[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]



 
  DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Judd Gregg (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Gregg, Domenici, Craig, Allard, Byrd, 
Leahy, Kohl, Murray, and Feinstein.

                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF, SECRETARY

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

    Senator Gregg. I call the hearing to order.
    Senator Byrd is the ranking member on this committee, and 
obviously on the full committee, and he will be here a little 
later. And when he arrives we will accord him the opportunity 
of making an opening statement if he should so wish.
    We appreciate Secretary Chertoff coming here today. He's 
just assumed one of the priority responsibilities in our 
government relative to the safety of Americans. He's given up 
an extremely important position to take this position on, and 
it reflects well on him and I think on this administration as 
somebody who has caliber and is willing to do this type of a 
job, and we appreciate it.
    However, the agency he takes over has some very serious 
problems, and this morning before this hearing I was just 
writing down--and I didn't do this with any staff assistance--
just off the top of my head, the problems that I've seen and 
been reported to me over my brief tenure as chairman of this 
committee, they include things like the border patrol, the fact 
that our borders are not effectively protected anymore, that 
they are not--we have virtually no security along our borders, 
that people are pouring over the borders illegally.
    It's gotten so bad that in Arizona citizen groups are now 
seeking to enforce the borders, which obviously is not good, 
that the border patrol training capabilities are not up to what 
the Congress asked them to be. We asked for 200 agents a year 
to be trained. Maybe they can do 400, 500, if they are 
fortunate. They cannot find people. They cannot hire them.

                              IMMIGRATION

    In the area of immigration, this is an agency which has had 
a very long history of very significant management issues. Back 
when I chaired the Subcommittee on Commerce, State, and Justice 
before this Department was moved over to DHS; the Department 
had a lot of problems.
    Even under the prior administration, the problems were 
significant and they have continued in the area of management. 
I don't think any member of Congress receives complaints about 
any agency with more consistency than about the immigration 
issues that we get.

                               IT ISSUES

    We have got the issues of IT. The inability of the 
fingerprint capability at the borders to communicate 
effectively and in real-time with the database of the FBI. 
IDENT is not integrated into IAFIS.
    We have the US VISIT program, which I have serious 
reservations about whether it is going where it is supposed to 
be going as a technology capability.

                                  TSA

    We have the TSA. It has become almost a weekly event now 
that there is some report that comes out about the TSA's 
failures in a variety of areas, from waste and fraud in the 
most recent IG report relative to the construction of its 
facilities for its headquarters to an internal investigation 
which I guess concluded that weapons and contraband were still 
going through the airports with regularity, which was totally 
unacceptable, to what I consider to be an inexcusable situation 
of a large amount of theft being reported from passengers in 
this country.
    The fact that an agency of the Federal Government would 
have thousands upon thousands of reported thefts occurring by 
Federal employees against American citizens makes us look like 
a third-world country. And it still goes on.
    Workman Compensation claims are outrageous. And I think 
anybody who goes through airport security has to ask 
themselves, at least occasionally when going through airport 
security, is this really having an effect on security or is 
this simply mindless when you see some of the actions taken by 
the TSA.

                              INTELLIGENCE

    The intelligence issue, the agency has ceded intelligence 
over to other agencies when originally it was supposed to be 
the center of basically coordinating of intelligence. And now 
we see that the intelligence decisions are being made outside 
the agency by a conscious decision. And maybe it was the right 
decision, but essentially the IAIP has been raided the last 2 
years from its resources to do other things. And I view 
intelligence as probably the essence of whether or not we win 
this war.
    This is not a war about reacting to events. It is a war 
about getting to those events before they occur. And that 
involves intelligence.

                           PERSONNEL CONCERNS

    The personnel issues, the senior management turnover is 
extraordinary. The number of people in an acting position is 
unacceptable and the number of positions which are unfilled at 
senior management levels is unacceptable.

                ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE ALONG THE BORDER

    The electronic surveillance capability along the border is 
non-existent right now from all I can tell. There has been a 
total breakdown in the camera structures; and the unmanned 
vehicle program has basically been stopped, even though it was 
proving very successful.

                             OTHER CONCERNS

    Contingent to the agency's responsibility is the issue of 
protecting us against a biological or chemical attack. And 
granted, the HHS has priority here, but the Department has a 
very significant role in making sure that HHS is successful. 
And it is very obvious that in the area of vaccines, Bioshield 
has not produced the results it should have produced, and that 
we have not created a robust vaccine capability in this country 
against very significant disease issues, specifically anthrax, 
botulism, plague, and small pox.
    Container ships, we all know we are not getting anywhere 
near the scrutiny on the container ships. If we look at the 
agency objectively, just on that list you have to say that were 
this agency admitted to an emergency room, it would be 
considered to be in extreme distress.
    The fact is we have not been attacked. And credit on that 
goes to the Department, and I give them credit for that. But 
the fact also is there are very serious, serious problems, 
especially on what I consider to be the three core elements of 
the Homeland Security portfolio, which is protecting us from 
weapons of mass destruction attack, protecting our borders, and 
making sure that they are under control, and making sure that 
we have adequate intelligence capability.
    So the problems exist now. You did not create them, Mr. 
Secretary. They did not come on your watch. You have just 
arrived. I congratulate you for setting up a Department-wide 
review of what is going on and trying to figure out how to 
correct it. But they exist and we have to get our arms around 
them.

                    FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

    The budget that has been sent up by this Administration 
presumes that the Congress will pass a significant increase on 
the fees of people who are flying. I do not think you are going 
to see this Congress accomplish that. Certainly, the chairman 
of the Commerce Committee here in the Senate has been more than 
vociferous in opposition to that proposal, and that is his 
authorizing committee, although this appropriating committee 
will play a role.
    But if you take that number out, the budget that was sent 
up is well over a billion dollars less than last year's budget 
to operate this Department. If you put that number in, and 
giving you the benefit of the doubt that we are going to raise 
the fees on travelers in this country by dramatic amounts, even 
though the stated amount is that the budget is up by 7 percent, 
our estimate is that the budget is up by about a $100 million.
    Now it may not be that money solves this problem. In fact, 
I do not think it does. I think a lot of this is an issue of 
management and structure. But we know, for example, in the area 
of border patrol that getting more bodies on the border is 
critical, and that is going to cost money. And there are other 
areas where we know money may make a difference, for example, 
backlogs.
    So I am not sure the budget that has been sent up is 
reflective of the urgency of the problem that this Department 
has relative to different functions that in my opinion are in 
distress.
    So I hate to start this hearing off with a dark cloud, but 
I think honesty is required, and these are not reports which I 
have manufactured. They are restatements of public information.
    So with that, again, I want to emphasize that I feel that 
we are extremely fortunate that you have been willing to take 
this job on. But I think you have been dealt a hand that is 
difficult to play, and I am looking forward to working with you 
to try to improve that hand. And that is the purpose of this 
committee, to constructively work with you to give you the 
resources you need to accomplish the improvements so that a 
year from now we do not have this long list of concerns. With 
that, we will listen to your thoughts.

                     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CHERTOFF

    Secretary Chertoff. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And 
thank you for welcoming me to this first appearance for this 
subcommittee, which I am looking forward to working with as we 
go forward to improve our performance and make sure we are on 
the right track to, as you point out, protecting the American 
people, and protecting our infrastructure. And then if worse 
comes to worse, appropriately responding.
    If I may, I would like to ask that the subcommittee receive 
my full statement for the record.
    Senator Gregg. Of course.
    Secretary Chertoff. I am going to be very brief so that I 
can be available to answer questions. Let me try in just a 
couple of moments to give you at high altitude the approach 
that I think we are taking in this review we have got going, 
and also in terms of our moving forward with the Department.
    Quite obviously, in creating the Department, Congress 
wanted to do more than assemble 22 organizations in a tent. We 
wanted to create a single organization that could achieve 
outcomes that are important in terms of enhancing our national 
security. So one of the critical tasks I think I have as I 
begin my tenure at the Department is to see what we need to do 
in order to further the process of integration.
    I completely agree that means intelligence, which is the 
driving guide to what we do all across the board. And we need 
to make sure we are appropriately collecting and fusing the 
intelligence we have available within the Department, and then 
contributing that to the community at large and consuming what 
the community has, and operationalizing that.
    So we are looking to enhance our ability across the 
Department to combine our intelligence, combine our operations, 
and combine our policymaking. So we have a Department-wide 
approach to these things.
    Second, as part of the review we are undertaking, I really 
want to be focused on outcome, and to kind of boil the jargon 
away. The example I have given to people when I try to explain 
what I mean, if my car is not running and I take it into the 
shop, and the electrician and the guy who does the transmission 
and everybody else takes a whack at it, and I come in at the 
end of the day to pick the car up, and everybody says, wow, you 
know, we have each done our process exactly right, but the car 
does not run, I do not consider myself a satisfied customer.
    I am concerned about the outcome. I want a car that runs. 
And that is true here, too. We want a Department that produces 
the outcomes we care about, and we ought to focus on how we do 
that without regard to everybody's individual stove pipes. And 
then the alignment of the stove pipes and the alignment of the 
organizations and the operations has to be what fits with 
getting the outcomes.
    The third piece is, we do want to use this risk-management 
philosophy. I think you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in your 
statement, there are a lot of important things, but there are 
some things that are the highest priority. WMD is one example. 
And we have to be disciplined, since we are talking about a 
long-term issue with terrorism and threat, about identifying 
the priorities and figuring out how we go about optimally 
taking what are obviously finite resources and getting them to 
where they have to be. And so that risk management approach is 
going to be our guiding philosophy.
    We are not interested in the Department of Homeland 
Security as simply an opportunity for people to, you know, raid 
the pots of money. We are interested in making sure that we get 
the money and everything we do over our deployment and our 
operations in a risk management, focused manner.

                           prepared statement

    So with these kind of general observations, again, I am 
delighted to work with the subcommittee. I know it is a very 
challenging position, but I know there is a tremendous amount 
of support with the American public to getting this job done 
right. And that is what I am going to do my level best to do, 
and I look forward to answering questions.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    [The statement follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Michael Chertoff

                              INTRODUCTION

    Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank 
you for the opportunity to address you today, and for your ongoing 
support of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to keep 
America secure and free. I am honored and pleased to appear before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Homeland Security. 
This is my first appearance before this Subcommittee, and I look 
forward to a productive exchange as the Department begins to reassess 
and readjust priorities and policies in accordance with the changing 
threat of terrorism over three and a half years after the September 11, 
2001 attacks.
    For more than 2 years now, the Department of Homeland Security has 
led a national effort to protect our country and our citizens from all 
manner of threats. It has been an honor to join the dedicated men and 
women who carry out this task daily. Ours is a difficult mission--to 
prevent another deadly and catastrophic terrorist attack such as the 
one we experienced on September 11, and if an attack occurs, to respond 
quickly and prevent further damage.
    The 180,000-plus people of the Department carry out this mission 
with unflinching resolve and a driving determination that such an 
attack should never occur on American soil again. Realizing that we can 
make no guarantees, we pursue our mission with a sense of urgency and 
daily diligence, so that this Nation can respond and recover quickly, 
should an incident or attack occur.
    Since its establishment just over 2 years ago, DHS has made great 
strides in its efforts to unify the defense of our homeland. We have 
continued to integrate 22 distinct agencies and bureaus, each with its 
own employees, mission and culture.
    But our security requires even greater coordination and effort 
throughout the Department, across all levels of government, and 
throughout our Nation to create synergy and new capabilities. It 
requires an unwillingness to accept complacency as part of anything we 
do; rather, we know we must apply all effort to tear down stove-pipes 
and coordinate key intelligence, policy, and operational issues across 
DHS and the government.

                          SECOND STAGE REVIEW

    I have therefore initiated a comprehensive review of the 
organization, operations and policies of the Department as a whole. 
This comprehensive review will examine what we are doing and what we 
need to do without regard to component structures and programmatic 
categories.
    We want to understand better what's working and what isn't. We will 
be evaluating every element of our working mission and making sure that 
the Department is best organized to meet the threats--both current and 
future--that face our Nation.
    Old categories, old jurisdictions, old turf will not define our 
objectives or the measure of our achievements because bureaucratic 
structures and categories exist to serve our mission, not to drive it.
    Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson has been charged with overseeing 
this process. The goal of the review is to help me make informed 
decisions as I lead the Department. Deputy Secretary Jackson has 
selected a team of Department officials to look at a number of critical 
cross-cutting issues and determine how departmental resources and 
programs can be most effectively applied to achieve our security goals. 
I have asked them to get back to me by Memorial Day with the bulk of 
their recommendations. I intend to study and act on their 
recommendations.
    What will the review cover? Take an issue such as maritime cargo 
security, which cuts across several departmental components. Customs 
and Border Protection, Coast Guard, Science and Technology, and 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection each address aspects 
of this overall mission. Each might perform its element well, but we 
must go further to ensure that each is performing seamlessly and in 
coordination with the others, that we eliminate any duplication of 
effort, and that we reap the full strength of our wide spectrum of 
capabilities.
    Of course, in executing the initial phase of putting the Department 
together and integrating the different components into a working 
structure, my predecessor and the men and women of Homeland Security 
did a tremendous job. They should be commended.
    Now, as we enter into the second phase of the Department's life, we 
must also take a fresh, creative look at the Department itself--
including its organization, its operations, and its policies. We are 
not yet fully integrated and our entities are still not always 
coordinated with each other. Now the challenge is to take the advantage 
of 2 years' experience and evaluate the Department to see if there are 
potential structural and operational changes that will improve and 
enhance our capabilities to protect and safeguard this Nation.

