[Senate Hearing 109-1102]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1102
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S AGE 60 RULE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 19, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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0SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
CONRAD BURNS, Montana, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona Virginia, Ranking
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA BOXER, California
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 19, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Pryor....................................... 15
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 2
Witnesses
Eichelkraut, Captain Joseph ``Ike'', President, Southwest
Airlines Pilots' Association................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Gibbons, Hon. Jim, U.S. Representative, 2nd District, Nevada..... 2
Hunter, Captain Ralph, President, Allied Pilots Association...... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma................ 3
Jordan, Jon L., M.D., J.D., Federal Air Surgeon, Office of
Aerospace Medicine, Federal Aviation Administration............ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Rayman, Russell B., M.D., Executive Director, Aerospace Medical
Association.................................................... 10
Spain, Captain Al, Senior Vice President, Operations, JetBlue
Airways Corporation............................................ 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Woerth, Captain Duane E., President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA)........................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Appendix
AARP, prepared statement......................................... 51
Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination (APAAD), prepared
statement...................................................... 45
Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared
statement...................................................... 45
Chapman, Thomas B., Legislative Counsel, Government Affairs,
Southwest Airlines Co., letter with attachment, dated July 27,
2005, to Hon. Conrad Burns..................................... 47
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division,
prepared statement............................................. 52
Mikelsons, George, Chairman, President and Chief Executive
Officer, ATA Holdings Corp., letter, dated July 19, 2005, to
Hon. Conrad Burns.............................................. 61
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gordon H. Smith
to:
Captain Joseph ``Ike'' Eichelkraut........................... 59
Captain Ralph Hunter......................................... 57
Captain Al Spain............................................. 60
Captain Duane E. Woerth...................................... 58
Yetman, Bert M., President, Professional Pilots Federation,
prepared statement............................................. 50
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION'S AGE 60 RULE
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building. Hon. Conrad Burns,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. We'll call the Committee to order, thank you
for coming today and thank you for joining us, and I welcome
the witnesses, I would hope that Senator Inhofe is on his way,
somewhere, if not, we'll let him make his statement when he
gets here.
We're conducting this hearing on the controversial FAA Age
60 Rule. It's our intention to re-visit this issue because of
substantial changes in the aviation industry and because of
financial struggles many of the carriers are going through.
Those struggles have adversely affected many of our pilots.
With tensions posing significant problems, it might be time to
take a serious look at altering that Rule.
Since 1960, Federal regulations have specified that
individuals age 60 and older may not serve as airline pilots on
any commercial flight operations. The FAA adopted what is
commonly referred to as the ``Age 60 Rule'' in 1959, because of
concerns that a hazard to safety was presented by aging pilots
in air carrier operations.
Over the years there have been several attempts to
challenge the Rule, but to date no pilot has ever been granted
an exemption, and no Federal court has ruled in favor of
changing the Rule. Based on this history, it is evident that
any change or modification to the Rule will likely require
Congressional action.
The Subcommittee is very much aware of the emotion attached
to the issue for many pilots. In light of the current financial
condition of the airlines and the continuing pension problems,
I think it is important that we revisit this issue.
On today's panel we will hear medical testimony along with
varied pilots' opinions and experience with the Rule. As with
any aviation issue, safety is of the utmost concern, it is with
this Senator anyway, but safety should also be based on facts,
and not arbitrary or subjective dynamics. I welcome the panels
and look forward to the testimony.
Congressman Gibbons from Nevada, thank you very much for
coming, and do you have an opening statement, Senator Stevens?
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. I think I have a conflict of interest.
Senator Burns. No comment. That's how you stay in good
stead with your Chairman.
Congressman Gibbons, I look forward to your testimony,
thank you for coming today, by the way.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM GIBBONS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE,
2ND DISTRICT, NEVADA
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Senator Burns, and Senator Stevens,
thank you for allowing me to be here to testify on an issue
that is very near and dear to my heart, and personally to
millions of current and future commercial airline pilots.
Mr. Chairman, I have worked as a commercial airline pilot
for 17 years, and recently I just reached the age of 60. While
this bill will not, and nor is it intended, to benefit me
personally, I am outraged by the blatant age discrimination
that continues to be perpetuated by this FAA Rule. Both the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the AARP agree that
the Age 60 Rule is a biased, unfair regulation that effectively
deprives the flying public of some of the best pilots that our
country has to offer.
Senator Inhofe and I have worked for several Congresses to
pass legislation that will extend the mandatory pilot
retirement age beyond 60. In the current Congress, our
legislation would repeal that rule and allow pilots to remain
in the cockpit until they reach the age at which they can
receive their full Social Security retirement benefits. This
comes down to a basic fairness issue.
Current FAA regulations require that commercial airline
pilots leave the cockpit 5 years before most are even eligible
to receive Social Security benefits. Now, these pilots are only
asking that they be able to continue to work in the field that
they have been trained for, and worked in their whole lives,
until they can get their Social Security benefits. I certainly
do not think that this is too much to ask. Especially since
there is absolutely no proof to show that a pilot is any less
capable at the age of 59 years, 364 days, than a pilot who is
60 years old.
The fact is, several studies have shown that older pilots
have better safety records than their younger colleagues, and
that pilots 60 years or older, tend to be healthier than their
cohorts in the population at large. In addition, 65 year old
pilots would still have to go through the same rigorous testing
and training that 25 year old pilots do. Now this includes
flight physicals twice a year, and EKG heart tests every year.
The Federal laws were not intended to micromanage what is the
responsibility of the airlines themselves. Unsafe pilots must
be detected and relieved of duty by the airline, no matter what
age, and safe pilots should be allowed to continue to fly,
period. That's the job of airlines.
Historically speaking, let's dispel the myth, right now,
that the Age 60 Rule was created to improve airline safety--it
wasn't. The FAA Age 60 Rule is an ancient relic of a bygone era
in which one airline in 1959, seeking relief from a labor
dispute, curried political favor and forced the implementation
of a rule which served to shove its older pilots out the door,
period.
It's time for this rule to be overturned, and for the
United States to provide the same opportunities as most
industrialized nations do. We can look overseas, Mr. Chairman,
and in the sky right above this very building, for proof that
the Rule is outdated and serves no safety purpose whatsoever.
Over 50 countries allow their commercial airline pilots to
fly past age 60, including Canada, Australia, Israel, Japan,
and 31 European countries as well. Furthermore, the FAA allows
these foreign pilots to fly into, and over the United States.
On top of that, the FAA's own pilots are allowed to fly past
their 60th birthday. If foreign and FAA pilots are good enough
to fly the friendly skies past their 60th birthday, then our
own commercial pilots should be able to do so as well.
In closing, I want to reiterate that this legislation, H.R.
65 and Senator Inhofe's legislative bill S. 65, do not in any
way require pilots to work past age 60 if they don't want. Nor
does it require airlines to rehire any pilot that has had to
retire already due to the Rule. Our bill simply brings fairness
to our pilots by closing the gap between their forced
retirement and their ability to collect Social Security. In a
time of failing pensions and soaring passenger numbers, we only
want to allow our pilots to provide for their families and to
retire with dignity.
Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the Ranking
Member as well, for allowing me to speak to your Committee on
this very important bill, it's my hope that we can repeal this
discriminatory age rule as soon as possible. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Congressman, we appreciate----
[Applause.]
Senator Burns. No, no, no, no, no. We don't allow outbursts
here at all, no matter what your leanings may be. But it's nice
to have you here, how's that. Your faces here tell us much more
than the noise that you make.
Unfortunately, Senator Rockefeller couldn't make it today,
he had some family business to take care of that was
unavoidable. He will submit a statement and then we'll go on
with the hearing, and I assume he will have some questions for
the witnesses today, and if he does, we will handle that in due
time.
Senator Inhofe, nice to have you.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Burns. You're welcome.
Senator Inhofe. Nice to be here with you, and I, let me,
first of all, thank both of you, both Chairman Stevens, and
Chairman Burns for being the original co-sponsors of this
legislation.
I was crossing things off as Jim Gibbons was making his
statement, so I've dramatically shortened what I was going to
say, but I think that, you know, if you look at it, my
preference would not just be 65 years old. I know people who
are old at age 50, and I know people who are good pilots well
past 70, I happen to be 70 years old today, I mean, now--not
today--I've been 70 years old for quite a while, and I, you
know, if you are taking the very stringent proficiency tests
and medical tests, there's no reason you can't continue to fly,
it is purely arbitrary, if you look at the different
organizations, the ICAO, I don't know whether you talked about
that or not, but the International Civil Aviation Organization
stated in a recent report that there is no medical evidence to
support an age restriction of the amount here. Only 25
countries have an age limit of 60 or less, the United States
and France are the only developed nations with limits this low,
and I don't think either of the Chairmen up there would like
that distinction of being the only country joining France in
their policies.
[Laughter.]
Senator Inhofe. The news is full of reports of airline
pension funds being terminated and turned over to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, I think the legislation
introduced by Congressman Gibbons and me will help alleviate
this burden on taxpayers and the airlines.
I want to also say that there are some organizations like
the AARP, you'd expect them to be supportive of this, they are
supportive of this, and they had quite a statement to make on
it. The--if you look back and see how this came about in the
first place, and why the ALPA right now is in support of it.
I've talked to a number of the officers in ALPA, they're
good people, they're my friends--I make it a point to be
friendly with the people I work with, and they are good.
Although, if you stop and think about the decision that they
made in opposing extending it to age 65--it was a political
decision. I mean, there are enough people who want the vertical
mobility that would bring them up to an age where they could
have a longer career. Now, I think as I recall, the margin was
very thin in terms of the pilots' unions in their opposition to
this, there are many pilots that are very much for it.
I guess the only other thing I would say is, when you look
at what has happened in the past, this Age 60 Rule came in
1959, I believe, wasn't it, Jim? At that time, the life
expectancy was 8 years younger than it is today. And if you're
going to go by that, and you go by every rule we have with
Social Security or any other program that's year to age--they
increase that age as time goes on, they haven't increased this
in almost 50 years.
And I would at last say, when I was involved in a rally
with Congressman Gibbons, I felt--you know, after all, they
have a lot more hours than he does--I found out he's got
19,000? Twenty two thousand, and I only have 11,000, so he has
twice as many hours as I do, but I've been flying, probably, a
few more years.
And I would say this----
Mr. Gibbons. I wasn't flying without a prop, by the way.
Senator Inhofe. Well, and I'll tell that story, then, I
think that's very significant.
At age 65 I was flying a twin--no, I was flying a single-
engine plane--down to Tinker Air Force Base when, not just the
propeller, Chairman Burns, came off, but the fly wheel and a
whole bunch of stuff. This was a four-passenger, single engine
airplane. Now, for those in the audience, and you folks
certainly are so knowledgeable in this, you realize if you take
300 pounds off of a single-engine airplane, and you're alone in
the airplane, that does something to the airplane.
First of all, I need to determine where the new stalling
speed was on that airplane. I found out it was not at 48 knots,
it was 120 knots. There's the bad news, the good news is, you
take the front end, a prop off of an airplane, you can coast a
long ways. So I did, and I was able to make it back to an
airport and make a landing--it wasn't pretty, but I'm here
today.
Now, I was 65 years old when that happened. My kids right
now are good pilots, I was their instructor, all four of them,
but I think with the lack of experience, I'm not sure that they
would have made it through an incident like that. There's
something good that can be said about experience. I had
occasion to fly an airplane around the world when I was over
the legal age that we have today for commercial pilots, and a
lot of things happened on that trip that I had to draw upon a
great deal of experience, so I just think that the arbitrary
age doesn't work, we have a lot of people who want to continue
to work, the three of us are working, the four of us are
working past that age, and I think that we should allow others
to pursue their profession in the same way. They're good
pilots, they're safe pilots and they've passed their tests.
Senator Burns. Congressman Gibbons, you mentioned countries
that allow over-60 pilots. Do they have a mandatory cap at some
point?
Mr. Gibbons. You know, I'm not sure.
Senator Burns. I'm just wondering.
Mr. Gibbons. I don't know, I couldn't answer that and tell
you with certainty, Senator, because I have not looked at that
myself.
Senator Burns. OK, all right. Mighty fine. Do you have
anything for this panel?
You're invited to sit up here and join us during this
hearing if you don't have other things to do. We have an
interesting line-up for our first panel will be Dr. Jon Jordan,
M.D. for Federal Flight Surgeon, Office of Aerospace Medicine,
Federal Aviation Administration up next, so you might want to
stick around, so you're invited to join us, and thank you for
your testimony today.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Not you Jim, you need to go pass that
Highway bill.
Mr. Gibbons. That's what I'm going to do.
Senator Burns.You might need something to land on. Anyway,
here we go, and we also have Dr. Russell Rayman. Dr. Rayman is
Executive Director, Aerospace Medical Association, with us
today, and we look forward to hearing their testimony. Dr.
Jordan and--that seat sets down a long time, doesn't it? Thank
you, gentlemen, for coming today, and we're looking forward to
your testimony, Dr. Jordan.
STATEMENT OF JON L. JORDAN, M.D., J.D., FEDERAL AIR
SURGEON, OFFICE OF AEROSPACE MEDICINE, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Jordan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the Subcommittee. I'm Jon L. Jordan, I'm the Federal Air
Surgeon for the Federal Aviation Administration. And I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the FAA's Age 60 Rule. I am accompanied today
by my colleague, Jim Ballough, who is the Director of FAA's
Flight Standard Service.
As you know, the Age 60 Rule provides that a pilot may not
engage in what are known as Part 121 operations if the pilot
has reached his or her 60th birthday. The Rule means that a
pilot who reaches age 60 must leave Part 121 operations, but it
does not mean that he or she can no longer play an important
role in aviation. Many pilots continue to work for Part 121
airlines in the screening, recruitment, and training of pilot
applicants, service flight engineers, or fly in non-Part 121
operations or become flight instructors. Or, fortunately for
us, the FAA, work as safety inspectors.
Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the Age 60
Rule several times to determine whether new and sufficient
evidence exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation.
In fact, our most recent empirical studies completed in 2004
shows some of the results, that there appears to be a
relationship between pilot age and accident rate. The
consistency of these findings across three recent empirical
studies, suggests that changes to the Age 60 Rule should be
approached cautiously.
I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety
rule, the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will
maintain or raise the current level of safety. What is clear to
us from reviewing public comments and relevant literature
concerning the Age 60 Rule is that there is no single right
answer. What is also clear is that the question for the FAA is
one of public safety, and determining acceptable risk. At this
time the FAA cannot be assured that changing the Age 60 Rule
will maintain or raise the level of safety.
At some age, every individual reaches a level of increased
infirmity, leading to decreased reliability. That age will vary
from person to person, but cannot yet be predicted in a
specific individual. While science does not absolutely dictate
the age of 60 for commercial pilot retirement, that age is
within the age range during which sharp increases in disease,
mortality, and morbidity occur.
Clearly, there is an anatomic, physiological, and cognitive
decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity and
onset among individuals. There is no absolute, scientific
formula that may be readily applied. But it's indisputable
that, as pilots, as people age, they experience more illnesses
and disorders, and suffer more cognitive decline.
Cardiovascular disease rises with age steeply, beginning
between ages 55 and 65, and while mortality has dropped since
1960, cardiovascular disease remains the most frequent cause of
death in pilots and the general population. With these
increased incidents of cardiovascular disease in the older
population, the risk for unexpected events that could be a
threat to safety of flight is increased. Cardiac events, such
as heart attacks and heart failure, for example, during flight,
have continued to occur in low, but fairly consistent numbers
over the years, and have caused general aviation accidents.
Other health conditions are known to increase in incidents,
or to become more complicated with aging. Many present greater
difficulties of detection and risk assessment than do
cardiovascular disease. Among these are cerebrovascular
disease, malignancies, endocrine dysfunction, neurological
disorder, psychiatric disorders, including depression, a
decline in sensory and motor capabilities. There has been an
increasing awareness of the more subtle, adverse conditions
affecting performance, such as those related to cognitive
functioning.
The Age 60 Rule has served well as a regulatory limit in
the U.S. In our view, it remains the best determination that
can be made of a time when a general decline in health-related
functions and overall cognitive capabilities has reached a
level where decrements in a pilot's performance may jeopardize
safety. Repeated reviews and studies have not provided
sufficient information that would address our concerns about
changing the Rule. In addition, several U.S. Courts of Appeals
have reviewed the Age 60 Rule, and studies related to the Rule.
Uniformly, these courts have denied petitioner's challenges.
Also, the FAA has invited the public to provide comments on the
viability of the Age 60 Rule. The most recent comment period
was opened in September of 2002, in relation to a petition for
exemption to the Rule filed by a coalition of U.S. pilots
approaching age 60.
Nearly 7,000 comments were submitted during the month-long
open comment period. Overwhelmingly, the comments favored
retaining the current Age 60 Rule. They cited safety and
medical issues most often as reasons for retention of the
current rule.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA develops regulations in the context
of what is best for public safety. The FAA's primary mission is
ensuring the safety of the National Airspace System. The FAA
establishes through our regulations, basic safety standards for
aircraft and crew members that would ensure the safety of our
traveling public. Modifying the longstanding baseline of age 60
in the U.S., requires that the public be shown how such
modification would maintain an equivalent level of safety. None
of the studies completed since implementation of the Rule
provide satisfactory data that conclusively supports changing
the Rule. Also, I should note that no medical protocols exist
to reliably predict when or whether an over-age 60 pilot might
experience a medical event that will jeopardize aviation
safety. In some, with inconclusive data, and no practical
experience with pilots above age 60, the FAA does not agree at
this time with efforts to modify the current age limit for
commercial airline pilots. That concludes my prepared remarks,
my colleague and I will be happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, Dr. Jordan, and I might
add that your complete statement, or any other information that
you want in the record, we'll be happy to include those
documents.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jordan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon L. Jordan, M.D., J.D., Federal Air Surgeon,
Office of Aerospace Medicine, Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Age 60
rule, which provides that a pilot may not engage in what are known as
Part 121 operations if the pilot has reached his 60th birthday. Part
121 covers operations of large commercial passenger aircraft, smaller
propeller aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats, and common carriage
operations of all-cargo aircraft with a payload capacity of 7,500
pounds. I am accompanied today by my colleague, Jim Ballough, Director
of FAA's Flight Standards Service.
The Age 60 rule represents the FAA's best determination of the time
when a general decline in health-related functions and overall
cognitive and performance capabilities may begin and reach a level
where a pilot's judgment and physical ability may begin to decline, and
therefore jeopardize safety. Our rule means that a pilot who reaches
age 60 must leave Part 121 operations, but it does not mean that he or
she can no longer play an important role in aviation. Many pilots
continue to work for Part 121 airlines in the screening, recruitment,
and training of pilot applicants, serve as flight engineers, or fly in
non-Part 121 operations, or become flight instructors, or, fortunately
for us, work as safety inspectors for the FAA.
Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the Age 60 rule
several times to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists
to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation. The FAA has also
successfully defended the Rule in several administrative and judicial
challenges.
FAA has conducted five studies on the relationship of pilot age to
accidents between 1999 and 2004. The first four studies were conducted
at the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which
requested in 1999 that the FAA study and provide data regarding
relative accident rates based on pilot age. The FAA's Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute (CAMI) conducted a four-part study. The four studies
were as follows: (1) an annotated bibliography of the scientific
literature (1990-1999); (2) a re-analysis of the Chicago Tribune study
data (1999) relating pilot age and accident rates; (3) an empirical
analysis of accident rates by pilot age for professional pilots holding
Air Transport Pilot (ATP) and Class 1 medical certificates between 1988
and 1997; and (4) an empirical analysis of accident rates by pilot age
for professional pilots holding ATP or Commercial Pilot and Class 1 or
Class 2 medical certificates between 1988 and 1997.
Certain aspects of the analytic methodology used in the third and
fourth studies were criticized in the open scientific literature. In
response, the first author for those studies, Dr. Dana Broach of CAMI,
re-analyzed the accident rate data. That study was published in 2004.
The 2004 study used more restrictive criteria to select which accidents
to include in the analysis than were used in the previous studies.
Taken together, the criteria resulted in an ``apples-to-apples''
comparison of accident rates for pilots age 60-63, and younger pilots
in that the accident and non-accident pilots had the same credentials,
worked for the same employers, and operated complex, multi-engine
commuter or larger aircraft now covered by Part 121. As in the previous
studies, the data were aggregated by age group (in five-year
increments) and year, and analyzed with the same statistical technique.
The results of the 2004 study were similar to those reported in the
third and fourth empirical studies previously reported to Congress.
Overall, accident rate increased with pilot age. The patterns of
findings across the three empirical studies are similar--there appears
to be a relationship between pilot age and accident rate. The
consistency of this finding across the three empirical studies suggests
that changes to the Age 60 rule should be approached cautiously.
I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety rule,
the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise
the current level of safety. What is clear to us from reviewing public
comments and relevant literature concerning the Age 60 rule is that
there is no single ``right answer.'' What is also clear is that the
question for the FAA is one of public safety and determining acceptable
risk. At this time, the FAA cannot be assured that changing the Age 60
rule will maintain or raise the level of safety.
At some age, every individual reaches a level of increased
infirmity leading to decreased reliability. That age will vary from
person to person but cannot yet be predicted in a specific individual.
While science does not absolutely dictate the age of 60 for commercial
passenger pilot retirement, that age is within the age range during
which sharp increases in disease mortality and morbidity occur.
Clearly, there is a progressive anatomic, physiological, and cognitive
decline associated with aging, albeit variable in severity and onset
among individuals. There is no absolute, scientific formula that may be
readily applied.
It is indisputable that, as people age, they experience more
illnesses and disorders, and suffer more cognitive decline.
Cardiovascular disease rises with age, steeply, beginning between ages
55 and 65, and, though mortality has dropped since 1960, cardiovascular
disease remains the most frequent cause of death in pilots and the
general population. With this increased incidence of cardiovascular
disease in the older population, the risk for unexpected events that
could be a threat to safety of flight is increased. Cardiac events
(e.g., heart attacks, heart failure) during flight have continued to
occur in low, but fairly consistent numbers over the years, and have
caused general aviation accidents.
Other health conditions are known to increase in incidence or to
become more complicated with aging. Many present greater difficulties
of detection and risk assessment than do cardiovascular disease. Among
these are cerebrovascular disease; malignancies; endocrine dysfunction;
neurological disorders; psychiatric disorders, including depression;
and decline in sensory and motor capabilities. There has been an
increasing awareness of the more subtle adverse conditions affecting
performance, such as those related to cognitive functioning.
The ``Age 60 rule'' has served well as a regulatory limit in the
United States. It remains the best determination that can be made of
the time when a general decline in health-related functions and overall
cognitive capabilities has reached a level where decrements in a
pilot's performance may jeopardize safety. The ``Age 60 rule'' has been
repeatedly reviewed to determine whether new and sufficient evidence
exists to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation. Studies
conducted to date do not present sufficient information that would
address concerns about negatively impacting the current level of safety
by changing the Rule.
The FAA has invited the public to provide comments on the viability
of the ``Age 60 rule.'' The most recent comment period was opened in
September 2002, in relation to a petition for exemption to the Rule
filed by a coalition of U.S. pilots approaching age 60. Nearly 7,000
comments were submitted during the month-long open comment period.
