[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2007
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:07 p.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard C. Shelby (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Shelby and Mikulski.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, ADMINISTRATOR
CHAIRMAN'S OPENING REMARKS
Senator Shelby. The subcommittee will come to order. Today
we welcome the NASA Administrator Dr. Michael Griffin, who has
joined us to testify on the President's fiscal year 2007 budget
request for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA).
The proposed budget for NASA is $16.8 billion. After
accounting for one-time supplemental funds provided for
Katrina-related expenses, the increase to NASA-based programs
becomes $519 million, an increase of just over 3 percent. The
requested increase can be attributed to nearly $900 million to
fund the Vision and Exploration Program. While this is a
significant increase, there are a number of programs slated for
decreases that are troubling. Specifically, funding for
aeronautics and education have been cut, and science has been
shortchanged with little hope for funding in future years that
I see now.
Dr. Griffin, I feel that fulfilling NASA's goals including
returning to the Moon are important and will take more than
just plans for rockets and research missions. It will also take
a sound financial structure, as we've talked about, a skilled
workforce, and capable management. One of the greatest
challenges that I believe NASA faces is building and retaining
a technical workforce that we have talked about. NASA is one of
the most publicly recognized agencies within the Federal
Government. Such high visibility can be a powerful tool for
aspiring future scientists, engineers, and explorers. The
success of NASA programs in science and exploration seen by
students today is the inspiration needed to attract the young
people of this Nation to the careers of tomorrow.
Further investment in education is the direct link to
future generations. I believe we agree that we must continue to
encourage young people to explore these educational avenues and
endeavor to carry on the important research and exploration
capabilities for which NASA is so well known. It is a serious
issue that must be addressed in order to ensure that future
exploration in space can occur, and one that I do not believe
should be sacrificed.
Dr. Griffin, this budget before us reflects the process of
implementing the Vision for Space Exploration, and I understand
that the path was laid out in the exploration systems
architecture study. I believe that the intent of the study is
commendable in its aim to reach the goal of returning to the
Moon in a fiscally prudent, and safe manner. However, it is my
hope that such implementation can be accomplished while
maintaining the capabilities that NASA has developed in other
areas of its mission. I do not believe that we should sacrifice
important capabilities that will be vital to future missions
and efforts at NASA in trying to attain this goal. I believe
that we can and should find a balance, and I believe you will.
The path laid out for returning to the Moon is contingent
on several factors. However, we are both keenly aware that any
unexpected bump in the path could pose significant challenges
to NASA's long-term plans. Today we can point to the sizable
funding requirements of the space shuttle, as well as the
ongoing construction of the International Space Station (ISS)
as hefty fiscal burdens on NASA's ability to continue down the
path laid out in the Vision for Space Exploration.
The evident strain on funding in the science missions and
aeronautics budgets for NASA are indicators that we are
traveling down a tenuous path. Return to Flight and the
implementation of the Exploration Vision are a significant
financial strain on NASA, and, therefore, require other aspects
of NASA to remain relatively flat or decline over the next 5
years. It is all important.
I also believe that we will have an ongoing dialogue over
the course of the year about NASA's ability to achieve the
President's vision for space exploration. I am very interested
in discussing how NASA will preserve its ongoing programs and
how it will modernize its institutions and facilities which are
critical to NASA's success in the coming years. Again, I
believe that we can, and we have to, strike an appropriate
balance.
The Vision laid out by the President in 2004 calls for a
return to the Moon, and building upon that foundation to
eventually set foot on another planet. I am excited by the
opportunities that lay ahead with the Exploration Vision at
NASA, but I must point out that there are fiscal realities that
may affect the vision.
Dr. Griffin, I believe that this subcommittee has made
every effort to work with you, and we will continue to do that,
to provide NASA with the appropriate level of funding in an
effort to ensure that roles and missions are protected and
preserved. Along with that funding comes a fair amount of
direction, but the subcommittee has provided NASA with
reprogramming flexibility to react to those bumps in the path
that I discussed. However, in return, there is the expectation
that NASA will be a wise steward of taxpayers' dollars. I am
concerned that the financial systems for NASA have earned the
worst rating possible from the administration with little
progress toward correcting the problem over the past 3 years. I
realize that you have not been there all that time. Even more
troubling is a recent report of NASA having violated the anti-
deficiency laws. These reports come at a time when NASA is
holding an unprecedented amount of unobligated funds while
claiming to need every additional dollar in order to accomplish
the missions they have set out before them. Such reports have a
tendency to erode confidence in NASA's ability to responsibly
manage the funds that have been appropriated. Dr. Griffin, I
appreciate, as I said a minute ago, that you have only been in
your position for about 1 year, and I trust that you are
working diligently, and I want to work with you to correct
these problems, and ensure that there will be no further issues
in complying with anti-deficiency laws. In addition, I expect
that we will continue to discuss the unobligated balances that
NASA has accumulated over the years and how those best can be
utilized toward moving forward.
I look forward to hearing your insights on how NASA can do
better, your views, and the challenges ahead.
Senator Shelby. Senator Mikulski.
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER MIKULSKI OPENING REMARKS
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
again I, too, wish to welcome Dr. Griffin.
It has been a very busy and in many ways successful year
for NASA, and I believe it is today that we celebrate the 25th
anniversary of the first shuttle flight, in which we thought
the shuttle was going to do wonderful things, and it did, but
now the shuttle is getting old and we need to be able to look
ahead.
There have also been an amazing set of accomplishments in
science. Dr. Bennett, of my very own Johns Hopkins, saw the
first light, and actually almost the beginning, of the Big Bang
through a gamma ray burst. We are looking at how we can
successfully launch the mission to Pluto by a team at APL;
Cassini, the probe that gave us the best pictures on Saturn;
and of course, the Hubble telescope and many other things.
Despite what we have been able to do, and despite the
successes of NASA, it has been a difficult year for NASA. The
cost of running the space shuttle to flight has run into delays
which are absolutely crucial to ensure our number one priority,
the safety of the astronauts, but it has also increased by $2.4
billion. Hurricane Katrina caused over $600 million of damage
to two NASA centers, and hats off to how the employees saved so
much of the facility, and know even slept on floors, but
nevertheless, will be a tremendous cost to rebuild, and the
years of flat budgets have put great stress on all of NASA's
programs.
In looking at areas ahead, we know that we are facing new
external challenges; a challenge from China. We know China
wants to go to the Moon. We know that they want to be the first
to go back to the Moon. We cannot let China be the first back
to the Moon. I know we have to go to the Moon and go in a way
that we can stay there for a variety of reasons.
At the same time, the President has challenged us and
worked with us on a bipartisan basis to be competitive, to
promote innovation and discovery, to focus on education and
research, innovation-friendly government. But we are concerned
as we have responded to the call raised in the excellent report
``Gathering Storm,'' that NASA was left out of that. I felt so
strongly about that in a bipartisan meeting at the White House,
to talk with the President about how his bold vision of
returning to Mars was exactly what could inspire people,
promote the development of incredible technology and
breakthroughs that would help inspire the next generation of
scientists, engineers and technologists, but also the kinds of
new technologies that end up in the marketplace and help us be
an economic superpower.
What we have seen though is a fairly flat budget, a modest
increase, but we are deeply concerned about the consequences of
what we see here. NASA's role in promoting science is not
included in the budget in the way we had hoped. Science is cut
over $2 billion; Mars; solar system research; aeronautics
research which is cut by $100 million which is so crucial. We
need a robust science program, we do need human exploration, we
do need a crew return vehicle (CRV), but we know that we have
enormous stresses in our own appropriations.
I'm going to work with my colleague, Senator Shelby, to
find a balanced space program, to get that shuttle flying again
and fix that shuttle, so as to move on to our next generation
of science, technology, and aeronautics. But I am concerned
that we are doing too much with too little money, that we have
an aging workforce, we have aging technology, and that, quite
frankly, I believe we have to find a way to do more, and we
cannot continue to do more with less.
So we look forward to your ideas. We thank you for your
leadership and we thank you for your candor. I particularly
want to express my appreciation for the way you have handled
the question of the ability to speak your scientific views and
so on, truth through power, and so we look forward to hearing
your testimony today.
Senator Shelby. Dr. Griffin, your written testimony will be
made part of the record without objection, and you may proceed
as you wish. Welcome to the subcommittee, sir.
OPENING REMARKS OF MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, Senator Shelby and Senator
Mikulski. I am pleased to be here to discuss our fiscal year
2007 budget request and how we are carrying out our missions of
space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics
research, within the resources provided. With a 3.2 percent
increase over last year's appropriation, this budget does
represent the President's commitment to our Nation's civil
space program, and especially so in view of the many pressures
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the war on terrorism.
As we begin, I want to thank this subcommittee for its
leadership over the past year in providing emergency
supplemental funds for NASA's recovery and repair efforts after
Hurricane Katrina. We are also very appreciative of the action
taken by the Committees on Appropriations, and by the Congress
as a whole, in providing $16.5 billion in fiscal year 2006
appropriations to the agency, and essentially the level of the
President's fiscal year 2006 request before the application of
rescissions, as well as the strong endorsement of the Vision
for Space Exploration, timely development of the crew
exploration vehicle (CEV) and the crew launch vehicle (CLV),
and support for NASA's other core programs. We need the help of
this subcommittee now, and will continue to need it in the
future. Senator Shelby, I want specifically to address the
concerns you raised, because I think they are very fair.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
With regard to NASA's financial management, we delivered to
the Congress this past February an integrated cross-NASA
corrective action plan to address the findings and
recommendations to which you referred that were made by Ernst &
Young in the 2005 financial audit. Through this plan we are
working toward resolution of those audit issues by the third
quarter of this fiscal year, fiscal year 2006. NASA does not
control the opinion delivered by its auditors, but we fully
expect that resolution of the issues they raised by the third
quarter of this year will allow the auditors to perform a
complete audit of NASA's 2006 financial statements. We will
know when their opinion is released on November 15 of this
year. I could not take your concerns more seriously, nor be
more personally concerned about them myself.
ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT VIOLATIONS
You mentioned the ADA violations, Anti-Deficiency Act
violations. Two of these did occur as a result of the agency's
failure to file apportionment requests in fiscal 2004. The
first was of magnitude $1.6 billion that was obligated in 2005,
and a smaller one, $30.4 million, obligated in 2004. The funds
were not willfully or knowingly obligated or overly expended,
but that does not excuse the fact that it was done. We did
catch it ourselves, and we brought both instances to OMB's
attention. Again, that does not excuse the behavior, but we
sought to mitigate it to the maximum extent possible. We
addressed both of those issues without the need for
supplemental funds, and we have implemented corrective actions
in our financial accounting chain of command to see to it that
they do not happen again. I am certain that our auditors will
explore those issues as well.
UNOBLIGATED BALANCES
With regard to the point you made about unobligated
balances, it is true that as we sit here today we have $625
million presently unobligated. Ninety-six percent of funds have
been obligated. Of the $625 million, $108 million is for
construction, and $517 million is for nonconstruction
activities. We have definite plans for all of these funds. All
of them will be obligated, and all of the funds are required or
programs that have been approved by this Congress. I say again,
I am happy to work with your staff or with you as Members to
convince you that these statements that I am making today are
true. I have been here but a year, however, I fully accept and
in fact require ownership of these problems that you have
raised. They became my problems on April 14 of last year when
the Senate confirmed me, I do own them and we are working
toward a resolution.
In many ways, Mr. Chairman, NASA is a victim of its own
success. Our can-do attitude toward the Nation's greatest
technical challenges has left many people believing that NASA
can do anything and everything. I hate to say it, but I am here
to testify before you that NASA cannot do everything that our
many constituencies would like us to do within our proposed
$16.8 billion budget. I am truly sorry that this is so, but it
is a fact. Given this fact, I believe that the President's
fiscal year 2007 budget request before this Congress strikes a
careful, disciplined approach to meeting congressional
priorities and Presidential priorities for the Nation's civil
space program within the resources we have. NASA must go as we
can afford to pay across our entire mission portfolio of human
space flight, science, and aeronautics.
To gain a sense of perspective, I think it is useful to
recall that at the peak of the Apollo Program, NASA's budget
represented 4.4 percent of Federal outlays. Today, NASA's top
line is six-tenths of 1 percent of the Federal budget. During
Apollo, NASA funding employed over 400,000 contractors, civil
servants, technicians, scientists, and engineers across all of
its programs, and more than that. Today, NASA employs about
75,000 full-time equivalent employees throughout the aerospace
industry. NASA cannot and should not in this fiscal environment
try to do everything. We need to set priorities carefully, and
we need to execute our programs to match the resources
available with incredible schedules.
NATIONAL PRIORITIES
The national priorities that we have that have been agreed
upon by this Congress are, to fly the space shuttle as safely
as possible while using it to complete the assembly of the
International Space Station, using the minimum number of
flights necessary to do that, and to fulfill our commitments to
international partners. To conduct a space shuttle servicing
mission if technically possible to the Hubble space telescope,
pending outcome of the next Return to Flight mission. To retire
the space shuttle in 2010, and to bring on-line a new crew
exploration vehicle and crew launch vehicle not later than
2014, and possibly sooner. To develop a space shuttle derived
heavy lift launch vehicle to enable lunar missions not later
than 2020, and later missions to Mars and other destinations.
To develop a balanced program of space and Earth science, along
with aeronautics research, that appropriately leverage the new
direction of NASA's Human Space Flight Program. To pursue
appropriate commercial and international partnerships,
especially with the International Space Station.
These priorities require a careful balance of time, money,
and energy within the overall agency budget. Thus, our budget
request shifts resources to the space shuttle and the
International Space Station from both science and exploration,
to ensure that our highest priorities have the resources
necessary to accomplish them between now and 2010. NASA's
science missions remain one of our Nation's greatest
achievements, but we must defer some missions that we would
prefer to do sooner but simply cannot afford at this time. We
will continue to maintain a robust portfolio of missions and
research within the $5.33 billion science budget requested for
fiscal year 2007. NASA is listening to the priorities of the
science community in this process, and we will keep this
subcommittee informed if we believe that any adjustments in
mission or research priorities within that planned total
funding are necessary.
AERONAUTICS RESEARCH
In aeronautics research, NASA is developing a national
policy and plan in concert with the White House, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, and other Federal agencies,
including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), a policy which dedicates us to
the mastery and intellectual stewardship of the core
competencies of aeronautics in all of its flight regimes. This
plan will focus our research efforts on those areas appropriate
to NASA's unique capabilities. We hope to provide this plan
which will inform future budget resource decisions to the
Congress by December as required in our authorization act.
BALANCING THE BUDGET
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, NASA's fiscal
year 2007 budget request represents a careful balance,
conscientiously apportioned. We will need your help to maintain
that balance. As this subcommittee proceeds to mark up our
appropriation for fiscal year 2007, I most strongly urge you to
avoid the temptation to rob Peter to pay Paul by taking funds
from NASA's replacements for the space shuttle, the CEV and
CLV, to pay for science missions beyond the $5.33 billion
requested. Doing so will delay the CEV beyond 2014, and will
exacerbate problems in safety, workforce, and, frankly,
perceptions of a loss of U.S. leadership in space during this
gap in human space flight.
Likewise, it is important to fly out and retire the space
shuttle in a safe and orderly manner. The next several years
are critical as we effect this transition from the space
shuttle to the crew exploration vehicle. Indeed, this is NASA's
greatest management challenge, and we will need your help to
meet it.
The Space Shuttle Program is dealing with many technical
issues today, not least of which is fixing the external tank
foam shedding problems. I believe we have a grasp on those
issues, and I invite Members and staff of this subcommittee to
their next launch which will be space shuttle Discovery STS-
121. The launch window opens in July, and we are making
preparations for it, but we will fly only when we are ready.
I must also ask your help in considering limits to
redirection of funds to pay for congressional interest items.
Back in fiscal 1997, specific direction for NASA constituted
only $74 million for six specific projects. In fiscal year
2006, NASA was earmarked at a total of $568.5 million for 198
projects and programmatic increases. We and I fully acknowledge
the prerogative of the Congress to direct and appropriate
funds, but we desperately need your help and that of your staff
to minimize impact on our proposed programs and activities. We
simply cannot afford everything that everyone would like us to
do.
EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS
We are also asking for this subcommittee's help in
providing some flexibility to use as much as $60 million in
emergency supplemental funds to reimburse our space shuttle and
space station programs for the funds used last fall to pay for
immediate Hurricane Katrina damage recovery. We are still
refining estimates of the total cost for the repair,
refurbishment, and hardening of our facilities at Michoud
assembly facility and the Stennis Space Center, but our most
recent estimate is a little bit less than $500 million. As you
consider the pending emergency supplemental appropriations
bill, I ask that you favorably consider this legislative
provision enabling flexibility for NASA. As we continue to
refine our total estimates for Katrina recovery, we will keep
the subcommittee fully informed as to how we would use this
flexibility. I look forward to working with you to address this
matter, and I think at this point it is good to thank the
subcommittee for the help you have provided within the last two
hurricane seasons which have been especially tough on NASA's
facilities in Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. I regret to
say that I will probably be counting on your help in the
future.
HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
Space flight remains a dangerous endeavor. Following the
loss of space shuttle Columbia, the Nation's leadership in both
the White House and the Congress recognized that the broader
goals of human space flight must be worth the cost and risk
involved. The Vision for Space Exploration articulates just
such goals, goals which are worthy of pursuit by a great
nation. Our purpose is not to impress others, or merely even to
explore the Moon and Mars, but, rather, to advance U.S.
scientific, security, and economic interests through leadership
in the grandest expression of human imagination of which we can
conceive. Put simply, human space flight is today one of those
strategic capabilities that define a nation as a superpower.
Other nations and societies aspire to this capability and have
achieved it, or will. The United States once surpassing command
of this arena has vanished, but international cooperation
leavened with a healthy dose of competition is what makes the
United States the greatest country in the world. The pursuit of
this vision requires technical excellence, hard work,
sacrifice, and the necessary resources, but we also need
leadership and we need the help of this Congress.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman and ranking member Mikulski, we have a long
journey ahead of us. We need your help. I look forward to
working with you and the members of the committee. Thank you.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael D. Griffin
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this
opportunity to appear today to discuss NASA's plans as represented in
the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for NASA. I will
outline the highlights of our budget request and discuss the strategic
direction for NASA in implementing the priorities of the President and
Congress within the resources provided. The President's fiscal year
2007 budget request for NASA of $16,792 million demonstrates his
commitment to the Vision for Space Exploration and our Nation's
commitment to our partners on the International Space Station. The
fiscal year 2007 budget request is a 3.2 percent increase above NASA's
fiscal year 2006 appropriation, not including the $349.8 million
emergency supplemental for NASA's recovery and restoration efforts
following Hurricane Katrina. However, let me put NASA's budget into
perspective. NASA's budget is roughly 0.7 percent of the overall
Federal budget. This is a prudent investment to extend the frontiers of
space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. With
it, we enhance American leadership, our safety and security, and our
global economic competitiveness through the technological innovations
stemming from our space and aeronautics research programs. Our Nation
can afford this investment in NASA.
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush announced the Vision
for Space Exploration to advance U.S. scientific, security, and
economic interests through a robust space exploration program. NASA is
very appreciative of the action by the Committees on Appropriations and
Congress in providing regular fiscal year 2006 appropriations for the
Agency totaling $16,456.8 million--essentially the level of the
President's fiscal year 2006 request before application of
rescissions--including a strong endorsement for the Vision for Space
Exploration, timely development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV)
and Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and support for NASA's other core
programs. NASA is also grateful to the Congress for endorsing this
Vision last December in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law
109-155) and providing guidance and expectations for us in carrying out
the Agency's missions of space exploration, scientific discovery, and
aeronautics research. To that end, NASA is implementing the priorities
of the President and Congress within the resources available. NASA
carries out its missions with a ``go as you can afford to pay''
approach where we assume NASA's top line budget will grow at the
moderate rate laid out in the President's 2007 budget request. NASA's
Strategic Plan and fiscal year 2007 Congressional Budget Justification,
provided to the Congress in February, reflect those priorities and
describe how NASA is implementing those policies into practice by
describing our programs, projected resources, and workforce needs.
As part of his fiscal year 2007 budget request to Congress, the
President proposed the American Competitiveness Initiative, or ACI, to
encourage American innovation and strengthen our Nation's ability to
compete in the global economy. Many have asked why NASA is not a part
of the ACI. My response is that it is the mission of NASA to pioneer
the future of space exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics
research, while the ACI is focused on bolstering the Nation's economic
competitiveness in areas such as information technology and
nanotechnology. NASA contributes to the Nation's competitiveness
through all of the cutting-edge exploration, science, and aeronautics
investments accomplished by our Mission Directorates. As part of the
President's Vision for Space Exploration, NASA expects to spawn entire
new industries in this Nation. Furthermore, NASA's education and
training initiatives are designed to enhance math and science
education, as well as to provide research opportunities at the
university level. We are currently reviewing our portfolio of education
programs to assess opportunities for potential collaboration at the
invitation of the Department of Education, National Science Foundation,
and other Federal agencies. NASA can offer opportunities and
inspiration to students as no one else can. For example, a University
of Colorado-Boulder student-built experiment on the New Horizons
mission is currently being activated and will be operated by university
students all the way to Pluto and beyond.
IMPLEMENTING THE VISION
Later this year, NASA will continue the assembly of the
International Space Station (ISS) with the minimum number of Space
Shuttle flights necessary to fulfill our commitments to our
international partners before the Space Shuttle's retirement in 2010.
The commitment of resources in the President's budget has shown our
international partners that NASA and the United States are good
partners through thick and thin and this commitment will encourage them
to team with us in future endeavors of space exploration and scientific
discovery. NASA has consulted with our international partners on the
configuration of the ISS, and is working closely with them to determine
the crew size and logistics necessary during this assembly period as
well as the period following the retirement of the Space Shuttle. The
heads of space agencies from Canada, Europe, Japan, Russia and the
United States met at Kennedy Space Center on March 2, 2006, to review
ISS cooperation and endorse a revision to the ISS configuration and
assembly sequence. The partners reaffirmed their agencies' commitment
to meet their mutual obligations, to implement six person crew
operations in 2009, and to conduct an adequate number of Space Shuttle
flights to complete the assembly of ISS by the end of the decade. The
partners also affirmed their plans to use a combination of
transportation systems provided by Europe, Japan, Russia, and the
United States in order to complete ISS assembly in a timeframe that
meets the needs of the partners and to ensure full utilization of the
unique capabilities of the ISS throughout its lifetime. The fiscal year
2007 budget request provides the necessary resources to purchase Soyuz
crew transport and rescue for U.S. astronauts as well as needed
Progress vehicle logistics support for the ISS from the Russian Federal
Space Agency. Likewise, the fiscal year 2007 budget request provides
necessary funds for U.S. commercial industry to demonstrate the
capability to deliver cargo and/or crew to the ISS. If such cost-
effective commercial services are successfully demonstrated, NASA will
welcome and use them.
