[Senate Hearing 109-1097]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1097
VESSEL OIL POLLUTION:
REDUCING THE RISK OF FUTURE SPILLS
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES
AND THE COAST GUARD
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 1, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES AND THE COAST GUARD
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine, Chairwoman
TED STEVENS, Alaska MARIA CANTWELL, Washington,
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Ranking
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on August 1, 2005................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 1
Prepared statement of Hon. Christine O. Gregoire, Governor of
the State of Washington submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell... 3
Witnesses
Boothe, Captain Myles, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.............. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Felleman, Fred, Northwest Director, Ocean Advocates.............. 57
Article by Mike Merritt, dated June 17, 1989, from the
Seattle Post--Intelligencer, entitled, ``Big oil spill
here? We're unprepared''................................... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Helton, Douglas, Incident Operations Coordinator, Office of
Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), DOC..................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Holmes, Frank E., Northwest Regional Manager, Western States
Petroleum Association (WSPA)................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Jensen, Dale, Program Manager, Spill Prevention, Preparedness,
and Response Program, Washington State Department of Ecology... 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Leschine, Professor Thomas M., Director, School of Marine
Affairs, University of Washington.............................. 51
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Sones, Hon. David, Vice Chairman, Makah Tribal Council; on behalf
of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (NWIFC)........... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Wright, Richard, Pacific/Northwest Region Vice President, Marine
Spill Response Corporation (MSRC).............................. 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Appendix
Jensen, Dale, letter with attachment, dated August 15, 2005, to
Hon. Maria Cantwell............................................ 75
Prince William Regional Citizens' Advisory Council (PWSRCAC),
prepared statement............................................. 78
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell
to:
Captain Myles Boothe......................................... 83
Douglas Helton............................................... 80
Richard Wright............................................... 90
Stevens, Naki, Director of Programs, People for Puget Sound,
letter, dated August 12, 2005, to Hon. Maria Cantwell.......... 77
VESSEL OIL POLLUTION:
REDUCING THE RISK OF FUTURE SPILLS
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MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Seattle, WA.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in the
Port of Seattle Commission Chambers, Hon. Maria Cantwell
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Good morning. Today's field hearing is a
hearing of the U.S. Senate Commerce Committee to make sure that
we are doing all we can to prevent future oil spills in
Washington State waterways, and to make sure that the area of
oil spill prevention and response is something that not only
Washington State is good at, but to learn from the Washington
State experience as we look at Federal policies and legislation
to address the nationwide risk from continued oil spills.
Today's hearing is important for several reasons. First and
foremost, Congress recently received a report from the Coast
Guard assessing the progress our Nation has made in
implementing the ground-breaking Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a
major piece of legislation Congress passed in the wake of the
devastating Exxon Valdez incident.
What the Coast Guard told us is that while the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 has done a lot to reduce the risk of
maritime oil pollution, spills are still occurring far too
often. In fact, according to the Coast Guard, the total volume
of oil spills in the United States from vessels in 2004 was
larger than in 1992.
One of the primary findings of the report was that the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund, which makes sure that resources are
available to respond to oil spills immediately, would be
running out before 2009. In fact, new predictions based on the
rising costs of the ongoing cleanup in the Delaware River from
the Athos I spill estimate that the Fund could actually run out
even sooner. This could have a big impact on Washington State,
which received over $5 million from the Trust Fund between 1997
and 2004 for emergency response and cleanup.
I was surprised to learn that spills can cost anywhere from
$1,000 per gallon of oil released. With 50 spills in Washington
State over 10,000 gallons over the past 30 years, the Trust
Fund has provided a critical source of funding, ensuring fast
and effective response, and that states are not crippled by the
burden of paying for oil spill cleanup.
Fortunately I am pleased to report that Congress, in the
energy bill passed last week, included language from Senate
Bill 1222, which would reinstate the fee that ensures the
health of the Oil Spill Cleanup Fund.
However, the Coast Guard report indicated that there are
other remaining issues. These issues include: one, whether the
cost of spills is outpacing the amount that responsible parties
are to pay; two, whether enough is being done to guard against
the risks from aging single-hulled vessels; three, whether all
of the navigational tools that we have at-hand are up to date
and being used fully; four, whether adequate manning and
inspection regulations are in place; and lastly, whether
response capabilities are sufficient.
Now, 15 years after the Oil Spill Pollution Act, I hope we
can reexamine these vital issues, especially as they relate
today to the State of Washington, so that I can take this
information back to my colleagues in Washington, D.C. That's
why I'm pleased to have the group of panelists that we have
before us today.
We have expert witnesses from two key Federal agencies
involved with oil spill prevention, response, and cleanup, and
I thank them for coming today. We are also lucky to have a key
player in our state's oil prevention effort, Mr. Dale Jensen
from the Washington State Department of Ecology. Washington
State has been extremely active in addressing and reducing oil
spill threats and has worked collaboratively with our Federal
partners.
I'd like to publicly thank Governor Gregoire for her
leadership on this critical issue. She has submitted a
statement and I will include that in the record of our hearing
today. We, I believe, do have a proud history with previous
Governors who have looked at the valuable resource we have in
Puget Sound, and taken aggressive action to protect it from oil
pollution.
Rounding out our government panel will be Dave Sones, who I
believe is on his way, the Vice Chairman of the Makah Tribal
Council who will speak on behalf of the Northwest Indian
Fisheries Commission in representing our diverse coastal
tribes.
Our second panel is equally important because it has a set
of witnesses that represent key stakeholders including the oil
industry, the oil spill response industry, a key academic
analyst, and members of our vigilant citizens' groups who have
been at the forefront of fighting to protect Puget Sound and
our incredible quality of life here.
So again, thank you all for coming. I know we share the
goals of having good, sound oil spill prevention, and if
necessary, cleanup, and we're all here to protect our
magnificent Puget Sound and coastal regions, not just in the
State of Washington but around the Nation. So I look forward to
hearing from each of you and your insights on the issues this
morning.
The Port here has a fabulous technology conference center,
but it doesn't allow us the same technology signals that we
have in the U.S. Senate. I'm going to ask, if you can, to keep
your comments to 5 minutes, and longer statements can be
submitted for the record.
And all I have here is this little digital clock--not only
am I chairing the hearing, I'm the official time-keeper here. I
will be lenient, but if you can, keep to your 5 minutes and
that will be helpful.
[The prepared statement of Governor Gregoire follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christine O. Gregoire,
Governor of the State of Washington
Senator and Madame Chair Cantwell and Members of the Committee:
Greetings and welcome to Washington State!
There could be no better backdrop than Puget Sound to highlight the
critical importance of Federal and state oil spill prevention and
response programs. And there is no better program in the country than
the partnership between the U.S. Coast Guard and the state of
Washington.
Our state is a national leader in oil spill prevention,
preparedness, and response. We have a proud history of taking action to
protect our valuable natural resources from oil spills. The courts have
been clear about the respective roles of the Federal and state
government, including the obligations of each level of government to
ensure sufficient funding for spill response.
The state has established the Oil Spill Response Account to provide
funding for incident response activities. This account is funded
through a tax on crude oil and petroleum products. On the Federal side,
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is a key tool in our ability to
respond to spills. Access to this fund was crucial in securing quick
and effective response to significant spill events in Puget Sound such
as the Olympic Pipeline explosion and the recent Dalco Passage mystery
spill.
I thank Senator Cantwell for securing continued funding for this
account through her efforts with the Federal energy bill.
The Federal and state oil spill partnership benefits from the
strong support of our oil and shipping industries. Our inspections and
surprise drills show strong compliance, a high state of readiness, and
a solid commitment to the programs. Just last week, we called for an
increase in the number of spill response vessels to improve our ability
to respond to a larger spill. As they have in the past, our industry
representatives have signaled that they will do what is necessary to
make sure Puget Sound is safe and protected.
Equally important, our oil spill programs have benefited from the
active engagement of our citizens. We are giving our citizens a
stronger voice in these matters. Pursuant to new state law, I am
pleased to announce that I have appointed Mike Cooper as the chair of
the Washington Oil Spill Advisory Council. The details of Mike's role,
and the remaining council members, will be announced in the coming
days.
I extend my gratitude to Senator Cantwell for holding this hearing
and bringing our region to the Committee's attention. I pledge the
state's continued vigilance, and ask for your support to ensure the
Federal Government's vigorous engagement in oil spill prevention and
cleanup.
Senator Cantwell. Again, thank you all very much for being
here, and I think we're going to start with you, Captain
Boothe.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN MYLES BOOTHE, COMMANDANT,
U.S. COAST GUARD
Captain Boothe. Thank you, good morning, Senator Cantwell.
It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
Coast Guard's role in protecting our marine resources within
the Pacific Northwest against the threat of pollution, while
also preserving the safe and efficient flow of commerce within
our diverse waterway systems here. The Coast Guard Captains of
the Port as the pre-designated Federal On-Scene coordinators
for the coastal zones, have primary responsibility for
preparedness and response to oil and hazardous material spills
within this area.
Despite the increased emphasis on maritime homeland
security since September 11, 2001, these Captains of the Port
have steadfastly led their respective area committees' planning
and response actions prescribed under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, or OPA. The Pacific Northwest environment and economy are
of exceptional, if not strategic, importance to the Nation. We
all know that. The Coast Guard's overarching environmental
protection goal is to eliminate damage to our environment and
degradation of our natural resources associated with maritime
activities.
We strive to achieve this goal by eliminating or reducing
the probability and/or consequence of pollution resulting from
a marine accident with the same vigor as we did prior to the
attacks on America. Spills in Washington coastal waters under
Coast Guard jurisdiction have averaged just three--or 10,300
gallons in the last 5 years. Considering that some 15 billion
gallons of oil are transferred or moved annually by marine
sources in Washington, that equals approximately \7/10\ of a
gallon per million gallons shipped.
Based on a 2002 National Research Council report which
alluded that over 29 million gallons of oil is spilled annually
in the United States marine environment, Washington State's
spills within the coastal zone equal only \3/100\ of a percent
of this annual pollution. Yet even acknowledging this
remarkably low spill rate, we cannot become complacent in our
relative success. We must remain ever vigilant to address the
risk of future pollution.
OPA 90 has dramatically reduced pollution in America.
Within the Pacific Northwest, OPA measures have greatly
enhanced Coast Guard, Washington Department of Ecology,
industry, and Canadian efforts to prevent and mitigate the
effects of an acute oil or hazardous material spill in our
environment. As detailed in my written statement submitted for
the record, within the Pacific Northwest and Puget Sound in
particular we have established arguably the strongest marine
safety prevention net in the Nation, including 16 major
intervention strategies that vastly reduce the probability of a
catastrophic release of oil from a vessel in transit or during
cargo transfer operations.
Some of the measures like tug escorts, vessel monitoring
systems, vessel traffic services, and single-hull tank vessel
phaseouts were either imposed or strengthened further by OPA,
and are addressed generally within the Coast Guard's recent
report to Congress on OPA's implementation. However, the
combination of OPA measures with several other strategies
established through separate efforts unique to this region,
creates an extraordinary level of risk reduction.
Likewise, this region has a unique and active unified
regional and area response system operating under a single
contingency plan to assure consistent, effective, and
coordinated responses to mitigate the severity and impact of
oil spills.
While we have one of the strongest pollution mitigation
systems in the country, or at least I say so, we nonetheless
must, and do, continually assess areas for improvement. Last
winter, the Governor and the District Commander here
established an Oil Spill Early Action Task Force, convened
under the auspices of the Regional Response Team and the area
committee to assess the potential areas for improved response
to oil spills and adverse weather conditions.
The task force developed 11 broad recommendations for
system improvement. Many of these have already been integrated
into the Northwest Area Community Strategy Work Plan for
implementation, while Washington State is addressing others
separately. A key task force concern was the Federal and state
response to a mystery spill. In the absence of an effective
responsible party-led and financed response effort, the Coast
Guard and states must have the means to respond promptly and
appropriately to meet the mandates of OPA 90 and the Federal
Order Pollution Control Act.
Thank you, Senator Cantwell, for your leadership and
interest in preserving the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund as a
viable and stable funding source for this purpose.
Nationally there are a number of important gap closing over
rulemakings that also remain outstanding that I would like to
talk about. But in conclusion, the Pacific Northwest has a
robust collaborative maritime safety prevention and response
net which has greatly mitigated the potential for a
catastrophic spill within the region. Their tremendous success
is achieved or due in large part to the strong partnerships and
an engaged environmental community here. Much work remains to
be done to complete the OPA agenda and reduce America's
vulnerability to pollution and other maritime safety threats.
With continued Congressional and Administration support I'm
confident that we will succeed in delivering the robust
maritime safety and environmental security this state and
America expects and deserves.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning,
ma'am. I'll be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Boothe follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Myles Boothe, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning Senator Cantwell and distinguished members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role in protecting our marine resources within the Pacific
Northwest against the threat of pollution while preserving the safe and
efficient flow of commerce within our diverse waterway systems.
The Coast Guard has continued to meet our statutory
responsibilities, even with the increased emphasis on maritime homeland
security since September 11, 2001. This is particularly true regarding
protection of the marine environment, from both a prevention and
response perspective. The Coast Guard has primary responsibility for
preparedness and response to oil and hazardous material spills within
the coastal zone. Our Captains of the Port, as the pre-designated
Federal On-Scene Coordinators for the coastal zones under the National
Contingency Plan, have continued to lead their respective Area
Committees' planning and response actions prescribed under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). In particular, the Coast Guard
continues to oversee and manage numerous intervention strategies to
prevent maritime accidents that may cause harm to our environment, and
oversee or direct most clean-up efforts within the coastal zone with
the same vigor as prior to the attacks on America.
The Pacific Northwest Environment and Economy
Environmental Sensitivity
Washington State waters within the coastal zone represent some of
the most pristine coastal areas within the Nation. Encompassing over
4,000 square miles and over 2,700 miles of rugged coastline, including
over 300 hundred miles of the Columbia River, this diverse ecosystem
includes many ``environmentally sensitive'' areas, some of which
include the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, Padilla Bay
National Estuarine Research Reserve, the South Slough National
Estuarine Research Reserve, the Washington Maritime National Wildlife
Refuge Complex, the Willapa National Wildlife Refuge Complex, the Grays
Harbor National Wildlife Refuge, and numerous tribal aquaculture sites.
Both resident and migrating orca (killer whale) pods feed extensively
throughout the waters of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, Puget Sound, and
Haro Strait. Many species of nesting, wintering, and migrating
seabirds, shorebirds, waterfowl, and raptors utilize the outer coast as
well as the Strait of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound for foraging,
nesting, and resting. Environmental responses can be particularly
challenging along Washington State's Pacific coast, due to the steep
slopes on shore, exposed location, shoals and offshore rocks, and lack
of roads. Within the Puget Sound region, the challenges include
significant tidal ranges and sensitive wetland mud flat areas.
Puget Sound is a complex environmental system made up of diverse
shoreline features. There are heavily industrialized areas immediately
adjacent to sensitive refuge areas. There are several historical and
tribal archaeological sites along much of the coastal zone. Vegetated
banks and marshes line most of the waters that flow into the Sound, and
Columbia River and its tributaries.
The biological resources in the region cross the spectrum of marine
life including birds, fish, shellfish, and marine mammals. There are
high concentrations of waterfowl present over most seasons, as well as
several birds of prey which nest in the region. Coastal estuaries are
sensitive habitats for many types of birds and forage fish. Coastal
islands are used as nesting and rearing sites for many seabird species,
some of which are nationally rare. The Grays Harbor estuary provides an
internationally significant resting and feeding area for tens of
thousands of migrating shorebirds that concentrate there in the spring.
The Puget Sound region is home or feeding grounds for several orca
families, and the region has several seal rookeries. Dungeness crab,
oysters, clams, and mussels are the predominant significant shellfish
in Puget Sound and coastal zone region. Numerous salmon species also
thrive in these waters, as well as the Columbia River and its
tributaries, which serve as both fish highways and critical spawning
grounds.
Economics
The Puget Sound region, Gray's Harbor, Columbia River, and other
waters of the Pacific Northwest provide several fine harbors for
commercial and public vessels. The area has historically supported
valuable fisheries (both recreational and commercial) and a large,
ever-increasing, recreational boating community. We share a 125-mile
international maritime border with Canada along the Strait of Juan de
Fuca, Haro Strait, Boundary Pass, and the Strait of Georgia, which
provide access to the ports of Victoria and Vancouver, British
Columbia, and several U.S. ports. The Marine Transportation System
(MTS) in Puget Sound and the Columbia River port complexes provide an
important economic link to Asian markets and to the West Coast of the
United States, including Alaska.
The Puget Sound region receives approximately 5,000 deep-draft
vessel arrivals through the Strait of Juan de Fuca each year.
Approximately three-fifths of those vessels transiting the 125-mile
international maritime border are bound for U.S. ports, while the
remainder proceed to Canadian ports. The Seattle-Tacoma port complex is
the third largest containerized cargo complex in the Nation, and Puget
Sound is homeport to a large Seattle-based fishing fleet, the largest
passenger ferry fleet in the Nation, and a major cruise ship industry
which has seen dramatic growth over the last several years. Over 700
tank ships arrive each year, transporting approximately 15 billion
gallons of crude oil and refined products to and from the five
refineries in Puget Sound waters. Puget Sound possesses one of only 15
strategic ports in the Nation, transporting military supplies and
equipment by vessel to support our troops overseas. The Puget Sound
region is critical not only locally, but also to the Nation.
Gray's Harbor, approximately 10 miles south of the Olympic Coast
National Marine Sanctuary on the Washington coast serves as a major
local coastal fisheries homeport, as well as one of the principal
oyster aquaculture beds for the region.
Finally, the Columbia River system, along the Washington-Oregon
border, serves the principal port complexes of Longview, Washington at
mile 50; and Vancouver, Washington, and Portland, Oregon; located 100
miles from the entrance. This system serves as the Pacific gateway and
the second largest port complex for U.S. grain export. It also serves
as a major automobile distribution port. Approximately 1,800 foreign,
deep-draft vessels transit this 100 mile serpentine stretch of the
river each year.
The port complexes in Puget Sound and the Columbia River are key
contributors to the economic vitality of the United States, ranking on
the Coast Guard's list of the most economically significant ports in
the Nation.
Reducing Risk in the Pacific Northwest Maritime Environment
The Coast Guard's overarching environmental protection goal is to
eliminate damage to our environment and degradation of our natural
resources associated with maritime activities, including
transportation, commercial fishing, and recreational boating. Having
set the stage for the level of activity in this marine transportation
system and the resources at risk throughout the region, I will describe
the key risks of pollution within the region, the substantial and
unique safety net which this region boasts, and then some areas for
improvement.
Causes of Spills: Spills can originate from every type of vessel
and facility on or near the water. However many spills, including some
high-volume spills, come from sources completely outside the Coast
Guard's jurisdiction, such as rail, small plane, truck and industrial
accidents, highway runoff, or underground storage tanks leaking into
storm drains. In the National Research Council report, Oil in the Sea
III: Inputs . . . and Effects (2002), it is noted that 16.2 million
gallons of a total of 29 million gallons spilled annually in the United
States are attributable to street runoff, industrial waste, municipal
wastewater, refinery wastewater, and recreational vessels. Of that
amount, approximately 1.5 million gallons are attributable to spills
from tank vessels.
Regionally, our record is much brighter. While we have averaged
about 10,300 gallons per year of oil spilled for the past 5 years, in
2004 less than 5,000 gallons of oil were spilled in Washington waters,
and that included the 1,000 gallon spill attributable to the Dalco
Passage incident. That is a remarkably low amount of oil spilled, given
the excess of 15 billion gallons of oil that is transferred annually by
Washington marine sources.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Recreational vessels and fishing vessels typically account for the
highest number of identified marine related spills each year. The
pollution threat potential from recreational vessels is relatively
small in the total volume spilled per incident; however, for 2004, the
recreational vessel spills accounted for the most gallons spilled
within the Puget Sound region. Tank vessels and bulk liquid oil
facilities are highly regulated and are operated by highly trained and
certified professionals. The probability of spills from tank vessels
and facilities is understandably lower. However, should such spills
occur, the potential spill volumes are much greater in magnitude. The
volume from one spill from those sources could easily be over 1,000
gallons given quantities and typical handling rates. Likewise, spills
from uninspected commercial vessels (fishing and towing vessels) and
derelict vessels can also involve relatively high potential oil
volumes. Together, known recreational vessels and fishing vessels
accounted for over 50 percent of the oil spilled within the Washington
coastal zone in 2004. A significant amount attributable to ``mystery
spills'' is also considered likely to come from these mostly
uninspected and unregulated marine sources.
Hundreds of oil transfers take place every week in the Pacific
Northwest region. These may range from a recreational boater getting a
fill-up at a marina, to a 900-foot tank ship unloading a cargo of crude
oil at a local refinery. During each transfer, there is a risk of an
oil spill. In 2004, 58 of the 560 spills reported were linked to oil
transfer operations, accounting for 6 percent of the total volume
spilled.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The cause of oil spills is, of course, related to the source. While
most spills from vessels occur at the dock, rather than while the
vessel is underway, there can be many contributing factors causing
these spills. The most common causes include:
Mechanical failure of hydraulic lines.
Structural failure of hulls of derelict vessels (vessel
sinkings).
Structural failure of cargo tanks, cargo piping, or cargo
relief valves.
Operator error during fueling--generally related to
overfilling a tank.
Human factors such as poorly-documented procedures.
Truck rollovers, collisions, mechanical failures, and human
errors from non-marine sources such as trucks, trains,
factories, etc.
Of the 8 billion gallons of crude oil typically transported and
transferred by tank vessels within Puget Sound each year, less than
1,500 gallons of crude oil were spilled within the last 5 years.
Another 7 billion gallons of refined products are annually transported
by tank vessels; again, only 500 gallons of refined oil was spilled
over the last 5 years by tankers. These spills were the result of human
error during cargo handling or ballasting operations. None of these
spills from tank ships were attributable to collisions, allisions, or
groundings.
Despite this extraordinary tank vessel safety history, and an
acknowledgement that the likelihood of in-transit accidents within the
Puget Sound region are greatly mitigated by the existing safety net
within Puget Sound region, the inherent hazards associated with the
transport and transfer of such significant volumes of oil through an
extremely difficult navigation area represent a very high consequence
should a major grounding and large-volume oil spill occur. Therefore,
the Coast Guard and industry must remain prepared, regardless of
source, to monitor and direct a proper response for all spills
impacting coastal zone waters, and specifically be prepared to address
the acute damaging impact to the environment of a large oil spill from
a vessel.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Unique Pacific Northwest Marine Safety Net
Within the Pacific Northwest we have one of the strongest maritime
safety nets in the Nation to help prevent and mitigate the effects of
oil and hazardous material spills on our environment. The Coast Guard
employs a threat-based, risk managed approach to mitigate the potential
for a serious marine incident that might result in a substantial threat
to the marine environment.
Prevention Systems
Pre-Arrival Checks and Offshore Routing: Before any vessel
greater than 1,600 gross tons enters U.S. waters its crew is
obligated to perform safety checks of propulsion and steering
equipment, and report any deficiencies prior to entering port,
to help guard against a mechanical malfunction occurring close
to U.S. shorelines or within maneuvering waters. In addition,
tank vessels enroute or departing the region are required to
follow offshore routing schemes that hold them further off the
pristine coastlines of Washington and Vancouver Island, British
Columbia. On the U.S. side, the International Maritime
Organization has recognized an ``Area To Be Avoided'' (ATBA)
buffer zone extending 25 miles out from the Washington coast
along the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, for all
laden tank vessels and other vessels of 1,600 gross tons and
above. Similarly, a 50-mile wide Tanker Exclusion Zone has been
established off of the Canadian coast to route the Trans-
Alaskan Pipeline tanker traffic further offshore to protect
against groundings as a result of any potential disabling
vessel conditions. Most deep draft freight vessels operating
off the Washington coast comply with the voluntary Olympic
Coast National Marine Sanctuary ATBA.
The United States and Canada jointly operated Cooperative
Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS) and the International Maritime
Organization adopted Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) within the
Puget Sound Waters have existed for decades and serve to ensure
an ordered and predictable traffic pattern for shipping in the
region. All deep draft vessels (all above 300 gross tons) are
obligated to participate in the CVTS and follow the TSS
according to the International Navigation Rules of the Road.
The TSS establishes one-way traffic lanes, similar to an
interstate highway, with a separation zone between the opposing
lanes of marine traffic. The Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service
actually tracks and directs all participating vessels
transiting the region as necessary to ensure collisions and
powered groundings will not occur. Significant improvements to
the TSS were implemented with international approval in 2004,
after an extensive analysis and collaboration with Canada and
tribal interests and as complemented by the discussions and
recommendations from the Long-term Risk Management Panel. The
most significant adjustments ensure greater separation for
tankers while in transit throughout the system, particularly in
more confined waters. The CVTS system is a model of bilateral
cooperation and waterways safety management, ensuring the
environmental protection and safety of our shared waters.
Automated Identification System (AIS): In addition to the
required participation in the CVTS, as of December 2004, nearly
all commercial vessels, including tugs, are required to have
AIS transponders installed which automatically broadcast vessel
name, position course, speed, and other marine information to
other shipping and to U.S. and Canadian safety officials. These
broadcasts are being received as far away as several hundred
miles from shore, greatly enhancing our awareness of vessels in
our environ and their activities. Indeed, the AIS has enhanced
the CVTS coverage by providing vessel tracking within waters
which were previously not covered by the existing Vessel
Traffic Service radars.
Port State Control Examination Program. In 1994, the Coast
Guard enhanced our pre-existing foreign tank vessel examination
program to include foreign freight vessels, such as container
ships and bulk carriers, in an effort to eliminate substandard
shipping in U.S. waters. Every foreign vessel bound for a U.S.
port is screened upon receipt of their 96-hour Advance Notice
of Arrival to the United States utilizing a targeting matrix
which considers numerous risk factors, including vessel type,
ownership, flag state, classification society and vessel's
operating history as indicated in the USCG's marine information
databases. All vessels above a certain score are then targeted
for a USCG safety and environmental protection compliance
examination either at sea prior to port entry or after docking,
depending on the relative risk determined. Vessels found in
non-compliance may be denied entry. If already in port, they
will be detained until major discrepancies are corrected. While
the national average percentage of foreign vessels examined is
approximately 19 percent, the two Captains of the Port in the
Thirteenth District examined over 38 percent of all foreign
vessel arrivals, and over 80 percent of distinct vessel
arrivals accounting for the fact that many foreign vessel may
make repeat port calls.
Pilotage Requirements: Upon arrival at Port Angeles, all
deep draft vessels and most foreign vessels other than small
yachts are obligated to embark a Puget Sound pilot, a local
knowledge expert and professional mariner, for continued
transit of the vessel to its final destination. Vessels bound
for Canadian ports are similarly obligated to embark a British
Columbia pilot.
Tug Escorts: Almost all oil laden tank vessels must also be
under the escort of two tugs which are capable of stopping the
vessel's movement within strict parameters. No vessel above 100
gross tons is permitted to meet a laden tanker transiting
Rosario Strait, the typical route for tankers destined for
Washington refineries. Typically, as tankers enter Rosario
Strait, escort tugs actually tether themselves to the tanker
for enhanced ability to positively control the tanker's
movement if needed.
Weather Sensors and Decision Aids: As a result of a special
appropriation for Puget Sound pollution prevention enhancement,
two sophisticated weather buoys and numerous other weather
sensors and cameras have been installed throughout Puget Sound
waters to enhance the mariners' and the Coast Guard's
situational awareness in the region. In addition, a Rescue Tug
Deployment Decision Making tool has been created to assist the
Captain of the Port in objectively determining the need for the
dispatch and pre-staging of stand-by tug capabilities to
protect against adverse weather and potential disabled vessels
combining to create an unacceptable risk for particular areas
within the region. These measures all combine to facilitate
both normal voyage planning and emergency response
decisionmaking.
Double Hull Requirements: Most tankers servicing these ports
have a double hull, in compliance with OPA 90 standards; and
many are also equipped with redundant propulsion systems to
mitigate even further any loss of vessel control.
Oil Pollution Prevention and Response Agreements: In 2003,
the Thirteenth Coast Guard District and Washington Department
of Ecology established a series of protocols to implement and
guide our respective operations in the area of spill
prevention, preparedness and response to reduce duplication of
effort, and instill better coordination and communication.
Harbor Safety Committees: In addition to government safety
and pollution prevention efforts, the Puget Sound and Columbia
River region's maritime industries have established strong
Harbor Safety Committees, with members from a broad spectrum of
industry. These Committees have established Standards of Care,
voluntary measures for operating practices and equipment
testing that supplement the Federal and state standards. These
additional measures have proven a valuable tool in quickly
improving the maritime industry's performance, without the need
to embark in regulatory changes.
MARPOL Enforcement: The Thirteenth Coast Guard District
Captains of the Port, in close cooperation with the U.S.
Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency and Washington
Department of Ecology Investigators have gained international
acclaim for trailblazing efforts to uncover criminal acts of
intentional marine pollution at sea. This collaborative
tenacious effort has produced Federal prosecutions of 21 ship
owners, numerous convictions of the vessels' senior crew, and
the collection of over $38 million in criminal fines and
settlements, including over $7 million for environmental
restoration projects within the Pacific Northwest.
Response System
Regional Response Team, Region 10/Northwest Area Committee
and Contingency Plan: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the
National Contingency Plan mandates each Federal On-Scene
Coordinator establish Area Committees to protect public health,
safety and environment by ensuring coordinated, efficient, and
effective response to oil and hazardous material spills. Within
the Pacific Northwest, the two Coast Guard FOSCs, the EPA
FOSCs, and Washington, Oregon, and Idaho State environmental
response organizations established a single Area Committee to
address all regional environmental response activities in a
more collective manner. Further, the Regional Response Team and
Area Committee established a single Contingency Plan to address
responses executed by each authority.
Orphan Spills: In the absence of an identified responsible
party (spiller), or in case of a party's failure to adequately
respond to a spill, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator is
responsible to mount such response. As noted earlier, many of
the oil spills within this region are ``mystery'' spills, and
as such, fall to the Coast Guard and state environmental
response agencies to mount an effective and coordinated
response action.
National Preparedness for Response Program (NPREP) was
established under OPA 90 to ensure Area Committees and facility
and vessel operators maintain an active exercise program to
continually test their regional response capability to address
both worst case and most probable spill scenarios on a regular
basis. The results of these exercises feed into a lessons
learned database accessible to all within the national response
system. The lessons learned are then taken for action by the
Area Committee and individual operators, as appropriate.
Non-Tank Vessel Response Plans: Next week vessel spill
response plans for non-tankers must be implemented, as mandated
by Congress. This initiative will compel virtually all deep
draft vessels to have detailed plans and capabilities in place
to ensure an aggressive and effective response to spills
occurring from those vessels, similar to the system already
required of tank vessels. Washington State has had a state-
driven requirement since the early 1990s, when the state
legislature established a vessel fee and a maritime commission
to serve as an umbrella response management structure to effect
a ``first 24-hours'' response to spills.
Standby Rescue Tugs: Since 1999, Washington State has
maintained a dedicated rescue tug at the mouth of the Strait of
Juan de Fuca to respond to disabled vessels and to participate
in response drills and exercises. That same year, a Coast Guard
cost-benefit analysis suggested that the International Tug of
Opportunity System (ITOS), paid for by industry fees collected
through Puget Sound Marine Exchange, was a fiscally responsible
alternative. In contrast, a standby rescue tug system, which
incorporates tug deployment in areas deemed to present a higher
risk due to severe weather or other causes, is also an
effective countermeasure to groundings in the region, but at
greater cost. The Automated Identification System has greatly
expanded the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness, providing
the ability to identify a tug's presence, capabilities, and
availability to assist vessels in distress and has successfully
been employed by the Captain of the Port in the past.
Areas for Improvement
As a result of the recent Dalco Passage Spill, an Oil Spill Early
Action Task Force was convened under the auspices of the Regional
Response Team, Region 10 and the Northwest Area Committee. The Task
Force was charged to evaluate actions to be taken during the early
stages of oil spills when meteorological conditions are adverse, and
make recommendations to improve notification procedures, response
policies and response technology, including any recommended changes to
the Northwest Area Contingency Plan. The task force developed 11 broad
recommendations, many of which the Area Committee has already
integrated into the NWAC strategic work plan for implementation. It was
clear that the assessment and response to the relatively minor (1,000
gallon) oil spill was exacerbated by weather conditions, and that the
Area Committee needs to further explore means to more effectively and
aggressively assess spills during reduced visibility to permit more
rapid implementation and coordination of appropriate response
strategies, particularly in situations where no responsible party has
acknowledged the spill and taken action to respond.
