who work and live near them?
        Answer. The report was submitted on June 8, 2005.
        Maritime and supply chain security remain priorities for DHS. When
    the President signed HSPD-13/NSPD 41 in December 2005, he indicated the
    Administration's commitment to addressing port security as part of the
    greater maritime system. In this Directive, DHS and DOD were directed
    by the President to develop a strategy for securing the Maritime
    domain, including a variety of issues related to port and cargo
    security. DHS is actively working with DOD and other Federal partners
    to meet this goal.
        In addition, I am reviewing the status of DHS's cargo security
    efforts, how they can be further strengthened and how we can further
    transform the system to ensure the United States security and economic
    needs are met.

                                HAMMER TRAINING

        Question. Mr. Secretary, as you might be aware, Washington State is
    home to the The Volpentest Hazardous Materials and Emergency Response
    Training and Education Center--we know it as HAMMER.
        This is a state-of-the-art, Department of Energy facility with
    expertise in threats posed by chemical, radiological, and biological
    agents, hazardous materials, and weapons of mass destruction. HAMMER
    specializing in hands-on training for first responders but the
    Department has not designated this facility a regional training center.
    Instead, first responders from throughout the Northwest have to use
    their local budget--or DHS funding--to travel to facilities around the
    country for the training they could receive close to home. Under the
    fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of Energy was
    specifically authorized to enter into partnership arrangements with to
    share the facilities at HAMMER with Federal agencies. Under the
    Homeland Security Act of 2002, you are authorized to enter into joint
    sponsorship arrangements with the Secretary of Energy to use DOE sites
    to carry out the missions of the Department of Homeland Security. Mr.
    Secretary, we have a great facility at HAMMER and I encourage you to
    come personally, or send your staff out to visit. I know that when you
    see their capabilities, you will agree that using HAMMER as a
    designated training center would be a benefit to both the first
    responder community throughout the Northwest--and DHS itself.
        Will you visit HAMMER and consider adding it as a member of the
    National Domestic Preparedness Consortium?
        Answer. The NDPC was chosen based on each member's expertise in
    first response training. At present, plans to expand DHS' training
    network are extremely limited, and more than likely will not include
    the establishment of additional consortium members or residential
    training facilities. Under the provisions of the Department of Homeland
    Security's fiscal year 2004 Appropriations Act (Public Law 108-90), ODP
    received funds for a limited ``competitive training grants'' program to
    supplement training efforts provided through the National Domestic
    Preparedness Consortium. The Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP)
    was developed to facilitate national scale training programs, and the
    fiscal year 2004 program funded 14 training sites. Currently, the
    Department is undergoing its evaluation process for fiscal year 2005
    CTGP applicants. In addition, enhancing existing training programs is
    an eligible use of other SLGCP grant funds. The Department encourages
    HAMMER to explore the use of other DHS grants as a potential source of
    Federal funding in the future.

                            NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY

        Question. Mr. Secretary, the President's budget request only
    includes funding for 210 of the 2,000 new border agents called for by
    the Intelligence Reform Act that was signed into law last December.
        We currently have about 11,000 Border Patrol agents and 90 percent
    of them are stationed on the southern border. We have a major security
    issues at our northern border--ranging from drug trafficking to the
    apprehension of potential terrorists--and they aren't being addressed.
        What kind of message is this sending to our border communities? Is
    stepping up this security going to be a priority for you?
        Answer. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
    CBP Border Patrol has accelerated its efforts in increasing its
    enforcement presence along the Northern Border to achieve the
    definitive goal of operational control, and the number of agents
    allowing the Northern Border more than tripled. This accelerated and
    focused effort has clearly provided the Nation with a more secure
    Northern Border. Moreover, Emergency Supplemental Legislation and
    President Bush's fiscal year 2006 Budget call for the hiring of an
    additional 710 agents by the end of fiscal year 2006, and CBP is taking
    aggressive steps to recruit, hire and train candidates to fill these
    spots. The hiring of these new agents comes in addition to the standard
    attrition hires that supplement the several hundred agents who retire,
    transfer, or leave for medical reasons over the course of a year. New
    agent positions will be allocated based on risk-based priorities. That
    said, effective control of the border--Northern or Southern--requires a
    more comprehensive approach than simply adding more agents.
        DHS is accordingly in the midst of a systems-level review of its
    border control architecture to identify the right mix of personnel,
    technology and infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the
    border. DHS will identify a program manager to oversee the development
    of a specific set of border security plans.

                            NORTHERN BORDER AIR WING

        Question. Along those lines, the first Customs Air and Marine
    Operations Wing was established in Bellingham, WA last summer. I was
    very happy to be there at the dedication and have worked with Director
    Stallworth to get the program up and running. The second air wing is in
    Up-State New York and 3 more are planned. We need to make these a
    priority--especially with the lack of Border Patrol agents on the
    Northern Border. They also need to be able to communicate with the
    local law enforcement. Since that time it has become clear that many
    local law enforcement jurisdictions don't have compatible radios--our
    eyes-in-the-sky can't coordinate with the police on the ground. I'm
    told it would cost about $5 million to run a pilot program.
        Do you agree that this is an issue we should deal with? Will you
    help make this happen?
        Answer. Deployment of additional Northern Border airwings will be
    addressed as part of the CBP Air and Marine program integration review
    now underway. This review is expected to be completed in the summer of
    fiscal year 2005.

                          NORTHERN BORDER PROSECUTIONS

        Question. Mr. Secretary, because of the increased presence and law
    enforcement activity on the northern border, incarcerations and
    prosecutions are up dramatically since September 11. The major border
    crossing between Seattle and Vancouver, BC is in Blaine--a very small
    community compared to Detroit and Buffalo--and a very limited local tax
    base to cover these costs. This community has already seen more than a
    $3 million increase in prosecution costs simply because they are
    located on the border. This trend is expected to continue with an
    expected $4 million in prosecution and incarceration costs in fiscal
    year 2005. Mr. Secretary, this community needs some special help--they
    don't have the tax base or population to sustain this and even greater
    increases.
        What can your Department do to help communities like this one?
        Answer. DHS has committed significant resources to address the
    increase in smuggling activity between the United States and Canada, as
    well as the demonstrated vulnerabilities that exist on the Northern
    Border. This dedication of enforcement resources has resulted in an
    increase in arrests, seizures, and prosecutions involving border
    related criminal activity. Some prosecutions based on DHS enforcement
    activities have been deferred to the State for prosecution since the
    violators also fall under State law.

                                 SEATAC AIRPORT

        Question. Secretary Chertoff, I am very concerned with the reports
    that Seattle Tacoma International Airport in Washington State may see a
    reduction in their Federal security screener force this year.
    Currently, SeaTac Airport is facing a shortage of approximately 200
    FTEs to meet the summer travel season at present staffing levels.
    Without these additional screeners SeaTac will undoubtedly see repeats
    of 2002 and 2003 that saw security lines regularly exceeding 1 hour.
        Mr. Secretary, I request that you review the situation at SeaTac
    and work with the local Federal Security Director to ensure that
    SeaTac's screener staffing level allows the airport and TSA to provide
    the same level of customer service achieved last year.
        Answer. Based on the Screener Staffing Model, SeaTac Airport (SEA)
    is currently below its required staffing level. TSA is in the process
    of bringing SEA up to that staffing level. Recruitment of new screeners
    is underway.

                              SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

        Senator Gregg. The hearing is recessed.
        [Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., Wednesday, April 20, the
    subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene to subject to the call
    of the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 2005

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met at 10:29 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
    Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
        Present: Senators Gregg, Cochran, Stevens, Craig, Allard,
    Byrd, and Inouye.

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT, ASSISTANT
                SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                    OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

        Senator Gregg. We will convene this hearing.
        The purpose of this Homeland Security hearing is to review
    where we stand relative to defending this Nation from
    biological or chemical attack, which is in my opinion the
    biggest threat to our country. If you prioritize threat, which
    is exactly what we should be doing as a Congress and as a
    Government, you have to put at the top of the list the concerns
    weapons of mass destruction used against the American
    population somewhere here in the United States or overseas
    obviously.
        We, 2 years ago, began the effort to try to aggressively
    address this issue, recognizing some fundamental flaws within
    our structure as a country, the biggest flaw being the
    pharmaceutical industry, which one would presume would
    naturally pursue ways of being able to respond to a biological
    attack, was not structured to do so, and the Government was not
    structured to deal with a chemical or a biological attack.

                                   BIOSHIELD

        So we worked very hard, in my prior role as Chairman of the
    Health Committee, to pass a piece of legislation called
    BioShield, which was the initiative of the administration. And
    the purpose of this bill was to reenergize the vaccine industry
    in this country and to energize the research community within
    our Nation to pursue ways to respond to various chemical and
    biological agents which might be used against us.
        We understand, obviously, there is no market for a product
    to respond to these type of agents. These agents are by
    definition agents which do not commonly occur, but only occur
    when we are attacked, although smallpox was a problem, but it
    has been eradicated. So we needed to create a structure where
    there would be not only an atmosphere where creative
    individuals and scientists would step forward to develop
    responses to attacks involving threats such as anthrax,
    smallpox, botulism, and plague, but we also had to create a
    monetary system, a market system which would encourage this
    from a standpoint of making it a reasonable place to invest
    your money if you were an investor. And that is what BioShield
    was all about. It basically put the Government in the business
    of buying antidotes and vaccines for this list of major
    threats.
        We are now well into this process. Progress has been made
    in some areas but there is still a long way to go in other
    areas. The purpose of this hearing is to discuss what we are
    doing and what we should be doing that will better produce
    results.
        My own personal concern is we have still not stood up a
    vaccine industry in this country at the level I would like to
    see it. We still do not have many participants in the
    production of vaccine, that the research community, especially
    our academic research community, has not yet embraced this
    initiative as well as and as aggressively as I would hope, and
    that there appears to be some incentives in the system which
    are discouraging research in this area, and the question of how
    we are purchasing products, to the extent it is being brought
    on line, whether that is chilling competition or participation
    of other parties in the research and development of creative
    new ways to address these types of threats.
        It is a complex issue involving the most cutting-edge
    levels of science, and it does not have a simple solution. If
    it did, we would have gotten to it much sooner. But we do have
    a committed effort to do it, and we have got a committed
    Government to accomplish it, and I think we have got some good
    witnesses today to find out where we stand and where we should
    go.
        With that, I will yield to the honorable Senator from
    Virginia, Senator Byrd.

                      STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

        Senator Byrd. That is West Virginia.
        Senator Gregg. I apologize profusely.

                         BIOLOGICAL OR CHEMICAL ATTACK

        Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank you
    for your service. I listened with rapt attention at your
    remarks. You are well prepared to be the Chairman of this
    subcommittee and well prepared to probe this very important
    subject.
        I welcome the witnesses on both panels for this hearing,
    and I applaud you, Mr. Chairman, for calling us together for
    such an important topic.
        Earlier this year during testimony before the Senate
    Intelligence Committee, CIA Director Porter Goss warned and I
    quote ``It is only a matter of time before Al Qaeda or another
    terrorist group tries to use chemical, biological,
    radiological, or nuclear weapons in the United States.'' Mr.
    Chairman, I believe that. I believe it is absolutely the case,
    and I am not sure that we are prepared. I doubt it because we
    do not know when, we do not know where this monster will
    confront us with a bioterror attack, a chemical attack, a
    nuclear attack, or a radiological attack.
        With regard to a biological attack, Congress made a serious
    commitment by appropriating $5.6 billion to pursue new vaccines
    and medications to protect the American public from known
    biological threats. It is essential the agencies involved in
    this process be accountable for progress in this area. So, I
    look forward to discussing this and other homeland security
    efforts, not only to detect and respond to a bioterror
    incident, but what efforts are being made to prevent a
    biological, chemical, also to examine nuclear terror incident.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd.
        We will turn to the panel now. The first panel will be
    people in our Government who have first-line responsibility for
    getting us prepared for a biological or chemical attack and
    being able to respond to it. Our first witness is Dr. Albright
    who was confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security,
    Plans, Programs, and Budgets on October 3. Our second witness
    is Mr. Simonson who is the Assistant Secretary for Public
    Health Emergency Preparedness, United States Department of
    Health and Human Services. And these two gentlemen have the
    portfolio and we look forward to hearing how we are doing. So
    let us start with you, Dr. Albright.

                      STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE C. ALBRIGHT

        Dr. Albright. Good afternoon, Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd,
    and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to
    appear before you today to discuss the progress the Science and
    Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security
    is making in the Nation's efforts to prevent, protect against,
    respond to, and recover from acts of bioterrorism against the
    American people.
        President Bush has made strengthening the Nation's defenses
    against biological weapons a critical national priority. The
    President's focus on these issues has resulted in a joint
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive/National Security
    Presidential directive entitled Biodefense for the 21st Century
    that provides a comprehensive framework for our Nation's
    sustained and focused effort against biological weapons
    threats.

                         ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN BIODEFENSE

        The Department of Homeland Security and the Science and
    Technology Directorate have explicit responsibilities in this
    integrated national effort. In particular, I want to highlight
    the strategy, planning, and accomplishments to date of the
    Science and Technology Directorate in the area of biodefense
    and the essential collaborations with key Federal partners,
    including those represented here today.
        In 2004 and 2005, the Science and Technology Directorate
    developed a national architecture and plan for the detection of
    biological attacks, should they occur, and as initial steps,
    deployed the BioWatch Environmental Sensor System to protect
    our Nation's cities from the threat and ramifications of such
    an attack and also initiated the design of the National
    Biosurveillance Integration System as part of an interagency
    process.
        We completed the planning and conceptual design of the
    National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. This
    center will focus on, among other things, creating a
    scientifically based understanding of the biological threat.
        We established the Biodefense Knowledge Center, which is an
    operational hub for enabling collaboration and communication
    within the Homeland Security enterprise. We have certified four
    material threats and have two additional certifications
    underway. These material threat determinations are required in
    order to commit BioShield funds.
        We have established a National Bioforensic Analysis Center
    to provide a national capability for conducting forensic
    analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism to obtain a
    biological fingerprint to identify perpetrators and determine
    the origin and method of the attack.
        In 2006, our expectations are to complete the deployment of
    the second generation BioWatch system to the top threat cities
    and to complete test and evaluation of the laboratory
    prototypes for the third generation of these detection systems.
        We will also complete the first formal risk assessment that
    is required under HSPD-10 and close many of the key remaining
    experimental gaps in our knowledge of the classic biological
    threat agents.
        We will continue operations of the Plum Island Animal
    Disease Center and essential upgrades to the facility and
    initiate the design of the National Bio and Agrodefense
    Facility.
        We continue to develop bioassays for Foot and Mouth Disease
    and look-alike animal diseases. We continue to conduct cutting-
    edge research in academia through our Homeland Security Centers
    of Excellence. Although each of the four centers we have has a
    role in addressing bioterrorism, let me highlight two.
        One is at Texas A&M and its partners which study foreign
    animal and zoonotic diseases at the National Center for Foreign
    Animal and Zoonotic Disease, and they address potential threats
    to animal agriculture, including Foot and Mouth Disease, Rift
    Valley fever, Avian influenza, Brucellosis, that sort of thing.
        The University of Minnesota and its partners established
    best practices and attract new researchers to manage and
    respond to food contamination events.

                  S&T DIRECTORATE'S INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

        Ensuring that all relevant Federal Departments and agencies
    coordinate in the area of biodefense is critical to protecting
    the Nation from biological threats. The Science and Technology
    Directorate has been and continues to be an active participant
    in relevant interagency activities. A full list of the S&T
    Directorate's interagency collaborations is in my statement for
    the record. Highlights include our integral participation in
    the creation of HSPD-10. We also participate in the
    Counterproliferation Technology Coordinating Committee, the
    National Science and Technology Council's Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Medical Countermeasures Committee, which is really
    crucial to our way ahead on BioShield. This last, which I
    personally co-chair, provides an interagency forum for
    discussing and prioritizing the medical countermeasure needs,
    as I said, that will be pursued under the BioShield program.
        We work closely with our colleagues in the Department of
    Health and Human Services and USDA. Mr. Simonson and I see each
    other very frequently, and he and I and our staffs interact
    nearly daily in our respective efforts to protect the Nation
    from the threats of bioterrorism.
        As I hope I have indicated, the Science and Technology
    Directorate's programs fully support the National Biodefense
    Program, as stated in HSPD-10. Moreover, they are conducted in
    an active collaboration with other Federal Departments and
    agencies, having a role in meeting this national priority and
    are focused on reducing the threat of a biological attack
    against the Nation's population and its agricultural and food
    infrastructures. We also support a science-based forensics and
    attribution capability.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        This concludes my prepared statement. With the
    subcommittee's permission, I request that my formal statement
    be submitted for the record. Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
    members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before you and will be happy to answer any questions
    that you may have.
        [The statement follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Dr. Penrose C. Albright

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Good afternoon, Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd and distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to
    discuss the progress the Science and Technology Directorate of the
    Department of Homeland Security is making in the Nation's efforts to
    prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts of
    bioterrorism against the American people.
        President Bush has made strengthening the Nation's defenses against
    biological weapons a critical national priority. Although significant
    progress has been made to protect America, President Bush instructed
    Federal departments and agencies to review their efforts and find
    better ways to secure America from bioattacks.
        This review resulted in a Presidential Directive entitled
    Biodefense for the 21st Century that provides a comprehensive framework
    for our Nation's biodefense. This directive builds upon past
    accomplishments, defines specifies roles and responsibilities, and
    integrates the programs and efforts of various communities: national
    security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic,
    agricultural and law enforcement into a sustained and focused effort
    against biological weapons threats.
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Science and
    Technology (S&T) Directorate have explicit responsibilities in this
    integrated national effort. In particular, I want to highlight the
    strategy, planning and accomplishments to date of the Science and
    Technology Directorate in the area of biodefense, and the essential
    collaborations with key Federal partners.

                                   BIODEFENSE

        Before I speak directly to the biodefense efforts of the S&T
    Directorate, I want to briefly address the role of the DHS's
    Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP),
    and how their work is linked to the S&T Directorate. IAIP assesses
    intelligence and information about threats and vulnerabilities from
    other agencies and takes preventative and protective action. They are
    partners in the total interagency efforts to obtain, assess and
    disseminate information regarding potential threats to America from
    terrorist actions. These threat and vulnerability assessments are
    inputs into the strategy and research, development, testing and
    evaluation (RDT&E) activities of the Science and Technology
    Directorate. For example, agriculture and food are two of the multiple
    critical infrastructure sectors identified by Homeland Security
    Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). As such, they fall within the domain
    of the IAIP Directorate; they are also within the domain of concern for
    biological threats and are considered in HSPD-9 and HSPD-10/National
    Security Presidential Directive-33 (NSPD-33). In addition, the IAIP
    Directorate's cooperation with the Science and Technology Directorate
    is critical to the Department's mission to determine what agents would
    significantly impact national security if released (Material Threat
    Determinations).

    Mission and Objectives
        HSPD-10 outlines four essential pillars of the Nation's biodefense
    program and provides specific directives to further strengthen the
    significant gains made in the past 3 years. The four pillars of the
    program are:
      --Threat Awareness.--Which includes biological weapons-related
            intelligence, vulnerability assessments, and anticipation of
            future threats. New initiatives will improve our ability to
            collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence on biological
            weapons and their potential users.
      --Prevention and Protection.--Which includes interdiction and
            critical infrastructure protection. New initiatives will
            improve our ability to detect, interdict, and seize weapons
            technologies and materials to disrupt the proliferation trade,
            and to pursue proliferators through strengthened law
            enforcement cooperation.
      --Surveillance and Detection.--Which includes attack warning and
            attribution. New initiatives will further strengthen the
            biosurveillance capabilities being put in place in fiscal year
            2005.
      --Response and Recovery.--Which includes response planning, mass
            casualty care, risk communication, medical countermeasures, and
            decontamination. New initiatives will strengthen our ability to
            provide mass casualty care and to decontaminate the site of an
            attack.
        The Department of Homeland Security has a role and responsibility
    in each of these four pillars of the national biodefense program. The
    S&T Directorate has the responsibility to lead the Department's RDT&E
    activities to support the national biodefense objectives and the
    Department's mission.

    Accomplishments and Planned Activities
        In fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, the Biological
    Countermeasures portfolio:
      --Deployed the BioWatch environmental sensor system to protect our
            Nation's cities from the threat and ramifications of a
            bioterrorist attack.
      --Engaged in creating additional near real-time monitoring
            (Autonomous Pathogen Detection System) of critical
            infrastructure facilities such as major transportation hubs.
            New infrastructure protection efforts include shorter response
            time biological agent detection capabilities for BioWatch. This
            pilot (second generation Bio Watch) is in the process of being
            deployed in New York City and will join an expansion of the
            number of collectors in that city.
      --Initiated the design of the National Biosurveillance Integration
            System (NBIS) as part of an interagency process. Recently
            completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, we will
            work with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
            Protection (IAIP) Directorate to implement this system.
      --Conducted preliminary analyses, using the reference scenario
            approach recommended by Homeland Security Presidential
            Directive (HSPD)-10 for understanding the requirements of an
            integrated national biodefense architecture, of four baseline
            reference cases: a large outdoor release of a non-contagious
            agent (anthrax); a large indoor release of a contagious agent
            (smallpox); contamination of a bulk food supply; and two highly
            virulent agricultural attacks, one on livestock (Foot and Mouth
            Disease) and the other on crops (soy bean rust).
      --Established the Biodefense Knowledge Center, an operational hub for
            enabling collaboration and communication within the homeland
            security complex. The Biodefense Knowledge Center will meet the
            operational and planning requirements of government decision-
            makers and program planners, the intelligence community, law
            enforcement officers, public health practitioners, and
            scientists. Specific capabilities offered to these end-users
            include knowledge services, modeling and simulation,
            situational awareness and a pathway to accelerate research and
            development.
      --Certified four ``material threats'' (anthrax, smallpox, botulinum
            toxin, and radiological/nuclear); will complete the rest of the
            Category A bioagents (plague, tularemia) by the end of fiscal
            year 2005.
      --Established the National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) to
            provide a national capability for conducting forensic analyses
            of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism to attain a
            ``biological fingerprint'' to identify perpetrators and
            determine the origin and method of attack. The NBFAC was named
            in HSPD-10 as the lead Federal facility to conduct and
            facilitate the technical forensic analysis of materials
            recovered following a biological attack in support of the
            appropriate lead Federal agency [in most cases the lead Federal
            agency will be the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)].
        In fiscal year 2006, the Biological Countermeasure portfolio plans
    to:
      --Complete the three high-level architectures initiated in fiscal
            year 2005, identifying key requirements for each major element,
            a ``report card'' on the current and projected status in that
            area and performing detailed design tradeoffs for those areas
            in which DHS has execution responsibility.
      --Complete the first formal risk assessment required under HSPD-10
            and close many of the key remaining experimental gaps in our
            knowledge of the classical biological threat agents. Near-,
            mid-, and long-term plans for dealing with engineered agents
            will be developed, and R&D on addressing the gaps in responding
            to genetically modified organisms (e.g., antibiotic resistant)
            initiated.
      --Complete the deployment of Generation 2 BioWatch systems to
            additional cities while continuing to operate and optimize
            already extant BioWatch systems.
      --Complete test and evaluation of laboratory prototypes of the
            Generation 3 BioWatch detection systems for selection of
            fieldable prototypes for fiscal year 2007.
      --Continue operation of the interim National Bioforensic Analysis
            Center. International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
            certification is expected to
      --5 have been achieved, giving the analyses conducted additional
            credibility and authenticity in both the national and
            international community and courts of law. R&D will continue on
            the physical and chemical signatures of the ``matrix''
            materials associated with biological agents so as to develop
            methods for understanding tell-tale remnants of enrichment
            media, culture conditions, metabolites, and dispersion
            technology.
      --Continue operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
            and essential upgrades to the facility and initiate design of
            the National Bio and Agrodefense Facility (NBAF). R&D will
            continue on next generation vaccines and antiviral therapeutics
            for foot and mouth disease (FMD) and other high priority
            foreign animal diseases.
      --Continue to develop bioassays for FMD and look-alike animal
            diseases. The initial agricultural forensic capability
            established in fiscal year 2004 at PIADC will be enhanced and
            epidemiologic capability added. A High Throughput Diagnostics
            Demonstration will be initiated to work with regional and State
            laboratories to demonstrate a capability of analyzing thousands
            of samples per day in support of response to a suspected case
            or an outbreak. A FMD table top exercise will be conducted, and
            development of a coupled epidemiological and economic model for
            FMD will begin. The end-to-end systems study initiated in
            fiscal year 2004 for Soybean Rust and FMD will be completed,
            and system studies will be initiated for highly pathogenic
            avian influenza.

    National Bio-Defense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
        The NBACC, a key component of the National Strategy for Homeland
    Security, addresses the need for scientific research to better
    anticipate, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of biological
    attacks. The need for the NBACC facility is further defined in HSPD-10,
    the Nation's blueprint for future biodefense programs. The NBACC's
    mission will support two pillars of this blueprint--threat awareness
    and surveillance and detection. The NBACC is made up of two centers,
    the Biological Threat Characterization Center and the National
    Bioforensic Analysis Center to carry out these missions. Specifically,
    NBACC's mission is to:
      --Understand current and future biological threats, assess
            vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the
            research, development, and acquisition of biodefense
            countermeasures such as detectors, drugs, vaccines and
            decontamination technologies; and
      --Provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of
            evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism to attain a ``biological
            fingerprint'' to identify perpetrators and determine the origin
            and method of attack.
        In fiscal year 2004, the Department completed the planning and
    conceptual design of the NBACC facility. Additionally, the Department
    has been working through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
    process during the year, which culminated in the signing of the Record
    of Decision in January 2005 of the Final Environmental Impact Statement
    (EIS) for the construction project and subsequent operations. It was
    decided to delay the award of any contracts for design and construction
    until further in the EIS process. As the public concerns are analyzed
    and considered it is anticipated that contracts will be awarded in
    fiscal year 2005 to initiate design and construction of the NBACC
    facility
        In fiscal year 2005, the solicitations of contracts for the
    construction of the NBACC facility are expected to be awarded. The
    design of the NBACC facility will commence in March 2005. Congress
    appropriated $128 million in obligated funds, of which $35 million was
    appropriated for award of the construction contract in the fourth
    quarter of fiscal year 2005. Construction of the facility is planned
    for completion by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2008.

    University Centers of Excellence
        The mission of the University Programs is to stimulate, coordinate,
    leverage and utilize the unique intellectual capital in the academic
    community to address current and future homeland security challenges,
    and to educate and inspire the next generation of scientists and
    engineers dedicated to homeland security.
        Within the University Programs in the S&T Directorate, the Homeland
    Security (HS) Centers of Excellence provide independent, cutting-edge
    research in academia for focused areas of homeland security Research
    and Development. Established centers include: the Homeland Security
    Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, the National
    Center for Foreign Animal Disease and Zoonotic Defense, and the
    National Center for Food Protection and Defense. In the next few
    months, the S&T Directorate expects to establish the Homeland Security
    Center for Behavioral and Social Aspects of Terrorism and Counter-
    Terrorism. Each Center is selected on a competitive basis, and each
    grant is for 3 years. Each Center has a role in addressing bioterrorism
    and two are specifically aligned with addressing bioterrorism.
        DHS awarded funds, over 3 years, to the University of Southern
    California (USC) and its major partners, University of Wisconsin at
    Madison, New York University and Structured Decisions Corporation
    (affiliated with MIT) to establish the Center on Risk and Economic
    Analysis of Terrorism Events. The mission objectives are to evaluate
    the risks, costs and consequences of terrorism and to guide
    economically viable investments in countermeasures. Specifically, the
    Center will develop risk assessment and economic modeling capabilities
    that cut across general threats and targets, in application areas such
    as electrical power, transportation and telecommunications.
    Additionally, USC and their partners will develop tools for planning
    responses to emergencies, to minimize the threat to human life and
    reduce economic impacts of terrorist attacks.
        Texas A&M University and its partners from the University of Texas
    Medical Branch, University of California at Davis, and the University
    of Southern California expect to receive funds over the course of the
    next 3 years for the study of foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The
    Center, which will be known as the National Center for Foreign Animal
    and Zoonotic Disease Defense, will work closely with partners in
    academia, industry and government to address potential threats to
    animal agriculture including Foot and Mouth Disease, Rift Valley fever,
    Avian influenza and Brucellosis. The Foot and Mouth Disease research
    will be conducted in close collaboration with DHS's Plum Island Animal
    Disease Center.
        The Department of Homeland Security will provide the University of
    Minnesota and its partners, Michigan State University, University of
    Wisconsin at Madison, North Dakota State University, Georgia Institute
    of Technology, and the University of Tennessee at Knoxville with funds
    over the course of the next 3 years to establish best practices and
    attract new researchers to manage and respond to food contamination
    events, both intentional and naturally occurring. The University of
    Minnesota's National Center for Food Protection and Defense, will
    address agricultural security issues related to postharvest food
    protection.
        Negotiations began January 10, 2005, for a 3-year grant with the
    University of Maryland for a fourth Center on Behavioral and Social
    Research on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism. We expect its mission
    objectives to be to provide strategies for intervention of terrorists
    and terrorist organizations and to embolden the resilience of U.S.
    citizens. Major domestic partners include, the University of California
    at Los Angeles, University of Colorado, Monterey Institute of
    International Studies, University of Pennsylvania, and the University
    of South Carolina.
        A broad agency announcement was released in mid-January, 2005 for
    proposals for a fifth DHS Center of Excellence on the topic of High
    Consequence Event Preparedness and Response.
        In addition to the University Centers of Excellence, the Department
    of Homeland Security's University Programs and the Environmental
    Protection Agency's Science to Achieve Results (STAR) Program are
    reviewing proposals for a research Center of Excellence focused on an
    area of high priority to both Agencies, Microbial Risk Assessment (MRA)
    for Category A bio-threat agents.

    Interagency Collaboration
        Ensuring that all relevant Federal Departments and agencies
    coordinate in the area of Biodefense is critical to protecting the
    Nation from biological threats. The previously mentioned HSPD-10, as
    well as other directives including HSPD-9, Defense of United States
    Agriculture and Food; HSPD-8, National Preparedness; HSPD-4, National
    Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction; and HSPD-7, Critical
    Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, identify
    national objectives and priorities, and departmental and agencies'
    roles in addressing these national objectives.
        The S&T Directorate has been, and continues to be an active
    participant in these interagency activities as illustrated by our
    participation in the biodefense program. At the highest level HSPD-10/
    NSPD-33 laid out the overall strategy, department and agency roles, as
    well as specific objectives and called for periodic reviews to plan,
    monitor and revise implementation. This was followed by an interagency
    review, of specific fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2010 science and
    technology needs to support the national biodefense strategy as
    articulated in HSPD-10.
        The National Science and Technology Council's Weapons of Mass
    Destruction Medical Countermeasures Subcommittee (WMD-MCM), co-chaired
    by the Assistant Secretary of the S&T Directorate, provides an
    interagency forum for discussing and prioritizing medical
    countermeasure needs to be pursued under BioShield. At still the next
    level of coordination, there are strong bilateral efforts around key
    elements of the strategy. Examples of this coordination including
    strong and frequent collaborations on Bioshield (HHS/DHS), the
    development of coordinated civilian and military surveillance and
    detection systems (DHS/DOD), the development and execution of a
    National Strategy for Agricultural Biosecurity (DHS/USDA), and
    development and assessment of decontamination technologies (DHS/EPA).
        In addressing these activities, DHS has a leadership role in
    several key areas and partners with lead agencies in others. Those
    areas in which the S&T Directorate provides significant leadership are:
      --Providing an overall end-to-end understanding of an integrated
            biodefense strategy, so as to guide the Secretary and the rest
            of the Department in its responsibility to coordinate the
            Nation's efforts to deter, detect, and respond to biological
            acts of terrorism.
      --Providing scientific support to the intelligence community and the
            IAIP Directorate in prioritizing the bio-threats.
      --Developing early warning and detection systems to permit timely
            response to mitigate the consequence of a biological attack.
      --Conducting technical forensics to analyze and interpret materials
            recovered from an attack to support attribution.
      --Operation of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to support both
            research and development (R&D) and operational response to
            foreign animal diseases such as foot and mouth disease.
        DHS also supports our partnering departments and agencies with
    their leads in other key areas of an integrated biodefense: the
    Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on medical
    countermeasures and mass casualty response; the U.S. Department of
    Agriculture (USDA) on agriculture biosecurity; USDA and HHS on food
    security and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on
    decontamination and on water security.
        In addition, the Science and Technology Directorate has engaged
    with other Federal Agencies in the following efforts:
      --The S&T Directorate worked with DOS (STAS), USDA, Office of Science
            and Technology Police (OSTP), National Science Foundation (NSF)
            to create and support the U.S.-Japan Safe and Secure Society
            forum.
      --The Directorate and DOS (OES) jointly created and negotiated the
            US-UK S&T Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The resulting MOA
            supports collaboration on Homeland Security research,
            development, testing, and evaluation between the United States
            and the UK.
      --The S&T Directorate represents DHS as the lead U.S. agency for the
            US-CA Public Security Technical Program (PSTP) which is the
            primary cooperative arrangement on S&T for homeland security
            between the two countries. Other U.S. agencies involved in the
            PSTP include: FBI, DOE, DOD, USDA, HHS, DOC (NIST), EPA, DOS,
            NSA and other DHS components.
      --Currently leads a partnership with the Center for Disease Control
            (CDC), EPA, and FBI on the deployment of BioWatch, a bioaerosol
            detection system deployed to many of this Nation's cities.
      --Funds BioNet--Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) executed pilot
            program to integrate civilian and military domestic
            biodetection and consequence management, using San Diego as a
            pilot city.
      --Leading an interagency effort with HHS, DOD, and the United States
            Postal Service (USPS) to develop a National Integrated
            Biomonitoring System, part of HSPD-10 responsibility.
      --Primary participant in the establishment of the National
            Interagency Biodefense Campus being developed at Ft. Detrick.
      --The National Bioforensics Analysis Center (NBFAC) is a joint
            Science and Technology Directorate-FBI program
      --In a joint effort with USDA, have developed an integrated national
            agrodefense strategy, with especial emphasis on foreign animal
            disease. The Directorate and USDA also conduct joint research
            and development programs at the Plum Island Animal Disease
            Center

    Presidential Initiatives
        Three Presidential Initiatives address the needs of an integrated
    biodefense strategy and DHS plays a key role in each one. These three
    initiatives are:
        BioShield.--Signed into law July 21, 2004, BioShield is a program
    coordinated by the Secretary for Homeland Security and the Secretary
    for Health and Human Services that provides $5.6 billion over 10 years
    for the purchase and development of countermeasures to WMD. DHS's S&T
    Directorate plays a significant role in this in determining which
    agents constitute ``material threats'' and in developing scenarios that
    inform decisions on the quantity of countermeasures required. We have
    certified four ``material threats'' (anthrax, smallpox, botulinum
    toxin, radiological/nuclear, and nerve agents), have two additional
    underway, (plague and tularemia), and the rest of the Category A
    bioagents should be completed by fiscal year 2006.
        Biosurveillance Initiative.--A program that seeks to enhance
    systems that monitor the Nation's health (human, animal and plant) and
    its environment (air, food, water) and to integrate these with
    intelligence data to provide early detection of an attack and the
    situational understanding needed to guide an effective response. The
    S&T Directorate plays a major role in the Biosurveillance Initiative in
    operating its 1st Generation BioWatch System, in deploying a 2nd
    Generation system and significantly expanding the number of collectors
    in the highest threat cities and at key facilities (e.g. transportation
    systems), and in continuing to develop advanced detection systems to
    further increase the capabilities. We are also designing the
    information system that will be used to integrate health and
    environmental monitoring information from the sector specific agencies
    with intelligence data from the IAIP Directorate. Implementation of
    this system will actually be initiated by the IAIP Directorate in
    fiscal year 2005, but the S&T Directorate will continue to supply
    subject matter expertise in biological threat and defense.
        Food and Agricultural Initiative.--Seeks to enhance the security of
    our agricultural and food infrastructures. DHS activities in this area
    are led by the IAIP Directorate--but the S&T Directorate brings
    significant contributions in end-to-end studies of key agricultural and
    food threats, through the development of advanced diagnostics, and
    through R&D conducted jointly with USDA at the Plum Island Animal
    Disease Center.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The Science and Technology Directorate's programs conducted within
    the Department of Homeland Security fully support the national
    biodefense program as stated in the presidential directive Biodefense
    for the 21st Century, and other Homeland Security Presidential
    Directives. Moreover, they are conducted in an active collaboration
    with other Federal departments and agencies having a role in meeting
    this national priority, and are focused on reducing the threat of a
    biological attack against this Nation's population and its agriculture
    and food critical agricultural infrastructures, and supports a science-
    based forensics and attribution capability.
        This concludes my prepared statement. With the Committee's
    permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank
    you for the opportunity to appear before you and I will be happy to
    answer any questions that you may have.

        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Albright.
        Before we turn to Mr. Simonson, it is the tradition of this
    subcommittee to recognize the Chairman of the full committee,
    whenever he arrives, for any statement he wishes to make.

                       STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me
    congratulate you on the success of the legislation which you
    authored here in the Senate to establish the legal authority to
    appropriate funds to deal with threats to our food supply and
    our agriculture infrastructure and our other concerns in the
    whole general area of bioterrorism. There is nothing more
    frightening to contemplate than an attack against these
    resources and assets in our country, and we do have a serious
    lack of products, drugs, countermeasures to deal with a serious
    assault on our food supply and our agriculture infrastructure.
    So it is very appropriate, I think, that you chair this
    subcommittee now that is in charge of funding the law you
    helped create and took a leadership role in, and we appreciate
    those efforts very much.
        I am glad to be here with Dr. Albright and Mr. Simonson to
    congratulate them on their initiatives and hard work in
    developing a response structure at the Federal level and to
    provide national leadership in this very important undertaking.
        Thank you.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would simply
    note, it is only through your generosity that I chair this
    subcommittee, and I am very appreciative of that.
        Mr. Simonson.

    STATEMENT OF STEWART SIMONSON, J.D., ASSISTANT
                SECRETARY, OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
                EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
        Mr. Simonson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
    Senator Allard, and Senator Craig, and other members of the
    subcommittee. I am Stewart Simonson, Assistant HHS Secretary
    for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, and I appreciate the
    opportunity to share with you information on the progress of
    implementing the Project BioShield Act of 2004, which was
    enacted some 9 months ago.
        The events of September and October of 2001 made it very
    clear bioterrorism is a serious threat to our Nation and the
    world. The Bush administration and Congress responded
    forcefully to this threat by seeking to strengthen our medical
    and public health capacities to protect our citizens from
    future attacks. To encourage the development of new medical
    countermeasures against threats and to speed their delivery,
    President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address proposed
    and Congress subsequently enacted Project BioShield. The $5.6
    billion 10-year special reserve fund was created to assure
    developers of medical countermeasures that funds would be
    available to enable the Government to purchase critical
    products.
        Since enactment, my office has moved aggressively to fill
    immediate gaps in our reserve of medical countermeasures. A
    sense of urgency has pervaded our efforts and has defined new
    ways of doing business. Let me briefly describe to you what we
    have done to address these gaps beginning with anthrax.

                                    ANTHRAX

        Anthrax is a serious public health threat, and although the
    Strategic National Stockpile contains antibiotics sufficient to
    treat millions of persons exposed to anthrax, the vaccine has
    an important place in our preparedness and response strategy.
    The U.S. Government, relying on interagency expert input,
    defined the initial vaccine requirement for protecting 25
    million persons.
        The Institute of Medicine, in a report issued in 2002,
    urged that a new anthrax vaccine based on modern principles of
    vaccinology be developed. An assessment of developing
    technologies was undertaken by HHS, experts in the field, and
    it was determined there was sufficient scientific basis to
    support the aggressive development of a new generation of
    vaccine consisting of recombinant protective antigen, the so-
    called rPA vaccine. Research spanning more than a decade,
    conducted in large part by the U.S. Government, permitted us to
    move the vaccine further along the development pipeline. The
    National Institutes of Health took the lead in working with the
    private sector to advance development of this new vaccine.
        When HHS felt the technology was mature enough to indicate
    that the vaccine could be licensed within 8 years, my office
    launched an initiative to acquire it for the Strategic National
    Stockpile. Utilizing a stringent evaluation process, we
    reviewed multiple proposals and finally negotiated a contract
    with VaxGen of Brisbane, California for 75 million doses of
    vaccine, anticipating a three-dose regimen. The milestone
    contract with VaxGen lays out an ambitious program, including
    delivery of the first 25 million doses of usable vaccine within
    2 years of award.
        I want to draw your attention to a feature of the contract
    with VaxGen and, indeed, all BioShield contracts. No payment
    for vaccine is made until the product is received into the
    stockpile.
        To provide for the stockpile's immediate needs, my office
    is in the process of completing negotiations for 5 million
    doses of the currently licensed vaccine and hopefully with an
    option for an additional 5 million doses. We expect those
    negotiations to be concluded shortly.
        But we are focused on threats beyond anthrax as well. My
    office has moved quickly to address the need for pediatric
    liquid formulation of potassium iodide, a drug that protects
    the thyroid from radioactive iodine. This formulation is aimed
    at young children who are at the greatest risk from the harmful
    effects of exposure to radioactive iodine. In March, a contract
    was awarded under Project BioShield for suspension potassium
    iodide to protect at least 1.7 million children. Product
    delivery will begin next month.
        In addition to the BioShield contracts that have already
    been awarded, there are several other BioShield procurement
    related activities underway. We are reviewing the responses for
    request for proposals for anthrax therapies and we are
    continuing to move forward on the acquisition of an antitoxin
    treatment for botulinum.
        To signal our intent to acquire a next generation smallpox
    vaccine, we will be releasing a draft request for proposal for
    industry comment within the next few weeks.
        Finally, in anticipation of yet-to-be-determined
    requirements, we actively monitor the state of the medical
    countermeasure pipeline, both within and outside of the U.S.
    Government, by evaluating Government research and development
    portfolios and engaging industry to the publication of requests
    for information. For example, we have released three RFIs to
    assess the time line to maturity of medical countermeasures to
    treat nerve agent exposure, acute radiation syndrome, and
    additional products that might be available to treat anthrax.
    These requests are key for HHS to dialogue with industry
    partners to inform them on the development of a sound
    acquisition strategy.
        Defining priorities and quantifying the size of the threat
    to the population are key steps in focusing our efforts. In the
    process, we must be mindful of the realities of the spectrum of
    efforts needed along the research and development pipeline to
    produce a usable medical countermeasure. The process of
    defining required specifications for countermeasures often
    reveals few, if any, candidates in the pipeline. We have been
    fortunate that some of our highest priority needs for
    countermeasures could be addressed using the available advanced
    development products already in the pipeline. However, basic
    research and early development efforts, when even robustly
    funded, often take years before a concept is mature enough for
    advanced development, and it is only when a product has reached
    the advanced development stage that Project BioShield provides
    a meaningful incentive for manufacturers to take the product
    the rest of the way.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        In closing, HHS has a clear mandate from President Bush and
    Congress to lead the charge in countermeasure development. We
    have already made important strides to address the public
    health needs of the Nation, but there is more that needs to be
    done. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and
    Senator Byrd and other members of the committee to address the
    challenges of bioterrorism and to improve the public health of
    the Nation.
        Thank you.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Stewart Simonson

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd and Subcommittee members.
    I am Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
    Preparedness. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you
    information on our progress in implementing the Project BioShield Act
    of 2004, which was enacted some 9 months ago. Biodefense is a top
    priority for the Bush Administration and having an appropriate
    armamentarium of medical countermeasures is a critical aspect of the
    response and recovery component of the President's ``21st Century
    Strategy for Biodefense.'' The acquisition and ready availability of
    medical countermeasures, such as antibiotics, monoclonal and polyclonal
    antibodies against infectious threats, therapies for chemical and
    radiation-induced diseases, and vaccines to protect against exposure
    from biological agents will have a substantial impact on our
    preparedness and response capabilities.

                              PROTECTING AMERICANS

        The events of September and October 2001 made it very clear that
    terrorism--indeed bioterrorism--is a serious threat to our Nation and
    the world. The Bush Administration and Congress responded forcefully to
    this threat by seeking to strengthen our medical and public health
    capacities to protect our citizens from future attacks. The
    Bioterrorism Act of 2002 substantially increased funding authorization
    for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Strategic National
    Stockpile. To encourage the development of new medical countermeasures
    against biological, chemical, or radiological agents and to speed their
    delivery and use in the time of an attack, President Bush, in his 2003
    State of the Union address proposed and Congress subsequently enacted
    the Project BioShield Act of 2004. The Special Reserve Fund, pre-
    appropriated with $5.6 billion was created to assure developers of
    medical countermeasures that funds would be available to purchase
    critical products for use to protect our citizens.

                     THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE TODAY

        The wake-up call that we received in the fall of 2001 brought
    clarity to the gaps in our chemical countermeasure armamentarium and we
    immediately sought to address them. Although there is much work still
    to be done, we have made significant progress in building our Strategic
    National Stockpile from that time to what we have on-hand today. For
    example, our smallpox vaccine stockpile has grown from 90,000 ready-to-
    use doses in 2001 to enough vaccine to protect every man, woman, and
    child in America. Major strides have been made in building our chemical
    countermeasure reserve against anthrax, plague, and tularemia. We are
    now able to protect and treat millions of Americans in the event of an
    attack with one of these agents. We have taken the botulism antitoxin
    program started by the Department of Defense in the early 1990s to
    completion and we are now building our antitoxin stockpile further. We
    have also built our stockpile of countermeasures to address the effects
    of radiation exposure with products such as Prussian Blue and
    diethylenetriaminepentaacetate, or DTPA. These countermeasures act to
    block uptake or remove radioactive elements such as cesium, thallium,
    or americium from the body after they are ingested or inhaled.
    Potassium iodide, a drug that can protect the thyroid from the harmful
    effects of radioactive iodine, is also in the Stockpile.

        THE STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ADDRESSING MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURE GAPS

        The initial focus of our efforts to protect the Nation was aimed
    largely at those threats that could do the greatest harm to the
    greatest number of our citizens, namely, smallpox and anthrax. A sense
    of urgency has pervaded our efforts and has defined new ways of doing
    business. Our new national security environment demanded accelerated
    product development timelines and new paradigms of interactions between
    industry and government with risk-sharing and enhanced intra-
    governmental collaboration. Using a robust interagency process, that
    mined intra- and extra-governmental expertise, requirements for medical
    countermeasures were identified, and options elaborated for addressing
    immediate and long-term needs. These experts continue to help us define
    the most expeditious way to traverse the critical pathway to develop
    and acquire usable countermeasures for the Strategic National
    Stockpile.

    Application of the strategic approach: Anthrax
        Although not transmissible from person-to-person, an attack
    involving the aerosol dissemination of anthrax spores, particularly in
    an urban setting, was considered by public health experts to have the
    potential for catastrophic effects similar to smallpox. . . . The
    potential for large-scale population exposure following aerosol release
    of anthrax spores, the threat demonstrated by the anthrax letters, and
    our knowledge that anthrax had been weaponized by state-actors,
    highlighted the nature of the treat. The Secretary of the Department of
    Homeland Security determined that anthrax posed a material threat to
    the Nation. And, because untreated inhalation anthrax is usually fatal,
    the Secretary of HHS identified anthrax as a significant threat to
    public health.
        The approach to protect citizens against this threat demanded
    immediate, intermediate and long-term strategies and requirements.
    First, the existing stockpile of antibiotics in the Strategic National
    Stockpile was increased. Second, there was a need for a licensed
    vaccine to be used not only for pre-exposure protection for laboratory
    and other workers at known risk for anthrax, but for use along with
    antibiotics after an exposure to potentially decrease the currently
    recommended 60-day course of antibiotic therapy. Anthrax spores are
    stable in the environment and would have a profound impact if released
    in an urban population. Availability of a vaccine is a critical
    requirement for repopulation and restoration of the functionality of
    any exposed area.
        The limitations inherent in the currently available anthrax vaccine
    were articulated in a 2002 Institute of Medicine report, ``Anthrax
    Vaccine: Is It Safe? Does it Work?'' The report stated, ``. . . a new
    vaccine, developed according to more modern principles of vaccinology,
    is urgently needed.'' An assessment of developing technologies was
    undertaken by HHS experts in the fall of 2001 and the decision was made
    that there was a sufficient scientific foundation, including a detailed
    understanding of the pathogenesis of anthrax and how anthrax vaccines
    provide protective immunity, to support the aggressive development of a
    next generation vaccine consisting of recombinant protective antigen
    (rPA). This research, spanning more than a decade from its inception in
    the early 1990s, was conducted in large part by the United States Army
    Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick,
    Maryland.
        HHS defined a three-stage development and acquisition strategy with
    open competition for awards at each stage. The early and advanced
    development programs were supported by the National Institutes of
    Health's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases with
    contract awards in September 2002 and 2003, respectively. These were
    milestone-driven contracts with well-defined deliverables including the
    manufacture of clinical-grade vaccine and the conduct of Phase 1 and
    Phase 2 clinical trials. Large-scale manufacturing capacity would be
    required to support the civilian requirement for this medical
    countermeasure, which was defined through an interagency process to be
    the initial protection of up to 25 million persons. Senior officials
    throughout the United States government evaluated acquisition options
    to achieve this requirement and, in the fall of 2003, the decision was
    made to pursue the acquisition of rPA anthrax vaccine.
        An evaluation of the status of the NIAID rPA anthrax vaccine
    development program suggested rPA vaccine could potentially become a
    licensed product within 8 years. In March 2004, the acquisition program
    for this vaccine, under the direction of my office, was launched using
    the Special Reserve Fund created in the fiscal year 2004 Department of
    Homeland Security appropriations bill. Utilizing a robust technical and
    business evaluation process, we reviewed multiple proposals and finally
    negotiated a contract with VaxGen of Brisbane, California, for 75
    million doses of the vaccine, (anticipating a three-dose regimen).
    Using a milestone and deliverables approach utilized with the ACAM2000
    smallpox vaccine development and acquisition program, and the rPA
    anthrax vaccine development related contracts at NIAID, the VaxGen
    contract lays out an ambitious program to include the delivery of the
    first 25 million usable vaccine doses to the Strategic National
    Stockpile within 2 years of contract award. A unique and critical
    aspect of the rPA vaccine BioShield acquisition contract is the fact
    that no payment is made until a usable product is delivered to the
    Stockpile. While awaiting delivery of this new vaccine to the Stockpile
    my office will complete negotiations for 5 million doses of the
    currently licensed anthrax vaccine in the next few days to support
    immediate requirements. Delivery of the product to the Stockpile will
    begin very soon after the contract award and will have a direct impact
    on our preparedness.

    Other Needed Countermeasures
        In an effort to fill other gaps in the Stockpile, we have made
    progress in contracting for products that will soon be delivered for
    use.