The next return to flight test mission, STS-121 commanded by
Colonel Steve Lindsey, will confirm that we can safely return the Space
Shuttle to its primary task of assembling the ISS. We have continued to
reduce the risk associated with the release of foam debris from the
external tank by eliminating the liquid hydrogen and the liquid oxygen
protuberance air load ramps. We are now working toward a July launch,
which is the next available lighted launch window as mandated for STS-
121. The window is open from July 1 through July 19. NASA will launch
when ready. Pending the results of this test flight, I plan to convene
my senior management team for space operations as well as my Chief,
Safety and Mission Assurance and my Chief Engineer in order to
determine whether the Space Shuttle can safely conduct a fifth
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope in 2007-08. NASA's
fiscal year 2007 budget provides the necessary resources to conduct
this mission.
In previous budget requests, NASA reported only placeholder budget
estimates for the Space Shuttle for fiscal year 2008-2010. The Agency's
management focus on return to flight efforts of the Space Shuttle
resulted in NASA deferring this analysis until the fiscal year 2007
budget. As I testified before Congress last year, NASA's estimates of
the budget shortfall required to safely fly out the Space Shuttle with
the minimum number of flights necessary to complete ISS assembly and
meet our international partner commitments were $3-$5 billion. With the
fiscal year 2007 budget runout, NASA has added $2.4 billion to the
Space Shuttle program and almost $1.5 billion to the International
Space Station in fiscal year 2008-2010 compared to the fiscal year 2006
budget runout. There is no ``new money'' for NASA's top line budget
within the budget projections available given our Nation's other
pressing issues, so, working with the White House, NASA provided
sufficient funds for the Space Shuttle and ISS programs to carry out
their missions by redirecting funds from the Science and Exploration
budgets.
There are several strategic implications behind this decision.
Foremost among them is that our Nation will keep its commitment to our
international partners on the ISS. Thus, with limited resources, we
made some difficult decisions. Leadership means setting priorities of
time, energy, and resources, and I have tried to make these decisions
with the best available facts and analysis. The plain fact is that NASA
simply cannot afford to do everything that our many constituencies
would like the Agency to do. We must set priorities, and we must adjust
our spending to match those priorities. NASA needed to reallocate
budgeted funds from the Science and Exploration budget projections for
fiscal year 2007-2011 in order to ensure that enough funds were
available to properly support the Space Shuttle and the ISS. Thus, NASA
cannot afford the costs of starting some new science missions at this
time. It is important to know that NASA is simply delaying missions,
not abandoning them. With the limited resources available, I believe
that fulfilling our commitments on the International Space Station and
bringing the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) online in a timely manner,
not later than 2014 and possibly much sooner, is a higher priority than
these science missions during this period.
There are several reasons not to delay the CEV farther. First and
foremost is increased risk to the Vision due to an extended gap in our
Nation's ability to launch humans into space after we retire the Space
Shuttle in 2010. I experienced first-hand the stagnancy in the
aerospace industry that existed during the gap in human spaceflight
between the end of the Apollo program and the first flight of the Space
Shuttle in 1981, and I know that our Nation's space program suffered
greatly from the unintended loss of critical expertise. Our Nation's
space industrial base withered. A longer gap in U.S. human spaceflight
capabilities will increase risk and overall costs and lead to even more
delays in pursuing the Nation's vision. Equally important, the United
States may risk a perceived, if not a real loss of leadership in space
exploration, if we are unable for an extended period to launch our
astronauts into space when other nations are establishing or building
on their own abilities to do so. An extended gap in U.S. human
spaceflight capabilities also increases our risk posture to adequately
maintain and utilize the ISS and, unless a commercial capability arises
to transport our astronauts, NASA would continue to be reliant on the
Russian Soyuz.
Thus, further delays in the CEV are strategically more damaging to
our Nation's space program than delays to these other science missions.
I stand by my decision regarding how to implement the priorities of the
President and Congress within the resources provided, and I will work
closely with our stakeholders in Congress and the scientific community
to make sure they understand my rationale. Some of our stakeholders
will not agree with my position, but it is important for everyone to
understand the rationale. These are difficult decisions, but we must
balance the competing priorities for our Nation's civil space and
aeronautics research endeavors with the limited resources available.
If the funds budgeted for Exploration Systems were to be used to
provide additional funds for Science missions, additional Aeronautics
Research, or other Congressionally-directed items, I must advise the
Congress that such redirection of already-budgeted funds will directly
impact NASA's ability to effectively and efficiently transition the
workforce and capabilities from the Space Shuttle to the new CEV
systems. Funds available to carry out this transition are already lean,
with little management reserve or margin for error. This transition
from the Space Shuttle to the CEV is NASA's greatest management
challenge over the next several years, and we will need everyone's help
within NASA, industry, and our stakeholders to make the transition
successful.
Beyond fulfilling our existing commitment, NASA's fiscal year 2007
budget provides the necessary resources to carry out the next steps of
the Vision for Space Exploration. The fiscal year 2007 budget provides
$3,978 million for Exploration Systems. Last summer, NASA defined the
architecture for the exploration systems that will be necessary in
carrying forth that Vision, and we notified the Congress of NASA's need
to curtail several research and technology activities not directly
contributing to the near-term priorities of timely development of the
CEV and Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) based on the results of that
exploration architecture study and the limited funds available. I want
to thank the Congress for its endorsement of the general architecture
plans in the fiscal year 2006 Appropriations Act for NASA (Public Law
109-108) as well as the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-
155).
The fiscal year 2007 budget request is sufficient to bring the CEV
online no later than 2014, and potentially much sooner. Given the
analysis I have today and the need to balance budgets with proposed
development work for the CEV and launch vehicles along with the cost
estimates for that work, I cannot be more specific for our stakeholders
in the White House and Congress at this time about the specific point
between 2010 and 2014 when NASA will be able to bring the CEV online.
NASA requested industry proposals for the CEV, and we have considerable
incentives for an industry bidder to propose a planned development for
the CEV as close to 2010 as possible. NASA has begun to evaluate those
industry proposals, with a planned contract award in late summer/early
fall 2006. NASA plans to select one industry contractor team for the
design and development of the CEV. Concurrently, NASA will refine its
independent cost estimates for the CEV and launch systems as well as
find cost savings through workforce synergies and contract efficiencies
between the Space Shuttle and CEV launch systems within the budget
profile projected in fiscal year 2007. We believe we can find synergies
and contract efficiencies by sharing or transferring subsystems,
personnel, resources, and infrastructure between the Space Shuttle
propulsion elements and the CEV, CLV, and Heavy-Lift Launch Vehicle. I
believe that with the fiscal year 2007 budget, NASA and industry have a
real opportunity to make the CEV operational sooner than 2014. I should
be able to report a more definitive date for bringing the CEV online by
the time we award the CEV contract. Until then, NASA is in the midst of
source selection for the CEV procurement, and we are limited in our
ability to provide information in this competitive environment
involving a multi-billion dollar procurement.
For the CLV, NASA has directed two industry teams to begin initial
development of the vehicle's propulsion systems, and to develop designs
for the CLV upper stage. The Agency also plans to award design,
development, test, and evaluation contracts later this year. NASA is
planning a systems requirements review for this project in the fall
with a preliminary design review in 2008 in order for this new launch
vehicle to be ready for when the CEV comes on-line.
While NASA needed to significantly curtail projected funding for
biological and physical sciences research on the ISS as well as various
research and technology projects in order to fund development for the
CEV, the U.S. segment of the ISS was designated a National Laboratory
in the NASA Authorization Act. Thus, NASA is seeking partnerships with
other government agencies like the National Science Foundation,
Department of Defense, National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department
of Energy, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology as
well as the commercial sector to conduct research onboard the ISS.
However, the research utilization of the ISS is impacted due to limited
cargo and crew transportation. For this reason, NASA's need for
investment to spur a commercial cargo and/or crew transportation
service is even more compelling.
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
In 2005, NASA's science missions enjoyed a year of significant
achievements. Deep Impact traveled 268 million miles to meet comet
Tempel 1, sending its impactor to collide with the comet and providing
researchers with the best-ever comet data and images. The Mars twin
rovers continue studying the harsh Martian environment, well beyond
their expected mission life. Cassini may have found evidence of liquid
water erupting from below the surface of Saturn's moon Enceladus. The
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter successfully launched and went into orbit
around Mars, to help us better understand the history of water on Mars.
The Voyager 1 spacecraft entered the vast, turbulent expanse of the
heliosheath, 8.7 billion miles from the Sun, where no human-made object
has traveled before. The Hubble Space Telescope continues its
successful mission of discovery and exploration. Among its many
achievements was the discovery that Pluto may have three moons,
offering more insights into the nature and evolution of the Pluto
system and Kuiper Belt. Through coordination of observations from
several ground-based telescopes and NASA's Swift and other satellites,
scientists solved the 35-year old mystery of the origin of powerful,
split-second flashes of light called gamma-ray bursts. The Tropical
Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) provided data to aid our
understanding of the changes inside a hurricane, helping scientists re-
create storms on computer forecast models, which can assist in the
forecasting of future tropical cyclone transformations. On January 19,
2006, we successfully launched the New Horizons Mission, beginning its
nine year journey to Pluto for scientific discovery. In the near
future, we will launch CALIPSO (Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared
Pathfinder Satellite Observations) and Cloudsat from Vandenberg Air
Force Base. Together, they will provide new perspectives on Earth's
clouds and aerosols, answering questions about how they form, evolve,
and affect water supply, climate, weather, and air quality. Truly, this
has been a successful year of science achievements--a trend I expect to
continue.
NASA's fiscal year 2007 budget request provides $5,330 million for
the Agency's Science portfolio to explore the universe, solar system,
and Earth. My decision to curtail the rate of growth for NASA's Science
missions is not intended in any way to demonstrate any lack of respect
for the work done by NASA Science. On the contrary, NASA's science
missions remain one of the nation's crowning achievements, and NASA is
a world leader with 54 satellites and payloads currently operating in
concert with the science community and our international partners. My
decision to slow the rate of growth for NASA's Science missions is
simply a matter of how the Agency will use the available resources
within the overall NASA portfolio. In fact, the Agency's Science budget
has grown much faster than NASA's total budget since fiscal year 1993.
In 1992, the Science budget represented only 24 percent of the overall
NASA budget while it represents 32 percent of the Agency's budget in
fiscal year 2007. NASA's Science budget is moderated to 1.5 percent
growth in the fiscal year 2007 budget request compared with the amount
appropriated for NASA in fiscal year 2006 (in accordance with NASA's
Initial Operating Plan provided to the Committee) and then 1 percent
per year thereafter through fiscal year 2011.
In the fiscal year 2007 budget, there are some additional budget
shifts within the Science portfolio to rebalance the program to better
reflect our original science priorities and consistent with the fiscal
year 2006 Budget Amendment. Within the Science budget, the Solar System
Exploration budget provides $1,610 million to fund missions to all
solar system bodies and to maintain the Deep Space Network. Mars
exploration is kept at roughly its current level of funding which
allows missions every 26 months when the Earth and Mars are in
planetary alignment. Mars will be the most thoroughly studied planet
besides our own Earth. NASA continues a series of openly competed
missions for Discovery, New Frontiers, and Scout missions to various
planetary bodies in the solar system. Juno, a competitively-selected
mission to study Jupiter, is slated to be the next New Frontiers
mission, following the New Horizons mission on its way to Pluto after
its successful launch in January.
After extensive reviews, NASA has extended the mission operating
life of several Earth Science missions including TRMM and Terra,
Heliophysics missions such as both Voyager spacecraft, and Astrophysics
missions including Chandra and the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy
Probe.
AERONAUTICS RESEARCH
NASA's fiscal year 2007 request for the Aeronautics Research
Mission Directorate is $724 million. Proper stewardship of this funding
requires a coherent strategic vision for aeronautics research, which we
are working to develop. While I am concerned that our Nation's aviation
industry not lose market share to global competitors, NASA's research
must benefit the American public by supporting a broad base of
aeronautics research. NASA's aeronautics research cannot and will not
directly subsidize work to specific corporate interests. There are
fundamental questions in aeronautics research needing to be answered,
and NASA will focus its aeronautics research on those issues. NASA will
take responsibility for the intellectual stewardship of the core
competencies of aeronautics for the Nation in all flight regimes, from
subsonic through hypersonic flight. We will also conduct the
fundamental research that is needed to meet the substantial challenges
of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS), and we intend
to work closely with our agency partners in the Joint Planning and
Development Office (JPDO).
Across our aeronautics portfolio, NASA is taking a long-term,
strategic approach to our research plans to ensure that we pursue the
cutting-edge across the breadth of aeronautics disciplines that will be
required to support revolutionary capabilities in both air vehicles and
the airspace in which they fly. NASA's commitment to technical
excellence requires a commitment to rigor and discipline and will not
focus on demonstrations that lack the traceability and scalability
required for true scientific and engineering advancement. Hence, we are
turning away from the four-demo approach proposed last year under the
Vehicle Systems Program. Instead, our Fundamental Aeronautics Program
will focus on fundamental research that addresses aeronautics
challenges in areas such as aerothermodynamics, acoustics, propulsion,
materials and structures, computational fluid dynamics, and
experimental measurement techniques. The Fundamental Aeronautics
Program will generate data, knowledge, and design tools that will be
applicable across a broad range of air vehicles in subsonic (both fixed
and rotary wing), supersonic, and hypersonic flight.
In the Aviation Safety Program, NASA is developing strategic
research plans, ensuring that the research conducted will lead to
capabilities and technologies for improving safety consistent with the
revolutionary changes anticipated in air vehicles foreseen in the
future. The focus will be vehicle-centric, with areas of research that
include vehicle health management, resilient aircraft control, aging
and durability challenges, and advanced flight deck technologies.
In the Airspace Systems Program, NASA will conduct the fundamental
research required to bring about the revolutionary capabilities
articulated in the JPDO's vision for the NGATS. Our research will focus
on the development of future concepts, capabilities, and technologies
that will enable major measurable increases in air traffic management
effectiveness, flexibility, and efficiency.
In addition to the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate's three
research programs, NASA is committed to preserving as national assets
those aeronautics test facilities which are deemed mission critical and
necessary to meet the needs and requirements of the Agency and the
Nation. NASA has established the Aeronautics Test Program (ATP), a
component of the Shared Capability Assets Program (SCAP), as a long-
term, funded commitment by NASA to retain and invest in test
capabilities that are considered important to the Agency and the
Nation. ATP's purpose is to ensure the strategic availability of the
requisite, critical suite of wind tunnel and ground test facilities
which are necessary to meet immediate and future National requirements.
As part of our overall portfolio, NASA program managers and
researchers will work closely and constructively with industry,
academia, and other Government entities to enhance our Nation's
aeronautics capability. In this vein, as a principal member of the
interagency JPDO, NASA has established investment priorities that
directly address the research and development needs of the NGATS which
will enable major increases in the capacity and mobility of the U.S.
Air Transportation System. NASA also plans to collaborate closely with
industry and academia through the use of competitive research awards
and Space Act agreements on prospective research work in line with the
critical thrust areas of the Aeronautics program that will enable
numerous commercial aviation and scientific applications. Our goal is
to focus our total research investments on fundamental aeronautics
questions that need to be answered, and that will benefit the broader
community of academia, industry, and Government researchers. We will
transition the achievements from NASA's Aeronautics research and
technology for use by both Government and industry. Additionally, and
in line with the refocused program's priorities, NASA will leave to
others work more appropriately performed or funded by other Agencies or
the private sectors.
In accordance with the fiscal year 2006 Science, State, Justice,
Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 109-108),
NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy have been jointly
developing a National Aeronautics Research and Development Policy which
will establish a long term policy and guidance for future aeronautics
research and development activities. This policy will establish the
appropriate role for Federal investment in U.S. aeronautics research:
near- and far-term, high-priority objectives; roles and
responsibilities of the multiple agencies involved; and, guidance on
related infrastructure and workforce challenges.
CROSS-AGENCY SUPPORT PROGRAMS
In the fiscal year 2007 budget, NASA proposes a new direct budget
category for programs that cut across NASA's portfolio of space
exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research. These
Cross-Agency Support Programs include: NASA's Education programs funded
at $153.3 million; Advanced Business Systems, or more commonly known as
the Integrated Enterprise Management program, is called out as a
separate program rather than being budgeted from within Corporate and
Center General and Administrative accounts and is funded at $108.2
million; NASA's Innovative Partnership Program, including Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology
Transfer (STTR), has been transferred from Exploration Systems so that
these partnerships may better address Agency-wide needs and is funded
at $197.9 million. Also, the Shared Capabilities Assets Program is
funded at $32.2 million (with additional funding located in the Mission
Directorates) and will ensure that NASA's unique facilities (e.g., wind
tunnels, rocket engine test stands, high-end computing, thermal vacuum
chambers, and other capital assets) are adequately managed with agency-
level decision-making to address NASA's and the Nation's needs.
NASA's Education budget request sustains our commitment to
excellence in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM)
education to ensure that the next generation of Americans can accept
the full measure of their roles and responsibilities in shaping the
future and meeting the workforce needs to implement the Vision for
Space Exploration. NASA will continue to provide innovative programs
that use STEM resources (NASA content, people and facilities) to
inspire the next generation of explorers and innovators. I have
outlined three primary goals for our education investments: (1)
strengthening NASA and the nation's future workforce; (2) attracting
and retaining students in the STEM pipeline; and, (3) engaging
Americans in NASA's mission through partnerships and alliances. The
greatest contribution that NASA makes in educating the next generation
of Americans is providing worthy endeavors for which students will be
inspired to study difficult subjects like math, science, and
engineering because they too share the dream of exploring the cosmos.
These students are our future workforce. Our education investment
portfolio is directly linked to our overall workforce strategy.
NASA WORKFORCE STRATEGY
The Vision for Space Exploration is a unique endeavor that will
last many generations. The NASA management team has been working to
build NASA as an institution having ten healthy field Centers known for
technical excellence. We continue to define program management and
research roles and responsibilities for each Center in order to carry
out NASA's missions of space exploration, scientific discovery, and
aeronautics research. All of our centers must contribute to NASA's
primary missions. We are beginning the process of assigning specific
research programs and projects to appropriate NASA Centers. We are not
done, but we are taking the necessary steps to make it happen.
We have many challenges in the Agency, but none more important than
the technical excellence of NASA's workforce. Likewise, we are
beginning to address the problems posed by the aging of NASA's
facilities and physical assets. The overall objective is to transform
the composition of NASA's workforce so that it remains viable for the
long-term goals of NASA's missions. We have a lot of work cut out for
us in the coming months and year ahead in assigning these program
responsibilities and re-building the Agency's technical competence in
performing cutting-edge work. NASA has been addressing the challenge of
mitigating the number of civil service employees in the Agency that are
not currently assigned or supporting NASA programs (the so-called
``uncovered capacity'') through a number of means, which were addressed
in a draft report, shared with the Subcommittee in February in
compliance with the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The final workforce
report, reflecting input from our unions, was provided to the
Subcommittee earlier this month. NASA will conduct a reduction in force
of our civil servants only as an action of last resort consistent with
our statutory constraints. Instead, NASA is focusing its efforts to
solve its uncovered capacity workforce problems through a number of
other actions, including the assignment of new projects to research
Centers that will strengthen their base of in-house work, the Shared
Capability Assets Program that should stabilize the skills base
necessary for a certain specialized workforce; the movement of certain
research and technology development projects from certain centers not
suffering from uncovered capacity problems to centers that are;
retraining efforts at field centers so that the technical workforce can
develop new skills; and the pursuit of reimbursable work for projects
and research to support other government agencies and the private
sector through Space Act Agreements.
NASA'S FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Earlier this month, NASA notified the Committee that it had two
violations of the Antideficiency Act. The violations resulted from the
Agency's failure to request from the Office of Management and Budget
timely reapportionment of Congressionally-approved fiscal year 2004
funds and timely apportionments of unobligated balances carried over
from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005. The Agency has corrected the
errors without the need for additional appropriations. The Agency has
also identified the root cause of these errors and has addressed them
through its aggressive staff training and process improvements.
NASA has continued to make progress in addressing its other
financial management and reporting challenges. The Office of Management
and Budget has recently provided feedback to NASA affirming the
Agency's progress. The Agency finalized a Corrective Action Plan
addressing financial weaknesses identified in NASA's 2005 financial
audit. The plan was delivered to the Congress, specifically at the
request of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics of the Committee
on Science and the Subcommittee on Government Management, Finance and
Accountability of the Committee on Government Reform, on February 15,
2006. It incorporates the expert advice of NASA's Inspector General. In
addition, we have reviewed the plan with the Office of Management and
Budget. This Corrective Action Plan provides an integrated, cross-NASA
approach to resolving the Agency's outstanding deficiencies.
Implementation of these corrective actions is reviewed regularly by the
NASA Deputy Administrator. While these corrective actions will require
some time to implement, NASA remains committed to improving its
financial management and reporting.
IMPACT OF EARMARKS ON NASA'S MISSION
NASA pioneers the future in space exploration, scientific discovery
and aeronautics research. In order to carry out this mission, NASA
awards peer-reviewed science grants and conducts competitively-selected
procurements to select research and development projects to benefit the
public based on the priorities of the Congress, President, and
scientific community. NASA is implementing these priorities within the
resources provided. NASA's fiscal year 2006 appropriation totals
$16.623 billion, including $349.8 million in emergency supplemental
appropriations for Hurricane Katrina recovery at NASA facilities in
Louisiana and Mississippi. Within this fiscal year 2006 appropriation
is a total of $568.5 million in directed funding for 198 discrete site-
specific and programmatic Congressional interest items, a record high
in both dollar amount and number of individual items. These
Congressional interest items are offset by reductions within NASA's
budget, to ongoing and planned NASA programs. Earmarks have increased
by a factor of more than 30 in number and almost 8 in dollar value
since fiscal year 1997, when NASA was earmarked $74 million, for 6
discrete items. The growth of these Congressional directions is eroding
NASA's ability to carry out its mission of space exploration and peer-
reviewed scientific discovery.
