[Senate Hearing 109-1104]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1104
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S AIRLINE PASSENGER
AND BAGGAGE SCREENING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 4, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
Kenneth R. Nahigian, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 4, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Ensign...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 34
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 43
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 47
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Witnesses
Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hawley, Hon. Edmond ``Kip,'' Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration........................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Principato, Gregory O., President, Airports Council
International--North America (ACI-NA); on behalf of the
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE).............. 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Appendix
Report (2005), entitled, ``Luggage Security--More Safety, Less
Hassle for American Travelers: a Private Sector Solution,'' by
Richard A. Altomare, Coalition for Luggage Security............ 55
Hawley, Hon. Edmund ``Kip'':
Written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye......... 72
Supplementary information.................................... 72
Miller, Hasbrouck B., Vice President of Government Affairs,
Smiths Detection, prepared statement........................... 68
Ripp, Thomas, President, Security and Detection Systems Division,
L-3 Communications, Inc., prepared statement................... 66
Sparapani, Timothy D., Legislative Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union, Washington Legislative Office, prepared
statement...................................................... 61
THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S AIRLINE PASSENGER
AND BAGGAGE SCREENING
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 4, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:19 a.m. in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. Let me welcome you to the Committee hearing
today. We appreciate your willingness to participate in our
review of TSA. This is the second in the series of hearings
held by this committee on aviation security. The first was
conducted on February 9, when the Committee examined two of
TSA's airline passenger non-physical prescreening programs, the
secured flight and registered traveler systems. That hearing
focused on the policy and management issues that have prevented
TSA from launching those programs and using intelligence in a
more integrated fashion.
The purpose of today's hearing will be to evaluate TSA's
physical screening of airline passengers and their baggage. The
hearing will focus generally on TSA's security checkpoint
screening processes, the agency's deployment of new screening
technologies, screener workforce issues, and TSA's procurement
processes.
It has been more than 4 years since Congress created TSA to
ensure, in part, the viability of commercial aviation as a
secure means of travel within the United States.
Well, I commend you, Mr. Hawley, for your tireless work
over the past year. We believe TSA has made significant strides
toward fulfilling a security mission. The agency is still
experiencing its share of growing pains. The agency has been
criticized for inconsistent screening policies, privacy
invasions at the checkpoint and search of baggage,
ineffectiveness in detection of explosives, and changes to its
carry-on prevented items list and excessive no-bid contracts.
Our committee wants to seek some information today from you
as witnesses regarding ways to make passenger screening
checkpoints more efficient, effective, without compromising
privacy. We want to seek TSA's vision for the checkpoint of the
future and review whether existing technologies can be
integrated to a single more effective portal that can be
applied in the short term.
This hearing will also focus on ways to reduce the
attrition and injury rate among the TSA screener force,
something that surprised me to hear about. But we look forward
to constructive dialogue with you today and I do hope the other
Senators will be here soon. Senator, do you have an opening
statement?
[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
We welcome each of the witnesses who appear before the Committee
today, and thank you for your willingness to participate in this
hearing.
Today represents the second in a series of hearings held by the
Committee on aviation security. The first hearing was conducted on
February 9, when the Committee examined two of TSA's airline passenger
non-physical pre-screening programs, Secure Flight and Registered
Traveler. That hearing focused on the policy and management issues that
have prevented TSA from launching those programs and using intelligence
in a more integrated fashion.
The purpose of today's hearing will be to evaluate TSA's physical
screening of airline passengers and their baggage. The hearing will
focus generally on TSA's security checkpoint screening processes, the
agency's deployment of new screening technologies, screener workforce
issues, and TSA's procurement processes.
It has been more than 4 years since Congress created TSA to ensure
in part the viability of commercial aviation as a secure means of
travel in the United States. While I commend Mr. Hawley for his
tireless work over the past year, and the significant strides TSA has
made toward fulfilling its security mission, the agency has experienced
its share of growing pains. The agency has been criticized for
inconsistent screening policies, privacy invasions at the checkpoint
and in the search of baggage, ineffectiveness in the detection of
explosives, changes to its carry-on prohibited items list, and
excessive no-bid contracts.
The Committee will seek answers today from the witnesses regarding
ways to make passenger screening checkpoints more efficient and
effective without compromising privacy. The Committee will seek TSA's
vision for the checkpoint of the future, and review whether existing
technologies can be integrated into a single, more effective, portal
that can be deployed in the short term. The hearing also will focus on
ways to reduce the attrition and injury rate among the TSA screener
force.
I look forward to a constructive dialogue with the witnesses.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Ensign. I'll just make a 30 second statement, Mr.
Chairman. There are a lot of good TSA employees around the
country, we all deal with them. Often the unfortunate part of
the whole system is that the terrorists are winning simply
because of the amount of time that we all spend in airports.
With all the extra time spent in line, we have to design better
systems. The current system works the vast majority of the time
and is a reasonable inconvenience, which I think most people
are willing to put up with.
But then there are the peak times when the wait is half an
hour or 45 minutes or even an hour. Most of us travel through
Dulles periodically and we see it there, but other airports
around the country experience this as well. In Las Vegas,
McCarran Airport can really get backed up and when you spend
that amount of time in line, that just hurts the country. It
hurts the country and the overall economy. I think we have to
continue to work to make this whole process better. Not just by
improving screening technologies and performance, but by also
doing it in a much more efficient fashion.
The Chairman. Our first witness is Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley,
Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security
Administration. Let me say to all of you that your statements
will be printed in full in the record. We are not going to put
a time limit on you now, so give us as much as you think we
should hear of the statements, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND ``KIP'' HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hawley. Thank you Mr. Chairman and good morning and
Senator Ensign and other members.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on aviation
security and the physical screening of airline passengers and
baggage. I'm pleased also to appear with two of our key
partners at TSA, Cathy Berrick of GAO and Greg Principato of
ACI. I look forward to hearing their insights.
In my prepared remarks I outlined the many layers of
security that are in place to protect airline passengers. Each
of them, and I listed 15, is formidable. Each one of them by
itself is capable of stopping a terrorist attack. Together, as
one system, they have tremendous resilience against expected
and unexpected attack scenarios. Not only does each of the 15
security layers add to security, their combination multiplies
their security value, creating a much stronger system. Truly
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and together
they are formidable.
TSA is now in transition as the Chairman and Senator Ensign
mentioned at the beginning. We're moving from a startup mode,
when large scale acquisitions and hiring were needed to quickly
stand up the agency. We're becoming more nimble and flexible
and our needs are becoming more targeted. We face an ever-
changing threat and TSA must now adapt while we constantly
improve. TSA is approaching the challenge in three ways: one,
strengthen each individual layer; two, increase the number of
layers; and three, add additional flexibility and
unpredictability to the equation.
First, what are we doing to strengthen the most visible
layer, TSA passenger checkpoints? Increased and enhanced
security training for our TSO's, our front line security
officers, aimed at detecting IED components. Finding IED's at
the checkpoint is our number one goal and well-trained,
motivated TSO's significantly improve the effectiveness of the
system. The best technology we have is the human mind, and our
security process and training should be based at taking
advantage of the combined thinking power of everyone at every
level of TSA. Continued challenging training is the way to do
that.
Retain our core TSO's, who's experience and judgment
represent both our biggest investment and biggest payback. As
we increase TSO capability by training, it is even more
important to keep the excellent TSO's we have by creating a
stable, positive work environment. We are rolling out this week
some initial steps based on recommendations from TSOs that are
aimed at increasing retention of our critical front line
officers.
Give our Federal Security Directors more flexibility, both
in hiring and in designing the best security system for each
airport's unique environment. Having completed the massive
startup hiring needed to get TSA off the ground, we are giving
our airport FSD's the authority and the tools to hire locally.
This will help us with quality and improve retention as well.
Technology is a critical part of today's system and holds
the promise to make dramatic improvements over time. We're in
the process of testing new technologies, some of which are in
airports today. In order to get the big benefits we seek in
effectiveness and efficiency, in order to take our system up to
the next level, more needs to be done on detection, throughput,
and on the economic model itself.
What more can we do with layers? Deploy a new layer of
security, behavior observation, using existing resources and
budget. We've already tested this capability and it adds
considerable additional security while protecting our
constitutional guarantees. Improve identity verification
throughout the airport for passengers and workers. We are
working on using biometric ID's for all workers who have access
to secure parts of the airport, and we are working for improved
identity verification for passengers as well. I know that this
committee is well aware of the value of biometrics in security
work, and it has already given strong direction to TSA
regarding biometrics in ATSA, as well as regarding Registered
Traveler and TWIC.
Focus on explosives expertise as a core competence again,
with our existing resources. We've used professional Bomb
Appraisal Officers to train our TSO's, now we'd like to make
these BAO's available at checkpoints on a regular basis.
The addition of flexibility and unpredictability into our
security system is the most important new requirement for TSA.
This doesn't cost more money, but it does require a willingness
to change. It has been 4 years since we constructed the ATSA
required security system. I believe its biggest vulnerability
has been its predictability. Just as we can't depend on the
idea that terrorists would plan and train for 4 years to run
exactly the same attacks as they've done in the past, we can't
allow them the luxury of being able to make their plans knowing
exactly what defense they will face. We cannot sit back as a
good security system loses its effectiveness by becoming
static, rigid, and ultimately defeatable.
By refreshing our layers of security, building
unpredictability into our operations, deploying new technology
as it becomes ready, and getting the most out of our excellent
people, we can keep our security system flexible, dynamic,
unpredictable, and effective against attacks that we prepare
for or may not expect.
Thank you Mr. Chairman. I'd be happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Edmond ``Kip'' Hawley, Assistant Secretary,
Transportation Security Administration
Good morning Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, and
distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity
to speak with you about aviation security and to continue our dialogue
regarding improvements to physical screening of airline passengers and
baggage.
Created in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
Transportation Security Administration continues to pursue its vital
mission of protecting our Nation's transportation systems. With ATSA as
its statutory foundation, TSA has worked with the airlines, airports,
shipping industry, flight crews, law enforcement, and passengers to
take aviation security orders of magnitude beyond where it stood on 9/
11. Today, our challenge is to keep it fresh, to make our security
regime as flexible, dynamic, adaptable, and unpredictable as the enemy
we face.
When I appeared in December before this committee, I noted the
numerous independent layers of security that reinforce each other. The
recent classified GAO test demonstrated that an individual security
layer can probably be beaten; but, together, the layers of the security
network are formidable. Physical screening at the airport is only one
of these layers.
Aviation security begins well before a passenger arrives at the
airport.
1. U.S. Government agencies work with others around the globe
to identify and disrupt terrorist activities at their source.
2. Customs and Border Protection activities further identify
potential terrorists and bar their entry into the United
States.
3. Federal, state, and local law enforcement work together with
the FBI in Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States
to identify and disrupt terrorist activities within the U.S.
4. A No-Fly system is used to prevent anyone known to an agency
of the U.S. Government to be a threat to commit a terrorist act
from flying into or in the United States.
5. Airline flight crews and airport employees who have access
to an aircraft are subject to an even stricter vetting standard
than the No-Fly analysis.
These first five security elements mean that anybody known to U.S.
intelligence or law enforcement agencies as a terrorist or a close
terrorist associate never gets close to an airplane. But there is much
more.
6. An additional, risk-based computer-assisted pre-screening of
passengers is conducted before a boarding pass is issued.
7. Hundreds of canine teams and local law enforcement officers
are working at airports across the country to identify
suspicious articles or people.
8. Surveillance activities take place in and around the airport
environment on a daily basis.
All of this happens before a passenger even shows up at a TSA
checkpoint.
9. At the checkpoint, a professional, well-trained, experienced
team of Transportation Security Officers (TSO), assisted by
multiple technologies, screens passengers and their carry-on
bags for weapons and explosives.
10. In the baggage area, similarly well-trained, experienced
Transportation Security Officers use a variety of technologies
to screen baggage, and, when necessary, they physically search
baggage to resolve anomalies.
Then, on the aircraft:
11. Thousands of Federal Air Marshals fly undercover on a very
significant number of flights, both domestic and international.
12. Thousands of pilots who undergo special training and become
Federal Flight Deck Officers are authorized and ready to
protect the cockpit with firearms.
13. Other local, state, and Federal law enforcement officers
travel armed as part of their normal duties and are prepared to
intervene.
14. Hardened cockpit doors prevent unauthorized access to the
flight deck.
15. And sitting on every airplane are passengers who remember
the courage and commitment of the men and women on United
Flight 93, and who are prepared to act, if necessary.
Each and every one of these 15 security layers is important.
Important Principles of Passenger Screening
Two important principles drive our decisions about the physical
screening of passengers. First, we are focusing our investments in both
people and technology on the highest risks. As we discussed at the
hearing last December, this means that we are placing less emphasis on,
and spending less time finding items that do not pose a threat of
taking over an airplane. For example, taking small scissors and certain
small tools off the prohibited items list has allowed us to spend TSO
time on training to find the more serious threat of improvised
explosive devices. Since last November, more than 20,000 TSOs have
received instructor-led training in enhanced explosives detection.
Additionally, over 20,500 TSOs have taken on-line training that
includes simulated image detection instruction. Within the next several
months, we anticipate that all checkpoint screeners will have completed
both on-line training and instructor-led hands-on training in
explosives detection.
Second, we seek to avoid giving terrorists an advantage based on
our predictability. We know that terrorists will look for ways to
defeat our security measures, and that they will adapt to changes in
our security measures. If we follow exactly the same procedures
everywhere, every time, we make it easier for terrorists to break the
security code. If, on the other hand, we build a measure of
unpredictability into our operations, terrorists cannot use our
consistency to their advantage in planning an attack. Our approach,
therefore, must be based upon flexibility and unpredictability.
Our current screening process, however, is overly rigid, static and
predictable. Terrorists can more easily ``engineer around'' these
highly structured defenses. Therefore, we need to build more
flexibility and more layers of security into our current checkpoint
screening process, so that terrorists conducting pre-operational
surveillance will not be able to plan based on what they observe.
Starting last December, TSA piloted new protocols to implement
unpredictable screening procedures at ten airports. In these pilots, a
customized schedule of enhanced screening procedures was created for
each new TSO shift. The schedule dictated the type and frequency of
property and/or passenger searches to be conducted. Each of the
enhanced screening procedures was designed to specifically address the
threat of explosives, and the procedures were carried out regardless of
whether a passenger cleared the walk-through metal detector or a carry-
on bag successfully passed through the x-ray machine. None of the
airports reported any significant impact on passenger wait times, and
for any individual passenger, the extra time required to undergo a
particular screening procedure was very short. More importantly,
however, no passenger--and, therefore, no terrorist--could predict
exactly what screening procedure he or she would be subject to. Based
on this successful pilot, we intend to incorporate similar
unpredictable additional screening into our standard operating
procedures.
In addition, TSA has begun developing a plan to train TSOs in
behavior pattern recognition and to begin deploying trained individuals
at high-risk airports. Last December, TSA piloted the use of behavior
pattern recognition techniques at some ticket checker positions in ten
airports (including Logan Airport in Boston, which began utilizing
trained TSOs at ticket checker positions in September 2005). Each
airport in the pilot utilized five to eight TSOs from that airport who
had received classroom and on-the-job training in behavior pattern
recognition techniques. If a passenger was identified as exhibiting
behaviors indicative of fear, stress and/or deception, they were either
referred for additional screening, or referred for selectee screening
and an evaluation interview with a law enforcement officer. Under the
program now being developed, trained TSOs can be deployed in
conjunction with a variety of functions, including checkpoint
screening, passenger verification (ticket checking), gate screening, or
as part of specific threat mitigation efforts. This capability will add
further unpredictability to passenger screening at the airport.
A Professional, Highly Motivated Workforce
Since returning to TSA almost 9 months ago, I have been reminded
daily that TSA is full of Americans who serve their country with
dignity and diligence. Our Transportation Security Officers are at the
front-line. They have difficult, complex jobs. They must evaluate the
behavior of every passenger who seeks to board a commercial airliner;
identify and find weapons and explosive devices that may have been
hidden in luggage or clothing; perform hand searches of personal
belongings, some of which may contain dangerous articles or weapons;
pat down individuals who set off alarms or are selected for secondary
screening; operate sophisticated equipment used to detect explosives or
other dangerous weapons; and be able to control people who seek to do
harm, while expediting the passage of law-abiding customers and
workers.
TSOs have frequent and recurrent contact with airline passengers
and employees, airport employees and vendors, and law enforcement
personnel, all of whom must follow strict security requirements before
gaining access to secure areas of airports. On a daily basis, they
interact with people of different nationalities, cultures and
backgrounds, and who have varying degrees of experience with the
security laws, regulations, and procedures which TSOs must implement
and enforce. In this environment, TSOs encounter fear, cynicism and
stress among the traveling public. They must be able to deliver
business-like directions to guide travelers through security
procedures, and must remain professional, even when travelers become
aggravated or angry by procedures.
As you know, when TSA was created in 2002, a centralized hiring and
human resources infrastructure was created to support the rapid stand-
up of the federalized screening workforce. Now that the agency is
essentially hiring to maintain an employee base of 43,000 TSO FTEs,
that centralized model is no longer cost-effective. We have begun,
therefore, to develop a local hiring and training system in order to
achieve efficiencies and better meet our current and expected hiring
requirements. These requirements include an increase in the proportion
of our screening workforce that is part-time, to better match the daily
peak-load workflow at airports.
In addition, we recognize that high employee turnover rates drive
up hiring and training costs, and lower the overall experience level of
our workforce. Yet our screening workforce has few upward mobility
opportunities within their profession, and TSA has not fully utilized
performance incentives. Therefore, we have reclassified the agency's
43,000 screeners as Transportation Security Officers (TSOs). This new
classification acknowledges the judgment and skills required and the
standards to which we hold our workforce. It also gives TSOs an
opportunity to step onto a career ladder and apply for DHS law
enforcement positions. In addition, in order to encourage top
performance, we are deploying a pay-for-performance system and have
requested an additional $10 million in Fiscal Year 2007 to support
pilot programs to improve recruitment and retention.
TSA has also taken steps to reduce TSO injury rates, which are a
significant drain on our workforce. Based on the recommendations of our
Screener Injury Task Force, we have implemented a TSA-wide nurse case
management program to assist TSOs in getting the medical attention they
need to return to work as soon as possible. In addition, we are sending
teams of industrial engineers to evaluate the 25 airports with the
worst injury rates and make recommendations for improvements, including
simple configuration changes and small equipment purchases (like roller
tables and floor mats) that could have significant impacts on injury
rates.
Technology
Technology plays a critical role at TSA, now and in the future. We
deploy sophisticated and effective technology in all phases of our
security process. We invest in new technology that holds the promise
for better security, more efficiently delivered. I believe that we are
in a period where we have deployed the best, most reliable, and
operationally effective technology available. There are many promising
new technologies, such as Explosives Trace Portals (ETPs) Automated
Carry-On Bag Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), and Whole Body Imaging
Technology (backscatter). However, until that technology is available,
we are best served by a focus on getting the most out of what we have
deployed today--in terms of both people and equipment. When the
technology is available, it should be ready for widespread economical
deployment, as part of an integrated screening process that includes
behavior pattern recognition, document checking, and other security
measures.
Closing
TSA's mission is to protect the Nation's transportation systems
while facilitating the movement of people and commerce. We recognize
the importance of physical screening to the security of our aviation
network, and our risk-based strategy includes innovations and
investments in training, workforce deployment, and technology. At the
same time, we are committed to a strategy that goes far beyond physical
screening. It begins with intelligence gathered by multiple U.S.
agencies that is analyzed, shared, and applied. It includes checking
every passenger manifest against terror watch lists and observing
behaviors and activities in the airport environment. And, finally, it
includes a law enforcement presence in airports and on aircraft, and a
partnership with airlines, airports, pilots, flight crew members, and
the traveling public--all of whom are committed to stopping terrorists
in their tracks.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today.
I am happy to respond to the Committee's questions.
The Chairman. Our next witness is Cathleen Berrick, who is
a Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the U.S.
Government Accountability Office.
Ms. Berrick. Correct.
The Chairman. Ms. Berrick?
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Ensign for
inviting me to discuss the physical screening of passengers and
checked baggage at the Nation's airports.
My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA has made and
the challenges it faces related to three key components of the
screening system, the deployment, management, and training of
the Transportation Security Officer workforce, or TSOs,
screening procedures used to screen passengers and their
baggage and TSA's efforts to leverage and deploy needed
screening technologies.
Regarding TSA's efforts to deploy, manage and train the TSO
workforce, TSA has made significant progress in these areas,
but continues to face staffing and training challenges. For
example, TSA has significantly increased the amount of training
available to TSOs to include focusing on explosive detection
and has made changes to training programs based on identified
vulnerabilities.
However, insufficient staffing has made it difficult for
all TSOs to have the time needed to take required training. We
found the Federal Security Directors at about half of the 263
airports we surveyed reported that there was not sufficient
time for TSOs to receive required training within regular work
hours. In addition, a lack of high speed Internet capability at
about half the Nation's airports has prevented many TSOs from
fully utilizing TSA's online learning center.
TSA has also developed a staffing allocation model to more
effectively determine TSO allocations at airports. This model
takes into account unique airport configurations and other
important factors. However, TSA has had difficulty attracting
and retaining a part-time TSO screener workforce needed to
address staffing needs, and some screeners are used to perform
administrative duties at airports due to a lack of
administrative staff.
Related to screening procedures, we found that TSA creates
new or modifies existing procedures to improve the efficiency
of the screening process or to enhance security. These changes
are based on operational experience, stakeholder concerns, and
risk-based factors, including available intelligence
information. We are encouraged by TSA's consideration of risk-
based factors and the development and modification of screening
procedures, which is consistent with previous GAO
recommendations.
Regarding screening technologies and, in particular, the
ability to detect explosives on passengers, more work remains.
TSA has taken action to address identified gaps and is
investing in fielding technology for this purpose. However,
more progress is needed to deploy these technologies on a large
scale basis.
TSA also has the potential to achieve significant
efficiencies and enhanced security through integrating
explosive detection systems in line with airport baggage
conveyor systems to screen checked baggage. Limited analysis
has shown that integrating this equipment in line, although
requiring a significant up front investment, could result in
savings of over $1 billion to the Federal Government over 7
years for 9 airports that TSA reviewed. This estimated savings
is due in large part to the significantly fewer number of
screeners that will be required to operate the equipment in
line.
We recommended that TSA more systematically plan for the
deployment of this equipment, including the installation of in-
line systems. TSA recently published a strategic framework for
its checked baggage screening program and is exploring
financing strategies to support the installation of in-line
systems. However, these efforts are not yet complete.
Regarding measuring effectiveness of its screening systems,
TSA has made significant progress in testing its screening
components, including establishing an annual recertification
for TSOs. However, although TSA's TSOs generally perform well
during annual recertification testing, covert testing has shown
that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to exist in the
screening system.
In conclusion, TSA has made significant progress in
ensuring the security of airline passengers and their baggage
despite many obstacles and challenges, including hiring a
workforce of over 40,000 TSOs and deploying explosive detection
systems at over 400 airports. As TSA moves forward
opportunities for further strengthening these screening systems
exist.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I would
be happy to respond to questions at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security
and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the progress made and challenges remaining in the physical
screening of airline passengers and their checked baggage, and in the
deployment of explosive detection technologies. Securing commercial
aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of
aircraft, and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of
passengers and pieces of checked baggage. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted on November 19, 2001,
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandated
actions designed to strengthen aviation security, including requiring
that TSA assume responsibility for conducting passenger and checked
baggage screening at over 400 commercial airports in the United States
by November 19, 2002. It has been over 3 years since TSA assumed this
responsibility, and the agency has spent billions of dollars and
implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the key
components of its passenger and checked baggage screening systems--
people, processes, and technology. These components are interconnected
and are critical to the overall security of commercial aviation.
My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in
strengthening airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and the
challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key
areas, including TSA's efforts to (1) enhance the performance of the
transportation security officer (TSO--formerly referred to as
screeners) workforce and manage and deploy the TSO workforce; (2)
strengthen procedures for screening passengers and checked baggage on
passenger aircraft; (3) leverage and deploy screening technologies; and
(4) measure the effectiveness of its passenger and checked baggage
screening systems.
My comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies
addressing the security of the U.S. commercial aviation system and our
preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger
checkpoint screening procedures and staffing standards for TSOs. We did
our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Appendix I contains a list of related GAO products released
since September 11, 2001.
Summary
TSA has taken steps to enhance the performance, management, and
deployment of its TSO workforce, but it continues to face staffing and
training challenges. Acknowledging imbalances in the screener
workforce, TSA developed standards for determining TSO staffing for all
airports at which Federal screening is required and developed a
Screening Allocation Model (SAM) to determine airport staffing levels.
In determining staffing allocations, the SAM takes into account not
only flight and passenger data, but also data unique to each airport--
including flight schedules, load factors, passenger and baggage
distribution curves, and TSA passenger and baggage screening
configurations. However, in interviewing several Federal Security
Directors (FSD)--the ranking authorities responsible for the leadership
and coordination of TSA security activities at the Nation's commercial
airports--we identified some preliminary concerns about the SAM. For
example, one assumption of the SAM is that 20 percent of the TSO
workforce at airports will be part-time. However, FSDs whom we spoke to
said that it has been a challenge to attract, hire, and retain TSA's
part-time TSO workforce, which has made this goal difficult to achieve.
Further, several of the FSDs we interviewed stated that they had not
been able to hire up to their authorized staffing levels, and that the
SAM did not take into account that TSOs were also being routinely used
to carry out non-screening and administrative duties. TSA has
established the National Screening Force to provide screening support
to all airports in times of special need, and implemented a number of
initiatives to reduce attrition among its TSO workforce. In addition to
having an adequate number of screeners, effective screening involves
screeners being properly trained to do their job. TSA has taken
numerous steps to expand training beyond the basic training requirement
to include self-guided courses on its Online Learning Center; a
recurrent training requirement of 3-hours per week, averaged over a
quarter; and training on threat information, explosives detection, and
new screening approaches. However, insufficient TSO staffing and a lack
of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity create impediments to the
TSO workforce taking full advantage of training opportunities.
TSA is proposing changes to its screening procedures to enhance
detection capabilities, but could strengthen its evaluation of these
procedures. Since April 2005, TSA has gathered proposals for passenger
screening procedural changes from a variety of sources within the
agency. Based on preliminary observations from our ongoing review, we
found that most of these proposed changes for passenger screening were
intended to improve efficiency or TSA's ability to detect prohibited
items. Other security-related changes to passenger screening procedures
are made based on several risk-based factors, including results of
covert (undercover, unannounced) tests that are designed to reveal
vulnerabilities in the screening system. TSA also recently piloted
additional procedures that would incorporate unpredictability into the
screening system and allow TSOs to determine the level of screening
passengers should receive based on suspicious behavior. TSA vets
proposed screening procedural changes through various TSA offices and
tests significant proposed changes in an operational environment.
However, our preliminary observations indicate that TSA's evaluation of
procedural changes could be strengthened to include how the procedure
would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist attack.
