[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senator Stevens, Cochran, Shelby, Burns, and
Inouye.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Missile Defense Agency
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. ``TREY''
OBERING III, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
DIRECTOR
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. We're pleased to have Lieutenant General
Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
and Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, Commander of the U.S. Army
Space and Missile Defense Command, U.S. Army Forces Strategic
Command, and the Joint Functional Component of the Command
Integrated Missile Defense (IMD).
General Obering, given your service at the Missile Defense
Agency for the last 2 years, we have been acquainted with you
and your role, and appreciate your service as Director of the
Missile Defense Agency.
General Dodgen, we thank you, again, for coming to appear
before the subcommittee, and recognize your multiple command
roles and responsibilities.
Since I am late, I am going to put the balance of my
statement in the record. I would also like to include the
statement for Senator Cochran in the record as well.
[The statements follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
The committee is pleased to welcome Lieutenant General
Henry Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency and
Lieutenant General Larry Dodgen, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command, U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command,
and Joint Functional Component Command--Integrated Missile
Defense.
General Obering, given your service at the Missile Defense
Agency for almost two years, we are acquainted with you and
your role as Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
General Dodgen, thank you for testifying again before this
committee and we recognize your multiple command roles and
responsibilities and look forward to hearing your statement
today.
We thank the both of you for being here today.
In the face of a growing threat, ballistic missile defense
is one of the most challenging missions in the Department of
Defense. Recognizing the strategic importance of this mission
to the United States, this committee has consistently provided
resources for missile defense programs. Unfortunately, we as a
nation face multiple threats with limited resources, forcing
this committee to make tough choices with respect to our
defense priorities. This committee seeks to ensure that our
nations limited resources are tightly focused, on countering
the most important threats.
General Dodgen and General Obering, we look forward to
hearing about the current status of our missile defense
capabilities and how the program is proceeding. We will make
your full statement a part of the committee's record. Before we
begin, let me turn to Senator Inouye, my vice chairman, for his
opening remark.
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Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses today.
Given the development of missile programs around the world and
the nuclear development efforts by North Korea and Iran, the
importance of maintaining a strong missile defense program
cannot be overstated. Our nation needs to continue to develop
and deploy a missile defense capability.
I look forward to your testimony about the capabilities on
which you are working. I appreciate your service, and offer you
my support toward achieving a layered system capable of
defending our nation, our deployed forces, and our allies
against the full range of missile threats.
Senator Stevens. But I do want to tell you, we do look
forward to hearing from you about the status of our missile
defense capabilities. I enjoyed very much the event out at
Vandenberg, where we did commit part of that base to the
National Missile Defense Command. And I look forward to hearing
more from you about the future of that command.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'll follow your leadership, and may I ask that my statement be
made part of the record.
Senator Stevens. Without objection, we'll put your full
statement in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye
Today I am pleased to join our Chairman in welcoming to the
committee Lieutenant General Obering and Lieutenant General
Dodgen to discuss the fiscal year 2007 budget request for
missile defense.
Gentlemen, it has been nearly two years since the President
directed the Department of Defense to field an initial missile
defense capability. We have been investing close to $10 billion
annually on missile defense to reach that goal, and while there
have been multiple successes for the system, we still do not
have any of the ``shoot-down'' systems on alert.
We have placed significant resources and time in the
ground-based missile defense system, the Aegis system, and in
programs such as Airborne Laser and Theater High Altitude Area
Defense. This Committee wants to see these programs succeed.
However, each year as we review the budget request, it seems
that the Missile Defense Agency is investing more of its
resources on new research activities, instead of focusing on
getting an operational capability out of the core programs I
just mentioned.
Gentlemen, I know that you are committed to proving that
the missile defense system works and that it is fielded and
fully operational. I am confident that you have the best
intentions when you invest in new research programs. However, I
am concerned that we might not be able to continue the current
rate of spending on missile defense into the future. As such, I
want to be sure that the systems we have been investing in so
heavily are deployed and that their funding is not curtailed to
pay for new programs.
I thank you both for appearing before the Committee. I hope
you will address this concern today during our discussions, and
I look forward to hearing your remarks.
Senator Stevens. And we'll put the statement of each of you
in the record in full, as though read.
Senator Shelby, do you have any comments?
Senator Shelby. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to both
generals' testimony here today.
Thank you.
Senator Stevens. Senator Burns, do you have a comment?
Senator Burns. I have a statement, and I'd put that in the
record, looking forward to their testimony today. And it's a
short one, so I think we get on with the business at hand.
Senator Stevens. Yes, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Conrad Burns
Mr. Chairman, Lieutenant General Obering, Lieutenant
General Dodgen. I would like to welcome you and let you know
that we appreciate your professional service to our nation.
We also appreciate your efforts to field a ballistic
missile defense system. Your labors are the continuation of
years of research and development that began with the Strategic
Defense Initiative under President Reagan. When SDI was
introduced over 20 years ago there were many doubters who
dubbed the program ``Star Wars''. In the due course of time
those doubters were proven to be on the wrong side of history.
As it turned out SDI was a definitive factor in breaking the
back of our Soviet enemies. As we have seen, many of the
technologies that resulted from this effort have seen uses that
no one could have predicted. The development and fielding of
the Patriot missile is one example of how missile defense
technology is critical to our Armed Forces. The Patriot PAC-3
is now the most mature and effective system in our missile
defense arsenal.
Today we have a new enemy, and our efforts need to be
geared toward facing that enemy in the war that we are now
engaged in. Missile defense is an important element of
protecting our forces that are forward deployed. The spiral
development of Patriot PAC-3 on the land, and the Navy Standard
SM-3 missile paired with new long range radars are two examples
of technology that can be used in any theater around the world,
or re-deployed back to the United States for homeland defense.
These tactical systems now have strategic capabilities.
Although, I understand the importance of developing missile
defense technology I have concerns that your agency is juggling
too many programs; and the result is that we are paying for
parallel programs with some redundancies. I look forward to
hearing your views about the integration of your programs, and
your plan for making the most of our tight budget while we are
fighting the global war on terror.
Senator Stevens. Generals, we put a high value on your
activities. And I must say that the progress that's being made
is very enlightening, very welcome. So, we look forward to your
statement.
General Obering.
General Obering. Well, thank you. Good morning, Mr.
Chairman, Senator Inouye, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It's an honor to be here today.
This morning, I'll review the progress that we've made in
fielding and developing a missile defense capability, our plans
for 2007, and our test program.
We structured the Missile Defense Program to meet the
current and evolving ballistic missile threats by balancing
early fielding with steady system improvements over time. We're
requesting $9.3 billion to support our very intense program of
work in 2007. About $2.4 billion will cover the fielding and
sustainment of the system components. And about $6.9 billion
will be invested in further development and continued testing.
Since I last addressed you, we've made good progress in
developing and fielding an integrated layered defense for the
United States, our deployed forces, allies, and friends,
against ballistic missiles of all ranges and all phases of
flight. This is especially true in our long-range defense
component.
Last year, following the two test aborts, I chartered an
independent review of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
Program. The independent review team concluded that we were on
the right track, but needed to make adjustments in our quality
control, system engineering, and test readiness. I established
a mission readiness task force to follow through on these
adjustments, and delayed the interceptor deployment in 2005
until we were satisfied with that progress. We are finishing
the additional recommended qualification tests and have
implemented much stronger engineering accountability,
configuration management, and mission assurance processes.
We've had a very successful flight test of our
operationally configured long-range interceptor in December,
and a very successful flight test generating intercept
solutions from our Cobra Dane and Beale radars and their
operational configurations, as well. These comprehensive
reviews and our recent successes indicate that we should
continue interceptor deployment. But I will pause again, if
necessary.
We recently emplaced three more ground-based interceptors
in Alaska, and plan to have a total of 16 at sites in Alaska
and California by December. Current plans support emplacement
of 22 interceptors by the end of 2007, and the fielding of 10
interceptors to a European missile field by 2011, which will
expand our total available long-range inventory to over 50.
Sensors are the eyes of this system. They detect, track,
and discriminate threatening objects and provide critical cuing
information to the system. In addition to the Cobra Dane and
the Beale radars that I mentioned earlier, this year we
completed construction of the very powerful sea-based X-band
radar and began integrating it into the system. It is now
undergoing tests near Hawaii and will depart this summer for
Alaska. We are also deploying the first transportable forward-
based X-band radar to our very important ally, Japan, where it
will support both regional and homeland defense. In the United
Kingdom, we expect the upgraded Fylingdales radar to achieve
its initial capability this year, and in 2007 we will deliver a
second forward-based X-band radar and initiate a major upgrade
of the Thule radar in Greenland.
By placing a third long-range interceptor field in Europe
along with forward-based sensors in the region, we will meet
two major objectives laid out by the President: Improved
coverage of the United States and greatly improved protection
of our allies and friends in Europe against a Middle East
threat.
The command, control, battle management, and communications
infrastructure is the heart, soul and brain of our defensive
capability. Without it, we simply couldn't execute the mission.
It is a true force multiplier for missile defense. The global
command and control foundation that we've established is
unmatched in the world. We need to expand this effort to enable
the integrated fire control which will allow us to mix and
match sensors and weapons, greatly increasing our capability.
Our aegis ships provide a flexible intercept capability
against the shorter range ballistic missiles, as well as the
long-range surveillance and track support to the system. This
past year, we added 6 more surveillance and track destroyers,
for a total of 11, and another engagement cruiser, for a total
of two. By the end of 2007, we expect to have 10 engagement
ships available, with 33 interceptors delivered.
We also have an aggressive development program of work. In
our terminal high altitude area defense, or THAAD, component,
we are coming off a very successful test flight last November
and are on track to field an initial capability against the
short- to medium-range threats in 2008. To lay the foundation
for global capability to meet future emerging threats, we plan
to launch two space-tracking and surveillance system
demonstration satellites in 2007, as well.
And in our very challenging boost-phase defense area, the
airborne laser reached all of its knowledge points last year
when it achieved a full-duration laser at operational power and
completed the initial beam-control/fire-control flight tests.
Currently, we're installing the tracking and atmospheric
compensation lasers and preparing the aircraft to accept the
high-power laser modules in 2007.
In our other boost-phase development activity, the kinetic
energy interceptor (KEI), we are focused on demonstrating a
mobile, very high acceleration booster that could give us
improved capabilities to engage targets in the boost,
midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. We've had a number of
test successes and project the first flight of this interceptor
in 2008. And with our multiple kill vehicle (MKV) system
development, we will bolster long-range defenses by improving
our abilities to engage multiple targets with a single
interceptor.
Now let me quickly turn to testing. The test schedule for
this year and next continues at a rigorous pace. We will
conduct 38 major system tests in 2006 and 37 major system tests
in 2007. We plan two to three more long-range flight tests this
year, including intercepts, two intercept flight tests of our
aegis standard missile-3, and four flight tests of the terminal
high altitude area defense interceptor.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Chairman, we certainly have our challenges, but I
believe the program is on track. The successes that we've had
over the past year bear this out. I greatly appreciate this
subcommittee's continued support and patience, and I want to
thank the thousands of Americans and our allies, both in
Government and industry, who are working hard to make missile
defense a success.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Stevens. Thank you, General.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Henry A. Obering III
Good morning, Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, distinguished
Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be here today to present
the Department of Defense's fiscal year 2007 Missile Defense program
and budget. The Missile Defense Agency mission remains one of
developing and progressively fielding a joint, integrated, and
multilayered Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system to defend the
United States, our deployed forces, and our allies and friends against
ballistic missiles of all ranges by engaging them in all phases of
flight. I believe we are on the right track to deliver the
multilayered, integrated capabilities that are necessary to counter
current and emerging threats.
As was the case last year, our program is structured to balance the
initial fielding of system elements with steady improvements using
evolutionary development and a test approach that continuously
increases our confidence in the effectiveness of the BMD system. This
budget balances our capabilities across an evolving threat spectrum
that includes rogue nations with increasing ballistic missile
expertise.
We are requesting $9.3 billion to support our program of work in
fiscal year 2007. The $1.6 billion increase from 2006 reflects a return
to the annual investment level targeted by the Department for ballistic
missile defense and is indicative of the robust phase we are entering
in the development and fielding of the integrated layered capability.
Approximately $1 billion of this increase will be applied to fielding
and sustainment, and $600 million to continued development of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System. $2.4 billion of the fiscal year 2007
request covers the continued incremental fielding and sustainment of
long-range ground-based midcourse defense components; our short- to
intermediate-range defense involving Aegis ships with their
interceptors; and the supporting sensors, command, control, battle
management and communication capabilities. This increase in funding for
fielding and sustainment of nearly a billion dollars from last year
reflects the success we have had across the program. About $6.9 billion
will be invested in continued component improvements, system capability
development, and testing.
I would like to review our accomplishments, as well as our
shortfalls, over the past year, explain our testing and fielding
strategies, and address the next steps in our evolutionary ballistic
missile defense program.
EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Proliferating and evolving ballistic missile systems and associated
technologies continue to pose dangers to our national security. In 2005
there were nearly eighty foreign ballistic missile launches around the
world. Nearly sixty launches last year involved short-range ballistic
missiles, approximately ten involved medium- and intermediate-range
missiles, and about ten involved long-range ballistic missiles.
North Korea and Iran have not relented in their pursuit of longer-
range ballistic missiles. Our current and near-term missile defense
fielding activities are a direct response to these dangers. There are
also other ballistic missile threats today for which we must be
prepared, and there will be others in the mid- to far-term. We must be
ready to operate the ballistic missile defense system against new and
unexpected threats.
Our potential adversaries continue efforts to acquire ballistic
missile systems and technology. Ballistic missiles were used against
our forces, our allies and friends during the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars.
When combined with weapons of mass destruction, they could offer our
enemies an attractive counterbalance to the overwhelming conventional
superiority exhibited by U.S. and coalition forces during those wars.
We can expect that in the future our adversaries could use them to
threaten our foreign policy objectives or pursue a policy of terrorism
by holding our cities and other high value assets hostage. After all,
those who support global terrorism can hide behind the threats posed by
offensive missiles carrying highly destructive or lethal payloads. They
will use them to try to deny our forces access to a theater of conflict
or to coerce a withdrawal of our forces from that theater. Ballistic
missiles provide a way for our adversaries to attempt to achieve some
degree of strategic equality with us, especially at a time when
ballistic missile defense is still striving to catch up with the
progress made by ballistic missile offense over the past four decades.
MISSILE DEFENSE APPROACH--LAYERED DEFENSE
We believe that layered defenses integrated by a robust command and
control system, will improve the chances of engaging and destroying a
ballistic missile and its payload in-flight. This approach to missile
defense also makes the effectiveness of countermeasures much more
difficult, since countermeasures designed to work in one phase of
flight are not likely to work in another. It is much harder to overcome
a complex, multilayered defense. Layered defenses, a time-honored U.S.
approach to military operations, provide defense in depth and create
synergistic effects designed to frustrate an attack.
