[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
----------
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
[The following testimonies were received by the
Subcommittee on Homeland Security for inclusion in the record.
The submitted materials relate to the fiscal year 2007 budget
request for programs within the subcommittee's jurisdiction.]
Prepared Statement of the American Psychological Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, the American
Psychological Association (APA) represents 150,000 members and
affiliates, and works to advance psychology as a science, a profession,
and a means of promoting health and human welfare. Psychologists are
involved in a broad spectrum of programs within the jurisdiction of
this Subcommittee. For example, psychologists manage the Social and
Behavioral Research Program within the Threat Awareness Portfolio of
the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. Psychologists also provide
expertise as members of the Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee and the Academe and Policy Research Senior Advisory
Committee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Psychologists
serve as Principle Investigators directing the activities of two of the
five University-Based Centers of Excellence and student psychologists
are becoming the next generation of Homeland Security experts training
under the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
Overall, APA has been pleased to see the increasing emphasis DHS is
placing on behavioral and psychological science within the department.
However APA is also concerned about how pending DHS reorganization and
proposed budget cuts might undermine long range planning for
psychological and behavioral research programs within the department.
Finally, DHS must remain ever-mindful that behavioral research
necessarily involves systematically collected and analyzed empirical
data that cannot be replaced by the well-intentioned but perhaps ill-
informed speculation of experts or contractors who lack training in the
behavioral sciences.
The Threat Awareness Portfolio was cut 35 percent from fiscal year
2005 to fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an
additional 6.4 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that
Congress restore the proposed 6.4 percent cut and fund the Threat
Awareness Portfolio at or above the $43 million fiscal year 2006
appropriation.
The Threat Awareness Portfolio (TAP) in the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsors
research to inform, develop, and test tools and methodologies to assess
terrorist threats, understand terrorism, and improve national security.
There are three broad program areas within TAP, one of which is the
Social and Behavioral Research (SBR) Program. The SBR Program sponsors
social science and behavioral research to support the missions of DHS
and the broader law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well
as promote the safety and security of the American public.
SBR Program Description, Strategic Goals, and Areas of Research
The SBR Program was developed with four strategic aims. The program
leverages the theories, data, and methods of the social and behavioral
sciences to improve the detection, analysis, and understanding of the
threats posed by individuals, groups, and radical movements; it
supports the assessment of the psychosocial impacts of catastrophic
events and the validation of public communications and education
programs to increase the American public's all hazards preparedness and
response capabilities; it facilitates information exchange across the
Federal Government to enhance the knowledge and coordination of
Federally sponsored social and behavioral science research related to
national security and preparedness; and it develops mechanisms to
provide senior policymakers with social and behavioral science theories
and data that can inform their decisions. To achieve these aims, the
SBR Program supports numerous coordinated activities that incorporate
social and behavioral science into coherent, integrated techniques and
methodologies. These activities fall within four broad research and
development areas that support each of the strategic goals of the SBR
Program.
First, the program's activities inform the ability of operational
end users (including personnel involved with border and transportation
security, customs enforcement, and intelligence analysis), to detect
threats and conduct accurate risk assessments. With continued support,
these efforts will produce two main products--models of behavioral and
linguistic cues that indicate whether an individual is likely engaged
in deception or is intent on doing harm; and an integrative model of
the ideological, organizational, and contextual factors associated with
a group or radical movement's likelihood of engaging in violence.
Second, the program supports coordinating research in public
education and communication aimed at increasing the American
population's ability to prepare for and respond to natural and man-made
catastrophic events and developing quantitative assessments of
psychosocial vulnerabilities. With continued support, these efforts
will test and evaluate the effects of various theoretically sound
messaging and education programs on public all-hazards preparedness and
response, as well as develop an index to measure the psychosocial
impact of catastrophic events.
Third, the program sponsors activities to improve the coordination
of social and behavioral science research related to national security
and preparedness by supporting various methods of information sharing
across the Federal Government. With continued support, these efforts
will produce integrated symposia and workshops attended by relevant
Federal partners and a participatory web-based system for sharing
information on Federally funded social and behavioral science research
related to national security and preparedness.
Fourth, the program assembles leading thinkers on the social and
behavioral aspects of terrorism and national security to participate in
study sessions and web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to
the SBR Program and DHS as a whole. With continued support, this group
will produce white papers and briefings on a range of topics (see
appended description of DHS Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
Program).
IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENT BY INCREASING THE AWARENESS OF THREATS
To protect the nation effectively, it is essential to improve our
ability to assess the potential threats posed by individuals as well as
the larger terrorist groups and movements to which they may belong. In
fiscal year 2007, the SBR Program's activities will continue to build
upon work completed in fiscal year 2006 to improve our ability to model
whether an individual is intent on doing harm or engaged in deception,
as well as improve our ability to model the likelihood that a group
will engage in violent activity. Additional work will be sponsored to
compare how models based on open source material differ from models
developed on classified data.
Improving Awareness of Individual Threats--Project Hostile Intent
An ongoing program, Project Hostile Intent aims to detect and model
the behavioral cues that indicate an individual's intent to do harm
and/or deceive The cues examined in Project Hostile Intent are those
that can be assessed remotely and in real time, and the procedures and
technologies required to collect these cues are non-invasive and
amenable to integration into busy operational contexts. In addition to
detecting these cues, this project examines whether this process can be
automated through the use of sensors and detection algorithms and,
subsequently, integrated with other technologies aimed at identifying
individuals who pose threats to the homeland, e.g., biometric tools and
databases. The targeted customers of this research are Customs and
Border Patrol and Transportation Security Administration personnel.
Improving Awareness of Group Threats
Another SBR Program research priority is improving our ability to
determine the intentions of various domestic and foreign groups who may
pose a threat to the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad. The
central activity in this area is the Motivation and Intent (M&I)
Project, aimed at developing models to inform analysts' assessments
regarding whether a group intends to engage in violent activity to
further its goals. In future years, work in this area will be further
expanded to incorporate the modeling of radical movements and the
violent activity associated with such movements. In addition, several
projects will be sponsored to augment the M&I effort by providing
additional data or addressing gaps in the current social and behavioral
science research. The tools, methodologies, and knowledge developed
through this research program will improve the efficiency and accuracy
of intelligence analysis by identifying key social and behavioral
science variables to consider when assessing the likelihood that a
group may intend to act violently.
The Motivation and Intent (M&I) Project
In fiscal year 2005, the SBR Program initiated funding of the M&I
Project. This activity draws on social science data and theories to
develop analytic models aimed at determining the ideological,
organizational, and contextual factors associated with a group's
likelihood of engaging in violence. The goal of this on-going effort is
to develop an integrated framework that enables analysts to examine the
impact of various social and behavioral science variables on a group's
intent to engage in violence. The project will model the factors
associated with violent activity carried out by both domestic and
foreign groups. APA believes that this work could be augmented by
research to understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect
to target selection (i.e., does target selection depend on
circumstances such as differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed
to other considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand
how specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
tactic selection.
Update and Maintenance of the Global Terrorism Database
The SBR Program has supported the updating of a coded and
computerized database comprised of more than 69,000 terrorist incidents
recorded worldwide from 1970-1997 as well as the initial coding and
inclusion of incidents that have occurred from 1998 to the present.
While this worthwhile activity will continue to be supported in fiscal
year 2006 and beyond, APA believes a complementary database of
government responses to terrorism would also be helpful as terrorists
appear to adapt and counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
Quantitative Analysis of Terrorist Perspectives and
Behaviors
The SBR Program also will sponsor activity to incorporate
perspective analysis into the M&I Project. This project will involve an
analysis of the perspectives of multi-level (individual, group, and
subculture) actors in a country or region in which various terrorist
groups of interest operate. An underlying conceptual framework will be
created informed by social and behavioral scientists and other subject
matter experts who are familiar with the region, politics, and actors
of interest. The framework will extract patterns in actors' foci and
attitudes from various sources of data (e.g., media statements and
materials from actors' websites). This activity will add a unique
capability as it will allow an analyst to make more informed decisions
regarding agents' intentions based on the perspectives of multiple
actors in a region of interest.
In addition, a team of social and behavioral scientists will
quantify the perspectives of these actors and conduct statistical
analyses relating these perspectives to various types of activities
(for example, engaging in violence, condoning violence, participation
in the political process, etc.). This effort will allow for the testing
of social and behavioral science theories drawing on the unique source
of data provided by the perspective analyses of various actors. It will
also allow for a scientifically rigorous analysis of trends in actors'
attitudes and behaviors based on an analysis of actors' perspectives
and detailed chronologies of their behaviors. The findings from this
project will inform the M&I Program's modeling efforts and allow for
the refinement of the conceptual framework that forms the basis for the
perspective analysis.