Overwhelmingly, the comments favored retaining the current ``Age 60
rule.'' They cited safety and medical issues most often as reasons for
retention of the current rule.
Several U.S. courts of appeals have reviewed the ``Age 60 rule,''
and studies related to the Rule. Uniformly, these courts have denied
petitioners' requests for relief from the Rule. In September 2004, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to
review FAA's denial of a petition for exemptions from the Rule. In May
2005, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear arguments on the same
matter.
In recent years, several bills to revise the age limit for airliner
pilots have been introduced. In February 2001, a bill to modify the
``Age 60 rule'' by increasing the age limit to age 65, was referred to
the House Subcommittee on Aviation. In March 2001, a bill to modify the
``Age 60 rule'' to age 63 was favorably reported by this committee.
Neither bill was ultimately enacted. Most recently, legislation was
proposed earlier this year that would tie an age limit for air carrier
pilots to Social Security retirement-age eligibility.
Modifying the long-standing baseline of age 60 in the U.S. requires
that the public be shown how such modification would maintain an
equivalent level of safety. The ``Age 60 rule'' is a long-standing
operational rule that pre-dates subsequent studies completed over the
years. None of the studies completed since implementation of the Rule
provide satisfactory data that conclusively supports changing the Rule.
No protocols exist to reliably predict when or whether an over-age-60
pilot might experience a medical event that could jeopardize aviation
safety. With inconclusive data and no practical experience with pilots
above age 60, the FAA does not agree, at this time, to modify the
current age limit for airliner pilots.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context of
what is best for public safety. The FAA's primary mission is ensuring
the safety of the National Airspace System. We work hard to manage a
growth oriented aviation system--and the constraints on the system that
growth imposes--in the most efficient and safe way possible. The FAA
establishes, through our regulations, basic safety standards for
aircraft and crewmembers that will ensure the safety of our traveling
public. We construct our regulations very carefully, taking into
account as many factors as we can, but ultimately, always making the
decision that will best enhance aviation safety. While economic factors
are certainly a part of that calculation, I am sure the Committee and
our colleagues in industry would agree that safety must be the top
priority.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any
questions the Committee may have.
Senator Burns. Dr. Rayman?
STATEMENT OF RUSSELL B. RAYMAN, M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AEROSPACE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
Dr. Rayman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Aerospace Medical Association appreciates the
opportunity to submit this statement to the U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Aviation
Subcommittee on the important issue of the Age 60 Rule for air
transport pilots.
I am Dr. Russell B. Rayman, Executive Director of the
Aerospace Medical Association, representing approximately 3,100
physicians, scientists, and flight nurses engaged in the
practice of aerospace medicine, or related research.
The Age 60 Rule implemented by the Federal Aviation
Administration in 1959, does not allow persons engaged in
operations conducted under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations to serve as a pilot or co-pilot on reaching their
60th birthday. The rule was implemented under the premise that
the risk of incapacitation, due to medical causes after 60
years of age, was unacceptably high.
Is there evidence that this is true for air transport
pilots? And is there evidence that aging causes a significant
performance decrement in the cockpit? Unfortunately, there is
no clear answer to either of these questions. The reason being,
that there are no studies of air transport pilots who are
beyond 60 years of age, simply because none have ever been
certified by the FAA.
To answer these questions with reasonable certitude, it
would be necessary to study a cohort of air transport pilots
who are over age 60 and to compare them with a cohort of air
transport pilots below age 60. Since this cannot be done today,
the only alternative is to study cohorts of general aviation
and commercial pilots, both categories having no age limits.
And, indeed, a number of such studies have been accomplished
and published in the literature. However, the conclusions of
these studies are vexing in their inconsistencies and
contradictions. Hence, they do not provide convincing evidence
to support, or refute, the Age 60 Rule.
In any event, the validity of these studies comes into
question if we attempt to extrapolate the findings derived from
general aviation and commercial pilots to air transport pilots,
because of significant differences in aircraft and operations.
This represents a significant flaw.
We believe, the Aerospace Medical Association, believes
that some pilots beyond age 60 could continue to fly without an
added risk to flying safety. The challenge is to determine
which ones could be safely certified and which ones should be
retired. To resolve this dichotomy, studies would have to be
designed to determine if, and what, medical tests might be
added to the current FAA flight medical examination as a means
of monitoring the health of the older pilot. Additional studies
would also be needed to determine how older pilots might be
tested for significant performance decrement in the cockpit.
Such a study would be daunting in terms of scientific design
and costs, and most likely would take years to accomplish. In
the meanwhile, we would suggest that selected pilots be
certified to an arbitrary age beyond age 60, and closely
monitored.
Although medical sudden incapacitation is always a
possibility--and I might add, at any age--we believe there's a
vanishingly small risk. Even if there were such an occurrence,
there is always a second pilot in the cockpit. It might also be
added that there has never been a U.S. air carrier accident due
to medical causes. And finally, there are about 30 countries,
and that number--I might add--is probably low, that permit air
transport pilots to fly beyond age 60, and to our knowledge,
there has been no adverse affect upon flying safety.
In conclusion, on review of the existing evidence, the
Aerospace Medical Association concludes there is insufficient
medical evidence to support restriction of pilot certification
based on age alone. Although studies could be designed to
determine which pilots could be certified to safely fly beyond
age 60, they would be difficult to design, and would be costly.
In the meanwhile, we would recommend that selected pilots be
certified to fly beyond age 60, and closely monitored.
Thank you, sir.
Senator Burns. Thank you. Dr. Jordan, we've made
significant gains both medically and technologically over the
last few years, I was just looking at some figures the other
day of just 100 years ago, life expectancy was 47 years old.
And, of course, that has steadily increased, I think, ever
since, let's say, World War I. And there's a growing trend
among foreign aviation authorities, of course, and we heard the
testimony from Representative Gibbons that they fly over the
age of 60, and I'm wondering, have we looked at their records
and made any comparisons? We know that over 60 will not, maybe
it will not increase our level of safety, but does it decrease
according to European records, or those other countries, that
allow pilots to fly over 60 years old?
Dr. Jordan. Sir, I don't know of any studies that have been
conducted using the data that might have been developed by the
foreign carriers that do permit pilots to fly over age 60, I
think it's mainly anecdotal and observational in nature, and
not specific. It won't really provide a scientific basis, I
think, for concluding that allowing pilots to fly over age 60
is appropriate.
Senator Burns. Does the FAA grant waivers to pilots of
foreign carriers who are over 60?
Dr. Jordan. Yes, that's correct.
Senator Burns. If so, why do you accommodate foreign
pilots, but the FAA has never granted an exemption to a U.S.
pilot?
Dr. Jordan. It's a matter of international concern, and
international law, sir. And our current process in terms of
dealing with pilots flying into the U.S. who are over age 60,
is that according to ICAO rules, a pilot-in-command must be
under age 60, but the first officer, for example, can be over
age 60, or age 65. Because we follow ICAO rules, we do not
permit the pilot-in-command to fly over age 60, but we do
permit the first officer to fly over age 60. The first officer
would not be in accordance with our rules.
Senator Burns. Senator Stevens, you have a question?
Senator Stevens. I'm a little disturbed by that last
comment, I didn't understand, Dr. Jordan--you let the first
pilot come in if he's over 65, but you don't let a co-pilot
come in if he's over 65?
Dr. Jordan. Well, the current ICAO rule provides that the
pilot-in-command must be under age 60. It's a recommended
practice that the first officer be under age 60, and because
it's a recommended practice, the Agency does permit pilots to
come into the country who are over age 60, but the pilot-in-
command has to be under age 60, it's enforced by the Agency.
Senator Stevens. You do the same thing for Britain?
Dr. Jordan. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Is there any country that has an age limit
that you do not accept?
Dr. Jordan. Would you repeat that, Senator?
Senator Stevens. Is there any country that has an age
limit, I take it would be over 65, that you do not accept? Are
there any in civil aviation that are over 65?
Dr. Jordan. Well, the rules would apply equally no matter
who the carrier flies for, the company that they fly for. It's
going to be applied evenly across the board.
Senator Stevens. Did I hear you express reservation about
those who are over 60 having qualifications to fly?
Dr. Jordan. The Age 60 Rule is a somewhat arbitrary or
discretionary rule, and I think there are those individuals
that are probably OK, the problem is in determining who is, and
who is not, all right for flying over age 60.
Senator Stevens. I'm 82 this year, I think I'm in better
shape than I was when I was 60. I can run faster, play better
tennis, swim better, I'm in better shape, 25 pounds less--
aren't the factors that you're talking about related to overall
health, rather than age?
Dr. Jordan. It would be preferable to do that, but I know
of no protocol that could be used to make those kinds of
distinctions.
Senator Stevens. But what I'm saying is those who you're
talking about in terms of being questionable, over 60, don't
they have other health factors, other than age, that would lead
them to be disqualified?
Dr. Jordan. I'm not sure I follow the question, Senator,
could you rephrase that?
Senator Stevens. You're questioning anyone that's over 60
being healthy enough to fly, aren't you?
Dr. Jordan. I'm still having a little trouble
understanding, you said people over age 60 are healthy enough
to fly?
Senator Stevens. My understanding of what you've testified
is that those over the age of 60 have some question as to
whether they should be allowed to fly, am I misunderstanding
you?
Dr. Jordan. No, I think that's correct, I think anyone over
age 60--the problem is we don't, we're unable to sort out those
who might be healthy enough to fly from those who are not.
Senator Stevens. And my question to you is, is that age-
related, or just health-related, over 60?
Dr. Jordan. Well, it's the Age 60 Rule, so it's age-
related?
Senator Stevens. I'm asking you as a doctor, forget about
the Rule. People over 60--are you saying that they tend to be
unhealthy, so that they shouldn't be able to fly as a
commercial pilot?
Dr. Jordan. I think the problem is knowing who can and who
should not fly over age 60.
Senator Stevens. It seems to me what you're saying is the
rule is the rule and you're going to support the Rule, I'm
asking you as a doctor whether you agree with that rule?
Dr. Jordan. I believe that there has to be some arbitrary
age limit for pilots. Whether or not it be age 60, or 63, or
65, or 55, I think is a matter of discretion.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
Senator Burns. I have one question for Dr. Rayman--are
there other experts in the medical and scientific field--I
guess this the question--that share your views on the Age 60
Rule? And have there been no independent studies or analysis to
refute the FAA's justification for keeping this rule?
Dr. Rayman. Well, as I said, sir, the studies that have
been published were dealing with pilots that are not air
transport pilots, and we consider that a flaw. But, the
Association, which I represent, takes a stand that the age for
air transport pilots could be raised to another arbitrary age
above age 60. That is the official position of our
organization.
Senator Burns. Would you suggest that--and I would ask
that, if the Rule was removed--would you suggest a physical
twice a year, rather than the once a year that's required now?
Dr. Rayman. I think if the Rule was removed, it would
probably be an operational decision and not a medical decision,
but we would be very willing to work with whatever body that
deliberates this issue to determine if more medical tests
should be added--perhaps some should--some countries don't add
any tests, they just increase the maximum age to 65 and require
no further exams, other than the routine exam. We'd be willing
to work with any deliberative body to determine if we ought to
add more tests to--medical tests, that is--or tests of
cognition, or tests of motor function. I haven't a prepared
answer for you on this which tests should be selected, if any,
but there's a possibility that we would recommend no further
testing.
Senator Burns. I find it odd that if other countries allow
their pilots to fly over the age of 60 that there isn't some
sort of a record--not only with their health, but their safety
record--as compared, say, to people that are flying between 55
and the age of 60.
Dr. Rayman. Well, as you've heard Senator, there are a
number of pilots flying for other airlines, but I have seen
nothing published regarding a study of their health status, or
how well they fared. I do know I've seen no studies or no
reports that indicate that these older pilots are unsafe.
Senator Burns. Dr. Jordan, are there age restrictions on
any other modes of transportation?
Dr. Jordan. Not that I'm aware of, sir, no.
Senator Burns. Have you got another question? Ask your
question, Senator.
Senator Stevens. Well, let me--both Dr. Jordan and Dr.
Rayman, here's my problem--I come from a state where there are
very few buses and roads. Over 75 percent of our towns, cities
and villages can be reached only by air. We have Part 121
planes, they are subject to the Age 60 Rule, Part 135 is not.
There's no limit at all on being a commercial pilot in Part
135. Now, they're flying to the same places, along comes the
FAA and says, ``We want you to help us transition the Part 135s
into Part 121s because they're safer. They're safer to fly,
Part 121s.'' And we're doing that, the Postal Service asked us
to do that. Ten thousand pilots in my state, there are 750 of
them that are truly commercial in the sense of being multi-
engine commercial operators. Fifty percent of them are over
55--fifty percent of all pilots in Alaska are over 55. Now, the
bulk of the aircraft are owned by people doing some type of
commercial work. I don't understand a Rule that says, pretty
soon we're not going to have enough pilots to fly our planes.
And I'm trying to find out what the justification is for the
FAA to keep this rule on us, at the same time as they're
telling us, ``Try to move your people out of the Part 135
operations into Part 121.''
Now, have you ever done any studies of those people that
are flying the Part 135s that are over-age, and determined
whether their accident records were related to age or either
medical conditions?
Dr. Jordan. Yes, sir, several studies have been done, the
results of those studies are somewhat conflicting. Studies done
by Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, would
tend to indicate that the accident rate does increase in those
operations, based upon age. There is at least one outside study
that I'm aware of that would tend to indicate that the accident
rate does not increase with age for those pilots. Those studies
vary, because the cohorts that are used in determining how the
research should proceed, factors related to what licenses the
airmen hold, what classes of medical certificates, and
precisely what operations they're involved in. And I think that
has led to a great deal of confusion in terms of whether there
is an increase in accidents in that population. I think overall
that there probably is.
Senator Stevens. The Part 135 pilots and Part 121 pilots
take the same physical, for commercial operations.
Dr. Jordan. Yes, they do, but they're involved in different
operations.
Senator Stevens. That's my point, too, the aircrafts in
Part 135 may not be as safe and as modern as the Part 121s are,
and we're trying to transition there, but as we transition
there, we've got a 60 year age limit. We're going to lose 50
percent of our pilots because they're over 55 within 5 years. I
think this bill means a great deal more to my state than anyone
else.
What would it take to get some type of studies that you all
would rely on in terms of determining whether this rule makes
total sense from a medical point of view?
Dr. Jordan. Over the years a number of studies have been
done, but they don't seem to provide us the answers we need to
make those changes.
Senator Stevens. Well, what are the questions you don't
have the answers to?
Dr. Jordan. Well, the questions that we don't have the
answers to are in relationship to accidents, I think in those
particular operations, the Part 121 operations, and this is
largely an outgrowth of the Rule itself, because we don't
permit individuals to fly those operations after age 60. So
those, you have to use surrogate data, which are data from air
taxi operations, private operations, those data have been used
in the past, and unfortunately, by-and-large, most of those
studies indicated that accidents do increase with age. And age
60 seems to be the break-point.
Senator Stevens. Then why don't you apply it to Part 135
planes that carry people commercially?
Dr. Jordan. We do apply it to Part, well, Part 135
operations being operated under Part 121 rules, which include
aircraft of ten or more seats, all of those operations fly
under Part 121 rules and are subjected to the Age 60 Rule. But
the smaller operations, the age limits do not apply. And I
think it's a matter of where you draw the line.
Senator Stevens. More than nine seats, you mean?
Dr. Jordan. Yes.
Senator Stevens. Well, no offense, but this is a
conundrum--10 years ago, or even longer--I remember sitting at
the table with Barry Goldwater, a similar hearing back when he
was here that, what, didn't have the pressure on us now,
Alaska, that it does now, because our pilots are aging, and
they're not coming up to fly the way they used to in terms of
younger pilots coming into Alaska for these operations. I think
something has to be done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Burns. Dr. Rayman, we've been joined with Senator
Pryor in the Committee, Senator Pryor, do you have a question
for this panel, these are the physicians that are in charge,
Aerospace Medicine for the Federal Aviation Administration, do
you have any questions for these folks?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS
Senator Pryor. I do, Mr. Chairman, if they've answered your
questions.
Senator Burns. And if you have a statement, I'd sure put it
in the record for you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you, I don't have a statement.
Senator Burns. You have the floor.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
I'm sorry I was late joining this meeting, Mr. Chairman,
and the panel, but let me just say this, and maybe this is what
Senator Stevens was referring to as well. The 60 year rule in
my view, has a degree, at least, of arbitrariness to it. Can
you all walk through with me, if possible, what is so magic
about age 60? If I could just--
Dr. Jordan. Well, sir, I don't think that there is magic to
age 60, I think it is an age at which individuals appear to be
developing more frequently, the medical problems that could
cause sudden, or even subtle incapacitation, a deterioration in
cognitive performance that may become problematic from a safety
perspective, but there is a certain amount of arbitrariness or
discretion related to age 60, as I mentioned in earlier
testimony, some individuals deteriorate in terms of performance
and develop medical problems well before age 60, but it seems
like it is a logical point at which, with the discretionary
approach that you would say that an individual should no longer
serve in the highly safety-sensitive responsibilities,
particularly in the piloting of aircraft.
Senator Pryor. Do you all have anything to add to that? Do
you have anything to add to that?
Dr. Rayman. In a word, I would say that any age that we
select today is arbitrary. You won't find any studies that will
convince everybody what the proper age should be. If you really
want to find out the proper age, you have to do a whole bunch
of studies, and these studies would take years to do and would
cost a lot of money, and would be very difficult to design. In
the meanwhile, we would suggest that pilots, once they reach
the age of 60, be permitted to continue flying beyond age 60,
albeit it would be another arbitrary age, whichever one is
selected, whether it's sixty-three, four, five, or whatever. We
feel that there's very little risk in taking this course of
action, and these older pilots could be monitored for some
period of time, and if we do, indeed, find that there are no
safety problems, then more and more pilots could be added on,
beyond age 60, and perhaps the arbitrary age could even be
lifted even higher.
Senator Pryor. And I guess what both of you are saying is
that it really is an individual test in a sense that for some
people, 60 is not as old as it is for other people in terms of
physical abilities and mental abilities, et cetera, I mean,
that's what my life experience tells me, anyway.
Let me ask you both about the International Civil Aviation
Organization, I think they call that ICAO? Is that the acronym,
is ICAO, which is spelled I-C-A-O, but nevertheless, they
looked at the age 60 matter in December of this past year, and
they recommended proposing a change in the current standards
that would raise the age limit for pilots to 65 in multi-crew
situations, are you familiar with this, Senator Stevens?
Senator Stevens. That is the European rule.
Senator Pryor. Yes, 65 in multi-crew situations, with a
second pilot age 60 or under, I guess, under age 60, and in
addition, those over 60 would require medical assessment every
6 months, which I assume is more frequently, probably they
would do an annual exam now, I would guess, and they'd
recommend if you're over 60 that you do it every 6 months.
Dr. Jordan. Currently in the U.S., pilots are, in air
carrier operations, there's a pilot-in-command, who must be
examined at 6 month intervals.
Senator Pryor. Six months, now, in the U.S., for a pilot-
in-command.
Dr. Jordan. That's correct.
Senator Pryor. OK, and so, Mr. Jordan if I can, what are
your opinions of the ICAO recommendations?
Dr. Jordan. Well, you know, I think it's the selection of a
different, somewhat arbitrary age limit for certain pilots in
the cockpit, and I think that ICAO, and actually what's being
proposed by ICAO mirrors what's going on, I think, with the
Joint Aviation Authority in the European countries. Because
those countries, or at least some of those countries, have gone
to age 65, but again, that's arbitrarily selected. And without
good, scientific foundation, I think that, perhaps, ICAO and
the European countries are hedging their bets, so to speak, by
requiring the other pilot in the operation be under age 60, so
they're very tentatively, I think, changing the position on age
60. I do need to point out that ICAO has not yet adopted this
rule.
Senator Pryor. Right, that's a recommendation that they've
received. Right.
Dr. Rayman, do you have a comment on the ICAO approach?
Dr. Rayman. We would be in favor of it.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask this, too, and this will be the
last question, is--just medically speaking--the fact that life
expectancy is growing, people are living longer, more active
longer, on average, does that factor in and of itself, does
that mean that we should examine the Age 60 Rule? Should we
consider, as life expectancy grows, that we maybe should go to
62 or 65, I mean, is that--or does that matter at all? Does
life expectancy have a bearing on this?
Dr. Jordan. Well, you know, I think life expectancy, of
course, increased life expectancy that we're experiencing, at
least in the United States and other developed countries, is
very encouraging for all of us, but we still have to contend
with diseases that occur at earlier ages, and cardiovascular
disease, neurological disorders, psychiatric disorders,
cognitive performance is also problematic as an individual
ages. Those things have really not changed. What has changed, I
think is the delivery of healthcare in advanced nations, more
methodologies for treatment of various conditions, whether
surgical, medicinal, or otherwise, and I think that has
contributed substantially to prolonging the life of people in
developed countries.
Senator Pryor. So, I guess what you're saying is, the fact
that people are living longer, doesn't necessarily mean they're
more capable of flying aircraft beyond age 60?
Dr. Jordan. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Pryor. Dr. Rayman?
Dr. Rayman. Well, I would agree with what you just said,
certainly people are living longer, but as I said in my
testimony, some individuals, pilots, could fly safely--we
believe--beyond age 60, and some probably should be retired,
and the challenge is to determine which ones are which, and
that's our great challenge.
Senator Pryor. Right.
Mr. Chairman, that's all I have, thank you.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much. I was just reminded
here, Senator Stevens, as a reminder, controllers have an age
limit of 56, is that correct, Dr. Jordan?
Dr. Jordan. That's correct, currently, yes.
Senator Burns. Now, they have been granted waivers after
extensive physical and psychological tests, is that correct?
Dr. Jordan. Not so much medical or psychological testing,
no, I think they've been granted waivers based upon
performance, and observations of performance, those controllers
that are able to work very busy sectors and seem to do so
proficiently, those controllers who are not out sick
frequently, those controllers who are not problem employees, so
there are a lot of criteria that are being used to grant those
exceptions, but they are not medically based.
Senator Burns. Thank you, that's sort of interesting, and I
think it sort of lends to the statement of Senator Stevens as
maybe they should base, if they fly over 60, it should be based
on the health of the pilot, rather than on the age. It would
seem like that would lend a pretty strong support to his
statement.
Dr. Jordan. Again, I don't think those decisions are
currently based, except in a peripheral way, on the medical
status of the individual, or----
Senator Burns. But the same could be said about the
proficiency of the pilot, the individual pilot may be a check
ride, or whatever, we could make those determinations, or
whatever. So, I have no other questions for this panel, I want
to thank you for your testimony, though, it's important that we
have it, and I would imagine there will be questions from other
members of this committee, if they're submitted, could you
respond to the Committee and to the individual Senator? We
thank you today.
Our second panel is Captain Duane Woerth, President, Air
Line Pilots Association International, Captain Joseph
Eichelkraut, President, Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association,
Captain Ralph Hunter, President of Allied Pilots Association,
and Captain Al Spain, Senior Vice President of Operations,
JetBlue Airways Corporation. So, we welcome you gentlemen to
the Committee today, and we look forward to having your
testimony and respond to our questions.