                CROSS-CUTTING FUNCTIONS AND INTEGRATION

    On the most basic level, we need to take a step back and focus on 
the fundamental question: Why was the Department of Homeland Security 
created? It was not created merely to bring together different agencies 
under a single tent. It was created to enable these agencies to secure 
the homeland through joint, coordinated action. Our challenge is to 
realize that goal to the greatest extent possible.
    Let me tell you about three areas where I plan to focus our efforts 
to achieve that goal. First, we need to operate under a common picture 
of the threats that we are facing. Second, we need to respond actively 
to these threats with the appropriate policies. Third, we need to 
execute our various component operations in a unified manner so that 
when we assess the intelligence and we have decided upon the proper 
policies, we can carry out our mission in a way that is coordinated 
across the board.
    My intent is to integrate each of these three areas--intelligence, 
policy, and operations--across the Department, so that each is directed 
from the most senior level of the Department.
    Let me turn to intelligence. Intelligence plays a pivotal role in 
mapping our mission. When the Department was created, 22 separate and 
distinct entities were woven together, a number of which had components 
focused on intelligence-gathering and analysis. One of my top 
priorities is to make sure that these various intelligence components 
function as a cohesive unit, and that our information and analysis is 
coordinated across the Department so that DHS, as a full member, can 
enhance its contribution to the Intelligence Community.
    First, we must organize and combine all intelligence within DHS. To 
do this effectively, we must ensure that our own intelligence 
components are interoperable. The Department has already made progress 
in this area. For example, the Homeland Security Operations Center was 
stood up to help the Department develop a common operating picture and 
facilitate information sharing.
    We must make sure that we are gathering all relevant information 
from the field, communicating with each other, and approaching analysis 
with a mission-oriented focus. We must ask, for example, whether those 
who evaluate the border from the Customs and Border Protection 
perspective are learning from analysts in the U.S. Coast Guard. They 
each look at border security, but from different vantage points. Only 
if they are working together can they fill in key gaps, paint a 
realistic picture, and evaluate all of the different pieces of 
information and intelligence that they are each gathering. We have to 
maximize the fact that all of these components now exist under the same 
umbrella.
    Second, we must make sure that information is being disseminated 
both up and down the ranks of the Department. Strong and effective 
coordination does not just mean that our analysts at DHS headquarters 
are working together. We need to fuse and exploit all the information 
that we learn across the country, so that when a Border Patrol agent in 
Texas learns of a new alien smuggling method, that information is fed 
up to our intelligence analysts, incorporated where appropriate into 
our strategy to combat smuggling, and disseminated across the 
Department to others focused on the same problem. We must build a 
culture in which the disparate pieces of information are being 
transmitted to our analysts so that they, who have the benefit of the 
fuller picture, can properly analyze all of our information and inform 
our decision-making.
    The converse must be true when our intelligence analysts learn of 
new vulnerabilities that terrorists are trying to exploit. That same 
agent in Texas needs to know, on a timely basis, of the threat and what 
he should be looking out for. We have a great many talented individuals 
at the Department. Some gather and analyze intelligence. Others learn 
critical information as they are in the field performing their jobs. 
The opportunities are endless. DHS needs to bring all of these nuggets 
of information together and disseminate them appropriately. We need to 
have the structure and the correct systems and technologies in place to 
take full advantage of them.
    Third, our focus must extend beyond the Department itself. We must 
review and make use of intelligence coming from the Intelligence 
Community and we must play an active role in providing intelligence 
information to the Intelligence Community. As the WMD Commission made 
clear in its report 2 weeks ago, sharing information across the Federal 
Government is critical if we are to succeed. To that end, I am 
committed to making sure that our law enforcement and intelligence 
partners across the Federal Government have appropriate access to the 
Department's information and analysis, to the maximum extent possible 
under the law, while protecting the privacy rights and civil liberties 
of Americans. By the same token, we must sit as full partners at the 
table with full access to others in the Intelligence Community. We must 
work in concert with the Intelligence Community. I will work closely 
with the Director of National Intelligence, whose job it will be to 
make sure that the Intelligence Community is well-coordinated and 
mission-focused.
    In addition, intelligence and information from other Federal 
agencies is critical to our efforts to secure the homeland. The 
development of the terrorism information sharing environment, as called 
for under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, will 
connect the resources (people, systems, databases, and information) of 
Federal, State, and local governments, and the private sector allowing 
users to share information and improve collaboration.
    Finally, we must inform and communicate with our State, local, 
tribal entities, and private sector partners. As I observed just last 
week during TOPOFF, when it comes to securing the Nation, we must 
ensure that these entities are well-equipped both to react to crisis 
and to prevent it. As part of this effort, we must improve our ability 
to operationalize intelligence. As information comes in, we need to 
make sure it is getting out to the right people and in a way that they 
can use to strengthen their efforts and contribute effectively to ours. 
Intelligence in a vacuum is meaningless. We need to explain how our 
outside partners can counter that threat and what we need them to do to 
watch out for it.
    Now, let me address policy development. Development and 
coordination of policy are major responsibilities of this Department. 
The Department has the central mission of securing the homeland, but 
there are many different aspects of that mission with numerous 
contributors. Large elements of DHS include traditional operational 
functions in which we deploy personnel, equipment, planes, ships and 
vehicles. But other elements principally involve planning and rule 
making, and networking with State, local, and tribal entities, and 
private parties. All of these must serve and promote our homeland 
security imperatives.
    Therefore, we need to further enhance our capability to think 
through broad and overarching issues like border security, emergency 
preparedness, transportation security, and cargo security, with a 
Department-wide perspective, rather than just through the lenses of one 
particular component. We need to develop our policies by first looking 
at our missions and asking the comprehensive, result-oriented 
questions, rather than by looking to one particular entity that has the 
lead in driving an issue to conclusion.
    Accordingly, I believe that we should pull together the vast 
expertise and the varying perspectives already at the Department as we 
work toward integrating our many crosscutting functions. For this 
reason, one of the areas that we are closely studying in the Second 
Stage Review is the advisability of creating a department-wide, 
substantial policy office. This office will also be a very important 
focal point for coordinating DHS's policy work with other Federal, 
State, local, and tribal entities.
    Finally, let me discuss operational coordination. Just as with 
intelligence and policy, we need to find new ways to increase our 
operational coordination. Diverse operational components were woven 
together when Congress stood up the Department, each with its own 
history and identity. As I have become acquainted with these various 
components, I have quickly learned that there is a great deal of talent 
within them. Each entity has its own unique focus, but often they 
address the same mission from differing perspectives. But we cannot 
function as a cohesive unit, unless each operational component works 
together in combination to promote common missions.
    This means that our operations must be driven by mission-oriented 
plans. It can no longer be the case that different components tackle 
different problems each in its own way and then later look to see if 
the pieces fit together. Whether it is preventing a potential act of 
terrorism, emergency preparedness, border protection, or countering a 
particular threat, we must first define the mission and second deploy 
all the tools within the Department to effectively execute each 
operation.
    The Department has already begun this process. To take but one 
example, on the Arizona border, we have a cross-cutting initiative to 
protect the border, integrating intelligence gathering, border 
enforcement, and monitoring. It encompasses the efforts of several of 
our agencies, including Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, Science and Technology, the Coast Guard, and 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Each plays an 
integral role. The operations themselves involve patrolling the border, 
generating information, and using it to take enforcement actions. The 
genius of the Department of Homeland Security is that we have the 
capability within one department to do all of these things. But we need 
to carry out joint operational activities and have a joint perspective 
on a routine basis, not only when we stand up a special project.
    Operations are also the mechanisms by which we respond to crisis. 
We cannot wait for a crisis, however, to learn, for example, whether 
TSA has the capability to communicate effectively and coordinate with 
FEMA. Nor can we learn in crisis that both are conducting the same 
operations or sending different messages to the private sector. The 
Department has made significant progress in this area. For example, it 
developed the National Response Plan to more effectively map out how to 
handle crisis situations. Now is the time to organize around missions 
rather than old bureaucracies, work through all of these potential 
disconnects in our systems, and operate as one unified Department. But 
integrating ourselves cohesively is not enough.

                          RISK-BASED APPROACH

    I have been saying, and you will continue to hear me say, that we 
need to adopt a riskbased approach in both our operations and our 
philosophy. America is dynamic. Our strength as Americans is the sum of 
every generation that has ever been born in or immigrated to this great 
land. Our wealth and livelihoods are advanced by the inspired ideas and 
innovation of our own people. We prosper through the vast opportunities 
that exist to interact with the global economic community.
    Risk management is fundamental to managing the threat, while 
retaining our quality of life and living in freedom. Risk management 
must guide our decision-making as we examine how we can best organize 
to prevent, respond and recover from an attack. We need to be realistic 
in our prioritization. We must assess the full spectrum of threats and 
vulnerabilities.
    We all live with a certain amount of risk. That means that we 
tolerate that something bad can happen; we adjust our lives based on 
probability; and we take reasonable precautions. So, too, we must 
manage risk at the homeland security level. That means developing plans 
and allocating resources in a way that balances security and freedom 
when calculating risks and implementing protections.
    The most effective way, I believe, to apply this risk-based 
approach is by using the trio of threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
as a general model for assessing risk and deciding on the protective 
measures we undertake.
    Here I inject a note of caution because the media and the public 
often focus principally on threats. Threats are important, but they 
should not be automatic instigators of action. A terrorist attack on 
the two-lane bridge down the street from my house is bad but has a 
relatively low consequence compared, to an attack on a major 
metropolitan multi-lane bridge. At the other end of the spectrum, even 
a remote threat to detonate a nuclear bomb is a high-level priority 
because of the catastrophic effect.
    Each threat must be weighed, therefore, along with consequence and 
vulnerabilities. As consequence increases, we respond according to the 
nature and credibility of the threat and any existing state of 
vulnerabilities. Our strategy is, in essence, to manage risk in terms 
of these three variables--threat, vulnerability, consequence. We seek 
to prioritize according to these variables . . . to fashion a series of 
preventive and protective steps that increase security at multiple 
levels. We must examine the mission and work of all elements of DHS 
through this template of consequence, vulnerability and threat. Have we 
fully defined our missions? How far have we gone in carrying them out? 
What more needs to be done?
    The Department is already working with State, local, and private 
sector partners to further refine the Interim National Preparedness 
Goal to aid the targeting of resources to where the risk is greatest. 
There is much that we are doing. DHS agencies, for example, have 
provided unprecedented level of funding and resources since 9/11 to 
State, local and private sector partners to protect and prepare 
America's communities and individual citizens. We continue to improve 
the ways for first responders across the Nation to be better equipped, 
better trained and more capable of communicating across the public 
safety community. But we must bring even greater focus and discipline 
to our preparedness mission. We need to take a very substantive look at 
how we align our preparedness activities and functions. We need to look 
at how best to configure our organizations, operations, programs and 
policies so that we can think strategically about preparedness.
    What should drive our intelligence, policies, operations, and 
preparedness plans and the way we are organized is the strategic matrix 
of threat, vulnerability and consequence. And so, we'll be looking at 
everything through that prism and adjusting structure, operations and 
policies to execute this strategy.

                    FISCAL YEAR 2005 ACCOMPLISHMENTS

    Before beginning to outline the major themes of the Department's 
fiscal year 2006 Budget request, I would like to highlight a few of the 
Department's accomplishments over the past year, including the 
following:
  --The Department established ``the One-Stop-Shop'' for first 
        responder grants which allows a single point of entry to the 
        Federal Government for homeland security preparedness 
        resources.
  --DHS has provided unprecedented levels of funding and resources to 
        State, local and private sector partners to protect and prepare 
        America's communities and individual citizens. We continue to 
        improve ways for first responders across the Nation to be 
        better equipped, better trained and more capable of 
        communicating across the public safety community.
  --U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) is on track to 
        eliminate the backlog of immigration benefit applications by 
        the end of fiscal year 2006. In fiscal year 2004, the agency 
        increased productivity by 21 percent and successfully reduced 
        the backlog to 1.3 million cases--down from a high of 3.8 
        million cases in January 2004.
  --United States-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US 
        VISIT) was successfully implemented at 115 U.S. international 
        airports and 14 seaports and immediately demonstrated results 
        by preventing individuals with criminal records and immigration 
        violations from entering the United States. In addition, US 
        VISIT successfully deployed initial capability to the 50 
        busiest land border ports of entry in December 2004 and was 
        also deployed at pre-clearance airports in Canada, Bermuda, the 
        Caribbean and Guam.
  --The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) developed, reviewed, and approved 9,000 
        domestic vessel security plans; 3,200 domestic facility plans; 
        48 Area Maritime Security Plans and Committees; and verified 
        security plan implementation on 8,100 foreign vessels.
  --USCG interdicted nearly 11,000 undocumented migrants attempting to 
        enter the country illegally by sea, saved the lives of nearly 
        5,500 mariners in distress and responded to more than 32,000 
        calls for rescue assistance.
  --Counterdrug efforts remain a top priority for the Department. With 
        the passage of the December 2004 Intelligence and Reform Bill, 
        the Department's Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement is 
        heavily invested in ensuring counterdrug operations and policy 
        are synchronized across the Department, and that our components 
        are adequately resourced to perform their counterdrug mission. 
        In fiscal year 2004, the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs 
        Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection collectively 
        kept 489,870 pounds of cocaine from reaching the streets of our 
        Nation.
  --In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom the USCG protected, safely 
        secured, and escorted to sea over 200 military sealift 
        departures at ten different major U.S. seaports, carrying over 
        25 million square feet of indispensable cargo.
  --The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Homeland Security 
        Information Network (HSIN) infrastructure to facilitate 
        providing Secret level connectivity has been expanded to state 
        level Emergency Operations Centers in all 50 States, 
        territories, and the District of Columbia.
  --The Department's Information Sharing and Collaboration Office 
        (ISCO) is responsible for producing immediate, near-term and 
        long-term improved information sharing processes and systems. 
        ISCO successfully partnered with DOJ to establish a first ever 
        capability to share information between systems supporting law 
        enforcement users across the country. The Homeland Security 
        Information Network (HSIN), Regional Information Sharing System 
        (RISS), Law Enforcement On-line (LEO), and Criminal Information 
        Sharing Alliance Network (CISANet) now share information posted 
        on each system with the users of the other systems with the 
        result that over 7,000 documents are already posted and the 
        numbers are growing every day. Users are able to access 
        information on any of the four systems through a single sign-
        on, thus eliminating the need to access all four network 
        simultaneously.
  --Working closely with importers, carriers, brokers, freight 
        forwarders and others, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
        developed the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
        TPAT) program, which has become the largest government/private 
        partnership to arise from September 11.
  --In carrying out its agricultural mission, Customs and Border 
        Protection (CBP) Agricultural Specialist conducted 3,559,403 
        cargo inspections, 111,416,656 passenger inspections and made 
        more than 400,000 interceptions of prohibited meat and animal 
        by-products. During the same time period, CBP agricultural 
        specialists intercepted more than 96,000 prohibited plant 
        materials and found more than 64,000 agricultural pests.
  --The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided $4.9 
        billion in aid, including hurricane relief efforts for victims 
        and communities affected by disasters. FEMA, with its DHS 
        counterparts, responded to 65 major disaster declarations and 
        seven emergencies in fiscal year 2004.
  --Passenger screening by the Transportation Security Administration 
        (TSA) kept 6,501,193 prohibited items from coming on board 
        aircraft during fiscal year 2004.
  --In 2004, TSA screened approximately 600 million checked bags using 
        advanced explosive detection technologies and over 31 million 
        mail parcels using explosive detection canine teams.
  --Since establishment of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) 
        Program in February 2003, TSA has selected, trained, and armed 
        thousands of volunteer flight crewmembers to defend the flight 
        decks of commercial passenger and cargo aircraft against acts 
        of criminal violence or air piracy. To date, hundreds of 
        thousands of flights have been protected by one or more FFDOs 
        serving in mission status.
  --A total of 428 million people, including 262 million aliens, were 
        processed at land, air and sea ports of entry. Of that number 
        643,000 aliens were deemed inadmissible under U.S. law.
  --Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers achieved a 112 
        percent increase over the prior year for fugitive apprehensions 
        resulting in more than 7,200 arrests. ICE removed more than 
        150,000 aliens in 2004.
  --Border Patrol agents apprehended almost 1.2 million illegal aliens 
        between our official ports of entry.
  --The Container Security Initiative (CSI), which involves pre-
        screening shipping containers to detect and interdict 
        terrorists' weapons and other illegal material, was expanded to 
        include 21 countries. CSI is now operational in 34 foreign 
        ports in Europe, Asia, and Africa.
  --Approximately 600 million checked bags were screened using advanced 
        explosive technologies in 2004.
  --More than 2,500 criminal investigations were conducted involving 
        the illegal export of U.S. arms and strategic technology, 
        including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
  --The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) provided basic 
        and advanced law enforcement training to more than 44,750 
        students, representing 81 Federal agencies, as well as State, 
        local and international law enforcement organizations.
  --Border and Transportation Security (BTS) assumed responsibility for 
        visa policy under the Homeland Security Act and implemented 
        improvements in visa review times and transparency.
  --The Department planned, designed, and implemented security for five 
        events designated as National Security Special Events (State of 
        Union Address, G-8 Economic Summit, Former President Ronald 
        Reagan Funeral, Democratic National Convention and Republican 
        National Convention) as well as the support, integration, and 
        coordination of hundreds of national special events not meeting 
        the National Security Special Events designation.
  --USSS arrested 30 individuals involved in global cyber organized 
        crime, domestically and internationally. Industry experts 
        estimate that $1 billion in total fraud loss was prevented.
  --The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has implemented 
        initiatives in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
        explosive (CBRNE) countermeasures, cargo security, border and 
        transportation security, interoperability, standards for 
        emergency responders, and cyber security. These initiatives 
        have resulted in improved security of U.S. borders, 
        transportation systems and critical infrastructure, and 
        resulted in the greater preparedness of our Nation. To date, 
        Department officials have visited more than 200 chemical, 
        petrochemical, water, energy, (i.e. electricity, oil, liquefied 
        natural gas, pipelines, storage, etc.) agriculture, commercial 
        assets, national icons, soft targets, and mass transportation 
        centers.
  --The Department established the National Cyber Response Coordination 
        Group (NCRCG) in partnership with the Department of Justice and 
        the Department of Defense, as a forum of 13 principal agencies 
        that coordinate intra-governmental and public/private 
        preparedness operations to respond to and recover from 
        largescale cyber attacks.
  --The Department co-sponsored Blue Cascades II and Purple Crescent 
        II, two regional tabletop cyber exercises in Seattle, WA and 
        New Orleans, LA. Each exercise brought together more than 200 
        government and private sector officials to examine cyber 
        security readiness and response procedures, highlight the 
        importance of cyber security in critical infrastructure 
        protection, and discuss solutions for integrating physical 
        security and cyber security. Region-specific coordination and 
        communication plans between first responders, the Federal 
        Government, and critical infrastructure owners/operators were 
        exercised.
  --The Department established the US-CERT Control Systems Center to 
        bring together government, industry, and academia to reduce 
        vulnerabilities, respond to threats, and foster public/private 
        collaboration to improve the security of the data and process 
        control systems that operate our Nation's critical 
        infrastructures.
  --The Department established the Control Systems Security and Test 
        Center (CSSTC) in conjunction with Idaho National Environmental 
        and Engineering Laboratory, to provide an opportunity for 
        government and industry to collaborate on cyber vulnerability 
        enumeration and reduction activities for control systems 
        currently in use across critical infrastructure sectors. The 
        CSSTC models map the cause and effect relationships of cyber 
        attacks on control systems, assess the outcomes of actual 
        events in a simulated environment, and provide the US-CERT with 
        response and mitigation actions to share with partners in the 
        control systems community.
  --DHS and the Germany Ministry of the Interior jointly hosted a 
        Multilateral Cyber Security Conference in Berlin, Germany. The 
        conference brought together cyber security policymakers, 
        managers from computer security incident response teams with 
        national responsibility, and law enforcement representatives 
        responsible for cyber crime from 15 countries. The conference 
        program included a facilitated tabletop exercise and 
        interactive discussions on how to develop an international 
        framework--as well as near term actionable steps--for watch, 
        warning, and incident response.
  --The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) 
        Directorate has developed and disseminated warning products 
        (i.e. warning messages) to Federal, State, territorial, tribal, 
        local, private sector, and international partners to protect 
        citizens, governments, critical infrastructure, and key assets.
  --IAIP has produced more than 70 ``Common Vulnerability'' reports 
        executed over 250 Site Assistance Visits, nearly 600 Buffer 
        Zone Protection Plans, and is continuing to build the National 
        Asset Database. As of today, more than 80,000 ``assets'' have 
        been compiled.
  --Uninterrupted communications are critical for national security and 
        emergency preparedness personnel in responding to a crisis. The 
        National Communications System (NCS) issued an additional 
        17,000 calling cards, further enabling priority wire line phone 
        communications and an additional 8,000 cell phones for priority 
        wireless communications. In past disasters and crises, these 
        capabilities have proved crucial.
  --Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7, IAIP is 
        coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the 
        protection of the critical infrastructure and key resources of 
        the United States and has distributed the Interim National 
        Infrastructure Protection Plan (Interim NIPP) to other Federal 
        departments and agencies, the State Homeland Security Advisors, 
        and the private sector stakeholder groups (e.g., the Homeland 
        Security Advisory Council, Sector Coordinating Council, ISAC 
        Councils, National Infrastructure Advisory Council, the U.S. 
        Chamber of Commerce, etc.) The Interim NIPP provides a risk 
        management framework for integrating and coordinating the 
        Nation's infrastructure protection activities that takes into 
        account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to manage a 
        broad range of risks across the Nation's 17 critical 
        infrastructure sectors.
  --These important DHS activities were analyzed where appropriate for 
        their impacts on personal privacy and civil liberties.