With the initial fielding in 2004 of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense components, the Aegis long range surveillance and track ships,
and the first integrated command, control, battle management and
communications (C2BMC) suites, we made history by establishing a
limited defensive capability for the United States against a possible
long-range ballistic missile attack from North Korea and the Middle
East. With the cooperation of our allies and friends, we plan to evolve
this defensive capability to make it more effective against all ranges
of threats in all phases of flight and expand the system over time with
additional interceptors, sensors, and layers.
Since we cannot be certain which specific ballistic missile threats
we will face in the future, or from where those threats will originate,
our long-term strategy is to strengthen and maximize the flexibility of
our missile defense capabilities. As we proceed with this program into
the next decade, we will move towards a missile defense force structure
that features greater sensor redundancy and sensitivity, interceptor
capability and mobility, and increasingly robust C2BMC capabilities. In
line with our multilayer approach, we will expand terminal defense
protection and place increasing emphasis on boost phase defenses.
We are effectively employing an evolutionary acquisition strategy
to field multiple system capabilities while maintaining an aggressive
test and development program. The Missile Defense Agency continues to
evolve and refine desired capabilities, based on warfighter need and
technology maturity, through sound risk management. Our goal continues
to be one of fielding the best capabilities possible, on schedule, on
time, and within cost, in order to address current and emerging
threats.
COMPLETING THE FIELDING OF BLOCK 2004
Since I last appeared before this committee, we have made a number
of significant accomplishments to complete initial fielding of the
Block 2004 capability. We have also fallen short in some areas. When we
rolled this program out in 2002, we set out to deploy 10 Ground Based
Interceptors in 2004 and another 10 in 2005. A booster motor plant
explosion in 2003, which had a major impact across the missile defense
program, and the need to step back and undertake a mission readiness
review of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense program following two test
failures caused us to miss our fielding mark. I delayed the Ground-
Based Interceptor deployment in 2005 and made changes based on the
recommendations of the mission readiness review. I believe we are now
back on track, but I will pause again if necessary. We recently
emplaced three more Ground-Based Interceptors in silos at Fort Greely,
Alaska, for a total of nine, and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. This progress is critical because we expect the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense element to be the backbone of our national
missile defense capability for years to come. Today we continue with
interceptor fielding and plan to emplace additional Ground-Based
Interceptors, for a total of sixteen by December of this year.
This past year we also added a second Aegis engagement cruiser and
delivered additional Standard Missile-3 interceptors to our evolving
sea-based architecture to address short- and medium-range threats in
the midcourse phase of flight. We did not advance as rapidly as we
hoped. We needed to resolve technical issues associated with the third
stage rocket motor and the solid divert and attitude control system to
take full advantage of interceptor performance designed to pace the
threat. However, we are close to the 10 to 20 sea-based interceptors we
projected for delivery in our initial program. Right now, I am
comfortable with where we stand in our sea-based interceptor deployment
plans. We will continue to grow our inventory of Standard Missile-3
interceptors for deployment aboard Aegis ships and, by the end of 2006,
outfit three Aegis destroyers and one additional cruiser with this
engagement capability. So, in addition to providing surveillance and
tracking support to the integrated ballistic missile defense system,
Aegis provides a flexible sea-mobile capability to defeat short- to
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase.
In our sensors program, we upgraded the Beale Early Warning Radar
in California. The Beale radar complements and works synergistically
with the surveillance and tracking capabilities of the fully
operational Cobra Dane radar in Alaska, and together they will help us
defend against the longer-range threats coming out of East Asia. The
Beale radar will play an instrumental role in tests this year to
demonstrate the system's ability to intercept intercontinental-range
missiles using operationally configured assets.
This past year we added six more Aegis Long-Range Surveillance and
Track destroyers to our force, for a total of eleven. These ships
provide much sought-after flexibility in our architecture, giving us
more time to engage enemy missiles and improving the performance of the
entire system.
We are making good progress in integrating the Sea-Based X-band
radar into the system. It is the most powerful radar of its kind in the
world and will provide the system a highly advanced detection and
discrimination capability. This past January the radar completed its
long journey from Texas, where it underwent extensive sea trials and
high-power radiation testing in the Gulf of Mexico, to Hawaii. This
spring its voyage continues to Adak, Alaska, where it will be home-
ported and put on station.
This past year the Forward-Based Radar, our transportable X-band
radar, successfully acquired and tracked intercontinental ballistic
missiles in tests conducted at Vandenberg Air Force Base. We are now
preparing to deploy the radar to provide precision track and
discrimination capabilities, which will improve regional and homeland
missile defense capabilities.
We also completed subsystem checkout of the Fylingdales radar in
the United Kingdom and achieved high-power radiation. We conducted the
necessary operator training at that site and are now in the middle of
completing an important series of ground tests that are necessary to
verify this system's capability, tests that had been deferred on the
recommendations of the Mission Readiness Task Force. We expect to
complete testing at Fylingdales later this year.
We have an extensive command, control, battle management and
communications infrastructure to support all these elements, and we are
ready to provide complete operations and maintenance support to the
warfighter. We have taken the first step in integrating the BMD system,
which is necessary to establish an affordable and effective global,
layered defense. We have installed hardware and software at the United
States Northern Command (NORTHCOM), United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), and United States Pacific Command (PACOM). C2BMC
capabilities include basic deliberative crisis planning and common
situational awareness at these Combatant Commands. In addition, we now
provide common situational awareness directly to the President of the
United States and the Secretary of Defense to aid in decision-making.
In addition to fielding these suites, we also completed five major
software release upgrades this past year, each improving the capability
of the command, control, battle management and communications system.
It is this global connective capability that allows us to combine
different sensors with different weapons. For example, we are
developing the Aegis BMD system so that it can support a ground-based
interceptor launch by sending tracking information to the fire control
system. A forward-deployed radar can cue and pass tracking information
on to, for example, a Patriot Advanced Capability-3 unit, or a
regionally deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery, or a
Ground-based Midcourse Defense or Aegis BMD engagement ships. In other
words, we want to be able to mix and match sensor and interceptor
resources to give the system more capability by expanding the detection
and engagement zones. Our ability to integrate all of the weapons and
sensors into a single package that will use interceptors in the best
location to make the kill gives us a critical multiplier effect.
We work closely with U.S. Strategic Command and the Combatant
Commanders to certify missile defense crews at all echelons to ensure
that they can operate the ballistic missile defense system. We have
exercised the command, fire control, battle management and
communication capabilities critical to the operation of the system.
We also are continuing to exercise the system to learn how best to
operate it, and we have demonstrated our ability to transition smoothly
from test to operations and back. In our exercises and tests, we have
worked through a number of operational capability demonstrations in
order to increase operational realism and complexity, certify crews and
safety procedures, and demonstrate the operational viability of the
system. The Missile Defense Agency will continue to coordinate with the
warfighter to implement developmental upgrades and improvements in the
system to maximize system capability. This is very important since we
will continue to improve the capabilities of the system over time, even
as we remain ready in the near-term to take advantage of its inherent
defensive capability should the need arise.
BUILDING CONFIDENCE THROUGH SPIRAL TESTING
We have consistently pursued a comprehensive and integrated
approach to missile defense testing and are gradually making our tests
more complex. Missile defense testing has evolved, and will continue to
evolve, based on results. We are not in a traditional development,
test, and production mode where we test a system, then produce hundreds
of units without further testing. We will always be testing and
improving this system, using a testing approach that cycles results
into our spiral development activities. This approach also means
fielding test assets in operational configurations. This dramatically
reduces time from development to operations in a mission area where,
until now, this nation has been defenseless.
Last year, following the two launch aborts of the interceptor for
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element, I explained that we had
several concerns with quality control and reliability; but we did not
view the failures as major technical setbacks. In response to those
failures, I chartered an independent team to review our test processes,
procedures and management. The team concluded that the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense program met the challenge of providing an initial
defensive capability but found deficiencies in systems engineering,
ground qualification testing, flight test readiness certification,
contractor process control and program scheduling. The independent
review team recommended that the Missile Defense Agency reorient the
missile defense program to strengthen its emphasis on mission
assurance.
I established a Mission Readiness Task Force under Admiral Kate
Paige to implement the corrective actions needed to ensure a return to
a successful flight test program. The task force identified steps to
strengthen our systems engineering and quality assurance processes and
provide the reliability and repeatability necessary for operational
success. As a result, we undertook a comprehensive review of these
system processes at each step along the way. We are also undertaking
the necessary ground and flight qualification tests to retire the risks
uncovered by the independent review team and the Mission Readiness Task
Force. To strengthen our test program, I diverted four long-range
interceptors slated for operational use into testing, with the intent
to replace them in 2007 if our test program was successful. Last year,
I asked the committee to have patience, knowing that the system's basic
functionality was not at risk. As a result of our aggressive actions, I
believe that mission assurance and system reliability are now on track.
We finished the year strongly with a string of test successes
across the board. These successes continue to build confidence in our
spiral development approach. In a major step forward, in September
2005, we flew a threat representative target across the operational
Cobra Dane radar and generated an intercept solution using the long-
range fire control system. We then flew the operational configuration
of the long-range interceptor in December 2005 and put the kill vehicle
through its paces. We not only achieved all of the test objectives for
that flight, but we also accomplished many of those objectives we
identified for the next flight test scheduled for this spring. Last
February, we exercised an engagement sequence that used the Upgraded
Early Warning Radar at Beale Air Force Base in California to provide
tracking information to a simulated long-range interceptor from an
operational site at Vandenberg. Based on the many tests we have
conducted to date, including three successful flight tests of the
operational long-range booster now emplaced in Alaska and California,
we maintain our confidence in the system's basic design, its hit-to-
kill effectiveness, and its inherent operational capability. We will
continue to test this system to ensure it will remain mission ready.
We continue to work closely with the Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation, Operational Test Agencies, and Combatant Commanders to
characterize the effectiveness and readiness of the system at every
stage in its development and fielding. This year the fielded BMD system
will undergo ever more challenging and operationally realistic testing.
We will begin the important next step of testing our long-range
ground-based defense with more operationally robust flight tests as a
part of the integrated ballistic missile defense system. With the next
tests involving the Ground-Based Interceptor, we will step up testing
complexity and involve operational crews, operational interceptor
launch sites, and operational sensors. These tests will involve an
operationally configured interceptor launched from Vandenberg that will
attempt to acquire and intercept a target missile launched out of the
Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska. With the last two tests in this
series, we will demonstrate the ability of the system to perform more
refined acquisition and discrimination functions and the ability of the
exo-atmospheric kill vehicle to divert toward the target and intercept
it. We also plan to use tracking data from the Sea-Based X-band radar
when it is available to feed its data into system tests and operations.
In 2007, as we return our focus to fielding long-range interceptors, we
plan one system intercept test and one flight test, both of which will
further demonstrate the operationally configured interceptor.
In our sea-based midcourse defense element, we have continued to
ratchet up the degree of realism and reduce testing limitations. This
past November, for the first time, we successfully used a U.S. Navy
Aegis cruiser to engage a separating target carried on a threat-
representative medium-range ballistic missile. A separating target is
more challenging to engage because it can fly faster and farther than
the boosting missile. In order to increase operational realism, we did
not notify the operational ship's crew of the target launch time, and
they were forced to react to a dynamic situation. We are planning two
more Aegis interceptor flight tests in 2006. Last March, we conducted a
very successful cooperative test with Japan involving a simulated
target to demonstrate the engagement performance of a modified SM-3
nosecone developed by the Japanese in the United States/Japan Joint
Cooperative Research project. One of the upcoming U.S. Aegis intercept
tests will again involve a separating warhead. In 2007 we plan to
conduct two tests of the sea-based interceptor against short and
medium-range targets.
Flight-testing involving the redesigned interceptor for the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) began last November when we
successfully demonstrated the separation and operation of the
production booster and kill vehicle. This year we will conduct four
more tests to characterize performance of the new missile and the
ability to integrate it into the BMD system. Later this year we will
also conduct the first intercept test high in the atmosphere. In 2007
we plan to conduct four intercept tests as part of our THAAD flight
test program.
Also planned in 2007 are two Arrow system flight tests and one
Patriot combined developmental and operational test. The command,
control, battle management, and communications infrastructure will be
exercised in all of our system level tests.
Ground tests, wargames and modeling and simulation help demonstrate
interoperability, assess performance and specification compliance, and
develop doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. In 2007 we will
continue with our successful ground-testing, which involves warfighter
personnel and test hardware and software in the integrated system
configuration to demonstrate system connectivity and interoperability.
Upcoming tests will verify integration of the sea-based, forward-based,
and Fylingdales radars. The funds we are requesting also will support
additional capability demonstrations and readiness demonstrations led
by the warfighting community.
COMPLETING THE NEXT INCREMENT--BLOCK 2006
To keep ahead of rogue nation threats, we continue to hold to the
fielding commitments we made to the President for Block 2006, which
include investment in the necessary logistics support and command,
control, battle management and communications infrastructure. In 2006
and 2007, we will build on the successes we had in 2005 to improve
protection against a North Korean threat, provide protection against a
threat from the Middle East, expand coverage to allies and friends,
increase countermeasure resistance, and improve protection against
short-range ballistic missiles. We are also planning to field more
mobile, flexible interceptors and associated sensors to meet threats
from unanticipated launch locations.
For midcourse capability against the long-range threat, the Ground-
based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element budget request for fiscal year
2007 of $2.7 billion will cover continued development, ground and
flight testing, fielding and support. This is about $125 million more
than we budgeted for fiscal year 2007 in last year's submission. The
risk-reduction work prescribed by the Mission Readiness Task Force has
caused us to reduce the number of interceptors fielded in 2007. This
request includes up to 4 additional ground-based interceptors, for a
total of 20 interceptors in Alaska by the end of 2007, their silos and
associated support equipment and facilities as well as the long-lead
items for the next increment. The increase in fiscal year 2007 funding
from last year to this year is attributed, in part, to increased
sustainment, logistics and force protection requirements, as well as to
other needs associated with preparing the system for operations. This
budget submission also continues the upgrade of the Thule early warning
radar in Greenland and its integration into the system.
The Royal Air Force Fylingdales early warning radar in the United
Kingdom will be fully integrated for missile defense purposes by fall
2006. It will provide sensor coverage against Middle East threats.
As part of our effort to make the system more robust, improve
defense of our allies, and address threat uncertainties, we are
continuing discussions with our allies in Europe regarding the
deployment of radars and a third site for Ground-Based Interceptors.
Later this year we will be able to give greater definition to this
important evolutionary effort.
To address the short- to intermediate-range threat, we are
requesting approximately $1.9 billion to continue development and
testing of our sea-based midcourse capability, or Aegis BMD, and our
land-based THAAD terminal defense capability. System tests will involve
further demonstrations of the sea-based interceptor, and we will
continue enhancing the system's discrimination capability. We will
continue Standard Missile-3 improvements. We added approximately $49
million to the fiscal year 2007 request for Aegis BMD from last year to
this year to address the Divert and Attitude Control System and other
aspects of the system, including the development of a more capable 2-
color seeker for the SM-3 kill vehicle. We will continue purchases of
the SM-3 interceptor and the upgrading of Aegis ships to perform the
BMD mission. By the end of 2007 we will have three Aegis engagement
cruisers, seven engagement destroyers, and seven Long Range
Surveillance and Track destroyers. These sea-based sensors and weapons
will improve our ability to defend the homeland and our deployed troops
and our friends and allies. In fiscal year 2007 we will initiate work
with Japan for follow-on SM-3 development in order to increase its
range and lethality. We also will continue the THAAD development effort
that will lead to fielding the first unit in the 2008-2009 timeframe
with a second unit available in 2011.