I first call on a familiar face, he's been before this
committee before, and I thank him for coming, Captain Duane
Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International. Thank you for coming.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT,
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL (ALPA)
Mr. Woerth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Duane
Woerth, I am the President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International and our union is the largest pilot union in the
world, it represents more than 64,000 airline pilots of 41
carriers, and it's an honor to be before your committee today
to address this Rule.
The Federal Regulation that restricts airline pilots from
flying as captains and first officers in Part 121 operations is
one of the most historically contentious issues inside the
pilot community. For every strongly held opinion that this rule
must be changed, there is an equally strong opinion that it
remains the same.
As many of you already know, our Association recently
completed the most comprehensive information campaign and
member survey that our union has ever concluded on a single
issue and, by the way Mr. Chairman, I have copies of all of the
information and the survey, if you'd like copies of that I
would submit it for the record if any Senator wants that.
The results of that survey were presented to the leaders of
our 41 pilot groups known as our Executive Board for
discussion, and their discussion led to the unanimous vote to
simply accept the reported results. No matter their personal
views on the issue or the views within the pilot community, the
ALPA Executive Board agreed that the information campaign had
been exhaustive and balanced, that the members understood the
issues at stake, and that the survey results were clear and
accurate. While the survey confirmed that our membership is
split--I will emphasize that, we have a split membership on
this issue--a clear majority did manifest itself. Therefore,
the Air Line Pilots Association, today, remains opposed to
changing the Age 60 Rule.
So, what exactly did our pilots tell us? Let me share just
a few of the statistic nuggets gleaned from the survey, which
has less than a 1-percent margin of error. When asked in a
straightforward ``yes or no'' format, 56 percent of ALPA pilots
opposed changing the Rule, 42 percent want to change it. When
we asked pilots specifically about changing the age to 65,
support for maintaining the current rule actually rose to 58
percent, and support dropped to 39 percent. When asked about
the support for additional operational or medical requirements,
should the Rule be changed, results indicate the opposite,
rather the opposition to the Rule would actually grow into the
mid-sixties. Only 29 percent support additional or more
stringent medical exams, and a mere 23 percent support more
line or simulator checks. And only 22 percent support
additional operational restrictions, should the Age 60 Rule
change.
In a separate survey we conducted earlier in the year, on
priorities for ALPA, we asked pilots to rank legislative issues
in order of importance, as you said Mr. Chairman, we've been
before your committee for many issues. At the top of the list
were issues the pilots wanted us to fight strongest against--
opposing foreign sabotage, passing pension legislation,
restricting foreign ownership, and promoting general aviation
issues.
The bottom of the list was changing the Age 60 Rule, second
from the bottom was keeping it the same. After all that our
pilots have been through--terrorism, bankruptcy, furloughs, pay
cuts, work world changes--a majority, a small majority, still
believes that this rule works.
If you had asked me one year ago to predict what I would be
saying today, I would have predicted that a majority of ALPA
members would have moved to the other side. That's why, one of
the reasons, we went through all this elaborate survey, because
we felt with the terrible loss of pension benefits--and many of
the pilots in this room today have lost their pensions--with
all of the deep pay cuts we have suffered, I was convinced that
the membership was probably going to vote the other way. As it
turns out--we did not, incidentally, include our furloughed
pilots--5,000 furloughed pilots--who might have been expected
to vote strongly to keep the Rule--we didn't do that, but in
spite of that there was a majority who want to keep the Rule.
In my formal testimony, I have included a litany of medical
studies, court decisions, and previous Congressional actions to
build a strong case for keeping the Rule. I will not elaborate
on them here today, but I think much of what has been said
holds true. There are a lot of pilots who would like a separate
physical for them that would make that test. Today the FAA says
they can't do it, or they haven't done it, or it's too costly.
Furthermore, no safety rule operates in a vacuum, or is
isolated from the rest of the world's operating environment we
face in the first years of the 21st century--mind-numbing pilot
fatigue, and the mental errors it leads to are still one of the
largest threats to aviation safety. Sixteen hour domestic duty
days--even longer with trans-Pacific operations are facts of
life for airline pilots. Irregular shifts, all-night
operations, and significant circadian-living challenges all
contribute to pilot fatigue.
Airline piloting is an occupation that is physically
punishing. A significant percentage of airline pilots do not
make it now to age 60. I'd like to cite a Northwest Airlines
example you often meet in the World Club as we head out to
Minneapolis and Montana--that's my alma mater, by the way--and
43 percent, we've been doing a check of every single pilot
who's retired from Northwest Airlines since 1993. Forty-three
percent of the pilots retired do not retire at 60, they retire
before 60, either with disabilities, or voluntarily early.
Now, with all of the contract award concessions that have
occurred since September 11, especially at our legacy airlines,
a higher percentage of pilots are flying more hours, working
more days, with longer duty periods than any other time in
recent history. Nonetheless, some air carriers want to increase
pilot flight and duty time limitations. At least one air
carrier who advocates changing the Age 60 Rule, wants this
pilot to fly from the East Coast to the West Coast and back,
all within one duty period. Now, current safety rules would
have to be waived to permit this. I think airline managements
who advocate changing the Age 60 Rule should put all of their
cards on the table, and tell us what other safety regulations
they'd like to change, since we're not going to do this in a
vacuum.
Now, no matter what this committee or the full Senate may
decide to do with the Age 60 Rule, the current flight and duty
time rules affecting pilot fatigue need to be enhanced, not
weakened. Mr. Chairman, I believe this issue of pilot fatigue
is one of those issues that your committee might want to tackle
this year.
As to international standards as to the Age 60 Rule--there
are some who cherry-pick the facts and point to several, or
many, European nations that have carved out exceptions to
ICAO's age 60 standards. The fact remains that the most
retirement ages in Europe are governed by contractual language
between airlines and pilots' unions. The regulatory standard in
France and Italy remains at 60, the Dutch airline, KLM, pilots
have negotiated a retirement age of 56, at British Airways,
that age is 55.
Let's be clear about this--the state licensing standard has
been raised to 65 throughout almost all of Europe. However, the
overwhelming majority of airline pilots within Europe still
retired before 60, I think that explains some of the questions
you had that were kind of self-evident, why aren't there a lot
of pilots--most pilots still retire under contracts below 60,
even though the licensing standard has been changed as you've
noted, and others have noted, to 65 within Europe.
At any rate, you invited me to hear data to offer the
pilots profession's perspective on the Age 60 Rule. As is done
with any transparent, representative organization should do
when faced with a very controversial issue--and believe me,
this is as controversial as it gets inside our union. We've
learned about it, we've talked about it, we've asked our
members, recorded from this fine profession what they believe,
the results are in, and we do have a majority--although a small
majority--who still want to maintain the Rule. Thank you for
inviting me to this committee's hearing.
[The prepared statement of Captain Woerth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Duane E. Woerth, President,
Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA)
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am
Duane Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA). Our union--the largest pilot union in the world--
represents more than 64,000 airline pilots at 41 carriers. On behalf of
ALPA, I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Committee today
to present ALPA's views on the mandatory retirement age for airline
pilots as specified under the FAA regulation commonly known as the
``Age 60 Rule.''
The Federal regulation that restricts airline pilots from flying as
captains and first officers in Part 121 operations is one of the most
historically contentious issues among the pilot community. For every
strongly held opinion that this rule must be changed, an equally strong
opinion holds that it remain the same. As many of you already know, our
Association recently completed the most comprehensive information
campaign and member survey that our union has ever conducted on a
single issue. The results of that survey were presented for discussion
to our Executive Board, which is made up of the leaders of our 41 pilot
groups.
Their discussion led to a unanimous vote to accept the reported
results, leaving our policy on the Rule intact. No matter their
personal views on the issue, or the views within their own pilot
communities, the ALPA Executive Board agreed that the information
campaign had been exhaustive and balanced, that our members understood
the issues at stake, and that the survey results were clear and
accurate. Their unanimity makes it possible for me to state for the
record today that the Air Line Pilots Association opposes changing the
Age 60 Rule, as we have since 1980.
Results of the ALPA Age 60 Survey
Since September 2004, when we began this initiative, our members
have considered the issue from many angles, weighed the evidence, and
expressed their views on the Age 60 Rule candidly and forthrightly. The
assessment of ALPA members' views is based on two studies with
identical questionnaires. The first was a telephone poll conducted from
March 30 through April 4. The second was a web-based survey conducted
from April 4 through April 29, 2005. Taken together, the telephone poll
data and the two sets of demographically stratified web survey data
provide extremely accurate results, with a raw sample margin of error
of less than 1 percent, and less than 0.5 percent with sample
stratification. We specifically excluded polling our roughly 5,000
furloughed pilots, who would presumably be the strongest supporters of
keeping the Rule in place.
The results of the survey show that a majority of ALPA pilots favor
maintaining the Age 60 Rule. Consider the following statistics from the
survey:
When asked in a straight-forward yes or no format, ``Do you
favor changing the FAA Age 60 Rule?'' 56 percent of ALPA pilots
support maintaining the current rule; 42 percent want it to
change.
When we asked pilots specifically about changing the Rule to
age 65, support for maintaining the current rule rose to 58
percent and support for change dropped to 39 percent.
The more specific we got, the fewer pilots supported change.
When given a series of options and asked which they would most
support, 54 percent support the current rule, while only 10
percent support increasing the age limit to 62, and only 22
percent support increasing it to 65. Further, fewer than 10
percent support the option of changing the Rule to one that
measures physical ability and health on an individual basis,
regardless of age. And, fewer than 5 percent support increasing
the age limit to higher than age 65 (2 percent), or lifting the
age limit completely (3 percent).
Several collateral findings indicate that the majority who oppose a
change in the Age 60 Rule could grow even larger--into the low-to-mid-
60 percent range or higher--depending on the specifics of any
requirements and/or restrictions that might be proposed. We asked
pilots whether they support additional operational and/or medical
requirements if the Rule is changed. Only 29 percent support additional
medical exams, a mere 23 percent support more line/simulator checks,
and only 22 percent support additional operational restrictions if the
Age 60 regulation is changed.
These results reflect the pilot profession's perspective on the Age
60 Rule. Additionally, numerous court decisions, extensive medical
studies, and previous Congressional actions have led to the same
conclusion: This rule should be changed only if we can guarantee--
beyond all reasonable doubt--that any change will have a positive
effect on air safety.
Rationale for Maintaining the FAA Age 60 Rule
The Age 60 Rule is based on two fundamental principles of medical
science that are indisputable. First, the risks of incapacitation and
unacceptable decrements in performance increase with age. Second,
medical science has not developed a regimen of reliable tests that can
be administered effectively to determine which aging pilots will become
incapacitated, or whose performance will decline to an unacceptable
level. The issues surrounding the regulation have been studied as
thoroughly as any aeromedical matter affecting pilots, and after
decades of comprehensive studies and exhaustive review, these two
principles are still valid as the underlying basis for the Rule.
The FAA, when it reviewed the most advanced cognitive testing
technology, known as CogScreen-AE, concluded that that test ``cannot
sufficiently identify age-related cognitive function deficits that
would impact pilot performance and aircraft safety.'' On appeal of this
decision in Yetman v. Garvey 261 F.3d at 675 (7th Cir. 2001), the Court
of Appeals affirmed the FAA's decision, concluding: ``Ultimately, we
find that substantial evidence supports the FAA's finding that
CogScreen-AE is not, at this point, an adequate cognitive tool for
determining whether an exemption to the Age 60 Rule is warranted.''
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a lower court ruling
declining to hear a group of pilots' applications for exemption from
the FAA Age 60 Rule in Butler v. FAA, cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1986
(May 2, 2005).
The Age 60 Rule has also withstood the legal challenge that it
constitutes age discrimination. Although the Rule does mandate a
chronological age for retirement, the D.C. Circuit Court ruled that it
does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In
Professional Pilots Federation (PPF) v. FAA, 118 F.3d at 763 (D.C. Cir.
1997), the court held that, ``nothing in the ADEA can plausibly be read
to restrict the FAA from making age a criterion for employment when it
acts in its capacity as the guarantor of public safety in the air . . .
therefore, we conclude that the ADEA does not limit the authority of
the FAA to prescribe a mandatory retirement age for pilots.''
In late 1979, the House of Representatives rejected a proposal to
relax the Rule, and directed the National Institutes of Health to
conduct a study to determine if sufficient medical evidence supported
the Rule. In August 1981, the National Institute of Aging Review Panel
on the Experienced Pilots Study, which was responsible for reviewing
the study and submitting a report to Congress, concluded:
``The Panel attaches no special medical significance to age 60
as a mandatory age for retirement of airline pilots. It finds,
however, that age-related changes in health and performance
influence adversely the ability of increasing numbers of
individuals to perform as pilots with the highest level of
safety and, consequently, endanger the safety of the aviation
system as a whole. Moreover, the Panel could not identify the
existence of a medical or performance appraisal system that can
single out those pilots who would pose the greatest hazard
because of early or impending deterioration in health or
performance.''
After the NIA completed its review, the Rule was contested in
Federal court and reconsidered by the FAA. In 1989, in response to a
directive by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the FAA
reviewed the evidence and reaffirmed its support of the Rule. In the
decision, the FAA's Director of Flight Standards stated:
``Based upon all of the studies discussed, we conclude that an
older pilot's edge in experience does not offset the undetected
physical infirmities associated with the aging process.
Notwithstanding that most pilots who are approaching or have
passed age 60 report that their health is excellent and they do
not experience any physical or cognitive limitations which
would prevent them from continuing their flying career, the
research of aging indicates that there is often a sharp decline
in physical and cognitive performance after age 60. There is
substantial scientific evidence which indicates that the
greater experience of the pilots who have reached or passed age
60 does not outweigh the increased risk of incapacitation or
skill deterioration which accompanies seniority.''
Between 1990 and 1994, the FAA sponsored a four-part study, known
as the ``Hilton Reports,'' to review the Age 60 Rule. The part that
received the most attention was a study of accident rates as a function
of age, and that part concluded that the FAA could cautiously raise the
age limit to 63. However, the FAA found some substantial flaws in the
accident study and never adopted its conclusions. The D.C. Circuit
upheld the FAA's decision in PPF v. FAA, 118 F.3d at 769.
Between 2000 and 2003, the FAA, at the request of Congress,
sponsored an updated four-part study conducted by the Civil Aerospace
Medical Institute (CAMI). The CAMI study claimed that no necessary
relationship existed between the accident rate and pilot age, but in
2004 an update to the original CAMI study analyzed the general
methodology used in accident studies and concluded that the data are
prone to errors and misinterpretations, thus calling into question the
results.
Advocates for changing the Rule point out that many countries have
an upper age limit beyond 60, and a few have no upper age limit at all.
Some countries have modified their regulations for licensure purposes
as one way to address their pilot staffing needs. However, this is not
a need in the United States, where more than 6,000 ALPA pilots are
currently furloughed because of the financial state of the airline
industry.
Pilots for many of the major airlines in Europe actually retire
before the age of 60, some as young as 55. This corresponds with a
large percentage of pilots for the major U.S. carriers who actually
retire before age 60 for medical or other reasons. Also, regardless of
the local regulatory requirement, at most European national carriers,
their collective bargaining agreements govern the retirement age, which
in most cases is less than 60, and pilots older than 60 are generally
limited to the second-in-command position.
These examples substantiate the FAA's determination that the Age 60
Rule is reasonable and within an acceptable range of risk for
commercial air transportation operations and has proven to be an
effective safety regulation. The results of the ALPA Age 60 survey
reaffirm the Association's policy in support of the FAA's position.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my statement by saying that
commercial aviation is the safest form of transport in human history. I
am proud of the role that ALPA pilots have played in achieving that
reality. We cannot take that reality for granted, however. We must do
all we can to defend and preserve our safety record--and resist all
attempts to change safety regulations simply to boost profit margins.
The Age 60 Rule is a safety regulation and should not be changed or
repealed unless and until the FAA--not ALPA or any other pilot
organization--is convinced, based on sufficient and conclusive
evidence, that such action would not have a negative effect on safety.
Thank you for this opportunity. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Captain, we appreciate your
coming today.
Captain Joseph Eichelkraut?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH ``IKE'' EICHELKRAUT, PRESIDENT,
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES PILOTS' ASSOCIATION
Mr. Eichelkraut. Chairman Burns----
Senator Burns. President of Southwest Airlines Pilots'
Association, sorry about that, I'm--we look forward to your
testimony and thank you for coming.
Mr. Eichelkraut. Thank you, Chairman Burns and Chairman
Stevens, Senator Pryor.
Senator Burns. You might want to pull that microphone up,
everybody wants to hear you.
Mr. Eichelkraut. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
on the Age 60 Rule. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and Chairman
Stevens for your leadership in becoming original co-sponsors of
S. 65, which would end the Age 60 Rule, and the 45 years of age
discrimination it has engendered.
At Southwest Airlines, we view the Age 60 Rule as a
solution in search of a problem. It is a government-imposed
restriction without a justifiable medical or safety
explanation, and the Rule is more indefensible now than it has
ever been.
In today's economically strained aviation industry, it
seems that companies can renege on pension promises made to
their pilots, leaving them without a livelihood and with
reduced retirement benefits at age 60, and our government won't
let these pilots, many of whom are the safest, most experienced
pilots in the skies, keep working until they are eligible for
Social Security or Medicare benefits. No one on this panel in
support of changing the Rule is looking for a handout. We are
simply asking Congress to tell the FAA to allow us to work, to
let us pay into Social Security and our own pension funds, and
to retire at 65, our national retirement age.
At Southwest Airlines, we believe safety has never been the
real basis for this rule. After all, millions of hours of
flight time have been logged by pilots over 60, all over the
world, and there has never been a single accident in a two-man
crew environment attributed to pilot age. Moreover, the FAA
routinely permits pilots of foreign carriers who are over the
age of 60 to fly here, but not the U.S. pilot, operating under
Part 121.
In a related issue, the FAA maintained, until this year,
that safety was the reason why air traffic controllers were
forced to retire at 56. In the face of controller shortages,
however, the FAA now permits them to work until 61, and says
that safety is less of a concern.
So, if it is not about safety, what is the reason? Well,
the Age 60 Rule came about in 1959, not due to any public
outcry over safety concerns, but as a convenient way to settle
a labor dispute regarding forced retirements at American
Airlines over training pilots to fly the brand-new Boeing 707
jet aircraft. ALPA successfully challenged, and reversed, these
company-imposed retirements. Following this, C.R. Smith, CEO of
American Airlines turned to FAA Administrator Pete Quesada, and
asked him to make age 60 the federally mandated retirement age
for airline pilots. The rule became effective on March 15,
1960.
Today, ALPA supports the Rule, but apparently only for U.S.
pilots. If safety were truly a concern for the ALPA leadership,
why would they compromise safety principles to negotiate a
contract allowing Canadian regional Jazz pilots to fly until
the age of 65?
In a display of solidarity, the pilots and management of
Southwest Airlines strongly support changing the Rule. In a
recent amicus brief to the Supreme Court, Southwest Airlines
argued that the FAA's rigid implementation of the Rule deprives
not only Southwest Airlines, but the flying public, of some of
its best pilots. Our founder, and Chairman of the Board, Herb
Kelleher summed up his reasons for supporting change by telling
a reporter, ``It's the right, moral thing to do.''
The EEOC opposes the Age 60 Rule, and maintains that it
violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In 1981, the
National Institutes of Health agreed, saying, ``The Age 60 Rule
appears indefensible on medical grounds.'' The American
Association of Retired Persons agrees as well.
The fact is, the FAA already has in place the ideal
mechanism for ensuring safe pilots at any age. The current
system of checks and balances including a fail-safe cockpit
with two pilots simply won't fall apart the day a pilot turns
60. And given a chance to work, we know the current system will
continue to perform as well.
To retain my license, I must pass semi-annual physicals,
administered by an FAA-licensed aero-medical examiner. At 40
years of age, pilots must undergo an annual EKG, which is
electronically transmitted to the FAA. We must pass simulator
training twice each year, along with flight checks annually. By
the way, there is no greater test of cognitive ability than
these simulator rides.
Additionally, we are also subject to random in-flight check
rides, and random drug screens. There is no other profession in
America today examined to this level. A 59-year-old captain
arrives at this point in his or her career, having performed
successfully for years, and is one of the fittest and best-
trained pilots in the skies. Yet, the FAA forces the retirement
of hundreds of these pilots every year because of the Age 60
Rule.
The FAA's system is self-purging, and will continue to
maintain, or improve, the level of safety the public counts on
independently of this rule. Today, simulator failure rates
among Southwest pilots are low, as shown on the graph in my
written testimony. But as pilots approach age 60, the failure
numbers are at their lowest. Experience is a key to this fact.
It follows, that as pilots get older, they will be better able
to handle complex situations, when airborne, that they may have
encountered in simulator training and evaluations.
In 1993, the FAA relates the Hilton study, which backs up
this data. The study found a modest decrease of accident rates
with age, and no sign of increase in accident rates as pilots
near the age of 60. That suggests to me that by retiring these
pilots at 60, the overall safety of the flying public is
compromised.
Some of you may remember that 16 years ago today, July 19,
1989, United Airlines Flight 232, loaded with 285 passengers
and 11 crew members, found itself without hydraulics, unable to
turn, and essentially doomed. By using throttle movements to
control the paralyzed aircraft, 59-year-old Captain Haynes and
his crew were able to get it back to a runway in Sioux City,
Iowa. The lives of 186 people were saved by his actions and his
experience. In subsequent simulator tests, other crews were
unable to repeat this. Al Haynes was forced to retire that year
because the FAA told him he was too old.
The Committee has before it a great solution, S. 65, and
its House companion H.R. 65 would give pilots over 60 the
opportunity to continue flying passengers safely to their
destinations, until these pilots reach our national retirement
age.
Mr. Chairman, the pilots of Southwest Airlines, and all of
those here in uniform today, appreciate your willingness to
hold this important hearing, and hope that it will be the first
step in moving legislation to change the FAA's antiquated and
discriminatory Age 60 Rule once and for all.
[The prepared statement of Captain Eichelkraut follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Joseph ``Ike'' Eichelkraut, President,
Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association
Chairman Burns, Ranking Senator Rockefeller, and distinguished
members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today and to present the views of the pilots of Southwest Airlines on
the FAA Age 60 Rule. Mr. Chairman, I commend you and Chairman Stevens
for your leadership in becoming original cosponsors of S. 65, which
would end the Age 60 Rule and the 45 years of age discrimination it had
engendered.
At Southwest Airlines, we view the FAA Age 60 Rule as a solution in
search of a problem. It is a government imposed restriction without a
justifiable medical or safety explanation, and the Rule is more
indefensible today than it ever has been. In the current economically
strained aviation industry, it seems that companies can renege on
pension promises made to their pilots, and leave them without a way to
make a living and with reduced retirement benefits at age 60. And our
government won't let these pilots--many of whom are the safest, most
experienced pilots in the skies--keep working until our national
retirement age of 65 when they are eligible for Social Security and
Medicare benefits. No one on this panel here today in support of
changing the Rule is looking for a handout. We are simply asking
Congress to tell the FAA to allow us to work, to let us pay into Social
Security and our own pension funds, and to retire at an age more in
line with current economic and social conventions.
Safety or Economics?