                    FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

    The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request revolves around 
five major themes: Revolutionizing the Borders; Strengthening Law 
Enforcement; Improving National Preparedness and Response; Leveraging 
Technology; and Creating a 21st Century Department.

                      REVOLUTIONIZING THE BORDERS

    September 11, 2001 demonstrated the sobering reality that the 
United States is no longer immune from catastrophic attack. No longer 
do vast oceans and friendly neighbors provide the buffer against 
aggressive adversaries. In order to maximize the security of our Nation 
against persons determined to undermine the economy of the United 
States, our way of life and the freedoms we enjoy, the Department is 
determined to deter, thwart, and remove any threat to the Nation long 
before it reaches our borders. During fiscal year 2005, we will 
continue to strengthen our border security. For fiscal year 2006, the 
President's Budget includes several initiatives aimed at 
revolutionizing the Borders.
    Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Detection Technology is an 
integral part of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that 
includes a comprehensive strategy to address the threat of nuclear and 
radiological terrorism. The Budget includes $125 million to purchase 
additional Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and pilot advanced next 
generation RPMs to detect both gamma and neutron radiation at our 
borders. In addition, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), which 
focuses on pre-screening cargo before it reaches our shores, will have 
a preventative and deterrent effect on the use of global containerized 
shipping of WMD and other terrorist equipment. Egypt, Chile, India, the 
Philippines, Venezuela, the Bahamas and Honduras have been identified 
as expansion locations for this initiative in fiscal year 2006. An 
increase of $5.4 million over fiscal year 2005 is included in Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) budget for CSI. The total amount in the 
President's Budget for CSI is $138.8 million.
    CBP's America's Shield Initiative (ASI) enhances electronic 
surveillance capabilities along the Northern and Southern land borders 
of the United States by improving the sensor and video surveillance 
equipment deployed to guard against the entry of illegal aliens, 
terrorists, WMDs and contraband into the United States. The Budget 
includes $51.1 million for ASI, an increase of $19.8 million. With 
additional technology investments, the President's Budget proposes to 
increase Border Patrol staffing over current levels to backfill staff 
vacated along the Southwest border, as well as increase staffing levels 
assigned to coastal areas. Since September 11, 2001, some Border Patrol 
agents were shifted to the Northern border in order to increase the 
number of agents assigned there. An increase of 210 positions and $36.9 
million is included in the Budget for the Border Patrol. This increases 
the number of Border Patrol Agents to 10,949.
    The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which 
began in November 2001, is another essential cargo security effort. C-
TPAT focuses on partnerships along the entire supply chain, from the 
factory floor to foreign vendors to land borders and seaports. The 
President's Budget includes an increase of $8.2 million for this 
effort, bringing total funding for C-TPAT to $54.3 million. These funds 
will be used to enhance our ability to conduct additional supply chain 
security validations.
    In addition to enhancing secure trade programs, the President's 
Budget also seeks to support additional investments in CBP's National 
Targeting System. CBP Targeting Systems aid in identifying high-risk 
cargo and passengers. The Budget includes a total of $28.3 million for 
these system initiatives, of which $5.4 million is an increase over the 
fiscal year 2005 level. Further, US VISIT, which will be consolidated 
within the Screening Coordination Office, will increase from $340 
million to $390 million in the Budget. The increase will provide for 
the accelerated deployment of US VISIT at the land border and enhanced 
access for border personnel to immigration, criminal and terrorist 
information.
    The President's 2006 Budget includes $966 million for the 
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) to help address the Coast Guard's 
declining readiness trends and to transform the Coast Guard with 
enhanced capabilities to meet current and future mandates through 
system-wide recapitalization and modernization of Coast Guard cutters, 
aircraft, and associated sub-systems. Among other things, the IDS 
request funds production of the third Maritime Security Cutter-Large 
and continues HH-65 helicopter re-engineering to eliminate safety and 
reliability issues in the Coast Guard's operational fleet of short 
range helicopters.
    Finally, within CBP, Long Range Radar technology is used by the 
Office of Air and Marine Operations to detect and intercept aircraft 
attempting to avoid detection while entering the U.S. CBP and the 
Department of Defense will assume responsibility for operating and 
maintaining these systems from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) beginning in fiscal year 2006. CBP's share is $44.2 million in 
the Budget.

                     STRENGTHENING LAW ENFORCEMENT

    Law enforcement is a critical element in preventing terrorism 
across the Nation. Whether at the Federal, State, or local level, law 
enforcement agencies perform this vigilant task. As we know from 
unfortunate first hand experience, the known threats are creative, 
clever, and sophisticated. The Department's law enforcement agencies 
need to stay ahead of the threat. To achieve this, the Budget includes 
funding for numerous key initiatives to maintain and strengthen current 
law enforcement initiatives both within and beyond our borders.
    The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the Nation's leading 
maritime law enforcement agency. The President's Budget seeks 
additional investment in USCG assets to enhance its ability to carry 
out its mission. The President's budget provides $11 million to 
increase port presence and Liquefied Petroleum Natural Gas (LNG) 
transport security, funding additional Response Boat-Smalls and 
associated crews to increase presence for patrolling critical 
infrastructure, enforce security zones, and perform high interest 
vessel escorts in strategic ports throughout the Nation. This 
initiative also provides additional boat crews and screening personnel 
at key LNG hubs such as Baltimore, MD and Providence, RI to enhance LNG 
tanker and waterside security.
    In addition, in the President's Budget, the Armed Helicopter for 
Homeland Security Project increases by $17.4 million. These funds will 
provide equipment and aircraft modifications to establish armed 
helicopter capability at five USCG Air Stations. This will provide the 
USCG and DHS with the tools needed to respond quickly and forcefully to 
emergency maritime threats. A total of $19.9 million is included in the 
Budget for this project. Finally, the Response Boat-Medium Project 
increases by $10 million the effort to replace the USCG's 41-foot 
utility boats and other large non-standard boats with assets more 
capable of meeting all of the USCG's multi-mission operational 
requirements. A total of $22 million is proposed in the Budget for this 
effort.
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the largest 
investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is 
responsible for identifying and shutting down vulnerabilities in the 
Nation's border, economic, transportation and infrastructure security. 
The President's Budget seeks a 13.5 percent budget increase for ICE, 
including increasing the Detention and Removal program by $176 million. 
For the Temporary Worker program, the Budget seeks to more than double 
the resources available for worksite enforcement including employer 
audits, investigations of possible violations and criminal case 
presentations. An increase of $18 million is proposed in the Budget for 
this effort. The President's Budget seeks a total of $688.9 million for 
ICE's Federal Air Marshal Service. This funding will allow ICE to 
protect air security and promote public confidence in our Nation's 
civil aviation system.
    The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes several other 
funding enhancements for law enforcement, including:
  --The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center's (FLETC) budget 
        increases by $2.7 million for Simulator Training Technology to 
        teach officers and agents how to avoid collisions and reduce 
        the dangers associated with pursuit driving.
  --Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO)/Crew Member Self-Defense (CMSD) 
        Training is increased by $11 million in fiscal year 2006. This 
        allows for the expansion of the semi-annual firearm re-
        qualification program for FFDO personnel and to fund the first 
        full year of the CMSD training program. A total of $36.3 
        million is included for FFDO/CMSD in the Budget.
  --Enhancing law enforcement training through co-location of the Coast 
        Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement Training program with the 
        Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, increasing maritime 
        law enforcement training throughput and promoting better 
        coordination among field activities with other Federal, State, 
        and local agencies.

              IMPROVING NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

    Though the primary mission is to protect the Nation from terrorism, 
the Department's responsibilities are diverse. No DHS effort has a 
greater scope, reach and impact upon the citizens across the United 
States than our efforts to prepare the Nation to respond to major acts 
of terror or natural disaster. This Budget continues to support the 
President's homeland security directives that establish the methods and 
means by which our Nation prepares for and responds to critical 
incidents. Since its establishment, the Department has, and continues 
to provide, an unprecedented level of financial support to the State, 
local, and tribal governments and to certain private sector entities. 
The Budget builds on these efforts and proposes significant resources 
to provide direct financial assistance to our Nation's first 
responders, emergency managers, and citizen volunteers. There are 
several initiatives in the Budget geared towards improving national 
preparedness and response.
    The fiscal year 2006 budget continues to support the Nation's first 
responders and seeks a total of $3.6 billion to support first-responder 
terrorism preparedness grants, administered by the Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, with better targeting 
to high-threat areas facing the greatest risk and vulnerability. This 
funding will support State and local agencies as they equip, train, 
exercise, and assess preparedness for major emergencies, especially 
acts of terrorism. While there may be gaps in State and local 
capabilities, we believe special emphasis must be given to 
communications interoperability, catastrophic planning, WMD awareness, 
critical infrastructure protection, and cross-jurisdictional/regional 
cooperation and interaction.
    For fiscal year 2006, the President's Budget proposes $20 million 
for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) enhanced 
catastrophic disaster planning. This funding will support catastrophic 
incident response and recovery planning and exercises. FEMA will work 
with States and localities, as well as other Federal agencies to 
develop and implement plans that will improve the ability of Federal, 
State, or local governments to respond to and to recover from 
catastrophic disasters quickly and effectively. FEMA will address the 
unique challenges a catastrophic disaster situation poses, including 
food and shelter, transportation, decontamination and long term housing 
needs.
    On October 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security launched 
the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility designed to help State 
and local public safety practitioners improve communications 
interoperability. The Office of Interoperability and Compatibility 
(OIC), part of the Science & Technology directorate, oversees the wide 
range of public safety interoperability programs and efforts currently 
spread across Homeland Security. These programs address critical 
interoperability issues relating to public safety and emergency 
response, including communications, equipment, training, and other 
areas as needs are identified. The OIC allows the Department to expand 
its leadership role in interoperable communications that could be used 
by every first responder agency in the country. The OIC has currently 
identified three program areas: Communications, Equipment, and 
Training. With $20.5 million in fiscal year 2006, the OIC will plan and 
begin to establish the training and equipment programs, as well as 
continue existing communication interoperability efforts through the 
SAFECOM Program.
    The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget for the Department proposes 
other enhancements to improve our national preparedness and response, 
including:
  --Replacement of the USCG's High Frequency (HF) Communications 
        System. Funded at $10 million in the Budget, this system will 
        replace unserviceable, shore-side, high power high frequency 
        transmitters, significantly improving longrange maritime safety 
        and security communications.
  --The Budget increases Cyber Security to enhance the U.S. Computer 
        Emergency Preparedness Team (US-CERT), a 24/7 cyber threat 
        watch, warning, and response capability that would identify 
        emerging threats and vulnerabilities and coordinate responses 
        to major cyber security incidents. An increase of $5 million is 
        proposed, bringing the program total to $73.3 million.
  --The Rescue 21 project is funded at $101 million in the Budget to 
        continue recapitalizing the Coast Guard's coastal zone 
        communications network. This funding will complete system 
        infrastructure and network installations in 11 regions and 
        begin development of regional designs for the remaining 14 
        regions.