We will continue to roll out sensors that we will net together to
detect and track threat targets and improve discrimination of the
target set in different phases of flight. In 2007, we will prepare a
second forward-based X-band radar for operations. We also are working
towards a 2007 launch of two Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) test bed satellites. These demonstration satellites will perform
target acquisition and handover and explore approaches for closing the
fire control loop globally for the entire BMD system. In fiscal year
2007 we will undertake initial satellite check-out and prepare for
tests involving live targets. We are requesting approximately $380
million in fiscal year 2007 to execute this STSS activity, and $402
million for the Forward-Based Radar work.
For the ballistic missile defense system to work effectively, all
of its separate elements must be integrated by a solid command,
control, battle management and communications foundation that spans
thousands of miles, multiple time zones, hundreds of kilometers in
space and several Combatant Command areas of responsibility. C2BMC
allows us to pass critical information from sensors to provide input
for critical engagement decisions. Combatant Commanders can use the
C2BMC infrastructure to enhance planning and help synchronize globally
dispersed missile defense assets. These capabilities also can provide
our senior government leadership situational awareness of ballistic
missile launches and defense activities.
This C2BMC capability allows us to mix and match sensors, weapons
and command centers to dramatically expand our detection and engagement
capabilities over what can be achieved by the system's elements
operating individually. We cannot execute our basic mission without
this foundation.
With this year's budget request for $264 million for the C2BMC
activity, we will continue to use spiral development to incrementally
develop, test, and field hardware and software improvements. We will
press on with the development of the initial global integrated fire
control to integrate Aegis BMD, the forward-based radar, and Ground-
based Midcourse Defense assets. We plan to install additional planning
and situational awareness capabilities to facilitate executive
decision-making among the Combatant Commanders.
The Missile Defense Agency is committed to delivering the best
capabilities to the warfighter in a timely manner, and warfighter
participation and input is a critical part in the engineering process.
Today, the Army National Guard's 100th Missile Defense Brigade, Air
Force's Space Warfare Center, and Navy ships in the Pacific Fleet are
on station and operating the system. Our fiscal year 2007 request
continues to fund critical sustainment and fielding activities and
ensure that system developers have financial resources to support
fielded components. We will continue to work collaboratively with the
Combatant Commanders and the Military Services as the system evolves to
define and prioritize requirements. Exercises, wargames, and seminars
continue to be important collaboration venues. We will also continue to
support training activities to ensure operational readiness, combat
effectiveness, and high-level system performance.
MOVING TOWARD THE FUTURE--BLOCK 2008 AND BEYOND
There is no silver bullet in missile defense, and strategic
uncertainty could surprise us tomorrow. So it is important that we
continue our aggressive parallel paths approach to building this
integrated, multilayered defensive system. There are several important
development efforts funded in this budget.
In executing our program we continue to follow a strategy of
retaining alternative development paths until capability is proven--a
knowledge-based funding approach. That means we are setting specific
targets, or knowledge points, that the development efforts have to
reach within certain periods of time. Knowledge points are not reviews,
but discrete activities in a development activity that produce data on
the most salient risks. The approach involves tradeoffs to address
sufficiency of defensive layers--boost, midcourse, terminal; diversity
of basing modes--land, sea, air and space; and considerations of
technical, schedule, and cost performance. This is fundamental to how
we execute the development program, because it enables us to make
decisions as to what we will and will not fund based upon the proven
success of each program element.
For example, we are preserving decision flexibility with respect to
our boost phase programs until we understand what engagement
capabilities they can offer. We have requested approximately $984
million for these activities in fiscal year 2007. This past year the
revolutionary Airborne Laser (ABL) reached its knowledge points when it
achieved a full duration lase at operational power and completed
initial flight tests involving its beam control/fire control system.
The program's knowledge points for 2006 include flight testing of the
lasers used for target tracking and atmospheric compensation. This
testing, which will test the entire engagement sequence up through the
point where we fire the laser, will require use of a low-power laser
surrogate for the high-power laser. Once we have completed modification
of the aircraft which has begun in Wichita, Kansas, we will start
installation of the high-power laser modules in 2007. This will provide
us with the first ABL weapon system test bed and allow us to conduct a
campaign of flight tests with the full system. In addition to
installation of the high-power lasers, we will continue integration,
ground, and flight test activities in fiscal year 2007 to support ABL's
low-power beam control/fire control and battle management systems. We
will be working towards a lethal demonstration of the weapon system
against a boosting ballistic missile in 2008.
We still have many technical challenges with the Airborne Laser.
Yet the series of major achievements beginning in 2004, when we
achieved first light and first flight of the aircraft with its beam
control/fire control system, gives me reason to be optimistic that we
can produce an effective directed energy capability. An operational
Airborne Laser could provide a valuable boost-phase defense capability
against missiles of all ranges.
The Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) is a boost-phase effort in
response to a 2002 Defense Science Board Summer Study recommendation to
develop a terrestrial-based boost phase interceptor as an alternative
to the high-risk Airborne Laser development effort. Last year we
focused near-term efforts in our kinetic energy interceptor activity to
demonstrate key capabilities and reduce risks inherent in the
development of a land-based, mobile, very high acceleration booster. It
has always been our view that the KEI booster, which is envisioned as a
flexible and high-performance booster capable of defending large areas,
could be used as part of an affordable, competitive next-generation
upgrade for our midcourse or even terminal interceptors. A successful
KEI mobile missile defense capability would improve significantly our
ability to protect our allies and friends.
This past year we demonstrated important command, control, battle
management, and communications functions required for a boost intercept
mission, including the use of national sensor data for intercept
operations in the field. The key knowledge point for this program is
the demonstration of a very high acceleration booster. We began a
series of static firing tests of the first and second stages of the
booster and had a successful firing this past January. We plan a flight
test to verify the new booster in 2008.
Development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) system will offer a
generational upgrade to ground-based midcourse interceptors by
increasing their effectiveness in the presence of multiple warheads and
countermeasures. We are exploiting miniaturization technology to
develop a platform with many small kill vehicles to engage more than
one object in space. This effort will supplement other innovative
discrimination techniques we are developing for use in the midcourse
phase by destroying multiple threat objects in a single engagement. In
2005 we made progress in the development of the MKV seeker, but
resource constraints and technical shortfalls have caused a delay in
this development effort. We are now planning to conduct the hover test
in 2009. Our first intercept attempt using MKV is now scheduled for
2012. We are requesting $162 million in fiscal year 2007 to continue
the MKV development effort.
INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION
The global nature of the threat requires that we work closely with
our allies and friends to develop, field, and operate missile defenses.
We have made significant progress in fostering international support
for the development and operation of a ballistic missile defense system
capable of intercepting ballistic missiles of all ranges in all phases
of flight. We have been working closely with a number of allies and
friends of the United States to forge international partnerships. I
would like to highlight a few of our cooperative efforts.
The Government of Japan continues to make significant investments
toward the acquisition of a multilayered BMD system, with capability
upgrades to its Aegis destroyers and acquisition of the Standard
Missile-3 interceptor. We have worked closely with Japan since 1999 to
design and develop advanced interceptor components. This project
culminated in the flight test of an advanced SM-3 nosecone earlier this
year and ended this phase of our joint cooperative research.
Additionally, the Missile Defense Agency and Japan have agreed to co-
develop a Block IIA version of the SM-3 missile, which will
significantly improve the kinematics and warhead capability. We also
have agreed to deploy an X-band radar to Japan, which will enhance
regional and homeland missile defense capabilities. In addition, Japan
and other allied nations continue upgrading their Patriot fire units
with Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and improved ground support
equipment.
In addition to the Fylingdales radar development and integration
activities, we are undertaking a series of cooperative technical
development efforts with the United Kingdom. Newly installed
situational awareness displays in the United Kingdom also are
indicative of our close collaboration with our British allies in the
missile defense area.
Last year we signed an agreement with Denmark to upgrade the radar
at Thule and integrate it into the system. This radar will play an
important role in the system by providing additional track on hostile
missiles launched out of the Middle East.
We will continue to expand cooperative development work on sensors
and build on our long-standing defense relationship with the government
of Australia. In April 2005 we concluded a Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation agreement to enable collaborative work on specific
projects, including high frequency over-the-horizon radar, track fusion
and filtering, distributed aperture radar experiments, and modeling and
simulation.
We are continuing work with Israel to implement the Arrow System
Improvement Program and enhance its capability to defeat longer-range
ballistic missile threats emerging in the Middle East. This past
December Israel conducted a successful launch and intercept of a
maneuvering target using the Arrow missile. The United States and
Israel are co-producing components of the Arrow interceptor missile,
which will help Israel meet its defense requirements more quickly and
maintain the U.S. industrial work share.
We also have been in discussions with several allies located in or
near regions where the threat of ballistic missile use is high for the
forward placement of sensors, and we continue to support our North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in conducting a
feasibility study to examine potential architecture options for
defending European NATO population centers against longer-range missile
threats. This work builds upon ongoing work to define and develop a
NATO capability for protection of deployed forces. We have other
international interoperability and technical cooperation projects
underway and are working to establish formal agreements with other
governments.
CLOSING
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee for its continued
support of the Missile Defense Program. When I appeared before you last
year, we faced numerous challenges. Over the past year, the dedicated
men and women of the Missile Defense Agency and our industrial partners
met these challenges head-on and overcame the difficulties we
experienced in 2004 and early in 2005. The result was that in 2005 we
made significant progress. We had a series of successful tests that are
unparalleled in our development efforts to date. In 2006 and 2007 I am
confident that we will continue this success. I am proud to serve with
these men and women, and the country should be grateful for their
unflagging efforts.
There have been many lessons learned, and I believe the processes
are in place to implement them as we field follow-on increments of the
system. I also believe that our program priorities foster long-term
growth in multilayered and integrated capabilities to address future
threats. There certainly are risks involved in the development and
fielding activities. However, I believe we have adequately structured
the program to manage and reduce those risks using a knowledge-based
approach that requires each program element to prove that it is worthy
of being fielded.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Stevens. General Dodgen.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LARRY J. DODGEN,
COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND
MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/U.S. ARMY FORCES
STRATEGIC COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY
General Dodgen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for your ongoing support of our
military and for the opportunity to appear before this
distinguished panel.
This subcommittee continues to be a great friend of the
Army and the missile defense community, particularly in our
efforts to field missile defense forces for the Nation and our
allies. I appear before this subcommittee in two roles. The
first is as the warfighting member of the joint missile defense
team. I am the Commander of the Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense, or JFCC-IMD, a part of
United States Strategic Command. The JFCC is a joint user
representative working closely with the Missile Defense Agency,
services, and combatant commanders to ensure that our national
goal of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated
missile defense system is met.
The second is as an Army commander for missile defense and
a proponent for the ground-based midcourse defense system. In
my role as the JFCC-IMD commander, I directly support the U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) commander in planning the global
missile defenses. The JFCC is truly joint, manned by Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel, and is
headquartered at the Joint National Integration Center at
Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado.
This arrangement allows us to leverage the existing robust
infrastructure and our strong partnership with the Missile
Defense Agency to execute the IMD mission. In the past year,
the JFCC-IMD has aggressively executed USSTRATCOM's global
mission to plan, coordinate, and integrate missile defense. In
collaboration with geographical combatant commanders, we are
developing the IMB plans that integrate theater and national
assets to provide the best protection. STRATCOM, in partnership
with MDA, is setting the stage to evolve the ballistic missile
defense system (BMDS) beyond its current capabilities to
provide a more robust missile defense for the homeland,
deployed forces, friends, and allies.
I would now like to highlight the Army fiscal year 2007
budget submission for air and missile defense (AMD) systems.
The President's budget, presented to Congress on February
6, includes approximately $1.57 billion with which the Army
proposes to perform current Army AMD responsibilities and focus
on future development and enhancement of both terminal phase
and short-range AMD systems. The Patriot system remains the
Army's mainstay theater air and missile defense system and our
Nation's only deployed land-based short- to medium-range
ballistic missile defense capability. Today's Patriot force is
a mixture of configured units. To maximize our capabilities and
better support the force, the Army is moving toward updating
the entire Patriot force to the PAC-3 configuration.
The medium extended air defense system, or MEADS, is a
cooperative development program with Germany and Italy to
collectively field an enhanced ground-based air and missile
defense capability. The MEADS program will enable the joint
integrated air and missile defense community to move beyond the
critical asset defense designs we see today. MEADS will provide
theater-level defense of critical assets and continuous
protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force as part of a
joint integrated AMD architecture.
As I believe you are aware, the Patriot/MEADS combined
aggregate program (CAP) has been established. The objective of
the CAP is to achieve the objective MEADS capability through
incremental fielding of MEADS major end items in the Patriot.
Patriot/MEADS CAP is an important capability that will operate
within MDA's BMDS. The Patriot and PAC-3 CAP research
development and acquisition budget request for fiscal year 2007
is approximately $916 million. This request procures 108 PAC-3
missiles, purchases spares for the system, and reflects the
necessary Patriot development to keep the system viable as we
pursue development of the CAP capabilities.
The fiscal year 2007 President's budget also includes a
$264 million request for joint land attack cruise missile
defense elevated netted sensor system, a program developing
unique lightweight fire-control and surveillance radars to
detect, track, and identify cruise missile threats. With the
program funding, we expect first unit equipped occurring by
2011. Surface launched advanced medium range air to air missile
(SLAMRAAM) will provide a cruise missile defense system to
maneuver forces within an extended battle space and a beyond-
line-of-sight engagement capability critical to countering the
cruise missile and unmanned aerial vehicle threats we foresee
in the future.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these
important matters, and I look forward to addressing questions
you and other members of the subcommittee may have. I also
respectfully request that my written statement be submitted for
the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. The statement has been included in the
record, General.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Larry J. Dodgen
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, and Members of the Committee, thank
you for your ongoing support of our military and for the opportunity to
appear before this distinguished panel. This Committee continues to be
a great friend of the Army and the missile defense community,
particularly in our efforts to field missile defense forces for the
Nation and our allies. I consider it a privilege to be counted in the
ranks with Lieutenant General Obering as an advocate for a strong
global missile defense capability.
I appear before this committee in two roles. The first is as an
Army Commander for missile defense and a proponent for the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense (GMD) System. The second is as a soldier in the Joint
Missile Defense Team and Commander of the Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD), a part of the United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the joint user
representative working closely with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA),
other services, and Combatant Commanders to ensure that our National
goals of developing, testing, and deploying an integrated missile
defense system (IAMD) are met.
Mr. Chairman, as I reported last year, Army soldiers are trained,
ready, and operating the GMD System at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the
Joint National Integration Center (JNIC) at Schriever Air Force Base in
Colorado. Just a couple of years ago, we activated the GMD Brigade in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, and a subordinate GMD Battalion at Fort
Greely. These soldiers, as part of the Joint team, are our Nation's
first line of defense against any launch of an intercontinental
ballistic missile toward our shores. I am proud to represent them along
with the other members of the Army's Air and Missile Defense (AMD)
community.