TSA is supporting the development and deployment of technologies to
strengthen commercial aviation security but faces management and
funding challenges. Effective screening depends on having the right
technology in place to detect threats, and TSA has taken steps to
deploy and develop technologies to strengthen commercial aviation
security. However, challenges in funding and planning created
impediments to the technology's implementation. For example, to improve
explosives detection at some passenger screening checkpoints, TSA has
deployed explosives trace portal machines, which use puffs of air to
help detect the presence of explosives on individuals. The Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) Fiscal Year 2007 budget request states
that about 434 explosive trace portal machines will be in operation
throughout the country during Fiscal Year 2007.
However, limited progress has been made in fielding other
explosives detection technology at passenger checkpoints. At baggage
screening checkpoints, TSA has been effective in deploying explosive
trace detection systems (in which TSOs collect samples by rubbing bags
with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials) and the more efficient explosive detection systems
(in which probing radiation is used to examine objects inside baggage
and identify characteristic signatures of threat explosives). Now that
the initial deployment of this equipment has been completed, however,
TSA must focus on deploying enhanced explosive detection systems,
including larger or smaller models depending on the needs of a
particular airport, and on incorporating explosive detection systems
in-line with baggage conveyor systems, to further enhance efficiency
and security. In looking to the future, DHS has agreed with our
recommendations to improve its research and development (R&D)
management and planning, including completing basic research, strategic
planning, and risk assessment efforts; coordinating R&D efforts with
transportation stakeholders; and assessing the costs and benefits of
deploying explosive detection systems--either in-line or stand-alone at
the Nation's airports. In February 2006, TSA took a positive step
forward by completing a strategic framework for its checked baggage
screening operations that will help ensure the efficient allocation of
limited resources to maximize technology's effectiveness in detecting
threats. However, additional work will be needed to determine funding
and deployment strategies to support the implementation of in-line
baggage screening systems.
TSA has measures in place to assess the effectiveness of passenger
and checked baggage screening systems. TSA headquarters has conducted
covert testing of passenger and checked baggage screening by having
inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through checkpoints in order
to measure vulnerabilities and identify systematic problems affecting
TSO performance in the areas of training, procedures, and technology.
These tests have identified that, overall, weaknesses and
vulnerabilities exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems. Implemented in September 2002, the testing protocols for
passenger and checked baggage screening changed in September 2005 to
implement a more risk-based approach and focus on catastrophic threats
to aircraft. Additionally, in February 2004 and February 2005, for
passengers and checked baggage, respectively, TSA issued protocols to
help FSDs conduct covert testing of local airport screening activities.
Other ways TSA tests the effectiveness of passenger and baggage
screening include the use of the Threat Image Projection System, which
projects threat images onto a screen as the bag is screened to test the
screener's ability to positively identify the threat; annual screener
recertification testing; and passenger and checked baggage performance
indexes. These performance indexes reflect indicators of effectiveness,
efficiency, and customer satisfaction. However, due to a lack of
targets for each component of the index, TSA may have difficulty
performing meaningful analyses of the parts of the index.
Background
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the President
signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act into law on
November 19, 2001, with the primary goal of strengthening the security
of the Nation's aviation system. To this end, ATSA created TSA as an
agency with responsibility for securing all modes of transportation,
including aviation. \1\ As part of this responsibility, TSA oversees
security operations at the Nation's more than 400 commercial airports,
including passenger and checked baggage screening operations. Prior to
the passage of ATSA, the screening of passengers and checked baggage
had been performed by private screening companies under contract to the
airlines. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was responsible for
ensuring compliance with screening regulations. Today, TSA security
activities, including passenger and checked baggage screening at
airports, are overseen by Federal Security Directors--the ranking
authorities responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA
security activities at the Nation's commercial airports. Each FSD is
responsible for overseeing security activities, including passenger and
checked baggage screening, at one or more commercial airports.
TSA reported that between October 2004 and September 2005, about
735 million passengers were physically screened. In addition, 550
million bags were screened using explosive detection systems with
standard screening procedures.
Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening
In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for
passenger and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA set forth
specific enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement,
with deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements
included:
assuming responsibility for screeners and screening
operations at more than 400 commercial airports by November 19,
2002;
establishing a basic screener training program composed of a
minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of
on-the-job training;
conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;
conducting operational testing of screeners; \2\
requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an
operational test; and
screening all checked baggage for explosives using
explosives detection systems by December 31, 2002.\3\
Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item
onboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.\4\ TSOs (formerly referred
to as screeners) must inspect individuals for prohibited items at
designated screening locations.\5\ The four passenger screening
functions are: (1) X-ray screening of property, (2) walk-through metal
detector screening of individuals, (3) hand-wand or pat-down screening
of individuals, and (4) physical search of property and trace detection
for explosives.
Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or
weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished
through the use of explosive detection systems \6\ (EDS) or explosive
trace detection (ETD) systems,\7\ and through the use of other means,
such as manual searches, canine teams, and positive passenger bag
match,\8\ when EDS and ETD systems are unavailable.
The conference report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2006 DHS
appropriations act allocates about $3.6 billion to TSA for passenger
and checked baggage screening operations, of which about $2.4 billion
is for the TSO workforce and the remaining amount is for private sector
TSOs,\9\ equipment purchase, installation and maintenance, and support
functions associated with the TSO workforce, such as training and other
human resource functions.\10\ The President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget
request includes about $3.5 billion for passenger and checked baggage
screening, of which about $2.5 billion would support the TSO workforce.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen the Management and Performance of Its
TSO Workforce, but Continues to Face Challenges
TSA Has Taken Steps to Better Manage Its TSO Workforce, but Faces
Challenges in Hiring, Deploying, and Retaining TSOs
TSA has taken and has planned actions to strengthen its management
and deployment of the TSO workforce, but it continues to face
challenges in hiring and deploying passenger and checked baggage TSOs.
To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of
passenger and checked baggage TSOs trained and certified in the latest
screening procedures and technology. We reported in February 2004 that
staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process had hindered the ability of
some FSDs to provide sufficient resources to staff screening
checkpoints and oversee screening operations at their checkpoints
without using additional measures such as overtime.\11\ TSA has
acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts created imbalances in
the screener workforce and has since been taking steps to address these
imbalances over the past 2 years.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
required TSA to develop and submit to Congress standards for
determining the aviation security staffing for all airports at which
screening is required.\12\ The act also directed GAO to review these
standards, which we are doing. These staffing standards are to provide
for necessary levels of airport security, while also ensuring that
security-related delays experienced by airline passengers are
minimized. In June 2005, TSA submitted its report on aviation security
staffing standards to Congress. Known as the Screening Allocation Model
(SAM), these standards are intended to provide an objective measure for
determining TSO airport staffing levels, while staying within the
congressionally mandated limit of 45,000 full-time equivalents (FTE)
screeners.\13\
Whereas TSA's prior staffing model was demand-driven based on
flight and passenger data, the SAM model analyzes not only demand data
but also data on the flow of passenger and baggage through the airport
and the availability of the workforce. In determining the appropriate
TSO staffing levels, the SAM first considers the workload demands
unique to each individual airport--including flight schedules, load
factors and connecting flights, and number of passenger bags. These
demand inputs are then processed against certain assumptions about the
processing of passengers and baggage--including expected passenger and
baggage processing rates, required staffing for passenger lanes and
baggage equipment, and equipment alarm rates. Using these and various
other data, the SAM determines the daily workforce requirements and
calculates a work schedule for each airport. The schedule identifies a
recommended mix of full-time and part-time staff and a total number of
TSO FTE needed to staff the airport, consistent with a goal of 10
minutes maximum wait time for processing passengers and baggage.
For Fiscal Year 2006, the SAM model estimated a requirement of
42,170 TSO FTEs for all airports nationwide. In order to stay within a
43,000 TSO FTE budgetary limit for Fiscal Year 2006, TSA officials
reduced the number of FTEs allocated to airports to 42,056, which
allowed it to fund the 615 TSO FTEs in the National Screener Force--a
force composed of TSOs who provide screening support to all airports--
and to maintain a contingency of 329 TSO FTEs in reserve to meet
unanticipated demands, such as a new air carrier coming on line at an
airport.\14\ As of January 2006, there were 37,501 full-time TSOs and
5,782 part-time TSOs on board nationwide, representing an annualized
rate of 41,085 TSO FTEs. According to TSA headquarters officials, the
SAM can be adjusted to account for the uniqueness of particular airport
security checkpoints and airline traffic patterns. Further, it is up to
the FSDs to ensure that all of the data elements and assumptions are
accurate for their airports, and to bring to TSA's attention any
factors that should be reviewed to determine if changes to the SAM are
appropriate. The President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget requests a total
of 45,121 FTEs for TSO personnel compensation and benefits.
As part of our ongoing review of the SAM model, we have identified
several preliminary concerns about TSA's efforts to address its
staffing imbalances and ensure appropriate coverage at airport
passenger and checked baggage screening checkpoints, which we are
continuing to assess. At the five airports we visited, FSD staff raised
concerns about the SAM assumptions as they related to their particular
airports.\15\ Among other things, they noted that the recommendation
for 20 percent part-time TSO workforce--measured in terms of FTEs--
often could not be reached, the expected processing rates for passenger
and baggage screening were not being realized, non-passenger screening
at large airports was higher than assumed, and the number of TSO FTEs
needed per checkpoint lane and per baggage screening machine was not
sufficient for peak periods. Regarding the SAM assumption of a 20
percent part-time TSO FTE level across all airports, FSD staff we
visited stated that the 20 percent goal has been difficult to achieve
because of, among other things, economic conditions leading to
competition for part-time workers, remote airport locations coupled
with a lack of mass transit, TSO base pay that has not changed since
Fiscal Year 2002, and part-time workers' desire to convert to full-time
status. According to TSA headquarters officials, while the nationwide
annual TSO attrition rate is about 23 percent (compared to a rate of 14
percent reported in February 2004), it is over 50 percent for part-time
TSOs. TSA has struggled with hiring part-time TSOs since it began
actively recruiting them in the summer of 2003. In February 2004, we
reported that FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that
they experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners,
which they believed to be due to many of the same factors, such as low
pay and benefits, undesirable hours, the location of their airport, the
lack of accessible and affordable parking or public transportation, and
the high cost of living in the areas surrounding some airports.\16\
These FSDs stated that very few full-time screeners were interested in
converting to part-time status--a condition that still exists--and TSA
officials stated that attrition rates for part-time screeners were
considerably higher than those for full-time screeners.
At two of the five airports we visited as part of our ongoing
review of the SAM model, FSD staff told us that they had not been able
to hire up to their authorized staffing levels. In February 2004, we
reported that many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern that
TSA's hiring process was not responsive to their needs and hindered
their ability to reach their authorized staffing levels and adequately
staff screening checkpoints. Specifically, FSDs expressed concern with
the lack of a continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost
through attrition, and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an
as-needed basis. We reported that TSA was taking steps to make the
hiring process more responsive to FSDs' needs. Since then, TSA has
provided FSDs with more input into the hiring process in an effort to
streamline the process and enable FSDs to more quickly meet their
staffing needs.
During our five airport visits, some FSD staff also cited another
limitation of the SAM--specifically, that the model does not account
for screeners who are performing administrative or other duties. The
officials also noted that, because they are not authorized to hire a
sufficient number of mission support staff, TSOs are being routinely
used--in some cases full time--to carry out non-screening and
administrative duties, including supporting payroll, scheduling,
uniform supplies, legal support, logistics, and operations center
activities. At the five airports we visited in January and February
2006, out of a total of 2,572 TSO FTEs on-board at those airports,
roughly 136 FTEs (just over 5 percent) were being used for
administrative duties. FSD staff stated that some of these TSOs are
being used on a part-time basis, while others are used on a full-time
basis. The use of TSOs in these support functions could adversely
affect the ability of FSDs to adequately staff their screening
checkpoints.
To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational
flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003,
TSA established a National Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Force
(formerly known as the Mobile Screening Force established in November
2002) to provide screening support to all airports in times of
emergency, seasonal demands, or under other special circumstances that
require a greater number of screeners than regularly available to FSDs.
In February 2004, we reported that the National Screening Force
consisted of over 700 full-time passenger and baggage TSOs. TSA
officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport to
which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening
staff approximately 70 percent of the year.
TSA budgeted for 615 FTEs for the National Screening Force in
Fiscal Year 2006. The President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request
includes $35 million for operational expenses of the force (not
including salaries and benefits of force members). According to the
budget request, in Fiscal Year 2007, the National Screening Force will
generally be deployed only to those airports experiencing significant
staffing shortfalls associated with increased seasonal traffic or when
a special event, such as a Super Bowl or a large national conference,
occurs requiring an immediate influx of additional TSO support. At one
category X airport we recently visited, the FSD stated that because of
challenges in hiring and retaining TSOs for this airport, he currently
had 59 members of the National Screening Force deployed to his airport,
and had been relying on this force since 2004. The President's Fiscal
Year 2007 budget request states that TSA will continue to review
methods for reducing costs associated with this force, including
ensuring that each airport has a sufficient staffing program in place
to address short-term needs.
In February 2006 in the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget
request, TSA identified a number of initiatives it has under way to
address the management of the TSO workforce, including:
requesting $10 million to support TSO retention programs,
including utilizing workforce retention flexibilities to
potentially include pay for performance, performance bonuses,
retention allowances, college credit reimbursement, and
flexible staffing; and:
establishing retention incentives for part-time screeners.
We will continue to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing
work on TSA's aviation security staffing standards.
TSA Has Strengthened TSO Training but Faces Challenges in Delivering
the
Training
Since we reported on TSO training in September 2003,\17\ TSA has
taken a number of actions designed to strengthen training available to
the TSO workforce as part of its efforts to enhance the performance of
TSOs. Additionally, TSA's Office of Inspections (OI, formerly the
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review) makes recommendations to
TSA leadership in its reports on covert (undercover, unannounced)
testing results. These recommendations address deficiencies identified
during testing and are intended to improve screening effectiveness. As
of December 2005, OI had issued 29 reports to management on the results
of its checkpoint and checked baggage covert testing. In total, the
reports include 19 distinct recommendations related to passenger and
checked baggage screening.\18\ Of these 19 recommendations, 11 relate
to screener training.
In September 2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or
deployed a recurrent training program for passenger TSOs. At that time,
little training was available to TSOs once they completed their basic
TSO training. Since then, TSA has expanded training available to the
TSO workforce, such as introducing an Online Learning Center that makes
self-guided courses available over TSA's intranet and the Internet and
expanding training available to supervisory TSOs. TSA also established
a recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, averaged over a
quarter, and provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate and
enhance TSO training, including at least one modular bomb set kit--
containing components of an improvised explosive device (IED)--and at
least one weapons training kit. TSA has also instituted a program
called ``Threat in the Spotlight'' that, based on intelligence TSA
receives, provides screeners with the latest in threat information
regarding terrorist attempts to get threat objects past screening
checkpoints. Additionally, in December 2005, TSA reported completing
enhanced explosives detection training for over 18,000 TSOs. This
training included both classroom and hands-on experiences, and focused
particularly on identifying X-ray images of IED component parts, not
just a completely assembled bomb. TSA plans for the remaining TSO
workforce to receive this training by June 2006 through the Online
Learning Center or other delivery methods. TSA also has developed new
training curricula to support new screening approaches. For example,
TSA recently developed a training curriculum for TSOs in behavior
observation and analysis at the checkpoint to identify passengers
exhibiting behaviors indicative of stress, fear, or deception.
However, as we reported in May 2005, insufficient TSO staffing and
a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to access the
Online Learning Center have made it difficult for all TSOs at many
airports to receive required training and has limited TSO access to TSA
training tools.\19\ As previously discussed, TSA is taking steps to
address the TSO staffing challenges. However, it is too soon to
determine whether TSA's efforts will address TSA's ability to provide
required training while maintaining adequate coverage for screening
operations. In terms of access to the Online Learning Center, TSA plans
to complete the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity
to airports during Fiscal Year 2007. TSA established its Online
Learning Center to provide passenger and baggage screeners with online,
high-speed access to training courses. However, effective use of the
Online Learning Center requires high-speed Internet/intranet access,
which TSA had not been able to provide to all airports. In May 2005, we
reported that as of October 2004, about 45 percent of the TSO workforce
did not have high speed Internet/intranet access to the Online Learning
Center. The President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request reports that
approximately 220 of the more than 400 airport and field locations have
full Information Technology (IT) infrastructure installation, to
include high-speed network connectivity, while the rest of the airports
operate with dial-up access to TSA systems. According to the budget
request, TSA will use $120 million in Fiscal Year 2006 to deploy high-
speed connectivity to all category X and I airports and preliminary
high-speed connectivity to all category II, III, and IV airports. The
budget request includes a request for a total of $90 million to support
this effort in Fiscal Year 2007, of which $54 million is needed to
complete the deployment of high-speed connectivity at category II, III,
and IV airports.\20\
TSA Is Making Changes to Its Passenger Screening Procedures to Enhance
Detection Capabilities Based on Risk and Other Factors, but
Could Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Procedures
Proposed Passenger Checkpoint Screening Procedural Changes Are
Generally Based on Operational Experience and Risk-Based
Assessments
Our preliminary analysis of TSA data indicates that since April
2005, TSA has considered 70 proposed changes to passenger checkpoint
screening procedures.\21\ Most of these proposed changes were generated
by TSA airport officials and TSA's Security Operations division, which
is responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of
checkpoint screening procedures. TSA headquarters also formally
solicited input from TSA airport staff by initiating a field review of
standard operating procedures (SOP), which involved representatives
from airports across the Nation. This review resulted in 120 suggested
revisions to the passenger checkpoint screening procedures. To a lesser
extent, changes to checkpoint screening procedures are recommended by
TSA senior leadership, such as the Assistant Administrator of Security
Operations or the Assistant Secretary. Congress has also proposed and
subsequently mandated changes to checkpoint screening procedures, such
as adding lighters to the list of items prohibited on aircraft.
According to a senior TSA official, recent suggestions for procedural
changes, such as removing small scissors from the prohibited items list
to allow TSOs to focus on higher risk items, were generated by a TSA
task force focused on improving the agency's ability to detect
explosives at the screening checkpoint.
Based on our preliminary analysis, the majority of proposed SOP
changes considered by TSA in April 2005, August 2005, September 2005,
and December 2005 were not specifically designed to enhance the
security of the screening process.\22\ Of the 70 proposed checkpoint
screening SOP changes considered by TSA, 23 were intended to improve
the efficiency of the screening process (e.g., passenger flow) such as
modifying the HazMat reporting requirements to exclude torch lighters
and pepper spray in quantities less than 4 ounces. Seven of the 70
proposed changes considered by TSA during this period were intended to
specify or clarify procedures for passengers requiring special
consideration, such as law enforcement officers. Ten of the proposed
changes were specifically intended to improve TSA's ability to detect
prohibited items. Sixteen proposed changes were intended to enhance
customer service or clarify the wording of the SOP. Fourteen of the 70
proposed changes were not included in these categories.\23\
According to TSA, security-related proposed changes to checkpoint
screening procedures are based on risk-based factors, including
previous terrorist incidents, threat information, vulnerabilities of
the screening system, as well as operational experience and stakeholder
concerns. For example, according to TSA officials, the initial change
to the pat-down procedure in September 2004 was based on the attacks
carried out on two Russian aircraft. According to TSA, the pat-down
procedure was further revised in response to passenger concerns that
the procedure was too invasive. TSA officials stated that the pat-down
procedure was changed a third time based on additional threat
information. TSA also informed us that reported threat information led
them to further amend the pat-down procedure in December 2005.
Recommended changes to passenger checkpoint screening procedures
are also generated based on the results of covert testing conducting by
TSA's Office of Inspections and the DHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG). Covert tests are designed to assess vulnerabilities in the
checkpoint screening system to specific threats, such as vulnerability
to the various methods by which terrorists may try to conceal hand
guns, knives, or IEDs. OI and the DHS OIG identified vulnerabilities in
the checkpoint screening system, which existed, in part, due to
deficiencies in screening procedures. To address these vulnerabilities,
since March 2005, OI and the DHS OIG recommended four changes to the
passenger checkpoint screening procedures.\24\ TSA has also made
procedure changes in response to operational experience and stakeholder
concerns. For example, TSA changed the SOP to specify the ``individual
tester'' instead of ``supervisor'' to alleviate field confusion that
supervisors were the only ones allowed to perform a particular task.
Also, based on field input, TSA is changing the SOP to allow TSOs to
instruct passengers with long hair to hold their hair during the
explosives trace portal (ETP) screening process. TSA also made changes
due to stakeholder concern, such as modifications to the pat-down
procedure. After passengers expressed discomfort with the invasive
nature of the procedure, TSA modified it to be less invasive while
maintaining its security effectiveness.
TSA Could Strengthen Its Evaluation of Proposed Screening Procedural
Changes Based on our Preliminary Observations
As previously mentioned, TSA airport staff and headquarters
officials suggest changes to checkpoint screening procedures to
generally improve the efficiency, effectiveness and clarity of
screening procedures. These proposed procedural changes are
periodically gathered and vetted through various TSA offices, and
ultimately the Assistant Administrator of Security Operations, for
approval. The offices involved in the review process for SOP changes
include Security Operations, Office of Chief Counsel, and the Office of
Training. As required, proposed procedural changes are also evaluated
by other offices including the Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Office of Civil Rights, and Office of Passengers with Disabilities.
Representatives of these component divisions meet informally or
formally to discuss proposed changes and determine whether the changes
should be incorporated into the checkpoint screening SOP.
In addition, TSA officials informed us that the agency evaluates
all significant proposed changes in an operational environment prior to
determining whether such changes should be implemented nationwide.
Specifically, under the current Assistant Secretary, TSA pilot tests
changes that require substantial training or that may generate concerns
from the traveling public. The significant changes implemented in
December 2005 include revisions to the pat-down procedure, the
procedure for searching carry-on luggage, the process for screening
selectee passengers,\25\ and the list of items prohibited on aircraft.
The major changes also include a new procedure for screening passengers
for IEDs. While TSA evaluated these procedures in an operational
environment, our preliminary analysis suggests that the evaluations
primarily focused on the operational feasibility of the procedures, and
less on how these procedures would reduce vulnerability to a terrorist
attack. TSA assesses the vulnerability of the existing checkpoint
screening system by conducting covert tests in which persons attempt to
carry prohibited items through the checkpoint without the items being
detected. However, TSA officials questioned whether covert testing
could be used to assess statistically whether new procedures would
decrease the vulnerability of the screening system. For example, TSA
officials stated that since some procedures are only piloted in the
operational environment for a few days, TSA could not run enough covert
tests for the results to allow for comprehensive analysis of reduced
vulnerability. TSA officials also stated that because the agency
implements a layered approach to passenger screening, it would be
difficult to determine the extent to which any one layer reduces
vulnerability of the checkpoint screening system.
During the course of our review, we met with five aviation security
experts, four of which identified covert testing as the best way to
assess the security effectiveness of new and existing procedures.
However, they also acknowledged the difficulty of using covert testing
to assess the extent to which specific procedures would reduce
vulnerabilities, especially considering that the effectiveness of a
procedure also relies on the capability of TSOs and screening
equipment.
TSA also recently piloted additional procedures that would
incorporate unpredictability into the screening system and that would
allow TSOs to determine the level of screening passengers should
receive based on suspicious behavior. While TSA has not yet determined
whether to incorporate these new procedures into the SOP, our
preliminary observations indicate that TSA did not have a formal
evaluation plan in place when piloting these procedures. Regarding
screening passengers based on suspicious behavior, TSA officials stated
that this method has been successful for law enforcement officials,
including those operating in airports, as well as aviation officials in
other countries such as Israel. FSD staff at three airports that
participated in the piloting of these procedures identified factors TSA
headquarters should consider prior to implementing these procedures,
one of which is the lack of TSOs to conduct these procedures. FSD staff
at one airport said that they had to close a screening lane in order to
have a sufficient number of TSOs to implement the piloted procedure.
FSD staff at all three airports also reported that some TSOs had to
work overtime so that other TSOs could be trained to implement these
procedures. TSA headquarters staff stated that the prohibited items
list and changes to other programs would offset the additional TSO
resources needed to implement these procedures. However, FSD staff with
whom we spoke at 2 of the airports that piloted these procedures stated
that the changes made did not free up screening resources as was
planned.
TSA Is Supporting the Development and Deployment of Technologies To
Strengthen Commercial Aviation Security, but Faces Management
and Funding Challenges
DHS and TSA Are Taking Steps To Develop and Deploy Technologies for
Screening Passengers and Checked Baggage, but Further Planning
Is Needed To Focus R&D Efforts
DHS's and TSA's research and development efforts for passenger and
checked baggage screening are part of a broader DHS program focused on
researching and developing technologies to detect, prevent, and
mitigate terrorist threats. History has shown that terrorists will
adapt their tactics and techniques in an attempt to bypass increased
security procedures, and are capable of developing increasingly
sophisticated measures in an attempt to avoid detection. This ever
changing threat necessitates the need for continued R&D of new
technologies and the fielding of these technologies to strengthen
aviation security.
In March 2005, the DHS OIG reported that significant improvement in
screener performance may not be possible without greater use of new
technology. The DHS OIG encouraged TSA to expedite its testing programs
and give priority to technologies that will enable the screening
workforce to better detect both weapons and explosives. In addition,
the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget request states that checkpoints
do not currently have the ability to accurately and quickly detect
explosives on all passengers, and only a minimal number of airline
passengers are directed to a selectee lane for further inspection in
which they are manually searched for explosives. The request further
states that ``many travelers are allowed to pass through the
checkpoints without complete testing and detection,'' and recognizes
the importance of filling this detection gap. TSA officials stated that
the agency is addressing this issue through a variety of security
measures. TSA has recently put increased focus on the threats posed by
IEDs and is investing in technology for this purpose. For example,
about 60 explosives trace portal machines have been installed at over
20 airports. This new technology uses puffs of air to help detect the
presence of explosives on individuals. DHS's Fiscal Year 2007 budget
request states that TSA expects that about 434 explosive trace portal
machines will be in operation throughout the country by September 2007.
TSA is also developing backscatter technology, in which backscatter
signals interact with explosives, plastics and metals, giving them
shape and form and making them easy to visually interpret. However,
limited progress has been made in fielding this technology at airport
passenger screening checkpoints. We will soon begin a review of DHS's
and TSA's progress in planning for, managing, and deploying their R&D
programs in support of passenger checkpoint screening operations.