In formulating our budget, NASA prioritizes activities to achieve
an integrated package of programs and projects to best achieve the
priorities that have been provided us by both the President and the
Congress. The redirection of funding erodes the integrity of our plans,
has resulted in delays and/or cancellation of planned activities, and
may conflict with timely development of the CEV. In fiscal year 2006,
as a result of earmarks, NASA had to redirect a significant portion of
many planned budgets. Fully 50 percent of the planned Education program
required redirection, 16 percent of the Innovative Partnerships
Program, 5 percent of the Exploration Systems budget, and 4 percent of
the Science budget. Further, the scientific community bases its
research priorities on a peer-review process. Congressional site-
specific earmarks circumvent this process for setting research
priorities within the science community and erode the integrity of that
process. Site specific earmarks to institutions outside of NASA
exacerbate the problems of NASA's ``uncovered capacity'' workforce,
where NASA civil servant scientists and engineers do not have funds for
their own research and development projects. As stated in the
President's ACI, ``The rapidly growing level of legislatively directed
research funds undermines America's research productivity.'' NASA seeks
the assistance of this Committee and Congress in reducing earmarks in
the fiscal year 2007 budget process.
NASA'S NEXT STEPS
For the last three decades, NASA and the Nation's human spaceflight
program have been focused on the development and operation of the Space
Shuttle and the ISS. In its final report, the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board (CAIB) was very forthright in its judgment that
these goals are too limited to justify the expense, difficulty, and
danger inherent to manned spaceflight, given the limitations of today's
technology. The CAIB was equally forthright in calling for a national
consensus in the establishment of a program having broader strategic
goals. The Vision for Space Exploration is that endeavor. The Congress
has endorsed it, and NASA is working to implement it. But to effect
these changes, NASA must engage in a major transformation--taking the
capabilities we have throughout the Agency and restructuring them to
achieve a set of goals for the 21st Century that we have outlined
earlier this month in our 2006 NASA Strategic Plan. This is an enormous
challenge, but we have begun to transform our entire organization to
foster these changes and to enhance a positive, mission-driven culture.
The CAIB was also clear in its assessment that the lack of open
communication on technical and programmatic matters was a direct cause
of the loss of Columbia. We have understood and embraced this
assessment, and are absolutely and completely committed to creating an
environment of openness and free-flowing communication. However, NASA
still has to make a number of improvements in its internal
communications as well as how we communicate externally to our
stakeholders, the scientific community, and the public. NASA is making
a concerted effort to address all problems in this area.
For America to continue to be preeminent among nations, it is
necessary for us also to lead in space exploration, scientific
discovery, and aeronautics research. It is equally true that great
nations need allies and partners. The spirit of innovation and the
muscle of government and industry are needed to turn the Nation's
Vision for Space Exploration into reality. These journeys to the ISS,
the Moon, Mars, or even Pluto are the most difficult things our nation
does. June Scobee Rodgers, the widow of Dick Scobee, Commander of the
Space Shuttle Challenger on that ill-fated day twenty years ago,
recently noted, ``Without risk there's no discovery, there's no new
knowledge, there's no bold adventure . . . the greatest risk is to take
no risk.'' We must continue our journey. America, through NASA, leads
the way.
INTERNAL WEAKNESSES IN INTERNAL CONTROLS
Senator Shelby. Can you be a little more specific on
addressing the material weaknesses in internal controls that
have been reported for several years?
Dr. Griffin. I can be.
Senator Shelby. Could you do that for the record?
Dr. Griffin. I will do that for the record.
[The information follows:]
Internal Weaknesses in Internal Controls
NASA's independent financial auditors identified three
material weaknesses and one reportable condition through its
fiscal year 2005 financial audit. The weaknesses are repeat
findings from prior financial audits. NASA submitted a
Corrective Action Plan in February 2006 to Congress, OMB and
NASA's Office of Inspector General that addresses each of the
recommendations made by the independent financial auditors.
NASA has been executing this plan throughout fiscal year 2006.
For your convenience, we have attached NASA's Financial
Management Corrective Action Plan, which provides a complete
list of in-process actions to address each material weakness.
ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT VIOLATIONS PREVENTIVE STEPS
Senator Shelby. And the next question, what steps have you
taken to prevent this type of ADA violation from occurring
again? Do you want to do that for the record?
Dr. Griffin. We will do it for the record to get the
details right and proper.
Senator Shelby. That will be fine.
[The information follows:]
ADA Violations Preventive Steps
NASA agrees with each of the OIG's specific recommendations:
--OIG Recommendation #1.--We recommend that the Administrator report
the ADA violations for the funds carried over from fiscal year
2004 to fiscal year 2005 for each affected account and for the
$30,413,590 to the President of the United Statues through the
OMB Director, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
President of the Senate, and the Comptroller General of the
Government Accountability Office, as required by the ADA and by
OMB Circular A-11, section 145.7
--OIG Recommendation #2.--We recommend that the Administrator request
a comprehensive demonstration by the OCFO that the
appropriations available to be spent in fiscal year 2006 can be
traced from appropriation to apportionments to allotments to
commitments and to obligations to help ensure that NASA is not
violating the ADA for fiscal year 2006
In addition to accepting and acting upon NASA's OIG two specific
recommendations, NASA has implemented specific correction actions in
the OCFO. These corrective actions include:
--Certification of reconciliations by responsible financial
management personnel. Both the Directors of Accounting and
Budgeting reconcile NASA appropriations to OMB apportionments.
They jointly certify apportionment requests to OMB. This
ensures that the operations of each organization, the budget
and execution of the budget, are appropriately reflected in
NASA financial systems. In addition, a manual of all related
apportionment transactions is maintained;
--Met with the NASA OIG to demonstrate that the core financial system
has effective system controls that prevent obligations from
exceeding apportionment control totals;
--Conducted Appropriations Law training for 30 staff in January 2006,
and 8 in March 2006;
--Conducted OMB Circular A-11 training for 24 staff in February 2006.
An additional course is currently being scheduled;
--Increased the staff size in the Funds Distribution branch from 7 to
14; and
--Documenting enhanced internal controls, to include: Logging and
tracking of all OMB apportionment requests and approvals; and
reconciliation of OMB apportionments to Congressionally
approved Operating Plans to the funds loaded into the Agency's
centralized financial system.
Dr. Griffin. But, basically, we have put additional cross-
checks in. We are working on training staff, and we have put
additional cross-checks into the system so that it, frankly,
does not happen again.
Senator Shelby. We think that that is important, but I want
to say again, Dr. Griffin, you may have inherited a lot of
this, and you are strong to say it is your deal now, and it was
not always your deal, but it does have to be addressed, as you
know.
Dr. Griffin. I thank you for that observation, Senator. You
hired me to fix the problems, and we will fix them.
INTEGRATED ENTERPRISE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Senator Shelby. What is NASA's current estimated cost to
develop, implement, and maintain the Integrated Enterprise
Management Program including those costs incurred to resolve
data integrity issues resulting from the initial implementation
of the core financial system?
Dr. Griffin. Sir, again, I do not have those figures.
Senator Shelby. Will you do that for the record?
Dr. Griffin. I will be happy to provide that for the
record. We do have that data. I just don't have it right here.
[The information follows:]
Integrated Enterprise Management Program
The development and implementation costs for NASA's
Integrated Enterprise Management Program, including all the
hardware, software, civil service labor, contractor labor,
travel, and overhead costs associated with re-engineering
business processes and implementing business systems for human
capital management, financial management, asset management, and
procurement and contract management are estimated at $842
million for the development years 2000 through 2011, consistent
with the fiscal year 2007 President's budget request.
Of this total development estimate, $82.6 million is being
expended to update NASA's financial system, which, among other
benefits, helps resolve data integrity issues identified with
the initial core financial system implementation. Approximately
$50 million per year is expended operating and maintaining this
business systems environment.
ROBOTIC LUNAR EXPLORATION PROGRAM (RLEP)
Senator Shelby. I know it is a complicated question. The
Robotic Lunar Exploration Program?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Let's get into that. Last December, NASA
announced that the Marshall Space Flight Center would be the
project lead for the second mission under the Robotic Lunar
Exploration Program (RLEP-2). The intent of the announced
mission is to land on the lunar surface and search for deposits
of water and ice as a precursor to later human missions.
Unfortunately, no funding for this mission was included in the
President's budget request for fiscal year 2007, and there are
concerns that RLEP-2 is no longer a priority for NASA. Could
you provide us an update on the overall RLEP program and the
current projects under the program, and is the RLEP-2 mission
still proceeding as announced, and so forth?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. The concern that you cite that the
RLEP Program is not a priority is not a well-founded concern.
Indeed, it is a priority. As you know, sir, in order to meet
our unfunded obligations for the space shuttle and space
station, we had to remove from the Science Program $2.2 billion
over the 5-year run-out, and $1.6 billion from exploration, the
crew launch vehicle and crew exploration vehicle, and those
budget hits to the tune of almost $4 billion have resulted in
deferring some missions. We probably will not start RLEP-2 in
fiscal year 2007. We will do that mission. Marshall Space
Flight Center will continue to retain the project lead for that
mission.
Senator Shelby. You are committed to the mission?
Dr. Griffin. I have committed to the mission. In the wake
of difficult funding decisions, I cannot commit to the date,
but I have committed to the mission, and to the leadership of
the mission and to do so in a timely way to provide precursor
information for returning humans to the Moon, but it probably
will not start in fiscal year 2007.
Senator Shelby. Would you give us a status of each of the
elements for the next manned spacecraft, specifically focusing
on the crew exploration vehicle, the crew launch vehicle, and
the launch operations aspect of the program? I know it is early
in the program.
Dr. Griffin. It is, but I can give you a top-level status.
If you want more when I am done, I will be happy to provide it
for the record.
Senator Shelby. Sure.
Dr. Griffin. At the top level, since I last met with you in
this formal setting, we have refined and issued the request for
proposals for the crew exploration vehicle. There are two
bidders on that. They have completed and submitted their
proposals. The Source Evaluation Board is considering those
proposals as we sit here at this moment. Later this spring we
will enter into negotiations and oral presentations by those
bidders, and this summer we will make a selection for the crew
exploration vehicle which will represent a real milestone. It
will be the first new development of a piloted space vehicle by
this Nation in 35 years.
The crew launch vehicle is the launch side of that. In
fact, Marshall Space Flight Center has the lead for that. The
crew launch vehicle is coming along slightly behind the crew
exploration vehicle. The folks down there are actually led by
Program Manager Steve Cook under the management of Center
Director Dave King, and are doing a great job pulling together
the concept design for that vehicle. We expect to have a
request for information out on the street shortly. It will be
followed by a request for proposals to industry. That program
is on track.
Launch operations modifications down at the Cape are at
this point I can only say under study. We have asked for bids
from construction contractors to begin work on those systems.
Of course, the launch operations infrastructure has to follow
from the nature of the launch vehicle and the crew vehicle that
it serves, and so it necessarily follows a bit behind. But I
am, frankly, real pleased with where we are on that.
Senator Shelby. I understand progress has been made in the
overall Constellation architecture by establishing project
offices for the various elements involved. What is the time
line for establishing the project offices for the remaining
elements of the architecture such as the lunar lander?
Dr. Griffin. The lunar lander is not the current first
thing on our plate. We don't need that until starting out
around 2012. As I think I just mentioned, Johnson Space Center
has the crew exploration vehicle, Marshall Space Flight Center
has got the launch vehicles, both the crew launch vehicle and
the heavy lift launch vehicle. Kennedy Space Center, of course,
will be the site for launch operations. Within those broad
assignments of responsibility are our other seven centers. Each
will have pieces because the effort overall must occupy all of
NASA. By mid-May we will be I think prepared to say at the next
level of detail down which elements of the system are going
where.
VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION
Senator Shelby. The Vision for Space Exploration is an
initiative that will last a long time. While a lot of interest
is paid on how much the exploration initiative will cost, an
area that must also be addressed is the current state of NASA
facilities. Many of the centers that will play significant
roles in the Vision have aging infrastructures, we have talked
about this before, and in many cases, buildings that were
inherited from other agencies when we last went to the Moon.
How does NASA address the need for facilities in this budget?
What are the actual funding requirements to truly address the
shortfalls in facilities? And do you believe that a worthwhile
use of the billions in unobligated balances would provide the
agency with the facilities? How do we attack this, I guess is
what I'm saying.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir, I understand the intent of the
question. I must lead by saying that whatever the problem, the
source of those funds cannot and should not be the unobligated
balances, because although those are unobligated, in the sense
that the fiscal accounting people go off in a corner and talk
about unobligated funds, yes, they are unobligated.
Senator Shelby. You have specific plans for them?
Dr. Griffin. Precisely, sir. They are not unspoken for.
Senator Shelby. That is a good phase, unspoken.
Dr. Griffin. They are not unspoken for. You raise a very
important point. NASA's physical infrastructure like many of
the other bridges, roads, and buildings that are important to
this country's public life, is an aging infrastructure, much of
it in our newest buildings in our overall NASA infrastructure,
all 10 centers. The newest buildings, the newest centers, by
and large are approaching 50 years old, and many go back to
World War II, and some are pre-World War II. They are aging,
they are expensive to heat, and expensive to maintain. In a
perfect world, we would have plenty of money to fix all those
buildings. We do not. We have to set priorities.
If I must be made to choose between executing missions,
being run out of old buildings, or having new buildings and not
being able to execute missions, then I'm going to choose the
former. We replace buildings or modify or upgrade them in ones
and twos as the need expresses itself, but we simply do not
have the funding to embark on a substantial building campaign.
I wish that we did.
With regard to the buildings, infrastructure, and
facilities needed for the Vision for Space Exploration, just
exactly as the launch operations infrastructure at the Cape
must follow the definition of the launch vehicle and the crew
vehicle, so, too, must the buildings to support the mission
follow the definition of all these things. I do not today have
a plan for you regarding which of our NASA infrastructure we
need for the future and which should be mothballed or
demolished. I do not have that plan today.
Senator Shelby. I agree with you to some extent that the
mission must go on and just brick and mortar will not do it, it
has to be beyond that, but sometimes you have to have a little
brick and mortar to cover the roof.
Dr. Griffin. You do, indeed. We try in our construction of
facilities as compared with our mission priorities to set a
reasonable balance and to make sure that this subcommittee and
your staff knows where we are on that balance.
PROPULSION RESEARCH
Senator Shelby. On propulsion, the Vision for Space
Exploration will require many new technologies and systems to
be developed in order to maximize our investment in returning
to the Moon. One of these areas that will require ongoing
research and development is in the area of, as you have told me
before, propulsion. The Marshall Space Flight Center has
expertise in this area and has worked on propulsion systems
from the time of the last missions to the Moon and to the
present. As research and development on Vision-related vehicles
and systems begins, what do you anticipate we will need for
propulsion research and development this year and in the
future? In other words, where are we going and what do we need
to get there?
Dr. Griffin. That is an excellent question, and with all
respect, the propulsion research needs to implement the Vision
for Exploration are at this point rather minimal, and likely to
remain so for a little while. One of the things that I tried
very hard to do in crafting our exploration architecture was to
utilize the technology and infrastructure for which the Nation
had already paid in past years and decades. We have available
or can restore to production the rocket engines that are needed
for the Vision for Space Exploration. We have those today, by
and large. That is not the most critical need. In some cases,
we may need to resume or restore production on certain units,
we may need to make modifications, but it is not in the nature
of propulsion research.
If we look much further out to when we are really ready to
go to Mars in another 20 years, I would like to believe that
the Nation will allocate funding for new propulsion research. I
would like to believe that the decisionmakers of those later
times will be able to restore research in, for example, nuclear
thermal propulsion, one of my highest interest items. We do not
need that technology for the Moon which means we do not need it
anytime in the next 15 years, and certainly we do not in the
next 15 years have the money for it. So what we need to do is
we need to restore in this Nation's space program basic
capabilities and basic infrastructure that we once owned and we
have allowed to atrophy.
Senator Shelby. When would that research you are talking
about begin?
Dr. Griffin. Sometime in the next decade. The research
levels would begin sometime in the next decade.
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION'S SCIENCE BUDGET
Senator Shelby. Dr. Griffin, in order to address the budget
needs for the exploration program, NASA has reduced the rate of
growth of the agency's science budget from about 6 percent to
about 1 percent. I understand that the science budget at NASA
is on a growth path, although at a reduced rate than previously
projected. I also understand that the science activities at
Marshall are actually taking a 10-percent cut over the next
fiscal years. Would you provide us some insight into that
reduction?
Dr. Griffin. I can provide the specifics of that 10-percent
reduction at Marshall Space Flight Center for the record.
Senator Shelby. That would be fine.
[The information follows:]
Science Reductions at the Marshall Space Flight Center
In the fiscal year 2007 budget request, there is a reduction of
approximately 10 percent for Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
Science activities compared with fiscal year 2006. This is due, in
part, to the fact that some projects are ending as planned. However,
since release of the fiscal year 2007 budget, additional work for MSFC
has been defined in several Science projects, and additional funding is
likely, particularly in projects with pending competitive selections.
Additional funding is likely in New Frontiers, James Webb Space
Telescope, Chandra, Solar Terrestrial Probes, and other areas. When
this new work (actual and likely) is factored in, fiscal year 2007
Science funding to MSFC is expected to be equal to or higher than
fiscal year 2006.
At the same time, it should be noted that, as one of NASA's premier
space flight centers, MSFC has been given project management
responsibility for the new Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and Cargo Launch
Vehicle (CaLV), both critical elements to our Nation's plans for humans
to explore the frontiers of space. These responsibilities are supported
by the President's fiscal year 2007 request from Exploration Systems.
Specifically, Marshall's responsibilities include:
--Responsible for achieving all CLV and CaLV objectives for the
agency.
--Lead associated systems engineering and integration activities, all
CLV and CaLV safety and mission assurance activities.
--First stage design and upper stage engine development contracts
management, as well as leading or otherwise overseeing CLV
associated demonstration testing.
--Responsibility for advanced development flight test-0 and other
flight demonstrations.
--Support responsibilities for the Crew Exploration Vehicle.
--Support for launch abort systems, service module, and abort test
booster.
Level II or project tasks include:
--Safety, Reliability & Quality assurance (SR&QA)--Support integrated
hazards analysis and probabilistic risk assessment; represent
SR&QA at assigned systems integration groups; support quality
assurance, risk management, and safety software system
development; support Constellation SR&QA panels.
--System engineering and integration: Co-Lead for several system
integration groups including thermal and environmental control
and life support, environments, human factors/human rating,
loads and structures.
--Test and verification lead for loads/structures and environments
system integration group.
In support of lunar exploration, Marshall will:
--Establish a Lunar Precursor and Robotic Program Office, which
includes the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter and the Lunar Crater
Observation and Sensing Satellite.
--Establish a Lunar Lander Project Office, under the Constellation
Program, responsible for performing early trade studies and
developing requirements for the Lunar descent stage.
--Plan to use the Michoud Assembly for CLV and CaLV tank
construction.
Dr. Griffin. But do understand, please, that Marshall Space
Flight Center is receiving, and will receive substantial
increases as we embark on the Crew Launch Vehicle Program. So
although the skill mix of those employed at Marshall Space
Flight Center may change, the overall employment base at
Marshall Space Flight Center is and will continue to be quite
healthy. Yes, it is true, prior to my tenure the science
community had been promised growth rates of 5, 6, or 7 percent
in science, but NASA's growth rate as a whole is only 2.4
percent, averaged over the next several years.
Senator Shelby. I agree with you that we need more money.
Dr. Griffin. I did not say that.
Senator Shelby. I can say it.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, sir. Within the amount of money that the
administration has chosen to allocate to the program, I cannot
have science growing at 6 percent while the agency is growing
at 2.4 percent and the science program at NASA is a full one-
third of our overall program, and in my judgement, sir, it is a
very robust program.
SPACE SHUTTLE FLIGHT RATE SCHEDULE
Senator Shelby. Dr. Griffin, assuming a successful shuttle
launch this summer, NASA will begin a very aggressive flight
schedule for construction of the International Space Station
and the Hubble space telescope servicing mission. We pray you
will be successful there. In order to accomplish the 16 to 18
flights necessary for these missions and to retire the shuttle
by 2010, as you mentioned earlier, would require a flight rate
that has not been achieved for many years. How much
flexibility, Dr. Griffin, is there in the schedule for the
remainder of the flights of the space shuttle? Is there any
room for unexpected delays that will not compromise both the
retirement date of the shuttle and the completion of our
agreements on the ISS? And how does NASA intend to balance the
need for such a sizable workforce to maintain the shuttle
program until it is retired and at the same time to build up
Moon missions and so forth? I know it is a tough question.
Dr. Griffin. But it is a good one, and I understand the
question, so let me try to answer. First of all, I must simply
say it is not correct that the fight rate required of the
shuttle to complete the International Space Station by the
shuttle's retirement date is something that we have not seen.
In fact, the required flight rate is nothing more than our
average flight rate over 25 years of history, and that
includes, as I know you recall because you have been here, that
includes basically 6 years of down time due to shuttle
accidents and other technical problems. So even factoring in
all of that down time, our average flight rate for the shuttle
program over 25 years has been 4\1/2\ flights per year. If we
fly successfully in July or if we fly successfully in September
and then merely execute our average flight rate for the balance
of the program, we will finish with margin to spare. So I
believe we can do it.
WORKFORCE TRANSITIONING
Now with regard to your question about transitioning the
workforce, you are correct, and I have said this in many
forums, our biggest challenge over the next 5 years is to
develop a plan that allows us to fly the last shuttle mission
as safely as the next one. At the same time, to be able to have
the appropriately skilled workforce involved with the design
and development of the replacement vehicle, the CEV, and to not
damage either program in the process of doing so. We are
working on that. We spend time on that at every Management
Council meeting I have in NASA. We care about that problem a
lot. I have top-level plans that I can share with your staff,
and are those plans in their detail, we will be happy to share
those plans with your staff as well.