                         LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY

    Rapid advances in technological capability are allowing the 
Department personnel to protect the homeland more efficiently and 
effectively across many components. To prepare the Nation to counter 
any WMD threat--threats from CBRNE substances--this Budget includes an 
increase for new initiatives that support research and development to 
counter these weapons and their potentially devastating effects.
    First, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is being 
established as a joint national office to protect the Nation from 
radiological and nuclear threats. This office will consolidate 
functions within DHS and establish strong interagency linkages for the 
deployment of a national domestic nuclear detection architecture, the 
conduct of transformational research and development (R&D), and the 
establishment of protocols and training for the end users of equipment 
developed and deployed through the new office. The DNDO will integrate 
domestic nuclear detection efforts undertaken by individual Federal 
agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector and be 
closely linked with international nuclear detection efforts. A total of 
$227.3 million is requested for this effort in fiscal year 2006.
    Second, TSA's emerging checkpoint technology is enhanced by $43.7 
million in fiscal year 2006 to direct additional resources to improve 
checkpoint explosives screening. This request responds to the 9/11 
Commission Report's finding that investments in technology may be the 
most powerful way to improve screening effectiveness and priority 
should be given to explosive detection at airport checkpoints for 
higher risk passengers immediately. This new equipment assures that TSA 
is on the cutting edge, ahead of the development of increasingly well-
disguised prohibited items. This proposed increase will result in 
investing more than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 
2006 for new technology to ensure improved screening of all higher risk 
passengers.
    In addition, to improve TSA's information technology network, the 
President's Budget includes $174 million to complete installation of 
High Speed Operational Connectivity (Hi-SOC) to passenger and baggage 
screening checkpoints to improve management of screening system 
performance. Within the Screening and Coordination Office, funding is 
sought for the Secure Flight and Crew Vetting programs--an increase of 
$49 million to field the system developed and tested in fiscal year 
2005. The funds will support testing information systems, connectivity 
to airlines and screen systems and daily operations. This also includes 
an increase of $3.3 million for crew vetting.
    Third, the President's Budget also proposes additional funding for 
two critical Department programs--the Homeland Secure Data Network 
(HSDN) and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). For fiscal 
year 2006, the Budget includes $37 million for HSDN. This funding will 
streamline and modernize the classified data capabilities in order to 
facilitate high quality and high value classified data communication 
and collaboration. Funding for the HSOC is increased by $26.3 million, 
bringing its fiscal year 2006 funded level to $61.1 million. This 
includes an increase of $13.4 million for the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) and an increase of $12.9 million to enhance 
HSOC systems and operations. The funding will provide the HSOC with 
critical tools for sharing both classified and unclassified information 
and situational awareness with Federal, State, local and tribal 
governments.
    Fourth, a key element of the Department's Maritime Security 
Strategy is to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), leveraging 
technology to improve sharing of accurate information, intelligence, 
and knowledge of vessels, cargo, crews and passengers, mitigating 
threats to the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United 
States. The fiscal year 2006 budget funds several key MDA initiatives, 
including $29.1 million for the nationwide Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) and $16.5 million to provide additional maritime patrol 
aircraft flight hours in support of detection, surveillance and 
tracking activities.
    Finally, the Department is seeking additional technology 
investments in other critical areas, such as:
  --$20 million for developing a Low Volatility Agent Warning. This 
        system will serve as the basis for a warning and identification 
        capability against a set of chemical agents whose vapor 
        pressure is too low to be detected by conventional measures;
  --Increasing Counter-Man Portable Air Defense Systems funding by $49 
        million to a total of $110 million in the Budget. This program 
        will continue to promote the viability of technical 
        countermeasures for commercial aircraft against the threat of 
        shoulder-fired missiles by improving reliability and 
        affordability.

                   CREATING A 21ST CENTURY DEPARTMENT

    The Department has made significant progress in strengthening the 
management of its business processes from inception to implementation. 
The Office of the Under Secretary for Management focuses its efforts on 
the oversight, integration and optimization of the Department's human 
capital, information technology, financial management, procurement and 
administrative operations. Over the past year, this office has made 
strides in designing, planning, and supporting new standards for 
business processes and resource allocation in order to achieve a 
cohesive organization while ensuring maximum return on investment. This 
organization is focused on establishing the overall framework, 
developing management methods, and monitoring the progress of each 
management function.
    Examples of major enterprise initiatives included in the Budget 
that contribute to Creating A 21st Century Department include the 
following:
  --The program for electronically managing enterprise resources for 
        government effectiveness and efficiency--or eMerge2--to 
        continue implementation of a DHS-wide solution that delivers 
        accurate, relevant and timely resource management information 
        to decision makers. The Budget includes $30 million for this 
        program. By delivering access to critical information across 
        all components, the Department will be able to better support 
        its many front-line activities. It focuses on the areas of 
        accounting and reporting, acquisition and grants management, 
        cost and revenue performance management, asset management and 
        budget that will be integrated with MAX HR.
  --MAX HR funding of $53 million involves designing and deploying a 
        new human resources system. The $53 million is requested to 
        support the development and deployment of the new HR personnel 
        system as published in the Federal Register on February 1, 
        2005. These funds will be used to fund the detailed system 
        design for our labor relations and pay-for-performance 
        programs, provide appropriate training and communication for 
        our managers and employees and to provide proper program 
        evaluation and oversight. In this effort, our goal is to create 
        a 21st Century personnel system that is flexible and 
        contemporary while preserving basic civil service principles 
        and the merit system.
  --The Information Sharing and Collaboration (ISC) program will affect 
        the policy, procedures, technical, business processes, 
        cultural, and organizational aspects of information sharing and 
        collaboration, including coordinating ISC policy with other 
        Federal agencies, drafting technical and operational needs 
        statements, performing policy assessments, and analyzing new 
        requirements. The total funding for fiscal year 2006 will be 
        $16.482 million.
    These initiatives will help move the Department toward an efficient 
and effective shared services environment, avoiding duplication of 
effort across the program areas.

                               CONCLUSION

    Two years ago, Congress and the President took on the enormous 
undertaking of creating a new Department whose central mission would be 
to secure the homeland. Under Secretary Ridge's leadership, the 
entities that now comprise the Department of Homeland Security unified 
under this overarching goal. As I have become acquainted with the many 
talented people of the Department, I am impressed by all that they have 
accomplished thus far. But there is no time to pat ourselves on the 
back.
    As the Department initiates our second stage review, organizes 
around missions, eliminates duplications, and adopts a risk-based 
approach, we must identify our crosscutting functions and ensure that 
we are thinking innovatively how to best exploit our intelligence 
capabilities, develop policy functions, execute our operational tasks, 
and implement our long-range preparedness planning.
    I thank the Congress for its support, which has been critical in 
bringing us to this point. I am grateful to be here today to talk about 
the work we are doing to make America a safer home for us, for our 
children and generations to come. Thank you for inviting me to appear 
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.

                 NUMBER OF BORDER PATROL AGENTS NEEDED

    Senator Gregg. It is hard to know exactly where to begin, 
because there are a lot of issues here. But let me begin with 
some of the higher priority items as I see them. And I 
congratulate you on the risk management approach. I think 
threat is the issue to finding threat and then responding to 
it.
    Clearly, one of the priority issues from the standpoint of 
threat is who is coming into the country and where they are 
when they get here, and who they are when they come across. 
There have been a whole lot of amendments floated this week on 
expanding the number of border patrol agents. I actually asked 
the folks down at border patrol if they had an assessment as to 
how many agents they needed and where they needed them, and I 
was told that, no, they did not.
    I found that to be a startling fact, in the sense that I 
would have presumed that there has been a study done within the 
last 2 years as to where the agents are needed and to what 
numbers are needed. Obviously, there has been a significant 
movement of agents to the northern border.
    I guess my question is: How many border patrol agents do we 
need and where do we need them----
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, again----
    Senator Gregg [continuing]. In comparison to where we are 
today? Congress has, as you know, required an increase of 
agents by 2,000 each year for a 5-year period.
    Secretary Chertoff. I know that in the Intelligence Reform 
Act authorizations were put in place for 2,000, going forward. 
The President's 2006 budget looks for an increase of slightly 
more than 200.
    I can tell you, because I have sat with Border Patrol, that 
we do have a comprehensive picture of where we need to deploy 
our resources. We had an Arizona Border Control Initiative last 
year, which was successful. This year, I guess about a month 
ago, we rolled out a follow-up to that initiative, and in 
talking with Commissioner Bonner and the other leaders of the 
Border Patrol about how to do that, they took a very unified 
approach to figuring out where the sectors of the border where 
we are now seeing the greatest penetration.
    How do we deploy not only Border Patrol at the front line, 
but technology, and also a capability to transport people that 
we apprehend and bring them back in a way that does not pull 
people off the line in order to drive them several hours back 
to Tucson.
    How do we use checkpoints? How do we use investigative 
resources to target organizations? And also, frankly, how do we 
work with the Mexicans on their side of the border to see that 
they are doing things to attack these human trafficking 
organizations.
    So I do think that we have a comprehensive plan about 
dealing with the issue of deploying resources in a unified----

                    TRAINING OF BORDER PATROL AGENTS

    Senator Gregg. But is 2,000 the right number, a year? And 
can you train--how many people can you train--let us say we 
actually funded 2,000, which clearly we are not going to do, 
but we are going to significantly increase the funding. In 
fact, Senator Byrd has a proposal to do that, which I presume 
he is going to offer within the next day or so, and increase 
border patrol agents.

     STATUS OF TECHNOLOGY IN USE ON THE BORDERS AND DETENTION SPACE

    How many agents can you train? And two, what's the status 
of the unmanned vehicle program and did it work? And if it did 
work, why is the line basically being shut down? And three, 
what's the status of the electronic surveillance in the 
cameras? And four, how many detention beds do we need? We hear 
about a lot of people being sent home who are criminals and who 
should probably be detained permanently here to make sure they 
do not come back to commit further criminal acts? How short are 
we on the detention bed area?
    Secretary Chertoff. I might forget all this, so if I do, I 
mean to come back. I'll give you the answer. With respect to 
training, obviously, the President's budget talks about 210. We 
can certainly train and assimilate that. I do not know that 
this is the limiting number in training, but I would also be 
inclined to agree, I doubt we could train 2,000 even if one had 
2,000.
    Certainly, we can train and deploy the 210 that we have 
asked for on top of whatever we are replacing in terms of 
attrition.
    The UAV program, as I understand, did work well. We are 
currently working now to begin the process of procuring UAVs. 
We would like to get that done in a matter of months and start 
to put UAVs up and have them flying over the border.
    Now I don't think we can rely exclusively on UAVs. I think 
that sometimes you need manned vehicles and you need 
helicopters. But I think it was generally viewed as a positive 
program, and we are in the process of getting the RFIs and RFPs 
out in order to make sure that that gets done.
    As far as detention beds are concerned, again, the budget 
contemplates adding some additional beds. I do want, I guess, 
to address an issue which seems to come up a lot when we talk 
about releasing people. The fact of the matter is, we do not 
detain every single illegal person that we apprehend. And 
frankly, I have to say, as a graduate of the criminal justice 
system, neither does the criminal justice system.
    Most people who are arrested in States all over the country 
get released on bond. What everybody does, whether they are 
criminal justice people or people in the immigration areas, is 
prioritize. And I do think we are working very hard to make 
sure that the people who are mandatory detainees are being 
detained and that we have adequate beds to do that.

                        ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

    Senator Gregg. And the camera situation that allows 
electronic surveillance on the borders?
    Secretary Chertoff. I beg your pardon?
    Senator Gregg. The camera situation relative to electronic 
surveillance. I mean there was a contract let that appears did 
not work and now I guess they are trying again. What is the 
status on it?
    Secretary Chertoff. I gather, and I think this is under 
investigation, there was a contract let and there were some 
problems with the procurement process. This goes back a number 
of years. The procurement phase of that contract is over. 
Obviously, we are maintaining.
    My understanding is that as a general rule the surveillance 
stuff does work well. Obviously, we have maintenance issues. We 
are now going to begin the second stage of that, which is the 
America Shield Initiative, where we are sending out RFIs and 
RFPs to begin the process of acquiring technology.
    Obviously, we are going to learn something from the 
procurement problems in the last round that go back several 
years, but again, it is a very good technology. I mean the idea 
of using cameras and remote sensors does work. As long as we 
get, you know, the right contractor and the right equipment, 
and it is handled in a cost-effective manner, I think that is a 
very promising way to go about handling it.
    Senator Gregg. Well, maybe you could have your staff tell 
us whether or not--we know we had the wrong contract. We spent 
a lot of money.
    Secretary Chertoff. Right.
    Senator Gregg. We bought cameras that did not work. 
Supposedly, this has been corrected. We would like to get some 
specifics on that.
    Secretary Chertoff. We will get back to you on it.
    [The information follows:]

         Background on GSA Basic Purchasing Agreement With IMC

    The Remote Video Surveillance project was formed in 1998 to install 
camera systems mounted on poles or towers near the U.S. Border. These 
cameras would transmit video images back to a control room where a Law 
Enforcement Control Agent (LECA) could view the images and dispatch 
Border Patrol agents as necessary.
    The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Office of Information 
Resource Management (OIRM) managed the RVS program. From its beginning, 
the OIRM faced tremendous pressure to get RVS poles installed or face 
losing their funding. At first, the OIRM administered the RVS Project 
through a series of individual purchase orders with various 
contractors. OIRM would give bills of material (BOMB) to NTMI, a GSA 
FAST contractor, for the equipment needed for the installations. NTMI 
would procure the equipment and store it until needed for an 
installation. Chugash was the contractor used to install the poles, 
cameras and monitors. IMC was the contractor used to install the 
microwave transmission equipment.
    A competition was conducted in 1999 in order to increase 
accountability for the installations and to obtain volume discounts for 
the equipment involved. GSA considered four companies for this award: 
the three listed above and Hazmed, a contractor that has assisted OIRM 
in managing the purchase orders for the other three contractors and 
that had core competencies in the area of installing electronics 
systems. IMC was selected as the contractor in March 1999 and given an 
initial task valued at $2 Million.
    In November of 2000, in an effort to optimize procurement 
procedures, OIRM and GSA agreed to convert the GSA schedule award to a 
Blanket Purchasing Agreement (BPA). The rationale for the BPA was that 
it would ``further decrease costs, reduce paperwork, and save time by 
eliminating the need for repetitive individual purchases from the 
Schedule contract.'' \1\ The end result was to ``create a purchasing 
mechanism for the Government that works better and costs less.'' \2\ 
The hope was that the reduction of costs would allow for funds to 
accelerate deployment of additional RVS systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Immigration and Naturalization Service Integrated 
Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) Equipment and Services Blanket 
Purchase Agreement (BPA) between GSA Federal Technology Service (FTS/
FAST) Region 5 and the International Microwave Corporation Team, 
GS05KR01BMC0001, dated November 8, 2000, page 2 of 12.
    \2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Installation of RVS sites was completed in three phases. The first 
phase involved administrative preparation (i.e., environmental 
assessments, rights of entry (ROE), real estate issues, permits, and 
survey activities). Phase I activities generally required between 16 
and 18 months to complete. However, there were often issues with access 
to the land desired for the surveillance site, or environmental 
assessments, which caused greater delays.
    The second phase of the installation involved groundbreaking 
activities such as installing foundations and poles, assembling and 
populating platforms, installing power, aligning equipment and radios, 
and installing equipment shelters. This phase took between 3 and 6 
months.
    The third and final phase lasted approximately 1 month. It involved 
installation of the cameras, transmission lines, consoles, other 
related electronics and the build out of control rooms. Finally, after 
completing build out of the control room and successful integration 
testing, the Border Patrol agents would begin using the RVS system. The 
timeframe for an average RVS installation varied between 20 and 25 
months. $239 Million was allocated to GSA for the RVS BPA. 
Approximately $220 Million was expended by the contractor during its 
term, which ended on September 30, 2004. At that time there were 248 
completed RVS sites. Since that time, six more sites have become 
operational for a total of 254 sites. The Border Patrol is working with 
GSA and the contractor to finalize the credits due back to the 
government for incomplete installations.
    Currently the Headquarters Office of Border Patrol's Integrated 
Project Team is seeking contractor support to complete the installation 
of 21 Phase III RVS sites partially installed by L-3 Communications 
Corporation. Government furnished equipment bought under the terms of 
the BPA will be used to complete the 21 sites. The Headquarters Office 
of Border Patrol projects these 21 sites will be completed by the end 
of calendar year 2005.