Conclusion
While we must always remain vigilant in assuring our ability to
respond aggressively and appropriately to oil and hazardous material
spills, it is evident that the Pacific Northwest's broad prevention
efforts and its collaborative maritime safety net have greatly
mitigated the potential for a catastrophic spill within this region. We
endeavor to improve the system through continual self-examination. The
tremendous successes we have achieved in this endeavor are due, in
large part, to the cooperation and prompt measures taken by the
government, the spill response community, the environmental community,
scientists, and industry working together as partners. Much work
remains to be done to reduce America's vulnerability to pollution and
other maritime safety threats, but with the continued support of the
Congress and the Administration I know that we will succeed in
delivering the robust maritime safety and environmental security
America expects and deserves well into the 21st century.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to
answer any questions.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Captain Boothe. We're going to
let all the panelists speak and then we'll come back to
questions. So, Mr. Helton, thank you for being here, thank you
for representing NOAA at today's hearing.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HELTON, INCIDENT OPERATIONS COORDINATOR,
OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA), DOC
Mr. Helton. Thank you. Thank you for inviting me to speak
today about oil pollution issues in Washington State. My name
is Doug Helton, I'm the Incident Operations Coordinator for the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. NOAA's Spill
Response program is headquartered here in Seattle, we have over
45 scientists and responders available on a 24/7 basis to
provide technical support for oil spills throughout the nation.
When a spill occurs that team provides and coordinates
advice on scientific issues, cleanup, natural resource
assessment issues, and spills. NOAA essentially, as support
coordinator, leads this effort with a team of scientists on-
scene, provides support in such areas as pollutant fate and
transport, resources identification and protection strategies,
cleanup, shoreline cleanup assessment and natural resource
trustee coordination. NOAA also provides currents, tides, and
weather forecasts during spills.
Effective spill responses also depend on planning and
preparation. Between incidents NOAA promotes preparedness by
working closely with local responders and Federal partners. We
work with a regional response team on a variety of issues
including dispersant use, best cleanup practices,
communications and response capabilities. NOAA also enhances
the state-of-readiness by developing better response tools.
NOAA works with our Federal, State, and tribal partners to
determine how best to restore injured resources to the State
they were in before the incident and to compensate the public
for the loss of natural resources resulting from those
injuries. NOAA scientists and economists provide technical
foundation for natural resource damage assessments. Our experts
collect data, conduct studies, and perform analysis needed to
identify whether coastal regions have been injured by spills
and how to restore those spills.
In the Puget Sound region, approximately 500 spills are
reported each year. Fortunately large spills are infrequent,
most of those are quite small, with the average spill being
less than 20 gallons; however, with the increased daily travel
of fishing vessels, cruise ships, freighters, there is an
increasing number of spills in this region.
I'd like to talk to you about a couple of examples of
prevention. Catastrophic discharge of oil in the Olympic Coast
National Marine Sanctuary is one of the greatest threats facing
that sanctuary, and reducing this threat has been one of NOAA's
highest priorities. The sanctuary is located at the entrance of
the Strait of Juan de Fuca, it's a major fairway for ships
going to the Pacific Rim. NOAA worked with the Coast Guard to
develop an Area To Be Avoided, and that was implemented in
1995.
This Area advises operators carrying petroleum and
hazardous materials to stay at least 25 miles off the coast
while they're approaching the entrance to the Strait of Juan de
Fuca. Since that Area has been adopted, NOAA has also worked on
its charts and other publications to make sure that mariners
are aware of that on the appropriate charts.
We have two other programs that are critical here in
Seattle to our work in prevention of spills. One of them is the
Navigation Response Team and the other one is our PORTS
program. The Navigation Response Team conducts surveys of
obstructions in harbor areas and to locate potential navigation
problems before they cause spills. The team also is available
to respond after spills to help identify whether that
obstruction was the cause of that incident. This team is on
hand throughout the year and a regional team is based here in
the Seattle area.
The other program is the PORTS program. This is the
Physical Oceanographic Real Time System. This is a system that
we have in the Port of Tacoma that provides realtime weather,
tides, and current information to the marine operators in the
harbor. This information is critical to daily harbor
operations, but it's also very important during spill
responses.
In the last few years NOAA has assisted the Coast Guard in
several spills in this region, and I'd like to give you a few
examples. The 2004 mystery spill--you've all heard about it--in
Dalco Passage, NOAA and the State worked on perfecting
overflights for that incident, due to calm weather conditions
that oil was spread over a very large area, giving the
impression that it was a very significant spill.
Response teams worked to treat the affected beaches and the
follow-up investigations that we've done along with the State
of Washington have shown relatively minor environmental
impacts.
At Point Wells, just north of here in Seattle, there was a
4,600-gallon spill in December 2003. That oil spread across
central Puget Sound and affected an area of the Suquamish Tribe
over in Port Madison. Unfortunately, oiled the pristine marsh
and shoreline area. In that incident NOAA provided response
services, including tracking the floating oil, predictions of
how the oil would evaporate, and where it would go. We helped
with the shoreline surveys; we also helped with the seafood
sampling afterwards because there was concerns about the
wholesomeness of seafood. We're continuing to work with the
State and U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service on completing a
cooperative damage assessment on that incident.
The final incident I want to share with you is the 1999
Olympic Pipeline spill. It's a reminder that not all spills
come from marine sources. This incident affected Bellingham,
Washington, including aquatic and terrestrial resources in the
Whatcom Creek and Whatcom Falls area. NOAA's regulations under
the Oil Pollution Act encouraged cooperative and restoration
assessments, and those efforts were illustrated in this effort.
Working with the other trustees and the responsible party
NOAA was the lead administrative trustee and worked to develop
both emergency and long-term restoration plans for that creek.
A number of restoration actions were implemented during the
summer following the spill, and salmon successfully spawned in
the creek that fall. Several long-term projects were also
developed, and those are being implemented now.
Thank you for this opportunity to let me talk about NOAA's
spill response program. I'd be happy to talk more about
prevention, preparedness, and recovery actions associated with
oil spills. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Helton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Helton, Incident Operations Coordinator,
Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), DOC
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the role of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in response,
restoration, and research under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA; 33
U.S.C. 2701-2761). I am Douglas Helton, Incident Operations Coordinator
for the Office of Response and Restoration, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration within the Department of Commerce. NOAA's
spill response program is headquartered in Seattle, WA, and has over 45
scientists and responders available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to
provide technical support for oil spills nationwide. As the Incident
Operations Coordinator, my role is to plan and staff incident
responses, and to ensure that NOAA products are timely and useful. I
also help to coordinate preliminary natural resource damage assessment
studies, working closely with biologists, economists, and legal counsel
in the NOAA Damage Assessment and Restoration Program. Over the past 12
years, I have been involved with most major spills in the United
States, including several here in the Puget Sound region.
Brief Overview
The Exxon Valdez oil spill taught us a valuable lesson. Our Nation
must be prepared to respond to major oil spills. Some time has passed
since a domestic spill rivaled the Exxon Valdez in size. However, the
recent Prestige spill in Europe and the near simultaneous spills in
Delaware and Alaska last winter serve as reminders that, although rare,
significant oil spills still happen. We must therefore continue to be
prepared to respond to these spills when they do occur. OPA created a
comprehensive prevention, response, liability, and compensation regime
that is needed to respond to these types of oil pollution incidents
from both vessels and on-shore facilities. OPA authorized NOAA to
represent the public as a natural resource trustee for ocean and
coastal resources regarding the discharge or threatened discharge of
oil into the environment. NOAA is mandated to seek damages on behalf of
the public to restore natural resources injured by oil spills. When oil
spills threaten or injure these resources, NOAA and other natural
resource trustees are responsible for:
Working through the Regional Response Teams and National
Response Team to ensure that the most appropriate response and
cleanup actions are taken to protect resources from further
injury;
Assessing and recovering natural resource damages to
compensate for the loss of services that the natural resources
provided; and
Implementing restoration projects for injured natural
resources.
OPA required NOAA to draft regulations under which all natural
resource trustees perform natural resource damage assessments. In
addition, OPA mandates oil spill research and development under Title
VII, and created the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil
Pollution Research to coordinate research and development efforts among
industry, universities, and others.
NOAA's Response Role
When a spill occurs a multi-agency interdisciplinary scientific
response team provides and coordinates advice on response, cleanup, and
natural resource issues. For spills in the marine environment, or
spills in areas where the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has jurisdiction,
NOAA assumes the role of Scientific Support Coordinator (SSC). NOAA has
SSCs in USCG offices to assist the USCG in its role as Federal On-Scene
Coordinators. The SSC also supports the Unified Command, an
organizational structure that allows the Incident Commander position to
be shared among several agencies and organizations that have
jurisdiction, in order to enhance coordination among these agencies.
SSCs lead a team of scientists who provide support in such areas as
pollutant fate and transport, resource identification and protection
strategies, shoreline cleanup assessment, and natural resource trustee
coordination.
NOAA's response to each incident is dependent upon the spill's
characteristics. Scientific coordination is critical. Through
experience, expertise, and state-of-the-art technology NOAA forecasts
the movement and behavior of spilled oil, evaluates the risk to
resources, and recommends protection priorities and appropriate cleanup
actions.
Effective spill response depends on effective planning and
preparation. NOAA promotes preparedness by working closely with
Regional Response Teams on a variety of issues including dispersant
use, best cleanup practices, communications, and response organization.
In addition, NOAA enhances the state-of-readiness by developing better
response tools including trajectory models, fate models, and
integration of improved weather data and data from ocean observing
systems into spill trajectory forecasts.
NOAA's Restoration and Damage Assessment Role
Oil spills can harm natural resources in a number of ways. The most
immediate and visible impacts may be oiled beaches and injured or dead
organisms, such as fish, lobsters, birds, and wetland plants. Other
impacts may not be readily apparent and may not show up for weeks,
months, or even years. Nurseries for fish or nesting sites for birds
and turtles may be destroyed, and birds and other wildlife may become
ill from eating contaminated food.
Wetlands may slowly be destroyed several months after an incident,
coral reefs may continue to erode and be more susceptible to disease,
and fish may be unable to reproduce. A spill may also diminish the
services that natural resources provide us, such as fishing, boating,
beach going, and wildlife viewing, as well as ecological services, such
as providing habitat, nutrient cycling, and energy transfer through
food webs.
Many factors affect how quickly restoration actions can be
implemented and how fast recovery can occur. These factors include the
type of resource that was injured, the time of year it was injured, and
the type, amount, and duration of the oil spilled. In some
circumstances, natural recovery may be sufficient to restore resources.
In other instances, active restoration efforts may be necessary.
NOAA and other natural resource trustees ensure that restoration
projects satisfy the OPA's goal of restoring natural resources and
services to baseline (the pre-incident condition) and compensating the
public for interim losses resulting from the injury. Trustees are
responsible for two types of restoration: primary and compensatory. The
purpose of primary restoration action is to return the injured natural
resources and services to baseline conditions, while the purpose of
compensatory restoration is to compensate the public for losses
occurring from the time of the incident to the return of injured
resources and services to baseline. In developing primary restoration
plans, trustees focus on actions that accelerate the recovery of the
injured resources, such as reconstructing physical habitat that was
destroyed. In developing compensatory restoration plans, trustees
ensure that restoration projects address the period from injury until
recovery. This is vital because while a resource is impaired, it is
unable to provide services on which other parts of the ecosystem and
the public rely.
NOAA scientists and economists provide the technical foundation for
natural resource damage assessments and work with other trustees and
responsible parties to restore resources injured by oil spills. To
accomplish this effort NOAA experts collect data, conduct studies, and
perform analyses needed to determine whether coastal resources have
sustained injury from oil spills. NOAA experts determine how best to
restore injured resources and to ascertain the most appropriate
restoration projects to compensate the public for associated lost
services.
Regulations promulgated by NOAA under OPA provide a framework for
conducting natural resource damage assessments when oil spills injure
the public's natural resources. The regulations require the following
steps in the natural resource damage assessment process:
1. Preassessment--Trustees evaluate data on impacts to natural
resources to determine whether natural resources and their
associated services have been injured;
2. Restoration Planning--Trustees quantify injuries to natural
resources and their services and use that information to
determine the type and scale of restoration activities that
fully compensate the public for the injures; and
3. Restoration Implementation--Trustees, often working with
those responsible for the release, implement restoration
actions.
NOAA has long been interested in looking at alternative ways to
expedite and cut costs for natural resource damage assessment. One
alternative is the cooperative assessment in which the Responsible
Party plays a major role with the natural resource trustees. Based on
NOAA's successful experiences in cooperative assessments, NOAA is
promoting this approach through national and regional dialogues. The
intent is to expedite restoration, encourage innovative approaches,
strengthen partnerships, and provide meaningful public involvement.
Cooperative assessments offer industry the opportunity for a greater
role and more control over the timing of restoration actions without
undermining the natural resource trustee responsibilities. This
approach also reduces damage assessment costs and the risk of
litigation.
Environmental and Navigation Safety at Work
A catastrophic discharge of oil or hazardous materials remains one
of the greatest threats facing the Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary. Reducing this threat has been one of NOAA's highest
priorities. The Sanctuary, the third largest in the United States, sits
at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a major commercial
thoroughfare linking the ports of Seattle, Tacoma, and Vancouver, with
trading partners around the Pacific Rim. The juxtaposition of such an
important international trade route and a national marine sanctuary
requires the balancing of political, social, economic, and natural
resource issues.
NOAA worked with the USCG to propose that the International
Maritime Organization approve and adopt an ``Area To Be Avoided''
(ATBA) off the Olympic Coast. This ATBA, which went into effect in June
1995, advises operators of vessels carrying petroleum and hazardous
materials to maintain a 25-mile buffer from the coast. This distance
narrows as the vessel traffic lanes converge at the entrance to the
Strait of Juan de Fuca. Since the ATBA was adopted, Olympic Coast
National Marine Sanctuary has ensured that information on the ATBA is
included on the appropriate nautical charts and in relevant
publications.
It is important to note that the boundaries of the ATBA and of the
Sanctuary are not contiguous. National marine sanctuaries are not
exclusionary areas (e.g., commercial fishing and shipping occur within
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary). While the designation of the
ATBA has improved maritime and environmental safety within the
Sanctuary, it is only one means of reducing risk. NOAA has been
participating in other initiatives reviewing additional measures to
improve maritime and environmental safety in the region.
NOAA has Navigation Response Teams (NRTs) that conduct hazardous
obstructions surveys using diving operations, electronic navigation
capture, data collection, and mapping support capabilities to locate
potential navigation impediments and to prevent a spill. NRTs also
perform emergency response surveys at the request of the USCG to locate
obstructions that may have caused a spill. An NRT is on hand 365 days a
year in the State of Washington to support NOAA's mission of promoting
safe marine navigation.
NOAA has identified the navigable approaches to the Puget Sound as
one of the critical areas in the national hydrographic survey backlog.
In Fiscal Year 2006, NOAA expects to conduct surveys around Puget
Sound, as well as in Alaska, the Gulf of Mexico, and along the East
Coast. This project will provide essential chart data and reduce the
``critical areas'' backlog for hydrographic surveys. Additionally, this
project will provide a response to requests from the Puget Sound Pilots
Association for such a survey. The Association is concerned with this
area because four major traffic lanes cross here, there are shoals in
the vicinity of those traffic lanes, and the area experiences a high
density of traffic.
NOAA's Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS')
provides quality controlled real-time oceanographic (water levels,
currents, water temperature, salinity, etc.) and meteorological (wind
speed, direction, air temperature, barometric pressure, etc.) data in
support of safe and efficient marine navigation. PORTS' data
also helps support response efforts when spills occur by providing
responders with a better understanding of their operational environment
and improving trajectory model forecasts. There are currently 12
PORTS' around the nation, including one in Tacoma, WA, in
partnership with the Port of Tacoma. PORTS' is recognized as
a backbone system within the Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS).
A fully implemented IOOS would make observations and model data
from various local, state, and Federal agencies available for spill
response. This would include real-time and historical observations and
products for meteorological, physical oceanographic, and biological
parameters. The resulting enhancement of data management and
communications would improve the quality and quantity of model input
and output for spill trajectory modeling. IOOS would provide emergency
responders with access to unprecedented amounts of real-time and
historical data for decisionmaking regarding spill response and
mitigation. The envisioned Northwest Association of Networked Ocean
Observing Systems component of IOOS would meet local needs and
requirements of the region and enhance response and decisionmaking
support in the event of a spill.
Examples of Response and Restoration at Work
The USCG is notified of approximately 20,000 incidents annually in
the United States, including approximately 500 annually in the Puget
Sound region. Fortunately, large spills are infrequent, and most
incidents are small fuel spills and mystery sheens reported in marinas
and harbors, or spills from terrestrial sources such as truck
accidents. The average spill report in Puget Sound is 20 gallons.
However, anywhere vessels transit, there is a risk of spills, and the
risk is not only from tank vessels. Daily transits of fishing vessels,
ferries, cruise ships, naval vessels, and even large yachts can pose a
threat of spills. A typical Alaska-bound cruise ship may carry in
excess of 500,000 gallons of fuel while an ocean-going tug may carry
over 100,000 gallons of fuel and lube oils.
Over the past 2 years, NOAA has assisted the USCG in several spills
in the region including the following:
Mystery Spill, Port Townsend, April 2005--Unknown (small)
amount
Dalco Passage Incident, October 2004 (1,500-2,000 gallons)
Foss Barge, Pt. Wells, December 2003 (4,600 gallons)
Now I would like to illustrate NOAA's recent efforts in regards to
Northwest and Alaska oil spills.
M/V Selendang Ayu
During a major winter storm event on December 8, 2004, the cargo
vessel M/V Selendang Ayu lost power, ran aground and broke in half on
the shore of Unalaska Island, within Alaskan waters of the Bering Sea
and part of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge. The Selendang
Ayu loaded here in Seattle, with approximately 60,000 tons of soybeans,
and was destined for China via the Great Circle Route. That navigation
route took the vessel through Unimak Pass in the Aleutian Islands.
During rescue operations, six Selendang Ayu crew members were lost at
sea when a USCG helicopter crashed. Approximately 335,000 gallons of
fuel oil and other miscellaneous machine oils were subsequently
released to the environment. Most of the cargo was also released to the
environment.
During the initial response, NOAA participated in aerial
observations and mapping of floating and shoreline oiling, as well as
provided on-scene weather information, including the establishment of
an emergency remote weather station and the provision of a dedicated
on-scene meteorologist. This expertise enabled focused operations
during a severe weather time of the year. Without accurate, up-to-date,
spot-specific forecasts, it would not have been possible to safely
conduct complicated operations in such an extreme environment. To give
an example of the difficult nature of work involved, a special Chinook
helicopter was used to remove the remaining 140,000 gallons of fuel on
the Selendang Ayu in 2,000 gallon fuel canisters, one at a time,
through the mountains 25 miles to Dutch Harbor.
The NOAA SSC also coordinated environmental issues for the Unified
Command, including technical issues related to potential dispersant
use; prepared short and long-term trajectory forecasts for the residual
oil onboard; reviewed satellite data and remote sensing information for
potential utilization; and responded to a USCG request for assistance
in locating the flight recorder of their downed helicopter.
NOAA also worked with the local community to address subsistence
and seafood safety concerns. The Port of Dutch Harbor on Unalaska
Island processes the largest volume of fish of any port in the United
States. Many of these vessels and fishermen come from the Puget Sound
region, and concerns were widespread regarding the potential closure of
fisheries, or potential market impacts if any seafood products were
contaminated. There was particular concern for the Bering Sea crab and
trawl fisheries. The crab fleet delivers its catch alive with
constantly circulating sea water through the vessel holds, while the
trawl vessels use large nets that could become contaminated during
deployment and retrieval. Any real or perceived contamination of these
fisheries products could cause world-wide marketing problems for Alaska
seafood products. With a combination of trajectory analysis and advice
on monitoring techniques, NOAA was able to provide assistance to the
Seafood Safety Task Force. Similar concerns were expressed for the
safety of the subsistence foods harvested from the sea and inter-tidal
zones. As the result of information gained following the Exxon Valdez
spill and other spills that NOAA has worked on, we were able to provide
meaningful input, based on actual experiences, as a member of the
Subsistence Foods Task Force.
NOAA continues to work with the other natural resource trustees
(U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and the State of Alaska) and the
responsible party to conduct a natural resource damage assessment. The
parties are conducting a preliminary assessment of potential injuries
to natural resources and beginning to evaluate restoration
alternatives. Categories of potential injuries include: shorelines
(including inter-tidal habitat, wetlands, beaches, shoreline
vegetation); aquatic resources (including crabs, salmon, and other
anadromous fish species); birds (including seabirds, gulls, and
shorebirds); wildlife (including sea otters and sea lions) and human
uses (including impacts to subsistence, cultural, and recreational
uses).
We have learned that the public has confidence in NOAA's ability to
deal with the diverse issues that surround an oil spill. The public
relies on our experience and knowledge to assist their local agencies
that do not have the same level of spill response experience. NOAA and
other trustees are committed to providing the public with up-to-date
information and meaningful opportunities for review and comment during
the preliminary assessment and restoration planning process. Public
meetings will be held later this year on Unalaska Island to convey to
the public the status of the damage assessment activities and to
solicit input on potential restoration alternatives. Public review and
comment of the draft restoration plan and environmental assessment
report will also be sought later in the damage assessment and
restoration planning process.
Foss Barge, Point Wells
On December 30, 2003, a transfer accident at the Point Wells
Asphalt terminal in Shoreline, WA, resulted in a spill of approximately
4,600 gallons of heavy bunker fuel. The oil spread across central Puget
Sound and much of the oil stranded between Point Jefferson and
Indianola in Kitsap County. Unfortunately, a pristine marsh and
shoreline area managed by the Suquamish Tribe was hard-hit. The Do-Kag-
Wats marsh was heavily oiled and significant cleanup issues were raised
in this culturally and biologically sensitive area.
NOAA provided several services to the response and on-going
assessment, including tracking the floating oil, evaporation and
dispersion predictions, systematic shoreline surveys, seafood sampling,
and natural resource damage assessment studies. NOAA is currently
working with the State, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and the
Suquamish Tribe in the completion of a cooperative damage assessment.
Dalco Pass
On October 14, 2004, the USCG received a report of a mystery oil
spill in the vicinity of Dalco Passage in southern Puget Sound. NOAA
and Washington State conducted flights over the area the next day and
estimated that 1,500-2,000 gallons of product had been released and was
spreading, mostly around Vashon Island. Weather conditions were nearly
calm during this time. As a result, the oil was able to slowly spread
over a large area giving the appearance that a large volume of oil had
been released. Response teams treated the impacted beaches promptly and
thoroughly, and the cleanup of all oiled beaches was signed-off as
complete by the Unified Command only 2 weeks after the spill was first
reported. Follow-up inspections indicated little to no apparent
environmental impact. In total, one bird was killed and one was cleaned
and released. Several dead harbor seal pups were collected during the
spill but necropsy results found no link to the spill.
Whatcom Creek
Perhaps the most significant recent spill incident in the Puget
Sound region was the 1999 Olympic Pipe Line Company spill into Whatcom
Creek in Bellingham, WA. This spill highlights the fact that vessels
are not responsible for all oil pollution events; land-based sources of
oil can also invade the marine environment and have significant
impacts. The restoration efforts for the June 10, 1999, gasoline spill
illustrate NOAA's damage assessment functions at a spill, and highlight
the benefits of NOAA regulations that encourage cooperative and
restoration-based damage assessment.
The incident resulted in the release of approximately 236,000
gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Creek, Bellingham, WA. The spilled
gasoline ignited, burning much of the riparian vegetation including a
large section of mature forest in an urban park. Whatcom Creek and
adjacent forests, parks, and open-space areas are important ecological
and recreational resources for the City of Bellingham. During the past
decade, a concerted effort by local governments, tribes, nonprofit
organizations, and private citizens has lead to habitat improvements in
and along Whatcom Creek. The creek also has important cultural and
subsistence values. The creek falls within the 1855 Point Elliott
Treaty Area for the Lummi Nation and Nooksack Tribe.
The fire that resulted from the Olympic Pipeline Oil Company spill
killed three people, and the combination of the fire and toxic levels
of hydrocarbons eliminated nearly all aquatic biota from the spill site
to the mouth of the creek. Over 100,000 fish were killed. Affected
biota included several species of juvenile salmonids, including chinook
salmon. Most of the dead salmonids were fry and smolts. Over 26 acres
of forest, including approximately 16 acres of mature riparian forest
within the adjacent park, was lost as a result of the fire.
Shortly after the incident, NOAA and the State and tribal trustees
entered into a cooperative assessment process with Olympic Pipe Line
Company. NOAA was the lead administrative trustee and worked to develop
both emergency and long-term restoration plans for the creek. This
cooperative process reduced duplication of studies, increased the cost-
effectiveness of the assessment process, increased sharing of
information, and, most importantly, sped the restoration process.
Because salmon would be returning to spawn in the creek in the months
following the spill, a concerted effort was made to conduct early
restoration in the stream. At the same time, data were collected for
long-term restoration needs. A number of emergency projects were
implemented and salmon successfully spawned in the fall after the
incident. A long-term plan was prepared and finalized following a
period of public comment. NOAA worked closely with Washington State,
the City of Bellingham, the Lummi Nation, and the Nooksack Tribe, and
successfully protected funding for the long-term restoration plan. This
plan includes projects that are currently being implemented in the
following areas: Land Acquisition and Park Enhancements, Fish Habitat
Projects, and a Long-term Monitoring and Maintenance.
Conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to talk about NOAA's important role
under OPA. NOAA's expertise is critical to prevent further harm,
restore adverse effects on natural resources, aid planning and response
decisionmaking, and document damages associated with oil spills. I look
forward to any questions that you may have.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Helton. Mr. Jensen.
STATEMENT OF DALE JENSEN, PROGRAM MANAGER,
SPILL PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE,
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY
Mr. Jensen. Senator Cantwell, welcome to our beautiful
state, and thank you----
Senator Cantwell. You might have to turn on your mike
there. There's a button there.
Mr. Jensen. Oh, sorry. Senator Cantwell, welcome to our
beautiful state, and thank you for this opportunity to testify
today on the state of oil spill prevention, preparedness, and
response in Washington. First, on behalf of the staff of the
Ecology Spills Program I would like to thank you, Senator
Cantwell, and other Members of the Senate for your leadership
for including in the Energy Policy Act the fix for the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. I would also like to express the
gratitude of the members of the Pacific States/BC Task Force.
Your passage of the funding provision will ensure that oil
spill cleanup actions will continue to be done in a timely
manner, safeguarding our valuable natural resources. Again,
thank you for your efforts on this issue.
Washingtonians demand that we are not only vigilant in our
efforts to prevent oil spills, but that we are also prepared
for a rapid and aggressive response in the event of a spill.
Our citizens have a very high expectation for an active state
oil spills program, and we are meeting those expectations.
As a leader in state oil spill prevention preparedness and
response, we work closely with our Coast Guard partners,
industry, and stakeholders to develop a comprehensive and
innovative oil spill program. And I'm proud to report that
these efforts have been successful. Over the past 2 years,
Department of Ecology vessel inspectors have conducted over
2,500 inspections. In one case, an Ecology inspector identified
a problem onboard an Evergreen International vessel and worked
closely with the Coast Guard and Federal investigators, leading
to a $25 million settlement with the company that led to
greater worldwide focus on illegal waste while dumping.
We have also seen a decline in the number of spills in the
25- to 10,000-gallon range. We are now responding to 99 percent
of all reported spills within a 48-hour period. These successes
have come from the dedication of a highly skilled and trained
staff at the Ecology Spills Program and from the commitment of
many companies and stakeholders who all share a pride in
ensuring the highest degree of prevention and preparedness
possible.
But with these successes we still are faced with many
challenges. Our experience in the Dalco Passage spill
demonstrates the need to have the appropriate response
equipment on the scene quickly. There's much that still needs
to be done to ensure that we can respond quickly with the most
effective spill containment and cleanup resources available.
Since the Dalco Passage spill we've partnered with the
Coast Guard to create and work with the Oil Spill Early Action
Task Force as Captain Boothe mentioned. We capitalized on the
incident to approve our ability to assess and track spills in
the dark. We are streamlining our access to aerial and on-water
reconnaissance capabilities. We are updating local knowledge
specific Geographic Response Plans, making sure all private-
sector response resources can immediately be called upon to
respond to an orphan spill. Growing from our lessons learned,
we will continue to strengthen the critical functions provided
by my Program's Incident Management Action Team.
We will continue to evaluate and test our spill response
capabilities to ensure that we have the most effective program
possible. Congress can help in this effort by providing
funding, particularly for capital needs as well as cleanup
response.
Since 2001, the Coast Guard has been faced with increased
demand for and participation in homeland security activities.
In our region, the Coast Guard has stepped up to these new
challenges with exceptional professionalism. However, the
Agency is also facing budget constraints due to a declining
Federal budget and increasing need in the various aspects of
our National War on Terrorism. We're concerned that these new
responsibilities and pressures on the Coast Guard will impact
their activities in the area of oil spill prevention and
response.
Currently the 13th District Coast Guard has done an
outstanding job in balancing these demands; however, we urge
Congress to provide more resources to the Coast Guard
commensurate with the increased demands that are placed on the
Agency.
We should also look to states as partners to help with
these demands. We should remember that it was a talented
Ecology Spills vessel inspector who first caught the problem
leading to the penalty to Evergreen Shipping. This is a perfect
example of how the state can assist our Federal partners in oil
spill prevention, preparedness, and response.
Congress should consider methods by which they can support
state actions on oil spill prevention, preparedness, and
response. These actions don't necessarily have to be funding.
Improved regulatory authority and flexibility for states can
also provide for some relief for the Coast Guard, as well as
increased cooperation with states.
One area that needs additional attention is salvage. I
strongly encourage the Coast Guard to complete the salvage
role. In response to an incident where fuel oil was spilled
during a transfer from the facility to a tank barge, the
Washington State legislature directed the spills program to
report on the scope of oil and fuel transfers in Puget Sound
and to develop standards for these transfers.
Our report will be completed in the next few months, but
our preliminary assessment is that information on cargo and
fueling volume, frequency, location, and practices is not
consistently required and is often incompletely reported. We
believe there are regulatory gaps that our standards can cover
that will result in fewer spills to water. The next steps in
this process will be to work with the Coast Guard and others on
the specifics of the rule and the monitoring program that the
state will develop.
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court issued their decision on
Intertanko v Locke, a seminal case in Federal/State regulation
of shipping. Prior to the decision, Washington had a very
detailed and aggressive oil spill prevention program for oil
tankers and tank barges.
In brief, the court ruled that many aspects of the state
program are preempted by Federal law and historic Congressional
action in the area of shipping. As a result, much of our state
oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response program was
struck down.
This has created a difficult situation where the people of
Washington have very high expectations as to the degree of
protection from the risk of oil spills that they would like to
see for our State, but Federal law limits the scope of an oil
spill program. Congress can assist in reducing this legal
tension by supporting joint cooperative opportunities between
states and the Coast Guard.
Understanding the nature of shipping and the need for a
certain degree of uniform standards, Congress should also
consider allowing neighboring states to work together as a
region to develop solutions and standards in the area of oil
spill prevention, preparedness and response.
In conclusion, we must remember the proud tradition in our
state of protecting our precious natural resources from the
risk of oil spills. Residents of Washington demand that we
maintain a high degree of vigilance and a rapid and aggressive
response to all major spills. We must also remember that
companies, including shippers and oil facilities of types,
consider themselves residents of our great state. They too
share in this desire to protect our resources.
We will continue to work collaboratively with the Coast
Guard as we develop our oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response program. And we are ready to provide support for the
Coast Guard as they operate in an increasingly demanding and
challenging atmosphere.
And finally, Congress can help by funding for oil spill
prevention, preparedness and response activities. Again, thank
you for this opportunity to testify, and I'd be happy to answer
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jensen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dale Jensen, Program Manager, Spill Prevention,
Preparedness, and Response, Washington State Department of Ecology
Senator Cantwell and members of the Subcommittee, welcome to our
beautiful state, and thank you for this opportunity to testify today on
the state of oil spill prevention, preparedness and response in
Washington.
First, on behalf of the staff at the Ecology Spills Program, I
would like to thank Senator Cantwell, and other Members of the Senate,
for including in the Energy Policy Act the fix for the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund. I would also like to express the gratitude of the
members of the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force. The long-term
sustainability of the Fund is a priority issue for the Task Force. Your
passage of the funding provision will ensure that oil spill response
and cleanup actions will continue to be done in a timely manner,
safeguarding our valuable natural resources. Again, thank you for your
efforts on this issue.
We have a proud tradition in our state of active citizen and state
agency involvement in oil spill prevention. Washingtonians demand that
we are not only vigilant in our efforts to prevent oil spills, but that
we are also prepared for a rapid and aggressive response in the event
of a spill. Our citizens have very high expectations for an active
state oil spills program, and we are meeting those expectations.
As a leader in state oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response we work closely with our U.S. Coast Guard partners, industry,
and stakeholders to develop a comprehensive and innovative oil spill
program. And I'm proud to report that these efforts have been
successful.
Over the past 2 years, Department of Ecology vessel inspectors have
conducted over 2,500 inspections. In one case, an Ecology inspector
identified a problem onboard an Evergreen International vessel and
worked closely with the Coast Guard and Federal investigators leading
to a $25 million settlement with the company.