Systematic Comparison of Open and Classified Data Sources
The SBR Program will sponsor work that conducts a detailed
comparative analysis of open source data and classified data,
specifically focused on the information used to identify the motives
and intents of actors of interest. This activity will identify the
relative strengths of these two types of data and explore what types of
information they provide to help an analyst determine the intentions of
individuals and groups. The research in this area will provide detailed
comparative information on open source and classified data that will
better inform decisions regarding whether and/or when to rely on open
source data, and the applicability of academic research to intelligence
analyses.
Improving Risk Assessment and Risk Communication
Research in the social and behavioral sciences can examine how best
to help the American population prepare for and respond to natural and
man-made catastrophic events, thereby reducing one component of
national vulnerability. Public communication and education strategies
for natural and man-made catastrophic events are key components of
DHS's overall preparedness and response missions, and sponsoring
research on the efficacy of these communications is a stated priority
of the SBR Program.
However, current risk communications strategies should be informed
by decades of existing research which have produced consistent findings
regardless of the category of risk under study. Such research shows
that people want the truth, even if it is worrisome and as such, candor
in risk communication is critical. People can absorb only a limited
amount of new information at a time and as a result risk communications
must prioritize and organize critical facts according to the way the
target audience naturally thinks. Further, people have an inherent
difficulty in understanding certain kinds of information (e.g. that
repeated exposure to small risks increases their overall risk) so risk
communications must accommodate the known strengths and weaknesses of
the target audiences thought processes. Additionally, emotions can
cloud people's judgment in predictable ways that interferes with
decision making so those charged with communicating risks must do so
respectfully in order to facilitate reasoned decision making. Even the
most experienced communicators cannot accurately predict how messages
will be interpreted on novel topics or with unfamiliar audiences. Thus
messages must be systematically evaluated for both intended and
unintended reactions before they are disseminated. In emergency
planning exercises, people exaggerate their ability to predict others
behavior, as a result social and behavioral scientists need to be
included in such planning teams to ensure that plans are based upon
science rather than intuition. Finally, people generally make sensible
and effective decisions if communicators deliver relevant, timely and
accurate information.
Improving Federal Information Sharing and Collaborative Research
Efforts
A priority of the SBR Program is the development of effective
methods for information sharing among Federal agencies tasked with
addressing various aspects of national security and preparedness. Not
only will such information sharing increase the effectiveness and the
ability of the government to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad,
it will also increase collaborative research efforts and reduce
unnecessary duplication. The initial effort will consist of workshops
focused on issues related to national security and will later expand to
the provision of web-based dialogue and interaction to facilitate
information exchange.
Providing Policymakers Social and Behavioral Science Information--The
Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
The Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership (Partnership)
Program assembles leading thinkers on the social and behavioral aspects
of terrorism and national security to participate in study sessions and
web-based dialogue focused on topics of relevance to the SBR Program,
DHS, and the nation as a whole. It was created to describe the
significant roles that social, cultural, economic, and psychological
factors play in the threats we face and our counter-threat activities
and provide a mechanism for communicating social and behavioral
research findings to policymakers. In fiscal year 2006, at the request
of the DHS Policy Directorate, the Partnership will examine the impact
of U.S. policies on radicalization in the United States. It will also
hold study sessions on topics related to (1) assessing the intent of
terrorist groups and (2) determining the long-term impacts of a
terrorist attack with improvised nuclear device.
APA recognizes that recent events such as hurricane Katrina, as
well as forecast events such as a pandemic flu outbreak, have forced a
realignment of the Department's strategic goals to prioritize the
strengthening of public resilience in responding to the diverse threats
facing us. That will mean evaluating Departmental investments in terms
of their contribution to, among other things, strengthening
communities, securing trust in government, providing multi-threat
response capabilities and enhancing economic and institutional
recovery.
Accomplishing these tasks will require attention to social and
behavioral variables in three contexts:
Predicting the public's response to various threats (e.g., to what
extent will people understand warnings, trust authorities,
support one another in the face of threats, rebound from
trauma).
Understanding the limits to analyses and plans, so that citizens and
officials have realistic expectations of the confidence to
place in them.
Communicating about threats, so that people receive the specific
information that they need for effective action, in a credible,
comprehensible form.
These issues are relevant to preparation, response, and recovery
for all threats. While the Social and Behavioral Sciences Partnership
has begun to address these issues, APA believes the Department would
benefit from an in-house Center for Translational Social and Behavioral
Science Research tasked with ensuring that our homeland security plans
are grounded in the best available science.
Although the center should be located in the Science and Technology
Directorate, it should provide services to the entire Department. For
example, it would be a resource for creating scientifically sound,
behaviorally realistic communications, usability standards, risk
analyses, and emergency plans. It would also identify fundamental
issues, to be studied by the University Centers of Excellence and
others.
The Center proposed is similar to the Office of Behavioral and
Social Sciences Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
which celebrates a 10 year anniversary this year and leverages a modest
budget to coordinate interdisciplinary and translational behavioral and
social science research across the twenty-seven Institutes and Centers
of NIH. This initiative would address a significant gap in the
Department's science and technology resources, while providing an
essential input to implementing the Department's commitment to risk-
based decision making.
UNIVERSITY PROGRAMS--DHS SCHOLARS AND FELLOWS PROGRAM.
APA has been very pleased to see how well behavioral and social
scientists are represented in the DHS Scholars and Fellows awards.
However, we are concerned that cuts to the fiscal year 2006 budget and
proposed cuts to the fiscal year 2007 budget will serve to disrupt a
critical career pipeline for the next generation of Homeland Security
scientists. If the proposed fiscal year 2007 budget is enacted, DHS
will cut Scholars and Fellows support by one third. Especially this
year, as the Administration and Congress focus on the American
Competitiveness Initiative, we strongly recommend that the subcommittee
restore full funding of the DHS Scholars and Fellows program.
University Programs were cut 11 percent from fiscal year 2005 to
fiscal year 2006. The fiscal year 2007 budget calls for an additional
16 percent cut over fiscal year 2006. APA recommends that Congress
restore the proposed 16 percent cut and fund the University Programs at
or above the $62 million fiscal year 2006 appropriation.
department of homeland security report language for fiscal year 2007
Proposed by the American Psychological Association
Science and Technology Directorate
The Committee understands that terrorists are people and terrorism
is behavior, therefore understanding the importance of the behavioral,
psychological and social sciences to countering terrorism and homeland
security is paramount. The Committee applauds DHS strong support of a
full range of behavioral and social science research.
The Committee recommends DHS implement a Center for Translational
Social and Behavioral Science Research tasked with ensuring that our
homeland security plans are grounded in the best available science. The
Committee believes such a center should be a resource for creating
scientifically sound, behaviorally realistic communications, usability
standards, risk analyses, and emergency plans and should also identify
fundamental issues to be studied by the University Centers of
Excellence and others.
The Committee appreciates that the psychological consequences of a
manmade and natural disasters are likely to be widespread and long
lasting and that events like hurricanes Katrina and Rita are known to
have caused stress and anxiety in Americans of all ages, ethnicities,
and disparate geographical locations. Mental health practitioners must
be trained to deal with the particular aftermath that such events
impose. The Committee encourages DHS to ensure that mental health
research, particularly longitudinal research, is focused on how to
respond, mitigate and inoculate the populace as effectively as
possible.
The Committee also recognizes, however, that the social and
behavioral sciences have a much larger role to play than the single
domain of mental health. The technological devices and infrastructure
that are created in support of counter-terrorism and homeland security
efforts will be only as effective as the humans who interact with them.
Because many instances of protection against devastating loss since 9/
11 involved human alertness to unusual behavior, the Committee
recognizes that a significant portion of the most effective defense
against domestic attack will be human agents. In addition, the
Committee acknowledges that as we devise innovative technological
systems to thwart terrorists, the most dangerous terrorist will be one
who knows how to modify his or her behavior so as to circumvent these
systems. Therefore, the Committee believes that effective counter-
terrorism technologies must be developed in concert with the social and
behavioral sciences.