    Senator Gregg. I think I have certainly used up my time, 
although this clock does not seem to be working correctly.
    But in any event, Senator Byrd, did you want to make an 
opening statement or pursue questions? It is--obviously, the 
floor is yours.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

    Senator Byrd. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, you and the 
179,000 employees in your Department are to be commended for 
your efforts to preserve our freedoms and secure our homeland. 
I applaud Chairman Judd Gregg for taking on the challenge of 
chairing this subcommittee.
    His predecessor, Senator Thad Cochran, did a superlative 
job as chairman. Under Chairman Cochran, this subcommittee 
worked on a bipartisan basis to provide the Department of 
Homeland Security with resources to fill critical gaps in our 
security. Of course, you should know, and I am sure you do 
know, Mr. Secretary, that Chairman Gregg brings excellent 
credentials to this task.
    As a former governor, he understands that simply setting a 
policy in Washington does not automatically make that policy a 
success. We have to work effectively with State and local 
governments and with the private sector to protect the 
homeland.
    Years before the tragic events of September 11, Chairman 
Gregg led the way by funding State and local antiterrorism 
programs. He authored provisions for training and equipping 
first responders for chemical and biological attacks.
    In fact, if you want to meet the father of the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness, the predecessor to your office of State 
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, I am 
sitting right next to him, on my left, today.
    Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our partnership on this 
subcommittee, and I thank you for taking on this assignment.
    I thank you, Mr. Secretary, also. As the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, you are responsible for a critical balancing 
act. We are a Nation that thrives on liberty, but 9/11 taught 
us that we also must invest in our security. I hope that you 
will work with the Congress to make sure as much as possible 
that your Department promotes our security without sacrificing 
our liberty.
    I wrote to you on March 2 to express my dismay that the 
President's budget fails to fund the border security 
investments authorized by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 which he signed into law on December 17 
of last year.
    That Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new border patrol 
agents per year for 5 years, the hiring of an additional 800 
immigration investigators per year for 5 years to enforce our 
immigration laws, and the funding of 8,000 new detention beds 
for the holding of illegal aliens.

                            BUDGET AMENDMENT

    I urged you to work with the White House to propose a 
budget amendment seeking resources to increase security on our 
borders and to enforce our immigration laws. Despite the 
statements by Secretary of State Rice and former Homeland 
Security Deputy Secretary Loy that al Qaeda is a threat on our 
porous borders, there is virtually nothing in the President's 
budget to provide these additional resources for border 
security.
    According to Former Deputy DHS Secretary James M. Loy, when 
testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
about threats to the United States, ``Current intelligence 
strongly suggest that al Qaeda has considered using the 
southwest border to infiltrate the United States.'' According 
to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ``we are all concerned 
about terrorists and how they might use our very long and 
porous borders. The terrorists are going to keep trying. 
They're going to keep trying on our southern border. They're 
going to keep trying on our northern border.''
    So, I could not help but be disappointed to read your 
response to my letter yesterday that no budget amendment would 
be forthcoming.
    The threat to our security is clear. The holes in our 
borders are well known. I look forward to hearing from you on 
this and other issues today. I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. I thank all the Senators.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator Byrd, and thank you for 
your generous comments. Did you wish to proceed with questions 
at this time?
    Senator Byrd. Would you please have someone else go and 
then call on me at your leisure.
    Senator Gregg. All right.
    Well, then I think I would turn to Senator Feinstein, I 
believe, was the first member of your party here.
    Senator Byrd. Very Well.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to say, Judge Chertoff, that at least for this 
Senator you are so far a breath of fresh air, and I am 
delighted to say that. I just want to publicly thank you for 
your response of April 6 in the use of fraudulent passports, 
stolen or lost passports, which is a big problem.
    I know that from the intelligence committee. And your 
letter was no-nonsense, and it set forward very directly what 
the Department is prepared to do. I, for one, will certainly 
hold you to it.
    And I am very pleased that you share my concerns about the 
visa waiver program, and indicated, you know, that you share 
the findings of the critical reports that have been done, and 
that you have established a visa waiver program oversight unit. 
So I look forward to--my understanding is that you are probably 
going to come in asking for another extension on the visa 
waiver program.
    My vote, as you know, is conditioned on getting the 
management act together in that unit, which critical reports 
have said has been in disrepair for some time. So I just wanted 
to say that.

                             BORDER PATROL

    I want to follow up on what the chairman said on the border 
patrol. The expansion of the border patrol is not really just 
the recommendation of the 9/11 committee. Those of us on the 
judiciary committee have recommended this for a long, long 
time, and specifically, the border reform and visa entry law 
recommended an enhanced border.
    As you know, 600 agents have retired this past year. So on 
a four-to-one basis, whether the 210 additional agents is 
actually going to provide you with a net gain or not, I think, 
is somewhat dubious, and I am really concerned about it. The 
position of the border patrol on 2,000 agents, going back 6 
years, has always been they do not need them, they do not have 
the room to train them. I mean this goes on year after year 
after year. The time has come to fish or cut bait. That is no 
longer, I think, a justifiable response.
    Bills have called for this. The President says he calls for 
it. Although, only 210 will not do it. I would like to get your 
real answer to this, because on the southwest border, other 
than Mexican intrusions have gone from 22,000 in 2002 to 88,000 
in 2004. This clearly indicates that the southwest border is 
being utilized as a point of major penetration into this 
country by other than Mexicans. If you look at the list of 
apprehensions made from countries that are terrorist States, 
there are numbers there as well.
    So I have a hard time, in view of the Minutemen coming on 
the Arizona border, the remonstratives made by this Congress 
over and over and over again as to why there cannot be a net 
large increase in border control. This is something I think we 
are willing to pay for. This is something that I think we would 
be willing to add. And yet, year after year it is the same kind 
of 200, which does not make even for retirements. Could you 
respond, please?

                              VISA WAIVER

    Secretary Chertoff. Well, first let me begin by just, if I 
can, for a moment go back to your visa waiver point. I mean as 
I think you indicated, Senator, I share your concern. We have 
to look at the border as a whole and make sure we are 
addressing every possible point of entry. And I certainly 
intend to hold the Department to what I have indicated to in 
the letter we need to do to make sure----
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Our end is up. And I have 
spoken to our foreign partners and talked about the importance 
and I have spoken personally to them about the importance of 
making sure they have their house in order in terms of tracking 
and getting us information on this, and ultimately moving to a 
biometric passport that is resistant to the kind of alteration 
or counterfeiting, which is obviously a vulnerability.

                        SOUTHWEST BORDER CONTROL

    The southwest border, obviously, is a concern as well. As I 
understand it, what we are proposing to do in the budget is a 
net increase of 210 border patrol agents, which would fill 
those that are leaving and fund an additional 210.
    Senator Feinstein. So if I may, that means 810 new border 
agents?
    Secretary Chertoff. I do not----
    Senator Feinstein. Six hundred have retired.
    Secretary Chertoff. I think new. As I understand it, new 
means over and above what we currently have, the funding level 
we have. So that we will wind up at the end of the day with--
and I cannot do the math in my head, but I guess there is 
approximately 10,800 currently. We would be adding about 200. 
That should include backfilling for positions that are becoming 
vacant. I mean that is keeping the funding level steady and 
then adding 210.
    So that is what we contemplate, in addition to which we 
want to be able to bear the UAVs. As I told Chairman Gregg, we 
want to acquire those and start to put those up. I think that 
was a successful pilot program, no pun intended. And we do want 
to do more with sensors, which, again, notwithstanding the 
contracting issues, apparently, several years ago, we think the 
idea of the sensors and the usefulness of sensors is proven. So 
we have an America Shield initiative and we are in the process 
of setting out RFIs in order to start acquiring that technology 
and deploying it.
    This is obviously an issue that we have to constantly look 
at. I am going to go down to the border at some point in the 
next month or two. I want to see for myself how we are doing 
down there, and what additional things we can do. We have 
redeployed agents down to the Arizona border to deal with the 
issue of a surge of people coming across.
    I totally agree with the principle that this is a paramount 
responsibility of ours, and I am going to be spending a lot of 
personal time focused on it.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.
    Senator Gregg. Senator Craig.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR LARRY CRAIG

    Senator Craig. Mr. Secretary, like all of us, let me 
welcome you to the committee, and let me also speak, as others 
have, about our belief that you are the person who can get the 
job done.
    At the same time, let me not sound like a broken record, 
but let me repeat what has been said here by both our chairman, 
our ranking member, and certainly the Senator from California. 
I am going to focus on our southwestern border again.
    Because I have been a bit outspoken about immigration 
policy and changes in it, and I actually led the Senate in 
debate for the last 2 days on it, I have also been given a lot 
of attention by those who might criticize any form of policy 
change, but most importantly, it has led to a lot of 
conversations about border. And it has allowed me to focus more 
intently on border. Because I will tell you, if we cannot 
control our border, we will never be able to write immigration 
policy that works. We will always be playing catch-up to an 
ever increasing number of illegals in our country.
    The Senator from California and I have discussed this at 
length. Probably every one on this committee today has a 
slightly different opinion about how we handle the problem, but 
I think we are all in concert about how we handle the border.
    So my folks in Idaho say build a fence high and build it 
strong, and spare no cost. Now there are a variety of ways to 
build the fence, and you're exploring all of them, but there 
are also not just the physicalnesses of it and all of the tools 
that we are going to acquire and should acquire to control that 
border.
    There are other issues as to who is there and how they 
handle process and movement. We have got this interesting 
situation. Yuma, Arizona. A lot of folks live on the other side 
of the border, but work across in Yuma. They harvest lettuce. 
Your folks were out there a few weeks ago rounding them all up 
early in the morning to come back across the border, because 
many of them were undocumented illegals. But by 2 o'clock in 
the afternoon they were back in the fields harvesting the 
lettuce.
    The crisis of the harvest was over, but the reality was 
that a great deal of border movement occurred during that day. 
And in that movement, there could have been someone that meant 
to do this country harm, not just to pluck lettuce from the 
fields of Yuma, Arizona. And that is something we have to get 
under control, both sides of that issue.
    So let me give you a dialogue that I had with a young man 
who sought me out because of my position on this committee last 
year, a very frustrated member of the intelligence community. 
He and his group were prevented from apprehending suspects at 
the border because of strict guidelines and the chain of 
command, even though it was his group's responsibility to 
collect the intelligence.
    His group had gathered immediate intelligence regarding 
certain aspects and actions needed to take immediate action. 
However, because of the chain of command and the hamstringing 
that resulted, certain intelligence agents, this intelligence 
officer had to sit and watch while suspects possibly crossed 
the border.
    These were not Hispanics. These, by all appearances, were 
people of Arabic descent. They were believed to be terrorists. 
And yet the outcome still today is who is on first and who is 
second and who is in control. And in that fight, people are 
crossing our borders at an unprecedented rate.
    And while we can talk about the money we have spent, and I 
did on the floor yesterday, billions of dollars, with a ``B,'' 
and we apprehended a 1,750,000 or 1.2 million last year, or 
something like that. Big numbers. It demonstrates one thing 
when we are apprehending them, that they got across.
    And I cannot imagine that when someone is illegal, by 
definition, and they are apprehended, that they are turned 
loose. At least take them to the border and shove them across. 
Do not say, ``Well, they will come back.'' They do not come 
back.
    All of us are going to be able to control this process, and 
I am going to keep pushing for changes in the law that are 
realistic and that work. But all of a sudden the Senator from 
California and I are engaged in conversation, and I say my 
proposal will affect 500,000 or 600,000 or 700,000, and she 
says, ``No, it will not. It is millions.''
    I do not know whether she is right or I am right. We may 
both be right in some ways. But we do know there is a huge 
problem. Enough said.
    I guess my question is: Go to the border. Look it over. Get 
to understand it. It is unique in a variety of ways. And 
lastly, I was in Houston, Texas, over the weekend. I was 
visiting with a former State judge, who said to me very 
directly, there is a clear understanding in Texas that the laws 
are not going to be enforced because they are unenforceable. 
And I am talking about border laws.

                            BORDER PROBLEMS

    Now if that is the name of the game along the border, we 
have got a huge problem that you must get your hands around and 
get it under control. I agree with the Senator from West 
Virginia. I am a co-sponsor of his amendment to pull money in 
this emergency supplemental to give you more. Either build the 
fence or we do something that causes that border crossing to 
stop. How do we do it?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, Senator, there are 
a number of things you raise, and I hope I keep them in mind so 
I can address them all. I think it is important, as you say, to 
look at this as a comprehensive issue, not an issue you can 
deal with in terms of individual slices of policy.

                        TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM

    Clearly, one piece of this is the issue of what the 
President has advocated addressing through a temporary worker 
program, finding a way to bring some portion of the people who 
come across the border not to do us harm, but to work, to bring 
them within the system.
    Senator Craig. Very important.

                STEPPED UP ENFORCEMENT ALONG THE BORDER

    Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. So that we have some 
control over them, and also we then reduce the pressure and we 
reduce the demand which gives the trafficking organizations the 
kind of resources they need to bring bad people across the 
border. Now that is one piece of a comprehensive package. 
Another piece has to be stepped up, enforcement along the 
border, including better deployment and more efficient 
deployment of border patrol, use of technology to give us a 
better span of control over who is coming across the border.
    Absolutely, the idea that there are laws that are tacitly 
not going to be enforced is dead wrong, and something certainly 
I do not endorse.
    When you talk about chain of command issues interfering 
with somebody apprehending persons coming across illegally, I 
have to say, I mean if there are bureaucratic obstacles to 
enforce in the law, I want to get rid of those. I have spoken 
to Border Patrol and to Commissioner Bonner about, in fact, 
breaking down the stove pipes that I think used to be. We used 
to have very regionally controlled, border sector controlled 
deployment of resources so that you had seams between the 
regions. Everybody took the view that, hey, I am going to worry 
about my region and that is all I am going to worry about.
    We have now moved away from that. Commissioner Bonner has 
put together a much more nimble program for deploying 
resources, which I think, again, is trying to break down those 
stove pipes. When I hear about these kinds of bureaucratic 
things, I do want to go out and see what the problem is and try 
to fix it.
    This problem has been around for a long time. When I was 
U.S. attorney back in the early Nineties we were talking about 
this. So I know it is not a new problem. I know there is a new 
urgency. And I think although there is a lot to discuss in 
terms of detail, I think there is a general view we have to 
take a comprehensive approach. And I really look forward to 
working with you and with everybody who is interested in this 
in putting together a comprehensive policy.
    Senator Craig. Thank you.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you. Senator Murray.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATTY MURRAY

    Senator Murray. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. You 
have been handed a very, very difficult job, and I commend 
Senator Gregg for his opening statement and agree we need an 
honest assessment from you of what resources we need for all of 
these difficult challenges.

                             PORT SECURITY

    I think everybody here shares the same goal of doing 
everything we can to make sure our country is secure and it is 
always difficult when we feel like we are not getting what we 
really need. We have heard a lot about border security. I 
obviously am concerned about the northern border. I know all 
200 of those, plus, are going to the southern border. We know 
that the northern border is a problem, but let me set that 
aside, because I want to focus on port security and cargo 
security, which you and I have had some time to talk about.
    I am very concerned. The Coast Guard commandant testified 
before us that it would take more than $7 billion to implement 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act. So far, Congress has 
provided a little over $500 million of that. I do not think any 
of that was requested by the Administration. That was Congress 
adding those dollars in.
    Now for the past 2 years, about a billion dollars in port 
security grants have come in to your agency, and the American 
Association of Ports Authorities say they need at least $400 
million to help secure port facilities this year.
    From our discussions I know port security is an important 
issue for you. You understand it is not only human life. It is 
economic disaster if we do not secure our ports. But it is 
disconcerting to me that the Administration does not ask for 
the dollars for these port security grants.
    Does the Agency just discount all the intelligence reports 
that tell us our ports are a significant risk, or what can we 
expect on this?
    Secretary Chertoff. No. I mean I do think ports are a very 
significant part of the infrastructure we have to work to 
protect. One thing I want to emphasize: You know, as we go 
through this process of reviewing the entire operation of the 
Department over the next couple of months, I try to look at the 
issue, whether it be ports or rail or aviation, in terms of an 
outcome or an approach.
    In other words, I don't want to know what each agency is 
doing. I want to know what we are doing in combination to deal 
with the issue of ports or rail or aviation, because that gives 
us our total sense of how good we are doing or how well we are 
doing in protecting ourselves.
    There are a number of dimensions to this. First of all, 
there is container security. We have begun a container security 
initiative, which pushes our screening and inspection process 
overseas. That is a very positive----
    Senator Murray. Well, I want to ask you about that 
separately in just a minute. What I want to ask you about first 
of all, is the port security--under the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act, our ports have to harden the ports, and they are 
just not getting the resources to do that.
    Secretary Chertoff. We want to make sure they get adequate 
resources, bearing in mind, again, with the philosophy of risk 
management, that we have to prioritize.
    Senator Murray. But the Administration is not requesting 
any money to do that, despite the fact that the commandant of 
the Coast Guard told us we needed $7 billion to do that.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do think we have money in 
various grant programs that are requested in the budget that 
are available to be used for purposes of strengthening ports. 
We have infrastructure, proposing an infrastructure protection 
program. We have State grants. We have urban assisted--UASI 
grants.
    We have a lot of different kinds of types of grants, but I 
also have to say I think that the issue of how we protect the 
ports has to be looked at comprehensively. Coast Guard plays a 
role in that. Private parties play a role in that, and have----
    Senator Murray. I understand that----
    Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Private obligations.
    Senator Murray [continuing]. But under the Maritime 
Security Act we directed all of these ports to give us a plan 
of how they were going to protect their ports, which they did. 
And they now have to implement it. They are not getting any 
money to do it. And we need a direct targeted program, the Port 
Security Grant program, to do that.
    So I want to work with you on that. I am just disappointed 
every time when the budget comes over with no money for that, 
because as you and I both know, a disaster at one of our ports 
is going to dramatically hurt not only human life, but the 
economy of this country, whether you are in a port city or not.