USSTRATCOM JFCC-IMD
The JFCC-IMD was established in January 2005 as one element of
USSTRATCOM and reached full operational capability on early in 2006.
This organization complements the capabilities inherent in other
USSTRATCOM JFCCs and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) which plan, coordinate,
and integrate USSTRATCOM's other global missions of Space and Global
Strike, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Net Warfare
and Global Network Operations, and the newest element, the USSTRATCOM
Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).
The JFCC-IMD is manned by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
personnel. It is headquartered at the JNIC at Schriever Air Force Base,
Colorado. This arrangement enables us to execute the IMD mission by
leveraging the existing robust infrastructure and our strong
partnership with our collocated MDA team.
In the past year, USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, has
aggressively executed its mission to globally plan, coordinate, and
integrate missile defense. In collaboration with geographic Combatant
Commands, we are developing IMD plans within a regional area of
operations in the context of USSTRATCOM's global mission instead of
individual theater plans.
Based on guidance from the Commander, USSTRATCOM, we have also
developed plans to take existing MDA assets, currently in test and
development status, and rapidly transition them, in an emergency, to an
operational warfighting capability. This allows USSTRATCOM to provide
additional critical IMD capabilities to the Combatant Commands in times
of crisis. Examples of this capability include early activation and
deployment of the AEGIS SM3 Missile and the sea-based and Forward Based
X-band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar to operational locations in the
Pacific region, where, by the end of 2006, they will join a global
network of radars. USSTRATCOM initiated planning efforts to integrate
the capabilities of all the JFCCs to support the ``New Strategic
Triad,'' as it determines the next steps needed to fulfill our
commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of defending the
United States, its deployed forces, friends, and allies.
JFCC-IMD works closely with the other JFCC elements of USSTRATCOM
and the Combatant Commands to make Offense-Defense Integration, ISR,
and the other mission areas integral aspects of how we fight, to ensure
the optimal application of limited resources.
The IMD community, led by the USSTRATCOM Commander and his Unified
Command Plan Authority, has conducted numerous capability and readiness
demonstrations, integrated flight and ground tests, and Combatant
Command exercises to develop and validate the operators' tactics,
techniques, and procedures. As we work toward our system's future
operational capability, increased warfighter involvement in the testing
and exercising of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) ensures
both the viability of the defense and the confidence of its operators.
USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC-IMD, is leading the planning of global
missile defenses with the development of the global IMD Concept of
Operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS relies on the development and
coordination of engagement sequence groups (ESGs) and the advocacy of
desired global missile defense characteristics and capabilities.
USSTRATCOM-developed global IMD CONOPS serves as a roadmap for the
warfighting community to guide the development of more detailed IMD
planning and execution. These CONOPS contains two fundamental
principles. First, the geographic component commanders execute the IMD
fight within their Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Second, multi-
mission sensors are centrally tasked by USSTRATCOM Commander to
optimize their use in forming ESGs.
As a key requirement for IMD planning, the identification of ESGs
as the optimal pairing of sensor and weapon capabilities required to
provide active missile defense for the designated defended area is
critical. The ESGs are a tool the IMD community uses to help operate
the BMDS by balancing operational necessity with the realities of
ongoing research, development, and testing in the near term. As more
elements and components are made available, ESGs will serve to optimize
our global missile defense system.
The USSTRATCOM commander represents all the component commands as
the advocate for IMD. He executes this responsibility at two levels.
First, for those elements already deployed, Headquarters, USSTRATCOM
J8, in collaboration with the JFCC-IMD, conducts the Warfighter
Involvement Process (WIP) to evaluate the adequacy of the current
capabilities of the BMDS. This process can encompass anything from
identifying simple human interface changes or modifications to
developing refined planning tools. These needs are prioritized by
USSTRATCOM for review and approval and are provided to MDA for
consideration. The second level of advocacy focuses on future
capability needs. These future elements and components will provide
additional capabilities that enable a more robust, reliable, and
capable system.
The critical element that ties the entire BMDS system together is
the Command and Control Battle Management Communications, or C2BMC.
C2BMC is an essential evolutionary component of the BMDS that will
greatly enhance both planning and execution capabilities. C2BMC
contributes to all phases of BMD from optimizing planning to
synchronizing the automated execution of the BMDS. Upgrades to the
Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications System will
extend situational awareness capability to Pacific Command and European
Command by the end of 2006.
As our planning processes have matured over the past year, JFCC-
IMD's innovative use of new collaborative planning capabilities in
major combatant command exercises has demonstrated the effectiveness of
distributed crisis action planning. JFCC-IMD was able to support the
Combatant Commands with development of new defense designs and
optimized locations for BMDS in exercises such as USSTRATCOM's GLOBAL
LIGHTNING and PACOM's TERMINAL FURY.
Through our partnership with MDA, the Services, and the warfighters
at the Combatant Commands, USSTRATCOM is setting the stage to evolve
the BMDS beyond its current capability to that of providing more robust
missile defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friends and allies.
We are actively engaged with MDA and the Services in the development
and deployment of BMDS elements and components ensuring a layered,
multi-phase operational capability for the Combatant Commands.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE--AN OVERVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2007 ARMY
BUDGET SUBMISSION
In addition to deploying a GMD system, MDA, the Services, and the
Combatant Commanders are focused on improving Theater Air and Missile
Defense (TAMD) capabilities within the context of the evolving BMDS in
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Joint Integrating Concept.
Both GMD and TAMD systems are vital for the protection of our homeland,
deployed forces, friends, and allies. Air and missile defense is a key
component in support of the Army's core competency of providing
relevant and ready land power to Combatant Commanders.
I would now like to focus on the Army's fiscal year 2007 budget
submission for Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems. The President's
Budget, presented to Congress on February 6th, includes approximately
$1.57 billion with which the Army proposes to perform current Army AMD
responsibilities and focus on future development and enhancements of
both terminal phase and short-range AMD systems. In short, the Army is
continuing major efforts to improve the ability to acquire, track,
intercept, and destroy theater air and missile threats.
The Army, as part of the Joint team, is transforming its AMD forces
to meet the increasingly sophisticated and asymmetric threat
environment encountered by the Joint warfighter. The Army has the lead
to conduct the IAMD Capabilities Based Assessment. This analysis will
comprise the front end of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Joint Capabilities Integration Development System. The study will
identify key joint, agency and combat command IAMD capability gaps and
will recommend doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership
and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) transformation
actions. The document is envisioned to fulfill time-phased IAMD needs
across the range of military operations.
INTEGRATED AMD SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The Army is transforming its Air Defense Force from its current
separate systems architecture to a component-based, network-centric,
IAMD System of Systems (SoS). The IAMD SoS program focuses on systems
integration, common battle command and control, joint enabling
networking, and logistics and training, to ensure operational
requirements, such as force protection, lethality, survivability,
transportability and maneuverability are achieved. The IAMD SoS program
will employ an evolutionary acquisition strategy consisting of a series
of increments leading to the objective capability. This SoS approach
calls for a restructuring of systems into components of sensors,
weapons and Battle Management Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I) with a standard set of interfaces
among these components using a standardized set of networks for
communication.
Technology insertions to the IAMD SoS will continue throughout each
increment as high-payoff technologies mature and are ready for
integration. Incremental development of the IAMD SoS allows the Army to
field new or improved capabilities to warfighters faster, by producing
and deploying systems and components as the technologies mature.
Funding in the proposed fiscal year 2007 President's Budget supports
the first steps in achieving an IAMD SoS architecture.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE BATTALIONS
As part of Air Defense Transformation, the Army is creating
composite AMD battalions. These battalions address capability gaps,
which permit us to defeat cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) while maintaining our ability to defend critical assets from the
ballistic missile threat. The composite AMD battalions will capitalize
on the synergies of two previously separate disciplines: short-range
air defense and high-to-medium altitude air defense. The current plan
is to organize eight battalions as PATRIOT-pure units, five battalions
as AMD battalions, and create one battalion as a maneuver AMD battalion
which will soon be our first pure SLAMRAAM Battalion. This
transformation is underway.
Within the context just provided, allow me to briefly discuss each
of the programs that support the Army's AMD Transformation.
TERMINAL PHASE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
The PATRIOT/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) capability
is designed to counter theater ballistic missile threats in their
terminal phase in addition to cruise missiles and other air-breathing
threats. Combining these systems with the Theater High Attitude Area
Defense (THAAD) System capability being developed by MDA with a planned
fielding in fiscal year 2009, brings an unprecedented level of
protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, friends,
and allies well into the future.
PATRIOT/PAC 3 and MEADS Overview
Mr. Chairman, since the combat debut of the PATRIOT AMD System
during Operation Desert Storm, the Army has continued to implement a
series of improvements to address the lessons learned. During Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), we saw the debut of the improved PATRIOT
Configuration-3 system, including the effective use of the Guidance
Enhanced Missile and the PATRIOT Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile.
PAC-3 is the latest evolution of the phased materiel improvement
program to PATRIOT. Combining developmental testing and operational
data, this program has enabled the development and deployment of a new
high-velocity, hit-to-kill, surface-to-air missile with the range,
accuracy, and lethality necessary to effectively intercept and destroy
more sophisticated ballistic missile threats. Today's PATRIOT force is
a mixture of PAC-2 and PAC-3 configured units. To maximize the full
advantage of the PAC-3 capabilities, the Army is moving toward pure-
fleeting the entire PATRIOT force to the PAC-3 configuration.
As I highlighted last year, PATRIOT saved many lives when defending
against Iraqi ballistic missile attacks during OIF. However, there were
some operational deficiencies. The Army has undertaken steps to correct
them and address lessons learned. The Army has pursued two thrusts--
identification and execution of a $41.6 million program for nine
specific OIF fixes and continued aggressive participation in joint
interoperability improvements in situational awareness. All funded OIF
fixes are on schedule to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2007,
pending any materiel release issues.
The PATRIOT system remains the Army's mainstay TAMD system and our
nation's only deployed land-based short-to-medium range BMDS
capability. The current PATRIOT force must be maintained through
sustainment and recapitalization efforts until 2028, until the MEADS
begins fielding, projected to begin in 2017.
MEADS is a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy,
to collectively field an enhanced ground-based AMD capability. The
MEADS program, which supports the President's goal for international
cooperation in missile defense, will enable the joint integrated AMD
community to move beyond the critical asset defense designs we see
today. MEADS will provide theater level defense of critical assets and
continuous protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force as part of
a Joint IAMD architecture. Major MEADS enhancements include 360-degree
sensor coverage, a netted and distributed battle manager that enables
integrated fire control, and a strategically deployable and tactically
mobile, AMD system. While the PAC-3 missile is the baseline missile for
the international MEADS program, the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE)
missile is being developed to meet U.S. operational requirements. MSE
will provide a more agile and lethal interceptor that increases the
engagement envelope.
Combined PATRIOT/MEADS Approach
With the approval of the Defense Acquisition Executive, the Army
embarked on a path to merge the PATRIOT and MEADS programs,
establishing the PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program (CAP) with
the objective of achieving the MEADS capability through incremental
fielding of MEADS major end items into PATRIOT. PATRIOT/MEADS CAP is an
important capability that will operate within MDA's BMDS. It is in
fact, the number one Army priority system for defense against short and
medium-range Tactical Ballistic Missiles and air breathing threats
(i.e. cruise missiles and UAVs). The PATRIOT/MEADS CAP will be capable
of operating within a joint, interagency, and multinational
interdependent operational environment. It will provide wide-area
protection at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
PATRIOT/MEADS CAP will also provide BMC4I, introduce lightweight
deployable launchers, upgrade the PAC-3 missile, and eventually provide
the full MEADS capability to the entire force. The MEADS system offers
a significant improvement in the ability to deploy strategically while
maintaining tactical mobility. The system uses a netted and distributed
architecture with modular and configurable battle elements, which
allows for integration with other Army and Joint sensors and shooters.
These features and capabilities will allow MEADS to achieve a robust
360-degree defense against all airborne threats. By establishing the
CAP, the joint integrated AMD architecture has become more robust.
First, MEADS enhancements are integrated into the existing system.
Second, as lessons are learned from the present missile defense
capability, they will be incorporated into the MEADS follow-on system.
We are confident that this path will provide our service members,
allies, friends, and the Nation with the most capable AMD system
possible.
The Army and the entire missile defense community continue to
strive to improve our nation's missile defense capabilities. The
PATRIOT and PAC-3/MEADS CAP research, development, and acquisition
budget request for fiscal year 2007 is approximately $916.5 million.
This request procures 108 PAC-3 missiles, purchases spares for the
system, and reflects the necessary PATRIOT development to keep the
system viable as we pursue development of PAC-3/MEADS CAP capabilities.
CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE
In the world today, there exists a real and growing threat from
land attack cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are inherently very
difficult targets to detect, engage, and destroy because of their small
size, low detection signature, and low altitude flight characteristics.
When armed with a WMD warhead, the effect of a cruise missile could be
catastrophic. It is clear that the required systems and capabilities
necessary to counter this emerging threat need to be accelerated to
field a cruise missile defense (CMD) capability as soon as possible.
The Army's CMD program is an integral piece of the Joint Cruise Missile
Defense architecture, and we are proud of our contributions to this
effort. Critical Army components of the Joint CMD architecture are
provided by the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated
Netted Sensor (JLENS), the Surface-Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missile (SLAMRAAM), the Patriot MSE missile, and an integrated
fire control capability. We are also working closely with the Joint
community to assure development of doctrine that synchronizes our
military's full capabilities against the cruise missile threat.
JLENS Overview
JLENS brings a critically needed capability to address the growing
CM threat. To support an elevated sensor, the JLENS program is
developing unique lightweight fire control and surveillance radars to
detect, track, and identify CM threats. JLENS will support engagements
using the SLAMRAAM/Complementary Low Altitude Weapon System (SLAMRAAM/
CLAWS), Navy Standard Missile, and PATRIOT/MEADS weapon systems. JLENS
uses advanced sensor and networking technologies to provide precision
tracking and 360-degree wide-area, over-the-horizon surveillance of
land-attack cruise missiles. The fiscal year 2007 JLENS funding request
of $264.5 million supports development of a full JLENS capability, with
the first unit equipped by 2011.
SLAMRAAM Overview
SLAMRAAM will provide a CMD system to maneuver forces with an
extended battlespace and a beyond line-of-sight, non-line-of-sight
engagement capability critical to countering the CM threat, as well as
UAV threats. SLAMRAAM uses the existing Joint AMRAAM missile currently
used by the Air Force and the Navy, thereby capitalizing on the Joint
harmony that the Department of Defense (DOD) is striving to achieve.
The Army and the Marine Corps are also executing a joint cooperative
development for SLAMRAAM/CLAWS to meet the needs of soldiers and
Marines in Homeland Defense as well as overseas deployments. The fiscal
year 2007 funding request of $49 million supports the scheduled Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) target of 2011.