Senator Shelby. Thank you very much. I am going to go vote.
Senator Mikulski has voted, and she is recognized.
Dr. Griffin. Thank you, sir.
AGING AND DAMAGED FACILITIES
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
know Administrator Griffin, you probably have covered some of
these issues. We know that you and the NASA budget is under a
lot of stress.
Let me go to the question about aging facilities and
damaged facilities. I know that Senator Shelby talked about the
aging facility issue. You talked about some of these go back to
Apollo.
Dr. Griffin. Or before.
Senator Mikulski. Yes, sir. But let's go to what was
damaged because of Katrina, again, acknowledging the
magnificent efforts of the NASA staff and local responders, et
cetera. The subcommittee provided $300 and some million last
year toward this. The President's supplemental request had
nothing in it. We had $35 million which is just a chunk of
change. You estimate that it is going to be $500 million to
really restore these facilities properly. Where are we, and
where is this money going to come from?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, ma'am. Yes, Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. You need to know I was very disappointed
that there was not money in the President's budget to do this,
and it's beyond the scope of an individual Member, for example
like myself, to find a $500 million offset, and we could not
take it from the troops.
Dr. Griffin. Of course not. I'm sorry, the damage estimate
that we have is just under $500 million, $484 million to be
specific. As we have continued to refine our estimates, we have
kept you and your staff current on what those are. And you are
right, last year the subcommittee, of course, appropriated
roughly $330 million in supplemental funding to repair the
damage. The balance of the money must come out of program funds
which is shuttle and station unless we move money across
accounts, and that would require special permission from our
oversight committees.
Senator Mikulski. How much would you need this year?
Dr. Griffin. Pardon me?
Senator Mikulski. No construction occurs at once.
Dr. Griffin. At once, right.
Senator Mikulski. What do you think for both Stennis and
Louisiana would be required for this year?
Dr. Griffin. I will answer for the record on the phasing of
the money. The total that we know we need is $484 million at
this point.
Senator Mikulski. And that would take care of both?
Dr. Griffin. That would take care of all years.
Senator Mikulski. But it would take care of both Stennis
and Louisiana?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, Senator.
[The information follows:]
Aging and Damaged Facilities
After a detailed review by the Katrina Headquarters Recovery Team,
as of April 25, 2006, the Agency reduced its total estimate of all
costs for responding to Katrina and for catastrophic risk mitigation
projects that would protect against future hurricanes to $483.8
million. This estimate includes the following:
--Michoud Assembly Facility--$220.2 million;
--Stennis Space Center--$208.7 million;
--NASA Shared Services Center--$7.7 million;
--Other NASA Centers/HQ Support--$8.1 million; and
--Program Contingency/Reserves--$39.2 million.
Review of the content of this estimate is ongoing and will continue
to be revised; NASA will keep the Committee informed of future
adjustments to the estimate.
As has been discussed during hearings and in briefings with
Committee staff, NASA borrowed $100 million in fiscal year 2005 funds
from the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) crew/cargo
programs to provide immediate support of hurricane recovery efforts in
the Gulf region before any supplemental funds were provided. The intent
was to eventually repay these programs for this initial outlay of
funds, and NASA repaid $20 million of the amount borrowed in the May
update to the fiscal year 2006 Operating Plan.
NASA currently has available $384.8 million in fiscal year 2006
funding from two emergency supplemental appropriations and $80 million
in fiscal year 2005 funding that was borrowed from the Shuttle and ISS
crew/cargo programs. NASA may repay approximately $20 million in
additional borrowed fiscal year 2005 funds that are not yet spent in a
future Operating Plan update. The Agency continues to require transfer
authority to use up to $60 million in available fiscal year 2006
supplemental funding to repay the balance of funds borrowed and
expended in fiscal year 2005 to allow the Agency to adequately fund the
requirements of the Space Shuttle and ISS programs.
Hurricane-related Center recovery and operations costs, along with
real property repairs and programmatic recovery requirements are
accommodated within the current funding availability. Catastrophic loss
mitigation projects will be addressed on a priority basis depending on
the availability of funding.
The following Center recovery operations, real property repairs,
and programmatic recovery activities are likely covered within
available funding:
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
STENNIS SPACE CENTER
Center Recovery Operations Support...................... 17.0
IT/Communications/Environmental/Other................... 6.0
Programmatic Recovery................................... 3.0
===============
Real Property Repairs................................... \1\ 82.61
Repair Site wide Electrical Distribution System..... 7.79
Repair/Replace Roofing Various Administration 7.95
Buildings..........................................
Replace Bldg 2204 Roof.............................. 7.91
Repair Administration Building 1100................. 7.65
Repair and Replace Perimeter Fencing................ 7.95
Replace Bldg 1100 North Wing & Bldg 1105 Roof....... 1.03
Repair Bldg 2205 High Bay Roof (complete)........... .73
Repair Building 1100 North Wing--Interior........... 2.70
Site wide Mold Remediation and Asbestos Abatement... 2.44
Replace Bldg 2201 Roof.............................. 3.50
Repair/Replace Roofing Various Industrial Complex 1.74
Buildings..........................................
Repair/Replace Roofing Various Test Complex 1.99
Buildings..........................................
Site wide Debris Cleanup............................ 1.59
Replace Bldg 8100/8110 Roofs........................ 3.04
Site wide Lightning Protection Repairs (Multiple .80
Projects)..........................................
Relocate Roads and Grounds Building................. .87
Repair and Pave Roads for Heavy Vehicles............ 2.88
Education Center (Replacement for Bldg 1200)........ 1.93
Site wide Electrical Panel Enhancements and Database 1.06
Local Projects (<$500,000) and Maintenance Items.... 7.06
MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY
Center Recovery Operations Support...................... 20.9
IT/Communications/Environmental/Other................... 2.4
Programmatic Recovery................................... 42.5
===============
Real Property Repairs................................... \2\ 69.00
Hazardous Materials Investigation................... .05
Repairs of B103, Phase 1............................ 2.50
Repairs of B451, Phase 1............................ .75
Repairs of B114..................................... .60
Repairs to Damaged Elevator B110.................... .10
B303 Temporary Roof Repair.......................... .09
TBD Projects during test and checkout............... .50
MSFC--COSS Contractor Support for damage assessment. .04
MSFC--M1 Yard Roof Repairs.......................... .01
MSFC--Remove Damaged Trees and Repair B4707 Tower .02
Roof...............................................
Work Plans for B420, 110, 114, 103, 303, 451, 220, .94
101, 102, 173, 175, 320, 404.......................
Local Projects (<$500,000) and Maintenance Items.... 5.21
Repairs of B110, Phase 2............................ 6.40
Repairs of B173..................................... 2.02
Repairs of B175..................................... .68
Repairs of B220..................................... 1.37
Repairs of B303..................................... 6.60
Repairs of B320A.................................... 1.54
Repairs of B320B.................................... .94
Repairs of B404..................................... 1.49
Repairs of B420..................................... 5.63
Repairs of B103, Phase 2............................ 4.77
Repairs of B451, Phase 2............................ 1.50
Repairs of B101..................................... 5.04
Repairs of B102..................................... 8.22
Repairs B75, 105, 106, 107, 109, 113, 119, 127, 130, 12.00
131, 135, 140, 171, 176, 177, 178, 179, 201, 203,
206, 207, 221, 232, 239, 301, 302, 304, 305, 307,
308, 318, 321, 327, 329, 359, 351, 360, 361, 406,
409, 421, 423, 424, 419, 450, 480, 485.............
NASA SHARED SERVICES CENTER
Recovery/Workarounds.................................... 7.7
OTHER NASA CENTERS/HQ SUPPORT/RESERVE
Center Recovery Operations Support...................... 2.2
Other General Support................................... 4.0
FEMA Volunteers......................................... 1.9
Program contingency/Reserves............................ 39.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Does not include $13.7 million in program manager reserve.
\2\ Does not include $10 million in program manager reserve.
The following potential catastrophic loss risk mitigation projects
been identified. Unless noted, the majority of these projects have not
yet been approved for funding. Projects for each Center are listed in
order of priority.
[In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
STENNIS SPACE CENTER
Hurricane Proof Emergency Operations Center............. \1\ 14.90
Replace and Enhance Backup Generator Capability Site- 3.00
wide...................................................
Enhance Site-Wide Electrical Distribution System 18.65
Hardening..............................................
Add Additional Bulk Diesel Storage...................... .50
Enhancement to Potable Water Pump Houses................ .10
Emergency Communications and EMCS Enhancements.......... .90
Hurricane Proof Record Retention Facility............... 2.50
Relocate Electrical Equipment Building 1200............. 1.00
Expand and Enhance Communication Ductbank............... 3.00
Inspect Bridge and Locks................................ 1.00
Dredge Canal............................................ 3.00
Enhance Administration Building 1100.................... 3.00
Test Complex High Pressure System Uninterruptible Power. 30.00
Design Cost (6 percent)................................. 4.89
---------------
Total............................................. 86.44
===============
MICHOUD ASSEMBLY FACILITY
Upgrades to Pump House.................................. \2\ 11.00
Install levee floodgate at barge dock................... .70
Upgrades to Emergency Operations Building............... \2\ 3.30
Rewire security cameras to operate on emergency power... \2\ .70
Replace electrical feeders on poles below ground........ 5.00
Reconfigure computer servers to provide critical ops 5.00
during severe weather..................................
Replace main manufacturing building exterior siding..... 7.00
Levee improvements (requires Corp of Engineers 5.00
coordination and app)..................................
100 percent increased labor, materials, and 37.7
transportation costs...................................
---------------
Total............................................. 75.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Project is approved for funding. The total project cost is $21.4
million; the remaining $6.5 million will be funded with fiscal year
2005 Institutional CofF funds.
\2\ $1.7 million in funding has been approved for MAF projects as
follows: $300,000 for designs and studies, $600,000 for remote
controls for the existing Pump House, $500,000 for relocating the MAF
Emergency Operations Building, and $300,000 for security cameras. The
``Install levee floodgate at barge dock'' project will be approved for
funding as soon as design is complete.
CUTS IN SCIENCE
Senator Mikulski. As we look ahead to our own mark up, I
have not had a chance really to confer with Senator Shelby in-
depth until we complete all of our hearings. We have heard from
Justice, the Byrne grants and COPS Programs have been cut. This
is not to lay this on you. In just looking at NASA and know
that it was flat-lined now and it has been flat-lined under
this administration and the previous one, President Clinton, I
feel we need more money. One of the things that I am going to
suggest to Senator Shelby is that we look at the repair related
to the Katrina damage in some kind of an emergency way so that
it does not add further stress to the NASA budget. I don't even
know if it is possible, but I am looking for legitimate ways to
bring other revenue into our subcommittee, so just know that.
That is why the sequencing of how much, so that we do ask for
or even ponder appropriate amounts. You need to have your
facilities, dedicated people have to work somewhere, and we
have to be dedicated in restoring it as they did to protecting
it.
Your comments were don't rob Peter to pay Paul, don't go
after the science budget, to some back to the other priorities,
but in some ways I feel that is what we are doing. We are
juggling and rearranging, and that you robbed Paul to give it
to Peter, and you are telling us don't rob Peter to give it
back to Paul. We don't see it as robbing, we see it as a give-
back.
Could you tell us about the consequences of this deferral
in science? I know you are committed to science programs, but
we are troubled about the cuts in science. Could you tell us
what you think the consequences are in this deferral? We are
particularly concerned about all science. We are concerned
about the impact on big science as people talk about it, the
Webb telescope mission, like Earth science and some of the
others? Could you share with us?
Dr. Griffin. At the top level I can, and, again, as always
I am happy to coordinate details with your staff at your
discretion.
Yes, I did propose and I am proposing taking money from
both exploration and science in order to pay our bills for our
nearer-term priorities to finish out the station and fly out
the shuttle. The shuttle and station accounts as we both know
when I took this job in the out-years had placeholder amounts
in them. We did not have realistic amounts. Those were in the
out-years at the time. The out-years have arrived, and if we
are going to fly the shuttle and finish the station, then those
bills had to be paid, and the only other source of money was
exploration and science. So that is why I did what I did.
As to the impact of deferrals, first of all, James Webb
telescope mission as I think everyone knows is the National
Academy's highest priority in their decade-old survey plan for
astronomy, and that priority continues to be respected. James
Webb telescope mission may be delayed a bit, but only because,
I exaggerate to make a point, about 15 minutes after I was
confirmed, the folks on the James Webb Program brought to me a
$1 billion plus overrun on the program which is presently in
its formulation stages. So we are currently in the middle of
re-baselining that program not, to alter its priority within
the queue. But I do not have over that time period an extra
billion dollars laying around to fix it. So it will slip a
little bit in schedule, not because of anything going on with
the shuttle and station, but just because it is overrun.
With regard to Earth science, before I took office, Earth
science had been I would say damaged in the budgetary planning,
and I have acted to restore that. It is not all the way back,
but I know that you know, and that your staff will tell you,
that I have acted to restore that as I have with heliophysics,
but I cannot do it instantaneously.
Senator Mikulski. They have shared that with me, and I
appreciate it.
Dr. Griffin. Other missions that we believe are very
important to do like the space interferometry mission will be
delayed for a couple of years.
Senator Mikulski. So could I say what you are saying is
though that they have not been eliminated, they have been
deferred?
Dr. Griffin. Correct.
Senator Mikulski. But given where we are, do you think is
deferral going to become a de facto elimination in some
categories? I am not going to ask you to enumerate.
Dr. Griffin. There may be smaller missions which just will
not make the cut, but the major mission priorities that had
been established and were on the table when I took office will
continue to be respected. We must defer something. We will
either defer the CEV, the Nation's replacement for the shuttle,
or we will defer some of these science missions. In truth, I
have delayed both of them a bit and I would be very
uncomfortable delaying the CEV any more.
SPACE SHUTTLE
Senator Mikulski. This brings me back to, first of all,
Senator Shelby and me, and the whole committee, we are
absolutely committed to the shuttle mission. The safety of the
astronauts is a committee obsession that we share with you, so
we know that is the priority. Second, I appreciate your
willingness to consider a Hubble rejuvenation mission.
Dr. Griffin. If we can possibly do Hubble, we will do
Hubble.
Senator Mikulski. And I understand now that it is up to the
technical matters, but I appreciate your commitment to analyze
as we progress, so we know what that is going to take, but we
do not know how much more it is going to take. Am I correct?
And it has cost $2 billion more to do the shuttle and return to
flight than we had originally anticipated. And that is not a
fault-finding. It is just a fact-finding.
Dr. Griffin. Of course. I understand. I just want to answer
accurately. We needed $3.8 billion more to fly out the shuttle
and finish the station; $3.8 billion more was needed for those
accounts than was bookkept in those accounts in the fiscal year
2006 run-out. So as we prepared the fiscal year 2007 run-out,
we had to fix that problem, so the total was $3.8 billion.
Senator Mikulski. I am glad we are getting this out in the
sunshine, quite frankly, because the only way we can truly get
the proper national priorities, and the framework is there, but
in other words, you inherited something that you have had to
straighten out and get real life-cycle costs and accounting
into it. Am I correct?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, Senator. The way that I would phrase it
is to say that, in having decided a couple of years ago that we
would retire the shuttle, there was considerable uncertainty as
to how much the run-out costs would be in retirement. As we
have analyzed it as carefully as we can, we have concluded that
the run-out costs to retire it do not drop off as rapidly as--
--
Senator Mikulski. We are committed to this, and, again, I
think I feel secure in saying this, I liked what you said when
you said the next shuttle flight is going to be as safe as it
possibly can be made, but that the last shuttle flight will be
as safe. So we have a big kind of shaking-hands commitment that
we need to make with you to ensure that safety of the next
astronauts or the last astronauts to fly that shuttle, so we
are in agreement with that. Then that is like a fixed cost that
we have to almost be neurotic about. Am I correct?
Dr. Griffin. Exactly, Senator. Exactly, and I have been
neurotic about it, and the amount was $3.8 billion.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
Senator Mikulski. I say that, because, again, it is the
safety of our people.
That takes me then to the station itself. Having done that,
completed it, do all those things along the questions that
Senator Shelby has raised, the 16 flights, et cetera, are we
going to use the station? And how are we going to get to the
station to use the station? Soyuz has been a lifesaver, but it
is little, it cannot do cargo.
Dr. Griffin. You are right, Senator.
Senator Mikulski. We have this fantastic machinery at
tremendous cost to build and maintain.
Dr. Griffin. Let me try to answer.
Senator Shelby. Is this going to be a techno-whoops? Then
what will that take if we are talking about science and Webb
and going to the Moon and so on? Or is this going to be one of
those, well, now we have it, but we cannot afford to use it?
Dr. Griffin. I certainly hope not. For the station for the
next few years, the choices which confronted us were, given the
available shuttle flights, that we could use the station
approximately as it exists today, which is fairly stable but
does not have much power and does not have a lot of research
facilities, we could use it to a very limited extent. Or we
could finish assembling it but not use it. I do not have enough
shuttle flights to assemble it and utilize it at the same time.
We have talked about this, we have committed to finishing the
assembly.
As the assembly is finished, it will be the full-up station
that you have come to know and love with substantial research
capability and a crew of six. In the period between retirement
of the shuttle and deployment of the CEV, we will have no
choice but to depend on international partner logistics and
resupply. Or if our COTS initiative, our commercial initiative,
works well, we hope that we may be able to bring some U.S.
commercial capability on-line with seed funding from NASA. But
the CEV, which is, of course, intended to service the station
as well as go to the Moon, will not be available for
operational use until, at this point, 2013-2014.
Senator Mikulski. Then my question is, why should we do
this now if we are not going to use it? We thought we are going
to build it and they will come, but we are going to be building
it but we cannot get there. I have not been harsh or sarcastic,
and yet we are making a tremendous investment for the shuttle
to go up there, for the safety of our astronauts, only then to
complete an assembly of something.
Dr. Griffin. We can use the station in concert with our
international partners, and we can use it as soon as the CEV
becomes available, and this, of course, addresses the gap that
you have been so forceful about, and we can use it if we can
get some commercial capability in space flight.
Senator Mikulski. There are a lot of ifs.
Dr. Griffin. But with our existing budgetary resources,
there will be a gap between retirement of the shuttle and
deployment of the CEV.
Senator Mikulski. I think this is a dilemma.
Dr. Griffin. Yes, Senator, it is.
INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS
Senator Mikulski. Within the scope of the hearing it is
difficult to discuss, and I am not advocating what we should
do, but I am advocating that we need to come to grips with this
dilemma, and a tremendous cost to finish our commitment. What
do our international partners say about this, Dr. Griffin?
Would they be able to use it? They have been very patient and
steadfast, I think, in their ongoing commitment, and the
Russians have proved to be a fairly reliable partner.
Dr. Griffin. All of that is true. You, I believe,
understand the situation perfectly. The international partners
are appreciative of the renewed United States commitment to
finish the station, because unless it is finished, the
laboratory modules that they have worked on for many years will
not fly. So they are appreciative of that. They, we, and I are
concerned about what we will do in the period following
retirement of the shuttle and prior to deployment of the CEV.
We, as you say, are very grateful to our Russian partners for
the reliability with which the Soyuz and Progress systems have
worked, but they have, frankly, very minimal capability to
really utilize the assets of the station and other partner
capabilities.
Senator Mikulski. So it will be hard for our international
partners to get up there to use it.
Dr. Griffin. Until we have the CEV deployed, right.
Senator Mikulski. Let me try to get a timeframe. If
everything works the way we hope and anticipate, when will the
completion of the assembly of the station be done?
Dr. Griffin. 2010.
Senator Mikulski. Then at the same time, that is when you
hope to retire the shuttle upon the completion?
Dr. Griffin. Correct.
CREW VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
Senator Mikulski. Then with hopefully the new crew vehicle,
with your time table, that would be 2013?
Dr. Griffin. The first test flight, which is not the same
as an operational flight, of course, of the CEV, at this point
with the resources we believe we have to bring to bear on it,
we project for 2012, and then operational use would be in the
2013-2014 timeframe.
Senator Mikulski. So there will be 4 years in which the
United States of America will, number one, have a space gap?
And, number two, 4 years where the station will be up there but
will not be utilized, and I presume could even begin to
deteriorate. Space, as you would share with me, is a harsh and
demanding environment. I wonder where we are going here with
the station.
Dr. Griffin. That is, on the face of it, correct. I remind
you again that we have the ISS Crew Cargo Program, our
commercial orbital transportation or COTS initiative, where we
are making available as seed funding to industry $500 million
over the next few years to bring on-line, hopefully, a
capability to ferry cargo and later crew to and from the
station. If that works and industry invests, they stand to make
a good profit, and we stand to be able to buy services.
Senator Mikulski. First of all, we have been through the X-
Plane, and X-Planes have not come out too well. I would hope
that the private sector could develop a cargo vehicle.
Dr. Griffin. I hope they can. I hope they can. I consider
it be a good gamble. It is well past time for NASA to do
everything it can to stimulate commercial space transportation
capability, and I am trying to do that. But you raise an
excellent point, we cannot count on it.
Senator Mikulski. And we will not know until 2012 whether
it is going to happen. Is there any way you can accelerate in a
prudent way, prudent, again, meaning always the safety factors,
and prudent in fiscal reality, the development of a crew
vehicle?
Dr. Griffin. Again, Senator, not without moving money from
other things which we all also like.
Senator Mikulski. What do you think from a technological
and engineering standpoint, and you are the expert in this?
Dr. Griffin. From a technical and engineering standpoint, I
could have a crew vehicle deployed in 2011, following right on
the heels of the shuttle, from a technical and engineering
standpoint.
Senator Mikulski. What would it take to do that?
Dr. Griffin. Fiscally I will have to take that for the
record. I do not have that in my head because that is not a
program we have been studying. We know we do not have that
money, and so we are funding limited, as you have said.
Senator Mikulski. Again, I do not know if we could even
contemplate that. I know our colleague, Senator Hutchison has
raised that with you yesterday at the Commerce hearing in which
you testified.
Dr. Griffin. She did.
Senator Mikulski. I know we are troubled by the gap, and
yet we do not want to take from Peter to pay Paul, and we do
not want to take from Paul to pay Peter.
Senator Shelby. Senator Mikulski, if you would yield, it is
obvious that we need more money to fund NASA.