The Committee encourages DHS to pursue research on the assessment
of the human dimensions (social, cultural, and behavioral) in which
networks exist, such as first-response teams, emergency management
teams, communication systems, intelligence networks, terrorist groups,
and U.S. government (Federal, State, and local) departments and
agencies. Systems analysis and systems engineering are powerful tools
for understanding how these networks function. However, the Committee
recognizes that these tools will be useful only to the extent those
human behavioral variables are appropriately described and incorporated
into the analyses.
The Committee is concerned about the utility of the Homeland
Security Advisory System and encourages DHS to include an on-going
evaluation of its effectiveness. The Committee encourages DHS to
support research on risk assessment and the communication of risk in
order to understand the framework in which the communicator operates as
well as the knowledge base and competence of the audience. The
Committee recognizes that an effective and meaningful alert system
involves knowing how to articulate the goals of the communication
including whether to inform only, or to inform and change behavior.
The Committee encourages further development of animal models for
the assessment of chemical, radiological and biological agents that
might be used as weapons of attack and the pharmacological
countermeasures required to neutralize or reverse their effects. The
Committee recognizes that animal models are useful not only as
indicators of the apparent physiological responses to such agents, but
careful measurement of their behavior (motivation, learning,
aggression) can serve as more sensitive indices of both long- and
short-term effects of such weapons. Further, the Committee recognizes
animals also are potential targets of attack in the agricultural
sector, so that longitudinal data on animal behavior can serve as
valuable baseline data against which to detect attacks by biological
agents that may be either slow- or fast-acting.
The Committee recognizes that understanding how humans process
information is critical to developing new technologies for information
gathering and intelligence analysis. The Committee encourages
additional research to ensure that such technologies optimally
accommodate the human user. Further, the Committee encourages DHS to
support research that applies basic learning algorithms to data-mining
systems. Such systems can then become language-independent and analyze
text for meaning rather than simply the identification of keywords.
The Committee recognizes the value of robotics in performing
dangerous work and in substituting for human surveillance. The
Committee encourages DHS to support research on human-machine
interaction to optimize the functions of both the human and machine in
this partnership. The Committee recognizes that it is imperative to
understand how best to design robotic systems to interact effectively
with their human controllers and partners. The Committee believes that
human behavior cannot be perceived as a weak link in this interaction
because human cognitive, perceptual and motivational capacities are a
given and the machine system must be built to complement the human
user.
The Committee recognizes the profound effect that terrorism can
have on social systems and encourages DHS to support research on how
attitudes and beliefs about terrorism affect consumer confidence,
population mobility, decisions about child-care, job behaviors, and
attitudes towards immigrants, religion, political institutions and
leaders. The Committee encourages further research on understanding the
short- and long-term effects of stereotyping and marginalization of
groups as well as research on hate-crimes and the emergence and
maintenance of fundamentalist, extremist, and anti-government groups
within the United States and outside the United States.
The Committee recognizes the potential for massive disruption by
those who would distribute erroneous or system-destructive information
into the Internet, the telecommunications infrastructure, embedded/
real-time computing systems, and dedicated computing devices. The
Committee recommends DHS support research to analyze the behavior,
motivations and social contexts of known instances of successful
``hacking''. The Committee encourages DHS to research effective
safeguards that our consistent with the behaviors of the humans that
use these systems.
The Committee recognizes that emergency management, evacuation, and
the design of egress systems are operable only to the extent that we
know how humans behave in emergency situations. The Committee
encourages research on human behavior under duress and encourages
research on designing emergency systems and infrastructure (operation
and communication systems, buildings, roads and tunnels, stadiums) that
facilitate the most effective behavior in emergency situations.
The Committee recognizes there is a need to put as much attention
into government responses to terrorism as into terrorist acts
themselves. There are a number of data bases recording particulars of
terrorist attacks, but none so far that record government responses
(legal, military, political, policing; strategy and tactics) on the
same time line as the terrorist attacks. The committee believes this
information is critical to track because terrorists appear to adapt and
counter-adapt based on responses to their actions.
The Committee recommends that DHS also encourage research to
understand how terrorist organizations reason with respect to target
selection (i.e., does target selection depend on circumstances such as
differential vulnerability of targets, as opposed to other
considerations). Further, it would be helpful to understand how
specific tactics are adopted and the considerations that enter into
tactic selection.
The Committee realizes there is a need to understand how groups
move from radical protest or social movement to terrorism and to
examine the trajectories by which individuals move to terrorism.
Whether an individual joins a protest group or social movement which
escalates to the level of terrorism or joins an existing terrorist
group, the background and experience and psychology of individuals
recruited to terrorism in these two ways may be quite different. Moving
to terrorism as a member of a continuing group is more like a slippery
slope, whereas moving to terrorism by joining an existing terrorist
group is more like making a decision.
The Committee urges DHS to developing data bases of terrorist
rhetoric for important terrorist groups over time. If terrorists there
are rhetorical differences between protest groups that do and do not go
on to commit terrorist acts such differences might be useful for
directing countermeasure resources. When the rhetoric is not in
English, English speaking researchers need the rhetoric translated so
that they can apply text analysis tools in seeking rhetorical
predictors.
The Committee appreciates the DHS focus on jihadist terrorism but
recognizes that it also needs to prepare for a resurgence of domestic
terrorism. Neo-Nazi, constitutionalist, and white militia violence
emerged after the Soviet threat disintegrated; similarly it can be
expected that these groups and their violence will reemerge as the
threat from Al Qaeda fades. There is a danger in focusing only on
jihadist terrorism. The Committee suggest that National surveys with
unobtrusive questions (what percent of world's population is white?)
could begin to track the popularity of ideas associated with the idea
that the U.S. Federal Government is the enemy.
The Committee notes that thus far, Islamic communities in Europe
have been more involved in jihadist violence than Islamic communities
in the United States. The Committee urges DHS to continue to research
the determinants of support for violence among diasporas and develop
theories of diaspora experience in relation to home country politics
and especially support for violence in relation to home country
politics.
The Committee understands that Al Qaeda is less an organization
than a brand name or sympathy group with many local franchises now. The
anarchist movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s had a similar
quality, and due to the international nature of the anarchist threat
governments leaders reached unprecedented cooperative agreements in
trying to suppress the anarchists. The Committee recommends that DHS
conduct a review of research on anarchist terrorism at the beginning of
the 20th century in an effort to apply lessons learned for suppressing
Al Qaeda.
The Committee urges DHS to continue research on the psychology of
negative intergroup emotions. Most analyses of terrorism and terrorist
motives makes reference to fear, hate, anger or humiliation but the
Committee understands there is very little empirical research on hate
and humiliation. Further while there is research on anger and hate it
appears to focus on the interpersonal level which may be very different
than anger and hate at the intergroup level. The Committee recognizes
that episodes like Abu Ghraib highlight the problem in understanding
intergroup emotions which are twofold: understanding the relation
between interpersonal and intergroup emotions, and understanding in
particular intergroup emotions of hate, humiliation, and shame.
The Committee recommends that DHS continue to review criminology
literature and research related to gangs, especially youth and prison
gangs, to better understand how different types of terrorist groups on
the basis of recruiting, decision making, and desistence. The Committee
believes that through research comparing terrorist groups that do and
do not split, DHS might learn how to encourage internal conflict and
splitting within terrorist organizations. Further, the Committee notes
that there are cases, such as the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation
of Armenia, and Egyptian Group after Luxor, in which terrorist activity
drops quickly from high to low levels. As the dynamics of endings are
not necessarily the reverse of the dynamics of beginnings, the
Committee believes it should be useful to study such cases to learn how
to encourage desistence.
The Committee notes that terrorists are sometimes but not always
seen as representing the group or cause they claim to be fighting for.
Psychological research has emphasized attributions to individual actors
with little attention to attributions to groups, and the attributions
of interest are moral responsibility more than the usual psychological
focus on perceived ``causes'' of behavior as trait-based or situation-
based. The Committee encourages DHS to conduct additional research on
attribution theory to better understand how actions of a few are
sometimes but not always attributed to the group the individuals come
from.
The Committee urges DHS to continue to study why some groups move
from local to international terrorism. Most terrorism begins in
response to local issues, and relatively few groups escalate to
international attacks. The Committee believes we need to understand
when and how this kind of escalation occurs. The Committee notes that
most data bases focus on international terrorist attacks and may
discount data about earlier local attacks by the same groups. The
Committee believes that by studying local terrorist groups whose
actions remained local DHS would have a basis for comparison with local
groups that transitioned to international attacks.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Public Transportation Association
APTA is a nonprofit international association of over 1,600 public
and private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical
transit services and products. Over 90 percent of persons using public
transportation in the United States and Canada are served by APTA
members.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to submit written
testimony on the security and safety of public transportation systems.