                             CARGO SECURITY

    But the other part of that is cargo security. And as you 
know, I have been really pushing to get some kind of 
coordinated port security regime in place. Everyone out there 
is trying their best to move those ports out, to follow our 
cargo from where they are loaded, into our ports here, and 
there is no coordinated approach to that.
    In the committee report from last year, we directed the 
Undersecretary of Border and Transportation Security to help us 
develop a plan for that coordinated approach. It was due 
February 8. We still have not gotten that yet. And I just feel 
like--we need the Administration--I have talked with you about 
this. I have talked with Commissioner Bonner. I have talked 
with a number of folks about it. And all we get is, ``We're 
going to study this.'' I know that you and I agree this is an 
important issue.
    How can we help you come up with a coordinated approach to 
secure our ports, all the cargo that moves through them, and 
the people who work and live there?
    Secretary Chertoff. Of course, I am very sensitive to 
being--you know, not saying we are studying something. So let 
me be a little bit more concrete.
    Senator Murray. Thank you.
    Secretary Chertoff. We need to take the issue of cargo and 
container security to whatever is considered to be the next 
level of systems sophistication. There are people in the 
private world who are very, very good at tracking everything, 
from point of departure to point of arrival. And there are 
processes and technologies that allow us to do that. And that 
is the kind of system we ought to be looking to moving toward 
in our container security initiative.
    CSI is part way towards that. The principle of moving this 
overseas is a good step in that direction. We have been meeting 
with, for example, the private sector, and shipping companies, 
to talk about ways we might, with greater specificity, track 
cargo from the time that it departs the manufacturer to the 
time it gets to the point of arrival, working with the private 
sector to have them build a security envelope.
    And again, through the C-TPAT program, we have got that 
process as a precedent. We do use that kind of process, so that 
eventually what we can do is put as much of the cargo through a 
security envelope from point of departure to point of arrival 
as possible, track it, screen it, have private sector take a 
lot of responsibility within that envelope for maintaining 
security, use technology to make sure we are not getting 
penetrations, and then, again, you are always going to have 
some cargo that does not fit within that envelope.
    We are deploying technologies like VACAS radiation portal 
and our National Targeting Center to focus on that subset of 
cargo that really needs a much tougher regime of screening and 
inspection. So that, I think, this is the way forward. And I do 
think we are working with a lot of diligence and a lot of 
urgency to move into that next level.

                           prepared statement

    Senator Murray. Well, I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, it 
is a very complex problem. There are a lot of players in it, 
and what I think is most disconcerting to me is that we do not 
have a coordinated approach. Mr. Secretary, I hope we can get 
that report from you that was due February 8 so that we can 
really start moving forward to get that accomplished.
    [The statement follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Patty Murray

    Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you, Senator Byrd, and the 
rest of our colleagues in welcoming Secretary Chertoff to the 
Committee.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for taking the time to meet with 
me prior to your confirmation. We had a good discussion about many of 
the issues we are going to talk about today.
    I know that you are still new to the job and understand that this 
budget request was formulated before you were nominated.
    I also understand that you have been handed a tough task in a very 
difficult time. But from our private conversations, I know that you are 
committed to keeping our country safe--and I look forward to working 
with you.
    That being said, I fear this Administration--through this budget 
request--is failing in this most important responsibility.
    Mr. Secretary, as you are well aware, the Department you now lead 
faces enormous challenges.
    Concerns that DHS is not meeting the Nation's security challenges 
are growing--in the Congress, and among the American public.
    Don't get me wrong, in fact, I believe Secretary Ridge and Admiral 
Loy did the best they could with the hand they were dealt.
    Merging so many complex entities into one organization was a 
monumental challenge. We all knew success wouldn't come overnight.
    But many of DHS' problems were created by this Administration 
because it didn't request adequate funding.
    Mr. Secretary, the Administration has many priorities--we all do.
    The bottom line is that current White House fiscal policy isn't 
consistent with providing the resources DHS needs to provide the level 
of security the American people deserve.
    To compound this problem, DHS has spent what funding has been 
available in a scattershot way. There appears to be very little rhyme 
or reason to how funding is allocated compared with actual threats.
    And, we are hearing about it on a daily basis.
    Just this morning, we're reading newspaper reports about financial 
mismanagement at TSA. I don't want to get into that now because I know 
you'll have an opportunity to respond this morning.
    But please know that it just makes it harder for us in Congress to 
help DHS succeed.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to work with you to ensure our budget will 
actually deliver the security we both seek for our country.
    But if we are going to work together, we need to be honest about 
what resources are necessary to do your job and let the Congress worry 
about budget priorities.
    For example, adding to what I believe is already an insufficient 
budget request, the Administration assumes user fees that we all 
recognize are not going to be approved.
    In fact--$2 billion of the $2.5 billion increase in the 
Administration's request would come from a 60 percent increase in 
airline passenger fees.
    Fees placed on the back of an industry that we all know is having 
significant financial difficulty.
    Mr. Secretary, these ``proposals''--if not accepted by the 
Committee--only make the funding problem worse.
    As I'm sure you are aware, the Senate has included $276 million for 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations bill.
    This is funding that we all agree your agency desperately needs. In 
fact, many of us have known about this issue for quite some time.
    Last year, I asked Commissioner Bonner and ICE Assistant Secretary 
Garcia about a news report highlighting a budget shortfall that would 
result in a hiring freeze at ICE.
    At that time, I was told the problem was an accounting error 
resulting from combining budgets from legacy agencies.
    Now it's clear that it was a real budget shortfall and the Senate 
was forced to include this as new money--designated as an emergency--to 
enable ICE to lift its hiring freeze.
    Curiously, this money was not part of the Administration's 
supplemental funding request.
    Mr. Secretary, the Senate's action speaks volumes about how much we 
want this agency to succeed, but we need the Administration's help.
    We need realistic annual budget proposals--not reprogramming 
requests and not emergency supplemental requests.
    Mr. Chairman, I don't say this to denigrate the performance of any 
of the hard working men and women who serve us so ably on the front 
line. Like Secretary Chertoff's predecessor, they are doing a 
tremendous job with the tools they are provided.
    But, this Committee--and the Congress--must do a better job of 
providing oversight to this agency because right now we are failing the 
American public.
    Mr. Secretary, I know that you, Chairman Gregg, Senator Byrd and 
the rest of our colleagues care about these issues as much as I do.
    And, I don't want to dwell on this too much--but I think it is 
important context for the other specific issues that I'd like to 
discuss here today.
    I'm quite concerned that good intentions are not going to help us:
  --Establish a rigorous port and cargo security regime,
  --Protect our borders, or
  --Train our personnel correctly
    Mr. Secretary, I look forward to your testimony, working with you 
to address these issues, and ensuring our budget will actually deliver 
the security we both seek for our country.
    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

    Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Allard.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR WAYNE ALLARD

    Senator Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I also would like to join my colleagues and welcome 
Secretary Chertoff here this morning. I am also new to the 
committee here, Mr. Secretary, and I am looking forward to 
serving under the able chairmanship of Senator Gray.
    I wonder sometimes if maybe we are not looking too much to 
a Federal solution and perhaps should not think a little bit 
more about what the local law enforcement along the borders. 
That is the counties along the borders. It is the States along 
the borders.
    This is homeland security. Everybody is talking about more 
money for Customs and more agents and whatnot, but I happen to 
believe that those people down along the border that form the 
Minutemen organization have some real concerns. I think they 
are really concerned about their property. I think they are 
really concerned about the safety of their families.
    I do not know whether any thought has been in trying to do 
more to support our local law enforcement along the borders. 
They are local elected officials. They know about those things. 
They understand the problems of their community. I wonder if we 
should not do the same thing with the State. The governor is 
elected by that State.
    I wonder if we should not consider targeting those 
counties, share with them more of the technology that we have 
developed at the Federal level, and take citizen groups, 
incorporate them. Deputize them. Have the local sheriff 
deputize them or whatever, or have your National Guard or 
whatever, bringing some responsibility.
    I am not implying that they have not been responsible at 
this particular point in time, but at least bring them under 
some organized law enforcement thing that traditionally has 
relied on citizens. That is why we have deputization process. 
That is why we have the National Guard.
    I wonder how much thought you have given to that, because 
all I am hearing from this committee and all I am hearing so 
far in this discussion is a Federal solution. I think we will 
get a better bang for the buck. I mean they are worth a lower 
salary level. They have more of a commitment in that safety 
because they live there. I wonder if you would comment on that.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, we do work, actually, in the 
Arizona border control initiative, we are working. We have had 
a great working relationship with State and local law 
enforcement officials now.
    I guess depending on what community you are in, some law 
enforcement officials want to be involved and engaged in the 
process of enforcing the laws against illegal immigration. Some 
do not. I do not think we can make them do it.
    Clearly, though, we want to work cooperatively, because 
they are a force multiplier. And when we get well trained and 
we share information, and we get well-trained State and local 
enforcement officials, they are a welcome addition to the 
process of extending our ability to deal with the issue of 
illegal migration across the border.
    Senator Allard. Well, obviously, you have been in 
conversation with local elected officials. I just think we can 
do more. And I think I will be a voice on this committee, at 
least, for pushing you towards more of a local solution than 
something run out of Washington. I do not think we have all the 
answers necessarily here in Washington.

                       VISIT TO ONE OF THE PORTS

    The other thing that I would like to say in a positive way 
is there has been a few million years since we have had a 
coastline in the State of Colorado. So I made a personal 
concerted effort to visit one of our ports. I visited the port 
of Miami. And I will have to tell you, I was pretty impressed.
    And this is the very thing that you talked about in your 
previous testimony, I saw happening there. I saw technology 
developed at the Sandia Laboratories in New Mexico being used 
at that port. And I have to tell you that I feel much better 
about our port security.
    And I think sometimes we are looking at a 100 percent 
solution. I do not think the citizens of this country can 
afford a 100 percent solution. But I think we have to come up 
with some reasonable solutions that work. And I think what I 
saw there at the port, it was efficient, where they could 
handle a fair amount. I saw a lot of dedication there, and I 
was really pleased. I just have to tell you that.

                            AIRPORT SECURITY

    I think sometimes what we see happening in our airports, I 
wonder if maybe we have not gotten off track a little bit and 
expecting too much on security in airports. I think the most 
important thing we did and probably the most cost-effective 
thing is we put a door that was secure between the pilot and 
the passengers. But I do think that we need to take a hard look 
at what is happening at our airports to see if we cannot come 
up with some more common-sense solutions to what I see 
happening. So I think there are some good things happening 
there.

                     RUDENESS OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES

    On the other hand, I have also seen, as I have walked 
through Customs, and particularly in the State of Colorado, and 
I have been appalled at the rudeness of the employees there. I 
come from a State where I want to welcome people to my State as 
tourists. And I have been sort of appalled at some of the 
rudeness that I saw at Customs.
    So hopefully we can kind of improve our bedside manner a 
little bit. Remember that we have visitors coming to our 
country. We have visitors coming to our States.
    Secretary Chertoff. And they are not all criminals.
    Senator Allard. And if that--yes. And they are not all 
criminals. If the Federal employee does not treat them 
respectfully and with a welcome attitude, it hurts our tourism 
in our State. So I just want to call that to your attention.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Senator Byrd.

                       STATUS QUO BUDGET REQUEST

    Senator Byrd. In fiscal year 2004, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) removed a record 150,000 illegal aliens from 
this country. However, we know that more than 10 million 
illegal aliens reside in this country. Two and a half million 
illegal aliens have overstayed their tourist or work visas. 
There are over 370,000 illegal aliens who have knowingly 
disobeyed orders to leave the country.
    ICE teams, Immigration and Customs Enforcement teams, 
deported 11,000 of them in 2004, but more than 35,000 others 
were added to the list. The system is not working, and this 
budget request does almost nothing to fix it.
    I have a border security amendment pending to the Iraq war 
supplemental, which is currently being debated on the floor of 
the Senate. My amendment is offset, responds to known security 
shortfalls on our borders, and responds to the concerns of many 
Americans, including the self-styled Minutemen who are 
performing a major community watch effort on the Arizona 
border.
    While there are, indeed, slight increases proposed for next 
year, the fact remains that both the Border Patrol and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement are experiencing 
significant attrition this year. According to your agencies, 
137 Border Patrol agents have left the service since the 
beginning of the fiscal year. By the end of January, ICE had 
experienced a net loss of 299 positions.
    On average, you are filling 2,000 fewer detention beds a 
week than the level for which the Congress provided funds. The 
proposed increases for next year merely backfill the losses you 
are experiencing this year. In short, this is a status quo 
budget request.
    The crisis we are experiencing today on our borders 
deserves more than a status quo budget. Why should we be 
satisfied with a status quo budget, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, Senator, first of all, my 
understanding, again, of what we are proposing to do is that we 
are going to--when we talk about increases, we are talking 
about net increases. In other words, we are going to fund over 
200 additional Border Patrol Agents, 140 additional ICE 
investigators, almost 2,000 additional beds over and above the 
current level.
    Obviously, when people leave, we always backfill those 
positions, so that I think you have to add those numbers 
together. And we are talking about funding that would get us a 
net up-kick in all those categories.
    In fact, in terms of 2005, we have submitted a 
reprogramming to get more money to ICE so that even this year 
we can begin the process of starting to do some hiring to move 
them to the level they need to be.
    There is no question there is a serious issue, this whole 
issue of managing illegal immigration. What we have to do is 
use a comprehensive approach. We have to be able to have more 
people at the border, better technology at the border, all of 
which we are now pushing forward. Better investigative 
capability. Better and more available use of detention beds. 
And we are doing some additional things as well to free up 
beds.

                   REPATRIATION PROGRAM WITH MEXICANS

    For example, we are working with the Mexicans to begin the 
internal repatriation program in the next couple of weeks, 
whereby we transport Mexicans who come in back to interior 
locations so that they do not simply go back across the border, 
connect up with the same trafficking organizations, and then 
come back a couple of days later.

                           EXPEDITED REMOVAL

    We are using other kinds of techniques in terms of 
expedited removal to try to expedite the process of getting 
people that we do apprehend, moving them, again, across the 
border back to Mexico.

      ABSCONDERS AND VIOLATORS OF RELEASE ORDERS AND RETURN ORDERS

    We are now targeting for the first time enforcement of 
people who are absconders or who are violating release orders 
and return orders to make sure we are apprehending them, and we 
are, again, getting them and sending them back across the 
border. And we have to also be vigorous in enforcing the laws 
against people who are removed and then in violation of the law 
come back across the border again. We have not always succeeded 
in getting the kinds of sentences we need from judges in 
keeping those people who are violators, repeat violators in 
prison.
    So we are very concerned about it. We are taking steps to 
move forward on this. I am going to look at this issue. As I 
said previously to Senator Feinstein, I am going to go down to 
the border, I think, within the next 2 months and talk myself 
personally to the local people and our Border Patrol folks down 
there to keep moving forward on this issue.