Safety is not now, and never has been the basis for this rule
forcing commercial pilots flying under Part 121 to retire before their
60th birthday. As Southwest pilots reach 60, like pilots of other
airlines, they are usually the best pilots they have ever been. Pilots
age 60 and over fly passengers safely in countries across the globe
every day. There are millions of hours of flight time that have been
logged by pilots over 60 all over the world, and there has never been a
single accident attributed to a pilot's age. In fact, the FAA routinely
grants waivers to overseas pilots of foreign carriers over age 60, but
not for the U.S. pilot operating under Part 121.
The FAA says the age restriction is only about safety, but recent
and past actions on the part of the agency seem to point to economics
and politics, rather than safety as the number one consideration on the
age question. Similar age restrictions had been placed on air traffic
controllers. Until this year, the FAA maintained that safety was the
reason why controllers were forced to retire at 56. In the face of
shortages of controllers, however, the FAA now permits them to work
until 61, and says that safety is less of a concern.
The same logic must have applied when the FAA exempted a group of
pilots from the Age 60 Rule between 1995 to 1999, that were flying
aircraft carrying between 10 and 30 passengers. Prior to 1995, these
passenger operations were conducted under FAR Part 135, but were
shifted by the FAA in 1995, to come under compliance of Part 121
operations with its age 60 rule. If the FAA truly believed that the
level of safety could not be maintained, then why grant the exception
for these pilots to continue flying well past the age of 60? The FAA
often cites its duty to ensure air carriers operate with the highest
possible degree of safety. But this does not explain why the FAA
applies the Age 60 Rule to some, but not to all air carriers operating
in the United States.
In a 1991 letter, Dr. Stanley Mohler, then Director of Aerospace
Medicine at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio, references a
meeting held in Congressman Edward Roybal's office in the 1980s, on the
same subject before us today in this hearing. According to Dr. Mohler,
the FAA, represented at the meeting by Administrator Don Engen, Federal
Air Surgeon, Frank Austin, and Deputy Federal Air Surgeon, Jon Jordan,
stated that there was no longer a medical basis for the Age 60
regulation. He goes on in his letter to say that the FAA was reluctant
to delete or make exceptions to the Rule primarily because of
administrative burdens it believed would be placed on the airlines. It
was pure economics.
Background on the Age 60 Rule
If it is not about safety, then what is the Rule all about? The Age
60 rule came about in 1959, not due to any public outcry over safety
concerns, but as a convenient way to settle a labor dispute at American
Airlines over training pilots to fly new Boeing 707 jet aircraft. It
took longer to train older pilots with no prior jet experience than
younger, jet experienced, Korean War veterans, and therefore, it was
more expensive to transition the older pilots. There were no safety or
medical concerns expressed by either American Airlines or a panel of
experts, convened in May 1959 by the Administrator, which recommended
that age 55 become the maximum age for jet transition and age 60 become
the federally mandated retirement age for airline piloting. The age 55
provisions went away due to comments at public hearings and written
comments. The age 60 proposal was never publicly aired per the
prescribed rulemaking process nor was there any medical or statistical
evidence of reduced performance in older airline pilots. In the Q&A
section of the FAA press release that announced the age rule, the first
question asks: ``Has it been demonstrated that age is a factor in the
occurrence of air carrier accidents?'' The Answer was, and remains,
``No.''
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) opposed age-based retirement
as a matter of policy, and challenged these company-imposed age-based
retirements through the grievance process. In 1958-59, grievances were
directed against American Airlines (whose pilots were represented by
ALPA at the time), TWA and Western Airlines. In some cases the
companies used medical and flight-safety arguments to support their
positions; interestingly enough, ALPA succeeded in rebutting these
points, which had no scientific or medical evidence back then either.
Each of the grievances were decided in favor of the union and against
the airline. C.R. Smith, American Airlines founder and CEO, unhappy
with the arbitrator's decision, refused to reinstate the three pilots
who had brought the retirement grievance. ALPA called for a strike
against American. After the 21-day walkout, the company ceded most
points to the pilot group and pilots returned to work.
Unable to hold back the pilots through normal collective
bargaining, Smith turned to a longtime friend, Elwood R. (Pete)
Quesada, who had been appointed Administrator of the newly-created
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In a letter dated February 5,
1959, Smith asked the FAA to proclaim age 60 as a federally-mandated
retirement age for pilots. Quesada obliged by proposing what we now
know as the Age 60 Rule. The FAA issued its Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) less than 1 month after Quesada received Smith's
request. I am unaware of any Congressional or FAA hearing to debate the
proposal at the time. The Final Rule, which was modified to pertain
only to air carrier pilots, was published on December 5, 1959, and
became effective on March 15, 1960. In January 1962, Administrator
Quesada retired from the FAA and was elected to American Airline's
Board of Directors.
Today ALPA is opposed to allowing U.S. pilots to fly past 60. But
they support flying up to the age of 65 for Canadian pilots. If safety
were truly a concern of the ALPA leadership, why would ALPA President,
Captain Duane Woerth, compromise those safety principles by affixing
his signature to an agreement permitting Canadian Regional Jazz pilots
to fly until age 65?
Time for a Change
The 4,700+ pilots of the Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association and
the management of Southwest Airlines strongly support changing the
Rule. In a recent Amicus Curiae brief to the Supreme Court, Southwest
Airlines argued that FAA's application of the Age 60 Rule, without
consideration of individual pilot abilities, health conditions or
medical data is purely arbitrary and not justified; moreover, the FAA's
rigid implementation of the Rule deprives Southwest Airlines of some of
its best pilots at the peak of their careers. SWA believes that the
arbitrary rejection of all age exemption requests disserves the public
interest by depriving commercial airlines of leadership and experience
in the cockpit. At recent rally outside the Capitol, Southwest Airlines
Founder and Chairman of the Board, Herb Kelleher, responded candidly to
one reporter's questions, ``It's the right, moral thing to do!''
Experts Agree: It's Age Discrimination
The rule amounts to nothing more than blatant age discrimination
and needs to change. The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC)
agrees. The EEOC opposes the Age 60 rule and maintains that the FAA
violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1968 (ADEA)
because it unjustifiably applies a different standard to pilots over
age 59 than younger pilots doing the same job. In fact, The EEOC has
successfully forced private corporations to eliminate rules that
required their pilots to retire at 60.
The American Association of Retired Persons agrees as well. In a
letter of support to Senator James Inhofe for S. 65, they state ``. . .
Older workers, like all workers, should be judged on the basis of their
individual competency and ability to do the job. There is no evidence
that pilots over 60 perform worse than younger pilots. Indeed, there is
reason to believe that lengthy experience is a good predictor of pilot
competence.''
The NIH agrees too. In 1981, The National Institute on Aging of the
National Institutes of Health agreed saying, ``The Age 60 Rule appears
indefensible on medical grounds,'' and ``There is no convincing
evidence to support age 60, or any other specific age for mandatory
pilot retirement.''
Safe Cockpits at Any Age
The FAA has stated that unless it can be assured that the level of
safety is maintained or improved, it cannot support a change to the
current age 60 rule. But this condition stated by the FAA is already
and inherently attained by their own existing procedures--procedures
which are the gold standard around the world. The FAA already has in
place the ideal mechanisms for ensuring safe pilots at any age,
regardless of whether they are 35, 45, 55 or, frankly, 65 years old.
The current system of checks and balances does not simply fall apart
the day a pilot turns 60; given the chance to work, we know that the
current system would continue to perform as well. In a perfect world,
this system coupled with the choice of the pilot, would dictate when
the proper age for retirement has been reached.
Let's review the current system in place. To retain my license, and
fly as a pilot for Southwest Airlines, I must pass semi-annual flight
physicals administered by a qualified (FAA-licensed) aero-medical
examiner (AME). When a pilot turns 40 years of age, he must undergo an
annual EKG every other flight physical, which is electronically
transmitted by the AME directly to FAA headquarters where a computer
program alerts if parameters dictate.
Pilots must also successfully pass semi-annual simulator training
and flight checks designed to evaluate the crewmember's ability to
respond to various aircraft emergencies, and/or competently handle
advances in flight technology and the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
environment. Captains must demonstrate, twice yearly, complete
knowledge of systems and procedures, safe piloting skills, and multi-
tasking by managing emergency and normal flight situations, typically
in instrument flight conditions conducted in advanced simulators. There
is no greater test of cognitive ability and mental dexterity than these
simulator rides. Flight crews are also administered random in-flight
check rides by FAA inspectors and Southwest check airmen. Further, we
are subject to random alcohol and drug testing at any time while on
duty.
There is no other profession in America today examined to this
level. The 59 year old Captain arrives at this point in his career
having demonstrated successful performance following years of this kind
of scrutiny. This pilot is one of the fittest, and best trained pilots
in the skies. Yet the FAA forces Southwest and other airlines to retire
hundreds of their best every year because of the age 60 rule. These are
the checks and balances that are in place today for every pilot: two
pilots in a failsafe cockpit, twice yearly medicals, annual training,
annual simulator evaluations, annual flight evaluations, Federal
inspectors, computer-verified EKG's, and Chief Pilot supervision. The
list goes on and on. The system works now. The system is self purging.
It will continue to maintain the level of safety the FAA banks on every
day, and says that it needs in order to consider a change in the
current rule.
Today, simulator failure rates among Southwest pilots are low. But
as pilots approach age 60 the failure numbers are at their lowest. The
graph below shows this.
Experience is the key in this fact. As pilots get older, they know
how to better handle the extreme situations they may have encountered
in simulator checks. The mean failure rate declines at an even rate
from a pilot's thirties through his fifties. Of course, because of the
Age 60 rule, I don't have data to show that this trend would continue
throughout a pilot's sixties, but I suspect it would.
In 1993, the FAA itself released the Hilton Study, which backs up
the simulator data above. The study found that ``The data for all
groups of pilots were remarkably consistent in showing a modest
decrease in accident rate with age [and] no sign of increase in
accident rates as pilots near age 60.'' That would suggest to me that
by retiring these pilots at 60, the overall safety of the flying public
is compromised.
Commercial flying, under Part 121 passengers requires a pilot and
co-pilot, at least in the large commercial aircraft which SWA flies. It
is uncommon for one of the pilots to become ill during flight, but not
unheard of. In such cases, the other pilot is present to safely conduct
the flight to a conclusion, at which point, a replacement is obtained
before continuing. Most of the illnesses encountered during the flight
regime encompass pressurization changes or incompatible food ingestion
(the latter is probably the greatest source of illnesses flying on
line). Less frequent are the unwanted physiological responses to
pressure changes, but the most common is an inability to neutralize
pressures in the sinuses or Eustachian tubes (ears) during climbs and
descents.
Why Change Now?
Safety has never been anything more than a pretense for the Rule.
Political opposition to change is strong and comes from respected
organizations like the FAA and ALPA. Age discrimination laws have been
in place for decades and haven't forced a change in the Rule. Why
should Congress act to change it now?
The Rule has clearly been about economics all along. And economics
are the reason to change the Rule now. The airline industry is
changing. Airline pension funds are migrating rapidly from defined
benefit (DB) to defined contribution plans (DC). At Southwest Airlines,
my retirement benefits are quite like those that most Americans
fortunate enough to have retirement benefits also have. I have a 401k
plan that my company pays a defined contribution to every year. All but
a handful of airlines now have similar benefits.
U.S. Airways and United pension funds were terminated and taken
over by the PBGC this year. Delta, Northwest and Continental--
essentially all DB plans--are at risk, and are likely to add
significantly to the Federal Government's unfunded pension liability.
Pilots at these airlines have already lost significant portions of
their retirement, and face uncertain futures with a gap in retirement
and healthcare benefits to carry them over to Social Security and
Medicare age--which we all know is going up not down (as ALPA would
like it to for pilots).
Working to 65 would help these pilots close that gap. DC plans also
offer pilots, and all Americans, an opportunity to maximize retirement
savings at little cost to the government, and no risk to the PBGC or
the corporations. DC plans offer older legacy carrier pilots the only
opportunity to recover from the loss of their defined benefit plans.
But pilots must be able to work until full Social Security retirement
age, as S. 65 allows, to maximize these benefits. This will have a net
positive impact on the Federal budget, and will have a net positive
impact on the safety of the flying public by keeping our most
experienced pilots in the air for an additional few years.
Breaking Records Past 60
Today, it seems that sixty-plus year old pilots are breaking world
aviation records with regular frequency. Just last summer the world was
thrilled when SpaceShip One became the first manned commercial vehicle
to slip the surly bonds of earth. The craft was piloted by 63-year-old
test pilot Mike Melvill, who had a very physical challenge bringing
that ship safely back to Earth. Then, we all watched this Spring, when
60-year-old Steve Fossett became the first to complete a nonstop, solo
airplane flight around the world.
Fossett and Melvill are clearly top pilots, out there ``pushing the
edge of the envelope.'' Under the current FAA rules however, neither
would be allowed to fly a Boeing 737 for my airline.
Today, July 19, is a fateful day in aviation history. Many of you
will remember that sixteen years ago today, July 19, 1989, United
Airlines Flight 232 took off from Denver, CO. Captain Al Haynes
reported to air traffic control that his DC-10 loaded with 285
passengers and 11 crew, were without hydraulics and unable to turn the
aircraft, and essentially doomed. By using throttle movements to
control the paralyzed aircraft, Capt. Haynes and his crew began to
slowly turn and control the aircraft, and were able to get it to a
runway in Sioux City, IA. Although 110 people were killed that day, the
deaths of 186 people were averted due to the experience of fifty-nine
year old Captain Al Haynes and his crew. In subsequent simulator tests
other DC-10 crews were unable to repeat the effort of the crew of
Flight 232. Investigators concluded that, in its damaged condition, it
was not possible to land the aircraft on a runway. Al Haynes was forced
to retire that year, not because he had been in a crash, but because
the FAA told him he was too old.
Congress Should Act Now
The Committee has before it the solution to the problem. S. 65,
introduced by Sen. James Inhofe of Oklahoma, and its House companion,
H.R. 65 introduced by Rep. Jim Gibbons (R-NV) would give those pilots
the right to continue to work, safely flying passengers to their
destinations should they chose to do so. In fact, it is our belief that
safety is actually compromised by requiring our most experienced pilots
to retire at the peak of their careers.
Mr. Chairman, the pilots of Southwest Airlines, and all those here
in uniform today, appreciate your willingness to hold this important
hearing, and hope that it will be the first step in moving legislation
to change the FAA's antiquated and discriminatory Age 60 Rule once and
for all.
Thank you.
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, Captain. Now we'll hear
from Captain Ralph Hunter, President, Allied Pilots
Association. Thank you for coming today.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN RALPH HUNTER, PRESIDENT, ALLIED PILOTS
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Hunter. Chairman Burns, Chairman Stevens, Senator
Pryor, thanks for the opportunity.
I am Captain Ralph Hunter, President of the Allied Pilots
Association, representing the approximately 13,000 pilots of
American Airlines, the world's largest passenger airline. On
behalf of our members, I thank you for this opportunity to
testify before this panel in strong support of the current Age
60 Rule that governs the mandatory retirement age for
commercial airline pilots.
In the course of debating a significant change to air
transportation regulations, our goals should be--first, do no
harm. Maintaining or increasing the current level of aviation
safety must be the primary test by which any new regulation is
judged. Economic and personal considerations should not be
disregarded, but the annals of aviation and aerospace history
overflow with examples of the false economy that results by
giving safety a backseat to other issues.
Safety concerns gave birth to the Age 60 Rule, and in the
absence of compelling evidence for change, the Federal
Government's continuing commitment to aviation safety demands
the retention of this important regulation. I would submit that
much of the current support for increasing the mandatory
retirement age of airline pilots is an economic argument
masquerading as an age discrimination argument. Along with most
of our Nation's commercial pilots, APA pilots have also
suffered the financial pains of an industry in turmoil. Despite
this deep concern, we should not contemplate a change to the
current retirement rule in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that safety is not compromised. Mandatory retirement
ages are not discriminatory when tied to a bona fide
occupational qualification.
Both the U.S. Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court
have repeatedly denied challenges to the Age 60 Rule based on
this doctrine. Many other professions responsible for the
public's health and safety, such as law enforcement,
firefighting, air traffic control, and even the military impose
some form of mandatory retirement age. Recognizing this
important public policy, Congress passed an exemption to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act in 1996, allowing state
and local governments to set mandatory retirement ages as low
as 55 for public-safety employees. It's simply good public
policy for individuals in safety-sensitive professions to
conclude their careers before the natural process of aging
becomes a problem.
We all recognize that whenever mandatory retirement is
based on a fixed chronological age, some workers may well be
physically capable of continuing their careers for some unknown
period. However, current medical technology does not provide a
safe and reliable method to make that determination, and the
use of a fixed, chronological age has proved to be a fair and
effective standard. Even the opponents of the Age 60 Rule
tacitly admit this fact by merely requesting an increase--and
not elimination--of the mandatory retirement age.
The question then becomes what is the appropriate age for a
pilot to retire before the inevitable effects of aging become
too high risk? This question has been repeatedly asked,
studied, and answered over the Rule's 46-year history. While
opponents of the Age 60 Rule would accuse the FAA of ancestor
worship, the reality is that as recently as 1994, the FAA made
a significant rule change for certain commercial flight
operations that actually reduced the retirement age for some
pilots as part of its One Level of Safety program.
One of the most recent and comprehensive surveys of the
medical basis for the Age 60 Rule was published in January of
2004, by the Aerospace Medical Association. I've included the
report as an attachment with my written remarks. Let me quote a
few of the key findings from the AsMA study, ``Physiological
studies consistently show age-related declines in hearing,
vision and motor skills. Pilot cognitive performance has been
shown to generally decline with age. A recent simulator study
of age and pilot performance found that increased age was
significantly associated with decreased aviator performance.
Increased pilot experience does not appear to alter the typical
age-related declines found in many cognitive skills.''
While opponents of the Age 60 Rule regularly cite this same
report as concluding that there's insufficient medical evidence
to support pilot restrictions based strictly on chronological
age, the study also demonstrates how incredibly difficult and
expensive it would be to develop another set of criteria.
Quoting from the study's summary, ``A transition to a
criterion-based process for determining a pilot's fitness to
fly beyond age 60 would require extensive additional research.
The economic burden on the FAA and corporations to develop a
non-age safety basis for denying pilots continued employment
could be significant.''
Despite the report's support for a shift away from an age-
based retirement standard, it presented no viable alternative
with a substantiated capability to maintain the current level
of aviation safety, with available medical technology. It's
significant to note that a majority of commercial airline
pilots support the existing policy. More than 80 percent of APA
members supported the Age 60 Rule in a survey we conducted a
few years ago. The Air Line Pilots Association recently re-
affirmed its support for age 60 retirement, and the FAA has
stated its desire to maintain the status quo. I believe it
would be a grave error to disregard the voices of those closest
to the trenches in this debate. We are frequent observers of
the very real impact of aging on pilot skills. While we know
that nothing magical occurs at age 60 years and 1 day, to make
a previously competent pilot unsafe, we're also keenly aware of
the inevitable impact of aging on pilot skill, and the near
impossibility of clearly defining the acceptable limit of that
decline with current medical technology.
Our position is firm--the Age 60 Rule is a well-established
safety regulation substantiated by medical science, and re-
affirmed repeatedly by the FAA and the courts. Despite the
apparent arbitrariness of using a fixed, chronological age, the
Rule has actually performed its mission quite effectively for
more than 46 years. We concede that there very well may come a
day when conclusive data exists that supports a replacement for
the Age 60 Rule. However, that data does not currently exist,
and the Federal Government's commitment to aviation safety
demands that the current rule be retained.
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to speak on
behalf of the 13,000 pilots that APA represents, and I'll be
glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Hunter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Ralph Hunter, President,
Allied Pilots Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Captain Ralph
Hunter, President of the Allied Pilots Association (APA) representing
the approximately 13,000 pilots of American Airlines--the world's
largest passenger airline. On behalf of our members, I thank you for
this opportunity to testify before this panel in strong support of the
so called ``Age 60 Rule'' that governs the mandatory retirement age for
commercial airline pilots.
In the course of debating a significant change to air
transportation regulations, our goal should be, ``First, Do No Harm.''
Maintaining or increasing the current level of aviation safety must be
the primary test by which any new regulation is judged. Economic and
personal considerations should not be disregarded, but the annals of
aviation and aerospace history overflow with examples of the false
economy that results by giving safety a back seat to other issues.
Safety concerns gave birth to the Age 60 Rule, and in the absence of
compelling evidence for change, the Federal Government's continuing
commitment to aviation safety demands the retention of this important
regulation.
I would submit that much of the current support for increasing the
mandatory retirement age of airline pilots is an economic argument
masquerading as an age discrimination argument. Along with most of our
Nation's commercial pilots, APA pilots have also suffered the financial
pains of an industry in turmoil. Despite this deep concern, we should
not contemplate a change to the current retirement rule in absence of
clear and convincing evidence that safety is not compromised.
Let's be perfectly clear on one point--mandatory retirement ages
are not discriminatory when tied to a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). Both the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S.
Supreme Court have repeatedly denied challenges to the Age 60 Rule
based upon this doctrine. Many other professions responsible for the
public's health and safety, such as law enforcement, firefighting, air
traffic control, and even the military impose some form of mandatory
retirement age. Recognizing this important public policy, Congress
passed an exemption to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
in 1996, allowing state and local governments to set mandatory
retirement ages as low as 55 for public safety employees. It is simply
good judgment for individuals in safety-sensitive professions to
conclude their careers before the natural process of aging becomes a
problem. We all recognize that whenever mandatory retirement is based
upon a fixed chronological age, some workers may well be physically
capable of continuing their careers for some unknown period. However,
current medical technology does not provide a safe and reliable method
to make that determination, and the use of a fixed chronological age
has proved to be a fair and effective standard. Even the opponents of
the Age 60 Rule tacitly admit this fact by merely requesting an
increase--and not elimination--of the mandatory retirement age.
The question then becomes, ``What is the appropriate age for a
pilot to retire before the inevitable effects of aging become too high
a risk?'' This question has been repeatedly asked, studied, and
answered over the Rule's 46-year history. While opponents of the Age 60
Rule would accuse the FAA of ancestor worship, the reality is that as
recently as 1994, the FAA made a significant rule change for certain
commercial flight operations that actually reduced the retirement age
for some pilots as part of its ``One Level of Safety'' program.
One of the most recent and comprehensive surveys of the medical
basis for the Age 60 Rule was published in January of 2004, by the
Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA), and I have included their report
as an attachment with my written remarks. Let me quote a few of the key
findings from the AsMA study:
``Physiological studies consistently show age-related
declines in hearing, vision, and motor skills.''
``Pilot cognitive performance has been shown to generally
decline with age.''
``[A] recent simulator study of age and pilot performance
found that increased age was significantly associated with
decreased aviator performance.''
``Increased pilot experience does not appear to alter the
typical age-related decline found in many cognitive skills.''
While opponents of the Age 60 Rule regularly cite this same report
as concluding that there is insufficient medical evidence to support
pilot restrictions based strictly on chronological age, the study also
demonstrates how incredibly difficult and expensive it would be to
develop another set of criteria. Quoting from the study's summary, ``A
transition to a criterion-based process for determining a pilot's
fitness to fly beyond age 60 would require extensive additional
research. The economic burden on the FAA and corporations to develop a
non-age safety basis for denying pilots continued employment could be
significant.'' Despite the report's support for a shift away from an
age-based retirement standard, it presented no viable alternative with
a substantiated capability to maintain the current level of aviation
safety with available medical technology.