To enhance checked baggage screening, TSA is developing and testing
next-generation EDS machines. Most of the currently deployed EDS
technology was developed prior to the passage of ATSA and was based on
criteria set forth by Congress in the Aviation Security Improvement Act
of 1990. According to TSA, since the large-scale deployment of EDS
machines in 2002 and 2003, manufacturers have only marginally improved
false alarm rates and throughput capabilities of the equipment. The
maximum number of bags an EDS machine can screen per hour is 500, which
can be achieved only when the machines are integrated in-line with the
baggage conveyor system. New EDS equipment was certified in 2005,
including a smaller EDS machine designed to replace ETD machines used
for primary screening and an upgraded large EDS machine. In September
2005, TSA entered into a $24.8 million contract to purchase 72 smaller
EDS machines to be installed at 24 airports. The President's Fiscal
Year 2007 budget request for TSA includes funding to support research
and development for EDS machines that can operate at up to 900 bags per
hour and employ new threat detection concepts. In its February 2006
strategic framework for checked baggage screening, TSA identified
development of high-throughput EDS machines and lowering of false alarm
rates as key arenas for improving investment management of next-
generation technologies.
We reported in September 2004 that DHS and TSA have made some
progress in managing transportation security R&D programs according to
applicable laws and R&D best practices. However, we found that their
efforts were incomplete in several areas, including preparing strategic
plans for R&D efforts that contain measurable objectives, preparing and
using risk assessments to select and prioritize R&D projects, and
coordinating with stakeholders--a condition that increases the risk
that their R&D resources will not be effectively leveraged. We also
found that TSA and DHS delayed several key R&D projects and lacked both
estimated deployment dates for the vast majority of their R&D projects
and adequate data bases to effectively manage their R&D portfolios. We
recommended that DHS and TSA: (1) conduct some basic research in the
transportation security area; (2) complete their strategic planning and
risk assessment efforts; (3) develop a management information system
that will provide accurate, complete, current, and readily accessible
project information for monitoring and managing their R&D portfolios;
and (4) develop a process with the Department of Transportation to
coordinate transportation security R&D efforts and share this
information with transportation stakeholders. DHS and TSA agreed that
the recommendations were key to a successful R&D program. We will
examine DHS's and TSA's efforts to implement these recommendations as
part of our upcoming review of TSA's checkpoint R&D program.
TSA Is Focusing Its Checked Baggage Strategic Planning Efforts on
Deployment of In-line EDS Systems, but Faces Challenges in
Funding These Systems on a Large-Scale Basis
TSA has made substantial progress in installing EDS and ETD systems
at the Nation's airports--mainly as part of interim lobby screening
solutions--to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage for
explosives, as mandated by Congress. Although TSA made progress in
fielding EDS and ETD equipment at the Nation's airports, TSA placed
this equipment in a stand-alone mode--usually in airport lobbies--to
conduct the primary screening of checked baggage for explosives, rather
than integrating EDS machines in-line with airports' baggage conveyor
systems. TSA officials stated that they employed these interim
solutions because of the significant costs required to install in-line
systems and the need to reconfigure many airports' baggage conveyor
systems to accommodate the equipment. These interim screening solutions
led to operational inefficiencies, including requiring a greater number
of screeners and screening fewer bags for explosives each hour, as
compared with using EDS machines in-line with baggage conveyor systems.
Performing primary screening using ETD machines, as is the case for
more than 300 airports, is more labor intensive and less efficient than
screening using the EDS process. TSA's placement of stand-alone EDS and
ETD machines in airport lobbies also resulted in passenger crowding,
which presented unsafe conditions and may have added security risks for
passengers and airport workers. In May 2004, TSA conducted a
retrospective cost-benefit analysis on nine airports with agreements to
install in-line screening systems and found that significant savings
and other benefits, including reduced screener staffing requirements
and increased baggage throughput, may be achieved through the
installation of in-line systems. TSA estimated that in-line baggage
screening systems at these nine airports would save the Federal
Government about $1 billion over 7 years,\26\ compared with stand-alone
EDS systems, and that initial investment would be recovered in a little
over 1 year.\27\ TSA's analysis also showed that a cost savings may not
be achieved for all airports. According to TSA's data, Federal cost
savings varied from about $50 million to over $250 million at eight of
the nine airports, while at one airport, there was an estimated $90
million loss.\28\
With the objective of initially fielding this equipment largely
accomplished, TSA is shifting its focus from equipping airports with
interim screening solutions to systematically planning for the more
optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems, although
identifying the resources to fund the systems on a large-scale basis
continues to be a challenge. To assist TSA in planning for the optimal
deployment of checked baggage screening systems, we recommended in our
March 2005 report that TSA systematically evaluate baggage screening
needs at airports, including the costs and benefits of installing in-
line baggage screening systems--explosive detection systems integrated
in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems--at airports that do not
yet have in-line systems installed. We suggested that part of such
planning should include analyzing which airports should receive Federal
support for in-line EDS baggage screening systems based on cost savings
that could be achieved from more effective and efficient baggage
screening operations and on other factors, including enhanced security.
Also, for airports where in-line systems may not be economically
justified because of high investment costs, we suggested that a cost-
effectiveness analysis be used to determine the benefits of additional
stand-alone EDS machines to screen checked baggage in place of the more
labor-intensive ETD machines. We also recommended that TSA consider the
costs and benefits of the new technologies being developed through its
research and development efforts, which could provide smaller EDS
machines that have the potential to reduce the costs associated with
installing in-line EDS baggage screening systems or to replace ETD
machines currently used as the primary method for screening at over 300
airports nationwide. DHS agreed with our recommendations and stated
that TSA had initiated an analysis of deploying in-line EDS machines
and was in the process of formulating criteria to identify those
airports that would benefit from an in-line EDS system. DHS also stated
that TSA had begun conducting an analysis of the airports that rely
heavily on ETD machines as the primary checked baggage screening
technology to identify those airports that would benefit from
augmenting ETDs with stand-alone EDS equipment.
On February 8, 2006, TSA issued a report to Congress outlining a
framework for a strategic plan for its TSA Checked Baggage Screening
Program. TSA plans to finalize the plan, including funding and cost-
sharing strategies for in-line baggage screening systems, in Spring
2006. The framework introduces a strategy intended to increase security
through deploying EDS to as many airports as practicable, lower life-
cycle costs for the program, minimize impacts to TSA and airport/
airline operations, and provide a flexible security infrastructure for
accommodating growing airline traffic and potential new threats. The
framework addresses the following issues:
Optimized checked baggage screening solutions--finding the
ideal mix of higher-performance and lower-cost alternative
screening solutions.
Funding prioritization schedule by airport--which airports
should receive funding for an in-line baggage screening system
based on quantitative modeling of security, economic, and other
factors.
Deployment strategy--a plan for the acquisition of next-
generation EDS systems, the redeployment of existing EDS
assets, and investment in life-cycle extension programs.
EDS Life-Cycle Management Plan--structured guidelines for
EDS R&D investment, procurement specifications for next-
generation EDS systems, and the redeployment of existing EDS
assets and investment in life-cycle extension programs that
minimize the cost of ownership of the EDS systems.
Stakeholder collaboration plan--TSA plans to work closely
with airport operators and other key stakeholders to develop
airport-specific screening solutions, refine the nationwide EDS
deployment strategy, and investigate alternative funding
programs that may allow for innovative as well as non-federal
sources of funding or financing, including formulas for sharing
costs between different government entities and the private
sector. This strategic framework is a positive step forward in
systematically planning for TSA's checked baggage screening
program. The completion of a strategic plan for this program
should help TSA ensure that it is efficiently allocating its
limited resources to maximize the effectiveness of its checked
baggage screening operations. However, it will be important for
TSA to complete their analysis and plans for the funding of in-
line EDS systems, which has been the primary obstacle to the
deployment of these systems over the past few years.
TSA Has Strengthened Its Efforts to Measure the Effectiveness of
Screening Systems
TSA has strengthened its efforts to measure the performance of the
various components of the passenger and checked baggage screening
systems--people, processes, and technology--but results of covert
testing identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to
exist. In November 2003, we reported on the need for TSA to strengthen
its efforts to measure the performance of its aviation security
system.\29\ At that time, TSA had collected limited data on the
effectiveness of its aviation security programs and initiatives.
Specifically, limited covert testing had been performed, the Threat
Image Projection (TIP) system \30\ was not fully operational at
passenger screening checkpoints and was not available for checked
baggage screening systems, and TSA had not fully implemented a
congressionally mandated annual screener proficiency review (referred
to as the recertification program). Since then, TSA has implemented and
strengthened efforts to collect performance data in these areas.
In the area of covert testing, TSA headquarters increased the
amount of passenger and checked baggage screening covert tests it
performs and recently changed its approach to covert testing to focus
its resources on catastrophic threats--threats that can take down an
airplane or blow up an airplane. These tests, in which undercover OI
inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through passenger screening
checkpoints and in checked baggage, are designed to measure
vulnerabilities in passenger and checked baggage screening systems and
to identify systematic problems affecting performance of TSOs in the
areas of people (training), processes (procedures), and technology. OI
began conducting covert testing in September 2002, conducting test
scenarios for the passenger checkpoint and for checked baggage. These
scenarios were carried over from tests developed and conducted under
FAA, but OI reported using more updated weapons than those used by FAA
and more robust tests. TSA considers its covert testing as a snapshot
of a TSO's ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in
time, as one of several indicators of systemwide screener performance,
and as an important mechanism for identifying areas in passenger and
checked baggage screening needing improvement.
In September 2003, we reported that OI had conducted limited covert
testing, but planned to double the amount of tests it conducted during
Fiscal Year 2004, based on an anticipated increase in its staff from
about 100 full-time equivalents to about 200 full-time equivalents.\31\
TSA officials stated that based on budget constraints, OI's Fiscal Year
2004 staffing authorization was limited to 183 full-time-
equivalents.\32\ Despite a smaller than expected staff increase, by the
end of the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2004, OI had already surpassed
the number of tests it had performed during Fiscal Year 2003--
conducting a total of 836 tests in Fiscal Year 2003 and 1,233 in the
first two quarters of Fiscal Year 2004.\33\
Our analysis of TSA's covert testing results for tests conducted
between September 2002 and September 2005 identified that overall,
weaknesses existed in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects
on passengers, in their carry-on bags, and in checked baggage. Covert
testing results in this analysis cannot be generalized either to the
airports where the tests were conducted or to airports nationwide.\34\
During the first 3 years of covert testing, OI decided to maintain
the same test scenarios and same level of difficulty so that test
results would be comparable over time.\35\ In July 2005, OI began
revamping its covert testing program based on the results of the
Secretary of DHS's Second Stage Review--a review of the department's
programs, policies, operations, and structure.\36\ Specifically, the
Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, instructed OI to implement a more
risk-based approach and focus its resources on catastrophic threats--
threats that can take down an airplane or blow up an airplane. In
August 2005, the Assistant Secretary of DHS, TSA, further instructed OI
to discontinue its former covert testing program and implement the
revamped covert testing program. OI began implementation of its
revamped testing in September 2005. OI conducted 117 tests over a 1-
week period at one airport focusing on catastrophic threats and
incorporated additional testing elements that had not previously been
included. According to OI officials, this testing involved over 50
personnel from various TSA components. Since then, OI has conducted
tests at three additional airports.\37\ OI officials stated that TSA
leadership is considering these initial tests in making final
determinations regarding the revised testing program that OI will
implement, and that final decisions regarding the structure, content,
and frequency of these tests have not yet been made.
In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their
own covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities--a
practice that TSA had previously prohibited.\38\ Between May 2004 and
April 2005, FSDs conducted a total of 17,954 local covert tests at 350
airports; as of February 2006, TSA reported that FSDs had conducted a
total of 48,826 local covert tests. In February 2005, TSA released a
general procedures document for local covert testing at checked baggage
screening locations. Between March 2005 and September 2005, 1,370 local
tests of EDS screening were conducted at 71 airports. TSA headquarters
officials stated that a key challenge FSDs face in conducting local
testing is the lack of available Federal staff to conduct the testing,
particularly at smaller airports. In May 2005, we reported that TSA
officials stated that they had not yet begun to use data from local
covert testing to identify training and performance needs because of
difficulties in ensuring that local covert testing is implemented
consistently nationwide.\39\ TSA officials stated in March 2006 that
data is available for use by FSDs to identify training needs and TSO
performance.
Covert testing is one method TSA uses to measure the security
effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening procedures and
technologies in the operating environment in addition to other TSA
measures that assess the performance of passenger and checked baggage
TSOs. One other source of information on TSO performance in detecting
threat objects is the results from the TIP system. TIP is designed to
test passenger screeners' detection capabilities by projecting threat
images, including images of guns, knives, and explosives, onto bags as
they are screened during actual operations. TSOs are responsible for
identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched.
Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is
real and then records the TSO's performance in a data base that could
be analyzed for performance trends.\40\ TIP threat detection results in
conjunction with OI covert test results and local testing are intended
to assist TSA in identifying specific training and performance
improvement efforts.
In May 2005, we reported that in October 2003 TSA reactivated TIP
as planned with an expanded library of 2,400 images at all but 1 of the
more than 1,800 checkpoint lanes nationwide. In December 2005, TSA
reported that it has further expanded the image library to include
additional images of IEDs and IED components as part of its effort to
improve TSOs' detection of explosives. Additionally, the President's
Fiscal Year 2007 budget request states that TSA plans to maximize the
training benefits of the TIP system by tailoring TIP sessions to
address individual TSO weaknesses revealed in user performance data.
For example, if a TSO has particular difficulty identifying IEDs, the
TIP would trigger the projection of a higher proportion of simulated
IEDs while that TSO was operating the machine than under standard
circumstances. While there have been improvements in TIP for passenger
screening, TIP is not yet available for checked baggage screening. In
April 2004, we reported that TSA officials stated that they were
working to resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for
checked baggage screening on EDS machines and have started EDS TIP
image development.\41\ However, in December 2004, TSA officials stated
that because of severe budget reductions, TSA will be unable to begin
implementing a TIP program for checked baggage in Fiscal Year 2005.
Officials did not specify when such a program might begin.
Another measure of TSO performance is the results of annual
recertification testing. ATSA requires that each TSO receive an annual
proficiency review to ensure he or she continues to meet all
qualifications and standards required to perform the screening
function. To meet this requirement, TSA established a recertification
program. The first recertification program--which was conducted during
the period October 2003 through March 2004--was composed of two
assessment components, one of TSOs' performance and the other of TSOs'
knowledge and skills. During the performance assessment component of
the recertification program, TSOs are rated on both organizational and
individual goals, such as maintaining the Nation's air security,
vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost attention to tasks that will
prevent security threats, and demonstrating the highest levels of
courtesy to travelers to maximize their levels of satisfaction with
screening services. The knowledge and skills assessment component
consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of standard operating
procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical demonstration of
skills.
Across all airports, TSOs performed well on the recertification
testing for the first 2 years the program was in place, with about 1
percent of TSOs subject to recertification failing to complete this
requirement. In both years, TSOs faced the greatest difficulty on their
first attempt to pass the practical demonstration of skills module--a
hands-on simulated work sample used to evaluate a screener's knowledge,
skill, and ability when performing specific screener tasks along with
the ability to provide customer service.\42\ According to TSA
officials, at the completion of recertification at an airport, TSA
management has access to reports at both the individual TSO and airport
level, which identify the specific areas that were missed during
testing. National level reports are also available that isolate areas
that need improvement and can be targeted in basic and recurrent
training. In Fiscal Year 2004, TSA established a performance measure
for the recertification program.\43\
During the first year of recertification testing, dual-function
TSOs who were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage
TSOs were required to take only the recertification test for passenger
TSOs. They were therefore not required to take the recertification
testing modules required for checked baggage, even though they worked
in that capacity.\44\ TSA's second annual recertification testing,
which began in October 2004, included components for dual-function
TSOs, but did not include an image recognition module for checked
baggage TSOs--which would include dual-function screeners performing
checked baggage screening. TSA officials stated that a decision was
made to not include an image recognition module for checked baggage
TSOs during this cycle because not all checked baggage TSOs would have
completed training on the onscreen resolution protocol by the time
recertification testing was conducted at their airports.\45\ In October
2005, TSA released guidance for screener recertification that included
an image recognition module for checked baggage and dual-function
screeners trained in the onscreen alarm resolution protocol.
In addition to enhancing its efforts to measure the performance of
TSOs, TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the
effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems.
These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of
indicators and are derived by combining specific performance measures
relating to passenger and checked baggage screening, respectively.
Specifically, these indexes measure the effectiveness of the screening
systems through machine probability of detection and covert testing
results; \46\ efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per
passenger or bag screened; and customer satisfaction through a national
poll, customer surveys, and customer complaints at both airports and
TSA's national call center. We reported in May 2005 that the screening
performance indexes developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but
without targets for each component of the index, TSA will have
difficulty performing meaningful analyses of the parts that make up the
index. For example, without performance targets for covert testing, TSA
will not have identified a desired level of performance related to
screener detection of threat objects. Performance targets for covert
testing would enable TSA to focus its improvement efforts on areas
determined to be most critical, as 100 percent detection capability may
not be attainable. In January 2005, TSA officials stated that the
agency planned to track the performance of individual index components
and establish performance targets against which to measure these
components.
Concluding Observations
Since its inception, TSA has achieved significant accomplishments
in meeting congressional mandates related to establishing passenger and
checked baggage screening operations. With the initial congressional
mandates now largely met, TSA has turned its attention to assessing and
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of its passenger and checked
baggage screening systems. As threats and technology evolve, it is
vital that TSA continue to enhance training and procedures for the TSO
workforce. Over the past several years, TSA has strengthened its TSO
training program in an effort to ensure that TSOs have the knowledge
and skills needed to successfully perform their screening functions.
However, without addressing the challenges to delivering ongoing
training, including installing high-speed connectivity at airport
training facilities, TSA may have difficulty maintaining a screening
workforce that possesses the critical skills needed to perform at a
desired level. TSA is also revising existing screening procedures and
developing new procedures to enhance security effectiveness, many of
which are risk-based, as we have previously advocated. Additionally,
TSA has developed a staffing model intended to provide the necessary
levels of TSOs to support security activities at the Nation's airports.
However, given the challenges TSA faces in determining appropriate
staffing levels at airports--to include hiring the appropriate mix of
part-time TSOs needed to support screening functions--it is critical
that TSA carefully consider how it strategically hires, deploys, and
manages its TSO workforce to help strengthen its passenger and checked
baggage screening programs.
As TSA works toward improving the performance of individual TSOs
and screening operations, it will also be important that the agency
deploy and leverage screening equipment and technologies, sustain its
research and development efforts, and strengthen its R&D management and
planning efforts. We are encouraged that TSA is currently undertaking
efforts to systematically analyze the cost and benefits of in-line
baggage screening systems and to identify innovative funding and
financing options. This planning should help TSA support future funding
requests by demonstrating enhanced security, improved operational
efficiencies, and cost savings to both TSA and the affected airports.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may
have at this time.
Related GAO Products
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November
28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air
Cargo Security, GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005.
Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the
Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935.
Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005.
Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-
781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not
Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight
Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps
to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July
22, 2005.
Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July
13, 2005.
Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May
2, 2005.
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way,
but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356.
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005.
Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using
Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2005.
Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.
Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to
Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services.
GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004.
General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed,
but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-
Term Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004.
Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security
of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728.
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed
to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May
28, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-
04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004.
Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519.
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004.
Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer-
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.:
March 17, 2004.
Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004.
Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington,
D.C.: February 13, 2004.
Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,
D.C.: February 12, 2004.
The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a
Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program.
GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003.
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing
Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional
Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003.
Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003.
Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress
Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September
24, 2003.
Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address
Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides
Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T.
Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-
Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 2003.
Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build
a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,
2003.
Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and
DOT's Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,
2003.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for
the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.
Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.
Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects
Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.:
October 15, 2002.
Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses
Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002.
Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: July
25, 2002.
Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002.
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for,
Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.:
September 25, 2001.
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.:
September 21, 2001.
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts.
GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to
Improve Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington,
D.C.: September 20, 2001.
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.
ENDNOTES
\1\ ATSA created TSA as an agency within the Department of
Transportation (DOT) with responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation, including aviation. Pub. L. No. 107-71, Sec. 101, 115
Stat. 597 (2001). The Homeland Security Act of 2002, signed into law on
November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the DOT to the new Department
of Homeland Security Pub. L. No. 107-296, Sec. 403, 116 Stat. 2135,
2178.
\2\ TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of
a screener conducted by TSA, on any screening function, to assess the
screener's threat item detection ability or adherence to TSA-approved
procedures.
\3\ Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for
screening all checked baggage using explosive detection systems was, in
effect, extended until December 31, 2003.
\4\ Sterile areas are areas located within the terminal where
passengers wait after screening to board departing aircraft. Access to
these areas is generally controlled by TSA screeners at checkpoints
where they conduct physical screening of passengers and their carry-on
baggage for weapons and explosives.
\5\ TSOs must deny passage beyond the screening location to any
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must
not be allowed into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft.
\6\ Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of
threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode.
\7\ Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and
residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags
with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of
explosive materials.
\8\ Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of
screening checked baggage that requires that the passenger be on the
same aircraft as the checked baggage.
\9\ ATSA required that TSA begin allowing all commercial airports
to apply to TSA to transition from a Federal to a private TSO
workforce. To support this effort, TSA created the Screening
Partnership Program to allow all commercial airports an opportunity to
apply to TSA for permission to use qualified private screening
contractors and private sector screeners. Currently, private screening
companies provide passenger and checked baggage screening at six
airports.
\10\ Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at
49-50 (2005).
\11\ GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and
Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO-04-440T
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004).
\12\ Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-458, Sec. 4023, 118 Stat 3638, 3723-24.
\13\ One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080
non-overtime hours.
\14\ This budgetary FTE limit is not to be confused with the 45,000
FTE screener cap imposed by Congress in the FY 2006 DHS Appropriations
Act that limits the total number of FTE screeners available to TSA.
\15\ We interviewed FSD staff at 3 category X airports, one
category I airports, and one category III airport. TSA classifies the
commercial airports in the United States into one of six security risk
categories (X, I, II, III, IV, and V) based on various factors, such as
the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, and other special
security considerations. In general, category X airports have the
largest number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have
the smallest.
\16\ GAO-04-440T.
\17\ GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 24, 2003).
\18\ Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports
issued by OIAPR.
\19\ GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance
Measurement Strengthened but More Work Remains, GAO-05-457 (Washington
D.C.: May 2, 2005).
\20\ According to the budget request, the remaining $36 million is
needed to support operations and maintenance costs, including recurring
costs for routers, switches, circuits, cabinets, racks, and network
monitoring.
\21\ In April 2005, TSA began documenting proposed changes to
passenger checkpoint screening procedures.
\22\ TSA does not review proposed SOP changes on a regular basis.
Rather, the administration accumulates proposed changes and reviews
them periodically on an as-needed basis. Since TSA began documenting
proposed changes to checkpoint screening procedures, the agency has
conducted three reviews of proposed changes, which took place in April
2005, August 2005, and September 2005.
\23\ TSA attributed nine proposed changes to senior leadership
direction, and TSA did not categorize five proposed changes from 2005.
\24\ Office of Inspections recommended two additional changes to
checkpoint screening procedures prior to March 2005.
\25\ A selectee is a person identified for additional screening by
a computer-assisted passenger screening system or another process as
determined and approved by TSA.
\26\ This figure refers to the net present value saved over 7 years
if received up front.
\27\ For a basis of comparison, Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-94 stipulates using a 7 percent real discount rate to
compute the present value of cost savings. TSA used a 4 percent real
discount rate. Following Office of Management and Budget guidance, cost
savings are $1.14 billion. In addition, in TSA's analysis, the Federal
Government does not pay for $319 million, or 25 percent, of project
costs. Accounting for these costs to reflect total costs, as
recommended by Circular A-94, lowers overall savings to $820 million.
\28\ The relatively large costs for upfront in-line EDS at one
airport are not offset by the modest amount of estimated operation and
maintenance cost savings; therefore, the in-line EDS system may be more
costly than EDS stand-alone. By contrast, at another airport the
upfront costs of in-line EDS are lower than for stand-alone EDS, and
there is a substantial amount of estimated operation and maintenance
cost savings. Therefore, the in-line EDS system for this latter airport
may be less costly than stand-alone EDS.
\29\ GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and
Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).
\30\ The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test TSOs'
detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including images of
guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened. TSOs are
responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for
the bag to be searched.
\31\ GAO-03-1173.
\32\ Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time
assignment for the majority of OI staff. According to OI, 14 full-time-
equivalent positions in headquarters are dedicated fully to the covert
testing program, which includes covert testing of all modes of
transportation, not just airports. These 14 full-time-equivalents are
in a special group that forms the core of team leaders for the covert
testing trips.
\33\ OI conducted a total of 2,369 passenger and checked baggage
covert tests in Fiscal Year 2004.
\34\ Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were
not identified using the principles of probability sampling. In a
probability sample to assess screener detection of threat objects, each
screening of a passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of
being selected. A well-designed probability sample would enable failure
rates to be generalized to all airports. However, for cost and
operational reasons, probability sampling may not be feasible for
passenger and checked baggage screening because it would require a very
large sample size and an exhaustive examination of each sampled
passenger or baggage to determine if there was a threat object to
detect.
\35\ In August 2004, OI began piloting various enhanced covert test
scenarios based on more current threat information.
\36\ The review examined elements of the Department of Homeland
Security in order to recommend ways that DHS could better manage risk
in terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence; prioritize policies
and operational missions according to this risk-based approach; and
establish a series of preventive and protective steps that would
increase security at multiple levels.
\37\ OI conducted testing at two of the three airports twice during
September 2005 through December 2005.
\38\ The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004
and August 2004 to provide information on alternative testing methods.
\39\ GAO-05-457.
\40\ The TIP data base records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false
alarm rate. These two results are used to determine the probability of
detection and probability of false alarm, which determine overall TIP
performance. The TIP performance measure is classified as sensitive
security information.
\41\ GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have
Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-505T
(Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004).
\42\ We cannot report on the specific results of the testing due to
the security classification of this testing.
\43\ Information related to the measures is sensitive security
information.
\44\ As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce
included approximately 25,947 dual-trained TSOs who were certified to
serve as passenger or baggage TSOs.
\45\ TSA's onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS
machine alarm goes off, indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA
screeners, by reviewing computer-generated images of the inside of the
bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or items are in
fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to make this
determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an
area where it receives a secondary screening by a screener with an ETD
machine.
\46\ According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are
established by the certification standards for each particular model of
machine, and machines are not deployed unless they have met those
standards.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Our next witness is Mr.
Gregory Principato, President of the Airports Council
International. Mr. Principato?
STATEMENT OF GREGORY O. PRINCIPATO, PRESIDENT,
AIRPORTS COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL--NORTH AMERICA (ACI-NA); ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES (AAAE)
Mr. Principato. Thank you, Senator Stevens, Senator Ensign
for the opportunity today to share the views of the airport
community on aviation passenger and baggage screening. As you
said, I'm Greg Principato, President of Airports Council
International--North America.
I'm testifying today on behalf of ACI-North America, the
American Association of Airport Executives, and our joint
legislative organization, the Airport Legislative Alliance.
ACI-North America represents local, state, and regional
governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports
throughout the United States and Canada. AAAE represents the
men and women who manage primary, commercial service, reliever
and general aviation airports.
Passengers have returned to our skies in record numbers.