We have also seen a decline in the number of spills in the 25 to
10,000 gallon range. And we are now responding to 99 percent of all
reported spills within the first 48 hours.
These successes have come from the dedication of a highly skilled
and trained staff at the Ecology Spills Program, and from the
commitment of many companies and stakeholders who all share a pride in
ensuring the highest degree of prevention and preparedness possible.
But with these successes we still are faced with many challenges:
1. The need for adequate spill response capacity to stage an
aggressive spill response in the event of a spill.
2. Concerns regarding new pressures on the Coast Guard--
increased emphasis on homeland security and budget
limitations--and how these will impact decisions.
3. New information on oil transfers and the risk they pose to
our environment.
4. Limitations placed on the state in the Intertanko decision,
while at the same time Washington's citizens expect an
aggressive program to prevent spills, prepare for the potential
of a spill, and a rapid and effective response in the event of
a spill.
Spill Response Capacity
Immediately following the Dalco Passage spill in October 2004,
then-Governor Locke and the U.S. Coast Guard established the Oil Spill
Early Action Task Force. Consisting of representatives of environmental
groups, industry, spill response organizations, local communities and
local government, and tribes, the Task Force examined our spill
response and planning procedures focusing on the first hours of
response. Working in a very short time-frame, the Task Force produced
eleven recommendations for improving our response capabilities. But
they also recognized that ``full implementation of the recommendations
is outside the funding currently available to Ecology and the Coast
Guard for these activities.''
In a recent report for Ecology, Glosten Associates studied the
possibility of utilizing commercial fishing vessels to assist in oil
spill response. As part of this report, Glosten conducted a ``scenario-
based'' approach to determine the adequacy of spill response vessels in
the event of a hypothetical spill in the San Juan Islands in the amount
of approximately 500,000 gallons of oil. The scenario identified the
number of vessels for an ideal response to such a spill, and evaluated
the actual number that would be available. This analysis revealed a
shortfall of available response vessels for this scenario. The report
concluded that although current Oil Spill Response Organizations
(OSROs) could provide all the on-water resources necessary for them to
meet their current basic obligations, they could not meet the
shortfalls identified in the report in addition to their current
obligations.
Our experience in the Dalco Passage spill demonstrated the need to
have the appropriate response equipment on the scene quickly. This
recent report emphasizes that there is much that still needs to be done
to ensure that we can respond quickly with the most effective spill
containment and cleanup resources available.
We learned many things as a result of the Dalco Passage spill:
a. We partnered with the USCG to create and work with the Oil
Spill Early Action Task Force
b. We capitalized on the incident to improve our ability to
assess and track spill in the dark;
c. We are streamlining our access to aerial and on-water
reconnaissance capabilities;
d. Updating local knowledge specific Geographic Response Plans
(GRPs);
e. Making sure all private sector response resources can
immediately be called upon to respond to an orphan spill;
f. Growing from our lessons learned. We will continue to
strengthen the critical functions provided by my program's
Incident Management Action Team (IMAT).
We will continue to evaluate and test our spill response
capabilities to ensure that we have the most effective program
possible.
Congress can help in this effort by providing funding, particularly
for capital needs as well as cleanup response. The Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund is critical to this effort, and I want to thank Senator
Cantwell for her leadership in securing continued funding for this
account.
Increased Coast Guard Responsibilities
Since 2001, the Coast Guard has been faced with increased demand
for and participation in Homeland Security activities. In our region,
the Coast Guard has stepped-up to these new challenges with exceptional
professionalism. However, the agency is also facing budget constraints
due to a declining Federal budget and increasing need in the various
aspects of our national War on Terrorism.
We are concerned that these new responsibilities and pressures on
the Coast Guard will impact their activities in the area of oil spill
prevention and response. Currently the regional MSO has done an
outstanding job balancing these demands. However, we urge Congress to
provide more resources to the Coast Guard commensurate with the
increased demands that are placed on the agency.
We don't question the dedication and commitment to the women and
men serving in the USCG, but we are concerned with these external
pressures and demands. We must maintain our vigilance on spill
prevention, preparedness and response. We should look to states as
partners to help with these demands.
Again, we should remember that it was a talented Ecology Spills
vessel inspector who first caught the problem leading to the penalty to
Evergreen Shipping--this is a perfect example of how the state can
assist our Federal partners in oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response.
Another example of state/Coast Guard cooperation occurred on
October 14, 2004, when the ConocoPhillips' Polar Texas spilled black
oil at Dalco Passage, near Tacoma. At the time the spill was reported,
the source of the spill was not known. This ``orphan spill'' required
the close cooperation of our state inspectors and the U.S. Coast Guard.
The response to this highly visible spill has triggered a new dimension
in spill response in our state. Up to last year, our system for
managing major oil spills relied too heavily on a Responsible Party
being immediately identified, and participating in the spill response
Unified Command. A lesson learned in the Dalco spill was that Ecology
and the Coast Guard must be better prepared to immediately assess
orphan spills at night and begin recovery operations during any weather
conditions.
Congress should consider methods by which they can support state
actions on oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. As I will
discuss later, these actions don't necessary have to be funding.
Improved regulatory authority and flexibility for states can also
provide for some relief for the Coast Guard, as well as increased
cooperation with states.
Increasing Risk From Oil Transfers
On December 30, 2003, a tank barge was taking on bunker fuel at a
facility near Shoreline, Washington in the middle of the night. The
tank was overfilled and 4,620 gallons of fuel was spilled into the
waters of Puget Sound. In response to this incident, the Washington
State Legislature directed the spills program to report on the scope of
oil and fuel transfers in Puget Sound and to develop standards for
these transfers.
Our report will be completed in the next few months, but our
preliminary assessment is that information on cargo and fueling volume,
frequency, location and practices is not consistently required and is
often incompletely reported. We believe there are regulatory gaps that
our standards can cover that will result in fewer spills to water. The
next steps in this process will be to work with the Coast Guard and
others on the specifics of the rule and the monitoring program that the
state will develop.
Intertanko Limitations on State Activities
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court issued their decision in Intertanko
v. Locke, a seminal case in Federal/state regulation of shipping. Prior
to the decision, Washington had a very detailed and aggressive oil
spill prevention program for oil tankers and tank barges. In brief, the
court ruled that many aspects of the state program are preempted by
Federal law and historic Congressional action in the area of shipping.
As a result, much of our state oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response program was struck down.
This has created a difficult situation where the people of
Washington have very high expectations as to the degree of protection
from the risk of oil spills that they would like to see for our state,
but Federal law limits the scope of an oil spill program.
Congress can assist in reducing this legal tension by supporting
joint cooperative opportunities between states and the Coast Guard.
Understanding the nature of shipping and the need for a certain degree
of uniform standards, Congress should also consider allowing
neighboring states to work together as a region to develop solutions
and standards in the area of oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response. We already have some examples such as the Pacific States/BC
Oil Spill Task Force, where states and the province of BC coordinate
and share information on oil spill activities in the region.
Congress and the Administration should support a structure where
the Federal laws are a floor, and the states can implement a program to
address the particular needs of the state or the region. The court in
Intertanko allowed a degree of support for this approach when it
acknowledged that there may be ``peculiar circumstances'' in a state
that would allow for state specific regulation. Congress should codify
this approach and expand it to regions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we must remember the proud tradition in our state of
protecting our precious natural resources from the risk of oil spills.
Residents of Washington demand that we maintain a high degree of
vigilance, and a rapid and aggressive response to all major spills.
We must also remember that companies, including shippers and oil
facilities of types, consider themselves residents of our great state,
and they too share in this desire to protect our resources.
We will continue to work collaboratively with the U.S. Coast Guard
as we develop our oil spill prevention, preparedness and response
program. And we stand ready to provide support for the Coast Guard as
they operate in an increasingly demanding and challenging atmosphere.
And finally, Congress can help by continuing to provide funding for
oil spill prevention, preparedness and response activities by both the
Coast Guard and the states. Congress should also explore how to provide
states and regions with more authority and flexibility to address risks
in their areas.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I should have said at the outset of this that I invited my
colleagues to come join me today in Seattle and unfortunately I
think our lateness in getting out of Washington, D.C. and our
schedule made that difficult. So, you'll have to bear with me
through these questions. I thought I'd start with just a few
questions generally to all of you. First of all, I'm sure
everybody would love to know the latest on the Dalco spill and
where we are.
Mr. Helton, in your testimony you alluded to some of the
challenges in terms of where we are from a technology
perspective, for example, for spills that happen at night and
things of that nature. Where are we in terms of improving this
process, and what further information do we need?
Mr. Helton. Well, on the Dalco Pass there are obviously
lots of things going on in terms of changing the way Federal
and State agencies are responding, looking at new technologies.
There's also the ongoing investigation into the cause of the
incident, which I would defer to the Coast Guard and the state.
But the third element that I'm aware of is the
environmental assessment that has been going on and the--on any
significant spill there is a natural resource damage
assessment. The state and the Federal agencies have regulations
for how to pursue those.
It looks like the impacts were relatively minor. There was
a, I think one bird that was killed, one that was captured and
released. There were several harbor seal pups that were
collected. All of those, the chemistry on the oil spills did
not match the oil from the spill, so they appeared to be oil
from a creosote source or something else. So we're pretty
confident that the environmental impacts are relatively benign,
but I would defer to the state and the Coast Guard about the
investigation.
Captain Boothe. Senator, I guess I can't really comment on
the investigation at this point since it's with the U.S.
Attorney and he has not yet decided whether to pursue criminal
action, so we're awaiting that decision so that we may move
forward on the civil case as well.
But related to your question on response technologies, and
in particular remote sensing capability, I think the Dalco
Passage spill presented a unique set of circumstances for us
that fortunately highlighted a weakness in our system, or at
least a weakness in our prior response strategies. The fact
that it was a mystery spill where we didn't have a reporting
source immediately tell us that they discharged oil, caused a
bit of a problem in this particular case.
The U.S. Coast Guard probably responds within the
Washington waters to in excess of 220 to 250 mystery spills
each year, of which the Dalco Passage was one. Most of those
spills, as Mr. Helton indicated, are small spills, and in
particular, mystery spills are typically small spills that the
person that discharges probably does it most often
intentionally. We don't believe that to be the case in the
Dalco Passage spill, but nonetheless, clearly we don't normally
have a spill of the magnitude of the Dalco Passage spill as a
mystery spill.
So the response in that particular case, I think, was
perhaps colored by that experience in the past and the
expectation that it might be a small spill, despite the fact
that it had been reported as a heavy fuel spill. So we didn't
respond to assess that spill magnitude quickly enough in my
view, but nonetheless, there are other conditions that were
involved in it since it occurred at 2 o'clock in the morning
when we first got the report.
And so there was a gear up phase that the Coast Guard and
the State went through, coordinating and communicating with one
another, and establishing a game plan for the response. All
that aside, it identified that maybe there is technology that
we could use.
We have Coast Guard helicopters that are equipped with
forward looking infrared capabilities that might have been
brought to bear on that before fog set in. We did not employ
that in the wee hours of the morning on October 14, and
fortunately, but unfortunately perhaps, we haven't had another
case like that to be able to exercise the system that we
already have in place, or as we learned in the response to the
Dalco Passage spill, other assets that exist within the
community. King County has some remarkable infrared
capabilities as well that we have added to our inventory of
response capabilities.
I think that there are a number of things that we are
working on to improve our response. I think the Dalco Passage
spill makes us a lot more, if you will, ``trigger happy'' in
the nature of our response, which is a good thing. We need
alacrity in our response and we need to make sure it's both
aggressive and appropriate. So----
Senator Cantwell. Of those, excuse me, Captain, of those
250 mystery spills you were mentioning, how many of those
happened at night?
Captain Boothe. Senator, I'm not aware of the percentage
that occurred at night versus daytime.
Senator Cantwell. So with respect to this infrared
technology, I guess my question is, does this particular case
point to the fact that we need better technology, or is it, as
you say, just running our current system with a little bit
better use of existing technology?
Captain Boothe. Senator, as is the case with computer
technology, it is changing so rapidly that it's hard for me to
assess whether or not the equipment that we have in current
inventory is sufficient or is up-to-date enough to be able to
give us the best tools. Obviously it's not cheap technology.
So one of the strategies we looked at in the aftermath of
the Dalco Passage spill was, instead of having in-house
capability in the Coast Guard other than for our multi-mission
purposes, that we might look at employing outside contractors
that have that capability and have trained observers in the use
of that equipment for oil spills in particular, in lieu of
using just our top notch professional Coast Guard aviators with
potentially pollution investigators and observers from the
various marine safety officer sector commands across the
country. I think we probably need to explore more exactly what
capability we have and how good it is before we decide what the
next steps are in terms of new equipment procurement, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Jensen, did you want to comment on
this--on the Dalco case?
Mr. Jensen. I think, you know, Captain Boothe and Mr.
Helton covered most of it. I think just to add to that, as
Captain Boothe alluded to a number of avenues, I think where we
are now is how do we address these in the future. And so
looking forward to the future, and looking at all the resources
capable, we are going through assessment processes right now to
see what additional resources are available within, you know,
Puget Sound. And, you know, as technology changes, we want to
take advantage of every opportunity to improve our system
within Puget Sound.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. You all mentioned in your
testimony, and I mentioned it in my statement, that we were
very fortunate to get funding for the Oil Spill Trust Fund
reauthorized. And it's probably a little known fact that this
provision was buried in the Energy Bill, but at one of our
first hearings with the Coast Guard it was clear that something
needed to be done. There was some uncertainty about whether the
trigger mechanism of the program just reinstated itself or
whether we needed to reinstate it, and in discussions with
Senator Stevens, we decided we needed to do something proactive
and that's how we came to that legislation.
I don't think at the time we thought we would be having
this hearing that we'd be so fast to move. Congress isn't
always so fast, but in this particular case we're very thankful
that it did move quickly so that we know that we have a
resource to use for cleanup and prevention activities.
But, Captain Boothe, you mentioned in your testimony that
there were some questions about funding or issues in which
maybe the program liability or structure might be changed in
the future?
Captain Boothe. You mean the management by the National
Pollution Fund Center, ma'am?
Senator Cantwell. Yes.
Captain Boothe. No, Senator, I don't believe there's any
anticipation that they would change the structure of how the
funding would be used and how they dispense those funds for the
purposes of emergency response. The concern that I expressed in
my statement, Senator, was that obviously OPA and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act require the President to respond to
all spills, and that the United States has a ``no discharge''
or a ``zero tolerance,'' if you will, for oil spills in that we
have a mandate to go clean it up. If we don't have a viable
funding source, then obviously that makes it a bigger challenge
for the Coast Guard and the EPA and the states involved across
the country in dealing with this threat to the environment.
It might mean that we would be faced with a situation
similar to the Exxon Valdez where we really didn't have an
adequate fund in place to be able to respond nimbly to such an
emergency of that magnitude. With the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund solvent I think, and for a continuing sustainable basis, I
don't see any problem for us to be able to respond----
Senator Cantwell. So you don't think the liability limits
are too low?
Captain Boothe. Oh, yes, ma'am, I think that that's a
different issue, and I think the premise or the tenet of OPA 90
was polluters should pay. And the liability caps were
established on that premise that we expected that the
responsible party would clean up and pay for that or finance
that cleanup action.
Right now the cap probably doesn't address, as you
mentioned in your statement, ma'am, that it didn't address the
Selendang Ayu adequately or the Athos I spill, and so that
means the Federal Government has to pick up the rest of that
beyond the limit of liability. So I think there should be a
raise to the liability caps.
Senator Cantwell. Well, do you have a suggestion? Does the
Coast Guard have a suggestion on that?
Captain Boothe. Well, as you know, I guess OPA 90 provided
a mechanism by which the limits of liability could be increased
based on the Consumer Price Index; however, that authority
isn't vested with the Coast Guard, or has not been to date. So
it hasn't been done since 1990. It's remained at the static
level that it was at.
I don't know, I'm not a finance major so I'm not sure I
have the best answer for how do we go about ensuring that we
have adequate liability limits. I think, though, that the law
currently would limit us. If we only used the Consumer Price
Index, we're not going to get to the level of what the polluter
pays that we need to be at.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Jensen, do you have any comments on
that?
Mr. Jensen. Well, I think----
Senator Cantwell. As the State struggles for a more
comprehensive program?
Mr. Jensen. Well, I think from the standpoint of the Oil
Spill Trust Fund, it's such an important fund for us. At the
State level, we have a $9 million response fund at the state
level and just even, you know, the two spills that we had this
year, if the state would have been funding those spills it
would have bankrupted that fund.
So in the event, it's a great opportunity for us at the
State level to be able to kick in our response account because
we feel that aggressive and rapid response is very important.
We want to be able to pool all the resources together, you
know, to do that and then back off on resources when the spill
starts, you know, winding, or recovery starts winding down.
So we're very appreciative of that fund being kicked in
place, it provides a great safeguard for us in the State.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I want to get to Mr. Helton on our
unique marine sanctuary and traffic issues, but one more
question on this point. I don't think the Coast Guard report
addresses or makes a specific recommendation on this, on the
liability issue.
Captain Boothe. No, ma'am, I don't believe the report----
Senator Cantwell. But if you were going to venture a guess
on how to adequately make sure that there are resources there
in the future----
Captain Boothe. Well, I think----
Senator Cantwell.--what structure would you look at for
increasing liability that you think would be a fair way to look
at the equation?
Captain Boothe. Are you talking about what should the
limits of liability be or----?
Senator Cantwell. Well, obviously the hearing today is to
address this increase in spill volume that we've seen, and
we're here because Washington State's probably one of the most
aggressive, and the Coast Guard response probably is the most
technologically sophisticated. Obviously we do have a lot of
traffic in and out of here, so, we're probably where we have
the best deployment so far. So, yes, I'm asking you what else
do you think we should do to address the liability limits?
Besides CPI, what else would you look at?
Captain Boothe. Well, I think one of the issues that we
have to address, Senator, is the fact that I think a
preponderance of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
expenditures are actually paid out to claimants for third-party
actions that caused the spill. So, for example, in the Athos I,
although I know the investigation has not been completed, but
hypothetically let's presume that it finds that some third-
party caused the spill, the company that owned Athos I which
had paid $124 million to date--maybe it's more than that; I'm
not sure I have the right figure--but in any event they're
going to be seeking compensation from the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund likely to recover their costs, or at least the P&I
club or the insurers are going to be looking for that funding
to come back to them.
So I think it's an important aspect that the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund provides that we have to maintain that
capability for the Federal Government to pay that out. I think
somehow you have to look at the spiller as paying for the
impacts that have been caused, and I'm not sure how you go
about quantifying that exactly. I think OPA 90 did the best it
could, I think so did the FWPCA in trying to establish what's a
fair and reasonable value per ton of oil carried, or barrel of
oil carried to establish a threshold that hopefully provides a
reasonable gauge on how much is it going to cost to clean up
this oil.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Mr. Helton, you described our
marine sanctuary off the coast of Washington, and I don't
suspect anybody could possibly see this map but maybe you can.
And this purple area represents the outline of the marine
sanctuary area, I believe. So you're talking about an
additional rule that was implemented by NOAA up here at the top
of Tatoosh Island or something of that nature; is that correct?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Helton. Let me clarify the graph that you hold. The
purple is the area to be avoided. The marine sanctuary is
actually slightly larger and extends out further. So vessels
are allowed to transit through the sanctuary----
Senator Cantwell. So they can transit through this purple
area?
Mr. Helton. No, the purple area is the area to be avoided
for tank vessels----
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Mr. Helton.--and the blue/gray area that sticks out is the
additional footprint of the sanctuary that's not within the----
Senator Cantwell. This area here?
Mr. Helton. Yes. So the boundaries of the area to be
avoided are not the same as the sanctuary. But the idea is to
keep vessels that are approaching the Strait of Juan de Fuca
and ports in Vancouver and Seattle, to keep them offshore until
they have to make the turn into the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
The, and that was implemented about I think 10 years ago
now and compliance has been very good. It applies to tank
vessels and vessels carrying hazardous materials, so smaller
vessels like fishing vessels can still transit the area. And
it's a voluntary scheme, so if a vessel is in duress or for
some reason they can transit it, but it's not, it's a voluntary
compliance scheme. And our experience is that about 95 to 99
percent of the vessels comply with the regulation.
Senator Cantwell. And how is that information translated to
incoming vessels and to people who may be traversing for the
first time into the Strait?
Mr. Helton. There's, I believe that there's a, directly on
the chart itself there, is a notation of the area to be
avoided, and it's also, I think been placed in other documents
that mariners use, notice to mariners and other sources of
information. And that I believe that if a vessel does transit
through the sanctuary, through the area to be avoided, and they
are a tank vessel, we have a system in place to contact them
afterwards and clarify that they understand what the
regulations are.
So there is some follow-up for those vessels that do
inadvertently transit the area.
Senator Cantwell. And how has compliance been?
Mr. Helton. It's, my understanding is that it has been very
good. The Coast Guard, I think the, our sanctuary staff work
with both the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard on their vessel
traffic information that comes into the Strait of Juan de Fuca,
so they have vessel tracks for all the larger vessels that come
through. And I believe it was in the 98 percent compliance
rate.
Senator Cantwell. I see on some information that was
provided by the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary that
there are some noncompliance statistics that are below that,
for tugs and oil barges and tugs and chemical barges.
[The information preferred to follows:]
Vessel Transits through the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary and
Area to be Avoided (ATBA) During Calendar Year 2005
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a
specialized agency of the United Nations, has designated the
Area to be Avoided (ATBA) off the coast of Washington to reduce
the risk of marine casualties including oil spills, and the
resulting environmental damage in the Olympic Coast National
Marine Sanctuary (Sanctuary). Vessels advised to stay clear of
this ATBA include all ships and barges carrying cargoes of oil
or hazardous materials and all ships 1,600 gross tons and
larger. The Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, in
cooperation with the U.S. and Canadian Coast Guards, monitors
vessel compliance under this voluntary program. The Cooperative
Vessel Traffic System (CVTS) collects data on all vessels
entering and leaving the Strait of Juan de Fuca.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vessel Type Transits in and out of Transits passing Transits passing Estimated ATBA
------------------------ the Strait of Juan de through the through the ATBA Compliance Rate \4\
Fuca recorded by the Sanctuary \2\ within the --------------------
CVTS \1\ --------------------- Sanctuary \3\
-------------------------- --------------------- 4
1 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Container Ship 2,989 1,959 10 99.5%
Bulk Carriers 2,925 1,980 24 98.8%
Oil Tankers 898 636 5 99.2%
General Cargo ships 595 477 1 99.8%
Tugs with Oil Barges 582 570 100 82.5%
Vehicle Carriers 467 367 6 98.4%
Chemical Tankers 375 261 1 99.6%
Roll-on Roll-off 362 222 3 98.6%
Vessels (RORO)
Cruise Ships 326 209 4 98.1%
Articulated Tank Barges 283 283 0 100.0%
Fishing vessels 194 114 26 77.2%
Heavy Load Carriers 33 28 0 100.0%
Refrigerated Ships 27 15 1 93.3%
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Carriers (LPG) and
Liquified Natural Gas
(LNG) Carriers 18 6 0 100.0%
Non-oil Tankers 16 10 0 100.0%
Cable Layers 14 11 0 100.0%
Ore-Bulk-Oil Vessels 14 8 0 100.0%
(OBO)
Tugs with Chemical 14 14 9 35.7%
Barges
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALS 10,132 7,170 191 97.3%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The vessel transits in this column were provided by the Cooperative Vessel Traffic System (CVTS) and include
commercial vessels greater than 1600 gross tons, or tugs with oil or chemical barges.f\2\ This column includes
a subset of the CVTS vessel transits through the Sanctuary.
\3\ This column includes a subset of the Sanctuary vessel transits that also go through the ATBA. These are
vessels potentially not complying with the provisions of the ATBA. This is not known with certainty. For
example, in some cases fishing processors do not transit the ATBA, but are engaged in operations within the
ATBA and are therefore not subject to ATBA provisions. In other cases tank barges may be transiting while in
ballast and not carrying petroleum products or chemicals.
\4\ This column shows the percentage of vessels transiting through the Sanctuary that stayed out of the ATBA
(Column 4 = 1-(Column3/Column2)). This is used as an estimate of compliance with ATBA provisions.
Mr. Helton. So the target of the restriction is on vessels
carrying oil and hazardous materials. And there are lots of
other vessels that transit, and occasionally a vessel may, a
tank vessel or a barge in transit, but it's not, if it's not
loaded with fuel or----
Senator Cantwell. So you just believe that those are lower
threats as it relates to incidents, but why is the compliance
lower for these vessels?
Mr. Helton. I'd, I have to get back to you on that detail
of explanation. As I said before, the rules apply to the larger
vessels that are the larger threats. It's not meant to preclude
fishing vessels and other vessels that transit the coast from
having to avoid the area.
Senator Cantwell. Capital Boothe, did you have a comment on
that?
Captain Boothe. Yes, Senator. It is intended that all tank
barges that are laden would also remain outside of the ATBA. I
think historically on some occasions barges and barge traffic
coming out of Grays Harbor would cut the corner, and those
would still nonetheless be considered to be, if you will, in
violation of the voluntary area to be avoided. Even though they
typically, at least from my experience when I was Captain of
the Port, in monitoring this, they predominantly try to abide
by the outer edge of the area to be avoided, if not further
offshore than that.
And I think another point that Mr. Helton mentioned as well
is that the commercial vessels, deep draft vessels, cargo
vessels of 1,600 gross tons or over, are also asked to
voluntarily comply with, since they obviously have a great deal
of bunker oil on board as well, and we would like to restrict
as much traffic within the marine sanctuary as possible. And
they had, I believe, committed an involuntary agreement by
resolution of the then-Puget Sound Steamship Operators
Association to remain outside of the ATBA as well.
Senator Cantwell. I don't know the specific statistics
regarding the percentages of spills related to vessels other
than oil tankers in the last several years, but what we're
trying to get at is that the perception that spills come just
from oil tankers is the wrong idea; correct? And that's part of
why we're trying to implement a more cohesive system?
Captain Boothe. Yes, ma'am, Senator Cantwell. I think folks
who interpret the equation of risk as probability times
consequence, seem to ignore the fact that probability is a huge
part of that. Even though you may have a significant
consequence potential from a tank ship, if you have enough
prevention strategies in place, potentially you can drive the
probability down so low that it ultimately doesn't represent
the highest risk.
I'm not suggesting that to be the case here, but I think
looking at the various measures that we have in place in Puget
Sound is a model for the rest of the country to view. I mean if
I had about 5 minutes I could probably walk you through that
safety net that is pretty substantial here.
Senator Cantwell. Including this marine sanctuary and areas
to be avoided and things of that nature?
Captain Boothe. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. Does that exist in any other part of the
country that you know of, like off the coast of Florida?
Captain Boothe. There are certainly other marine
sanctuaries, whether they've actually established either state
restrictions on transit or Federal, I don't know. Maybe Mr.
Helton would know whether, who mans those.
Mr. Helton. I believe that the Florida Keys National Marine
Sanctuary also has a similar traffic avoidance scheme to keep
deep draft vessels away from the coral reefs in that area. And
that's a much more shallow, it's a coral area so it's much more
critical that vessels stay well away from the reefs. About 25
miles off the Washington coast you're in lots of water, but 25
miles off the Florida Keys you may still be in, in that,
several hundred feet of water.
Senator Cantwell. I understand that member countries of the
International Maritime Organization also agreed to speed up the
phasing out of single-hulled vessels. Can I get your comments
on that?
Captain Boothe. Well, in terms of the OPA 90 MARPOL
similarities or differences, I think we would end up with a
mixed effect. As it is right now, OPA has much more stringent
phase-out period dates for single-hulled, pure single-hulled,
whereas the MARPOL convention provides earlier phase-out of the
double-bottom and double-side structure that is still a single-
hulled vessel, but not purely single-hulled, meaning there's
only one barrier throughout the whole envelope exposed to the
sea.
So for us to implement the earlier phase-out associated
with double-bottom and double-sided tank vessels, it would
require an amendment to OPA, and probably would have some,
obviously some impact on shipping within the U.S. as well.
Senator Cantwell. Given the incidents you've seen, do you
think that we need to do that?
Captain Boothe. No, ma'am, I don't believe so. From my
personal opinion, now, I'm speaking predominantly from a Puget
Sound perspective, and that takes into account the significant
safety net that exists here. I mean in Puget Sound we start
almost 2,000 miles from the coast when a vessel has to give us
its advanced notice of arrival, and with that advanced notice
we begin immediately getting the information about the vessel
and determining what kind of risk they pose.
As they approach the coast they have, obviously, the area
to be avoided, restrictions on the U.S. side, and Canada for
tankers has a tanker exclusion zone that extends out 50 miles
from Vancouver Island. So channeling from north and south
vessels will come into the U.S. waters or the Strait of Juan de
Fuca from a distance offshore.
We recently modified the, again IMO adopted a traffic
separation scheme which could be likened to an interstate
highway. It has essentially one-way traffic, or if you will, a
fast and slow lane on each side, predominantly one-way,
although there is some small traffic that's allowed to go
opposite the flow, but well outside of the main traffic lines.
And the major shipping coming in the opposite direction is
obviously separated from the inbound traffic by a several-mile
wide separation zone typically. As they come in then they have
to talk to the vessel traffic service, and here we have a
jointly-operated Canadian and United States cooperative vessel
traffic service that basically is a mandatory system. All deep
draft vessels are obligated to participate in that, and the
vessel traffic service, at least on the U.S. side, has
intervened probably in excess of a hundred times in the last 5
years to prevent an accident from happening.
So then they get to Port Angeles, and if we've decided they
need to be inspected, they get inspected there if it's a major
deficiency that we've identified that needs to be addressed.
And here in Puget Sound, where the rest of the Nation probably
has a foreign vessel examination program averaging about 16 to
19 percent of the foreign vessel arrivals get inspected, here
the number is up around 38 percent. And 80 percent, if you
discount them for those that make repeat calls to the Puget
Sound region.
So we've got just a myriad of measures and obviously many
more that apply specifically to tankers as they come through
our waters, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Helton, any comments about single-
hulled risks?
Mr. Helton. Well, I guess as a resident of the Puget Sound
area and as a sailor, I'm happy to know that vessels are coming
in more and more with double-hulled construction. It's not a
panacea, it's a design effort to prevent a leakage of a vessel
after it's collided with other objects or grounded. And I think
that at that point we're happy to know that it's a double-
hulled tanker, and hopefully we can minimize a spill or prevent
a spill just by rupturing the outer hull.
But all of these efforts to prevent the grounding and
prevent the collision in the first place are very important and
we shouldn't let the double hulls become a, ``let us relax our
confidence that we have solved the problem,'' because those
other efforts are very important as well.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Jensen, any comments on that?
Mr. Jensen. Yes, I think anything that we can do to
minimize spills and make our Puget Sound waters safer I think
is very much appreciated. I think that there are many companies
that have been ahead of the game. I know that some of the cargo
industry vessels are beginning to move forward with designing
their hull structures for double hulls.
And I think that we're very fortunate here in Puget Sound,
to see some of those more aggressive, you know, moves from some
of the companies and some of the actions. But safety is a big
factor and I think that, you know, you can do a lot with hull
designs, but I think the human factor is a big part of it, so
the more that we can do to work with the crews, to work with
the companies to prevent the spills, in the first place, are
very helpful.
And I think that, just one comment too, is we're very
fortunate here in this state to have a state-funded tug out at,
located in Neah Bay, and I think that that certainly helps with
minimization of risk and it helps our citizens to have some
assurance that, you know, we're doing everything that we can to
minimize risk here in Puget Sound.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Jensen, you mentioned the state and
the limits that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 has on the
ability of states to implement further regulations. I know I
see Representative Cooper here who's been very involved in this
issue. Do you want to elaborate further on that as my
colleagues and I look at this issue when we return in
September? Are there things that you would recommend right now
as changes to the 1990 Act?
Mr. Jensen. Well, I think that, I don't have specifics to
share with you right now. I think that when, when changes were
made through the Intertanko case, our focus really was on the
human factor, you know, part of it was, you know, really on the
safe operation of waters. And I think that that's one area that
if the state has more authority we can certainly work, you
know, continue to work more closely with the Coast Guard. But
that's, that's definitely one, you know, piece of it.
Senator Cantwell. More authority, how would that manifest
itself?
Mr. Jensen. I think just access to, more access to vessels,
which I think right now we look at complementing our programs,
the Coast Guard and us, complement our programs through making
sure that there isn't a redundancy, but I think that in areas
of fishing vessels, cargo, that we can do more to work closely
with those operators of those vessels to minimize risk.
Senator Cantwell. So what would we need to change in the
Act? If you have a good working relationship with the Coast
Guard now, what would you like to see? Not to put you on the
spot, but just to get a general sense. Again, part of today's
field hearing is to learn of the good things that Captain
Boothe and others elaborated on that we are doing in Washington
State that can be somewhat of a model for the rest of the
country.
Mr. Jensen. I don't have a specific for you right now.
Senator Cantwell. All right. I want to get on to the next
panel but, just to make sure I'm understanding--Captain Boothe,
you seem to be saying that of the recommendations from the
Coast Guard report, the issue of resources, and the issue of
cost of spills outpacing such resources, is the critical issue;
is that correct?