It is significant to note that a majority of commercial airline
pilots support the existing policy. More than 80 percent of APA members
supported the Age 60 Rule in a survey we conducted a few years ago. The
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) recently reaffirmed its support for
Age 60 retirement, and the FAA has stated its desire to maintain the
status quo. I believe it would be a grave error to disregard the voices
of those closest to the trenches in this debate. We are frequent
observers of the very real impact of aging on pilot skills. While we
know that nothing magical occurs at age 60 years and 1 day to make a
previously competent pilot unsafe, we are also keenly aware of the
inevitable impact of aging on pilot skill, and the near impossibility
of clearly defining the acceptable limit of that decline with current
medical technology.
Our position is firm: The Age 60 Rule is a well-established safety
regulation substantiated by medical science and reaffirmed repeatedly
by the FAA and the courts. Despite the apparent arbitrariness of using
a fixed chronological age, the Rule has actually performed its mission
quite effectively for more than 46 years. We concede that there very
well may come a day when conclusive data exists that supports a
replacement for the Age 60 rule. However, that data does not currently
exist, and the Federal Government's commitment to aviation safety
demands that the current rule be retained.
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the
13,000 pilots that APA represents, and I will be glad to answer any
questions.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Captain. Now, Captain Al Spain,
Senior Vice President of Operations, JetBlue Airways.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN AL SPAIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
OPERATIONS, JetBlue AIRWAYS CORPORATION
Mr. Spain. Chairman Burns, Senator Stevens, Senator Pryor,
on behalf of my 8,500 ``crewmembers'', which we call all of our
employees at JetBlue, particularly my 1,000 pilots, I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on this
issue of mandatory retirement age for airline pilots.
As we've heard, we currently operate under this rule that
requires pilots flying under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations to abandon their cockpit flying duties by their
60th birthday. JetBlue pilots and the leadership oppose the
current mandatory retirement age rule for many reasons, but
most importantly, it's just simply wrong.
JetBlue, in its five and a half years of operation, has
achieved the Department of Transportation rank of a major
carrier. We built the company, and we conduct our operations
daily based on five simple values: safety, caring, integrity,
fun, and passion. Safety is our leading value, and if I thought
for one second that changing the mandatory retirement age would
negatively impact safety, I would not be asking for a change
today.
If safety were the true basis for this rule, we would not
be seeing business and world leaders traveling around the world
in complex jet aircraft operated by private corporations and
international airlines, while being flown by pilots over the
age of 60. Yet, today these experienced aviators are safely
delivering their passengers to points far and near.
Also, it's interesting that the first commercial vehicle to
go into space and return was under the command of a 63-year-old
pilot. These over-age 60 pilots also enjoy the support of both
the National Institutes of Health and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, who find no way to support the Age 60
Rule.
JetBlue would never discriminate in its hiring policies, so
in our short life, we have recruited a significant number of
pilots in their mid- to late-50s, hired because of their
tremendous experience, and their maturity. We've seen four of
these pilots--myself included--forced from flying revenue
customers under the Age 60 Rule. But what's most important is
that these JetBlue pilots, these four pilots, are still flying.
Because under Part 91, they still fly the same airliners that
they flew before their 60th birthday. Like their younger pilot
colleagues, they still take, and pass, their semi-annual FAA
flight physical exams. They still attend and successfully
complete the FAA-required ground school, and proficiency
checks. They're still observed by both FAA inspectors, and
JetBlue check airmen. If the Age 60 Rule were based on safety,
we simply wouldn't be doing this now. Our corporate values
would not allow us to disregard an individual's decades of
valuable experience as a result of an arbitrary and outdated
rule.
The proposals in S. 65, while not requiring a return to the
cockpit for someone over 60, would at least give the
opportunity to take this experience, maturity, and safety back
into the cockpit at the discretion of the carrier.
Additionally, by continuing to fly over age 60, the pilots
would be able to earn wages, pay taxes, contribute to their
retirement plans, and close the gap between the age at which
they stop flying, and the age at which they are eligible for
Social Security and Medicare benefits. The current 5-year gap
can be quite problematic for pilots forced from the cockpit at
age 60.
Simple summary--JetBlue believes that each pilot should be
judged on the basis of his or her ability to fly, their
competency, and their abilities, not on an unsubstantiated and
outdated rule giving a specific date. We strongly support
Senator Inhofe and Congressman Gibbons, both fellow pilots, and
thank them for their tireless work on this important issue. We
urge the Committee to move to do its part to make S. 65--a bill
to amend the age restriction for pilots--the law of the land.
Safety is the basis for our concern.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Captain Spain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Al Spain, Senior Vice President,
Operations, JetBlue Airways Corporation
Chairman Burns, Ranking Member Rockefeller, and distinguished
members of this Subcommittee. On behalf of my 8,500 JetBlue Airways
Crewmember colleagues and, in particular, my 1,000 pilot colleagues,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the important issue
of the mandatory retirement age for commercial airline pilots.
Today, under a rule first enacted in 1959 by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), pilots flying commercial aircraft under Part 121
of the Federal Aviation Regulations must retire by their 60th birthday.
Since its enactment more than forty-five years ago, this rule has been
the source of great debate, and at no time has it been of more intense
debate than today.
JetBlue and its pilot corps oppose the current mandatory retirement
age rule for many reasons. However, as I will explain below, the
principle reason is that it is simply wrong.
JetBlue, established in 2000, has already achieved the Department
of Transportation (DOT) rank of a ``major'' carrier--the quickest this
status has ever been achieved by an airline in the United States.
JetBlue was built on five simple values: Safety, Caring, Integrity,
Fun, and Passion--with Safety always first and foremost in all that we
do. These five values are the foundation of our airline, and all of the
blocks on which JetBlue are built are consistent with these values.
With 77 aircraft today, growing to 91 by year's end, JetBlue's safety
value lights the path for our continued controlled-growth.
In keeping with our safety value and our integrity value, JetBlue
has stood on the sidelines and watched as several key pilot leaders
have been removed from active flying as a result of the Age 60 Rule.
This alone, and not any previous or pending economic impact to our
healthy bottom line, is why I am here today. JetBlue has been
profitable for 17 successive quarters at a time when 100,000 airline
employees have lost their jobs, several carriers are in bankruptcy and
others openly discuss bankruptcy. As an officer of JetBlue, a pilot who
has been forced to retire under the Age 60 Rule, and as the leader of
our pilot corps, this is a wrong that Congress now should right. Both
S. 65, along with H.R. 65, are the means by which to do so.
In 1959, the FAA promulgated its rule based on the ``medical
facts'' of the day. It was believed then, and relied upon as the
primary basis for the Rule itself, that ``significant medical defects''
resulted from the progressive deterioration of physiological and
psychological functions which occur normally with aging. These supposed
``facts'' from the last century are anything but accepted facts today,
and the Rule based on these ``facts'' amounts to pure 21st century age
discrimination.
The facts of 2005 weigh in favor of eliminating the Age 60 Rule. As
far back as 1985, The National Institutes of Health testified before
the House Select Committee on Aging that the National Institute of
Aging (part of the NIH) could no longer support the FAA's retention of
the Age 60 Rule. Similarly, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(EEOC) has held that the FAA Age 60 Rule violates the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1968. In the private sector, the
EEOC has successfully ensured that private companies eliminate rules
that required their pilots retire at age 60.
In the Senate, one of your most distinguished former colleagues,
Ohio's John Glenn, at age 77, flew for 9 days in space. More recently,
the first manned commercial vehicle to travel to space and back was
piloted by test pilot Mike Melvill, winner of the X Prize, at age 63.
Mr. Melvill, despite worldwide acclaim resulting from his historic
achievement, would be barred by the law were he to try flying for
JetBlue. Further, the American Association for Retired People, on
behalf of their 35 million members over age 50, strongly supports H.R.
65 and S. 65.
Throughout the developed world, the United States stands nearly
alone by mandating retirement of pilots at age 60, with the notable
exceptions of France and China. Most nations permit pilots to fly until
age 65, such as Japan and Israel, and the European Joint Aviation
Authority recently raised their age limit to 65 for commercial pilots.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), too, has
recommended that member states, including the United States, adjust to
a maximum age of 65 for commercial pilots.
All JetBlue pilots, whether age 40 or age 59, must undergo rigorous
FAA medical screening procedures to ensure they are fit to fly. This
includes a semi-annual physical exam and, after age 40, an annual
electrocardiogram. Beyond medical screening, all pilots must
successfully pass a simulator training flight check twice yearly. Such
testing ensures awareness and thorough knowledge of procedures,
systems, piloting skills, and the ability to safely manage emergency
scenarios. These tests, which ensure the mental and physical health of
pilots, are in addition to random in-flight check rides performed by
both FAA inspectors and JetBlue check airmen. Almost no worker in
America has more oversight when it comes to their medical ability and
competency to fly, and no one has more of an incentive to maintain
safety for the flying public than airlines' themselves.
Finally, in the current economic environment faced by most
airlines, thousands of pilots have lost their jobs. Equally
unfortunate, for many still employed, they have seen their pension
plans virtually eliminated. Thus, while not at issue at JetBlue where
we have defined contribution plans, many pilots must retire from flying
at age 60 and they do not collect Social Security until age 65. The
proposals in S. 65 would allow these experienced pilots to continue
fly, earn wages and contribute to their pension plans.
In this regard, JetBlue has only had a small number of pilots
removed from the cockpit due to the Age 60 Rule. Of our more than 1,000
pilots, these few pilots have all remained employed as active
crewmembers, some flying non-revenue flights, some teaching, and some
serving as members of our leadership team. JetBlue's values simply
cannot allow us to disregard an individual's decades of valuable
experience merely because of an outdated rule. Not only does our
airline benefit from the wisdom attained through decades of experience,
but these pilots remain active contributors to their own retirement
savings. This benefits JetBlue, our pilots and all taxpayers.
JetBlue believes that each pilot should be judged on the basis of
his or her ability to fly and their competency--not an unsubstantiated
rule based on outdated and mistaken medical assumptions. We strongly
support Senator Inhofe, and Congressman Gibbons, both fellow pilots,
for their tireless work on this important issue, and urge this
Committee to make S. 65, a bill to amend the age restrictions for
pilots, the law of the land.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for today's opportunity to testify.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Captain. Senator Stevens has an
appointment coming up and wants to ask a couple of questions.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, let me
correct the record, I said there were 750 of our 10,000 pilots
were commercial, and over 55--it's 2,000, 2,000 of our 10,000
pilots are commercial and over 55. It's a difficult problem for
us.
Let me just ask each of you this, you mentioned a series of
polls taken, do you know the average age of those people you
polled, Captain Woerth, do you know it?
Mr. Woerth. I don't have the age of the poll, or the
average age, or the median age of the entire pilot group, I
could probably get that for you.
Senator Stevens.--relate the age to the polls?
Mr. Woerth. Throughout the polling process, especially as
to the random telephone poll, was randomly stratified to take
out sampling errors that were biased one way or another.
As to the survey, anytime you do a survey, it's voluntary,
and we had a high number of participants, particularly over the
age of 56, and so we actually had more older people,
participating for their own interests that you'd expect in a
democratic organization.
Senator Stevens. How about you, Mr. Eichelkraut?
Mr. Eichelkraut. I don't have the exact numbers, sir, but I
would believe around 45 or 46 years old is the average age of
the respondent.
Senator Stevens. Captain Hunter?
Mr. Hunter. I don't have the breakout, sir, the last poll
we did was----
Senator Stevens. Captain Spain?
Mr. Spain. In all of our polls with the pilots, we've had
about an 80 percent response in our pilot, the thousand pilots
we have, the average age is, I believe it's 48.
Senator Stevens. Captain Hunter, you mentioned in your
letter to us that a sizable number of these people are
furloughed at the present time, how great is that number?
Mr. Hunter. We're sitting at just under 3,000 pilots on
furlough from American Airlines.
Senator Stevens. Do you know, Captain Woerth, what the
furlough rate is for your organization?
Mr. Woerth. A little over 5,000 members of ALPA are
furloughed.
Senator Stevens. OK, and pilot fatigue, you mentioned,
Captain Hunter, wasn't it?
Mr. Hunter. That was, I believe it was Captain Woerth that
testified.
Senator Stevens. You, Captain Woerth, you say we've ignored
it, ignored that issue?
Mr. Woerth. No, I'm saying that the Federal Aviation
Administration had put forward some notice of proposed
rulemaking almost 10 years ago, because it was recognized--they
had NASA studies--that they thought the flight time and duty
time regulations, particularly as to the length of the duty
day, were antiquated and needed revisions, based on a study by
NASA. Nothing's really come of that in almost 10 years, and
what I was referring to is, it wasn't just pay concessions that
pilots were taking, a lot of the work rules, frankly, were
better than FARs had been mitigated, and so many of those
pilots--many of those in the room today--are flying more hours,
longer hours, and longer duty days, and I certainly think the
struggle we've had maintaining even the minimum standards, such
as the 16 Hour Rule, which we have a tremendous fight with in
and around the FAA, the 16 hours, those kind of hours which are
becoming more and more routine, not the exception, are adding
to pilot fatigue, so no matter what the age, this isn't just a
function of, I'm 57, I feel a little more tired than I did when
I was 35, it is an issue even for a 35-year-old, I think
fatigue needs to be looked at by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
Senator Stevens. Well, I flew transports in World War II,
and I'll tell you, fatigue wears me a hell of a lot more than
age does. I'd be very pleased to work with you on a fatigue
thing, see if we can't get someone to really take a good long
look at that, that is more dangerous to any passenger, in my
opinion, than age. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Burns. For the record--the 16 Hour Rule, explain
that to me, would you, please?
Mr. Woerth. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, for quite some time
there was a controversy over, if it, was 16 hours really a
limit, or was that just a scheduling goal, and we finally had
to get a ruling, and work with the APA, in particular, on this,
it was known as the ``Whitlow Letter,'' a person out of the FAA
finally determined at 16 hours you are done, a pilot cannot get
back in a cockpit and fly just because the airline was running
late, or somebody wants to continue the march, the 16 hours is
the real limit. The fact that that's twice the normal day--that
might have been a midnight shift going until the middle of the
afternoon the next day, thank God we have the Whitlow Letter,
but there was still opposition within certain airlines who
didn't want to live with that, they wanted even more hours to
be flown, or a duty day to be even longer than that.
Senator Burns. Let me, after you're, say you've been on
duty for 16 hours, now is that 16 hours in the air?
Mr. Woerth. Doesn't have to be in the air, that's from
report to release, you might have had a break, you might be in
Chicago, you might be in Atlanta----
Senator Burns. And then you're done until when?
Mr. Woerth. Well, there's a rest requirement after that
that varies depending on the rest of your schedule, but you at
least have 10 hours off.
Senator Burns. I was going to ask you about how many pilots
that are laid off now, or that have been furloughed, and you
know, there for a little while, we had a big shortage of
pilots, in fact, it wasn't very long ago we were having
hearings on how to get more trained pilots and get them into
the air, and some of those were moving up from local carriers,
local service areas, and so I think my question is a little out
of whack, but we've been contacted about an agreement that you
have with Jazz, a Canadian air carrier, which allows pilots to
sign and work until 65. Why are you supportive of this in
Canada and not in the United States? I guess you're kind of
going with your poll, I understand your position, but why would
that be?
Mr. Woerth. Yes, Mr. Chairman, when we actually merged with
pilots in Canada in 1997, we had a major merger when we took
over a number of pilots within Canada. Air Canada Jazz was a
group of regional carriers that happened to be in that group,
there are other Canadian carriers we represented as well.
Part of our merger agreement with the Canadian pilots was
stuff that affected, that was set by Canadian law. If it was by
Transport Canada, or by the Canadian Parliament, under our
merger agreement, they would be able to deal with their
government, make the decisions for Canadians, not have the
United States laws imposed upon them. As you probably realize,
that in Canada, it is one of those nations that does not have
the Age 60 Rule, so the state licensing standards of Canada are
different. So, I had no trouble recognizing that, and since
they're allowed to do it under Canadian law, I wasn't prepared
to become involved in an age discrimination suit myself, so,
their law permits it, so their contract permits it.
Senator Burns. We've all been involved in this debate for
some time, and I'd like to have your response--all of you--to
this. Do you think it's more about economics, or is it more
about safety? Yes, sir, Mr. Eichelkraut?
Mr. Eichelkraut. It's about economics, sir.
Senator Burns. How do you base that?
Mr. Eichelkraut. Well, I believe that if it were truly
about safety, that we'd look at the individual's medical
requirements, medical qualifications, and his operational
qualifications, and determine whether or not he's fit to fly
Part 121 based on those credentials, not on an age issue.
The economic side of the house is a piece that's very
interesting, we come from--I come from a company that has a
defined contribution retirement plan, and as such, the longer
we can work, the longer we can contribute to it. Some of my
compadres up here have varying forms of that, or possibly not
that, and a defined benefit plan, and we all know there's
stress under that, but I think economically there's some
direction being driven by the fact that they have a defined
benefit plan, but the contracts between labor and management
have wound these contracts into being for such a long time. So,
I actually think that there's probably a reluctance to see a
real change, because that might force an unwinding of some of
these contracts and these issues to be addressed.
Senator Burns. Anybody else have a comment on that
question?
Mr. Hunter. I would like to.
Senator Burns. Captain Hunter?
Mr. Hunter. I think it's an interesting question, Mr.
Chairman, because I think it depends on precisely who you ask.
I testified, and believe, that this is an economic argument
masquerading as an age discrimination argument. I believe very
strongly, based on the feedback from my pilots, which have not
wavered over the course of the last 14 years that we've been
surveying them, have been very close 12 years ago to what they
were 2 years ago. I might add, 2 years ago they suffered some
pretty significant economic losses, and continued to believe
that the Age 60 Rule should remain in place. So, clearly from
my perspective it's a safety issue, but I do believe that other
arguments are being made for economic reasons.
Mr. Spain. Mr. Chairman, I don't think that we're asking
for the change based on economics, because our pilots, like
Southwest, have a defined contribution plan, and I think we
look at it more from a safety aspect and allowing a pilot to
fly also, to eliminate just the absolute age 60 as a
discriminatory thing, if we participate in testing and get
facts and data, we certainly don't mind doing that if we have a
way, a mechanism to go beyond the age 60.
Mr. Woerth. Mr. Chairman, I guess I would say that all of
those factors would come into play, and as the Senate deals
with so many issues in our country, whether social issues or
economic, there's no clear line of demarcation. It is clear to
me that, as we broke out our survey of the 41 airlines we
represent, certainly those that have recently lost their
pensions whether they were at United or US Airways, certainly
the values in that pilot group for reasons all of us can
understand, were different than for example, Federal Express or
different for Delta. I don't really have a baseline that is
reliable from our previous national survey, but clearly, and
another thing that is clear, Mr. Chairman, when I was 28 and I
got hired out of the military, I wasn't paying a lot of
attention to this argument, ALPA happened to be on the other
side of it. One thing that I've noticed in my many years of
being a pilot representative, is that at 40 you need glasses,
at 50 you decide to probably think about the Age 60 Rule
differently, and clearly our statistics are clear that once you
reach age 56, whether you lost your pension or not, pilots feel
differently about the Rule, I don't think anybody should be
surprised, that's human nature, all the factors that go through
the pilot's mind as he progresses through his career, they
weigh all of those things differently. And so we just try to do
the best we can being transparent, and represent our members'
majority interest, and I thank you for holding this hearing so
we can express it.
Senator Burns. I don't walk on very many airplanes, I just
got a letter the other day, I hit two and a half million miles
with Northwest, which means the only thing you get done in this
job is your wear out airplanes and the seat of your pants,
where I don't say hello to the pilots and strike up
conversation, because we're going to reauthorize FAA next year,
changing technologies means we're going to have to change some
ideas in the FAA and controller safety, new technology has
given us maybe a little bit of leeway where we can narrow up
our separation a little, and operate safely, but I take very
seriously the advice of the people, the men and women that are
flying those planes, so I talk to them a lot.
Senator Pryor?
Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Spain, I'd like to start with you, if I may.
Mr. Spain. Sure.
Senator Pryor. I know that you are advocating changing the
Age 60 Rule, and at the same time, as I understand it, you're
advocating changing some FAA rules and regs that would allow
pilots to fly coast to coast, and back again in the same work
period, is that correct?
Mr. Spain. What we asked is that we be able to gather facts
and data, and get research on specifically, the duty time
limitations, and to see what facts and data are, rather than
the 8 hour rule, in domestic operations. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Well, I just wonder if those two positions
that you're taking are consistent with keeping the highest
possible standard of air safety. In other words, I guess I'm
asking, do you think these two policy changes that you're
pursuing will enhance air safety?
Mr. Spain. I think so, sir, because we're asking for facts
and data, we're asking to find a way to get something other
than an arbitrary rule in duty time, in flight time
limitations. And if we have facts and data, the same thing, in
age, finding the facts and data beyond age 60 for airline
pilots, which there are none, because no one's flown beyond age
60, and all we ask is a way to do testing under the auspices of
an accredited agency, or NASA, or someone, to get the facts and
data about duty time limits, exactly what Captain Woerth's
talking about. I agree with a duty time limit, I absolutely do.
We just don't know what that is, because today in the
international flight rules in the U.S. you can fly longer than
you can in domestic rules, same airplane, same crew. We'd just
like to have the facts and data to make a good decision on
whether we should look at a duty time limit rather than a
number of flight hours limit, in other words, back to the 16-
hour rule we were talking about a while ago.
Senator Pryor. OK, I appreciate that explanation, but do
you understand how an ordinary reasonable person might look at
your policies and say you are in favor of an older population
flying your aircraft, and also want them to be able to fly
longer in the same duty period.
Mr. Spain. Only if we have facts and data to support it.
Senator Pryor. But in order to get the facts and data----
Mr. Spain. We would have to do testing, we'd have to find a
way to test.
Senator Pryor. In other words, you would have let your
pilots fly.
Mr. Spain. We'd have to find a way to do that, yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Let me just ask, sort of the panel,
generally, and I'm just going to throw these open, and I'm not
saying everybody has to answer, but if you want to, I'd love to
hear your answers on this. I want to focus a little bit on the
economic ramifications of changing the Rule, and some of you
covered this a little bit in your statements, but how would
extending the age limit beyond 60 years impact younger and mid-
level pilots, in terms of their opportunities for career
advancement?
Mr. Eichelkraut. What I found is pilots who have not made
captain yet or on a narrow-body airplane would like to
continue, I think everybody wants the upgrade opportunities. In
the near-term that might restrict overtime but it will all
equalize itself out. Normally growth opportunities are what get
pilots jobs, not retirements. I've always based, promotions
come when airlines are successful and grow. They can't rely on
pilots to retire to be successful in the airline business.
Senator Pryor. Anybody else?