    Potassium Iodide
        In March 2005 a contract was awarded under Project BioShield for a
    pediatric liquid formulation of potassium iodide, a drug that helps
    limit risk of damage to the thyroid, from radioactive iodine. This
    formulation is aimed at young children who cannot take pills and are at
    the highest risk of harmful effects from exposure to radioactive
    iodine. This acquisition will provide needed protection for at least
    1.7 million children. Product delivery will begin next month.

    Ongoing Project BioShield activities
        In addition to the Project BioShield acquisition contracts that
    have been awarded in the last 9 months, there are several other
    important BioShield procurement-related activities underway. We are
    reviewing the responses for Requests for Proposals for anthrax
    therapies, and we are continuing to move forward on the acquisition of
    an antitoxin treatment for botulism. Furthermore, to signal our intent
    to acquire a next generation smallpox vaccine, we will be releasing a
    draft request for proposal for industry comment within the next 2
    weeks. Finally, in anticipation of yet to be determined requirements,
    we actively monitor the state of the medical countermeasure pipeline--
    both within and outside the government--by evaluating USG research and
    development portfolios and engaging industry through the publication of
    Requests for Information (RFIs). For example, we have recently released
    three RFIs to assess the timeline to maturity of medical
    countermeasures to treat nerve agent exposure, acute radiation
    syndrome, and additional products that might be available to treat
    anthrax. These requests are a key tool for HHS to dialogue with
    industry partners and to inform the development of sound USG
    acquisition strategies.

    Priority Setting Beyond Smallpox and Anthrax
        The approach taken to rapidly expand our Nation's response capacity
    to meet the medical and public health impact of either a smallpox or
    anthrax attack demonstrate our national resolve to address these
    threats. But, in many ways, anthrax and smallpox represent the ``low
    hanging fruit'' for medical countermeasure research, development and
    acquisition and was enabled by a substantial research base developed by
    USAMRIID and NIH. There was consensus that these were our highest
    priorities and we had countermeasures available or relatively far along
    in the development pipeline to permit acquisition. Given an almost
    endless list of potential threats with finite resources to address
    them, prioritization is essential to focus our efforts. We rely heavily
    upon our interagency partner, the Department of Homeland Security, to
    provide us with a prioritized list of threats along with material
    threat assessments that will provide reasonable estimates of population
    exposure. This information is critical for future strategic decision
    making regarding how best to focus our National efforts in
    countermeasure development and acquisition, including whether in the
    short-term, the so-called ``one-bug, one-drug'' approach should
    continue while simultaneously investing in more broad-spectrum
    prevention and treatment approaches for the longer term.

    Challenges to Rapidly Expanding the Strategic National Stockpile
        Although defining priorities and quantifying the size of the threat
    to the population are the key steps to focus our efforts, we must be
    mindful of the realities of the spectrum of efforts needed along the
    research and development pipeline to produce a useable medical
    countermeasure. The process of defining required specifications for a
    countermeasure often reveals few, if any, candidates in the pipeline.
    Basic research and early development efforts, even when robustly
    funded, often take years before a concept is mature enough for advanced
    development. When a product has reached the advanced development stage,
    Project BioShield Act of 2004 provides an important incentive for
    manufacturers to take the product the rest of the way through the
    pipeline. And, as I have outlined here today, in the 9 months since
    Project BioShield was enacted, the incentive has sped final development
    of several products for the Stockpile.

    Conclusion
        In closing, I must emphasize that the number of threat agents
    against which we could guard ourselves is endless and new and emerging
    threats introduced by nature will present continuing challenges.
    Although we cannot be prepared for every threat, we have the ability to
    create a strategic approach to identifying and combating the greatest
    threats. HHS and its agencies including NIH, CDC, and FDA, have a clear
    mandate from President Bush and Congress to lead the charge in this
    arena. We have already made important strides and will continue to work
    to address the obstacles identified. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to
    working with you and members of the Subcommittee to address the
    challenges of bioterrorism preparedness and its impact on public
    health.
        I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

        Senator Gregg. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Let me start by saying I think there has been significant
    progress made. We started at zero, but I do not think we should
    underestimate how far we still have to go. We will start off by
    saying you have done a good job getting to where you are going,
    but the context of this hearing may ask questions about where
    do we have to go and how do we get there and why are we not
    there yet.
        Let us begin. You, Mr. Simonson, talked about anthrax, and
    that is probably a good case study to look at because if you
    order the pathogens which are our biggest threat, smallpox is
    number one, followed by anthrax, and you have botulism. Then
    you actually drop down a level in my opinion and you hit
    botulism and hemorrhagic fever and a number of other things
    that are much more controllable than either anthrax or
    smallpox.

                               SYSTEM WEAKNESSES

        But we have also seen three instances of what I would call
    real-life case studies as to how we react. We have got the SARS
    situation. We have got the avian flu situation, and we have
    just the simple flu vaccine situation. In each one of those
    instances, we saw weaknesses and we saw strengths of our
    system. I wanted to focus a little bit on the weaknesses
    because the strengths are good. Let me congratulate you for
    them, but I am concerned about the weaknesses.
        The weaknesses, as I see it, are this. In the flu
    vaccination situation, we found ourselves with an ``all the
    eggs in one basket'' philosophy, and the provider of the
    vaccine turned out to be incapable of maintaining the supply.
    And thus, people were unable to get the vaccine. Are we
    creating the same problem again with anthrax, for example,
    where we essentially committed to a single supplier where the
    situation is that the supplier has not even gotten through
    clinical trials yet. Should we be approaching this by throwing
    the net wider and trying to energize more input to get more
    participation from more players?
        We have one approved vaccine out there, which you mentioned
    you are buying 5 million doses from. It is a much more complex
    vaccine procedure than the one being proposed, but the one
    being proposed has not been approved, whereas the one that
    exists is approved. And so I guess my question is, why are we
    not splitting up at least into a couple baskets here rather
    than going full bore with one basket? That is the first
    question.
        The second question is, are we energizing the minds out
    there that might have even more creative answers? Again, I will
    use anthrax as an example. I hate to be anecdotal because this
    should be more systematic than anecdotal. But I was up at
    Dartmouth where they have a very fine research facility, and
    the researchers up there said they were having great success
    with a proposal which basically addressed not only pre-
    prevention, but also if you were actually exposed to anthrax,
    had almost 100 percent recovery from anthrax. It was just at
    the mice level but they thought they were making great
    progress. But their attitude was they could not break into the
    system.
        How many other people are out there? Are there people at
    Baylor? Are there people at Duke? Are there people out in
    Minnesota who basically have not figured out how to break into
    the system but might have the ideas? Are we energizing the
    research community first to come up with ideas and are we
    giving them a clear pathway that gets those ideas into the
    process, or are we shutting them out by simply choosing a
    winner here and saying this is the vaccine we are going to use,
    everybody else is off the table for the next 5 years because
    all the money is committed to this vaccine?
        So it is two levels of questions. Have we made technically
    the right decision by choosing one vaccine to basically put all
    our eggs in one basket in light of the flu experience? And
    secondly, in doing that, have we also shut down the creativity
    in this area of anthrax because everybody now says, well, the
    anthrax is off the table because they have chosen this vaccine?
    So people at Dartmouth, people at Baylor, people at Duke are
    going to move on to something else.
        Mr. Simonson. I think, Senator, the influenza situation and
    other situations where we have put all of our eggs in one
    basket is distinguishable from what we are doing on anthrax.
    Utilizing what we sometimes call the push-pull, you push
    scientific development along the way using NIH and other
    instrumentalities to the point where it is far enough along
    that a Government contract can incentivize a maker to pull it.
    That is a very delicate balance in the negotiations with these
    companies. We found in our negotiations with the contractor
    that got the award that the $75 million was about what we
    needed to pull it and----
        Senator Gregg. How much does that constitute in dollar
    value?
        Mr. Simonson. $877 million.
        That was the pull needed to get there. Cutting it in half
    would have really limited our ability to take advantage of the
    economies of scale and so forth as you ramp up.
        But I think our interest in acquiring more AVA BioPort
    vaccine shows we are seeking not to put all of our eggs in one
    basket. Hopefully, we will be finishing the 5 million dose
    contract very soon. There is an option in there for another 5
    million doses. It keeps the door open and allows us to continue
    a dialogue with BioPort so we can, where appropriate, adjust
    our stockpiles there.
        Plus, we are doing some other things that are related. We
    have enormous quantities of antibiotics effective against
    anthrax.
        We are trying to develop a good anthrax therapeutic, and
    this procurement I think especially speaks to the situation you
    mentioned earlier about people feeling locked out. What we have
    said is in order to keep our acquisition in sort of the state
    of the art, we are going to engage in essentially a three-stage
    acquisition, acquire the first round of anthrax therapeutics,
    but keep RFPs open for the next 2 years so products that were
    not able to compete in the first round could compete in the
    second round so that we have a diverse portfolio of anthrax
    therapeutics. So it was specifically designed for the purpose
    of not locking out someone who was on the verge of a
    breakthrough but had not quite gotten to the point where he
    could meaningfully compete for a BioShield contract. So we are
    sensitive to that.
        I am not sure we are doing it the right way. I am not
    saying we are fully satisfied with the experience, but I think
    we are learning as we go and we are trying to be good stewards
    and to not over-commit where we do not see a need to. But we
    are sensitive to the need to keep the scientific community
    energized and interested in breakthroughs.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.

                         CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

        Senator Byrd. The Gilmore Commission in its December 15,
    2003, report stated that a single biological or nuclear attack
    could realistically kill tens of thousands of people. The
    report went on to say that to meet today's threats, we need
    technological breakthroughs such as the development of sensors
    to detect deadly chemicals or biological agents.
        I believe that is your area, Dr. Albright. What are you
    doing to prevent these deadly agents from crossing our borders,
    coming into our ports, or arriving by plane?
        When Secretary Ridge testified before the subcommittee last
    year, he said if a passenger wanted to board a plane with a
    biological or chemical weapon, we do not have the capacity to
    detect it. Is that still the situation? Does your budget
    request address this issue?
        Dr. Albright. So there were a couple questions. To answer
    the second question, the answer is no, we do not have a good
    way of detecting someone trying to bring a vial of pathogen
    across the border. That would be an extraordinarily difficult
    technical problem to address. If you think about the amount,
    for example, of anthrax or of smallpox needed to be brought
    across the border in order to either affect a large number of
    people or to act as seed stock for a domestic capability, you
    do not really need very much. The amount of the actual anthrax
    you would need would be about the size of a quarter. You would
    need very little smallpox to start culturing seed stock.
        So the approach we have taken is rather than trying to
    solve what appears to be an intractable problem at the borders,
    let me stop and say there is another side to this, and that is
    when people and cargo do cross our borders, to the extent that
    we are able to target suspicious individuals or suspicious
    cargo and then inspect them manually and thoroughly, that would
    certainly provide a venue, just as it would provide a venue for
    detecting almost anything else they would bring across the
    border. But looking for, as I said, a vial of anthrax, the
    technical obstacles to that are just extraordinary.
        So the approach we have taken instead is rather to detect
    an attack when it occurs because, in a sense, one of the real
    dangers or terrors associated with these kinds of pathogens is
    if they are deployed covertly, they start to infect people
    before anybody really knows what has happened. And by the time
    you start to see symptoms, it is usually too late to do much
    about it. So the trick here is to detect the attack before
    people become symptomatic, and when we have an opportunity,
    deploy the stockpile and treat the individuals concerned and
    save them.

                                 BUDGET REQUEST

        Senator Byrd. Would you touch upon the other question I
    asked? Does your budget request address this issue?
        Dr. Albright. Yes, sir. Our budget request I believe is
    approximately $80-odd million for the next generation of the
    BioWatch. These are the urban detection systems. We have also
    got about $100 million in our budget, roughly that is
    operations in support for the current system and actually there
    is another generation being deployed as we speak.

                               CHEMICAL DETECTORS

        Senator Byrd. The Department is spending over $100 million
    on the system of sensors known as BioWatch. The budget request
    for fiscal year 2006 proposes over $225 million for a new
    office called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
        Less clear are the Department's efforts to prevent a
    chemical attack. After 9/11, the Senate approved $15 million
    for the D.C. Metro system to deploy chemical detectors in the
    D.C. subway system. Now, that is an excellent system. It gives
    Metro the capacity to immediately determine if the subway has
    been exposed to a chemical agent so it can effectively respond.
        This funding was included at Congress' initiative. It was
    not requested by the President. In fact, the White House
    specifically objected to the funding, describing it as
    excessive.
        Last year, Under Secretary McQueary listed the D.C. Metro
    project as an accomplishment.
        Is there any funding in the President's budget to take
    advantage of the lessons learned from this pilot program to
    deploy the chemical detectors in other large subway systems or
    urban areas around the country?
        Dr. Albright. The short answer is yes. Let me explain to
    you how it works.
        First, it is called the PROTECT System, the system we have
    in the Washington Metro system. We see it as a significant
    success. In fact, the Department of Homeland Security is no
    longer really involved with it. We turned it over to the
    Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. They operate it
    to the extent they need technical assistance, which is almost
    never, we supply it for them, but this is something that has
    been completely transitioned.
        I will also add that during both the Republican and
    Democratic national conventions, we deployed this system also
    to the subway systems in Boston and in New York, and in fact,
    at the specific request of the New York Transit Authority
    police, we have kept the system deployed at certain sites in
    the New York subway system.
        The way it works, though, is that from our perspective, the
    technology development is finished. So now the question here is
    one of transition. How does one do that? In particular, how
    does one transition these technologies to transit authorities
    which are local government entities?
        So what we have been doing is working very closely with the
    Office of Domestic Preparedness, with ODP, to create grant
    guidance that will allow and focus grants to be deployed in
    local metro systems. There are something like over 30 metro
    systems around the country. They would then basically take the
    system and install it. It is really very inexpensive. It is
    only a few million dollars per metro system that is needed to
    do this. So that work is underway, but that would be embedded
    within our overall grant budget.
        Senator Byrd. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. Again, I recognize the chairman
    of the full committee.

               NEW PRODUCTS TO PROTECT AGAINST BIOTERRORISM ACTS

        Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of
    questions. One is to focus attention on how we are developing
    incentives for researchers to discover and develop new products
    to protect the general public against bioterrorism acts. Dr.
    Albright, what are we doing and what is in the budget to try to
    help reach that goal?
        Dr. Albright. In terms of fundamental research for medical
    countermeasures, sits within the realm of my colleague here,
    Mr. Simonson, and the Department of Health and Human Services.
    I will point out they have well over $1 billion devoted to
    research and development activities within NIAID to invoke
    intramural and extramural contracts, and by that, I mean to
    researchers within NIAID, as well as to universities to develop
    the scientific basis for countering these threats across the
    entire list of category A and even B and C agents.
        Senator Cochran. Mr. Simonson, do you have a response?
        Mr. Simonson. That is absolutely right. We have about $1.7
    billion assigned to the biodefense research portfolio at NIH.
    It is a very aggressive agenda there to move advancement
    forward.
        Senator Cochran. Will this utilize expertise that we have
    at academic health science centers, specifically the drug
    discovery efforts of schools of pharmacy?
        Mr. Simonson. The extramural program does leverage academic
    health centers. I will check this for certain, but I would be
    shocked if discoveries in schools of pharmacology did not
    leverage some of this money.

             SYSTEMS THAT MONITOR SUPPLY OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS

        Senator Cochran. I know there are efforts underway at the
    Centers for Disease Control and other agencies to develop
    systems that monitor the supply of pharmaceutical products
    besides those already in the strategic stockpile that could be
    needed in the event of widespread bioterrorism attack. Mr.
    Simonson, can you comment on such systems?
        Mr. Simonson. Yes. CDC, through the Strategic National
    Stockpile, has a monitoring function where we are looking for
    availability in the both reverse distribution and distribution
    system, in case something happens where we would have to
    leverage what is already out in the field.
        The FDA has a drug shortage function where they are
    tracking vulnerabilities in the pharmaceutical industry, how
    much of a particular product is out there and could be used in
    an emergency.
        The difference is FDA has access to very closely held
    proprietary data that CDC often does not have access to. So we
    work it together.
        Senator Cochran. Is there a sufficient amount of money in
    the budget request to get us started, Dr. Albright, to develop
    the infrastructure, the facilities for continued research in an
    aggressive way to meet this challenge?
        Dr. Albright. I think certainly in our fiscal year 2006
    budget request, the answer is yes. There are multiple aspects
    to your question. Certainly in the research side, again that
    would be in DHHS, but there have been funds actually
    appropriated in 2004, for example, for the development of the
    laboratory infrastructure, the capitalization, for example, of
    biosafety level 4 research facilities across the country, and
    it is my understanding is well underway.
        There are other issues, though. One of the things that Mr.
    Simonson and I have been working closely with is some of the
    capitalization needs associated with the developmental process.
    There are some unique issues associated with putting some of
    these bioterror pathogens through clinical trials, or the
    equivalent of clinical trials, because obviously we do not
    infect human beings with these diseases in order to test them,
    that we are actively discussing at the moment.
        Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you.
        Senator Craig.

                            SHELF SENSITIVE VACCINES

        Senator Craig. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
        You touched upon a subject I want to pursue with our panel,
    and gentlemen, you are the professionals here. You tell me if
    this is an area that does not pertain to this particular area.
        In the last several years, I chaired the Select Committee
    on Aging and a week before Chiron announced its Liverpool plant
    had been shut down, they were before us telling us they were
    going to meet the necessary 100 million doses, or whatever the
    number was, for the flu season. They did not meet it. We got
    through that season.
        But it exposed to us the vulnerability of that particular
    vaccine industry, and it was a product, in part, because of
    what had transpired over a course of years. Here you have a
    mutating virus, I believe, and it changes annually, and you
    cannot stockpile, and so you have to predict and produce. If
    you mispredict, you end up with a lot more doses and it
    bankrupts your company and you go away. And you find out it is
    much too expensive to play in that field of health care, if you
    will, unless it is incentivized by government.
        Of course, that technology is an egg-driven culture
    technology, and we are not into cell technology yet. We are
    trying to get money there.
        The bottom line is we made it through this last season. I
    do not know that a flu virus could be brought to this country
    effectively and spread to create a pandemic by a terrorist
    organization. You are the ones who would have to be able to
    tell us that, whether it was a doable proposition.
        But if it were, we would be so unprepared at this time to
    deal with it by all situations, and in certain segments of our
    country, certain demographics, the elderly, flu can be lethal,
    as we know, losing thousands and thousands of them in a normal
    flu season.
        We are trying to correct that problem, but we are not quite
    there yet. Government is simply going to have to help these
    companies and buy off the surplus at the end of the season to
    allow them to produce.
        Senator Cochran. How many of these kinds of vaccines or
    treatments are we preparing that are shelf-sensitive, that have
    to be rotated on an annual basis, that have to be sensitized to
    the mutating viruses all the time to be good and usable?
        Mr. Simonson. Flu is the only vaccine that has to be made
    in this campaign process.
        Senator Craig. Is it transportable and can it be used as a
    weapon?
        Mr. Simonson. Influenza?
        Senator Craig. Yes.
        Mr. Simonson. One would think so, yes.
        Senator Craig. Would you agree we are totally unprepared if
    it were ever used in that situation?
        Mr. Simonson. I am not sure I would say we are totally
    unprepared, but it presents an enormous challenge to us and it
    is something we have been mindful of and worried about I think
    since the President took office.
        Senator Craig. We are proceeding into the next flu season
    with how many producers of flu vaccine? Two?
        Mr. Simonson. There are two producers of the killed
    vaccine, one producer of the live attenuated vaccine, and a
    third on the horizon. There is still regulatory work occurring
    with respect to the third.

                   CELL TECHNOLOGY VERSUS CULTURE TECHNOLOGY

        Senator Craig. How much investment are we making in the new
    cell technology versus, if you will, the culture technology of
    eggs?
        Mr. Simonson. We entered into a $97 million contract for
    tissue culture, cell culture technology, which has enormous
    benefits over the embryonated hen's egg approach.
        Senator Craig. And that benefit is to be able to speed up a
    process ultimately to produce a vaccine more quickly. Is that
    not correct?
        Mr. Simonson. More quickly and it is less vulnerable to the
    things chickens are vulnerable to. We have hundreds of
    thousands of chickens who lay eggs for our vaccine every year.
    A high path influenza virus, avian influenza virus----
        Senator Craig. Clean chickens.
        Mr. Simonson. Yes, but they are still susceptible to
    disease. So it has worked out so far, but it is a fragile
    infrastructure.
        We have also developed over the last 6 months some
    contingencies for our chicken flocks. We are building up flocks
    so if we have a problem in one, we can supplement with another,
    and we can also produce year around.
        Senator Craig. But you have a tremendous time spread in
    that technology compared to tissue. Is that not correct?
        Mr. Simonson. That is right.
        Senator Craig. Well, I hope you are putting money into that
    new technology. We lucked out this year. We made it through the
    season with a lot of cooperation and, frankly, a lot of good
    coordination on the part of NIH and others and a lot of
    communities of interest. But I was absolutely amazed at our
    vulnerability in that area and the unwillingness, at least of
    Congress to date, to recognize it and incentivize it so we can
    keep industries functioning in those areas, not just in
    influenza but in other childhood areas. There is the liability
    issue, along with a lot of other things, that have just simply
    caused them to leave the market.
        Mr. Simonson. Even before 9/11, this was a very clear
    priority of the Bush administration. There was work going
    forward even before 9/11 on this. There is so much more to be
    done, but we have made a very good start I think. But it was,
    for decades, neglected as a seasonal nuisance, the flu, and the
    flu is not a seasonal nuisance. The flu is, in some ways, a
    very, very unique threat to us if you look back at 1918 and
    what that did to this country, and we have to prepare for that
    and we are.
        Senator Craig. Thank you.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Stevens.

                             ADVANCE APPROPRIATION

        Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I was pleased to join you in introducing this basic bill on
    BioShield, Senator Gregg. We gave an advance appropriation of
    $5,593,000,000. How much of that has been allocated to you for
    2005? That was for the years 2004 to 2013. I just wondered how
    much has been released to you.
        Mr. Simonson. Well, $2.5 billion has been released to us.

                        DEMONSTRATION OF IDEAS BY PEOPLE

        Senator Stevens. We had a sense of urgency in terms of your
    mission. Part of it came from the fact that I was chairman of
    appropriations. Senator Cochran is now, and he is going to have
    this delightful experience. But people came to me to
    demonstrate some of the things they said they had prepared. One
    gentleman told me he had a substance which, if it was injected
    into the leg of an individual, would guarantee protection
    against all substances for a period of 48 hours. Now, I sent
    them to see you. What do you do with people like that when they
    come in?
        Mr. Simonson. Well, there are a number of these people.
        Senator Stevens. There are a great number of people, but
    somewhere there might be one who knows what he is doing. That
    is what I want to know. What do you do with them?
        Mr. Simonson. I hold out that hope as well. So what we do
    is we gather the research and development types, the physicians
    and scientists, in my office who have the capability of seeing
    maybe a gem in the rough and we go through it. In fact, we do
    this, I would say, in the regular course of business. We are
    going to be doing it again next week with a provider, a stem to
    stern review of what they say will protect against, in this
    case, irradiation exposure.
        But it does happen often. We do it, and if we think there
    is any hope for it, we bring in our colleagues from NIH. We are
    looking all the time for more. Sometimes they are stacked up a
    little bit, but we do get to the people who come forward with
    these ideas.
        Senator Stevens. Is Dr. Franz still out there?
        Senator Gregg. He has not testified yet.
        Senator Stevens. He has not testified yet. Can I ask him a
    question?
        Senator Gregg. You can, sure.

                        NONGOVERNMENTAL SCREENING GROUP

        Senator Stevens. Do you think there should be a
    nongovernmental screening group that people will know exists
    that could review suggestions like this coming from individual
    scientists?
        Dr. Franz. I'm sorry, sir. A nongovernmental screening
    group?
        Senator Stevens. Yes. Should we have provided for such an
    entity in the bill that we passed, a nongovernmental screening
    entity to review these suggestions so it would be quickly
    reviewed?
        Dr. Franz. I think it depends on the resources. My own
    experience was as the Commander of the USAMRIID, we used to
    receive a lot of these things, and for the most part, as Mr.
    Simonson has said, I believe it is possible to look at the data
    presented, and oftentimes it is scanty. And to sit down with
    some smart people with both basic research and clinical
    experience and make a decision to do a very careful screening,
    using good laboratory practices and so on, of each of these
    products would be very, very expensive. So I think it is
    important there be some kind of careful look outside the
    laboratory by some smart people before we send them to the
    laboratory.
        Senator Stevens. Thank you.
        Mr. Simonson, my only comment is it just sounds to me there
    are a great many people in our national community who are
    thinking about these threats and some of them have capability
    and others do not. But I do hope we find some way to have an
    identification of where these people can take their
    suggestions. I am sure Senator Cochran will appreciate this
    because they still keep coming to us for money and we do not
    know one single thing about what they are talking about. So I
    do think there ought to be some identifiable place where people
    with capability and ingenuity to try to help solve some of
    these problems could go and know who they are talking to and we
    could know who to send them to.
        Mr. Simonson. There is one other mechanism we use, as I
    indicated earlier. This request for information. We will take a
    look at what is missing and having looked through the
    Government pipeline, seeing nothing, we will send out a request
    for information, sources sought. Do you have work in this area
    that might be useful to the Government? And that produces a
    fair amount of really reliable data that we can then move
    forward on. So we are trying to do that.
        I think there is no question, Senator, that when it comes
    to security countermeasures, people coming forward and saying
    we have got these ideas and we need a place to go, ours is the
    place to go. We want to have an open door for those sorts of
    inquiries.
        Senator Stevens. Thank you very much. My only comment would
    be if I let someone study how many permits the Wright brothers
    would have had to proceed with the demonstrations down at Kill
    Devil Hills, it would amaze you how many they would have had. I
    am sure similar things apply in this area. There is just an
    overwhelming number of permits necessary for anyone to even
    proceed with this independently. So I do hope we find some way
    to accommodate the knowledge of some people who may have the
    ingenuity to think a lot better than we thought they could.
        Senator Gregg. Senator Allard.
        Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      BIOTERRORISM AND COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

        I would like to make an inquiry as to how your efforts
    against bioterrorism are being coordinated with the Department
    of Defense, as well as the CDC lab? They are all deeply
    involved in biological threats to this country either through
    an epidemic, what we naturally have occurring in this country,
    which may be introduced or could be used by other nations as
    far as a bioweapon is concerned. I wonder if you might comment
    about your cooperative efforts, if you would, please.
        Mr. Simonson. We have a structure in place that Dr.
    Albright and I, Dr. Winkenwerder, Assistant Secretary for
    Health Affairs at the Department of Defense, and Dr. Kline, who
    is Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld for chemical and
    radiological and nuclear matters. The four of us chair an
    interagency group that works through these countermeasure
    issues, set requirements, and make sure the right hand knows
    what the left is doing because there is a fair amount going on
    outside of HHS laboratories. Parny may have something to add to
    this, but I think that really is where all the coordination is
    occurring right now on the countermeasure development front.
        Senator Allard. Are you communicating with the Department
    of Agriculture's plant and animal infectious diseases also?
    That is anthrax and potentially plague and zoonotic diseases. I
    assume you are also communicating with them.
        Mr. Simonson. Yes. They participate in this group.

                 INTRODUCTION OF DISEASES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

        Senator Allard. Now, I understand the chairman had some
    questions he raised about flu. I was not sure whether he was
    talking about just the regular variety of flu that affects
    humans or he was talking about the avian influenza, which does
    not occur in this country but causing some deaths in Asia and
    apparently is pretty virulent and is a disease that is of
    serious concern to get introduced in this country.
        When you have those kind of reports, what kind of action do
    you take?
        Mr. Simonson. The first thing we do is to ensure that we
    are getting reliable data out of the region.
        Senator Allard. So we send scientists down there to confirm
    the diagnosis.
        Mr. Simonson. We do send people there. We also bring
    material back to the CDC or other laboratories to make sure the
    sample is being properly evaluated and that we are watching for
    antigenic drift, changes in the characteristics of the disease.
        We fund, directly through the World Health Organization
    (WHO) or through bilateral agreements, ways to improve
    surveillance in these countries that have minimal
    infrastructure.
        The United Kingdom and the United States fund a transport
    fund to actually pay for isolates to be shipped out of these
    countries that cannot afford to ship them, believe it or not.
    It is a very expensive proposition.
        So that is the first thing we do. We trim that up. We send
    doctors into the field working with the WHO.
        I think the second thing we do, this is something Secretary
    Levitt has been very committed to doing, is work diplomatically
    with his counterparts, health ministers and so forth to
    underscore the importance of transparency because without
    transparency, none of this is going to do us any good. We are
    trying to back up that transparency with funding.
        Senator Allard. Well, the importation of material that is
    infected or potentially infected is a very volatile issue. We
    have a research laboratory off the shores of this country so we
    can make a claim that the disease does not occur in this
    country. I would hope that when you are bringing in those types
    of materials some consultation be made that in this particular
    case we happen to be talking about animal diseases, and it is
    important on our trade agreements that we never and we can
    always make the claim the disease does not occur in the United
    States. And avian influenza can have a dramatic impact, for
    example, in the poultry industry if we cannot make that claim
    as far as import and international trade and everything.
        So I would encourage you, if you are not, to work closely
    with those various agencies because we are trying to do what is
    necessary to protect our population. We need to study. We need
    to be prepared for them, but yet we have to be careful in what
    way we set up our studies and how we handle that kind of
    material. It can be very complicated and it could be very
    controversial.
        Mr. Simonson. I just want to follow up on something I said
    a moment ago. When we bring material back into this country, it
    is done in a very high level of bio-security so that we do not
    have to worry about it getting out, much like when other agents
    are brought back----
        Senator Allard. Very, very important. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Gregg. Thank you. I want to thank the panel.
        I think Senator Stevens' point that we need to formalize
    the point of access where people of ideas can go is a pretty
    valid one because I know I hear it too. I have people come to
    me and say I have got a solution to this problem, and I refer
    them. It would be nice, I think, if we could pick a central
    Government place where we could send all these people who have
    those good ideas. I guess yours is the shop. I am not sure how
    we make it more visible in that area, but I think that might be
    useful.
        But we do appreciate your work and we thank you for your
    time this morning and appreciate your testifying.
        We are going to now move on to the second panel which is
    folks who are outside the Government right now and who have
    expertise as to whether or not we are doing a good job as a
    Government and who have a lot of experience, beginning of
    course with Dr. Franz, who has already been drawn into the
    discussion here, which we very much appreciate. Hopefully we
    can get the electronics here to work well so we do not end up
    with a lot of interference. Dr. Franz we know well because he
    was head of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command
    for 23 years. He is now active in a number of other activities.
        We have Dr. Leighton Read, who has joined the Alloy
    Ventures as a general partner in October 2001. He has 14 years
    as a biotechnical entrepreneur and investor, and he is going to
    give us his thoughts as to how you get into this business and
    whether or not the Government is making it easy.
        And we have Mr. John Clerici who is an expert in liability
    issues. He was Judge Advocate in the United States Air Force
    where he spent a considerable amount of time advising the Air
    Force research laboratories on how to procure technologies.
        So we appreciate all of you taking the time to be with us
    today. What we are interested in hearing about is how you think
    the Government is doing in instituting the goals of BioShield,
    which have certainly been outlined rather thoroughly this
    morning, to prepare ourselves to deal with a biological/
    chemical attack and to anticipate what the problems would be
    and be ready to deal with them. So we want to hear your
    thoughts on this.
        We will start with you. Why do we not start with Dr. Franz
    and make sure we have got this thing working so that he is up
    and running. Dr. Franz is in Boston, which is obvious because
    there is a Red Sox symbol in front of him, probably curing Red
    Sox fever. If you could give us a test, Dr. Franz, that would
    be good.
        Dr. Franz. Good morning, sir. Can you hear me?
        Senator Gregg. Yes, we can. Thank you. Why do you not
    proceed?
    STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID FRANZ, CHIEF BIOLOGICAL
                SCIENTIST, THE MIDWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
        Dr. Franz. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is an
    honor to appear before you to address issues related to the
    procurement of medical countermeasures to protect the American
    population from bioterrorist agents and emerging infectious
    disease. I am currently Senior Biological Scientist at the
    Midwest Research Institute in Kansas City. I believe you have
    my resume.
        This committee has asked that I provide some broad
    perspective on the medical aspects of biological defense in the
    context of a world in which intentional release of biological
    agents is of significant concern and natural introduction of
    disease is a reality. I will make seven brief points that
    encapsulate my written statement and then summarize my thoughts
    regarding the implications of these points for the challenges
    at hand.
        First, regarding the threat, I believe the most significant
    barriers to biological terrorism today is the intention to
    commit the crime. This is especially true for contagious
    viruses. In the future, technology will draw on the options for
    both protection and for abuse.
        Second, we are extremely vulnerable to bioterrorist attack
    in this free society, but for many technical and behavioral
    reasons measuring actual risk to any segment of the American
    population or its agriculture will continue to be extremely
    difficult.
        Third, biology is characterized by great diversity.
    Microbes like our own immune systems can be either strong or
    weak. We can rank microbial capabilities that cause disease and
    even their utility for terrorist exploitations, but without
    solid intelligence, we can never know for sure which specific
    biological agent we might face or when. Many of us agree,
    however, as was mentioned earlier, there are outliers among the
    diverse microbial population. These include organisms that
    cause smallpox, anthrax, and foot and mouth disease.
        Fourth, biology is neither as crisp nor are the rules of
    play as well defined as they are for physics and chemistry.
    Therefore, there are many opinions regarding the way ahead for
    bioterrorism defense.
        Fifth, just trying to decide how to organize to protect
    ourselves is challenging. Secretary Richard Danzig has proposed
    a handful of select scenarios to be used ``as an anvil against
    which to hammer our ideas.'' A compatible approach, which I
    have often discussed, is to prepare for the outliers and then
    broadly enhance our public health system as if we were
    expecting an unknown emerging infectious disease.
        Sixth, regarding future threats, we should assume that
    almost anything is or will be possible, but we must not forget
    just because it is theoretically possible it is almost always
    harder for us to manipulate biology either for good or for ill
    than we predicted.
        And finally, seventh, we can do many things to protect
    ourselves but our preparation can never be perfect. I believe
    it is critically important that we carefully craft our concept
    of use and application of various biodefense measures are being
    developed so we address the greatest risks and vulnerabilities
    and ensure the maximum benefit for our investments. It will be
    costly, but the cost of failure in this area is potentially
    enormous. So how can we apply these principles?
        First for vaccines. It is relatively easy to justify the
    acquisition of vaccines for anthrax and smallpox for the
    population. It is important, however, we thoroughly understand
    our concepts of use as we attempt to develop traditional agent-
    specific vaccines for the civilian population. In the short
    term, we should exploit next generation, flexible vaccine
    platforms. We were working on these in USAMRIID in the mid-
    1990's already, which will allow us relatively quickly to
    produce a licensed product, counter an outbreak of either
    epidemic or even pandemic. The basic platform might be licensed
    for use in humans now, allowing us to simply add a genetic
    cassette when a new vaccine is needed, greatly shortening the
    time for use. Our current system of vaccine research,
    development, and approval is simply not flexible enough to
    respond to terrorist attack or emerging disease.
        For drugs, it is difficult to argue against spending as
    much as we can afford on antivirals and new classes of
    antibiotics and exploiting the genomic revolution to develop
    new categories of anti-infectives. All of these will improve
    the lives of Americans with or without a bioterrorist attack.
        And regarding the future, attempting to protect our
    population from the unknown threat of today and especially of
    tomorrow with specific countermeasures like traditional
    vaccines will likely be extremely costly and inefficient.
    Significantly boosting the immune system to give us broad,
    multi-agent protection is now slightly more than a great idea I
    believe. I will not be surprised if it will be 15 or 20 years
    before we can do this in domestic animals effectively and maybe
    30 years before we can really make a difference in the broad
    population of humans. But I believe we must be doing the
    necessary research right now. We probably do not yet know how
    much difference attempts to turn up the gain on our own immune
    systems will make. It is likely that for prophylactic use in a
    broad population where side effects may be totally
    unacceptable, the value could be minimal. However, in select
    populations or the already exposed or ill, where non-life-
    threatening side effects are accepted, this class of
    countermeasures may be significantly more effective. We
    actually have examples of use in individual patients with
    cancer and hepatitis today, but our tools are still very, very
    crude.
        Finally, regarding market drivers for medical
    countermeasures, my experience is second-hand and limited. I
    believe specific countermeasures for most bioterrorism agents
    and probably for briefly emerging infectious diseases will, for
    the most part, require Government funding. For those
    countermeasures that have broader application, a significant
    portion of the research will still probably be funded by the
    Government. However, advanced development and even production
    will be of interest to industry, I am sure. Even there,
    incentives may be helpful or necessary in driving development
    and production of certain compounds.

                               prepared statement

        Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this
    information before the committee. I worked hard to keep our
    leading national laboratory for the development of medical
    countermeasures for the force solvent through the 1990's. I
    know it is not easy to convince someone that medical
    countermeasures for a poorly understood threat of unknown risk
    are really important. The field of the vaccine and antiviral
    drugs requires both science and imagination, a phenomenal
    personal dedication by scientists and shepherding over enormous
    regulatory hurdles. And when it is completed, you cannot paint
    on the national colors and sail it around the world or even fly
    it over the Super Bowl at half-time. When it is finally
    licensed, the administration of that vaccine is often dreaded
    by the healthy recipient whose very life you want to save.
        Thank you for your important work and for this opportunity.
    I'd be happy to answer any questions.
        [The statement follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of Dr. David Franz

    Medical Countermeasures to Biological Threats--and Emerging Infectious
            Disease
        Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, it is an honor to appear
    before you to address issues related to the research, development and
    procurement of medical countermeasures to protect the American
    population from bioterrorist agents and emerging disease. I am
    currently the Senior Biological Scientist at the Midwest Research
    Institute in Kansas City. I served on active duty in the U.S. Army from
    1971 to 1998, with 24 of those years in the U.S. Army Medical Research
    and Materiel Command. I served for 11 years at the U.S. Army Medical
    Research Institute of Infectious Disease, which I commanded before my
    retirement. I currently serve on a number of senior S&T advisory panels
    for the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security.
        This committee has asked that I provide some broad perspective on
    the medical aspects of biological defense in the context of a world in
    which intentional release of biological threat agents is of significant
    concern and natural introduction of disease is a reality. I have
    attempted to provide my views on a number of these issues below.
    What is the nature of the bioterrorist threat?
        Biological terrorism is a unique threat to our society, our economy
    and our freedom. Like the biological warfare threat of a decade ago,
    dual-use facilities and technologies may be exploited to make terrorist
    weapons. Although we have improved our defensive capability, we can
    still not yet, geographically or temporally, warn our citizens of an
    attack in time to take evasive or protective action. Unlike biological
    warfare, the production facility' and the weapon of the bioterrorist
    may be very small indeed. Finally, as we have learned since October
    2001, attribution of a small scale attack can be very difficult or
    impossible. Furthermore, the microbes are generally widespread in
    nature and the technological tools are rapidly improving in capability
    and availability worldwide. Neither the microbes nor the tools to
    manipulate them can be outlawed, the former because if their ubiquity
    and the latter because of their value to society. Therefore, it is
    possible to easily hide a biological terrorist program. With proper
    agent selection there could be minimal technical hurdles. The most
    significant barrier to the biological terrorist today--and for the
    foreseeable future--is the intention to commit the crime.
    Can we measure the risk?
        We know that our human and livestock populations are extremely
    vulnerable; this is a function of our free society and our well-
    developed livestock industry. We know that the impact of an intentional
    attack with microbes could be enormous, measured in human lives or
    dollars lost. We know there are groups and individuals who threaten us
    and we have some sense of their abilities with things biological. Our
    understanding of the all-important factors of intent and motivation is
    much less clear. Therefore, risk--where all these variables come
    together--is only poorly understood. The president's directive
    ``Biodefense for the 21st Century'' specifically calls for a biological
    risk assessment to be performed every two years, so that our national
    response to the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences of
    bioterrorism can be improved. This risk assessment presents technical
    challenges that are being addressed by the Department of Homeland
    Security.
    Are some agents to be feared more than others?
        Biology is characterized by great diversity. Microbes of a given
    genus or family may be strong or weak. Species, subspecies or strains
    within a genus or family may be stronger or weaker than their near
    relatives. We call variola virus (the agent of smallpox), Bacillus
    anthracis bacterium, the foot and mouth disease virus and maybe even
    the toxin, botulinum, ``outliers'' because they can cause severe
    disease in humans or impact animal populations. Even that is an
    oversimplification. Botulinum isn't botulinum and anthrax isn't
    anthrax. All of these organisms, or the toxins they produce, live on a
    spectrum with regard to the pathology they can cause in humans or
    animals: some weaker; some stronger. To be an agent of concern' the bug
    need not only be able to cause disease in humans or animals, but must
    also have the right combination of a series of important
    characteristics, for example: stability, transmissibility, easy
    producability and/or the ability to overcome countermeasures. With
    regard to catastrophic bioterrorism, we may be truly concerned about
    less than 1 percent of those microbes found in nature. Yet, that's
    enough! The lesson for us is that we can--at least to some degree--
    prioritize the agents for which we use our resources to develop
    countermeasures. However, without solid intelligence, we can never know
    for sure which one we will face.
    What is the impact of all this variability in biology?
        If we were able to plot all known microbes in the world on a graph
    with their name stacked up on the vertical (Y) axis and their relative
    ability to hurt us spread across on the horizontal (X) axis, we would
    get some kind of a curve. Let's assume the curve would be roughly bell-
    shaped with a small number of microbes having very low ability to cause
    disease, most of them with moderate ability to cause disease and few
    which can cause severe disease. We could do the same thing with
    stability, transmissibility and the ease with which they can be
    produced. If that isn't enough, we could plot all Americans on a
    similar curve, describing the relative ability of their natural immune
    systems to combat disease of various kinds. Some of us are strong and
    some are weak, but most of us are average in ability to withstand
    exposure to disease. More than half of us might survive exposure to
    smallpox, without any medical help, but maybe only a few percent of us
    would survive inhalational anthrax. To complicate the picture even
    further, the outcome of some exposures is dose-dependant. This is
    especially true of the toxins, which don't replicate within out bodies,
    but act more like chemicals. Biology is just not as crisp and clean as
    physics or even chemistry; this is one reason we have heard so many
    opinions about protecting our citizens from biological terrorism.
    How can we decide what to protect ourselves against?
        The short answer is, ``We can't''. However, certain bugs are much
    better suited as weapons than others: B. anthracis, because of it's
    ability to survive in a spore form for many years; variola virus,
    because of its ability to spread from person to person and foot and
    mouth disease virus because of the way it can sweep through an
    agricultural economy so quickly that its point of introduction may be
    difficult to discern. We have recognized those and either have dealt
    with the outliers or are in the process of dealing with them
    specifically--as we should.
        Richard Danzig has proposed another scheme in his excellent
    document entitled, ``Catastrophic Bioterrorism: What is to be done?''
    His approach involves a short set of specific agent release or
    introduction scenarios, which if prepared for properly will likely give
    us many of the tools and capabilities to deal with most other agents
    which have characteristics similar to those we specifically prepared
    for. Several of our government departments and agencies responsible
    have implemented Secretary Danzig's approach.
        Another model which I, and others, have put forward--after taking
    anthrax and smallpox off the table with specific countermeasures--is to
    think about the unknown as emerging infectious disease and take general
    steps such as establishing surveillance systems, upgrading diagnostics
    capabilities and educating healthcare providers regarding outbreak
    response. Eliminating vulnerabilities in our public health system is
    not difficult to justify, and has a beneficial ``dual use''. I have
    characterized this way of thinking about preparation by the simple
    equation, Bioterrorism--Emerging Infectious Disease + Intent. We don't
    know when we will face a bioterrorist attack, but history tells us that
    we should expect emergence and reemergence of ``exotic'' diseases every
    few years in the United States. If we prepare our public health system
    to deal with these types of occurrences, we will be far better prepared
    to deal with a bioterrorist attack.
    What about future threats?
        We believe that multiple-drug-resistant bacteria were produced by
    the Soviets before the genomic era. We know that foreign genes can be
    added to both bacteria and viruses, making avirulent agents virulent,
    or conferring additional properties of virulence or pathogenicity. We
    know that the tropism--the virion's preference regarding the body's
    cells it infects--can be changed. We know that nature can change an
    animal pathogen so that it infects humans. In the biology of microbes,
    we should assume that almost anything is possible. That does not mean
    that it will be done by a human--but we are entering an era in which
    all these manipulations and more will become easier.
    Can we place a value on classes of countermeasures?
        We can do many things to protect ourselves from a bioterrorist and
    his bugs; they range from political and behavioral actions to change
    intention in those who might harm us, or to undermine their support
    where they live, to medical solutions like vaccines and drugs, physical
    devices such as protective masks that filter microbes out of the air we
    breath, or monitoring systems to detect an attack on high population
    densities. All have a place in our integrated national defense, but not
    all are equally suitable for all populations we must protect--or
    deter--OR for every agent we wish to protect against. The Nunn-Lugar
    Cooperative Threat Reduction program has had a very significant
    positive result among the now-aging weaponeers of the FSU, but we would
    not expect the same model to work with Al Quiada. A protective mask
    will be of much greater utility to a soldier on the battlefield than a
    businessman in Boston, because we don't have, and probably can't
    afford, the capability to tell the business man when to don it. A
    vaccine against plague will more likely be useful to a Marine than a
    housewife, for behavioral and cost reasons. A currently-available
    antibiotic may be of great utility after an anthrax attack and useless
    after the release of highly-pathogenic avian flu virus that has been
    adapted to infect humans. We need to carefully craft our concept of use
    and application of the various biodefense measures that are being
    developed so that we address the greatest risks and ensure the maximum
    benefit of our investments.
    Can we place a value on individual countermeasures within a class?
        Vaccines are the most agent specific of medical countermeasures;
    therefore, for agents which are rarely seen in the clinic, they have
    very limited application. Stockpiling vaccines for civilians makes
    sense for anthrax and smallpox for two reasons. For these two agents,
    unlike most others, vaccines can be used--in different ways--after an
    attack. For most other agents, efficacy of post-exposure vaccination
    just hasn't been demonstrated. The one instance in which, let's say a
    plague vaccine or an Ebola vaccine if we had one, might have utility is
    during a bioterrorist campaign; a series of sequential attacks (the
    term ``reload'' was coined by Secretary Danzig). Here, an individual or
    group attacks one U.S. city and then announces that another city will
    be targeted unless we capitulate. I will leave it to epidemiologists
    and statisticians to decide if we could respond effectively in such a
    situation, assuming we had the right vaccine licensed and in stock. In
    attempting to place a value on such a vaccine, we must consider actual
    cost to develop, produce and license, the shelf life, as well as the
    biology and the psychology involved. The behavioral and legal issues
    surrounding the prophylactic use of vaccines in the general population,
    without significant evidence of risk, can be difficult, as has been
    seen with both anthrax and smallpox vaccine programs in the recent
    past.
        Antibiotics are considered a general countermeasure and, therefore,
    will likely have dual-utility. They can and are typically given post-
    exposure. This makes them ideally suited for protecting a civilian
    population after an attack. The issues to be considered include, first,
    sensitivity of the specific bacteria to a given antibiotic, then
    availability of the drug and its timely distribution to the affected
    population, if that population can be determined. Secondary issues,
    post attack, include possible allergy or other reactions to the drug,
    but the psychological and public relations issues may be slightly
    different after an attack than before. We currently have licensed
    antibiotics which are effective against most bacterial agents likely to
    be used by a terrorist. For some there would be issues of availability
    and, possibly, surge production. We believe that the Soviet Union
    developed antibiotic resistant strains in the past. Resistant strains
    have also developed naturally' throughout the world in recent years.
    Although, I am not expert regarding recent submissions to the FDA, it
    is my understanding that there are few, if any, new classes of
    antibiotics moving forward for licensure. This trend should be of
    concern to all of us, even if there were no potential for bioterrorist
    attack on our population.
        Anti-viral preparations can, for this purpose, be considered to
    have the general use characteristics of antibiotics, but are for use
    against viruses. They would have wide application if we never have a
    bioterrorist attack. For a number of reasons related to the way viruses
    live and function in our bodies, it is more difficult to develop
    antivirals that both stop the microbe and are safe for human use than
    it is to develop antibacterials. A very few antiviral drugs have been
    developed in the past 20-30 years. Now, with the availability of
    genomic and proteomic information, we are probably in a better position
    regarding the discovery or design of new classes of antivirals
    compounds, at least for certain families of viruses. As is with
    antibiotics, it is my understanding that market dynamics within the
    pharmaceutical industry have not, in recent years, been favorable for
    the development of antiviral drugs.
        Antibody preparations which provide passive immune protection
    without vaccination, whether produced in animals, or by modern
    synthesis methods, have a place in our medical tool kit. They, like
    vaccines, are specific in that they typically are only effective
    against the agent they were developed for. Unlike vaccines, they can be
    used immediately before exposure, immediately after and in some cases
    in the face of disease. They are typically less effective than
    vaccines, even if given before exposure; an exception to this
    generality is the antibody preparation for botulinum toxins, which, if
    given before clinical signs of disease, is amazingly effective in
    laboratory animals. Logistically, however, antibody preparations are
    cumbersome in that they must be administered either intramuscularly or
    intravenously.
        Vaccines protect by stimulating the body to produce a specific
    antibody which identifies and deals with the microbe when it enters the
    body. Antibiotics and antiviral drugs generally attack the microbe
    directly. There is a fourth possibility that we haven't fully
    exploited, primarily because we don't yet understand our immune systems
    well enough. This method is called non-specific immunity. Our bodies
    normally produce a variety of cells and chemical substances that attack
    microbes and help keep us healthy. These cells and chemicals deal with
    both bacteria and viruses. This part of our immune system is tightly
    integrated into our entire being and might be what we are describing
    when we say one person is generally ``healthy'' and another is not. The
    ``innate'' immune system is generally stronger when we have had a good
    night's sleep, when we are fit, when our nutritional and hydration
    status is within normal limits and when we are ``happy''. This
    protective system breaks down when we are jet-lagged or stressed. The
    beauty of the innate immune system is that it can protect us from many
    different agents and it's always on board. The limitation is that it
    can be easily overwhelmed. Some scientists believe that, if we could
    increase the ``strength'' of the innate immune system, we might be able
    to actually shift each of us toward ``healthy'' on the population bell
    curve. Today we understand this system only well enough to use very
    crude tools to treat some cancers and viral infections like hepatitis
    C. Even when we gain greater precision, it is likely that turning up
    the power of the innate immune system won't work for everyone. Just as
    a vaccine might only work for 90 percent of a given population, this
    method might work for 40 or 60 percent--and until we get really good,
    there will be significant side effects. As we learn more and more about
    this system, we will be better able to control it and protect humans
    and animals from infectious diseases. This method of protecting our
    citizens from biological terrorist attack--or emerging infections--may
    be available in 15 years--or maybe 30. It is critical that we do the
    basic research now to make the most of the innate immune system. This
    investment will pay enormous dividends even outside the world of
    infectious disease.
        Principles regarding development of medical countermeasures for
    biodefense:
      --Vaccines are probably the best solution, but they are good for only
            one microbe and must generally be given long before onset of
            illness. Their concept of use is more consistent with military
            deployment than with homeland security, with some specific
            exceptions.
      --Antibiotics have more general application, but they are good only
            for bacteria.
      --Antivirals that are safe and effective have been difficult to
            discover, but we have some new tools and should exploit them.
      --Our innate immune system, if manipulated appropriately, holds
            promise, but we have a lot to learn before we can exploit it,
            especially in the healthy population.
    What principles might we consider regarding acquisition of medical
            countermeasures?
        Vaccines.--It is relatively easy to justify the acquisition of
    vaccines for anthrax and smallpox. Reactogenicity, cost, shelf-life,
    animal efficacy and licensure are all being considered. It is important
    that we thoroughly understand our concepts of use as we develop
    additional agent-specific vaccines. We should be developing next-
    generation flexible vaccine platforms which will allow us to relatively
    quickly produce and license a vaccine to counter an outbreak that
    subsequently becomes epidemic or pandemic. The basic platform might be
    licensed for use in humans, allowing us to simply add a genetic
    cassette when a new vaccine is needed, to greatly shorten the time to
    use. Our current system of vaccine research, development and approval
    is simply not responsive enough to respond to terrorist attack or
    emerging disease.
        Drugs.--It is difficult to argue against spending as much as we can
    afford on antivirals, new classes of antibiotics and exploiting the
    genomic revolution to develop new categories of anti-infectives. All of
    these will improve the lives of Americans with or without a
    bioterrorist attack.
        Non-Specific Therapies.--We have a long way to go to achieve broad
    application of what is little more than a hypothesis, but we should be
    doing the necessary research now. Attempting to protect our population
    from the unknown threat of today, and tomorrow, with specific
    countermeasures, will likely be extremely costly and inefficient. We
    probably don't yet know how much difference these preparations will
    make; it is likely that, for use prophylactically in the broad
    population where side-effects may be totally unacceptable, the value
    will also be minimal. In select populations or the already exposed or
    ill, where non-life threatening side effects are accepted, this class
    of drugs may be significantly more effective.
    Market issues:
        My experience regarding market drivers for medical countermeasures
    is second-hand and limited. I believe that specific countermeasures for
    most bioterrorism agents--and probably for emerging infectious
    disease--will remain in the category of orphan drugs. Research,
    development and production will be dependent on funding by the U.S.
    Government and the debate regarding licensure or investigational use
    will be handled for each preparation. For those countermeasures that
    have broader application, a significant proportion of the research will
    be funded by the government; however, advanced development and even
    production will be of interest to industry. Tax- or intellectual
    property-related incentives may be helpful or necessary in driving
    development and production, especially where the market is large enough
    to interest the pharmaceutical industry.
        Again, I appreciate the opportunity to present this information
    before the Committee. I shall be happy to answer your questions.