The increasing numbers of passengers, combined with today's
labor-intensive screening system, have pushed the TSA's
passenger and baggage screening capabilities to the limit. This
has resulted in ever-increasing wait times at passenger
screening checkpoints and growing problems with checked baggage
screening. Without dramatic changes to today's aviation
security model, we will not be able to meet the demands created
by the nearly 300 million additional passengers who will be
added to our crowded aviation system within the next decade.
That's the combined population of the United States and Canada
that we're going to add to our system in the next decade.
The airport community, backed by a recommendation of the 9/
11 Commission, believes that TSA can enhance aviation security
by the permanent installation of in line explosive detection
equipment at airports. We need to move oversized, bulky
explosive detection equipment, referred to as EDS, out of
passenger terminal lobbies and relocate them where we can
facilitate in-line solutions. This will improve security
screening operations and increase public safety and security.
In-line systems can also improve efficiency and reduce
TSA's personnel costs. Ms. Berrick has already alluded to some
of that. At the Lexington/Bluegrass Airport in Kentucky, for
example, a $3.5 million investment to modify the terminal for
an in-line baggage system has resulted in annual personnel
savings of more than $3 million. I believe in my prepared
testimony, I talked about San Francisco and the tens of
millions of dollars that have been saved annually there.
TSA has been able to use four screeners for the in-line
system in Lexington per shift, rather than the 30 that would
have been necessary to screen checked bags using explosive
trace detection machines. In addition, the in-line EDS option
in Lexington allows for reduced congestion in terminal areas.
Unfortunately, the Fiscal Year 2007 budget calls for only $344
million for EDS installation. While this is an increase of $49
million over last year's inactive level, it falls far short of
the billions that are necessary to fully integrate EDS machines
in-line with baggage systems at airports where such a solution
makes sense.
It's now four and a half years since September 11, 2001 and
the Federal Government does not yet have a long term EDS
solution for airports. Only nine airports have received funds
for in-line EDS installation from the TSA's Letter of Intent
Program in which the Federal Government reimburses an airport
for project costs. A few others have received funding from TSA
via the other transactions agreement program. Despite the
success of the Letter of Intent Program, the Administration has
stated that it will not issue new ones. This matter cannot go
unaddressed another year. We must move beyond our current,
labor-intensive screening system and adopt a more efficient
means of using technology and personnel.
In addition to moving EDS equipment in-line, the airport
community believes that a registered traveler program can help
the TSA use its checkpoint screeners more effectively. This
could help expedite the screening process for all travelers and
allow screeners to focus more intensely on unknown and
potential threats. It is our hope that TSA will meet the
deadlines the agency has announced to have an effective
registered traveler program operational later this year.
In the mean time, and considering EDS technologies will not
be made available immediately, Congress and TSA should take
steps to improve passenger and baggage screening in the short
term. These options might include: expansion of the Screening
Partnership Program, also known as opt-out, so that it becomes
a real alternative for airports; providing Federal security
directors more autonomy to work with airports to address unique
local situations relative to screening; adoption of screening
performance standards so that TSA can more effectively manage
limited resources, and keeping TSA focused on its mission of
passenger and baggage screening while avoiding mission creep
and, I'd say, including the continued staffing of exit lanes.
To conclude, I'd like to thank you Chairman Stevens, Co-
Chairman Inouye, and the other members of the Committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today. We have great
challenges facing the aviation industry and airports stand
ready to be a partner in meeting those challenges. We believe
that by providing TSA with the long and short term solutions it
needs, limited Federal resources can be leveraged to produce
enhanced security and better results for America's taxpayer and
traveling public. We look forward to working with you and TSA
to ensure that our Nation's aviation system is the most secure
and efficient in the world. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Principato follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gregory O. Principato, President, Airports
Council International-North America (ACI-NA); on behalf of the American
Association of Airport Executives (AAAE)
Thank you for the opportunity to share with the Committee the views
of the airport community on aviation passenger and baggage screening. I
am Greg Principato, President of Airports Council International-North
America (ACI-NA). I am testifying today on behalf of ACI-NA, the
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), and our Airport
Legislative Alliance, a joint legislative advocacy organization. ACI-NA
represents local, regional and state governing bodies that own and
operate commercial airports in the United States and Canada. AAAE
represents the men and women who manage primary, commercial service,
reliever, and general aviation airports.
I want to thank you Chairman Stevens and Co-Chairman Inouye, for
holding this series of hearings on the responsibilities, operations and
priorities of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in
aviation passenger and baggage screening.
Since the TSA's creation, airports have striven to be an active
partner with the TSA in meeting its mandates and its mission. We look
forward to continuing our work with the TSA and with this Committee to
ensure we have the highest level of security as well as high levels of
customer service for the traveling public.
As the members of this committee are well aware, passengers have
returned to our Nation's skies in record numbers. The increased volume
combined with problems inherent in today's labor intensive screening
system have pushed the TSA's passenger and baggage screening
capabilities to the limit as evidenced by ever increasing wait times at
passenger screening checkpoints and by growing problems with checked
baggage screening. Without dramatic changes to the aviation security
model in use today, we will not be able to meet the demands created by
the nearly 300 million passengers who will be added to today's already
crowded aviation system within the next decade.
Technological Improvements Needed To Move Beyond Labor Intensive
Screening System
Airports maintain that one of the most important ways to improve
passenger and baggage screening is to move oversized, bulky explosive
detection equipment out of public circulation areas in passenger
terminal lobbies to restore capacity in existing terminal facilities
and to increase public safety and security. To the extent the Federal
Government invests in in-line baggage-screening equipment, TSA's
operating costs will be reduced and airlines will see improved baggage
services for their passengers through reduced lost and mishandled
luggage.
In order to meet congressional deadlines to screen all checked
baggage placed aboard commercial aircraft, TSA quickly placed thousands
of explosive detection system (EDS) and explosive trace detection (ETD)
machines in airports across the country. Many of those machines have
been placed in airport ticketing lobbies without an integrated plan to
take maximum advantage of their certified throughputs and alarm
reconciliation capabilities. The result, too often, is crowded airport
lobbies (a safety and security hazard), major backups at security
screening checkpoints, and an unnecessarily large number of TSA
personnel necessary to operate the equipment.
The airport community, backed by a recommendation of the 9/11
Commission, continues to believe that TSA can enhance aviation security
and restore capacity in existing terminal facilities by quickly moving
forward with the permanent installation of in-line explosive detection
equipment in airports. ACI-NA would note that the Canadian Air
Transportation Security Authority (CATSA), working with airport
operators, has already paid for the installation and is now operating
in-line baggage screening at all major Canadian airports.
Unfortunately, the Fiscal Year 2007 TSA budget calls for only $344
million for EDS installation funding. While this is an increase of $49
million from the 2006 enacted level, it falls far short of the billions
of additional dollars that are necessary to fully integrate EDS
machines in-line with baggage systems at airports where such a solution
makes sense, and regrettably provides little new money for converting
existing, inefficient systems.
To date, only a handful of U.S. airports have received Federal
funding for in-line systems. Nine airports--Atlanta, Boston, Dallas/
Fort Worth, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Ontario, Phoenix, and
Seattle--have received funds for in-line EDS installation from the
TSA's Letter of Intent (LOI) program and a few additional airports,
including Chicago O'Hare and Harrisburg, have received funding from TSA
via Other Transactional Agreements (OTAs).
Airports contend that the cost of in-line projects should be met
entirely by the Federal Government, given its direct responsibility for
baggage screening established in law, in light of the national security
imperative for doing so, and because of the economic efficiencies of
this strategy. Airports have agreed to provide a local match of 10
percent in the case of large and medium hubs and 5 percent for smaller
airports. However, the budget request once again includes a provision
that would reduce the Federal share under any Letter of Intent to 75
percent at medium or large hub airports and 90 percent at all other
airports. We strongly oppose proposals to increase the local share
beyond the levels established in VISION-100.
Of the $344 million that TSA proposes in the 2007 budget for EDS
installment, $187 million is slated to fulfill existing LOI
obligations. While the projects at those airports are necessary and a
top priority, that leaves just $157 million for the dozens of other
airports that do not currently have LOIs with the TSA. Although TSA has
not yet determined the total cost of installing in-line EDS baggage
screening systems at airports, we estimate that costs could range from
$2 million for a category III airport to $250 million for a category X
airport. Nationwide, estimates run anywhere from $3 billion to $5
billion. That estimate is being revised upward, as construction costs
have skyrocketed recently. In fact, construction cost inflation is now
triple the consumer price index.
Despite these overwhelming needs, the Federal Government does not
yet have a long-term EDS solution, a full four and a half years after
9/11. It is readily apparent that incremental installments, even at
several hundred million dollars a year, will not get projects started
at additional airports in the foreseeable future. Clearly, more
resources and new strategies are needed to fund projects at the rest of
the Nation's airports.
The TSA's task has not been made any easier by opposition from the
Office of Management and Budget to issuing additional LOIs to airports
for these projects. Budget rules that don't recognize the benefit of
one-time capital improvements to save years of operating costs are both
``pennywise and pound foolish'' and continue to shortchange vital
security improvements.
The Federal Government cannot allow this issue to go unaddressed
another year. To help find a solution to this persistent problem,
airports, airlines and other industry stakeholders are collaborating
with TSA on a baggage screening investment study, expected to be
completed in the next few months. The study seeks to identify
innovative funding and financing alternatives for integrated EDS/out of
lobby solutions for baggage systems. We welcome this study and look
forward to the results which should provide TSA and airports with
creative solutions to this problem.
In-Line Systems Enhance Efficiency And Reduce Personnel Costs
Although in-line systems require up-front capital expenditures,
they pay for themselves in short-order through major reductions in
personnel and recouped costs. Last year, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) concluded that in-line baggage screening systems at the
nine airports that have received LOI funds from TSA would save the
Federal Government $1.3 billion over 7 years compared with EDS systems
that are not in-line. To support GAO's findings, we have examples at
the dozen or so airports where EDS systems have been installed to take
advantage of their full capabilities and, as a result, dramatic savings
have been achieved.
The airports that currently have ``in-line'' baggage systems report
that they have paid for themselves with personnel cost reductions in as
little as 16 months. The case of the Lexington Blue-Grass Airport in
Kentucky offers a perfect example. At Lexington, a $3.5 million
investment to make the terminal modifications necessary to establish an
in-line baggage system instead of a terminal lobby ETD protocol
resulted in annual personnel savings of more than $3 million. The TSA
has been able to use 4 screeners for the in-line system per shift
rather than the 30 screeners that would have been necessary for the ETD
configuration. In addition, the in-line EDS option at Lexington allows
for reduced congestion in terminal areas, a result that has improved
security and enhanced passenger convenience. TSA can achieve greater
savings at large airports. Modeling at San Francisco International
Airport, for example, shows savings of tens of millions of dollars
annually for their in-line EDS solution.
In addition, in-line screening has also been shown to reduce the
rate of TSA screener on-the-job injuries. TSA Administrator Kip Hawley
testified last month that he expects the agency to spend $57 million on
workers compensation claims in 2007. By moving equipment in-line, fewer
personnel would be needed resulting in fewer injuries and less time off
the job, all of which contribute to savings for the TSA.
Registered Traveler
As we have discussed in great detail as part of previous testimony
before the Committee on TSA passenger pre-screening programs, the
airport community believes a Registered Traveler program can more
effectively calibrate the resource allocation at airport screening
checkpoints. Relatively few passengers make up the overwhelming
majority of all travel, and we should make every effort to provide a
different screening protocol for this group of travelers. Doing so will
help expedite the screening process for all travelers and allow
screeners to focus more intensely on unknown and potential threats. It
is our hope that TSA will meet the deadlines the agency has announced
to have an effective Registered Traveler program operational by this
summer.
Short Term Steps Needed To Improve Screening
Recognizing that Registered Traveler has yet to be deployed
nationwide and that EDS technologies will not be available immediately,
Congress and TSA should consider taking steps to improve passenger and
baggage screening in the short-term. These options include:
Expansion of the Screening Partnership Program (opt-out) so
that it becomes a real alternative for airports.
Providing Federal Security Directors more autonomy to work
with airports to address unique local situations relative to
screening.
Adoption of screening performance standards so that TSA can
more effectively manage limited resources.
Keeping TSA focused on its mission of passenger and baggage
screening including the continued staffing of exit lanes.
Making the Screening Partnership Program a Viable Option for Airports
While there are a number of airports that are not interested in
participating in the Screening Partnership Program under any
circumstances, there are others that would like to see the program
become a viable option. Unfortunately, the role of local airport
operators in the existing program is minimal. The only real authority
that an airport operator now has is to raise the issue at the beginning
of the process and express an interest in having TSA use a private
contractor. After that, airports have virtually no say in how screening
operations will be designed. They are not allowed to decide the
specific qualified screening company that will operate at their
airport, and they have no role in deciding how screening will
ultimately function at their facility. Given the existing construct, it
is not surprising that only a couple of smaller airports have expressed
an interest in opting out beyond the original five SPP pilot airports.
In order to make the opt-out program truly viable, the law must be
changed to give airports additional control over the design and
implementation of plans for passenger and baggage screening at their
individual facilities. Airports must be free, should they so choose, to
select and contract directly with the qualified companies with which
they intend to work and establish the scope of work rather than wait
for TSA to make such decisions. TSA should remain responsible for
establishing standards and providing regulatory oversight, but airports
should be given the freedom to decide how best to get the job done. We
believe that TSA is best suited for regulatory functions while airport
operators and their private sector partners are best suited for
operational and customer service functions.
Many of these items obviously require statutory changes. As
Congress moves forward with its discussion in this area, we would
encourage you to consider the following:
Airport operators must be given the authority to select and
enter into contracts directly with qualified screening
companies to screen passengers and property at the airport.
Under current law, airports simply apply to participate in the
program and then rely on TSA to select qualified vendors. TSA--
as opposed to airports--enters into contracts with those
vendors to perform passenger and baggage screening. Airports
must be given a more prominent role in the process and more
control in managing the contracts and performance.
Airport operators must be given the ability to perform
passenger and baggage screening directly if they so choose. The
law must make clear that airport operators should be able to
qualify as a qualified screening company.
TSA should establish a notification process under which
airports submit a detailed proposal for passenger and baggage
screening for approval. Under current law, interested airports
apply to participate and the process moves on from there
without their involvement. Interested airports should be
encouraged to work closely with qualified private sector
partners and then submit that plan to TSA for approval.
Adequate funding must be provided to ensure that airports
can cover the costs associated with screening and debt service
on security-related capital improvements such as in-line EDS
projects.
The program should be expanded to allow interested airports
to assume responsibility for screening cargo in addition to
passengers and baggage screening.
This is not intended to be a comprehensive and final list, but it
is included for purposes of moving the discussion forward and to give
the Committee an idea of some of the specific concerns that a number of
airport operators have raised as impediments to participation. If some
of these items were to be resolved, we believe that many airports would
at minimum give the program a much closer look.
In addition to encouraging additional local involvement and new and
creative approaches to screening, an expanded SPP program potentially
could be utilized to move forward with the in-line installation of EDS
equipment at participating airports. By providing interested airport
operators with additional control and a steady and reliable funding
stream--either by guaranteeing a base level of continued funding to
support screening operations or by alternative means such as a formula
that captures key airport characteristics such as passengers and amount
of baggage screened--some airports might be willing to move forward on
their own with in-line systems. The concept here is to capture and
utilize the eventual personnel savings from in-line systems to pay for
the initial capital investment and debt that a participating airport
would use to fund that system.
Again, even if Congress is able to make all of the changes
highlighted here, there are a number of airports across the country
that will not be interested in participating in the SPP. For that
reason, it is imperative that TSA be encouraged to be innovative,
creative, flexible, and inclusive in its approach to screening
regardless of the type of employee who ultimately screens the passenger
or their baggage. The keys are local flexibility, airport involvement,
and tough security standards that all organizational models are
compelled to meet.
Local Flexibility Critical in Addressing Short-Term Problems With
Screening
TSA continues to struggle with recruiting, assessing, hiring,
training, and retaining screeners--a fact that is evidenced by large
vacancy rates at a number of airports across the country. In Oakland,
for example, it is my understanding that the vacancy rate stands at 25
percent, and there are other airports that report similar problems with
filling screener staff positions. The problems are exacerbated by high
attrition rates for screeners.
In many instances, the strict rigidity of TSA in its hiring and
staffing practices seems to be the source of current problems. A number
of airports report that many issues could be resolved through more
flexible staffing schedules or through the use of additional part-time
workers, for example. Unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be
sufficient flexibility locally to tackle problems that are inherently
local in nature. TSA has made some progress in this area, but we still
have a long way to go.
As is the case in so many areas relating to security, one size does
not fit all. The challenges in Anchorage with regard to hiring,
placing, and maintaining screeners are not the same as they are in
Honolulu, Billings, or Los Angeles. Each of these locations has unique
local labor markets, unique balances between local and connecting
traffic, unique seasonal traffic patterns, unique airport
configurations, and so on down the list. To be effective,
responsiveness to local airport operational characteristics must be the
guiding criterion for the hiring and management of workforces.
TSA Performance Standards
Beyond additional local flexibility, we believe that it is critical
that the agency establish measures and performance standards for
passenger processing. While the 10-minute goal established initially by
Department of Transportation Secretary Mineta may not be exactly the
right standard, it is clear that a reasonable goal must be established
and that the TSA and the full array of passenger and cargo processing
personnel employed by the Federal Government must be held accountable
for meeting such goals. We have goals holding the airlines accountable
for meeting their schedules; it is only appropriate and right that we
do the same with the Federal workforce. Only by setting a standard can
TSA and airport managers know that the workforce size and deployment
model for their airport is the appropriate one.
Focusing on TSA's Core Mission
Given the enormous task that TSA has been given to ensure the
security of the Nation's transportation system, the agency must rely on
its airport partners to continue performing important functions that we
have successfully performed for decades such as perimeter security and
access control. Airports are organizations owned and operated by state
and local governments and, therefore, have the necessary and
appropriate incentives to perform security responsibilities at the
highest levels. The primary mission of an airport is to establish and
maintain a safe and secure environment for travelers and the general
public and to serve the community and the national aviation system by
encouraging competitive air service. Airports have always been
responsible for the safety and security of their facilities and the
people who use them, and this will continue to be so.
Despite those facts, we continue to see efforts to expand TSA's
mission into areas traditionally performed by airport operators and to
expand the regulatory enforcement personnel at airports. This creates a
natural conflict of interest by giving a single entity operational and
oversight responsibilities. Clearly, there are a number of ways to
better utilize limited TSA resources. Our members have been pursuing
every opportunity to refine and improve our working relationship with
TSA to avoid duplication and to develop more productive working
relationships, and we will continue to do so. We firmly believe that
these efforts will ensure that limited TSA resources are reserved for
other priorities.
Exit Lanes Should Remain TSA's Responsibility
One of the priorities that airport operators believe that TSA must
continue to focus on is the monitoring of screening checkpoint exit
lanes after checkpoint screening activities cease and the monitoring of
exit areas that are located away from the screening checkpoint.
Unfortunately, TSA has recently undertaken efforts to shift those
responsibilities to airports.
TSA has repeatedly cited budget constraints as further
justification for shifting this responsibility to airports. We
understand the resource crunch facing the agency, and we are all
struggling to do more with less. However, TSA has not in any of its
presentations on the screener allocation model shown how abdicating its
responsibility at the exit areas will help to meet staffing demands at
the security checkpoint. Rather, it appears that TSA is choosing to
interpret its responsibilities in the airport environment according to
what is convenient given today's budget resources. This sets a
worrisome precedent and makes us question the consistency of TSA's
policy going forward as budgets ebb and flow from year to year.
Monitoring the exit areas after the security screening checkpoint
operations cease and at all times at exit areas not co-located to the
security screening checkpoint represents a major operational change in
the airport environment. It also represents a significant non-budgeted
expense that airports must address in the middle of the fiscal year.
Yet, TSA chose to announce this major operational change through an
action memo without any comment period and with a deadline of only 90
days. To execute such a major and unprecedented operational change, TSA
should have issued a proposed amendment to the Airport Security Program
or a Security Directive. This would have allowed airport operators to
have a formal review and comment period.
We oppose this proposed change in policy and hope that the Congress
will prevent TSA from abdicating its responsibilities in this area.
Proposed Cuts to AIP Will Impact Ability of Airports to Address
Security, Safety, and Capacity
I also want to briefly mention the impact the Administration's 2007
budget request will have on airport capital improvements and
operations. As this committee is well aware, the Administration has
proposed significant cuts to the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). The
proposed $2.75 billion level is $765 million below the Fiscal Year 2006
funding level and nearly $1 billion below the 2007 authorized level.
This proposed cut represents the largest percentage cut in the entire
Federal budget. In addition we are concerned that the Administration's
budget calls for funding FAA air traffic control modernization programs
significantly below the authorized level, and cuts funding for programs
aimed at providing service to smaller communities.
While the FAA budget is not the topic of today's hearing, the
proposed cuts in AIP will have a profound impact on the ability of
airports to address ongoing safety, capacity, and eligible security
needs. In addition, at a time when congestion is returning to our
airports and our skies, a reduction of airports' authorized share of
the Airport and Airways Trust Fund is ill-advised.
In addition to reducing the amount of discretionary funding
available to FAA for high-priority projects, funding AIP at the
President's requested level of $2.75 billion would have a significant
impact on the amount of entitlement funds flowing to individual
airports across the country. Under current law, a number of AIP formula
changes are contingent upon AIP being funded at a minimum of $3.2
billion. Funding at levels below $3.2 billion would:
Reduce Funding to Commercial Service Airports: Under current
law, primary airports--those airports with more than 10,000
annual passenger enplanements--receive an AIP entitlement based
on the number of enplaned passengers they have in a given year
with a minimum entitlement of $650,000. When AIP is funded at
$3.2 billion or higher--as has been the case since Fiscal Year
2002--those entitlements double and the minimum entitlement is
increased to $1 million. Unless AIP is funded at a minimum of
$3.2 billion in Fiscal Year 2007, entitlements to primary
airports could effectively be cut in half from Fiscal Year 2006
levels and the minimum entitlement paid to nearly 200 airports
across the country could be reduced from $1 million to
$650,000.
Reduce Funding to Small Commercial and Non-Commercial Airports:
Current law also provides grants of up to $150,000 to smaller,
non-primary airports in years where the program is funded at
$3.2 billion or higher. In Fiscal Year 2006, more than 2,700
airports received funding under this entitlement. Funding AIP
at $2.75 billion would result in the elimination of the non-
primary entitlement in Fiscal Year 2007. Additionally, the pool
of funding for smaller airports through the Small Airport Fund
would be reduced by more than $150 million. The total amount
apportioned to states for use at non-primary commercial
service, general aviation, and reliever airports also falls
from 20 percent of the total AIP funding level to 18.5 percent
of total funds below $3.2 billion. Certain airports in Alaska
that receive a separate entitlement would also be affected by a
reduction below $3.2 billion.
With passenger traffic approaching record levels, airports
throughout the country simply cannot sustain almost a $1 billion
reduction in AIP from authorized levels.
Conclusion
Again, I'd like to thank the Chairmen and this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I have highlighted how the
airport community believes limited TSA resources can be leveraged to
produce enhanced security and better results for America's taxpayers
and the traveling public. We look forward to working with you and the
TSA to ensure that our Nation's aviation system is the most secure and
efficient in the world.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Co-Chairman, sorry to start
before you got here. Do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. I'd just like to commend TSA for what
they've done. I realize that there are shortcomings. I think
that we should keep in mind that we haven't had a major
terrorist attack since September 11. Since I travel more often
than most of my colleagues, I find that the agents are very
courteous, but I get swept more often than anyone else. Maybe
I'm just too attractive. But I like the vigilance, but I hope
you come through with that passenger program where some of us
can go through with some dispatch. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I think the two of us probably fly
more than any Members of Congress, as a matter of fact. And we
have sort of been exposed to every portion of your system in
one way or another. I think we get more complaints than other
members do, also, because we see more passengers and where we
live, offshore, in my state, as you know, if you want to
travel, you travel by air, whether it's in the state or
traveling throughout the United States. We have a very air-
minded population.
It does seem to me that airline passengers feel they
deserve a little bit more attention because they're the only
people in the country that pay for their own security. So they
speak up--just this morning I had three more letters that I was
going through last evening and this morning, and--along with
Senator Inouye, I wonder why haven't we come further in terms
of this registered traveler program? Why can't we establish
that quicker?
Mr. Hawley. Mr. Chairman, we are on track for that. We had
the first deadline, January 20, which we met and the industry
met. And there's another one coming up in April as an interim
and our expectation is to get it--our goal is to have it up and
running in June and we've set a date of June 20.
A lot depends on getting the equipment that would be needed
for it and work--the big issue right now is working out the
security benefit for the security given at the lane. We have--
today, in fact, we have some new equipment, some new technology
that is being tested at our lab. And depending on that
performance, that will have a role in what the security
benefits will be. But it is very high on our radar screen and I
expect it to go forward this year.
The Chairman. Will their baggage be handled differently?
Mr. Hawley. The checked baggage, no.
The Chairman. Why not?
Mr. Hawley. It actually is not a hold up for the passenger
and it is easier to run the system with--or it is better to run
the system with our existing EDS equipment, to give it the full
treatment. It doesn't take a cost out of the traveling
passenger.
The Chairman. Well, I fail to see that. As a matter of
fact, I think we got the--and I didn't put any time on them, so
I don't know what to tell them myself, either. I think we get
as many complaints from passengers about baggage as we do about
the system of check in.
For instance, when a bag has been inspected, we don't know
who's inspected it. We get a little card saying TSA's inspected
it. Why doesn't the person who's doing the inspection put a
little card in the bag that says this bag's been inspected by
inspector number 123.
Mr. Hawley. I think that has been looked at as a good idea.
I will look at that again. We have put a considerable expense
into having video cameras to be able to tape it so that we have
evidence of what happens in the bag room, so if there are
allegations of stealing out of it. But we were in fact
reviewing for this hearing and that topic came up as to
numbering the inspected by cards and that's something we'll
look into.
The Chairman. Well, let me get to the questions raised by
Mr. Principato. Just last evening when I was looking at the
news, there was a person that indicated that they went into
China, they had, at one place they went into they looked up at
a screen and they were checked by eye identification. I thought
we were going that direction too.
Mr. Hawley. We're looking at biometrics too. The first step
will be for airport workers, the access to secure areas, to
take the existing background check that we do and add a
biometric to it and it would be--the protocol is essentially
either iris or fingerprint so that we are rolling out both in
the TWIC program, Registered Traveler, and essentially all of
our biometric programs are aimed at using both a fingerprint
and the iris or either/or because some people can't do one or
the other.
The Chairman. A person who was demonstrating the new
equipment came to our offices and showed us just a handheld
device that they could take a picture of your eyes now and
you'd be identified anywhere in the world that had that same
system and once again reproduced a contact with your eyes. Have
you looked at those systems?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir, if it's the iris recognition, that is
something that we're very bullish on, it's a good system and,
in fact, is part of the Registered Traveler Program and that is
expected to initially go out for the Registered Traveler folks.