Mr. Woerth. Senator, the question is a good one because it
identifies the fact that there might be some differences of
opinion based on demographics. And I agree there are, and in
fact I think the ALPA survey or poll indicated that to be, in
particular, the case. The older guys want the Rule to be
extended, and the younger guys want to keep it in place. But
there's an assumption in that statement, and it has to do with
a static environment. A lot of us joined our airlines with the
hopes that it stays solvent, that it continues for years and
years that over the years we'll progress up. The advantages of
working a little bit longer apply to everyone who is in that
static environment, so that an individual might be, in this
case, a first officer in our airline, he might have to wait an
extra year or two to upgrade him, but on the outside years, he
would have the extra number of years to contribute to his
personal finances or retirement, those issues. One of the
issues that comes along, also with this question is for those
people who are furloughed, and raising the age for those
individuals, in that case, gives them an opportunity to maybe
be employed elsewhere. There's no guarantee that those
individuals are ever going back to those carriers they came
from, and it gives them an opportunity to work a little longer
somewhere else rather than start over.
Mr Hunter. Yes, I think it is a very good question,
Senator, certainly the facts that, again, it's a question of
who you ask the question, and I think one thing we can probably
all agree on in our profession is that timing is everything, if
you're hired at the beginning of an economic boom, you're
destined to have probably a very different career than if
you're hired at the tail end of it, and certainly that has been
a cycle in the piloting profession as I've observed it, and I
do have 3,000 pilots on furlough and Captain Woerth mentioned
this as well, who obviously have a very different view of this
issue, because the perception is that this rule negatively
impacts their economics as well.
Senator Pryor. When you talk about negatively impacting
their economics, certainly they get their paycheck when they're
flying, but what about their pensions? Is this, changing the
Age 60 Rule would it impact the pension situation with the
airlines?
Mr. Woerth. The current crisis we're facing in the defined
benefit plan which is being looked at in both the House and the
Senate, because that crisis is the money that's already earned
and already owed, and so no matter what happens later, that
does not resolve the debited deduction contributions that are
currently required. Certainly, a change in it would not affect
their pension, but it would allow people to work longer to
recover some of the money they lost. We've also had issues
we've tried to deal with. Senator Akaka and others have
introduced legislation for the terminated pension plans,
relating to pensions plans, the maximum a pilot can receive,
which is now $29,000 as opposed to other workers at $45,000
could be corrected, and we've always acknowledged that it has
been tough for pilots for a long time to have a gap between
Social Security and the retirement age, whether they've lost
their pension or not. And that's been unfair for pilots for
some period of time.
Senator Pryor. Also, staying on the economics of all this,
when pilots right now hit age 60, does that mean they are
necessarily out of a job, or do you have places for them
elsewhere in the companies? Or the industry?
Mr. Woerth. Some companies do provide opportunities in the
training departments, or other places where they're not flying
Part 121 operations and other regulations that allow that, but
the union doesn't provide that, it's certainly a management
decision, we're not involved with it.
Mr. Eichelkraut. There are very limited positions in that
regard, I'd also like to bring up the issue that these pilots
who are retiring at 60 have been trained in Part 121
operations, and are well versed in that area and that
experience they're not allowed to pursue any longer, so are
there other jobs in the aviation industry? Certainly there are,
you can start over in other places, et cetera, but you
certainly aren't doing exactly the same thing you were trained
to do, up for sometimes 35 years.
Mr. Spain. As I mentioned, we are small and we are growing,
and we have the need for the pilots to operate our airplanes
under Part 91, things such as maintenance test flights,
delivery flights, and positioning flights, and so our pilots
who have reached 60 are currently still flying with JetBlue.
Senator Pryor. The last question I have, and maybe the
Chairman covered this, but I missed the answer, is the
percentage of pilots who actually hit age 60, I assume a number
of them retire, or quit, or move onto something else before
they hit age 60, so what type of numbers or what percentage are
we talking here?
Mr. Woerth. Within the ALPA, there's only one group of ours
that we've tracked with any confidence, and that's Northwest
Airlines, since 1993 to now, has tracked every retirement, and
it's the fourth largest airline in the country involved in
wide-body flying and domestic operations, about 43 percent of
the pilots retired early, either through medical disability and
voluntarily, early. And that is out of 1,700 retirements since
1993.
Senator Pryor. So, as I understand those statistics, over
half----
Mr. Woerth. Forty-three percent, sir. Fifty-seven percent
do retire at the normal age.
Senator Pryor. Of 60.
Mr. Woerth. Of 60, and 43 percent actually retire earlier,
some disability, some just voluntarily decide to retire.
Senator Pryor. So, over half actually hit age 60 and are
forced to retire.
Mr. Woerth. Yes.
Senator Pryor. Thank you.
Senator Burns. I have one more question, one last question.
If the Age 60 Rule is changed, what other legal or regulatory
changes should there be? Will this have a ripple effect we have
to change in some other areas? Does anyone want to comment on
that?
Mr. Woerth. You've asked the $64,000 question for most
airline pilots. What we've certainly found out in our poll, a
lot of us are good old country boys, too. They don't want to
buy a pig in a poke, they'd like to know ``what am I voting
on?'' and what they've asked us is, if everything is going to
stay the same, that would be one question. But they've watched
these hearings previously, and heard what the FAA said, they're
going to change something to have an equivalent level of
safety, we need to do something, they like to know what that
``something'' is. And since they don't know, a lot of them
would like to work longer. I think that has been clear, but
they would like to know that whatever changes the FAA proposes
is not a career threat to them, they don't want any additional
check rides, they don't want to be an astronaut, they don't
want to take an astronaut's physical just to fly to
Minneapolis, but they would certainly like to know or have the
FAA give some indication what they're thinking about, because
right now we don't know what you're thinking about, and that's
a concern of those who might change their mind, or those who
would continue, they don't know what those changes might be.
Senator Burns. Yes, sir?
Mr. Eichelkraut. Senator, the ICAO is recommending to go to
a standard, I know, and one of those requirements they would
like to see is go to twice a year medical physicals, of course,
the Class One physical they already do in this country, so I
wouldn't see a change in that part, what I would suggest
though, that it would certainly help in changing this age, it
would certainly help us blend with the rest of the world in
terms of commerce.
Senator Burns. Captain Hunter?
Mr. Hunter. Part of the difficulty in answering that
question, Mr. Chairman, is, we'd like to see whatever is
necessary to maintain the current level of safety, our
difficulty in answering the question well characterizes our
concern with changing the Rule in the first place, I don't
think we have a good idea about what would need to be changed
in order to maintain the level of safety, and that precisely
characterizes our difficulty with changing the Rule.
Senator Burns. Captain Spain?
Mr. Spain. I think as I've mentioned before, I'd really
like to be able to explore that and get the facts and data to
know what else would have to be changed, and we'd have to look
at it in some way to see whether it's test flying, whether it's
additional medicals, but we need to know what else has to be
changed, and the only way to do that we need to go get the
facts and data.
Senator Burns. I look at it like truck driver, CDLs. In
other words, if you change it from 60, maybe once you hit that
60 level you would take a look at hours of service, hours in
the air, do you require say, the first officer to be under 55,
or whatever, and I wonder does it lead to other rules and
regulations that we would have to look at in order to extend
that age, that's what I'm looking at.
I think maybe, this is an issue that might have to be dealt
whenever we reauthorize the FAA next year, and this debate will
continue, and we may know more about what the economic
conditions are because we have an obligation, I think, I have
an obligation to this industry to first, do no harm. And that's
certainly what we'll base our decisions on. I appreciate your
testimony, and I appreciate you being very candid about it,
because I just remarked to Senator Stevens that it's ironic
that we have the so-called point-to-point carriers wanting it
extended, the legacy carriers are on the other side of the
issue, and I'll sort that out one of these days whenever I have
a little time. But I thank you, anybody who would like to
submit a closing statement, you're welcome to do that. I see
that it is almost 5:30, that's not dinner time, but almost is,
I've never missed a meal yet, nor do I intend to.
I thank you for your service, and I thank you for testimony
and being candid with this committee. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
Today, we are once again weighing the pros and cons of changing the
commercial airline pilot retirement age in the U.S. This is not a new
issue, as the Senate has considered the matter on several occasions
over the past 10 years.
We must be very careful before taking steps to change the long
standing Age 60 rule, and make certain that any modification does not
negatively impact commercial aviation safety in the U.S.
The Age 60 rule has been in effect and worked well since 1959, to
ensure that we maintain the highest level of airline safety. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has reviewed the Rule numerous
times, and medical and scientific authorities, including the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), have studied it repeatedly. To date, no
research has conclusively determined that repealing the law would
improve aviation safety.
Some contend that extending the Age 60 rule will provide economic
benefits to the aviation industry and the individual pilots. Obviously,
a rule change would mean that some pilots could extend their earning
potential for a few additional years, and given that most have had
their benefits cut, I understand and appreciate their keen interest.
However, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the world's
largest pilots union, voted on this issue recently and rejected the
proposal, while some of the Nation's major air carriers have expressed
concerns about how the change would affect their labor costs.
I believe the current effort to increase the pilot age in the
current economic environment is particularly untimely. Ever since
September 11, 2001, the major air carriers have faced pronounced
financial difficulty and have been forced to furlough thousands of
airline pilots. Changing the Age 60 rule has the potential to further
disrupt the careers of more junior pilots and could, quite possibly,
impact the caliber of America's future aviators.
While some maintain that the Age 60 Rule is discriminatory, the
Rule has been reviewed and upheld on numerous occasions by Federal
courts, concluding that it does not violate age discrimination
employment law.
I appreciate the Chairman's commitment to this issue, and I
understand that there are varying medical opinions regarding the
appropriate retirement age for commercial airline pilots. However,
without concrete evidence that the Rule change would improve safety,
absent a true consensus on the issue, I feel that we must leave air
safety to the regulatory experts at the FAA.
______
Prepared Statement of Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination (APAAD)
Airline Pilots Against Age Discrimination (APAAD) is a grassroots
organization comprised of pilots flying for a variety of airlines
engaged in Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 121 operations as well as
other interested parties. As the name of our organization indicates, we
are opposed to age discrimination. Our goal is to see the elimination
of the federally mandated, discriminatory regulation known as the ``Age
60 Rule.''
Chairman Burns, thank you for revisiting this onerous regulation
that has been allowed to continue for some 45 years, denying the
traveling public the safest pilots we have to offer, and denying these
pilots the right to earn a living in their chosen profession.
It is obvious to those of us who have studied the origination of
this rule in 1959, realize that this was a political favor by then FAA
Administrator, General Pete Quesada, so that his friend, C.R. Smith at
American Airlines, could fire his older pilots. Subsequent
Administrators of the FAA have, for some unknown reason, felt compelled
to defend the first Administrator's back-office deal.
We have seen a whole industry develop around this notion that the
older pilot may not be as safe--wasting an untold amount of resources.
The FAA supports its Age 60 Rule based on psuedo-science and
theoretical conjecture, and has never proven that the Age 60 Rule
enhances public safety!
There have been countless studies and reviews about the Age 60
Rule, inside and outside of the FAA. The following are some examples of
these studies.
FAA report number DOT/FAA/AM 94/22, known as the ``Hilton
Study.'' ``The results present a converging body of evidence
which fail to support a hypothesis that accident rates increase
at or about the age of 60 years.''
The John Hopkins School of Medicine study: ``Age, Flight
Experience, and Risk of Crash Involvement in a Cohort of
Professional Pilots.'' The headline announcing the study
results was ``Older pilots OK to fly, study shows.'' Their
conclusion was: ``Our study indicates that chronologic age by
itself has little bearing on safety performance,'' says Susan
P. Baker, co-author of the study and Professor of Health Policy
and Management at Johns Hopkins' Bloomberg School of Public
Health. ``What really matters are age-related changes, such as
health status and flight experience.''
The Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA), after conducting a
two-plus year review of the literature concluded; ``. . . that
there is insufficient medical evidence and/or accident record
to support airline pilot restrictions based on age alone.''
We have a real world study from Japan.
The Japanese Ministry of Transport allowed 159 airline
pilots to fly until age 63 to generate data--a study the FAA
has refused to conduct here! The study: ``A 10-Year
Retrospective Review of Airline Transport Pilots Aged 60 to 63
in Japan.'' Conclusion: ``The review suggests that the aged
pilots who are deemed medically qualified by the official
notice criteria are flying safely without mishap incidence.''
The FAA had a chance to gather real world data in the United
States, when FAR Part 135 pilots past age 60 were grandfathered for 4
years as they operated under FAR Part 121 in 1995.
Captain Robert Perry, an FAA designated check airman,
surveyed a group of these age 60-plus pilots at his airline.
These pilots were flying the more rigorous trips in the turbo-
props and regional jets. This group, whose oldest was 71, flew
over 100,000 accident/incident free hours.
With most of the industrialized world permitting their airline
pilots to fly past age 60, the body of anecdotal data overwhelmingly
supports the safety of such operations. In fact, the FAA has a double
standard when it comes to the Age 60 Rule. The FAA allows age 60-plus
United States pilots to fly in FAR Parts 91, 125, and 135 in this
country. The FAA also allows age 60-plus foreign airline copilots to
fly into this country--which our age 60-plus copilots cannot do.
The FAA relies on its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI)
reports to justify its position that the Age 60 Rule is safety-based.
The curious observation is that CAMI Report 4 shows an accident rate
for pilots younger than 30, 2\1/2\ times higher than pilots in the age
50 to age 60 group. The obvious question is--If safety is the issue,
why is there not an ``Age 30 Rule'' to prevent younger pilots from
flying FAR 121 operations?
The ghost of General Pete Quesada still occupies 800 Independence
Avenue. It is time for Congress to exorcise this demon and return
sanity to this bureaucratic malaise. It is time for Congress to give
the flying public our most experienced aviators and these aviators a
chance to earn a living in their chosen profession.
The best safety device on our Nation's airliners is an experienced
pilot!
______
Southwest Airlines Co.
Washington, DC, July 27, 2005
Hon. Conrad Burns,
Chairman,
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman,
On behalf of Southwest Airlines, I request that this letter and the
attached legal brief be made a part of the formal record for the July
19th hearing, convened by the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation to
consider the FAA's controversial ``Age 60'' Rule. The Age 60 Rule
requires all commercial pilots employed by Part 121 air carriers to
retire at the age of 60, regardless of individual pilot abilities or
health conditions.
The attached brief was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court as a
``Friend of the Court'' in the case of Butler, et al. v. Federal
Aviation Administration. The Petitioners in the Butler case challenged
the FAA's rigid application of the Age 60 rule.
As is more fully explained in the brief, Southwest Airlines
maintains that the Age 60 rule, coupled with the FAA's practice of
automatically denying all pilot requests for exemptions regardless of
merit, is arbitrary and unfair to our individual pilots, and it is
economically harmful to our company. Exemptions for physically and
mentally qualified pilots from the Age 60 Rule should be allowed to
accomplish the FAA's dual statutory mandates of maximum safety and
optimal efficiency in United States commercial aviation.
We appreciate the Subcommittee's consideration of this important
issue. Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Thomas B. Chapman,
Legislative Counsel, Government Affairs
cc: Captain Joseph ``Ike'' Eichelkraut, President, Southwest
Airlines Pilots' Association
______
No. 04-1233--In The Supreme Court of the United States
Dallas E. Butler, et al., Petitioners, v. Federal Aviation
Administration, Respondent.
on petition for a writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the district of columbia circuit
Brief Amicus Curiae of Southwest Airlines Co. In Support of Petitioner
Robert W. Kneisley, Counsel of Record, Southwest Airlines Co.
Deborah Ackerman, Vice President/General Counsel.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Southwest Airlines Co.
This amicus curiae brief is submitted on behalf of Southwest
Airlines Co.\1\ Petitioners and Respondent have consented to the filing
of this amicus curiae brief, as indicated by the letters submitted with
the filing of this brief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for
a party. See Sup. Ct. R. 37.6. It was authored by in-house counsel for
Southwest Airlines Co. In addition, no person or entity, other than
Southwest Airlines Co., its members, and its counsel, made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interest of Amicus Curiae
Southwest Airlines Co. (hereafter ``Southwest'' or ``Southwest
Airlines''), the largest commercial airline in the United States in
terms of passengers boarded, provides point-to-point, low-fare service
to 60 cities in 31 states. In operation since 1971, Southwest currently
serves more than 70 million passengers annually with a fleet of over
400 Boeing 737 aircraft operating approximately 2,900 flights daily.
Headquartered in Dallas, Texas, Southwest has approximately 31,000
employees nationwide and has one of the best overall customer service
records in the U.S. airline industry. With annual revenues exceeding
$6,500,000,000 in 2004, Southwest is a Fortune 500 company and one of
the few profitable U.S. airlines.
Southwest is directly impacted by this case because it employs over
4,500 pilots, many approaching the age of 60. In fact, Michael L.
Oksner, a Petitioner in this case, was recently forced to retire from
Southwest Airlines when the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
denied his petition for an exemption from the ``Age 60 Rule.'' That
rule, codified at 14 CFR Sec. 121.383(c), requires pilots operating
under Part 121 of the FAA's regulations (i.e., virtually all U.S.
commercial airline pilots) to retire on their 60th birthday.
The direction and authority to evaluate this case and to file an
amicus curiae brief herein came from Herbert D. Kelleher, co-founder
and Executive Chairman of the Board of Southwest Airlines.
Summary of Amicus Argument
Southwest Airlines urges the Supreme Court to grant certiorari as
requested by the Petitioners in this case, Butler, et al. v. Federal
Aviation Administration, et al., D.C. Cir. No. 03-1386 (September 24,
2004). The Petitioners challenge the FAA's rigid application of its Age
60 Rule, which requires all commercial pilots employed by Part 121 air
carriers to retire at the age of 60, regardless of individual pilot
abilities or health conditions. The current Age 60 Rule was adopted by
the FAA 45 years ago, and is based on obsolete data that has been
superceded and refuted by more recent medical findings. This rule,
coupled with the FAA's practice of automatically denying all pilot
requests for exemptions regardless of merit, is arbitrary and injurious
to Southwest Airlines. Exemptions for physically and mentally qualified
pilots from the Age 60 Rule should be allowed to accomplish the FAA's
dual statutory mandates of maximum safety and optimal efficiency in
United States commercial aviation. The court below erred in acceding to
the FAA's argument that the case should not even be heard on the
merits.
Amicus Argument
I. The FAA's Application of the Age 60 Rule Without Consideration of
Individual Pilot Abilities, Health Conditions, or Current
Medical Data Is Not Justified
The FAA's practice of automatically denying all pilot requests for
exemption from the Age 60 Rule is not medically justified. The
mandatory retirement rules for pilots were established in 1959--45
years ago. Today, FAA data shows that pilots over age 60 are as safe
as, and in some cases safer than, their younger colleagues. For
example, the FAA released the Hilton Study in 1993, which stated ``the
data for all groups of pilots were remarkably consistent in showing a
modest decrease in accident rate with age [and] no hint of an increase
in accident rates as pilots near age 60.'' \2\ In addition, the
National Institute of Aging stated, in 1981, that ``the Age 60 Rule
appears indefensible on medical grounds'' and ``there is no convincing
medical evidence to support age 60, or any other specific age, for
mandatory pilot retirement.'' \3\ Both medical technology and medical
services, as well as the aging process itself, have dramatically
improved since 1959. Southwest Airlines is familiar with, and agrees
with, these medical studies which have concluded that there is no
current health justification for automatically grounding all commercial
airline pilots upon turning age 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Hilton Systems, Incorporated. Kay et al. (1994).
\3\ 149 Cong. Rec. 63, S5607 (April 30, 2003) (Statement of Senator
Inhofe (for himself, Mr. Stevens, and Mr. Burns) on the Introduction of
S. 959, Bill to Abolish the FAA's Age 60 Rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Captain Joseph ``Ike'' Eichelkraut, President of Southwest Airlines
Pilots' Association, and a pilot with 25 years of experience flying
both military and commercial aircraft, testified on the Age 60 Rule
before the Senate Special Committee on Aging on September 14, 2004.\4\
His testimony explains the many safeguards that are already in place to
ensure pilots of all ages are healthy and medically fit to fly:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A Fresh Look At Mandatory Retirements: Do They Still Make
Sense? Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong.,
2004 WL 2052540 (F.D.C.H.) (Statement of Captain Joseph ``Ike''
Eichelkraut, President, Southwest Airlines Pilots' Association).
The FAA already has the ideal mechanisms in place for ensuring
safe pilots at any age . . . To retain my license and fly for
Southwest Airlines, I must pass semi-annual flight physicals,
administered by an FAA licensed medical examiner, that include
an annual EKG. I must also demonstrate complete knowledge of
safe piloting skills, systems and procedures, and semiannual
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
check rides and advanced simulators.
Pilots must also successfully pass semiannual simulator
training and flight checks designed to evaluate the
crewmember's ability to respond to various aircraft emergencies
and/or competently handle advances in flight technology and the
Air Traffic Control environment . . . There is no greater test
of cognitive ability and mental dexterity than these simulator
rides . . . The 59 year old Captain arrives at this point in
his career having demonstrated successful performance following
years of this kind of scrutiny. FAA studies have verified the
superior level of safety exhibited by this senior captain.
The documentary evidence--disclosed in the record of this case--
reveals that the FAA's automatic denial of all age exemptions has no
tangible safety purpose. The FAA itself even granted exemptions from
the Age 60 Rule in the early 1990s to commercial pilots of foreign
carriers. Because the undistorted data of pilot performance shows that
older, more experienced pilots have excellent safety records, it
clearly is in the interest of both the airlines and their passengers to
allow qualified, medically-certified pilots to fly beyond age 60.
II. The FAA's Inflexible Application of the Age 60 Rule Undermines U.S.
Airline
Economics and Disserves the Traveling Public.
The 1950s-era Age 60 Rule, coupled with the FAA's rigid
implementation of it, arbitrarily deprives Southwest Airlines of some
of its best pilots at the peak of their careers. Southwest, which
employs over 4,500 highly-skilled professional pilots, believes that
the arbitrary rejection of all age exemption requests disserves the
public interest by depriving commercial airlines of leadership and
experience in the cockpit. This inflexible approach inhibits the
industry from achieving maximum safety as well as optimal efficiency in
passenger airline operations. The flight experience and training
accumulated over the career of a professional pilot approaching the age
of 60, along with the investment in training by that pilot's airline
employer such as Southwest, is enormous. Commercial pilots have the
potential for years of safe, productive aviating ahead of them beyond
their 60th birthday. Many airlines could operate more efficiently,
while maintaining the highest standards of safety, if qualified pilots
were allowed to continue to fly beyond age 60.
Southwest Airlines Captain Michael L. Oksner, one of the 12
Petitioners in this case, was forced to retire on his 60th birthday,
April 5, 2004, because of the FAA's denial of his individual Age 60
exemption request. Captain Oksner's safety performance and medical
records were unblemished. Southwest believes that he should have been
granted an exemption by the FAA to continue flying. The Petitioners in
this case, including Captain Oksner, should have their requests for
exemption considered on the merits, not arbitrarily denied by the FAA.
The Agency should be required to reach its decision on such exemption
requests based on the safety performance and medical records of the
individual pilots, not on an arbitrary, out-dated standard that the FAA
imposes on all pilots regardless of individual abilities. Accordingly,
we urge the Court to grant de novo review of the Petitioners' case, and
require the FAA to follow a reasoned standard of individual
consideration of Age 60 Rule exemption requests, pursuant to the
Agency's statutory power to grant exemptions from its regulations when
in the public interest (49 U.S.C. Sec. 44701(f)).