        Senator Gregg. Thank you, Dr. Franz. The last few comments
    there are well taken and very much appreciated. We appreciate
    your service to the Nation. Clearly you should have a flag
    painted over your front door and the appreciation should be
    there for all you have done in the area of protecting our
    soldiers, sailors, and airmen.
        Dr. Read.
    STATEMENT OF J. LEIGHTON READ, M.D., GENERAL PARTNER,
                ALLOY VENTURES
        Dr. Read. Mr. Chairman and members, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify about BioShield and our Nation's
    strategy. Your interest in stopping to consider the overall
    approach is timely and appropriate here.
        I am commenting today as an individual who has been
    building and financing biotechnology companies in Silicon
    Valley for about 17 years now. Before that I was an internal
    medicine doctor, and my academic career was studying costs,
    risks, and benefits of new medicines and vaccines.
        When I received your invitation just a little a while ago,
    I looked up my testimony on biodefense for the Senate
    Governmental Affairs Committee in 2002 and then in 2003 for the
    Subcommittees of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Re-
    reading that testimony, I have to say I had concerns and
    recommendations that I voiced then that are just as relevant
    today as they were when the Department of Homeland Security and
    Project BioShield were still on the drawing board. So there is
    clearly still some work to do.
        This problem requires long-term thinking. I agree with
    statements made earlier by your colleagues that there is no
    potential threat to us. I would like to focus particularly on
    our economy and our lifestyle. If an easy-to-deploy,
    transmissible bioweapon were deployed, even with a very small
    loss of life, the impact on our economy would be unbelievable
    because the necessary steps to interrupt the chain of
    transmission would interfere with travel and commerce of all
    kinds, even potentially food and medical supply distribution.
    Most importantly, I am really concerned about the impact of
    this on the freedom of people to meet during a time of stress
    and worry and political consequence. Nothing would test our
    trust in Government authority more than a quarantine separating
    loved ones. So, the stakes are very high.
        One of the companies I built was in the influenza vaccine
    business, and I agree it would be a very realistic proposition
    that someone could smuggle a dangerous strain of influenza into
    the United States. That deserves serious attention.
        Now, a great deal of positive work has been done. It is
    hard to describe how big a step forward the BioShield
    legislation was and some of the implementation that has
    followed that at the same time as talking about how much is
    still to be done, but we need to do that. Much remains to be
    done to educate the public and strengthen our traditional
    public health systems, our first responders.
        I was very heartened by some of the responses to the
    presidential directives in Mr. Albright's testimony. Many of
    those problems or challenges can be dealt with in just a few
    years of sustained effort, and one of my key points is that is
    not the case for our longest lead time countermeasures, drugs
    and vaccines, that have not even been invented yet to counter
    these threats. As you know, drugs typically take 5 to 10 years
    from the first commitment to do something to the delivery of
    something for patients; vaccines, more like 10 to 20 years.
        This company I founded in 1992 licensed a very promising
    influenza vaccine, nasal influenza vaccine technology from the
    University of Michigan in 1995. This technology had already
    undergone 20 years of clinical trials under NIH support, and
    yet it was 2003, 8 years later, and after the expenditure of $1
    billion by three different companies of private capital before
    this product was approved by the FDA. This is a product known
    as FluMist which is now of growing importance as part of our
    influenza protection armamentarium.
        My second point is we clearly need the private sector to be
    involved and BioShield represented a very strong and clear
    recognition that this was the case, that we needed to get the
    incentives right. There are many reasons why we need the
    private sector, but basically all of the drugs and vaccines we
    use today for everything outside the field of biodefense come
    from the private sector, admittedly and with great respect for
    the huge national investment in the basic science made these
    discoveries possible.
        Start-ups and smaller companies play a very important role.
    I invest in these companies as a full-time venture capitalist.
    They take on higher-risk projects. They can demonstrate proof
    of principle.
        But I would like to underscore today the importance of the
    larger, more capable companies. They often acquire technology
    by acquiring these smaller companies that we invest in or by
    carrying out licensing deals with them. But there are skills
    for the downstream development of pharmaceuticals and vaccines
    that are very hard to come by outside a relatively small number
    of very large pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. The
    real test of whether BioShield is working is whether it engages
    the capabilities of these companies in the development of
    countermeasures. I would say we are not there yet.
        A biodefense procurement strategy that relies on companies
    that have not even launched a commercial product is likely to
    incur extra delays and other down-side surprises. So this is
    really a point for attention.
        What I think is a key missing ingredient is, we need
    markets for these products which mimic the size and the
    predictability of markets for treatment and prevention of other
    diseases. That is really the goal. The current BioShield law
    was, as I said, a step in the right direction, but it fails to
    adequately signal the Government's intention to purchase
    successful countermeasures. We need much more transparency on
    what the priority list is so the companies can begin to think
    about these things in advance. We need much more clarity about
    who are the people who have both the knowledge to comment and
    the authority to make decisions.
        There are lessons to be learned from some of the ideas
    being aggressively explored to stimulate private sector
    investment in vaccines for global health problems, such as
    AIDS, malaria, and TB. This notion of advanced purchase
    contracts deserves study as a model for your continued
    refinement and enhancement of BioShield. The notion there is a
    strong connection between the benefits of investing in
    infectious disease research for other diseases or even broadly
    and defense against biodefense is a very valid concept that is
    completely appropriate.
        BioShield misses in important respects with respect to
    providing indemnification from product liability. Basically it
    is a test of confidence. If a company tells you they are not
    really concerned about that in a conversation about working
    with the Government in biodefense, it is just because they have
    not grown up to understand how critical it is for their
    shareholders.
        We need to streamline procurement. It is not clear that any
    of the work so far by our great public servants who are
    carrying out the legislation of BioShield have taken advantage
    of the full ability to streamline the procurement process and
    take advantage of those special provisions. I think that is
    going to be important.
        I would like to come back to emphasize the point raised by
    Senator Stevens that we need a way to screen. As a venture
    capitalist, we get a very large number of proposals for
    investments, and only a tiny, tiny percentage are actually
    companies that receive investment. We have worked out screening
    processes, and I do not know that it is a model but it makes me
    sympathetic to the problem of a public servant who gets calls
    from people who think they have a good idea but the science is
    not really there and the person who gets lost in that crowd
    really does have the right idea. I can think of a number of
    ways we could use some of the new technologies, web-based
    technologies, table top exercises and maybe even a private
    sector intermediary to help with some of the filtering.
        We are in a biological arms race with our future attackers,
    and there are specific targets we should be going after. I
    completely agree with the priority for anthrax and smallpox.
    That makes sense to me. I must say it is pretty hard for people
    outside the Government to figure out what the priority list is
    below that. We have the long list of 20 or 30 agents, but the
    Government's own thinking about the rank order of what comes
    after smallpox and anthrax for civilians in particular is
    obscure. And it seems to me while it might require some defense
    of that ranking and that might be a little bit difficult, that
    it should be transparent so the private sector can set
    priorities.
        Sooner or later, despite our efforts to make good specific
    countermeasures, a clever or lucky perpetrator may deploy an
    agent for which we have not made specific preparations. And
    this calls for the notion of some kind of broader approach. We
    may need broad spectrum antimicrobials or vaccines, as has been
    mentioned. We may need to harness the nonspecific defenses
    already working in human biology like innate immunity. We may
    need to build systems, still very speculative, that you could
    move from obtaining the pathogen to having a drug in a very
    short time period. And all of those are worth stimulating some
    kind of prize or novel recognition and financial reward for
    some of these more speculative approaches. It might be very
    useful. I compare it to the X-prize for manned space flight
    that was successfully competed for and won in the last year.
        If we want to think about this broadly and in the long time
    frame which is really appropriate, a 2030, maybe even longer
    time horizon, we should be looking broadly. One idea I would
    like to suggest as an example, it should be studied before
    moving forward, would be to think about a survey of the
    microbial world on a scale that has not been attempted. Just as
    we carry out ambitious projects to systematically catalog the
    sky within reach of our light and radio telescopes, maybe it is
    time to carry out a planetary scale survey of humans and the
    microorganisms with which we frequently interact. We might want
    to begin by focusing on the respiratory tract.

                               PREPARED STATEMENT

        There is technology available. I cite a remarkable
    experiment by Craig Venter's group in which they obtained
    sequences for over a million new genes by looking at 1,500
    liters of Atlantic seawater. A company called Affy Metrix has
    gene chips that have been used to study which organisms are
    present in nasal swabs taken from approximately 10,000 subjects
    in studies. So it is possible now with some of the technology
    to think about such a broad survey. Not only could it provide
    us a baseline for measurement of new emerging infections by
    intent or by nature, but the basic science that would be
    enabled by this survey could provide more fundamental
    understandings to help us deal with the general problem.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        [The statement follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of J. Leighton Read, M.D.

        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today regarding BioShield and our Nation's
    strategy for confronting bioterrorism. Your interest in stopping to
    consider our overall approach is timely and appropriate.
        I am commenting today as an individual who has been building and
    financing biotechnology companies in Silicon Valley for over 17 years.
    Before that, I was an internal medicine doctor doing research on the
    cost, risk and benefits of new medicines and vaccines. On receiving
    your invitation to appear here, I looked up my testimony on biodefense
    for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee \1\ in 2002 and for
    Subcommittees of the House Energy and Commerce Committee \2\ in 2003.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ http://www.bens.org/highlights_testimony_read.html.
        \2\ http://www.bio.org/healthcare/biodefense/20030327.asp.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Unfortunately, the concerns and recommendations voiced then are as
    just as relevant today as they were when the Department of Homeland
    Security and Project BioShield were still on the drawing board. Since
    those remarks are available on the internet, I will only restate the
    main points here before turning to new thoughts.
    Long Term Thinking
        Biodefense is a gigantic, long-term problem. There is no potential
    threat to our economy or lifestyle that would be as easy to deploy or
    costly to contain as the release of a transmissible bioweapon. We
    should be clear that deliberate introduction of an agent that spreads
    from person to person is a completely different category of risk than
    an attack with dangerous organisms that do not spread. This is because
    our reasonable efforts to interrupt the chain of transmission would
    interfere with travel and commerce of all kinds, including distribution
    of food and medical supplies, and importantly, the freedom for people
    to meet each other in a time of grave worry and political consequence.
    Effective quarantine separating loved ones will profoundly test our
    trust in government authority.
        Despite a great deal of positive work, we are not yet organized to
    deal with this threat. Much remains to be done in educating the public
    and strengthening traditional public health systems and our first
    responders. Fortunately, much of this kind of work can be accomplished
    in only a few years of sustained effort. That is not the case for the
    longest lead-time components of our readiness: medicines, vaccines and
    other biomedical technologies needed to protect our population and that
    of our trading partners. For drugs against viruses or bacteria, it
    takes 5-10 years from commitment to delivery of medicine for patients.
    The process for vaccines typically takes 10-20 years. In 1995, a
    company I founded, named Aviron, licensed a promising intranasal
    influenza vaccine from the University of Michigan that had already
    undergone 20 years of clinical testing by the NIH. It took nine more
    years and over $1 billion in private investment by three companies
    before the product known as FluMist TM was approved by the
    FDA. Despite these timelines and costs, some pathogens are such natural
    candidates for potential abuse well into the foreseeable future that we
    must begin work now. It is important to seize this opportunity because
    infectious diseases represent some of our greatest triumphs in
    discovering, preventing and treating disease.
    Larger, More Capable Companies must be Involved
        This work will require enthusiastic and committed engagement by our
    country's most capable pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. All
    of the drugs and vaccines in use in the United States come from the
    private sector, often after substantial public investment in government
    and university laboratories. Start-ups and smaller companies play an
    essential role in taking on many higher-risk projects and demonstrating
    proof of principle. Larger players gain access to these technologies
    through licensing deals or purchase of the smaller companies. Several
    hundred million dollars of private capital and down-stream development
    skills rarely found outside of larger companies are usually required to
    finish the job for each important innovation. When R&D is successful,
    this investment makes sense because innovative products that address
    substantial medical need are reimbursed at the high value they
    represent to patients and healthcare payers.
        The experience factor is so important that a biodefense procurement
    strategy that relies on companies with scant experience in launching
    commercial products is likely to incur extra delays and other down-side
    surprises. Yet this appears to be exactly where we are heading with
    BioShield because the market incentives are not yet in place to attract
    the most capable innovators.
        The missing ingredients for biodefense countermeasures are markets
    which mimic the size and predictability of markets for treatment and
    prevention of other serious diseases. The current BioShield law
    provided an important step in the right direction, but it fails to
    adequately signal the Government's intention to purchase successful
    countermeasures that are still years away from completion. There is
    much to be learned from progress in defining Advanced Purchase
    Contracts and related ``pull'' mechanisms for stimulating vaccine R&D
    against global health targets such as malaria., tuberculosis and HIV.
    Restoration of patent term lost during regulatory review will be
    helpful. Important gaps still remain in the details and degree of
    indemnification from product liability. Larger, more capable companies
    will not participate unless these problems are addressed in future
    legislation.

    Streamline Procurement and Improve the Dialogue With Industry
        It is time to finish the job of re-inventing procurement of
    biodefense countermeasures. The bureaucratic tangle of approvals and
    sign-offs involving multiple agencies and departments (even including
    the President) prescribed in BioShield must be streamlined. Spending
    authority should be concentrated in the hands of someone close to the
    intelligence analysis which helps set priorities.
        It is essential that much more frequent and transparent
    conversation occur between companies and those setting the priorities
    for countermeasures. The formal process of RFPs and related acronyms
    cannot substitute for frequent, informal contact. Novel formats for
    meetings, including more table-top exercises web-based interactions
    should be encouraged. Antitrust relief may be required if these
    concerns are inhibiting valuable multiparty conversations.
        BioShield did not adequately address the need for more
    centralization of authority for setting priorities, funding solutions,
    and managing incentives. There is a recurring theme in my conversations
    with executives interested in making a contribution to biodefense: they
    can't find the right person in the government who knows the issues AND
    can make a decision. This more centralized authority should also have
    enhanced ability to adjust FDA influence processes and safety standards
    in preparing for high-risk threats.

    A Biological Arms Race
        One can identify the highest risk agents for the near and
    intermediate time frame, based on the biology of the microbes, the
    technical challenges faced by our potential attackers and intelligence
    data. These agents are presumably at the top of the priority list for
    BioShield, although it is hard to get clarity about which of a dozen
    potential threats rank most highly after anthrax and smallpox. There
    are at least a dozen agents that deserve serious countermeasure
    investment.
        Sooner or later, however, a clever or lucky perpetrator may deploy
    an agent for which we have not make specific preparations. It may have
    been derived from nature, cultivated in the laboratory, or engineered
    to have novel drug resistance or host range. There are several paths to
    get ready for this event. One is to seek broader spectrum antimicrobial
    drugs or vaccines. While there are examples of such agents discovered
    by accident, the rational design of broad spectrum countermeasures is
    largely beyond our current capabilities. Another path is to harness and
    enhance the non-specific defenses already available in human biology.
    We are still early in our understanding of how to manipulate innate
    immunity and the role of cellular factors such as interferon. Finally,
    highly speculative processes have been proposed by which one could move
    from knowledge of a new pathogen to a new treatment in a month, or a
    week, or a day. Technologies such as antisense agents and interfering
    RNAs may hold promise for such a goal.
        Our biodefense strategy must include a mix of disease-specific
    countermeasures and new technologies which offer more general treatment
    or prevention. I am concerned that getting the right mix depends on the
    quality of the dialogue among companies and the diverse government
    agencies that are involved. A high level of transparency on priorities
    and authority will be essential before the parties can effectively
    explore technical risk and financial incentives needed to get the job
    done. For some of the more aggressive goals, serious prizes, such as
    the X-prize for manned space flight may be the most appropriate way to
    focus innovator's attention.

    The Basic Science of Biodefense
        Our country has made and continues to make a large national
    investment in the underlying science of infectious disease and host
    defense. This effort is serving us well in many current biodefense
    efforts. In many cases, adequate financial rewards for the final
    product will provide incentives to develop new research tools along the
    way. In other cases, and particularly, animal models it is more
    efficient to have centralized research tools that can be shared by many
    innovators. When the government has the keys to scarce resources needed
    to carry out research, such as higher level biocontainment facilities,
    or access to dangerous strains, it is essential that access be
    facilitated for all who need them in pursuit of sanctioned goals.
        It may be time to consider an even bolder investment in basic
    understanding of the relationship between humans and microbes. Research
    is giving us a growing appreciation of the interdependency of genetics
    and environment, with particular emphasis on the environmental
    interaction of unrelated, but physically proximal organisms. Technology
    is now available to conduct a broad survey of microorganism diversity,
    genetics and metabolism A few projects have demonstrated the
    feasibility of collecting and analyzing data on a very large number of
    organisms. One example is Craig Venter's report on a rapid genetic
    sequencing technique that found evidence of 1.2 million new genes in
    1,500 liters of Atlantic seawater. Another comes from a company called
    Affymetrix whose gene chips have been used to identify which organisms
    are present in nasal swabs taken from thousands of study subjects.
        Just as we have carried out ambitious projects to systematically
    catalogue all of the heavenly bodies within reach of our telescopes, it
    may be time to carry out a planetary-scale survey of humans and the
    microorganisms with which they frequently interact. A focus on agents
    which colonize or infect the respiratory track might be the best place
    to begin. Data from such a survey could serve as a baseline for
    detecting introduction of novel threats. More importantly, analysis of
    the data could lead to more fundamental understanding of how to create
    robust protection against such threats.
        Mr. Chairman, I know that you have recently introduced legislation
    that would address many of the concerns mentioned here. Thank you for
    your leadership on this issue and your persistence in asking whether we
    are doing enough of the right things at the right time. I would be
    happy to provide further comment if you have questions.

        Senator Gregg. Thank you.
        I have to recess. I have got to make a quick phone call. I
    will be right back. It should not take more than 5 minutes.
        Thank you for your courtesy. I apologize for the
    interruption.
        Mr. Clerici.

    STATEMENT OF JOHN M. CLERICI, ESQ., PARTNER, McKENNA,
                LONG & ALDRIDGE, LLP
        Mr. Clerici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members
    of this subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you
    regarding my views of where we are with Project BioShield and
    biodefense in general. I applaud the leadership of you, Mr.
    Chairman Gregg, in your work on the Health Committee and being
    the lead sponsor on BioShield I, and also applaud the
    bipartisan leadership of Senator Lieberman and Senator Hatch,
    and Senator Kennedy, obviously, took a great leadership role in
    that effort and continue to be leaders on the issue of
    biodefense.
        Over the last few years, I have had the chance to
    personally work with the Department of Health and Human
    Services on behalf of a number of clients and entities not only
    in the area of biodefense, but also emerging infectious
    disease. We have negotiated contracts, some of which Assistant
    Secretary Simonson referred to, for SARS, avian flu, pandemic
    influenza planning, and other issues.
        Based upon that experience, it is clear to me that HHS does
    need additional tools beyond what was provided in BioShield to
    get the goals accomplished that the legislation meant to
    accomplish. Primary and first among those goals, as Dr. Read
    has pointed out, is to address the issue of liability.
        As we have begun to purchase these countermeasures slowly
    and there have been a couple contracts let to date, as
    Assistant Secretary Simonson said, and a few more on the way
    shortly, the primary obstacle at the end of the day to getting
    these deals done is addressing how liability concerns will be
    addressed. Certainly, as Dr. Read just pointed out, the
    liability concerns of a public company with shareholders and
    large assets are much different than a small biotech which has
    the ability to bet the company without worrying about
    liability. And I am not sure those are the types of companies
    we want necessarily participating or leading the way in this
    effort to bring these countermeasures to market.
        Today, there are two primary ways liability can be
    addressed. Public Law 85-804 has been on the books since the
    first Wars Powers Act during World War II, and it allows the
    Government to indemnify contractors after award, only after
    award, for risks that are deemed in the national security
    interest. It is an indemnity contract. Therefore, the public is
    at risk, and I know in your role as budget chairman is of great
    concern to you as well, Senator. But unfortunately, it provides
    no predictability because you do not know whether you are going
    to get liability protection until after you bid on the
    proposal, negotiated a contract, and are prepared to deliver.
    It provides no certainty to industry and no transparency to
    industry to plan.
        The second mechanism has been pointed to is the SAFETY Act,
    and I am very familiar with the operations of the SAFETY Act.
    It is a piece of landmark legislation to address the tort
    concerns of providers of Homeland Security goods and services
    in general. It does not work particularly well for
    countermeasures for two primary reasons.
        First, the SAFETY Act has a gap in it that does not protect
    vaccine manufacturers because the liabilities removed by the
    SAFETY Act are only those that occur following an act of
    terrorism. Most of the liability concerns of a vaccine
    manufacturer are, of course, before anything has happened. It
    is in the administration of the vaccine itself.
        Second, much like with Public Law 85-804, it is an
    application process, and there is lack of predictability
    involved with the SAFETY Act. And currently there are less than
    20 companies that have been certified under the Act and no
    biodefense measures or pharmaceutical companies are among
    those.
        The SAFETY Act also requires a company to litigate all over
    the country to exert what amounts to an affirmative defense to
    get out of litigation. Therefore, there are still substantial
    uncertainty subject to the judicial system in America, which is
    obviously not something that anyone wants to be their company
    on sometimes.
        I note in your bill, Senator, in Senate bill 3, you have
    done an excellent job of addressing, in my view, the liability
    concerns for biodefense manufacturers, and you also attempt to
    address the liability concerns of pandemic flu manufacturers.
    As we heard during the previous panel, the threat facing the
    country from a pandemic flu is much greater in my mind than the
    threat facing the country in bioterrorism, and that threat is
    enormous, as you know. The 1918 influenza pandemic, Spanish flu
    pandemic, killed millions of Americans, and unless we are
    prepared for that pandemic, we will be facing those same sort
    of liabilities both in terms of lives and in dollars if another
    influenza pandemic occurs again.
        The reason why pandemic influenza should be treated off
    line in my view is the sense of urgency. No amount of
    detection, no amount of intervention, and we can have the
    biggest armies and navies in the world, are going to prevent
    mother nature from affecting us. And this is urgent. We are
    past the time when this country and this world should be facing
    a pandemic based on statistics.
        The threat of pandemic liability is much like the threat of
    smallpox in the sense that if there is a pandemic, you will
    need to vaccinate the entire Nation. And your previous
    committee, the Health Committee, and through the Homeland
    Security Act, addressed the liability for smallpox vaccine
    manufacturers particularly by providing them immunity. We need
    to provide at least the same sense of liability protection to
    providers of pandemic flu vaccine because the threat from
    liability is identical, if not greater than the threat of
    liability from a smallpox vaccine manufacturer.
        Your staff has also asked me, Senator, to address some of
    the challenges in the implementation of the procurement
    provisions of BioShield, aside from liability, and liability is
    certainly first among them again.
        As Dr. Read has mentioned, the Department, in implementing
    Project BioShield, has not taken full advantage of all of the
    authorities that Project BioShield gave them back in 2004 when
    the legislation was signed. They have the ability at HHS to
    conduct these procurements under simplified acquisition rules.
    They have not exercised that authority to date. What has
    transpired through these negotiations is nongovernmental
    contractors, commercial entities, that are not used to doing
    business with the Federal Government are subject to the same
    amount of Federal acquisition regulation that our large defense
    contractors are subject to in providing these goods and
    services. That causes them both delay, uncertainty, a lack of
    transparency in what they are signing up to, and the delays
    resulted have been definitely inhibiting our ability to bring
    these countermeasures into the market as quickly as possible.
        We have discussed already there have been two awards to
    date, primarily big awards. There is a third smaller award
    addressing irradiation treatment for children, but two large
    awards using the special reserve fund under Project BioShield,
    one large award and one RFP pending, one award pending.
        The first award went to VaxGen which has already been
    discussed. Although that is often labeled as the first
    BioShield procurement, I would disagree with that
    characterization. It is the first procurement using BioShield
    funding, but the mechanisms to procure that countermeasure was
    done the same traditional way the Government would normally
    procure things. It was a multi-stage procurement, taxpayer-
    funded research and development resulting in, at the end of the
    day, a contract that as Secretary Simonson says, will not be
    paid until substantial delivery but, nevertheless, is a multi-
    stage, prolonged procurement. We did not set a market or set
    someone to guarantee it. Rather we had them chase the market
    just as if they would traditionally.
        The next award up in Project BioShield will most likely be
    for anthrax therapeutic, and Secretary Simonson mentioned that
    as well. Now, that will be the very first BioShield
    procurement, but again, HHS has not made use, in the
    solicitation at least, of the simplified acquisition procedures
    allowed to make use of it during that process.
        As a result, those contractors, whoever will get this
    award, face the possibility of very powerful and strong
    regulatory burdens upon them, including certified cost and
    pricing data and other burdens that have led this award to take
    over a year at this point from award. The request for
    information for anthrax therapeutics was issued on April 1,
    2004, and I believe we are at least 2 months away from award
    for that contract. So these pharmaceuticals and these vaccines
    are not entering the stockpile at the rate I think Congress
    intended.

                              PREPARED STATEMENTS

        Going forward, we can certainly do oversight to make sure
    that HHS and DHS work closely together to make better use of
    the authorities that BioShield I provided them. We can also,
    through BioShield II or other legislation such as Senate bill
    S. 3, provide additional tools such as liability reform and
    encouragement to make clear these contracts are not to be
    burden by over-regulation.
        I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
        [The statements follow:]

                     Prepared Statement of John M. Clerici

        Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Committee, it is
    an honor for me to testify before you today regarding my views on the
    Project Bioshield Act of 2004 and whether we are meeting the biodefense
    needs of the United States.
        I appear before you today as someone who has worked with industries
    helping to supply the United States with critical biodefense, chemical,
    radiological, and nuclear countermeasures since even before the attacks
    of 2001. During this time, I have worked with a number of large
    pharmaceutical companies, mid and small size biotechs, and companies
    that provide detection equipment and other ancillary services to help
    protect the Nation from the threat of biological, chemical, nuclear, or
    radiological weapons. I also have had the opportunity to work with
    Congress and the Administration to help formulate policies to stimulate
    the creation of a thriving bio-defense industry in America. I and other
    members of our firm have provided testimony to both the House and
    Senate regarding the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 and we continue to
    work closely with your staff, Mr. Chairman, and the staff of other
    leaders in this area, including Senator Lieberman, Senator Kennedy,
    Senator Burr, and Senator Enzi, to ensure the best possible policies
    are in place to promote the deployment of the best possible
    countermeasures in this critical area.
        During the last 3 years, I have been personally involved with a
    number of direct negotiations with the Department of Health and Human
    Services (HHS) for a number of critical biodefense countermeasures, as
    well as negotiations for contracts for critical vaccines for emerging
    infectious disease such as SARS, Avian influenza, and pandemic
    influenza. That said, it is my view, and I believe the view of many
    others in this industry, that HHS should be given additional tools to
    maximize participation of the entities that are best suited to provide
    critical countermeasures.
        First among these additional tools must be expanded authority to
    address the issue of unmitigated liability associated with undertaking
    Bioshield contracts.

    Liability Must be Addressed to Have a Successful Bio-Defense Industry
        Industry concerns over the massive cost of product liability
    lawsuits are preventing critical countermeasures from being developed
    for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The liability concerns of a
    company engaged in day-to-day drug development are clearly different
    from the liability concerns of a company participating in Project
    Bioshield. Manufacturers of countermeasures produced under Project
    Bioshield risk exposure to devastating product liability lawsuits to a
    far greater degree than typical drug companies. Safety and efficacy
    data must be derived, for the most part, from animal trials since
    healthy humans cannot be exposed to toxic agents during testing. Thus,
    these critical countermeasures must be developed and are likely to be
    deployed without the full battery of testing typical of other drugs.
    Without liability protections, responsible companies will remain on the
    sidelines for fear of risking corporate assets to defend lawsuits
    brought as a result of producing a countermeasure that generally has a
    much lower profit margin than a typical pharmaceutical product.
        Even as the Federal Government has begun to purchase Bioshield
    countermeasures, it has no current way to resolve issues of liability
    with any degree of certainty. As a result, needed countermeasures are
    not being developed and deployed, thereby exposing the economy, and the
    Nation as a whole, to far greater potential liability due to the lack
    of available effective countermeasures in the event of attack. Either
    way, the Federal Government is likely to bear both the human and
    financial cost of such an attack as it did on September 11th. By
    failing to account for these costs before an attack, countermeasures
    will not be developed and the Nation will be more exposed to attack.
        Senate Bill 3 attempts to address these liability concerns for not
    only terrorism, but also countermeasures developed and deployed to
    protect the United States against naturally occurring epidemics such as
    SARS and pandemics such as Avian influenza. These epidemics and
    pandemics have the potential to be even more costly in terms of lives
    and dollars than even the worst terrorist attack. By addressing the
    issue of liability before an event occurs, we are not only assuring
    that needed countermeasures are developed, but also, being fiscally
    responsible by mitigating at the least economic cost of such a tragedy
    and reducing the cost of needless litigation.
        While the similarities between the public health threats of bio-
    defense and infectious disease are obvious, I would strongly urge
    Congress to consider--and act upon--liability protections that are
    necessary to bring a pandemic influenza vaccine to market as quickly as
    possible. The dangers of a pandemic are real and immediate. Should the
    Nation face a pandemic similar to the one it faced in 1918 and 1919
    with the Spanish flu, millions of American are certain to die. While I
    do believe Senate Bill 3 provides adequate protections to stimulate the
    creation of a bio-defense industry, it is inadequate to protect
    providers of pandemic vaccine given that the response to such an event
    would be to quickly vaccinate nearly 300 million Americans. Thus, the
    response to a pandemic is similar to--and perhaps, far broader than--
    the response to a potential outbreak of smallpox. For this reason, the
    liability protections provided for a pandemic influenza vaccine
    provider must be at least as strong as those protections given to
    providers of smallpox vaccine under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
        Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, manufactures, suppliers
    and administrators of smallpox vaccine are immune from any and all
    liability resulting from the administration of the vaccine during a
    declared emergency. These protections provide the certainty necessary
    to ensure the Nation has an adequate supply of smallpox vaccine in the
    event of an attack. While there are several improvements that should be
    made to this legislation to ensure health care workers are properly
    compensated, these same types of protections must be extended to
    providers of pandemic influenza vaccine.
    Available Liability Mitigation Tools are Inadequate
        Under current law, there are currently only two legal authorities
    that allow the Federal Government to mitigate the liability concerns
    for providers of countermeasures other than smallpox vaccine--through
    Federal indemnification under Public Law 85-804 and through
    designation/certification under the SAFETY Act. Both measures are
    inadequate to address the practical realities of potential litigation
    facing the providers of countermeasures and the fiscal realities facing
    the Federal Government
        Public Law 85-804 grants the President an extremely broad authority
    to allow a Federal Government contractor to obtain financial or other
    forms of relief under certain circumstances, even when the government
    may have no express legal obligation to grant such relief, or when
    there are express prohibitions against such relief contained in other
    statutes, regulations, or common law. Under this authority, the heads
    of designated departments or agencies have the discretionary power to
    provide contractors with government indemnity when they are engaged in
    ``unusually hazardous'' activities and when it is in the interest of
    the national defense to provide such indemnity.
        Indemnification under Public Law 85-804 relies upon the American
    tort system and places the Federal Government in the position of an
    insurer--where payments are made only after all claims have been
    adjudicated in the court system and judgments have been rendered. This
    rather lengthy process does not result in compensation to victims being
    paid in a timely manner nor does it place any effective limits on the
    Federal Government's potential payments to victims when it acts in this
    capacity.
        Although this authority has been invoked by the Department of
    Health and Human Services (which was first granted the authority in
    October 2001 following the anthrax attacks) in agreements involving the
    donation of smallpox vaccine by Wyeth and Aventis Pasteur to the
    Federal Government in 2001, HHS will only address the issue of
    indemnification prior to the award of a contract for a countermeasure.
    As a result, potential providers of countermeasures must expend scarce
    resources to prepare and submit a proposal that may result in a
    contract that cannot be accepted due to the lack of liability
    protections should HHS ultimately refuse to provide indemnification.
    More often, companies simply refuse to bid at all due to the lack of
    certainty on the issue of liability. This has resulted in the largest,
    and far more experienced, drug companies with the necessary expertise
    to address this threat being left on the sidelines.
        Moreover, HHS and OMB have taken the position that indemnification
    under Public Law 85-804 cannot be granted to protect suppliers of
    pandemic influenza vaccine since there is not an immediate connection
    to national security. This extremely narrow view of what constitutes
    ``national security'' ignores the implications that our troops
    stationed in Southwest Asia (which is currently facing a potential
    Avian Flu epidemic), it also ignores the national security implications
    of having millions of America perish in a pandemic. Thus, Congress must
    address this issue immediately to ensure the Nation is fully prepared.
        Congress did attempt to address the issue of liability associated
    with antiterrorism goods and services with the passage of the SAFETY
    Act in November 2002. The SAFETY Act does, in fact, provide significant
    protections to providers of countermeasures that receive certification
    under the Act. However, to date, no such certifications have been
    granted for bio-defense countermeasures. In addition, there are
    specific limitations upon the effectiveness of the SAFETY Act for
    providers of countermeasures under Project Bioshield.
        Section 865(1) of the SAFETY Act notes that qualified anti-
    terrorism technologies may include technologies deployed for the
    purpose of ``limiting the harm such acts [of terrorism] might otherwise
    cause.'' The ``harm'' that may be caused by an act of terrorism clearly
    goes beyond the immediate effects of the Act itself. An act of
    terrorism such as the attacks of September 11th or the October 2001
    anthrax attacks trigger a number of immediate remedial and emergency
    responses to limit the resulting harm and deter follow-on attacks.
        While the SAFETY Act can provide signification protections to a
    company, its application in the context of countermeasures is extremely
    limited. Most significantly, the potential liability of a provider of
    anti-terrorist technologies that may allegedly cause injury PRIOR to a
    terrorist attack, such as a vaccine, are not currently addressed by the
    SAFETY Act. This limitation of the SAFETY Act leaves providers of anti-
    terrorism vaccines without any adequate projections aside from the
    possibility of Federal indemnification.
        Moreover, SAFETY Act certification is most inadequate to provide
    the type of protections required for large companies to enter the
    market for countermeasures. Holders of SAFETY Act certification are
    still faced with the possibility of hundreds of lawsuits brought
    against them throughout the country, albeit in Federal court. Since the
    SAFETY Act protections must be asserted as an affirmative defense to
    any lawsuit, the unpredictability of the American judicial system still
    places providers of countermeasures with a large degree of uncertainty
    regarding potential liability. This uncertainty, coupled with the
    ``gap'' in the SAFETY Act for vaccine providers and the cumbersome
    nature of the application process to receive SAFETY Act certification
    makes it an inadequate protection for providers of countermeasures
    under Project Bioshield.
        For all of these reasons, Congress should equip HHS with the
    adequate tools to address liability concerns that are inhibiting the
    development and deployment of critical countermeasures as soon as
    possible. More over, it is in the best interests of the United States
    that Congress act immediately to extend the same types of protections
    afforded to providers of smallpox vaccine to providers of pandemic
    influenza vaccine to ensure an adequate response to the certain public
    health crisis an influenza pandemic will cause the United States unless
    we are adequately prepared.
    Additional Regulatory Relief for Providers of Countermeasures is Needed
        The Project Bioshield Act of 2004 makes great strides to reduce
    many of the regulatory burdens that are obstacles to allowing companies
    that do not traditionally sell the Federal Government to participate in
    the development of needed countermeasures. Based upon the experience of
    industry during the first procurements conducted Bioshield, more can be
    done to reduce the amount unnecessarily burdensome regulations. To
    date, industry reaction to Bioshield has been muted, partly because of
    initial implementation challenges and partly because the scope and
    incentives of Bioshield are too limited to attract serious attention
    from investors, including venture capitalists, institutional investors,
    or manufacturers that are needed to grow the biodefense industry.
        It is important to examine the first actions HHS has taken under
    the Project Bioshield to understand the challenges in implementing the
    statute, as well as the need for additional procurement reforms.
        On October 26, 2004, HHS received the first proposals to provide
    therapeutic products for treatment of inhalational anthrax disease in
    response to Solicitation No. 2004-N-01385 (the ``Anthrax Therapeutics
    Solicitation'') under what was the first, true, Project Bioshield
    procurement. Just over 2 weeks later, on November 4, 2004, VaxGen, Inc.
    (``VaxGen'') received an award of a large contract to produce an
    experimental recombinant protective antigen anthrax vaccine (``rPA'').
        While this award to VaxGen was the first countermeasure contract
    funded from Bioshield's Special Reserve Fund, this was not a true
    Bioshield procurement. In fact, all of the research and development for
    this countermeasure was funded at the taxpayer's expense through the
    National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease under two earlier
    awards totaling over $200 million. Unlike the goals of Bioshield to
    create a market to encourage private investment, the first award funded
    by Bioshield was a very typical, multi-stage, Federal procurement fully
    funded at the taxpayer's expense, without utilizing any of the unique
    authorities Congress provided to HHS under Project Bioshield.
        The first Bioshield procurement for Anthrax therapeutics
    solicitation is for the acquisition and maintenance within the SNS of
    therapeutic products to treat U.S. civilians who have inhalational
    anthrax disease. The Anthrax therapeutics solicitation contemplates
    that the awarded contract(s) will be for 10 grams of an investigational
    new drug (``IND'') for use in testing. The actual manufacture of
    anthrax therapeutic product is an optional contract line item, which
    the government may decide to exercise within 12 months from the date of
    contract award and after the government reviews and approves the test
    sample. However, while this procurement could have utilized the
    streamlined procurement provisions provided under Project Bioshield,
    the solicitation includes numerous provisions of the Federal
    Acquisition Regulation (``FAR'') and other detailed requirements for
    bidders, including detailed rules governing the methods of preparing
    pricing for the proposal.
        This initial Bioshield solicitation was curious in three ways.
    First, the way the solicitation structures the options in the contract
    fall short of the Congressional intent of the Act to provide for a
    commitment to recommend funding for production for the SNS as
    contemplated by Project Bioshield. Contrary to the intent of the Act,
    HHS has not committed to recommend exercise of the options for
    production quantities of the countermeasure upon successful development
    of the countermeasure. Such a commitment would help to advance the
    Act's purpose of promoting the development of a biodefense industry by
    informing the markets that there is some certainty that there will be a
    government market for the product. Second, as noted above, the
    solicitation failed to use the simplified acquisition authorities that
    Bioshield makes available to the government, which would have permitted
    far fewer bidding requirements. Third, the solicitation makes IND
    status an absolute criteria for award of the contract. This has been
    criticized as unduly--restricting the ability of companies with
    promising technologies that have not yet reached IND, FDP status from
    competing.
        Unlike the Anthrax therapeutics solicitation, the VaxGen
    solicitation did not suffer from a lack of commitment to production
    quantities. The scope of work for the rPA contract requires VaxGen to
    manufacture and deliver to the SNS 75 million doses of experimental
    (and non-FDA approved) rPA vaccine in pre-filled syringes along with
    safety needles (with a minimum of 25 million doses delivered within two
    years of contract award). The contract also requires a variety of
    ancillary commitments by VaxGen related to testing and licensing.
        The VaxGen contract is valued at $877.5 million, representing
    approximately 15 percent of the amounts appropriated for Project
    Bioshield for the next 10 years. The contract provides for payments to
    VaxGen of $754 million in advance of the following milestones: (1)
    approval of a Biologics License Application (``BLA'') for general use
    prophylaxis, (2) approval of a BLA for post exposure prophylaxis; and
    (3) demonstration of 18 months of real time stability in pre-filled
    syringes. When and if these milestones are accomplished, VaxGen will
    receive specified per dose price supplements.
        There are three main criticisms of the VaxGen contract. First, it
    appears that, as with the Anthrax therapeutics solicitation, HHS
    elected not to use simplified acquisition procedures in awarding the
    contract. Second, despite the availability of an FDA licensed competing
    vaccine technology, HHS restricted the competition for the contract to
    firms that produced rPA-based vaccines, which have not been advanced
    beyond early testing in the regulatory approval process. This has made
    the government and the Nation's security against anthrax attacks highly
    dependent on an early stage, unproven technology. Third, the government
    awarded the contract to a single vendor, thereby making the Nation's
    security against such attacks dependent on this single vendor.
    Proposed Implementation Improvements
        HHS can take several steps to implement Bioshield to increase
    industry participation. To fully realize the legislative intent of the
    law, HHS should enact regulations required under the Project Bioshield
    Act that take into account the following issues:
      --Specify that Project Bioshield Act procurements include only those
            FAR clauses specifically required by FAR Part 13, Simplified
            Acquisition Procedures;
      --Fully describe how HHS and DHS will make a determination of a
            material threat and the other determinations required by the
            Project Bioshield Act;
      --Provide for determinations of the order in which the government
            plans to procure countermeasures;
      --Require HHS to specify a firm number of doses or courses of
            treatment in the call for countermeasures stage;
      --Provide for industry participation in market surveys undertaken
            during the assessment of the availability and appropriateness
            of countermeasures stage;
      --Provide critical suppliers of needed medical countermeasures annual
            ``warm base'' funding to ensure that the U.S. Government will
            have continued access to those products following any
            procurement contract;
      --Provide that multiple products manufactured by multiple suppliers
            using multiple technologies be procured where practicable to
            avoid undue dependence on any single supplier or single
            technology;
      --Provide that countermeasures that are already licensed by the Food
            and Drug Administration should where possible be purchased
            under Project Bioshield; and
      --Provide for the appropriate use of HHS' ``Other Transaction''
            Authority in procurements under Sections 2 and 3 of the Project
            Bioshield Act, in accordance with the authority provided to HHS
            by Title XVI of the fiscal year 2004 Defense Authorization Act.
        Also, as required by Section 319F-2(c)(4)(C)(ii) of the Public
    Health Act, HHS should, in a call for bio-terrorism countermeasures,
    provide industry with an estimate of the quantities of a countermeasure
    (in the form of number of doses or number of effective courses of
    treatment) that HHS intends to procure upon development of a
    countermeasure that meets the statutory criteria. Providing industry
    with wide ranges of potential requirements for a countermeasure, as HHS
    did in the Anthrax therapeutics solicitation, does not serve the
    statutory purpose of promoting the development of a biodefense industry
    because it introduces additional uncertainty about the size of the
    government market for the countermeasure.
        HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') should
    provide industry with information concerning the implementation of the
    Project Bioshield Act. For example, HHS and DHS should provide industry
    and the public with a status report concerning the governmental
    processes required by Section 319F-2(c)(2)-(6) of the Public Health
    Act. HHS should also publish the report on the adequacy of
    biocontainment facilities required by Sec. 5(c) of the Project
    Bioshield Act. This report was due in January, and yet, has not been
    completed or provided to industry.
        Perhaps most important, DHS should inform industry of the progress
    and priority of the required threat assessments so that companies can
    make proper business decisions in their planning process. Project
    Bioshield requires that the DHS, in conjunction with the HHS, conduct a
    threat assessment to ``assess current and emerging threats of chemical,
    biological radiological, and nuclear agents; and determine which of
    such agents present a material threat against the United States
    population sufficient to affect national security'' and for which a
    countermeasure is needed. As implemented, this threat assessment must
    be conducted prior to any decision to purchase a needed countermeasure
    under the Project Bioshield.
        It is my understanding that, to date, no such assessment has been
    conducted to determine the threat of cyanide to the American people.
    Aside from cyanide's historical use as a battlefield weapon in World
    War I, this country has already suffered from terrorist attacks and
    plots using cyanide: in the 1980s, with the tampering of Tylenol; in
    2003, with the discovery of a cyanide bomb in the possession of a white
    supremacist in Texas that held enough cyanide to fatally gas everyone
    in a 30,000 sq ft facility; and, in early 2004, with the discovery by
    U.S. troops in Baghdad of a 7-pound block of cyanide salt. Moreover,
    soon after our successful liberation of Afghanistan in 2002, our forces
    discovered Al Qaeda training videos using cyanide to poison dogs and
    other animals.
        I note that in the legislative history of the Project Bioshield, a
    potential treatment for cyanide poisoning, hydroxocobalamin is
    specifically identified in the reports filed by the House Committees on
    Government Reform and Energy and Commerce. Thus, providers of this
    countermeasure are ``on hold'' pending completion of this threat
    assessment. Providing this information to industry will aid industrial
    base planning efforts and thereby promote the Project Bioshield Act's
    objective of fostering the development of a biodefense industry.
        In addition to the specific recommendations above that should be
    taken into account during regulatory process and in order to carry
    forth the initiative's legislative intent, we have several policy
    suggestions that should be considered in implementing Project
    Bioshield: HHS should keep in mind that the government's use of
    multiple countermeasure suppliers and technologies would be in the
    overall interests of public health and homeland security. As evidenced
    by the recent influenza vaccine shortage, having a diverse
    ``portfolio'' of countermeasures in the strategic national stockpile
    will facilitate flexibility in responding to bioterrorism threats and
    attacks.
        First and foremost, HHS should make clear that the statute does not
    require contractors to comply with burdensome government procurement
    requirements, including the requirement for certified cost and pricing
    data, in order to stimulate the maximum interest possible by commercial
    companies. Similarly, HHS should avoid the use of cost-type contracts
    or contract line items (thus, eliminating the need for a proposed
    contractor to adopt non-GAAP accounting practices) wherever possible.
        HHS should structure Bioshield contracts to avoid a ``staged''
    procurement approach such as that announced in the recent Anthrax
    therapeutic request for proposal, wherever possible. While we recognize
    the need for staged procurements under certain circumstances, using
    this method where HHS has conducted proper market research will avoid
    unnecessary delays and unpredictable results, thereby stimulating far
    greater private sector interest.
        Maximizing the use of these authorities, as well as enactment of
    the additional streamlined authorities identified above, will go a long
    way to ensuring the greatest possible participation in Bioshield.
    Moreover, as we have already seen in how slow the contracting process
    has been to date with Bioshield, failure to act on these procurement
    reforms will cost the Nation something that no amount of money or any
    act of Congress can ever make up for time.
        I very much appreciate the opportunity to offer testimony on this
    very important public health and anti-terrorism issue. Achieving the
    objectives of the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 and Senate Bill 3 are
    of the utmost importance to ensuring homeland and national security.
    Again, I applaud your efforts, and the efforts of President Bush and
    his Administration, and look forward to continuing our work with
    Congress and the Administration in this critical area.
        I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
                                     ______

                 Prepared Statement of the Sarnoff Corporation

        Chairman Gregg, Ranking member Byrd, Sarnoff Corporation
    appreciates the opportunity to offer testimony on ``BioShield and
    Bioterrorism.'' Sarnoff Corporation (www.sarnoff.com) produces
    innovations in information, biomedical, and electronic technology that
    generate successful new products and services for clients worldwide.
    Founded in 1942 as RCA Laboratories, Sarnoff has been serving both the
    public and private sectors to develop breakthroughs in integrated
    circuits, lasers, and imagers; drug discovery and development; digital
    TV, video for security, surveillance and entertainment; high-
    performance networking; and wireless communications. Our history
    includes the development of color TV, liquid-crystal display, and the
    disposable hearing aid, as well as a leadership role in creating the
    U.S. digital television standard. With the Rosettex Technologies and
    Ventures Group (a joint venture with SRI), Sarnoff has demonstrated a
    unique ability to bring a broad range of private sector organizations
    together to accelerate technology development in the interest of the
    national security. As discussed below, we believe that these skills are
    vital to the Nation's ability to meet the bioterror threat.
        As a science and technology leader, Sarnoff recognizes the serious
    danger posed by bioterrorism and emerging infectious diseases to the
    United States. In addition to the many infectious agents already
    recognized as threats, new agents, like the SARS coronavirus and the
    avian flu continue to emerge. Moreover, the bioterrorist threat
    includes the growing potential to use biotechnology to create new,
    genetically engineered pathogens against which existing countermeasures
    are ineffective.
        To effectively secure our Nation against the threat of
    bioterrorism, in addition to developing countermeasures for all
    existing threats, it will be necessary to rapidly develop, manufacture,
    and distribute new countermeasures to treat illness and prevent further
    infections in the population for those agents we cannot predict.
    However, today it takes an average of 10 years to develop a
    countermeasure for a new agent. Clearly, this process must be
    accelerated if the entire spectrum of the biothreat, not just the set
    of currently recognized agents, is to be defeated.
        Sarnoff believes that the countermeasure development process can be
    significantly shortened with a focused effort. For this reason, we are
    highly supportive of the inclusion of the concept of ``research tools''
    in S. 3 and other legislative efforts seeking to improve the Nation's
    biodefense. Research tools are integral to the drug and vaccine
    development process, and thus an essential focus of all efforts to
    accelerate this process. The concept of research tools includes not
    only animal models and in vitro tests, but also technologies that
    reside outside the laboratory or in computers, such as bioinformatics
    and toxicological databases and drug and disease modeling systems. In
    addition, the use of new technology and methods in the clinical setting
    and during manufacturing will have crucial roles to play in
    accelerating development. While new animal models are essential for
    approval of needed countermeasures under FDA's current Animal Rule,
    ultimately research tools will help us move beyond the existing
    regulatory system by enabling much faster, less expensive, but highly
    reliable routes to new countermeasures. The FDA's 2004 report,
    Innovation or Stagnation? The Critical Path to New Medical Products
    lays out a vision of faster translational research and improved product
    development, and calls for better research tools for determining safety
    and efficacy and new manufacturing processes.
        Determining what research tools are necessary to shorten the
    countermeasure development process is a significant challenge. Drug and
    vaccine development is extremely complicated, highly diverse, and
    multidisciplinary, involving hundreds of different types of technology
    and areas of scientific expertise. Along the pathway, roadblocks and
    time-consuming steps, often referred to as ``bottlenecks,'' are
    multiple and interconnected. We believe a systems approach is required
    to address what is essentially a complex systems problem. Research
    tools must be integrated into end-to-end systems in order to move from
    the local acceleration of the development process that is current
    practice to substantial, overall reductions in the drug development
    cycle.
        The development of research tools and research tool systems
    requires more than just scientific and technological advancements. It
    requires a well coordinated and tightly orchestrated national strategy
    designed to encourage and support creation of these systems. That
    coordinated national strategy is not yet in place.
        Further, Sarnoff believes an unprecedented public-private
    partnership will be required not only to bring new research tools and
    research tool systems into use, but also to enable their application to
    rapid development of production of life-saving countermeasures in the
    event they are needed in a national public health emergency.
        In summary, the Sarnoff Corporation thanks you, Mr. Chairman, and
    the Committee for the opportunity to submit this statement for the
    record of this important and very timely hearing. We look forward to
    working with you and your colleagues in ensuring that the threat
    bioterrorism and infectious disease pose to national security and the
    public health is adequately addressed, mitigated, and, ultimately,
    eliminated.