The issue is actually putting the readers at the checkpoints so
that they are accessible everywhere and working that in
conjunction with the airport and the funding.
The Chairman. I don't believe----
Senator Lautenberg. Is that an instantaneous process?
The Chairman. What?
Senator Lautenberg. Is that an instantaneous----
The Chairman. Pull your mike around.
Mr. Hawley. It's virtually, I believe it's sub-second.
The Chairman. Yes, it is instant. It was shown to us for
use in military purposes first though, some time ago. Ms.
Berrick, it's my understanding your investigation with
undercover investigators smuggled bomb materials past
checkpoints, indicated screener technology deficiencies and
actually penetrated two major levels of security. Is that
right?
Ms. Berrick. Mr. Chairman, the results of those tests are
classified. GAO did do some undercover testing in airports
throughout the country and I would be happy to provide you a
separate classified briefing on that if you would like more
detail on those tests.
The Chairman. I'd be happy to have the classified stuff,
but what can you tell the public?
Ms. Berrick. What we can say publicly is GAO, in addition
to doing our own covert testing, has also assessed TSA's
internal covert testing program. TSA has a group of inspectors
that also try to get prohibited items through the checkpoints
and we've analyzed their covert testing results. What I can say
publicly is that for the 2-year period we reviewed between 2002
and 2004 we identified vulnerabilities in passenger checkpoint
screening and also in checked baggage screening in airports of
all sizes and airports throughout the country.
The Chairman. Well we are approaching the 5th anniversary
of 9/11 and when did you conduct those investigations?
Ms. Berrick. We analyzed TSA's covert testing results
between June of 2002 and June of 2004 and we're in the process
of updating that analysis right now, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We would like to arrange a classified
briefing. But what would be more important, I think, to have
people understand what the reaction to your inspections were.
Mr. Hawley, what did you do after you got that report?
Mr. Hawley. Sure. Well, as the Committee knows, we, this
fall, put into place a very major focus on finding IED
components at the passenger checkpoints and instituted a
massive training program that is ongoing.
I should say with regard to the GAO testing that you
referred to, that it has two principle take-aways that I would
say comfortably in public. Number one, it reiterates the
importance of focusing on IED components and that we agree with
and feel very strongly about. The second is it points up a
number of things that we've seen confirmed in our own testing,
and I believe they were talking about tests in the 20 range.
We've done thousands of tests, we do them frequently, we're
doing them this week. We do them virtually all the time to keep
our data fresh. And the second piece, in addition to the bomb
finding is important, is that our supervision and level of
personal engagement by the Transportation Security Officer is
key, and that we need to get to a point where, rather than
opening up a bag of--the TSO is thinking about a checklist, I
have to do this, then I have to do this, then I have to do
this, they're opening up thinking I've got to find a threat
object in here. And make it more accountable to them personally
and have them able to use their own personal judgment rather
than just saying I followed a checklist and that's good enough.
The Chairman. I'll ask other questions, but to get back to
you Ms. Berrick, we're told that TSA has the highest attrition
and worker injury rates of government and private sector jobs.
Have you looked into that problem and made any suggestions for
solutions to those two problems?
Ms. Berrick. We've looked at them as a part of other
engagements, but not directly. I can speak first to attrition.
We found that staffing attrition obviously has been a
problem for TSA. Their attrition rate for the part-time TSO
workforce is about 50 percent. And the attrition rate for the
overall TSO workforce is about 23 percent and there has been
some increase over the past year. That's caused a problem for
the airport Federal Security Directors in making sure they have
enough screeners on board to perform the screening function. We
have an ongoing engagement right now looking at how TSA
allocates TSOs among the airports and we believe that we'll
have recommendations coming out of that work to address some of
these deficiencies, but attrition certainly has been a problem
for TSA.
Related to workforce injuries, we've also identified that
that's been difficult for airports because when TSOs get
injured, they're not available to staff the checkpoints or
screen checked baggage.
The Chairman. What type of injuries are these?
Ms. Berrick. It's typically due to lifting heavy baggage,
and that could be due to a lot of different factors. This gets
back to the importance of having in-line baggage screening
systems. When you have stand-alone explosive detection
equipment it requires the screener to lift heavy bags, take
them over to the machine and put them in. If that equipment's
integrated in-line with baggage conveyor systems, it takes away
that impact on the screener. They don't have to physically
carry the baggage. So in addition to creating a lot of
efficiencies with the in-line baggage screening system, it
would also help, we believe, the screener injury rate.
The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. I'm sorry. A few days ago, a gang of
thieves were uncovered, arrested, they were four screeners
stealing valuables from bags. Is this a common occurrence?
Mr. Hawley. It's not a common occurrence, but it does occur
and it's something that we deal with. It goes to the very fiber
of trust that we have with the American public. So we are
vigorous at, A, preventing it, and B, if it does occur,
enforcing immediately on it. So it is something where we build
in safeguards, as I mentioned about the cameras, and I know in
Honolulu, that's something that we're working on specifically
to give the passengers comfort that their bags, when they are
checked, are checked professionally and that nothing is taken.
And theft is a problem in the industry and we're not immune to
it, but it is something that we take extremely seriously and we
have stringent background checks so when it does occur we'll
get those people out and get them prosecuted.
Senator Inouye. Are we satisfied with the quality of
screeners?
Mr. Hawley. I am. I think we have great Transportation
Security Officers and what I hear over and over again is the
desire to have more training, to be more involved, to have more
discretion to use their judgment. What we need to do from our
perspective is provide more and better training and I think it
was touched on by a number of the Senators in the opening
remarks about having the time and the focus to do the job the
right way. And I think we have an excellent source of people
and our goal is let's train them and keep them. And if we can
do that, then I think our total system performance will go even
higher than it is today.
Senator Inouye. I presume you have been studying the
technology of other lands.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator Inouye. How do we compare ourselves with say, the
British?
Mr. Hawley. I think both systems are good and they're a
good ally and we meet with them frequently. Our technology is
the best in the world, in my opinion. We have the best
technology, we use very top technology. Our security protocols
are a little bit different from our partners, even in Canada,
Mexico, the U.K., and around the world. We have slight
variations.
But we've spent a lot of time working with each other to
harmonize so there is not a gap between the two security
systems. It's something that we work on all the time to see
what more we can do to close those gaps.
Senator Inouye. On my last trip to Hawaii, I saw a young
lady being handcuffed. She was trying to get some drugs
through. How many passengers fail to go through the line
properly and get arrested?
Mr. Hawley. I'd have to go research that number, but it is
not very many. It's very few people who do turn around. And
once somebody has presented themself for screening, then we do
have the opportunity to stop them from leaving, and that has
happened on a number of occasions. I know it was in the last
month or maybe 2 months ago in Philadelphia we had an incident
where that occurred. It is not very common, but it is something
that we plan for and are prepared for.
Senator Inouye. Well your job is not an easy one. You're
always being criticized, but I'm pleased that we haven't had a
repeat of 9/11.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator?
Senator Ensign. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have several
questions and I want to start by talking about Reno/Tahoe
International Airport and the Reveal EDS system. At the Reno/
Tahoe International Airport, TSA conducted a successful pilot
program of the Reveal system. However, the TSA has yet to
incorporate at the Airport these smaller EDS machines that can
be installed right at airline ticket counters. We hear so much
about the promise of in-line screening, yet very few systems
have actually been installed in the field. My question is, when
we have this successful pilot program at a smaller airport, why
wouldn't we install that technology there and get it done?
Mr. Hawley. We're working very hard on getting Reno exactly
the right solution and it may or may not involve one particular
kind of advanced technology or the other. But it will be some
form of that technology. What we're actually looking at right
now is having that behind the counters and that we think we can
do a more efficient, better job by putting some larger machines
in-line with a higher throughput. So it's going to be the best
technology and Reno is very high on our plate.
Senator Ensign. When you talk about full in-line EDS
systems at places like Reno, the cost of installing those are
prohibitive because of the modifications that have to be made
at the airport. When you have a smaller, more affordable unit
that was working there, I don't understand why you wouldn't use
it.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator Ensign. If it wasn't working, I can understand it.
But it was working.
Mr. Hawley. It definitely works. It's a math puzzle that
says how many bags are you going to run, how much does the
machine cost, and the best total deal to the government and to
the airport, the analysis has showed a different solution, but
it----
Senator Ensign. Has GAO looked at this?
Ms. Berrick. We haven't looked at that specific airport
regarding the installation of in-line baggage screening. We are
looking at TSA's strategic framework for installing in-line
systems in their baggage screening solutions. We know that TSA
recently published a framework for a strategic plan where
they've outlined some of their future vision for installing in-
line systems, which is what we had previously recommended. So
we think they're moving in the right direction, but more work
remains in this area.
Senator Ensign. OK.
Ms. Berrick. TSA established a task force to look at
financing strategies for in-line systems because they are very
expensive. But that task force hasn't yet completed their
efforts.
Senator Ensign. My experience has been that the airports
know what is going to save them money. They've done the
analysis. The Reno/Tahoe International Airport feels that this
Reveal system worked and is their most cost-efficient way to do
it. I would encourage you to work with them and to keep us
apprised.
I do have another question. Sorry to be parochial here,
because I have some other, bigger questions, but I have to deal
with these two first. Las Vegas McCarran originally had 42 EDS
machines slated for their in-line system. At least from what
the airport tells me, they were never given a good reason for
why TSA cut down this number to 29 despite McCarran having been
built out to have the 42 machines. Now they have 29 EDS
machines and they have these 13 extra conveyor belts that are
sitting there empty. Do you have an explanation?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir. We've recently added three EDS
machines in--at McCarran Airport and I think the third one is
being installed next week in the southwest node. So it's my
understanding that these new machines will meet the throughput.
There was a period where, because of the explosive growth at
Las Vegas McCarran that we were under-serving, but now these
additional machines--two of them are in place and one of them
is coming in next week. So that should be balanced out.
Senator Ensign. You're right, the growth is explosive at
that airport and it's not subsiding. From all the projections,
it's going to continue to grow like that. So I would encourage
you, once again, to work with the folks at McCarran because it
is already the second busiest origination/destination airport
in the United States. So it certainly has a lot of bags going
through, a lot of people going through, and it has some major,
major concerns.
I have another question that has to do basically with the
whole use of employees. We know that you have a cap number. We
know that one of the reasons that people have not wanted to
lift that cap is because a lot of people think that a lot of
the employees are being used inefficiently. Mr. Principato
talked about TSA employees manning exit lanes. That's never
made any sense to me. I mean, you see that at Dulles. You see
it at every place. You all have been up and running for a few
years now and those TSA employees are still at exit lanes. It
doesn't seem to me that it is a highly skilled TSA employee's
job to do that. And on a related note, I was just at Denver
International Airport and I see that the TSA employees are
helping people out front with their bags. I see this out at
Dulles quite often as well. In other words, before passengers
go through the security lines we see the TSA employees, and I
don't know if that's a common practice or not. I don't see that
in my own airport. The airport hires lower paid, not as skilled
workers because they're just helping people and getting staff
ready to go on the conveyor belt. That doesn't seem to be a job
for a highly skilled TSA screener. Could you address that? A
third related question has to do with the in-line systems.
Maybe GAO has studied this. I don't know if you've extrapolated
this out from the seven airports in the GAO study, but if this
technology was installed system-wide, at least where we need to
at the larger airports, how many of the baggage screeners can
we save to be able to shift over into passenger screening? So
all of that has to do with TSA employees in general and better
utilization of those employees.
Mr. Hawley. We agreed to split up the questions.
Senator Ensign. OK.
Mr. Hawley. Cathy's going to do the last one first.
Ms. Berrick. Related to installing in line systems for the
9 airports TSA reviewed, they identified they could reduce
screeners by 78 percent.
Senator Ensign. What is the total number? Can you give me--
--
Ms. Berrick. I don't know off the top of my head. I can get
that information for you after.
Senator Ensign. OK, and did you extrapolate that out?
Ms. Berrick. No, we didn't. But one of the things we're
doing is looking at TSA's strategic plan for baggage screening
and we're continuing to monitor how that's playing out. Now
that they're installing in line systems, are these screener
savings actually being realized?
The other thing I wanted to mention, installing in line
systems doesn't make sense for all airports.
Senator Ensign. Right.
Ms. Berrick. Because like you mentioned it's a huge capital
investment. It requires a lot of airport modifications. And of
those nine airports that TSA studied, TSA identified that they
probably would incur a loss at one of those airports from
installing the in line systems because it was so expensive to
modify the airport.
And if I could address your question on TSOs performing
other duties, we are looking at this as a part of our review of
TSA staff allocations. We are finding that there are about two
thousand TSOs throughout the country that are being used in
administrative positions, such as doing time and attendance or
uniforms. Not all of them are doing that full time, but a good
portion of them are. So one of the things that we're looking at
is how that is impacting the Federal Security Director's
ability to staff the checkpoints when they have TSOs performing
these other duties.
Senator Ensign. OK.
Mr. Hawley. OK. On the exit lanes, we totally agree. Where
the TSO trained in the transportation security business
performs the function of a gate, we think that's not very good
use of time. We do, however, have a legitimate security need to
stop people coming back in through the exit lane and also, in
some airports, that's where the armed law enforcement officers
come. So we have a need to have somebody in those cases.
Senator Ensign. Yes, but why do they have to be a TSA
employee? I don't understand that. It's not like they have to
be highly skilled to do that. Nobody comes through. I mean, no
one goes back through. Why does it have to be somebody that's
highly trained in detection and all of the things that you do
at TSA. I don't understand that.
Mr. Hawley. I'll just say I agree with you. It does happen,
though. But I agree with your punch line, which is manning the
exit lanes is not a----
Senator Ensign. It's not--and maybe Mr. Principato can take
a shot at that if you agree. You all have been doing this for
so long. I don't understand why it's still happening.
Mr. Principato. Well, to clarify my statement from before,
the exit lanes have been TSA's responsibility and we in the
airport community believe that that was where the
responsibility rested for some of the--some of the reasons that
were just discussed. And part of our problem was that when the
decision was made to transfer that responsibility to the
airports rather than being done in a process that included
comment and working with the airport community, it was done--it
was done through a memo and we were given 90 days.
Now I'll say that in the time since then, Kip and his folks
have been very responsive to our concerns, allowing their
Federal Security Directors to work more closely with airport
directors and the security folks at the airports to try to
figure--try to figure this out. But our basic view remains that
this has been a TSA responsibility from the beginning and
should remain. So if I didn't make--if I wasn't clear enough
before, I apologize.
Senator Ensign. Mr. Chairman, I'll just finish with this.
I've talked to everybody who's been the Administrator of TSA
about this. I've mentioned this possibility and they all have
seemed to think that it was at least a reasonable suggestion.
We are managing risk. We understand that. Just like when you
drive on the highways, you know there's a certain amount of
risk involved. You can't eliminate all risk. We will never take
every bit of risk out of traveling in any form, whether it's on
our highways, on our airways, or wherever it is.
And, as I mentioned before, the terrorists win when we are
so severely delayed at airports, when people are aggravated.
Your employees deal with it and the couple hour waits all the
time. The idea is using random number generators during peak
times to take certain people out of line. If we're using the
random number generators, you can't game the system. It'd be
computerized. You could take certain percentages of people out
of line and just shove them through. That seems to be managing
risk. The terrorists are not going to know who gets picked. It
would seem to me to be at least a reasonable thing to do, and
everybody that's been through my office thought it was
reasonable, but I have not seen TSA's work on that, or at least
not before the Congress. Have it presented to the Congress. I
know that sometimes you all are afraid that we'll come down on
it if you do something like that. But it would seem to me that
we could manage risk in the same way that we're doing today
without compromising security to any significant degree, and
still get people through the lines a lot faster.
Mr. Hawley. Risk-based we totally agree with, the aspect of
random we totally agree with. We're not comfortable on letting
anybody just go walk all the way through. But we are adding,
and we'll be rolling out over the course of the year, an
unpredictable screening component that will be random-based and
that we will have some random impact on what screening
different people get that will not be predictable.
Senator Ensign. Yes, but that's just adding additional
screening. That's not taking away.
Mr. Hawley. The net effect will be not to slow things down.
So it will be to take----
Senator Ensign. But the net effect is not going to speed
things up.
Mr. Hawley. Well, with Registered Traveler, there will be a
speed up based on lack of a risk, or less risk.
Senator Ensign. Has GAO looked at managing the risk in that
regard? You guys have a lot of statisticians on your payroll.
Ms. Berrick. Yes.
Senator Ensign. Have you looked at that at all?
Ms. Berrick. In all of the reviews that we do at TSA, we
always look at programs within a risk-based framework. How is
TSA considering threats and vulnerabilities in making the
decisions that they make? Right now we do have an ongoing
review looking at TSA's development of screening procedures and
the modification of those procedures. And TSA makes changes to
procedures for a lot of different reasons, such as to improve
efficiency and also based on intelligence information.
Our preliminary observation is that their decisions are
risk-based. We've looked at intelligence information, we've
looked at vulnerabilities at the checkpoint. And we're going to
continue to review that. We'll be publishing a report this
summer on TSA's efforts related to that.
This particular procedure that Mr. Hawley's talking about
is one of the procedures that we're looking at. We're also
talking to security experts throughout the country to get their
feedback on this unpredictability screening procedure, and how
might that be improved? What are their views on how that would
work?
Senator Ensign. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, thanks Mr. Chairman.
As usual, you raised timely subjects here at this committee
and this one is particularly timely in terms of the interest of
the public and what we want to do to protect the public without
drowning them in process and interfering with their time frames
of getting to their destinations and making their connections.
There is a serious problem, and where I come from in New Jersey
we've lost 700 of our friends and neighbors in the 9/11
attacks. So this has really struck home, and there are still
injuries that are being recognized as a result of that, from
respiratory diseases and things of that nature.
So on one hand we say we can't do enough, and I think the
Senator from Nevada was certainly correct when he said you
can't protect against every eventuality no matter how hard you
try. I mean, if someone hit an airplane with a bazooka or
something like that it would be a terrible, terrible thing, but
certainly these things exist as a possibility. We are, I think,
working very hard and a lot of good people want to do the work.
I don't know whether the conditions we've set for them
encourage them to do their best.
When I looked at the things that I see in--I travel usually
twice a week at a minimum by air, short flights from New Jersey
or from the New York airports which I also use sometimes. The
sky is so full that it's hard for the airlines to maintain
their schedules, even after the hassle that you have to go
through to get on the plane. I was one of those who supported
re-focusing our efforts from the confiscation of small scissors
and things of that nature. I always thought it was an effort
led by the scissors manufacturer's association. They had a
pretty good business going on for a while. But it certainly has
speeded things up and when we look at the places that we want
to make sure are secure--key checkpoints, I think we want
passengers to be able to move fairly quickly to the inside of
the airplane.
Now, some time ago, we thought it would be a positive thing
to arm the cockpit doors and some had even suggested that we
also include cameras in the cabin so that pilots could see
visually what goes on in the cabin. Mr. Hawley, are you
familiar with that proposal?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir.
Senator Lautenberg. What's happened there?
Mr. Hawley. It has been suggested and discussed, but when
we did our risk-based analysis of where to put our investments,
that did not meet the hurdle of extra security added versus the
cost that it would be. And that's really where it is.
Senator Lautenberg. What would the cost be? Do you know?
Mr. Hawley. I don't know, but I remember that we did look
at it and that it didn't make the top of the list.
Senator Lautenberg. Because that would seem like a
relatively small investment. So now we have plastic knives on
some airlines--is there a rule on what kind of utensils are
allowed in the airplane?
Mr. Hawley. Our rule of thumb is no blades. So we've said
blades, sharp blades, knives, we do not allow and will not
allow. Scissors four inches or less are allowed. Small tools
under seven inches are allowed. And we constantly look at the
numbers. We're right around now, probably 20 percent of what we
take at the checkpoints are knives and upwards of 75 percent
are lighters. So that's really what our----
Senator Lautenberg. Right. But is a plastic knife with a--a
saw edge pretty dangerous?
Mr. Hawley. Well, anything could be used as a weapon. I
believe that's not a prohibited item at this point.
Senator Lautenberg. Because if one takes a compact disk,
digital video disk, or whatever disk and breaks it in half,
that's a pretty sharp weapon. And the reason I mention that is
there's a degree of discomfort that comes with almost everybody
who has to get in an airplane. The pain in the neck of taking
off your coat and your shoes and things of this nature. Being
felt to be leaning toward the criminal and having to prove that
you're not is a harrowing thing. It adds anxiety, et cetera.
And I just wonder, and I'm not for abandoning our security
checks, believe me, I was a Port Authority Commissioner in New
York and New Jersey, which manages the four airports there, and
I am very conscious of safety measures that we have to take.
I've talked to air marshals and I see things that are done
which are routine, but I'm not sure that they're always
necessary.
How many times, do you know of, where air marshals have
been called upon into active duty in the last couple years?
Mr. Hawley. Well, there's the one incident where they were
called upon to fire their weapons in Miami, the unfortunate
incident there.
Senator Lautenberg. Right. While the plane was on the
ground.
Mr. Hawley. Correct.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes.
Mr. Hawley. They are frequently on mission status that does
not involve physical interaction and where there are--I have to
be careful because most of the work that they do is classified,
but essentially, the only physical intervention, I believe, was
the incident in Miami. There have been a number of others where
Federal Air Marshals have certainly delivered significant
security value.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. And I don't want to get rid of the
air marshals, I like them and know they perform an essential
role. But, again, all of these things have to be examined in
their value for the expenditure that it creates. And I wish
that we could find a way to make flying a little more
comfortable. I think it would kind of ease the national anxiety
if we could do it. Two million people a day get in an airplane
and two million people a day take their shoes off, and take
their jackets off. I understand that you are currently
evaluating something called backscatter technology that was
going to identify the person without--as if they were clothes-
less, that gets up front and personal, I'd say. Is that still
in consideration?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir. It's something we're looking at
piloting this year. It is a very good, promising technology.
It's not ready for widespread deployment across the system. It
also has a fairly large footprint at the checkpoint and takes a
relatively significant amount of time to do the scan. So it
would not be effective for large numbers of people going
through.
Senator Lautenberg. Who's going to do the selection of
those who get so examined?
Mr. Hawley. Well----
Senator Lautenberg. We'll let that question go.
Ms. Berrick, the turnover question--I thought there was
some interesting consideration, and that is to give people an
avenue for growth in their jobs. One of the things that I
proposed is an internship for high school students who may want
to become TSA screeners to develop a pool of people who have
some training and who show some aptitude for it. What would you
think of--of something like that?
Ms. Berrick. I think it's important to look at creative
ways to help with the retention and recruitment issue. With TSA
it's not just retaining, but also recruiting has been a
problem, especially with a part-time workforce. So I think we
should look at any ways that may be creative to help correct
that problem. We haven't specifically looked at the issue of
high school students being trained. We have an ongoing review
looking at TSA's staffing issues and we can look at that to see
to what extent that might be a possibility. I know there was
potential legislation that addressed that, and it did move
forward.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes. What's the starting wage for a
screener and what's the average wage?
Mr. Hawley. It's about $28 thousand a year.
Senator Lautenberg. $28 thousand a year?
Mr. Hawley. $12, $14 bucks an hour, something like that.
Senator Lautenberg. Yep, $28 thousand.
Ms. Berrick. I don't believe they've had a pay raise in 3
years, if that's correct.
Senator Lautenberg. Now that's a starting wage?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir.
Senator Lautenberg. And is that also--there are
promotions--are there COLs included for--as people work the
job?
Mr. Hawley. There is the equivalent of that annually, which
is on the order of like 3 percent total with everything added
in.
Senator Lautenberg. So the average then gets up above the
$28 thousand level. Are they--these people, do they have the
traditional fringe benefit programs, healthcare.
Mr. Hawley. Full-time, yes, part-time, no. Although we are
piloting some areas with the part-time to see if that--
obviously that would have a huge impact on part-time retention,
which is important to us. It also has a large price tag.
Senator Lautenberg. Has a very large price tag, but there's
a very clever, very successful company called the--the coffee--
--
Mr. Hawley. Starbucks.
Senator Lautenberg. Starbucks that has a--they pay part-
timers a part fee for their health care. And it's helped
their--they have one of the best retention levels in the
country.
And so I close with this, and that is, wouldn't it make
sense when taking reservations for flights to get some
verifiable source of identification? Social Security number, or
a credit card number, no questions beyond that. Do you have an
American Express or VISA or Master, and for how long? That
information is instantaneously available and at least you have
a basis for identity of the individual and it's often been
talked about having some kind of a preferred status for
frequent fliers or people who's background you can quickly vet
in some way. Has that--has that ever been tried, ever been
thought--been reviewed as a possibility?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir. We're moving what we call the
Registered Traveler Program that would take background
information ahead of time and use that, in addition to a
biometric, to give speedier treatment, still some security but
not the full, for a person that we know who they are. We also
are looking at, as part of our Secured Flight Program, asking
for the date of birth in addition to the passenger's name to be
submitted that would help us with our watch list checking. But
there are, as you know, there are very, very significant
privacy issues both in the United States and with our partners
abroad that is a very sensitive topic.
Senator Lautenberg. Mr. Chairman, one last thing, please.
And that is, considering the financial condition of the
aviation industry, why on earth are we seeking to increase
security fees? The Chairman mentioned in his early remarks
about the fact that the airline industry is the one place where
people pay for their own security. But to increase those
security fees, I can tell you now that that kind of proposal is
not going to fly through the Congress. It is an added tax and
we spend so much on the infrastructure for aviation and
screening and so forth that now, to add a fee on top of that,
on top of an industry that's barely hanging on, I don't think
is particularly wise.
Mr. Hawley. We came up last year with a user fee that was
soundly rejected. This year we thought that----
Senator Lautenberg. Do the same this year.
Mr. Hawley. Well, it was $2.50 plus $2.50 and a maximum of
$5 per leg. And what we said was let's just have $5 a leg,
which for people who take two flights is no different. People
who only take one, that is an increase. But the maximum does
not change. It's still five bucks a one way trip, max ten bucks
round trip. So it's the same maximum as it is additionally. It
does get us about a billion-three, which is 40 percent of our
budget. So to us it's a very significant piece of our funding
in a way that is about as non-intrusive as we could come up
with to raise that money.
The Chairman. Would you yield right there? What about
people who fly fifty miles on a commuter? Ten bucks?
Mr. Hawley. Five.
The Chairman. As opposed to flying three thousand miles on
a cross--intercont--transcontinental plane.
Mr. Hawley. The theory is you go through screening once no
matter how long the flight is or whether you connect or not. So
that was our judgment that we charge for that screening and
whatever happens after that, the passenger does pay.
The Chairman. Well then why don't you exempt from screening
all passengers that get on planes that don't connect with an
interstate plane? I mean, 70 percent of my people get on planes
every day and fly 30, 40, 50 miles. I don't understand that at
all. And besides that, I don't understand why you can't find
other people who pay something for security in this country
other than airline passengers.