Moreover, the FAA has a statutory duty to consider exemptions in
light of paramount safety requirements in air commerce, pursuant to 49
U.S.C. Sec. 40101(a)(1). Without lessening safety, the FAA also has a
duty to consider the economic health and efficiency of the Nation's air
carriers pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 40101(a)(6)(A) (the FAA shall
consider it in the public interest ``to encourage efficient and well-
managed air carriers to earn adequate profits . . .''); and 40101(a)(7)
(it is in the public interest for FAA to develop and maintain ``a sound
regulatory system that is responsive to the needs of the public . .
.''). Southwest Airlines' analysis of the issue has concluded that
safer and more efficient operations will result from reasoned
consideration--instead of arbitrary denial--of age exemption requests.
Therefore, Southwest Airlines believes that the Petitioners' case must
be heard, for the sake of both the health of U.S. commercial aviation
and the safety of the flying public.
The FAA's arbitrary no-exemptions policy for commercial airline
pilots should be ended, consistent with the public interest in air
safety, because it serves no safety purpose. Pilots of smaller aircraft
such as those operating under Parts 91 and 125-137, general aviation
pilots, and certain test pilots are allowed to fly beyond age 60. In
addition, at least 24 nations allow pilots to fly commercial aircraft
past age 60.\5\ These pilots share the same airways and runways with
the large U.S. passenger airlines operating under Part 121. The safe
performance of these pilots and others worldwide confirms that the
FAA's asserted claim of a safety basis for its no-exemptions policy for
Part 121 pilots is unfounded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ A Fresh Look At Mandatory Retirements: Do They Still Make
Sense? Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 108th
Cong., 2004 WL 2052541 (F.D.C.H.) (Statement of Russell B. Rayman, MD,
Executive Director of the Aerospace Medical Association).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Southwest Airlines urges the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari to the Petitioners in this case.
______
Prepared Statement of Bert M. Yetman, President,
Professional Pilots Federation
Introduction
The Professional Pilots Federation (PPF) has, since being
established in 1991, represented pilots encumbered by FAR 121.383(c),
known as the Age 60 Rule. This Federal Aviation Regulation forces the
safest, most experienced pilots from our airline cockpits at 59 years,
364 days. regardless of health or competence. Although the Federal
Aviation Administration has held the regulation to be a ``safety
rule,'' the evidence has shown that the Rule was promulgated as an
economic favor to the airlines. Safety was the only ``fortress'' which
would allow such a Rule to endure for 45 years. 44 or more nations have
eliminated age 60 as a pilot retirement age and have no age limit, or
65. relying on medical and practical testing (simulator and en route
checks). They have experienced no problems with the over-60 pilots.
Airline Crisis
No one would deny that the American airline industry is suffering
one of its worst crises ever. Many familiar airlines have disappeared.
Still others are fighting for their very existence, such as legacy
carriers US Airways, United Airlines and Delta. American Airlines is
struggling to keep its head above financial waters. A 1993 study showed
one of these carriers, now in bankruptcy, would save more than
$53,000,000 for each year the age Rule was extended, mostly in training
costs for upgrading to replace the retiring captain.
Through collective bargaining agreements. pilots salaries are no
longer a factor in the economic maintenance of the Age 60 Rule. After
12 years, a pilot has reached the top of the seniority pay increase
scale. Equipment changes and contractual negotiations are his only
salary increases. The single economic reason for implementation of an
Age 60 Rule has gone the way of the dinosaur.
Airline Pensions
Employee pensions have been hard hit by airline management's
striving to cut costs. Pilot pensions, in particular, have been the
hardest hit. Employee concessions, negotiated over the past few years,
have not been enough to satisfy airline financial losses. Airlines
entering bankruptcy are defaulting on underfunded pension plans, in
turn placing the substantial financial burden on the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Even this is not an assurance of a
comfortable retirement, certainly not the retirement expected after
many years of faithful airline employment. In some cases pilots are
expected to receive \1/3\ or less of their anticipated pension, and
that may be reduced further by the PBGC policy of reducing payments for
early retirement, which pilots are forced to take upon reaching age 60.
Those closest to retirement are in the worst position, with no time to
recoup losses even if they were allowed to continue their careers. A
total restructuring of retirement planning is necessary for those
retirees, with the selling of homes, scaling down of living standards,
acquiring medical coverage, the expenses of college age children, etc.
Social Security does not help airline pilots at age 60 retirement.
In fact they will lose benefits for each quarter year they fail to
contribute. In other words, after many years of contributing at the
highest possible level, their benefits will decline for each year of
noncontributing until Social Security begins. And, of course. Medicare
is unavailable until reaching 65. At age 65, that would be 20 quarters
of reduced benefit, or hundreds of dollars each month. The only
solution to that problem is to find alternate means of work. Not an
easy task at age 60.
Conclusion
The answer to this 45-year-old antiquated, illogical, and unfounded
problem of FAA forced retirement for pilots is simple. Follow Europe,
Australia, Japan, and the rest of the world (the USA used to lead) by
allowing pilots to continue their careers at least until full Social
Security and Medicare benefits begin, presently age 65. If they choose
to retire at 55 or 60, it should be allowed without unnecessary
restrictions or undue loss of benefits. Certainly present medical and
proficiency standards would still apply.
According to the 1993 study * titled Economic Impact of the FAA's
``Age 60 Rule'', if pilots were allowed to continue beyond their 60th
birthday, the realized annual savings at one major carrier, now in
bankruptcy, would have been:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Economic Impact of the FAA's ``Age 60 Rule'', S.D. Woolsey, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Real Permanent Savings:
Staffing levels: $2,251,320.00
Pay differentials: $16,380,000.00
Temporarily Deferred Expenditures:
Training costs: $34,579,124.00
Savable/Deferrable in 1993: $53,210,444.00
Those savings would have easily exceeded $250 million over 5 years
for just this one carrier, largely through savings in transition
training costs--which are available to most carriers.
The Professional Pilots Federation thanks you for the opportunity
to allow pilots to be part of the solution, not the problem. We wish to
continue supporting our airlines. We wish to continue contributing to
Social Security. We wish to continue to bolster the economy of this
great country.
______
Prepared Statement of AARP
AARP appreciates the opportunity to present its views regarding
mandatory retirement rules for airline pilots for the record of the
July 19 hearing, before the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation.
With more than 35 million members, AARP is the largest organization
representing the interests of Americans age 50, and older, and their
families. Nearly half of AARP members are working either full-time or
part-time, and they have a vital interest in remaining on the job or
finding work--without facing age discrimination by their employers.
Protecting and expanding older workers' rights was a founding
principle of AARP. Today, AARP is the leading organization advocating
for older workers at the Federal and state court levels, before
Congress and state legislatures, and before enforcement agencies. AARP
works closely with other organizations seeking fair treatment for those
in the workforce. In addition, we work with employers to develop
policies that enhance opportunities for, and eliminate discrimination
against, the ever-increasing number of workers who stay on the job past
age 55.
AARP is pleased that the Subcommittee is holding this hearing to
take a look at the outdated policies surrounding mandatory retirement
for pilots. Elimination of forced retirement based on age is long
overdue, and it is AARP's hope that today's hearing will lead to the
speedy enactment of legislation to end arbitrary age limits for pilots
who must retire at age 60.
Discrimination on the job is one of the most common problems faced
by older persons today. Employment discrimination based on age, like
that based on race and sex, is the result of unfair stereotypical
assumptions that ignore an individual worker's ability. Not
withstanding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), age-based
employment discrimination remains prevalent. Older workers face sharply
limited employment opportunities. In addition to a rapidly increasing
unemployment level among older persons, labor statistics indicate that
among persons looking for work, older persons have longer periods of
unemployment and more difficulty finding jobs.
Congress passed the ADEA, in 1967, to eliminate discrimination on
the basis of age and to promote employment of older persons because of
an individual's ability to carry out a job's duties. This landmark
employment law did not affect airline pilots who are subject to a 1959
FAA rule, requiring they stop flying at age 60. This 46-year-old rule
continues to be in effect, even though there is no sound justification
for it.
The most frequently articulated argument to justify continuing the
age-based employment discrimination for commercial pilots is medical.
This argument does not hold water, however. Medical evidence
consistently shows that chronological age is a poor determinant of
ability, and that capability varies among individuals independent of
age. The medical and scientific means exist to test individual fitness
for jobs. Regular fitness testing is not a new concept; it is already
in force for airline pilots. They are subject to periodic medical
certification and successful completion of flight simulator exercises.
Although the FAA has statutory authority to grant exemptions to the
Rule in the public interest, it has never done so. Challenges to the
age 60 rule, and to the FAA's refusal to grant any exemptions from it,
have been unsuccessful over the years. Perhaps this year the arbitrary
age limit will be overturned in favor of sound policy recognizing that
years of experience, good judgment, and conformance with objective
performance and medical criteria are much better indicators of a
pilot's competence. AARP supports S. 65, sponsored by Senator James M.
Inhofe and its companion bill. H.R. 65, sponsored by Representative Jim
Gibbons. Both bills would link pilot retirement with the normal
retirement age under Social Security. S. 65 and H.R. 65 take an
important step toward eliminating the mandatory retirement age for
pilots.
The current age cap on employment for commercial airline pilots is
contrary to the principles of equal opportunity and treatment.
Furthermore, it is a waste of valuable skills and experiences. Federal
law should not deny capable individuals the right to work based on out-
dated, invalid, and discriminatory assumptions about older workers.
Mandatory retirement based on age should be eliminated--not just for
those whose employment situation is addressed by the hearing today--but
for anyone who is subject to arbitrary age limits.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Airline Division
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Airline Division,
represents 40,000 aviation employees, including over 7,000 air
transport pilots (ATPs). Our organization supports changing the Age 60
Rule, and urges Congress to pass S. 65 and H.R. 65, legislation
introduced by Senator James Inhofe and by Congressman James Gibbons,
respectively.
The Federal Aviation Regulation at 14 C.F.R. Sec. 121.383(c),
commonly referred to as the Age 60 Rule, is a simplistic rule for a
complex problem. The Age 60 Rule, enacted in December 1959, and
effective in March 1960, was the subject of controversy then, and has
remained so throughout the past 45 years. From its inception, the Rule
has been the focus of numerous inconclusive studies, several subsequent
rulemaking proceedings, many court battles, and occasional legislative
attempts to overturn or modify it.
Once again, the Age 60 Rule is in the spotlight. A confluence of
events in the aviation industry (e.g., 9/11, fuel prices, chronic
industry mismanagement, etc.) that have resulted in bankruptcies, wage
concessions, the freezing of pensions and/or the transfer of pension
plans to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and the
resultant unexpected loss of income for pilots who face retirement in
the immediate or near future, have refocused attention on the issue of
forced retirement for pilots flying under Part 121.
The Teamsters Airline Division supports the proposed legislation,
which would permit pilots to fly until age 65. At the same time
however. we advocate that the legislation be amended to include two
additional components: (1) pension protection for those pilots retiring
or required to retire at age 60 for medical or other reasons (such
protection could be temporary and designed to phaseout over period of
10 to 15 years), including adjustments to PBGC and Social Security
rules to accommodate the new mandatory retirement age: and (2) an
independent longitudinal study of the correlation between aviation
safety and pilot age.
The Age 60 Rule was promulgated in response to the air carriers'
desires and needs, rather than any demonstrable safety concerns. Fifty
years later, however, this issue is no longer relevant except to
explain the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) dogged reluctance
to modify the Rule. The Committee should instead consider: (1) the
meager scientific evidence cited to support the Age 60 Rule when it was
first issued; (2) the lack of credible evidence used to defend the Rule
throughout its many legal, legislative, and regulatory challenges; and
(3) the FAA's continued intransigence in view of emerging scientific
evidence regarding aging and cognition. The FAA's policy is undermined
by its highly selective, inconsistent, and specious application of the
scientific literature.
An objective review of pertinent literature makes it clear that age
is neither a valid nor reliable predictor of a pilot's ability to fly a
transport aircraft safely. Rather, the pilot's individual health and
cognitive status, as well as training, skill, experience, and
demonstrated proficiency, best determine suitability for active ATP
status. Even the FAA's own Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI)
investigators, after having conducted an extensive review of selective
literature from 1990 to 1999, noted, ``the vast majority of the
scientists who have subsequently reviewed and commented on the issues
associated with the continued use of chronological age suggest that
there are better alternatives.'' (Schroeder, et al., 2000) (emphasis
added). ``Better alternatives'' would surely result in equal, if not
superior, safety effects.
Opponents have alleged that the Age 60 Rule was issued in response
to a ``suggestion'' from then-Chairman of American Airlines, C.R.
Smith, to then-FAA Administrator, General Elwood Quesada, that ``[I]t
may be necessary for the regulatory agency to fix some suitable age for
retirement. (Smith letter dated February 5, 1959). The Professional
Pilots Federation (PPF) claimed in a 2002 petition for exemption that,
``the age 60 rule was not initiated as a safety measure'' but rather
``to force Smith's older pilots into early retirement.'' The FAA has
denied these allegations. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported,
in 1989, that according to the FAA, the Rule was a response to FAA
concerns that ``the use of pilots aged 60 and over in air carrier
operations presented a safety hazard'' and ``this concern emerged as
major airlines, whose practice was to allow senior pilots the option of
flying the newest and largest aircraft, were making the transition to
turbojets.'' The ``FAA reasoned that accidents among older pilots,
although not a problem at the time, could become one.'' (GAO, 1989).
Interestingly, the GAO also stated that it was not age, as such that
caused the FAA concern, but rather the increased frequency of impairing
medical conditions associated with aging.
Schroeder, Harris, and Broach (2002), based on their review of the
historical literature, reported that several factors drove the
promulgation of the Age 60 Rule. These included an aircraft accident
involving a 59 year old pilot and a new generation turbo jet aircraft,
the supposed difficulties older pilots had experienced in transitioning
to the new generation jet aircraft, the growing numbers of older
pilots, and the increased incidence of coronary heart disease in older
adults, resulting in a greater probability for sudden incapacitation in
older pilots. They also noted that the FAA was concerned with the
``subtle consequences of age'' that might have a negative impact on
pilot performance and judgment.
The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) has agreed,
at least for the past 25 years, with both the FAA's account of the
Rule's origin and its scientific validity. In its comments to the
docket on the PPF petition for exemption filed in October 2002, ALPA
argued that the PPF's claims regarding the Rule's origin ``are neither
relevant nor supportable'' and that ``even if the Rule's origin were
questionable, those questions would have been cured by the Agency's
later proceedings.'' (Emphasis added.) Ironically, ALPA's support of
the Rule is at odds with its original position on the issue; it was
ALPA who filed the first legal case against the Age 60 Rule, because it
strongly opposed the Rule for 20 years.
When ALPA sued the FAA, it claimed that the Rule: ``(1) was outside
the rulemaking power of the Administrator; (2) could not be promulgated
without a hearing, as required by either the Constitution or the
Administrative Procedure Act; (3) was not reasonable related to safety
concerns; and (4) was arbitrary.'' ALPA v. Ouesada, 182 F.Supp. 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), 286 F.2d 319 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961) (emphasis added); (GAO,
1989). The courts rejected ALPA's arguments.
ALPA's remarks to the 2000 Age 60 docket notwithstanding, ALPA's
official publication, Airline Pilot, recently included a historical
synopsis that suggests the Rule had little to do with safety, and more
to do with accommodating the carriers' desires to rid themselves of
older pilots. (Francis, 2005). In 1958, ALPA signed its first jet
contract, with National Airlines. According to Francis, air carriers
wanted to transition into jet flying quickly, and minimize the cost by
using younger military pilots who already had jet training and
experience. FAA regulations did not limit a pilot's age, so several
carriers implemented their own mandatory retirement age. (Holbrook,
1974). When American, TWA, and Western airlines attempted to force
pilots into retirement at age 60, these policies were challenged via
the grievance process. (Francis, 2005). The arbitrator in each case
ruled in favor of the pilots.
American ignored the arbitrator's ruling and continued to enforce
mandatory retirement at age 60, which helped lead to a pilot strike
from December 20, 1958 through January 10, 1959. American finally
capitulated, met the pilot's strike demands, and agreed to reinstate
three captains who were forced to retire. After the strike, American
delayed reinstating the pilots and its Chairman wrote a private letter
to the FAA Administrator suggesting the need for a statutory retirement
age. American also conducted a study of their pilots (which reported
that older pilots required more training than younger pilots to
transition from propeller to jet aircraft) to substantiate the need for
a mandatory retirement age. FAA attorneys, however, recommended that
the study not be used to justify age limits, and advised instead that
the FAA use medical criteria to justify the Rule. (Francis, 2005).
ALPA maintained its opposition to the Rule until 1980, arguing for
20 years that an individual pilot's mental and physical abilities,
rather than an arbitrary age limit, should determine fitness for
flight. ALPA also insisted that the Age 60 Rule was discriminatory,
posed an economic hardship for pilots, was based on faulty evidence,
and that subsequent medical evidence refuted the FAA's premise for the
Rule. In 1971, ALPA engaged the services of four internationally
recognized physicians to testify at a public hearing in opposition to
the medical claims made by the FAA. (Holbrook, 1974). By 1980, however,
ALPA's interests had shifted, and it decided to support Age 60 ``in
view of its relevance to contract items such as retirement benefits.''
(Francis, 2005) (emphasis added). ALPA also acknowledged that as the
number of younger pilots increased proportionally in its ranks, the
importance of overturning the Rule diminished since these younger
members were interested in advancing their careers by moving more
quickly into the left seat. (Francis, 2005).
In testimony before this committee on July 19, 2005, ALPA, speaking
in opposition to the proposed legislation, asserted that the Age 60
Rule is based on ``two fundamental principles of medical science that
are indisputable . . . the risks of incapacitation and unacceptable
decrements in performance increase with age'' and ``medical science has
not developed a regimen of reliable tests that can be administered
effectively to determine which aging pilots will become incapacitated,
or whose performance will decline to an unacceptable level.'' (Woerth,
2005). Both of these arguments reflect those put forth by the FAA. Both
are misleading.
While the risk, and incidence of incapacitation and performance
decrement increases with age, these outcomes are not inherently linked
to aging as is implied. Research on aging suggests that the cognitive
decline and performance impairment associated with aging is actually
more a functional outcome of chronic disease, especially cardiovascular
disease, than age per se. This relationship between disease and
physical and cognitive decline is well established, and in fact, was
recognized by the FAA's own medical experts in the early 1960s (Balke,
1963; Spieth, 1964; and Wentz 1964).
Another argument the FAA offers is the relationship of pilot age to
accidents based on several studies (Broach, 1999; Golaszewski, 1983,
1991, 1993; Kay, Hillman, Hyland, Voros, Harris, and Deimler, 1994)
that have been roundly criticized for methodological and analytical
flaws. Notably, none of these studies were published in peer-reviewed
journals, but were still referenced in the FAA's testimony before this
Committee on July 19, 2005, and the FAA reiterated another often cited
justification for the Rule: ``There is no absolute, scientific formula
that may be readily applied'' to determining a pilot's fitness for duty
after age 60.
The assertion by the FAA and supporters of the Age 60 Rule that
medical science has not developed a ``regimen of reliable tests'' to
identify pilots at risk for incapacitation, or who might be cognitively
impaired is at best disingenuous. Medical science has come a long way
since 1959. The medical certification requirements and proficiency
testing protocols for ATPs are rigorous, and certainly sufficient to
identify pilots at risk for incapacitation and impaired performance.
The system is effective; the record speaks for itself.
In fact, the FAA and ALPA extolled the validity and reliability of
the medical tests and proficiency evaluations imposed by the FAA and
air carriers when they testified in April 2000, before the Subcommittee
on Aviation in the U.S. House of Representatives, on issues arising out
of the crash of Egypt Air. At that hearing, ALPA pointed out that
``Airline pilots are certainly the most frequently tested and monitored
professionals in the world, in regard to physical and mental health as
well as professional performance and competence.'' (Woerth, 2000).
Further, in arguing against the need for additional psychological
testing as was then being contemplated, ALPA claimed that the existing
medical and proficiency evaluation requirements provided ``ample
means'' to identify impaired pilots. It is illogical and inconsistent
to now claim that these same medical and proficiency tests lose all
validity and reliability when a pilot reaches age 60. While opinion and
self-interest (whether based on membership polls, economic necessity,
or political expediency) may change over time, fundamental scientific
principles do not.
Considering the relationship between pathology and performance
decrement/cognitive decline, the reliability and validity of the FAA's
medical certification program for air transport pilots is certainly
important. Since the incidence of pathology increases with age, one
would expect that medical disqualifications of pilots would likewise
increase with age, if the certification process was indeed valid and
reliable. Additionally, one would expect that the initial application
for a first-class medical certificate would disqualify individuals with
underlying health problems, and would result in a ``healthy worker
effect'' in this population. Analysis of the FAA medical certification
data supports both these hypotheses.
The age-specific denial rates for air transport pilots are
compelling evidence that the FAA medical screening process works
dependably to purge the ATP population of persons with those
pathologies most associated with cognitive impairment or risk for
incapacitation. This information is not new. In the late 1960s, the FAA
initiated a study to quantify the attributes of medical certification
denials in an effort to identify standards that might need amendment,
as well as specific pathologies that might be of special concern in the
aviation environment. (Siegel & Booze, 1968). While this initial
attempt to analyze medical denial actions does not provide much insight
relative to ATPs and the Age 60 Rule, it did lay important groundwork
for later FAA studies. For example, Siegel and Booze noted that
cardiovascular disease was the most significant medical
disqualification factor for aviators. Since several FAA researchers
(Balke, 1963; Spieth, 1964; and Wentz 1964) had reported a relationship
between cardiovascular pathologies and cognitive decline, Booze's
findings were noteworthy and emphasized the importance of careful
screening for cardiovascular disease.
In 1974, Booze conducted another study to quantify medical
disqualification events. This study was the first in a program
established by the FAA, to examine and monitor denial actions
periodically to identify research direction, needed modifications to
standards, and risk determination criteria. The primary purpose was the
``enhancement of flight safety through medical program data analysis.''
In the first two program reports, the FAA reviewed the medical
disqualification rates for all pilots (Booze, 1974; Dark, 1980) and in
subsequent years (Dark, 1983; Dark, 1984; Dark, 1986; and Downey &
Dark, 1992) they focused on the disqualification rates for airline
pilots. In every report, cardiovascular disease was identified as the
most frequent cause of disqualification; in the most recent analysis
(Downey & Dark, 1992) it accounted for 33.5 percent of the denials. It
appears that the FAA's medical protocols have reliably eliminated a
significant cause of cognitive decline and impairment in the ATP
population. Additionally, in each report, the rate of denial increased
with age. In the 1992 analysis, for example, the age specific denial
rates per 1,000 pilots were: 25-29 years--1.0; 30-34 years--1.0; 35-39
years--1.0; 40-44 years--2.7; 45-49 years--5.6; 50-54 years--9.7; and
55-59 years--16.2.\1\ These studies, along with the very small number
of incapacitations experienced in air transport operations, confirm
that the FAA's medical certification process does reliably screen
pilots who are at risk for impairment and incapacitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ We were able to obtain raw data from the FAA/CAMI on the number
of applicants and denials for first class medicals for 2004. Analysis
shows the same trend (i.e., increasing number of disqualifications with
increasing age); however, because the raw data do not specifically
identify air transport pilots, the information does not lend itself to
direct comparison with the referenced FAA studies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is ironic that the FAA's preoccupation with cognitive decline
and impaired performance seems to be limited to aging pilots (and those
who abuse alcohol or drugs) while ignoring fatigued pilots. A robust
body of scientific literature clearly establishes a relationship
between fatigue and impairment. There is also ample evidence that the
current Federal Aviation Regulations for flight/duty time and minimum
rest do not adequately prevent fatigue in air carrier operations. The
FAA last addressed the fatigue issue with a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in 1995. Ten years later, we still wait for FAA action;
there has been no disposition of comments, no Final Rule, no change. In
the meantime, pilots of all ages continue to fly fatigued, and possibly
impaired, because of excessive duty periods and inadequate rest.