We appreciate your interest in transportation security, and we look
forward to working with you as you develop the fiscal year 2007
appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of more than 1,600 public and
private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and State departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using
public transportation in the United States and Canada are served by
APTA member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our Nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot overemphasize the critical importance of our
industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6
billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit
service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million
times each weekday. This is more than 16 times the number of daily
travelers on the Nation's airlines.
Safety and security are the top priority of the public
transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve
security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since
then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United
States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency
preparedness programs and technology from their own budgets with only
minimal Federal funding. Last year's events in London and the previous
year's events in Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen
security on public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do
not need another wakeup call like the terrorists attacks on rail
systems in London and Madrid.
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the
documented needs, we respectfully urge Congress to provide at least
$560 million in the fiscal year 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations
bill for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue
to address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment
needs. Funding at this level annually would allow for dramatic
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
period. Federal funding for additional security needs should provide
for both hard and soft costs as described below and will be in addition
to investments as transit systems continue to provide from their own
resources. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) so that DHS can in turn
provide that amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards
program which includes participation with our Federal partners to
assist with the development of transit security standards. In addition,
we respectfully urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the
Public Transit Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC).
BACKGROUND
In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine
what actions they needed to take to improve security for their
customers, employees and facilities. In response to the survey, transit
agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in
transit security investment needs. State and local governments and
transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is
important that the Federal Government be a full partner in the effort
to ensure the security of the Nation's transit users.
In fiscal year 2003, transit security was allocated $65 million in
Federal funds from DHS for 20 transit systems. In fiscal year 2004, $50
million was allocated from DHS for 30 transit systems. For the first
time in fiscal year 2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150
million for transit, passenger and freight rail security. Out of the
$150 million, transit is to receive approximately $130 million--almost
$108 million for rail transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also,
passenger ferries are slated to receive an additional $5 million for
security from a separate account. In fiscal year 2006, Congress
appropriated $150 million for transit, passenger and freight rail
security. DHS is currently deciding how to allocate this funding among
the modes of transportation. We are very appreciative of this effort.
However, in the face of significant needs, more needs to be done.
Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security
needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000
rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005
Transit Vehicle Database, 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars,
and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Fewer
than one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems
(AVLs) that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an
emergency occurs. Nearly 75 percent of demand response vehicles lack
these AVLs. Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological
detection system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a
permanent chemical detection system. A partnership with the Federal
Government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
We are disappointed that the Administration proposed only $600
million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the fiscal
year 2007 DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security
grants for transit, seaports, railways and other facilities. We are
also disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific
line item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to
working with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate
transit security funding that begins to address unmet transit security
needs throughout the country.
We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS
Federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed
directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating
Agencies (SAA) on a regional basis. We believe direct funding to the
transit authorities would be more efficient and productive. The
Administration's process and conditions that have been put into effect
have created significant barriers and time delays in getting the actual
funds into the hands of transit agencies.
As I noted in previous testimony, APTA is a Standards Development
Organization (SDO) for the public transportation industry. We are now
applying our growing expertise in standards development to transit
industry safety and security, best practices, guidelines and standards
as well. We have already begun to initiate our efforts for security
standards development and we have engaged our Federal partners from
both the DHS and Department of Transportation in this process. Through
these initial meetings, I am pleased to advise that our Federal
partners have agreed to support these efforts. We look forward to
working with the Administration and Congress in support of this
initiative. We respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
DHS so that it can in turn provide that amount in grant funding to the
APTA security standards program which includes participation of our
Federal partners to assist with the development of such standards and
practices consistent with what we have already seen through the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA). Our efforts in standards development for
commuter rail, rail transit and bus transit operations have been
significant and our status as a SDO is acknowledged by both the FTA and
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). The FTA and the
Transportation Research Board have supported our standards initiatives
through the provision of grants.
We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.
INFORMATION SHARING
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit
systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their
security plans and procedures and have been very active in training
personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to
emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective
budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their
services through the introduction of additional technologies such as
surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems.
While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been unable to
fully implement programs without more assistance from the Federal
Government.
A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare
and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security
intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to
informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public
Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision
Directive #63, established an ISAC for public transit systems
throughout the United States. A funding grant in the amount of $1.2
million was provided to APTA by the Federal Transit Administration to
establish a very successful Public Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours
a day, 7 days a week, and gathered information from various sources,
including DHS, and then passed information on to transit systems
following a careful analysis of that information. However, given that
the Federal Transit Administration was subsequently unable to access
security funds, and given the decision of DHS to not fund ISAC
operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate method of providing
security intelligence through DHS's newly created Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). APTA continues to work with DHS staff to
create a useful HSIN application for the transit industry. It is clear,
however, that while the HSIN may become an effective resource, it does
not match the 24/7 two-way communication functions provided through the
Public Transit ISAC. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and
reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit
ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security
intelligence. Therefore, we respectfully urge Congress to provide
$600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international
public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid
Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with
the European-based transportation association, the International Union
of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated
in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give United States
transit agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address
transit security both here and abroad.
COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY
Following the attacks on London, APTA was asked to assist the TSA
in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to
discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing
the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat
levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems
and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These
costs totaled $900,000 per day for U.S. public transit systems or an
estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the
heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount
does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York,
New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches.
Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to
upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (NY-MTA) is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure
the safety and security of its transportation systems in what are among
the most extensive security measures taken by a public transportation
system to date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000
motion sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities
as part of a $212 million security upgrade announced late last year
with the Lockheed Martin Corporation. In fact, NY-MTA plans to spend
over $1.1 billion between now and 2009 on transit security.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
has invested some $2 billion of its own funds for enhanced security
measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At
the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to
determine how we could build upon our existing industry security
practices. This included a range of activities, which include research,
best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and
surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of
how to create a more secure environment for our riders and the most
critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional Federal investment for security
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
--Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel
--Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels
--Training for security personnel
--Joint transit/law enforcement training
--Security planning activities
--Security training for other transit personnel
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
include:
--Radio communications systems
--Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit stations
--Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas
--Automated vehicle locator systems
--Security fencing around facilities
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for Federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
for the transit industry in May 2004 which would require that transit
authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which
would set the stage for more extensive measures without any Federal
funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of
the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and
setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of
these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened
alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with
you in addressing these issues.
As you know, in the fiscal year 2006 Homeland Security
Appropriations bill (Public law 109-90), TSA can hire rail inspectors
using an $8 million appropriation. We have concerns about this
provision. We believe that funding for the inspectors would be better
spent on things that would support the industry such as surveillance
cameras, emergency communication and other systems rather than
highlighting security issues without providing the necessary resources
to address them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our
concerns.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs. In
light of our new realities for security, the APTA Executive Committee
has established a Security Affairs Steering Committee. This committee
addresses our security strategic issues and directions for our
initiatives. This committee will also serve as the mass transit sector
coordination council that will interface with DHS and other Federal
agencies forming the government coordinating council.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, APTA
supported two TCRP Panels that identified and initiated specific
projects developed to address Preparedness/Detection/Response to
Incidents and Prevention and Mitigation.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, APTA has been instrumental
in the development of numerous security and emergency preparedness
tools and resources. Many of these resources were developed in close
partnership with the FTA and we are presently focused on continuing
that same level of partnership with various entities within DHS. Also,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
APTA has long-established safety audit programs for commuter rail,
bus, and rail transit operations. Within the scope of these programs
are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Management Audit
Programs have been modified to place added attention to these critical
elements.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our Nation's heightened security needs
post 9/11, we believe that increased Federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. Therefore, we
respectfully urge Congress to provide at least $560 million in the
fiscal year 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill
for transit security grants to assist transit systems to continue to
address the $6 billion in identified transit security investment needs.
Funding at this level annually would also allow for dramatic
improvement in security for the Nation's transit users over a 10 year
period. We also respectfully urge Congress to provide $500,000 to the
Department of Homeland Security so that DHS can in turn provide that
amount in grant funding to the APTA security standards program which
includes participation of our Federal partners to assist with the
development of transit security standards and practices consistent with
what we have already seen through the FTA. In addition, we respectfully
urge Congress to provide $600,000 to maintain the Public Transit ISAC.