Senator Lautenberg. Amen.
The Chairman. Senator Pryor?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Berrick, if I can start with you, you mentioned
recruiting and retention a few moments ago and I think it's a
very important line of questions. I am curious, and I'm sorry
if I missed your opening statement, you covered this, but I am
curious, your impression about some of the staffing shortages.
Is it due to a lack of applicants or is it due to a poor
process? And one reason I ask that is because we have a staffer
in my office who actually applied for a part-time position with
TSA back when he was in college and he left college, eventually
came to work for me, and 16 months later he finally gets a
response from TSA. So I'd like to get your impression on, is it
a process issue at TSA or lack of applicants or what?
Ms. Berrick. I think it's both. And I do think TSA's made
improvements in this area. Related to a lack of applicants,
this is really a concern for part-time screeners. Just about
every airport we visited has had challenges in hiring a part-
time screener workforce, which has to do with the pay and
benefits, the hours, lack of mass transit to the airports, cost
of living, a lot of different factors. So part of that is just
the circumstance that TSA's facing at the airports.
I also think part of it is the process. TSA's initial
process for hiring screeners was very centralized at the
headquarters level. The reason they did that, is primarily
because they needed to hire about 50 thousand screeners in a
very short amount of time. So it was very centralized. Federal
Security Directors at the airports have consistently complained
that they didn't have a lot of input. It wasn't real responsive
to their needs. So it wasn't satisfying them.
TSA's recently made changes to decentralize the hiring
process and we actually went back and talked to some Federal
Security Directors at airports and they're pleased with the
direction that TSA is moving. They feel that TSA can do more to
provide them the flexibility. For example, TSA is creating
regional hiring centers around the country, which weren't there
before.
So I think it's both process and circumstance. And I do
think TSA is making improvements on the process end.
Senator Pryor. Good, thank you. Mr. Hawley, let me ask you,
if I may, and again I'm sorry I arrived to the hearing late,
but I want to ask you about the explosive detection system,
EDS, which, as I understand it, could save the Federal
Government about a billion dollars if it's an in-line system as
compared to the more traditional system. And where are we on
that and what's the latest on that?
Mr. Hawley. Well, we had a little discussion about that
earlier, but I think all of us agreed that in-line checked
baggage is for large airports, high throughput the way to go
for every reason, the efficiency of finding bombs, getting the
bags through quickly, and decreasing injuries. So that we all
agree on.
It comes down to money, really. And the issue there is TSA
pays for the equipment itself, the actual bomb detection
equipment. But then the conveyors and all the other associated
equipment that goes to make it an in-line systems is up for
grabs. Then there's also the maintenance of that system and
that's where the dollars come to.
I think it's no surprise that our current--I mentioned in
my opening that our economic model needs to be looked at
because it is really a business expense that businesses all
around the country deal with and somehow manage. And it was the
way we had to jump after 9/11 to put the system up that we got
to this funding scheme. But it is not going to work for us long
term, and it's something that we work very closely with the
industry and it's probably our biggest joint issue that we
don't have completely solved. So it is something we're working
on, we've done studies, we're continuing another effort that
will have some ideas with the industry this spring.
Senator Pryor. OK, Secretary Hawley, thank you. Let me now
ask a question--I had a couple of constituents who've written
in, I think both these are by e-mail, and one constituent was
upset because their teenage son was selected for secondary
screening and after it was all done they asked the--a local TSA
person why he had been selected and apparently the reason is
because he was wearing baggy shorts. Is that--and then they
pressed further on that they apparently said that there is,
``there are guidelines.'' Do you all have a guideline about
baggy shorts?
Mr. Hawley. Not specifically about baggy shorts, but there
are a number of ways that you get referred to secondary
screening, including random and including judgment of the TSO
and we've added some particular protocols having to do with
people bringing explosives in using various places to hide
them. That is part of the IED training, is to say, you use your
judgment. If you feel that that could be a potential
vulnerability, you may use your judgment to request secondary
screening.
Senator Pryor. OK. We have another constituent who went
through an airport and apparently was selected for secondary
screening and had to go over to another area, but had to leave
all of his stuff there and he was concerned that his stuff may
not be secure there, someone may pick up something or whatever.
Anyway, I think all worked out OK, but as he was talking to the
TSA person there he was told, ``this is not Burger King, you
don't get it your way.'' And on one level that's funny, but on
another level that's kind of sassy and it's not really what you
want to hear from a public servant there working and screening
at TSA. And so, really more of a general question on training
and that is kind of customer relations. How do you--how do you
train your folks to--I know they work long hours and hard days,
but how do you train them to always be courteous and----
Mr. Hawley. It's part of the training that goes on with the
shift change and so it's part of the initial training and it's
something that we work on as a part of the security process,
that you certainly don't want to anger customers, and everybody
realizes it's a stressful experience going through it, so
they're trained to diffuse those situations and try--the person
may have been making a bad attempt at humor. But we do want to
have the process be friendly to the customer but allow them to
do their professional job.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask one more question on your
screeners. As I understand it, you do have a process whereby
the TSA screeners who fail an operational test, they'll be
required to do some remedial training. Do you know much about
that?
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
Senator Pryor. And do you have a sense of the statistics in
terms of how many of your screeners do fail operational
training and how many times someone can go through remedial
training? Do you have a sense of that?
Mr. Hawley. It's twice. If they're going to be certified,
if you fail it once, you have to pass it the second time. And
the overall numbers are quite high, above 90 percent. I forget
exactly----
Senator Pryor. In other words, not over 90 percent fail.
Mr. Hawley. No, no, pass.
Senator Pryor. Yes.
Mr. Hawley. And I forget what the number is on the first
time through. We're changing the process now to go to a more
frequent--this is, right now, an annualized system. We want to
go to a quarterly system and continue to change it and not have
everything ride on 1 day, but continue to build, test, train,
test, train, test, train and make it more cumulative than,
essentially sudden death if you don't pass.
Senator Pryor. OK. Mr. Chairman that's all I have, thank
you.
The Chairman. Sorry about that, are you finished?
Senator Pryor. I am finished, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. My apologies. Got another little crisis up
here on another subcommittee. But if I may, let me go back to
the question of these fees that we have. We have enormous
revenue coming in now. Why couldn't it be used--it is fees,
it's not taxes. We have jurisdiction over it. Why don't you
give us a plan to use that money in a way that you want to use
it, directly. It doesn't even have go to the Treasury under the
concept of fees. Parks service takes their money directly,
other people take their money directly. Why don't you take this
money directly and use it for the function--we're charging
people--the airline passengers to support.
Mr. Hawley. Essentially a trust fund?
The Chairman. Yes sir.
Mr. Hawley. Yes. I know that that has been looked at and
there are major issues governmentwide with that, and----
The Chairman. Well get ready for it. We're going to do it,
because we're getting too many complaints about the fact that
these fees are not being used for what we want. You want to
increase the fees, that's just merely to increase the flow of
cash into the Treasury, not to increase the flow of cash into
the problem. Now if you want to increase fees--if the fees
you're getting aren't sufficient, we'll consider raising them,
but not for the purpose of just showing an increase in the
cash-flow to the Treasury.
These are not taxes, they're fees and they should be used
for the people who are paying them. So I would hope you'd
consider it. I do think that the problems we've had with the
pace of development of the program that you administer, I think
it's been related to the amount of moneys we've been able to
get to you through the Treasury after the money goes into the
Treasury.
I would urge you to take a look at that and tell us why--as
I understand it, you do oppose it. We could very easily do it
and, as far as I'm concerned, since these fees are there for
the purpose of improving airline passenger safety, that's what
they should be used for.
Let me go back to the problem of the in-line screening
process. Isn't it true that you physically inspect every bag
before it goes on that line?
Mr. Hawley. It has to be lifted by somebody, but it's not
really inspected until it goes through the machine.
The Chairman. I'm talking about the baggage inspections.
Mr. Hawley. The passenger bag?
The Chairman. Yes. When I check a bag, it's looked at,
right? Every one I've checked in recent months has had that
little card in it saying this has been opened. So I assume that
you've been opening everybody's.
Mr. Hawley. No sir. It's only if there's something on the
screen that the computer inside recognizes has a similarity to
an explosive. And there are common----
The Chairman. An explosive?
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir. It looks at the image and it analyzes
it using its high technology and if it looks as if it could be
a bomb, it flags it for somebody to go take a look at. And
there are a number of common things that could trigger that.
The Chairman. Well then I think we need some education of
frequent travelers such as myself. Now, for instance, I take an
old glasses case, and I put in it the things that I don't want
flipping around all over the bag, OK? And it's a steel framed
glasses case.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
The Chairman. In it are maybe a small pen knife, some
needles and thread that I use just to sew on my own buttons.
Now is that going to show up as a bomb?
Mr. Hawley. Not likely. However, there is an improvement
for this, which is better software that they add to the
computer can separate what is more likely to be a bomb from
what is less likely to be a bomb.
The Chairman. Well why can't we publish something to
frequent fliers saying these are the things you should not use
in packing. Have you done that?
Mr. Hawley. We have not done specifically that, but that is
something that we'll look into. There gets to be a classified
part because we don't want to say this is what we detect, it
looks like a bomb.
The Chairman. No, what--there must be something you can
tell.
Mr. Hawley. We'll--we'll----
The Chairman. This week I'm going to go to ten places in 12
days, alright? And every time I get back on the airplane that
bag's going to be searched. Every time. Because, I don't know
why, but something's in there you want to search. If you just
tell me what you're looking for, I won't pack that.
Mr. Hawley. I think we could--we could----
The Chairman. I think every frequent flier feels the same
way.
Mr. Hawley. Yes.
The Chairman. Have you thought about that?
Mr. Hawley. I am now, so we're----
The Chairman. Well, I hate to tell you, though, it's not
that I want to be excluded, but I would like to be able to pack
so I don't require----
Mr. Hawley. Right.
The Chairman.--you to look at it.
Mr. Hawley. Right.
The Chairman. And I'm just traveling, I'm a frequent flier,
we're all doing the same thing. Sometimes I throw part of my
briefcase in my bag, OK? And it always is somewhere else other
than where I put it. So I assume, for some reason or other, the
briefcase and the buckles and what not might have attracted it.
I don't know. But you ought to think about this. How can a
frequent flier pack a bag so that it will not require opening.
And you can just look at it and see it's clothes and
toothbrushes and shaving cream and deodorant, OK. That's what
we normally pack. I would hope you'd try.
Mr. Principato, have you ever sat down with these people to
try to work out some of these things you've talked about?
Mr. Principato. We have. They've been very open to us and
we've worked very closely with them both here in Washington and
airport directors with Federal Security Directors.
The Chairman. Well you made some principle suggestions that
I thought made a lot of sense in terms of the equipment and how
to bring about some long-term solutions. As we get into this
frequent flier program, can you help work with TSA and provide
frequent fliers a way to pack baggage so they and the baggage
get on the plane without delay?
Mr. Principato. We'll do that. We've, in fact, in the past
have often helped and worked with TSA to get word out at
Christmas time, for example, to get the word out to passengers
not to pack wrapped packages and that kind of thing. So we've
done that kind of thing before and we'll do that again. Yes.
The Chairman. Isn't that something. You don't want wrapped
packages in bags.
Mr. Hawley. In carry on.
Mr. Principato. Carry on, yes.
The Chairman. Oh, on the carry on, I see.
All right. When you talk about these in-line systems to
give efficiency and reduce congestion, have you looked at how
we might find extra money to invest to accelerate this process?
Mr. Principato. Yes. I think if there's any technology that
warrants a creative look at that it's this--it's in-line EDS.
And actually many of our most active members, Jim Bennett from
the Metropolitan Washington Airport Task Force, Lewis Miller
from Tampa, Steve Grossman from Oakland are on a task force at
TSA right now that meets fairly regularly. Kip can give you
more information on how often they meet, but to come up with
creative ways to finance moving forward on this in-line EDS
which, from our perspective, if we could pick one thing that we
ought to do, that would be the thing we ought to do.
The Chairman. You mentioned this strain because of
additional passengers, right?
Mr. Principato. Yes.
The Chairman. And I think you realize that too, Mr. Hawley.
Mr. Hawley. Yes sir.
The Chairman. Well, let me tell you, it's not just the
passengers. We've got a whole new generation of planes coming
now. I call it the mosquito fleet. They're the small planes
that will carry 12+ passengers, not many more.
Mr. Principato. Right.
The Chairman. And there are new jets that are going to
enter this. We think there are probably 40,000 coming in in the
period you're talking about.
Mr. Principato. Right.
The Chairman. Now hopefully most of them will be over in
the private aviation side, but some of them are going to become
commuters. Now, I think we have to devise ways to get people on
and off those planes quickly. And I do think one of the things
we need to do is find ways to determine what Mr. Hawley's
looking for in terms of things--I know you don't want to talk
about the classification, how they look for it, but--and make
certain people don't pack in their bags substances or objects
that will look like these things. Have you looked at that?
Mr. Principato. Well to--to paraphrase Kip, we are now. And
we'll be working with him on that any way we can be helpful,
we'll do that.
The Chairman. Well, until we can get these new
technologies, have you looked at the problem of this labor-
intensive screening process and the things that Ms. Berrick has
mentioned?
Mr. Principato. Well we have and the airports are the place
where all this happens. And we see the evidence every day.
Senator Ensign talked about the--the big crowds in the lobbies
and the lines and all that at peak times, which is really
evidence that the--that the system is too labor-intensive, not
technology-intensive enough and that the balance needs to be--
needs to be changed going forward. And so that the ultimate
goal, the checkpoint of the future as somebody talked about
before would be that at those peak times the lobby would look
much like it does now at 10 in the morning where there really
isn't a lot going on. People could walk through the checkpoints
and, I'm not smart enough to know what the technology would be,
whether it's iris scanning or those pictures they're taking or
whatever. But people could walk through the checkpoint almost
without breaking stride, someday, and a system that's as secure
as the one we're aiming for.
The Chairman. Well, I'm going to get everybody mad at me.
I've walked through an airport, it's got ceilings that are 90
feet high, it's got modern facilities all the way along the
side, everybody that's got some kind of a business that once
they get everything they want in the business, but you go to
the gate and guess what, you got a gate that looks just like it
did when I came to the Senate in 1968. We've got to find some
way to get those passengers through there quicker and the
security factor is what's changed in terms of delay at getting
through the gate.
I would hope that we'd find some way to get your three
agencies together and give us some ideas. Do we need to change
laws? Do you need more money? Do you need more money sooner,
Mr. Hawley? It's coming in every day, I don't know why you
can't have it available to you every day through a trust fund
theory. But--and Ms. Berrick, I appreciate what you're doing in
terms of looking at this problem from the point of these people
getting injured. That should have a lot to do with the number
of people that won't stay--if they see their friends getting
seriously injured because of too much weight in these bags.
Ms. Berrick. That and another impact that it has that isn't
readily apparent is the impact on training. When you have
screeners that are injured, they're not available to staff the
checkpoint, so you have a shortage of screeners as a result and
they don't have time to take the required training that TSA
requires of them. It has really been a challenge for the
airports to just ensure that screeners get the training they
need.
The Chairman. What if I just put a little amendment in one
of these bills and said that if you check in a bag that weighs
more than 20 pounds you're going to pay an additional fee as a
passenger? I mean, the weight of some of these bags, I see
these guys and they weigh 250 pounds and they're lifting 100
pounds and put it right over my head. My bag weighs 30 pounds,
40 pounds. Why should we let people carry on bags that weigh
more than that?
Ms. Berrick. Senator, we haven't looked specifically at
that, but I think all of these questions are good ones that
should be considered.
The Chairman. And that's got something to do with these
injuries? The fact that these bags weigh too much?
Ms. Berrick. That is correct for screeners related to
checked baggage screening. Because the explosive detection
systems are not integrated in-line with baggage conveyor
systems, screeners or Transportation Security Officers have to
physically carry these heavy bags, and that's what's causing a
lot of these injuries.
The Chairman. Well then why don't we charge the people that
are bringing those heavy bags more money to screen them?
Ms. Berrick. That's a good question----
The Chairman. Have you made that suggestion?
Ms. Berrick. No, we have not.
The Chairman. Well, we'll have another hearing somewhere
along the line. We want to keep up with this because, again, I
think I speak for all the members up here, we get more comments
about this system than anything else. And I'm sure you get
tired of it Kip.
Mr. Hawley. No.
The Chairman. Well, we'll look forward to seeing you again
soon. Thank you all very much.
Mr. Hawley. Thank you.
Ms. Berrick. Thank you.
Mr. Principato. Thank you.
[Whereupon at 11:49 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Coalition for Luggage Security
Luggage Security--More Safety, Less Hassle for American Travelers: a
Private Sector Solution
by Richard A. Altomare
Executive Summary
The airline industry has been adversely affected not only by the 9/
11 terrorist attacks but also by billions of bags transported by the
airline industry each year creating the potential for additional
security breaches and continued lost revenue. Several airlines are
either operating in bankruptcy status or are on the verge of bankruptcy
or collapse. Increases in fuel prices and added security have further
contributed costs to this troubled industry. Universal Express, a
company that offers worldwide delivery of luggage to consumers, is
offering a solution that will not only decrease the security costs
associated with airline travel, but also has the potential to create
revenue streams and save taxpayers billions of dollars.
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express suggests
imposing a user fee for baggage transported for the passengers by the
airlines. Passengers would be given a choice of paying a per bag fee
for luggage or utilizing alternate methods to transport their luggage
to and from its final destination. This will encourage passengers to
either cut down on the number of bags they bring with them, or seek
alternate sources for getting their bags to the final destination.
Passengers have many options, including Luggage Express, which offers
luggage collection from home, hotel or business and delivery to
consumers' final destination at a competitive price. Various other
companies offer similar services or have the ability to do so if the
need were to arise. This solution will put the cost of screening on the
passengers who utilize the service, rather than imposing the fee on all
passengers, regardless of luggage.
The Transportation Security Administration will spend $1.45 billion
on baggage screening in 2005, as indicated on their 2006 budget.
Universal Express' solution offers a savings projected between $550
million and $1.2 billion, as a direct result of revenue from new
available cargo space for commercial usage, refocusing personnel and
equipment. This proposal will not only decrease costs, but will
increase revenue by opening up cargo space for more commercial usage,
it will allow more flight turnaround which will offer more
predictability and constant revenue for the industry.
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' proposal is a
simplified, but focused on transportation of baggage for air
passengers. It allows for faster check-in times, more on-time flights,
and a dependable tracking solution for passengers. The solution will be
cost effect to passengers, the airlines, all agencies interacting with
the industry, and taxpayers.
The Problem
Security gaps in the airline industry: In the aftermath of the 9/11
terrorist attacks a need was exposed for greater security in the air
transportation industry. Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which authorized security fees of up to
$10 per round trip per passenger, to be used to generate funds to
enhance the security of air travel, through better screening of all
passengers and bags. To meet the security mandates, the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has invested billions of dollars to
supply more highly trained security agents and expensive metal and bomb
detecting equipment at airport check points for passenger and baggage.
Air travel security has improved, but it falls short of addressing
a major source for the security problems and the associated costs--the
baggage transported by the airlines for passengers. A security fee
based on passengers only suffers from a shortcoming similar to the
airline fare structures that fail to recognize the difference between
passengers with and without bags. The current system gives passengers
no incentive to limit the baggage they carry. Therefore airlines are
spending additional money on baggage screening and transporting
unrelated to passenger movement.
Airline industry losses: Although the airline industry was
deregulated almost 25 years ago, it has not demonstrated that it can
distinguish the actual costs associated with baggage handling. The
industry transports more than double the number of bags than
passengers, incurring enormous labor and equipment cost. Most airlines
do not track or adequately recover the cost for transporting baggage,
continually pricing primarily on the purpose of travel--either leisure
or business. The failure to distinguish the cost of transporting
passengers with and without bags, even within these two groups, costs
the industry billions of dollars in unrecoverable expenses and is
contributing to security gaps in baggage transport.
With approximately 1.5 billion bags transported last year by the
domestic U.S. airlines, there are compelling reasons to consider the
baggage-handling proposal presented by Coalition For Luggage Security
and Universal Express, Inc.
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' Solution
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express propose
separate security fees for passengers and baggage and an economical
solution for transportation of baggage for air passengers. The proposed
solution involves separating the baggage from its passengers and
encouraging travelers to ship their bags prior to the departure date.
This will provide for the bags to be transported in a similar manner as
the 5 billion parcels shipped annually by businesses and consumers. The
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' (USXP) proposal
calls for utilizing the United States Postal Service and parcel
carriers (UPS, FedEx, DHL and others) to handle some of the baggage
that is currently handled by the airline industry. The proposal will
allow airline passengers the option of carrying and checking bags at
the airport, however they will incur a separate baggage charge for
luggage transportation and a separate TSA baggage screening security
fee.
Enabling a framework of fees for passengers to choose how to handle
baggage will allow for an overall economical solution for the
transportation of baggage for air passengers. It will encourage use of
less expensive means to meet security needs and transportation of bags.
Rather than having to take the baggage through the check-in points
and through the security lines, passengers would have a framework of
choices for shipping their luggage in advance to reach their
destination in time of their arrival at a lower price or carry bags to
the airport for transporting by airlines at a premium price. While
travelers can ship their bags directly with private carriers, the
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' proposal would
further enable the collective bargaining power of millions of travelers
to be leveraged for lower cost, faster service, greater security via
enhanced visibility, and exceptional customer service for delayed bags.
Benefits to Homeland Security--Return Security to the Transportation
Industry
Decline in passenger baggage reduces the prospect of
infiltration of terrorist devices onboard airplanes and reduces
the chances for security breaches. Managing security measures
to protect passengers becomes easier when baggage is separated
from its passengers.
Lack of information on the specific aircraft or trucks used
for baggage transportation makes the likelihood of terrorist
attacks more difficult.
Benefits to Homeland Security--Opportunities for Reduced Spending
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the
Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for
people and commerce.
For Fiscal Year 2006, the Homeland Security Appropriations
Bill appropriates $5.2 billion for 4 TSA programs as shown in
Table 1: Aviation Security, Surface Transportation Security,
Transportation Vetting and Credentialing and Transportation
Security Support. Of the total TSA budget, $4.6 billion is
dedicated to Aviation Security. (Source: Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill, 2006)
Currently, baggage screeners are limited to 45,000 at 441
domestic airports. (Source: TSA, 2005). The security bill for
2006 provides $3.6 billion to specifically meet the needs of
baggage screening in terms of workforce, screener training and
checkpoint support and maintenance. This proposal could result
in fewer bags being brought to airports, thereby limiting
additional expenses needed for screening.
Reduce demand for baggage screening: Too often, passengers
check in two large bags and carry on-board two more. Incurring
a charge for transporting bags will encourage flights, less
congestion and an easier flow. This could reduce security-
related problems and costs, such as waiting time at the
security lines, and matching bags loaded on airplanes with
passengers boarding the aircraft. Under the current pricing
approach, either the business traveler is paying for the cost
of handling such bags or the airline is not recovering actual
expenses. A baggage security fee would reward passengers who
carry less, could enhance airline security, bring rationale to
airfares by eliminating cross subsidies, and improve flow of
passengers at airports.
Faster and enhanced security check-in: There is less
opportunity for an error in screening if there are fewer bags
being brought to the airport and lines at security checkpoints
will move faster.
This would result in savings due to a reduction in screening
professionals needed at checkpoints.
The savings could be either used to reduce the size of Federal
expenditure or deployed at Amtrak train stations and bus terminals, to
reduce terrorist threats in those arenas.
Table 1--Homeland Security Appropriations for TSA--Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appropriations
for 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Security $4.98 B
Screener Workforce & Equipment $3.6 B
Aviation Direction & Enforcement $1.0 B
Surface Transportation Security $32 M
Transportation Security Support $545 M
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total $5.56 B
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Fiscal Year 2006
Benefits to Airlines--Reduction in Costs
Airlines should benefit from lower costs under the proposed
approach. Specifically, the Coalition For Luggage Security and
Universal Express' proposal for handling baggage could reduce the
number of bags brought to the airports and transported by the airlines.
Fewer bags handled by airlines could reduce operating costs as follows:
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express
estimates that by enabling a user fee approach, airlines would
be able to save or refocus between $2.5 billion to $6 billion
of labor costs.
Airlines would be able to reduce the resources used for
baggage claims, delayed baggage delivery, and compensation for
the passenger's lost baggage.
Aircraft turnaround could be enhanced. Fewer checked-in bags
would provide faster loading of bags on the aircraft at origin
and transfer airports. Moreover, a per baggage security fee
applied to all bags could help limit carry-on items to only
those required for use in flight (such as briefcase, laptops,
etc.). This could result in faster boarding of passengers, less
damage to overhead bins, more flights from the same crew, and a
more efficient cost structure. More scheduled flights for the
domestic fleet could save an estimated $8 billion in operating
cost for the airline industry.
Benefit to Airlines--Increased Revenue Streams
The Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' proposal
could also provide revenue streams for airlines from those bags
checked-in at the airport and could produce additional space for
revenue-generating air cargo.
If airlines charged a premium price (about 20 percent for
faster same day service) to passengers using traditional check-
in over a Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express
baggage handling charge (using parcel carriers), this approach
could generate additional revenues between $15 and $27 billion
for the airlines, which represents about 12 percent to 21
percent of the annual revenues of airline industry. Currently,
the airline industry is running at operating losses of
approximately 1.4 billion. This is an improvement over the 10
billion in operation losses reported in 2001. Nevertheless the
airlines have lost more money than they have ever made. This
has resulted in retained loses of $7.6 billion and reduced
equity of 6 billion (Source: ATA Annual Airline Report, 2005).
The revenue generated through the Coalition For Luggage
Security and Universal Express' proposal could take the
airlines from present losses to an estimated profit of between
$14 billion to $26 billion.
Additional revenue up to $2 billion could be generated from
surcharges for more difficult and labor-intensive baggage items
(such as golf bags, skis, musical equipment, trade show
displays) and for certain white glove personalized services
(such as handling of baby strollers and car seats at departure
and arrival gates). For example, the new Denver airport was
built just a few years ago with a separate baggage handling
system for skis at an expense of several hundred million
dollars. This cost will be recovered from passengers traveling
with skis and not subsidized by other passengers.
The premium price for airlines to provide baggage
transportation is still considerably lower than the existing
costs of slower service by express parcel carriers. One-way
shipping charges for a typical 28 lb. bag via express carriers
would range between $90 and $130 for a next day express
service. Moreover, shipping charges for one-way overnight
transportation of two 70-pound bags via express carriers will
range from $300 to $500 depending on the distance. This
demonstrates the value of the baggage service presently
provided by the airlines even after implementing the baggage
charge recommended by this proposal.
Baggage already sent to the destination could result in
fewer cancellations of travel plans and airlines could gain
greater predictability of revenue in terms of seat occupancy
and increased load factor.