Sentinel Radar Overview
The Sentinel Radar is an advanced, three-dimensional, phased array
air defense radar and a critical component in the Army's ability to
conduct air surveillance for the maneuver force. Sentinel is a small,
mobile battlefield radar that supports the joint air defense sensor
network in detecting cruise missiles, UAVs, and helicopter threats,
thereby contributing directly to the overall Single Integrated Air
Picture (SIAP) and supporting multiple Homeland Defense missions. Its
Enhanced Target Range and Classification (ETRAC) radar upgrades will
enable it to support engagements at extended ranges and reduce the time
required to perform target classification. Additionally, these upgrades
support next generation combat identification for friendly air, thereby
reducing the possibility of fratricide and providing an enhanced
positive friendly and civil aviation identification capability. The
fiscal year 2007 funding request of $17.6 million provides for joint
identification and composite sensor netting development efforts, four
ETRAC system upgrade kits, and development and integration of
improvements to support joint interoperability.
AIR, SPACE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Army is increasing its command and control capabilities on the
battlefield. The Army's Air and Missile Defense Commands (AAMDCs) will
help integrate TAMD operations, by integrating, coordinating, and
synchronizing Joint attack operations, active defense, passive defense,
and C4 operations in the theater, and also globally tie into our JFCC-
IMD.
Concurrent with the creation of AMD composite battalions, the Army
has developed, and is now in the process of fielding, air defense
airspace management (ADAM) cells throughout the force. ADAM cells will
perform four missions: plan AMD coverage, contribute to third-dimension
situation awareness and understanding, provide airspace management, and
integrate operational protection. With an emphasis on receiving and
sharing the Joint air picture from multiple sources and assets through
the battle command network, ADAM cells will provide commanders with
situational awareness as well as the traditional friendly and threat
air picture, enabling commanders to effectively manage their aerial
assets. ADAM cells are already being fielded to the Army to meet
modularity requirements, with two ADAM cells at the Division
Headquarters and one to every Brigade in the Army, to include both the
active and reserve forces. This high-priority system has been supported
through supplemental appropriations to this point. The fiscal year 2007
funding request of $49.5 million provides 15 ADAM Cells for the active
and reserve components.
Also in the past year, the Army activated the 94th Air and Missile
Defense Command, supporting the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater
of operations. With the 94th AAMDC activation, there are three Army AMD
Commands; two in the active component and one in the reserve component.
The 94th AAMDC, designed for Joint and multinational operations, will
provide for missile defense in the Pacific theater and will assist in
planning theater-level air and missile defenses. The 94th AAMDC will
provide the PACOM commander with a more robust theater-based
capability. Moreover, the unit's presence in the Pacific adds depth,
because its capability will be readily available to the warfighting
commander.
The Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS), forward deployed today
in European Command (EUCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and PACOM, are
providing assured missile warnings to Combatant Commanders and assigned
forces through a direct downlink from space-based infrared assets into
the joint theater communications architecture. In addition to
protecting the deployed force, these systems alert the BMDS
architecture and enhance attack operations. The fiscal year 2007
funding request of $24.9 million sustains the forward deployed JTAGS
units supporting Joint warfighters and postures the Army to participate
with the Air Force in a future ground mobile system compatible with the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) and follow-on sensors. The planned
Multiple Mission Mobile Processor (MP3) Program is being restructured
due to the delays in the SBIRS schedule.
COUNTER-ROCKET, ARTILLERY, MORTAR (C-RAM)
A significant danger in OIF/OEF today is posed by insurgents
employing indirect-fire tactics of quick-attack, low-trajectory, urban-
terrain-masked rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) strikes against U.S.
forward operating bases in Iraq. To combat this threat, the Army
developed C-RAM, an integrated solution of capabilities to provide
warning and intercept of RAM threats. C-RAM provides a holistic
approach to the Counter-RAM mission. Horizontal integration across the
core functions--command and control, shape, sense, warn, intercept,
respond and protect--is providing an integrated modular and scalable
capability. This capability provides timely warning of mortar attacks,
intercept and defeat of incoming rounds, and accurate location of
insurgent mortar crews, enabling a rapid, lethal response. C-RAM takes
advantage of existing systems and capabilities, combining them in a SoS
architecture to support the warfighter on today's battlefield. The
current C-RAM solution is truly Joint, in that it uses fielded systems
from the Army, Navy and Air Force along with a commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) system. C-RAM has been supported through supplemental
appropriations. The Army will request funding for continued C-RAM
fielding in the upcoming supplemental request, and the C-RAM program
will be included in the Army's POM beginning in fiscal year 2008.
DIRECTED ENERGY INITIATIVES
The Army continues to explore directed energy capabilities for
weapon system development and integration into Army Transformation
applications. High Energy Laser (HEL) systems have the potential of
being combat multipliers, meeting air and missile defense needs in the
future and enhancing current force capabilities, such as addressing the
RAM threats. The ability of a HEL system to shoot down RAM targets has
been repeatedly demonstrated, with mature chemical laser technologies
proven by the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program.
Meanwhile, the Army's fiscal year 2007 science and technology
funding request of $32.8 million supports HEL technology development
focused on solid state laser technologies that will offer electric
operation and compatibility with the Future Combat System (FCS) by the
year 2018. The Army is participating in a Joint high-powered solid
state laser program with the Office of the Secretary of Defense High
Energy Laser Joint Technology Office and the other Services to pursue
several candidate solid state laser technologies with the operating
characteristics necessary for weapon system development. In fiscal year
2007, while leveraging the Joint program, the Army is initiating a HEL
Technology Demonstrator (HELTD) that will, by fiscal year 2013, have
the ability to shoot down RAM threats as a stepping stone toward
deployment of HELs in a FCS configuration. Ultimately, HELs are
expected to complement conventional offensive and defensive weapons at
a lower cost-per-shot than current systems.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Army, a full contributing member of the Joint
team, is relevant and ready, fighting the war on terrorism, deployed in
Southwest Asia and elsewhere, and deterring aggression throughout the
world, while transforming to meet future threats. With its
responsibilities for GMD and PATRIOT/MEADS, the Army is an integral
part of the Joint team to develop and field the BMDS in defense of the
Nation, deployed forces, friends, and allies. In my role as the Joint
Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense, I will
continue the development of a Joint BMDS capability to protect our
warfighters and our Nation. The Army has stepped up to the land-attack
cruise missile defense challenge by aggressively developing the joint,
integrated, and networked sensor-to-shooter architecture necessary to
defeat the emerging threat. The fiscal year 2007 budget proposal
continues the transformation of the Army's ASMD Force to support the
Army's Future Force, the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense
System, and our global BMDS, building on the ongoing success of our
theater AMD force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Transformation will
continue to define the characteristics of the emerging ASMD force and
determine how it can best support the Future Force operating in a
Joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important
matters and look forward to addressing any questions you or the other
Committee members may have.
MISSILE DEFENSE FLIGHT TESTING
Senator Stevens. General Obering, the Graham panel
recommended intensifying the flight and ground testing of your
systems. And I am told that the Inspector General pointed out
there were some issues concerning network communications
security. Now, it seems that you have changed the confidence in
the deployed system at both Greely and Vandenberg. As I
understand it, and staff tells me, your plans call for only one
ground-based missile defense interception in this year we're in
now, 2006. Is that right?
General Obering. Sir, we have three more flight tests that
we have planned. We know that two of those will be before the
end of the calendar year 2006, based on our current
projections.
Senator Stevens. That's calendar 2006----
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. One will be over in----
General Obering. Yes, Chairman. One, most likely, will
slide into the early part of calendar year 2007. We will be
flying against targets in all of those flights. This next
flight that will occur to--the mid part to the latter part of
July, we will have a target, but the interceptor's not that
primary objective of that mission, because this will be the
first time that we are able to match the radar, the Beale
operational radar, with the kill vehicle characterization, the
seeker characterization. So, while an intercept could occur,
it's not the primary objective. We will fly against a target
later this fall which--in which an intercept will be the
primary objective, and then we will also fly against a target
in the third flight test, which, as I said, will probably move
on into 2007.
Senator Stevens. General Dodgen, is this system on alert
right now?
General Dodgen. Mr. Chairman, currently the system is not
on alert, however, we do have some capability that we can reach
and put up at the Nation's disposal, if called.
Senator Stevens. Well, what unit has operational control,
then, if it's not on alert?
General Dodgen. I command the unit, sir, at Colorado and at
Alaska, as an Army commander, and they are operationally under
the commander of Northern Command, who is charged with our
homeland defense.
Senator Stevens. Well, then, operationally, General
Obering, are you satisfied with the number of interceptors and
the various assets you have, surveillance and capabilities? Is
this system ready now?
OPERATIONAL READINESS
General Obering. Senator, if we had to use the system in an
emergency, as I've said before, I fully--I believe that it
would work, based on what we have done to date in our testing,
and that the previous testing we conducted with the actual
intercepts using a prototype of the kill vehicle that we did in
the 2000 to 2002 timeframe, that the recent tests that we
conducted this past year do nothing--I mean, do a lot more to
bolster our confidence in the system, as well, because we
actually flew the operational configuration of the interceptor
that we have in the silo, and we also, for the first time, used
the actual track information from an operationally configured
radar--in this case, Beale--as part of our flight test. And
that--the results of those tests were actually much more
encouraging than we had originally even planned. The accuracy
of that radar track and the ability of the system to accept
that met all of our expectations. So, I feel confident that the
system would work, if necessary. And, as General Dodgen can
tell you, all of the operators have been trained and certified,
and are ready, in that regard.
Senator Stevens. General Dodgen, you mentioned upgrading
all of the Patriots to PAC-3 level. Is that funded?
General Dodgen. It is not funded, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. In this budget?
General Dodgen. It is not funded in this budget.
Senator Stevens. When do you intend to budget--fund it?
General Dodgen. The reason it was not funded in this budget
is, that we just did a recent review of our worldwide posture
of the Patriot system, a review of Iraqi Freedom, and also the
timeline to MEADS, which is the system of the future where we
want to go. When we did this review with the chief, it became
clear that our operational requirements overseas and the
ability to operate succinctly and from different places, we
needed the ``pure fleet.'' In other words, we needed to take
our last three battalions and bring them to Config-3, where we
were holding those battalions in Config-2 until MEADS came on.
So, the chief made a decision a couple of months ago that we
needed the ``pure fleet,'' and told us to do that by 2009. So,
you'll begin to see that in the next budget cycle that we
submit.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
AIRBORNE LASER
General Obering, we're pleased with the report on the
airborne laser. Is there enough money in this bill, the request
of--for 2007, to meet the key milestones you have to meet, in
terms of that program?
General Obering. Yes, sir. And what we are shooting for
there, of course--we will roll the aircraft out, here, in about
1 month, with the tracking lasers installed and the atmospheric
compensation lasers installed. We will begin a series of ground
testing this summer, and then we go to flight testing in the
fall with that aircraft, where we will use, initially, a
surrogate of the high-energy laser to make sure that we've got
the jitter and the beam control completely addressed. Then we
plan to take the high-energy laser modules and move them on the
aircraft, beginning in 2007, and shoot toward a lethal shoot
down of a boosting missile in the 2008 timeframe. So, yes, sir,
what we have funded in the program will get us to that.
Senator Stevens. Well, you call for funding a second
aircraft, modification of the 747. Is that in this budget, too?
General Obering. Yes, sir. The--across our future year
defense plan (FYDP), it is. We have not allocated the long-lead
items for that second aircraft yet, because what we want to do
is make sure that we were able to take all the results of this
testing that we'll be doing in the next 2 years, and fold that
into the design of that second aircraft. So, we want to make
sure we've gotten all of the lessons learned, and we need
basically what we call a design turn between that and the
procurement of the second aircraft.
Senator Stevens. But do you have enough money in this
budget, now, to meet the needs for that second aircraft, as far
as the program is concerned that you have scheduled for this
fiscal year?
General Obering. Based on the schedule that we have laid
out, yes, sir, we have enough money to do that.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. General Dodgen, we are very much encouraged
by your success on the Aegis Missile Defense Program. Six out
of seven intercepts is quite an impressive record. Assuming
that the success continues, I would assume that it will be
deployed. And, when that happens, who will be in charge--the
Navy or will it be a national asset?
General Dodgen. Of the SM-3 missile, Senator? The vision
right now is that the Navy will man that system, and it'll be
aboard the fleets. Currently, there are some missiles in
Pacific Command (PACOM). JFCC is actually planning the command-
and-control relationships with the combatant commander to bring
that capability into the family of ballistic missile defense
systems. So, we're very encouraged by its performance. It has
regional reach in its capabilities against these threats,
combined with the Patriot system, and ultimately when the THAAD
gets here, it'll be a tremendous combination of capabilities
that we'll have in PACOM and in our other combatant commander
regions.
TERMINAL HIGH-ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE PROGRAM
Senator Inouye. You've mentioned terminal high-altitude
area defense (THAAD). It's been very successful recently.
You're going to be finishing your testing at White Sands. Where
do you go from there?
General Dodgen. Well, the testing done by the Missile
Defense Agency, actually we are somewhat constrained, as I
understand, by the testing that we do at White Sands, so we'll
need more battle space in order to test against the threats we
perceive for THAAD. And so, we'll go into the Pacific test
range to do those things that we need to. General Obering could
probably elaborate on that a little more, sir.
General Obering. Yes, sir. We have a very aggressive
program on track right now in our testing there. We will finish
up the White Sands testing and then move out to the Pacific
missile test range. Everything that we can see is on track. In
fact, we have--the next flight will be tomorrow, of that
system. And we're very encouraged by the progress that we've
made to date.
KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM
Senator Inouye. General Obering, 3 years ago your agency
began the kinetic energy interceptor program. This is a
multibillion dollar program that began as a boost-phase
program. Over the last few years, the program has shifted. We
have heard that it does everything from boost to midcourse to
land and sea based, and it could be the replacement for the
interceptors at Greely and Vandenberg. Can you straighten out
the record and tell this subcommittee what MDA's intentions are
for the KEI program?
General Obering. Yes, sir. The KEI program started, as you
said, 3 years ago, and it started at the recommendation of the
Defense Science Board, because they felt that the airborne
laser program, while it was very high payoff with respect to
its directed energy, it was also very high risk from a
technical perspective. And so, they recommended that we have a
backup basically for the--for that program. So, what that
indicated is that we needed a very, very high acceleration
booster to be able to reach out in that boost phase, that very
quick boost phase, to intercept the boosting threat missile. As
we got into the program and we realized what that capability
entails, that means that with that high acceleration, you also
have a much-expanded footprint in a terminal role, for example,
and you could also apply that in the midcourse, as well.
So, what we're trying to do is be good stewards of the
taxpayers' money. If we're developing this very high
acceleration booster for the boost phase, could it be applied
in other phases, as well, in other uses? The only thing you
have to change is, you have to--you have to make sure that you
integrated a different seeker as part of the kill vehicle. So,
that's what we were looking for as--how could we exploit as
much as we can of this capability?
So, as it exists today, it is, in fact, still an
alternative for our boost-phase defense. And if it pans out--
and it--we will know in fiscal year 2008, when we have planned
for the first flight of that very high acceleration booster--if
it pans out, then it could be applied to the other phases, as
well. So, we're trying to keep an eye for the future to make
sure that we have all of our bases covered. But what we're
trying to do is take advantage of that very high acceleration.