Captain Boothe. Yes, Senator. I think the fact that you
raised early in your statement, ma'am, regarding the cost
potentially outpacing the actual funds that are available
within the Federal domain apply toward oil spill response, or
that is provided through the liability limits provided in OPA,
probably need to be reexamined. And I'm not sure what the best
mechanism to address that and the right size of that amount
mean.
Senator Cantwell. And then to the question of whether all
the navigational tools are here and available, it seems that
Puget Sound has a pretty safe system, and given that we've set
aside certain regions to be avoided, or did I miss something
there, Mr. Helton? Do you think we need more navigational
tools?
Mr. Helton. Oh, I think that we're, NOAA as the Nation's
chartmaker, we're busy trying to update our charts and complete
all of the surveys. There's still work to do there, but we are
making progress, and most of the areas have been surveyed
recently. So----
Senator Cantwell. So are the charts out-of-date?
Mr. Helton. Well, when you, if you're a boater, if you get
a chart from the marine store, you'll see that the chart has an
edition on it. That edition might be dated 1999 or 2004, that's
the last time it was published. It doesn't necessarily refer to
when it was last surveyed. So some of the, we are going through
a survey backlog in trying to update all the critical areas,
especially harbor areas and areas where they're may be
shoaling, to update those base surveys so that the navigation
information that goes to the mariners is as updated as
possible.
Senator Cantwell. So you'd say we're in good shape?
Mr. Helton. Well, I think we're, my understanding is that
there is a backlog that is being addressed. I'm sure that the
agency would love to provide a list of other things that could
be, could be done to improve navigation, but that's beyond my
scope.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And then, Mr. Jensen, I'm sure that
you'll get back to us on whether there's adequate manning and
inspection or if there's something else that the State would be
interested in looking at this?
Mr. Jensen. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. Great, well, thank you, gentlemen, for
your testimony, and we'll have the record open for 2 weeks if
you want to add any additional comments to the record, but
thank you for being here, and thank you for giving testimony.
So we'll move to our next panel.
Captain Boothe. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. If our next panel would come up, and I
don't know whether Mr. Sones made it yet or not. Okay, if you
could come up and join this panel, that would be great.
[Brief pause in proceedings.]
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Sones, we're going to, since you were
supposed to be on Panel 1, we'll go ahead and start with you
this morning, and we appreciate your time in being here to give
testimony to the Commerce Committee field hearing. So thank
you.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SONES, VICE CHAIRMAN, MAKAH
TRIBAL COUNCIL; ON BEHALF OF THE NORTHWEST INDIAN
FISHERIES COMMISSION (NWIFC)
Mr. Sones. Well, thank you. I had to catch a boat, I missed
one, missed our canoe, as we Indians would say. We're at Tribal
Journeys this week so we've really got a busy schedule, but we
really appreciate you holding this hearing. And I'm fairly
familiar with this group of people as the last panel we tried
to sort of kind of, right in the middle of a lot of the issues
that happen here and work with all of the groups, so I thank
you.
My name's Dave Sones, I'm the Vice Chairman with the Makah
Tribe and representing the Northwest, 20 Northwest Indian
Fisheries Commission tribes. I want to thank the Senator for
holding this hearing. We do appreciate that, and the Fisheries
and the Coast Guard Subcommittee also. These are essential
environment issues, sensitive issues for Washington State
Treaty Tribes in protecting our natural resources from oil
spills.
I'd also like to take this time to reaffirm the mutual
trust responsibility that exists between the Federal and tribal
governments to defend our treaty-protected resources from the
long-term cultural, economic, and social impacts from an oil
spill. Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission Tribes and the
Makah Tribe recognize that it is a matter of when, not if, the
next oil spill will occur in Washington waters.
Simply acknowledging this fact acknowledges at least a base
understanding that an oil spill places a greater strain on an
already strained marine environment. Makah has witnessed this
firsthand from the devastating effects of an oil spill on our
resources and our cultural way of life.
The Makah Tribe is involved and has been involved in
tracking this issue, not only as a resource trustee and a, but
as a co-manager with the State and Federal Governments, but we
are also first responders contracted by major oil spill
response organizations to assist in oil spill response efforts
off the Olympic Coast and in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Other
Northwest Indian Fish Commission Tribes could offer the same
oil spill response capability if properly trained by the oil
spill response companies.
Other, we, other Washington tribes have experienced the
devastating impacts of an oil spill. The Suquamish, Puyallup,
and Muckleshoot Tribes were severely impacted by the Dalco Pass
in the 2004 spill, while the Suquamish Tribe was particularly
impacted by the December 2003 spill at Point Wells. Like the
number of spills off of Cape Flattery, little oil was recovered
from these incidents before the oil hit the beach.
Tribal notification and the opportunity for tribal
involvement in the decisionmaking process during these
incidents was difficult for us to establish. Northwest Indian
Fish Commission Tribes need a more institutionalized solution
to these shortcomings.
We believe the Washington State legislature has recognized
the importance of tribal notification from the time a spill is
detected, but there is still a need to assure tribal input in
the Incident Command established, that is, established during
the spill. For example, Tribal input in the Incident Command is
crucial to the proposed U.S. Coast Guard's rulemaking aimed at
requiring new application capabilities for oil spill
dispersants while maintaining response requirement levels for
mechanical recovery.
Decisions relating to dispersant use need to be made on a
timely basis, but need to consider long-term impacts on the
ability of tribes to harvest shellfish, as well as impacts on
the ability to recover undispersed oil through skimming or in
situ burning.
Formal consultation when major rulemakings are undertaken
such as the Coast Guard's proposed 2003 Removal Equipment
Requirements and Alternative Technology Revisions, are critical
for Tribal involvement. We concur with Washington State
Department of Ecology that there continues to be a need to
increase mechanical recovery equipment capabilities rather than
decrease them. It is the Northwest Indian Fish Commission
Tribal members' position that treaty protected resources cannot
simply be calculated as a cost of doing business reflected in
the cost of a barrel of oil retrieved scenario, but rather
represents far-reaching cultural and economic implications.
We also believe that offering a credit to offset purchases
of in situ burn equipment does not encourage the maintenance of
a full response toolkit. To that end we are concerned that
proposed DOE contingency planning standards that are more
stringent than the proposed Coast Guard rules, will be
interpreted by the Coast Guard to frustrate its purpose and
overrule DOE's effort. In order to adequately protect the
Washington waters from oil spills we must reconcile these
political--or potential differences.
The Makah Tribe realizes that there is a greater, there is
a need for greater tribal involvement in the oil spill arena as
well as the limitations in our technical ability to review and
comment on various state and Federal oil spill policy
documents, and that becomes problematic. To address that
shortcoming we solicited technical support from NOAA Hazmat in
Seattle to assist us with navigating and clarifying issues of
particular concern to the Tribe.
The Makah Tribe is currently analyzing the planning and
response assets the NOAA Hazmat Response Division is able to
provide the Makah Tribe during an oil spill and we are finding
them quite capable. Our initial request highlighted the
underlying necessity to develop a strong partnership between
the Makah Tribe and NOAA's National Marine Sanctuary Program
through Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary. We hope to
develop similar collaborations with the EPA and the Coast Guard
and the U.S. Navy over the next year.
While the Makah Tribe is part of the region's front line of
defense on the outer coast, we believe equipment and training
that is reconciled to ocean conditions can be further improved.
It would be a considerable improvement if the on-the-water
identification phase of an oil spill response were conducted as
soon as possible after an incident occurs. We need to build the
capacity to provide the Makah Indian Tribe and other Northwest
Indian Fish Commission tribes with personnel trained in such
procedures, and to have equipment post--pre-positioned to
respond to the oil spill once it is detected.
There is also a need for expanding response infrastructure,
i.e., dedicated response gear. When response to the Dalco Pass
spill occurred, much of the spill response gear situated at
Neah Bay had to be redirected to other areas, and this action
left our treaty-protected resources unprotected. The Makah
Tribal Council, or the Makah Tribal Council fully supports the
year-round positioning of a rescue tug in Neah Bay outfitted
with multi-mission capability.
The outer coast of Washington State includes the Olympic
National Park and three wildlife, national wildlife refuges,
the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, numerous
endangered species, and four tribal reservations that are
located there.
The Makah Tribe believes that in order to adequately
address these trust interests translates into increasing the
salvage, rescue and towing capabilities for the outer coast.
Two National Academy of Sciences reports on the state of U.S.
salvage capability point out that there is an immediate need
for improved salvage capability within the United States. The
U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with completing the salvage and
firefighting rulemaking as part of OPA 90.
The National Academy of Science has also sponsored two
separate reports of knowledge regarding oil spill dispersants.
We are reviewing this second study very carefully and are
concerned to find that the unknowns are still unknown. The lack
of solid conclusions about the efficacy and effects of
dispersants in cold water and near shore environments raises
concerns with the Makah Tribe and the Northwest Indian Fish
Commission Tribes in regard to the appropriate application of
dispersants in our waters and the rigor with which such
information is being sought.
Finally, in order for the Makah Tribe and the Northwest
Tribes to understand a real world picture of our state of
readiness for oil spill response, we need to conduct an oil
spill drill. We know how difficult it is to respond to an oil
spill in our region from first-hand experience. We do not,
however, have a clear understanding on how that overall
capability has changed or improved over the years.
The Makah Tribe would like to do its part in assisting with
the coordination of an oil spill drill to be conducted within
the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, enabling us a
realistic evaluation of our oil spill response capabilities. A
goal of the original OCNMS management plan was to conduct an
oil spill drill within the sanctuary boundaries.
In closing, we appreciate the Senator's leadership in
reinstating the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and increasing
its cap to $3 billion. We respectfully request that tribal
governments be allowed to draw from this account in the same
manner as the U.S. Coast Guard and EPA and other Federal
organizations. This ability will increase our capacity to
address the risks associated with the increasing volumes of oil
transiting through our waters.
We see opportunities to improve our oil spill prevention
and response capabilities at the Federal level through the
finalization of the Salvage and Fire Fighting Rule, continued
funding of a rescue tug in Neah Bay, oil spill drills being
used to identify where to stockpile equipment appropriate to
the operating environment, evaluation of the oil barge traffic
moving through the ATBA, and the ability for State and tribal
governments to exceed Federal response standards where
appropriate.
We have a mutual trust obligation to protect the treaty
resources of the 20 federally recognized Indian tribes in the
Pacific Northwest. We appreciate Senator Cantwell's leadership
in calling for this hearing and look forward to working with
the Senator and the Committee to see that these recommendations
are implemented. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dave Sones, Vice Chairman, Makah Tribal Council;
on behalf of the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission (NWIFC)
Senator Cantwell and Members of the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation:
My name is David Sones. I am Vice Chairman of the Makah Tribal
Council and I am speaking on behalf of the 19 other Washington State
Treaty Tribes that make-up the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission
(NWIFC). We appreciate the opportunity to present to you our tribal
interests and concerns in regard to the development and implementation
of oil spill policy.
We would like to thank Senator Cantwell and the Fisheries and Coast
Guard Subcommittee for holding this field hearing and for recognizing
the mutual trust responsibility that exists between the Federal and
Tribal governments to defend our treaty-protected resources from the
long-term cultural, economic and social impacts of a major oil spill.
The NWIFC Tribes and Makah Tribe recognize that it is a matter of when,
not if, the waterways in the State of Washington will experience
another oil spill. In fact, as we are preparing this testimony the
Canadian fishing vessel, Ocean Tor, has been drifting capsized for over
24 hours carrying four thousands gallons of fuel oil and 350 gallons of
hydraulic oil through our Usual and Accustomed fishing area.
In our case the Makah Tribe is not only a resource manager with the
state and Federal Governments, we are first responders, contracted by
major oil spill response organizations to assist in timely and capable
responses to oil spills off the Olympic Coast and in the Strait of Juan
de Fuca. These waters are transited by 10,000 commercial vessels
annually carrying over 15 billion gallons of oil. Other NWIFC Tribes
could offer the same oil spill response capability if properly trained
by the spill response companies.
The Makah Tribe has first hand experience with three of the largest
oil spills in Washington State (General Meiggs, 2,300,000 gallons in
1972; Nestucca, 231,000 gallons in 1988, Tenyo Maru, 400,000 gallons in
1991). However, the Makah Tribe does not have a monopoly on suffering
the negative impacts of oil spills. The Suquamish Tribe, Duamish,
Puyallup and Muckelshoot Tribes have recently been impacted by the
October 2004 Dalco Pass spill while the Suquamish Tribe was
particularly impacted by the December 2003 spill at Point Wells. Like
the spills off Cape Flattery, little was recovered from these incidents
before oil hit the beach and tribal notification and the opportunity
for tribal involvement in the decisionmaking process was difficult to
establish.
We believe the Washington State Legislature has recognized the
importance of tribal notification from the time a spill is detected,
but there is still a need to assure Tribal input in the Incident
Command established during a spill. For example Tribal input in the
Incident Command is crucial to the proposed USCG rulemaking aimed at
requiring new application capabilities for oil spill dispersants while
maintaining response-requirement levels for mechanical recovery.
Decisions relating to dispersant use need to be made on a timely basis,
but need to consider long-term impacts on the ability of tribes to
harvest shellfish as well as impacts on the ability to recover un-
dispersed oil through skimming or in situ burning.
The Makah Tribe has repeatedly supported the maintenance of a full
toolkit of oil spill response options. We Tribes depend on the Federal
Government to assist us in developing the assurances that our treaty-
protected interests will be represented when policy decisions are being
made. These decisions include not only having a seat at the Incident
Command but also formal consultation when major rulemakings are
undertaken, such as the USCG proposed 2003 Removal Equipment
Requirements and Alternative Technology Revisions (USCG-2001-8661). The
Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement associated with this
rulemaking has a written comment deadline of August 1, 2005. We concur
with Washington State Department of Ecology that there continues to be
a need to increase mechanical recovery equipment capabilities rather
than decrease them. It is the NWIFC Tribal members position that
treaty-protected resources cannot be simply calculated as a cost of
doing business reflected in the cost of a barrel retrieved scenario but
rather represents far reaching cultural and economic implications. We
also believe that offering a credit to offset purchases of in situ burn
equipment does not encourage the maintenance of a full toolkit. To that
end we are concerned that proposed DOE contingency planning standards
that are more stringent than the proposed USCG rules will be
interpreted by the USCG to ``frustrate its purpose,'' this rule has
implications for ``federalism'' which is explicitly allowed for under
Executive Order 13132, but contradicted in the proposed USCG rule.
The Makah Tribe realized the need for greater tribal involvement in
the oil spill arena as well as the limitations in its technical ability
to review and comment on various state and Federal oil spill policy
documents had become problematic. To address that shortcoming we
solicited technical support from NOAA HAZMAT in Seattle to assist us
with navigating and clarifying issues of particular concern to the
Tribe. This initial request highlighted the underlying necessity to
develop a partnership between the Makah Tribe and NOAA's National
Marine Sanctuary Program through Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary. We hope to develop similar collaborations with the EPA,
Coast Guard and Navy next year. This collaboration between the National
Marine Sanctuary Program and the Makah Tribe is just beginning yet
progressing well.
The necessity of stationing dedicated response gear became evident
to the MTC when in order to respond to the Dalco Pass spill much of the
spill response gear situated at Neah Bay had to be redirected to other
areas. The Washington State DOE just released a study showing that 15
additional spill response vessels would be needed to respond to a
420,000-gallon spill in the San Juan Islands. If such additional assets
are needed in close proximity to four oil refineries where the majority
of our spill response assets are pre-positioned, the same or even more
would be needed to address a spill in the more remote waters of the
Olympic coast. We support the DOE's call for training fishermen to
assist in spill response and believe that tribal fishermen may be
particularly helpful in that they are more likely to be present in the
State year round.
While the Makah Tribe is part of the region's front-line of defense
on the outer coast, we believe equipment and training that is
reconciled to ocean conditions can be further developed. It would be a
considerable improvement if the on-water identification phase of an oil
spill response were conducted as soon as possible after an incident
occurs. We need to build the capacity to provide the Makah Indian Tribe
and other NWIFC member Tribes with personnel trained in such procedures
and to have equipment pre-positioned to respond to the spill once it is
detected.
We recognize that the Strait of Juan de Fuca receives more vessel
traffic bound to ports in British Columbia and Washington State than
any other water body in North America. Further, we understand that
current projections suggest trade volumes are expected to double or
triple in the next 10 to 20 years. We understand these projections to
affect an increase in the number and size of ships calling on our
waters. These larger ships require larger tugs to tow them, especially
off the coast where high winds and waves counteract a tug's ability to
assist a vessel. The rescue tug stationed in Neah Bay is only available
on a seasonal basis and only assured State funding for another 3 years.
The Makah Tribe fully supports the year-round positioning of a
rescue tug in Neah Bay outfitted with multi-mission capability. The
outer coast of the State of Washington includes the Olympic National
Park, three National Wildlife Refuges and Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary, numerous species listed under the Endangered Species Act,
and the four tribal reservations that are located there. While the
Federal Government has a much vested interest in protecting the outer
coast from the impacts of an oil spill, it makes sense for the Federal
Government to support year round funding of a rescue tug. The Makah
Tribal Council believes addressing these interests translates to
increasing the salvage, rescue, and towing capability for the outer
coast. According to the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary
Program's efforts to monitor vessel compliance with the Area To Be
Avoided (ATBA) off the coast, 142 tugs with oil barges transited
through the ATBA in 2004. While this represents a 75 percent compliance
rate of the tugs and barges that avoided the ATBA, of the remaining 25
percent, just one accident with a laden oil barge can impact us for
over 10 years. We therefore view near-shore transits of laden oil
barges to be one of the greatest risks to our treaty-protected
resources and our way of life.
Two National Academy of Sciences reports on the state of U.S.
salvage capability point out the immediate need for improved salvage
capacity in the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard is tasked with
completing the Salvage and Firefighting rulemaking as part of OPA 90.
During the December 6, 2004 incident involving the Selendang Ayu over
400,000 gallons of oil spilled in the waters surrounding the Aleutian
Islands. The Coast Guard and the State of Alaska, despite expending
considerable resources in responding to the incident were unable to
prevent the Selendang Ayu from grounding. Governor Murkowsky of Alaska
has since called for Coast Guard vessels to be equipped with rescue
towing capability. This option should be kept in mind for remote areas
such as Neah Bay. Alternatively, uniquely capable Navy Powhatan Class
salvage tugs could be strategically stationed in Neah Bay and operated
by either private contractors, Military Sealift Command, the Navy, or
the Coast Guard.
In our own waters during a November 11th incident with a cargo ship
the Neah Bay Rescue tug had to travel 16 hours round trip from Neah Bay
to Port Angeles and back in order to pick up salvage equipment and
boom--resources that could reside in Neah Bay. The salvage master and
dive crew could have been transited into Neah Bay rather than having
the tug make the trip to PA. Fortunately the bulk carrier Thrasyvoulos
V was well offshore when the call came in. Passage of a strong Salvage
and Firefighting rule should be a priority of this year.
The National Academy of Sciences has also sponsored two separate
reports on the state-of-knowledge regarding oil spill dispersants. We
are reviewing this second study carefully, and are concerned to find
that the unknowns are still unknown. The lack of solid conclusions
about the efficacy and effects of dispersants in cold water and near-
shore environments raises concerns with the Makah Tribe and the
Northwest Indian Fish Commission Tribes in regard to the appropriate
application of dispersants in our waters and the rigor with which such
information is being sought.
Finally, in order for the Makah Tribe and the N.W. Indian Fisheries
Commission to understand a real world picture of our state-of-readiness
for oil spill response we need to conduct oil spill drills. We know how
difficult it is to respond to a spill in our region from first-hand
experience, we do not have a clear understanding on how that overall
capability has changed or improved in recent years. The Makah Tribe
would do its part in assisting with the coordination of a spill drill
to be conducted off the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary
enabling us a realistic evaluation of our oil spill response
capabilities. A goal of the original OCNMS Management Plan was to
conduct an oil spill drill within the sanctuary boundaries.
In closing, we appreciate the Senator's leadership in reinstating
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) and increasing its cap to $3
billion. We respectfully request that tribal governments be allowed to
draw from this account in the same manner as the USCG and EPA. This
ability will increase our capacity to address the risks associated with
the increasing volumes of trade moving through our shared waters.
To summarize, the Makah Tribe and the Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission Tribes stand ready to constructively contribute to the level
of oil spill readiness in Washington State through our participation in
the development of oil spill policy, the Incident Command System, and
as spill response contractors. However, in order maximize our
contributions, increased levels of consultation will be needed with the
tribes before and during our next oil spill.
We see opportunities for improvements to our oil spill prevention
and response capabilities at the Federal level through the finalization
of the Salvage and Firefighting rule, continued funding of a rescue tug
in Neah Bay, oil spill drills being used to identify where to stockpile
equipment appropriate to the operating environment, evaluation of the
oil barge traffic moving through the ATBA, and the ability for state
and tribal governments to exceed Federal response standards where
appropriate.
We have a mutual trust obligation to protect the treaty resources
of the 20 federally recognized Indian tribes in the Pacific Northwest.
We appreciate Senator Cantwell's leadership in calling for this
hearing, and look forward to working with her and the Committee to see
that the recommendations are implemented.
Thank you.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Sones. Where did you start
your morning?
Mr. Sones. In Port Angeles. And back there for the
Journeys, the canoes are coming in today.
Senator Cantwell. Even that's a distance, but I thought
maybe you started on the reservation this morning.
Mr. Sones. Well, my staff did so they came and picked me
up.
Senator Cantwell. And that is a long journey to get here,
so thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Holmes, did you want to go next?
STATEMENT OF FRANK E. HOLMES, NORTHWEST REGIONAL MANAGER,
WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM ASSOCIATION (WSPA)
Mr. Holmes. Sure. Good morning, my name is Frank Holmes,
I'm the Manager for the Northwest region for Western State
Petroleum Association, or WSPA. WSPA is the petroleum trade
association for the six western states. Our members produce,
refine, market, and transport petroleum and petroleum products.
Thank you for inviting us here today to participate in this
panel on this very important topic of oil spill prevention
response in the State of Washington. Our members are committed
to oil spill prevention and timely and effective response in
case of an incident. Washington State is a major refining
center with five refineries located in the western portion of
the state. These five refineries have a combined crude oil
processing capacity of approximately 621,000 barrels per day.
Washington State does not have any oil and gas production
so all the petroleum the state consumes needs to be transported
in the state. Eighty-five percent of the crude oil refined in
the state is transported to the refineries by tanker, with the
remaining being brought in by pipeline from Canada. Thirty-
eight percent of the petroleum products that are produced in
Washington are transported by vessel. The remaining 50 percent
is transported by pipeline.
The Puget Sound is a safe waterway and supports marine
vessel activities from both the United States and Canada. This
marine vessel activity includes a wide range of uses from
transportation of goods and products to military operations to
fishing to recreational boaters. The petroleum industry has
always been supportive of a robust oil spill prevention and
response program. We willingly pay the barrel tax that funds
the Department of Ecology's oil spill prevention and response
program.
The industry is a very active participant in the oil spill
prevention and response actions within the State of Washington.
The industry is engaged in every possible venue to consider
improvements to the oil spill prevention and response, along
with investing heavily at our facilities and in new vessels to
protect the Puget Sound.
Here are some of the more recent and ongoing examples of
this. Some of these you've heard in the previous panel. Through
the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, the
shipping routes were moved further offshore so that the tanker
traffic of persistent oil is 50 miles or more offshore, along
with tug and barge traffic being 25 miles offshore.
In cooperation with the Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary, the area to be avoided was established. Also the
Coast Guard moved the entrance buoy to the Strait of Juan de
Fuca ten miles further offshore, again to be more protected by
moving all vessels off shore.
Under the OPA 90, the oil industry is spending billions of
dollars to build the safest double hull redundant system tank
ships in the world. The U.S. and Canadian industry jointly
instituted the International Tug of Opportunity Systems, or
ITOS, to track and identify tugs within the Puget Sound that
could be called to support a vessel if needed. ITOS is now
being enhanced by the installation of the AIS, or Automatic
Identification System, by the Coast Guard, which will in real-
time track most vessels over 65 feet and towing vessels over 26
feet.
The petroleum industry is spending millions of dollars
annually to fund oil spill response organizations, OSRO's, such
as MSRC that is here today, which are located here in the Puget
Sound. This funding provides for the acquisition of appropriate
equipment and the continuous staffing of trained personnel.
Individual companies have expended large amounts for dedicated
equipment at their facilities, and have ongoing extensive
training and drill programs to keep employees ready to respond
in the case of an incident.
Industry participates in the Northwest Area Committee which
developed the area contingency plan for the Puget Sound. The
industry and the OSRO's have been instrumental in testing the
protective strategies for the Geographic Response Plans for
sensitive sites within the Puget Sound.
The petroleum industry provides the bulk of the funding for
the program and the contingency fund. The State of Washington
legislature has established an Oil Spill Advisory Council under
the Governor's office that is currently being organized, and
industry hopes to actively participate in the council's
efforts.
The industry is also currently engaged in a number of
regulatory efforts here in the State of Washington. The
Washington State Oil Spill Contingency Plan regulation is in
the process of a stakeholder work group. This effort will
include a review of the responsive equipment requirements for
the state. Also, there is a regulatory process to develop a
rule for oil spill transfer regulations. This was instituted
through a piece of legislation last year, and this regulatory
effort focuses on the booming and manpower requirements for
transfer operations.
Industry is also working very closely with the Coast Guard
on the Outer--Outer Coast Logistics Project to develop an
initial database identifying logistical and communication needs
as well as local tribal and agency contact information. This
effort is continuing. Another Coast Guard drill is planned for
this fall.
This list is not a comprehensive list, but I hope this
gives you an understanding of the serious attention that's
being put forth by the industry regarding the issue of oil
spill prevention and response. No one wants to spill oil.
Industry is actively engaged in conducting the appropriate
activities and practices to reduce the risk inherit in the
transportation of oil and prevent spills from occurring.
Industry is also trained and ready to respond to any incident
that may occur in Washington. Thank you again for allowing me
to participate.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holmes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank E. Holmes, Northwest Regional Manager,
Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA)
Good morning. My name is Frank Holmes. I am the Manager for the
Northwest Region for Western States Petroleum Association (WSPA). WSPA
is the petroleum trade association for the six western states. Our
members produce, refine, market, and transport petroleum and petroleum
products. We provide the transportation fuels that transparently move
the entire economy of the Northwest, and we do so while responsibly
managing virtually every drop of oil and product throughout the
distribution system.
Thank you for inviting us to participate on this panel today to
discuss the very important topic of oil spill prevention and response
in the state of Washington. Our members are committed to oil spill
prevention and timely and effective response in the case of an
incident. We are surprised that the oil industry was not contacted to
participate in today's Senate Hearing until last Wednesday evening.
Washington State is a major refining center with five refineries
located in the western portion of the state. These five refineries have
a combined crude oil processing capacity of approximately 621,000
barrels per day (in 2003 operated at 94 percent of capacity).
Washington does not have any oil and gas production so all of the
petroleum the state consumes needs to be transported into the state.
Eighty-five percent of the crude oil refined in the state is
transported to the refineries by tanker, with the remaining being
brought in by pipeline from Canada. Thirty-eight percent of petroleum
products produced in Washington are transported by vessel, with 50
percent being transported by pipeline.
The Puget Sound is a safe waterway and supports marine vessel
activities from both the United States and Canada. This marine vessel
activity includes a wide range of uses from transportation of goods and
products, to military operations, to fishing, to recreational boaters.
The petroleum industry has always been supportive of a robust oil
spill prevention and response program. We willingly pay the barrel tax
that funds the Department of Ecology's Oil Spill Prevention and
Response Program.
The industry is a very active participant in the Oil Spill
Prevention and Response actions in Washington State. The industry is
engaged in every venue possible to consider improvements in oil spill
prevention and response along with investing heavily at our facilities
and in new vessels to protect the Puget Sound. Here are some of the
more recent and ongoing examples:
1. Through the Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task
Force, the shipping routes were moved further offshore so the
tanker traffic of persistent oil is 50 miles or more offshore
along with the tug and barge traffic being 25 miles offshore.
2. In cooperation with the Olympic Coast National Marine
Sanctuary, an Area to Be Avoided (ATBA) was established which
moved vessel traffic entering and leaving the Strait of Juan de
Fuca further away from sensitive areas.
3. The Coast Guard moved the entry buoy to the Strait of Juan
de Fuca 10 miles further offshore--again to be more protective
by moving all vessels further offshore.
4. Under the OPA 90 the oil industry is spending billions of
dollars to build the safest double-hull/redundant system tank
ships in the world.
5. U.S. and Canadian industry jointly instituted the
International Tug of Opportunity System (ITOS) to track and
identify tugs within the Puget Sound that could be called for
support if needed by a vessel. ITOS is now being enhanced with
the installation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS)
by the Coast Guard which, in real-time identifies most vessels
over 65 feet and towing vessels over 26 feet.
6. The industry supported placement of an equitably-funded-
dedicated tug at the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca
during the 9-month long Oil Spill Risk Management stakeholder
process in 1999 and 2000 and subsequent legislative funding
efforts.
7. The petroleum industry is spending millions of dollars
annually to fund Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs) such
as MSRC, located here in the Puget Sound. This funding provides
for the acquisition of appropriate equipment and the continuous
staffing of trained personnel.
8. Individual companies have expended large amounts for
dedicated equipment at their facilities and have ongoing
extensive training and drill programs that keep employees ready
to respond in the case of an incident.
9. Industry participates in the Puget Sound Harbor Safety
Committee, which has developed the Puget Sound Harbor Safety
Plan and Standards of Care that focus on reducing the risks of
spills.
10. Industry participates in the N.W. Area Committee which
developed the Area Contingency Plan for the Puget Sound.
Industry and OSROs have been instrumental in testing the
protection strategies for the Geographic Response Plans (GRP)
for sensitive sites throughout Puget Sound.
11. The petroleum industry provides the bulk of the funding for
the Washington State Department of Ecology Oil Spill program
and the state's contingency fund.
12. The Washington State Legislature has established an Oil
Spill Advisory Council under the Governor's office that is
currently being organized. Industry hopes to actively
participate in the council's efforts.
13. Industry is currently an active participant in ongoing oil
spill regulatory activities such as:
a. The re-write of the Washington State Oil Spill
Contingency Plan Regulation through a stakeholders work group.
This effort will include a review of the response equipment
requirements for the state.
b. Participation in the stakeholder work group to develop
Oil Transfer Regulations as required under legislation passed
last year. This regulatory effort focuses on booming and
manpower requirements during transfer operations.
c. Industry has worked very closely with the USCG on the
Outer Coast Logistics Project to develop an initial database
identifying logistical, and communication needs, as well as
local tribal and agency contact information. This effort is
continuing; another USCG drill is planned for this fall.
This is not a comprehensive list of activities, but I hope it gives
you an understanding of the serious attention being put forth by the
industry concerning the issue of Oil Spill Prevention and Response.
NO ONE wants to spill oil. Industry is actively engaged in
conducting the appropriate activities and practices to reduce the risk
inherent in the transportation of oil and to prevent spills from
occurring. Industry is also trained and ready to respond to any spill
incident that may occur in Washington.
Thank you for inviting us to participate.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Holmes. Mr. Wright, do you
want to go next? Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD WRIGHT,
PACIFIC/NORTHWEST REGION VICE PRESIDENT,
MARINE SPILL RESPONSE CORPORATION (MSRC)
Mr. Wright. Senator Cantwell, good morning. Thank you for
this opportunity. My name is Richard Wright. I'm the Region
Vice President of the Marine Spill Response Corporation,
Pacific Northwest region, that encompasses Washington, Oregon
and Hawaii. Prior to the merger last April of MSRC and Clean
Sound Cooperative, Incorporated, I was the President of the
latter response organization. I'm also a retired U.S. Coast
Guard captain and was a member of the Governor's and District
Commander Early Action Task Force.
The Marine Spill Response Corporation is the largest oil
spill response and cleanup company operating in the United
States. MSRC is a private, not-for-profit organization founded
in 1990 by industry as a direct result of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. MSRC is funded by the Marine Preservation Association,
MPA, whose member companies include those involved in the
transportation of petroleum products by water, refining
companies, pipeline companies, energy companies, as well as
various other types of shippers. Since the passage of OPA 90,
MPA member companies have funded in excess of $1 billion to
MSRC to develop and enhance oil spill response capability.
In April of this year MSRC merged with Clean Sound
Cooperative, Incorporated, an Everett, Washington-based,
industry-funded not-for-profit response organization, in
existence since 1971 to provide oil spill response services to
the oil industry in Western Washington. At the time of the
merger both MSRC and Clean Sound independently had significant
resources that greatly exceeded the U.S. Coast Guard planning
capacities required to meet both Facility Response Plans as
well as Vessel Response Plans under OPA 90 regulations.