We have also found that investment in public transit security
programs, resources and infrastructures provides a direct benefit in
preparation and response to natural disasters as well. We look forward
to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department
of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We
again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to submit testimony
on these critical issues and look forward to working with you on safety
and security issues.
______
Prepared Statement of the International Association for Emergency
Managers
Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to provide
testimony on the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security.
I am Michael D. Selves. I am currently the Emergency Management and
Homeland Security Director for Johnson County, Kansas. Johnson County
constitutes the Southwest suburbs of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area
and, with a population of approximately a half million, is the most
populous county in Kansas. I currently serve as the First Vice
President of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)
and am providing this testimony on their behalf. I am also a Certified
Emergency Manager (CEM), and have served IAEM over the past 5 years as
chair of the Government Affairs Committee. For the past 11 years I have
been an active participant in the National Association of Counties,
chairing their Subcommittee on Emergency Management, as a charter
member of their Homeland Security Task Force as well as serving 2 years
on their Board of Directors. I was appointed by Department of Homeland
Security Secretary Ridge to his task force on State and local Homeland
Security funding.
The International Association of Emergency Managers has over 2,700
members including emergency management professionals at the State and
local government levels, the military, private business and the
nonprofit sector in the United States and in other countries. Most of
our members are city and county emergency managers who perform the
crucial function of coordinating and integrating the efforts at the
local level to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and
recover from all types of disasters including terrorist attacks. Our
members include emergency managers from large urban areas as well as
rural counties.
Hurricane Katrina has unequivocally demonstrated the need for
strong emergency management programs at the Federal State and local
levels. As emergency management professionals, we know the only way
plans, preparations and equipment can be brought to bear in a disaster
is through the planning efforts--of people . . . people whose job it is
to bring all elements of a community together to make the plans work
and who will be there when the time comes to implement those plans. For
this reason, we are limiting our statement to one single critical
issue: We respectfully request your assistance in increasing the
funding for the Emergency Management Program Grant (EMPG).
Emergency Management Performance Grant
--Request the $13,100,000 funding cut be rejected and the amount
increased to $256 million to begin addressing the shortfall.
--Request that EMPG funding be maintained in a separate account as in
the fiscal year 2006 Congressional action and not combined with
other grant programs.
Increase funding for EMPG.--Appropriations Committee report
language referred to the program as ``the backbone of the Nation's
emergency management system.'' In order to maintain this system and
build the capacity required to meet the greatly increasing demands,
additional investment is needed.
However, the President's Budget request for fiscal year 2007
proposes to reduce the funding from the $183,100,000 appropriated in
fiscal year 2006 to $170,000,000. According to a biennial study
conducted by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) in
2004 there is a shortfall of $260 million. We respectfully request that
EMPG be increased $86 million over the fiscal year 2007 request for a
total of $256,000,000 to begin addressing this shortfall.
Maintain EMPG as a separate account.--We also urge you to continue
to maintain EMPG as a separate account. The President's budget includes
this program in the ``State and Local'' account with a number of other
grant programs. EMPG is different from the other programs in this
account. EMPG has existed for over 50 years and supports all hazards
emergency management, including terrorism. In addition, it is a
performance based continuing program with deliverables and requirements
that must be met in order to receive funding the next year.
EMPG is critically important.--We believe it is the single most
effective use of Federal funds in providing emergency management
capacity to State and local governments. No other source of homeland
security funding is based on a consensus building process determining
outcomes and specific deliverables backstopped by a quarterly
accountability process. In fact, we feel this program would more
accurately be described by the name Emergency Management Assistance
(EMA) because of the unique requirements for deliverables and
accountability it imposes--unique among all other homeland security
sources of financial assistance.
In addition, this unique program has never experienced ``backlogs''
of unspent funds because it is built on the experience and refinement
of over 5 decades of proven effectiveness and efficiency. EMPG
assistance requires a 50 percent State or local match, thus creating
the much-needed ``buy-in'' not present in many other grant programs.
Actually, the ``buy-in'' in this program is significantly greater due
to the fact that currently many local jurisdictions are receiving 20
percent or less. In addition many local jurisdictions receive no
funding at all because of shortage of funds.
Examples of the critical benefits of EMPG are the following:
--This program provides funding for the emergency managers who
perform the role of the ``honest broker'' at the State and
local level and who establish the emergency management
framework for preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.
--EMPG funding provides the people who are legally responsible for
creating a ``culture of preparedness'' at the State and local
level.
--EMPG funding also provides many of the personnel who can be
deployed across State lines to assist other States in case of
disaster through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC). During the 2005 response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
65, 919 civilian and military personnel and equipment assets
were deployed from 48 States, the District of Columbia, the
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. Over 2100 missions were
performed.
--EMPG funding has assumed a greater importance in light of recent
catastrophic events and the responses to those events. For
example, the President and the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) have tasked State and local government emergency managers
with the responsibility to review their Emergency Operations
Plans regarding the issue of evacuation.
--EMPG supports the people who have had the added responsibility of
administering homeland security funding programs and additional
planning efforts since 2001. While we agree the National Plan
Review is a vitally important project, floods, tornadoes and
other disasters simply haven't stopped happening.
Without more funding and people we can't reach the level of
preparedness our Nation deserves and our citizens demand.
The recent White House report on the response to the Hurricane
Katrina contains 125 recommendations. A significant number of these
recommendations are ``top-down'' initiatives which require the
collaboration and coordination efforts of State and local emergency
managers in order to be fully implemented. We also know that genuine
solutions to broad based issues like emergency management can only
succeed if they recognize the primary importance of State and local
governments.
One way to sum things up is to acknowledge that beautiful plans
written without the input and agreement of key stakeholders on roles
and responsibilities will gather dust on shelves. A plan that works and
has broad based buy in may be ugly and patched, but it lives, breathes
and works, just like the people who implement it in a disaster.
EMPG provides people who build partnerships.--The single most
critically important thing EMPG funding provides is emergency
management personnel at the State and local level. People are the most
important investment this program makes because without them nothing
else works. Emergency Management is a people process. I would like to
point to my own jurisdiction--Johnson County, Kansas--as an example.
Even before Katrina, we were engaged in the process of evaluating
and revising our local emergency operations plan. I can tell you that
this plan truly has broad buy in and acceptance within our
jurisdiction. This happened because 16 subcommittees involving more
than 120 people for 8 months of effort developed the 16 annexes of our
plan. Because of the extensively and intensively people-based approach
of this process, all of our officials--from our elected local
leadership and senior management to front-line first responders--know
and accept their roles and responsibilities. This would not have
happened without EMPG funding providing the personnel in my office to
facilitate this process. And the end result is very important. If we
shake hands before the disaster, we won't have to point fingers
afterwards.
Emergency Management personnel at the State and local level have
long involved private enterprise and faith-based groups in their
inclusive, all-hazards planning process. For example, many of the State
and local governments that hosted Katrina survivors fully integrated
private and faith based organizations in their reception planning.
These organizations' contributions ranged from providing critically
needed supplies to serving as counselors and community emissaries for
potential new residents of our communities.
In conclusion, we believe this program must be maintained and
sustained at a level which ensures that we continue to have a strong,
truly national, system of emergency management in America. I sincerely
thank you for this opportunity to express our deep concerns.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Border Patrol Council
The National Border Patrol Council thanks the Subcommittee for the
opportunity to present the views and concerns of the 10,500 front-line
Border Patrol employees that it represents regarding the resources
necessary to provide effective homeland security now and in the future.
Initially, it is important to recognize that there are numerous aspects
of homeland security, and each of them must receive adequate funding
and support in order for the overall program to function properly.
Deficiencies in any part(s) of the system will weaken the entire
structure, enabling terrorists and other criminals to exploit these
vulnerabilities. Thus, it is imperative that all of these matters are
addressed concurrently. Beyond the obvious need to substantially
increase the number of personnel in all of the Department of Homeland
Security's programs, there is an equally pressing need to enhance the
infrastructure that supports these programs.
It is beyond dispute that our borders are out of control. Millions
of people cross them illegally every year, and only a small percentage
are apprehended. While most of these people are merely seeking to
improve their economic lot in life, a small but significant percentage
of them are criminals who take advantage of our open borders, and a few
terrorists undoubtedly do the same. In order to restore a semblance of
order to this chaotic situation, the root cause of illegal immigration
needs to be addressed by turning off the employment magnet that lures
impoverished people to our country. This will require a significant
revision in the existing statutes so that employers are able to easily
determine who has a right to work in this country and are discouraged
from ignoring or disobeying the law through the certain imposition of
tough penalties. A single, counterfeit-proof document must serve as the
foundation of this approach. In order enforce this new law, substantial
additional resources will need to be allocated. At a minimum, 10,000
criminal investigators should be added for this purpose.