Reduced baggage handling implies that the air-cargo bellies
would have more space for handling cargo. Depending on the
decrease in the baggage handled and the increase in the cargo
handling capacity, airlines can generate additional revenue of
$4 billion to $11 billion annually.
A baggage security fee on passengers still opting to bring
bags to an airport would result in TSA directly recovering its
security cost from the passengers imposing the cost. This could
save billions of dollars paid to TSA by the airlines to cover
the cost of passenger and baggage screening.
Encourage more business travel: As the airlines recover
actual costs of baggage handling from passengers that generate
those bags, they will be able to avoid the huge disparity in
airfares between the business and leisure traveler. Relating
airfare and baggage fare to costs of transporting people and
bags respectively should create more rational pricing of
business fares, allowing more businesses to generate cost-
effective trips, which would allow airlines to handle more
passengers and greater revenues for transporting more people
than bags.
Benefits to Passengers
U.S. taxpayer money is being used for aviation security related to
baggage screening alone. Moreover, a significant part of the TSA budget
for passenger screening is associated with carry-on bags. The current
system places additional cost on the airlines and non-direct cost on
passengers. The Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express'
proposal could generate many benefits for the traveling public:
More passengers will be encouraged to travel by air with a
greater confidence in the security of the transportation
network at airports.
Passengers will endure shorter lines and avoid the
unpleasant experience of TSA security guards going through
their luggage.
Less cancellations and increased load factor for airlines
could result in fares for business passengers and leisure
passengers traveling with fewer bags.
This proposal would help reduce security fees for some
travelers. Currently, the security fee of $2.50 per flight
segment with a maximum of $10 per round trip is assessed
against passengers, even though much of that cost is connected
with luggage. A separate security fee for bags would reduce the
security fee for passengers to cover just the expenses
associated with passenger screening.
Table 2--Domestic Airline Passenger Tax Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tax Type *** Rate Unit of Taxation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Ticket Tax 7.5% Domestic Airfare
Federal Flight Segment Tax $3.20 Domestic Enplanement
Federal Security Surcharge $3.00 Enplanement at U.S.
* Airport
Airport Passenger Facility Up to $4.50 Enplanement at eligible
Charge ** U.S. Airport
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Domestic passengers are taxed $3.20 per Enplanement at a U.S. Airport
with a regulation maximum of $8.00 for a round-trip.
** Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) are federally authorized but levied
by local airport operators, who set the amounts (up to $4.50 per
enplanement, to a maximum of two PFCs per one-way trip and four per
journey).
*** The above is in addition to the airlines surrendering to TSA what
they would have spent on their security operations: In 2005 that
amounted to nearly \1/2\ billion dollars.
The Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express'
proposal would result in less time wasted in line for baggage
check-in and claim. The economic cost of additional time spent
on a roundtrip by the airline travelers is estimated in excess
of $50 billion for 2003.
Faster turnaround time for aircraft and more consistent on-
time arrivals by airlines would help business travelers spend
less time at hotels away from home and more time with their
families and loved ones.
Provide better tracking and tracing of bags for enhanced
service: Passengers would gain greater knowledge of location of
baggage using e-mail and wireless technology to provide
estimated time of arrival (ETA) to passengers on baggage in-
transit and already delivered at the destination address.
Lower rates for hotels and rental cars due to greater
predictability of occupancy and asset utilization.
Travel bookings over the Internet could be coupled with an
additional option of scheduling a pick-up for passenger
baggage, thereby making it easier for passengers to ship their
bags via Universal Express and other parcel carriers.
Benefits to American Public
A more robust and secure air and ground public
transportation industry would avoid further congestion on
highways and roads, would reduce air pollution, and would save
tax dollars for other national priorities. The potential for
saving time for travelers is immense.
The Federal Government could find itself in the position of
collecting interest on the funds made available to the airlines
by the Airline Stabilization Board, since this solution could
improve the airlines ability to pay down debt from increased
passenger traffic and revenue streams.
The American public would not have to share as much, if any
of the expense of funding airline security through general
taxes.
Benefits to Transportation Industry
Creates an opportunity for $17 billion to $28 billion in new
revenue and a several hundred thousand jobs for the
transportation industry.
The proposal would result in business for baggage handling
and transportation activities for 500 million bags. Parcel
carriers and the United States Postal Service are well-suited
to support this activity.
Parcel carriers would gain billions of dollars in new
revenue for providing pickup, inter-city transportation, and
delivery to final destination. These carriers would generate
thousands of new high paying jobs for union workers at USPS and
UPS and non-union workers at FedEx and DHL.
Even with the addition of 500 million bags per year to the
existing volume, the parcel carriers and the USPS already have
the network and ability to handle the volume without
compromising their high level of service, currently achieving
98 percent on-time performance versus the airline baggage
claims, i.e., American Airlines--33.2 percent, United Airlines
-14.6 percent, Delta Airlines--102.1 percent, Northwest
Airlines--80.5 percent, Continental Airlines--55.7 percent,
Southwest Airlines--39.2 percent, U.S. Airways--331.5 percent
(March 8, 2005 Report on Lost Luggage, Wall Street Journal).
Independent private postal store franchises belonging to a
national network, such as UniversalPost, NPC and Postal Annex,
would gain new business from handling bags from price sensitive
passengers who may prefer to perform the drop-off and pickup
services for an even lower baggage handling rate than Universal
Express and other service providers.
Benefit to Travel Industry
Hotels would experience lower cancellation rates and thus
achieve higher occupancy rates. This will create opportunity
for hotels to offer lower rates to travelers, thereby
offsetting the baggage transportation charges being paid by the
passengers.
Currently, there are no standards as to the type of bags
that can be checked-in or carried on board the aircraft. This
lack of standardization results in higher transportation cost
for the airlines, greater risk of the bags being damaged or
misrouted, and higher security risks. With TSA approved bags,
which can be sold in certain standard shapes and sizes with
imbedded Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, there
could be greater security and visibility of bags. This could
generate new revenue and jobs for the luggage manufacturers and
retail stores.
Travel agencies would also gain from this new opportunity to
market baggage shipping service along with the traditional
ticket-booking services.
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' Role in this
Proposal
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express
believes its business model can compete and provide for
collective bargaining power of passengers to be leveraged
against lower baggage shipping costs via parcel carriers,
enhanced security, and better overall travel experience for the
airline passengers.
It can provide seamless tracking and tracing capability
through an integrated system versus the current system that has
limited knowledge regarding the location of bags.
It can help to develop commercial technology for TSA to
consider in promoting baggage tickets that passengers can
purchase for baggage screening fees and airline charges for
carry-on and checked baggage in conjunction with booking of
passenger tickets.
It can help to develop and manage technology that would
integrate baggage shipping with travel bookings/hotel
reservations to promote advance baggage shipping.
Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express
believes it can facilitate and expedite the proposed approach
by combining the comprehensive capabilities of the following
companies and resources in various areas of luggage logistics:
-- Extensive Industry Knowledge: Through a partnership with
industry consultants, Universal Express has access to one of
the most recognized parcel industry experts about various
shipping options for bags and at lowest prices with greatest
access to state-of-the-art tracking and tracing technology for
visibility by TSA and the passengers. This will ensure that the
passengers get baggage service at significantly reduced prices
than available on their own and with the high on-time delivery
service.
-- Luggage Express: Luggage Express has built a business around
handling the transportation of passenger's luggage. Services
include pick-ups or drop-offs of luggage from a person's home
or business by Universal Express' UniversalPost Network
TM postal stations and through an extensive courier
network that includes Sky Net Worldwide Express. Luggage
Express is a member and sponsor of SATH (Society for Accessible
Traveler and Hospitality), is a preferred supplier for A.S.T.A.
(Association for Travel Agents), and a member of the N.C.A.
(National Concierge Association).
-- Virtual Bellhop: Virtual Bellhop provides the smart
alternative to an archaic and burdensome multi-step process of
transporting baggage from doorstep to destination and back
again. Virtual Bellhop currently provides service throughout
the United States and some International destinations. Virtual
Bellhop currently has alliances with American Express, Fairmont
Hotel, Tumi, Hertz, and Sabre among others.
Benchmarking Against Success of Such a Model in Other Service
Industries
Achieving discipline for baggage transportation will only occur
through a financial incentive system, which express/parcel carriers
have succeeded in doing so with their customers. UPS used to have less
than ten special fees in the 1980s and a pricing structure which cross-
subsidized rates between various types of customers. The travel
industry, and more specifically the airline industry, have precedents
for surcharges and extra fees for certain non-basic and value added
services. Examples include:
Itinerary change fee of up to $100 per ticket on restricted
fares.
Additional fee for in-flight meals, alcoholic drinks and
entertainment.
Extra charge for transporting live animals, excess baggage
by the airlines.
Special handling fee for unaccompanied children between 5
and 12 years of age.
Separate fee for child seats and navigation devices by
rental car companies.
Surcharge for telephone usage and other in-room amenities by
hotels.
Successful implementation of such approaches by UPS and other
parcel carriers has resulted in a pricing structure that provides for
lower rates for basic shipping service with new surcharges for extra
services (increased from 8 to 30) that are not essential to
transportation of a parcel. Consequently, the shipping charges paid
today by large customers are just 5 percent higher than in 1987, over
15 years ago. As a result, the overall industry has benefited from the
efficiencies brought about by more discriminate pricing.
The Coalition For Luggage Security and Universal Express' proposal
builds on these precedents and similar developments in other services
such as parcel carriers, banks, and hospitals. Expansion of such
surcharges for all but one carry-on bag would result in lower prices
for base airfares, as illustrated by the parcel carrier industry. The
passengers and consumers of airline service would greatly benefit.
Summary
The events of 9/11 have led to a greater Federal role in ensuring
the security of the air transportation network. Steps can be taken to
simultaneously enhance the security of travelers from terrorist attacks
and maintain the financial health of the airline industry. Coalition
For Luggage Security and Universal Express proposes consideration for
assessing security charges per bag and providing incentives for
passengers to ship bags in advance via competitive parcel services.
The passenger transportation industry can learn from the success of
other industries. The experience of parcel carriers have with
allocating revenue and cost to services provided is an example. The
result will be improved air transport security, more convenient air
travel for millions of passengers, and realignment of long overdue
airline industry pricing for industry viability.
______
Prepared Statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative Counsel,
American Civil Liberties Union, Washington Legislative Office
I. Introduction and Summary of Requests for Committee Action
The Honorable Chairman Stevens and Ranking Member Inouye: the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a nationwide non-partisan
organization with hundreds of thousands of activists, members and
affiliates in virtually every state, respectfully submits this
testimony. We appreciate the opportunity to submit this written
statement for the record of this hearing on physical screening of cargo
and passengers. In the statement, the ACLU first lays out six
principles of airline security, and then applies those to particular
security measures, rejecting some and endorsing others.
The ACLU urges committee members to embrace the concept that
Americans can and must be both safe and free, and that physical
screening technologies should be proven to be both effective and
minimally intrusive to protect civil liberties, particularly privacy
interests. Further, the ACLU urges Congress eliminate support for
proposed airline passenger pre-screening programs such as Secure Flight
and Registered Traveler in favor of more effective security measures.
Certain minimally intrusive technologies focused on addressing a
genuine security threat--such as explosives that are not discoverable
through use of conventional metal detectors--are preferable to the
fatally flawed approaches taken in such pre-screening programs.
The ACLU believes that Congress should apply the following
principles in deciding which proposals it would support to increase air
travel safety:
Principles of Airline Security
New physical security technologies must be genuinely
effective, rather than creating a false sense of security.
The level of intrusion--the degree to which a proposed
measure invades privacy--should reflect the level of risk, and,
if both are effective, the least intrusive physical screening
technology or technique should always trump the more invasive
technology.
Given limited Homeland Security funding, Congress must
insist that those technologies that reduce the gravest threats
be implemented first.
The physical security technologies employed must be focused
on accomplishing the critical objective that authorizes their
application--increasing passenger aviation security. Neither
TSA's screening employees nor the machines they operate should
be diverted to search for illegal contraband that does not pose
a threat to aviation security.
Minimally intrusive physical screening technologies should
be implemented in lieu of ineffective passenger pre-screening
proposals, such as Secure Flight and Registered Traveler.
Security measures should be implemented in a non-
discriminatory manner. Travelers should not be subjected to
intrusive searches or questioning based on race, ethnic origin,
country of origin, or religion. Rather, heightened security
measures should be employed where neutral criteria show that a
person poses a physical threat to aviation.
Each of these principles is discussed in detail below.
II. Congress Must Insist that Each Technology TSA Adopts Satisfies the
Principles of Airline Security
A. Principle 1: Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies Must Be
Effective, or they Should Not be Utilized or Funded
Congress should not allow TSA to fund or implement physical
screening techniques and technologies that do not substantially advance
passenger aviation security. The wisdom supporting this principle is
obvious: funds to increase aviation security are limited, and any
technique or technology must work and be substantially better than
other alternatives to deserve some of the limited funds available. It
therefore follows that before Congress invests in the purchase of
technologies from private vendors, it must demand evidence and testing
from neutral parties that the technologies have a great likelihood of
success--i.e., that they prevent terrorists from bringing explosives
and weapons onto planes. Technologies with such low probabilities for
success unnecessarily infringe travelers' personal privacy and could
harm civil liberties, while doing little to increase passenger aviation
security. The ACLU believes that the American people deserve real
security if they are to accept administrative searches in the form of
physical screening, not just the purchase of machines that provide a
false sense of security.
B. Principle 2: The Least Intrusive Techniques and Technologies are
More Likely to Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny
Because the application of administrative searches for aviation
security burdens the constitutionally protected right to privacy,
Congress must insist that all new physical screening techniques and
technologies authorized be the least intrusive necessary to accomplish
the screening of aviation passengers, their bags, and cargo. The
administrative search exceptions to the Fourth Amendment demand that
where Congress has a choice between two equally effective technologies,
it must only authorize the technology that will least burden the
traveling public.
C. Principle 3: Prioritize the Techniques and Technologies Targeted at
the Gravest Threats
Focus on the greatest threats first. As TSA Director Kip Hawley has
stated, since the commercial airplanes hardened their cockpit doors and
terrorists have lost the element of surprise, it is more likely that
any terrorists would attempt to blow up a plane with explosives than it
is that they will try to hijack a plane to use as a missile. Thus, the
greatest threat to aviation security is likely to be from explosives,
which cannot be addressed through passenger pre-screening programs. As
a result, searches for conventional weapons, while important, are less
vital to aviation security than insisting that 100 percent of cargo,
luggage, and carry-on bags are screened for explosives. Through the
power of the purse, Congress should help TSA to prioritize its efforts
to deal with this threat and direct its energies to implement effective
technologies that accomplish this goal first.
D. Principle 4: Techniques and Technologies that Impact Personal
Privacy Must be Narrowly Tailored to Accomplish the Sole
Objective of Improving Passenger Aviation Security
Because physical search techniques and technologies used in
domestic air travel affect privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, TSA may only deploy and Congress should only authorize those
techniques and technologies that are minimally intrusive to achieve the
goal of increasing passenger aviation security. Repeated tests by
various Federal agencies after 9/11 demonstrate that screeners
regularly fail to identify weapons and explosives, reminding us that
screeners and screening technologies need to remain focused on their
core mission: stopping explosives, weapons and their components from
being brought or shipped on planes. The ACLU believes that the flying
public expects and deserves such a focus, particularly since other
Federal, state and local government agencies have other means of
searching for and identifying contraband.
E. Principle 5: Effective and Minimally Intrusive Physical Screening
Technologies Should be Implemented While Proposed Passenger
Prescreening Programs, Such as Secure Flight and Registered
Traveler, Should be Eliminated
Passenger prescreening programs are not effective, in that they
treat everyone as a suspect, nor are they minimally intrusive because
they require review of substantial amounts of personally identifiable
information to assign passengers a risk assessment. TSA's focus on
proposed passenger prescreening programs has diverted scarce resources
since 9/11 from those techniques and technologies that could lessen the
gravest threat to passenger aviation security by detecting explosives
brought on or shipped in planes. This diversion has been costly because
proposed prescreening programs--such as Secure Flight and Registered
Traveler, with their myriad of constitutional, technological, security
and efficiency infirmities--are only slightly closer to implementation
than when they were first proposed shortly after September 11, 2001.
Yet, as has been made clear by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office and Congressional hearings, these programs do not substantially
improve passenger aviation security. Further, they are prohibitively
expensive and privacy invasive. More importantly, TSA's insistence on
moving forward with passenger prescreening likely has led to TSA's
failure to implement robust, narrowly tailored explosives and weapons
screening of all carry-on bags, luggage, and cargo. Thus, this
divergence of attention and resources has been, and continues to be, a
potentially dangerous one.
The ACLU once again urges Congress to redirect TSA's efforts toward
implementing effective and minimally intrusive physical screening
technologies while eliminating authorization for passenger prescreening
programs and shifting funding to purchase those narrowly-tailored
physical screening technologies. The result will surely be speedier and
more certain improvements in passenger aviation security.
F. Principle 6: Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies May Not
Be Applied in a Discriminatory Matter
Longstanding constitutional principles require that no
administrative searches, either by technique or technology, be applied
in a discriminatory matter. The ACLU opposes the use of profiles based
on race, religion, ethnicity, or country of origin. Profiles can be
used in lieu of evidence to subject some passengers to heightened
scrutiny. The ACLU opposes the use of profiles based on these factors
because they are not only unfair, but are an ineffective means of
determining who may be a terrorist. It is unconstitutional to single
out any person because of their race, religion, country of origin or
ethnicity. It is, however, permissible to, for example, use race in
conjunction with other information, if race is one of several
characteristics used to describe a particular suspect. The Israeli
government discovered that shortly after it devised a profile of the
likely terrorist based on race, gender and age, that the terrorist
organizations it was trying to stop changed the profile of the suicide
bomber. Thus discriminatory profiling techniques to select individuals
for secondary screening actually may create a security weakness by
focusing too few security screening resources on travelers who do not
fit the profile. The ACLU points out that America's sophisticated,
patient enemies may well seek to exploit such a discriminatory scheme.
III. Techniques and Technologies that Fail to Satisfy these Principles
Should Not Be Authorized or Funded by Congress
Some physical screening techniques and technologies under
consideration deserve further scrutiny, in part because they fail to
satisfy one or more of the principles of good airline security. Some,
discussed below, are ineffective or inefficient. Congress should block
authorization or funding of these programs unless and until they can be
modified to meet the principles and thereby lessen the threat they pose
to personal privacy and civil liberties.
A. Pat-Down Searches Must Not Lead to Groping
The ACLU has long been concerned about the increased use of pat-
down searches post-9/11, but we recognize that secondary screening--
perhaps including the use of pat-downs--may be acceptable when a metal
or explosives detection device suggests the presence of a weapon or
explosives. Thus, the level of intrusion would be keyed to a risk. Pat-
down searches in the absence of other evidence are unnecessarily
invasive. Further, TSA's use of pat-downs have led to substantial
numbers of complaints about groping of passengers breasts, buttocks,
and genitalia. Congress must continue to monitor this situation to
ensure that pat-downs only occur when necessary.
B. Biometric Identifiers Should be Used Only for Airport Personnel and
Not for the General Traveling Public
There have been proposals to use biometric techniques to accurately
identify airport personnel who have access to sensitive areas. The ACLU
does not oppose using biometric identification techniques with a proven
record of accuracy--such as iris scans or digital fingerprints--to
identify and authenticate persons working in secured areas of airports.
The error rate for those technologies is very low, and using the
technology could increase security without compromising civil
liberties. This represents a good application of modern technology.
Biometric identifiers collected from airport and airline workers should
not, however, be used for unrelated purposes.
The ACLU does, however, oppose using this technology for all
airline passengers because it is so intrusive. To be effective, the
government would have to have the iris scan or digital fingerprint of
every person living in the United States and probably that of anyone
traveling through America's airways. This would be the high-tech
equivalent of creating a National ID system. Doing so would raise grave
privacy concerns and, furthermore, it would be unrealistic to expect
that high quality images could be easily obtained and maintained on the
tens of million of Americans who travel by air.
C. Facial Recognition Is Not Effective
Not every technological solution makes sense and will enhance
safety. For example, many have proposed using facial recognition
technology for several uses in airports. But this modern technology is
notoriously inaccurate. One government study, for example, showed a 43
percent error rate of false negatives--a failure to properly identify
posed photographs of the same person taken 18 months apart. In other
words, persons who should have been matched to their own photo were
not. Put another way, if Osama Bin Laden were to stare in the camera at
one of our airports, the technology would have no more chance than a
coin toss of properly identifying him.
Some have also proposed using video surveillance to scan crowds at
airports and compare those images with photographic data bases. Facial
recognition technology is even less accurate in those circumstances,
and its use will not only create privacy problems for law-abiding
passengers, but also will create a false sense of security. Terrorists
will not line up to be photographed for security data bases and will
quickly learn the techniques for obscuring their identity. There is no
reason to jeopardize our privacy for measures that will create a false
sense of security.
D. X-Ray Backscatter Is Highly Invasive of Personal Privacy and Is Not
Narrowly Tailored
There are some security measures that are extremely intrusive and
should only be used when there is good cause to suspect that an
individual is a security risk. Low-dose X-ray backscatter machines--
such as those offered by Rapiscan, Inc. and AS & E--are used by the
Customs Service in some airports to search for drugs and other
contraband. The ACLU is concerned that these searches--akin to
Superman's X-ray vision--have been conducted without good cause and are
based on profiles that are racially discriminatory. In addition, these
machines are capable of projecting a high-resolution image of a
passenger's naked body.
Congress should prohibit X-ray backscatter's use as part of a
routine screening procedure. Passengers expect privacy underneath their
clothing and should not be required to display highly personal details
of their bodies--such as evidence of mastectomies, colostomy
appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the size of their
breasts or genitals--as a prerequisite to boarding a plane. However, X-
ray backscatter technology has tremendous potential to screen carry-on
bags, luggage, and cargo.
As discussed above, however, X-ray backscatter technology's routine
use likely will lead to increased passenger screening delays and will
certainly require subsequent searches for numerous passengers. For
example, an image projected by X-ray backscatter that may look like a
concealed gun or explosive device carried on a person will require TSA
screeners to put the person through: (a) a conventional metal detector;
(b) an explosives detection ``puffer'' machine; or (c) both. Further,
even if an object is identified, TSA screeners will then need to pat
the individual in question down and likely ask them to remove their
clothing to verify what the object in question may be. Even the
presence of a seemingly innocuously shaped item, such as a prosthetic
device or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially
humiliating) verification. Thus, X-ray backscatter requires a
tremendous invasion of privacy with little speed or efficiency gains.
The ACLU, therefore, recommends that Congress not authorize and fund
TSA's purchase of X-ray backscatter machines.
E. Behavioral Profiling Should Not be Utilized in a Discriminatory
Manner, Nor Should It Supplant Minimally Intrusive Physical
Screening
Behavioral patterning to select passengers for heightened security
is troublesome because it gives so much discretion to screeners that
often result in racial profiling. Congress should not authorize TSA
screeners to employ secondary screening simply because someone is
sweating or wearing a jacket. Oftentimes, people must run to make a
flight, and others are chilled easily by air conditioning. Similarly,
it will be difficult to train TSA screeners to effectively distinguish
between those who--because of their cultural experiences--are less
likely to give straightforward answers to authority figures such as TSA
screeners wearing uniforms, and those who may be intending to carry out
an attack. Such behavioral profiling may be only marginally helpful in
identifying someone who poses a threat, but is a practice that is
certainly likely to lead to abuse.
The ACLU is not suggesting that TSA screeners ignore their own eyes
and instincts when someone is behaving suspiciously. However, the
application of behavioral profiling in an environment--commercial air
travel--that is highly stressful for many even frequent, experienced,
business travelers, must be tempered with concerns for constitutional
norms to prevent unnecessary erosions of civil liberties and personal
privacy. Rather, any searches or questioning should be based on neutral
criteria.
F. Explosives Detection Devices Should Be Implemented Only When False
Positive Signals Can Be Minimized
The use of particle sniffers that are tuned to detect molecular
traces of explosives (puffer machines) hold out the potential for
searches that preserve the privacy and dignity of passengers far more
than pat-downs, physical searches, and backscatter X-ray scans. If
utilized, the ACLU believes they should remain focused on the
legitimate administrative purpose of protecting airline safety (as
opposed to looking for contraband, such as drugs), and that system
should be implemented to minimize false positives and handle them in a
way that preserves passengers' dignity. It has been reported that
molecular ``cousins'' of certain explosives that could trigger many
false alarms may include such substances as heart medicine and lawn
fertilizers. This poses the question: how will those individuals who
signal a false alarm be treated, both at that moment and in the future?
The ACLU recommends that Congress exercise oversight over the
implementation of such ``puffer'' machines to ensure that the rate of
false positives is not unacceptably high so that passengers are given
an efficient, non-intrusive means of resolving concerns about a false
signal. This is particularly important where a search by TSA screeners
shows that neither the passenger nor their carry-on bags and luggage
are concealing a bomb or bomb-making components. Congress must insist
that if TSA employs puffer machines, it also must set up fair
procedures to rapidly ensure that innocent passengers who raise false
positives can reach their destination.
IV. Conclusion
The ACLU recommends that Congress apply the six principles
articulated above when considering whether to authorize and fund
physical screening techniques and technologies. Those techniques and
technologies that do not demonstrably improve aviation security should
be rejected. Among the others, the least intrusive means available for
accomplishing the goal of reducing the gravest threats to aviation
security should be implemented. In recommending Congress' application
of these principles, the ACLU supports the use of effective, narrowly
tailored security measures to enhance airport safety that have minimal
risk to privacy, maximum-security benefit, and reflect the level of
risk. The ACLU believes that increased safety need not come at the
expense of civil liberties. The ACLU has suggested several measures,
such as: increased training for security personnel; heightened
screening of airline and airport security personnel; strict control of
secured areas of airports; measures to improve security at foreign
airports; a neutral entity to which passengers can report lax security
procedures; luggage matching of all passengers; and the screening of
all luggage, carry-on bags and cargo for explosives and weapons, which
would satisfy the principles articulated.
______
Prepared Statement of Thomas Ripp, President, Security and Detection
Systems Division, L-3 Communications, Inc.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee,
I am Tom Ripp, President of L-3 Communications' Security and
Detection Systems Division. I am pleased to have the opportunity to
submit this statement for the record to highlight some of the
approaches we believe will assist in strengthening security for the
American traveling public while improving efficiency and reducing
costs. Before describing the security improvements we believe can and
should be made, I would like to briefly discuss the genesis of L-3
Communications, and our involvement in the security field.
L-3 Communications, Inc., was formed in 1997 as a spin-off of
Lockheed-Martin and, through a series of strategic acquisitions and
product development, has quickly become a leader in supplying defense
contractors. In the civil aviation arena, L-3 produces and sells both
TCAS, which is an airborne collision avoidance system, and digital
flight data recorders, commonly referred to as black boxes.'' Our
security division has been involved in aviation security since the
company's inception and successfully developed the eXaminer3DX6000, an
explosive detection system (EDS) based on computer tomography, that was
certified by the FAA in 1998. It was the second type of EDS certified
by the agency for operational deployment at airports. Since that time,
we have continued to refine and upgrade our EDS, having made
significant strides in detection capabilities, speed, and reliability.