Senator Mikulski. I think that that is it, Mr. Chairman,
and that is where I was trying to ponder as we went through
this.
Senator Shelby. Absolutely. You are absolutely right.
Dr. Griffin. From a technical point of view, the crew
vehicle could be delivered to you in 2011. Anything after that
is controlled by the funding.
Senator Mikulski. Why don't you share with us what you
think would be a realistic option?
AERONAUTICS RESEARCH
One last point which goes to the aeronautics issue when we
talk about commercial cargo in space. I really do not want us
to lose ground aeronautically in the international marketplace,
and I know we have declined an aeronautic research at 18
percent. What do you think we can do about this? Again, I am
concerned about the consequences, not only in futuristic sonic,
hypersonic flight, but even aviation safety. We have a
consortium in Maryland that is working on cockpit safety. One
is at our historically black college, Morgan, the largest
producer of African-American engineers in the State, and maybe
even in the country. They are so enthusiastic. They feel they
are working on things that are going to spur our economy, and
working on cockpit safety. That is the next generation. They
will be sitting there 20 years from now. So what can we do?
Dr. Griffin. I am ready to give it to them sooner if you
would like. With regard to aeronautics research, I share your
concern. I think when you look at the loss of competitiveness
in aeronautics to which you refer and that you see about you
today, I believe that in actuality that is a consequence not of
funding decisions, but of strategic decisions, what the money
is spent on, that go back a decade or two.
We have not in my opinion been doing in some areas the
right things with our aeronautics funding. We are recrafting
our Aeronautics Program to focus on basic aeronautical science
which underlies the entire discipline of all flight regimes to
learn new things and to be out at the frontiers of the state of
knowledge in aeronautics. That, I believe, is in past decades
what provided the kind of capability that allowed American air
frame manufacturers to be second to none.
When we started focusing on demonstrations and point
designs and things that were off the beaten track for NASA's
research skills, I believe that is when we started to lose
ground. So I am trying to recraft and put into place----
Senator Mikulski. Is that what we will get in the December
report?
Dr. Griffin. Yes, ma'am, that is what you will get.
Senator Mikulski. What I would hope we could try to do,
Senator Shelby, is stay the course or do a bit better, but that
we really join hands and focus on this, because I think we are
going to win the international markets not because we are going
to be the most subsidized like other countries, but because we
are going to be the smartest and the best, and we want to help
you get there.
Dr. Griffin. We have to be the best.
Senator Mikulski. Mr. Chairman, I think I have gone over my
questions.
AMERICAN COMPETITIVE INITIATIVE
Senator Shelby. No, you have asked some good questions. Dr.
Griffin, I will get into the American competitiveness
initiative. I was surprised to see that NASA was not included
as part of the American competitiveness initiative, ACI. The
goal of ACI, as I understand it, is to ensure that the United
States prominence in technology and our continued
competitiveness in an ever-evolving global economy and ensure
that we are there. Your stated goals for the education
component of NASA's budget are to strengthen the Nation's
future workforce, attract and retain students in science and
engineering, as in your own background, and to engage Americans
in NASA's missions, coupled with high public visibility and
recognition that NASA enjoys. It seems that NASA would be a
natural fit for such an initiative. Why was not NASA not
included in this initiative in your judgment? I was surprised.
Dr. Griffin. Senator, I have spoken with Dr. Marburger on
precisely that issue, and the point that I would make is that
the ACI was designed to target those agencies or portions of
agencies such as physical science within the Department of
Energy, which have not received good support in the recent past
and which need significant help to get back to even. NASA
received a 3.2 percent increase even without being part of the
ACI in an environment where overall domestic nondefense
discretionary funding is down by one-half of 1 percent. So NASA
was treated by the President 3.7 percent better than the
average domestic discretionary nondefense agency.
It is hard to do better than that. I believe that we were
well treated within the context of the overall administration,
and to be part of the American competitiveness initiative was
not really on point.
Senator Shelby. I think it was not either.
Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Senator Shelby, I just want to comment
and share this with Dr. Griffin. I was part of a group at the
White House with Senators Alexander and others talking about
this, and I asked the President the same thing in a very
cordial way because I thought his Mars statement was to inspire
the next generation, and they said that they were going to give
it more consideration. I wanted to follow-up with some of the
staff.
Senator Shelby. I think you are absolutely right.
Senator Mikulski. Perhaps that is something that you and I
could follow-up with.
CHAIRMAN'S CLOSING REMARKS
Senator Shelby. We could work together because we think it
is important, and Dr. Griffin is a product of it himself of
many years.
If I could, Dr. Griffin, I want to thank you on behalf of
the subcommittee for your appearance here. We both are
committed to NASA and we want to continue to work with you. I
personally believe that NASA is still underfunded, as Senator
Mikulski does.
Senator Mikulski. Yes.
Senator Shelby. We know that it is a tough environment, but
we have some, I think, lofty goals out there and we want you to
implement them, and you have the capability to do that.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
We appreciate your appearance before the subcommittee
today. There are a number of Senators, and we have been voting,
and I keep the record open where they can submit questions for
the record. I am going to ask you to, if you could, respond to
them no later than June 9, which is a month or so.
Dr. Griffin. We absolutely will do that, sir.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the agency for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
Question. NASA was recently cited for violation of the
Antideficiency Act (ADA). According to the Inspector General, a lack of
internal controls within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer
(OCFO) was a major cause of the violations. It is also troubling that
the Inspector General was unable to determine the exact size or number
of ADA violations due to the unreliability of the agency's financial
management system.
What are the Agency's plans for addressing the material weaknesses
in internal controls that have been reported for several years?
Answer. NASA's independent financial auditors identified three
material weaknesses and one reportable condition through its fiscal
year 2005 financial audit. The weaknesses are repeat findings from
prior financial audits. NASA submitted a Corrective Action Plan in
February 2006 to Congress, OMB and NASA's Office of Inspector General
(OIG) that addresses each of the recommendations made by the
independent financial auditors. NASA has been executing this plan
throughout fiscal year 2006.
For your convenience, we have attached NASA's Financial Management
Corrective Action Plan, which provides a complete list of in-process
actions to address each material weakness.
Corrective Action Plan Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Audit--February 15,
2006
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER'S MESSAGE
I am pleased to present the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) financial audit corrective action plan.
Achieving financial management excellence is essential to achieving
NASA's Vision for Space Exploration. Efficiently managing all of our
precious resources will maximize the opportunities for creative and
safe programs and projects. In the Office of the Chief Financial
Officer, from Headquarters to Field Centers, we are working hard to
improve the financial management of our Agency.
Reviewed by NASA's Office of Inspector General, the plan represents
the collaborative efforts of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer,
the Integrated Enterprise Management Program (IEMP), and the Office of
Infrastructure and Administration. The plan articulates NASA's strategy
for eliminating the root cause(s) of the four reportable conditions
(three of which are material) identified in the 2005 financial audit:
--1. Financial Systems, Analyses and Oversight (material weakness)
--2. Fund Balance with Treasury (material weakness)
--3. Property, Plant and Equipment (material weakness)
--4. Environmental Liabilities
For each of the four reportable conditions and related
recommendations, the plan defines NASA's goals, objectives, strategies,
activities, due dates and responsibilities for execution. Progress will
be monitored throughout the execution of this plan.
Our ability to improve the quality of the Agency's financial
information, to better manage our assets, and to achieve business
efficiencies is dependent on the successful execution of this plan with
the support of the entire NASA community. NASA has always had a well-
deserved reputation for successfully meeting challenges head on, and
this effort will be no different.
Gwendolyn Sykes,
Chief Financial Officer.
INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)
This corrective action plan addresses the material and significant
weaknesses identified through NASA's 2005 financial audit. Those
weaknesses reflect process, system and internal control issues that
cross NASA functional areas, including procurement, infrastructure and
administration, systems management, and financial management.
Accordingly, this plan was developed through a coordinated effort with
all NASA organizations that have a critical role and primary
responsibility in the execution of it. In addition, the NASA Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) reviewed and provided comments to this
plan. The OIG's comments were considered in the final product.
For each noted weakness, this plan documents the goals, objectives,
strategies and planned corrective actions determined to be the most
effective and efficient means for mitigating or eliminating those
weaknesses. Through the course of implementation, changes to strategies
or corrective actions may be either required or advisable given new
information or events. The implementation approach and progress toward
plan goals and objectives will be monitored, and plan adjustments made,
by the Office of the Chief Financial Officer on a regular and ongoing
basis until the those goals and objectives have been met. Status
reviews will be conducted with NASA's Deputy Administrator.
The weaknesses addressed in this plan are not new to NASA's 2005
financial audit. They have, in fact, been noted in previous NASA
financial audits. Significant work has already been performed to
address them. The repetition of the recommendations is an indication of
the technical complexity and organizational breadth of the issues. This
corrective action plan reflects the work planned by NASA organizations
over the next year, and highlights the work performed in previous years
to address the audit recommendations. The integration of strategies and
plans from multiple NASA organizations is an important success factor
and reduces the risk of potentially disjointed, non-complementary
solutions to common issues. Several other challenges to the successful
accomplishment of plan goals have been identified and will be managed
throughout plan implementation. These include:
--Resource constraints. Sufficient resources to appropriately staff
the corrective action implementation teams have not yet been
fully secured. Authority for additional Office of the Chief
Financial Officer staff at both Headquarters and Field Center
locations was provided by NASA's Administrator in 2005. The
OCFO is in the process of hiring additional staff to support
NASA's financial management improvement initiative efforts.
While additional resources are being secured, there is a
familiarization and training lag before these resources are
fully able to contribute. Other areas of NASA, such as asset
management, which are critical to the success of this plan,
have identified additional staffing needs for which staffing
plans will be developed. These plans will identify staffing
shortfalls and associated options.
--Change management. The anticipated process changes necessary to
resolve NASA's identified weaknesses, particularly in the area
of Property, Plant & Equipment (PP&E), will impact the way
business is conducted at NASA. These changes will require a
significant portion of NASA's workforce, both institutional and
programmatic, to change the way they currently perform their
daily activities. Communicating the need for change,
documenting new procedures and delivering training are key
elements embedded in each of the corrective action initiatives.
Additionally, initiative owners will work with NASA leadership
to build buy-in and support at the most senior levels of the
organizations for the changes that must take place. The strong
commitment provided by NASA's Executive leadership will be a
major factor in overcoming this challenge.
--External support. Some of the proposed strategies--such as those
for PP&E and Environmental Liabilities--include changes to
policy or procedures that will require support from NASA
vendors and contractors. Just as process changes will impact
employees' daily activities and procedures, so will they impact
the activities and reporting requirements of NASA's vendors and
contractors. Contract changes, procedural changes, reporting
changes; all will take time and money to implement. Through the
course of executing the improvement initiatives, the OCFO will
be evaluating the risk, cost, benefit and trade-offs of each of
the changes that may be required to ensure the actions taken
are the most cost effective.
While the challenges and risks are considerable, the strategies and
plans presented in this corrective action plan are designed to achieve
NASA's goals and objectives within the targeted timeframes.
CHAPTER 1: FINANCIAL AUDIT IMPROVEMENT
WHY NASA NEEDS A CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
NASA's vision for Space Exploration is an ambitious and bold
journey into areas of space that man has never visited and into areas
of science and research that man has yet to fully comprehend or master.
Complex research and development projects, like those at NASA, require
effective project planning and management to meet quality, schedule and
budget requirements. Having ready access to accurate and reliable
financial information is critical for NASA's program and project
managers to achieve their own technical goals. Budget constraints
combined with the uncertainties inherent in primary research and
development further highlight the need for effective program and
project financial management information.
While NASA's program and project managers are the ultimate users of
financial information, NASA management and external stakeholders have
an important need for information that helps them to prioritize the
allocation of scarce Federal dollars. Congress and the White House must
be assured that NASA is using its resources in the most effective
manner to achieve the goals they have set for the Agency. Only through
well designed and implemented processes and systems, effective internal
controls and well trained and disciplined staff will the Agency be able
to deliver the fidelity of financial information that is required.
Today it is clear from audit reports and the OCFO's own analysis of
its processes, systems and data that improvement is necessary before
the required fidelity is achieved. This comprehensive and integrated
financial audit corrective action plan is an important tool for
organizing and efficiently managing NASA's financial audit
improvements. The problems cited in IG audit reports did not appear
overnight; nor will they disappear quickly, either. This plan is a
realistic reflection of the time and effort required to make the
necessary improvements.
This plan takes a holistic view of the financial management
challenges at NASA. It recognizes the interrelatedness of process
across the organization; how problems in an operations process can
ultimately contribute to problems with how costs are captured and
reported in financial management processes. With that perspective, this
plan identifies and resolves the root causes of NASA's financial audit
weaknesses.
WHAT THE CAP IS AND WHAT IT DOES
NASA's financial audit corrective action plan (CAP) is NASA's
response to the financial audit recommendations made by IG auditors in
the 2005 financial audit. The CAP is organized around the reportable
conditions contained in the auditor's Report on Internal Control (NASA
Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report, pages 190-212).
For each reportable condition, the plan is further organized by the
specific recommendations contained in the Report on Internal Control.
For each recommendation, NASA has developed, and has begun
implementation of, logical, interdependent sets of specific actions
that directly address that recommendation. The CAP lays out how NASA
will address each recommendation made by the IG auditors. The
graphicdepicts the layout of the plan for one sample reportable
condition.
The CAP is designed to provide NASA's framework for resolving the
internal control and management weaknesses identified by the IG
auditors. These extend beyond financial accounting into the operations
of the agency. Effectively resolving the identified weaknesses will
take a coordinated and integrated effort involving the support, buy-in
and ownership of many NASA offices and directorates. Affected
organizations have been involved in the creation of this plan, and, in
many cases, have been assigned the primary responsibility for taking
the necessary actions to resolve the identified weaknesses.
The financial audit CAP is a living document. Performance against
the plan will be monitored on a regular basis and initiatives will be
adjusted as needed to ensure that results continue to meet the goals
and objectives of the plan. The plan projects actions and target dates
for resolving the issues. All projections are based on currently known
information and may change over time.
LINKING THE CAP TO NASA'S FINANCIAL LEADERSHIP PLAN (RP)
In 2004, NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer published a
four-year Financial Leadership Plan. This plan lays out the vision for
financial management at NASA through three comprehensive goals:
--1. Provide the Agency's Mission Directorates and Mission Support
Areas with the financial knowledge, information and tools
required to effectively manage programs, projects, institutions
and overall NASA resources.
--2. Ensure that all stakeholders have a clear understanding and
accurate assessment of how NASA resources effectively and
efficiently support NASA's vision.
--3. Enable the OCFO workforce to provide world-class management and
processes in support of the Agency's Mission Directorates and
Mission Support Areas.
Each of these four-year goals is supported by a set of one to two-
year objectives. Each objective, or set of objectives, has associated
with it initiatives intended to help NASA achieve that objective.
Financial Leadership Plan initiatives are solution sets to known issues
or improvements to current operations that contain specific activities
scheduled, sequenced, and assigned in documented project plans. These
initiatives are led by staff members from headquarters or one of the
NASA Field Centers, and staffed by appropriate subject matter experts
from across NASA. The graphic depicts the relationships throughout the
planning process.
This corrective action plan represents one set of initiatives that
specifically addresses NASA's ability to provide accurate, reliable and
timely financial information to decision-makers and external
stakeholders. The Financial Leadership Plan includes other financial
management improvement initiatives not directly linked to NASA audit
recommendations.
MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT
NASA's commitment to making financial management improvements is
evident at all levels of the organization, not just in the Office of
the Chief Financial Officer. This plan was developed through a combined
effort of the owners and operators of both the financial and those non-
financial processes that are contributing to the identified weaknesses.
Through the sponsorship of NASA's Administrator and Deputy
Administrator, the Agency is clear about the importance of resolving
these outstanding management and internal control weaknesses. Several
infrastructure elements are in place to help ensure the plan's success.
OCFO Governance Structure
The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has developed a
governance structure that will help to guide and speed information flow
during the implementation of the corrective action plan.
Recommendations for change that result from implementation of the plan
will be presented to either the OCFO Financial Steering Group or the
Financial Executive Roundtable, depending on the scope and magnitude of
the anticipated changes, for approval and disposition. These groups are
made up of OCFO headquarters and Field Center leadership who will have
the ultimate responsibility for implementing changes in NASA financial
processes and systems. The use of the governance structure will add
discipline to the corrective action process, and speed communications
and implementation.
Monthly and Quarterly Oversight
Measuring progress against the corrective action plan begins with
regular status reports from the initiative owners. The OCFO's program
management function will asses progress, make project management
recommendations, and suggest changes to specific initiatives, as
necessary. Progress is measured both in terms of completed activities
and assessments of work products.
The OCFO will report on overall corrective action plan progress
monthly to the Agency's Deputy Administrator. The Deputy Administrator
has the authority to determine Agency improvement priorities and to
address resource needs.
The OCFO will provide regular updates to NASA's Inspector General
and, as needed, with IG auditors.
Enhanced Human Resources
Having the necessary resources to implement the plan is a
recognized challenge. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer has
received the authority to hire the staff and engage the contractors it
needs to execute its responsibilities against the plan. The challenge
lies in finding the right people at the right time, quickly
familiarizing those people with the current issues, processes and
systems, and doing all of this while managing the day-to-day operations
of the office.
CHAPTER 2: THE ELEMENTS OF THE CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY THE NASA INSPECTOR GENERAL
Each year the Inspector General (IG) conducts financial audits
assessing NASA's operations and facilities as required by the Chief
Financial Officers' Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-576) as amended. In
2005, as in 2004 and 2003, the IG's independent public auditors
determined that the scope of their work was not sufficient to enable
them to express an opinion on NASA's financial statements.
From the work that the independent public auditors were able to
perform, they identified four reportable conditions, three of which
they considered to be material. Each of these reportable conditions is
a repeat condition from the fiscal year 2004 financial audit. A
material weakness is an identified problem that may impact the accuracy
and reliability of financial information. NASA is committed to
implementing solutions that best resolve these weaknesses.
The reportable conditions and NASA's goals, objectives and
strategies for resolving them are contained in this section of the
plan.
Initiative Overviews
Financial Systems, Analyses, and Oversight
Fund Balance With Treasury
Property, Plant & Equipment
Environmental Liabilities
1. Financial Systems, Analyses, and Oversight. (Material Weakness)
``Although progress was made [since the 2004 audit], significant
financial management issues continue to impair NASA's ability to
accumulate, analyze, and distribute reliable financial information.''
(Reference: NASA Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report
(PAR), Part 3, page 193)
Background
The implementation of NASA's Core Financial system in fiscal year
2003 represented a major transformation in NASA's financial management
systems and processes. Immediately following the completion of the
system's implementation, challenges were identified in system
processing, configuration and capabilities. While challenges from this
major change were anticipated, it has taken longer than expected to
stabilize the financial environment. The current version of NASA's
automated financial system has capability limitations which have
required the definition and implementation of compensating controls.
Examples of these limitations include:
--Audit trails within the system do not distinguish between source
documents of original entry and correction transactions
--Lack of fully automated support for adjustments to prior year
obligations
The independent public auditors specifically noted that
documentation regarding significant accounting events, recording of
non-standard transactions, and post closing adjustments, as well as
corrections and other adjustments made in connection with data
conversion issues must be strengthened. (Fiscal Year 2005 PAR, page
211)
Future versions of the Core Financial system promise to provide
capabilities to improve the integrity of budgetary ledger postings and
to further automate accounting processes. NASA has scheduled a system
update early in fiscal year 2007 that is intended to address many of
these issues through enhanced system capabilities and process
improvements.
Implementation of a Commercial Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS)
package in the federal government has presented its own set of
challenges. The alignment of NASA processes and its enterprise resource
planning (ERP) system is an ongoing activity.
Goal
NASA's goal for resolving this material weakness is to improve
NASA's financial management system and processes to achieve accurate,
reliable and timely financial information.
Objective
Supporting that goal is the objective of developing core standard
agency-wide procedures and tools to review and validate that financial
data and processes are consistent with authoritative guidance issued by
FASAB, Treasury and OMB.
Strategy
The strategy for achieving that objective is to develop and
implement procedures to identify and validate financial data and
processes in IEMP, to strengthen internal controls to ensure
consistency with authoritative guidance, and to implement automated
financial system enhancements to complement process changes.
Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2005
NASA made progress in 2005 towards resolving this material
weakness, which was also identified in 2004. Highlights of these
accomplishments are provided below, grouped by categories identified in
the 2004 financial audit.
``Lack of Integrated Financial Management System'' (2004 Audit
Finding Category)
--NASA eliminated noted weaknesses in its Integrated Enterprise
Management (IEM) information technology control environment
(NASA's financial system is one component of IEM). The
weaknesses were identified in three control areas: access
controls; systems software; and, segregation of duties.
--NASA implemented compensating controls and improved system
capabilities to improve its ability to identify and document
correction activities within the Core Financial system. With
these improvements, audit trails have been established by
identifying and linking certain system transactions between
original, reversal and re-post transactions.
--Through systems configuration analysis and modification, and
through the reconciliation of remaining data anomalies from
conversion in 2003, NASA generated fully supported year-end
financial statements directly from the Agency's Core Financial
system. Year-end balances are now supported by the Core
Financial system.
``Financial Statement Preparation and Analysis'' (2004 Audit
Finding Category)
--Through policies and procedures established in NASA's Financial
Management Requirements (FMR), Volume 19, Periodic Monitoring
Controls Activities, all NASA Field Centers are performing 23
financial reconciliations or verifications on a scheduled
basis. Field Center CFOs are providing certifications for each
reconciliation or verification to Headquarters, where they are
tracked and reviewed.
--NASA Field Center CFOs and Deputy CFOs reviewed and certified the
year-end financial management data from their Centers, and
included a statement that all corrections were fully
documented, for audit trail purposes, in NASA's official audit
tracking system.
--NASA developed and adopted enhanced financial statement validation
procedures and checklists for use at all Field Centers and
Headquarters. Through the preparation of extensive crosswalks
between NASA and Treasury financial data, the Agency has
validated that both the data and the business rules for posting
data into specific accounts are accurate. Also, checklists are
now in place for the preparation of financial statements. These
checklists are reviewed and certified by Field Center
management.