Even though the adoption of the foregoing measures would eliminate
most illegal border crossings by people seeking employment, it would do
nothing to diminish the flow of criminals and contraband. Stopping this
illicit activity will require a sophisticated network of detection
devices coupled with substantial increases in Border Patrol agents to
respond to such intrusions and apprehend the violators. The additional
1,500 agents requested by the Administration for the upcoming fiscal
year is entirely inadequate for this purpose, and should be increased
to 2,500. Thereafter, the size of the Border Patrol should be increased
by at least the same amount every year until a total of at least 25,000
agents are deployed.
The number of inspections personnel at the Ports of Entry also
needs to be increased significantly to allow for a more thorough
inspection process without disrupting the flow of legitimate traffic.
This will require an expansion of the existing facilities in some
locations, and the building of additional facilities in areas where
that is impractical. Moreover, the failed ``One Face at the Border''
initiative needs to be discarded in favor of a system that fosters
specialization in each of the complex areas of immigration, customs,
and agriculture laws.
The number of detention beds and personnel to guard detainees also
need to be augmented significantly. The promise of ``catch and return''
is meaningless unless it can be backed up by sufficient resources.
In order to adequately patrol the thousands of miles of coastal
areas and other waterways along the boundaries of the United States,
the Coast Guard also needs substantial increases in personnel.
The number of Federal Air Marshals has been allowed to dwindle to
dangerously low levels. A significant increase in the ranks of these
employees is also critical to efforts to bolster homeland security.
It is important that the occupations supporting the foregoing
programs also be increased commensurately. Far too often, these
important resources are neglected when the primary occupations are
augmented, resulting in needless inefficiencies.
The addition of significant numbers of new employees will present
many challenges. First and foremost, it will be necessary to make these
occupations more attractive in order to recruit and retain sufficient
numbers of highly-qualified personnel. Law enforcement agencies
throughout the country are currently experiencing difficulties meeting
their recruitment goals, and many of them are finding it necessary to
increase salaries and benefits to remain competitive.\1\ The Border
Patrol just raised its entry level age from 37 to 40, reflecting the
difficulties it is facing in attracting a sufficient number of
qualified recruits. In many areas of the country, the pay and benefits
of Federal law enforcement agents already lag behind that of their
State and local law counterparts. In order to become more competitive
in this job market, the Federal Government needs to upgrade its pay and
benefits, and take other steps to ensure that these jobs are deemed
desirable.
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\1\ ``Police Finding It Hard to Fill Jobs; Forces Use Perks And
Alter Standards,'' The Washington Post, March 27, 2006, page A-1.
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The pay of many of the Department of Homeland Security's
occupations needs to be raised substantially. This includes, but is not
limited to, Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection
Officers, Immigration Enforcement Agents, and Law Enforcement
Communications Assistants. Moreover, the demoralizing practice of
requiring many of the Department's law enforcement employees to work
long hours of overtime without any compensation needs to be remedied by
placing all employees under the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Also, all of the Department's law enforcement officers need to be
afforded law enforcement retirement coverage.
The pay-for-performance plan that is being implemented throughout
DHS must be discarded in favor of a fair and predictable pay system.
The pay of dedicated employees should not be left to the whim and mercy
of arbitrary and capricious supervisors, many of whom are ordered to
withhold pay increases in order to offset budgetary shortfalls in other
areas.
Additionally, the labor-management relations provisions of the
Homeland Security Act must be repealed. These draconian measures serve
no legitimate purpose, and will in fact deter employees from exposing
fraud, waste or corruption. Because they institutionalize the unfair
treatment of employees, they will also discourage the best and the
brightest from serving in the Department.
Although all Federal agencies have the authority to pay generous
recruitment and relocation bonuses and retention allowances, the
Department of Homeland Security rarely exercises it because little or
no money is budgeted for that purpose. This unwise practice needs to be
remedied. Similarly, the Department needs additional money for the
purpose of funding personnel relocations. Themovement of personnel from
one location to another is essential to the success of the
organization.
Counter-productive enforcement schemes such as the Border Patrol's
``strategy of deterrence'' need to be abandoned in favor of effective
strategies. The notion that criminals and terrorists will be dissuaded
from crossing the borders illegally because Border Patrol agents are
positioned at quarter-mile fixed intervals along the border is absurd.
Surveillance technology can be a useful enforcement tool,
especially in detecting violators who are attempting to illegally cross
our borders. The temptation to rely upon such devices to replace
trained law enforcement officers needs to be resisted, however. Even
the most sophisticated of these devices is incapable of apprehending a
single violator. At best, most of these devices are only capable of
providing snapshot views of intrusions, and their utility is thus quite
limited. The high cost of complex devices such as unmanned aerial
vehicles renders them less cost-effective than manned aircraft such as
helicopters.
The Department needs to provide all of its officers with instant
access to databases that allow them to quickly determine if a person is
wanted for the commission of a crime or suspicion of terrorist
activities. Disturbingly, almost none of the Department's vehicles have
portable computers.
Many of the Border Patrol's vehicles are long overdue for
replacement. It is senseless to spend large amounts of money repairing
vehicles that continually break down because of their age and the wear
and tear of law enforcement use.
Numerous DHS employees are wearing body armor that is not suited
for the types of dangers that they face and the environment in which
they operate. Moreover, the weapons issued to these employees are no
match for those utilized by the criminals that they face.
The communications system utilized by many of the Department's
employees is antiquated and inadequate. There are numerous areas where
employees routinely operate without the ability to communicate with
each other because the radio network does not provide coverage. This
hazardous situation needs to be remedied.
Many employees do not have hand-held global positioning system
devices to assist them in navigating around the vast areas that they
are responsible for patrolling. Moreover, the supply of night vision
equipment is inadequate, and much of it is outdated.
Hiring large numbers of employees will require an expansion of the
existing training facilities. The small size and deplorable condition
of the Border Patrol's facilities in Artesia, New Mexico are cause for
particular concern. The infrastructure of that community cannot support
an operation of the magnitude needed to properly train several thousand
agents every year, and serious consideration needs to be given to
finding a new location that is more suited to this purpose.
As significant numbers of additional personnel are added to all
parts of the country, it is important to plan ahead and ensure that the
facilities in those locations are large enough to ensure that the
operations run efficiently.
Although most of the infrastructure needs identified herein can
easily be met through proper planning, the chronic deficiencies in
these areas demand an approach that incorporates them into the hiring
process. A funding formula that factors all of these needs into the
cost of a full career must be developed, adjusted from time to time,
and followed.
While the expense of providing effective homeland security may seem
steep at first glance, it pales in comparison to the cost of failing to
do so. The investment in the infrastructure of America's homeland
security must begin now. Further delays will leave our Nation
needlessly vulnerable to further attacks by those who want to destroy
us.
______
Prepared Statement of the National Emergency Management Association
Introduction
Thank you Chairman Gregg, Ranking Member Byrd, and distinguished
members of the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to provide you
with a statement for the record on the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) fiscal year 2007 budget. I am Bruce Baughman, the President of
the National Emergency Management Association and Director of the
Alabama Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing
the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are
the State emergency management directors in the States, the U.S.
territories, and the District of Columbia. NEMA's members are
responsible to their governors for emergency preparedness, homeland
security, mitigation, response, and recovery activities for natural,
man-made, and terrorist caused disasters.
As you consider the budget for fiscal year 2007, emergency
management in our country has received greater attention as a result of
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Though, funding has not followed
from the Federal Government to assist in meeting the needs for all-
hazards emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation
activities. Over the past year, our Nation's emergency management
system has been tested by the extensive natural disasters that we have
faced. In all, there were 48 major disaster declarations, 68 emergency
declarations, and 39 fire management assistance declarations. Every
single State was impacted by one of these declarations, including the
District of Columbia, and all but two of the U.S. territories. 48
States were impacted enough by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to warrant
declarations for Federal assistance, whether the States were disaster
areas or the States took in significant numbers of evacuees. States
have been mandated to complete comprehensive reviews of evacuation
plans and other emergency plans with no Federal support. At the same
time, emergency management continues to prepare for the threat of
terrorism with new requirements coming from the Federal Government such
as updating State plans to reflect the National Response Plan (NRP),
training emergency responders on the new National Incident Management
System (NIMS), and implementing the National Preparedness Goal mandated
by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD 8) on National
Preparedness with no additional Federal financial assistance to meet
Federal mandates. The multi-hazards emergency management system
continues to be the means to practice and exercise for devastating acts
of terrorism, while at the same time preparing the Nation for
hurricanes, tornadoes, hazardous materials spills, and floods. We
respectfully ask for your Committee to consider the role of emergency
management as you address the fiscal year 2007 appropriations and ask
for your serious consideration for Federal support for the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) to build State and local
emergency management capacity.