Detection capabilities have been enhanced to achieve both 100
percent and 75 percent TSA certification levels without negative impact
to operational throughput or false alarm rates. Continued reliability
improvements have resulted in system availability of 99 percent for in-
line systems and 98 percent for stand-alone systems. In addition, L-3
was the first to develop a full multiplex network capability that
provides for a central screening operation, which allows for optimum
utilization of the screener workforce. Today, more than 625 L-3 EDS
units are found at airports throughout the U.S. with approximately 425
as stand-alone units and the remaining units deployed as in-line
configurations. The L-3 system is well suited for in-line installations
and was the first in the U.S. to be integrated into an in-line system
in 2002 in Boston. Also, the eXaminer 3DX has been very successful in
the competitive international markets winning 100 percent of the
competitions for certified EDS systems in 2005. Many of the largest
foreign airports such as London, Singapore and Beijing have selected L-
3 to provide their security screening solutions.
Although we have achieved considerable success in making
improvements to our EDS systems, technology continues to evolve and we
recognize that more gains can continue to be made. We are currently
working on integration of technologies with current checked baggage
products to enhance both detection capabilities as well as reduce false
alarm rates in order to increase operational throughput and further
reduce manpower requirements. We believe it is critically important
that TSA do more to fund and promote work on next generation EDS
systems that will address the needs from a systems solution. The
ability to evaluate the combination of systems and technologies, which
could optimize detection and throughput performance and reduce manpower
requirements cost-effectively, could provide improved solutions in the
near-term. Our industry continues sensor-based development efforts,
which are considered promising for the longer-term.
Despite significant cost and effort, today's aviation passenger and
baggage screening systems remain somewhat of a patchwork approach to
security that is increasingly costly to maintain, inefficient for
passengers, labor-intensive, wasteful of airport terminal space that is
becoming evermore congested, and has clear limitations on what can
reasonably be expected to be detected. With today's passenger levels
projected to increase dramatically over the next several years,
something needs to be done to avoid potential gridlock in our
terminals. The approaches we recommend that this committee consider are
intended to address these shortcomings. In aggregate, we are confident
that, if adopted, they will generate significant cost-savings, speed up
screening, increase detection capabilities, and free-up airport
terminal space that will become increasingly crowded as passenger
levels continue to grow.
EDS systems were introduced at our Nation's airports about a decade
ago, and a considerable effort was made to increase the numbers
following the events of 9/11. Many of these EDS systems are beginning
to age. Consequently, they are becoming more expensive to maintain and
their capabilities do not match what is available now. Therefore, we
recommend that TSA undertake three actions: (1) replace expired
manufacturer's warranties with new warranties, (2) refurbish existing
EDS with software and hardware modifications to improve their
detection, throughput speed, and reliability, and (3) acquire
additional, new certified EDS systems for in-line installations at
additional airports.
There are considerable benefits that can be achieved by following
these recommendations.
First, replacing warranties will provide TSA with known costs to
maintain its systems and ensure that covered systems will receive
pertinent software and hardware upgrades to keep pace with improvements
that are made for new systems. It can also help control TSA staffing
since L-3, for example, has approximately 175 field technicians
available to maintain and service equipment and a call center that
operates around the clock. Second, the refurbishment of existing EDS
systems can be done at approximately \1/2\ the cost of acquiring new
systems. Refurbished systems can then be redeployed, at lesser cost, to
new in-line configurations or can be installed as stand-alone systems
at medium and smaller airports that currently only have trace
detection. Trace detection systems are slower than EDS and have less
detection capabilities, meaning that even with their reduced detection
abilities they will simply be unable to accommodate the passenger
growth beginning to occur at these airports. Further, they are labor-
intensive. Replacing trace detection equipment with refurbished EDS
units will increase security, increase passenger throughput, and reduce
considerably the number of screeners required. Third, it is widely
acknowledged that in-line EDS configurations are far preferable to
stand-alone systems at the larger airports from perspectives of space,
efficiency, and improved detection.
Unfortunately, the proposed Fiscal Year 2007 budget proposal falls
far short of the funding needed to make progress in installing in-line
EDS systems. The funding shortfall holds true for both system
acquisition and for the costs of installing systems in in-line
configurations. We believe it is critical that TSA and the Congress
direct considerably more funding toward the acquisition of new EDS
units which, when supplemented by less costly, refurbished EDS units,
can help address the considerable gap that exists in installing in-line
configurations at 100 of the Nation's larger airports. Additional
funding is also required to install these EDS systems in in-line
configurations. Experience shows that, in light of cost-savings
achieved, installation of an in-line EDS system literally pays for
itself in less than 2 years. The sooner we attain the goal of
outfitting the large airports with in-line EDS, the sooner we achieve
the additional security they offer and the sooner TSA can begin to save
significant recurring costs.
The current approach to screening passengers and carry-on baggage
has significant inefficiencies, is labor-intensive, and has relatively
constrained detection capabilities. In addition, the present
methodology of deploying individual technologies as they emerge
continues to reduce the overall operational efficiency of checkpoints
and oftentimes proves a source of frustration to the traveling public
just as they commence their trips. We, therefore, recommend that work
be undertaken to develop and pilot an advanced screening checkpoint,
which would serve as a platform for additional sensors (including
biometrics) as technologies mature. We envision that the checkpoint
would employ automated carry-on baggage screening for weapons and
explosive detection and a passenger imaging portal that would identify
concealed threats and explosives carried by a passenger. These multi-
purpose checkpoint systems would be networked together to a centralized
screening room that will improve screener performance and reduce the
manpower currently required at the checkpoint.
The advanced checkpoint solution would enhance threat detection for
both personnel and carry-on baggage. It would also improve throughput
to an estimated 300+ passengers per hour, eliminate the need for
removal of personal items from carry-on baggage, eliminate the need for
separate shoe scanning technology, provide a universally fast and
efficient screening process, and dramatically reduce TSA checkpoint
operator staffing requirements by up to 40 percent.
We also recommend additional efforts to increase the use of
technology in the screening of air cargo. While work continues to
refine and improve the known shipper program, we believe that TSA
should begin to procure and deploy existing automated explosive
screening technology that has already been tested, certified, and
piloted for break bulk air cargo screening. These systems could be used
to inspect high risk cargo. Additionally, work should be undertaken on
the development of next generation pallet screening capabilities.
Employment of such technology can help address some of the concerns
that have been identified in current cargo screening programs and will
enhance security.
We appreciate having the opportunity to share our views with the
Committee and look forward to working with you to help identify ways to
improve the security of the American traveling public.
______
Prepared Statement of Hasbrouck B. Miller, Vice President of Government
Affairs, Smiths Detection
Introduction
Chairman Stevens, Ranking Member Inouye, and distinguished members
of the Committee, my name is Hasbrouck B. Miller and I am Vice
President of Government Affairs for Smiths Detection. On behalf of
Smiths Detection, thank you for the opportunity to submit this written
testimony for the record at today's hearing on aviation security and
the physical screening of airline passengers.
Smiths Detection, based in Pine Brook, New Jersey (with offices in
Connecticut, Maryland and Rhode Island, among other locations) is the
world's market leader in creating security solutions for transportation
security checkpoints at airports, ports and borders and other points of
entry. Our products are used here in the Washington, DC area at Dulles
Airport, Reagan National Airport, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority (Metro), and in Congress. Nearly every Federal agency is our
customer including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
United States Armed Forces, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of State, and the Federal Protective Service. Around the
world, countries such as Israel, the U.K., Canada, Argentina, Hungary,
Spain, U.A.E., Japan, Italy, France and China use our forward-looking,
highly sensitive security systems to detect explosives, weapons,
chemicals, biological agents, and contraband.
What will an airport security checkpoint look like next year, 5
years from now, or even 10 years down the road? Will the checkpoint be
positioned even further out from the secure area? Will it require
multiple layers of screening? Will it be merged with other modes of
transportation? Will all screening be done remotely with no operators
onsite? Will carry on luggage be screened with the person? Will
passengers travel with biometric passports? Will passengers be screened
only at checkpoints, or will they be screened throughout the airport
terminal? How will general surveillance technologies complement
checkpoint technologies? These are just some of the questions that our
R&D team works on every day. Explosive detection portals, biometrics
technologies, wireless remote monitoring systems, and other similar
technologies seemed more apt for science fiction films a few years ago.
Today, we innovate and deploy those technologies to compliment existing
screening approaches to increase passenger safety. We agree with
Assistant Secretary Hawley's statement at the February 9, 2006 hearing
before this committee that the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) must implement a ``comprehensive, multi-layered aviation security
network'' and Smiths Detection has always worked to promote such a
vision--a vision that would combine different aspects of explosives
detection technologies and monitoring systems that can provide the
traveling public the ease and efficiencies of flying while still
maintaining an adequate measure of security.
Looking forward to the functionality of the next generation people-
screening checkpoint, Smiths Detection is pursuing a number of clear
objectives. The primary objectives of cost reduction, automation and
sensor fusion are the driving forces in developing equipment for future
passenger screening:
Cost Reduction--An aggressive program of cost reduction is
underway to reduce the cost of screening an airport passenger.
This is being addressed from both the equipment cost aspects
and also the operational requirements to reduce the need for
operator attendance. The goal is to produce a low-cost
automatic detection system for passenger screening.
Automation--The use of built-in intelligence in screening
systems is essential to achieving a cost effective and fast
throughput checkpoint. Automatic detection development will be
based on existing experience and IP in X-Ray screening to
produce fast-transit, secure passenger checkpoints.
Sensor Fusion--Several approaches to screening and
monitoring passengers are currently proposed. These use diverse
technologies and are often complimentary in how and what they
detect. A single station passenger screen that combines a
variety of checks such as metal and trace detection, imaging,
biometrics and passenger ID tracking is an objective for Smiths
Detection as the technologies mature and become cost effective.
In a typical ``concept of operation,'' the passenger walks through
a secure area that detects explosives and metal objects simultaneously
while instantaneously either identifying the passenger through
biometrics or checks the passenger with a fully integrated registered
traveler data base (or both). All of this is done without disrupting
the flow of commerce or changing the footprint of existing checkpoints.
Today, we welcome the opportunity to partner with the U.S.
Government and outline our technological innovations so we may continue
to assist this committee, Congress, TSA, DHS, and the Administration to
meet the challenges we face as a nation in protecting aviation
passengers from terrorist threats. We strongly believe that there must
be a partnership between the government and industry, with the
government clearly promulgating its vision for the future and leading
the private sector to that vision.
We have come a long way since the tragic events of 9/11 at our
security screening points. Nevertheless, we would all agree that more
work needs to be done. Just last week, al-Qaida conspirator Zacarias
Moussaoui admitted his alleged plot with ``shoe bomber'' Richard Reid
to hijack a fifth airliner on September 11, 2001, and fly it into the
White House. Fortunately, we know that did not occur. But, in 2003,
Reid got through a security point with explosives and incendiaries to
attempt to create a bomb in his shoe. Also, last week, the Government
Accountability Office revealed that two undercover agents carried small
amounts of radio active material past border check points in two
states--Washington and Texas--enough to make ``dirty bombs.'' The
undercover agents apparently used false documents to persuade border
control agents to permit their entry. Next generation technology must
be the shield against these real threats. Through innovative
technologies, and a comprehensive and multi-layered approach, we
believe the technologies that we are working on and deploying
worldwide, coupled with existing approaches, will ensure more safety
for the flying public when they travel.
Next Generation Technology To Improve Passenger Checkpoint Security
We commend TSA on its work. TSA has the difficult task of deploying
technologies that effectively provide adequate aviation security
measures while not disrupting the flow of commerce, and must do so
within budgetary constraints. Smiths Detection has over the years, and
continues to be, true partners with TSA as we work together to develop
products that are both useful and efficient, and consistent with
Congress and TSA's stated goals.
Although Smiths Detection manufactures dozens of security-oriented
solutions that improve passenger screening, these written remarks will
focus on five particular areas:
Biometrics--Biometrics technologies that enable
fingerprints, palm prints, and other identifiers such as iris
scans to be screened, and crossmatched with wireless data
bases, eliminating human error in identifications process and
expediting the ID process in the future.
Software Systems--Software systems that allow airport
screeners to connect with first responders and others that
could facilitate monitoring of airport travelers with sensors
and video cameras connected to remote viewing and recording
stations.
Millimeter Wave Cameras--Cameras that detect explosives
through detection of differences in energy emitted by the human
body.
Document Scanners--Technologies that permit passports and
other identification to be scanned for trace amounts of
explosives; and
Trace Detection Walk Through Portals--A walk-through tunnel
that detects the presence of explosives on the bodies of
passengers and which has been deployed at hundreds of airports
in the United States, and is currently in operation at other
security checkpoints throughout the world.
We believe that some aspect of each of these technologies will be
used in the next generation people-screening checkpoint.
1. Biometrics
Biometrics is one of the cutting-edge technologies for checkpoints
and other types of screening that we believe will be part of the next
generation solutions. As a leading global provider of biometric
solutions, Smiths Detection sees that biometrics solutions have
multiple applications in the national security and public safety
arenas. Biometrics technology was used at the 2006 Winter Olympic Games
in Italy and the 2004 Summer Games in Greece, and is certainly
applicable to airport security. Smiths Detection's experience is that
innovative biometrics technology can be used to conduct quick iris
scans, or screen a person's fingerprints (or other ``live'' data), at
access points that is then compared with stored data. The biometric
features are then used to permit accredited persons to enter through
check points.
In the future at airports, we believe biometric scanners may be
useful for:
Physical Access Control--High security areas and buildings
can be protected with physical access control systems. An iris
scan or an actual print can be compared against information on
your ID badge or against a larger data base for one to many
matching.
Mobile Security--With wireless products, roving or random ID
checks can be carried out by security guards, police, the
military and others to match the data captured by either iris
scans or fingerprints in the field against a secured or
registered traveler data base.
ID Management --With ID management technology, airports can
manage who comes and goes from their facilities. By tracking a
visitor with an iris scan or with fingerprints, there is no
room for human error and security can be warned when the wrong
person comes to visit.
2. Software Technology Systems for Command Centers and First Responders
Another concept that fits within a comprehensive, multi-layered
approach is the integration of software systems linked to various
technologies within a security checkpoint and beyond. These software
systems network large numbers of sensors and video cameras with
connections to remote viewing and recording stations. Such networks
form the backbone for command and control capabilities that provide
security decision-makers with the situational understanding so vital to
ensuring the public's safety. Technology could allow us to build a
wireless broadband network in our airports that could distribute text,
voice, data and video to first responders and local law enforcement in
real-time (if need be), or other points of control within the airport
boundaries. With such a network, users would be able to communicate
securely via Internet Protocol on standard PCs, laptops and handheld
devices.
In the airport environment, for example, we envision video encoder/
server/recorder systems working together with various physical security
solutions to ensure a scalable and secure management platform for
digital video distribution and device control, supporting thousands of
sensors and simultaneous users. These open architecture systems would
support a wide range of robotic camera packages, digital video
recorders, sensors and legacy CCTV equipment and could integrate
various other security technologies.
Of course, one of the most important issues among this type of
system is interoperability among Federal, state and local agencies.
Whether transmitted by fiber or wireless connections, the networked
camera/video feeds must (and can) be distributed to authorized users
without requiring any proprietary hardware or software.
This approach has been utilized for numerous physical security
solutions for early warning, detection and response, public safety,
port and refinery security and operational safety with the Department
of Defense, Department of Energy, DHS, and several major transit
systems including the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority and
Metro. The airport community we believe is next.
3. Millimeter Wave Imaging
Another innovative technology that we feel could be useful to the
airport checkpoint area is millimeter wave cameras. This technology
detects threat objects, such as explosives or weapons, by measuring
millimeter wave energy. This nonionizing energy can penetrate clothing
and many other concealing materials. An explosive strapped to the human
body, for example, returns a different amount of energy to the camera
than the body around it, therefore revealing the explosive. At the same
time, the camera is unaffected by the presence of clothing because
clothing is transparent at millimeter wave frequencies.
Again, the technology is complicated, but the function is simple: A
passenger would stand before the camera which would measure his body's
natural radiation of energy in comparison to a controlled background.
If the passenger is carrying an explosive or a weapon, these objects
will stand out on the camera's image so that the screener can identify
them. The image is processed to provide the passenger with privacy
while still facilitating threat detection.
Real-time people screening using millimeter-waves has many
benefits:
Instant Detection of Threat Objects--When a person is imaged
using a real-time millimeter-wave camera, the operator receives
instantaneous feedback on the presence of any potential threat
items that may be concealed by the person's clothes. Concealed
objects appear as a lighter/darker contrast against the body
background. Because the information is provided as an image,
the operator can pinpoint the location of the suspect item and
follow-up with a directed search procedure to investigate the
object in question.
Safety--Millimeter-wave imaging uses a low energy, non-
ionising region of the spectrum to gather information on
concealed threat objects. It is harmless in terms of human
safety--there is no health implication for either subject or
operator.
Identification of Multiple Material Types--In addition to
providing location information on possible threat items,
millimeter-wave imaging can also detect a wide range of
material types. This is a significant advance on present-day
checkpoints that only screen people for metal. Dangerous
weapons and materials such as ceramic knives and explosives
that would pass undetected through a magnetometer will be
identified using a millimeter-wave imager.
Rapid Throughput --The screening procedure using a real-time
millimeter-wave imager typically takes between 5 and 10
seconds. The instantaneous availability of information on the
person as they are being screened means the operator can make
an on the spot assessment to pass or further investigate an
individual. These features combine to ensure a rapid screening
procedure and a fast transit time for passengers at the
checkpoint.
Millimeter wave imaging employs cutting-edge technology that has
matured to the point where TSA and Smiths can once again begin a
collaborative effort to implement this technology at various test
airport passenger checkpoints throughout the United States. We envision
a pilot project where the passenger enters a secure area where they are
requested to place their luggage on the belt of an X-ray system. The
passenger is also asked to remove all items from their clothing and to
put these also through the X-ray system. The passenger is then screened
by a mm-wave imaging system (with integrated metal detector) and if any
bulk object is detected underneath the clothing, they are automatically
asked to remove this and put it again on the X-ray. This procedure
could be repeated twice until the passenger is cleared or, if not
cleared, an operator is alerted.
Under the above scenario, we believe that such an approach may
reduce the number of operators required to run the checkpoint. A
majority of the cost of operating a checkpoint is ``Operator Time,'' so
the airport operator may achieve considerable savings for the total
checkpoint running costs.
4. Document Scanners
Another technology that is yet to be utilized fully although it has
been deployed in limited circumstances is the document scanner.
Document scanners allow detection and identification of traces of over
40 different explosive substances in a rapid eight-second period by
simply swiping passports or other travel documents over a sample disc,
or using an optional swab sampler. With a flip of a switch, the sample
disc is automatically brought into the detector for analysis. Screeners
at airports would have the technology to trace explosives on documents,
such as passports, visas, or airline tickets.
Combined with the other ``layers'' of security, document scanners
add yet another forward-looking approach to authenticating individuals,
detecting explosives, and mitigating against security threats.
5. Explosives Detection Portals
Finally, all aviation checkpoints should have an explosive
detection portal. Although not necessarily new, such portals were
developed in collaboration with the FAA, TSA, and the Sandia National
Laboratory in response to the general interest in providing a full
body, non-intrusive explosive screening method for use on personnel at
checkpoints in high traffic volume environments. We believe such
portals have proven to be an effective and efficient system that
complements proven technologies with cutting-edge improvements to
create an efficient and reliable detection system.
Despite the complexity of the technology behind the device, it is
fairly simple to describe and understand its operation. As you may
know, the passenger steps into the portal for a period of only seconds.
There are no true doors that must open or shut, it's more like walking
into and stopping in a conventional metal detector. Once the passenger
is in, the portal's gentle puffs of air dislodge any particles trapped
on the body, hair, clothing and shoes. These particles are then
directed into the instrument for analysis. The passenger then continues
through the security process. The time in the portal takes only
seconds--IONSCAN' technology combined with pre-concentration
technology developed by Sandia National Laboratories allows for the
high throughput of screening up to six people per minute. Trace amounts
of up to 40 substances can be detected and identified in seconds.
Results are displayed in an easy-to-understand fashion.
We highlight the explosive detection portal not only because it
uses a proven effective technology for contraband detection but also
because of the collaborative effort between Smiths Detection the FAA/
TSA to implement its use. In our opinion, this effort reflects the
proper function of TSA in turning to the private sector to solve a
public problem. \1\
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\1\ It is worth noting, however, that this collaborative effort
took nearly 10 years from its inception to deployment.
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Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Smiths Detection is constantly working on new
generation technologies that will greatly assist TSA and DHS in
achieving its stated goal of improved aviation security. We would like
to partner with this committee to provide more information on our
reliable and cost-effective means to detect the presence of explosives
and other contraband on passengers, in luggage, and in cargo. Tests
have established that Smiths Detection's technologies improve passenger
safety without disrupting passenger flow and we are continually working
to ensure that passenger flow is as efficient as possible while
maintaining an effective checkpoint process. Smiths Detection
appreciates the opportunity to submit testimony before the Committee
and looks forward to working with the Committee members in continuing
to implement its technologies.
______
Supplementary Information Submitted by Hon. Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley
Mr. Chairman, with respect to the question from Senator Lautenberg
regarding whether our Transportation Security Officers (TSOs)
participate in the traditional fringe benefit programs, I would like to
supplement my answer. All TSA employees under permanent appointments,
including TSOs, are eligible for benefits including leave, retirement,
and health and life insurance coverage. Part-time employees under
permanent appointments, including TSOs, are eligible for benefits on a
prorated basis. Our retention pilot program will offer part-time TSOs
at certain airports fully subsidized benefits.
______
Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Hon. Edmund ``Kip'' Hawley *
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* Response to written questions referred to were not available at
the time this hearing went to press.
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Explosive Detection Systems (EDS)
Question 1. It has been reported that at the nine airports where
the TSA has issued Letters of Intent (LOIs) to begin moving EDS
equipment ``in-line,'' that the TSA will recover its initial investment
in in-line systems in just over a year and save $1.3 billion over 7
years through reduced labor costs. Is it your belief that in-line EDS
will save money while strengthening security at a number of airports
that do not currently have it? Do you plan on more aggressively seeking
funding for in-line EDS or do you believe the current stream of funding
is appropriate?
Question 2. At many airports where they believe the placement of
in-line EDS is justified, including Honolulu International Airport
(HNL), the airports themselves are already working to construct full or
partial in-line EDS systems in their facilities. How is TSA assisting
in this effort? Will funds be available to help pay for some of the
costs for such airports that establish staff and costs savings through
the implementation of EDS in-line?
Screener Workforce
Question 3. Since the TSA was created, the issue of the proper
levels of screeners needed at individual airports and nationally has
been debated by all of the stakeholders involved. Has your Screener
Allocation Model provided the necessary guidance for TSA to determine
an absolute figure for the number of screeners you need nationally?
Have Federal Security Directors been able to properly implement you
recommendations? Are you comfortable with the current cap of 45,000
full-time employees? Have you been able to meet your needs with the
level of funding provided in Fiscal Year 2006? Is the use of 20 percent
Part-Time Screeners in the SAM realistic? Do Part-Time screeners have a
higher attrition rate?
Question 4. The TSA has been using a National Screening Force to
provide screening support to all airports in times of special need. How
often does the National Screening Force get utilized? Under the new
Screener Allocation Model will this National Screening Force still be
necessary? How many FTEs are currently utilized by the National
Screening Force? Have you ever performed a cost-benefit analysis of the
National Screening Force?
Question 5. The attrition rate for screeners has been noted as
detrimental to the public's demand for a Federal, professional, career
screener workforce following September 11, 2001. Do you believe that
the exemption of TSOs from the labor law protections afforded other
Federal workers deprives TSOs due process in the face of adverse
personnel actions? Some have argued that it resulted in the ability of
TSA to fire TSOs with relative ease for almost any alleged infraction,
regardless of proof or fairness which has directly contributed to the
current attrition rate. Do you believe that the lack of collective
bargaining rights has led to lower morale among the screener workforce?
For each year of the TSA's existence please provide the numbers of TSOs
who were involuntarily terminated. Please provide the reason for the
involuntary termination and airport.
Question 6. Is it accurate that any discipline less than a 15-day
suspension is handled within an airport with no outside or independent
review? What efforts have TSA made to ensure that the discipline meted
out at airports is consistent with TSA policy and the agency mission?
What efforts have been made to ensure that discipline has not been
arbitrary, capricious, and/or retaliatory? What training do airport
management, e.g., Federal Security Directors, Assistant Federal
Security Directors, Screening Managers, receive to ensure that they
understand agency policy on discipline? What training does airport
management receive to ensure that they understand the purpose and
policy goals behind discipline?
Question 7. Recently released Department of Labor statistics show
that 29 percent of airport screeners were injured on the job in 2005, a
rate higher than any of the other 600 jobs tracked by the agency and
over six times higher than the injury rate for the rest of the Federal
workforce. Do you believe this high injury rate has affected both the
high attrition rate for TSOs, and the TSA's ability to adequately staff
screening stations? What is the TSA policy for assignment of light duty
either following the return of a TSO from a work-related injury, or
otherwise upon the recommendation of the worker's physician? For each
year since the creation of the TSA, how many TSOs have been terminated
for reasons of being unable to perform the duties of a TSO following a
work-related injury?
Question 8. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) has investigated and reported on the workplace hazards faced by
TSOs at various airports around the country. Yet when TSOs request a
copy of these reports they have been told by OSHA that airport FSDs
have declared the entire report as ``Sensitive Security Information''
and denied access. What oversight does TSA exercise regarding whether
OSHA reports should be deemed ``Sensitive Security Information?''
Question 9. It is my understanding that the TSA has failed to apply
the veteran's preference in promotion and reduction-in-force decisions,
and unlike other Federal agencies, has only applied the veteran's
preference to those who retired from the military, denying the
preference to the majority of veterans who leave active duty before
retirement. TSO National Guard and Reserve personnel returning from
service in Iraq, Afghanistan and other foreign posts have reported that
they have been denied promotions in violation of the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994 (USERRA). What is the rationale
for the TSA's seemingly restrictive definition and application of the
veteran's preference? Are individual FSDs permitted to ignore USERRA as
it applies to TSOs returning to their positions following active duty?
Next-Generation Technology
Question 10. It seems various components of screening technology,
while likely improving security, would also require a great deal more
manpower to utilize. When the agency indicates new technology may be
available in about 2 years, do you mean an integrated system for
checkpoints or just the hardware? To date, how much progress has been
made in developing an integrated checkpoint of the future as required
by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 2004 which passed
Congress a little more than a year ago? Have you begun to consider the
cost of such technology? Do you plan to aggressively seek funding for
technological improvements?