``Additional Controls Need to be Strengthened'' (2004 Audit Finding
Category)
--NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) increased
staffing to support financial management activities. In May
2005, NASA's OCFO received relief from a NASA-wide hiring
freeze and approval to increase its headcount in fiscal year
2006 at Headquarters by 34 positions (including 2 Senior
Executive Service leadership positions) and at Field Centers by
50 positions. As of February 1, 2006, 90 percent of these
positions have been filled.
--NASA published the first volumes of the NASA Financial Management
Requirements (FMR) to ensure complete and consistent
application of NASA financial management policy. The FMR has
been distributed to appropriate Headquarters and Center staff.
--NASA established a financial quality assurance function to provide
direction and focus for NASA Internal Control activities. This
function has developed an agency-wide Policy Compliance Review
Plan, a corporate quality assurance strategy, and a
comprehensive internal control strategy to ensure that the
agency is positioned to successfully meet OMB A-123
requirements. In addition, all Centers have received internal
control training in conjunction with quality assurance visits.
--Other noted weaknesses have been addressed through compensating
controls for subsidiary ledgers and systems, including
property, to ensure the quality of data entered into the
official accounting system. A new system was created for
Contractor held assets, Contractor-Held Asset Tracking System
(CHATS). CHATS implementation has provided additional
validation and checks and balances for property data input.
Approach for Fiscal Year 2006
NASA has developed a comprehensive set of planned corrective
actions to further address each of the financial audit recommendations.
Following is a set of tables that track each planned corrective action
to the recommendations in the financial audit report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material Weakness or Reportable
Condition with Recommendation Number Planned Corrective Action (PCA) Target Date for PCA Completion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, Perform a review and verification to ensure that information presented 11/15/06
and Oversight (1a-g) in the Performance and Accountability Report (PAR) is accurate and
Recommendation 1a: Continue to consistent with OMB Circular A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements.
improve its financial reporting PCA 1 Submitted fiscal year 2005 PAR to AGA for feedback on the construction, Complete
and internal quality review content, and applicability of the report, as part of the CEAR Award
procedures to reasonably assure PCA 2 process. 3/31/06
that information presented in PCA 3 Review results of CEAR review process.................................. 3/31/06
the Performance and PCA 4 Gather feedback on PAR from OMB and Mercatus........................... 2nd Quarter
Accountability Report is Review latest revision of OMB Circular A-136 and incorporate required
accurate and consistent with the PCA 5 updates for fiscal year 2006 PAR. 3/31/06
requirements of OMB Circular A- Review PAR's from other Federal Agencies to identify potential areas of
136, Financial Reporting PCA 6 improvement for NASA. Draft by 7/31/06. Final by 11/15/
Requirements. Incorporate improvements in the Management Discussion and Analysis 06
PCA 7 (MD&A) section of the PAR as appropriate based on feedback received. Volume to accompany Draft MD&A
Verify accuracy of the MD&A portion of the PAR and compile supporting by 7/31/06. Volume to accompany
documentation. Final by 11/15/06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, Modify the statement of net cost (SONC) to provide a breakdown of net To coincide with 2nd quarter
and Oversight (1a-g) costs consistent with strategic plan and in the Management Discussion financial statements
Recommendation 1b: Configure the and Analysis (MD&A) section by major line of business. ................................
Core Financial Module to provide PCA 1 Defined the requirements and breakdown for the SONC; submitted a Complete
a breakdown of net costs Service Request (SR) to initiate the development of the report in SAP;
consistent with programs and reviewed the requirements with IEMP Competency Center (CC).
identified in NASA's strategic
plan and in the Management's
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)
section of the financial
statements.
PCA 2 Developed the report in SAP based on the requirements submitted by OCFO Complete
and coordinate with OCFO as needed.
PCA 3 Test (jointly) the report to ensure the report meets the requirements, 2/21/06
with OCFO approval required for production client.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Generate monthly financial statements and review prior to interim and Monthly
and Oversight (1a-g) year-end reporting dates to ensure completeness. Produce monthly
Recommendation 1c1: Ensure that financial statements from SAP.
systems used to prepare the PCA 2 Establish a cross-Agency task team to develop monthly schedule with due 3/1/06
financial statements are dates for data processing, reconciliations, verifications, feedback,
complete and have been and reports.
sufficiently tested prior to
interim and year-end reporting
dates.
PCA 3 Distribute monthly schedule to Centers................................. 3/3/06
PCA 4 Implement monthly schedule............................................. 3/31/06
PCA 5 Established procedures to ensure that all system configuration changes Complete
are subject to regression tests and year-end test procedures which
validate that changes made to the Core Financial System are valid,
appropriate, and do not adversely impact end-to-end business
processes, including external reporting.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Update Center workplans to capture remaining data anomalies from fiscal 2/10/06
and Oversight (1a-g) year 2003. ................................
Recommendation 1c2: NASA should PCA 2 Coordinate corrective actions with Centers and IEMP Competency Center 3/31/06
continue to validate its data to determine necessary steps. ................................
within the Core Financial Module PCA 3 Monitor progress until remaining data anomalies are resolved........... 6/30/06
to resolve issues with data
integrity that date back to the
system conversion in fiscal year
2003 to ensure that date is
accurate and complete.
PCA 4 Perform monthly reconciliation of financial data residing in the core Monthly
financial system.
PCA 5 Verify that Centers and IEMP Competency Center are executing standard Monthly
reconciliation procedures.
PCA 6 Review results of Center and IEMP Competency Center reconciliation Monthly
procedures.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Establish and implement an error correction and prior period adjustment 2/28/06
and Oversight (1a-g) procedure consistent with the FASAB (SFFAS #7) standards that allows
Recommendation 1c3: In addition, for the tracking of these items within SAP.
NASA should continue to develop
a long-term solution within IEMP
to identify, support, and track
adjustments made to general
ledger accounts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Established safeguards to ensure that system does not pay cost in Complete
and Oversight (1a-g) excess of obligation. ................................
Recommendation 1d: Continue to PCA 2 Develop compensating procedures to analyze Business Warehouse on a 3/31/06
devise short-term and long-term quarterly basis to ensure that liabilities are appropriately recorded. ................................
resolutions to IEMP systematic PCA 3 Formed cross-functional task team to review current process and Complete
and integration issues. Lack of identify opportunities for reengineering.
internal controls surrounding
costs in excess of obligations
and downward adjustments.
PCA 4 Conducted benchmarking sessions with Dept. of Education, Dept. of Complete
Agriculture, and others to identify best practices and lessons learned
for funds control, cost collection, and accrual processing.
PCA 5 Drafted proposed process design and high level requirements............ Complete
PCA 6 Obtained OCFO and Center CFO approval of SAP Version Update Project Complete
Scope Document which incorporated requirements from task team efforts.
PCA 7 Incorporate process design into Core Financial System Update Version 3rd Quarter Fiscal Year 2006
proj- ect.
PCA 8 Implement Core Financial System Version Update project, including 10/1/06
improved process designs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Developed an Operational Level Agreement (OLA) for the IEMP Competency Complete
and Oversight (1a-g) Center and Agency CFO to operate under that prescribes their ................................
Recommendation 1e1: Formally respective responsibilities pertaining to master data management and ................................
document roles and periodic closing processes. ................................
responsibilities of PCA 2 Finalized the OCFO Governance Structure, which encompasses the decision Complete
Headquarters, IEMP Competency making process within the financial management community and its ................................
Center, and center financial communications with IEMP. ................................
management personnel across all PCA 3 Developed performance metrics for Center CFOs to monitor compliance Complete
levels to ensure that with OCFO priorities, strategies, and objectives, as documented in the
appropriate responsibilities are Financial Leadership Plan.
aligned with job functions and
that accountability is achieved
at each level.
PCA 4 Shared performance metrics with Center CFO's........................... 2/1/06
PCA 5 Begin capturing metric information..................................... 2/28/06, utilizing 1st Quarter
data
PCA 6 Conduct quarterly evaluations or progress with Center CFO's............ Quarterly beginning 4/26/06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Continue to hire as expeditiously as possible up to allocated ceiling.. On-going
and Oversight (1a-g)
Recommendation 1e2: Additionally,
we recognize that resource
limitations may constrain NASA's
ability to execute its mission.
Management should continue to
focus on filling key vacancies
within the financial management
organization.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Issued quarterly report documenting all training conducted during the Complete
and Oversight (1a-g) 1st quarter of fiscal year 2006. ................................
Recommendation 1f: Provide PCA 2 Utilize a needs assessment and develop a training plan for providing 3/31/2006
additional ``hands-on'' training the following training: Processing transactions, Performing account
for financial personnel--at analyses and reconciliations, Maintenance of supporting documentation,
headquarter and center levels-- and Financial reporting requirements.
to ensure that they understand
their roles in processing
transactions, performing account
analyses and reconciliations,
maintaining supporting
documentation, and updating
their knowledge of financial
reporting requirements.
PCA 3 Execute and monitor the plan on a quarterly basis...................... 9/30/2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#1 Financial Systems, Analyses, PCA 1 Produce a series of management reports to facilitate financial Monthly 15th working day
and Oversight (1a-g) management oversight and analysis; e.g. aging, delinquencies, prompt
Recommendation 1g: Develop payment, etc. Suite of reports will be continually enhanced based on
reports from the Core Financial management requests.
Module to facilitate reviews and
ensure that aging of
transactions and open items, un-
liquidated obligations, grants,
and other key areas are
periodically assessed,
researched, and resolved.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Further Research Required to Resolve Fund Balance With Treasury
Differences. (Material Weakness)
``Although we were informed that many errors from fiscal year 2003
were resolved, significant errors within the accounting system were
still being identified by NASA in fiscal year 2005. Fund balance with
Treasury reconciliation processes were ineffective in fiscal year 2004
and much of fiscal year 2005, through the date of our visits to
centers, but it is our understanding that steps taken by NASA in the
last quarter of the year are believed by NASA management to have
substantially improved the effectiveness of such reconciliations.''
(Reference: NASA Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report
(PAR), Part page 201)
Background
NASA's Fund Balance with Treasury represents monies the agency can
spend for authorized transactions. Each month, NASA is required to
reconcile the difference between the amount of money it reports to be
in its Fund Balance with Treasury with the amount that Treasury reports
to be in the account. The 2005 audit identified FBWT as a material
weakness due to unreconciled discrepancies between Treasury's balance
and the balance represented in NASA's Core Financial system.
IG auditors indicated that documentation to support the application
of rigorous reconciliation processes was not available for their
review. (Fiscal Year 2005 PAR, page 211)
Goal
NASA's goal for resolving this material weakness is to fully
reconcile the agency's Fund Balance with Treasury and to process any
future corrections in a timely manner.
Objective
Supporting that goal is the objective of monitoring Fund Balance
With Treasury on a regular basis to ensure compliance with NASA and
Treasury policies, procedures and practices.
Strategy
The strategy for achieving that objective is three-fold:
--1. Center CFOs will perform monthly reconciliations and certify
their completion with Agency OCFO.
--2. Agency OCFO will perform monthly reviews of Center
reconciliations to ensure compliance with reconciliation
policies and procedures.
--3. OCFO will institute management reviews and monitor compliance
with the following metrics:
--a. Reconciliations performed every 30 days
--b. Corrections processed within 120 days of discovery
Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2005
In fiscal year 2005, NASA enhanced its funds distribution process
through policy and procedural changes to minimize manual and repetitive
process steps. The Agency will continue to refine and implement
enhancements.
In addressing previous year differences in NASA's Fund Balance with
Treasury, the OCFO reduced the out of balance condition through the
following actions:
--Developed and implemented a standard process that requires a review
and approval process be followed to correct errors, supported
with appropriate documentation.
--Implemented across all Field Centers standard reconciliation
procedures and associated templates to monitor FBWT status on a
monthly basis. These procedures will help to ensure timely
resolution of variances. The procedures make up the Periodic
Monitoring Controls Activities handbook, Volume 19 of NASA's
Financial Management Requirements (FMR). Policy was also
implemented requiring each Field Center CFO to review and
certify to Headquarters monthly that the reviews and
reconciliations were performed, and are complete and accurate.
--Developed and implemented a standard process to review and approve
the write-off of unsupportable differences.
--Established teams to resolve identified FBWT issues at targeted
NASA Field Centers.
--Implemented monthly Agency cash monitoring procedures and
guidelines to track reconciliations and the timely resolution
of differences.
--Implemented across all Field Centers an automated cash
reconciliation tool to identify differences and augment timely
processing of transactions.
Approach for Fiscal Year 2006
NASA has developed a comprehensive set of planned corrective
actions to address each of the financial audit recommendations.
Following is a set of tables that track each planned corrective action
to the recommendations from the financial audit report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material Weakness or Reportable
Condition with Recommendation Number Planned Corrective Action (PCA) Target Date for PCA Completion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#2 Further Research Required to PCA 1 Status Center CFOs to ensure monthly reconciliations are performed..... Monthly
Resolve Fund Balance with PCA 2 Review and monitor compliance with Fund Balance with Treasury policies, Monthly
Treasury Differences (2a). procedures, and practices. ................................
Recommendation 2a: We recommend PCA 3 Perform a CRCS to SAP reconciliation and resolve differences........... 6/30/06
that NASA continue to improve PCA 4 Established Fund Balance with Treasury metrics......................... Complete
its current procedures to ensure PCA 5 Assess compliance with Fund Balance with Treasury policies, procedures, 3/31/06
that all reconciling items are and practices.
thoroughly researched, timely
resolved, and reviewed by
appropriate center and
headquarters OCFO personnel. In
addition, NASA should retain all
reports and documentation used
in performing its fund balance
with Treasury reconciliations to
ensure that detailed, documented
explanations and resolution
actions are maintained for a
sufficient audit trail.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Enhancements needed for controls over Property, Plant and Equipment
(PP&E) and materials. (Material Weakness)
``Consistent with prior year audit reports, our review of property,
plant, and equipment (PP&E), totaling approximately $35.0 billion,
identified serious weaknesses in internal control that, if not
corrected, could prevent material misstatements from being detected and
corrected in a timely manner.'' (Reference: NASA Fiscal Year 2005
Performance and Accountability Report (PAR), Part 3, page 203)
Background
NASA Mission-related products are designed, built and deployed to
carry-out the agency's exploration and research objectives. Given the
unique scientific nature of the agency's work, these programs, such as
Hubble and the International Space Station, are highly specialized, and
to develop and maintain them, NASA contracts with industry. Often
multiple contractors participate in the design and creation of these
products in a cycle that, in some cases, has taken as long as forty
years from concept through deployment.
The primary issues related to NASA property, plant and equipment
are threefold:
--1. the accuracy and completeness of the financial records--meaning
the classification (expense or asset) and valuation--of project
property, plant and equipment, as well as the coding of
documents at obligation that carry through expenditure
--2. the accountability for the materials and equipment used in the
construction of physical products
--3. the accuracy and timeliness of contractor provided financial
information--including the classification (expense or asset)
and valuation--related to the status of contractor-held
property, plant and equipment and materials
First, given the complex and unique nature of its research and
development work, NASA and its respective auditors and GAO
representatives, have struggled over the years to define and agree upon
an approach, and related policies, for reporting program and product
costs in a manner consistent with FASAB guidelines. This impacts the
classification of PP&E costs (asset or expense), the valuation of
interim and finished products, and, ultimately NASA's financial
statements.
Second, as contractors develop parts and components of an overall
product, they ship them from the manufacturing location to various NASA
Centers across the country in preparation for assembly into a finished
product. NASA has been working to ensure proper control over these
components.
Finally, preparation of NASA's financial statements is dependent
upon contractors and their NASA program counterparts reporting costs
associated with developing these parts. The accuracy, completeness and
timeliness of this reporting must be improved.
IG auditors specifically noted that controls relating principally
to contractor-held PP&E and materials and NASA-held assets in space
(Theme Assets) need improvement, and that headquarters oversight needs
improvement. (Fiscal Year 2005 PAR, page 211)
Goal
NASA's goal for resolving this material weakness is to improve the
agency's internal controls over its property, plant and equipment
(PP&E).
Objective
Supporting that goal are the objectives to:
--1. Develop core standard agency-wide procedures and tools to review
and validate that financial data and processes are consistent
with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for
Federal reporting entities.
--2. Provide relevant, accurate, reliable, and timely financial
property information to stakeholders.
Strategy
The strategy for achieving that objective has six elements:
--1. Define Asset Categories (NASA-Held vs. Contractor-Held and
Program Related vs. Non-Program Related), based on published
accounting guidance (e.g. SFFAS #'s 6, 8, & 11 and SFAS #2)
--2. Define appropriate accounting treatment of an asset based upon
its use (Alternative vs. No Alternative Future Use), based on
published accounting guidance (e.g. SFFAS #'s 6, 8, & 11 and
SFAS #2);
--3. Review NASA's revised capitalization policy with OMB, OIG, GAO,
FASAB, and E&Y;
--4. Review and revise, as necessary, the PP&E policy regarding the
accounting treatment;
--5. Engage the entire NASA community (OCFO, Project/Program
Managers, Procurement, Logistics and Facilities) in improving
PP&E financial management and internal controls;
--6. Define, Communicate, Train and Implement procedures for
effective Property, Plant & Equipment Lifecycle Management, to
include valuation of Assets.
Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2005
NASA has made great strides toward enhancing its internal controls
and addressing the weaknesses in NASA's accounting for its Property,
Plant and Equipment and Materials.
NASA successfully implemented a system to account for assets held
by contractors, Contractor Held Asset Tracking System (CHATS) to
address the potential concern of inadequate supervisory reviews of the
Contractor submitted data and have a data base for the costs of these
fixed assets. The system is currently being used and was in place when
DCAA conducted its audit of agreed upon procedures on NASA's largest
contractors. As a part of the audit, DCAA reviewed whether Contractor
policies and procedures provide for detecting and correcting errors
reported on the Monthly CHATS reports.
The DCAA reviews were conducted closer to the end of the fiscal
year than had previously been the case in order to support the asset
balance on NASA's Balance Sheet at year-end. DCAA was also tasked with
reviewing contractor compliance in resolving prior year reported
deficiencies. Preliminary feedback from the draft reports indicates
that progress has been made during fiscal year 2005 toward resolving
these deficiencies.
NASA now performs the following activities to ensure
reconciliations of asset transfers between contractors:
--Completion of a monthly validation checklist requiring that all
transfers of $1 million or more be supportable with appropriate
documentation.
--Preparation monthly of a Transfer Matrix report by the NASA Center
property accountants. This report, using the data in CHATS,
lists all transfers made between and among contractors or with
NASA Field Centers. This reporting will assist NASA
Headquarters with readily identifying inter-contract transfers.
In keeping with the auditors' recommendation to fundamentally
revisit its approach to capitalizing property, NASA developed a
proposed change in accounting policy for the capitalization of Theme
Assets--the largest portion of NASA's PP&E. This policy would require
NASA to expense all costs as incurred for projects that are exploratory
in nature, that have no alternative future uses and are not reusable or
repairable (i.e. research and development type costs). The change would
more accurately reflect the nature of program and project expenditures.
NASA also implemented the Project Management Information
Improvement (PMI\2\) initiative in 2005. PMI\2\ is a project work
breakdown coding structure that tracks a project from obligation
through expenditure. PMI\2\ benefits include:
--Alignment of the Agency's technical WBS with the financial coding
structure
--Data standardization and configuration management
--Consistent and standardized tool for project management reporting
--Timely, consistent and reliable information for management
decisions
--Program and Project managers gain the ability to view detailed
costs and obligations at the project level
Approach for Fiscal Year 2006
NASA has developed a comprehensive set of planned corrective
actions to address each of the financial audit recommendations.
Following is a set of tables that track each planned corrective action
to the recommendations from the financial audit report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material Weakness or Reportable
Condition with Recommendation Number Planned Corrective Action (PCA) Target Date for PCA Completion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#3. Enhancements Needed for PCA 1 Defined Asset Categories based on published accounting guidance and Complete
Controls Over Property, Plant, NASA's business environment--Finalized how property will be classified
and Equipment and Materials. (e.g., NASA Held and Contractor Held Program Related vs. Non-Program
Recommendation 3a1: We recommend PCA 2 Related, etc.). Draft Complete
that NASA continue to focus on Completed draft defining appropriate accounting treatment per Asset Final Complete
resolving prior year issues and category and use (based on published accounting guidance and NASA's
completing its implementation of PCA 3 business environment). 2/28/06
suggested recommendations and PCA 4 Provide OMB, GAO, FASAB, and OIG NASA's revised capitalization policy.. 3/15/06
developing detailed corrective PCA 5 Adjust capitalization policy as necessary.............................. 3/31/06
action plans. Flowchart and document desired business processes and procedures, and
Recommendation 3a2a: In addition, define roles and responsibilities for effective PP&E lifecycle
we once again place further management, to include valuation of Assets. ................................
emphasis on recommending that Incorporate OIG comments in the flow charts as appropriate and ................................
NASA fundamentally revisit its PCA 6 disposition. 3/31/06
approach to capitalizing Identify and coordinate changes that must be made to existing policies
property. Agency-wide.
Recommendation 3a2b: Documenting, Meet with HQ Mission Support Offices (Procurement, Office of Chief
analyzing, and implementing Engineer, Institutions & Management, etc.).
robust control changes from end Develop a list of potential associated policy impacts
to end to all categories of PP&E. Coordinate with HQ Mission Support Offices to obtain draft policy
Recommendation 3a3: We also updates.
recommend that all NASA
obligation documents and
expenditures be coded to
identify whether they relate to
a property acquisition to create
a control for comparison to
recorded property transactions
and subsidiary ledgers, be they
NASA activities or contractors.
PCA 7 Assign cross-functional teams to participate in Working Groups to re- 4/3/06
engineer, as necessary, NASA's current processes and procedures.
PCA 8 Engage working groups to: 5/31/06
Identify process and system(s) gaps between current processes and
desired processes, as well as, identifying solutions. Specifically,
teams will focus on the following areas of PP&E Lifecycle
management:
Planning
Acquisition
Management Control and Accountability
Disposition
Ensure that OIG comments regarding specific corrective actions are
incorporated in the flow charts as appropriate and dispositioned.
Review Compensating Control Team recommendations and other relevant
material.
Establish single points of accountability within the PP&E Lifecycle.