                          THREATS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY

        Senator Gregg. Thank you and thank all members of the panel
    for what were very informative presentations. Hopefully there
    is somebody here from HHS and Homeland Security listening to it
    besides just those of us in Congress who try to get their
    attention. I think some excellent points were made.
        Dr. Franz, you essentially seem to be attracted to the
    second approach here, which you outlined, which is to pick off
    the major threats and try to come up with ways to address those
    rather than a more global approach. You mentioned smallpox and
    anthrax as being obvious areas to start with and where we do
    appear to have started and made progress. Dr. Read said, but
    what is next, and the market does not know what is next.
        Is it possible, with your years of experience in the
    Government, to get an agreement as to what the threats are in
    order of priority for, say, the top 10 potential pathogens so
    people could predictably start to look at those, if they are in
    the scientific community, as places where they might want to
    put some resources to develop responses?
        Dr. Franz. Senator, I believe as I mentioned, there are
    clearly outliers. The two that we all agree on are well above
    many of the others in my opinion, and that is based on the
    characteristics of the organisms. I really do not know anything
    about the likelihood of their being used, but we would have
    enormous vulnerabilities to those and likewise, as the last
    speaker mentioned, influenza. I think we would have enormous
    vulnerabilities there as well.
        Senator Gregg. So should we go beyond those pathogens?
    Should we just do those three then and get ready for those?
        Dr. Franz. I think if you start into plague and tularemia
    and Q fever and even botulinum--most of my lab work was done
    back at the bench at USAMRIID before I moved into the front
    office with bot. I do not put that up as high as these others,
    and it is because of the characteristics of the organisms, how
    difficult they are to grow, how easy they are to treat, how
    stable they are in the environment and so on.
        So I think it becomes so hard and so expensive to produce
    specific countermeasures for those we do not consider outliers
    that I prefer a broad, general approach to public health for
    those, after we have dealt with the outliers. That should
    include good diagnostics, good disease surveillance, good
    epidemiology, and the same kinds of things, good education for
    our health care providers and for our citizens, the same kinds
    of things that help us in any emerging outbreak.
        So I am a believer in very specific countermeasures for
    those that are really tough to deal with and then very broad
    preparedness for those which are easier to deal with and harder
    to pick as potential threats.
        Senator Gregg. That sounds like a rational approach, and it
    is sort of the approach we are taking. Is it not?
        Dr. Franz. I think it is, and I am happy with that. In that
    regard, I am actually involved at the S&T review for DHS
    programs for Secretary McQueary's program here today, and about
    6 weeks ago, I was in Galveston to review the RCE meeting which
    is the Fauci $1.5 billion or $1.8 billion basic R&D program.
    Academe is heavily involved in both of these, and I have really
    been quite pleased with the fundamental research going on out
    there. We have some of our best scientists in the country
    stepping forward as the Nation needs them to contribute.
        As the other speakers have said and as I learned in the
    military, the hard part is transitioning that good basic
    research into the arms or into the airwaves of our citizens to
    protect them, and that is where we need the most help I think.

                                INDEMNIFICATION

        Senator Gregg. Well, the first part is good news, and the
    second part is Dr. Read's job since he is the investment guy
    here.
        You listed a whole series of points, Dr. Read, as to how we
    could create a better climate for getting people to pursue
    these and move them to commercialization, if that is the right
    term. Probably not, but at least to being used.
        Would you put indemnification at the top of that list?
        Dr. Read. Maybe because it is a non-starter without. So
    there are many important things needed to be done to enhance
    BioShield in order for it to meet the test of drawing in our
    most capable innovators into this fight. So dealing with
    product liability and indemnification is clearly going to be
    necessary to have large, capable companies join the fray.
        Senator Gregg. And next on the list would be what? The need
    to know what the targets are, targets of opportunity, so to
    say?
        Dr. Read. Well, it is nice put next because it is clear and
    somehow we ought to be able to do it. I do not understand why
    the private sector should have to guess what the Government is
    thinking about these priorities. So I would put it second for
    clarity and because we ought to be able to check that box off.
        I think one of the best ways it can be signaled is through
    the economic incentives that our public servants can send using
    the legislation and the funds available through BioShield and
    whatever improvements you are working on. The clear economic
    signals about a market, a reward at the end is by far the most
    compelling way to communicate those priorities, as opposed to a
    list. So if we knew the reward that had been created by the
    Government because it cared so much about, just for example,
    pick an agent on that list, tularemia or ebola or something,
    was twice the size of the financial incentive to succeed with a
    vaccine against another one, that would be about as clear a way
    to send those priorities as possible. And it would be
    incredibly useful not only if the reward were big enough and
    product liability were dealt with. I sincerely believe our
    largest and most capable companies would engage.
        The truth is the market signals are used all the time to
    make portfolio decisions inside large companies and small ones.
    And if the large companies are there, the small ones will be
    there, the companies I invest in, because the small companies
    often make the key early-stage contributions that enable the
    larger companies to finish the job.

                               RISK OF LIABILITY

        Senator Gregg. Which brings us to Mr. Clerici's point,
    which is that the big companies are not in there and the reason
    we have lost our vaccine industry in this country is the
    liability and the fact that the risk of liability so far
    exceeds the risk of return that there is no way to get people
    to put capital into this market.
        Do you think we need to go beyond what we have in S. 3 or
    do we have enough in there on this liability? I mean, we know
    this whole liability fight is an uphill fight in the Senate,
    period.
        Mr. Clerici. Right. The approach that you take in S. 3,
    whereby a winner of a BioShield contract is automatically
    protected from liability, so it is based on the same theories
    as the SAFETY Act, but without the same hurdles, I think would
    provide the necessary incentives for manufacturers to get into
    the biodefense market, large and small, because there at least
    would be some certainty that, assuming that you deliver, this
    liability protection is forthcoming automatically. I will put
    aside the political challenges of a system such as that which
    amounts to, more or less, tort reform rather than an
    indemnification scheme such as present with smallpox or under
    Public Law 85-804.

                         ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

        For pandemic flu, I am not sure it is going to be enough
    because the providers of that vaccine know at the end of the
    day their vaccine is going into the arms of 300 million people.
    Even under the legislation proposed in S. 3, you are still
    going to be in Federal court defending those lawsuits
    throughout the country. So the predictability of what a Federal
    judge may do with the legislation and the fact that the
    plaintiffs could certainly file litigation in every
    jurisdiction throughout the land would be problematic to those
    companies. And the companies that are primarily going to supply
    the pandemic flu vaccine are the largest of the vaccine
    manufacturers and therefore have the most shareholders and the
    most concerns, being a large public company.
        [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
    were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
    hearing:]

                 Questions Submitted to Dr. Penrose C. Albright

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

        Question. Which Federal agency determines the bioterrorism threat
    and the Federal response to that threat?
        Answer. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 (HSPD-10),
    Biodefense for the 21st Century, identifies the Department of Homeland
    Security as the lead Federal agency for ``conducting threat periodic
    assessments of the evolving biological weapons threat'' and for
    ``developing comprehensive plans that provide for seamless, coordinated
    Federal, State, local, and international responses to a biological
    attack.''
        Question. Under what authority is the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) involved in responding to bioterrorist threats?
        Answer. DHS authority to respond to bioterrorist threats traces
    originally through Section 502 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
    which states that ``The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary
    for Emergency Preparedness and Response, shall include  . . . (3)
    providing the Federal Government's response to terrorist attacks and
    major disasters'' and has been reaffirmed specifically for biological
    attacks in the HSPD-10 as cited previously. This role is one of
    providing overall coordination with the individual Sector Specific
    Agencies executing their legislated responsibilities, e.g. the
    Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for public
    health and the Environmental Protection Agency for decontamination.
        Question. How is a biological threat addressed once the threat has
    been determined and what avenue does DHS use to respond to that threat?
        Answer. Once a biological threat has been determined, it becomes a
    potential or actual Incident of National Significance and DHS becomes
    responsible for the overall coordination of the response. This is done
    under the framework of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
    using the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP provides the
    coordinating structure and mechanisms for national level policy and
    operational Federal support to state, local and tribal incident
    managers. The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) serves as the
    primary national-level multi-agency situational awareness and
    coordination center. Other key coordinating mechanisms include: the
    Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), a senior level
    interagency group who provide strategic advice to the Secretary of DHS;
    a Joint Field Office (JFO), a temporary Federal facility established
    locally to provide a central point for Federal, State, local and tribal
    representatives responsible for incident support and coordination; and
    a Principal Federal Officer (PFO), designated by the Secretary of DHS
    to work in conjunction with other Federal officials to coordinate
    overall Federal incident management efforts. The Federal response to
    actual or potential Incidents of National Significance is typically
    provided through the full or partial activation of the Emergency
    Support Functions (ESF). The NRP applies a functional approach that
    groups the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies, as well as
    the American Red Cross, into ESFs to provide the planning, support,
    resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most
    likely to be needed during an Incident of National Significance. Each
    ESF is composed of primary and support agencies, based on their
    authorities, resources, and capabilities.
        The NRP also includes a Biological Incident Annex, which outlines
    the actions, roles, and responsibilities associated with response to a
    disease outbreak of known or unknown origin requiring Federal
    assistance. The annex outlines biological incident response actions,
    including threat assessment notification procedures, laboratory
    testing, joint investigative/response procedures, and activities
    related to recovery. Because of its authorities, capabilities, and
    resources, the Department of Health and Human Services is the lead
    agency for the Biological Incident Annex.
        Question. What role does DHS' Science and Technology (S&T)
    Directorate play regarding research into bioterrorist threats?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate plays a major role in research into
    bioterrorist threats. The S&T Directorate is the national lead for the
    periodic assessments required by HSPD-10 under its Threat Awareness
    Pillar. These assessments include formal Risk Assessments every 2
    years, with the first due in January of 2006, and Net Assessments every
    4 years, with the first due in 2008. Under the BioShield Act of 2004,
    DHS is also responsible for making the Material Threat Determinations
    (MTDs) that inform the Department of Health and Human Services as to
    which agents are of especial concern as to warrant pursuit of medical
    countermeasures utilizing BioShield funding. To support and inform its
    assessment roles, the S&T Directorate also conducts research to improve
    the Nation's understanding of critical agent properties that might have
    a significant impact on its defense and response, e.g. the infectivity
    of agents at low doses or how long an agent survives in air, food or
    water.

        SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE AND INTEGRATED BIOSURVEILLANCE

        Question. Can you provide the Committee an update on the status of
    Integrated Biosurveillance?
        Answer. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
    Directorate (IAIP) of DHS is implementing the National Biosurveillance
    Integration System (NBIS) to integrate biosurveillance information with
    the objective of identifying and characterizing a biological attack on
    the Nation. The NBIS implementation is closely aligned with the NBIS
    design effort that was led by the S&T Directorate in 2004, with the
    full participation of the interagency partners. Currently, IAIP is in
    the procurement process for the NBIS system.

                 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND BIOSHIELD

        Question. How does the National Biodefense Analysis and
    Countermeasures Center, or NBACC, fit into the Department's role in
    defending against a bioterrorist threat?
        Answer. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
    (NBACC) is one of the Department's and the Nation's key tools in
    defending against bioterrorism. NBACC consists of two centers: the
    BioThreat Characterization Center (BTCC) and the National BioForensics
    Analysis Center (NBFAC). The BTCC is responsible for the threat
    characterization activities described previously, i.e. for conducting
    the periodic Risk Assessments required under HSPD-10 and for the
    scientific research to inform these threat assessments and support
    intelligence activities. The NBFAC, as designated under HSPD-10, is the
    lead national facility for conducting technical analysis of forensic
    materials to support attribution by the appropriate Departments and
    agencies. As such, the NBFAC is operated in close coordination with the
    Department of Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation and with
    portions of the Intelligence Community.
        Question. Since its inception, the NBACC has received $130 million
    in Federal appropriations from various sources, beginning with work
    conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). Given the current
    research conducted by the Army at Fort Detrick, is there any
    duplication of effort between what the Army does and what is proposed
    for the NBACC facility?
        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National
    Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) and the U.S.
    Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
    fulfill complementary but distinct missions at the Fort Detrick
    National Interagency Biodefense Campus (NIBC), where Congress has
    identified the need for Federal agencies to work collaboratively to
    address the threat of bioterrorism.
        NBACC conducts research to protect the American public by enhancing
    our scientific understanding of biological threats. This complements,
    not duplicates, USAMRIID biodefense research and development and test
    and evaluation to provide medical protections such as vaccines, drugs,
    diagnostics, and information for military service members. Unlike
    USAMRIID, NBACC does not perform research to develop medical
    countermeasures.
        NBACC threat characterization research provides a scientific basis
    to understand current and future biological threats, to assess
    vulnerabilities, and to determine potential impacts. Moreover, NBACC
    threat characterization supports DHS material threat assessment
    responsibilities under the BioShield Act.
        NBACC bioforensic research provides a national capability to
    conduct forensic analysis of bio-crimes and terrorism to attain a
    ``biological fingerprint'' to identify perpetrators and determine the
    origin and method of a terrorist attack. HSPD-10 designates NBACC's
    National Bioforensic Analysis Center to be the lead Federal facility to
    conduct and facilitate forensic analysis of biological terrorism.
        Question. How does the Department address its responsibilities for
    dealing with a biological threat to our agricultural infrastructure?
        Answer. As specified in HSPD-7 (Critical Infrastructure
    Identification, Prioritization and Protection), the DHS Information
    Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) has the lead
    DHS role for vulnerability assessments and protection of the Nation's
    critical infrastructure, and has led the inter-agency effort to develop
    a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP; sector-specific plans
    for agriculture and food are now in preparation). IAIP also has the DHS
    lead role for outreach to the private sector, including the development
    of a Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (F&ASCC) to
    facilitate information sharing between government and the private
    sector, and a Government Coordinating Council (GCC) to facilitate
    coordination across government and between government and the sectors.
    A ``food and agriculture portal'' has been created for the Homeland
    Security Information Network (HSIN) to provide a platform for the
    secure sharing of information (e.g., alerts, warnings, incident
    reporting, event tracking, etc.), and a Protected Critical
    Infrastructure Information (PCII) classification for the protection and
    special handling of proprietary industry information (e.g.,
    vulnerabilities, threats).
        And, as specified in HSPD-9 (Defense of United States Agriculture
    and Food), the S&T Directorate has responsibility for the overall
    inter-agency coordination to ``accelerate and expand development of
    current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or
    natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic
    diseases.'' Since June of 2003, the S&T Directorate has been
    responsible for the operation and management of Plum Island Animal
    Disease Center (PIADC) and has developed a joint research and
    diagnostic strategy with USDA (Animal Research Service and the Animal
    and Plant Health Inspection Service) for foreign animal diseases (FAD).
    Together with USDA and HHS, we have also begun the conceptual design of
    the next generation National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF)
    needed to replace the aging PIADC. Other major S&T Directorate
    agricultural thrusts include: systems studies, coupled disease and
    economic models, and table top exercises to better understand outbreak
    control options and inform policy and decision makers; demonstration of
    high throughput detection to better control and respond to outbreaks of
    foreign animal disease; detection systems for monitoring critical food
    nodes in the processing and distribution of selected food products; and
    two University Centers--one on foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and
    the other on food protection--to provide longer term research and train
    the next generation of agro-defense researchers and practitioners.
        As specified in HSPD-5 (Management of Domestic Incidents), DHS has
    developed a framework for overall national coordination. This framework
    is established in the National Response Plan (NRP) and National
    Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRP includes Emergency Support
    Functions (ESF) to organize and provide Federal resources during
    responses (e.g., ESF-8, ``Health & Medical Services'', DHHS lead; and
    ESF-11, ``Agriculture and Natural Resources'', USDA lead) and Support
    Annexes to insure efficient and effective incident management (e.g.,
    ``Science and Technology'', DHS Science and Technology Directorate
    (S&T) lead).
        Question. Who determines which vaccines are placed in the National
    Stockpile and what's the Department's role in that decision, given its
    responsibility for determining the bioterrorism threat?
        Answer. The process to determine which vaccines are placed in the
    National Stockpile is determined by the Centers for Disease Control and
    Prevention (CDC) within the Department of Health and Human Services
    (HHS). Recommendations for advance development of chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) countermeasures utilize the Weapons of
    Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures (WMD MCM) Subcommittee. This
    is an interdepartmental subcommittee initially chartered by the
    National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and co-chaired by senior
    government officials from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
    the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
    Defense (DOD). The material threat assessments (MTA) developed by the
    DHS based on a plausible attack scenario informs the sizing of the
    requirement. The HHS then evaluates the availability of current
    countermeasures and the possibility of development of new
    countermeasures. The WMD MC subcommittee deliberates on the nature of
    the medical consequence and the availability of appropriate
    countermeasures to develop a recommendation for the acquisition of a
    specific countermeasure. The HHS can issue a Request for Information
    (RFI) to determine the market availability and to alert industry to the
    U.S. Government interests. A Request for Proposals (RFP) announcing the
    specific requirements will then follow, once a U.S. Government
    requirement for a particular new medical countermeasure has been
    established by the WMD MC subcommittee, and approved by the Office of
    Management and Budget (OMB). The HHS implements the acquisition
    process.
        Question. Explain the steps in developing and putting into the
    stockpile new medical countermeasures. Who has the lead at each step? I
    understand the role of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in basic
    research, but how is that science translated into product?
        Answer. The science and research to develop a new medical
    countermeasure will most likely have been supported by the National
    Institutes of Health (NIH) or the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
    for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID); however many industrial initiatives
    are launched independently to develop a new product. In order to
    translate a basic science advancement into a viable product, certain
    applied research and advanced development is required. This process
    will focus on establishing a ``formulation'' for the product and a
    scalable manufacturing process utilizing a Good Manufacturing Processes
    (GMP) validated process conducted under appropriate Quality Assurance
    and Quality Control activities. In addition the appropriate animal
    studies and human safety studies need to be conducted in accordance
    with FDA regulations to assure that the results can be applied to
    regulatory decisions. The ability to manufacture a consistent and
    stable product is also evaluated. Please consult HHS for a more
    complete description.
        Question. Does BioShield sufficiently incentivize industry to
    develop countermeasures to the bioterrorism threat?
        Answer. This question is perhaps best answered by industry.
    However, Project BioShield is a good first step and has sent a message
    to industry that the U.S. Government is committed to obtaining
    appropriate countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
    The establishment of a 10 year special reserve fund of $5.6 billion
    provides confidence to industry that acquisition funds are available in
    the long-term. Ten months after the enactment of the Project BioShield
    Act, the U.S. Government awarded three contracts totaling over $1
    billion for SNS acquisitions. Negotiations are in progress for two
    other contracts. In addition, two RFIs and one draft RFP have been
    recently published.
        Question. What is the appropriate Federal role regarding research
    and development of countermeasures for the National Stockpile?
        Answer. The role of the U.S. Government regarding research and
    development for countermeasures has traditionally been through the
    support of basic research. Both NIH and DOD (USAMRIID, USAMRICD, and
    AFRRI) have excellent records in this regard. The U.S. Government can
    further target and facilitate research and development (R&D) efforts by
    setting clear requirements and specifications for medical
    countermeasures; facilitating partnerships as needed between government
    and industry or between differing industries; and providing critical
    resources such as facilities (e.g. biocontainment labs), animals (for
    testing), reagents and assays.
        Question. How does the Department address the development of
    countermeasures as it relates to industry disparities regarding large
    and small companies and their available capital for research and
    development?
        Answer. Human medical countermeasures development is done through
    HHS and DOD and not through the Department of Homeland Security, so we
    will defer to them on the medical portions of this answer. For non-
    medical countermeasures, the S&T Directorate does not require nor
    expect cost sharing in our R&D programs. A company's available capital
    to co-fund R&D is not an issue. Our competitive solicitations for all
    kinds of countermeasures research and development have offered multiple
    opportunities for both large and small businesses. Competitive
    solicitation results show that for research and development in highly
    technical fields, small companies can successfully compete outright,
    and this is especially true when they partner with larger or other
    small businesses.
        Question. From your perspective, how has BioShield helped DHS
    respond to the bioterror threat? Is it working as intended, and what
    would BioShield II do for DHS and S&T specifically?
        Answer. BioShield is helping DHS respond to bioterror threats by
    stimulating the development of needed medical countermeasures, by
    providing for emergency use authorization of these and other
    countermeasures if needed, and by streamlining the review process for
    research related to future generations of medical countermeasures for
    these threats. Procurements are now in progress for botulinum anti-
    toxin, the current generation anthrax vaccine (AVA), the next
    generation anthrax vaccine (rPA) and for a pediatric formulation of
    potassium iodide--a therapeutic for certain kinds of radiation
    exposure. A Request for Information has recently been issued for a
    third generation smallpox vaccine (MVA) which would further minimize
    any side effects. Also, earlier this month, the National Institute of
    Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) made its first series of
    research awards using its new BioShield authorities.
        Question. Please provide a list of administrative, regulatory and
    legislative proposals needed to invigorate scientific research relevant
    to the development of needed countermeasures and products to counter
    natural pandemics and epidemics.
        Answer. The Nation has a strong program in basic scientific
    research related to the development of medical countermeasures. There
    are broad activities in understanding the genomics and proteomics of
    microorganisms. In addition many research programs are focused on the
    understanding and control of the immune system. Advanced research and
    development however falters after the proof of principle stage when
    applied product development activities are required. Additional
    attention is needed in areas critical to mid-stage development of
    medical countermeasures such as animal studies, clinical studies,
    regulatory issues and the need to establish and validate a GMP (Good
    Manufacturing Processes) production process.
        Question. I understand that you are the lead DHS representative for
    an interagency working group on bioterrorism and bioterrorism
    countermeasures. I also understand that the U.S. Department of Health
    and Human Services (HHS) and DOD participate in this working group. Can
    you tell me who else is involved in the working group, how often you
    meet, and what the basic function of the group is?
        Answer. Recommendations for advance development of CBRN
    countermeasures utilize the Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical
    Countermeasures (WMD MCM) Subcommittee. This is an interdepartmental
    subcommittee initially chartered by the National Science and Technology
    Council (NSTC) and co-chaired by senior government officials from the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and
    Human Services (HHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD). The material
    threat assessments (MTA) developed by the DHS based on a plausible
    attack scenario informs the sizing of the requirement. The HHS then
    evaluates the availability of current countermeasures and the
    possibility of development of new countermeasures. The WMD MC
    subcommittee deliberates on the nature of the medical consequence and
    the availability of appropriate countermeasures to develop a
    recommendation for the acquisition of a specific countermeasure.

       DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, BIOWATCH, AND DETECTION OF EVENTS

        Question. How does DHS respond to recent criticism in the press
    that BioWatch is not effective?
        Answer. BioWatch has been deployed to over 30 cities and provides
    these cities with protection against biological threat agents. At the
    request of the stakeholders, additional assets currently are being
    installed to provide increased coverage to include high trafficked
    facilities and other venues that attract large numbers of the
    population. DHS believes that BioWatch is an effective system which
    will be further improved by enhanced coverage while maintaining the no
    system false positives to date after conducting over two million
    assays.
        Question. What kind of measures are in place to assist the
    Department in its coordination role regarding BioWatch?
        Answer. Formal BioWatch coordination is done officially through a
    Memorandum of Understanding with the DHS, HHS/CDC, and EPA. Roles and
    responsibilities are articulated and budgetary aspects addressed.
    Additionally, the BioWatch Office works closely with CDC and EPA
    regarding day to day operations, enhancement of the current program,
    and future capabilities, thus ensuring success through close ties with
    the partners. Supported by a HSC Biodefense Memorandum of
    Understanding, the S&T Directorate also is actively engaged with USPS,
    DOD, HHS, and DoJ to discuss technology R&D programs and
    interoperability, concept of operations to include notification, and
    the development of a national architecture.

         DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S ROLE IN DETECTION EQUIPMENT

        Question. Given the overarching responsibility the Department has
    regarding biodefense, what is the Science and Technology Directorate's
    role in the development and evaluation of biological threat detection
    equipment?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate's role in the development and
    evaluation of biological threat detection equipment is to enhance
    current systems capabilities while developing the next generation of
    detection systems to provide early detection of attacks on outdoor and
    indoor areas and on our agricultural and food infrastructures.
    Currently, S&T Directorate efforts include: detection systems to enable
    the next generation of BioWatch, our urban monitoring program; the
    development of rapid (in minutes) identifiers for protection of high
    valued facilities and special events, and the development of detection
    systems for food distribution systems. Additionally, the S&T
    Directorate has a robust bio-assay development program which both
    supports our current biomonitoring systems such as BioWatch and is also
    integrated with the Directorate's detection technology development
    programs. The S&T Directorate, working through the Association of
    Analytical Chemists (AOAC), has also taken the lead in testing and
    evaluating hand-held assays for screening of so called ``white powder''
    events.
        The S&T Directorate participates routinely on interagency working
    groups through the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and Office of
    Science Technology Policy (OSTP) to help establish and coordinate
    biodefense detection strategies and requirements. A major recent
    accomplishment in this area is the signing of a Memorandum of
    Understanding for Coordinated Monitoring of Biological Threat Agents
    Amongst the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health
    and Human Services, the Department of Defense, the Department of
    Justice and the United States Postal System. The S&T Directorate also
    interacts regularly with the detection development, test and evaluation
    programs in the DOD and the EPA (e.g. the Environmental Testing and
    Verification Program), including mutual participation in each others
    program reviews. S&T Directorate staff members routinely monitors
    literature, attend technology conferences, and host members from
    industries, academia, and non-profit organizations which present their
    current efforts and findings in technology development.
        Question. How does the Directorate foster the growth in biothreat
    detection equipment, and how do you respond to a rapidly changing
    industry?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate fosters the growth in bio-threat
    detection equipment through two key steps (1) a clear formulation and
    communication of our needs and requirements; and (2) an active, multi-
    pronged, outreach to the broad R&D community for the best way to meet
    these requirements in a timely fashion. Through systems studies and
    scientific and interagency committees, we have focused on three classes
    of detection systems that are critical to an integrated national
    biodefense: advanced detection for monitoring urban areas; rapid
    (minutes) identification for protecting key facilities and special
    events; and detection systems for protecting our agricultural and food
    infrastructures. Detailed performance and cost requirements have been
    formulated to inform industry, academia and the national and Federal
    laboratories of our needs and have been published on the S&T
    Directorate's Homeland Security Advance Projects Research Agency
    (HSARPA) website. The S&T Directorate has had broad solicitations in
    each of these areas, typically involving an open, national level
    workshop conveying the needs and asking for inputs and refinements from
    the participants, a formal Request for Information (RFI), and then a
    formal proposal solicitation. Hundreds of proposals have been received
    and evaluated, with some fifteen proposals already funded and others in
    the works. The focus is on applied research with a goal of fielding
    technology as rapidly as possible, typically within 3 to 5 years. A
    phased development approach is used. The technology developers are
    evaluated and down selected by rigorous testing during each phase
    (Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, etc.). Each
    technology does receive feedback during the testing at each phase with
    an opportunity for adjustments and re-evaluation. However, candidate
    technologies will be terminated if they fail to show reasonable
    progress. The S&T Directorate will also consider testing technologies
    funded through other programs (from other organizations) against the
    goals set forth by the S&T Directorate. In parallel, the S&T
    Directorate participates in a range of technical conferences and
    discussions with developers of detection systems to stay abreast of any
    developments that might change how it thinks about the realm of the
    possible' in both near- and longer-term biodetection system. The S&T
    Directorate believes the strategy outlined above provides both the
    guidance and the flexibility to foster growth and responsiveness in a
    rapidly changing industry.
        Question. What role do the national labs play in this arena?
        Answer. The national laboratories have played a key role in
    BioWatch sensor development and deployment and provide expertise on
    siting of detection systems. They continue to be a vital part of the
    S&T Directorate's strategy to develop and pilot advanced biothreat
    detection systems, with research and development activities in the
    following areas:
      --Development of specific instrumentation (Biobriefcase, Enhanced
            BioAerosol Detector): Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
            (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL).
      --Development of new nucleic acid- and protein-based assays of
            recognized biothreat agents to be used in biodetection
            instruments: LLNL, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
            Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and SNL.
      --Identification of next-generation signatures that reflect either
            (a) the host-pathogen interaction or (b) virulence
            characteristics or antibiotic resistance of recognized or
            emerging biothreat agents and using these signatures to develop
            new assays for biothreat detection: LLNL and PNNL.
      --Provision of informatics support to enable the discovery of new
            targets for assays and to develop new reporting tools for
            detection instruments: LLNL, LANL, Lawrence Berkeley National
            Laboratory (LBNL), PNNL, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
        Question. Without getting into classified information, please tell
    us how we are doing in the deployment of surveillance and detection
    equipment.
        Answer. In January and February 2003, BioWatch was deployed to
    approximately 30 U.S. cities. At that time, a limited number of
    collectors were strategically placed in each city to provide for
    maximum population protection. At the request of the BioWatch cities, a
    Generation (Gen) 2 BioWatch was developed to provide increased temporal
    and spatial coverage and was piloted in New York City in fiscal year
    2004 and early fiscal year 2005. Gen 2 increases the number of
    collectors two to fourfold, including coverage of key priorities
    identified by the cities, such as transportation hubs and other indoor
    venues that are highly trafficked. Gen 2 is in the process of being
    deployed to the top threat cities in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
    2006. Additional samplers will be placed in each BioWatch city to be
    used at special events and/or at the cities' discretion. New technology
    is now under development that will enable a ``Gen 3'' BioWatch which
    reduces the sampling and analysis time to four hours on site and will
    be wirelessly networked to a local public health interface for further
    confirmation and so that positive samples can be retrieved for further
    analysis. This technology will provide for the high sensitivity and
    extremely low false positive rate consistent with the current system.
        We are also developing other detection systems. High throughput
    diagnostics for agricultural testing will be piloted in fiscal year
    2006 and food sensors for specific applications will be developed by
    fiscal year 2007. R&D is also on-going on detect-to-warn' sensors that
    can detect biological agents in a less than five minutes and hence be
    used to provide warning of releases in high value building, facilities,
    and special events.
        Question. Have you done any evaluation or testing of surveillance
    and detection equipment once it's been deployed and is in use?
        Answer. Yes, there is active evaluation and testing of the BioWatch
    system. The BioWatch Exercise and Evaluation Program (BWEEP) is an
    annual proficiency test for BioWatch laboratory and field operations
    and is designed to insure protocols and procedures continue to meet or
    exceed prescribed standards. If there are no deficiencies, they will
    not be revisited until the next annual cycle. If there are minor
    deficiencies, on-the-spot corrections or additional training will be
    administered and they will be re-inspected in approximately 6 months.
    If there are major deficiencies and/or safety violations, immediate
    remedial actions will be taken.
        Question. What collaborative process does the Department use to
    gain the input from industry, researchers, and responders in the
    development of new technology? Does the process include peer review?
        Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate uses an open and
    competitive solicitation process for research and development with the
    private sector.
        Before the official solicitation is issued, the S&T Directorate may
    publish a draft Statement of Work for public comment, giving industry
    the opportunity to provide advice and recommendations. In appropriate
    cases, full scale technical workshops are held to assess the state-of-
    the-art, inform all potential bidders of current developments in the
    field, and sharpen the technical focus of the solicitation. In most
    cases, after each solicitation is published, a public Bidders'
    Conference is held to explain the solicitation in detail and answer
    questions that may have arisen in the minds of potential bidders. Each
    solicitation has an open Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section on
    the website where individual bidders' questions are answered and
    published for the benefit of all. In a typical solicitation procedure,
    the S&T Directorate uses the first bidder submission--the white paper--
    as a vehicle for discussion with private sector bidders. In addition,
    industry representatives are free to request direct interviews with S&T
    Directorate Program Managers to describe or discuss their concepts,
    ideas, and ongoing developments for new technologies.
        The criteria by which white papers and proposals are evaluated by
    DHS technical experts are listed fully in the public solicitation so
    that bidders understand how their submissions will be judged. The S&T
    Directorate uses a technical merit review instead of peer review.
    Technical solutions to DHS needs and requirements often involve complex
    engineering, proprietary information, and other information of economic
    value to competitors. To perform technical review, the S&T Directorate
    organizes a panel of Federal Government experts, including S&T
    Directorate staff, other DHS technical and operational staff, and
    experts from other Federal agencies. The evaluation panel may be
    supplemented by outside advisors if there is a need for specialized
    expertise the government evaluators do not have. These outside advisors
    must agree that neither they nor their home institutions may bid
    against that particular solicitation. The S&T Directorate has found
    that providing review by government personnel, rather than a panel of
    peers, allows bidders to be more open about proprietary information
    supporting their proposed project.
        Additionally, DHS and national laboratories are consulted
    frequently by the S&T Directorate to formulate the strategic direction
    of research, development, technology and evaluation (RDT&E) programs.
        The science and technology needs of emergency responders are
    represented in the S&T Directorate by the Portfolio Managers. Other
    methods for collecting salient inputs include the annual Science and
    Technology Requirements Council, an annual joint conference with the
    Department of Justice, an annual conference to forecast S&T Directorate
    opportunities and major program direction to the industrial community,
    an intense 6 week effort each year involving the identification of
    responders' needs for rapid prototypes, and face-to-face contact with
    customers while working on current R&D projects.
        Question. What types of detection equipment are most difficult to
    develop, and how is the industry responding to the demands of the
    requirements? For example, the drug/vaccine industry indicates that
    decades of research are required before a drug/vaccine becomes
    available in the market. Is that same time and financial investment
    required by other industries?
        Answer. In general, any development program that deals directly
    with human health can take years of research, development, testing and
    evaluation prior to becoming available to the market because of
    extensive safety regulations. Instrumentation, including detectors for
    biological, chemical, and explosive threats, also has a difficult
    development schedule. Initial systems can be developed and deployed
    within the next few years, but it may take upwards of a decade to
    develop and deploy cost effective instruments with all the desired
    capabilities. The main reason is the requirement to achieve a high
    probability of detection and a extremely low probability of false
    alarms in instruments that are of sufficiently low cost that they can
    be widely deployed and used for continuous monitoring. This will
    require development of completely novel technologies or complex
    engineering projects.

                 SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE AND STANDARDS

        Question. Given that Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's
    2004 guidelines and standards for biological countermeasures have been
    in place for a year, please give us an assessment of the effectiveness
    and relevance to the standards issued by the S&T Directorate regarding
    biothreat agents? How has industry responded to them?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate has a role and responsibility to ensure
    the effectiveness of biological countermeasures tools developed for and
    used by the homeland security community. By setting consistent and
    verifiable measures of effectiveness for basic functionality, minimum
    performance, interoperability, efficiency, sustainability, and
    appropriateness and adequacy for the task, standards improve the
    quality of homeland security systems and technologies. The S&T
    Directorate's Standards Program strives to enable the homeland security
    community to make informed equipment purchases by establishing minimum
    performance standards which can be linked to Federal grants programs so
    that equipment purchases comply with these minimum performance
    standards.
        In 2004, the primary focus for Standards for Biological
    countermeasures revolved around developing minimum performance criteria
    for biological screening devices (specifically lateral flow
    immunoassays) used by first responders. In fiscal year 2004 and early
    fiscal year 2005, an interagency task force was formed to address the
    effectiveness and use of lateral flow immunoassays for the detection of
    Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) by emergency responders. The task force
    agreed upon and published accepted performance criteria associated with
    the hand held assays (HHAs). The HHAs were tested and evaluated against
    the accepted criteria and those results were also published. An effort
    was also initiated with the Center for Domestic Preparedness to develop
    a standard Bio-Protocol for first responders to use to guide their
    response to a suspicious powder incident.
        The relevance and effectiveness of this important effort to develop
    and implement standards for biological field screening devices are
    clear. In the past these devices were procured in great numbers and
    often used incorrectly in the field by first responders to assess the
    biological threat associated with suspicious powders. Numerous false
    alarms were raised based on the results of these devices. Before these
    devices can be used in the field, first responders must understand
    their limitations, have a clear concept of how they are to be used, and
    be trained to use them properly. The S&T Directorate's effort to
    develop standards for the detection of anthrax using HHAs has given the
    homeland security community access to reliable information on how these
    devices perform and which devices met the performance standards. These
    standards are just a first step in ensuring confidence in the Nation's
    response to biological threats. There are numerous other types of
    biological countermeasures technologies to be evaluated against the
    range of biological agents. In addition, standard sampling protocols
    and standardized training must be developed and implemented.
        Industry was heavily involved from the onset with the process of
    developing these standards. Manufacturers voluntarily attended the
    interagency task force meetings, provided technical feedback on the
    study design and testing protocols, and provided instruments for
    testing. The entire standards development process relied upon working
    in an open atmosphere and gaining consensus of the majority of the
    stakeholders. Results of the testing were supplied to the manufacturers
    in a clear and timely manner. Unfortunately not all of the devices met
    the published acceptance criteria and hence some manufacturers were
    disappointed with the outcome. However, most manufacturers have
    indicated a desire to improve their devices and enter into a second
    round of testing.
        Question. How does S&T respond to the Department's Office of State
    and Local Government Coordination finding that its existing standards
    are inadequate?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate acknowledges that the existing
    biological countermeasures standards only address the performance of
    one type of detection equipment to one type of biological agent. The
    S&T Directorate's Standards Program is building a long-term plan and
    process for the development of standards to ensure the effectiveness
    and performance of all critical biological countermeasures technologies
    for a number of biological agents. However, the standards development
    process relies on consensus building, an activity that is often time-
    consuming and costly. Therefore, standards development activities have
    focused to date on urgent, high priority areas. In order to validate
    the entire spectrum of biological countermeasures products and
    technologies, requirements for each of the technologies must be defined
    and consensus between the agencies on those requirements must be
    obtained. Additionally, standards need to be fully developed that are
    tested and evaluated for the various biological technologies, methods
    and processes. Also needed is the development of integrated policies
    and procedures based on conformance to the standards, and institute
    standardized training. All of these tasks are necessary and important
    and shall be incorporated in a long-term plan, but their accomplishment
    requires the necessary resources and cooperation of all of the key
    stakeholders. In addition, the Standards Program must assess and
    balance the need for standards in all homeland security areas based on
    the available resources. In the near future, (fiscal year 2005 and
    fiscal year 2006) the standards portfolio will address the need for
    standards for biological sampling activities and additional biological
    screening devices.
        Question. Have any revisions or refinements been made to those
    standards?
        Answer. The standards development process consists of a number of
    well-defined steps including periodic review and revision of standards
    when necessary. Revisions or refinements have not currently been made
    to the published acceptance criteria for the performance of hand held
    immunoassays for the detection of anthrax. DHS intends to initiate a
    second round of testing of new and improved devices and will hold a
    meeting of the interagency task force to determine whether revisions
    are needed and incorporate lessons learned before the new round of
    testing is initiated. As always, voluntary consensus standards
    development is an open process, and interested stakeholders will have a
    means of providing comments and feedback on any necessary revisions or
    refinements.
        Question. What process is used to update the biothreat standards?
        Answer. Because DHS is not a regulatory agency, the process of
    updating standards will follow the voluntary standards development
    organization's guidelines. In the case of the hand held immunoassays,
    the Association of Analytical Chemists International (AOACI) was the
    standards development organization. Hence, the AOAC process to update
    the standards will be followed.
        Question. Have end-users and industry found the biothreat standards
    useful in the development and use of new equipment? Can you give us an
    example?
        Answer. End-users are now able to obtain reliable information on
    the performance of various manufacturers' hand held immunoassays before
    procurement. That information enables end-users to make knowledgeable
    decisions on whether to use these devices and if so which ones are most
    reliable. In addition, many of the manufacturers have indicated that
    they have already made adjustments to their technologies and are eager
    to submit the new and improved technologies for a second round of
    testing.

                                   SAFETY ACT

        Question. How much of the SAFETY Act has been implemented by the
    Department? Is it being implemented by industry, issue, or on an ad hoc
    basis?
        Answer. The Department has placed significant emphasis on the full
    implementation of the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective
    Technologies Act (SAFETY Act) and has accomplished much in an extremely
    short time period. In less than 15 months, the Department has
    established an Office of SAFETY Act Implementation (OSAI), which is
    responsible for administration of the program. The Department has
    developed, published, and implemented a proposed rule (July 11, 2003)
    and an interim rule (October 16, 2003) governing the implementation of
    the SAFETY Act. In addition, the Department is in the process of
    developing revisions to the current implementing regulations to address
    public comments and operational experience.
        More than 450 experienced technical and economic reviewers have
    been vetted and are available to evaluate SAFETY Act applications in
    accordance with the statutory criteria. OSAI has designed a reviewer
    training program specific to SAFETY Act requirements that each reviewer
    is required to attend.
        The Department initially developed a SAFETY Act application kit for
    use by interested parties and has since revised the kit. The revised
    application kit reflects substantial feedback from applicants and
    industry as well as our operational experience, and we expect it to
    provide applicants with better guidance and tools for a successful
    application. On December 13, 2004, a Paperwork Reduction Act notice for
    the revised version of the new kit was published in the Federal
    Register. Further, a web-based, interactive application process has
    been instituted that allows sellers to submit applications
    electronically, obtain automatic feedback on the status of an
    application, submit questions to a help desk to obtain assistance with
    navigating the application process, and provide access to resource
    documents and frequently asked questions.
        Significant elements of the Department's SAFETY Act implementation
    include:
      --Website.--The SAFETY Act website (www.safetyact.gov) contains the
            electronic application kit, reference materials, Frequently
            Asked Questions (FAQs), and specific instructions for
            applications submitted in connection with a procurement.
      --Help Desk.--OSAI established a help desk that can be accessed by
            way of on-line forms, an e-mail address
            (helpdesk@safetyact.gov), or a toll free phone (1-866-788-
            9318). The Department has received much praise for the help
            desk. Applicants not only receive timely responses, but they
            can actually speak with a staff member.
      --Outreach.--Throughout the past year, OSAI has made presentations at
            numerous SAFETY Act-relevant conferences, held meetings with
            applicants, and established internal procedures to ensure that
            each applicant has the opportunity to discuss an application
            with relevant staff early in the review process.
      --Pre-Applications.--OSAI implemented a pre-application process
            designed to provide applicants with a quick assessment of the
            likelihood of its technology being approved for Designation or
            Certification if a full application is filed. These pre-
            applications are processed within the 21 days advertised and,
            in addition to a written assessment, each applicant is given
            the opportunity for a personal debriefing on its pre-
            application. Early processing delays have been eliminated--
            essentially all of the approximately 120 pre-applications filed
            since March 1, 2004, have been completed on time.
      --Application Kit.--The initial application kit was designed with the
            expectation that changes would be required as operational
            experience was obtained. During the past year, OSAI has sought
            input from applicants, industry, and government on areas
            appropriate for revision. Utilizing this input and its own
            operational experience, OSAI prepared a revised Application kit
            in concert with the proposed revision to the interim rule. The
            Paperwork Reduction Act notice for the final version of the new
            kit was published in the Federal Register on December 13, 2004,
            and the Department anticipates early adoption of the new kit.
        The SAFETY Act requires the Department to evaluate technologies on
    an application by application basis; however, the Department has
    undertaken a significant effort to coordinate the SAFETY Act
    application process with major anti-terrorism procurements where
    multiple Sellers will be providing the same technology to ease the
    burden on applicants and speed the evaluation process.
        To date, the Department has received more than 200 pre-applications
    and 94 full applications. As of June 18, 2004, twenty Designations and
    Certifications have been granted and five applicants have received
    Designation only.
        Question. How is the SAFETY Act being applied to Project BioShield
    products?
        Answer. The Department is not aware of any application submitted in
    connection with the BioShield program. Any provider of an anti-
    terrorism technology may apply for the protections afforded by the
    SAFETY Act and it is reasonable to anticipate that participants in the
    BioShield program will apply for SAFETY Act protections as their
    technologies mature.
        Question. Is the Department going to apply the SAFETY Act to the
    pharmaceutical industry when it comes to the development of biological
    countermeasures?
        Answer. A very wide range of technologies may potentially qualify
    for protection under the SAFETY Act. The Act explicitly applies to any
    qualifying product, equipment, service (including support services),
    device, or technology (including information technology) that is
    designed, developed, modified, or procured for the specific purpose of
    detecting, identifying, preventing, or deterring acts of terrorism, or
    limiting the harm that such acts might otherwise cause. This broad
    definition of ``technology'' encompasses tangible products, software,
    services, various forms of intellectual property, and anything else
    that can be sold that has a specific anti-terrorism application. This
    definition of technology would encompass pharmaceutical products and
    their related delivery technologies when used for anti-terrorism
    purposes.
        Question. How is S&T working with the drug and vaccine industry to
    determine which products should be considered for SAFETY Act
    protection?
        Answer. The Office of Safety Act Implementation (OSAI) has a robust
    outreach program. Members of OSAI staff frequently provide informative
    presentations on the SAFETY Act at a variety of trade shows and
    industry meetings and often have a presence in the vendor areas where
    additional informative material on the application process and the
    benefits of protection under the SAFETY Act are available. OSAI staff
    members also provide informal guidance on an individual basis at these
    same events. In addition, OSAI will host another round of nationwide
    SAFETY Act seminars to introduce prospective applicants to the program
    including the benefits of SAFETY Act protections, the new application
    kit, and the revised interim rule.
        The Department does not pre-determine if a particular technology is
    an anti-terrorism technology within the context of the SAFETY Act. Each
    applicant describes its specific anti-terrorism technology in its
    application and explains why it believes the technology or its proposed
    use of the technology meets the statutory criteria. OSAI does provide
    personalized guidance to applicants on a variety of issues at a number
    of points throughout the application process. Most often, the anti-
    terrorism application of the technology is reviewed, analyzed, and
    discussed with the applicant during the pre-application process,
    telephone discussions following receipt of the formal response to the
    pre-application, and through telephone conversations at the end of the
    completeness review before formal evaluation is commenced.
        While we are not able to assess directly the extent to which this
    information has penetrated the pharmaceutical community, the fact that
    we have received some applications relating to vaccines indicates that
    some measure of penetration has been achieved.
        Question. Is the SAFETY Act perhaps too limited with respect to
    certain areas? Is the Department reviewing the Act's authorities and
    issuing regulations or other administrative means to best utilize the
    Act?
        Answer. The Department is committed to the primary goal of the
    SAFETY Act--to ensure that the threat of liability does not deter
    potential manufacturers or sellers of critical anti-terrorism
    technologies from developing and commercializing technologies that
    could save lives. The SAFETY Act review process is not intended to
    guarantee that anyone will be able to purchase ``the very best''
    product or services. It is designed, as required by the statute, to
    help individual effective technologies overcome market barriers on an
    application-by-application basis. Throughout its implementation of this
    program, the Department has engaged applicants, industry, and the
    public to solicit feedback to enhance the process. Many concerns raised
    by interested parties have already been addressed and the Department
    will continue to encourage input to improve the program. The Department
    is committed to fulfilling the intent of Congress as set forth in the
    language of the SAFETY Act and will continue to improve upon efforts
    working towards successful implementation of this important
    legislation.
        Among the efforts being undertaken by the Department to improve its
    implementation of the SAFETY Act are revisions to the application kit
    and the interim rule. The initial application kit was designed with the
    expectation that changes would be required as operational experience
    was obtained. During the past year, Office of Safety Act Implementation
    (OSAI) has sought input from applicants, industry, and government on
    areas appropriate for revision. Using this input and its own
    operational experience, OSAI prepared a revised application kit in
    concert with the proposed revision to the interim rule. The Paperwork
    Reduction Act notice for the final version of the new kit was published
    in the Federal Register on December 13, 2004. In addition, the
    Department is in the process of developing revisions to the current
    regulation. The revised regulations will address public comments and
    address other areas with a view to facilitating greater participation
    in the SAFETY Act program.