This merger has enhanced the readiness and response
capabilities in the State of Washington by making a larger
inventory of responses--resources available as well as access
to the broader resource base of MSRC on the West Coast and
nationally. Importantly, the merged organization provides the
ability for a member or the U.S. Coast Guard to call out and
manage all of the combined resources with a single telephone
call.
As we all know, in an emergency situation, minimizing the
interfaces and simplifying decisionmaking is critical to the
success of the response, particularly in the earliest hours.
The merger combines the talents of both MSRC and the former
Clean Sound, who together have responded to over 500 spills
throughout the United States. In addition, a Memorandum of
Agreement between MSRC and Burrard Clean Operations of British
Columbia, Canada, affords MSRC access to the considerable
assets of that response organization.
Nationally, MSRC has 400 dedicated personnel and 88
equipment sites along the U.S. Coastline including the U.S.
Caribbean and the Hawaiian Islands. MSRC's entire inventory
includes 15 multi-million dollar state-of-the-art ``Responder''
class oil spill response vessels and over 100 additional
supporting oil spill response vessels and storage barges. We
have 600,000 feet of boom, 240 skimming systems, and mobile
emergency telecommunications capability. In addition to our own
inventory, MSRC has contracts with approximately 90
environmental service providers at over 200 locations
nationwide to provide additional resources at the time of a
spill.
In Washington State alone, at manned sites in Tacoma, Port
Angeles, Anacortes, Bellingham, Seattle, and Everett, MSRC has
over 60 full-time people managing the most comprehensive
inventory of response resources and equipment in any one area
in the entire United States. This includes 16 dedicated primary
response vessels, over 40 support vessels, approximately
120,000 feet of boom, 44 skimming systems, and four large
barges, with a total capacity of over 94,000 barrels or almost
four million gallons, to ensure that recovered oil and water do
not constrain a cleanup action.
While the above information may seem to be mere facts,
please allow me to put this level of resource base into a
perspective. Guidelines developed by the United States Coast
Guard for a classification of oil spill removal organizations,
OSRO's, are based on the OSRO's ability to bring quantities of
resources to various locations within certain time frames.
These resources include skimming capacity, booming capacity,
and storage capacity examination.
MSRC has received the highest rating available under the
system, which was developed as part of OPA 90. Further, through
industry commitment and funding, MSRC's resource base is far in
excess of what the regulatory guidelines require, even for
those with the highest ratings. For example, depending on which
location in the Puget Sound area is selected, our skimming
capacities exceed such guidelines for initial timeframe
requirements by at least five-fold.
Similarly, our storage and booming capacities exceed the
Federal guidelines by over more than double, and in some cases
by as much as ten-fold. The above are calculated only
referencing MSRC-owned and dedicated equipment and not
contractor resources which would greatly supplement this
capability.
Obviously, the above demonstrates the commitment on the
part of MSRC and the funding companies of MPA to exceed Federal
requirements, thereby ensuring a strong and robust response
capability in the event of an incident in Washington State.
Furthermore, all the MPA member companies operate a significant
exercise and drill program on a regular basis with MSRC to
ensure that not only the resource base is constantly tested,
but also to ensure that the management processes are in place
to successfully respond to any discharges.
We all know prevention's the key. Like firemen, the
response community would like nothing better than to never have
to respond to a spill. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
here today. I'm available to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Wright, Pacific/Northwest Region Vice
President, Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC)
Good morning. My name is Richard Wright. I am the Region Vice
President of the Marine Spill Response Corporation Pacific/Northwest
Region that encompasses Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii. Prior to the
merger last April of MSRC and Clean Sound Cooperative, Inc., I was the
President of the latter response organization. I am also a retired U.S.
Coast Guard Captain.
The Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) is the largest oil
spill response and clean up company operating in the United States.
MSRC is a private, not-for-profit organization founded in 1990 by
industry as a direct result of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. MSRC is
funded by the Marine Preservation Association (MPA) whose member
companies include those involved in the transportation of petroleum
products by water, refining companies, pipeline companies, energy
companies, as well as various other types of shippers. Since the
passage of OPA 90, MPA member companies have funded in excess of $1
billion dollars to MSRC to develop and enhance oil spill response
capability.
In April of this year, MSRC merged with Clean Sound Cooperative
Inc., an Everett, Washington-based, industry-funded not-for-profit
response organization in existence since 1971 to provide spill response
services to the oil industry in western Washington. At the time of the
merger, both MSRC and Clean Sound independently had significant
resources that greatly exceeded the U.S. Coast Guard planning
capacities required to meet both Facility Response Plans as well as
Vessel Response Plans under OPA 90 regulations. This merger has
enhanced the readiness and response capabilities in the state of
Washington by making a larger inventory of resources available as well
as access to the broader resource base of MSRC on the west coast and
nationally. Importantly, the merged organization provides the ability
for a member or the U.S. Coast Guard to call-out and manage all of the
combined resources with a single phone call. As we all know, in an
emergency situation, minimizing the interfaces and simplifying
decisionmaking is critical to the success of the response--particularly
in the earliest hours. The merger combines the talents of both MSRC and
the former Clean Sound, who together have responded to over 500 spills
throughout the United States. In addition, a Memorandum of Agreement
between MSRC and Burrard Clean Operations in British Columbia, Canada,
affords MSRC access to the considerable assets of that response
organization.
Nationally, MSRC has 400 dedicated personnel and 88 equipment sites
along the U.S. coastline including the U.S. Caribbean and the Hawaiian
Islands. MSRC's entire inventory includes 15 multi-million dollar
state-of-the art ``Responder''-class oil spill response vessels, and
over 100 additional supporting oil spill response vessels and storage
barges, 600,000 feet of boom, 240 skimming systems, and mobile
emergency tele-communications capability. In addition to our own
inventory, MSRC has contracts with approximately 90 environmental
service providers at over 200 locations nationwide to provide
additional resources at the time of a spill.
In Washington State alone, at manned sites in Tacoma, Port Angeles,
Anacortes, Bellingham, Seattle, and Everett, MSRC has over 60 full-time
personnel managing the most comprehensive inventory of response
resources and equipment in any one area in the entire United States.
This includes dedicated 16 primary response vessels, over 40 support
vessels, approximately 120,000 feet of boom, 44 skimming systems, and
four large barges (with a total capacity of over 94,000 barrels or
almost 4,000,000 gallons) to ensure that recovered oil/water product
does not constrain the clean-up.
While the above information may seem to be mere facts, please allow
me to put this level of resource base into perspective. Guidelines
developed by the United States Coast Guard for classification of Oil
Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs) are based on the OSRO's ability to
bring quantities of resources to various locations within certain
timeframes. These resources include skimming capacity, booming
capacity, and storage capacity. MSRC has received the highest rating
available under this system that was developed as part of OPA 90.
Further, through industry commitment and funding, MSRC's resource base
is far in excess of what the regulatory guidelines require, even for
those with the highest ratings. For example, depending on which
location in the Puget Sound area is selected, our skimming capacities
exceed such guidelines for initial timeframe requirements by at least
five-fold. Similarly, our storage and booming capacities exceed the
Federal guidelines by over more than double, and in some cases by as
much as ten-fold. The above are calculated only referencing MSRC-owned
and dedicated equipment and not contractor resources that would greatly
supplement this capability.
Obviously, the above greatly demonstrates the commitment on the
part of MSRC and the funding companies of MPA to exceed federal
requirements, thereby ensuring a strong and robust response capability
in the event of an incident in Washington State. Furthermore, all the
MPA member companies operate a significant exercise and drill program
on a regular basis with MSRC to ensure that not only the resource base
is constantly tested, but also to ensure that the management processes
are in place to successfully respond to any discharges. I am available
to answer any questions the Committee may have.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Wright, for being here.
Doctor, is it Leschine?
Dr. Leschine. Leschine.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR THOMAS M. LESCHINE,
DIRECTOR, SCHOOL OF MARINE AFFAIRS,
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Dr. Leschine. Thank you very much. I'm very pleased and
honored to be invited to speak at this hearing, Senator
Cantwell. I'm a Professor and Director of the School of Marine
Affairs at the University of Washington, not an oil spill
professional per se, so my remarks will be a little more
general, broader, and reflective.
I've been in and out of the oil spill business over my
career. I worked in the late 1980s to help develop the
Washington Compensation Schedule that the state now uses for
oil spill damages. I developed the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator's Report for the Exxon Valdez spill for the Coast
Guard, and most recently I've been a member of a scientific
advisory panel of an organization at the University of New
Hampshire, joint between them and NOAA, the Coastal Response
Resource Center, that is dedicated to promoting independent
research. So I said all that just as background because I'm
going to reflect in my testimony on my experiences in those
arenas.
I've got four basic points to make, first of all, a comment
on overall safety in the system and how we're maintaining it.
Second, I'll address social conflict, because I'm a social
policy scientist, and I think it's ever-present and doesn't
tend to get spoken to in discussions that are primarily
technical. Third, I'll address the nature of the risk. I've had
a fair amount of experience as a risk assessment practitioner,
commenter. And last, being a professor it's only right I should
address research, so I'll do that.
First of all, with respect to the overall safety, it's very
clear that improvements in the system have been enormous since
Exxon Valdez occurred. At the same time this risk will never be
reduced to zero and that's why we're all still here. And I
guess I'll just comment that what we were doing before Exxon
Valdez was relying on government to provide the ability to
respond to spills. What we're doing now is relying on the
private sector, or maybe I should say non-governmental
organizations such as Mr. Wright just spoke to.
And I guess I just want to say that there are some inherent
difficulties here because just the extent, to the extent that
one must maintain profitability in private sector operations,
for example, there's a difficulty in maintaining readiness. You
know, we have a Fire Department and we have, and the Fire
Department is there if we need it, and firemen oftentimes are
growing the best tomatoes in town because they've got lots of
time to tend their gardens. It's difficult to make money in
that kind of a system.
So I note that a recent report to the State of Washington
by Glosten Associates made reference to the need to incorporate
vessels of opportunity such as fishing vessels into the
response system, and it seems that the State Department of
Ecology is interested in doing, and maybe in spite of all the
resources that we obviously have available, things like this
are, potentially, still needed.
Let me go to my second point, social conflict. I think it's
inherent in this kind of situation because of many, many
reasons. People don't really expect oil spills, neither do the
experts. The experts assure us they won't happen. They do
everything they can to ensure they won't happen, but inevitably
one does and sometimes anger, disappointment, and other sorts
of reactions are the result. And there are always the questions
of liability that seems to split people right down the middle
when the lawyers get involved.
So I think it's worth noting that the arenas in which we
talk about oil spills and oil spill prevention are really
dominated by professionals. This has been the experience my
whole career. And the citizen voice is often fairly weak, in
the background, sometimes totally absent. So I think a
heartening advance I see is that Governor Gregoire signed
legislation in May to create an Oil Spill Advisory Council.
Social scientists that have looked at this problem often end up
looking at the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory
Council as a model for really engaging stakeholders into the
arena in which safety improvements are made.
I participated in a National Academy study that reviewed a
risk assessment that was commissioned by the Prince William
Sound RCAC, and it was really interesting in our briefings with
members of that organization how much industry and citizens and
representatives of industries like tourism were able to come
together and talk constructively about what needed to be done
under that mechanism.
So if you're going to do things like that, you need time to
let relationships develop. You really need adequate resources
to make sure the organization can function, and people really
have to be willing to come to an agreement. Those are sort of
necessities.
Let me go to the nature of the risk and I think I'll just
reinforce some of what I heard Captain Boothe say in Panel
Number 1. The sources of risk in Washington waters I think are
extraordinarily complex in their distribution. As I mentioned,
I was part of an evaluation of a big risk assessment study that
cost more than a million dollars that was conducted in Prince
William Sound in the late 1990s.
The panel that I was on came to the conclusion that Prince
William Sound was actually relatively simple as a problem of
risk analysis compared to Puget Sound. So what this says to me,
and I should add my background's in mathematics, but I'm going
to say I don't think technical analysis is as useful as we make
it, and really it's deliberation where you're constantly
talking about, ``what are the sources of risk'' that is
important.
I think the Sound is very different in the sense that spill
risk on the outer coast is dominated by the prospects of a
large tanker spill, but when you get into the interior parts of
Puget Sound, it's the bunkering operations, it's the wealth of
different craft on the water. The fact that it is a pleasure
craft can precipitate a major accident just by misbehaving. I
was a Commissioner of Pilotage in this state for 7 years, and
it was amazing how many times vessels were forced to leave the
lanes, or actually collisions occurred with passenger vessels
that were anchored in the sea lanes, despite all of the
prohibitions against that.
So these are real difficulties, and it tells you we've
really got to keep looking at the whole system. I think there
was a period that I hope we've gotten past where we were being
forced to consider this ``either/or'' choice, a tug in Neah Bay
or times of opportunity. I don't think we should be looking at
risk reduction as an either/or measure. I think we should look
at all the sources of risk and address each in proportion to
its reality of occurring.
As Captain Boothe said, it's the probability times the
consequence, and the things that happen over and over again may
be relatively low consequence but they are higher probability
events.
My last point about research, I think research is really
essential to not only improving the technology, the ability to
respond, but also to understanding what it is that people are
looking for to head off social conflict. So to me a proper
research agenda is technology and engineering, it's natural
science and it's social science, it's dealing with the human
dimensions of oil spill risk.
I don't think that happens very often. I think there's a
real problem in the kind of responses that happen to major
spills like Exxon Valdez where the nature of the research
that's done is injury determination, and when you look at what
the ecologists have to say 10 or 15 years later, such as
Charles Peterson in an article in Science that appeared last
year, it turns out there can be long-term effects that really
are the issue and the, you know, kind of immediate acute
toxicity and lethality is still being debated as to whether,
how consequential it was.
So we have to be mindful of asking the wrong questions. And
when you use an incidence of a spill as the basis for launching
research, you're never in a very good position for that
research to do as well as it could. So you need other
mechanisms and I think the CRRC mechanisms that I mentioned--
which I think was set up by Senator Judd Gregg; is that right?
New Hampshire?--is very interesting because it is independent
and it is a group. I'm a member of a panel of natural and
social scientists. We meet annually. We have a lot of feelers
out and we look at what we think needs to be done and then we
try to convince people to apply for funds to do it.
It's a competitive grants program, everything is peer-
reviewed, and as a result we're taking on now with the research
project something that the American Petroleum Institute has
been urging be done, that is, to try to come up with agreed
performance standards for oil spill response and prevention.
And yes, prevention systems can be evaluated too. How do we
know they're really ready to go? It's a difficult question, and
part of the major difficulty is that we have to really get
everybody's perspective on this. There isn't some magic set of
indicators that are the right indicators to assess readiness of
the system. We can quickly spew out all kinds of numbers on how
much of this and that equipment we've got, but what does
readiness really mean? As we are learning more and more we need
to really ask that question very broadly, and you can't do that
if you don't have social scientists, I would argue, as part of
the group that's doing that kind of thing.
So I think also more could be done with organizations like
the National Sea Grant program. Even institutions like my own,
we get officers from the Coast Guard who come and collect our
master degree in marine affairs, and while they're there, they
often take on a research project, something the Coast Guard
asks them to do. A recent graduate of our program developed a
system to evaluate responsive response preparedness for the
Coast Guard, developed a framework for it. He was then passed
to Washington, D.C.. to put that system into operation. So I
think that ability to step outside the formal mechanism
sometimes is very useful.
I guess my last comment is just, you know, thoughts on
learning because that's what this is all about, that's what I
stand for. You have a choice. Are you going to, you know, learn
from disaster, which is trying to recoup after some catastrophe
occurs, or do you want to really learn by design and be more
conscious about it? I think the fundamental problem in this
arena is that we tend to get all excited and pour money into
problems in the event of major spills, and then we let our
guard down and we don't do much in the interregnum between
events, and that's when we really should be putting together
our Citizen's Advisory Councils, deliberating about safety, and
not pretending like just because nothing's happened for 5
years, the problem is solved.
Thank you very much, I'd be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Leschine follows:]
Prepared Statement of Professor Thomas M. Leschine, Director,
School of Marine Affairs, University of Washington
My name is Tom Leschine. I am Professor of Marine Affairs at the
University of Washington where I have been since 1983. I became
Director of UW's School of Marine Affairs in 2003. My academic training
is in mathematics, and my research career has been in ocean policy
studies with an emphasis on environmental decisionmaking, especially
with regard to pollution policy and management. A considerable portion
of my work has emphasized the conduct and application of risk
assessment studies in support of public policy decisions affecting the
environment. I'm a long-time member of the Society for Risk Analysis.
Oil spill prevention, preparedness and response have been among my
academic pursuits since the late 1980s, when I received a grant from
the Washington State Legislature to provide research support to the
Department of Ecology in the development of more effective approaches
to oil spill damage assessment. The resulting Washington Oil Spill
Compensation Schedule, adopted by the state legislature in 1989, has
greatly facilitated Ecology's ability to assure the public is
adequately compensated for damage to public resources caused by oil
spills. In the early 1990s I served as Historian for the U.S. Coast
Guard, leading the team that prepared the Federal On-Scene
Coordinator's Report for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. I served as a
Commissioner of Maritime Pilotage in the state for 7 years during the
1990s, and currently I'm a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of
the Coastal Response Restoration Center (CRRC). The CRRC is a joint
center of NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration and the University
of New Hampshire whose mission is to support research aimed at
improving oil spill preparedness, response and restoration capabilities
through a competitive grants program. I've also served on numerous
National Research Council Committees, one of which examined the quality
of risk assessments being conducted to identify effective risk
reduction measures for Prince William Sound oil transport, in the wake
of the Exxon Valdez spill.
I am honored to be invited to testify at this field hearing on
vessel-source oil pollution being held by the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation's Subcommittee on Fisheries and
the Coast Guard. I wish to address four points in my testimony. These
points are summarized in bulleted paragraphs below.
Significant improvements have been made in the safety of oil
transport since the Exxon Valdez spill, both nationally and in
Washington State.
-- Oil spill risk will never be reduced to zero however, and
additional improvements in the total system that deals with oil
spill prevention, preparedness and response for Washington
waters remain necessary. Reliance on the private sector for
provision of response resources--the current approach--is
inherently problematic due to the necessity of maintaining
profitability.
-- The recommendation of the June 2005 report by The Glosten
Associates (Oil Spill Response Vessel Capabilities in
Washington) to increase reliance of fishing vessels and other
vessels of opportunity offers an innovative way to address this
problem, though non-specialized vessels may not prove equally
useful or available in all circumstances, suggesting the need
for additional specialized assets as well.
Social conflict is inherent in the arena of oil spill
prevention, preparedness and response. Historically little has
been done to address this problem directly, despite the high
costs it can impose on efforts to deal with spills and safety
improvements.
-- The arenas in which oil spill safety is deliberated have
been overly dominated by government and industry, with the
public voice absent or weak, and this has been true in
Washington State.
-- The public is vulnerable to ``hindsight bias'' a
psychological heuristic that colors public reactions when the
fact of an oil spill on the water belies earlier assurances by
experts, public officials, and industry representatives that
everything was under control.
-- Studies suggest that the Prince William Sound Regional
Citizens Advisory Council is an effective model for citizen
participation (G. Busenberg, Innovation, learning and policy
evolution in hazardous systems, American Behavioral Scientist
44(4) 679, 2000.) Legislation signed by Governor Gregoire in
May creating an oil spill advisory council (ESSB 5432, Chapt.
304, Laws of 2005) could produce a similar body for Washington,
a major advance in my view. Time, sufficient resources, and
commitment by all parties to negotiate an agreement will be
necessary for the new council to work effectively.
The sources of oil spill risk in Washington waters--
particularly in Puget Sound--are numerous and interconnected in
difficult-to-understand ways. This seriously complicates the
task of finding a few key remedies that convincingly reduce the
overall risk of spills. The whole maritime transport and oil-
handling system needs to be examined critically for sources of
risk and reexamined frequently.
-- Spill risk on the outer coast and Strait of Juan de Fuca
is likely dominated by different threats than risk in more
inland waters, especially central and southern Puget Sound,
where risk is likely most associated with non-tankship traffic
and operations--for example, fueling operations. Pleasure craft
or other non-commercial or non-oil transport vessels can easily
emerge as proximate causes of oil spills, or themselves be
directly involved in incidents that lead to significant spills.
The 1991 Tenyo Maru spill resulted from a collision between a
Japanese fishing vessel and a Chinese freighter in Canadian
waters, but close enough to Cape Flaherty to cause considerable
environmental damage in its vicinity.
-- Much rhetoric over the past several years has suggested
the region needs to make ``either/or'' choices on protection,
an unrealistically oversimplified proposition in my view.
Resources need to be invested in each aspect of the oil spill
risk problem in proportion to the risk each poses, and in ways
that effectively address identified risks. The challenge is to
know when we've done enough or done the right things.
-- Approaches dominated by technical analysis, like that of
the major Prince William Sound risk assessment study evaluated
by the National Research Council several years ago (Review of
the Prince William Sound, Alaska, Risk Assessment Study,
National Academies Press, 1998), are likely less useful in
Puget Sound, meaning more reliance needs to be placed on open,
active, and transparent deliberation among all parties on the
likely sources of risk and what can be done to address them.
This reinforces the value of a Prince William Sound RCAC-like
model for Washington State in my view.
Research is vital to understand how better to avoid major
oil spills and to deal with their aftermath. But opportunities
and funding for research are too frequently tied to oil spill
incidents, where social conflict and questions of legal
liability make it difficult for the right research to be done,
or for research to be sustained to the point where real
understanding emerges. Moreover, oil spill research has
historically been dominated by the natural sciences and
engineering, at the expense of understanding important ``human
dimensions'' of oil spill prevention, preparedness and
response.
-- Marine ecologists have argued that oil spills set
researchers up to ask the wrong questions, focusing on
quantifying wildlife injury rather than trying to understand
how best to help the areas affected by a spill get on the road
to recovery (R. Paine and others, ``Trouble on oiled waters''
Annual Review of Ecological Systems, 27:197-235, 1996). A
recent radical, new (and much discussed) view on how difficult
recovery from a spill like Exxon Valdez can be given the
continued presence of hydrocarbon contaminants in sensitive
environments--propounded by Charles Peterson of the University
of North Carolina and colleagues--emerged only after more than
a decade of monitoring results were available for analysis
(C.H. Peterson and others, ``Long-term ecosystem response to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill'', Science 302: 2082-2086, 2003).
-- Important ``human dimensions'' of oil spill prevention,
preparedness and response have received much less attention
than natural scientific and engineering aspects.
-- Human factors that can influence profoundly the real level
of safety in risky technologies like marine oil transport are
receiving increasing attention, but data is difficult to come
by due to the relative rarity of spill events and factors like
legal liability. Information on ``near misses'' is crucial, and
the airline industry has been very successful in developing
good data, while efforts to do the same thing in the maritime
domain seem to remain beset by difficulties.
-- Developing accurate and sensitive indicators of ``what
counts for success'' in the performance of preparedness,
prevention, and response systems--as judged from the
perspective of all interests potentially affected by spills--is
an especially important task that has to include researchers
from the social sciences to be done properly. A 1999 issue
paper of the American Petroleum Institute, underscores the
importance of this problem (Judging Oil Spill Performance: The
Challenge of Competing Perspectives, API Technical Report IOSC-
008, prepared by June Lindstedt-Siva, 1999).
-- A potentially useful and innovative model for bolstering
research quality and scope is the Coastal Response Research
Center (CRRC), a partnership between NOAA's Office of Response
and Restoration in Silver Spring, MD, and the University of New
Hampshire. The CRRC operates through a peer-reviewed
competitive grants program. It uses its Scientific Advisory
Panel--of which I am a member--to make an independent
assessment of research needs, and to encourage researchers to
develop proposals to address under-researched questions.
-- The National Sea Grant College Program could, with
encouragement, also become an effective conduit of research in
these areas, and the practice of the U.S. Coast Guard to select
promising junior officers for graduate training in schools like
the School of Marine Affairs has also been effective in
developing fresh perspectives on problems of preparedness,
prevention and response that then get carried back to the
parent organization. A recent student of mine at the School of
Marine Affairs, USCG Lt. Cdr. Drew Tucci, devoted his master's
thesis to developing understanding of impediments to evaluating
oil spill response readiness, and his work proved so useful
that the Coast Guard tasked him with the further development
and implementation of his own recommended approach to
evaluating response readiness upon his assignment to Coast
Guard headquarters following graduation.
As a final thought, opportunities for learning about the nature of
risk and what to do about it, as well as for learning how best to cope
with the environmental and social costs incurred as a result of a major
oil spill should one occur, are essential. The kind of learning I'm
talking about includes robust organizational design such as the Prince
William Sound RCAC seems to represent, as well as research and
development. The key is to take advantage of opportunities to learn
outside the situation of being in the midst of a major oil spill. I
alluded earlier to the work of Prof. George Busenberg of the University
of Colorado at Denver, in reference to the PWS RCAC. To paraphrase what
he said in his article, do you want to try to learn from disaster with
a major oil spill already on your doorstep and with passions running
high and the likelihood of genuine learning low, or would you rather
learn by design, through considered and ongoing deliberation among all
parties potentially affected by a major oil spill should one occur, in
an environment defined by the absence of a spill disaster and with the
prospects of useful learning much more likely to be high?
I sincerely thank the distinguished Senator and her staff for this
opportunity to present my thoughts on ways to address the risks that
oil spills from vessels pose to Washington waters, and ways to reduce
those risks, at this hearing.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Doctor Leschine. Let's let Mr.
Felleman go next and then we have questions for all the
panelists. But thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF FRED FELLEMAN, NORTHWEST DIRECTOR, OCEAN ADVOCATES
Mr. Felleman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell and members of
the Subcommittee, wherever they may be. I appreciate this
opportunity to testify and want to tell you that Ocean
Advocates is a small national non-profit NGO that specializes
in maritime safety. Our Executive Director Sally Lentz often
goes to the IMO and goes often on behalf of other environmental
organizations. We're also a member of the Shipping Safety
Partnership, a coalition of Alaska Natives, commercial
fishermen, recreation, science and community interests formed
in response to the December 2004 Selendang Ayu incident in the
Aleutian Islands, specifically addressing maritime safety in
the Great Circle route.
There is certainly no question that a major oil spill here
would be the straw that breaks the ecosystem's back. And the
last time this sort of question was addressed was in this
newspaper clipping I have from June 17, 1989, ``Big Oil Spill
Here, Are We Unprepared?'' We are unprepared. This is when the
Merchant Marine Fisheries Committee held a hearing here on the
heels of the Exxon Valdez and this archival photograph is for
you to keep and should be part of the record. You'll see Jolene
Unsoeld, and John Miller, and Congressman Dicks and other
familiar faces.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Seattle Post--Intelligencer, June 17, 1989
Big oil spill here? We're unprepared
By Mike Merritt
The Coast Guard, state officials and oil-industry groups told a
U.S. House Subcommittee yesterday that Washington State is unprepared
for an oil spill as large as the one that fouled Alaska's Prince
William Sound.
The Nestucca barge spill off Washington's coast in December dumped
231,000 gallons of oil into the sea, and the spill ``stretched our
resources to the limit,'' said Christine Gregoire, Director of the
Washington State Department of Ecology.
More than 11 million gallons of oil spilled from the Exxon Valdez
when it ran aground on March 24.
``It goes without saying we are not prepared, nor could we respond,
to a Valdez spill in Washington State,'' said Gregoire.
Gregoire and other officials painted a bleak picture of the
consequences of a major spill in Puget Sound during day-long testimony
in Seattle before the House Coast Guard and Navigation Subcommittee.
Yesterday's hearing was the first in a series across the country on
oil spills. Rep. Bill Tauzin, D-LA., Committee Chairman, has sponsored
legislation to create a nationwide $500 million fund to clean up oil
spills.
``The issue is not if another spill will happen, but when and where
it will happen,'' said Tauzin.
Coast Guard and industry authorities came under tough questioning
from members of Washington's Congressional delegation, including
Democratic Reps. Norm Dicks, Jolene Unsoeld, and Jim McDermott and
Republicans Rod Chandler and John Miller.
McDermott and Sen. Brock Adams, D-WA, are sponsoring legislation
requiring all new oil tankers be built with double-bottoms as a safety
measure, a measure the industry opposes as unnecessary.
Dicks said Alaskan officials and oil companies had 14 years to plan
for an oil spill in Prince William Sound. ``Sadly, after 14 years, that
system, when it was called on, failed,'' he said.
The Coast Guard's regional commander, Rear Adm. Robert Kramek,
conceded that a spill in Puget Sound the size of the Exxon Valdez
disaster had never been contemplated in contingency planning. If a
spill that large occurred today, ``there is not enough equipment
existing in Puget Sound'' to clean up the oil, Kramek said.
In the case of a spill, Kramek has authority to take over the
cleanup if the spiller fails to respond or acts too slowly. Kramek
said, however, that the oil industry in Washington has been cooperative
in planning and carrying out cleanup efforts.
But Miller, citing the disarray among government and industry
groups after the Alaska spill, asked whether the Coast Guard should not
have immediate powers to clean up a spill before it spreads too far.
Dicks, while praising the Coast Guard's efforts, said the Puget
Sound Vessel Traffic Control System's radars are outdated, can't see
ships in key locations and don't extend to Tacoma.
He noted that the Coast Guard cannot order industry to keep oil-
containment booms, oil skimmer vessels and other equipment ready for a
spill.
``I think that is a gap, yes, I do,'' replied Kramek.
Petroleum industry speakers told lawmakers the Valdez spill has
prompted a re-evaluation of plans for coping with a much more massive
spill than they now can handle.
An industry cleanup organization, Clean Sound Cooperative. has $9
million in equipment on hand to respond to spills.
``Clean Sound and its member companies are committed to ensuring
the protection of Puget Sound and making sure that a Valdez spill never
happens here,'' said John Wiechert, a former Coast Guard officer and
Clean Sound Manager.
Only since the Valdez spill, Wiechert said, has the industry begun
a study of how much and what kinds of equipment would be needed to
handle a ``worst-case'' spill of 7 million to 8 million gallons of oil
in Puget Sound.
Wiechert declined to predict how much more equipment would be
needed for such a spill, but he said the industry group should make
decisions within a month.
Industry authorities rejected charges from environmental groups
that, their oil-spill contingency plans have been kept secret. They
offered to make available the computer databases that would guide a
response in the event of a spill.
Environmentalists called for tough new regulations requiring each
oil tanker and barge, and each oil-handling facility. to have its own
emergency cleanup plan.
But I greatly appreciate the fact that your leadership has
reduced the likelihood that this incident would be happening
here in the tradition of the late Senator Magnuson. Not only
are we pleased that this hearing addresses issues that we
normally only see or hear about when dead birds are on TV and
there's oil in the water, but I'm particularly thankful for
your effort in drafting the energy bill--three provisions are
worthy of note and recognition.
Specifically, taking the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
out of the bill shows that we can't drill our way to energy
independence; second, the inclusion of the $500 million in
subsidies for biofuels will make a substantial contribution to
our reduction in our regional energy needs and hopefully reduce
the amount of tanker traffic; and third, the passage of Senate
Bill 1222 certainly makes a large step toward filling the gap
in our Nation's ability to respond to and prevent oil spills.
I'm of the belief, at the time and still of the belief to
this day, that a contributing factor to the slowness of the
response to the Dalco Pass spill had to do with concerns about
the money in the bank. The fact is we should no longer need to
worry when you don't have a responsible party, that's when you
have to open the bank account. Your leadership on S. 1222 makes
that so.
The Dalco Pass mystery, there was no mystery. We knew there
was a black oil spill in the Sound, a mariner reported it, but
we didn't know who was going to pay the bill. Any sort of
question that our responding agencies have that there won't be
somebody to pay the bill should not be on their mind. Having
the money in the bank is a great thing.
The fact that we had low impact to wildlife, people say is
a good thing. I suggest to you it's perhaps because there isn't
that much wildlife to impact anymore and it's quite concerning
that we could have a spill of that size, without more
noticeable impact. Having spent a lot of time on the water,
doing my graduate work on marine wildlife, I conclude the fact
that we didn't hit more wildlife is because it's harder to find
sea birds on the sea, and this is a not a good thing.
One promising technology for both preventing and responding
to oil spill is salvage. Salvage includes a wide range of
technologies from firefighting, spill response, pulling a ship
off the beach, dewatering a sinking ship. Salvage tugs can also
assist in spill response and lifesaving exercises, but despite
the fact that Congress called for a salvage and firefighting
rule in OPA 90, the Coast Guard still has not implemented such
a regulation. The distraction associated with homeland security
should not be seen as an excuse, but actually a further reason
for implementing this law, because in fact the potential risks
for environmental terrorism or impacts to cruise ships or
ferries associated with post-9/11 concerns is only heightening
the need for increased salvage posture in the United States.
The cost effectiveness of salvage can only be best
articulated when you look at incidences like the New Carrissa
or the Selendang Ayu. New Carrissa cost over a hundred million
dollars when you include fines, and the ship's still on the
beach. Selendang Ayu is expected to cost three times that
amount, and it's unlikely that they're going to get the ship
off the beach--not to mention the endangered plovers that were
impacted off of Oregon and the thousands of marine mammals, sea
birds, and subsistence lifestyles that were impacted in Alaska.