Establish a certification requirement (Center Director for Real and
Personal Property/Chief Engineer or Mission Director for Program
Assets).
Establish format for new RSSI disclosure reporting requirements.
PCA 9 Develop Process Implementation Plan for Changes Agency-wide............ 6/16/06
PCA 10 Complete interim policy and process changes, as necessary, to include 9/29/06
the following:
Program/Project Management policies
Procurement policies
Financial policies
Logistics policies
Facilities policies
Conduct focused communication forums with accountable parties to
discuss their roles and responsibilities within the PP&E lifecycle.
Prepare analysis and record changes to reported fixed assets and
expenses based upon revised policies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Internal controls in estimating NASA's Environmental Liabilities
require enhancement.
``During our review of NASA's environmental liability estimates
totaling $825 million as of September 30, 2005, and related disclosures
to the financial statements, we continued to note weaknesses in NASA's
ability to generate an auditable estimate of its unfunded environmental
liabilities (UEL) and to identify potential financial statement
disclosure items because of a lack of sufficient, auditable evidence.''
(Reference: NASA Fiscal Year 2005 Performance and Accountability Report
(PAR), Part 3, page 207)
Background
Due to the highly complex scientific and technical nature of NASA's
work, the Agency's scientific and engineering community develops the
actual estimates for environmental liabilities. The OCFO provides
accounting expertise in the form of policy and guidance to the
Environmental Liabilities staff responsible for developing these
estimates. Once estimates have been developed, they are then delivered
to the OCFO accounting staff, who records them in NASA's Core Financial
system.
IG auditors specifically noted weaknesses in NASA's ability to
generate auditable unfunded environmental liability estimates and to
identify disclosure items. (Fiscal Year 2005 PAR, page 211)
Goal
NASA's goal for resolving this material weakness is to validate the
tools and methodology used to prepare the unfunded environmental
liability estimates.
Objective
Supporting that goal are the objectives to:
--1. Develop standard agency-wide procedures to be applied by all
Environmental Liability staff on the preparation, reviewing,
validation, and processing of environmental liabilities, in
agreement with guidance from statutory agencies (OMB, FASAB,
Treasury, and State and local Governments).
--2. Ensure that all staff involved in the development of the
environmental liability estimates and in the review, analysis,
and processing of those estimates in the financial system are
properly trained.
Strategy
The strategy for achieving that objective is to improve existing
environmental liability procedures and implement needed internal
controls to assure the improved procedures are adhered to and followed.
NASA will also provide proper training to all staff involved in the
development of the environmental liability estimates and the review,
analysis, and processing in the financial system.
Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2005
The OCFO and the Environmental Management Division (EMD) developed
a close working partnership to coordinate policies, processes and
controls for estimating NASA's environmental liabilities. Members from
both offices met weekly to identify and resolve issues, and determine
the most appropriate steps toward improved estimates.
NASA has developed and conducted training in conjunction with the
EMD for staff that provides guidance and policy for estimating
environmental liabilities. The training outlines the process for
estimating environmental liabilities, explains Federal accounting
standards and guidance, defines quality review processes, and addresses
existing audit findings.
NASA has developed and published documented procedures for
estimating environmental liabilities. These procedures have been
distributed to all Centers.
Approach for Fiscal Year 2006
NASA has developed a comprehensive set of planned corrective
actions to address each of the financial audit recommendations.
Following is a set of tables that track each planned corrective action
to the recommendation from the financial audit report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Material Weakness or Reportable
Condition with Recommendation Number Planned Corrective Action (PCA) Target Date for PCA Completion
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#4 Internal Controls in PCA 1 Update the plan developed in response to the 2004 management letter 2/28/06
Estimating NASA's Environmental comments.
Liability Require Enhancement. PCA 2 Host the second joint, OCFO and Environmental Management Division 3/31/06
Recommendation 4a1: We recommend (EMD), training course to expedite the overall resolution of the
that NASA expedite the progress action plan.
on the action plan it developed
in response to our fiscal year
2004 audit.
PCA 3 Develop and have available for auditor review, the Environmental 5/31/06
Liability estimates based on 2nd quarter data.
PCA 4 Conduct review of Environmental Liability estimation process........... 7/15/06
PCA 5 Complete final liability adjustments based on current information...... 9/15/06
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#4 Internal Controls in PCA 1 Update 2004 plan to include action and timeframes for addressing and 2/28/06
Estimating NASA's Environmental resolving center and facility specific findings.
Liability Require Enhancement.
Recommendation 4a2: In addition,
we recommend that NASA include
in the action plan the center
and facility specific findings
that were identified during the
fiscal year 2004 audit as
opposed to the current work plan
steps which address only those
fiscal year 2004 observations
that were thought to be common
across all centers or apply to
headquarters.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#4 Internal Controls in Jointly assess the effectiveness of UEL internal controls, cost
Estimating NASA's Environmental estimation process and data gathering procedures. ................................
Liability Require Enhancement. PCA 2 Develop review/internal control checklist.............................. 3/1/06
Recommendation 4a3: We also PCA 3 Conduct site visits utilizing checklist................................ 7/15/06
recommend that NASA's OCFO PCA 4 Generate report for management review and disposition.................. 8/30/06
perform a self-assessment of the PCA 5 Incorporate changes as necessary based on joint assessment............. 9/15/06
Unfunded Environmental Liability
(UEL) estimation and aggregation
process. This assessment should
focus on identifying additional
weaknesses in NASA's UEL system
that went undetected because no
final estimates were available
for our review at the time of
our audit.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#4 Internal Controls in PCA 1 Assess utilization of IDEAL parametric model........................... 8/30/06
Estimating NASA's Environmental PCA 2 Incorporate changes as necessary....................................... 9/15/06
Liability Require Enhancement.
Recommendation 4b: NASA should
also continue to validate the
tools (including IDEAL) and
methodology used at the center
and facility level to prepare
the UEL estimates.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAPTER 3: INITIATIVE WORKPLANS
Initiative Workplans
--Financial Systems, Analyses, and Oversight
--Fund Balance With Treasury
--Property, Plant & Equipment
--Environmental Liabilities
APPENDIX
ACRONYMS
CAP--Corrective Action Plan
CC--Competency Center
CEAR--Certificate of Excellence in Accountability Reporting
CFO--Chief Financial Officer
COTS--Commercial off-the-shelf
CRCS--Central Resources Control System
DCFO--Deputy Chief Financial Officer
EMD--Environmental Management Division
E&Y--Ernst and Young
FASAB--Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board
FBWT--Fund Balance With Treasury
GAO--General Accounting Office
HQs--NASA Headquarters
IDEAL--Integrated Data Evaluation and Analysis Library
IEMP--Integrated Enterprise Management Program
MD&A--Management Discussion and Analysis
NASA--National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OCFO--Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OIG--Office of the Inspector General
OLA--Operational Level Agreements
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
PAR--Performance and Accountability Report
PCA--Planned Corrective Action
PP&E--Plant, Property and Equipment
RSSI--Required Supplementary Stewardship Information
SAP--Systems, Applications, and Products
SFAS--Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
SFFAS--Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards
SONC--Statement of Net Cost
SR--Service Request
UEL--Unfunded Environmental Liability
Question. Given this state of affairs, how can the Agency oversee
the expenditure of its appropriated resources and ensure that its
programs and operations are efficient and effective?
Answer. NASA relies upon an integrated system of management
controls to oversee the expenditure of its appropriated resources.
These controls span multiple phases of resource management from the
planning, programming and distribution of appropriations through to the
application and use of those resources across the entire program and
project lifecycle.
With respect to oversight of appropriated funds, as appropriations
are received and distributed, the Agency tracks them from appropriation
to apportionments to allotments to commitments and to obligations to
help ensure that NASA is tracking resource allocation through the
program lifecycle.
Efficient and effective programs and operations begin with planning
and budgeting. NASA's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
(PPBE) is NASA's four-phased methodology for aligning resources in a
comprehensive, disciplined approach that supports NASA's Mission and
directs Agency resources toward the priorities set forth by Congress
and the President. PPBE also enhances financial management quality and
accountability by linking the Agency's financial, programmatic, and
institutional communities for mission success. PPBE provides Agency
leaders with timely, accurate, and useful information about where
initiatives are and are not succeeding. This process helps to ensure a
budget that supports the Agency's strategic priorities and that is
traceable to outcomes.
As NASA's Mission Directorates use these funds to accomplish their
goals, NASA's three-Council governance structure helps to ensure that
they are doing so efficiently and effectively. The Strategic Management
Council serves as NASA's senior decision-making body for strategic
direction and planning by determining NASA's strategic direction and
assessing Agency progress in achieving NASA's Mission and the Vision
for Space Exploration. The Operations Management Council oversees
Center, or institutional, operations and performance while the Program
Management Council (PMC) serves as NASA's senior decision-making body
for base-lining and assessing program/project performance to ensure
successful achievement of NASA Strategic Goals and outcomes.
Below the PMC-level, NASA enforces the Agency's governance
principles of ``Checks and Balances'' and ``Balance of Power'' by
balancing and integrating the activities and authorities of the Chief
Engineer, the Independent Technical Authority, Program Managers, and
the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.
Funding requirements are set by law for government programs. The
Independent Technical Authority not under program direction sets
technical requirements. And, schedule requirements are set by a variety
of factors, usually external and outside the Program Manager's control.
In NASA, the Chief Financial Officer ensures funding compliance.
Appropriate third parties monitor funding and schedule compliance. The
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) ensures compliance with
the established critical technical requirements. Schedule compliance is
assured by third parties depending on the source of the schedule
requirements. For these reasons, the Chief Financial Officer, the IG,
the Independent Technical Authority, and OSMA are not in the Program
Manager's chain of command.
Three independent inputs give the NASA Administrator the confidence
that the Agency has exercised appropriate checks and balances of
Authorities, Responsibilities, and Accountabilities.
Below these governing structures, NASA employs financial management
and programmatic staff at each of its centers. These individuals have a
thorough knowledge of each of the Agency's programs and projects,
including the resources budgeted and expended to support those programs
and projects. The processes and procedures employed to monitor program
and project spending and performance were in place before the
implementation of NASA's new financial management system in fiscal year
2003. As the Agency continues to stabilize its centralized financial
management system, our center financial management staff, as well as
programmatic staff, continue to monitor and analyze the financial
health of the Agency's programs and operations.
Question. What steps has NASA taken to prevent this type of ADA
violation from occurring again?
Answer. NASA agrees with each of the OIG's specific
recommendations:
--OIG Recommendation #1.--We recommend that the Administrator report
the ADA violations for the funds carried over from fiscal year
2004 to fiscal year 2005 for each affected account and for the
$30,413,590 to the President of the United States through the
OMB Director, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
President of the Senate, and the Comptroller General of the
Government Accountability Office, as required by the ADA and by
OMB Circular A-11, section 145.7.
--OIG Recommendation #2.--We recommend that the Administrator request
a comprehensive demonstration by the OCFO that the
appropriations available to be spent in fiscal year 2006 can be
traced from appropriation to apportionments to allotments to
commitments and to obligations to help ensure that NASA is not
violating the ADA for fiscal year 2006.
In addition to accepting and acting upon NASA's OIG two specific
recommendations, NASA has implemented specific correction actions in
the OCFO. These corrective actions include:
--Certification of reconciliations by responsible financial
management personnel.
--Demonstrated effective system controls that prevent obligations
from exceeding apportionment control totals.
--Conducted Appropriations Law training for 30 staff in January 2006
and 8 in March 2006.
--Conducted OMB Circular A-11 training for 24 staff in February 2006.
An additional course is currently being scheduled.
--Increased the staff size in the Funds Distribution branch.
--Documenting enhanced internal controls, to include:
--Logging and tracking of all OMB apportionment requests and
approvals; and
--Reconciliation of OMB apportionments to Congressionally approved
Operating Plans to the funds loaded into the Agency's
centralized financial system.
Question. What is NASA's current total estimated cost to develop,
implement, and maintain the Integrated Enterprise Management Program,
including those costs incurred to resolve data integrity issues
resulting from the initial implementation of the Core Financial system?
Answer. The development and implementation costs for NASA's
Integrated Enterprise Management Program, including all the hardware,
software, civil service labor, contractor labor, travel, and overhead
costs associated with re-engineering business processes and
implementing business systems for human capital management, financial
management, asset management, and procurement and contract management
are estimated at $842 million for the development years 2000 through
2011, consistent with the fiscal year 2007 President's budget request.
Of this total development estimate, $82.6 million is being expended
to update NASA's financial system, which, among other benefits, helps
resolve data integrity issues identified with the initial core
financial system implementation. Approximately, $50 million per year is
expended operating and maintaining this business systems environment.
ADA VIOLATION
Question. The NASA Office of Inspector General reported that NASA,
as a result of actions by officials in the Office of the Chief
Financial Officer violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA). According to
the IG report, the ADA violations occurred because of the lack of
internal controls within the OCFO and OCFO personnel's misunderstanding
of OMB apportionment requirements.
The NASA Administrator agreed to report the ADA violations to the
President of the United States through the OMB Director, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the
Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office, as
required by the ADA.
Question. When will NASA provide its report on the ADA violations?
Answer. By letter dated June 23, 2006, the Administrator informed
the Committee of activities initiated regarding recommendations
concerning two ADA violations identified by the NASA Office of
Inspector General (0IG) in a report dated April 10, 2006. The
Administrator outlined his commitment to ensuring that the root causes
of the violations are addressed and that effective remedies are
instituted for all of NASA's financial management processes and
systems. As part of those efforts, and in conformance with the
requirements of OMB Circular No. A-11 and NASA Policy Directive
9050.3E, Administrative Control of Appropriations and Funds, the
Administrator received a determination from NASA's Office of the Chief
Financial Officer regarding the identification of the alleged
responsible party for the violations. That individual, no longer
employed with the Agency, in response to notification and the
opportunity to comment, has raised matters that the Administrator
determined require further investigation.
Accordingly, the Administrator directed an intra-Agency team, to
include representatives from the NASA Offices of Program Analysis and
Evaluation, Human Resources, and General Counsel, to conduct a de novo
review of the situation. That review is now expected to be completed by
July 31, 2006, and is expected to provide the requisite information for
the Administrator to accurately and comprehensively meet reporting
obligations per OMB Circular No. A-11 and complete formal
notifications.
Question. Who was responsible for the ADA violations?
Answer. As indicated above, the Administrator has directed an
intra-Agency team to conduct a de novo review that is expected to
provide the requisite information to enable him to accurately and
comprehensively meet reporting obligations per OMB Circular No. A-11
and complete formal notification, including identification of
responsible party/parties.
Question. Has disciplinary action been considered as required by
OMB Circular No. A-11?
Answer. This determination will be an outcome of the review
currently underway.
Question. The IG's report noted that the OCFO was unable to
determine the exact amount of the ADA violations because of the
unreliability of NASA's financial management system. Given this state
of affairs, how can the Agency oversee the expenditure of its
appropriated resources and ensure that its programs and operations are
efficient and effective?
Answer. The ADA violations occurred because of NASA's failure to
file timely reapportionment requests with the Office of Management and
Budget and not as a result of NASA's financial management system.
NASA has implemented corrective actions to ensure that
reapportionment requests are filed in a timely manner and that internal
controls are in place. These actions include:
--Certification of reconciliations by responsible financial
management personnel.
--Demonstrated effective system controls that prevent obligations
from exceeding apportionment control totals.
--Conducted Appropriations Law training for 30 staff in January 2006
and 8 in March 2006.
--Conducted OMB Circular A-11 training for 24 staff in February 2006.
An additional course is currently being scheduled.
--Increased the staff size in the Funds Distribution branch.
--Developing and documenting enhanced internal controls, to include:
--Logging and tracking of all OMB apportionment requests and
approvals; and
--Reconciliation of OMB apportionments to Congressionally approved
Operating Plans to the funds loaded into the Agency's
financial system.
Question. In committing the ADA violations, did NASA expend any
funds beyond those appropriated by Congress or, in a way that was
inconsistent with Congressional direction?
Answer. NASA did not expend funds beyond those appropriated by
Congress or in a way inconsistent with Congressional direction. NASA's
violations were the result of its failure to file timely
reapportionment requests with the Office of Management and Budget. The
first violation occurred during fiscal year 2005 when NASA authorized
and obligated in fiscal year 2005 the unobligated balance of
congressionally appropriated two-year funds from fiscal year 2004
without requesting an fiscal year 2005 reapportionment as required by
OMB Circular A-11. The second violation occurred when NASA failed to
submit a timely reapportionment request to OMB in August 2004 to match
congressionally approved Operating Plan changes.
Question. Were any NASA programs or operations adversely impacted
financially or operationally as a result of the ADA violations?
Answer. No programs were impacted as a result of the first
violation and no funding adjustments were necessary. To correct the
second violation, NASA de-obligated $30 million of fiscal year 2004
funds and used fiscal year 2005 funds to correct the overobligation.
These de-obligated funds remain available to the impacted Mission
Directorate to make any future upward adjustments to contracts awarded
in fiscal year 2004.
Question. What has NASA done to assure itself that it has not
committed any additional ADA violations?
Answer. NASA's Office of the Inspector General has recommended, and
NASA has agreed, that NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer
demonstrate to the NASA Administrator that the appropriations available
to be spent in fiscal year 2006 can be traced from appropriation to
apportionments to allotments to commitments and to obligations to help
ensure that NASA is not violating the ADA for fiscal year 2006.
Question. What steps has NASA taken to prevent this type of ADA
violation from occurring again? Will there be any independent analysis
to affirm that the measures implemented by NASA will prevent future ADA
violations, in any form?
Answer. NASA has implemented corrective actions to ensure that the
weaknesses that led to the violations have been addressed. These
actions include:
--Certification of reconciliations by responsible financial
management personnel.
--Demonstrated effective system controls that prevent obligations
from exceeding apportionment control totals.
--Conducted Appropriations Law training for 30 staff in January 2006
and 8 in March 2006.
--Conducted OMB Circular A-11 training for 24 staff in February 2006.
An additional course is currently being scheduled.
--Increased the staff size in the Funds Distribution branch.
--Developing and documenting enhanced internal controls, to include:
--Logging and tracking of all OMB apportionment requests and
approvals; and
--Reconciliation of OMB apportionments to Congressionally approved
Operating Plans to the funds loaded into the Agency's
financial system.
NASA's Office of the Inspector General has recommended, and NASA
has agreed, that NASA's Office of the Chief Financial Officer
demonstrate to the NASA Administrator that the appropriations available
to be spent in fiscal year 2006 can be traced from appropriation to
apportionments to allotments to commitments and to obligations to help
ensure that NASA is not violating the ADA for fiscal year 2006.
NASA CENTERS
Question. One of the dilemmas that NASA faces is that some centers
are better positioned to have future work on missions than others at
NASA. It has been mentioned that an option NASA would entertain is to
move the work to centers that will be having difficulty in the next few
years in order to keep skilled workers at NASA. While NASA should do
all it can to keep the skilled employees at NASA, I am concerned that
this option could marginalize all of the centers.
How do we ensure this does not occur? Could you please provide this
Committee with an update on how NASA has eliminated, or is eliminating,
the uncovered capacity related to facilities? Could you please explain
how moving research projects from a Center with low uncovered capacity
to a Center with high uncovered capacity reduces NASA's total uncovered
capacity?
Answer. As the NASA Administrator testified to both the House and
Senate, ``NASA is focusing its efforts to solve its uncovered capacity
workforce problems through a number of other actions, including the
assignment of new projects to research Centers that will strengthen
their base of in-house work, the Shared Capability Assets Program that
should stabilize the skills base necessary for a certain specialized
workforce; the movement of certain research and technology development
projects from certain centers not suffering from uncovered capacity
problems to centers that are; retraining efforts at field centers so
that the technical workforce can develop new skills; and the pursuit of
reimbursable work for projects and research to support other government
agencies and the private sector through Space Act Agreements.''
None of the above actions marginalizes any one Center. NASA's goal
is not to make all Centers equally unhealthy, nor to transfer work
packages so that all Centers end up with equal or near-equal amounts of
future work on NASA missions. Such an expectation is not realistic.
Rather the goal is to increase the future work at Centers currently
having difficulty sustaining workforce skills, while not damaging the
ability of the other Centers to maintain their workforce skills that
are critical to NASA's future. NASA Centers cannot grow in size, but
must effectively use other field Centers to get programs done. Work
moving between Centers will be done with assurances that it does not
aggravate an existing or potentially problematic situation. The
decisions associated with work transfers, however, will not be based
solely on numbers, but also on skills' availability and mismatches. For
example, NASA may seek to place additional scientific work at a Center
with uncovered scientists, but may move a limited number of engineering
tasks (where its engineering workforce is saturated with work) to
another Center that has uncovered engineers with the necessary skills
to complete those tasks. Such transfers allow the Agency, ``to do all
it can to keep skilled employees at NASA.''
Regarding facilities and related workforce, NASA continues to pare
the infrastructure wherever we can do so without compromising our
mission. This is an ongoing process. To date, the workforce has been
reduced by over 900 people through buyouts. Eligible employees for
buyouts included those associated with excess infrastructure.
PROCUREMENT
Question. This Committee has consistently noted their concern about
NASA's lack of transparency in contracting practices as well as
significant cost overruns. These issues have also been recognized by
the GAO and the NASA IG.
What is the Agency doing to improve its management of these
programs in order to reduce its vulnerability to additional cost
overruns?
Answer. Over the past three years since the GAO and IG reports were
issued, NASA has implemented a number of initiatives aimed at improving
its cost estimating performance. These include an overarching
initiative called Continuous Cost Risk Management, which requires the
NASA project management, and cost estimating community to identify
elements in projects, which have the potential to induce high cost and/
or schedule risk. CCRM goes on to include methods for tracking these
risks throughout the life cycle and methods for applying cost risk
dollars toward risk mitigation. The proper use of cost risk analysis
itself has been greatly emphasized by the Agency as a new tool in its
programmatic planning process. All major projects are now required to
perform a cost risk analysis to identify the range of cost that is
indicative of the risk of projects. Based on the cost risk analysis,
the Administrator is requiring projects to budget to an independent
cost estimate (ICE) that generally achieves a 70 percent level of cost
confidence.