Finally, the FAA's insistence that any change to the Age 60 Rule
maintain an ``equivalent level of safety'' is an impossible test to
meet because the point of reference is nonexistent. In this instance,
the ``equivalent level of safety'' is a ruse. Nowhere in the scientific
literature, or in any FAA report or document, is there a measure of
effect that can be directly attributed to the Age 60 Rule, as opposed
to, for example, improved weather forecasting, improved engines, better
pilot training, more reliable instrumentation, and so forth. There is
no measure of effect--positive or negative--that the Age 60 Rule has
had on aviation safety. Absent such a baseline measure, how can one
demonstrate that a proposed change to the Rule would provide an equal
or greater level of safety?
The Age 60 Rule is not a safety rule. Better alternatives exist to
ensure that the active ATP population remains healthy and free from
impairment that would compromise air safety. The public would be better
served if the FAA directed its limited resources toward enhancing these
alternatives. While the FAA may legitimately claim that it followed the
rulemaking process in issuing the Age 60 Rule, it cannot claim that the
scientific and medical evidence conclusively validates the Rule. Nor
has the FAA ever proved that the Rule's implementation resulted in a
safer aviation environment. The Aerospace Medical Association, in a
2004 position paper and in 2005 testimony before this Committee, argued
that there is ``insufficient medical evidence to support restriction of
pilot certification based on age alone.'' It is time to modify the Age
60 Rule. S. 65 and H.R. 65 together are an appropriate first step in
the right direction.
Works Cited
Aerospace Medical Association. (2004). The Age 60 Rule: Position Paper.
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 75, 3, 708-
715.
Air Line Pilots Association, International. (2002). Comments on the
matter of the petition of Dallas E. Butler, et al. (FAA
Docket. FAA-2002-12501). October 11, 2002. Available at:
http://dms.dot.gov.
Balke, B. (1963). Experimental Evaluation of Work Capacity as Related
to Chronological and Physiological Aging. (Report 63-18,
Sept. 1963). Oklahoma City, OK: FAA Aviation Medical
Service, Aeromedical Research Division, Civil Aeromedical
Research Institute. Available at: http://www.faa.gov.
Booze, C.F. (1974). Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airman
Applicants During Calendar Year 1971. (FAA-AM-74-5, May
1974). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Aviation Medicine. Available at:
http://www.faa.gov.
Broach, D. (1999). Pilot age and accident rates. A re-Analysis of the
1999 Chicago Tribune report and discussion of technical
considerations for future analysis. (As cited in Broach et
al. (2000). Unpublished Civil Aeromedical Institute report
prepared for Congress.) Oklahoma City, OK: FAA Civil
Aeromedical Institute Human Resources Research Division.
Dark, S.J. (1980). Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airman
Applicants in Calendar Years 1977 and 1978. (FAA-AM-80-19,
October 1980). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Aviation Medicine. Available at:
http://www.faa.gov.
Dark, S. (1983). Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airline
Pilots. (FAA-AM-83-5, January 1983). Washington, D.C.:
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aviation
Medicine. Available at: http://www.faa.gov.
Dark, S.J. (1984). Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots. (FAA-AM-84-
9), August 1984). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Aviation Medicine. Available at:
http://www.faa.gov.
Dark, S.J. (1986). Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots. (FAA-AM-86-7,
June 1986). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Aviation Medicine. Available at:
http://www.faa.gov.
Downey, L.E. & Dark, S.J. (1992). Survey Reveals Age and Pathology
Trends for Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots. Flight
Safety Digest. September 1992. Flight Safety Foundation:
Alexandria, VA. Available at: http://www.flightsafety.org.
Francis, G. (2005). Origins of the Age 60 Rule. Air Line Pilot. January
2005. Washington, D.C.: Air Line Pilots Association,
International. Available at: http://www.alpa.org.
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1989). Aviation Safety--Information
on FAA's Age 60 Rule for Pilots. (GAO/RCED-90-45FS.
November 1989). Washington, D.C.: General Accounting
Office.
Golaszewski, R.S. (1983). The influence of total flight time, recent
flight time and age on pilot accident rates. (Tech.Rep. No.
DTRS57-83-P-80750). Bethesda, MD: Acumenics Research and
Technology.
Holbrook, H.A. (1974). Civil Aviation Medicine in the Bureaucracy.
Bethesda, MD: Banner Publishing Company, Inc.
Jordan, J.L. (2005). Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Aviation Subcommittee Hearing
on the Federal Aviation Administration's Age 60 Rule. July
19, 2005. Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov.
Kay, E.J., Hillman, D.J., Hyland, D.T., Voros, R.S., Harris, R.M., and
Deimler, J.D. (1994). Age 60 rule research, Part III:
Consolidated data base experiments final report. (FAA-AM-
92-22). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Aviation Medicine. Available at: http://
www.faa.gov.
Rayman, R.B. (2005). Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Aviation Subcommittee Hearing
on the Federal Aviation Administration's Age 60 Rule. July
19, 2005. Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov.
Schroeder, D.J., Harris Jr., H.C., and Broach, D. (2000), Pilot age and
performance: An annotated bibliography (1990-1999).
Oklahoma City, OK: FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute.
Available at http://www.faa.gov.
Siegel, P.V. & Booze, C.F. (1968). A Retrospective Analysis of
Aeromedical Certification Denial Actions: January 1961-
December 1967. (FAA-AM-68-9, May 1969). Washington, D.C.:
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aviation
Medicine. Available at http://www.faa.gov.
Smith, C.R. (personal communication to Elwood Quesada, February 5,
1959). Available at: http://www.ppf.org/exhibits.htm.
Spieth, W. (1964). Cardiovascular Health Status, Age, and Psychological
Performance. FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, Georgetown
Clinical Research Institute. (Report 64-4). Washington,
D.C. Available at: http://www.faa.gov.
Wentz, A.E. (1964). Studies on Aging in Aviation Personnel. (FAA-AM-64-
1). Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Aviation Medicine, Georgetown Clinical Research
Institute. Available at: http://www.faa.gov.
Woerth, D. (2002). Statement before the Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House
of Representatives, On Issues Arising Out of the Crash of
Egypt Air 990. April 11, 2002. Available at:
http://cf.alpa.org/Internet/TM/tm041100.htm.
Woerth, D. (2005). Statement before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Aviation Subcommittee Hearing
on the Federal Aviation Administration's Age 60 Rule. July
19, 2005. Available at: http://thomas.loc.gov.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gordon H. Smith to
Captain Ralph Hunter
Question 1. If a pilot can meet the same requirements when they are
over the age of 60 that they met when they were in their 30s, 40s, or
50s, why should he or she no longer be able to operate a commercial
passenger aircraft?
Answer. The current medical and performance standards applied to
30, 40, and 50-year old pilots do not provide an adequate test for the
physical and cognitive declines due to advancing age. The current
testing regime was never designed for this task, and it would be a
mistake to assume that it was. In fact, the central issue of the entire
Age 60 Rule debate is that the current state of medical and performance
based testing does not provide a safe, reliable, and comprehensive
method to screen for the effects of aging. This salient fact is even
acknowledged by the opponents of the Age 60 Rule since they are merely
requesting to extend--and not eliminate--the mandatory retirement rule.
Requiring an individual to retire from a chosen profession due to
the inevitable impact of aging should never be taken lightly. While
aviation safety considerations demand some method of mandatory pilot
retirement, science and technology have not yet provided us with the
proper tools to identify high risk pilots on an individual basis.
Because of the absence of effective screening tools, virtually all of
the participants in this discussion agree that some chronological age
limit is necessary.
The opponents of the current regulation cannot point to any
existing test or screening method that is supported by objective data,
and, which would provide a safe and effective replacement for the Age
60 Rule. By arbitrarily increasing the retirement age in absence of
such a method, Congress would be exposing the traveling public to an
increased and unknown level of risk. Further research is warranted
before making any significant change to this important regulation.
Question 1a. Would you support additional and more stringent
testing and training for pilots 60 years of age that would indicate
whether they are able to safely operate a commercial airliner?
Answer. The Allied Pilots Association strongly supports additional
research into the effects of aging on pilot health and performance.
Both the FAA and the Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) have cited
the critical need for this research in their testimony to the
Committee. While numerous studies of pilots have unquestionably shown
that aging inevitably degrades performance and increases the risk of
incapacitation, no one has yet been able to establish measurable
criteria or reliable tests to identify when the level of risk reaches
an unacceptable level.
The supporters and proponents of the Age 60 Rule have highlighted a
great philosophical divide on how to proceed with any further research
in this area. The supporters of the Age 60 Rule advocate the time-
tested technique of establishing safe practices and procedures with
objective data prior to any implementation in commercial aviation. On
the other hand, the opponents of the Age 60 Rule are, in effect, asking
Congress to conduct an experiment on the traveling public. By raising
the mandatory retirement age first and collecting data later,
commercial airline passengers would be exposed to an unknown level of
risk. This is no different than introducing a new aircraft, engine, or
system into commercial airline service in the absence of adequate
testing based upon a sincere belief that safety would not be
compromised. This approach is simply not acceptable in aviation.
If further research on aging actually produces safe and reliable
medical tests, or performance measurements that conclusively screens
for the detrimental effects of aging, then APA would support its use in
conjunction with a change to the mandatory retirement age. However,
such tests do not currently exist, nor are they projected to exist in
the near future.
Question 2. How many pilots does the Age 60 Rule affect within your
airline or association each year?
Answer. Over the next 5 years, approximately 1,950 pilots (about 20
percent of American's active pilots) are expected to retire due to the
Age 60 Rule.
Question 2a. Of these pilots who are no longer allowed to fly
commercial passenger aircraft, are many interested in continuing as a
pilot?
Answer. While we have not asked this specific question of this
particular group of pilots, it is important to point out that every
commercial pilot was aware of the Age 60 Rule when they were hired at
their airline. I would also strongly caution against altering an
important safety-related rule based upon individual preferences.
Maintaining or increasing the current level of aviation safety must be
the primary test by which any new regulation is judged. In fact, many
of the current FAA regulations governing pilot qualifications,
responsibilities, hours on duty, and rest requirements exist to counter
the very real personal and economic pressures to operate aircraft in an
unsafe manner. Safety concerns were the original basis of the Age 60
Rule, and in the absence of compelling evidence for change, the Federal
Government's continuing commitment to aviation safety demands the
retention of this important regulation.
Question 3. Do many pilots continue working for your airline (or
airline you represent) in a different position, or do most enter
retirement?
Answer. Most pilots that retire due to the Age 60 Rule do not
continue employment at American Airlines. We do not compile data on
pilot activities after retirement from American, but we do know
anecdotally that some of them do go on to other careers in and out of
aviation.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gordon H. Smith to
Captain Duane E. Woerth
Question 1. If a pilot can meet the same requirements when they are
over the age of 60 that they met when they were in their 30s, 40s, or
50s, why should he or she no longer be able to operate a commercial
passenger aircraft?
Answer. The current requirements, by definition, assume that an
airline pilot will not fly past age 60, so they do not attempt to
identify many of the physical manifestations of the aging process,
whether that assessment is done at age 30 or age 59. In the current
system, there is no testing required by the FAA, at any age, which
would serve to identify cognitive degradation or an increased
likelihood of age-related debilitating illness. The bottom line is that
the current rule has proven to be safe for over forty years and there
is no medical evidence, nor any medical testing protocol, that would
suggest that safety would be improved by changing the Rule.
Question 1a. Would you support additional and more stringent
testing and training for pilots 60 years of age that would indicate
whether they are able to safely operate a commercial airliner?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, ALPA did a comprehensive poll
of our members and specifically addressed this issue. Fewer than one-
third of our members would support any sort of more stringent medical,
proficiency, or operational requirements for pilots over the age of 60.
Question 2. How many pilots does the Age 60 Rule affect within your
airline or association each year?
Answer. The best data we have is a comprehensive study of Northwest
pilots retiring since 1993. I believe that study is representative of
most, if not all, U.S. ALPA carriers, and it shows that about 57
percent of retiring pilots are retiring because they have reached age
60. The other 43 percent retire for a variety of reasons, including
medical retirement and elective early retirement.
Question 2a. Of these pilots who are no longer allowed to fly
commercial passenger aircraft, are many interested in continuing as a
pilot? Do many pilots continue working for your airline (or airline you
represent) in a different position, or do most enter retirement?
Answer. We don't have specific data on what our members do after
they leave active airline pilot service, but I know many of them
continue in aviation. Some fly for corporate or FAR Part 135 operators,
which, incidentally, is a category of operations that has an accident
rate almost ten times higher than FAR Part 121 airline operations.
Still others take non-flying positions at airlines.
Question 3. What were their main reasons for their opposition to a
possible rule change?
Answer. Safety. The Age 60 Rule recognizes that subtle declines in
cognitive and neuropsychological functions occur during the aging
process, and have a potentially adverse impact on the ability of pilots
to perform at maximum safety. Moreover, medical science has still not
devised a reliable testing protocol that can accurately screen pilots
for possible exemption from this safety standard. Until such technology
exists, the Age 60 Rule continues to prove both reasonable, and within
an acceptable range of risk for commercial air transportation
operations. Piloting is a demanding profession, and one of the highest
threats to aviation safety is fatigue. Sixteen-hour domestic duty
days--even longer with more trans-Pacific international operations--are
facts of life for airline pilots. Irregular shifts, all-night
operations, and significant circadian rhythm challenges all contribute
to decreasing the margins of safety. After what ALPA pilots have been
through over the last several years--terrorism, bankruptcy, furloughs,
pay cuts, pension terminations, and work rule changes--a clear and
sound majority still believe that safety considerations are entirely
too important to set aside the Age 60 Rule. As stated at the hearing,
this rule should only be changed if it can be guaranteed--beyond all
reasonable doubt--that raising the operational age limit for commercial
airline pilots will not jeopardize safety standards.
Question 3a. Did pilots of all ages oppose the ruling equally?
Answer. No. Age is a factor that greatly affects the position
pilots take on the Age 60 Rule. Pilots under the age of 40 opposed
changing the Rule by nearly a three-to-one margin (74 percent to 24
percent). In the 41 to 45 grouping, 31 percent said ``yes'' to an Age
60 Rule change, and 68 percent said ``no.'' Among pilots age 46& 50, 40
percent said ``yes,'' and 59 percent said ``no'' to changing the Rule.
Additionally, had the nearly 6,000 furloughed ALPA pilots--most of whom
fall in these age groups--been included in the polling, support for
maintaining the Age 60 Rule would have been even higher.
From this point on, however, the percentages reverse. Among pilots
aged 51 to 55, 61 percent indicated they want a rule change, while 37
percent were opposed. The strongest support for a change came from
pilots aged 56-60, with 80 percent favoring a change and 19 percent
opposed.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gordon H. Smith to
Captain Joseph ``Ike'' Eichelkraut
Question 1. If a pilot can meet the same requirements when they are
over the age of 60 that they met when they were in their 30s, 40s, or
50s, why should he or she no longer be able to operate a commercial
passenger aircraft?
Answer. Southwest Airlines and the Southwest Airlines Pilots'
Association strongly support S. 65, which would end the Age 60 Rule,
and allow pilots to retire when they are eligible for their full Social
Security Benefits. The Aerospace Medical Association and the
International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) have both said that there
is insufficient medical evidence to support an age-based rule. We
believe that pilots should be able to work as long as they are able to
pass an FAA Class 1 Medical exam, and meet all the safety criteria and
standards in their check rides and simulator tests. If an age
restriction is put in place due to political reasons, we feel strongly
that, at a minimum, any limit should allow pilots to work until they
are eligible for full Social Security and Medicare benefits. This is
especially important in the current environment in which airlines are
freezing, limiting, or terminating the defined benefit plans that were
promised contractually to their pilots. It is equally important for
airlines, such as Southwest, offering defined contribution benefits to
their pilots so that they may maximize those benefits and their Social
Security contributions.
Question 1a. Would you support additional, and more stringent
testing, and training for pilots 60 years of age that would indicate
whether they are able to safely operate a commercial airliner?
Answer. The FAA has safety standards that are the envy of the
world. ICAO, in its recent report, recommended that member countries
adopt a maximum age restriction of 65 (up from 60) in multi-crew
operations, and essentially suggested that the world adopt the FAA
standard as the suggested regime of medical and cognitive testing. We
know that the checks and balances now in the FAA system are self-
purging and believe they are a sufficient test of any pilot's
capabilities. The Class 1 medical exam, which must be passed every 6
months, and the annual EKG test, is a sufficient medical screen to
detect health concerns that may arise and create issues in the cockpit.
Furthermore, the semi-annual simulator check rides and random in-flight
check rides, by check airmen, are an excellent screen of piloting
skills and cognitive ability at any age.
Question 2. How many pilots does the Age 60 Rule affect within your
airline or association each year?
Answer. Southwest, being a relatively new airline has not had to
deal with many retirements until just recently. In the past 5 years,
SWA has experienced only a combined total of 281 pilot retirements, of
which, 86 percent stayed beyond their 59th birthday. We currently have
129 active members aged 59 or older, and this will raise the percentage
next year to over 92 percent.
Question 2a. Of these pilots who are no longer allowed to fly
commercial passenger aircraft, are many interested in continuing as a
pilot? Do many pilots continue working for your airline (or airline you
represent) in a different position, or do most enter retirement?
Answer. Most pilots at SWA who are forced into retirement at 60
would prefer to stay, whether for personal or financial reasons, e.g.--
a defined contribution retirement plan which grows both with
investments and with added (401k) contributions. Although we do not
track the employment activities of retirees, we know that most go on to
take jobs in other parts of aviation, whether it is flying for overseas
carriers that don't have the restrictive FAA Age 60 rule, or in other
parts of commercial aviation that do not require early retirement.
There are only 2 management jobs per year, on average, available to
Southwest pilots over 60, so this does not represent a substantial
employment opportunity for pilots over 60 at our airline.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Gordon H. Smith to
Captain Al Spain
Question 1. If a pilot can meet the same requirements when they are
over the age of 60 that they met when they were in their 30s, 40s, or
50s, why should he or she no longer be able to operate a commercial
passenger aircraft?
Answer. JetBlue believes that all pilots should be judged on their
individual ability and thus, if at age 60 or 61, just as at age 40 or
50, a pilot is judged competent to fly and medically able to fly, he or
she should not be prohibited by law from such flying. The tools are
already in place to ensure appropriate standards of safety. medical
testing and flight performance for all pilots, regardless of age.
Question 1a. Would you support additional and more stringent
testing, and training for pilots 60 years of age that would indicate
whether they are able to safely operate a commercial airliner?
Answer. Consistent with the answer above, current requirements for
Recurrent Ground School, twice-yearly simulator training and check
rides, and annual line checks prove the pilots flying and cognitive
abilities for the specific aircraft and operation. Maintaining a Class
I FAA Flight Physical requires a complete physical two times per year
along with an annual EKG.
Question 2. How many pilots does the Age 60 Rule affect within your
airline or association each year?
Answer. It would vary considerably from year to year, and depends
on future hiring trends. However in the near future we would not see
more than five (5) to eight (8) pilots per year leaving the cockpit due
to the Age 60 Rule.
Question 2a. Of these pilots who are no longer allowed to fly
commercial passenger aircraft, are many interested in continuing as a
pilot? Do many pilots continue working for your airline (or airline you
represent) in a different position, or do most enter retirement?
Answer. At JetBlue, all pilots impacted by the Age 60 Rule, thus
far, have desired to keep flying. In fact, each of the pilots continues
to work at JetBlue and most still do fly tech ops, ferry, or other
flights that do not carry revenue passengers, though many of the
flights do carry non-revenue passengers. Additionally, many pilots who
are approaching age 60 are currently actively searching for jobs.
Ironically, if the retirement rule is not changed, these pilots will
most likely be flying passengers in business jets, or even business
versions of commercial airliners, within the U.S. airspace system, and
consistent with the rules of the same FAA that bars their flying
commercial airlines.
______
ATA Holdings Corp.
Indianapolis, IN, July 19, 2005
Hon. Conrad Burns,
Chairman,
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Burns:
I am writing this on behalf of the pilots of ATA Airlines, Inc.
(ATA); a company I founded thirty-two years ago . . . and was the first
pilot.
Our pilots recently voted to oppose the mandatory Age 60 retirement
law; both in Congress and through their union. They have my
unconditional support on this issue. The Age 60 Law was, is and will
forever be, capricious and arbitrary. From the executive level of
airline management, as well as from the cockpit, I know there is no
medical issue justifying it; there never has been.
This law, 14 CFR 121.383(c), is simply age discrimination. It can
he defined in other terms.
You will have before you H.R. 65. sponsored by the Honorable Jim
Gibbons, and co-sponsored by an impressive list of bipartisan
supporters. H.R. 65 will move the mandatory retirement age for airline
pilots back to 65. This is still discriminatory, but is at least a
first step toward eliminating the age factor entirely, and ultimately
judging individual pilots on their ability and performance.
Please support the passage of H.R. 65, its Senate counterpart, S.
65 and any process that will eliminate this arcane rule with the full
weight of your most esteemed office.
Sincerely,
George Mikelsons,
Chairman, President/Chief Executive Officer.
______
Statements in Support of S. 65 and H.R. 65 *
Captain Roger Cox, Tempe, AZ.
Donald W. Wurster, First Officer, Brownsburg, IN.
Paul Turner III, Charlotte, NC.
Captain George Simmons, Charlotte, NC.
Captain Michael Oksner (Retired), Nassau Bay, TX.
Captain Billy Walker, Phoenix, AZ.
Captain Pete Russo, Ph.D., System Chief Pilot, JetBlue Airlines.
Bob Lavender, Provo, UT.
Les Fuchs, Atlanta, GA.
Bob Franklin, Federal Way, WA.
Captain David J. McKennan, Cooper City, FL.
Captain Horace Burnett, Amarillo, TX.
Robin Wilkening, M.D., M.P.H., Annapolis, MD.
Captain Robert Lawrence Cabeen, St. Charles, Illinois.
Captain and Mrs. Frederick W. ``Bill'' Siegert, Elburn, IL.
Robert R. Perry, EMB-120 Check Airman and FAA Designated Examiner,
Yarmouthport, MA.
Ramon Navarro, Gary L. Cottingham.
Statements Against S. 65 and H.R. 65 *
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* The information and attachments referred to have been retained in
Committee files.
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Jack Heidel, Tennessee.