                               RAPID PROTOTYPING

        Question. How does the rapid prototyping function within S&T assist
    in the Department's effort to combat bioterrorism?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate's Rapid Prototyping Portfolio assists
    in the effort to combat bioterrorism by reducing the time needed to
    develop and commercialize relevant technologies that can meet needs on
    an interim basis while technologies that meet long-range needs are in
    development. The S&T Directorate's first rapid prototyping effort
    (conducted with the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) in fiscal
    year 2003) produced thirteen separate efforts related to combating
    bioterrorism. When developed and completed, these efforts will provide
    such capabilities as: better methods to characterize biological
    backgrounds in facilities; methods for large-scale restoration of
    biologically contaminated urban areas; a low-cost, personal bio-
    decontamination system; a biological aerosol threat warning detector;
    direct detection assays for botulinum toxin; and improvements in
    biological detection systems.
        The S&T Directorate's Rapid Technology Application Program (RTAP)
    has worked intensively with the DHS internal customers and field agents
    to identify their most urgent needs for countering bio threats. These
    needs will be published to the private sector in early summer 2005 with
    the goal of delivering the prototypes to those customers within 18
    months of contract award.
        Question. Do bioterrorism-related technologies lend themselves well
    to rapid prototyping?
        Answer. All technologies, including technologies for bioterrorism
    countermeasures lend themselves well to rapid prototyping. Technologies
    needed to combat bio-terrorism range from near-term prototypes to
    extremely difficult long-term projects. Based on the expressed
    expectations of DHS customers, tactical concerns in the field dominate.
    They need technical capabilities to determine if a suspicious substance
    is a bio-agent or powdered sugar, other capabilities to tell them if an
    entire area is contaminated or not, and a fast, reliable method of
    definitive bio-agent identification. Technically effective isolation or
    containment of suspected bio-contaminants and improved protection of
    field personnel from bio hazards are cited often as developments needed
    in the short term.
        In other areas, such as bioinformatics, forensics, bioassays for
    novel or engineered bio-agents, rapid prototyping must give way to
    careful, painstaking, long-term development.
        Question. How do you determine which items are chosen for the rapid
    prototyping program?
        Answer. The Rapid Technology Application Program annually conducts
    a series of meetings with DHS internal customers and field agents, and
    State and local responders to identify their highest priority needs for
    rapid prototyping developments. These customers identify and prioritize
    their needs in any technical area. Within the constraints of technical
    feasibility, development time (no longer than 18 months), and available
    resources, their top priority rapid prototyping needs will be
    developed.
        Question. Has the rapid prototyping effort incentivized both the
    scientific community and entrepreneurs to develop products?
        Answer. Industry has been avidly interested in the S&T
    Directorate's solicitations. For example, the S&T Directorate's first
    rapid prototyping effort (with TSWG in fiscal year 2003) was valued at
    $60 million over 2 years and resulted in 94 contract awards for
    research and development work now underway. When developed and
    completed, these efforts will provide such capabilities as: better
    methods to characterize biological backgrounds in facilities, methods
    for large-scale restoration of biologically contaminated urban areas, a
    low-cost, personal bio-decontamination system, a biological aerosol
    threat warning detector, direct detection assays for botulinum toxin,
    and improvements in biological detection systems. There were more than
    3,000 initial submissions for that solicitation. The DHS Rapid
    Technology Application Program, currently valued at $35 million is
    scheduled to release its first public, competitive, rapid prototyping
    solicitation in early Summer 2005 and a proportional strong response is
    expected.
        Question. What is the most difficult hurdle when it comes to rapid
    prototyping?
        Answer. The most difficult part of the rapid prototyping process is
    deriving meaningful customer requirements that are feasible,
    affordable, and have a high potential for actual deployment upon
    completion of development.
        Question. Do antidote and vaccine development fall under the rapid
    prototyping effort or is that entirely under HHS' jurisdiction?
        Answer. Section 302(4) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigns
    to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology the responsibility
    for, . . . conducting basic and applied research, development,
    demonstration and testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant
    to any or all elements of the Department, through both intramural and
    extramural programs, except that such responsibility does not extend to
    human-health related research and development activities:'' [emphasis
    added]. Section 304 (a) assigns this responsibility to the Secretary of
    Health and Human Services.
        Question. Are different tools combined and cross-pollinated to
    accelerate research and development when rapid prototyping to address
    bioterrorism?
        Answer. Yes. The S&T Directorate's Rapid Prototyping development
    period is nominally between 6 and 18 months from contract award. In all
    but a very few cases this implies that most rapid prototypes will not
    involve basic research, but will heavily involve development. These
    developments take forms such as modifications of existing equipment for
    new purposes, increases in effectiveness derived from new algorithms or
    software, changes in configuration to be smaller, lighter weight, or
    redesign for decreased power consumption for example. Many of these
    rapid prototyping developments use ``tools'' developed for other
    purposes. Personal Data Assistants can be modified for identification
    of, and use by emergency responders. Personnel protective equipment can
    be redesigned to be less bulky, more effective against an array of
    hazards and more user-friendly. Wireless communications technology, for
    example, has many uses in bio countermeasures and it can be licensed
    off-the-shelf for many applications.
        Question. How are the legal ramifications to rapid prototyping
    being addressed when S&T is dealing with items which do not have
    patents filed? Under this scenario, who owns the intellectual property
    when the product is changed as it moves through the rapid prototyping
    process?
        Answer. In all but a very few cases most rapid prototypes will be
    heavily focused on late stage development. These developments take
    forms such as modifications of existing equipment for new purposes,
    increases in effectiveness derived from new algorithms or software,
    changes in configuration to be smaller, lighter weight, or have
    decreased power consumption, for example. The S&T Directorate will use
    procurement contracts (or Other Transactions for Prototypes) for rapid
    prototyping developments. Both kinds of vehicles are legally binding
    and require negotiation of many aspects of the development. Generally
    the developer retains title in any invention or data developed with the
    Government receiving a license. When appropriate, the Government will
    require licenses for Federal, State, tribal, and local government use.
    Specific intellectual property treatment, ownership, licensing, usage
    and royalties are always addressed in these detailed negotiations and
    contractually secured on terms agreeable to the developer and the
    Government, subject to all applicable laws and regulations.
                                     ______

                Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

                   CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DETECTION PROGRAM

        Question. In 2003, the Department of Energy transferred to the
    Department of Homeland Security a highly successfully Chemical and
    Biological Detection program, including $78 million in annual funding.
    This was a capability supported in conjunction with the nuclear
    detection capabilities at our national laboratories.
        How much progress has DHS made in implementing this capability and
    how much is budgeted for these activities?
        Answer. The Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological National
    Security Program (CBNP) was a highly successful R&D program that served
    as the foundation of the S&T Directorate's Biological and Chemical
    Countermeasures Portfolio, which was eventually split into biological
    and chemical components. The program was continued, augmented, and
    expanded to cover a range of biological and chemical countermeasures
    R&D targeted at homeland security applications. Efforts initiated in
    the CBNP that have come to fruition include the Biological Aerosol
    Sentry and Information System (BASIS), a deployable capability for
    biological threat agent detection that is now part of the S&T
    Directorate's special event monitoring and National Security Special
    Events (NSSEs), and served as the foundation for the BioWatch program
    that was deployed to over 30 U.S. cities. The Program for Response
    Options and Technology Enhancement for Chemical Terrorism (PROTECT)
    currently is operational and owned and operated by the Washington
    Metropolitan Area Transit Administration and the associated program in
    the San Francisco International Airport has provided guidance on
    airport protection. A restoration demonstration effort is underway
    there and will be completed this year. PROTECT served as a basis for
    the operational NSSE chemical protection efforts in New York City and
    Boston in fiscal year 2004.
        Another key CBNP chemical defense program is the MicroChem lab, an
    effort to develop a next-generation hand-held chemical detector with
    capability to detect a broader set of chemical hazards than currently
    available sensors and with fewer false positive responses. Under DHS
    funding in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, the effort has now
    completed development through prototype phase and will be evaluated
    against other developing sensors under the S&T Directorate's Chemical
    Detection program test/evaluation phase. There is no current active
    funding for this project as it has already accomplished the target
    prototype needed for evaluation. After fair test and evaluation among
    all candidates, successful technologies will be selected for further
    support toward final engineering. The Local Integration of NARAC
    (National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center) with Cities (LINC)
    program will continue to operate in its current configuration in five
    U.S. cities through this fiscal year and will be subsumed into the
    Biological Warning and Incident Characterization System once it is
    mature. R&D efforts that transitioned with the program in March 2003
    have been continued through this year and new ones, such as the foreign
    animal disease R&D efforts and NBACC-related activities have been
    initiated. In fiscal year 2004, Biological Countermeasures was funded
    at $286.5 million and in fiscal year 2005, $362.6 million.
        Question. Under the DHS Chem-Bio Detection program many research
    and development contracts have been made through industry instead of
    the national labs. The laboratory program supported a long term
    capability, but has also been successful in commercializing handheld
    detection units.
        How is DHS allocating funding between industry, universities and
    national laboratories?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate collaborates with academia through the
    Centers of Excellence program and its associated Integrated Network of
    Centers, which is establishing a national network of affiliated
    universities. Additionally, the S&T Directorate has a sizeable number
    of interactions and programs with individual universities on specific
    research topics and needs.
        The S&T Directorate solicits proposals from industry and uses a
    full range of contracting vehicles and its authority under the Homeland
    Security Act to engage businesses (large and small), federally funded
    research and development centers, universities, and other entities in
    development of advanced technologies for homeland security. The
    contracted research and development work now underway is the S&T
    Directorate's main form of collaboration with industry and academia.
    The S&T Directorate maximizes and leverages the existing capability
    base of the national laboratory complex. The Directorate engages all
    the national laboratories on a case-by-case basis, to tap into unique
    technical expertise that is critical to accomplishing portfolio
    objectives and goals. The Directorate also relies on national
    laboratory technical experts as needed throughout the RDT&E processes
    based on their years of experience applying technologies and processes
    to field applications. This technical and practical expertise is used
    to accelerate spiral development of technologies for transitioning
    capabilities to operational end-users.
        The S&T Directorate's CounterMeasures Test Beds (CMTB) program
    operates in close partnership with a number of Federal and national
    laboratories to execute its mission of testing and evaluating all
    threat countermeasures and systems. The following national laboratories
    participate in all CMTB Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E)
    efforts and enable deployments in response to heightened alert
    conditions as necessary. Multi-laboratory teams are encouraged to
    ensure objectivity and a healthy interchange of ideas.
        The Office of Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) is currently
    leveraging the resources of Eastern Kentucky University in developing
    effective test methodologies for equipment and to provide technical
    assistance to states and localities under the SAFECOM Program. At the
    same time, OIC has enlisted a consortium of well over one hundred
    universities and colleges to support the annual conference on
    Technologies for Public Safety in Critical Incident Response, jointly
    sponsored by DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
        Industry associations participate in SAFECOM Program activities,
    especially in standards development efforts. OIC has established a
    monthly vendor process which allows for constant communication and
    collaboration with our industry partners. Additionally, OIC/SAFECOM
    will be conducting an industry summit in late fall to allow for ever
    greater collaboration.
        Question. Is this allocation sufficient to support long term
    research and development necessary to develop the next generation
    technology?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate's strategic planning process uses a
    risk-based approach (including threats, vulnerabilities, and
    consequences) that identifies critical areas of need for RDT&E. The
    potential impact of RDT&E investments is evaluated and those efforts,
    both short- and long-term, that will have the greatest impact on
    reducing risk are pursued.
        In the 2 years that this Department has been in existence, the S&T
    Directorate has focused its efforts on near-term development and
    deployment of technologies to improve our Nation's ability to detect
    and respond to potential terrorist acts. However, we recognize that a
    sustained effort to continually add to our knowledge base and our
    resource base is necessary for future developments. Thus, we have
    invested a portion of our resources, including our university programs,
    toward these objectives.
        The S&T Directorate believes the distribution of funding between
    industry, universities, and national laboratories supports both long-
    term capabilities development as well as meeting near-term requirements
    for end-users. The current funding distribution may change based on
    national requirements and needs. We recognize the value of longer-term
    capability development to ensure that the Nation has the necessary
    knowledge for application development.
        Question. Can you please provide me list of the grants the
    Department has made in allocating the Chem-Bio diction funding for this
    the past year?
        Answer. The fiscal year 2004 grants that DHS has made in the area
    of chemical and biological detection and related areas are listed
    below:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Performer                              Topic
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U of Pitt.................................  Surveillance--RODS Decision
                                                 Enhancements for The
                                                 BioWatch System
    Johns Hopkins.............................  Surveillance--ESSENCE
                                                 Implementation of ESSENCE
                                                 Biosurveillance Systems
    Arizona University........................  High Resolution DNA
                                                 Signatures for biothreat
    Multiple \1\..............................  ECBC--Technical Advisory
                                                 Group to HSARPA on
                                                 Bioaerosol sensor testing
                                                 and evaluation.
    Multiple..................................  Bioinformatics and Assay
                                                 Development Program
    Potomac Institute for Policy Studies......  Bio-Alert
    MIT/Lincoln Lab...........................  Architecture Studies
    Johns Hopkins University/APL..............  Real-Time Neutralization of
                                                 Biological Weapons in
                                                 Stadiums or Arenas
    SAIC and Battelle.........................  Demonstration & Verification
                                                 of Chlorine Dioxide
                                                 Decontamination Tech. in
                                                 Large-Scale Test
    National Center for Atmospheric Research..  Urban Studies-Atmospheric
                                                 Transport & Dispersion
                                                 Calculations
    MIT/Lincoln Laboratory....................  Water System Vulnerability
                                                 Studies for Homeland
                                                 Defense
    Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command..  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    MIT/Lincoln Laboratory....................  High-Collection-Efficiency
                                                 Bio-aerosol Sampling
    General Dynamics/CBRTA....................  DFU Filter Replacement Study
    NYC DOHMH.................................  Integration of Clinical
                                                 Testing to Complement
                                                 BioWatch and Disease
                                                 Surveillance in NYC
    Army Research Laboratory..................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Naval Research Laboratory.................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Battelle Laboratory.......................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Ionian Corp...............................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Johns Hopkins University/APL..............  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Research Triangle Institute...............  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Multiple..................................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Agilent Corp..............................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Smiths Detection/Pasadena.................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    JHU/APL...................................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Smiths Detection/Watford..................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Goodrich Corp.............................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Sarnoff Corp..............................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    DOE National Laboratories.................  Enhanced Bioaerosol
                                                 Detection System
    Lawrence Livermore & Sandia Natl            Bio-briefcase
     Laboratories.
    Pacific Northwest Natl Lab................  Botulinum detection system
    Institute for Defense Analysis............  IDA Chemical Hazard Analysis
    Edgewood Chemical and Biological Command..  Evaluation of Fielded
                                                 Decontaminants Against Non-
                                                 Traditional Agents
    Institute for Defense Analysis............  Infrastructure Sensitivity
                                                 to Chemical Hazards
    MITRE Corp................................  A JASON Study of Selected
                                                 Topics for the Department
                                                 of Homeland Security
    Naval Research Laboratory.................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures use of
                                                 CASPAR
    Naval Research Laboratory.................  Autonomous Rapid Facility
                                                 Chemical Agent Monitor
    National Institute for Standards            Solid State MEMs Microsensor
     Technology.                                 Arrays to Detect Dangerous
                                                 Chemicals
    Goodrich Corp.............................  TeraSpec
    Sarnoff Corp..............................  TeraSpec
    Multiple..................................  Detection Systems for
                                                 Biological and Chemical
                                                 Countermeasures
    Monterey Institute........................  Survey/Evaluation of CBW
                                                 Detectors
    Multiple..................................  Low Vapor Pressure Chemical
                                                 Detectors
    Los Alamos National Lab...................  Study of Receptor
                                                 Development for Certain
                                                 Chemical Threat Agents
    Multiple..................................  Novel Personnel Protection
                                                 Equipment, BAA 04-13
    Multiple..................................  Bioinformatics and Assay
                                                 Development Program
    Lawrence Livernore Lab....................  Bioassays for Detection and
                                                 Forensics
    Los Alamos Nat'l Lab......................  Bioassays for Detection and
                                                 Forensics
    Sandia National Labs......................  Bioforensics
    National Academy of Sciences..............  Assessing Vulnerabilities
                                                 Related to the Nations
                                                 Chemical Infrastructure
    Scientific Applications International Corp  IBIS TIGER Biosensors
    Space and Naval Warfare Command...........  Border Net (Chem/Bio Agent
                                                 Support)
    Naval Sea Systems Command.................  Chem/Bio Agent Support
    Lawrence Livermore & other DOE Labs.......  High Throughput Diagnostics
                                                 for Agricultural
                                                 Applications
    Palo Alto Sensor Technology Innovation....  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Seacoast Science, Inc.....................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Intelligent Optical Systems, Inc..........  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Synkera Technologies Inc..................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Cape Cod Research, Inc....................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    CogniScent, Inc...........................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Technispan LLC............................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Nanomat, Inc..............................  New System/Technologies to
                                                 Detect Low Vapor Pressure
                                                 Chemicals (e.g., TICs)
    Weld Star Technology, Inc.................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    SomaLogic, Inc............................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Orthosystems, Inc.........................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Nomadics, Inc.............................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Peterson Ridge LLC (dba Fluence)..........  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    BioElectroSpec............................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Echo Technical............................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Operational Technologies Corporation......  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    Accacia International LLC.................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    BioTraces, Inc............................  Chem-Bio Sensors Employing
                                                 Novel Receptor Scaffolds
    CFD Research Corporation..................  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    Digital Flow Technologies, Inc............  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    MesoSystems Technology Inc................  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    Research International, Inc...............  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    InnovaTek, Inc............................  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    Enertechnix, Inc..........................  Advanced Low Cost Aerosol
                                                 Collectors for Surveillance
                                                 Sensors and Personal
                                                 Monitoring
    Isotron Corporation.......................  Wide-Area TIC Neutralization
    Gumbs Associates, Inc.....................  Wide-Area TIC Neutralization
    Synergistic Advanced Technologies LLC.....  Wide-Area TIC Neutralization

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Multiple indicates contract awards to more than one recipient in a
      category from the funding provided for this solicitation. In most
      cases, there remain companies in negotiation for award.

                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                               CHEMICAL DETECTORS

        Question. In your oral testimony, you indicated that there are
    funds in the budget to deploy chemical sensors, yet the S&T budget
    document refers to ``critical design review'' of technologies, but
    nothing about deployment of sensors across the country. Based on your
    hearing comments, please provide specifics on the Department's
    capabilities and deployment schedule for chemical monitoring.
        Answer. The interface to which this question refers was a short
    discussion on the issue of PROTECT, a networked chemical detection
    system for enhanced response against chemical attacks on facilities,
    particularly transit systems. This system has been demonstrated in and
    transitioned to three subway systems (DC, Boston, and NYC). With
    successful demonstration, the program has transitioned away from DHS
    S&T Directorate and is available for installation in other transit
    systems via the fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grants Program
    administered by the DHS Office of State and Local Government
    Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) Office for Domestic Preparedness.
    The reference to ``funds in the budget'' to support deployment was a
    reference to funds in the Department's budget versus the S&T
    Directorate budget. The fiscal year 2005 Transit Security Grant Program
    includes $108 million for rail transit security, targeted to specific
    urban areas for the prevention and detection of explosive devices and
    chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents. Expenditures to
    acquire the PROTECT system are permissible under this program. The
    Science and Technology Directorate is assisting SLGCP with technical
    data package development and is prepared to offer technical assistance
    in the deployment of the system through this program.

                               BIOWATCH DETECTION

        Question. Your budget proposes over $100 million for bio-aerosol
    detection systems, better known as the ``BioWatch'' program. These
    sensors are located in over 30 major cities across the country.
        Samples are taken manually 1 or 2 times daily and then tested at a
    lab to determine if a biological attack has occurred. If an attack
    really occurs, hundreds or thousands of people could be harmed before
    the lab results come in. What investments are you making to close the
    gap between the release of a biological agent and the time it takes to
    detect it?
        Answer. We have a major program to develop the next generation of
    biodetection systems which we call Biological Autonomous Networked
    Detection (BAND). These systems will collect and analyze the sample on
    site, reporting out as often as every four hours, and will wirelessly
    transmit the data from any positives to the nearest Laboratory Response
    Network for confirmation and to initiate sample retrieval. The BAND
    system will simultaneously perform analyses for twenty or more agents,
    significantly more than the current BioWatch system, with sensitivities
    and false alarm rates equal to or better than the current BioWatch
    system. Because the sample collection and analyses is fully automated
    and done on site, the operational costs per ``detection site'' will be
    about one-fifth that of the current system or less. This greatly lower
    operational cost and the fully autonomous nature of the system will
    enable expansion of biological protection within existing BioWatch
    cities as well as to those cities and venues where it was previously
    not practical. We are currently on schedule for demonstrating a
    laboratory prototype of the BAND system in fiscal year 2006, developing
    engineering prototypes in fiscal year 2007, piloting them in a BioWatch
    city or cities in fiscal year 2008 and deploying them throughout the
    existing BioWatch cities in fiscal year 2009/fiscal year 2010.
        Question. My understanding is that certain prototypes are being
    tested, but they won't be deployable until 2009. Is this a matter of
    resources? What is needed to accelerate deployment of this system?
        Answer. Your understanding is correct, as per the discussion
    previously, we are not scheduled to begin deployment of the BAND System
    to BioWatch cities until fiscal year 2009. This is in part technology
    limited and in part resource limited. If the available R&D funding for
    this system was increased from its projected fiscal year 2006-fiscal
    year 2007 levels of about $25 million per year to $60 million per year,
    we would be able to significantly reduce the technical risk in
    developing the system and speed its deployment by 6 to 12 months. This
    would be accomplished by pursuing more technology options more
    aggressively. The competition engendered by being able to carry two or
    three systems all the way through development would further assist in
    meeting the challenging technical performance and cost goals. In
    addition, manufacturing of these detection systems to enable wide scale
    deployment would benefit from creating a guaranteed market for 1,000-
    2,000 of these advanced detection systems, at a total estimated cost of
    $50-100 million. A significant portion of this additional required
    funding would need to be available in fiscal year 2007 so as to enable
    deployment to start in fiscal year 2008.

                               BIOWATCH RESPONSE

        Question. The budget notes as an accomplishment that the
    ``BioWatch'' detection systems, which are deployed in over 30 major
    U.S. cities, conducted over a million assays with no false alarms.
        While that is certainly an indication that the system works, an
    official with the National Association of County and City Health
    Officials recently complained that not enough focus has been placed on
    what happens if the ``alarm bell'' rings.
        If an incident of national significance is detected, are State and
    local governments prepared to respond?
        Answer. The S&T Directorate, in collaboration with CDC, EPA, and
    DoJ, has prepared BioWatch Preparedness and Response Guidance (interim
    draft guidance) and distributed it to the BioWatch cities. This draft
    guidance is intended to assist the cities in their development of an
    incident characterization plan following a positive BioWatch signal.
    While some cities have developed a comprehensive plan, other cities'
    plans are under development. The S&T Directorate continues to offer
    assistance to each city and currently has an effort underway to address
    the concerns of the local public health epidemiology community.
        Question. What management practices are in place at the Federal
    level to ensure that State and local governments are prepared to
    respond to an incident of national significance? I would like to hear
    both Assistant Secretary Albright and Assistant Secretary Simonson
    respond to the question.
        Answer. Contingency planning with State and local governments is an
    important and ongoing process. A key component of the National Incident
    Management System (NIMS) compliance for State and local jurisdictions
    is the requirement for updating and revising emergency operations
    plans. With the release of the National Response Plan (NRP), State and
    local jurisdictions are encouraged to align their plans with the NRP.
    State, local, and tribal organizations must adopt NIMS by fiscal year
    2007 as a condition of receiving Federal preparedness assistance. State
    and local governments can use DHS grant funds to implement the NIMS.
        The NRP and the NIMS provide the template, policies, and protocols
    for integrating all jurisdictions and the private sector as key
    components of the Nation's response to domestic incidents. The NRP and
    the NIMS are built on the principle that most incidents start, end, and
    are managed at the local level. The NIMS stresses the concepts of
    mutual aid, communications, resource typing, and preparedness, in
    addition to the command and control elements, including the Incident
    Command System and Multi-agency Coordination. The NRP details how those
    varying levels of responsibility work together during Incidents of
    National Significance (a new concept developed in the NRP to cover
    every significant incident), which require the Department of Homeland
    Security to take on the overall coordination role for Federal
    involvement in domestic incident management. The NRP provides the
    multi-agency coordination structures to support incident commanders and
    local entities at the scene. It also provides coordination structures
    for integrating with the private sector. One of the key concepts of the
    NRP is that preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering
    from Incidents of National Significance require the collective
    capabilities of all involved jurisdictions.

                    DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

        Question. The DHS budget proposes $227 million for a new office
    called the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). I share the
    Department's concerns that this threat warrants a coordinated effort at
    the Federal level to address it. However, the criticism following 9/11
    that led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was
    that there were too many stovepiped agencies across the Federal
    Government dealing with homeland security that didn't know what the
    other was doing.
        In your opinion, is enough being done by the Secretary's office to
    ensure that the DNDO will not become a stovepiped organization?
        Answer. One of the principal motivators in the formation of the
    DNDO was to remove this type of stovepiping within the Department, and
    across the Federal Government, with regards to the prevention of
    nuclear terrorist attack. DNDO is charged with integrating and
    coordinating all planning and implementation efforts across the other
    Federal departments and agencies, and within DHS, to ensure that
    individual efforts are effectively and efficiently contributing to a
    global strategy to defend against the terrorist use of a nuclear weapon
    on our Nation.
        The DNDO serves as a unique entity within the Department to
    consolidate all nuclear-detection related activities, allowing for the
    development of an integrated office that will be responsible not only
    for research and development, but also for developing a global nuclear
    detection architecture and developing and implementing a domestic
    detection system, to include acquisition programs for detection assets
    and operational support functions. This integration, as well as
    coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will
    allow for the development of a single global nuclear detection
    architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport
    a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for
    illicit use.
        Question. For instance, the proposal for DNDO calls for its own
    office of assessments and evaluations. It has its own policy planning
    office. It has an R&D office as well as a systems development and
    acquisitions office. These are also functions currently performed by
    the Science and Technology Directorate and the Information Analysis and
    Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Office.
        Is the Secretary proposing to set up a separate intelligence unit
    and a separate R&D arm just for this office? How does this affect
    ongoing efforts within the Science & Technology Directorate?
        Answer. With regards to intelligence collection and analysis, IAIP
    will continue to be the conduit for DNDO coordination with the larger
    intelligence community. Additionally, DNDO will leverage the current
    capabilities within IAIP for intelligence analysis. The DNDO's Joint
    Center for Global Connectivity (JCGC) will be closely integrated with
    the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) to ensure that effective
    information flows in both directions. DNDO expects to receive all
    relevant intelligence information from IAIP in a timely manner and will
    provide additional technical analysis capabilities on a 24/7 basis as
    part of the JCGC. The JCGC, by receiving information and finished
    intelligence from sources across the Federal, State and local levels,
    will be able to additionally provide continuous analysis of real-time
    data streams and the capability to provide continual national
    situational awareness.
        With regards to research and development, the DNDO will continue to
    closely interface with the S&T Directorate on joint projects, as
    appropriate, for the development of technologies that may provide
    countermeasures against multiple threat types. The separation of the
    DNDO nuclear detection research, development, test, and evaluation
    (RDT&E) from the RDT&E conducted within the S&T Directorate will be
    conducted so as to not have any detrimental affect on potential
    collaborative efforts that would be gained through the S&T
    consolidation effort. The goal is to make sure that this Nation
    maintains a preeminent research and development program to address the
    technical challenges in radiation detection science and technology,
    while at the same time capitalizing on the benefits of integrating this
    program with larger acquisition and operational support efforts.
        Again, the intent of the DNDO is to provide an integration of
    efforts across the Department, as well as the rest of the Federal
    Government, rather than another disconnected layer of bureaucracy. For
    exactly this reason, the DNDO will be a jointly-staffed office with
    detailed employees from other DHS components, as well as other
    departments, to provide strong linkages and a mutual continual
    awareness between the DNDO and the parent organizations. The DNDO will
    not operate in a vacuum separate from the rest of the Department, but
    will instead operate in a fully-informed environment, cognizant of all
    relevant Department efforts, including the intelligence and R&D efforts
    mentioned.

        RADIOLOGICAL/NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES TEST AND EVALUATION COMPLEX

        Question. The budget request includes $9 million for a
    Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex. The
    budget indicates that $13 million was appropriated prior to fiscal year
    2004 and $11 million was appropriated in fiscal year 2004. When was the
    $13 million appropriated? Under which public law or laws was the
    funding included?
        Answer. At the stand up of DHS and S&T, funds were transferred from
    other departments to provide an initial funding base. In particular,
    funds for the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Portfolio were
    originally transferred from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
    and the Department of Energy (DOE). The first $13 million that was put
    on contract for the Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and
    Evaluation Complex was part of the fiscal year 2003 funding. Funding
    was included under a reprogramming of funds request, and Radiological/
    Nuclear Countermeasures received $65 million which was approved by the
    House and Senate Appropriation Committees. The reprogramming did not
    specifically state that the S&T Directorate was using funds for the
    Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex;
    however, the S&T Directorate used $13 million for this effort.
        Question. The project schedule indicates that the construction
    phase is scheduled to begin on May 1, 2005. Is the project on schedule?
    If not, what impact does that have on the June 2006 completion goal?
        Answer. The Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and
    Evaluation Complex (CTEC) construction project is currently on schedule
    to meet the expected June 2006 completion goal.

                        UNIVERSITY CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE

        Question. Under Secretary McQueary testified last year that in
    addition to the risk analysis and agro-terrorism centers, two more
    solicitations would occur in fiscal year 2004 and if the budget request
    for fiscal year 2005 was maintained at fiscal year 2004 levels, an
    additional five Centers could be selected for a total of nine centers.
    In fiscal year 2005, the fourth center was named, but the fiscal year
    2006 budget request indicated that a fifth is being evaluated and two
    additional Centers are anticipated in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year
    2006 for a total of seven.
        Why has the number of Centers planned by the Department changed?
        Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate plans on supporting
    seven Centers of Excellence and two Cooperative Centers in fiscal year
    2005 and fiscal year 2006, for a total of 9 Centers supported. The
    Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for the fifth Center had proposals due
    at the end of April 2005. The BAAs for the sixth and seventh Centers
    are in development. The DHS-EPA Cooperative Center on Microbial Risk
    Assessment has been funded for fiscal year 2005, with the recipient to
    be announced shortly, and the second Cooperative Center is in
    development.
        Question. What areas of mission relevant research are not being
    considered because of the reduction from nine to seven Centers?
        Answer. We are planning on supporting a total of seven merit-based
    Centers of Excellence through fiscal year 2006; topics for the sixth
    and seventh Centers are being vetted within the Department for approval
    prior to announcement. We anticipate releasing Broad Agency
    Announcements requesting proposals for merit-based consideration in
    fiscal year 2005. In addition to the seven Centers of Excellence, the
    S&T Directorate will support two Cooperative Centers in fiscal year
    2005 and fiscal year 2006. We believe that these seven centers will
    address all current mission relevant research.

                     NATIONAL BIO AND AGRODEFENSE FACILITY

        Question. The budget proposes $23 million for the National Bio and
    Agrodefense Facility, which according to the project schedule, will
    cost over $450 million to complete. According to the project schedule,
    work to be performed in fiscal year 2006 will cost only $3 million. Why
    is $23 million needed in fiscal year 2006?
        Answer. The $3 million referenced will be spent in fiscal year 2005
    to initiate a conceptual design study to define the scope and size of
    the new facility. The $23 million fiscal year 2006 request will
    complete the conceptual design, the NEPA process including site
    selection, and initiate the detailed engineering design of the chosen
    concept.
        Question. Has a site been selected for this facility?
        Answer. No site has been chosen at this point in the NBAF
    development process. An interagency conceptual study has been
    undertaken by DHS, USDA and DHHS to explore three major options for
    NBAF each with increasing capability. The study will determine the
    programmatic requirements, scope and size of the facility taking into
    account cost, schedule, technical requirements and public support. This
    process will provide the basis for more detailed engineering design,
    NEPA evaluation and the site selection.
        Question. Is an authorization required for this facility?
        Answer. It is our understanding that under current legislation, an
    authorization for this facility is not required. However, should
    Congress decide to require one, we would of course comply.

                            CHEMICAL COUNTERMEASURES

        Question. The budget request includes an additional $49 million for
    the chemical countermeasures portfolio. The request indicates that $24
    million supports construction of a new facility for countermeasures
    testing. The object class for this funding is listed under ``Purchase
    of goods/services from Gov't accounts.'' Will this facility be leased
    or owned by DHS? Where will it be located? Why isn't this facility
    listed under the Capital Investment and Construction Initiative
    Listing?
        Answer. The budget request identifies a $24 million increase from
    fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006 in ``Purchases from Government
    Accounts.'' This funding includes support of two activities:
    construction of a singular facility to conduct tests of countermeasures
    against non-traditional agents and the enhancement of threat
    characterization, analysis, and assessment, including initiation of
    toxicology and environmental fate studies of non-traditional agents.
    For clarity, of this $24 million, only $11 million are apportioned to
    support the construction of the countermeasure test facility. The test
    facility will be constructed at Edgewood Area, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
    MD, and will be a Department of Defense (DOD) facility. The DHS funds
    will be utilized to conduct a series of critical studies to provide
    much of the foundation data to support design and safe use of the
    facility, which is required for countermeasures assessment both by DOD
    and DHS. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DHS and DOD is in
    development to outline agreement on the requirements, shared expenses,
    and use terms of the facility. Since the DHS funding is provided to
    another government agency (Army) to support a facility of that agency,
    the object class is identified as ``Purchase of goods/services from
    Gov't accounts'' versus Capital Investment.
                                     ______

                    Questions Submitted to Stewart Simonson

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

                    HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND BIOSHIELD

        Question. Please provide a list of administrative, regulatory or
    legislative proposals needed to invigorate scientific research relevant
    to the development of needed countermeasures and products for natural
    pandemics and epidemics.
        Answer. There is a very active scientific effort underway to
    develop needed medical countermeasures and products for natural
    pandemics and epidemics. Much of this effort is supported by the
    National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at the
    National Institutes of Health (NIH). For example, NIAID is using
    Project BioShield authorities to expedite the development of assays to
    be used for the high-throughput screening of candidate therapeutics for
    influenza. Influenza is currently considered a Category C biological
    threat agent by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
    The influenza antiviral therapeutics currently available are limited
    and the rapid emergence of antiviral resistance with widespread use of
    these therapeutic agents is a potential concern.
        Finding new options for treating influenza are a high priority for
    the Nation, as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) draft
    Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan articulates.\1\
    Grants will support research projects focused on the development of
    needed diagnostic assays and screening techniques to permit speedier
    identification of compounds with the potential to be effective against
    a broad spectrum of influenza strains, including newly emergent
    influenza strains.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ A copy of the Pandemic Influenza Response and Preparedness Plan
    can be found at http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/pandemicplan/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In an effort to address the pressing need for additional reliable
    influenza medical countermeasures, the RFP, NOT-AI-05-045, was released
    on June 17, 2005, and the receipt date for applications is September 1,
    2005. Grants are expected to be awarded in fiscal year 2006. The
    Department of Health and Human Services will implement appropriate
    administrative and regulatory actions to facilitate this research
    activity.
        Question. Many innovators complain that they cannot get access to
    your office for an evaluation of their new product ideas. Please
    describe your process for screening new products and new ideas.
        Answer. HHS/OPHEP/ORDC has hosted numerous meetings with external
    stakeholders. These meetings provide a forum for innovators to give
    presentations on their products and to describe their capabilities to
    ORDC. We have had over thirty contacts from industry since January
    2005. ORDC hosts a Project BioShield website http://www.hhs.gov/ophep/
    bioshield/ that provides frequently updated information on ongoing and
    planned acquisitions under Project BioShield. The website also has an
    email link that allows users to send a message directly to ORDC.
        New products or ideas are screened depending upon factors including
    the credibility and potential impact of the threat it proposes to treat
    and stage of development in the research and development pipeline.
        If the product is in the early stages of development, companies and
    researchers need to seek NIH funding through grants, contracts,
    partnerships or the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.
    The SBIR is a set-aside program (2.5 percent of an agency's extramural
    budget) for domestic small business concerns to engage in Research/
    Research and Development (R/R&D) that has the potential for
    commercialization. The SBIR program was established under the Small
    Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-219),
    reauthorized until September 30, 2000 by the Small Business Research
    and Development Enhancement Act (Public Law 102-564), and reauthorized
    again until September 30, 2008 by the Small Business Reauthorization
    Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-554).
        If an innovator's product is sufficiently advanced in development,
    then the Office of Research and Development Coordination (ORDC) in the
    Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) at HHS meets
    with developers to provide guidance concerning the Project BioShield
    acquisition process. This process includes a Material Threat
    Determination (MTD) and a Material Threat Assessment (MTA) by the
    Department of Homeland Security. A MTD is issued by the Secretary of
    Homeland Security if it is determined that the specific CBRN threat
    presents a material threat against the United States population
    sufficient to affect national security. The MTAs provide information
    about the extent of the threat and the vulnerabilities and are used to
    inform U.S. Government (USG) medical countermeasure requirements. The
    USG requirements and recommendations for acquisitions are established
    by the interagency Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures
    Subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council. The
    Project BioShield acquisition process also includes a joint
    recommendation for acquisition by the Secretaries of HHS and the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and an approval for the
    acquisition by the White House.
        Question. Several recommendations have been made to formalize
    access for screening new ideas for products, including convening a
    working group of outside experts, contracting with the private sector,
    and web-based submissions. Please provide a list of proposals on how
    you would recommend formalizing access for screening new ideas for
    products.
        Answer. The NIH peer review process works very well in providing an
    initial evaluation of new ideas. Both NIH and ORDC staff frequently
    meet with developers using a ``Technology Watch'' process aimed at
    ensuring that USG medical countermeasure research and development
    experts are informed about promising, innovative products. As part of
    the Technology Watch process, ORDC issues periodic Requests for
    Information (RFI) to determine the level of maturity of the medical
    product targeting countermeasures of interest in the developmental
    pipeline. Finally, ORDC has a regularly updated website and an email
    address that allows for web-based submission of questions.
        Question. You made mention in your testimony of a number of Project
    BioShield related procurement-related activities that include Pre-
    solicitation notices, Requests for Information, and Requests for
    Proposals. Can you provide additional information about these
    activities?
        Answer. A copy of the current OPHEP/ORDC BioShield procurement
    activities is attached for your convenience. Furthermore, information
    on these procurement-related activities is available on our website at
    http://www.hhs.gov/ophep/bioshield/PBPrcrtPrjct.htm. This information
    is also available at http://www.fedbizopps.gov.
        Question. As described in the Project BioShield Act of 2004, there
    are a number of determinations that must be made to support the
    acquisition of a security countermeasure using the special reserve fund
    appropriated in the fiscal year 2004 DHS Appropriations bill. Can you
    please describe the role of HHS and the process used to make these
    determinations, specifically that the determinations that
    countermeasures are necessary and are appropriate for inclusion in the
    Strategic National Stockpile and the joint recommendation for
    procurement?
        Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security is charged with making
    material threat determinations (MTDs). Upon receipt of the DHS MTD the
    Secretary of Health and Human Services determines if medical
    countermeasures are necessary to protect the public health. If
    countermeasures are needed, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
    must determine the number of doses required, if production and delivery
    of a approved or licensed product is feasible with 8 years of contract
    award, and an evaluation of whether there is a commercial market for
    the product(s) other than as a security countermeasure. Finally, the
    Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services jointly
    recommend to the President that the Special Reserve Fund be made
    available for the recommended countermeasure procurement. The approval
    for the procurement is made by the President (now delegated to the
    Office of Management and Budget.)
        Question. In your testimony, you've provided us with a summary of
    the many accomplishments of your office since the enactment of the
    Project BioShield Act of 2004, also known as BioShield I. As you know,
    I am sponsoring the so-called ``BioShield II'' bill to further expand
    on the efforts of BioShield I including indemnification for product
    manufacturers and liability protection for health workers and patent
    protections. Do you feel that the new bill appropriately addresses
    remaining obstacles to medical countermeasure development against
    weapons of mass destruction?
        Answer. The Department of Health and Human Services is committed to
    the development and acquisition of priority security countermeasures
    and will work with Congress and stakeholders to address obstacles to
    the effective implementation of Project BioShield.
        Question. It is often stated that it takes 10 years to develop
    medical products. What makes HHS believe that it can accomplish this in
    less time?
        Answer. It generally takes 10 years to develop a medical product
    from inception to full FDA licensure or approval by proceeding along a
    conservative, serial regulatory path. Project BioShield allows for the
    procurement and delivery of medical countermeasures to the Strategic
    National Stockpile (SNS) prior to full FDA approval or licensure and
    their use under the Emergency Use Authorization provision of the
    Project BioShield Act of 2004.
        In order to acquire these critical medical countermeasures as
    quickly as possible, Project BioShield encourages a parallel
    development process in which the developer concurrently is finalizing a
    formulation while conducting animal or human clinical trials and
    scaling up and validating a current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMP)
    production process. This approach has some increased risk of failure;
    however, the process is very closely monitored by relevant HHS staff.
        Question. There are many different biological threats. Can you
    explain why so much of the BioShield activities are focused on anthrax?
        Answer. The initial focus of our efforts to protect the Nation was
    aimed largely at those threats that could do the greatest harm to the
    greatest number of our citizens--namely, smallpox and anthrax. An
    attack involving the aerosol dissemination of anthrax spores,
    particularly in an urban setting, was considered by public health
    experts to have the potential for catastrophic effects. The potential
    for large-scale population exposure following aerosol release of
    anthrax spores, the threat demonstrated by the anthrax letters, the
    persistence of anthrax spores in the environment and our knowledge that
    anthrax had been weaponized by state-actors, highlighted the nature of
    the threat. The Secretary of Homeland Security determined that anthrax
    posed a material threat against the United States population sufficient
    to affect national security. And, because untreated inhalation anthrax
    is usually fatal, the Secretary of HHS determined that additional
    countermeasures were necessary to protect the public health.
        Question. I understand that the NIAID rPA anthrax vaccine advanced
    development contracts with VaxGen and Avecia are still ongoing. Why did
    you make the decision to commit to the acquisition of 75 million doses
    of this product before those NIAID contracts were completed?
        Answer. The material threat assessment provided by the DHS
    supported the requirement to acquire sufficient vaccine to protect 25
    million persons (75 million doses). The development work performed
    under the NIAID contracts had proceeded to a level such that HHS had
    confidence that a final rPA vaccine product was achievable and
    licensable within 8 years of a contract award.
        Question. In your statement you testified that the stockpile
    already contains sufficient smallpox vaccine to protect every American.
    Can you please explain why it is necessary to purchase any additional
    vaccine?
        Answer. The smallpox vaccines currently in the Strategic National
    Stockpile are live virus vaccines derived from a virus called vaccinia.
    These replicating vaccines are contraindicated in some segments of the
    population, particularly those with weakened immune systems. Therefore,
    there is a need to develop a vaccine which will be more appropriate for
    use in these persons. An attenuated smallpox vaccine with limited
    replication in humans, such as the Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA)
    vaccine would be appropriate for use in such individuals.
        Question. Former Secretary Tommy Thompson stated that food-borne
    bioterrorism was one of his greatest concerns. Certainly, deliberate
    contamination of food with botulism could result in a large number of
    casualties. Would you please further describe your planned procurement
    for botulism countermeasures?
        Answer. Botulism toxin was determined to be a material threat by
    the Department of Homeland Security on June 9, 2004. Presidential
    approval for the acquisition of botulinum antitoxin using special
    reserve funds under Project BioShield was granted on August 17, 2004.
    HHS released a presolictiation notice on September 4, 2004 indicating
    its intention to acquire 200,000 doses of heptavalent equine botulinum
    antitoxin through a sole-source contract. The Request for Proposal was
    issued to the prospective offeror on July 14, 2005. Horses are
    currently being immunized to generate the plasma necessary to produce
    the botulinum antitoxin. A contract award is anticipated in the 3rd
    quarter of 2005.
        Question. There is concern that we may not be responding adequately
    to the threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism. What is HHS doing
    to protect the public from illness after exposure to radiation?
    Particularly, would you provide more information regarding procurement
    of medical countermeasures against this threat?
        Answer. The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) currently contains
    medical countermeasures to treat the spectrum of potentially life-
    threatening effects of radiation exposures. These include drugs to
    block entry or to remove radioactive particles from the body as well as
    to treat a major effect of penetrating radiation known as acute
    radiation syndrome (ARS). Specifically, the SNS currently contains the
    following:
      --Potassium Iodide and a pediatric liquid formulation of potassium
            iodide. Potassium Iodide is used to block the uptake of
            radioactive iodine that could be released following a nuclear
            detonation or a nuclear power plant accident;
      --Calcium and zinc diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca/Zn DTPA). The
            DTPAs are used to remove radioactive transuranic particles such
            as plutonium and americium from the body following the use of a
            dirty bomb or similar device;
      --Prussian Blue. This drug is used to remove radioactive cesium from
            the body after a nuclear detonation or use of a dirty bomb or
            similar device; and
      --Filgrastim. This drug is used to treat life-threatening suppression
            of infection-fighting white blood cells after whole-body
            exposure to high doses of penetrating radiation--a form of
            acute radiation syndrome.
        Additionally, a Request for Information (RFI) for countermeasures
    for an acute radiation syndrome was published in October 2004.
    Responses to that RFI have been evaluated and a Request for Proposals
    (RFP) is being developed. We are in the process of determining what the
    specific requirements and acquisition options are so that we can
    proceed with the acquisition process. HHS is eager to enlarge the
    holdings of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) with respect to
    radiological/nuclear countermeasures. Accordingly, the quality of the
    proposals and the stage of product development will determine how HHS
    acts on the results of the RFI and RFP.
        Question. Nuclear or radiological terrorism has been cited as one
    of the greatest threats this country faces with regard to homeland
    security. Several promising bone marrow protection drugs could be
    available in the near term to protect against this threat. When do you
    expect to procure such drugs for the National Strategic Stockpile?
        Answer. The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) currently contains
    medical countermeasures to treat the spectrum of potentially life-
    threatening effects of radiation exposures. These include drugs to
    block entry or to remove radioactive particles from the body as well as
    to treat a major effect of penetrating radiation known as acute
    radiation syndrome (ARS). Specifically, the SNS currently contains the
    following:
      --Potassium Iodide and a pediatric liquid formulation of potassium
            iodide. Potassium Iodide is used to block the uptake of
            radioactive iodine that could be released following a nuclear
            detonation or a nuclear power plant accident;
      --Calcium and zinc diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca/Zn DTPA). The
            DTPAs are used to remove radioactive transuranic particles such
            as plutonium and americium from the body following the use of a
            dirty bomb or similar device;
      --Prussian Blue. This drug is used to remove radioactive cesium from
            the body after a nuclear detonation or use of a dirty bomb or
            similar device; and
      --Filgrastim. This drug is used to treat life-threatening suppression
            of infection-fighting white blood cells after whole-body
            exposure to high doses of penetrating radiation--a form of
            acute radiation syndrome.
        Additionally, a Request for Information (RFI) for countermeasures
    for an acute radiation syndrome was published in October 2004.
    Responses to that RFI have been evaluated and a Request for Proposals
    (RFP) is being developed. We are in the process of determining what the
    specific requirements and acquisition options are so that we can
    proceed with the acquisition process. HHS is eager to enlarge the
    holdings of the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) with respect to
    radiological/nuclear countermeasures. Accordingly, the quality of the
    proposals and the stage of product development will determine how HHS
    acts on the results of the RFI and RFP.
        Question. It is estimated that one quarter of the U.S. population
    cannot take the current smallpox vaccine that we have in our stockpile.
    NIH has been hard at work on the development of a safe MVA-based
    smallpox vaccine for that portion of the population that is
    contraindicated. Please describe where we are in the development of the
    vaccine and when you plan to issue your RFP for the purchase of the MVA
    vaccine?
        Answer. HHS released a presolicitation notice in anticipation of
    releasing an RFP by the end of the summer to manufacture and deliver to
    the SNS up to 20 million doses of the attenuated smallpox vaccine,
    modified vaccinia Ankara (MVA).
        Question. If the recent anthrax incident at the DC postal and DOD
    facilities had turned out be a real anthrax attack requiring the use of
    both antibiotics and the vaccine for those exposed and vaccinations for
    first responders, how many doses of the FDA licensed anthrax vaccine
    that are currently in Strategic National Stockpile managed by HHS would
    be used?
        Answer. The SNS currently contains sufficient antibiotics to treat
    about 180,000 symptomatic anthrax patients and to provide for a 60 day
    prophylaxis of more than 25 million persons. This stockpile of
    antibiotics is growing monthly. The USG is currently negotiating for
    the acquisition of specific anthrax antitoxins to treat symptomatic
    anthrax patients. In addition to the use of antibiotics, HHS would
    deploy as much anthrax vaccine from the SNS as was required to respond
    to the event and to protect the population. The vaccine and the
    prophylactic antibiotics would likely be used concurrently. There
    currently is no FDA-licensed vaccine for post-exposure use following
    anthrax exposure. In May 2005, HHS awarded a contract to BioPort
    Corporation for the manufacture and delivery of 5 million doses of
    licensed anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) to the stockpile. There are at
    present over 1 million doses of AVA available for the pre-exposure
    immunization of at-risk groups such as certain laboratory workers and
    first responders who would be involved with the response to an attack.
        Question. For the past 1\1/2\ years, HHS has been in the process of
    acquiring 5 million doses of the FDA licensed vaccine for the CDC
    stockpile while the agency has committed nearly $1 billion under
    government contracts to acquire 75 million doses of an early-stage
    anthrax vaccine from a single manufacturer. Why has it taken so long
    after the 2001 anthrax attacks for HHS to acquire any additional doses
    of the current FDA-licensed vaccine for the stockpile?
        Answer. HHS acquired a small amount of the AVA vaccine for civilian
    use (21,400 doses) following the anthrax events of the fall of 2001.
    Thereafter HHS initiated a process to acquire licensed AVA anthrax
    vaccine from DOD. Various administrative and legal issues caused delays
    in this acquisition. Once Project BioShield was enacted, HHS determined
    that initiating a BioShield acquisition contract directly with the AVA
    vaccine manufacturer, BioPort Corporation, would be the best mechanism
    to acquire this vaccine. HHS awarded the contract on May 5, 2005 for 5
    million doses and the company completed the initial delivery of over 1
    million doses soon after contract award. We would be happy to provide
    timelines if helpful.
        Question. Please explain the decision to eliminate from the
    President's fiscal year 2006 budget the funding for the CDC dose
    reduction studies to allow FDA approval for fewer doses of the FDA-
    licensed anthrax vaccine given that FDA approval of the new anthrax
    vaccine is still years away? If the number of doses for pre-exposure
    vaccinations against anthrax could be reduced in half, wouldn't that
    also result in significant net cost savings for the Federal Government
    and double the number of 1st responders and other who could be
    vaccinated and protected before an anthrax occurs?
        Answer. At the inception of this program in 1999, HHS anticipated
    it would take 5 years to complete the necessary studies. It is
    important to note that this type of study is normally undertaken by the
    manufacturer in the interest of improving product utilization. To date
    the program has generated sufficient data to allow BioPort to submit a
    request to the FDA to change the route of administration from
    subcutaneous to intramuscular and to decrease the six dose priming
    series from six to five doses.
        CDC has now completed the anthrax vaccine clinical trial interim
    safety analysis, has presented the results to key stakeholders and has
    submitted the final report detailing all findings from the safety
    analysis to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Accordingly, the
    HHS bioterrorism preparedness budget placed the highest priority on
    expanding mass-casualty treatment capacity and procuring additional
    pharmaceuticals for the Strategic National Stockpile.
        Question. Would HHS provide assurance that the human clinical,
    animal and CDC laboratory dose reduction studies for the currently
    licensed anthrax vaccine will be continued and completed given the
    potential rapid deployment and cost saving benefits for first
    responders, lab workers and others from fewer doses?
        Answer. Yes. As indicated above, HHS anticipated it would take 5
    years to complete the necessary studies. CDC has now completed the
    anthrax vaccine clinical trial interim safety analysis. The program has
    generated sufficient data to allow BioPort to submit a request to the
    FDA to change the route of administration from subcutaneous to
    intramuscular and to decrease the six dose priming series from six to
    five doses.
        Question. One of the chief purposes of the Project BioShield Act of
    2004 (the ``Act'') was to provide contracting flexibility to enable the
    government to more rapidly acquire countermeasures against biological,
    chemical, radiological or nuclear agents that might be used in
    terrorist attacks. To what extent has HHS used simplified acquisition
    procedures in the following Bioshield procurements:
      --Solicitation No. DHHS-ORDC-05-01 for Pediatric Formulation of
            Potassium Iodide;
      --Solicitation No. RFP-DHHS-ORDC-04-01 for Licensed Anthrax
            Recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) Vaccine for the Strategic
            National Stockpile;
      --Solicitation No. 2004-N-01385 for Therapeutic Products for
            Treatment of Inhalational Anthrax Disease for the Strategic
            National Stockpile (the ``Anthrax Therapeutics Solicitation'');
            and
      --Solicitation No. 2005-B-01696 for Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
            (BioThraxTM).
        Answer. Simplified acquisition procedures were not used for these
    procurements. Some of these products could be obtained only through a
    sole source, therefore a Justification for Other than Full and Open
    Competition (JOFOC) was used. Since there was more than one potential
    source, other products were acquired under full and open competitive
    procedures as governed by the FAR.
        Question. To what extent does HHS plan to use simplified
    acquisition procedures in the following upcoming procurements:
      --Solicitation No. 2004-N-01183 for 200,000 Doses of Heptavalent
            Botulinum Immune Globulin Reference-Number;
      --Request for Information (RFI) ORDC-05-01 for Therapeutics to Treat
            Neutropenia and Thrombocytopenia Associated with the Acute
            Radiation Syndrome (ARS); and
      --RFI No. ORDC-05-03 for Development and Manufacture of Plasma
            Derived Human Butyrl-Cholinesterase as a Prophylactice/
            Therapeutic for Exposure to Nerve Agents?
        Answer. For each proposed BioShield procurement, HHS reviews the
    contract options available and applies the most appropriate authorities
    to facilitate a fair, technically sound, and rapid acquisition. For
    example, HHS has selected to use a sole-source acquisition strategy for
    the procurement of the 200,000 doses of equine heptavalent botulinum
    immune globulin cited above.
        Question. Certain discretionary procurement laws and regulations,
    such as the requirement for submission of certified cost and pricing
    data under the Truth in Negotiations Act, place tremendous burdens on
    commercial entities that do not regularly do business with the Federal
    Government. Given that the express goal and clear intent of the Act is
    to encourage greater participation by commercial entities in supplying
    the Nation with needed countermeasures, to what extent has HHS, in its
    discretion, required compliance with such laws and regulations (and
    specifically, the submission of certified cost and pricing data)
    notwithstanding the existing regulatory exemptions for commercial
    entities to avoid such unnecessary burdens and the clear intent of the
    Act to reduce the regulatory burden on procurements conducted under the
    Act as much as possible?
        Answer. In order to obtain the best value to the government and to
    negotiate a fair price it is essential for the USG to have certified
    cost and price data unless the contract can be awarded based on
    adequate price competition. Cost or pricing data is especially needed
    in regard to those entities that may not as yet have a commercially
    marketed product or may be using a unique, innovative production
    process.
        Question. Please provide an explanation for any failure in Project
    Bioshield procurements, both completed or on-going, to use the
    simplified acquisition authorities granted to HHS under Sections 319F-
    1(b)(1) and 319F-2(c)(7)(C)(iii) of the Public Health Service Act
    (``PHSA'') as intended by the Act.
        Answer. Simplified acquisition procedures have not been used for
    Project Bioshield procurements to date. Some products could only be
    obtained through a sole source, therefore a Justification for Other
    than Full and Open Competition (JOFOC) was used. Since there was more
    than one potential source, other products were acquired under full and
    open competitive procedures as governed by the FAR.
        Question. Another chief purpose of the Act was to create incentives
    for manufacturers to develop countermeasures. The main incentive
    included in the Act was a grant of authority to the Secretary of HHS to
    issue a call for development of countermeasures and to include in that
    call a commitment that, upon the first development of a countermeasure
    that meets the criteria of the Act, the Secretaries of HHS and the
    Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') will recommend procurement of
    the countermeasure to the President. This provision was intended to
    promote the development of a biodefense industry by informing the
    markets that there is some certainty that there will be a government
    market for the product. The Act also requires that calls for
    countermeasures include: an estimated quantity of purchase, necessary
    measures of minimum safety and effectiveness; estimated price for dose
    and other information necessary to encourage and facilitate research,
    development and manufacture of the countermeasure. Sec. 319F-2(c)(4) of
    the PHSA.
      --What calls for countermeasures have been issued by HHS? Please
            provide copies of these announcements.
      --BioShield requires HHS to provide a single estimate of the quantity
            of countermeasures needed by the government. Has this process
            been included in every Bioshield procurement to date and if
            not, why not?
        Answer. The publication of a Request for Information (RFI) signals
    the USG interest in a particular countermeasure. The publication of the
    Request For Proposal (RFP) is essentially a ``call for
    countermeasures'' and indicates, by setting specific requirements and
    expectations, the government's commitment to an acquisition, including
    that funds are available to proceed with the procurement. The
    publication of the RFP and the statement of the specific requirements
    in the RFP establish that there is a certainty for a government market
    for the product.
        It is expected that most RFPs for BioShield acquisitions will
    provide a single baseline required quantity for procurement. Some RFPs
    also may provide options to acquire additional product beyond an
    initial requirement, based on ongoing threat assessments and ongoing
    requirements reviews. The RFP for ``Therapeutic Products for the
    Treatment of Inhalation Anthrax Disease'' (RFP-2004-N-01385) indicated
    a range of treatments required (10,000 to 200,000 treatments). This was
    structured to allow for the flexibility to acquire several products of
    differing therapeutic classes to meet the stockpile goal.
        Question. The Act envisions the use of animal models to permit
    expedited consideration by the FDA of request for approval for
    countermeasures. What steps have been taken to assure that the FDA has
    developed and implemented new procedures under the animal rule and
    related emergency-like powers under BioShield to signal its commitment
    to not slow down industries work to develop more countermeasures as
    quickly as possible?
        Answer. The FDA has been actively engaged in the review of animal
    models and the applicability of the ``Animal Efficacy Rule'' (Federal
    Register 67: 37988-37998, 2002) to facilitate the acquisition of
    critically needed medical countermeasures. Meetings with developers and
    the review of submissions related to bioterrorism countermeasures are
    given a priority status. The FDA staff work closely with NIH and DOD
    staff in the early phases of protocol designs and test methodology
    development. The FDA has a major role in the Product Development Tools
    (PDT) Working Group of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical
    Countermeasures Subcommittee which includes representatives of DOD, DHS
    and USDA as well as HHS. This PDT working group evaluates the need for
    animals, appropriateness of animal models in use and the need for
    additional models, facilities and reagents to support medical
    countermeasures R&D.
        Question. As you are aware, the issue of liability protections has
    been widely discussed as a necessary component to encourage greater
    participation in Project BioShield. While additional legislation may be
    needed, what steps has HHS made to maximize use of its existing
    authorities under Public Law 85-804 and the SAFETY Act to mitigate the
    risks associated with the development of countermeasures? Specifically,
    has HHS made clear that indemnification will be included as a contract
    term during the Request for Proposal process, thus allowing potential
    bidders the assurance that liability will not be a issue should they be
    successful in winning the award in advance of incurring proposal costs?
    If not, why not? Has HHS sought and/or received an exception from the
    requirement under the implementing Executive Order for Public Law 85-
    804 that application under the SAFETY Act is a condition for
    application for indemnification? If not, has HHS been willing to
    indemnify contractors for risks not otherwise excluded by the SAFETY
    Act? Has HHS worked with the Department of Homeland Security to
    integrate the SAFETY Act application process into the procurement
    process for countermeasures in order to expedite review and
    consideration of a SAFETY Act application by bidder? If not, why not?
        Answer. In a number of instances, HHS has required contractors to
    apply for SAFETY Act protection as a condition of indemnification.
    Moreover, we have complied with Executive Order No. 13286, which
    requires that before granting indemnification, the indemnifying agency
    obtain (1) the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) judgment as to
    whether the agency's requirement may constitute a qualified anti-
    terrorism technology (QATT) eligible for SAFETY Act protection, and (2)
    Office of Management and Budget approval in light of the DHS
    determination.
        HHS has not generally indicated in its solicitations that
    indemnification will be included as a contract term. Subpart 50.4 of
    the Federal Acquisition Regulation, concerning indemnification under
    Public Law 85-804, contemplates that contractors will request
    indemnification, rather than that the procuring agency will offer
    indemnification on its own initiative. Not all BioShield contractors
    have sought indemnification. Moreover, the Secretary must personally
    consider each request for indemnification on its own merits based on
    contractor submissions regarding, e.g., the availability of insurance.
    Thus, the contracting officer cannot preempt the Secretary by
    guaranteeing indemnification in the solicitation.
        Executive Order No. 13286 does not require that contractors apply
    for SAFETY Act protection as a condition of indemnification; rather, as
    described above, the indemnifying agency must obtain DHS' determination
    whether the agency's requirement may constitute a QATT eligible for
    SAFETY Act protection. HHS has not sought an exception to this
    requirement. HHS has indemnified contractors for risks not excluded by
    the SAFETY Act.
        Question. The Project BioShield Act grants HHS authority to enter
    into personal service contracts and streamlined personnel authorities
    to aid in the performance, administration or support of countermeasure
    research and development. Sec. 319F-1(d) and (e) of the PHSA. To what
    extent has HHS used this authority? Please explain any failures to use
    this authority.
        Answer. To date, NIAID has used Project BioShield authorities to
    hire two individuals, with a third appointment pending. The positions
    filled are:
      --One individual in the dual positions of NIAID Associate Director
            for Biodefense Product Development and Director of the Division
            of Microbiology and Infectious Diseases' Office of Biodefense
            Research Activities; salary >$100,000.
      --One individual for the position of Associate Director for Product
            Development in the Division of Allergy, Immunology, and
            Transplantation; salary >$100,000.
      --One individual for the position of Associate Director for Radiation
            Countermeasures Research and Emergency Preparedness, in the
            Division of Allergy, Immunology, and Transplantation; salary
            >$100,000.
        Question. Section 5(c) of the Act requires the Secretaries of DHS
    and HHS to issue a report to Congress within 120 days after the
    enactment of the Act concerning whether there is a lack of adequate
    large scale biocontainment facilities necessary for the testing of
    countermeasures in accordance with Food and Drug Administration
    requirements. Why has this report not been issued? What work has been
    done on this report? When will it be issued?
        Answer. An interim report was submitted to Congress on April 28
    2005, and the final report will be submitted soon. Additional time was
    needed to sufficiently conduct an assessment of U.S. Biocontainment
    facilities.
        Question. The Act requires the Secretaries of HHS and DHS to enter
    into an interagency agreement for procurement of countermeasures in
    accordance with the requirements of the Act. Sec. 319F-2(c)(7)(B).
    Please provide a copy of this agreement.
        Answer. A copy of this agreement as it applies to the acquisition
    of rPA anthrax vaccine is attached.
        Question. The Act requires HHS to institute appropriate controls
    concerning the use of procurement authorities under the Act. Secs.
    319F-1(b)(1)(C) and 319F-2(c)(7)(C)(iii)(III) of the PHSA. Please
    provide a copy of the written guidance explaining these controls. Does
    HHS intend to publish the controls as regulations? Does HHS intend to
    promulgate implementing regulations for the entire Act? If so, when? If
    not, why not?
        Answer. The BioShield Act is sufficiently detailed and prescriptive
    to obviate the need for regulations. The procurement control process is
    conducted consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and
    the Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulations (HHSAR). HHS will
    be happy to provide the Committee with a copy of these documents should
    you so desire.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Arlen Specter