In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy hosted a
Maritime Salvage Conference in Seattle. The Admiralty Counsel
to the U.S. National Supervisor of Salvage, Richard Buckingham,
presented a paper and I would like to quote a very brief
section. ``The problem of inadequate domestic marine salvage
capacity is well documented and recognized by both the
government and commercial sectors; furthermore, the situation
is not getting any better. Because of the Nation's overriding
interest in the protection of the environment/economy/marine
transportation system, as well as meeting homeland security
needs, we need a cohesive Federal national savage policy.''
This has been reiterated by numerous reports, and in fact
one of the ways in which to address this need could be through
the rebuilding of the Coast Guard's Deepwater fleet. The Coast
Guard doesn't put towing winches on their cutters, but in fact
when, oftentimes when the Navy surpluses cutters to the Coast
Guard, they take the towing winches off. In fact we could have
probably kept the Selendang Ayu off the beach if one of those
Coast Guard cutters hadn't been de-towed when it was up in
Alaska. We didn't have enough towing capacity up there to deal
with the sea state at the time.
The other alternative as proposed by the National Academy
of Sciences is to surplus the Navy's T-ATF, the Powhatan class
tugs, to the Coast Guard or to the private sector to have
really robust salvage capacity around the country.
Some others, the State of Washington obviously has taken on
this burden to have a salvage tug in Neah Bay or a rescue tug
in Neah Bay. It is not salvage capable, doesn't have
firefighting or spill response capacity on it, and it's only
funded for three more years. This is an opportunity, I think,
for the Federal Government to match the state in this exercise.
In particular, you've heard a lot about the efforts on the
Olympic Coast, but the fact of the matter remains the first 70
miles of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, there are no tanker size
limits, there are no speed limits, there are no pilots, there
are no tug escorts, and that's a long distance to go before you
get to Port Angeles.
Similarly, as you saw with the ATBA, all the ships are
allowed to cut the corner of the sanctuary, and every ship
entering the Strait of Juan de Fuca comes within two miles of
Duntze Rock, so even with the ATBA we still have a close
approach to the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary.
Furthermore, there are 142 tugs that cross through there.
We're not sure how many of them were laden with their tows.
This is an easy question. We know from the nature of the trade
the southbound traffic is loaded, the northbound traffic is
usually empty coming back from San Francisco or the Columbia
River. We should know by now whether or not those tugs and tows
are laden or not.
So some suggested Federal actions, we need, now that we've
tapped the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, we need to remove
the sunset date. There's no reason to revisit this again in the
future, as long as there are ships sailing on the sea we're
going to need that account.
We should amend OPA creating a cargo account, because as we
know, tankers are not the only ships on the sea that spill oil,
and there should be an account to draw for non-tank vessels. We
can amend OPA to make it easier for the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund to be used for preventative purchases. Jolene
Unsoeld was able to get a sum of money drawn from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund for setting up a marine firefighting
association in the Columbia River. It's one of the few times
I've ever heard it drawn from when it was not during a spill or
not for standard administrative purposes of the Coast Guard,
the EPA, or NOAA.
Have the Coast Guard either include towing capability in
their new deep water fleet or have the Navy Powhatan class tugs
brought to bear to help our Nation's salvage posture. Conduct a
review of the tow boat lanes in the Strait of Juan de Fuca with
tows passing through the area to be avoided.
Captain Boothe made mention to the fact that we have two-
way lanes. The fact of the matter is, the reason why we have
tugs and tows cutting through the Olympic Coast sanctuary is
because we allow these tugs to go outbound on the inbound
lanes. Following along the shoreline of Clallam County, so when
you come to Cape Flattery and you're going to California, the
first thing you want to do is head south. So instead of going
outbound like the other outbound traffic along the Canadian
coast and you're way off shore when you're coming down the
coast, these guys are hugging the corner and in fact going
outbound in the inbound lane. It's a practice that is
traditional, but I don't think it is sensible.
A couple of more recommendations. Provide Congressional
oversight of the Coast Guard's Salvage and Firefighting rule
assuring that it's adequate and completed this year. Have the
National Academy of Sciences evaluate the Coast Guard's cost
benefit analysis methodology. They use factors like the cost
per barrel not spilled for prevention studies and the cost per
barrel recovered for response studies, but neither of these
analyses look at the cost to the marine environment or the
economy from a spill. And I think this frustrates the purposes
of NEPA. We're only looking at the cost of the industry, not
the benefits to the environment. So it strikes me as a one-
sided equation that makes it hard to advance the score.
I mentioned to you about the need to review the Strait of
Juan de Fuca, first 70 miles, there's a gap in our protection,
otherwise very robust network that I'm very proud of. We have a
long tradition up in the State of Washington.
And then, I think, finally, there was mention made by Mr.
Wright of the consolidation of the maritime response community.
Like the oil and shipping industry we have great consolidation
occurring. We know mergers often are for cost savings and it
results in downsizing that occurs when you merge organizations.
Right now MSRC is like the only game is town because they
bought Clean Sound, and the National Response Corporation
bought Foss Environmental, so we actually have two
organizations, before we used to have four organizations in
this town. In the Dalco Pass spill, MSRC didn't respond at all,
but we had to go labor-ready, for a thousand gallon spill. We
had to have labor-ready workers on the beaches for a simple
thousand gallon spill. What's going to happen when we have a
really big spill?
In closing, the late Senator Magnuson oversaw the great
transition from when Washington State received its crude oil
primarily from Canadian pipelines to U.S. tankers. This change
in risk in our waters required proactive leadership and enabled
us to maintain a relatively good oil spill record to this date.
For example, Senator Magnuson made it clear that he wanted to
limit the size and amount of tankers transiting through the San
Juan Islands and passed several laws fulfilling his vision.
The one constant in the maritime world is change, and we
need constant vigilance to keep up with these changes. We
appreciate Senator Cantwell's proactive efforts and look
forward to working with her office and this Committee on these
matters in the future. Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Felleman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred Felleman, Northwest Director,
Ocean Advocates
Senator Cantwell and members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony to you this
morning. My name is Fred Felleman. I am the Northwest Director of Ocean
Advocates, a small national non-profit environmental organization
specializing in maritime safety. My offices are based in Seattle and
San Juan Island. I have a Masters of Science degree from the University
of Washington's College of Ocean and Fishery Sciences and have been
involved in the study and conservation of our resident killer whale
population since 1980.
My involvement with oil spills began in 1988 when I moved to
Washington D.C. to help Congressman Lowry develop the legislation
creating the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary. Since then I have
conducted damage assessment on the Exxon Valdez oil spill and have
served on numerous state and Federal oil spill committees. Ocean
Advocates is also a member of the Shipping Safety Partnership (SSP), a
coalition of Alaska Natives, commercial fishermen, recreation, science,
and community interests formed in response to the December 6, 2004
grounding of the Selendang Ayu in the Aleutian Islands to advance the
safety of cargo shipping through the Great Circle route.
There can be no question that a major oil spill would wreck havoc
on the biological, economic and cultural environments that are so
closely tied to Washington's waters. This is especially true now. The
marine environment is showing many signs of stress, from elevated sea
surface temperatures region-wide, to depleted oxygen levels in Hood
Canal, and a lack of upwelling on the outer coast, making the recovery
of our remnant populations of herring, salmon, and killer whales all
the more difficult. A major oil spill would end up being the straw that
broke the ecosystem's back, undermining many years and millions of
dollars of investment in recovery efforts.
We are encouraged by Senator Cantwell's leadership to help reduce
the likelihood of such a fate in the tradition of the late Senator
Warren Magnuson. Not only are we pleased by the attention this field
hearing brings to an issue that seems to only get addressed when there
is oil in the water and dead birds on TV, but we are particularly
thankful for the Senator's efforts in drafting the energy bill. Three
provisions in particular deserve recognition. First, removing the
provision that would have opened the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to
oil exploration recognizes that we will not be able to drill our way to
energy independence. Second, the inclusion of $500 million in subsidies
to encourage the development of biofuels makes a substantial
contribution to our regional energy needs, and will hopefully serve to
reduce the amount of tanker traffic calling on our waters in the
future. Finally, the introduction of S. 1222, the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund Maintenance Act, reinstating the 5 cent/barrel fee and
raising the cap to $3 billion is an essential step toward filling the
gap in our Nation's ability to respond to and prevent oil spills.
Our concern about oil spills is not theoretical. According to the
Department of Ecology there were more than 80 spills exceeding 1,000
gallons in Washington waters between 1986 and 2004. Ocean going vessels
are the Nation's primary vehicles of trade. The Strait of Juan de Fuca
is the busiest commercial waterway in North America serving both
Canada's and the U.S.'s busiest ports, and it is only getting busier as
Pacific Rim Trade has eclipsed that with Europe. While the number of
oil spills has declined since the passage of OPA 90 the volume of oil
spilled varies widely each year depending on whether one large ship has
had an accident or not. Therefore, we cannot be lulled into complacency
by these spurious statistics. Of particular concern are the 142 tugs
with oil barges that passed through the Area To Be Avoided within
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary in 2004. While there was a 96.3
percent overall compliance with the ATBA in 2004, it only takes one
laden oil barge to break its tow as recently happened off the Columbia
River to cause long-term damage. It is also important to note that even
ships that comply with the ATBA come within 2 miles of shore as they
enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca. It is also worth noting that laden
oil barges are allowed to transit near shore of the inbound shipping
lanes, putting the shoreline of Clallam County at unnecessary risk and
setting the tugs up to cut through the ATBA. This practice needs to be
reevaluated.
Our ability to respond to even relatively small spills has been
called into serious question of late. The responses to both the 4,700
gallon December 2003 Foss spill at Point Wells and the 1,000 gallon
October 2004 Dalco Pass spill were lackluster at best. There has also
been a series of recent transfer spills at refineries in Ferndale and
Tacoma that have unnecessarily spread into the marine environment
because vessels are not required to pre-boom before conducting such
transfers. It is my understanding that the State of Washington has a
task force studying this issue. The State Department of Ecology just
released a report documenting that there would not be enough response
equipment in the San Juan Islands to respond to a 420,000 gallon spill,
despite the fact that some of the State's largest caches of equipment
are stored at the four refineries surrounding the islands. This bodes
poorly for our state-of-readiness in more remote locations such as the
Olympic Coast where the State's largest spills have occurred in its
most pristine and productive environment. In a Congressional field
hearing held June 17, 1989, then Ecology Director, Christine Gregoire,
said in reference to the 231,000 gallon 1988 Nestucca spill that we
``stretched our resources to the limits.'' Unfortunately, very few
additional resources have been brought to bear on the problem since
1988, and there has not been a drill in the Olympic Coast Sanctuary
evaluating our response capacity in the 10 years since its creation.
Another issue affecting our ability to respond to oil spills has
been the unprecedented mergers that have been occurring in the oil and
shipping companies, as well as their spill response contractors. We can
only speculate on the political impact of the consolidation of the
world's largest corporations, but the downsizing that commonly occurs
during mergers can reduce the capacity of our spill response
contractors. This past year the National Response Corporation bought
Foss Environmental and MSRC bought Clean Sound, leaving the state with
just two primary spill response contractors.
Rather than react to the growing threat of oil spills posed by
increased vessel traffic through our waters with increases in the
levels of spill response capability, the Coast Guard has been urging
the liberalized use of dispersants and capping our currently inadequate
spill response posture. While dispersants have been shown to be
effective in reducing impacts to sea birds at the surface in warm
waters, no such demonstration has been made in the cold waters that
characterize our situation. Furthermore, sinking the oil allows it to
be taken up into the food chain that makes near shore applications
problematic. Rather than trading off one spill response capacity for
another, the Coast Guard should be calling on the maritime industry to
expand their ability to respond to spills. This should include
additional mechanical on-water recovery, dispersants for offshore
spills when the sea state makes skimming impractical and dispersants
more effective, and in situ burning which removes oil from the water at
even higher rates than skimming.
Of particular concern is the Coast Guard's assertion of Federal
preemption in their 2003 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Vessel and
Facility Response Plans for Oil Removal Equipment Requirements and
Alternative Technology Revisions. Unlike the case involving prevention
efforts, the state's response authority is not subject to Federal
preemption, and the Coast Guard should not be trying to suggest
otherwise.
One promising technology for both preventing and responding to an
oil spill is salvage. Salvage includes a wide range of capabilities
from rescue towing, firefighting, and patching to dewatering a sinking
ship. Furthermore, salvage tugs can assist in oil spill response
efforts and lifesaving exercises. Unfortunately, despite Congress
calling for a salvage and firefighting rule in OPA 90, the Coast Guard
has yet to complete such a measure. The Coast Guard's added
responsibilities for homeland security should not be used as a reason
for this delay, but rather as an additional reason for completion given
the potential for acts of environmental terrorism or the need to
respond to a cruise ships or ferry in distress.
We only have to look at the impact and expense of not having
adequate salvage capacity to see how cost-effective it is. In 1999,
when the New Carrissa broke in half off the Oregon coast because there
was not adequate tug support available, the resultant oil spill
impacted a threatened population of plovers, cost over $100 million
(including fines) and ended with the wreck left on the beach. Similarly
the 2004 grounding of the Selendang Ayu in the Aluetian Islands has
already cost $100 million, and cost is expected to triple while
thousands of sea birds and marine mammals have been killed and
subsistence lifestyles impacted.
The need to enhance our Nation's salvage capacity has been
acknowledged for many years, but has taken on particular urgency since
September 11. In 1994, the Marine Board's Committee on Marine Salvage
Issues of the National Research Council wrote, ``Congress should update
the national salvage policy to ensure that an adequate level of salvage
capacity is present in U.S. waters. The policy should clearly delineate
the following goals: to protect national security, to minimize or
prevent environmental impacts due to pollution from marine casualties,
to protect public safety, and to ensure minimal disruption to the U.S.
economy resulting from marine casualties in the Nation's port and
waterways (p. 4).''
While the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster will be forever remembered by
the general public for 11 million gallons of oil spilled, among salvors
it will be remembered for the vast majority of oil that was safely
transferred to another ship. In contrast, the relatively small, New
Carissa, that grounded off the Oregon Coast in 1999 is the poster child
for what happens when adequate salvage capacity is not readily
available.
The Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) in the New Carissa, Captain
Mike Hall, summed up the problem when he stated:
[W]e are essentially an island nation with over 47,000 miles of
shoreline; approximately 85 percent of all Americans live
within 100 miles of these shorelines; and 90 percent of all
international commerce enters the United States by vessel. One
can see from these facts that our Nation's ports and waterways
are the backbone of the U.S. intermodal transportation system.
This system must include a national salvage plan. We need a
salvage plan more capable than that demonstrated during the
initial stages of the New Carissa casualty. It was my belief on
4 February 1999, and it remains my belief today, that adequate
and timely salvage capability would have significantly
mitigated this crisis on the coast. There are currently only
two salvage vessels on the Pacific Coast capable of refloating
a large grounded ship, and neither was readily available to
respond in this case.
In January 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy hosted the National
Maritime Salvage Conference in Seattle. The Admiralty Counsel to the
U.S. Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, Richard Buckingham
presented a paper entitled, ``Toward a National Salvage Policy.'' The
abstract to his paper states:
The problem of inadequate domestic marine salvage capacity is
well documented and recognized by both the government and
commercial sectors; furthermore, the situation is not getting
any better. Because of the Nation's overriding interest in the
protecting the environment/economy/marine transportation system
(MTS), as well as meeting homeland security needs, we need a
cohesive Federal national salvage policy. The first step,
however, will be identifying a Federal agency to take the lead
in forging such a policy. Should it be the Coast Guard, the
Navy, or perhaps some other agency? Who appears best suited for
the role? Once the appropriate agency assumes (or is tasked
with) this leadership responsibility, what are some of the
likely issues to be initially confronted? Also, this pressing
need for a national salvage policy should really be a high
profile issue on the agenda of the newly created U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy, as well as a specific focus of the
Department of Transportation's MTS policy and SEA-21 maritime
infrastructure funding initiatives.
The Marine Board of the National Academy of Sciences wrote to the
Ocean Commission in June 2002 on the issue of national salvage
capacity. They wrote:
Within the maritime community, as well as government agencies,
it is recognized that the Nation's domestic salvage capacity is
inadequate to meet basic and emergency needs. This inadequacy
jeopardizes environmental, transportation, and homeland
security objectives. There is a need for a cohesive, Federal
national salvage policy and a designated lead government agency
to implement that policy.
While the Coast Guard and Navy try to resolve this longstanding
problem, the Makah Tribe have sought to have the U.S. Navy provide one
of their uniquely qualified T-ATF tugs for dedicated rescue tug service
in and around Neah Bay. The National Research Council found in their
1994 report on salvage that surplus assets, particularly the T-ATF
class of ships, if operated by the private sector and strategically
deployed, could go a long way to restoring the traditional salvage
capacity of the United States, particularly in rescue towing. The
operation of these vessels by the private sector would require
substantial subsidy, as it has been demonstrated in the United States
and elsewhere that salvage revenues cannot cover the costs of operating
and maintaining the vessels and their crews. The excess costs could be
covered, as they were in the past, through the Salvage Facilities Act,
and the plan could be implemented through the arrangements in place for
Navy contracting for commercial salvage services.'' (pp. 55-56). The
Coast Guard's Deepwater Program as well as the environment could be
benefited by such Naval assets. Alternatively, the Coast Guard should
consider including towing capability in the construction of their
deepwater fleet.
The State of Washington has public funding for just three more
seasons of the Neah Bay rescue tug. This tug, while having provided a
significant amount of additional protection to the Olympic Coast and
entrance to the Strait over the past 6 seasons, is still only seasonal,
and is not equipped for salvage, firefighting, or spill response.
Suggested Federal Actions:
1. Reinstate the OSLTF and raise the cap to $3 billion and
remove any sunset clause, for the account will be needed as
long as there are ships sailing on the sea.
2. Create a Cargo account within the OSLTF that would be drawn
from when non-tank vessels are the cause of the oil spill.
3. Amend OPA 90 making it easier for the OSLTF to be drawn from
for preventative measures, not just spill response. Such funds
could be used to help station salvage tugs in high-risk, remote
places such as Unimak Pass and Neah Bay. Other potential uses
of the Fund could be for improved vessel tracking technology or
additional aids to navigation. Tribal governments should be
able to draw from the Fund as the EPA and Coast Guard do.
4. Have the Coast Guard either include towing capability in
their new deepwater fleet or get the Navy to provide their T-
ATF Powhatan class tugs to the Coast Guard to improve our
Nation's salvage posture and their deepwater capability.
5. Conduct review of towboat lanes in Strait of Juan de Fuca
and 142incidents of tugs with tows passing through the ATBA in
2004.
6. Provide Congressional oversight on the status of the Coast
Guard's Salvage and Firefighting rule assuring that it is
adequate and completed this year.
7. Have the NAS conduct an evaluation of the Coast Guard's
Coast benefit analysis methodology. They use factors such as
cost per barrel not spilled for prevention studies and cost per
barrel recovered for response studies, but neither of these
analyses includes the cost to the marine environment and
economy when a spill does occur. These selective studies appear
to frustrate the goals of NEPA.
8. Conduct a no-notice, equipment deployment drill in the
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary to evaluate our level
of readiness off the coast.
9. Provide federal funds for year round Neah Bay Rescue tug for
first 70 miles of Juan de Fuca Strait lack tanker size limits,
speed limits, and tug escorts while being exposed to
increasingly high volumes of traffic from Canada and the US.
10. Review impact of consolidation of oil spill response
organizations on readiness.
11. Amend OPA 90 increasing liability caps on tankers and
freighters.
In closing, the late Senator Magnuson oversaw the great transition
from when Washington State received its crude oil primarily from
Canadian pipelines to U.S. tankers. This change in risk to our waters
required proactive leadership that enabled us to maintain a relatively
good oil spill record to this date. For example, Senator Magnuson made
it clear that he wanted to limit the size and amount of tankers
transiting through the San Juan Islands and passed several laws
fulfilling his vision. The one constant in the maritime world is
change, and we need constant vigilance to keep up with these changes.
We appreciate Senator Cantwell's proactive efforts and look forward to
working with her office and this Committee on these matters in the
future.
Thank you for the opportunity to present these issues before you,
and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Felleman, for your
testimony, and to all the panelists, thank you for being here
this morning and giving us input for the record. As I said with
the other panel, any questions or comments or additional things
that come up as part of your testimony, you have 2 weeks to
submit to the record.
Captain Boothe, I know you might be leaving. I hate to put
you on the spot, but I was wondering if you could come up for a
couple of questions--you can sit right there next to Mr. Sones.
If you can manage. Thank you.
Captain Boothe. We'll see. I don't think this is on.
Senator Cantwell. Is there a button there? Maybe you have
to move to a different spot.
Captain Boothe. Looks like it's on now.
Senator Cantwell. OK. In Mr. Sones' testimony he was
talking about this issue of chemical dispersants versus
equipment. Could you comment on that, and where you think we
are and do we have the right equipment, or are we using these
dispersants in ways that we shouldn't be? Are we measuring
their environmental impact?
Captain Boothe. Senator, I think from a response
perspective, and I've been in the business for quite a while,
certainly not as a responder like Mr. Wright and his
organization, but I think as a Coast Guard marine safety
professional, I never want to be in a position where I don't
have all the tools in my tool bag. And right now dispersants
have been in debate between the science and biologists for a
long, long time. I think from a Coast Guard perspective we
believe dispersants are a necessary part of the inventory of
response capability.
For high-energy environments, dispersants can be effective
in protecting sensitive ecosystems, wetlands, etc., off the
coast. And we know that we have very limited mechanical
recovery capability. I think some, I don't know what the exact
figures are, but somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of oil
spilled on the water is going to be able to be recovered by
mechanical means. So to the degree that dispersants might keep
that oil from getting on the beach and from affecting the
sensitive ecosystem on that side of things, it might be better.
It's always a trade-off. You're going to either potentially
affect waterfowl and marine mammals, or you're going to affect
the fish and crabs, or et cetera, that might live on the
bottom.
Senator Cantwell. So you're in the process, right, in
continuing on this rule that's required by OPA to determine
what vessel equipment requirements would be?
Captain Boothe. Right.
Senator Cantwell. And, Mr. Sones, you have some concerns
that they're over-focusing on dispersants; is that the case?
Mr. Sones. No, I think our position has been that, you
know, we want all the tools in the toolbox, and because of the
conditions of the Pacific Ocean, there are a lot of variables
that we deal with out there. Sometimes mechanical equipment
will work very efficiently if the weather conditions allow. So
where our concern has been is using certain tools in lieu of
other tools.
Senator Cantwell. What would you like to see in the Coast
Guard's rule?
Mr. Sones. I think we would like to see all of those
resources being able to be utilized depending on the conditions
and the effectiveness of those particular tools. There are
still questions I guess that we don't have enough information
about, is, what does happen to the oil, how does it affect the
other resources when a dispersant is used, it's breaking down
the oil and just moving it to the ocean floor rather than on
the surface. So we're interested in seeing more research and
really what the effects of using dispersants, and how the long-
term impacts of that tool might affect our resources on the
ocean.
And we may find that just simply letting it come ashore
might have less impacts. We don't know. So we want to look at
all of the opportunities, tools available to us, but not use
one over another I guess would be our biggest concern.
Captain Boothe. Senator, might I offer one other point?
Related to the rulemaking that's underway, the adjusted caps
for, or the issue of adjusting mechanical recovery and removal
caps will not be impacted by the decision to require plan
holders to actually have a response plan that includes a
dispersing capability. They are not trading off. Usually
we're----
Senator Cantwell. I think it's more that Mr. Sones is
worried that you're going to lessen the requirement on
equipment.
Captain Boothe. No, the point I'm trying to make, Senator,
is that it will not. We do not allow a substitution or credit
for dispersants for mechanical recovery equipment because they
actually operate at opposite ends. If the conditions are ripe
for mechanical recovery, dispersants won't work. And where
dispersants are intended to be used, mechanical recovery
typically will not work.
Senator Cantwell. When are we expected to have the final
rule?
Captain Boothe. That particular rulemaking I believe has
now been placed back on the fast track and hopefully will be
completed by the winter of 2006, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. And to Mr. Felleman's point
about cranes and ability to remove ships and the Coast Guard is
the Deepwater Program, since we're reviewing the Deepwater
Program right now since the Committee just passed out
authorizing language, and since the Deepwater Program is going
to be a huge investment by taxpayers in the Coast Guard
capability, is there a point here about the ability to remove
vessels?
Captain Boothe. Well, all of our assets, Senator, are
multi-mission assets, whether or not we have the same
capability as a salvage tug is clearly no question. We do not.
We don't, our cutters aren't designed for that purpose.
Typically if we're going to impose a requirement for marine
salvage and firefighting, we would look for that to be
established through regulation and impose upon the industry to
provide a separate mechanism other than the Coast Guard cutter
fleet to do that.
However, the Coast Guard is Semper Paratus, we're going to
respond to all search and rescue cases, and we will tow where
we have that capability.
Senator Cantwell. Mr. Felleman, it sounds like the Coast
Guard is saying they want to have a good public/private sector
partnership on salvage.
Mr. Felleman. And if they implemented the salvage and
firefighting rule, that's possible, but this has been in
development since OPA 90, so the question is, what's the status
of that rule and will it be robust enough to really require the
industry to invest in the salvage capability necessary to
protect this Nation's burgeoning shorelines. You know, Pacific
Rim trade has eclipsed that with the East Coast, so we are on
the forefront of, you know, a growth of doubling and tripling
of trade volume, and the question is whether we're going to
have salvage capability to match that.
Captain Boothe. Well, I hope we do, Senator. Obviously the
rule is still in progress and I think part of the problem or
part of the suspension associated with that was an impact
registered that it might have on the small business side of the
house. We pulled it back for reconsideration, making sure we
had all of those things addressed in the environmental and
economic assessment, and unfortunately the Maritime
Transportation Security Act requirements kind of overwhelmed
the Coast Guard's regulatory processes, and everything was kind
of shelved to enable us to address those rulemakings.
Now we're back on focus, hopefully we can address this
within the next year, Senator.
Senator Cantwell. What do you mean the impact on small
business, in terms of the Coast Guard being a competitor?
Captain Boothe. In terms of, yes, ma'am, in terms of being
able to provide some of those services as well.
Senator Cantwell. Well----
Captain Boothe. Salvage businesses.
Senator Cantwell. No, I understand, but I mean our efforts
in Iraq have not stopped us from using contractors; right?
Captain Boothe. No, ma'am.
Senator Cantwell. So why not do the same? I mean why not
have everything, why not have a salvage rule that basically
gives the ability to do salvage whether you use a ship in the
Deepwater Program or a contract? Is that not possible?
Captain Boothe. Yes, ma'am, I believe so.
Senator Cantwell. OK. So how would it have an impact on
small business? If, yes, we've built 10 ships from the
Deepwater fleet to do salvage only, yes, I get that point. I
just want to make sure that the Coast Guard, in its oversight
for salvage, has the authority now to use your existing vessels
or contract with the private sector?
Captain Boothe. Yes, ma'am, we do.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Captain Boothe. And we do contract with salvors using the
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund in many cases. And if I might
have a little bit of license here, Senator Cantwell, the Coast
Guard response to the Dalco Passage spill in no way was delayed
because of concern of funding. We spent over $2 million
cleaning up the oil from the Dalco Passage spill and we used
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to do that. It had nothing
to do with our hesitancy to access the fund to be able to
respond.
As I mentioned, we respond to mystery spills hundreds of
times a year and we access the fund more in Puget Sound
probably than any other ports in the nation.
Senator Cantwell. I don't want to speak for Mr. Felleman,
but I think his, the point, is that a healthy fund makes
everybody be aggressive.
Captain Boothe. Yes.
Senator Cantwell. And so, and we certainly have taken part
of that step last Friday, and hopefully the President will sign
that legislation.
But let me turn to Mr. Holmes. As you know, with the
passage of this legislation we're back on track, so to speak.
Do you worry about the liability caps? Do you think that we
should look at that issue?
Mr. Holmes. Well, again, Western States Petroleum
Association really focuses on the local and State issues, and
that would be handled through our sister organization API,
American Petroleum Institute. But I know that they supported
the continuation of the trust fund. I think there were concerns
about raising the cap and felt that the $1 billion would be an
adequate amount. And also, we would have liked to have seen
some auditing provisions added into the provisions which were
not. But----
Senator Cantwell. So you don't support or oppose changes to
the liability caps?
Mr. Holmes. No, I'm not ready to comment on that.
Senator Cantwell. OK. And what about this issue off the
coast in the marine sanctuary area where there were 142 tugs
with oil barges that, as Mr. Felleman stated--I liked his way
of describing that, ships are going outbound in the inbound
lanes.
So in the area to be avoided, it seems like there are a
certain number of vessels there that we don't have very good
compliance rates for. What do you think is occurring there, and
what should we do about that?
Mr. Holmes. Well, I'm a member of the Advisory Council for
the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary as an alternate,
and the sanctuary staff presented a presentation I believe
three meetings ago regarding that topic. And my recollection of
the presentation that the sanctuary staff made was that there
was very good compliance, similar to the numbers that the past
panel quoted which was 98 percent or something like that
overall.
So from, my understanding from the overall program, it's
very successful, and the staff was very careful to say that
they didn't really have all the answers where there were tracks
going through the system, and the staff was very careful not to
make any conclusions on that and required further research to
get the proper answers. But I know from our members'
perspective, they're making every effort to comply.
Senator Cantwell. If you'll look at the sheet and document
that I was given, it looks like the overall numbers for vessels
are pretty good.
You know, oil tankers have a 99.8 percent compliance rate,
but then you look at some of the other categories--tank barges
with oil, 75 percent compliance; chemical barges, 43 percent.
So I don't know if it's a communication issue or whether we
have people taking a different path or there's a different
economic issue there.
Mr. Holmes. Right, and again I don't want to speak for the
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary staff, but my
understanding is that there were some questions that needed to
be researched on that line item, tug and barges, to see whether
they were loaded or not.
Senator Cantwell. Well, whether they were loaded or not
wouldn't really matter, though; right? You'd want them to stay
out of that area?
Mr. Holmes. If they're empty they can pass through there
with no problem. This is to protect the sensitive areas within
the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary from the threat to
sensitive areas for spill. And if there's an empty tank going
through there that's not a threat and I believe that's allowed.
Senator Cantwell. So you think that 43 percent isn't an
accurate statistic because----
Mr. Holmes. I don't know, I just know that I saw a
presentation by the sanctuary staff saying that there's more
research needed to answer that question.
Senator Cantwell. OK.
Captain Boothe. Senator, I think Mr. Felleman's comment in
his statement was accurate. We ought to be able to at some
point be able to ascertain which direction they were going and
whether they were laden or not, and then address that with the
particular companies involved if indeed we find that they were
laden because, I think, as Mr. Holmes has pointed out, the
Western States Petroleum Association has agreed with the ATBA
in concept and in practice, and they endorse it completely and
expect their member companies to comply. And so I know when I
was Captain of the Port here I would co-sign letters with the
sanctuary manager to all those companies, saying, ``Hey, we
can't really tell from the data that we have because we don't
have, VTS does not have radar coverage off the coast there
typically, so we can't really tell which way you were going and
whether you were laden or unladen, but if you were laden, here
are what the ATBA rules are all about and we would expect and
ask for your voluntary compliance.
Mr. Felleman. Senator Cantwell, I just ask that you keep in
mind that because we have 10,000 transits going on our waters,
when people present to you statistics in percents that you
recognize that even a small percent is a lot of transits, and
it only takes one laden barge to really wreck your decade.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you. I think we will work with the
organization to try to further shed light on these statistics,
and it may be that as we attack the problem, as Doctor Leschine
was saying, going from the highest incidence before to now
developing a system, that it continues to need development.
One of those issues, Mr. Wright, is the commissioning of
fishing vessels to assist in response. I know that the
Department of Ecology found that maybe there may be
insufficient vessel capacity to respond to spills. So do you
agree with that?
Mr. Wright. Well, the study was commissioned by the
Department of Ecology, Senator, just came out mid last week. I
actually have it in front of me because I've been studying it
since it came out, and of course it's a very direct effect on
us. MSRC has a fishing vessel program which is not as robust as
it once was, and we were in the process long before this study
was even commissioned of breathing life back into that program.
And additionally, we don't want to limit ourselves to
fishing vessels because there are other vessels of opportunity
in our waterways that could be very helpful and we are looking
at them as well, such as tugboats, or work boats, or small
dredges, those kinds of things that folks are more, more likely
to be around than the fishing vessels which are quite nomadic
in their, by their very nature, and their crews being even more
nomadic than the vessels themselves.
Additionally, one thing that was overlooked in that study
was that we have a Memorandum of Understanding that I mentioned
in my testimony, with Burrard Clean Operations which brings
significant resources to bear if we have a major spill,
especially the one that was envisioned in the study which is a
10,000 barrel spill in Rosario Strait. So those things put
together really, I think we could benefit from it. There are a
lot of good points made in the study, the study was very well
done, and we are taking it right to heart.
Senator Cantwell. So you would say then, in general, let's
look at a program for getting assistance from other vessels?