The other advantage it has is, it is a mobile missile. It
is canisterized, and it is mobile. It is designed to be both
land based and sea based. And, there again, you could take
advantage of that mobile capability to be able to augment or
bolster your overall ballistic missile defense system where you
may need it worldwide. So, this is a system that you could fly
into a location, for example, and provide long-range
protection--coverage against long-range threat missiles and
very high speed missiles. And so, it became very attractive
from that perspective.
But to make sure we've set the record straight, as you say,
it is still our boost-phase defense alternative. We're still
focused on the knowledge point in 2008, and then we will
preserve our flexibility to determine what we would like to do,
based on the achievement of those knowledge points.
Senator Inouye. Is the funding request sufficient to keep
this on track?
General Obering. Yes, sir. The President's budget request
is sufficient to keep this program on track.
COUNTERMEASURES
Senator Inouye. One of the most difficult challenges facing
the program is developing methods to overcome enemy
countermeasures. There have been suggestions that we are
building a very expensive system that can be foiled by an
inexpensive countermeasure. How do you respond to that?
General Obering. Well, first of all, Senator, the system
that we're fielding today does not have a robust capability
against very complex countermeasures, as we have stated in the
past. However, the systems and the components that we're
bringing online this year, for example, and the work that we
have, being able to net together the sensors, and the
algorithms that we've developed to install those in these
sensors, get us very far down that path to be able to meet that
very complex threat.
In addition, we have a very important program that we call
the Multiple Kill Vehicle Program. And what that does is, it
takes a single interceptor and enables it to destroy multiple
credible objects, so that you can handle the much more complex
countermeasures and the much more complex threats suites that
we may face in the future. And so, we are very much
appreciative of that, the challenge that that represents. We,
by the way, have probably these nations' leading experts in
countermeasure, in counter-countermeasure technology. We have a
very robust countermeasure test program. We actually fly
missiles with very complex countermeasures on them, and we test
our radars' and our sensors' capability to discriminate and to
sort through those. And that's all part of this program. We
want to make sure that we are not fielding a system that will
only work against very simple threats, that we are, in fact,
keeping an eye toward the future and keeping an eye for the
robustness of this. And I'm very encouraged by what we have
done in that area.
Senator Inouye. And your funding request is sufficient to
carry out this program?
General Obering. Yes, sir, as long as we get the
President's budget request, especially for the Multiple Kill
Vehicle Program, which is that catchall, so to speak.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, may I request that my other
questions be submitted?
Senator Stevens. Yeah. I'd appreciate it if you'll respond
to the questions that are just submitted to you in writing.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE QUALITY CONTROL
General Obering, a recent Government Accountability Office
(GAO) missile defense report raised some doubt about the
quality of the GMD kill vehicles. What actions have you taken
to ensure that our ground-based midcourse interceptors are
highly reliable?
General Obering. Well, Senator, first of all, we have
revamped the way that we are doing quality control across the
program, and especially for the GMD, the EKV program.
Senator Shelby. It's paid off, too, hasn't it?
General Obering. Yes, sir, it has. In fact, the initial
report--or the reports that I've got back as recent as just a
couple of weeks ago about the changes that have been made now
in the production facilities, for example, in Tucson and other
areas, are very, very encouraging. We think that we've gotten
over the hump there.
What it primarily had to do with, by the way, is making
sure that we had accountable engineering processes being
applied, and we had folks accountable for the individual tail
numbers that were going through the facility, and that we also
had a much stronger supply-chain management approach to be able
to control the quality of the vendors and the suppliers, and
all of that is in place. We've also deployed more than 24
mission assurance representatives across the Nation in these
facilities, working day to day with the contractors. And so, in
fact, I've had at least one CEO of a major defense corporation
say that our mission assurance program is the best he'd ever
seen, and he's actually incorporating that as part of his own
internal documents.
KINETIC ENERGY INTERCEPTOR PROGRAM
Senator Shelby. I'm glad to hear that.
General Obering, the MDA budget request of $9.3 billion not
only supports fielding missile defense capabilities, as you
well know, but also funds the development of advanced
technologies to make missile defense more robust and more
effective. I believe our national defense needs to fully fund
technology development in order to remain in front of the
threat. One program currently threatened with cuts in the 2007
budget, as I understand it, is the Kinetic Energy Interceptor
Program. Would you address how KEI makes missile defense more
robust? And what is the impact to the ballistic missile defense
system if this program isn't fully funded?
General Obering. Well--yes, Senator----
Senator Shelby. To you both.
General Obering. Yes, Senator. As I mentioned earlier, that
is our program, which is an alternative to the airborne laser
program. While both of those programs are currently on track,
we won't know until we reach the knowledge point, in 2008, as
to whether we can actually lethally shoot down a boosting
missile with the airborne laser, and whether we can attain the
very high acceleration that we need out of that KEI program.
So, if we were to sustain the cuts that have been proposed for
the KEI program, it removes that flexibility, number one, and
it prematurely forces us to----
Senator Shelby. You need that flexibility, do you not?
General Obering. Yes, sir, because I can't tell you right
now with confidence that the airborne laser could be an
operational system. We may be able to technically shoot down a
missile, but it may not be operationally viable, and we have a
long way to go there. And it's making great progress, but I
would not like our options limited too prematurely at this
point.
Senator Shelby. How much more money would you need for
this, with this particular program?
General Obering. Well, Senator, the President's budget
request for 2007, I think, is about $386 million for the KEI
program, and we need all of that.
Senator Shelby. Need all of it.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
MULTIPLE KILL VEHICLE FUNDING
Senator Shelby. The multiple kill vehicle, as both of you
know well, an initiative to provide increased effectiveness
against potential countermeasures during midcourse engagement.
It's presently under development. The 2007 request of $164
million is a considerable increase from the 2006 request of $82
million. General, will you be able to execute the funding of
this requested increase? And what progress in MKV do you expect
to realize in 2007? I think this is progress here, but what do
you plan to do with it?
General Obering. Yes, sir. Well, we actually have laid a
divert and attitude control system test in the 2007 timeframe
for that program--again, a key knowledge point for the program.
We have transitioned and moved the management of that program,
by the way, from the Washington area down to the Huntsville
area, in terms of how we're executing that management. And so,
I have no doubt that we'll be able to fully leverage the money
that we've requested to be able to get us to--the next
knowledge point is a hover test of that vehicle in 2009. And,
again, as I mentioned with Senator Inouye, it is very, very
important to be able to address emerging threats that we may be
faced with in the future.
Senator Shelby. Thank you.
General Dodgen, the 2007 budget request includes proposed
funding for long lead items necessary for GMD interceptors 41-
50. From your warfighter perspective, General, what would these
additional interceptors provide, in terms of an increased
ballistic missile defense capability? Is this request
warranted? Do you need it?
General Dodgen. Senator, I think they're very much
warranted. I think the missile count, as strategically located
as Fort Greely is----
Senator Shelby. Absolutely.
General Dodgen [continuing]. To go east and west----
Senator Shelby. Sure.
General Dodgen [continuing]. It's all about how many rounds
you have in the ground, and the reach of those particular
rounds. And our shot doctrine calls for us to use potentially
more than one interceptor against a warhead. And so, we
potentially could use every one of those rounds.
Senator Shelby. That's just smart, isn't it?
General Dodgen. It is smart. We have, in addition to that,
our joint capability-mix studies played those full inventories
of munitions and verified that we'll need every one of those
rounds for the threats that we'll be facing.
Senator Shelby. Well, you can't afford to be too thin when
you're defending something, can you?
General Dodgen. That's correct, sir.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might have some
additional questions for the record.
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much.
Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to dwell on just a little bit of the development of
the entire system and where we're going and to complete the
mission. I've had an opportunity to visit facilities, as you
well know, and also it appears to me, when we dwell on the
development, I think, of the Patriot, the PAC-3, in the--and
the Navy SM-3. We're not only developing a tactical weapon, but
now--we have a weapon now that could probably go strategic as
this develops out.
I have some concerns about it, because I'm from Montana,
and if you guys miss, you put us into business----
Senator Stevens [continuing]. Up there. And so, we're--as
those--these systems--can you comment on how you're using these
multiple parallel paths, really, to create a competition or
synergy for our ground-based terminal missile system programs,
because we understand that competition does create a certain
synergy, and how those two programs play out? General Obering,
I--yes.
LAYERED DEFENSE
General Obering. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, we are
designing the system so that we have layers of defense that
work together, so we can take a sea-based interceptor, like the
SM-3, and the radar with the aegis program, and integrate that
into the long-range defense system that is based in Alaska,
California, and, of course, Colorado Springs. And so, it is
designed to work together to be able to integrate these
capabilities and greatly expand the detection and engagement
zones over what we would have individually.
Now, what you're referring to in the multiple paths is
that--for example, with airborne laser and the kinetic energy
interceptor, we have options that we can execute within the
boost phase--in the boost phase, for example, to be able to
make sure that we don't have all our eggs in one basket. And
that's why I think it would be premature to cut either one of
those programs until we get to those knowledge points.
We also have laid in several midcourse capabilities against
the long range and the Aegis, for example, with the shorter-
range threats. We have planned and have funded in the budget
the ability to engage the longer-range threats with the sea-
based interceptor and the midcourse, as well. That's our SM-3
block-2 capability. So, where we can, we like to make sure that
we have options and flexibility. And we also are integrating
all of these capabilities together to ensure that we get the
most that we can out of the system.
Senator Burns. Well, you were going down the path where
each one of them sort of had their niche.
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. General Dodgen could probably address that.
General Dodgen. Sir, I would add to that by saying,
operationally, what we're doing is divorcing sensors from their
normal role as a system and using them across all the systems
we have so that multiple sensors can shoot different
interceptors. When you do that, first of all, you probably
don't need as many systems. That's what the joint capability-
mix study is telling us. And, second of all, you bring great
flexibility in the ability to adjust the system for a
particular threat and in a regional fight. So, we definitely
plan to integrate the SM-3 missile onboard ships, with THAAD,
and with Patriot in the regional fight, and some of those same
sensors will be feeding the GBM system that's at Fort Greely
and gaining great significance to that. And we're about dealing
with the command and control to make that all work succinctly
for the future.
ARROW PROGRAM
Senator Burns. Let's talk about sharing of technology a
little bit. I think most of us are pleased with the success of
the Israeli Arrow, that missile in this past year. In fact,
they had a pretty successful shoot the other--about 1 month
ago, I understand. This subcommittee has funded that technology
development with the Israeli Missile Defense Agency, and we're
pleased that their system is really improving its capability,
in light of recent developments in Iran. We--you know, it may
play a larger role than we really think right now.
Would you care to comment on the benefits of funding the
Arrow program to your agency? And how has the sharing of
technology--has it enhanced what we're trying to do here?
And either one of you can----
General Obering. Yes, sir. Well, first of all, we've
learned an awful lot collaboratively together, working with the
Israelis. We have a series of exercises that we execute with
them on an annual basis that we learned even more. It played
out very well in Operation Iraqi Freedom, where we actually had
integrated and combined the Arrow system with the Patriot
system to be able to provide coverage during the Operation
Iraqi Freedom. But we've also, as you say, enjoyed the
technology benefits. We've actually been able to incorporate
some of the developments on the Arrow program back into other
interceptor programs within the Missile Defense Agency. We
continually do that. We continue to look at their advances in
software, advances in human/machine interface, and those types
of things, to see what advantages that we can take. So, it very
much is a collaborative effort. And, of course, we need that
even more so in the future as we expand the opportunities for
missile defense cooperation. And we have several countries that
are very much interested across the world, and that continues
to grow almost on a weekly basis.
Senator Burns. Well, I've had the opportunity to visit not
only what they're doing there, but also what we're doing down
in the South Pacific, General. And we stopped in down there
in--now, let's follow up on that. How positive has it been with
our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) friends? What--
and especially fielding the Joint Tactical Ground Station, the
JTAGS--have we had the same kind of cooperation with our NATO
friends?
General Dodgen. Of course, I command the JTAGS, and----
Senator Burns. Yes.
General Dodgen [continuing]. Right now they're positioned
with the combatant commanders to provide early warning for
those forces. And we have a JTAGS located in Stuttgart with
European Command (EUCOM). That early warning has been provided
to our allies in some regard. And so, there is a great deal of
cooperation there.
Senator Burns. Are they holding up their share of the
funding?
General Dodgen. Well, the funding's totally United States
at this particular time, but I think I'm encouraged by the fact
that NATO is beginning to step up their missile defense
efforts, and, to the most part, start to study and actually
come forward with some recommendations as to what they want to
field. They're certainly not where we are in missile defense, I
would say, but they're certainly talking with us at the
military level.
Senator Burns. Well, I get the feeling, you know--we're
really stretched for money, you know, in funding some of these
programs, and I'm starting to ask myself, Why should we be
funding their programs? The American taxpayers should know why
we're doing that. Is there a reason? Because it is costly.
General Obering. Senator, if I could address, from a
different geographic area, Japan, we have entered into a co-
development program pending Japanese approval, for a block-2
SM-3. And that is a--an equal share in the costing of that,
which is great for us, and great for Japan, because we are able
to get that capability, basically, at half the investment to
the United States. So, that is, I believe, the model, and is
something that we are very much interested in, in other
programs, as we proceed in the future, too, to be able to
leverage our allies.
General Dodgen. I would add to that, that certainly other
NATO nations have the Patriot system, like we do. And we have a
great operational cooperation with them in their systems, in
their force. Germany and The Netherlands and now the Greeks all
have Patriot, and Spain is procuring a system. In addition to
that, we're partners in MEADS with the Germans and the Italians
to develop the next generation. But those are the short-range
terminal systems, and cooperation in the longer-range systems
is something that will be forthcoming, I believe.
Senator Burns. Well, the reason I asked the question is
because we have--at the present time, we are facing an enemy
that offers none of those kind of weapons that would endanger
our security, both to our troops that are deployed, in the
Middle East or wherever, or our domestic security. And so, we
have to look at those. Should we be funding these systems, when
basically we're in support of boots on the ground, so to speak?
I come from a different mentality. I served in the Marine
Corps, and so my mentality is the support for the troops that's
on the lines, so to speak. And so----
MISSILE DEFENSE
General Obering. Senator, one thing I'd like to address
there is, this missile defense, as you started out your
statement, about the overall system----
Senator Burns. Yes.
General Obering [continuing]. It is designed not just to
defend the United States, but also our deployed forces. And, as
you know, they are deployed worldwide. And, as these ballistic
missile threats continue to proliferate, I think it's important
that we do provide that protection, whether they be from the
shorter-range missiles, as well as the longer-range missiles,
because, as we say, as we see this threat evolve, they will
reach those capabilities. And that's why we're trying to expand
out the umbrella of our defensive coverage to be able to give
ourselves that flexibility and to prevent a nation--a threat
nation from either coercing or threatening our allies or
ourselves, so we can do something about the ballistic missiles
that could be married with a weapon of mass destruction.