        Question. What role do you envision CDC would play in any new
    BioShield legislation? Should not CDC be heavily involved in the
    implementation of any future BioShield program?
        Answer. CDC plays a significant role in current BioShield programs.
    The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is located within CDC, is very
    actively engaged in the BioShield acquisition process, and provides the
    primary storage sites and distribution mechanisms for BioShield
    products. Subject matter experts (SMEs) at CDC are participants of the
    Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasure Subcommittee (WMD
    MC), which reviews and establishes the requirements for BioShield
    acquisitions.
        Section 10 of President Bush's Homeland Security Presidential
    Directive/HSPD-8 issued in December of 2003 States that ``the Secretary
    of HHS . . . and heads of other Federal departments and agencies that
    provide assistance for first responders preparedness will base those
    allocations on assessments of population concentrations, critical
    infrastructures, and other significant risk factors, particularly
    terrorism threats, to the extent permitted by law.''
        Question. Has HHS abided by this Presidential directive in the
    allocation of State and Local bioterrorism preparedness funding?
        Answer. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) funding
    priorities for State and local bioterrorism preparedness are consistent
    with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). A large
    percentage of public health emergency preparedness funds are allocated
    using a ratio of jurisdictional to U.S. population. In addition, this
    year CDC allocated funds for mass prophylaxis preparedness in 21 major
    metropolitan areas through the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI). Mass
    preparedness is one of our Nation's priorities as described in the
    Interim National Preparedness Goal. Urban areas are selected for CRI
    based on population, risk, threats, and infrastructure. All of the CRI
    awardees are also Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grantees. This
    year HHS awarded funds to 15 additional metropolitan statistical areas
    to support preliminary planning for becoming full CRI awardees in
    fiscal year 2006, as proposed in the President's budget request. CDC
    has developed Preparedness Goals designed to measure urgent public
    health system response performance parameters that are directly linked
    to health protection of the public. The Preparedness Goals are intended
    to measure urgent public health system response performance for
    terrorism and non-terrorism events including infectious disease,
    environmental and occupational related emergencies. Preparedness
    measures are a subset of the overarching targeted capabilities list and
    are consistent with national preparedness goals
        Question. What is the process for determining the prioritization of
    items to be purchased for the Strategic National Stockpile? At what
    level of the process are the scientists and infectious disease experts
    of the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease
    Control and Prevention included?
        Answer. The classifications of Category A, B, and C agents (agents
    that are likely to be used in a bioterror attack) have been generated
    from infectious disease and medical analyses to which NIH and CDC
    scientists contributed significantly. We have initially focused our
    countermeasure procurement efforts on Category A agents that pose the
    greatest threats. To address the threat of any one particular agent,
    consideration is given to currently available countermeasures, such as
    antibiotics and vaccines. Further consideration includes the need for
    or role of new countermeasures, such as antitoxins, next generation
    vaccines, or antibiotics. Perceived need and absence of a new
    countermeasure informs research initiatives. Scientists from OPHEP,
    NIH, CDC, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Defense
    (DOD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are asked to determine
    which new countermeasures are scientifically advanced enough to invest
    in advanced development and testing, would have the greatest public
    health impact, and have the greatest likelihood of success.
        The process to determine which countermeasures are placed in the
    SNS is informed by the interagency WMD MC subcommittee. This is an
    interdepartmental subcommittee initially chartered by the Office of
    Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and co-chaired by senior
    government officials from DHS, HHS, and DOD. The material threat
    assessments (MTA) developed by DHS based on a plausible attack scenario
    informs the sizing of the procurement requirement. HHS, through the
    coordination efforts of OPHEP, then evaluates the availability of
    currently developed countermeasures and assesses the scientific
    opportunities to develop new countermeasures. The WMD MC then
    deliberates on the nature of the medical consequence and the
    availability of appropriate countermeasures to develop a recommendation
    for the acquisition of a specific countermeasure. HHS can issue a
    Request for Information (RFI) to determine the market availability and
    to alert industry to the U.S. Government interests. Once a U.S.
    Government requirement for a particular new medical countermeasure has
    been established by the WMD MC and approved by OMB is granted, a
    Request for Proposals (RFP) announcing the specific requirements
    follows. HHS implements the acquisition process.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                 LACK OF BIOSHIELD FUNDING FOR RAD/NUC RESPONSE

        Question. On April 13th, the Department of Homeland Security wrote
    Congress notifying us of the creation of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
    Office. In the letter, the Department justified the creation of the
    Office based on the assertion that, ``The risk that terrorists will
    acquire and use a nuclear/radiological device is one of the gravest
    threats that confronts the Nation.''
        Yet despite this assertion, our Nation is still without a practical
    way to medically treat the thousands or even hundreds of thousands of
    Americans who may be exposed or who may believe they have been exposed
    to radiation in the event we are attacked in this way. While I
    understand that radiological and nuclear threats have been certified as
    a ``material threat,'' I was surprised to learn that the Bioshield
    program has not actually been used to procure several very promising
    drugs that are now in late-stage development and could be available in
    the near term to respond to this most insidious of threats.
        Beyond your limited plan to purchase pediatric potassium iodide,
    what is your schedule for procuring drugs for the national stockpile to
    respond to what is called Acute Radiation Syndrome (ARS)?
        Answer. HHS is eager to enlarge the holdings of the SNS with
    respect to radiological/nuclear countermeasures. A Request for
    Information (RFI) for countermeasures for an ARS was published in
    October 2004. Responses have been evaluated; and a Request for
    Proposals (RFP) is being developed. We anticipate releasing a draft RFP
    for industry comment on the general topic of ARS as soon as July 2005.
    Accordingly, the quality of the proposals and the availability of
    resources will determine how HHS acts on the results of the RFI and
    RFP. The SNS currently contains Potassium Iodide, Pediatric Potassium
    Iodide, Calcium/Zinc Diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca/Zn DTPA) and
    Prussian Blue (Ferric hexacyanoferrate (II)) as countermeasures for a
    radiation event. In addition, Granulocyte-Colony Stimulating Factor (G-
    CSF) is available to the SNS under Investigational New Drug (IND).

                      PRIVATE SECTOR INTEREST IN BIOSHIELD

        Question. When the President signed the BioShield Act into law last
    July, the Washington Post reported that ``Few companies have shown much
    enthusiasm for diverting staff and money from programs to develop
    drugs, such as cancer and cholesterol treatments, with bigger and more
    established markets. Of about 1,000 U.S. biotechnology companies, about
    100 are working on biodefense projects, according to the Biotechnology
    Industry Organization, an industry trade group.''
        Has the interest in BioShield increased or are companies still
    reluctant to participate in the program? What recommendations would you
    make to increase private sector interest in BioShield?
        Answer. We have seen significant interest in BioShield, however we
    recognize the need for continuing improvement and expanded outreach.
    Many of the innovative approaches to developing a medical
    countermeasure occur in small biotech companies that are inexperienced
    in manufacturing, clinical trials, and the regulatory process. They are
    generally funded by venture capital investors and are operating at a
    loss. They usually need funds to validate a current Good Manufacturing
    Practices (cGMP) manufacturing process and to conduct the necessary
    animal studies or human safety studies to qualify for an
    Investigational New Drug (IND) application.
        The large pharmaceutical companies have numerous opportunities to
    consider when establishing their business model and the priority
    targets of their research and development portfolios. They must weigh
    the opportunity costs for the biodefense market with its intrinsic
    uncertainty regarding the size and sustainability against more
    predictable and quantifiable markets for medical products for diseases
    with relatively well-established target populations, many of which will
    be sustained over many years. As large pharmaceutical companies
    consider the profits for traditional medical products versus the
    profits available for vaccines or other medical countermeasures, the
    reason for their reluctance appears to be driven by the markets. For
    example, as mentioned by Dr. Fauci in his February 8, 2005 testimony, a
    year's supply of Lipitor to lower cholesterol is $1,608; a year's
    supply of 50-milligram Viagra is $3,500; but a flu vaccine generally
    sells for $7 to $10.
        Today, the U.S. Government is involved throughout the pipeline of
    countermeasure development, through basic research support at NIH and
    the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
    (USAMRIID) all the way to the procurement activities undertaken through
    Project BioShield. Both NIH and the USAMRIID have excellent records in
    this regard. The U.S. Government can further target and facilitate
    research and development efforts by setting clear requirements and
    specifications for: medical countermeasures; facilitating partnerships
    as needed between government and industry or between industry and
    industry; and providing critical resources such as facilities (e.g.
    laboratories with high-level biocontainment), animals (for testing),
    reagents and assays.
    Grant Coordination--for Assistant Secretary Simonson
        Question. The recent TOPOFF 3 training event recently portrayed a
    scenario that exercised first responders, hospital capacity and the
    ability to treat a sudden rush of people affected by chemical and
    biological agents. We look forward to a report on the exercise around
    mid-summer. Since fiscal year 2002, Congress has appropriated $11
    billion to first responders through the Department of Homeland Security
    and $5.5 billion through the Department of Health and Human Services to
    provide local monitoring for outbreaks and surge capacity for
    treatment. BioShield has $5.6 billion over 10 years to feed our
    Strategic National Stockpile. We have committed a significant amount of
    money into these programs, over $22 billion. However, when tragedy
    strikes the citizens of this country demand a seamless operation that
    provides emergency care, timely correct information, and treatment if
    needed.
        Do local health agencies have the capacity and infrastructure to
    deal with a surge in activity?
        Answer. CDC funding, distributed through cooperative agreements,
    has enabled local health departments to increase both capacity and
    infrastructure to deal with surges by providing for increased
    epidemiologic capacity, terrorism preparedness and response trainings
    for public health practitioners, improved communications systems (in
    terms of not only equipment but also improved relationships between the
    public health, medical and homeland security communities), and enhanced
    technology and staff in public health laboratories. HHS recognizes that
    not each of the approximately 4,000 local health departments can or
    should have the same response capability, especially considering the
    wide variation in size, risks and populations served as well as a
    finite amount of funding. Therefore, HHS encourages and supports local
    health departments to work together to develop regional capacity and
    infrastructure through shared equipment, personnel, information and
    other assets. For example, during a mass prophylaxis event, neighboring
    local health departments might assist the affected jurisdiction in some
    aspect of the response, such as staffing, so that the local health
    department can focus on mass prophylaxis.
        Local health departments have been developing volunteer pools and
    strengthening partnerships with other agencies and businesses to
    provide support activities such as mass prophylaxis. Another example is
    laboratory capacity--a key asset for public health emergency
    preparedness and response that is expensive for a local jurisdiction's
    budget. Not every local health department can have advanced laboratory
    capability. Therefore, some local health departments have basic
    laboratory capability and refer some samples to a Laboratory Response
    Network (LRN) laboratory. Other local health departments have
    collaborative relationships with neighboring laboratories that have
    existing capability. The State public health laboratory can provide
    additional capability to all local health departments within their
    jurisdiction. While local health departments continue to improve,
    maintaining this capacity and infrastructure will also be necessary.
        For healthcare surge capacity, HHS has proposed in its fiscal year
    2006 budget funding for the procurement and maintenance of portable
    hospital units (Federal Medical Contingency Stations) as a part of its
    Mass Casualty Intiative. These units can be rapidly deployed to
    anywhere in the country and would supplement local hospital surge
    capacity by 5,500 beds in the event of an emergency.
        Question. What lessons have we learned through coordinating first
    responder efforts with medical response efforts?
        Answer. Force Protection.--Important steps have been taken to
    establish the necessary medical counter and preventive measures to
    protect first responders. Vaccination and prophylaxis for the most
    common agents have been studied and best practices developed. Personal
    Protective Equipment (PPE) standards have been established by the first
    responder industry in conjunction with public health. Manufacturers are
    now certifying equipment such as Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
    (SCBA) as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) compliant.
        Surge.--Issues of surge capacity have been addressed in multiple
    ways. Solutions are being sought both in and out of the hospital.
    Within the hospitals, mechanisms are being implemented to open beds in
    case of a catastrophic incident. These mechanisms include the use of
    adding beds to the existing infrastructure as well as discharging or
    transferring patients who could receive care elsewhere. First
    responders are being asked to support efforts to sustain develop and
    various levels of treatment outside the hospitals that are free
    standing or potentially an annex to an existing hospital.
        Incident Command Structure.--With the advent of the National
    Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP),
    we now have a common methodology for managing an event that
    incorporates first responders and medical communities. As planning
    efforts continue to move forward in these communities, the essential
    link between them may be articulated.
        Forensic Epidemiology.--CDC has created a course on Forensic
    Epidemiology in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (FBI) from which more than 13,000 public health and law enforcement
    officials have graduated. Criminal and epidemiological investigative
    methods are used to demonstrate an understanding of the similarities
    and differences in public health and law enforcement investigative
    goals and methods. Common operating procedures about how finding are
    communicated between the two groups are of primary importance.
        Equipment Standardization.--HHS has supported the efforts and
    participated in the Interagency Board (IAB) for Equipment
    Standardization and Inter Operability Working Group since its
    inception. The IAB is designed to ``establish and coordinate local,
    State, and Federal standardization, interoperability, and responder
    safety to prepare for, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any
    incident by identifying requirements for Chemical, Biological, and
    radiological, Nuclear or Explosives incident response equipment.''
        Early Event Detection (Syndromic Surveillance).--Information
    recorded by the first responders such as 9-1-1 call information,
    Emergency Medical Services patient care records, and other public
    health data are reviewed for statistical anomalies in the syndromes
    that present. These anomalies are reviewed against signs and symptoms
    of bio and chemical terrorism, as well as unforeseen natural disease
    outbreaks. By collaborating with the first responder community, public
    health authorities can obtain advanced insight into the changing health
    conditions of a given population or frequency with which they occur.
        Decontamination.--The capability of first responders to properly
    decontaminate hundreds of people has become well established in the
    majority of metropolitan statistical areas, which can be attributed in
    large part to leadership from Health Resources and Services
    Administration (HRSA) grants. Hospitals understand the importance of
    not allowing facilities to become contaminated, and have taken
    important steps to protect themselves. While acute mass decontamination
    continues to be a challenge, significant efforts are under way to
    develop methods to quickly decontaminate thousands of people.
        Rapid Registry.--The Rapid Response Registry (RRR) is an HHS
    response tool intended to assist local officials in rapidly
    identifying, enumerating, and obtaining contact information for
    individuals who have been, or who believe they may have been, exposed.
    The emergency contact information collected is necessary for both
    short-term and long-term follow-up for exposed, injured, and ill
    individuals and would be available to public health officials to guide
    public health response services directed at the affected population
    during the emergency response. In addition to the data collection tool,
    the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) staff can
    provide either remote or on-scene technical assistance to support
    public health needs assessment activities, medical assistance, health
    interventions, or health education in the affected population during or
    immediately following the recognition of a Chemical, Biological,
    Radiological, and Nuclear Warfare, and Explosives (CBRNE) emergency.
    This process allows State and local public health responders to target
    enrolled individuals with updated information, triage their specific
    risk for potential exposures, determine appropriate self-
    decontamination procedures, and recommend any immediate medical
    evaluation or interventions (countermeasures). Real time data
    collection also enables future health studies by State and local public
    health as part of long-term mitigation activities, should these be
    determined appropriate.
        HHS Secretary's Emergency Response Team (SERT).--The SERT acts as
    the Secretary's agent on emergency sites working along with the first
    responder community under the direction of the Assistant Secretary for
    Public Health Emergency Preparedness (ASPHEP). The ASPHEP, on behalf of
    the Secretary, directs and coordinates the Department's efforts to
    prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from, the public health
    and medical consequences of disaster or emergency. The SERT directs and
    coordinates the activities of all HHS personnel deployed to the
    emergency site to assist State, local, Tribal, and other Federal and
    government agencies as applicable.
        Health Alert Network (HAN).--The HAN ensures that each community
    has rapid and timely access to emergent health information; a cadre of
    highly-trained professionals; and evidence-based practices and
    procedures for effective public health preparedness, response, and
    service on a 24/7 basis. The HAN is dedicated to strengthening the core
    public health infrastructure for information access, communications,
    and distance learning at the State and community levels. Through
    continuous, high-speed internet connectivity and broadcast capacity to
    support emergency communication, HAN provides the national public
    health system with a network of public health officials and other
    first-responders who are continuously connected to information vital to
    emergency and non-emergency public health practice.
        Medical Reserve Corp (MRC).--MRC units are community-based and
    function as a way to locally organize and utilize volunteers who want
    to donate their time and expertise to prepare for and respond to
    emergencies, and promote healthy living throughout the year. MRC
    volunteers supplement existing first responders and public health
    resources. MRC volunteers include medical and public health
    professionals such as physicians, nurses, pharmacists, dentists,
    veterinarians, and epidemiologists. Many community members--
    interpreters, chaplains, office workers, legal advisors, and others--
    also fill key support positions in the first responder community.
        SNS.--The SNS has large quantities of medicine and medical supplies
    to protect the American public if there is a public health emergency
    severe enough to drain local supplies. Should Federal and local
    authorities agree that the SNS is needed, medicines will be delivered
    to any State in the United States or territory within 12 hours. Each of
    our 62 grantees has plans to receive and distribute SNS medicine and
    medical supplies to local communities as quickly as possible. Many of
    these medical countermeasures will initially be used by the first
    responder community so that they can continue to fulfill their vital
    role in support of an event.
        The National Incident Communications Coordination Line (NICCL).--
    NICCL is a special toll free line with limited access via PIN number,
    is maintained by DHS and is used to bring together the key Public
    Affairs representatives from Federal, State and local agencies during
    major incidents. DHS convenes calls to ensure all agencies are fully
    aware of the facts concerning the incident, achieve agreement as to
    which agencies have the public communications lead concerning the
    various aspects of the incident and coordinate all public announcements
    concerning the incident. The NICCL has been used effectively during a
    number of incidents over the past year and as part of the Top Officials
    3 (TOPOFF3) exercise. In each case not only Federal agencies
    participated in the calls but also State and local Public Affairs
    Officers from the affected areas were included.
        Question. Are grant programs coordinated by DHS and HHS so that
    Americans, in their time of need, are protected and treated to the
    highest standard possible without confusion or lack of direction?
        Answer. HHS cooperative agreement programs and DHS grant programs
    are being coordinated at the Federal, State, and local levels. Since
    2003 HHS has required that the State-wide joint advisory committees
    required by CDC and HRSA cooperative agreements include members from
    State homeland security or emergency management, fire, and police
    agencies. In 2005, DHS added similar language to its program guidance
    documents, which now requires State homeland security agencies to reach
    out to the public health and medical communities. Many intrastate
    coordinating bodies, which have been established by local
    jurisdictions, require participation by homeland security, emergency
    management, public health, and medical communities in regional planning
    and response efforts as well. HHS also requires its awardees to comply
    with the NIMS, which facilitates coordination, communication and
    cooperation between first responders (e.g., fire, police, public
    health) and first receivers (e.g., hospitals) during an event.
        At the Federal level, both HHS and DHS review and comment on the
    program announcements and guidance documents of their sister agencies,
    to which States and local jurisdictions respond in order to receive
    funds. Both Departments also have ten regional emergency coordinators,
    who work closely with one another and with States to plan, train and
    exercise across jurisdictional lines. More recently, HHS and DHS have
    formed a steering committee to identify additional mechanisms to
    increase coordination and collaboration between the awardees and
    grantees, as well as between the Departments at the Federal level.
    Future activities may include joint site visits and regional meetings.
    BioShield Benchmarks--for Assistant Secretary Simonson
        Question. In 1999, Congress charged the Department of Health and
    Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention with
    the establishment of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. The
    Homeland Security Act of 2002 renamed the effort the Strategic National
    Stockpile and tasked the Department of Homeland Security with defining
    the goals and performance requirements but the Stockpile was to be
    jointly managed by DHS and HHS. The Project BioShield Act of 2003
    returned oversight and guidance of the stockpile to HHS.
        With all of the changes in command, what information and tools are
    we using to ensure that Project BioShield is properly feeding the
    Strategic National Stockpile so that it is truly ready to provide rapid
    access to large quantities of the right types of pharmaceuticals and
    medical supplies? What specific benchmark are we using to gauge
    ourselves in the ability to respond to an unknown attack or natural
    disaster?
        Answer. The SNS staff has remained intact during the recent
    departmental changes. In addition, the deliberative process to set
    requirements and implement acquisitions for the SNS under Project
    BioShield has also remained constant. The SNS engages in deployment
    exercises with various State and local entities on a regular schedule
    to assess the readiness of State and local partners and to improve the
    deployment process. In addition, CDC and the SNS participate in
    National and international exercises, such as TOPOFF3, to fully assess
    their response capabilities for communication, logistics, resource
    allocations, and stockpile utilization. These exercises serve as a
    benchmark for the Nation's level of preparedness for an unknown or
    natural disaster. SNS performance measures to deliver assets within 12
    hours of decision to deploy. While project Bioshield is focused on
    development of new countermeasures which will be incorporated into SNS
    once available, SNS acquires and maintains significant countermeasures
    currently available.

                             CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

        Senator Gregg. Well, if you have got thoughts, we would be
    interested in language you think would improve that because I
    do believe unless we address this issue of liability, we will
    never get this straightened out and we will never get the
    participation we need.
        Well, all of your input has been excellent. I am trying to
    think of what title we should have on this novel award. We will
    have to come up with something. We will call it the Franz
    award.
        In any event, thank you very much. We appreciate your
    input. This is not an end. This is just an ongoing discussion
    as to how we make this whole system work better and just one
    part of the discussion. We intend to continue to pursue this as
    a committee. You obviously intend to pursue it as
    professionals. So thank you.
        Dr. Read. Thanks for your leadership.
        Senator Gregg. The subcommittee is recessed.
        [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Thursday, April 28, the hearings
    were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
    subject to the call of the Chair.]

      DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                                  ----------

                                           U.S. Senate,
               Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                           NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

        [The following testimonies were received by the
    Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
    The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2006 budget
    request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]

      Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
    testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
    We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
    forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2006
    appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

                                   ABOUT APTA

        The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
    nonprofit international association of over 1,500 public and private
    member organizations including transit systems and commuter rail
    operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product
    and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and
    State departments of transportation. APTA members serve the public
    interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical transit services
    and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public transportation in
    the United States and Canada are served by APTA member systems.

                                    OVERVIEW

        Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
    infrastructures. We cannot over-emphasize the critical importance of
    our industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6
    billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit
    service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million
    times each weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily
    travelers aboard the Nation's airlines.
        Safety and security are the top priority of the public
    transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve
    security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since
    then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United
    States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency
    preparedness programs and technology, almost all from their own budgets
    with only minimal Federal funding. Last year's events in Madrid further
    highlight the need to enhance security on public transit systems and to
    do so without delay. We do not need another wakeup call like Madrid.
        In response to an APTA survey, transit agencies around the country
    have identified in excess of $6 billion in transit security needs.
    State and local governments and transit agencies are doing what they
    can to improve security, but it is important that the Federal
    Government be a full partner in the effort to ensure the security of
    the Nation's transit users.
        In fiscal year 2003, transit security received $65 million in
    Federal funding from DHS. In fiscal year 2004, $50 million was provided
    for Federal transit security programs from DHS. For the first time in
    fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150 million for
    transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the $150 million,
    transit will receive approximately $130 million--almost $108 million
    for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also, ferries will
    receive an additional $5 million for security from a separate account.
    We are very appreciative of this effort. However, in the face of
    significant needs, more needs to be done.
        We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the
    documented needs, we respectfully urge Congress to provide $2 billion
    in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bill for
    transit security. Of that amount, we recommend that $1.2 billion be
    provided for capital needs, and $800 million for transit costs. Federal
    funding for needs should provide for, among other things, planning,
    public awareness, training and additional transit police.
        We are disappointed that the Administration recommended only $600
    million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the fiscal
    year 2006 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security
    grants for transit, seaports, railways and energy facilities. We were
    also disappointed that the Administration does not include a specific
    line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to
    working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate
    transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security
    needs of the country.
        We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS
    Federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed
    directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating
    Agencies (SAA). While we are willing to coordinate with the States and
    urban areas that we serve, we believe direct funding to the transit
    authorities would be more efficient and productive.
        We are pleased to note that APTA has become a ``Standards
    Development Organization'' (SDO) for the public transportation
    industry. Our efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail
    transit and bus transit operations over recent years have been
    significant and our status as a SDO has been acknowledged by both the
    Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railway
    Administration (FRA). The FTA and the Transportation Research Board
    have also supported our standards initiatives through the provision of
    grants. We would like to apply our growing expertise in standards
    development of transit industry safety and security, best practices,
    guidelines and standards. We look forward to working with the
    Administration and Congress in support of this initiative and trust
    that Federal financial assistance would be made available to develop
    such standards and practices.
        We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
    Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
    leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
    enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.

                           SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS

        Mr. Chairman, after the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
    invested some $2 billion in enhanced security measures, building on the
    industry's already considerable efforts. At the same time, our industry
    undertook a comprehensive review to determine how we could build upon
    our existing industry security practices. This included a range of
    activities, some I discussed earlier in testimony, which include
    research, best practices, education, information sharing in the
    industry, and surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better
    understanding of how to create a more secure environment for our
    riders, and the most critical security investment needs.
        Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
    enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
    maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
    meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
    for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
    development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
    security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
        Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
    which they required additional Federal investment for security
    improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
      --Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
            enforcement personnel.
      --Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
            heightened alert levels.
      --Training for security personnel.
      --Joint transit/law enforcement training.
      --Security planning activities.
      --Security training for other transit personnel.
        Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
    include:
      --Radio communications systems.
      --Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations.
      --Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas.
      --Automated vehicle locator systems.
      --Security fencing around facilities.
        Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
    priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
    devices.
        Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
    for the transit industry in May 2004, which would require that transit
    authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which
    would set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal
    funding assistance. We believe these directives are unfunded mandates.
    Many of our transit systems have already carried out most of the
    measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is calling
    for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and setting
    up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of these
    measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened alert
    is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with you in
    addressing these issues.
        As you know, in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
    Appropriations bill (Public Law 108-334), TSA can hire up to 100 rail
    inspectors using a $10 million appropriation. We have concerns about
    this provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be
    better spent on things that would support the industry such as
    surveillance cameras, and emergency communication and other systems
    rather than highlighting security issues without providing the
    necessary resources to address them. We look forward to working with
    you in addressing our concerns.

                                   BACKGROUND

        Mr. Chairman, prior to and following September 11, 2001--the date
    of the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history--APTA has
    played a key role in addressing the safety and security issues of our
    country. American public transportation agencies have also taken
    significant measures to enhance their security and emergency
    preparedness efforts to adjust to society's new state of concern.
    Although agencies had a wide range of security initiatives in place at
    the time of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and already had
    developed emergency response plans, the September 11 incidents focused,
    strengthened and prioritized security efforts throughout the industry.
        Transit agencies have had an excellent safety record and have
    worked for years to enhance their system security and employee security
    training, by following government standards and APTA guidelines, and by
    learning from the attacks on transit agencies abroad. For example, the
    1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system caused U.S. transit
    properties managing tunnels and underground transit stations to go on
    high alert. The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, for
    instance, responded to the potential threat of chemical weapons attacks
    by sending a transit police team to Fort McClellan, Alabama, to learn
    response tactics from U.S. Army chemical weapons experts.
        In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, transit
    agencies of all sizes worked to identify where they might be vulnerable
    to attacks and increased their security spending for both operations
    and capital costs. The agencies subsequently upgraded and strengthened
    their emergency response and security plans and procedures, taking
    steps to protect transit infrastructure and patrons and to increase the
    transit security presence while giving riders a sense of security.
        Some initiatives around the country include:
      --Increased surveillance via closed circuit TV;
      --Increased training for employees;
      --Hired more police, K-9 units added;
      --Chemical detection systems being tested;
      --Infrastructure design to eliminate hiding places;
      --Drills are routinely held with first responders; and
      --Encouraging riders to be vigilant for suspicious activities or
            items.
        After September 11, transit systems enhanced efforts to prevent
    unauthorized entry into transit facilities. The need for employees and
    passengers to stay alert and report suspicious occurrences became a key
    goal of many agencies. These efforts are paying off. But, while many
    transit agencies are more secure than they were prior to September 11,
    more can and should be done.
        APTA has launched additional efforts to further transit industry
    security and preparedness, collaborating with FTA in developing
    emergency preparedness forums, and sponsoring and organizing security-
    related conferences and workshops. Moreover, APTA developed a list of
    critical safety and security needs faced by the transit industry, which
    it has provided to the Department of Transportation and the U.S.
    Congress.

    PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION INFORMATION SHARING ANALYSIS CENTER (ISAC)--NEED
                              FOR ONGOING FUNDING

        Presidential Decision Directive Number 63 authorizes and encourages
    national critical infrastructures to develop and maintain ISACs as a
    means of strengthening security and protection against cyber and
    operations attacks. APTA is pleased to have been designated a public
    transportation Sector Coordinator by the U.S. Department of
    Transportation, and in that capacity has received a $1.2 million grant
    from the Federal Transit Administration to establish a transit ISAC.
    APTA formalized an agreement with a private company to implement the
    ISAC and make it available to public transit systems around the
    country.
        This ISAC for public transit provides a secure two-way reporting
    and analysis structure for the transmission of critical alerts and
    advisories as well as the collection, analysis and dissemination of
    security information from transit agencies. The public transit ISAC
    also provides a critical linkage between the transit industry, the U.S.
    Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security
    Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security.
        The Public Transit ISAC has been invaluable to the public transit
    industry. However, its 2-year funding from the FTA has expired, and
    even though APTA pursued future funding for the ISAC from DHS and other
    agencies, we were not successful. DHS has decided it will no longer
    provide funding for ISACs. Instead, DHS has launched a new program--
    Homeland Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure (HSIN-
    CI), in which we are participating. HSIN is designed to provide a new
    set of tools to share critical sector information among private
    industry and government, but a fully functioning HSIN has yet to be
    realized. Once it is, there is no guarantee that it will ever be as
    useful and comprehensive as the Public Transit ISAC. Consequently, we
    believe that ongoing, reliable and consistent funding from Congress for
    the Public Transit ISAC is necessary.

                       ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS

        Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
    level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
    working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
    address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
    Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
    established a Security Task Force. The APTA Security Task Force has
    established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
    our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
    steering group for determining security projects with more than $2
    million in Transit Cooperative Research funding through the
    Transportation Research Board.
        Through this funding, APTA has conducted four transit security
    workshop forums around the Nation for the larger transit systems with
    potentially greater risk exposure. These workshops provided
    confidential settings to enable sharing of security practices and
    applying methodologies to various scenarios. The outcomes from these
    workshops were made available in a controlled and confidential format
    to other transit agencies unable to attend the workshops. The workshops
    were held in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
        In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
    Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
    identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
    Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
    Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
    research projects to be operationally practical.
        In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
    Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
    has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
    APTA web site. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
    APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
    transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
    on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
    the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
        APTA has long-established Safety Audit Programs for Commuter Rail,
    Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within the scope of these programs
    are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
    Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
    increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Audit Programs have
    been modified to place added attention to these critical elements.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs
    post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
    transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
    transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
    improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward
    to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department
    of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We
    again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony
    on these critical issues, and look forward to working with you on
    safety and security issues.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the Association of State Floodplain Managers,
                                      Inc.