                  SATISFACTION WITH STATUS QUO BUDGET

    Senator Byrd. Well, are you satisfied with the status quo 
budget?
    Secretary Chertoff. I am not satisfied with the status quo. 
We need to move forward. We need to be better about keeping our 
borders policed. We need to be better about tracking 
absconders. We need to be better about getting people removed 
efficiently. And I think as we look at the whole issue 
comprehensively, there are a lot of things we can do to get a 
better outcome.
    Senator Byrd. Mr. Secretary, you did not answer my 
question.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I think what I----
    Senator Byrd. Are you satisfied with the status quo budget?
    Secretary Chertoff. I think what I am saying, Senator, is I 
think our budget is not a status quo budget. I think it looks 
to net increases, and, therefore, I will tell you, I would not 
be satisfied with a status quo budget or a status quo 
situation.
    Senator Byrd. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would look forward 
to your comprehensive approach. My amendment will provide you 
with real resources to implement your comprehensive approach.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Senator Domenici.

                 STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETE V. DOMENICI

    Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Byrd, I will follow up on your questions and give 
my own observation after first saying thank you for the job you 
are doing. I look forward to visiting the border with you and 
some of the facilities that we have in our State, such as the 
DOE laboratories, to make sure you understand the competence in 
other departments of the government to help you do your work.
    Senator Byrd, I would say I laud your concern about doing 
more than we are doing, which is an answer to a status quo. We 
cannot stand the status quo. I do not know about a status quo 
budget. But we also cannot stand a status quo with reference to 
our current laws on migration and immigration.
    I mean they are adding to the problem, because it is a mix-
up and a mumble-jumble of things and agents do not know what 
they are supposed to do. I mean when we catch illegal aliens on 
this side and send them home, what are agents supposed to do 
when they come right back? I mean we did then look at it and 
say they are not doing their job.
    Senator Byrd. I am with you.
    Senator Domenici. It is embarrassing to see that we do not 
have a bill yet on the floor of the Senate on immigration. This 
is not a way to deal with immigration on a supplemental 
appropriation bill. I think you would agree with me. We need to 
debate this issue thoroughly, and it makes them do their job 
better and adds to the propriety of the United States.
    Senator Byrd. I have been singing that song for many years 
now.
    Senator Domenici. It is time. I am telling you, many of us 
agree with you, finally.
    Senator Byrd. Thank you.

       OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Senator Domenci. Now having said that, first, let me say to 
you, people wondered when you got this job what somebody with 
your background was doing. I was at your side all the way, 
because I know what you are capable of doing. I want to laud 
you so far with the job you are doing. I want to give you a 
couple of my observations.
    First of all, you inherited a Department that was put 
together hurriedly. It is consequently a very hodgepodge 
Department. The sooner you yourself find out what was done that 
is not done right, what was done that might even be wrong, you 
ought to be the one finding out about those problems and fixing 
them, because they are going to be determined sooner or later. 
There are many of them up and down the chain of command of your 
Department, and you know that. I do not know how soon you can 
fix them, but I urge that you do so.
    My second observation is: Since we put the Department 
together this way, there is a multiplicity of activities that 
are, even though we thought we are putting them all together, 
that they are not all together, because there are many other 
facilities that do work of the type you need.
    I really urge that even though you have set up in the 
statute a function and thus a piece of your Department, that 
you resist your Department creating a total group of experts in 
every one of those niches. Because many of those experts 
already exist in the government, and you ought to use them. You 
are using them. I think you should just make that a policy.
    Somebody said, this distinguished Senator from Colorado, 
who shames me, he has been to see Miami, and I have not been to 
the border in 6 months, which is my own State. He has been way 
over there in the port of Miami. I ought to go see what is 
happening on my border.
    The problem is that in enforcing our laws, there exists 
terrific capacity in our national laboratories, in our Defense 
Department, and those who are studying unmanned aerial 
vehicles. You do not have to begin every program within your 
Department. Do I make sense?
    Secretary Chertoff. Yes. Absolutely, Senator. I mean I 
really do not want to rediscover the wheel, particularly if we 
have the wheel discovered elsewhere in the Federal Government 
or the State government, and the private sector. I mean we do 
not have the time to do everything ourselves.
    One of the observations I had when I came into the 
Department, two observations. One is completely consistent with 
your advice, that we really need to comprehensively review what 
we are doing. I give a lot of credit to Governor Ridge, and 
Admiral Loy and everybody who stood up in the Department, which 
was an enormous challenge. They did a lot in 2 years. It took 
the Defense Department decades to get to where it is now. And 
we do not have that time. So we should be willing to examine 
where we can adjust and make those adjustments.
    With your second point, Senator, a lot of what we bring to 
the table is a network. Nowadays in business, people talk about 
networking. We do not have to own or employ everybody in 
Homeland Security. We do not and we cannot. What we have to do 
is network with what is out there in our other Federal 
agencies, State and local partners, and figure out a way to 
make everybody work together and to coordinate those things.
    So even in my brief 2 months at the Department I have been 
very clear about saying that we ought to pay as much attention, 
if not more, to that networking function as we do to the actual 
physical assets that we own and the people that we have in our 
Department.

                          IMPACT OF NETWORKING

    Senator Domenici. Well, my time is running out. I am going 
to make one last observation. I will put it two in one.
    First, it seems to me, without question, that what you are 
doing out there in terms of networking is already having a big 
impact. I am not one who continues to carp on the fact that we 
do not have good homeland security, because I contend that 
nothing has happened since 9/11. And that is not an accident.
    I think we are doing a much better job at making it hard 
for terrorists than we give ourselves credit for. Now I do not 
need you to answer that, but if you can, you should. I mean 
everybody is just saying we are not doing anything, but why are 
the terrorists doing nothing? They keep saying they want to get 
America. They have not done anything yet. Thank God. Maybe 
tomorrow they will do it, and Domenici will be crazy. But that 
is one observation.
    And the second one is that it seems to be obvious that even 
though we want to address risks, we nonetheless want money to 
go to the States. And the new bill will do what you suggest, 
and put more money in risks and less in pork projects, 
allegedly. But I submit that this does not mean that all the 
heavily populated States are the harbors of all the risks.
    I mean in my State you have two national laboratories 
filled with nuclear activity, the center of nuclear weaponry. 
That is all I will say. You know what that means. Now you 
cannot expect New Mexico with .005 tenths of a percent of the 
money to assume the risk of the extraordinary activities.
    I would hope that if we give you a law that does what I 
have just said, that you have somebody looking at West Virginia 
and New Hampshire and New Mexico to say what else is there that 
is essential to our country and dangerous. I do not mean a 
football field. That is what people are saying. Every gym and 
football field, because people will assemble, ought to be 
protected. I do not know about that. You decide that.
    But I do know the place where nuclear weapons of the United 
States are in abundance shall not say, ``Well, that's old New 
Mexico. It's a rural State.'' Do you understand what I am 
saying?
    Secretary Chertoff. I absolutely do. As you have said, I 
think risk management is not about size of State or population 
or things of that. It is about individual pieces of 
infrastructure, individual networks of transportation. I mean 
population clearly is an element to be considered, but we have 
to have a much more sophisticated approach. And I think that is 
exactly what we want to drive to, is our risk management 
philosophy.
    Senator Domenici. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you. Senator Kohl, I appreciate your 
patience. Please take as much time as you think you need.

                     STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERB KOHL

    Senator Kohl. Thank you, Senator Gregg and Secretary 
Chertoff.
    I would like to talk about airport screening. For those of 
us, and it includes I assume most of the people here in this 
room, we are going through, as you know, a lot more intensive 
airport screening today than we were prior to 9/11. And yet a 
report came out this week which indicates that investigators 
have determined that things like knives, guns, and even fake 
bombs are still being processed through the screeners without 
detection.
    It is almost incomprehensible. I am trying to figure how 
that can be after all of the money and the effort that we have 
put in to trying to improve airport security for travelers. 
They talk about the need for new technology, additional 
technology, which we apparently do not have or have not yet 
been able to spend the money on.
    Can you tell us whether or not it is true that airport 
screening today is about at the level that it was before 9/11, 
and how soon it is that we are going to be able to improve it.
    Secretary Chertoff. I read the IG's report and I just spoke 
with the IG about it, because obviously I was very concerned 
about that. I do not have an independent way of verifying it, 
but I am not going to dispute it either.
    I was very concerned about the question of how do we move 
to the next level. Clearly, there are issues involving training 
and things of that sort, which are important, but I agree with 
the IG that technology is really ultimately what we have to use 
in order to get to the next level.
    We do have some good pilot projects and we do have some 
good technology. We are continuing to fund that, and I think 
that is a very promising development. I have to be completely 
forthright in saying we also have to make some difficult 
decisions about policy in order to decide if we are going to 
capitalize on that technology.

                         BACKSCATTER TECHNOLOGY

    For example, one form of technology that makes it easier to 
detect these kinds of threats is backscatter technology. That 
has certain implications for privacy, because it does 
essentially, in some form, allow you to look to see what 
someone is carrying on them that they may be concealing. And so 
there is sometimes resistance to that.
    I think we have to be prepared to say that we need to start 
to deploy these kinds of technologies and make appropriate 
adjustments for privacy if we are going to get to that next 
level. The technology is out there and it is being used. It is 
a question of the decision to deploy it and to try to balance 
that with legitimate privacy concerns, but not get so caught up 
in an endless debate about it that in 5 years we are still 
sitting there with the technology available and useful and 
helpful, but we have not put it out yet because people are 
still hand wringing about it.
    So I very much want to start to take the step of moving 
that technology out and continuing to press forward on the 
research and development side, but also not letting the perfect 
be the enemy of the good. If we can make things better, let us 
get them better rather than wait for the magic bullet that is 
going to solve everything.

                       IMPROVING AIRPORT SECURITY

    Senator Kohl. Yes, it is very surprising to me and I think 
to every traveler to think that in spite of all the money that 
we spent and the delays that we now go through at airports that 
we did not go through prior to 9/11, some people in the 
position to know are saying that airport security is about at 
the same point that it was then. This, I am sure, is a matter 
of great concern to you, and I hope that we can effect some 
improvements.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I intend to do so. It is 
troubling. I think we do have good capabilities in technology, 
and I think we have to now start to move the process forward. 
And I am very interested in seeing that we do that.

                         FOREIGN STUDENT VISAS

    Senator Kohl. Okay. I would like to talk about foreign 
student visas for a minute. As you probably know, there has 
been a significant increase in the time that it takes for 
foreign students to get their visas to enter this country to 
attend school. And as a result, the number of applications has 
gone down, the number of foreign students who are enrolling 
post-graduate has gone down. And universities all across the 
country are quite concerned about this.
    In 2003, it was indicated that 40 leading research 
universities reported that 621 students missed the start of 
classes because of visa delays. Now certainly we need to do the 
job of checking out, keep out those students who should not be 
here for security reasons, but is there not something we can do 
to increase our level of ability to move people through the 
process and allow them to get enrolled in universities?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, we should. I have talked to 
Secretary Rice about this. We have already taken some steps in 
terms of lengthening the period of time a visa is applicable so 
that at least once we have passed someone through the screen 
they have an ability to spend more time without rechanneling 
themselves through the process. That is a positive development.
    Obviously, we need to do more in terms of our ability to 
vet people in advance, to do it more quickly. And we need to 
also, frankly, send the message out that we want to be 
hospitable in doing those things. So I think we are all 
committed in moving that forward.
    Again, I want to be fair and like I said be blunt in saying 
the schools also have to help, too, because we do encounter 
situations where people come in for schools and they do not 
show up or they leave the program. And, of course, we should 
know about that. The school should report that to us. And 
certain schools get a reputation as being easy marks for people 
who want to come and maybe not to study, but to do something 
else.
    If the schools do not cooperate with us, they make it very 
hard to run the program in a way that helps the entire spectrum 
of universities. So part of what we need to do is make it more 
efficient for people to get their visas, give them longer 
visas, but also make sure the schools live up to their 
obligation to let us know if people are abusing the system. And 
that is part of the tradeoff in order to make this work for the 
best interest of everybody.
    Senator Kohl. I thank you very much and I thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Cochran was not able to join us today, but has 
submitted a statement for the record.
    [The statement follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Thad Cochran

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for accepting the job of chairing this 
important Subcommittee. You have some big shoes to fill, but I know you 
can do it.
    Mr. Secretary, you are off to a great start. We appreciate your 
visit to my State and the way you have moved quickly to identify the 
challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security.
    We need strong leadership in this important job and I know you are 
well-qualified to provide it. The main challenge is to coordinate the 
Nation's resources in this effort. Our greatest strength is the 
ingenuity of our public servants and citizens. With the proper 
leadership, we will meet these challenges.
    Our role on this Subcommittee is to provide you and your Department 
with the resources needed to carry out your responsibilities and we 
will work with you to identify the priorities.

                                  TSA

    Senator Gregg. Let me pick up on your question, because the 
TSA is an issue that I think just every American is a little 
frustrated with sometimes. And I guess my question is this, and 
it is a philosophical one.
    Once we hardened the doors and took away the capacity to 
use airplanes as missiles, private passenger airplanes as 
missiles, we changed the dynamic of the threat fundamentally. 
And yet we have created an agency which has what, 45,000 
people? And here we are on a border where we have 10,000 
agents, and we probably need 20,000 agents to do it right, have 
to be well trained, obviously, and there has to be an 
infrastructure to support them, and all that.
    Are we basically reacting to yesterday's threat? We have 
port security issues. We have border crossing issues. And yet 
we put a huge amount of resources into airport security 
without, it appears, any significant improvement in security 
relative to the ability to get weapons through security, and 
having addressed the fundamental threat, which is an airplane 
used as a missile.
    Secretary Chertoff. I asked myself that question coming 
into this job as well, and if I can just take a minute to break 
it into several different issues.

                           AVIATION SECURITY

    First of all, there is the issue of aviation security in 
itself. Are we optimally focused on what the real threat is? 
And I think you have put your finger on it, Mr. Chairman, when 
you indicated the first thing we have to be really pretty tough 
about is recognizing that there are degrees of consequence that 
we are worried about.
    The aircraft as a missile is the worst consequence. It is 
bad to have an aircraft blown up in midair, too, that may be a 
somewhat less significant consequence. It would certainly have 
tremendous ramifications across the airline system, and then 
there are yet other possible actions. So we have to frame the 
issue that way.
    We do have hardening of cockpit doors. There are other 
steps we can and should take to prevent the aircraft used as a 
missile. That might very well counsel to change or moderate or 
adjust our current levels for screening with respect to certain 
types of items, and increase our screening for other types of 
items.
    Maybe to use the proverbial example of nail clippers, which 
I do not think are being screened for now anyway, but maybe we 
need to be a little less worried about metal cutlery and a 
little more worried about explosives. So that is within the 
issue of aviation, and that is something we are actively 
looking at now.

                            EMERGING ISSUES

    The second issue is making sure our attention is not 
distracted away from emerging issues. We are looking heavily at 
the issue of rail security. We are looking at the issue of 
cargo. We have deployed non-intrusive inspection technologies. 
Those are very good. I have seen them work myself. You may very 
well have it as well. That is a positive step we are paying 
attention to.
    And as I said to Senator Murray, we are looking at this 
whole issue of cargo movement to see how we can use the modern 
supply chain, techniques, and technology to really make sure we 
are doing what we need to do to protect against bad cargo. So I 
am completely on board with the idea of making sure we are not 
distracted by the thing we have already done, spending a lot of 
time on that because we know how to do it and it is 
comfortable, rather than looking at the stuff we have not done 
as well that we need to elevate up.