Senator Burns. Well, I think the American taxpayer would
thank you for that answer. I agree with you, but those are
questions that come up, you know, when we talk about the
security or the support of our troops on the ground. I have
concern for those men and women, because they are really
standing in harm's way. I thank you for your answer.
General Obering. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Senator Cochran, do you have questions,
sir?
Senator Cochran. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And let
me join you and other members of the subcommittee in welcoming
our witnesses to the hearing today.
We have a genuine need for continuing to support a strong,
robust, workable missile defense system across a broad range of
threats that we see that are present today and that are
evolving for future concern--and give us concerns for the
future, as well. These are big, complicated, challenging jobs
that you have, and we appreciate the dedication and the efforts
that you are making to discharge your responsibilities and help
carry out these important activities in the development and
deployment of missile defense systems. So, thank you. That's
the first point I want to make.
Second, it appears that we are making good progress in
developing technologies, improving old technologies, in helping
stay ahead of the curve. And I think that investment of dollars
is very important. We need to be careful not to waste money.
And you realize that. We're concerned about keeping spending
under control, making sure we're getting what we pay for.
And, in that connection, I was interested in your
observations about some of the programs I know that you've
already talked about, the airborne laser and some of the other
programs, maybe the kinetic energy interceptor, which are still
under development, but with hope that we can deploy systems of
this type to help ensure that we have the best possible
protection.
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Now, one thing that I was curious about is the command and
control infrastructure. You're developing an integrated
ballistic missile defense system, but the infrastructure of
command and control is very important. I wonder what your
assessment--of this is at this point. General Obering, could
you give us an update or an overview on the progress you are
making in integrating command and control capability for
missile defense?
General Obering. Yes, sir, be happy to.
First of all, I have to say that I am extremely pleased
with the progress that we have made in that area. If you stop
and think about it, there's no other mission area that I'm
aware of where you have to get simultaneous situational
awareness across as many as 11 time zones or more, across the
various combatant commanders and the geographic commanders,
again, simultaneously, do the deconfliction and to the battle
management that will have to be done in the missile defense
arena, which is a--very much of a challenge.
But, in fact, we have tackled that. We have rolled out a
capability that is currently not only here in the National
Capital but also at Omaha, at STRATCOM, at U.S. Northern
Command (NORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, out at PACOM, in
Hawaii. We have plans to also continue to expand into EUCOM and
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and to give those capabilities--
those commanders that capability, as well. And so, from a
command and control perspective, I think the program is very
much on track.
We have requested--the money we have requested in the
President's budget is important for that work. It is important
to continue that, because that is the heart and soul and the
brain of the system. We can't do the necessary integration, as
General Dodgen mentioned, of the sensors and the interceptors
that we mentioned earlier, without that capability. And this is
truly a force multiplication effect. For example, if we can
integrate a land-based radar using this command and control and
battle management capability with sea-based interceptors, you
cut down on the number of ships that you need to provide
protection for a given defended area dramatically. And that
same effect happens over and over again through the system,
where you can do this mixing and matching of sensors with
weapons. And so, we think that it is very, very important.
So, I think that the money that we've asked for this in the
President's budget for 2007 is very much--is very important and
very critical to the program.
General Dodgen. Senator, could I add to that?
Senator Cochran. Yes, please.
General Dodgen. The command and control for the initial
capability that we fielded in Fort Greely, Alaska, what we've
called limited defensive operations, very mature tactics have
been taught through, the foreign doctrine is there, the command
and control through Northern Command is there. What we're about
now in a JFCC is expanding that globally through the other
combatant commanders. And what we do is, we understand the new
capabilities, such as the sea-based SM-3 capability and when
the THAAD comes on. We bring the warfighters in from PACOM and
EUCOM. We fight the system in games. We develop a concept of
how we're going to operate. We validate that concept. And then
we feed those means in which we want to operate in terms of
functionality to MDA, so that they can produce the command and
control battle management communications (C2BMC) terminals that
will populate the geographical combatant commanders. That
process is just starting to go globally. And the funding will
put that functionality into those command and control terminals
that we'll use to fight the global fight.
Senator Cochran. That leads me to my next question, which
is about international cooperation. It's important for us to
maintain a spirit of cooperation in order for us to deploy
radars and other capabilities around the world that make the
whole system work. At Fylingdales, for example, we have the
radar there that England has permitted us to continue to use.
Are there any other examples of problems that we're having in
the international area?
General Dodgen. Sir----
General Obering. Well, sir, in terms of the overall--not
only situational awareness, but the willingness to cooperate
and to collaborate in missile defense, I have seen that
dramatically increase just in my tenure as director of the
Missile Defense Agency.
To give you just one little anecdotal metric there, we
cohost a missile defense international conference every year.
The last one was held in Rome, last September. We had over
1,000 delegates at this conference. We had more than 20 nations
represented there. And we see an upswell of interest and of
cooperative effort across the board. We have countries, like
you said, the United Kingdom, who are working with us and
hosting radar sites and allowing us to be able to use that
information with respect to the missile defense system. We have
countries like Japan who are investing their own money,
significant amounts of it, over $1 billion a year, in missile
defense, and are working with us not only procuring systems
from us, but also co-developing new systems with us. And so,
across the board, I see a dramatic increase in that
collaboration and that cooperation.
But I think it's only reasonable, in light of what we see
happening with the threat. We know that there is a lot of
activity, nearly 80 missile launches last year around the world
in the threat communities. We know that this proliferation
continues. We know it is a weapon of choice. When you marry it
with a weapon of mass destruction, the ballistic missile
becomes a convenient delivery vehicle, whether you're talking
about short range or long range. And so, I think it's not only
important, I think it's critical that we get this continued
international development and cooperation.
EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM
Senator Cochran. One of the essential parts of this entire
process is maintaining intelligent satellites and launching
these satellites. You have the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program, which has produced a couple of families of
capability. These have had only a few initial launches. But you
were hoping to reduce the overall cost by agreements with
commercial customers who are likewise interested in these
capabilities. Tell us what the status of that is and what you
foresee as the need, in terms of budget requirements, funding
of this Expendable Launch Vehicle Program.
General Obering. Senator, I don't have the Expendable
Launch Vehicle Program. If you're referring to--I have the
Multiple Kill Vehicle Program. I also have the space tracking
and surveillance system programs. But the Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program is an Air Force-run program. We benefit,
obviously, from launch services that could be provided for our
space satellites when we are getting ready to deploy those and
getting ready to put those up.
Senator Cochran. So, this is not a part of your budget
request.
General Obering. No, sir.
Senator Cochran. I understood that $937 million is being
requested in the budget for the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle Program.
General Obering. No, sir, not for Missile--
Senator Cochran. But that's not----
General Obering [continuing]. Defense.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. Your budget----
General Obering. No, sir.
Senator Cochran [continuing]. Request. That's Air Force----
General Obering. It's not mine, sir.
Senator Cochran. Okay.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Thank you, sir.
X-BAND RADAR SECURITY
General, the radar--the X-band radar, Shemya--or, no, the
radar at Shemya, and the sea-based X-band radar, are going to
be part of this system. I'm--as you know, I'm fairly interested
in that. They're going to be, obviously, targets now. Would you
care to discuss the security situation of those targets, or
would you like to do it in closed session?
General Obering. Any details of that, Senator, I'd prefer
to do that in closed session. But I will tell you that we do
have what we consider to be adequate security and force
protection measures that we've employed on those--on the
platform, on the sea-based X-band radar. We have security
arrangements that we've--that we have procured for the Cobra
Dane radar, as well. I am working with General Dodgen and
STRATCOM and the combatant commanders, because the force
protection responsibilities, especially in an operational
environment, fall under the combatant commanders'
responsibility--area of responsibility. And we're working with
them to make sure that we have what is considered to be
adequate force protection for the future, as well.
But I would prefer the details of that to be in a closed
session, if you don't mind.
Senator Stevens. Well, we'll respect that, of course. We'll
look forward to having a closed session, discussing some of
these activities later this year.
General Dodgen, when is this X-band radar going to
transition to operational status?
General Dodgen. It will do that later this year. I
believe--I don't know what the exact month--is it December?
It's going to leave Hawaii and go through some more trials up
in the Adak region. Primarily, the software build that we're
going to put into the GMD fire control (GFC) system will allow
this radar to be used by the interceptors, will be tested and
validated in those particular times. So, it won't just be the
platform that'll be tested. It will be the command and control
system that's going into the GFC now that will be tested by the
operators and when I say the ``operators,'' I mean the soldiers
at Fort Greely, Alaska, will verify this system. And all
that'll be done before it's actually placed into the system on
alert later this year.
SEA BASED X-BAND
General Obering. And, Senator, if I may, we have had the
radar in the vicinity of Hawaii for the past several months. We
have been doing some corrosion control work on the platform.
And then, we motored it off the coast to begin the radar
calibration test, and we actually--I got a report this morning
that we've completed that activity. So, we'll be coming back
in, and then we'll be making our way--after a thorough review
of readiness, we'll be making our way up to Adak, Alaska, in
the next month or so.
Senator Stevens. Well, I want to chat with you about it.
I've been invited to participate in something in August
pertaining to that X-band radar, and I was surprised, because I
didn't expect it to be in our waters until later this year.
General Obering. No, sir. It will be up in Alaska, should
be there this summer, and then we will----
Senator Stevens. It will be there this summer?
General Obering. Yes, sir. And then, we will use the
remainder of the time to complete its integration from that--
from the location near Adak into the system, do the full
checkout using those satellite transponders, et cetera. And
then we'll be available for operations this year, as General
Dodgen said.
Senator Stevens. You intend it to be in Adak sometime this
summer?
General Obering. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Do you know a time--any timeframe for
that?
General Obering. I will take that for the record and get
back to you, but I believe it is in the latter part of July.
[The information follows:]
The SBX is currently scheduled to depart the Hawaii
Operational Test Area upon completion of X-Band Radar
Calibration testing, and will arrive at its loitering location
50 nautical miles off Adak, AK in late summer.
The MDA Mission Readiness Task Force, at Lieutenant General
Obering's request, recently chartered an independent review
team consisting of retired Navy and Coast Guard admirals,
senior naval architects, and semi-submersible oil rig experts,
to assess SBX operational viability with a focus on operations
in the Bering Sea. The agency will implement some of the
recommendations in the Hawaii region as well as perform low-
level repairs and maintenance required from calibration testing
prior to departing for Adak.
XBR calibration is scheduled to be completed in August,
2006.
Senator Stevens. Well, that fits in with the request I have
had, then. Thank you.
I was surprised. I didn't think it was going to be there
that early.
Well, gentlemen, I want to tell you that I, personally, am
very pleased with everything I've heard about this, and I'm
very pleased with the activities of the National Missile
Defense Support Group that's out there, with Ricky Ellison. And
I congratulate you on the way your information is being
disseminated throughout the country about the importance of the
program and how it's proceeding. I really think it meets up
with the basic expectations we've had.
I will tell you that we'd like to talk to you a little bit
later about some of the aspects of this program. I think that
it would be best to do that in that closed session we're
talking about, in terms of how this money is going to be
allocated.
Do you, Senators, have any further questions?
Well, we do thank you very much. And, again, we
congratulate you. I think the decision to deploy these missiles
while they're still in the development phase, has proven to be
a wise decision, and we'd look forward to your keeping us
advised on the schedule of further developments in the system.
I failed to ask you about the Kodiak connection. Do you
have anything scheduled with regard to the Kodiak launching
system during this year?
General Obering. Yes, sir. In fact, the targets that I
mentioned earlier that we will be flying in our next series of
tests next week, those targets will be launched from Kodiak.
And I have to tell you that we've been very, very pleased with
the performance and cooperation there.
Senator Stevens. That's proved to be a very good place for
that activity, and we're delighted that you're there.
And we do thank you for your testimony. And----
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. I just want to add something to what you
said. I think General Obering and General Dogden both, their
respective commands, Mr. Chairman, are showing real leadership
and resourceful for the Nation. And this ought to be
recognized.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Stevens. You're right, and I'm particularly
pleased, as I said, with the transparency. I think everywhere I
go, people have asked about it, and they've been stimulated by
the appearances that you and so many members of your command
have made throughout the country. So, it's very good to have
that kind of transparency in a program like this.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Lieutenant General Henry A. ``Trey'' Obering III
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
Question. Over a year ago, the Graham panel recommended
intensifying your flight and ground testing, while recently the
Inspector General pointed out issues with your network communications
security. How has your confidence in our deployed system, including the
interceptors Fort Greely and Vandenberg, changed? Your plan calls for
only one ground based missile defense intercept test in fiscal year
2006; are you comfortable with that level and rate of testing?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency's confidence in our deployed
BMDS is growing. If the deployed system were called upon in an
emergency we believe that it would work based on the testing we have
conducted to date. Recent tests conducted over the past year bolster
our confidence as we have successfully flown the operationally
configured interceptor. We hope to gain further confidence in our
system's capability when we conduct an intercept flight test with an
operationally configured GBI later this year.
We are successfully executing our plan of continued laboratory and
distributed asset testing at the component and system level, and are
conducting a regimented flight test schedule with well-defined entrance
and exit criteria in accordance with the recommendations of the
Independent Review Team (IRT) and the Mission Readiness Task Force
(MRTF). We have instituted a stringent pre-mission ground test program
prior to our Ground Based Midcourse Interceptor flight test missions
which allows us to fully exercise the ground components at Fort Greeley
and Vandenberg prior to a flight test event. In addition, we have
successfully demonstrated the ability to launch, fly and separate the
Ground Based Midcourse Interceptor's Exo-atmospheric kill vehicle,
thereby validating the modifications we made after previous flight
tests. We have also recently conducted live tests of other key BMDS
assets demonstrating the system's ability to detect and track live
targets in flight using operational sensors, operational networks, and
our operational battle management and fire control nodes.
Our disciplined path to returning to a flight program required
specific technical criteria to be met before the flight test could
occur. This approach limited us to one intercept flight test in fiscal
year 2006, but provided us with key insights to bolster confidence in
each and every subsequent event. We plan to maintain this strategy as
we strive to increase the flight test tempo in subsequent years,
improve integration of Information Assurance (IA) Controls, and believe
that this strategy helps balance the technical risks with additional
confidence that comes from testing in more stressful intercept
environments.
Concerning the Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG)
report on the Ground Based Midcourse Defense Communications Network
(GCN), MDA is confident that the GCN will continue to perform safely,
securely, and efficiently when called upon to defend this nation, our
friends and allies against missile threats. The IG recommendations are
matters that need attending to, and are being appropriately addressed.
GROUND-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE
Question. I'm pleased that the airborne laser has made technical
strides during the last year. Will this program have the funding to
meet its key milestones in 2007?
Answer. The program has sufficient funding to accomplish the
projected milestones in 2007. ABL is a high-risk/high-payoff program
based on cutting edge technology in developing and integrating advanced
optics and lasers on a flying platform. The program has made
significant progress by successfully demonstrating long-duration lasing
at lethal power levels in ground tests and completing flight testing of
the integrated beam control/fire control and battle management systems
on board the ABL prototype aircraft. The program is following a very
aggressive schedule to complete both ground and flight tests of the
beacon and tracking illuminators (including demonstration of
atmospheric compensation) before the end of CY 2006, and completion of
low power system testing in CY 2007, while the high energy laser
component is refurbished in preparation for installation on board the
aircraft in CY 2007. All these efforts are leading up to a lethal
shoot-down of a ballistic missile in the 2008 timeframe.