        The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. (ASFPM) is
    pleased to share comments on these key aspects of the fiscal year 2006
    budget proposal for FEMA, which we believe greatly impact the ability
    to reduce the Nation's risk and cost from flooding (or natural
    hazards):
      --Urge transfer of funds from the National Flood Insurance Fund to
            the Flood Mitigation Fund in the amounts authorized in 2004 to
            deal with the drain represented by repetitively flooded,
            insured properties.
      --Support for continued full funding for modernization of flood maps,
            with comments about quality and the need to re-evaluate the
            funding and duration of the effort.
      --Restore the 15 percent formula for the Hazard Mitigation Grant
            Program funding in States with Basic Mitigation Plans and
            oppose the Administration's proposed reduction of Hazard
            Mitigation Grant Program funds from 20 percent to 12.5 percent
            for States that have Enhanced Mitigation Plans approved by
            FEMA.
      --Monitor how the Department of Homeland Security addresses natural
            hazards, which each year threaten nearly every local
            jurisdiction to some degree, and how the Department addresses
            mitigation programs intended to bring about long-term reduction
            in the impacts of hazards.
      --Clarify that mitigation funds provided to private property owners
            under FEMA's programs are not taxable as income.
        The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., and its 20
    State chapters represent over 7,000 State, local, and private sector
    officials as well as other professionals who are engaged in all aspects
    of floodplain management and hazard mitigation. All are concerned with
    reducing our Nation's flood-related losses and reducing the costs of
    flooding.
    Transfer Funds to Address the NFIP'S Repetitive Loss Problem
        Following several years of deliberation, Congress enacted the Flood
    Insurance Reform Act of 2004. In large part, the Act is intended to
    provide FEMA, States and communities with the funding and tools needed
    to deal with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) repetitive
    loss problem. For many years FEMA has identified the disproportionate
    amount of repetitive claims paid on a very small percentage of NFIP-
    insured properties as the most significant factor that drives increases
    in the cost of flood insurance--which affects 4.4 million policyholders
    in every State and over 20,000 counties, cities and towns. Fewer than
    50,000 properties account for a drain of approximately $200 million a
    year.
        The Reform Act of 2004 authorizes transfers of funds (total of $90
    million) from the National Flood Insurance Fund (which contains only
    premium and fee income, no General Funds) into the National Flood
    Mitigation Fund to aggressively mitigate repetitive loss structures.
    Funds authorized for three elements of the Flood Mitigation Assistance
    program are: Basic ($40 million/year), Pilot ($40 million/year through
    fiscal year 2009), and Individual Property ($10 million/year). The
    Basic Program is mature, with virtually all States currently active to
    some degree. For the fiscal year 2006 Basic Program the Administration
    requests $28 million, just $8 million over the funding level of recent
    years. No funds were requested for the Pilot Program and the Individual
    Property Program.
        FEMA consistently asserts the merits of focusing mitigation efforts
    on repetitive loss properties in order to help stabilize and strengthen
    the National Flood Insurance Fund (NFIF). The Reform Act of 2004
    directs that the repetitive loss programs be funded by transfer from
    the NFIF without differentiating between fee income and premium income.
    DHS Undersecretary Mike Brown testified that the budget request is
    limited to only the additional $8 million for the Basic FMA program
    because the Department is studying how to fund the repetitive loss
    effort from fee income. ASFPM believes it is appropriate to transfer
    funds, without further delay, from fee income and/or premium income.
    Since the NFIF as a whole will benefit--and all policyholders will
    benefit if the pressure to raise the rates is diminished--then it is
    well worth the investment of some premium income.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to fully fund the Flood Mitigation
            Assistance programs authorized in the Flood Insurance Reform
            Act of 2004 by transferring funds from the National Flood
            Insurance Fund to the National Flood Mitigation Fund.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to make clear that transfer funds for
            the repetitive loss grant programs may be taken from premium
            income and/or fee income, subject to the limitations of the
            Reform Act of 2004.
    Continue Support for Flood Map Modernization
        Flood maps are used for many purposes beyond the immediate needs of
    the National Flood Insurance Program. Good flood maps play a major role
    in disaster cost reduction--they are used to support land use and
    management of identified flood-prone areas. FEMA estimates that local
    regulation of flood hazard areas, using the flood maps, avoids property
    losses of over $1 billion each year. FEMA's estimate does not count the
    benefits associated with using the maps to guide development to less
    hazard-prone areas. Quality flood maps yield benefits at all levels of
    government. They help reduce the need for Federal disaster assistance
    and casualty loss tax deductions because at-risk homes with federally-
    backed mortgages are required to be covered by flood insurance, which
    provides financial resources to help owners recover.
        ASFPM is concerned that rigid metrics imposed on FEMA are driving
    map production, rather than the goal of producing defensible and
    accurate flood maps that reflect necessary revisions. Further, budget
    constraints created by an out-of-date estimate of map needs is
    artificially restricting restudies and new studies to only a small
    number of streams or short reaches of coastline. The expectation that
    revised flood maps will meet high quality standards is an incentive and
    justification for States and communities to invest their own funds in
    the modernization effort--ASFPM is concerned that this expectation is
    not being met.
      --ASFPM strongly endorses the Administration's request for $200
            million.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to request that FEMA re-evaluate the
            duration and anticipated funding levels required to produce
            revised and updated flood risk maps to the appropriate and
            defensible quality standards. Re-evaluation is warranted
            because of advances in technology, lessons learned in the early
            years of this effort, improved understanding of the extent of
            areas not adequately mapped, priorities identified by States
            and communities, and the number of partnership efforts with
            States and communities, including in-kind and other
            contribution.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to express its expectation that FEMA
            will address State-identified priorities and that adequate
            quality data and mapping for streams and coastlines where
            people are at-risk are the objectives.
    Restore 15 percent Formula for Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and
            Reject Reduction of Funding Available for States with Enhanced
            Mitigation Plans
        ASFPM urges restoration of the 15 percent formula used to determine
    amounts made available after disasters for the Hazard Mitigation Grant
    Program (HMGP) authorized by Section 404 of the Stafford Act. States
    and communities across the country have evidence that the most
    effective time to garner support for mitigation projects is in the
    aftermath of disasters. While mitigation planning is a vital activity
    to identify hazards and potential risks, only actual damaging events
    generate significant public interest and State and local financial
    support. Redundant Regardless of the statistical evidence of the
    likelihood of future disaster occurrence, communities rarely place
    hazard mitigation above today's demands for education, social programs,
    local first responders, and the like. This is especially true in
    smaller communities where financial resources are always tight.
        On the proverbial sunny day,' flooding is a low priority for the
    millions of homeowners and business owners in the Nation's flood hazard
    areas--regardless of the mounting evidence that future floods will
    occur. Homeowners and business owners view offers for buyouts,
    elevations, and retrofit floodproofing very differently when they are
    shoveling mud, coping with toxic mold, or faced with collapsed
    foundations. Restoring HMGP to the 15 percent formula will provide
    resources to those who have just experienced damage and are most
    receptive to change.
        ASFPM recommends that pre-disaster funding be directed to
    community-based planning in order to prepare communities to undertake
    mitigation projects when the disaster strikes. It would also be
    reasonable to make pre-disaster mitigation funds available to support
    public projects that address at-risk State and community buildings,
    facilities, and public infrastructure--among the more costly categories
    of post-disaster public assistance. These projects, which do not
    require direct and voluntary participation of property owners, can
    readily be designed and implemented in the pre-disaster context and
    provide broad public benefits.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to restore the Hazard Mitigation Grant
            Program formula to 15 percent of certain Federal disaster
            expenditures. The Disaster Mitigation Assistance Act of 2000
            calls for communities to have pre-disaster local mitigation
            plans in order to access HMGP. One result of this requirement
            is that communities will be better prepared to identify
            eligible activities after the next declared disaster, thus
            further shortening the time needed to obligate and expend the
            HMGP funds.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to reject the Administration's
            proposed reduction in the formula to determine amounts
            available to States with Enhanced Mitigation Plans. To qualify
            for HMGP based on the 20 percent that is authorized by the
            Stafford Act, a State demonstrates a strong commitment by
            administering a comprehensive mitigation program, including
            having the capability and capacity to manage grants and assess
            the cost avoidance of mitigation measures. The potential
            availability of the increased HMGP amount is a powerful
            incentive for States to take on the significant additional
            responsibility to work with communities and others to identify
            and implement feasible and cost-effective mitigation measures.
      --ASFPM recommends that the Subcommittee examine the effectiveness of
            the nationwide, competitive Pre-Disaster Mitigation program. In
            the fiscal year 2005 appropriations bill DHS was directed to
            consult with State mitigation officials. Last fall State
            officials were provided just 2 weeks to respond and, to date,
            no report has been released. ASFPM recommends that particular
            attention should be paid to citizen, community and State
            interest in pre-disaster mitigation and how the ability to
            provide the non-Federal cost share differs in the pre- and
            post-disaster periods.
    Monitor How the Department of Homeland Security Addresses Natural
            Hazards and Mitigation
        Floods, hurricanes, severe storms, tornadoes, harsh winter storms,
    landslides, wildfires, and earthquakes put millions of Americans are at
    risk every day. From a cost and future consequences perspective, ASFPM
    remains concerned with the diminished focus on natural hazards and
    mitigation by the Department of Homeland Security. Despite continued
    assertions of commitment to FEMA's all-hazards mission, DHS has reduced
    cohesiveness of programs and reduced the number of staff who deal with
    natural hazards and mitigation. The following remain specific concerns:
    transferring FEMA funds to areas of DHS that are not under the
    jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness &
    Response; detailing FEMA staff out of that directorate; and reducing
    support for the vital network of State and local public safety and
    disaster mitigation officials.
        DHS Secretary Chertoff is beginning a thorough examination of
    threats and vulnerabilities in order to prioritize them, and has
    expressed his intent to align DHS resources and priorities based on
    this analysis. Natural hazards are a threat in every State--every State
    has experienced multiple devastating floods that resulted in
    declaration of major disasters. Damage due to floods of all magnitudes
    are estimated as exceeding $5 billion each year. Most areas are at risk
    to other natural hazards, as well. Clearly, our communities and our
    citizens are vulnerable. ASFPM hopes that adequate consideration of
    natural hazards is made in the analysis called for by Secretary
    Chertoff.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to monitor DHS proposals and actions
            that affect FEMA programs and staff to prevent unwise and
            unnecessary reduction in FEMA's effectiveness, which in turn
            will jeopardize State and local efforts to deal with natural
            hazards and mitigation.
    Clarify that Mitigation Grant Funds Received by Private Property Owners
            are not Taxable as Income
        In 2004 the IRS made a determination that mitigation grants to
    property owners who work with their communities and States to prevent
    and minimize future damages to their homes and businesses are taxable
    as income. This decision is having a dramatic impact on the Nation's
    ability to reduce future damages and costs (many disaster costs are
    paid directly by taxpayers). Property owners, when told that mitigation
    cost-share grants will be taxable, are simply opting to NOT mitigate,
    thus remaining at-risk to future damage. Ironically, property owners
    are only eligible for cost sharing mitigation grants if it is clearly
    shown that the benefits to the Nation outweigh the costs to the Nation.
      --ASFPM urges the Subcommittee to include language in the
            appropriations bill to clarify that mitigation cost sharing
            grants are not taxable income.
        For information about ASFPM and this testimony, contact Larry
    Larson, Executive Director, at (608) 274-0123 (asfpm@floods.org) or
    Rebecca Quinn, Legislative Officer, at (410) 267-6968
    (rcquinn@earthlink.net).
                                     ______

              Prepared Statement of the City of San Marcos, Texas

        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: On behalf of the City
    of San Marcos, Texas, I am pleased to submit this statement in support
    of our request for project funding through the Appropriations Bill for
    Homeland Security.
        The City of San Marcos requests an appropriation of $5,000,000 for
    the San Marcos Municipal Airport to construct and equip a multi-purpose
    fire station and fire fighter training facility. We would respectfully
    suggest that this project would properly fall within the scope of first
    responder, emergency preparedness and response training. There is no
    provision for this funding in the President's budget, nor has there
    been any prior year Federal funding.
        The City of San Marcos and facility users would be actively engaged
    in the project's funding through cost-sharing. Approximately $200,000
    would be provided by the City for all required real estate and
    utilities. The City and facility users would provide an estimated
    $600,000 annually in operating revenues when the facility is fully
    functional.
        The San Marcos Municipal Airport is a public general aviation
    airport owned and operated by the City of San Marcos, Texas. It is
    located just east of Interstate Highway 35 on Texas Highway 21
    approximately 30 miles south of Austin and 45 miles north of San
    Antonio. The airport occupies the site of a closed military air base,
    and we share the former military base with the Department of Labor's
    Gary Job Corps Center.
        There are currently 225 aircraft based at the airport, and the
    airport supports over 100,000 air operations annually. This makes the
    San Marcos Municipal Airport the largest and most active general
    aviation airport in the bustling Austin-San Antonio corridor. To serve
    the present and future safety and security needs of the airport, an
    emergency response capability, known in aviation terms as an Aircraft
    Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) facility, has been among our highest
    priority goals. We have encountered a challenge in obtaining Federal
    funding assistance through conventional Federal Aviation Administration
    channels. In order for the airport to qualify for ARFF funding, the
    airport must first be certified under Federal Air Regulation, Part 139;
    however, to achieve certification, the airport requires an ARFF.
        As a better, more cost-efficient approach to achieving our goal, we
    are proposing to partner with the San Marcos Fire Department and the
    Gary Job Corps Center to construct and equip a facility on the airport
    that will meet the airport ARFF requirement, serve as a fire station
    for the City of San Marcos, and also be a training venue for the Gary
    Job Corps Center and other regional agencies to train fire fighters and
    emergency service first responders.
        Our plan proposes to construct, equip, and then operate a multi-
    purpose fire station and fire fighter training facility located on the
    airport. The fire station would consist of two components. One would be
    a Federal Aviation Administration certified ARFF to meet the evolving
    public safety and security requirements of a growing public airport.
    Another component would be a conventional City of San Marcos fire
    station to be integrated with the San Marcos Fire Department's other
    emergency response forces to serve the citizens of San Marcos.
        In addition to these two emergency response capabilities, the
    facility would be the educational site and provide support to the Gary
    Job Corps Center's mission of training students for careers as
    professional fire fighters and emergency service first responders. We
    further envision that the facility will serve other regional training
    needs, especially for the many small community and rural emergency
    services responders who do not have the resources to maintain their own
    training facilities and programs. The planning estimate's total cost
    for project design, construction, furnishing, and equipping is
    $5,000,000.
        The San Marcos Municipal Airport is in desperate need of an ARFF to
    enhance public safety and security. Both the City of San Marcos and the
    San Marcos Fire Department need a fire station to serve the expanding
    eastern section of the city. The Gary Job Corps Center needs a fire
    fighter and first responder training school. All these critical public
    policy needs can be most effectively and efficiently met with a multi-
    purpose fire station and fire fighter training facility located on the
    San Marcos Municipal Airport. This multi-purpose facility would
    maximize the use of limited public safety tax dollars, and,
    consequently, makes sense from a public policy perspective.
        We appreciate very much the Subcommittee's consideration of this
    request for $5,000,000 for the City of San Marcos for this important
    public safety and security project.
                                     ______

         Prepared Statement of the Coalition of Northeastern Governors

        As the Subcommittee begins the fiscal year 2006 transportation
    appropriations process, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG)
    is pleased to share with the Subcommittee testimony on the fiscal year
    2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. The CONEG Governors commend
    the Subcommittee for its past support of funding for the Nation's
    critical transportation security needs, particularly rail security.
    Although we recognize the extensive demands being made upon Federal
    resources in the coming year, we urge the Subcommittee to continue the
    important Federal role in securing the Nation's transportation systems.
        Efforts to strengthen the Nation's security, particularly its
    multi-modal transportation system, are of paramount importance to the
    CONEG Governors. We believe high priority must be given to the safety
    and security of the Nation's passenger rail systems, and therefore urge
    that the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations include the funding necessary
    to enable the Department of Homeland Security to help strengthen the
    security of the Nation's intercity, commuter rail, and rail transit
    systems. These extensive systems move millions of riders daily, and are
    critical components of the transportation network. Funding for rail
    security programs will allow the Department of Homeland Security to be
    an essential partner with States, local governments and public
    transportation authorities in ensuring that these vital rail systems
    remain accessible, reliable--and safe.
        The CONEG Governors thank the entire Subcommittee for the
    opportunity to share these priorities and appreciate your consideration
    of these requests.
                                     ______

          Prepared Statement of the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority

        Chairman Gregg and distinguished members of the Senate
    Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security: The Greater Orlando
    Aviation Authority (``the Authority'') greatly appreciates the
    opportunity to submit written testimony in support of funding
    initiatives necessary to enhance the efficiency and execution of
    Department of Homeland Security requirements at Orlando International
    Airport. The Authority remains a steadfast partner in ensuring the
    highest standards of public safety and security of our homeland and
    deeply appreciates the leadership and efforts put forth by you and your
    Subcommittee to advance this mission.
        The Authority respectfully requests your Subcommittee's
    consideration and support of the following Federal initiatives:
    Integrated U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)/USDA Animal and
            Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Facility
        Two years ago, our Nation took a bold advancement in border
    protection by unifying all Federal entities with border
    responsibilities under one frontline border agency--the U.S. Bureau of
    Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) within the Department of Homeland
    Security. Identified as ``One Face at the Border'', this historic
    initiative merged the personnel and functions of the former Customs
    Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Animal and
    Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S. Border Patrol to enhance
    efficiencies and create greater accountability in one seamless border
    service. Today's CBP officers are cross-trained to perform all
    functions previously fulfilled by the individual legacy agencies.
        On March 1, 2003, CBP designated a Port Director at each port of
    entry to implement a single, unified chain of command. At Orlando
    International Airport, an officially designated Port of Entry, over 230
    employees of the legacy agencies were brought under the single command
    of our Area Port Director. Although functions have been merged to
    create a seamless border and inspection service, operational locations
    are still stretched across the airport's 13,247 acres at multiple
    locations.
        The primary CBP facility, constructed almost a decade ago, is
    located on the west side of the airport in the Tradeport Drive area. As
    a result of the BCBP initiative, this facility is being utilized to its
    maximum capacity and does not have the flexibility to accommodate the
    realignment and future growth of staffing. INS functions are housed in
    an independent facility along the west side of the airport, as is the
    USDA Animal and Plant Inspection Service personnel.
        The Greater Orlando Aviation Authority respectfully requests
    funding under the Department of Homeland Security to construct a 28,000
    square foot companion facility adjacent to the existing CBP facility in
    order to promote a campus-style complex. This facility will accommodate
    capacity needed by CBP and bring existing APHIS staff and inspection
    facilities closer to CBP to increase interaction and accessibility.
    Such a facility will ensure improved communications and efficiencies
    needed to implement the Department's mission to protect the security of
    our borders and homeland.
        The Authority respectfully requests the Committee to include the
    following line item in the fiscal year 2006 DHS budget:
        ``Design and Construction of an Integrated U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection/USDA APHIS Facility at Orlando International Airport--
    $9,000,000''
    Additional U.S. Customs and Border Protection Staffing Positions
        Orlando International Airport continues to steadily rebound from
    the events of September 11, 2001 and significantly outpace passenger
    growth estimates. During the past year, our airport has moved upward in
    performance rankings to now lead as the 12th busiest commercial
    passenger service airport in the Nation and the 20th busiest in the
    world. Orlando International Airport has also surpassed Miami
    International Airport as Florida's busiest commercial service airport.
        As Orlando is a top destination choice of passengers, it is no
    surprise that Orlando International Airport also ranks as our Nation's
    5th largest Origination and Destination (O&D) Airport. As O&D
    passengers are required to undergo more security screening requirements
    than connecting passengers because they enter the sterile security area
    for the first time, appropriate levels of staffing are needed to ensure
    the efficient and timely flow of passengers through the screening and
    inspection process.
        CBP passenger wait times at Orlando International Airport routinely
    exceed the national average. Additional inspectors are needed to
    accommodate the airport's continuing growth. Annual CBP Inspector
    expenses are approximately $150,000 per inspector per year. Federal
    funding in the amount of $750,000 is needed to support the addition of
    five new CBP officers.
        The Authority respectfully requests the Committee to include the
    following line item in the fiscal year 2006 DHS budget:
        ``Additional CBP staffing positions at Orlando International
    Airport--$750,000''
    Installation of In-Line Checked Baggage Explosive Detection System
            (EDS)
        Over 2 years ago, the Authority received concept approval from the
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for the installation of an
    In-Line Checked Baggage Explosive Detection System (EDS); however, the
    TSA has not issued a Letter-of-Intent to proceed with installation of
    this system due to lack of available Federal funding. Since the design
    has already been completed, the system could be installed and fully
    operational within two years if Federal funding is obtained.
        Orlando International Airport (OIA) currently has 41 EDS machines
    located throughout the airport, with the majority in ticket lobbies and
    other passenger areas of the terminal. The physical size of each
    machine and the footprint support area consumes a significant portion
    (10 to 15 percent) of the terminal's capacity needed to process and
    move passengers efficiently. The airport has already implemented
    substantial renovations to the main terminal in partnership with the
    Federal Aviation Administration to maximize the flow and efficiency to
    the greatest extent possible. The existing placement of the EDS
    equipment negates the effectiveness of this substantial investment and
    may lead to the airport exceeding capacity levels earlier than
    projected.
        Installation of an In-Line system would result in a significant
    reduction in the number of EDS machines needed and the number of
    personnel required to manual operate the integrated system. Of the
    1,000 plus TSA personnel currently stationed at the airport, almost
    half (50 percent) are dedicated to the operation of the free standing
    EDS machines. Initial investments by TSA for in-line systems clearly
    result in immediate and long-term operational cost savings to the
    Administration.
        OIA primarily serves origination and destination travelers, who
    undergo more screening requirements than connecting passengers. O&D
    passengers represent approximately 95 percent of all passengers at OIA.
    This high level of O&D activity is expected to continue. The Airport
    accommodates more leisure travelers, who typically travel with a
    greater number of bags and unusually-sized accompaniments such as golf
    clubs, water skis, surfboards, etc. Under the current system,
    passengers must wait in airline check-in lines to obtain a boarding
    pass; then carry their luggage to the nearest EDS machine. Overall,
    installation of an In-Line EDS at Orlando International Airport would
    result in significant operational cost savings for TSA; recovered
    terminal capacity for the airport; and a return to customer-friendly
    expedited passenger processing. The total cost of the In-Line EDS Phase
    II System is estimated at $100 million.
        The Authority respectfully requests the Committee to include
    additional funding for the installation of In-Line Checked Baggage
    Explosive Detection Systems to enable TSA to execute additional Letters
    of Intent to airports such as Orlando International Airport.
    Justification and Closing
        Orlando International Airport remains steadfast in its commitment
    to help our Nation in its mission to protect our borders and homeland
    while enabling safe, efficient and timely movement of passengers and
    commerce.
        Orlando International Airport (OIA) is one of the Central Florida's
    primary assets and has been designated as an U.S. Security Category X
    airport. In 2004, OIA served approximately 31.1 million passengers,
    surpassing Miami International Airport as the busiest commercial
    passenger airport in Florida. Additionally, OIA is the 12th busiest
    commercial service airport in the Nation and the 20th busiest in the
    world. In terms of origin and destination (O&D) passenger traffic at
    domestic airports, OIA ranked 5th behind Los Angeles International and
    traditional airline hub airports such as Las Vegas' McCarran
    International, Atlanta's Hartsfield International and Chicago's O'Hare
    International. O&D passengers represent approximately 95 percent of all
    passengers at OIA. This high level of O&D activity is expected to
    continue.
        OIA has scheduled service to 82 non-stop domestic destinations and
    19 non-stop international destinations, promoting increased airline
    service and competitive fares. The largest rental car market in the
    world is located at OIA. The airport shares a unique relationship with
    the regional economy. A completed Economic Impact Study determined OIA
    generates a $20.7 billion annual economic impact on Central Florida and
    is responsible for 62,100 direct and indirect jobs.
        The Authority expresses its gratitude for the opportunity to
    present this testimony to your Subcommittee. We look forward to working
    with you in advancing these safety and security initiatives that will
    benefit the National Aviation System.
                                     ______

       Prepared Statement of the International Association of Emergency
                                    Managers

        Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide
    testimony on the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        I am Dewayne West. As the Director of Emergency Services for
    Johnston County, North Carolina, I supervise the Emergency Management
    program, the Fire Marshal's Office and Emergency Medical Services. I
    currently serve as the President of the International Association of
    Emergency Managers (IAEM) and am providing this testimony on their
    behalf. I am also a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM), a member and
    past president of the North Carolina Emergency Management Association,
    and the Vice Chairman of the Emergency Management Accreditation
    Commission (EMAP). I was recently appointed by the Governor to serve on
    the N.C. State Emergency Response Commission (SERC).
        The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 2,600
    members including emergency management professionals at the State and
    local government levels, the military, private business and the
    nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
    our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
    crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
    local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
    recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our
    members include emergency managers from large urban areas as well as
    rural counties.
        We appreciate the support the Subcommittee has given to emergency
    management in the past 2 years and especially appreciate your support
    for the Emergency Management Performance Grants and your strong support
    for and the all hazards mission.
        We respectfully request your assistance on two issues.
        Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)
      --Request the $10,000,000 funding cut be rejected and the amount
            increased to $280 million to begin addressing the shortfall.
      --Request that EMPG funding be maintained in a separate account as in
            the fiscal year 2005 Congressional action and not combined with
            other grant programs.
        Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
      --Request that the legislative language proposed in the budget to
            reduce the formula for States with enhanced plans from 20
            percent to 12.5 percent be rejected.
      --Request HMGP formula for States with basic mitigation plans be
            restored to 15 percent of FEMA eligible cost.

                 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS (EMPG)

        Increase funding for EMPG.--Appropriations Committee report
    language referred to the program as ``the backbone of the Nation's
    emergency management system.'' In order to maintain this system and
    build the capacity required to meet the greatly increasing demands,
    additional investment is needed.
        However, the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2006
    proposes to reduce the funding from the $180,000,000 appropriated in
    fiscal year 2005 to $170,000,000. According to a biennial study
    conducted by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in
    2004 there is a shortfall of $264 million. We respectfully request that
    EMPG be increased $100 million over the fiscal year 2005 level for a
    total of $280,000,000 to begin addressing this shortfall.
        The Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) constitute the
    only source of direct Federal funding for State and local governments
    to provide the foundation for basic emergency coordination and planning
    capabilities for all hazards, including those related to homeland
    security. The grants are pass through grants to State and local
    emergency management offices and are used predominately for personnel
    who plan, train, coordinate, and conduct exercises and other functions
    essential to effective preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery
    efforts.
        EMPG grants require a 50 percent State or local match. Currently
    many local jurisdictions are receiving 20 percent or less. In addition
    many local jurisdictions receive no funding because of shortage of
    funds.
        Natural disasters continue to remind us of the great need for
    preparedness and response coordination. In 2004 alone there were 68
    federally declared disasters and 7 emergencies and local officials
    responded to many more disasters that were not federally declared. The
    size and scope of Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Jeanne and Ivan
    underscored the need for a strong national emergency system. Eight
    hundred personnel from thirty-eight States provided support to the
    affected States and communities through the Emergency Management
    Assistance Compact.
        State and local emergency management programs are in desperate need
    of financial support if they are to continue to meet the requirements
    of all hazard planning and coordination as well as implement the
    President's homeland security strategy in States, counties, cities and
    neighborhoods across America. Emergency managers must meet the
    challenge of bringing the emergency response planning and organizations
    in their States and communities in line with new Federal requirements
    contained in the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the
    National Response Plan (NRP), and numerous new and pending national
    standards for preparedness and response.
        The new security concerns arising from the current world situation
    make the coordination and unifying role served by emergency managers
    more important than ever. Given continued support and funding,
    emergency managers have the skills, the expertise, and the willingness
    to rise to the planning and coordinating challenges presented by the
    full range of hazards affecting their communities.
        Maintain EMPG as a separate account.--We also urge you to continue
    to maintain EMPG as a separate account. The President's budget includes
    this program in the ``State and Local'' account with a number of other
    grant programs. EMPG is different from the other programs in this
    account. EMPG has existed for over 50 years and supports all hazards
    emergency management, including terrorism. In addition, it is a
    performance based continuing program with deliverables and requirements
    which must be met in order to receive funding the next year.

                     HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM (HMGP)

        The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program which is authorized by Section
    404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
    Act provides funding to States following a Presidentially declared
    disaster in an amount equivalent to a percentage of eligible FEMA
    funds. The monies are provided by the President's Disaster Relief Fund
    and the costs are shared 75 percent Federal and 25 percent State or
    local. These funds are critical to reducing the costs and impacts of
    future disasters by breaking the cycle of damage and repair and damage
    again.
        Reject funding cut for States with enhanced plans.--The fiscal year
    2006 budget request in the Disaster Relief account in the Emergency
    Preparedness and Response Directorate proposes the following
    legislative language which would amend the Stafford Act: Provided, that
    the post-disaster hazard mitigation set aside for States is 7.5 percent
    of eligible disaster costs: Provided further, That States with an
    Enhanced Mitigation Plan may receive up to 12.5 percent of eligible
    disaster costs.
        This language would reduce funding available for post disaster
    mitigation to States with approved enhanced mitigation plans from an
    amount equivalent to 20 percent of eligible FEMA disaster costs to only
    12.5 percent. Since the passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
    which added the 20 percent incentive, FEMA has strongly encouraged
    States to work toward these enhanced plans. The FEMA regulations stated
    ``A State with a FEMA approved Enhanced State Mitigation Plan at the
    time of a disaster declaration is eligible to receive increased funds
    under the HMGP, based on 20 percent of the total estimated eligible
    Stafford Act disaster assistance.'' The States of Missouri, Oklahoma,
    and Washington have achieved this goal and others have been diligently
    working toward it. This effort required a very significant commitment
    of resources from already overburdened State and community officials to
    develop a comprehensive mitigation program and requires States to take
    on significant additional responsibility. However, many States have
    committed to the additional effort because of the 20 percent incentive
    provided by Congress. The ``carrot'' of increased funding has been in
    the law over 4 years. Now that States have made the effort to achieve
    the goal, the Federal commitment should be kept. We urge you to reject
    the language lowering the percentage for States with Enhanced
    Mitigation Plans.
        Restore Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) to 15 percent.--The
    President's budget language continues the HMGP program at 7.5 percent.
    The fiscal year 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill changed the formula
    used to determine hazard mitigation funding from 15 percent to 7.5
    percent of eligible disaster costs and provided funds for a new
    nationally competitive predisaster mitigation grant program. Citizens
    and elected officials are most receptive to undertaking projects and
    initiatives that prevent the loss of life and reduce destruction of
    property immediately after a disaster has occurred. States and
    communities regularly report that the demand for post-disaster grants
    exceeds the available funding. Now, with the HMGP funding reduced by
    half, many more of these post disaster opportunities are being missed.
    We urge you to restore HMGP to 15 percent.
        Thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide this testimony.
    We would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to
    the Subcommittee.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
    members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
    with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) fiscal year 2006 budget. I am David Liebersbach, the President of
    the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the
    Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. In my
    statement, I am representing the National Emergency Management
    Association (NEMA), whose members are the State emergency management
    directors in the 50 States, the U.S. territories, and the District of
    Columbia. NEMA's members are responsible to their governors for
    emergency preparedness, homeland security, mitigation, response, and
    recovery activities for natural, man-made, and terrorist caused
    disasters.
        Over the past year, our Nation's emergency management system has
    been tested by the extensive natural disasters that we have faced. In
    all, there were 68 major disaster declarations, seven emergency
    declarations, and 43 fire management assistance declarations. Our
    Nation bravely faced and responded to one of the most active hurricane
    seasons with impacts by tropical Storm Bonnie, Hurricanes Charley,
    Frances, Gaston, Ivan and Jeanne, while also dealing with other
    disasters like flooding, tornadoes, and earthquakes. We also watched
    the aftermath of the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and saw graphically
    illustrated the importance of catastrophic disaster planning and
    maintaining our own emergency preparedness and response system. In
    Alaska, we experienced the largest fire season ever, with fires
    impacting over 6.5 million acres and 10,000 square miles. At the same
    time, emergency management continues to prepare for the threat of
    terrorism with new requirements coming from the Federal government such
    as updating State plans to reflect the National Response Plan (NRP),
    training emergency responders on the new National Incident Management
    System (NIMS), and implementing the National Preparedness Goal mandated
    by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National
    Preparedness with no additional Federal financial assistance to meet
    Federal mandates. The multi-hazards emergency management system
    continues to be the means to practice and exercise for devastating acts
    of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for
    hurricanes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. We
    respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency
    management as you address the fiscal year 2006 appropriations.
        All-hazards preparedness is in danger of being regarded as a thing
    of the past as more focus is being placed on terrorism. We must ensure
    that our capability to deal with many hazards, including terrorism
    remains intact and that we do not shift our focus to preparedness for a
    single peril. The capability to coordinate an effective response to an
    event does not change by the type of disaster. The HSPD 8 process shows
    the increased focus on terrorism with only 2 of the 15 disaster
    scenarios representing traditional natural disasters. The all-hazards
    approach relies upon the maintenance of plans, trained personnel to
    carry them out, and supporting infrastructure in the form of emergency
    operations facilities with inter-operable communications. We must
    continue this approach in practicing and exercising for all
    emergencies, to include devastating acts of terrorism, as well as day-
    to-day emergencies. We cannot afford to lose the system we have in
    place to deal with all disasters in order to build new infrastructure
    for homeland security's sake.
        The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
    support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
    dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
    address three main issues with the proposed Federal budget for
    Department of Homeland Security.
      --Extreme concern for proposed cuts to the Emergency Management
            Performance Grant (EMPG) program while requirements increase
            for State and local governments;
      --The need to address massive shortfalls in updating Emergency
            Operations Centers (EOCs); and
      --Concern about the reduced formula for the post-disaster Hazard
            Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).

                  EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING

        The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is the only all-
    hazards emergency preparedness grant program in support of capacity
    building at the State and local level. At a time when we are aiming to
    build the system, additional resources and funding is needed to sustain
    State and local emergency management. The State and local government
    partnership with the Federal Government to ensure preparedness dates
    back to the civil defense era, yet increased responsibilities over the
    last decade have fallen on State and local governments. With the recent
    expanded focus on terrorism and the increased demands of the Federal
    Government to assist in implementation of Federal initiatives like the
    NRP, the NIMS, and HSPD 8, EMPG becomes more important as a means to
    ensure State and local involvement and compliance with new systems.
        The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
    the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
    responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
    proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $10 million. These
    cuts mean that emergency management would be saddled with increased
    mandates, while coping with decreases to an already modest budget. In
    budget consideration for fiscal year 2003 and 2004, Congress has
    affirmed the importance of EMPG in appropriations bills in language
    addressing the significance of the program and increased the levels of
    funding for the program twice. Prior to these increases in fiscal year
    2003 and 2004, the program had been straight lined for over a decade.
    Additionally, Congress affirmed the intent of the program as all-
    hazards and dedicated to supporting personnel during consideration of
    the fiscal year 2005 budget. NEMA is appreciative of Congress'
    recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we respectfully ask that
    Congress aggressively address the programs shortfalls with an
    additional $100 million in funding for EMPG for fiscal year 2006.
        EMPG is the only all-hazards program that State and local
    governments can use to build their emergency management capacity. The
    grants can be used for personnel, planning, training, exercises,
    warning systems, emergency operations centers, public outreach, and
    interagency coordination. EMPG is a flexible program that allows State
    and local governments to tailor funds to address the specific risks and
    needs of their jurisdiction. While it is called a grant, EMPG is really
    a 50/50 cost-share system which ties together the emergency management
    system of local, State, and Federal Governments. Every dollar
    contributed by the Federal Government is doubled with State and local
    contributions. EMPG's modest Federal increases in 2003 and 2004 helped
    the program grow, but shortfalls continue to force an unequal burden on
    state and local governments. States are continuing to increase their
    out of pocket costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for
    local programs. In fact, a 2004 NEMA study found that there is
    approximately a $264 million shortfall in EMPG for all 50 States. This
    means that many communities that would like to implement a full-time,
    professional emergency management capability cannot do so because of
    shortfalls in Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily used as a
    pass-through program for local governments, so the shortfall affects
    our smallest localities that are often those most in need of emergency
    preparedness planning. Currently, States and local governments are over
    matching the Federal Government's commitment to national security
    protection through EMPG by $96 million according to the same 2004 NEMA
    study.
        During last year's hurricane season, the interdependencies of the
    Nation's emergency management system were tested through the Emergency
    Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The state-to-state mutual aid
    compact enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the form of more
    than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets and over 800
    personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days of continuous
    response operations. The nature of the Nation's mutual aid system
    vividly shows the need for all States to have appropriate capabilities
    for all disasters. Additionally resources are needed to build emergency
    response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the system can
    handle the demand of natural disasters and other emergencies no matter
    where they occur. EMPG is the only means to support this assistance
    that can be offered by other States in the face of disaster through
    adequate preparedness. EMPG ensures all States have funding to develop
    and maintain a base level capacity that can be utilized by other States
    for mutual aid.
        While terrorism continues as a major focus at this time, we must
    balance preparedness efforts by integrating terrorism as one of the
    many threats facing our Nation, rather than the current approach of
    making all other preparedness efforts a subset of terrorism. Further,
    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 States that, ``to the extent
    permitted by law, Federal preparedness assistance will be predicated on
    the adoption of statewide comprehensive all-hazards preparedness
    strategies.'' The all-hazards approach cannot be dismissed based upon
    the assumption that one threat is greater and more significant than the
    other. After all, no one really has a crystal ball to predict what the
    next disaster or emergency may be. Yet, the Federal requirements tied
    to homeland security are not funded. Focus and resources will have to
    be taken away from other preparedness initiatives in order to address
    these new demands. Our system for day-to-day public safety and homeland
    security must be mutually supportive and nimble enough to address any
    hazard.
        Last year, Congress affirmed the Department of Homeland Security's
    (DHS) intent to create a ``one stop shop'' for homeland security
    funding. As the fiscal year 2005 funding has been processed, NEMA has
    been working alongside the Office of State and Local Coordination and
    Preparedness (OSLCP) to ensure that the all-hazards intent of the
    program is not changed. Additionally, OSLCP is looking at ways to
    improve the program also in coordination with NEMA. However, because
    DHS is a new Department with a new and developing financial management
    system the changeover has not been without significant delays in the
    amount of time that it takes for States to get their funding. In fact,
    homeland security funding including EMPG is processed through the
    legacy Department of Justice system that was used before the Office for
    Domestic Preparedness was transferred into DHS. Additionally,
    integrating EMPG funding into the homeland security grant program means
    that in more than half of the States, another layer of bureaucracy is
    added because only half of the Nation's emergency managers serve as the
    State administering agency (SAA). In these cases, it takes even longer
    for emergency management agencies to access the EMPG funding once it is
    awarded. This has a domino effect as delays are then experienced by
    local governments that receive EMPG monies. NEMA has received reports
    of situations in which county emergency management programs were on the
    verge of shutting their doors because they had expended their match
    funds while Federal funding continued to lag. In most States, EMPG
    funds were not received until 6 months into the Federal fiscal year.
    NEMA hopes to work collaborately with Congress and OSLCP to resolve
    these issues in the coming year to ensure swifter grant awards in
    fiscal year 2006. Specifically, we ask that Congress de-couple the
    Emergency Management Performance Grant which is an all-hazards, 50/50
    match program from the homeland security grant program which is
    terrorism focused with different and longer-term requirements.
        The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
    national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
    numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
    emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
    prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
    Congress must ensure predictable and adequate funding levels for the
    program.

                          EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS

        Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) serve as the nerve center as
    well as the State and local government coordination point during
    disasters and emergencies. In fiscal year 2002 and 2003, a total of $81
    million was appropriated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to
    address Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) improvements. The $81
    million was allocated to States to begin the planning process to assess
    the necessary infrastructure and security improvements and security
    measures to be taken. Since then, no dedicated Federal funding has been
    provided for the implementation of these plans. Many State and local
    facilities are out of date; do not have the interoperable technology to
    coordinate with the Federal Government or among State and local levels;
    and lack adequate security features. Federal assistance is necessary to
    match State and local commitments to upgrade their EOCs as an integral
    part of the Nation's emergency response system. According to a 2004
    NEMA survey, it is projected that more than $1.6 billion will be needed
    to construct and maintain State and local primary and alternate EOCs
    over the next 2 to 5 years. This includes the costs to consistently
    upgrade equipment, buildings, and software, train personnel, and
    conduct operations during emergency and non-emergency situations. NEMA
    calls on Congress to assist in addressing this shortfall and immediate
    need. When Congress did begin to address this shortfall, the match
    requirement was lowered to 25 percent for State and local governments.
    Congress should make a $160 million commitment this year as a down
    payment to addressing the shortfall, or EOCs will fall further behind.

            HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM & PREDISASTER MITIGATION

        NEMA supports efforts by the Congress and the Administration to
    continue both pre- and post-disaster mitigation activities. NEMA calls
    on Congress to restore the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant
    Program (HMGP) formula to 15 percent and maintain the formula at 20
    percent for ``enhanced plan'' States. Disasters present the opportunity
    to learn from past mistakes and to also take advantage of the lessons
    learned during the disaster. This means funding for utilizing
    elevations and buy-outs as tools and building warning systems and
    shelters.
        Effective February 20, 2003, Congress changed the formula for post-
    disaster mitigation grants from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. This change
    limits the availability of funds for post-disaster mitigation and
    prevents the lessons learned from disasters from being immediately
    incorporated into mitigation projects to prevent loss of life and
    destruction of property. The months immediately following disasters
    provide unique opportunities to efficiently incorporate risk reduction
    measures in a very cost-effective manner, in many cases lowering the
    overall cost of the project by leveraging other funding sources
    including insurance settlements. We ask that you restore the formula to
    15 percent this year in order to address mitigation needs.
        This year, the Administration is proposing to decrease the post-
    disaster formula for ``enhanced plan'' States as well. Last year, all
    States were required to complete hazard mitigation plans and to have
    them approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a
    result of changes made to the Stafford Act in the Disaster Mitigation
    Act of 2000, States could opt to do more work and planning in order to
    qualify for enhanced plans. Thus far, three States (Missouri,
    Washington, and Oklahoma) have qualified to receive the 20 percent
    formula as enhanced plan states, and many more States are pursuing
    enhanced plans for approval. But, the Administration is proposing to
    lower the enhanced plan formula to 12.5 percent of disaster costs,
    reducing the incentives for States to make the investment to seek
    enhanced plans. Further, this will limit even more the mitigation
    opportunities that are addressed in disaster-prone States.
        The HMGP has proven to be a highly effective tool in steering
    communities toward risk reduction measures, in many cases breaking
    repetitive loss cycles that have cost other Federal disaster relief
    programs multiple times. Cost-benefit analysis is currently a
    requirement for predisaster mitigation programs. We must not lose these
    opportunities to initiate projects to enhance our communities and
    reduce future disaster costs. HMGP must be restored and the enhanced
    plan formula must be maintained.

                        HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

        Congress has made significant attempts to ensure that the Homeland
    Security Grant Program is streamlined and provides greater flexibility.
    We appreciate the attention and funding that the Congress has given to
    ensuring emergency responders are adequately prepared for domestic
    terrorism threats. Emergency responders are better prepared today to
    face the various threats associated with terrorism because of the
    Federal commitment to address the war on terrorism that is being played
    out in our States, cities, and towns. States continue to take an all-
    hazards approach to disaster preparedness as we have integrated our
    domestic preparedness efforts into the proven systems we already use
    for dealing with both man-made and natural disasters.
    Funding Levels
        We continue to be concerned about cuts in the President's budget
    proposal for homeland security that has been dedicated to improving
    emergency responder preparedness for homeland security. The Federal
    Government must maintain its commitment to ensure that homeland
    security preparedness continues and the Constitutional responsibility
    to maintain a national defense is not compromised. Continuity of effort
    can only be maintained by State and local governments with adequate
    Federal support, especially when it deals with the front line emergency
    responders. Reductions in funding will immediately be translated into
    reductions in prevention, protection, and preparedness activities.
    Regional collaboration and mutual aid are critical components of the
    National Preparedness Goal. If the Federal Government provides adequate
    funding to the States for the necessary resources to be put in place to
    respond to any event, then the Federal Government is supporting one of
    the key overarching goals of the National Preparedness Goal. Further,
    continued or increased funding should not take away from traditional
    all-hazards capacity building programs for public safety, public
    health, and emergency management.
    Congressional Legislation to Simplify the Grants Process
        As Congress considers legislation to address and reform the
    Homeland Security Grants, we ask that you take NEMA's suggestions into
    consideration. The suggestions include the following:
      --Each State must have a base minimum level of funding to ensure the
            capacity to respond to any event. Such capacity is necessary
            for homeland security because of the changing nature of the
            threat and also because of the importance our emergency system
            places on mutual aid to respond to events;
      --All efforts to increase emergency management capacity must be
            coordinated through the States to ensure harmonization with the
            State emergency operations plan, ensure equitable distribution
            of resources, and to synthesize resources for intra-state and
            inter-state mutual aid. Also, the Stafford Act, which governs
            the way disaster assistance is allocated, successfully uses
            States and Governors as the managers of Federal disaster relief
            funds for local governments, which can become overwhelmed and
            in need of assistance when disasters occur.
      --States understand the need to get funding quickly to the first
            responders and have long coordinated statewide and regionally
            to ensure adequate State assistance to local governments for
            emergency preparedness and response; and
      --Traditional emergency management capacity building programs like
            EMPG must be continued as separate and distinct from the
            homeland security grants programs.
    Fiscal Conditions and Match Requirements
        Further, because the war on terrorism is a national emergency and
    States and local governments continue to be in the toughest fiscal
    situations since the deep recession in the early 1980s, we must be wary
    of programs that would require significant matches. In fact, for local
    governments to meet the match would be even more difficult given their
    fiscal constraints. If a significant match is required, the application
    of this initiative will only go to those agencies and governments that
    can fiscally afford the match and not necessarily where the need is
    greatest. If a match is necessary, we would suggest that the match be
    non-fiscal or in the form of a deliverable as opposed to soft or hard
    dollars. Waivers may be a way for the Federal Government to also
    address the lack of capital for a match when State and local
    governments are experiencing fiscal distress.
    Flexibility for Personnel to Manage the Program
        Greater flexibility to use some of the first responder grants for
    personnel both at the State and local level to manage the programs is
    critical to completing the preparedness mission. As an existing funding
    stream, EMPG is used in part to fund State and local staff to manage
    critical programs including the homeland security grants. The First
    Responder Grants should recognize that personnel are necessary to
    manage these programs, particularly when rigid deadlines are set for
    obligating millions of dollars and accountability is paramount.
    Additionally, new needs such as intelligence fusion personnel must be
    recognized. As HSPD 8 deadlines loom, States will be faced with a new
    set of requirements that could be tied to funding. Simply hiring
    contractors to do the work is not a long-term solution for building and
    maintaining national preparedness capabilities. State and local
    government, emergency management, and responder organizations are
    already working at a maximum capacity within existing resources and
    need Federal support for more than the purchase of equipment and
    exercises. Flexibility based on strategic approaches should be the
    norm, not single-issue, narrowly focused grants.

                     NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY CONSORTIUM

        The National Homeland Security Consortium is a voluntary, education
    and outreach group representing State homeland security advisors, State
    and local law enforcement, emergency management, fire, public health,
    EMS, National Guard, public works, emergency communications, State and
    local elected officials and private sector partners. The Consortium was
    established in 2003 by the National Emergency Management Association
    and was endorsed by former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge in September 2004.
    This comprehensive group of subject matter experts offers itself as a
    technical resource and sounding board for the Department of Homeland
    Security as they develop and implement new policies and programs. The
    Consortium represents State and local officials on the ground, in city
    hall and in the statehouses charged with the responsibility of homeland
    security and overall public safety. The group is meeting again in May
    to provide another opportunity for all disciplines and levels of
    government involved in emergency prevention, preparedness, response and
    recovery to come together to continue to share information, develop
    solutions to common challenges and build relationships that will
    enhance State and local homeland security capabilities. The Consortium
    serves as a model for intergovernmental coordination and demonstrates
    the commitment of State and local governments to collaboratively
    address the complex challenges of homeland security.

                                   CONCLUSION

        While we as a Nation are fortunate that another year has passed
    without a terrorist incident on our Nation's soil, we must continue to
    build national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. We
    must be prudent and thoughtful in addressing homeland security
    enhancements to our existing emergency preparedness and response
    system. In this year's appropriations process Congress will make
    critical decisions that shape the future of emergency management in
    this country. As you begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize
    the importance of adequately funding the EMPG program in building
    capacity through people at the State and local level for all disasters.
    I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and
    appreciate your partnership.
                                     ______

       Prepared Statement of the National Flood Determination Association

        Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the National Flood
    Determination Association (NFDA) strongly supports the Budget Request
    for the Flood Map Modernization Presidential Initiative. This major
    project to update and modernize the Nation's flood risk maps is
    critical to the functioning of the National Flood Insurance Program
    (NFIP) and to protection of property through effective floodplain
    management.
        The NFDA is a professional association of companies which provide
    flood zone determinations to lenders for compliance with the mandatory
    purchase requirements of the NFIP. The association represents some two
    thirds of the industry and has implemented a certification program
    containing standards for flood zone determination companies. Because
    the FEMA flood maps are the official documents for compliance with the
    NFIP, flood determination companies are probably the most frequent
    users of the maps. A survey of the NFDA membership reveals that it has
    completed approximately 33,000,000 determinations in the year 2003.
        Flood maps are used both to determine which properties are in or
    out of a Standard Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) and also are used by county
    and community officials to plan development and to reduce future risk.
        Approximately 70 percent of the maps are 5 years and older, 45
    percent at least 10 years old, and more that 2,200 flood prone
    communities remain without flood hazard maps. The current process
    utilized by FEMA to produce an updated map is 58 months. More than
    20,000 map panels identified as requiring updates, meaning they have
    outdated or inadequate flood hazard data requiring updates through
    field reconnaissance, engineering analysis and floodplain mapping
    utilizing improved analysis methodologies. The detailed flood studies
    will include ``approximately studied'' and ``unstudied'' flood-prone
    communities. There are more than 40,000 maps with adequate flood hazard
    data but inadequate non-engineering data and reference features such as
    roads. New elevation reference marks will be developed and implemented
    emphasizing the use of GPS surveying technology and a network of
    approximately 580,000 benchmarks.
        Complaints to lenders, flood determination companies, and realtors
    dramatized the problems caused for real estate transactions when maps
    do not reflect true risk. Over a 10 or 20 year period, development,
    road building and re-grading of land significantly alter flood risk.
        The NFDA has been extremely gratified that the Administration has
    recognized the real need to update and modernize the flood maps. As the
    Map Modernization project develops, however, we have some concerns
    about the update component. Updating the maps, particularly in high
    growth areas, requires a full restudy which includes engineering,
    surveying, hydrology and hydraulics. It should be noted that such
    extensive restudy is not needed everywhere as the water flow and
    retention properties may not have changed much over the years. Because
    the updates require more time and investment, we are worried that
    insufficient analysis is being undertaken in order to complete action
    on maps more quickly. The quantitative requirements by which the map
    modernization is judged may be moving away from the restudies and
    toward limited revisions and digitization. Such a newly issued map,
    with a new date, can be very misleading. Flood determinations done
    using these ``new'' maps will continue to generate complaints.
        To do justice to the national investment in good flood risk maps,
    there may need to be some adjustment to the quantitative standards by
    which the program is evaluated. It may not be possible to complete the
    job in the originally projected 5 years.
        Some technical coordination issues have also become apparent. It is
    key that the map modernization process and product reflect the needs
    and requirements of map users. For this reason, we strongly urge the
    establishment of a stakeholder advisory group. This could be modeled on
    the successful Technical Mapping Advisory Board established for 5 years
    by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994. It is our understanding that
    FEMA has been looking into creating this kind of advisory board. We
    urge the Committee to support this effort.
        We were aware of a possibility last year that certain (at the time)
    funds not obligated to map modernization could be redirected to other
    needs of the Department of Homeland Security. Because it is becoming
    very clear that the Nations' flood map modernization needs are
    extensive, we are concerned about any redirection of funds appropriated
    for the Flood Map Modernization Initiative.
        The National Flood Determination Association remains committed to
    working with FEMA to achieve the updated, modernized national flood
    risk maps we all need. We urge the Committee to approve the full budget
    request of $200 million.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the Ohio Department of Chiefs of Police, Inc.

        Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd and Distinguished Members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement
    for the record regarding the fiscal year 2006 budget proposal for the
    Department of Homeland Security.
        Our names are Director Kenneth L. Morckel, Ohio Department of
    Public Safety and Director Todd N. Wurschmidt, Ph.D., Ohio Association
    of Chiefs of Police (OACP). Director Morckel is the designated head of
    Homeland Security efforts in Ohio as appointed by Governor Bob Taft.
    Dr. Wurschmidt oversees staff operations for the OACP and is involved
    in managing the statewide effort and information sharing between Ohio
    law enforcement agencies.
        We respectfully request consideration on restoring a separate line
    item in Homeland Security funding for the category, ``LETPP--Law
    Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.'' Highlights of our statement
    include:
      --Prevention, Such As Information Sharing, Involves 100 percent of
            America's Law Enforcement Agencies
      --Terrorists Can Plan Anywhere, Thus Involving 100 percent of
            America's Geography
      --Preventing Terrorism Is Not UASI \1\ Urbans Versus SARASI \2\
            Suburban and Rurals
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ USAI=Urban Area Security Initiative.
        \2\ SARASI=Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiative.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      --Law Enforcement's Prevention Role Should Not Be Formula Funded At
            the Expense of Law Enforcement's First Responder Role
      --Proposed fiscal year 2006 Budget Cuts For Suburban and Rural
            Prevention and Responder Efforts Total 32 percent
        Have you heard of Iyman Faris? Probably not. In 2003, Mr. Faris was
    making plans to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge. He was NOT living in
    Manhattan. Mr. Faris was apprehended outside of Columbus, Ohio. Had the
    Brooklyn Bridge gone down, we probably would have all known Mr. Faris's
    name well.
        Heard of Azmi Al-Jayyusi? Probably not. In 2004, Mr. Al-Jayyusi
    headed up a sophisticated plot, designed in the small villages in
    Jordan, in which trucks, chemicals and explosives were surreptitiously
    purchased for purposes of blowing up select strategic targets
    (including the American Embassy) in the capital of Jordan, Amman. It
    was estimated the chemical explosives would have caused the deaths and
    injuries of 250,000 civilians. Once again, the urban city was not Mr.
    Al-Jayyusi's site for plotting and preparing; it was the rural
    countryside. Had Mr. Al-Jayyusi's terrorist plot been successful, we
    could probably recite his name easily as well.
        Heard of Ted Kazenski, the Unabomber? Yes, of course. Why? Because
    this domestic terrorist was successful in reeking widespread fear, his
    deeds carried out from the isolated forests of rural Montana. How about
    Eric Rudolph, the Abortion Clinic Bomber? Yes? Mr. Rudolph's eventual
    capture occurred during late night, at the site of a trash bin, behind
    a business in the small North Carolinian town of Murphy; a rural
    apprehension.
        ``All across our Country we'll be able to tie our terrorist's
    information to local information banks so that the front line of
    defeating terror becomes activated and real, and those are the local
    law enforcement officials. We expect them to be part of our effort; we
    must give them the tools necessary so they can do their job.''
    President George W. Bush, February 2003
        As President Bush so accurately notes, preventing domestic and
    international terrorism requires enlisting the commitment and
    involvement of 100 percent of America's geography and 100 percent of
    America's law enforcement agencies.
        Geography.--In the United States, there are 3,042 counties. There
    are only 60 to 65 counties within the UASI (Urban Area Security
    Initiatives) areas as designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security (Map 1). That leaves some 2,980 counties within the non-UASI,
    non-urban areas involved in preventing, detecting, deterring and
    disrupting terrorism (Map 2).
        Successful terrorism prevention requires that these 2,980 SARASI
    counties (Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiatives) continue to
    receive LETPP \3\ funds commensurate with their percentage geography,
    and commensurate with the need to prepare, equip and train all local
    law enforcement, urban, suburban and rural.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ LETPP=Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        L/E Agencies.--This Nation's terrorism fight requires our enlisting
    the aid and commitment of all of America's 19,000 law enforcement
    agencies. Over 80 percent of U.S. law enforcement agencies are located
    outside the UASI cities, and within the SARASI counties, towns and
    villages. Less than 20 percent of America's law enforcement agencies
    are in UASIs. Yet, proposed fiscal year 2006 prevention funding is
    weighted toward 50 large cities and decreases funding allocations
    available to the over 80 percent of America's suburban and rural law
    enforcement agencies (Table 1).

         TABLE 1.--UASIS \4\ VERSUS SARASIS \5\ IN PREVENTING, DETECTING, DETERRING AND DISRUPTING DOMESTIC AND
                                                 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
              [Prevention (E.G. Information Sharing) Involves 100 Percent of U.S. Law Enforcement Agencies]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Total U.S.         UASIs          SARASIs
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Counties:
        Number......................................................           3,042           60-65           2,980
        Percent.....................................................             100               2              98
    Law Enforcement Agencies:
        Number......................................................    About 19,000     About 3,500          15,500
        Percent.....................................................             100              18             82
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ UASI=Urban Area Security Initiative.
    \5\ SARASI=Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiative.