The Department of Homeland Security budget provides critical
support to State and local emergency management programs through actual
dollars, grants, and program support. This year, NEMA would like to
address three critical issues regarding the proposed Federal budget for
Department of Homeland Security:
--Extreme concern for proposed cuts to the Emergency Management
Performance Grant (EMPG) program while requirements increase
for State and local governments;
--The need for Federal support for the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC); and
--Concerns related to the status of reorganizations at the Department
of Homeland Security.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING
EMPG is the only program for All-Hazards Preparedness/Readiness
Natural disasters are certain and often anticipated. Every State
must be able to plan for disasters as well as build and sustain the
capability to respond. EMPG is the only source of funding to assist
State and local governments with planning and preparedness/readiness
activities associated with natural disasters. At a time when our
country is recovering from one of the largest natural disasters and
making strides to improve the Nation's emergency preparedness/
readiness, we cannot afford to have this vital program be cut by $13.1
million. EMPG is the backbone of the Nation's all-hazards emergency
management system as the only source of direct Federal funding to State
and local governments for emergency management capacity building. EMPG
is used for personnel, planning, training, and exercises at both the
State and local levels. EMPG is primarily used to assist States in
maintaining personnel for State and local emergency management
programs, and consequently the Nation's emergency response system. EMPG
is being used to help States create and update plans for receiving and
distribution plans for commodities and ice after a disaster, debris
removal plans, and plans for receiving or evacuating people.
The State and local government partnership with the Federal
Government to ensure preparedness dates back to the civil defense era,
yet increased responsibilities over the last decade have fallen on
State and local governments. With the recent expanded focus on
terrorism and the increased demands of the Federal Government to assist
in implementation of Federal initiatives like the NRP, the NIMS, and
HSPD8, EMPG becomes more important as a means to ensure State and local
involvement and compliance with new systems.
NEMA completed a Quick Response Survey in March 2006 to assess the
impacts of the proposed cut to the EMPG program. Of the 42 States
responding, 90 percent of the States will have to cut staff ranging
from one person to more than 50 positions. If the cut is included in
the budget: 20 States will have to cut between 1-10 positions; 10
States will have to cut between 11-30 positions; 4 will have to cut
between 31-50 positions; and 4 will have to cut more than 50 positions.
In the same Quick Response Survey, 83 percent of responding States
report that the majority of EMPG funds go to local grants, so the
impact of the cut would be greatest on local governments.
State and Local Match
EMPG is the only program in the Preparedness Account within the
Department of Homeland Security that requires a match at the State and
local level. The match is evidence of the critical partnership of State
and local governments to address the urgent national security need for
emergency planning for all disasters regardless of the cause. EMPG
requires a match of 50 percent from the State or local governments.
According to the NEMA 2004 Biennial Report, budgets for State emergency
management agencies nationally were reduced by an average of 23 percent
in fiscal year 2004, yet at the same time States were continuing to
over match the Federal Government's commitment to national security
protection through EMPG by $96 million in fiscal year 2004, which is a
80 percent State and 20 percent Federal contribution.
EMPG Helps Ensure Personnel for Mutual Aid
During last year's hurricane season, the interdependencies of the
Nation's emergency management system were demonstrated and one of the
success stories was the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
EMAC enabled 48 States, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands,
and Puerto Rico to provide assistance in the form of more than 2,100
missions of human, military and equipment assets and over 65,000
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
impacted States. The estimated costs of these missions may exceed $829
million and the missions and requests for aid are continuing. Of the
personnel providing assistance through EMAC, 46,448 were National Guard
personnel and 19,431 were civilians. Many of the civilians sent to
provide assistance were supported by the EMPG program. The nature of
the Nation's mutual aid system vividly shows the need for all States to
have appropriate capabilities for all disasters and EMPG allows States
and local governments to build this capability both for their own use
and to share in through EMAC. Additional resources are needed to build
emergency response capabilities on a national basis and to ensure the
system can handle the demands of natural disasters including
catastrophic events and other emergencies no matter where they occur.
Appropriate Support Needed to Strengthen Program
While EMPG received modest increases in 2003 and 2004 after 10
years of straight-lined funding, the program still needs significant
investment to accomplish its goals. The final fiscal year 2006 DHS
conference report provided an additional $5 million for the program,
but after the across the board cut, the program was left with $183.1
million. We appreciate all of the efforts of members of Congress and
the Administration to allow for these increases. The current cut comes
at a time when emergency management needs to address shortfalls and new
threats. EMPG needs adequate and predictable resources in order to
sustain the increased demand for preparedness/readiness. Continued
funding increases are necessary to make up for a decade of degradation
of funding and increased State and local commitments because funding
has not kept pace with inflation or with increasing demand. The
increased flexibility of EMPG is offset by funding shortfalls estimated
in the NEMA Biennial Report in 2004 to be over $264 million for all 50
States. The current shortfall is $260, because of a $3.1 million
increase in fiscal year 2006.
The President's budget proposal will have a devastating impact on
the Nation's emergency management system at the same time that
responsibilities are increasing for new and emerging hazards. The
proposal decreases funding for the EMPG program by $10 million. These
cuts mean that emergency management would be saddled with increased
mandates, while coping with decreases to an already modest budget. In
budget consideration for fiscal year 2003, 2004, and 2006, Congress
affirmed the importance of EMPG in appropriations bills in language
addressing the significance of the program and increased the levels of
funding for the program twice. Prior to these modest increases, the
program had been straight lined for over a decade and even with these
increases the program's growth rate has not kept pace with inflation
over the last 15 years. Additionally, Congress affirmed the intent of
the program as all-hazards and dedicated to supporting personnel during
consideration of the fiscal year 2006 budget. NEMA is appreciative of
Congress' recognition of the EMPG program, but this year we
respectfully ask that Congress aggressively address the programs
shortfalls with an additional $87 million in funding for EMPG for
fiscal year 2007, for a total of $270 million.
Clearly, Congress wants to understand what is being built with
these investments, especially in tight fiscal conditions. The 2006
Quick Response Survey found that if States were to each receive an
additional $1 million in EMPG funding for fiscal year 2007, States
would use the following percentages for the following activities: 88
percent of States responding would update plans including evacuation,
sheltering, emergency operations, catastrophic disasters and others; 83
percent would provide more training opportunities for State and local
emergency preparedness and response; 88 percent would provide more
preparedness grants to local jurisdictions; 69 percent would conduct
more State and local exercises; and 61 percent would use funding for
State and local NIMS compliance.
EMPG's modest Federal increases in helped the program grow, but
shortfalls continue to force an unequal burden on State and local
governments. States are continuing to increase their out of pocket
costs in order to ensure there is adequate funding for local programs.
The shortfall means that many communities that would like to implement
a full-time, professional emergency management capability cannot do so
because of shortfalls in Federal funding. Further, EMPG is primarily
used as a pass-through program for local governments, so the shortfall
affects our smallest localities that are often those most in need of
emergency preparedness planning. Currently, States and local
governments are over matching the Federal Government's commitment to
national security protection through EMPG by $96 million according to
the 2004 NEMA Biennial Report.
Accountability Measures
Many States have various accountability measures in place to track
the use of EMPG funding and NEMA supports the development of a national
system that quantifies the uses of the funding. In fact, NEMA through
the National Homeland Security Consortium is working closely with the
new Preparedness Directorate at DHS to work collaboratively on
performance metrics for HSPD-8 and performance metrics for the Response
Capabilities in the TCL. The DHS effort will help to develop a national
picture of EMPG metrics as well. At the same time, States already have
measures in place at the State level to track the use of EMPG funding
in their States. Some of the measures in place reported in the 2006
Quick Response Survey include: 95 percent of responding States have
reporting requirements; 76 percent of States responding require the
development of State-wide goals that must be met with the funds; 61
percent of the States responding call for local governments to
demonstrate performance against goals that are written by local
jurisdictions; 42 percent of responding States implement corrective
action plans if goals are not met with funding; and 45 percent of
States tie program funding to meeting the standards in place with the
voluntary Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) for State
and local emergency management agencies.