Mr. Wright. Yes, ma'am. In any kind of a large response
there's always going to be a ``more is better'' look at things.
Can we get geographic response plans in place quicker? Can we
tend those that are in place better? And this is all the kinds
of things that we're looking at right now.
When you get into actual contact with the oil, the cost of
doing business rises dramatically because of the training
requirements that are in place through the, through OSHA and
through the Washington equivalent. So keeping people trained to
be in the oil is a really difficult process, and it's something
that we've done in the past and are looking into doing again.
However, to train people to be at the fringes when they're
not likely to be in the oil is a lot easier.
Senator Cantwell. Do we need additional research on cleanup
technology?
Mr. Wright. The cleanup technology itself really hasn't
changed dramatically over the years. I think earlier on we
heard testimony that remote sensing is something that might be
advantageous to look at considerably more closely. It's very
difficult to find oil on the water. The vision of putting a
whole drum of oil in a bathtub is not what it looks like when
you're out there on the water. It spreads out very quickly, it
gets into stringers, it becomes very difficult to see from the
water. So normally we spot it from the air as best we can. Of
course at night that becomes problematic.
So, we heard Captain Boothe talk about the infrared
technology capabilities of the Coast Guard and of the King
County Sheriff's Office. Also, there has been some considerable
research done by the Canadians by Transport Canada and the
Canadian Coast Guard into the use of lasers as detection
devices. So these are the kinds of research things that could
bear very big benefits.
Finding the oil, especially at night, is the key. If you're
going to pick it up, very obviously you have to find it first.
Senator Cantwell. And so you would say if there are
improvements such as lasers and other solutions, we should look
at these, but otherwise you think no more research is needed?
Mr. Wright. Well, I would never, I would never say that
there shouldn't be more research in all the areas. There may be
a breakthrough out there that's possible in mechanical pickup,
but as I say, folks have been looking at this for quite some
time and there just, there haven't been many breakthroughs.
Certainly there should be a segment of the research community
looking at these kinds of things. And we will work with them as
we do with everyone else in partnership, and of course in the
State of Washington partnerships are the name of the game with
the response industry, with the oil industry, and with the
State and Federal Government.
Senator Cantwell. Doctor Leschine, you talked a lot about
partnerships. Do you think that this new Citizen's Advisory
Committee will solve some of the issues you raised?
Dr. Leschine. It's hard to read legislation and know
exactly what it will mean in practice, but it, I did read the
legislation and it seems like the ingredients are there. A
couple of things that I see that are there very positive are,
first of all, very broad participation by a large group of
people, both from the industry technical side and the
environmental community.
I also see something in the way of marching orders, in
other words, we're not just meeting to have an open, free-form
ongoing dialogue, but we really have a serious charge I believe
every two or 3 years to kind of revisit the oil spill safety
question. I think when I was a Pilotage Commissioner one of the
things I learned is the situation changes more rapidly than you
might think. You know, you get a different kind of vessel
showing up all of a sudden because there's a new kind of trade
or you have a different kind of, you know, jet skis, a whole
new idea, a group of people with a whole new sense of
themselves and what they're doing out on the water. And things
like that can happen overnight.
So I see the ingredients in place to all that. I guess
where I might ask a question--which is not the same as
criticism--is whether the resource provision through time will
be adequate. I think the state has tended to fund things
initially and then the gases kind of run out of the balloon.
This has certainly happened to the Office of Marine Safety.
We've tried to use barrel taxes and things like that, and the
legislature seems to sort of lose its incentive to keep those
kinds of funds going.
So, you know, I suppose, I've heard around the fringes of
the discussion over this Oil Spill Advisory Committee whether
some kind of Federal funding, or more guaranteed funding, and
the state might be willing to provide would in fact be
necessary to make this a full equivalent to the, to Prince
William Sound's model. Which I believe is funded directly by
the Congress, because at least it got an initial appropriation
through OPA 90, and I think they're being, continuing
appropriations since then. So if you don't have the resources,
then you don't have----
Senator Cantwell. Yes, I think the Prince William Sound
Advisory Group gets money from the Trust Fund.
Mr. Holmes. May I correct you? The Prince William Sound
RCAC is funded through Alyeska.
Mr. Felleman. It was actually set up before OPA passed.
It's a model that was, that happened before. Any future RCAC's
are to be funded through the trust fund. This one was set up
beforehand.
Senator Cantwell. Committee staff is telling me that it's
taken out of the Fund--is authorized by OPA, and the last time
Committee staff told me something about this in the Committee,
they proved to be right and that's how we got to reauthorizing
the Trust Fund. But we'll get to the bottom of how the money
flows because it is important and we certainly want the
resources to be there and we should look at this question, how
the advisory committees are set up, what resources they have,
and what role they play.
The state issue, Mr. Felleman, did you want to add any
comments? You mentioned something about the first 70 miles
and----
Mr. Felleman. Right. The gaps that I've identified after
looking at this issue for many years has been in our inability
to provide the adequate protection for the Olympic coast in
particular, open ocean skimming is a challenge, and I would
suggest if there's R&D money to be spent, my colleagues in
Alaska have a design that they would like to see be put to a
tank test that's basically using a trimaran type vessel.
Instead of using the boom that has all the problems of
deployment, you have the rigid hulls of a vessel, you create a
very wide swathe that can move through an oil spill in large
sea states because the vessel has much better stability than
most of the smaller type skimmers than we have. And this would
actually, the vessel's hull itself would be able to be used to
skim. This is something that I think in order to have the full
toolkit as the Makah spoke to, we need to have ocean capable
skimming. That's one.
But for the entrance to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, one of
the problems that I believe is that the Coast Guard's
demarcation line for where the ocean starts in our state, they
consider up to Port Angeles open ocean. The Coast Guard has a
line of demarcation, the Captain of the Port line says
basically that the open ocean begins in Port Angeles. So the
first 70 miles of the Strait of Juan de Fuca is treated as open
ocean environment.
And so all the protective measures that Senator Magnuson
and others have put into place, the tanker size limits, the
speed limits, the pilotage, the tug escort requirement, none of
that begins until vessels clear Port Angeles.
So I really believe that our maximum risk is going to be
through the entrance to the Strait to Port Angeles because
that's where all the wonderful things that we do in this state
are not present. And so, tugs of opportunity were introduced to
address this problem in part, but the fact of the matter is the
majority of the tug trade, the tugs with availability are in
the Sound where they're moving back and forth. Tugs that are
going out the Strait of Juan de Fuca are typically encumbered
with a laden oil barge, they're doing business.
So we don't have a lot of loose tugs hanging around in the
Strait of Juan de Fuca. And so keeping a year-round rescue tug
in Neah Bay is part of the solution, but it doesn't address the
questions of pilotage or speed limits or size limits and many
other things that are still a gap in our safety net. So I
really see that that's where some additional specific attention
needs to be drawn.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I want to thank you all for
testifying today and for your input, and again, the record
stays open for 2 weeks for you to give additional comments and
testimony or submit information that was brought up in some of
the Q and A. I think we have a tour that we're going to go on
that we were scheduled to start about 5 minutes ago, so unless
there are any other comments from panelists, again I want to
thank everyone here for not just your testimony today but for
your hard work as a community in addressing the security and
safety of Washington waters.
On the one hand we can say that we may well be the model,
given our unique geography and pristine area and incredible
trade and traffic. At the same time I think the challenges
continue. So thank you for stepping up to them and thank you
for today's testimony, and we'll look forward to keeping you
abreast of the Subcommittee's work and potential legislation.
So this Committee hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
State of Washington, Department of Ecology
Olympia, WA, August 15, 2005
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Cantwell:
Thank you for the opportunity to provide additional comments
relating to your recent field hearing of the Subcommittee on Fisheries
and the Coast Guard. At that hearing, you asked if I had any
recommendations for changes to the Federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA 90). I've discussed this question with my staff at the Ecology Oil
Spill Preparedness, Prevention and Response Program and our
recommendations can be found in the attached document.
Thank you again for co-sponsoring the portion of the recently
passed energy bill that reauthorized the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF). The OSLTF is critical for the rapid response and clean up of
oil spills. This fund will now continue to enhance our ability to
protect Washington's natural resources and economy.
Washington State has an excellent working relationship with the
Coast Guard. We work closely with them on all aspects of oil spill
prevention, preparedness and response. However, as I mentioned in my
testimony, we are concerned that Coast Guard homeland security
activities are competing for resources with other important missions,
including marine environmental protection.
The Thirteenth District U.S. Coast Guard Sectors Seattle and
Portland are doing an excellent job meeting this challenge within
limited resources, but we believe there is an opportunity to enhance
our partnership with the Coast Guard in some of these activities. A
stronger partnership may require changes to the traditional and
statutory responsibilities between the Coast Guard and the state. I
hope that as you consider changes to OPA 90, that one possible outcome
might be to make the OSLTF eligible for use on prevention and
preparedness work at both the Federal and state level.
Thank you again for your leadership. If you have further questions
or if I can be of assistance on these issues, please contact me.
Sincerely,
Dale Jensen,
Program Manager,
Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response.
______
Recommended Changes to OPA 90 and Federal Oil Spill Prevention,
Preparedness, and Response Activities
State/Coast Guard Cooperation on Oil Spill Prevention, Preparedness,
and Response
Congress recently reauthorized the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
(OSLTF) to provide for continued funding of the account up to $3
billion. The Coast Guard utilizes the OSLTF to reimburse for spill
response costs, and these funds are of critical importance to the
states.
Since 2001, the Coast Guard has been faced with increased
responsibility in critical homeland security activities. In our region,
the Coast Guard has stepped up to these new challenges with exceptional
professionalism even as it faces significant budget constraints.
We are concerned that these new responsibilities and pressures on
the Coast Guard will impact their activities in the area of oil spill
prevention and response. Fortunately, the Thirteenth District U.S.
Coast Guard's Sectors have done an outstanding job balancing these
demands. However, we urge Congress to provide more resources to the
Coast Guard commensurate with the increased demands that are placed on
the agency through their many important missions.
Washington and other states that have robust oil spill prevention,
preparedness and response programs can relieve some of the pressure
from the Coast Guard by picking-up more responsibility in the area of
oil spill prevention, preparedness and response.
Recommendation: The Coast Guard should continue work with states to
develop cooperative oil spill prevention, preparedness and response
programs. In Washington State, Ecology and the Coast Guard have
developed protocols pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding regarding
oil spills which is an excellent example and foundation for such
cooperative programs. Such programs can assist the Coast Guard by
engaging states in oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response,
while allowing the Coast Guard to continue to focus many of their
resources on the homeland security mission.
Under such cooperative programs, the OSLTF could be used to provide
additional resources for oil spill prevention and preparedness
activities, as well as continuing with the traditional spill response
funding.
Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, Area To Be Avoided (ATBA)
The Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary is a federally
protected area of Washington's northwest coast. A catastrophic
discharge of oil or hazardous materials remains one of the greatest
threats facing the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary
The 10-year-old Area to Be Avoided (ATBA) covers a large portion of
the Sanctuary. The ATBA helps to protect the coast from the risk of
vessel collisions, drift groundings, and powered groundings by
providing additional time for assistance to arrive prior to a drifting
vessel grounding along this rocky and environmentally sensitive coast.
All ships and barges carrying cargos of petroleum or hazardous
materials, and all ships 1,600 gross tons and above solely in transit
are advised to avoid sailing through this area. The provisions of the
ATBA are voluntary.
Recommendation: Cargo vessels measuring less than 1,600 GT, tugs,
and commercial fishing vessels (of 400 GT or more that are transiting
the area and not engaged in fishing operations in the area) are not
covered by the ATBA. These vessels can carry significant volumes of
fuel. Should there be a major or catastrophic event, this fuel could be
disastrous to the sensitive ecosystem of the Sanctuary. By extending
the application of the ATBA to these vessels it would give rescue
vessels more time to reach a stricken vessel. Also, the ATBA is
voluntary. When a vessel violates the ATBA, the owner/operator is sent
a letter explaining the purpose of the ATBA and asking that the vessel
operator avoid the area in the future. We recommend that Congress give
the Coast Guard and the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary the
authority to penalize repeat violators of the ATBA. The Coast Guard and
Sanctuary should also be given sufficient resources to accomplish this
task.
Pre-Booming During Fuel Transfers From Vessels
On December 30, 2003, approximately 4,500 gallons of fuel oil was
spilled into Puget Sound during a fuel transfer. Recent data provided
to the Department of Ecology indicates that in a 6-month period, 4,700
transfers were reported, which covers approximately 80 million barrels
total (excluding refineries and Navy transfers). Of this total, 7.9
million barrels are transfers between entities that aren't fully
regulated. One practice to protect water resources in the event of a
spill is to ``pre-boom'' oil transfers. This involves placing oil spill
boom around a vessel prior to transferring fuel. In the event of a
spill, the boom would prevent the spilled product from spreading.
Recommendation: Currently the Coast Guard Captain of the Port has
the authority to require pre-booming of transfer operations. The Coast
Guard, in cooperation with the Department of Ecology, should identify
certain high-risk transfers and require pre-booming of these
operations.
Coast Guard Salvage Rule and Rescue Tug
On May 10, 2002, the Coast Guard announced that it was seeking
comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal
Register. The proposed rule would revise the salvage and firefighting
requirements for tank ships and tank barges transporting oil in bulk as
cargo. The revisions clarify the salvage and marine firefighting
services that must be identified in a vessel response plan to ensure an
effective response to an incident. The proposed rule would also
establish specific response time requirements for those salvage and
marine firefighting services. General requirements for salvage and
firefighting services were first published in 1993 as part of the U.S.
Coast Guard's tank vessel response plan regulations under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990. To date, the Coast Guard has not finalized these
rules.
Since 1998, Washington State has paid for the stationing of a
rescue tug at Neah Bay. This pre-positioned tug is ideally situated to
assist vessels transiting through the Straits of Juan de Fuca. The tug
has also assisted vessels off the Washington coast. The tug is based in
Neah Bay for a period of six to 9 months depending on the available
funding. Winter storms present a higher risk of oil spills from the
nearly 10,000 cargo ships and tanker transits traveling through the
Strait each year. Fifteen billion gallons of oil are carried through
the Strait each year via cargo and passenger vessels, oil barges,
tankers and fishing vessels. Bad weather that is often experienced
along the outer coast and in the western Strait presents an added risk
to vessel traffic.
Recommendation: The Coast Guard should complete the Federal salvage
regulations. Once the regulation has been completed, we can evaluate
the current capability of the Neah Bay rescue tug and other salvage
requirements under the rule. Also, the state has consistently provided
the bulk of the funding for the tug. This should also be a Federal
responsibility, and the Federal Government should provide funding for a
year-round rescue tug presence at Neah Bay. The U.S. Government should
ask Canada and British Columbia to provide matching funds for tug
operations since the tug provides assistance to all vessels transiting
the Strait, including those bound for British Columbia ports.
Regulation of Tow Vessels
Currently all tank vessels must meet various Coast Guard regulatory
requirements for their operations. However, each year millions of
gallons of petroleum products are carried on barges, Articulated Tank
Barges (ATBs), and Integrated Tank Barges (ITBs). These vessels are all
classified as towed barges and are less stringently regulated, even
though some of the largest barges can carry as much product as a small
tankship.
Recommendation: OPA 90 should be amended to require the regulation
of tugs towing oil barges, Articulated Tugs and Barges (ATBs), and
Integrated Tugs and Barges (ITBs). Such regulations should be similar
to the requirements for tank vessels.
State Damage Claim Models for Natural Resources Damages
To meet the burden of proof for small damage claims the present OPA
rules do not consider the use of state damage claim models for
estimating natural resource damages. Although the D.C. OPA office has
begun to consider Florida model cases and has offered to look at the
Washington model, it would be useful to memorialize this in OPA to
assure that all claims for damages receive compensation.
Recommendation: OPA 90 should be amended to allow the use of the
Washington State Compensation model as a method of establishing
damages. The amendment could also allow the use of models developed by
any other state that have a proven alternative way to establish
damages. The amendment could consider standards of approval and
conditions for use when the fund would accept alternative assessment
procedures to compensate for damages that a state could not recover
from a responsible party that didn't pay or could not be located.
______
People for Puget Sound
Seattle, WA, August 1, 2005
Hon. Maria Cantwell,
Ranking Member,
Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries and the Coast Guard,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Cantwell and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for your interest in the pressing need to enhance the
Federal Government's vigilance in preventing oil spills and for
providing us with the opportunity to make recommendations for the
Committee's consideration. People For Puget Sound, a citizens'
organization striving to protect and restore the Sound, has long
recognized the Sound's vulnerability to oil spills and has been
actively involved in many policy deliberations on oil spill prevention
and response.
First, we would like to heartily thank Senator Cantwell for her
hard work on the energy bill to reinstate the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund, the tax that supports it, the cap increase to $3 billion, and
fund's extension to 2014. This is hugely important to Puget Sound, and
we greatly appreciate Senator Cantwell's efforts to be sure this issue
was addressed in the bill.
Despite years of effort, Puget Sound remains at an unacceptably
high risk from oil spills. One major spill would destroy the Sound, and
with it the enormous economic and cultural values Puget Sound provides
to Washington State and the nation. The Sound is a fjord, with many
narrow channels in which oil can slosh back and forth from beach to
beach with the tides. Clean up of spills has historically been nearly
impossible in Puget Sound primarily due to this convoluted geography.
We desperately need help from the Federal Government to increase
vigilance and prevent spills, as we simply cannot clean them up.
Thank you for considering the following enhancements to the Federal
role in preventing spills:
1. Instruct the U.S. Coast Guard and other appropriate Federal
agencies to implement those sections and subsections of OPA 90
that have not yet been implemented.
2. Fully fund a permanent, year-round, fully-equipped and
staffed rescue tug at Neah Bay and other high-risk areas in
Puget Sound, such as Haro Strait.
3. Include tank vessels, raise the cap to $4 billion, remove
the sunset, and authorize the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to
be used for prevention programs.
4. Require all fishing, cargo, passenger, and tank-ships and
barges to report casualties (as defined in the CFR),
malfunctioning propulsion, navigation, steering systems, and
other incapacities that threaten marine waters.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide these comments. We
look forward to working with you and the Committee to provide better
protection for Puget Sound and all of Washington's marine waters from
the threat of oil spills.
Sincerely,
Naki Stevens,
Director of Programs.
______
Prepared Statement of the Prince William Regional Citizens' Advisory
Council (PWSRCAC)
Introduction
Thank you for the opportunity to provide written testimony for the
field hearing held in Seattle on August 1, 2005.
The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council
(PWSRCAC) is an independent non-profit corporation whose mission is to
promote environmentally safe operation of the Valdez Marine Terminal
and associated tankers. Our work is guided by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90) and our contract with Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.
In language introduced by then-Senator Frank Murkowski, OPA 90
designates citizens' advisory councils in Prince William Sound and Cook
Inlet, Alaska, as ``Demonstration Programs.'' We believe that
designation implies that, if successful, the Alaska councils could be
replicated in other areas; however, that has never been done with the
exception of the recent creation of a citizens' council by the
Washington State Legislature. While Washington's council is similar to
the Alaska councils in some respects, there are some significant
differences such as the level of funding and the perceived independence
of the councils. Therefore, we recommend that Congress replicate the
OPA 90 councils in other areas of the country.
Our core principle is that citizens must have a direct voice in
ensuring the safety of oil transportation. Citizens have the most to
lose when the system fails as it did in 1989 in Prince William Sound,
and as it did last year and again earlier this year in Puget Sound. As
memories of the Exxon spill fade, we provide the constant vigilance
necessary to prevent a resurgence of the complacency that Congress
identified in OPA 90 as one of the spill's causes.
PWSRCAC's 18 member organizations are communities in the region
affected by the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, as well as commercial
fishing, aquaculture, Native, recreation, tourism, and environmental
groups.
As we describe our group, we'd like to address a common
misconception about us: That we are an environmental organization.
That's not accurate. We are not an environmental organization, at least
not in the sense of Greenpeace and the Sierra Club.
Our board has 19 seats, only one of which is held by a traditional
environmental organization. The others seats include:
two representatives for Alaska's tourism industry;
various cities, boroughs and unincorporated villages;
Alaska Native tribes;
Native-owned for-profit business corporations; and
commercial fishing organizations.
In fact, one of our member organizations is the Alaska State
Chamber of Commerce, which participates in PWSRCAC because of the
damage suffered by the tourism industry in the Exxon Valdez spill.
Indeed, the motives of most of these organizations for participating in
PWSRCAC are not primarily environmental in character. Rather, those
motives are economic and social, a reflection of the enormous damage
that a catastrophic oil spill inflicts on the economy, people, and
communities of the affected area.
Principles of Citizen Oversight
Over our sixteen-plus years of existence, we've learned a lot about
how to be effective in promoting safer oil transportation. The
oversight we provide, like that adopted in the Washington legislation,
is not regulatory in nature. It is purely advisory, buttressed by the
scientific and technical research we commission. Following are some key
points for effective citizen oversight:
Point One: Avoid Confrontation. Instead, Work Toward Partnership
We've teamed up with many companies and agencies on many projects
to improve safety in Prince William Sound. Our world-class tanker
escort system is one example of industry, citizens, and regulators
working together to achieve success. The iceberg-detection radar system
now operating near the site of the Exxon Valdez grounding is another.
But a meeting that took place recently in our Anchorage office is
perhaps the most telling example of how we've learned to work closely
with companies that many people would assume to be our natural
adversaries.
At that meeting, our staff sat down with Houston-based officials of
a major oil company to plan a large-scale spill drill that will take
place this fall in Prince William Sound. That oil company is giving our
council a major role in the drill, perhaps a bigger and more tightly
integrated role than we've had in any other company's drills.
And the name of that oil company? Exxon Mobil. That's correct. The
Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council is now working
hand-in-hand with the company responsible for North America's largest
oil spill to make sure nothing like it happens again.
We believe that if citizens' councils are created in other areas of
the country, they would be able to provide regulators, industry, and
the public the same kind of advice, information, and support to promote
the best prevention measures for their waters and that they could
operate in a collaborative, non-adversarial, non-regulatory fashion
that would be of great value to all stakeholders.
Point Two: Information Is the Most Valuable Thing We Can Provide
We spend hundreds of thousands of dollars each year on scientific
research and technical analysis to formulate and support the positions
we take in our advice to industry and regulators. It's all very well to
appear at a public hearing and say, ``We think the Sound should be
protected.'' But we've learned that, to make a real difference, we must
produce credible technical information on why a given protective
measure is needed, and why the option we favor is better than the
alternatives. This kind of scientific analysis is very expensive, so
much so that we sometimes provide regulators with research they could
not have commissioned on their own. That is why adequate funding is
essential if a citizen oversight group is to make a meaningful
contribution to preventing oil spills, and to ensuring a fast,
effective response if prevention fails.
Point Three: Independence Is Vital
We operate in a highly-charged atmosphere where investments of
hundreds of millions of dollars ride on regulatory decisions. The
industries involved have ready access to agency personnel and elected
officials. We are under constant pressure to bend our views and advice
to the prevailing political and regulatory winds. We are able to set
our own course only because of our independence.
That independence rests on two main pillars. One is the fact that
our member entities choose their own representatives to our board.
The other pillar is guaranteed funding. In our case, it comes from
a contract with Alyeska Pipeline Service Company that will stay in
effect as long as the trans-Alaska pipeline has oil in it. In this, we
are different from regulatory agencies. Their budgets may be at risk
because of cost-cutting by the government as a whole, or because the
political winds, temporarily at least, blow against vigorous oversight.
Point Four: Judge Us By Our Effectiveness
Since 1989, nothing remotely resembling the catastrophe of the
Exxon Valdez has happened in Prince William Sound. Industry and
regulators deserve much credit for this safety record, of course, but
so does the PWSRCAC, as attested by the numerous kudos we've received
from the industry and regulatory agencies we work with. The clearest
example: We've twice received the Legacy Award from the British
Columbia/Pacific States Oil Spill Task Force.
What have we done to deserve the recognition we've received? Here's
a partial list:
We helped perfect the contingency plans that govern spill
prevention and response in the Valdez trade.
We've introduced and helped develop Geographic Response
Strategies, similar to the Geographic Response Plans used in
Washington State.
We were instrumental in securing double-hull requirements in
Federal law, and in creating the world-class fleet of escort
tugs serving Prince William Sound.
We spearheaded and largely financed the project to obtain
ice-detection radar for Prince William Sound.
We conducted extensive research and published a
comprehensive community guidebook on dealing with the
socioeconomic impacts of oil spills.
We developed and promoted near-shore response plans.
We have conducted extensive research into the causes of and
cures for the problem of invasive species reaching Alaska in
tanker ballast water.
We have established procedures and relationships to provide
us with clear access to industry and regulators.
We have assisted in developing and training a fleet of
fishing vessels for oil-spill response.
We have a permanent drill monitor on staff to oversee drills
and recommend ways to improve response readiness.
We are a source of peer reviews for technical reports
utilized by regulatory agencies.
Our final point in this list of lessons we've learned and things
we've accomplished in Alaska has to do with the importance of longevity
and continuity. Citizens stay in place and maintain vigilance as
regulators and industry personnel come and go. The companies and
agencies that we work with now include very few people who were around
at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill. By contrast, virtually everyone
on our board and our staff was in Alaska in 1989, and many were
actually involved in some way with the spill or its aftermath.
Consequently, it now often falls to PWSRCAC to provide the
institutional memory needed to make sure the lessons of the Exxon
Valdez figure into today's decisions.
Conclusion
In closing, we would like to revisit history one final time. We had
calls for a citizens' council in Prince William Sound long before 1989,
but it took the Exxon Valdez to make it happen. Other areas of the
country are now in somewhat the same position we were back then. We
just hope that they are luckier and wiser than we were, and that it
won't take a disaster to bring about citizen oversight in preventing
oil spills.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Douglas Helton
Question 1. In your testimony you mention that NOAA has identified
the navigable approaches to Puget Sound as one of the critical areas in
the national hydrographic survey backlog. When is the new survey for
the Puget Sound region slated for completion? What is the schedule for
completely updating these surveys nationally?
Answer. The majority of work on the NOAA hydrographic survey
project at the ``Northern Approaches to Puget Sound'' (internally known
as OPR-N372-RA) was completed in 2004 and 2005. The remaining portion
of the Puget Sound project (excluding the traffic separation zone) is
scheduled for completion this fall (FY 2006) by the NOAA Survey Ship
Rainier.
The projected completion date for the ``original'' 43,000 nm \2\ of
critical backlog is 2018. NOAA continues to track the Critical Area
remaining on the original 43,000 nm \2\ identified as the critical
backlog in 1994. However, because this category of critical survey
miles is not static, NOAA no longer reports its performance against the
43,000 nm \2\. As areas become more or less critical to survey for
reasons such as changing navigation patterns, shifting vessel type and
use, weather/natural incidents reconfiguring depths, resurvey needed,
etc., NOAA has sought a better way to capture its performance and
reflect the larger pool of national survey needs. NOAA now reports its
hydrographic survey performance relative to all 537,000 navigationally
significant square nautical miles. The newly updated NOAA Hydrographic
Survey Priorities, which can be found at http://
nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/staff/NHSP.html, describes NOAA's priority
categories and criteria.
Question 2. The conversion of NOAA's nautical charts into digital
format is an excellent example of the potential for new technology to
enhance navigational safety. However, I understand that the completion
of this conversion in not slated until 2010. Is this correct? What
percentage of NOAA charts have currently been converted? How much is
this effort expected to cost?
Answer. Yes, completion of conversion of all U.S. and territorial
waters charted by NOAA will occur by 2010. Approximately 50 percent of
NOAA's nautical charts have been converted into digital format; 506
Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC) are currently available for use.
However, NOAA has completed 100 percent of its priority one charts,
which include all major ports. NOAA is currently working to provide
seamless coverage between ports. By 2007, when the U.S. Coast Guard is
slated to promulgate electronic chart carriage regulations, NOAA will
have 90 percent of its chart suite of U.S. commercial waters covered by
ENCs. For the Puget Sound area, only two additional charts are needed
in order to provide 100 percent coverage of that area.
The Fiscal Year 2006 President's Budget Request includes an
increase of $1.89M for Electronic Navigational Charts. At the total
requested funding level of $6.19M for Fiscal Year 2006, NOAA will
achieve complete Electronic Navigational Chart coverage by the end of
Fiscal Year 2008.
Question 3. Is there any promise of developing improved detection,
response, and other technologies aimed at reducing the risk from oil
spills, or is what we have now about the state-of-the-art? What is the
status of NOAA's research program for such technologies? How much
funding was requested for these activities in Fiscal Year 2006?
Answer. NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Minerals Management Service continue to conduct
and support research to reduce the risk from oil spills. Improvements
continue to be made in spill modeling and trajectory, as well as in
alternative technologies such as dispersants and in situ burning. Also
recent U.S. Coast Guard research and development efforts have been
aimed at developing the capability to identify, detect, track, contain,
and recover heavy oils on or below the surface, oil in extremely cold
conditions and oils from submerge wrecks at extreme depths.
One such mechanism is through the Coastal Response Research Center
(CRRC), which is a partnership between NOAA and the University of New
Hampshire. The goal of the CRRC is to reduce the consequences of spills
and other hazards that threaten coastal environments and communities.
The Center conducts research, develops new response and restoration
methods, and transfers technology to practitioners. Some of the
projects the CRRC has worked on include: (1) creating a modeling
program that will provide the capability to simulate deepwater oil and
gas spills; (2) developing an oil spill response cost-effectiveness
analytical tool; and (3) updating fate and transport forecasting models
of oil released through deep well blow-outs and pipeline failures.
Efforts aimed at developing improved detection, response and other
technologies aimed at reducing the risk from oil spills is spearheaded
by the Office of Response and Restoration within the National Ocean
Service. The Fiscal Year 2006 request for this office is $22.1 million,
not including funds for the continuing clean-up of the Pribilof
Islands.
Question 4. Is the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil
Pollution Research still an active, effective vehicle for guiding
research efforts at the Federal level?
Answer. While the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil
Pollution Research (the Committee) continues to provide a forum for
sharing the work of individual agencies, its level of activity has
decreased in recent years. The Committee is charged with coordinating a
comprehensive program of research, technology development, and
demonstration among Federal agencies in cooperation with industry,
universities, research institutions, state governments, and other
countries. This responsibility includes preparation of an Oil Pollution
Research and Technology Plan. The last plan was published in 1997 with
revisions based recommendations made by the Marine Board of the
National Research Council.
The Committee had been active in coordinating international
research and development (R&D) efforts. The Committee helped organize
the first and second International R&D Fora on oil spill response
issues, which were held in McLean, VA (1992) and London, UK (1995). In
2002, a third international forum was held in Brest, France, and
focused on High Density Oil Spill Response. The International Maritime
Organization and the European Commission were the primary sponsors of
these international meetings; NOAA was a meeting cosponsor.
Question 5. You testified that if a vessel transits through the
boundaries of the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary and the IMO-
recognized Area To Be Avoided (ATBA), you have a system in place to
contact such vessels to ensure that they are familiar with the
guidelines in place. Why doesn't NOAA also know whether tank vessels
engaged in such transits are carrying oil? Are oil-laden vessels in
fact ``cutting-the-corner'' of the ATBA and entering into its
boundaries, and if so, what can be done to end this practice?
Answer. The Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary (OCNMS) ATBA
Education and Monitoring Program has been greatly aided by the
availability of radar data, and the cooperation of industry and the
U.S. and Canadian Coast Guard. Since 2002, when the provisions of the
ATBA were expanded to include all vessels over 1,600 gross tons, the
highest priority of the program has been outreach to this new
population of vessels. Many of these vessel classes, including
containerships and oil tankers, have better than 99 percent compliance
rates.
The reported compliance rates for tank barges are lower and this
segment of the industry has not, to date, been a target for our
outreach efforts. Improving compliance rates for tank barges will be a
priority for the program in 2006, and this effort will require a
different approach than has been used with larger vessels. OCNMS and
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) evaluate two factors before deciding
whether or not to contact a vessel owner: (1) if the vessel entered the
ATBA; and (2) size or cargo of the vessel (i.e. ships and barges
carrying cargoes of oil or hazardous materials, and all ships 1,600
gross tons).
Tank barges regularly transit just outside of the ATBA boundary.
Positional accuracy and frequency of fixes of the radar data makes it
difficult to determine if they are violating the ATBA, or transiting
just outside the boundary. Another challenge is the status of the
barge's cargo. The data used does occasionally indicate if the oil
barge is ``loaded'' or ``empty;'' however, in most cases it does not.
Since this is a voluntary program, OCNMS and the USCG have taken a
conservative approach of only sending letters to those vessels for
which a violation is obvious. OCNMS plans to consult with the USCG and
marine industry to identify an alternative approach to improving ATBA
compliance within this segment of the industry. In addition, OCNMS
hopes that improved access to vessel track data and Automatic
Identification System (AIS) reports will help improve the accuracy of
our monitoring program.
Question 6. You also mention in your testimony that NOAA has been
``participating in other initiatives reviewing additional measures to
improve maritime and environmental safety in the region.'' What are
some of the additional measures and initiatives?