        ``Preventing terrorism equates to intelligence'' (eg. information
    sharing). Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA), Chair, Homeland Security
    Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, February 2005.
        In fiscal year 2004, the President and Congress identified the
    unique role of law enforcement in the Nation's fight against terrorism.
    That unique role of law enforcement is prevention. Thus, within the
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security's grant programs, the ``Law
    Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program'' (LETPP) was created. In the
    above television interview, Chairman Cox emphasized the need for
    prevention, intelligence and information sharing. Prevention,
    intelligence and information sharing can only be achieved with 100
    percent involvement of America's law enforcement agencies.
        Although the proposed fiscal year 2006 President's budget collapses
    grant fund categories and incorporates LETPP funding into UASI and
    SHSGP \6\ categories, the loss of the separate LETPP funding category
    will:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ SHSGP=State Homeland Security Grant Program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      --Greatly restrict suburban and rural law enforcement from moving
            forward on prevention efforts such as information sharing;
      --Increase the likelihood that local law enforcement will not be
            fully funded on prevention plus their responder roles because
            of the funding needs by all other public safety first responder
            and health agency groups; and
      --Greatly restrict funding for law enforcement's responder roles
            because of formula funding that could be interpreted as having
            funded law enforcement because of the 20 percent prevention
            mandate.
        Below we offer explanations for these potential complications.
        ``Smaller States would see an 80 percent cut according to the
    proposed fiscal 2006 budget. That's not just a small drop. That's a
    leap off the cliff.'' Senator Susan Collins (R-Maine), Chair, Senate
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.
        The four-fold purposes of this document are to respectfully request
    the U.S. Congress:
      --Reinstate the Homeland Security funding category of ``LETPP--Law
            Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program'' as a separate line
            item funding category;
      --Restrict the use of formula funding to require a threshold
            percentage of funding be directed toward prevention versus
            response efforts;
      --Avoid funding allocations that will have UASI urban cities funded
            to the detriment of all other counties, towns and villages
            involved in the prevention of terrorism; and
      --Avoid melding the prevention plus responder roles of law
            enforcement into one funding category used to fund responder
            functions for all other first responder public safety and
            health agency forces.
        The original purpose of the fiscal year 2004 LETPP was to ``seek to
    provide law enforcement communities with enhanced capabilities for
    detecting, deterring, disrupting, and preventing acts of terrorism.''
    \7\ It should be noted that the mission statement identified ``law
    enforcement communities,'' not just urban area law enforcement
    communities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Fiscal year 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program
    guidelines and application kit, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
    page 38.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The LETPP program funding category provided law enforcement
    communities with monies to pursue five program areas: (1) information
    sharing; (2) target hardening; (3) threat recognition; (4) intervention
    activities; and (5) interoperable communications.
        The President's 2006 Proposed Budget from the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security will inhibit efforts to build forward on terrorism
    prevention and first responder work of local law enforcement officials.
    The program budget review document for fiscal year 2006 ``State
    Homeland Security Grants Program'' (as prepared by the Office of State
    and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security) shows a total appropriation budget request of $1.242
    billion or, a $482 million reduction from the $1.725 billion homeland
    security funds approved for fiscal year 2005.8 This loss of half a
    billion dollars from thousands of public safety agencies' budgets will
    greatly reduce suburban and rural terrorism prevention and first
    responder efforts (Table 2 and Table 3).
        The philosophical and strategic argument for increasing funds for
    the Nation's UASIs (Urban Area Security Initiatives) appears to involve
    the adoption of ``risk assessment'' as opposed to population formula
    for allocation of Homeland Security funds. The argument being put
    forward is that the major cities will, in greater probability, be the
    location of future terrorist attacks. Then, the argument of logic is
    furthered that these major urban centers need more monies to adequately
    prepare to prevent and respond. This argument should also recognize the
    significant role that all of this Nation's law enforcement agencies
    play in prevention efforts--to ``detect, deter, disrupt and prevent
    acts of terrorism.''

     TABLE 2.--PROPOSED $480 MILLION (32 PERCENT) LOSS IN PREVENTION AND RESPONDER FUNDING FOR THE 2,980 SARASI \9\
                                                        COUNTIES
     [All suburban and rural prevention and responder efforts by fire, EMS, EMA, health and police will experience a
                                        32 percent total cut in fiscal year 2006]
                                                [In millions of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Fiscal year    Fiscal year 2006
                                                                 2005  enacted       request             Change
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SHSGP \10\................................................           1,100              1,020               (80)
    LETPP \11\................................................             400  .................              (400)
                                                               -----------------------------------------------------
          Total Funding to Suburban & Rural SARASIs...........           1,500              1,020              (480)
                                                                                                    (32 percent cut)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ SARASI=Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiative.
    \10\ SHSGP=State Homeland Security Grant Program.
    \11\ LETPP=Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.

     TABLE 3.--WITH THE PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 2006 20 PERCENT FORMULA FUNDING
     FOR LETPP \12\, FUNDING FOR JUST RESPONSE EFFORTS BY SUBURBAN AND RURAL
    PUBLIC SAFETY FORCES WILL BE CUT BY ($284 MILLION) (26 PERCENT CUT) FROM
                                FISCAL YEAR 2005
     [Proposed fiscal year 2006 First Responder cuts to SARASIs amount to a
              26 percent cut from fiscal year 2005 funding levels]
                            [In millions of dollars]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Amount                        Amiount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fiscal year 2006 Request           $1,020  SARASI First          $1,100
     SHSGP \13\.                                Responder
                                                fiscal year
                                                2005.
    Formula Funding percent to            204  SARASI First             816
     LETPP.                                     Responder
                                                fiscal year
                                                2006.
    Balance to First Responder            816  Loss to SARASI          (284)
     SARASIs \14\.                              First
                                                Responders.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ LETPP=Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.
    \13\ SHSGP=State Homeland Security Grant Program.
    \14\ SARASI=Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiative.

        Prevention of terrorism needs the involvement of 100 percent of the
    law enforcement community throughout the Nation. Although the
    probability of a future terrorist attack may involve major urban areas,
    the prevention of future terrorist attacks must involve all 19,000 law
    enforcement agencies throughout the 3,042 counties in the United
    States.
        Information Sharing as Prime Example: Information sharing amongst
    law enforcement agencies is as critical as President Bush noted in his
    February 2003 comments noted earlier, and as reinforced by U.S. House
    Homeland Security Chair Congressman Cox's February 2005 comments noted
    previously. Of the five program areas authorized in 2005 for LETPP
    Homeland Security funding, information sharing between law enforcement
    agencies is listed first. Effective information sharing requires
    linking information systems for all 19,000 law enforcement agencies,
    not just crime data systems within UASI agencies.
        As example, the ``Ohio Local Law Enforcement Information Sharing
    Initiative,'' as supported by the Ohio Department of Public Safety and
    managed by Ohio Attorney General Jim Petro's Office and the Ohio
    Association of Chiefs of Police, involves the linking of Record
    Management Systems (RMS) between the nearly 1,000 law enforcement
    agencies in Ohio. Approximately 18 percent of the Ohio law enforcement
    agencies are within the four Ohio UASI regions, while 82 percent of the
    law enforcement agencies are within Ohio's 84 SARASI counties.
        The cost of linking all nearly 1,000 Ohio law enforcement agency
    RMS systems approximates $20-25 million. The linking of any given
    single agency is on, average, approximately the same, whether located
    in an UASI region or SARASI region. Thus, of the total cost for Ohio's
    Information Sharing Project, $3.5 million to $4.5 million must be
    allocated for UASI located agencies, while $16.5 to $20.5 million must
    be directed toward the law enforcement agencies in the SARASI counties
    (Table 4).

       TABLE 4.--OHIO INFORMATION SHARING PROJECT--COST TO LINK THE 18 PERCENT OHIO UASI \15\ AGENCIES AND THE 82
                                            PERCENT OHIO SARASI \16\ AGENCIES
     [The proposed fiscal year 2006 LETPP budget formula will only direct up to 50 percent of the LETPP to Non-UASI
      or SARASI areas, while Ohio's suburban and rural SARASI agencies will need 82 percent of prevention funds to
                complete one aspect of prevention, i.e., information sharing between agency RMS systems]
                                                [In millions of dollars]
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    Cost of connect
                                                  No. of counties           No. of agencies         agency RMSs \17\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ohio UASIs:
        Number................................                  4    about 175...................           $3.5-4.5
        Percent...............................                  4.5  17..........................                 17
    Ohio SARASIs:
        Number................................                 84    about 825...................         $16.5-20.5
        Percent...............................                 95.5  82..........................                 82
                                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------
          Total...............................                 88    about 1,000.................             $20-25
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ UASI=Urban Area Security Initiate.
    \16\ SARASI=Suburban and Rural Area Security Initiative.
    \17\ RMS=Record Management systems.

        The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's fiscal year 2006 Budget
    proposes the cost for information sharing prevention efforts be
    allocated as a 50/50 split between UASIs and SARASIs. LETPP dollars
    have been incorporated within the UASI and State Homeland Security
    Grant Programs. By approaching 2006 LETPP funding using formula
    percentages, States will no longer have the flexibility to allocate
    necessary dollars to accomplish full information sharing.
        In addition, the proposed U.S. Department of Homeland Security
    fiscal year 2006 Budget also begins to increase the potential for
    funding competition between law enforcement and all other public safety
    first responder agencies. In the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005
    budgets, Homeland Security separated the law enforcement prevention
    role by having the separate LETPP line item. By separating LETPP from
    the State Homeland Security grant programs, response issues for all
    First Responders (including law enforcement) were debated and explored
    within the funds allocated to the ``State Homeland Security Grant
    Programs.'' Prevention issues did not have to be co-mingled with
    response discussions because LETPP existed as a separate line item.
        By collapsing the LETPP program within the State Homeland Security
    grant program, non-law enforcement First Responders (Fire, EMA, EMS,
    Health) may be inclined to restrict additional funding needs of law
    enforcement, be they prevention or response needs, because 20 percent
    has already been required for law enforcement. The predictable concern
    will be, ``Why should law enforcement get 22 or 30 or 40 percent of
    funding, when Congress has already assigned 20 percent of funds for
    police.''
        The proposed 20 percent formula funding of LETPP will restrict
    prevention efforts for the suburban and rural communities and counties,
    potentially increase competition between law enforcement versus all
    other first responders, and further inhibit police response role issues
    to be separated from prevention role issues.
        Additionally, all suburban and rural first responders will
    experience reductions from the fiscal year 2005 $1.1 billion allocated
    to State grants. With the proposed formula allocation of $204 million
    incorporated within the State Homeland Security Grant Program for
    LETPP, State grant allocations will be reduced to $816 million (an
    almost $300 million reduction for SARASI or non-UASI county use for
    response plans, equipment and training) (Table 3). These 80 percent of
    First Responder and Health agencies within the SARASI communities will
    experience a more than 25 percent reduction from funds available for
    all First Responders involved in response planning, equipment and
    training.
        In summation, we would respectfully ask that the United States
    Congress:
      --Reinstate the Homeland Security funding category of ``LETPP--Law
            Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program'' as a separate line
            item funding category;
      --Restrict the use of formula funding to require a threshold
            percentage of funding be directed toward prevention versus
            response efforts;
      --Avoid funding allocations that will have UASI urban cities funded
            to the detriment of all other counties, towns and villages
            involved in the prevention of terrorism; and
      --Avoid melding the prevention plus responder roles of law
            enforcement into one funding category used to fund responder
            functions for all other first responder public safety and
            health agency forces.
        America has not had any major terrorist incidents since 9/11. We
    would respectfully ask, ``Why would we want to change that which is
    working?'' Instead, would it not be more prudent to build forward, in
    not redesigning that which is working, but to instead address
    deficiencies which may have been recently identified? LETPP, as a
    separate line item, has served this Nation well toward accomplishing
    significant prevention strategies and in effectively separating out the
    unique prevention role 19,000 law enforcement agencies perform amongst
    the first responder roles all public safety forces are engaged in our
    3,042 counties.

                                     ______

                 Prepared Statement of the University of Miami

        Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
    the Subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide
    testimony on the Disaster Resistant University initiative and to
    request the program be continued in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations
    bill of your Subcommittee.
        We very much appreciate the interest Members of Congress have shown
    in this program. With only a small Federal investment, the Disaster
    Resistant University program created a model for other educational
    institutions to develop and implement a loss control program and
    created a sense of focus, pride and achievement. It is a small program
    with great benefits. We urge that the program be continued.
    Request for Fiscal Year 2006
        We respectfully request the following language in the fiscal year
    2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Report in the
    Emergency Preparedness and Response section under Predisaster
    Mitigation.
        The Committee directs Emergency Preparedness and Response (FEMA) to
    continue the Disaster Resistant University Program as a separate
    program and to provide continued support of $500,000 directly to each
    of the pilot universities and $500,000 each to those selected in 2004
    to implement mitigation efforts to reduce their vulnerabilities and
    improve protection of their students, employees, and the Federal
    investment in vital research.
        The FEMA Disaster Resistant University (DRU) Program was created to
    reduce the potential for large loss of life and hundreds of millions of
    dollars in key Federal research and billions of dollars in damage from
    natural disasters. The University of California at Berkeley was the
    prototype and founding member of the program.
        In October 2000, FEMA selected five additional universities to join
    Berkeley in the pilot phase of the program: the University of Alaska at
    Fairbanks, University of Miami, University of North Carolina at
    Wilmington, Tulane University, and the University of Washington at
    Seattle. The pilot universities have two elements in common: a
    vulnerability to disasters and a commitment to improve protection of
    students, faculty and staff, and one of our most valuable assets,
    intellectual property. The pilot program was funded with $700,000 in
    grants from predisaster mitigation funds and the U.S. Fire
    Administration.

    Purpose of the Program
        The purpose of the program is to help the Nation's colleges and
    universities facing the threat of natural disasters and acts of
    terrorism to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect the
    lives of their students, faculty, and staff; their research; and their
    facilities. It will provide a framework and process for other
    universities to do the same.
        The intent of the program is to assist universities by first
    providing a small grant for them to assess their vulnerabilities,
    devise appropriate plans, and set priorities and then to provide grants
    in following years of approximately $500,000 each for the universities
    to implement projects to reduce campus vulnerabilities to disaster.
    Need for the Program
        The Federal Government funds $21.1 billion annually in university
    research, according to the National Science Foundation statistics in
    2002, the latest year available. This Federal investment in the vital
    intellectual property of the Nation should be protected.
        In addition, universities are critical to the economic health of
    their surrounding communities. The ability to resume operations quickly
    following a disaster greatly speeds the recovery of the entire
    community.
        Some examples of the economic impact of universities on their
    communities follow:
      --The University of Miami is the largest private employer in Miami-
            Dade County with 10,157 employees and 6th largest employer
            overall and has an economic impact of $3.9 billion a year and
            37,000 employment positions in the community.
      --The University of Washington is the 3rd largest employer in the
            state of Washington and has a $3.4 billion impact.
      --The University of North Carolina at Wilmington is the 3rd largest
            employer in the area and is a $400 million annual benefit to an
            eight county area.
      --The University of California at Berkeley is the 3rd largest
            employer in the Bay area and generates $1.4 billion annually in
            the Bay area.
      --Tulane University is the largest private employer in the New
            Orleans metropolitan area and the 5th largest private employer
            in Louisiana with an $842 million annual economic impact on the
            City of New Orleans and an annual economic impact of $1.12
            billion on the state of Louisiana.
      --The University of Alaska at Fairbanks is the largest civilian
            employer in the Tanana Valley.
        In addition, many universities operate medical schools which
    provide essential clinical services to the residents of their
    communities and adjacent areas.
        In the past decade, disasters have affected university and college
    campuses with increasing frequency. For most universities, damage that
    results in closure of four weeks or more would result in canceling a
    semester with devastating consequences for the school, the students and
    the community.
        Many recent events underscore the need for the program: the loss of
    many years of research at the Texas Medical Center as result of
    flooding from Tropical Storm Allison; the earthquake damage to the
    University of California at Northridge and the University of California
    at Los Angeles; the facility damage and loss of life at the University
    of Maryland as result of a tornado; hurricane damage to the University
    of North Carolina at Wilmington; the earthquake damage to the
    University of Washington at Seattle; and the declaration by the FBI
    that our universities are ``soft' targets for terrorists.
    Status of the Program
        Congress directed in the fiscal year 2003 Appropriations Bill for
    FEMA that $500,000 was to be available to the six existing DRUs and
    $100,000 each was to be available for at least six new ones to start
    the process. On December 31, 2003, FEMA published a Notice of Funds
    Availability (NOFA) for grant applications. The funds were from the
    PreDisaster Mitigation Fund.
        Forty-four universities and four consortia applied by the March
    2004 deadline. Applications were received from six Historic Black
    Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and one tribal school. Applications
    were received from universities located in nine of the ten FEMA
    regions.
        In October 2004 FEMA announced twenty-four colleges and
    universities had been selected to join the six pilots in the program.
    Those universities are as follows: Radford University (VA), Virginia
    State University, Virginia Tech, Florida Agricultural & Mechanical
    University, Florida International University, University System of
    Georgia, University of Louisville (KY), University of Mississippi,
    Horry-Georgetown Tech (SC), University of Memphis (TN), University of
    Akron (OH) Southern University (LA), University of New Orleans (LA),
    University of Central Oklahoma, Texas State Technical College, Texas
    University-Medical Center, Metropolitan Community College (MO),
    University of Colorado at Boulder, North Dakota State University,
    Sitting Bull College (ND), San Jose State University (CA), University
    of Southern California, University of Nevada-Reno, and the University
    of Oregon. These colleges and universities received Federal grants
    ranging from $31,000 to $100,000. The institutions are providing 25
    percent of the cost.
        The applications for the fiscal year 2003 funding for the pilots
    and the new schools had layers of requirements and were very time
    consuming. One of the new schools indicated that over 150 hours of
    staff time was required to complete the application for $100,000.
    However, the colleges and universities seeking to enter the program and
    obtain a grant put forth the effort and accepted the responsibilities
    of a rigorous planning and risk analysis process because of the
    incentive to become part of the separate DRU program and to be eligible
    for yearly grants of $500,000 to implement mitigation projects. In
    addition the colleges and universities expected to be mentored by other
    universities and guided by FEMA.
        However, FEMA guidance for the PreDisaster Mitigation Program (PDM)
    issued in October 2004 for the combined 2004 and 2005 PDM grant cycles
    indicated that FEMA was not continuing the DRU as a separate program
    and recommended that colleges and universities apply for projects in
    the nationally competitive PDM program. Given the great benefit to FEMA
    and the Nation from such a small investment, this was a great
    disappointment to the pilots and to the new selections. Public and
    private nonprofit colleges and universities were already eligible
    applicants for the nationally competitive PDM program. Receiving a
    single grant for one hurricane shuttering project, one drainage
    improvement, or one earthquake retrofit is very helpful, but it is not
    a substitute for a comprehensive, multiyear program.
        Given the many challenges facing our universities, it is difficult
    to compete for attention and money for disaster preparedness and
    mitigation when there is not an immediate threat. However, designation
    as a Disaster Resistant University has real value. The pilot
    universities found that the designation as a Disaster Resistant
    University and the expectation of continuing to participate in the
    program brought attention and commitment at the highest levels of the
    universities. The networking and partnerships built with Federal,
    State, and local emergency management officials and other entities
    serving the public, such as hospitals and utilities, have benefits to
    the communities far beyond the scope of the original program and
    certainly way beyond the amount of the grants. Participating in the
    program created a framework for disaster planning and mitigation
    activities that helped universities focus and enhance efforts to
    protect their students, faculty, staff, vital research, and facilities.
    Two of the great values of the program which should not be overlooked
    have been the mentoring and exchanging of ideas among participating
    universities and the pilots spreading the FEMA mitigation message as
    they share their experiences at many different national and regional
    meetings of educational institutions.
        We again thank you for the opportunity to provide written comments
    and respectfully urge that the DRU program be continued. A summary of
    previous Congressional interest in this program is attached. We would
    welcome the opportunity to provide additional information or to discuss
    the program further with your staff.
    Summary of Congressional Interest
        We very much appreciate the support Congress has given this
    program.
    Fiscal Year 2002
        The Conference Report on the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies
    Appropriations bill for 2002 (House Report 107-272) contained the
    following language:
        The conferees believe that many of the Nation's universities are
    vulnerable to disaster and urge FEMA to continue its Disaster Resistant
    University program and expand the scope to include safe-guarding
    university assets from acts of terrorism.
    Fiscal Year 2003
        The Conference Report on the fiscal year 2003 Omnibus bill in the
    FEMA section of the VA, HUD and Independent Agencies stated the
    following:
        The conferees are in agreement that FEMA should continue the
    Disaster Resistant University program and direct FEMA to carry out the
    direction contained in House Report 107-740.
        House Report 107-740 stated the following:
        Finally, the Committee notes that in September of 2000 FEMA
    selected five universities to join the University of California at
    Berkeley in the pilot phase of the Disaster Resistant University
    program: University of Alaska/Fairbanks, University of Miami,
    University of North Carolina/Wilmington, Tulane University, and
    University of Washington/Seattle. The purpose of the program is to help
    the Nation's colleges and universities facing the threat of natural
    disasters to assess their vulnerabilities and find ways to protect
    their research, facilities and the lives of students, faculty and
    staff. The Committee directs FEMA to continue the Disaster Resistant
    University Program with grants of $500,000 to each of the six pilot
    Disaster Resistant Universities and $100,000 each to at least six
    additional universities, including at least one HBCU, to join the
    program.
    Fiscal Year 2004
        The Senate Report on the Department of Homeland Security
    Appropriations bill (S. Report 108-86) included the following language
    under the National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund which was funded at
    $150,000,000.
        The Committee encourages the Department to continue the existing
    Disaster Resistant University program at the fiscal year 2003 level.
        The House receded to the Senate in the conference agreement.
                                     ______

      Prepared Statement of the Upper Mississippi River Basin Association

        The Upper Mississippi River Basin Association (UMRBA) is the
    organization created in 1981 by the Governors of Illinois, Iowa,
    Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin to serve as a forum for coordinating
    the five States' river-related programs and policies and for
    collaborating with Federal agencies on regional water resource issues.
    As such, the UMRBA has an interest in the budgets for the U.S. Coast
    Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
        Both the Coast Guard and the FEMA have vital functions specifically
    related to homeland security that must be adequately funded. But both
    also have other traditional missions that are equally important to
    public health and safety, economic well-being, and environmental
    protection. For the Coast Guard, these include activities such as aids
    to navigation, vessel and facility inspections, emergency response, and
    mariner licensing. For FEMA, key traditional missions include the
    National Flood Insurance Program, flood map modernization, hazard
    mitigation, and response to floods and other natural disasters. Nowhere
    are these services more important than on the Upper Mississippi River
    System, which supports a vital link in the inland waterway
    transportation system, some of the Nation's most productive
    agricultural land, population centers ranging from small towns to major
    metropolitan areas, and a nationally significant ecosystem.

                         COAST GUARD OPERATING EXPENSES

        A continuing priority for the UMRBA is the Coast Guard's Operating
    Expenses account. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposal
    includes $5.55 billion for this account, an increase of almost 8
    percent from the fiscal year 2005 enacted level. However, this net
    increase of $390 million for Operating Expenses will be largely
    consumed by specific increases tied to implementation of the Maritime
    Transportation Security Act (MTSA); increased personnel costs; and
    operating costs for new vessels, aircraft, and facilities related to
    the Coast Guard's saltwater responsibilities. These initiatives are
    important in their own right and will benefit a range of Coast Guard
    missions. However, it is also true that the Coast Guard's non-security
    missions on the Nation's inland waterways will be under continued
    strain as the inflation-adjusted resources for many of these missions
    remain static or shrink.
        When the Department of Homeland Security was formed, the UMRBA
    strongly supported the Coast Guard's stated objective of sustaining
    traditional missions near their pre-9/11 levels. These traditional
    missions are critical to the safe, efficient operation of the Upper
    Mississippi River and the rest of the inland river system. Under these
    mission areas, the Coast Guard maintains navigation channel markers,
    regulates a wide range of commercial vessels in the interest of crew
    and public safety, and responds to spills and other incidents. The
    beneficiaries include not only commercial vessel operators, but also
    recreational boaters; farmers and others who ship materials by barge;
    and the region's citizens, who benefit enormously from the river as a
    nationally significant economic and environmental resource.
        Even prior to September 11, recent years had brought a number of
    changes to the way the Coast Guard operates on the inland river system,
    including elimination of the Second District; closure of the Director
    of Western Rivers Office; decommissioning the Sumac, which was the
    largest buoy tender on the Upper Mississippi River; and staff
    reductions. While the States understand the need for efficiency, the
    cumulative impacts of these changes must be carefully monitored,
    particularly in light of the increased demands that we are now placing
    on the personnel and assets that remain in the region. The UMRBA is
    quite concerned that staff reductions and resource constraints have
    combined to impair the Coast Guard's ability to serve as an effective,
    proactive partner.
        Specifically, increased security demands have reduced the staff
    assigned to vessel inspections and limited the Coast Guard's
    investigation of reported spills. Sending a single person to conduct
    vessel inspections reduces the rigor of those inspections, and, in a
    worst case scenario, potentially puts the inspector at risk. Similarly,
    electing not to respond to reports of small spills means some of these
    spills will go uninvestigated and puts increased demands on local
    officials, who do not have the Coast Guard's expertise or resources.
    Moreover, it could result in costly delays should a spill turn out to
    be larger than first reported, an all-too-common occurrence. Temporary
    adjustments initially made to accommodate immediate security needs are
    now evolving into long term standard operating procedures. While
    everyone recognizes the need to adjust to our new security environment,
    it is essential for the Coast Guard to retain the capacity to perform
    its traditional missions on the Upper Mississippi River. Toward that
    end, the UMRBA supports the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request
    for the Coast Guard's Operating Expenses account, and urges Congress to
    ensure that sufficient resources from within this account are allocated
    to the Coast Guard's inland river work.
    Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
        Through its Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
    program, the Coast Guard conducts cutting edge research in several
    critical areas, including oil spill prevention and response, risk
    assessment, and mariner safety. Of particular note, researchers at the
    Coast Guard's Groton, Connecticut Research and Development Center have
    made invaluable contributions to State-of-the-art fast water spill
    response, in situ burning, and human error reduction. However, the
    President is once again proposing to shift the Coast Guard's RDT&E
    funding to the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology
    (S&T) Directorate. This proposal represents precisely the kind of
    diminution of the Coast Guard's non-security missions with which the
    UMRBA and others have repeatedly expressed concern. Research on
    innovative oil spill recovery equipment or new methods for combating
    crew fatigue will likely be lost in the department-wide S&T
    Directorate, with its overwhelming focus on homeland security issues.
    Moreover, the President's proposal appears to be inconsistent with
    Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act, which calls for ``the
    authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform
    its missions . . . [to] be maintained intact.'' The UMRBA urges
    Congress to provide adequate and direct funding of approximately $24
    million to the Coast Guard's multi-mission RDT&E program in fiscal year
    2006. This is the amount the Administration suggests the Coast Guard
    would receive from the S&T Directorate's competitive funds in fiscal
    year 2006, and is a $5.5 million increase over the fiscal year 2005
    RDT&E appropriation.

    Reserve Training
        The President is requesting $119 million for Coast Guard Reserve
    Training in fiscal year 2006, an increase of $6 million, or 5 percent,
    over the fiscal year 2005 enacted level. The UMRBA States are keenly
    aware of the importance of the reserve forces. During major flood
    events on the inland rivers, reservists have consistently provided
    exemplary service, augmenting the Coast Guard's capabilities and
    helping to protect public health and safety. More recently, many
    reservists have been called to active duty, enabling the Coast Guard to
    meet many new security-related demands. On the inland rivers, this has
    included increased patrols near critical facilities and development of
    security plans for key inland ports. The UMRBA urges Congress to fund
    Reserve Training at $119 million in fiscal year 2006, thereby helping
    to maintain a Coast Guard reserve that can effectively execute both
    homeland security- and natural disaster-related missions.

    Boating Safety Grants
        The Coast Guard's boating safety grants to the States have a proven
    record of success. The Upper Mississippi is a river where all types of
    recreational craft routinely operate in the vicinity of 15-barge tows,
    making boating safety all the more important. As levels of both
    recreational and commercial traffic continue to grow, so too does the
    potential for user conflicts.
        Boat safety training and law enforcement are key elements of
    prevention. However, the future of this successful grants program is
    uncertain. Following the pattern of recent years, the President has
    requested $59 million in fiscal year 2006 funding for boating safety
    grants to the States. This is the amount historically authorized
    without annual appropriation from the Boat Safety Account, which is
    funded by a tax on fuel for recreational motor boats. Successive
    Administrations have not typically exercised their option to request an
    additional $13 million in annual appropriations for the grants.
    However, the authority for the funding from the Boat Safety Account
    must be extended if the program is to continue in fiscal year 2006.
    Such a provision is currently being considered as part of pending
    transportation legislation. The UMRBA urges prompt reauthorization of
    the Boating Safety Program, and funding of this important work at $72
    million annually.

        FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
                             RESPONSE DIRECTORATE)

    Hazard Mitigation
        UMRBA is particularly interested in FEMA programs that help
    mitigate future flood hazards. Mitigation, which is the ongoing effort
    to reduce or eliminate the impact of disasters like floods, can include
    measures such as relocating homes or community facilities off the
    floodplain, elevating structures, and practicing sound land use
    planning. Mitigation planning and projects are essential to reducing
    the Nation's future disaster assistance costs. Given the importance of
    mitigation, UMRBA supports the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant
    program, which was created in fiscal year 2003 and for which the
    President is requesting $150 million in fiscal year 2006. While the PDM
    grant program is still relatively new, it holds promise for enhancing
    communities' ability to prevent future damages, particularly in areas
    that have not experienced a major disaster and thus have not had access
    to post-disaster mitigation assistance through the Disaster Relief
    Fund. In addition, pre-disaster mitigation assistance is an effective
    means of meeting the ongoing need in all communities to plan for future
    floods and reduce their vulnerability before the next flood disaster.
        In fiscal year 2003, forty communities in the five Upper
    Mississippi River Basin States received PDM competitive grants,
    totaling $3.4 million. While most were relatively small planning
    grants, funding was also provided for acquisitions, safe rooms, and
    electric utility protection. The application period for the second
    round of grants (fiscal year 2004-2005 combined) just ended. While
    there have been concerns expressed about the complexities of the
    competitive process, there is no doubt that communities need such
    grants to help them develop effective mitigation plans and reduce the
    impacts of floods. Thus UMRBA supports the President's fiscal year 2006
    funding request of $150 million for the PDM program.

    Flood Map Modernization
        Flood maps are not only used to determine risk-based National Flood
    Insurance Program premium rates, but also provide the basis for local
    regulation of flood hazard areas and for State and local disaster
    response planning. However, current flood maps are rapidly becoming
    obsolete due to the effects of land use changes in the watersheds. When
    outdated maps underestimate flood depths, it can often lead to
    floodplain development in high risk areas. It is therefore important
    that flood maps be updated on an ongoing basis and in a timely way.
        The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposes $200 million for
    FEMA's Flood Map Modernization program. While funding for flood maps
    has increased substantially since the Map Modernization initiative
    began in fiscal year 2003, there are growing concerns about the
    adequacy of the original time and cost estimates. For instance,
    producing updated and accurate maps often requires that new studies be
    conducted. However, the existing map modernization budget is only
    sufficient to fund actual mapping costs and will not adequately cover
    the costs of necessary associated tasks, such as new flood elevation
    studies or levee certifications. Given that mapping needs are being
    prioritized based on population, rather than flood risk or need, it is
    not clear when relatively sparsely populated counties along the
    Mississippi River will be mapped. Ironically, the Federal Government,
    through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, recently spent approximately
    $17 million to develop new flood profiles for the Upper Mississippi and
    Lower Missouri Rivers. Unfortunately this updated information cannot be
    fully utilized until sufficient funding is made available to modernize
    and digitize the flood maps for river communities. Thus, the UMRBA
    urges Congress to provide adequate funding for map modernization,
    including sufficient funding to develop new maps for the Upper
    Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers based on the new flood profiles.

           LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PREPARED STATEMENTS

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Aguirre, Eduardo, Jr., Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
      Services, Department of Homeland Security......................     1
        Prepared Statement of........................................    32
        Statement of.................................................    30
    Albright, Dr. Penrose C., Assistant Secretary for Science and
      Technology, Department of Homeland Security....................   349
        Prepared Statement of........................................   353
        Questions Submitted to.......................................   400
        Statements of................................................   351
    Allard, Senator Wayne, U.S. Senator From Colorado, Statement of..   147
    American Public Transportation Association, Prepared Statement of   435
    Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., Prepared
      Statement of...................................................   439

    Bonner, Robert C., Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection,
      Department of Homeland Security................................     1
        Prepared Statement of........................................    18
        Statement of.................................................    15
    Byrd, Senator Robert C., U.S. Senator From West Virginia:
        Letter From..................................................     5
        Questions Submitted by............................99, 229, 416, 429
        Statements of...........................................3, 136, 350

    Chertoff, Michael, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security....   117
        Prepared Statement of........................................   121
        Statements of................................................   120
    City of San Marcos, Texas, Prepared Statement of.................   442
    Clerici, John M., Esq., Partner, McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP...   388
        Prepared Statement of........................................   391
        Statement of.................................................   388
    Coalition of Northeastern Governors, Prepared Statement of.......   443
    Cochran, Senator Thad, U.S. Senator From Mississippi:
        Prepared Statement of........................................   155
        Questions Submitted by......................................48, 218
        Statements of................................................1, 359
    Craig, Senator Larry, U.S. Senator From Idaho, Statement of......   140

    Domenici, Senator Pete V., U.S. Senator From New Mexico:
        Questions Submitted by.................................90, 221, 413
        Statement of.................................................   151

    Feinstein, Senator Dianne, U.S. Senator From California,
      Statement of...................................................   138
    Franz, Dr. David, Chief Biological Scientist, The Midwest
      Research Ins-
      titute.........................................................   376
        Prepared Statement of........................................   378

    Garcia, Michael J., Assistant Secretary, Immigration and Customs
      Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security...................     1
        Prepared Statement of........................................    10
        Statement of.................................................     8
    Greater Orlando Aviation Authority, Prepared Statement of........   443
    Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire:
        Opening Statements of......................................117, 349
        Questions Submitted by................................163, 400, 421

    Inouye, Senator Daniel K., U.S. Senator From Hawaii, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................   111
    International Association of Emergency Managers, Prepared
      Statement of...................................................   445

    Kohl, Senator Herb, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin, Statement of....   153

    Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator From Vermont:
        Questions Submitted by.....................................113, 341
        Statement of.................................................     2

    Murray, Senator Patty, U.S. Senator From Washington:
        Prepared Statement of........................................   145
        Questions Submitted by.......................................   344
        Statement of.................................................   142

    National:
        Emergency Management Association, Prepared Statement of......   447
        Flood Determination Association, Prepared Statement of.......   452

    Ohio Department of Chiefs of Police, Inc., Prepared Statement of.   453

    Read, J. Leighton, M.D., General Partner, Alloy Ventures.........   382
        Prepared Statement of........................................   386

    Sarnoff Corporation, Prepared Statement of.......................   396
    Shelby, Senator Richard C., U.S. Senator From Alabama, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................    91
    Simonson, Stewart, J.D., Assistant Secretary, Office of Public
      Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and
      Human Services.................................................   359
        Prepared Statement of........................................   361
        Questions Submitted to.......................................   421
    Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Questions
      Submitted by...................................................   428
    Stevens, Senator Ted, U.S. Senator From Alaska, Questions
      Submitted by..................................................89, 219

    University of Miami, Prepared Statement of.......................   459
    Upper Mississippi River Basin Association, Prepared Statement of.   462

                                 SUBJECT INDEX

                                  ----------

                        DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                                                                       Page
    Absconders and Violators of Release Orders and Return Orders.....   150
    Accomplishments in Biodefense....................................   351
    Additional Committee Questions.............................48, 162, 400
    Advance Appropriation............................................   372
    Agricultural Inspections.........................................   169
    Air:
        And Marine Operations--Recapitalization......................    75
        Cargo........................................................   285
            Security.................................................   175
        Carrier Fees.................................................   288
        Traveler Satisfaction........................................   188
    Airborne Rapid Imaging for Emergency Support.....................   326
    Airport Security.................................................   148
    All:
        Hazards......................................................   313
        State Minumum................................................   342
    Alternatives to Detention........................................    35
    America's Shield Initiative.....................................72, 105
    AMO Fleet Modernization Plan.....................................   274
    Anthrax..........................................................   360
    Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Collections......................    37
    APHIS--Food Safety Inspectors....................................   274
    Arizona Border Control Initiative................................    67
    Assessments and Evaluations......................................   337
    Asylum and Expedited Removal.....................................    68
    Attrition Rate...................................................   310
    Automated:
        Commercial Environment.......................................    74
        Identification System........................................   305
    Automation/Information Technology................................    26
    Aviation Security..............................................156, 218
    Avoiding Future Fund Lapses......................................   231
    Background on GSA Basic Purchasing Agreement With IMC............   135
    Backlog:
        Elimination..................................................    31
        Reduction Plan...............................................    81
    Backscatter Technology...........................................   154
    Base Decreases...................................................   289
    Best Practices...................................................   326
    Biodefense.......................................................   353
    Biological or Chemical Attack....................................   350
    Bioshield........................................................   349
    Bioterrorism and Cooperative Efforts.............................   373
    BioWatch:
        Detection....................................................   417
        Response.....................................................   417
    Border:
        Needs:
            Security Updgrades at Ports..............................   221
            UAV Technology...........................................   221
        Patrol................................................110, 138, 343
            Agent Staffing Increases.................................    40
            Aircraft Replacement.....................................    47
            Apprehensions............................................   109
            Checkpoints..............................................   114
            Stationing of Agents.....................................   110
            Vehicles.................................................    98
        Personnel:
            Manpower.................................................   222
            Training at FLETC........................................   222
        Problems.....................................................   141
        Security....................................................95, 271
    Budget:
        Amendment....................................................   137
        Issues.......................................................     9
        Request......................................................   367
            For Fiscal Year 2006.....................................    13
        Shortfalls and Increased Staffing for the Border Patrol......     2
    Buffer Zone Protection Plans.....................................   335
    C-130Js..........................................................   308
    C-TPAT...........................................................   278
    Call Centers.....................................................    89
    Cargo:
        Container Security...........................................   271
        Security...................................................144, 344
        Supply Chain Security........................................    18
    CBP Response.....................................................     7
    Cell Technology Versus Culture Technology........................   371
    Cerro Grande Fire Claims.........................................   329
    Challenges.......................................................    12
    Chemical:
        And Biological:
            Agents...................................................   366
            Detection Program........................................   413
        Countermeasures..............................................   420
        Detectors..................................................367, 416
        Security.....................................................   333
    Chief Information Officer........................................   260
    CIS Local Ombudsman..............................................   100
    Citizens Corp....................................................   326
    Citizenship and Immigration Services Funding.....................   115
    Classified vs. Sensitive Information.............................   231
    Coast Guard:
        C-130........................................................   211
        Support of NSF Research Operations in the Polar Regions......   306
    Collection of:
        Antidumping and Countervailing Duties........................   279
        Duties.......................................................   106
    Communication:
        And Technology Systems.......................................   213
        With ICE Employees...........................................     9
    Comprehensive:
        Border Control Strategy......................................    17
        Review of the Department.....................................   163
    Concerns of Employees............................................   257
    Consulting With Congress.........................................   262
    Container Security...............................................   105
        Initiative: Expansion and Regularization.....................   103
    Continued Funding Shortfalls--ICE................................    48
    Contract Employees...............................................   337
    Contracting Out Report...........................................   232
    Covert Surveillance Aircraft.....................................   305
    Creating a 21st Century Department...............................   132
    Critical Infrastructure Protection...............................   199
    Cross-Cutting Functions and Integration..........................   122
    Customer Service.................................................    82
    Customs:
        And Border Protection--The Second Year.......................    19
        Trade Partnership Against Terrorism..........................    72
    Cyber Crimes.....................................................   284
    Debt Management Center...........................................   114
    Deepwater........................................................   209
        Budget.......................................................   295
        Program Management...........................................   298
    Default of a Surety Company......................................    39
    Demonstration of Ideas by People.................................   372
    Department of Homeland Security:
        And BioShield................................................   401
        BioWatch, and Detection of Events............................   404
        ``Branding'' Not Completed...................................   277
        Headquarters.................................................   231
        Intelligence.................................................
            Mission..................................................   198
            Role.....................................................   158
        Reports Due..................................................   260
        Role in Detection Equipment..................................   405
    Departmental Reorganization......................................   166
    Detailees to the:
        Department...................................................   235
        White House..................................................   233
    Detention:
        And Removal..................................................    10
        Bedspace.....................................................   101
        Facilities...................................................   282
    Domestic Nuclear Detection Office..............................192, 418
    Drug Trafficking.................................................   229
    Electronic Surveillance..........................................   135
        Along the Border.............................................   119
    Emergency Response Fund..........................................   311
    Emerging:
        Checkpoint Explosives Technology.............................   292
        Issues.......................................................   156
    EMS First Responder Funding......................................   317
    Expedited:
        Removal......................................................   150
        Traveler Expanding Overseas..................................   269
    F2B Preference Visa Petition.....................................   112
    Federal:
        Air Marshals.................................................    78
            Service..................................................    10
        Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)......................   216
        Protective Service...........................................    80
    FEMA Personnel...................................................   330
    Financial and Procurement Controls...............................   208
    FIRE Grant Funding...............................................   314
    First Responders (General).......................................   343
    Fiscal Year:
        2004 Workload Statistics.....................................    16
        2005 Accomplishments.........................................   125
        2006 Budget Request.................................9, 30, 119, 128
            Enhancements.............................................    13
            For Citizenship and Immigration Services.................     3
    Fisheries Enforcement............................................   219
    Flood Map Modernization..........................................   328
    Foreign:
        And Domestic Repair Station Inspections......................   294
        Student Visas................................................   154
    Fugitive Operations..............................................    78
    Funding:
        For First Responders.........................................   172
        Issue........................................................     4
    Global Supply Chain Security.....................................   169
    H2B Visa Program.................................................     3
    Hammer Training..................................................   345
    Hazard Mitigation................................................   327
    Hazardous Materials Endorsement for Commerical Driver's License..   293
    Health and Human Services and BioShield..........................   421
    Hearings on the PATRIOT Act......................................   261
    HH-65 Helicopter Re-engining.....................................   211
    Hiring Journalists...............................................   249
    Homeland Secure Data Network.....................................   166
    Human:
        Resources....................................................   207
        Smuggling....................................................    81
    I-91 Checkpoint..................................................    41
    I-Staff..........................................................   206
    IA's Role in Intelligence Community..............................   331
    IAIP:
        Coordination of Protection...................................   202
        Hiring Difficulities.........................................   200
    ICE:
        CBP Merger...................................................   344
        Cyber Crime Center...........................................    89
        Hiring in Fiscal Year 2006...................................    39
        Response.....................................................     7
    IDENT/IAFIS......................................................   272
        Integration..................................................   273
        Update.......................................................   106
    Illegal Immigrants..............................................92, 279
    Immigration......................................................   118
        Advisory Program.............................................    71
        And Customs Enforcement......................................   341
        Enforcement..................................................   101
        Officers in Local USCIS Offices..............................   111
        Services.....................................................    89
    Impact of:
        Bush Amnesty on Backlog Reduction/Workload...................    99
        ICE Budget Shortfall.........................................   102
        Late Duty Collection on Crawfish Industry....................   104
        Networking...................................................   152
        REAL ID on Backlog Reduction/Workload........................   271
    Implementation of the Visa Reform Act............................    45
    Imported Shrimp Industry.........................................    98
    Improvement in Customer Service..................................    31
    Improving:
        Airport Security.............................................   154
        National Preparedness and Response...........................   130
    Indemnification..................................................   399
    Independent Review of Collective Bargaining Disputes.............   257
    Information Concerning the PATRIOT Act...........................   261
    Initial Preliminary Orders in Liquidation........................    39
    Institutional Removal Program....................................    79
    Integration of CBP Air and Marine Assets.........................    47
    Intelligence.....................................................   118
        Reform:
            Act/Border Patrol Staff Increases........................    44
            And Terrorism Prevention Act.............................     4
            Bill Authorizations......................................   249
    International Partnerships.......................................   163
    Interoperability:
        Communications...............................................   315
        Standards....................................................   315
    Interoperable Communications.....................................   174
    Introduction:
        And Overview.................................................    18
        Of Diseases From Other Countries.............................   374
    Investigations:
        And Intelligence.............................................    10
        Of Arms Export Control Act Violations........................   102
    IT issues........................................................   118
    L1 Visa Inter-Agency Task Force..................................    45
    Lack of:
        BioShield Funding for RAD/NUC Response.......................   429
        Funding for Border Security..................................   270
    Land Port of Entry...............................................    90
    Law Enforcement Support Center...................................2, 114
    Legal Orientation Programs.......................................   115
    Leveraging Technology............................................   131
    LIFE Act.........................................................   111
    Lobbying Rules...................................................   229
    Management and:
        Administration...............................................   336
        Staffing.....................................................   165
    Mandatory Termination With No Outside Review.....................   258
    Maritime:
        Security Cutter--Large Operational Costs.....................   309
        Transportation Security Act Implementation...................   299
    Measures for Determining Budgets.................................   284
    Meeting:
        Our Twin Goals: Building More Secure and More Efficient
          Borders....................................................    21
        With Unions..................................................   261
    Merging CBP and ICE..............................................   272
    Merit System Protection Board (MSPB).............................   257
    Movement of Resources............................................   157
    NAC..............................................................   208
    National:
        Bio and Agrodefense Facility.................................   420
        Border Security Assessment...................................   101
        Center for Critical Information Processing and Storage.......   219
        Preparedness Goal............................................   170
        Response Planning............................................   311
        Security Mission.............................................    31
    Need for Additional Assistance From the Subcommittee.............   162
    New:
        Mexico Capabilities--Training at Playas......................   222
        Office of Screening Coordination and Operations..............    41
        Products to Protect Against Bioterrorism Acts................   368
    NOAA Weather Radios..............................................   340
    Non-Profit Grant Funding.........................................   316
    NonGovernmental Screening Group..................................   372
    Northern Border:
        Air Wing.....................................................   346
        Prosecutions.................................................   346
        Security.....................................................   346
    Number of Border Patrol Agents Needed............................   133
    Observations Regarding the Department of Homeland Security.......   151
    Office of:
        Citizenship..................................................    84
        Fraud Detection and National Security........................    82
        Screening Coordination and Operations........................   167
            Mission..................................................    44
            (9/11 Commission Recommendation).........................    65
        Security.....................................................   204
    One Face at the Border...........................................    16
    1-800 Customer Service Numbers...................................   112
    Operation Predator...............................................    91
    Other:
        Concerns.....................................................   119
        Traditional Missions.........................................    27
    Overhead Cost Sharing............................................    78
    Overtime:
        Pay While Receiving Training.................................   104
        Rate.........................................................   310
    Overview of ICE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request..................    10
    Passenger Air Fees...............................................   285
    Passport Privacy.................................................   271
    Pay:
        For Performance..............................................   259
        Increase.....................................................   310
    Personnel Concerns...............................................   119
    Port Security..................................................143, 344
        Assessments..................................................   304
        Estimates....................................................   304
        Grant:
            Coordination.............................................   317
            Program..................................................   304
    Port/Rail/Transit................................................   313
    Ports of Entry in Vermont........................................   113
    Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants...................................   330
    Pre-Packaged News................................................   286
    Preparation for Biological Attack................................   160
    Private:
        Screeners....................................................   293
        Sector Interest in BioShield.................................   430
    Progress Since March 2003........................................    30
    Protecting Americans.............................................   361
    Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis.....................................   276
    R&D Consolidation................................................   191
    Radiological/Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex.   419
    Rapid Prototyping................................................   411
    Recruiting.......................................................   308
    Regions Initiative...............................................   205
    Registered Traveler..............................................   295
    Repatriation Program With Mexicans...............................   150
    Requirements Gap.................................................   300
    Research and:
        Development................................................213, 310
        Technology:
            Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).................   228
            Generally................................................   225
            NISAC....................................................   227
    Review of ICE Accomplishments....................................    11
    Revolutionizing the Borders......................................   128
    Risk:
        Based Approach...............................................   125
        Of Liability.................................................   399
    Role of Science and Technology Directorate.......................   194
    Rudeness of Customs Employees....................................   148
    S&T:
        Directorate's Interagency Collaboration......................   352
        University Partnership Program...............................   197
    SAFETY Act.......................................................   409
    Satisfaction With Status Quo Budget..............................   150
    Science & Technology Directorate and:
        Integrated Biosurveillance...................................   401
        Standards....................................................   407
    Screening Workforce Performance..................................   287
    SeaTac Airport...................................................   347
    Second Stage Review..............................................   122
    Section 605 of Vision 100........................................   288
    Secure:
        Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program
          (SENTRI)...................................................    71
        Flight.......................................................   262
            And Privacy..............................................   264
            Movement to SCO..........................................   264
    Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America.............   259
    Shelf Sensitive Vaccines.........................................   370
    Significant ICE Achievements.....................................     8
    SIPRINET.........................................................   309
    Six-Month Average for Processing Benefits Applications...........    37
    Slow Pace of Grant Distributions.................................   312
    Southwest Border Control.........................................   139
    Stabilization of Senior Management...............................   161
    Staffing........................................................85, 282
        Model........................................................    60
    Status of:
         Security of the United States 2 Years After the
          Establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.......     6
        Technology in Use on the Borders and Detention Space.........   134
    Status Quo Budget Request........................................   149
    Stepped up Enforcement Along the Border..........................   142
    Strategic:
        Approach to Addressing Medical Countermeasure Gaps...........   362
        National Stockpile Today.....................................   362
    Strengthening Law Enforcement....................................   129
    Supply Chain and Container Security..............................   271
    System:
        That Monitor Supply of Pharmaceutical Products...............   369
        Weaknesses...................................................   365
    Tasking the FLRA and MSPB........................................   258
    Technology Transfer..............................................   317
    Temporary Worker Program.........................................   142
        And Backlog Elimination Program..............................    97
    Terrorist Travel (9/11 Commission Report)........................    65
    Thefts of Luggage of Passengers..................................   158
    Threats in Order of Priority.....................................   397
    TOPOFF Exercise..................................................   161
    Trade/Travel Facilitation........................................    17
    Training of:
        Border Patrol Agents.........................................   134
        CBP Inspectors...............................................   108
        Supervisors..................................................   258
    Transportation of Butant Stoves (Without Butane) on Airplanes....   219
    TSA............................................................118, 156
        Air Carrier Security Fees....................................   178
        Contract Screeners...........................................   179
        ``No Fly'' Lists/Secure Flight...............................   185
        Passenger Fees...............................................   177
        R&D..........................................................   295
        Screener Training............................................   182
        Spending Abuses..............................................   287
    TWIC Program--Why the Delay?.....................................   269
    UAVs.............................................................   220
    Unfair Trade Practices--Catfish Imports..........................    46
    University Centers of Excellence.................................   419
    US VISIT.......................................................168, 268
        When Will We Have a Real ``Exit'' Component?.................   267
    USCIS Response...................................................     7
    Use of:
        IDENT, IAFIS and US VISIT....................................   159
        Radiation Monitors...........................................    36
        Stolen Passports--Inspector General Report...................    68
        Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.....................................   276
    Vehicle Fleet Management Report..................................   274
    Vetted Traveler Programs.........................................    42
    Violating the DHS Appropriations Act.............................   341
    Visa:
        Overstays....................................................    92
        Security Unit................................................    76
        Waiver.......................................................   139
            Program: Further Extension...............................    99
    Visit to One of the Ports........................................   148
    War on Drugs--Historical.........................................   111
    Weapons of Mass Destruction Detection Technology.................    17
    White House Mail.................................................   310
    Worksite Enforcement............................................75, 284

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