EMPG as a Separate Account
The President's Budget proposal for fiscal year 2007 suggests
combining the EMPG account with the Citizen Corp account to form a
formula-based grant account. NEMA strongly disagrees with this
approach, as EMPG must be maintained as a separate line item account as
Congress has affirmed since fiscal year 2003. Congress agreed at that
time that the program account needed to be visible and easy to find in
the budget because of the importance of the program. The separate
account is critical because the program is the only all-hazards grant
program being administered through the Grants and Training Office to
emergency management agencies. Further, the separate account allows for
EMPG to be tracked and has raised visibility on the importance of the
program among members of Congress. Additionally, we suggest that
Congress maintain the method of distribution for EMPG, similar to the
language in the fiscal year 2006 appropriations, however continuing to
allocate the funding through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs)
continues to cause delays in some States. NEMA supports language that
would expressedly restore the grants allocation to State emergency
management agencies, to facilitate the process of getting funding to
emergency management agencies at the State and local level faster.
All-Hazards Approach
The Federal Government must continue the commitment to ensuring
national security though all-hazard preparedness. Without adequate
numbers of State and local personnel to operate the all-hazards
emergency management system, the infrastructure used to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all disasters will collapse.
Unfortunately, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrated the need for
adequate emergency management needs from the ground up. Instead of
making significant investments towards terrorism preparedness, we must
maintain an all-hazards approach and shore up the foundation of our
response system for all disasters regardless of cause--EMPG. We
strongly ask for Congress to ensure predictable and adequate funding
levels for the EMPG in fiscal year 2007.
BUIDING OUR NATION'S MUTUAL AID SYSTEM THROUGH EMAC
The response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita resulted in the largest
deployment of interstate mutual aid in the Nation's history through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As mentioned
previously, EMAC deployed personnel comprised of multiple disciplines
from all member States to respond to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas. EMAC Operations in Louisiana are still underway.
The process enabled National Guard, search and rescue teams, incident
management teams, emergency operations center support, building
inspectors, and law enforcement personnel to immediately assist the
requesting States in need of support. The National Guard even chose to
continue under EMAC when deployed under Title 32 because of the
organization, liability protections, accountability, and tracking
abilities EMAC provides.
EMAC was created after Hurricane Andrew by then-Florida Governor
Lawton Chiles. The system was developed through the members States of
the Southern Governors' Association to establish mechanisms to enable
mutual aid among member sates in emergency situations. The Southern
Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC) was signed by
participating Governors in 1993. Following recognition of SREMACs
nationwide applicability by the National Governors' Association and
FEMA, Congress enacted EMAC in 1996 (Public Law 104-321). Currently 49
States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia are members of EMAC. Hawaii is currently considering
legislation to become a party to the compact during their current
legislative session. EMAC requires member States to have an
implementation plan and to follow procedures outlined in the EMAC
Operations Manual. EMAC takes care of issues such as reimbursement,
liability protections, and workers' compensation issues.
Prior to the historic 2005 deployments, EMAC's largest previous
deployment was during the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida, Alabama,
and West Virginia, which enabled 38 States to provide assistance in the
form of more than $15 million in human, military, and equipment assets
and over 800 personnel to support the impacted States for over 85 days
of continuous response operations. NEMA utilized the grant funds to
work with an independent consulting company to complete a 2004 After
Action Report, that identified areas for continuous improvement for the
EMAC systems and EMAC has worked to draft a strategic plan to implement
the lessons learned into practice. NEMA is currently working to
complete an After-Action Report on the 2005 season, with a meeting of
stakeholders, assisting States, requesting States, and others later
this month. The report is expected to be complete by September 2006 and
the strategic plan will be amended to reflect new lessons learned. The
support of EMAC is critical to helping offset the costs of disasters
and maintaining the need for a massive Federal workforce for response
to catastrophic disasters. The beauty of EMAC is that it provides
assistance to those in need, but allows others to assist and learn from
disasters in other States.
In order to meet the ever-growing need for and reliance on
interstate mutual aid, EMAC is seeking $4 Million over 3 years to
continue to build EMAC capabilities. This funding will allow EMAC to
focus on the implementation of lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita such as Training and Education, Resource Typing and
Credentialing, and Information and Resource Management. Since EMAC's
inception in 1993, EMAC was funded by member States until 2003. In
2003, FEMA funded EMAC with a 3 year grant of $2 Million. This funding
expires in November 2006. This funding has been used for administrative
support of EMAC, development of the EMAC Operations system whereby all
resources deployed under the Compact are tracked from when it is
requested until reimbursement is paid, and the 2004 and 2005 after
action reports.
SECOND STAGE REVIEW AND FEMA
As the Congress looks at the lessons learned and recommendations
for reform included in reports following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
we ask that NEMA's members be consulted regarding further changes to
the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA. Most importantly,
consideration needs to also be given to the connectivity between FEMA
and the Preparedness Directorate within DHS, since all FEMA's
preparedness functions were moved out into this new Directorate. When
the Second Stage Review proposal was announced, NEMA articulated grave
concern in a July 27, 2005 letter to the Department of Homeland
Security regarding the Second Stage Review (2SR) creating a
Preparedness Directorate that would be primarily focused on terrorism.
The letter to Congress highlighted the lack of the Department's focus
on natural-hazards preparedness and the inability to connect response
and recovery operations to preparedness functions, as any unnecessary
separation of these functions could result in a disjointed response and
adversely impact the effectiveness of Departmental operations.
Nevertheless, we understand that the 2SR is moving ahead and look
forward to finding ways to connect the new Preparedness Directorate
with FEMA. We fear that if those interrelationships are not made the
result could mean that many State and local governments will be meeting
FEMA for the first time when as disaster occurs in their State because
of the separation of functions. We hope to work with Congress to ensure
linkages of preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation functions
in the all-hazards approach to emergency management.
NEMA also calls on Congress to consider the needs of the FEMA in
this year's budget process, to restore the agencies ability to respond
to all disasters. Our Nation is same point as the Nation was after
Hurricane Andrew in 1992, questioning organizational structures,
leadership, the roles of Federal, State, and local government, funding
for FEMA and emergency management and even citizen preparedness. No
Federal agency is more qualified structurally and statutorily than FEMA
to help our Nation respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA has the
direct relationships with State and local governments because of the
grant programs and the disaster relief programs authorized through the
Stafford Act. FEMA is the only Federal agency authorized under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Relief Act (42 U.S.C.
5121 et seq.) to carry out duties on behalf of the President. The 1978
Reorganization Plan 3, which created FEMA, also gives FEMA the
responsibility for all of the functions of emergency preparedness and
response. The plan States:
``This reorganization rests on several fundamental principles.
First, Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to
major civil emergencies should be supervised by one official
responsible to the President and given attention by other officials at
the highest levels. The new agency would be in this position.''
FEMA is and should be the agency of choice to coordinate the
functions of the Federal Government in response to disasters,
regardless of their cause.
FEMA has the ability to tap into the emergency responder community
to build relationships through training and exercises. FEMA also has
the skills to work cooperatively with State and local elected and
appointed officials to work towards comprehensive recovery. FEMA has
the coordinating function in the Federal Government and should have the
ability to tap all the resources at the Federal level to respond to a
disaster. However, all these areas need to be strengthened with an all-
hazards focus to ensure that Federal, State, and local governments are
building relationships before a disaster and understand how to work
together cohesively. FEMA also needs financial support to maintain and
build their capacity.
The time to stop the cycle of degradation of emergency management
functions by reorganization after reorganization is now and we must
systematically improve our Nation's emergency response system through
verified lessons learned and not reactionary decisions. We hope that
Congress will partner with NEMA as they move forward to consider
changes to DHS organizational functions and the role of FEMA.
CONCLUSION
The last year has proved our Nation's continuous vulnerability
against all-hazards of many sizes. We will be faced with recovery on
the Gulf Coast for many years to come and we cannot ignore the
predictions for the coming Hurricane season. We must continue to build
national preparedness efforts with a multi-hazard approach. In this
year's appropriations process Congress will make critical decisions
that shape the future of emergency management in this country. As you
begin your consideration, we ask you to recognize the importance of
adequately funding the EMPG program in building capacity through people
at the State and local level for all disasters. I thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your
partnership.