Answer. NOAA provides products and services that aide mariners in
safe navigation through the waters, including:
Charting products that indicate shipping lanes, aids to
navigation, and shoals or other hazards to navigation.
Tidal current information and weather forecasts, all
essential information used by mariners to safely navigate their
vessels.
A Navigation Response Team is on hand 365 days a year to
perform emergency response surveys to locate potential
obstructions, at the request of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The Port of Tacoma is the location of one of twelve NOAA
Physical Oceanographic Real Time Systems (PORTS')
established around the country. PORTS provide quality-
controlled real time oceanographic and meteorological data.
NOAA computer modeling offers insight into the risks and
consequences of a spill in a particular location.
NOAA is an active member of the Harbor Safety Committee in
Puget Sound and the Ports and Waterway Committee in Portland.
These committees work to prioritize charting requirements.
Critical backlog survey--NOAA works with the United States
Power Squadron on the Committee to work on charting for the
West Coast.
NOAA is working with the U.S. Coast Guard, Washington State,
the Pilots Association, and others on access to vessel track
data.
Tsunamis--NOAA has a system of Deep-Ocean Assessment and
Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys in place on the West Coast,
in addition to a mapping system for the coast and inland, which
facilitate the planning effort and emergency warning system.
NOAA's All-Hazards Weather Radios will begin to include all
types of hazards warnings, not just those that are weather-
related.
NOAA is also active with the Region 10 Regional Response
Team, which works to coordinate efforts for responses to
significant oil and hazardous substance incidents and works
toward preparedness for such events.
Question 7. You testified, and we've heard previous testimony in
the Committee from others, that double-hull tankers are not a
``panacea,'' in that even a double-hull tanker could be involved in a
major spill were it to be involved in a collision. That being the case,
won't navigational measures continue to be necessary? What are some
additional steps that could be taken in this regard?
Answer. Double hulls are a feature designed to reduce the potential
for spillage from a low velocity grounding or collision. Because double
hulls would not prevent a grounding or collision from occurring,
navigational measures that aid in reduction and prevention of
groundings and collisions will continue to be necessary.
In addition to up-to-date surveys, accurate chart products, and
real-time environmental information such as water level, currents,
winds, etc., the best way to enhance navigation safety is to provide a
reliable system of aids-to-navigation to assist mariners in determining
their position and a safe course to steer, and to alert them to
dangers. Additional precautionary steps that could be taken include:
(1) implementing routing measures supported by Port Access Route
Studies, (2) completing the modernization of the Federal Vessel Traffic
Service (VTS) in the Puget Sound area, (3) establishing hydrological/
meteorological monitoring stations, and (4) placing additional current
and weather environmental data buoys that will help with navigation and
response to spills.
Question 8. Are there other areas of the country that could benefit
from some of the navigational and other prevention measures that are in
place in the Washington area?
Answer. All navigable waters of the country benefit from reliable
aids to navigation. Additional routing measures and new or improved
VTSs could provide additional benefits in some areas. However, they
should only be implemented after a careful risk analysis and
consultation with expert waterways users. All areas of the country
would benefit from expanded implementation of the Automatic
Identification System (AIS). Weather and environmental monitoring
stations likewise provide added benefits wherever they are applied.
NOAA's Physical Oceanographic Real Time System (PORTS')
is a cost shared partnership program that places water level stations,
current meters, meteorological packs, salinity meters, air gap (bridge
clearance) and other environmental sensors in locations identified in
concert with the local user community that most benefit safe and
efficient navigation.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Captain Myles Boothe
Question 1. Captain Boothe, can you tell me how many tank vessels
coming into Washington waters from the U.S. and overseas are still
single-hull vessels or have only double-sides or double-bottoms? When
will these ships be phased-out?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not maintain statistics on the double/
single hull status of tankers entering Washington State's waters. All
tankers operating in U.S. waters must be double-hulled by 2015. As a
matter of domestic law (per the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90))
most single hull tank vessels will be phased out by 2010. The
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) shares a similar scheme which assures that single-hull tankers
that are subject to the Convention are phased-out not later than 2010.
In some cases, MARPOL permits the extension of single-hull tanker
phase-out dates if a Condition Assessment Scheme indicates the vessel
is in a satisfactory condition for continued operation. Domestically,
vessels equipped with a double-bottom or double-sides may operate
beyond 2010 up until 2015 based upon a tiered phase-out schedule
outlined in OPA 90.
Question 2. How has Washington State law on the use of single-hull
vessels affected the phaseout schedule?
Answer. There is no data that indicates Washington State law has
affected the phase-out schedule of single-hull tankers. However, the
Revised Code of Washington, Section 88.16.190, may be influencing
vessel owners to build propulsion and steering system redundancy into
many of their new double-hull tankers constructed for the Puget Sound
trade.
Question 3. Can you tell me how many ships carrying oil--either as
cargo or large ships carrying oil as fuel--simply transit through U.S.
waters, including waters in the State of Washington, on their way to
foreign ports? Does the U.S. impose any safety regulations on such
ships? How many of these ships are single-hull tank vessels or have
only double sides or double bottoms? To the extent that such ships
include such tank vessels, when will they be phased out?
Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard does not maintain statistics on the
number of vessels that engage in innocent passage through U.S. waters
bound for foreign ports without calling upon a U.S. port. Vessels
engaging in innocent passage through U.S. waters are not required to
comply with U.S. laws or regulations, however these vessels are
expected to comply with international standards (applicable to the
vessel), such as the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), MARPOL, etc.
Vessels calling on U.S. ports are required to meet certain U.S.
laws and regulations including the OPA 90 for tank vessels. OPA 90
phases out single-hulled tank vessels based on a codified schedule.
MARPOL shares a similar scheme which assures that most single-hull
tankers that are subject to the Convention are phased out not later
than 2010. In some cases, MARPOL permits the extension of single-hull
tanker phaseout dates to 2015 if a Condition Assessment Scheme
indicates the vessel is in a satisfactory condition for continued
operation.
Question 4. I understand that member countries of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) recently agreed to amendments that would
apply more rigorous inspections to single-hull vessels, yet the U.S. is
not intending to implement this requirement. Is that true, and if so,
why is this the U.S. position?
Answer. OPA 90 governs double-hull requirements for vessels
operating in U.S. waters. In December 2003, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) amended Annex I to the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78), modifying MARPOL
Regulation 13G which includes a Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS). A
CAS is an enhanced survey system which verifies the structural
integrity of single hull tankers. If satisfactory, a CAS may be used to
extend single hull tanker phaseout dates. Since CAS was included in
[amended] Regulation 13G, it couldn't be adopted domestically, as the
regulation would have required the United States to implement a single
hull tanker phaseout schedule which is inconsistent with the existing
schedule required by Congress through the OPA 90. Further, the Coast
Guard already adopted and codified IMO's enhanced survey requirements
in 1996 for single hull tankers. This regulation aligns with the SOLAS
requirement to employ an Enhanced Survey Program (ESP) to assure
structural integrity. Some of the more significant features of CAS will
be incorporated into the ESP under SOLAS (which does not conflict with
domestically mandated single hull tanker phaseout dates). These updates
to the ESP will become effective on January 1, 2007.
In addition to the above regimes, the Coast Guard has developed and
implemented a voluntary CAS program. Currently, six vessels are seeking
voluntary CAS compliance documentation through this program. Moreover,
U.S. vessels transporting Alaskan North Slope Crude oil from Alaska
also participate in the Coast Guard-led Critical Area Inspection
Program to monitor structural integrity for vessels engaged in that
trade.
Question 5. When will the Coast Guard complete the upgrade of the
Vessel Traffic System in Puget Sound, and what kind of changes do you
expect will be made as part of this upgrade, particularly as they may
relate to improving the safe transport of oil?
Answer. The Coast Guard has completed upgrades of the Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS) in Puget Sound. Under the Ports and Waterways
Safety System acquisition project, the core VTS operating system and 13
Automatic Identification System (AIS) base stations were installed. In
addition, two radars were replaced with upgraded components.
The notable improvement resulting from the upgrade is the
introduction of AIS coverage. AIS allows for highly accurate tracking
and identification of all commercial vessels greater than 65 feet in
length. It also provides the VTS operator with information on a
vessel's cargo so that additional attention may be paid to oil or
hazardous material transports.
Question 6. Is the Coast Guard actively considering the use of a
traffic separation scheme or other navigational measures to lessen the
risks of oil spills in other parts of the country?
Answer. The Coast Guard is not currently considering the use of any
new traffic separation schemes or other routing measures to
specifically lessen the risk of oil spills in any other port or
waterway. The Coast Guard has, in the past, established recommended
routes to isolate tanker and hazardous material traffic from other
vessels and thus reduce the risk of collision. As an example, these
recommended routes are being used off the coast of California for
vessels carrying certain types of cargo.
Question 7. In a report to Congress dated May 12, 2005, the Coast
Guard indicated that it is more likely to recover claims for an oil
spill against a responsible party that has a Certificate of Financial
Responsibility (COFR). However, only vessels greater than 300 gross
tons have to have these certificates. Should this requirement be
extended to smaller vessels, particularly smaller vessels that
transport oil as cargo?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not taken a position that the COFR
requirement should be extended to small vessels (i.e., 300 gross tons
or less). The vast majority of small vessel spills requiring a Federal
response with OSLTF funding involve non-tank vessels, including some
cargo and towing vessels, but primarily consisting of commercial
fishing vessels and pleasure craft. The following are limited cost
recovery statistics for non-COFR'd vessel spills in which the OSLTF was
accessed.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incident Costs
Vessel Type Number of Incidents ($Million) Percent Collected
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fishing 593 8.2 29
Vessel
Pleasure 210 2.1 18
Craft
Cargo Vessel 180 4.0 32
Tug and 44 1.0 45
Towboat
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In enacting OPA, legislators intended that the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund would in many cases be the ultimate insurer when liable
polluters do not pay. Whether to expand the COFR requirements to all
small vessels, or a class of small vessels, as a means of improving
cost recovery for the Fund is in essence a reconsideration of how the
cost risk should be shared between the public's fund and individuals.
Any analysis in this regard would likely require data on the number of
vessels affected, the availability and cost of insurance to meet new
financial responsibility requirements, and the cost to administer the
expanded program.
Question 8. With respect to its ongoing rulemaking on improving
response equipment, what has the Coast Guard done to evaluate the
potential environmental impacts from use of dispersants or in situ
burning of oil? Do uncertainties remain?
Answer. Dispersants and in situ burning as oil spill response
methods have been used for many years throughout the world and in the
United States. Dispersant pre-approved zones and in situ burn policies
have been established for all coastal areas of the United States except
Oregon, Washington, and some areas of Alaska. A pre-approved zone is
one in which the Federal On-Scene Coordinator can deploy dispersants
(after employing a dispersant-use decision matrix) without seeking
immediate approval from the environmental and natural resource trustees
(Federal and state). These pre-approved zones have been developed by
the Regional Response Teams (the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior, and state and other
Federal agencies). Many factors are considered in developing these
zones, including the potential negative impacts of dispersant use.
Between 1985 and 2005, the National Academy of Sciences published 5
different studies on oil spills and the various methods to respond to
them, including a separate report on dispersants (1989). The conclusion
reached is that dispersed oil's short term negative impacts to near
surface plankton is far less then the contamination of coastal habitats
and natural resources. It should be noted that all dispersants used in
the United States are tested (toxicity and performance) and approved
for use by the EPA (National Product List), in accordance with National
Contingency Plan regulations. EPA maintains a schedule of dispersants,
known as the National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, that may be
authorized for use on oil discharges by the Coast Guard On-Scene
Coordinator with the concurrence of both the EPA representative to the
Regional Response Team and the state with jurisdiction over the waters
impacted.
The Coast Guard views dispersants as a critical component to a
successful oil spill response when mechanical recovery is limited in
its ability to recover oil. Mechanical recovery has significant
limitations when deployed in open water areas and is often times
overwhelmed in large scale off shore oil spills. These limitations can
have far reaching negative impacts on the environment. Dispersants,
when used as per the regional pre-authorizations, can significantly
reduce oil impacts on the near shore and shoreline environments.
Question 9. Given the recent Washington Department of Ecology
report which indicates a shortage of vessels for providing mechanical
response equipment to the site of an oil spill, is the Coast Guard
addressing this gap?
Answer. The Washington Department of Ecology report indicates that
the response system in Washington State could benefit from additional
vessels of opportunity to augment existing response resources within
the region.
The Puget Sound area has more dedicated response vessels than any
other region in the nation, and the oil spill response organizations'
equipment caches exceed the Federal requirements for the region. The
Federal requirements for response equipment do not include a specific
requirement for vessels used to assist in deploying spill response
equipment such as skimmers and boom. The source data used in the
Washington State Department of Ecology report indicated that there were
approximately 200 dedicated vessels of various types in the State of
Washington. There are 74 dedicated oil skimming vessels in one oil
spill response company alone. This past year the Coast Guard added 3
oil skimmers to its Puget Sound inventory and completed modifications
on two of these skimmers so that they may be used on Army Corps of
Engineers or Coast Guard vessels as vessels of opportunity skimming
systems (VOSS). Additionally, the Coast Guard has recently added one of
its newest vessels, USCGC FIR, complete with a Spilled Oil Recover
System, to the Port Angeles area.
Mandating an increasing in the number and type of vessels capable
and available for oil pollution response would require a change to the
Federal requirements for oil spill response equipment. This effort
would need to include a cost benefit analysis on a nationwide scale for
justification.
Question 10. The recent Washington Department of Ecology report
suggested using commercial fishing vessels to augment the insufficient
response vessel coverage. What would be involved in ensuring proper
training and safety for fishing vessel responders? Would the Coast
Guard be responsible for this new training?
Answer. Proper safety and response training of any vessels,
including fishing vessels, used as vessels of opportunity would be the
responsibility of the oil spill response organization hiring the
vessels.
Under existing programs, such as those in Alaska (e.g., Ship Escort
Response Vessel System (SERVS) for Prince William Sound and the Cook
Inlet Spill Response Inc. (CISPRI) for Cook Inlet), each response
organization funds their own training and develops their own
curriculum. These training programs are not subject to U.S. Coast Guard
requirements or standards. Review of the training and safety programs
for both SERVS and CISPRI indicate that 24-hour and 8-hour Hazardous
Waste Operations and Emergency Response training and fishing vessel
safety training, as well as training in Incident Command System;
Response Strategies and Tactics; and Wildlife Hazing, Capture and
Stabilization are all part of the general curriculum for these
``vessels of opportunity.'' This recurring training usually takes one
week a year.
Question 11. Please describe the status of all rulemakings required
by OPA 90, including rules on drug and alcohol testing of crew and
salvage, the issues that have caused delays in these rules, and when
the Coast Guard plans to complete these rules.
Answer. All but three of the forty regulations OPA 90 required have
been issued. The remaining projects are not complete because of
technical or jurisdictional complexity, as well as limited rulemaking
resources. The three remaining OPA 90 rulemakings are:
Tank Vessel Response Plans for Hazardous Substances
Facility Response Plans for Hazardous Substances
Reporting Marine Casualties [that pose significant harm to
the environment]
Regarding the drug and alcohol testing of crew, the current
rulemaking is not considered an OPA 90 action The rulemaking stems from
Public Law (Pub. L. 105-383) (46 U.S.C. 2303a) requiring alcohol tests
to be done within 2 hours of a serious marine incident. The Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for this Public Law was published February
28, 2003. The Final Rule has been prepared and is currently going
through clearance.
Regarding salvage and marine firefighting, the current rulemaking
is not considered an OPA 90 action. In 1993, the Coast Guard complied
with OPA 90 by publishing vessel response plan requirements that
included salvage and marine firefighting elements. The current
rulemaking builds on the existing requirements. The Coast Guard
published an NPRM in 2002. Analysis of public comments is ongoing, with
the goal of publishing a Final Rule in the future.
Additionally, the Coast Guard recently initiated a rulemaking in
the area of Vessel and Deepwater Port Limits of Liability--Adjustments
to Reflect the Consumer Price Index. This action is needed to adjust
the limits of liability for vessels and deepwater ports to reflect
significant increases in the Consumer Price Index. A NPRM is under
development, with a goal of publishing it in 2006.
Question 12. How can we best confirm whether vessels transiting
through the Area to Be Avoided off the coast of Washington are laden
with oil? Is this a responsibility of the Coast Guard? Does the Coast
Guard regularly access this area?
Answer. Tank vessels and tank barges transiting near the Olympic
Coast Sanctuary and its associated Area to be Avoided (ATBA) are
required to carry an Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponder,
and to report whether or not they are carrying hazardous cargo. In
addition, all vessels are required to submit an advance notice of
arrival to the Coast Guard that lists the cargo they are carrying.
The Coast Guard VTS in Seattle, and the Canadian Coast Guard VTS in
Tofino, British Columbia, continually monitor the ATBA to detect
incursions. As such, it is extremely rare for a vessel laden with oil
to enter the area. Compliance with the voluntary ATBA is better than 99
percent. In the rare event that a commercial vessel does enter the
area, its intentions are immediately questioned by one of the two
vessel traffic services, regardless of its cargo. Because this remote,
electronic vigilance has been successful, the Coast Guard does not
conduct regular patrols in the area.
Question 13. NOAA testified, and we've heard previous testimony in
the Committee from others, that double-hull tankers are not a panacea,
in that even a double-hull tanker could be involved in a major spill
were it to be involved in a collision. That being the case, won't
navigational measures continue to be necessary? What about measures to
reduce human error? What are some additional steps that could be taken
in both regards?
Answer. Carefully selected navigation and human factors measures
are effective in reducing the likelihood of accidents and will continue
to be applicable. The key is to focus on the most effective measures
which reduce overall risk. A number of such existing measures which
improve vessel operator decision-making through increased situational
awareness are described below. Likewise, technological advancements in
shipboard navigation and safety equipment greatly improve the mariners'
situational awareness and enhance their ability to prevent incidents
from occurring.
In addition to double-hull requirements, OPA 90 and its
implementing regulations imposed some additional measures to further
reduce the likelihood of tanker accidents, including the requirement
for a second officer on the bridge while operating within U.S. waters,
tug escorts for laden tankers in certain waters, and mandatory
participation in VTS.
Many other navigation and vessel traffic management measures have
successfully been applied as well, including AIS, floating and fixed
aids to navigation, Port Access Route Study, ship routing and Traffic
Separation Scheme (TSS) modifications, safety zones, electronic charts,
weather monitoring, pilotage requirements, and channel dredging and
widening.
The existing Port State Control program, coupled with the recent
implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act regulations,
increases Coast Guard situational awareness and provides opportunities
for accident prevention. This includes verification of a vessel's
compliance with the International Management Code for the Safe
Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention and the International
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW), the primary international tools for addressing human
and organizational factors. The 1995 amendments to STCW required
significant enhancements to the qualification and fitness of seafarers
worldwide.
Finally, the Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee instituted a
number of voluntary standards of care for vessels operating in Puget
Sound, improving the overall safety of vessel operations within the
Puget Sound region.
The many measures described above serve to augment the reduction in
risk provided by a double-hull design.
Question 14. You testified that the Pacific Northwest has some of
the strongest safety prevention elements in place, due to efforts
unique to the region. What are some of these unique elements, and could
they be applied in other parts of the country?
Answer. Although not unique to Puget Sound, before any vessel
greater than 1,600 gross tons enters U.S. waters, its crew is obligated
to perform safety checks of propulsion and steering equipment, and
report any deficiencies prior to entering port to help guard against a
mechanical malfunction occurring close to U.S. shorelines or within
maneuvering waters. In addition, tank vessels en route or departing the
region are required to follow offshore routing schemes that hold them
further off the coastlines of Washington and Vancouver Island, British
Columbia. On the U.S. side, the IMO has recognized an ``Area To Be
Avoided'' (ATBA) buffer zone extending 25 miles out from the Washington
coast along the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary, for all laden
tank vessels and other vessels of 1,600 gross tons and above.
Similarly, a 50-mile wide Tanker Exclusion Zone has been established
off of the Canadian coast to route the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline tanker
traffic further offshore to protect against groundings as a result of
any potential disabling vessel conditions. Most deep draft freight
vessels operating off the Washington coast comply with the Olympic
Coast National Marine Sanctuary ATBA.
The United States and Canadian jointly operated Cooperative Vessel
Traffic Service (CVTS), and the International Maritime Organization-
adopted TSS, have been in effect within Puget Sound Waters for decades
and serve to ensure an ordered and predictable traffic pattern for
shipping in the region. All deep, draft vessels (all above 300 gross
tons) are obligated to participate in the CVTS and follow the TSS
according to the International Navigation Rules of the Road. The TSS
establishes one-way traffic lanes, similar to an interstate highway,
with a separation zone between the opposing lanes of marine traffic.
The Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service tracks and directs all
participating vessels transiting the region as necessary to ensure
collisions and powered groundings will not occur.
Extensive analysis and collaboration with Canada and tribal
interests (complemented by the discussions and recommendations from a
Long-term Risk Management Panel convened by the Governor of Washington
State and the Secretary of Transportation) led to significant
improvements to the TSS, which were implemented with international
approval in 2004 (based on extensive analysis and collaboration with
Canada and tribal interests). The most significant adjustments ensure
greater separation for tankers while in transit throughout the system,
particularly in more confined waters.
The CVTS system is a model of bilateral cooperation and waterways
safety management, ensuring the environmental protection and safety of
our shared waters. Twice a year delegates from both the Coast Guard and
Canadian Coast Guard meet to facilitate consultations between the
United States and Canada on the effective implementation of the CVTS
Agreement.
Almost all oil laden tank vessels must also be under the escort of
two tugs which are capable of stopping the vessel's movement within
strict parameters. No vessel above 100 gross tons is permitted to meet
a laden tanker transiting Rosario Strait, the typical route for tankers
destined for Washington refineries. Typically, as tankers enter Rosario
Strait, escort tugs actually tether themselves to the tanker for
enhanced ability to positively control the tanker's movement if needed.
Other programs, which are readily applicable to other parts of the
country, include:
Weather Sensors and Decision Aids: As a result of a special
appropriation for Puget Sound pollution prevention enhancement, two
sophisticated weather buoys and numerous other weather sensors and
cameras have been installed throughout Puget Sound waters to enhance
the mariners' and the Coast Guard's situational awareness in the
region. In addition, a Rescue Tug Deployment Decision Making tool has
been created to assist the Captain of the Port in objectively
determining the need for the dispatch and pre-staging of stand-by tug
capabilities to protect against adverse weather and potential disabled
vessels combining to create an unacceptable risk for particular areas
within the region. These measures all combine to facilitate both normal
voyage planning and emergency response decisionmaking.
Harbor Safety Committees: In addition to government safety and
pollution prevention efforts, the Puget Sound and Columbia River
region's maritime industries have established strong Harbor Safety
Committees, with members from a broad spectrum of industry. These
Committees have established Standards of Care, voluntary measures for
operating practices and equipment testing that supplement the Federal
and State standards. These additional measures have proven a valuable
tool in quickly improving the maritime industry's performance, without
the need to embark in regulatory changes.
Question 15. You testified that in District 13, there are many more
inspections of foreign flag vessels than in the rest of the country.
Why is that?
Answer. From the data provided in the Coast Guard's Port State
Control Annual Reports, the National Average for examination percentage
of foreign vessels, based on total ship arrivals, is 19 percent in
2002, 19 percent in 2003, and 15.5 percent in 2004. Meanwhile, D13
ports examined foreign vessels at higher rates; approximately 46
percent in 2002, 32 percent in 2003 of the foreign vessels, and 38
percent in 2004.
The Coast Guard selects foreign vessels for PSC exams through the
use of a targeting matrix that weighs risk factors involving the ship
owner/operator, flag state, vessel classification societies, vessel
type, and vessel compliance history. We use this targeting matrix to
identify vessels that have the greatest risk of being substandard and
to focus our port state control efforts on high-risk vessels.
Collectively, Puget Sound and Portland zones receive a higher
percentage of foreign bulk cargo carrier arrivals than other ports.
Past data indicates that older bulk cargo vessels are more likely to be
substandard than most other ports in the nation, and older bulk
carriers receive more points during the targeting process than new bulk
carriers or other freight ships. Approximately 35 percent of the
foreign ships arriving at D13 ports are bulk carriers, compared with 18
percent nationwide.
Much of the cargo handled by ships visiting D13 ports are low-value
commodities. Past data indicates that vessels that carry low-value
commodities are more likely to be substandard and the targeting matrix
typically focuses upon vessels carrying low-value commodities. For
example, Portland is considered the second or third (by year) biggest
grain exporter in the nation. D13 also sees a large number of first-
time vessels to the U.S. or vessels on their maiden voyages. The Coast
Guard targets every vessel at its first arrival in the United States
for examination. Vessel Security Boarding Teams in Sector Seattle AOR
have received extensive training to conduct portions of Port State
Control Exams--they know what to look for with respect to safety and
environmental protection requirements; and if they note deficiencies,
they will initiate a Port State Control Examination.
Question 16. Please describe any ongoing joint efforts with the
Canadian government on oil spill prevention and response efforts.
Answer. The United States Coast Guard and the Canadian Coast Guard
jointly operate the Cooperative Vessel Traffic Service (CVTS) and the
International Maritime Organization adopted TSS. These cooperative
services have been in place for decades, and have ensured an orderly
and predictable traffic pattern for all vessels in the region. Within
this framework, the two Coast Guards have continued to refine and
improve the TSS by extending the initial entry point several miles
further offshore, providing greater separation of opposing ship
traffic, adding separation zones where none previously existed in some
of the narrower waterways, including a special operating area to
preclude meeting of large commercial vessels at a critical turn in the
waterway. The CVTS and TSS operation, along with internationally
recognized rules-of-the-road and standardized merchant mariner
training, are responsible for the extremely low frequency of collisions
and groundings in this very busy and confined waterway.
Additionally on the prevention side, the Coast Guard works closely
with our Transport Canada Marine Safety counterparts in executing our
respective port state control programs. In the Thirteenth District,
Captain of the Port/Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection Puget Sound
had established a program of reciprocity for Port State Control
examinations conducted by Transport Canada marine surveyors, thus
maximizing the number of foreign vessel exams within the Puget Sound
region.
On the response side, the Coast Guard has ongoing and routine
contact with our Canadian Coast Guard counterparts in implementing the
Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (JCP).
This plan plays a critical role in preparing for, and responding to oil
spills in the Puget Sound area. Using the CANUSPAC annex to the JCP,
both the Canadian and U.S. Coast Guard work together as part of a Joint
Response Team (JRT). The two Coast Guards exercise the plan at least
annually, and typically have a concurrent response equipment deployment
exercise to ensure we have the ability to move necessary equipment to
either side of the international border in concert, and engage spilled
oil at the earliest opportunity. On August 19, 2005, the Coast Guard
conducted a meeting with the Canadian Government and the Makah tribe to
finalize details on our upcoming joint-oil spill exercise scheduled to
take place on October 27, 2005. The exercise will simulate a vessel
sinking off the Washington coast with an oil discharge that threatens
both Canadian shores and the Makah reservation. Exercise play will
involve a command post being set up in Canada and on the Makah
reservation, as well as an equipment deployment at Swiftsure Bank, off
the British Columbia coast. There will also be a JRT meeting later in
November or December.
Question 17. Please describe any ongoing joint efforts with the
tribal governments on oil spill prevention and response efforts.
Answer. The tribes of the Pacific Northwest, as sovereign nations,
are invited to be a part of the Regional Response Team/Northwest Area
Committee (RRT/NWAC). They are routinely invited to participate in
efforts to develop and maintain the Northwest Area Contingency Plan,
the geographical annexes to the plan, and to all workgroup meetings of
the RRT/NWAC. There has been limited success in having the region's
tribes attend the RRT/NWAC meetings. There are approximately 27
different tribal entities in the RRT/NWAC area. Accordingly, it is
difficult to get them to participate collectively since there is no
single tribal group or committee that represents them all. As a result,
the CG works to include the appropriate tribes within the geographical
area in which we are involved. For example, some of the tribes have
participated in the Coast Guard sponsored Environmental Risk Assessment
in the Cape Flattery area. This risk assessment is designed to help
decisionmakers weigh various environmental trade-offs when applying
different cleanup technologies to oil spills.
Several of the coastal area tribes participated in a large
Washington coastal area logistics exercise. This exercise brought
together state, Federal, and tribal trustees and industry to look at
the unique and difficult logistical challenges of responding to a spill
on the Washington coast. This exercise identified issues requiring
further attention through planning and equipment placement necessary to
be able to conduct a successful cleanup operation in this rugged,
sensitive coastal area. Most recently, the tribes have participated in
the planning for the upcoming Joint Canadian-U.S. Oil Spill exercise
and at a Public Affairs Workgroup meeting of the RRT/NWAC. The October
2005 CAN/US exercise, will be an open water field training evolution
and partial Command Post Exercise beyond the mouth of the Strait of
Juan De Fuca. On the U.S. side, it will be based in Neah Bay on the
Makah tribal land area. Tribal representatives will be working with the
exercise committee to develop and participate in the exercise.
Furthermore, individual tribes within the region have been part of the
Unified Command stood up for response to pollution incidents within
Puget Sound. A most recent example is the Wells Point spill of December
2003.
The Coast Guard is working concurrently with regional tribes and is
in the process of establishing a Regulated Navigation Area (RNA) within
the Strait of Juan de Fuca to permanently establish VTS Measures to
modify traffic lanes to accommodate the usual and customary fishing
grounds of regional tribes. Recent changes to the Traffic Separation
Scheme conflicted with traditional fishing areas and impeded the
ability of the tribes to fish safely. The RNA will reroute vessel
traffic safely around traditional fishing areas, greatly reducing risk
of collision and associated pollution.
Question 18. Has the Coast Guard ever done a cost-benefit analysis
on the use of standby tugs to prevent oil spills in Puget Sound?
Answer. Yes. A regulatory assessment entitled, ``Use of Tugs to
Protect Against Oil Spills in the Puget Sound Area'' (Report No. 9522-
002) was published November 15, 1999, and is available on the Internet
at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/pscb.pdf.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Richard Wright
Question 1. I understand that a recent Washington State Department
of Ecology-funded study on the role of fishing vessels in clean-ups
found that there might be insufficient vessel capabilities for
responding to an oil spill in Washington. Do you agree with the
report's conclusions? If not, please let me know your specific
concerns.
Answer. As I stated at the field hearing, in a very large spill, it
is hard to argue that additional well-trained people and vessels would
not be a help. However, the study did not look at the program MSRC has
in place to train and access vessels and people of opportunity. I have
been in the process of improving that program since well before the
study and will continue to do so. The Department of Ecology (DOE) is
also working on this program as the study recommended that a government
agency take on this task to avoid potential competition for the same
limited resources by the various response entities. MSRC will lend
every assistance to the State in this project. Also, the study failed
to account for the considerable resources available to MSRC through our
Memorandum of Agreement with Burrard Clean Operations of British
Columbia, our partners to the north. One additional comment, it would
be a mistake to focus strictly on fishing vessels. Fishing vessels and
their crews are quite nomadic. This is especially true of the Puget
Sound-based fleet. This makes crews difficult to keep trained and
vessels difficult to depend upon. MSRC's program includes vessels of
opportunity of all types, such as tugs and workboats, as well as
fishing vessels.
Question 2. If you believe there are gaps in the current oil spill
prevention and response regime, what should be done to address them?
Are there steps that should be taken at the Federal level, both through
resource commitments or Federal legislation?
Answer. Once again, as I stated at the field hearing, I believe
that our biggest gap is in the area of remote sensing. I would support
any innovative research in any phase of response activities; however,
remote sensing remains the most important area, in my opinion. This is
most critical in the early hours of small to medium-sized releases,
especially at night. It may seem easy to find oil on water, but it
usually is not. Certainly, huge spills are obvious early in the
response, but as they quickly spread and age, finding the best place
for recovery activities becomes more difficult. Currently, most of the
effort in the U.S. seems to be focused on infrared technology. However,
the Canadian government has made great strides in laser-based sensing,
which shows much more promise than infrared. As this represents
possible international collaboration, it would seem that the Federal
Government should take the lead. In a time of limited resources, remote
sensing represents the biggest bang for the buck.
Question 3. You testified that in Washington State, the amount of
response equipment and location of such equipment far exceeds Federal
requirements. Why is that? Is it a function of state law or is this a
voluntary prevention initiative on the part of industry? Does this mean
that the level of response equipment in other parts of the country may
be lacking?
Answer. Oil spill response in Washington is very much a partnership
effort between the state, the Coast Guard, and industry. Where we are
today is reflective of that partnership. In cooperation with the
regulatory community, the industry has spent hundreds of millions of
dollars and invested hundreds of thousand of person-hours in making the
response stature in Washington the finest in the country, if not the
world. Laws and regulations have not been the drivers; protecting our
unique environment has been. I am not able to speak for other sections
of our country directly; however, OPA 90 and subsequent regulations
have provided a set of minimum standards for the entire nation. Here in
Washington, as previously stated, we greatly exceed these minimum
requirements.