Other improvements in NASA cost estimating includes the
institutionalization of a new cost data collection system, the Cost
Analysis Data Requirement (CADRe) which takes ``snapshots'' of each
project's technical, programmatic and cost status at 5 key milestones
across the project life cycle. The CADRe forms the basis of estimate
for ICEs, which are being performed by the Independent Program
Assessment Office within the Program Analysis and Evaluation
organization at NASA Headquarters. All CADRe submissions are being
maintained in a new NASA cost estimating data base, ONCE (One NASA Cost
Engineering Data Base) for the use of the NASA cost estimating
community.
All of the above efforts should lead to a vastly improved ability
to estimate projects more accurately at their outset and at the time
the Agency makes a formal commitment to OMB and Congress, which is at
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). After PDR, Earned Value Management
(EVM) systems are being set up and used by ongoing projects to manage
cost throughout the balance of the life cycle.
It must be remembered that NASA projects often include cutting edge
technology, which makes accurate cost estimation much more difficult.
But better initial cost estimating and the use of EVM to manage the
fiscal health of projects once underway, should significantly reduce
the Agency's vulnerability to cost overruns.
NASA'S UNOBLIGATED BALANCE GROWTH
Question. The Committee recognizes that NASA is authorized to
obligate funds over a 2-year period, and that a research and
development agency like NASA is expected to carry over some unobligated
funds at the end of each fiscal year. While the Committee recognizes
that NASA can use unobligated funds to help transition from one fiscal
to the next, there is no firm guidance on how much NASA should carry
over from year to year. NASA's balance of unobligated funds has more
than tripled from $616 million at the end of fiscal year 2000 to $2.1
billion at the end of fiscal year 2005.
Please explain to the Committee why these balances have built up at
NASA?
Answer. First and foremost, let us assure you that all of these
funds will be obligated within the assigned Mission Directorate or
Office and all of these funds are needed to carry out NASA's missions.
These are not ``extra'' funds that can be used to offset potential
reductions to NASA's fiscal year 2007 budget request or to support
unrequested activities. All of NASA's unobligated funds are needed to
carry out the Agency's planned activities, and our multi-year resource
planning strategy requires all of these funds. Unobligated funds are
simply not yet committed under a binding agreement (e.g., grant or
contract). Thus, the Agency has plans in place and needs all of its
appropriated funds.
There are several reasons why the unobligated balances have been
increasing over the last few years. There has been a tremendous amount
of change at NASA over the last several years, and many factors
associated with those changes have contributed to an increasing
unobligated balance. Effective in fiscal year 2004, we began
implementation of a new financial system, and also implemented full
cost management, budgeting, and accounting. As a result of these
changes, unobligated balances increased for several reasons. Labor
dollars embedded in the programs initially caused the slowing of
funding allocation and distribution throughout the Agency. Providing
the Mission Directorates (MDs) with full cost funding resulted in
increased funding being held at Headquarters. The new funds
distribution process slowed down the release of funding to the Centers,
which led the centers to seek more forward funding at the beginning of
the fiscal year in order to cover labor and other expenses.
In addition, there were several programmatic changes that
contributed to this instability. The Columbia accident required a major
shift in resources, curtailing many planned activities. The Vision for
U.S. Space Exploration announced January 2004, required redirection of
about $11 billion over five years. The Exploration Systems Architecture
Study identified some major shifts in budgetary resources, curtailing
many technology activities to provide more funding for major
development projects. Increasing levels of earmarks for NASA have had
the effect of slowing program definition and the release of funding.
Overall, through all these major changes over the last few years, there
has been less program definition at the start of the fiscal year for
guidance to be distributed down to the NASA Centers, and Centers have
been slower to obligate given the rate of change and the uncertainty
surrounding all these changes, and maturing definition of major
programs such as Constellation.
NASA recognizes this increasing trend over the last several years,
and is working to reverse the trend. As of May 19, 2006, NASA had
obligated 97 percent of our fiscal year 2005 appropriations ($535
million is not yet obligated), and approximately 50 percent of our
fiscal year 2006 appropriations ($8.1 billion is not yet obligated).
NASA has definite plans for all of these unobligated funds. The funds
include a total of $304 million for construction of facilities.
While NASA does not consider the levels of fiscal year 2005 and
fiscal year 2006 unobligated funds to be unreasonable, we are working
to expedite the obligation process where possible, and, as required in
the fiscal year 2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 109-108), have begun reporting
prior year, unobligated balances to the Committees on Appropriations on
a quarterly basis.
Question. What is the minimum amount of unobligated funds that NASA
needs to transition from one fiscal year to the next? How much in
unobligated funds does NASA believe it needs for other reasons?
Answer. There is no general minimum amount of unobligated funds
that can be applied generically. Over the past 2 months, NASA has
performed its standard midyear ``phasing plan review'' that has
consisted of an in-depth review of its expenditures down to the project
and Center levels at all NASA installations. Both the current status of
obligations and forecasts for expenditures has been scrutinized and
monthly spending plans throughout the remainder of fiscal year 2006
have been developed. Note that our 61 programs involve thousands of
contractual actions for obligating funds across the Agency and at all
Centers. In developing our spending plans, these procurements were
viewed for each of the 555 projects within their respective program.
The purpose of this standard in-house review was to ensure that we are
allocating and spending our resources in the most efficient manner, and
to ensure that we have the correct level of apportioned funding at the
appropriate points in time for our programs. Projections for
unobligated balances are about 9 percent at the Agency level, and range
from a low of 2 percent for the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate, to a high of 16 percent for the Science Mission
Directorate. Program management at all levels at both NASA Headquarters
and the Centers have participated in this expenditure review, and agree
that these levels of unobligated balances are appropriate in order to
ensure a smooth transition from one fiscal year to the next without a
lapse in funding that could prompt potential work stoppages.
Question. Has NASA ever submitted a request for more new budget
authority than it can realistically use?
Answer. No. NASA has never submitted a request for more new budget
authority than it can realistically use.
BANKING FUNDS FOR CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE (CEV)
Question. At a House Science Committee hearing in February, Dr.
Griffin acknowledged that NASA is ``banking'' funds to smooth the
funding profile for the CEV.
Is NASA using a portion of past unobligated balances to bank
funding for CEV? For how many additional fiscal years will NASA
continue this practice? Is NASA banking funds to smooth the funding
profiles of other major development efforts?
Answer: The development profile for the Constellation program
requires a funding curve that peaks in fiscal years 2008, 2009, and
2010.
This is the normal profile for hardware development efforts that
maximizes the chances of Program success and provides the basis for any
cost confidence evaluation.
Confronted with a flat Agency budget, Constellation's management
strategy is to carry unobligated fiscal year 2006 funds into fiscal
year 2007 and use uncosted funds from fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year
2008 to cover the peak requirements in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year
2010 (the years that the funds will be costed).
These carry-in funds will be used to smooth the overall
constellation development funding curve for all the Constellation
development projects, including Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), Crew
Launch Vehicle (CLV), Launch and Mission Systems (LMS), and Exploration
Communication and Navigation Systems (ECANS).
Current plans are to obligate money on the CEV contract that will
be signed early this fall and on the CLV and LMS contracts that will be
signed in 2007. As much as 90 percent of these funds will be obligated
by the end of the fiscal year.
NASA's strategy of using carry-in to smooth out the peak funding
requirements is prudent use of multi-year funding to maintain schedule
and reduce total costs.
LUNAR ROBOTIC ORBITER (LRO)
Question. NASA recently announced that a small secondary payload
has been selected to accompany the Lunar Robotic Orbiter mission in
2008. NASA noted that the secondary mission should cost no more than
$80 million.
What is the current cost estimate for this secondary LRO mission?
Answer. NASA has decided on the Lunar Crater Observation and
Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) as its secondary payload on the Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) mission. Per NASA's original request for
information requirements, the LCROSS vehicle should cost no more than
$80 million. Integration for flight will cost an estimated $15 million.
The total cost of LCROSS is therefore estimated to be $95 million.
Question. Where is the funding coming from to pay for this
secondary mission?
Answer. The Lunar Precursor and Robotic Program (LPRP, formerly
Robotics Lunar Exploration Program) has an existing funding line for
``Future Missions'', specifically designed to accommodate missions like
LCROSS.
Question. Did NASA's fiscal year 2006 budget or Initial Operating
Plan specifically include the requirement or justification for this
secondary mission?
Answer. The LRO mission is still in formulation, and as a result,
did not have an established life-cycle cost and program content at the
time of either the fiscal year 2006 or the fiscal year 2007 budget
submission. Critical Design Review (CDR) is scheduled for this fall.
In NASA's fiscal year 2007 budget submission, NASA rebaselined LRO
for launch on an EELV (from a Delta II). This change decreased risk to
the LRO development by reducing pressure to retain large design
contingencies and by eliminating a spacecraft spin stability issue
related to its original Delta II launcher.
As a result of the rebaselining to an EELV, NASA issued a request
for information, in January 2006, to industry to provide secondary
payload concepts to take advantage of the additional capacity afforded
by the launch vehicle. NASA's requirements for the secondary payload
were that it benefit the robotic lander program, cost no more than $80
million for development, and not exceed 2,205 pounds (1,000 kilograms).
After a competition involving NASA centers and industry, LCROSS was
selected as a secondary payload in April 2006.
The secondary payload is a cost-effective component of the overall
LRO mission. It will provide an important capability to help determine
whether water-ice is present in the Moon's polar cold traps. Total cost
of the secondary payload is estimated at $80 million, to be funded
within LPRP through fiscal year 2009. The secondary payload supports
LPRP LRO Level-1 Requirements (RLEP-LRO-M70), which state that, ``The
LRO shall identify putative deposits of water-ice in the Moon's polar
cold traps at a spatial resolution of better than 500m on the surface
and 10km subsurface (up to 2m deep).''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Byron L. Dorgan
UPPER MIDWEST AEROSPACE CONSORTIUM (UMAC)
Question. The Upper Midwest Aerospace Consortium (UMAC) is a
collaboration of eight universities in a five state region that
partners with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
to take data gathered from NASA satellites and makes it available in
everyday applications to educators, farmers, ranchers and residents in
the Upper Great Plains.
The group is headquartered at the University of North Dakota in my
state. I was proud to help connect the University to NASA in the 1990s
and have worked with NASA and my colleagues in Congress to support
funding to continue this important work.
Do you agree that UMAC and other groups like it play an important
role in connecting more Americans to the work and breakthroughs at
NASA?
Answer. Groups that connect Americans to NASA's research increase
the return the public receives on its investment in NASA. Features
common among such groups are: use of data provided by NASA satellites,
ties to the NASA-sponsored research community in academia and industry,
and direct connection to providers of goods and services to the public
and the organizations that serve the public. To the extent that UMAC
and other groups exhibit these features, they can perform a valuable
function.
Question. What role do you see for groups like UMAC in the future,
especially as it relates to new space and exploration missions?
Answer. NASA is dependent on the university community for the
successful implementation of its new space and exploration missions.
Opportunities to participate in NASA's missions will be openly
competed, and peer review will be used to identify the most outstanding
opportunities for participation by the university community.
Opportunities to participate will span the entire array of mission
activities including development of flight hardware (instruments and
full missions), development of data processing and data archiving
systems, participation in science teams including science operations,
and analysis of data returned from NASA missions.
WINDOW OBSERVATIONAL RESEARCH FACILITY (WORF)
Question. NASA once intended to install a facility, Window
Observational Research Facility (WORF), on the International Space
Station (ISS) within which various earth-observing instruments could be
operated. The University of North Dakota has been developing AgCam, a
sensor intended to operate on the WORF.
Is the Window Observational Research Facility (WORF) scheduled to
be installed on the International Space Station? If so, when?
Answer. NASA has assessed its plans for the utilization of the ISS,
and focused its research and technology development goals toward those
activities that most closely support the Vision for Space Exploration.
In this environment of limited opportunities for the launch of
facility-class payloads, it is critical that utilization planning align
as closely as possible with the needs of the human exploration planning
effort. The only missions for which specific payloads have been
manifested on the Space Shuttle are the first two Return to Flight
missions. Consistent with the Vision, the Space Shuttle will be retired
by 2010. Prior to its retirement, it will be utilized primarily for the
assembly of the ISS. Our top priority will be to make each flight safer
than the last. As we noted in our November 2004, correspondence to you
on this topic, in the event that an appropriate future flight
opportunity does become available, the WORF facility will be considered
for delivery to the ISS.
Question. If not, will it be possible to install small instruments,
such as AgCam, on the ISS that make use of the optical quality window
but do not use the WORF rack?
Answer. The AgCam hardware has been designed and built to be
operated in the WORF. The WORF would provide resources such as power,
thermal control, data and mounting positions for operations of the
AgCam. The hardware as designed could not operate independently of the
WORF. It might be possible to redesign the AgCam hardware and its
operations concepts, but it would require additional funding, testing,
and development time. Even with such a redesign, it is unclear whether
the redesigned hardware could achieve the expected scientific value
without the WORF.
DC-8
Question. The University of North Dakota (UND) recently signed a 5-
year agreement to operate the NASA DC-8 research flying lab. The
transfer of the DC-8 from an in-house NASA operation to a UND operation
has set a new precedent. To date, UND, on behalf of scientists
everywhere has operated two missions, Stardust and INTEX-B with total
success. I believe this approach has benefited education and public
outreach.
Does NASA see benefit in transferring some of its activities from
NASA centers to universities and other research organizations?
Answer. The success of the NASA program relies on partnerships with
universities and other research organizations. It also relies on NASA
maintaining core capabilities within the NASA Centers. In addition to
the operations of the DC-8, NASA also relies on universities and other
research organizations for activities such as the operation of the
Hubble Space Telescope, operation of the Earth Science Distributed
Active Archive Centers, and operation of the NASA Infrared Telescope
Facility. NASA will consider proposals that offer benefits to both the
science community and NASA.
The NASA Centers have unique capabilities that are critical to the
nation's preeminence in space science as well as to the successfully
carrying out the NASA mission. In order to maintain ten healthy
Centers, and in order to maintain critical core capabilities at the
NASA Centers, it is necessary that certain activities remain at NASA
Centers.
GLOBAL EARTH OBSERVATION SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS (GEOSS)
Question. Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) is an
international program in earth-observing designed to inform decisions
that benefit all humanity.
What will be NASA's role in providing societal benefits in the
Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)?
Answer. NASA's Earth science activity is closely coordinated
through interagency and international activities such as the Climate
Change Science Program, US Group on Earth Observations, and Joint
Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology, as well as their
international counterparts. The majority of NASA's space-based
observations of Earth involve such international partnerships on the
instruments and flight missions that comprise the space-based
contribution to the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).
NASA Earth system science results in research and development of
space-based observations and improved modeling capability are
recognized as contributing nearly 46 instruments on 16 spacecraft for
the international Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).
NASA Earth science applications are recognized for collaborating with
partners to benchmark integrated system solutions to each of the nine
societal benefit areas highlighted in the Strategic Plan for a U.S.
Integrated Earth Observation System (IEOS) and the 10-Year Plan for a
Global Earth Observation System of Systems.
NASA develops and uses innovative remote sensing approaches to
provide new views of the Earth to improve predictive capabilities for
weather, climate and natural hazards and benchmarks the capacity to
contribute to societal benefits through decision support. As an
example, NASA collaborations with EPA, USDA, and the FAA have resulted
in benchmarks for integrated solutions for air quality Nowcasting,
global crop assessments, and de-icing assessments for aviation safety.
The observation and Earth system modeling techniques NASA develops
and tests are a basis for future operational systems carried out by
other organizations (most notably NOAA and USGS). Through
collaborations, NASA observations are tested to determine their
capacity to contribute to policy formulation and resource management
through decision support systems.
Question. Will there be a role for universities to develop and
deliver benefits to the residents of their regions?
Answer. In implementing its Earth science program, the NASA Applied
Sciences Program conducts solicitations for ``Decision support through
Earth Science Research Results'' to provide universities, private
sector and others an opportunity to participate in extending the
benefits of NASA sponsored observations and predictive capabilities
through decision support tools. NASA involves the broad research
community through solicitation of principal investigator-led satellite
missions, technology and applications development, and a basic research
program as well as focused research efforts tied more specifically to
the results of our satellite programs. In particular, the university
community is very strongly represented in these areas, and the research
carried out at universities is critical to the education and training
of the next generation of Earth and environmental scientists.
Question. How seriously do the reductions in Earth Science limit
the U.S.'s role in the international program?
Answer. The International GEOSS and the U.S. IEOS include framework
architectures that can accommodate and benefit from the observations
and predictions/forecasts resulting from NASA research and development
of space-based Earth observation systems; including the ground
segments, data handling capacity, modeling, computing, knowledge, and
applied sciences and system engineering.
NASA's Earth Science budget contributes to GEOSS and fluctuations
in NASA Earth Science funding have a corresponding effect on
contributions to GEOSS. NASA's plans for research and development of
Earth observation systems include support for national and
international priorities and goals, including the U.S. IEOS and
international GEOSS. The GEOSS is architected to benefit from the full
scope of the results of NASA research and development programs, flight
missions and applied sciences partnerships on benchmarking enhancements
to integrated system solutions for the nine societal benefit areas.
Reductions in NASA's Earth Science flight program budget in recent
years directly impact the U.S. Earth Observing space-based capabilities
and therefore the U.S. contributions to that aspect of GEOSS. An
example is the delay of the Global Precipitation Measurement mission
(GPM) that is based on an international collaboration and has been
viewed as a prototype satellite constellation for GEOSS. Reductions in
the R&A budget have an indirect and non-immediate impact on system
contributions to GEOSS, by effectively delaying the utilization of
Earth observations in research and, further on, the development of
products and services.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Harkin
Question. There has been significant publicity about the ``muzzling
of scientists'' by the Administration when their conclusions do not
match the policies of the Administration. Because science requires
freedom of thought and discussion, we are concerned that this muzzling
could have a chilling effect on the critical work that scientists
pursue, as they will be afraid to undertake work that may lead to
conclusions that clash with Administration policy. Since it is in the
national interest to ensure that scientific discovery is free and
unconstrained by political ideology, we would like you to explain the
efforts you are making to ensure that NASA scientists are free to
present their findings both publicly and to the media, without any fear
of public affairs oversight that could limit their speech.
Answer. Earlier this year, NASA's Administrator assembled a policy
development team comprised of NASA employees with science, legal, and
public affairs backgrounds to review existing policies, identify ways
to improve them, and develop Agency practices to maintain our
commitment for full and open discourse on scientific, technical and
safety issues. The team recently concluded their review of the existing
NASA policies and has produced a substantially revised document: http:/
/www.nasa.gov/pdf/145687main_information_policy.pdf
In addition, the NASA Administrator issued an agency-wide statement
on his views of Scientific Openness last February: http://www.nasa.gov/
about/highlights/griffin_science.html
The revised policy and the personal commitment by the NASA
Administrator reaffirm the Agency's commitment to open scientific and
technical inquiry and dialogue with the public.
Question. Around the world, governments are taking aim at our
aeronautics industry--increasing their investment and making
aeronautics R&D a top priority. Meanwhile the United States continues
to deemphasize aeronautic research. For example, while NASA continues
to downsize and internalize its aeronautics program, implementation of
the European Union's Vision 2020 is accelerating. This trend will have
a serious impact on the nation's competitiveness, national security,
and our position as the world's leader in aeronautics research. How
does the fiscal year 2007 budget request address this trend?
Answer. To address this question, one must first ask, what is
NASA's role in helping to ensure that the United States maintains its
``edge'' in aeronautics? The answer is simply this: NASA's most
important role in aeronautics is to provide technical leadership. And
that is true regardless of budget.
Over the past several years, many independent reviews by the
National Research Council (NRC), the Aerospace Commission, and the
National Institute of Aerospace (NIA) have all raised the concern that
NASA needs to get back to the pursuit of long-term, cutting-edge
research. Historically, that is what NASA aeronautics has been known
for and that is what the Nation has relied upon NASA to provide. These
concerns were raised independent of the budget, and the concerns were
valid.
The Aerospace Commission Report of 2002, commonly referred to as
the ``Walker Report,'' stated that Government investment in long-term
research will be essential for the United States to maintain its global
leadership in aerospace. The report concluded that long-term research
enables breakthroughs in new capabilities and concepts and provides new
knowledge and understanding, often resulting in unexpected
applications, and the creation of new markets. It also noted that
industry has the responsibility for leveraging Government research and
for transforming it into new products and services.
NASA's Aeronautics program is currently undergoing a comprehensive
restructuring to ensure that we have a strategic plan in place that
enables us to pursue long-term, cutting-edge research for the benefit
of the broad aeronautics community. A commitment to the pursuit of the
cutting-edge, coupled with an unwavering commitment to technical
excellence, will ensure a strong, positive impact on the U.S. aviation
community.
Question. Though I am concerned with the level of NASA funding for
aeronautic research and development, I am equally concerned that a
national aeronautics policy be created that is consistent with the
government's historic role, to promote continued United States'
leadership of civil and military aeronautics research. How will these
cuts influence the national aeronautic policy? What progress has NASA
made on the policy? When will a draft be released for comment? What
input has NASA received from industry, academics and/or user groups on
the national aeronautics policy?
Answer. Work is currently underway on the creation of a National
Aeronautics Science and Technology Policy. In anticipation of the call
for a policy, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC)
Committee on Technology chartered an Aeronautics Science and Technology
(AS&T) Subcommittee in September 2005. The AS&T Subcommittee is co-
chaired by NASA's Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research and
OSTP's Transportation and Aeronautics Representative. The AS&T
Subcommittee is comprised of members from NASA, DOD (OSD, Air Force,
Navy, Army), DOT (FAA), JPDO, DOE, DHS, DOC, EPA, NSF, NSC, and the EOP
(OSTP, OMB, OVP, DPC and CEA). The development, publication, and, to
some extent, execution through governance of the policy called for by
statute, have been tasked to the AS&T Subcommittee. Round-table
outreach discussions with industry and academia occurred in April 2006
to ensure input from the stakeholder community. The policy is planned
for completion by December 2006. A detailed implementation plan will
follow completion of the National policy.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Shelby. For the information of the Senators and
people in the audience on the subcommittee, we will review the
fiscal year 2007 budget request for the Department of Commerce
on Wednesday, May 3, in room S-146 of the Capitol. At that
time, the Secretary of Commerce will be with us to discuss the
budget for the programs under his jurisdiction. Until then, the
subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., Wednesday, April 26, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., Wednesday,
May 3.]