Question. Fielding Aegis and Ground Based Midcourse Defense are
priorities for this committee. Can you assure this committee that the
Missile Defense Agency has adequate resources allocated to the testing,
fielding and operational aspects of the current system before embarking
on the development of new capabilities?
Answer. I share your views on the importance of fielding the
Ground-based Midcourse and Aegis BMD elements of the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS).
In fiscal year 2007 we plan to continue the incremental fielding
and sustainment of Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors;
additional SM-3 missiles and upgrades to Aegis BMD ships; and the
supporting sensors, command, control, battle management and
communication capabilities required to integrate these interceptors
into the BMDS. We have been steadily increasing the operational realism
of Aegis BMD flight tests leading to deployment of a certified tactical
capability later this year. In Aegis BMD, the Navy's Operational Test
and Evaluation force is conducting concurrent testing as part of Aegis
BMD flight test missions. We will also be pursuing a comprehensive and
integrated approach to increasing the operational realism of our GMD
and BMDS flight tests as well as making our ground testing program more
robust. At the same time, we are not wavering from our commitment to
sustaining these systems once they are in the field.
The resources included in our fiscal year 2007 President's Budget
request, as well as throughout the FYDP, are adequate to support our
fielding, sustaining and testing commitments. Currently, we are
fielding missile defense assets about as fast as we can and I can
assure you that our budget request represents an appropriate balance
between providing near term missile defense capabilities and preparing
for the emerging threats of the future through our evolutionary
development programs.
Question. The radar at Shemya and the sea based X-Band are key
elements of the ground based missile defense system. As such, they are
likely high value targets in the initial phases of an attack. Does the
Missile Defense Agency plan to protect these assets from our
adversaries? Can you provide us that plan in a classified session?
Answer. The overall protection strategy for the Cobra Dane Radar on
Shemya Island, Alaska and the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) is based upon an
assessment of the current threat, the application of security measures
to deter identified threats and appropriately protect the radar and
personnel, and the Combatant Commanders planned response to actual
threats.
Cobra Dane
U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Strategic Directive 538-2,
``Global Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (GBMDS) Physical Security
Program'' directs protection standard at the SSL-A level. This
specifies protection commensurate with assets for which loss, thefts,
destruction or compromise would cause great harm to the strategic
capability of the United States. Cobra Dane does not currently meet all
SSL-A protection requirements. Remoteness of the asset, severe weather
conditions, and cost vs. risk are considerations being evaluated
towards a decision to properly updated existing security. MDA is
working with USSTRATCOM and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to conduct a
security assessment and develop a risk mitigation plan to identify
security systems suitable for the Eareckson environment, including
enhanced security for the Cobra Dane radar.
SBX
SBX is currently protected as a System Security Level-A asset in
accordance with DEPSECDEP direction, as implemented by U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) Strategic Directive 538-2. USSTRATCOM has endorsed
MDA security and force protection measures as consistent with 538-2 for
SSL-A.
Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) are responsible under the
Unified Command Plan (UCP) for force protection oversight of SBX-1 when
operating in their area of responsibility. While MDA is responsible for
antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) of the vessel, the GCC is
responsible for responding to attacks by adversaries during increased
threats/wartime. Based on the Force Protection Condition (FPCON) and
current intelligence, GCCs will direct assigned forces or request
additional forces to protect the SBX operations, as required.
Question. Your agency is in the initial development stages of the
Kinetic Energy Inteceptor, which appears to offer improved performance
during boost and ascent phase engagements. For commonality,
supportability, and cost have we examined all avenues of improvements,
or modifications, to the existing ground based interceptors to provide
this capability?
Answer. The Missile Defense Agency did examine the possibility of
improving or modifying the existing Ground-Based Interceptor to enable
boost and early ascent phase defenses prior to starting the Kinetic
Energy Interceptors program in 2003. What we and multiple industry
teams determined is that a mobile, fast-burning, high acceleration
booster capability is required to meet boost/ascent phase mission
requirements. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor booster has approximately
three times the acceleration of a Ground Based Interceptor with a
similar payload volume and weight capacity. The Kinetic Energy
Interceptor is also half the weight of a Ground Based Interceptor; its
physical size (length and diameter) is constrained to allow rapid
transport on a C-17 aircraft and future integration on a sea-based
platform. The only way to achieve this mobile weapon capability is to
design, develop, integrate and test new booster motors. The development
of this unique booster vehicle capability is the primary focus of the
Kinetic Energy Interceptors program through the 2008 booster flight
knowledge point.
Question. What milestones and testing events need to occur prior to
announcing an initial operating capability of the ground-based missile
defense system?
Answer. Today, the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) could
provide a limited defense if called upon as the initial set of
capabilities necessary to defeat an incoming ballistic missile have
been fielded and demonstrated. These capabilities are currently in a
``shakedown period'' under which our crews are gaining valuable
experience in their operations, and should some threat arise, we could
transition from a test phase to an operational phase in a matter of
hours. MDA is working with the warfighters to ensure they are ready to
operate the system when directed as well developing the capability to
operate and test the BMDS concurrently.
A Secretary of Defense decision to put the system on a higher level
of alert will be based on a number of factors. These factors include:
the advice he receives from the Combatant Commanders, and other senior
officials of the Department; our confidence in the operational
procedures we have developed; demonstrated performance during both
ground and flight tests; modeling and simulation; and the threat.
Question. If the third stage rocket motor is removed from the
ground-based interceptor, can it do boost phase intercept? What would
its capabilities and characteristics, including size and mobility, be
in comparison to the Kinetic Energy Interceptor?
Answer. [Deleted].
VALUE OF TEST RANGES TO MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (MDA)
Question. White Sands is perhaps the most unique installation in
all of DOD and, when combined with Fort Bliss (most of which is located
in New Mexico) and Holloman Air Force Base, it gives the Department a
highly valuable venue for combining operations and testing.
Can you describe the value MDA places on its access to an
installation like White Sands with its enormous geographic size and
unrestricted airspace?
Answer. MDA values access an installation like White Sands Missile
Range (WSMR) for testing of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMDS) elements
due to its geographic size and airspace. However, WSMR is not well
suited for MDA test engagements across multiple time-zones which are
necessary to increase confidence in the whole BMDS. We continue to
integrate theater and regional missile engagement capabilities into the
Ballistic Missile Defense System with a strategic engagement capability
demonstrated for Block 04. With its size and airspace, WSMR will
contribute to the success of the BMDS in future testing involving
PATRIOT integrated with Command Control Battle Management and
Communications (C2BMC) and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense
system (THAAD). PATRIOT testing is required to assist in maintaining
the Limited Defensive Capability of the BMDS as well as the development
of future Blocks of the BMDS.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici
VALUE OF TEST RANGES TO MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (MDA)
Question. Does this access provide the type of realistic testing
environment needed to collect accurate data for your systems?
Answer. Yes, at the developmental testing level, but not as much
for operational testing:
Airborne Laser (ABL).--WSMR is well suited for firing the laser in
flight at diagnostic missiles during beam characterization, and for
some test sorties where active laser operation is not required.
THAAD.--For ground testing, THAAD will conduct a total of 26
activities comprised of tests, demonstrations and New Equipment
Training/Collective Training. These activities will exercise the
Launcher, Radar, and Fire Control and Communication components of the
THAAD element, at WSMR and other ranges, from 2007 through 2011.
PATRIOT Advanced Capability (PAC)-3.--In fiscal year 2007 and
fiscal year 2008 there will be a total of two BMDS tests that use the
Army's PATRIOT tests at WSMR. The first test, set for the second
quarter fiscal year 2007, will bring C2BMC and THAAD Hardware-In-the-
Loop (HWIL) to exercise the latest PATRIOT and C2BMC software. MDA will
collect data on communications between THAAD and PATRIOT and will test
PATRIOT's ability to receive C2BMC engagement-coordination direction.
For the second test, set for the first quarter fiscal year 2008, MDA
will bring C2BMC and THAAD HWIL to the PAC-2 Guidance Enhancement
Missile (GEM) P6X-2 test to accomplish the same objectives. It should
be noted that the Army will be conducting PATRIOT tests at WSMR in
addition to MDA specific tests.
Question. How will White Sands contribute to the success of the
Ballistic Missile Defense System in the future?
Answer. In Block 06 and beyond, the MDA has planned engagement
sequences that include THAAD engagement on its X-band radars and on
system-level tracks. The WSMR flight campaigns will contribute to
proving key functionality and interfaces as the BMDS extends to
integrated, layered, worldwide-defensive capabilities. Accordingly, the
MDA testing program includes THAAD flight tests and Patriot flight
tests to demonstrate early interoperability, then integration with the
BMDS. The C2BMC element will participate in these flight tests to
demonstrate the situational awareness and planning functions that are
needed to conduct regional missile defense operations.
Question. A range-wide environmental impact statement has not been
completed for WSMR in more than ten years. Would the Missile Defense
Agency benefit from such an EIS?
Answer. A decision to conduct a range wide EIS at the Army's White
Sands Missile Range would be made by the Army and White Sands Missile
Range, and any value to the Missile Defense Agency would be indirect.
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) coordinates test planning at White
Sands Missile Range with the Army, and as new missile tests are
identified to meet our testing goals, and as the proponent of those
tests, the Missile Defense Agency would initiate the necessary level of
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act for the specific
action. Current planned Missile Defense Agency testing at White Sands
Missile Range is compliant with the National Environmental Policy Act.
Question. What does the Missile Defense Agency need from White
Sands Missile Range and New Mexico?
Answer. THAAD returned to flight testing in 2005, and the second
flight test of five at WSMR occurred on May 11, 2006. The THAAD program
currently plans to conduct three additional flight tests at WSMR over
the rest of this year and into fiscal year 2007 before moving future
testing to the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Barking Sands,
HI, where we can conduct tests of more challenging engagement
scenarios.
WSMR provides support for many other MDA flight tests via our
Pacific Range Support Teams (PRST) which are teams composed of staff
from multiple DOD ranges to support broad ocean area tests, and to
specific MDA dedicated mobile test assets. We need the WSMR team to
continue their outstanding support of our MDA PRST, providing critical
mobile equipment and expertise to remote locations around the Pacific.
While the WSMR geography seems substantial for tactical systems, MDA
systems must demonstrate their capabilities on both a broader theater
and global scale. This large-scale testing will require us to use large
areas within the Pacific oceans.
MDA and DOD continually seek more commonality of testing processes
and tools across the Major Ranges and Test Facility Base, to enable
more efficient and flexible testing in the future. WSMR's continued
support of these activities is crucial.
The C2BMC element participates in THAAD and PATRIOT testing from
WSMR to achieve early demonstrations of element interconnectivity and
data message transfer during live fire events. This interconnectivity
testing is made easy by WSMR's SIPRNET on-range connectivity and ease
of set-up and troubleshooting.
MDA's programs take advantage of a substantial amount of
infrastructure and technical expertise from across New Mexico. Some of
the other areas include: Holloman High Speed Test Track and WSMR for
lethality and survivability testing; Kirtland Air Force Research Labs
and the ABL program office support to our Directed Energy activities;
and Sandia National Labs for support to our FT targets, threat
analyses, survivability, among others.
______
Questions Submitted to Lieutenant General Larry J. Dodgen
Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
Question. Given that the system spans multiple departments,
commands and areas of responsibility, can you describe the current
operational control of the system? Is the system currently on alert, if
not when do you project that it will be?
Answer. The operational control of current Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) begins with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) who
retains direct control of the current capabilities. These capabilities
are in a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) status
managed by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). However, in an emergency,
operational capabilities are available today and upon direction from
the SECDEF, control transitions to an operational status. The
operational control is executed by a combination of Geographic
Combatant Commanders (GCCs), e.g. Commander STRATCOM, Commander
NORTHCOM, and Commander PACOM. Control processes have been vetted by
the GCCs in readiness exercises that verified necessary warfighter
tactics, techniques and procedures to operate the system. MDA and GCCs
continue to add capability to BMDS that remain in an RDT&E status until
the SECDEF decides to place all or parts of the BMDS into a 24/7/365
mode of operation.
Question. I understand the 2007 budget cut the advanced procurement
for the second aircraft. The airborne laser program calls for a fleet
of modified 747 aircraft. How comfortable are you with the overall
concept of operations provided the laser's range, aircraft on station
time and deployment options?
Answer. The Ballistic Missile Defense Concept of Operations has
been vetted during developer (Missile Defense Agency) and warfighter
(Geographic Combatant Commanders) exercises. In many of these
exercises, use of current simulation resources to depict Airborne Laser
(ABL) capabilities as part of the larger Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS) is exercised. Operator's tactics, techniques and
procedures are refined as we learn more about how each element and
component of the BMDS interacts in a dynamic, operational context over
a range of potential adversarial operations. Once ABL technology and
potential deployment advances, we will be able to better assess the
state of ABL's concept of operations within the overall BMDS.
Question. Operationally, to meet the current ballistic missile
threat, are you comfortable with the number of interceptors,
surveillance assets, and capabilities at your disposal? When will the
Sea Based X-Band Radar transition to operational status, and who will
operate it?
Answer. As you are aware, the system continues to evolve within the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) arena but, if
necessary, it can provide an operational capability now. While we now
have an operational capability, continuous assessments indicate that we
need both present as well as programmed assets to defeat the evolving
ballistic missile threat. Provided that planned assets are fielded, I
am comfortable that the Nation will possess an effective global missile
defense system. The Sea Based X-band radar (SBX) continues to undergo a
series of sea trials and sensor calibration activities prior to moving
to its area of operations later this year. Currently, the SBX is
operated by a combination of Missile Defense Agency (MDA) provided
contractors and security personnel. Negotiations are continuing with
the Services to ensure long-term operations of the SBX.
Question. Given uncertainty in the international community to
support our missile defense efforts, what are the risks to the forward
deployment concept?
Answer. Capabilities of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)
remain in a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) status
under direct control of the Secretary of Defense. Limited, rudimentary
capabilities are spread over a number of geographic areas that include
the domains of friends and allies who are forthcoming in support of our
forward deployment needs. To date, it appears there is a legitimate
interest by additional friendly and allied entities to provide support
necessary for stationing and operation of additional deployable
elements and components and therefore, greatly mitigate any risks there
may be. In fact, as countries like North Korea and Iran continue to
develop and market ballistic missiles, there is a corresponding
increase in international support for missile defense. Many elements
and components are rapidly deployable from friendly and allied
operating areas serving as forward basing for support and sustainment
of BMD assets in adjacent operating areas. Sea and airborne BMDS
elements and components are rapidly relocated to compensate for any
loss of any ground stationing issues that may arise in any particular
scenario. In addition, many friends and allies continue to make their
own BMDS asset contributions fully integrating regional BMD
architecture.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Stevens. We will stand in recess until Wednesday,
May 17, when we will hear testimony from the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., Wednesday, May 10, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday,
May 17.]