                         MOVEMENT OF RESOURCES

    Senator Gregg. Yes. I agree. And I am glad you are looking 
at it that way. But I am asking, are we taking it to the next 
step, which is, you know, we are spending, I think, I have 
forgotten the numbers, $3.5 billion, some outrageous number, on 
TSA. But should we be moving that number to border patrol? 
Should we be taking a large percentage of that employee base 
and moving them over, if not as a direct personnel shift, as at 
least a resource shift, reducing the number of personnel at TSA 
and moving people to border patrol where we know we have a 
bigger risk right now relative to the potential threat.
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, I do not know, Senator, that I 
would do that, because I do not know that I would say that 
there is a bigger risk. I mean I do not want to go to the other 
end and minimize the aviation risk too much. I mean the reality 
is, even putting aside the aircraft as a weapon, if we were to 
have a series of explosions on airlines, or something 
comparable, that would have a humongous effect on the national 
economy and a humongous effect on our ability to move around.
    We want to have a smarter deployment of resources in the 
aviation security area, but we want to have the outcome be 
very, very good security in terms of things we are worried 
about. I do not know that, for a whole host of reasons, 
including training and skill sets, that we could simply move 
TSA people into----
    Senator Gregg. I do not think you could----
    Secretary Chertoff. Yes.
    Senator Gregg [continuing]. Move people, but I am talking 
about the dollars to support those people. I mean the threat to 
the aircraft now is, as you mentioned, an explosive probably 
more than a weapon, because you cannot take control of an 
aircraft with a weapon, theoretically. I mean maybe it is 
possible if you have a big enough weapon on board. But if an 
explosive is the threat, is it not really a technology response 
to that rather than a people response?
    Secretary Chertoff. I think that is right. I think 
ultimately the way to move to the level we need to get is 
technology, because I think there is an inherent limitation. 
People are limited by the technology. I mean you can be the 
best trained and the most well-intentioned person in the world. 
If your detection device does not let you get sufficient 
granularity or make distinctions between types of things, 
between the dangerous and not dangerous, that is limitation. So 
we need to get the technology to where it needs to do.
    That might ultimately allow us to reduce workforce, 
although I do not want to make a prediction that it is going to 
happen in the short term, because I still think there is an 
element of human judgment that you bring to bear that is still 
very important. But there is no question that we have to both 
invest in the technology, but also, as I said, roll out the 
technology we have and start to use it, rather than continuing 
to fuss around, you know, everybody having--I do not want to 
minimize privacy concerns. I have them as well. But we need to 
come to grips with them, we need to adjust for them, we need to 
reach a decision about how to accommodate them, and then we 
need to start to move forward.

                    THEFTS OF LUGGAGE OF PASSENGERS

    Senator Gregg. The problem I see coming here--well, this is 
just one element of the issue, but relative to TSA--is that 
with a report of literally thousands of thefts occurring in 
luggage of travelers, and it appears that a high percentage of 
those thefts are the responsibility or the actions of Federal 
employees of TSA, that we are probably going to have to 
institute a major camera program or something to monitor the 
search of luggage by employees. And so we are going to end up 
spending significant resources to protect ourselves from the 
employees who are supposed to be protecting us from damage on 
the planes. As a taxpayer I find that uniquely frustrating. And 
as a policymaker, I find it to be a terrible waste of 
resources.
    Secretary Chertoff. I agree. I mean, obviously, pilferage 
is completely unacceptable. And it is a bad State of affairs if 
we have to spend money protecting ourselves from people who are 
protecting us.
    I am convinced, of course, the majority of screeners are 
terrific and ethical and----
    Senator Gregg. I am sure that is true.
    Secretary Chertoff [continuing]. Things like that. But you 
are right.
    Senator Gregg. The track record, unfortunately, is that 
there is a large amount of--there is a big problem here.
    Secretary Chertoff. And that is why--I agree with you. The 
technology is really the way forward in terms of getting 
ourselves to where we need to go.

                         DHS INTELLIGENCE ROLE

    Senator Gregg. In the area of intelligence, I am not sure I 
understand, and I am new to this. Since the issue was moved out 
of CJS, and I am new to this committee, I am not sure I 
understand what the Department sees as its role in intelligence 
right now. It is clear that there was a conscious decision to 
give up the actual collection and analytical effort to other 
Federal agencies. You got IAIP, which I guess is stood up, but 
it seems to continually to be raided for its revenues.
    What do you see as the intelligence function of Homeland 
Security, of the Agency, in relationship to these other 
agencies and internally?
    Secretary Chertoff. Well, first of all, I think we are 
definitely in the business of collection. Let me explain what I 
mean by collection. We have thousands of interactions every day 
at the border and investigations with ICE agents at the 
airport. And many of those yield information which I would 
consider to be of intelligence value.
    We are in the process now of increasing our use of that 
intelligence and our collection of that intelligence, doing a 
number of different things. For the first time, we are putting 
reports officers into the operational units, meaning people who 
will look at the operational flow of information and say, wait 
a second, this is not just a trivial interaction. This is a 
piece of information that is useful from an intelligence 
standpoint. Let us make sure we capture it and send it up to 
our information analysis section so it can be fused and 
collected and then ultimately transmitted to the community.
    We have started to do that. I have seen the results. The 
Federal Air Marshals actually use modern technology to in real-
time report things they see on airplanes that could have 
intelligence value in terms of suspicious behavior, so we get 
identification of people that we need to be on the lookout for 
and we can then put that into a system that all of law 
enforcement can have access to. So we have a tremendous 
potential to be collectors, which I want to make sure we are 
fully exercising.
    The second piece of that is, once we get ourselves to where 
we need to be in collection and we continue this process, we 
can contribute to the whole community by putting that into the 
NCTC, which is the counter-terrorism center. And that was set 
up by Congress in the Intel Reform bill as the kind of fusion 
point for counter-terrorism intelligence.
    By putting that information in there, we are sharing with 
the community. We are also contributing. And my experience is 
that when you contribute as a partner, you then get full 
partnership. So I view that as a very critical piece of what we 
need to do to make sure we are sitting at the table with 
respect to everything else that comes in from the other parts 
of the intel community--overseas stuff, signals intelligence, 
human intelligence in other countries.
    The third piece is, as partners at the table, we need to be 
able to look at all that stuff and operationalize it. And right 
now in the Department we are talking about how we want to 
enhance the ability of IA, of information analysis, to collect 
all this from the central pool that we have at the NCTC, to 
translate into operational mandates to make sure we make 
adjustments at the border and other adjustments so that we 
actually make use of this intelligence.
    So that is my vision of where we are going. I have met with 
the acting head of NCTC. I have met with other main players in 
the community, and I have expressed my very strong personal 
interest in seeing that we get this done.

                    USE OF IDENT, IAFIS AND US VISIT

    Senator Gregg. Where do you see the technology situation 
relative to IDENT, IAFIS, and also relevant to US VISIT.
    Secretary Chertoff. As you know, Senator, IDENT was, I 
guess, the system that was stood up under the old INS, pre-9/
11. IAFIS is a system the FBI set up. Right now, as I 
understand it, we have the ability at ports of entry, at 
Customs and border-patrolled posts, to access both of those 
databases at the same time. They are separate databases, but we 
can run prints against both of those databases.
    Now IAFIS is a ten-print database. So ultimately there is a 
decision which we need to reach about implementing a way to get 
to making effective use of a ten-print database. And I think 
there is a technological challenge there and there are some 
policy decisions that we are in the process of making.
    I think we made a lot of progress in making both databases 
accessible at a single point at the border and at our border 
and customs stations. We have not fully exploited the 
technology. We need to continue the process of building an 
architecture that lets us get the maximum use out of our 
biometric data that we capture and run it against the maximum 
number of databases.
    Senator Gregg. US VISIT.
    Secretary Chertoff. We have deployed it at our airports. We 
have deployed it at seaports. We have deployed it at our 50 
most significant land border entry points. We are starting to 
pilot it at the exit points.
    It has been very successful. I have seen it operate. It is 
fast. We have captured people on it that we should not be 
letting in the country and we have been able to turn them away.
    You know, it can be improved, and we can make better use of 
it. But it is, I think, the key to the next generation of 
keeping our borders secure.

                   PREPARATION FOR BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

    Senator Gregg. What do you see your success relative to 
preparation for an attack that might be biological?
    Secretary Chertoff. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we just 
finished TOPOFF III, which was a massive exercise done 
internationally and in two States, which had a hypothetical 
biological attack. I have met with Secretary Levitt. We have 
talked about some preliminary lessons learned. We are doing a 
very comprehensive review of that to make sure that we have the 
following things in place.
    First of all, we have an adequate stockpile of the kinds of 
antidote where we have them or vaccinations where we can have 
them against the likely agents; that we have very particular 
plans in place for distributing that type of vaccine or that 
type of antidote, if we should have an attack; and that we are 
fully integrated across the board in terms of our standards for 
reporting biological incidents.
    You know, we had that anthrax false scare about a month 
ago. We did a very vigorous review of that. We have made some 
changes now with the Defense Department as well as with our 
Department in making sure we are operating with the same set of 
standards. And we are now working across the Federal Government 
to test to make sure everybody has got the same template for 
what we are sensing, what constitutes a positive finding, when 
do we get to the point that we need to take steps to get people 
inoculation or antidote.
    Again, we have got progress to make. I think we have 
learned a lot of lessons, both recently and going back, and I 
think we have a program in place to start to move ourselves to 
a position of readiness for what, I agree with you, is one of 
the two or three worst-case scenarios that we have to be 
prepared for.

                            TOPOFF EXERCISE

    Senator Gregg. It is interesting. When I was on the 
Commerce and Justice Committee, when I was chairman of that, we 
began the TOPOFF exercise program over the strong resistance, 
ironically, of almost every Federal agency. We simply insisted 
we do it. It has now turned into a very successful program.
    But I was interested when I was at the TOPOFF exercise this 
year that neither New York City nor Los Angeles were--I guess 
Washington, marginally, participated in the major TOPOFF 
exercises there. I guess that is because they have not been 
asked to do it, or agreed to do it.
    It would seem since they are priority areas, that we would 
want in our TOPOFF exercises to go to places where the actions 
may actually most likely occur.
    Secretary Chertoff. I was not involved in, I guess, the 
selection for 2003 and I guess the selection for the next one 
was made before I came on. I know people do apply and then a 
decision is made.
    I know Chicago did the last one, I think, TOPOFF II. 
Northern New Jersey and Connecticut are part of the New York 
metropolitan area, so we did exercise some pieces of this.
    I agree, at the end of the day--by the way, we should be 
doing tabletop exercises, meaning not maybe the full TOPOFF, 
but something all across the board. I wondered myself how 
valuable it was, and I have to say I was convinced that it was 
of tremendous value.
    I learned a lot and I think a lot of people learned a lot 
by testing the system. So I am in favor of doing at least some 
kind of exercise as an important part of our preparedness.
    Senator Gregg. Well, I would hope that the Department would 
take a look at whether or not we should not do them to some 
degree based on the threat criteria versus just the willingness 
of a governor to participate or a State to participate.
    Well, I appreciate your time. I have two last questions.

                   STABILIZATION OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT

    There is a large amount of open slots and acting slots. 
What do you see relative to senior management getting it up and 
stable?
    Secretary Chertoff. I am concerned, obviously, as a 
secretary who does not want to have to do every job himself, to 
make sure we have very good people. I am pleased to say we have 
filled some of those spots. We have got others where we have 
nominations pending before the Senate. Obviously, the more 
quickly we can fill those spots the better.
    We want to get the right people. We want to get people who 
have the energy and the creativity to make the Department what 
I think it can be, going to the next level. And part of what we 
are trying to do, frankly, is to recruit and bring people in to 
top slots that bring a variety of different perspectives.
    I think it is good to have people with military 
backgrounds, people with law enforcement backgrounds, people 
with business backgrounds, people with first responder 
backgrounds, because ultimately our success involves merging 
functions, and that means merging skills.
    So we are actively out there finding the right people. The 
President has got some nominations in and has made some 
appointments already. And I am, for personal as well as 
professional reasons, very eager to get this process done as 
quickly as possible.

          NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEE

    Senator Gregg. And lastly, beyond approving your budget, 
which I suspect we will do and actually probably do more than 
your request, is there anything this committee can do to be 
helpful in the legislative or other areas?
    Secretary Chertoff. There may well be as we complete this 
process of second-stage review that we will have some 
recommendations to make for some legislative action that would 
align us better in terms of what we need to be able to generate 
for outcomes. And I will look forward to when we get to a point 
that we can, I think, have some recommendations sitting down 
with you and the other members of the subcommittee and talking 
about those, and trying to adjust as much as possible.
    One thing I do want to thank you for is the subcommittee's 
commitment to make sure that we get real discretion in terms of 
using risk management as a way of handling issues like funding 
and all of our functions, as opposed to--I know from what I 
read in the paper that the lobbyists continue to view DHS as a 
wonderful--I think one used in a newspaper article the term 
``pots of money'' for the clients.
    I do not view us as pots of money. I view us as having an 
obligation, both as stewards of the public money and as 
stewards of the public safety to make sure that what we do with 
our money that Congress appropriates for us is based on sound 
judgment and risk management, not based on lobbyists trying to 
get their clients into the pots of money.
    Senator Gregg. Well, I agree with you. In this issue, first 
off, funds should be distributed on the basis of threat; and, 
secondly, earmarks should be used only in the extreme situation 
where Congress has a very legitimate policy reason that feels 
that the Administration is not pursuing. So I presume that will 
continue to be this committee's approach.
    Secretary Chertoff. Right. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Senator Gregg. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for all your time. 
I appreciate your courtesy.
    Secretary Chertoff. Thank you.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Gregg. There may be members who wish to submit 
questions to the Department. As is typical, we presume they 
will be answered in a prompt way.
    Secretary Chertoff. Absolutely.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]

               Questions Submitted by Senator Judd Gregg

                 COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT

    Question. Secretary Chertoff, in your first speech after being 
confirmed Secretary of Homeland Security; you announced that you had 
initiated a 60 to 90 day comprehensive review of the organization, 
operations and policies of the Department as a whole. You discuss that 
review more fully in the prepared statement which you have submitted to 
the Committee.
    You are now some 30 days into that review. Can you share any of 
your preliminary findings with us at this point, including any 
preliminary conclusions you may reach on what's working and what is 
not?
    Answer. The comprehensive review of the Department is complete. I 
gave a speech on this topic on July 13 where I outlined our preliminary 
conclusions, the text of which can be found at the following website: 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597.
    Question. You indicate that the Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson is 
overseeing this review and has selected a team of Department officials 
to look at cross-cutting issues and determine how departmental 
resources and programs can be effectively used to achieve our security 
goals. Do you intend to involve others outside of the Department in 
this review?
    Answer. Other Federal agencies were included in this effort where 
appropriate. Moreover, while the committee was comprised exclusively of 
DHS employees, we considered recommendations from our state, local, 
tribal, and private sector partners, among others.
    Question. What cross-cutting issues are you looking at? How were 
those determined?
    Answer. We looked at all areas to examine the mission and work of 
all DHS elements to ensure that we have the best organization, 
operations, and policies possible to most effectively protect and 
safeguard this Nation. Notable examples of areas in need of greater 
cross-cutting included maritime cargo security, information sharing, 
and immigration policy. As a matter of process, the senior leadership 
of the Department was asked to identify the key issues that should be 
evaluated as part of the comprehensive review. The issues were then 
reviewed by me and the Deputy Secretary to identify further and refine 
cross-cutting topics that encompassed the key issues identified by the 
senior leadership.
    Question. As you are aware, we are fast-approaching the time when 
the Committee will make decisions on the Department's appropriations 
for fiscal year 2006. The budget request now before us is based on the 
Department's current structure and operations. Therefore, we are very 
interested in staying abreast of what changes are being contemplated 
and recommended.
    What is your time frame for concluding the review and for making 
any changes you determine are necessary, including those that might be 
done through your reorganization authority or require the submission of 
a legislative proposal or fiscal year 2006 budget amendment to the 
Congress for consideration?
    Answer. The comprehensive review of the Department is complete. I 
gave a speech on this topic on July 13 where I outlined our preliminary 
conclusions, the text of which can be found at the following website: 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597.
    We have also outlined our reorganization plan in detail in our 
Homeland Security Act Section 872 report, which was submitted to 
Congress after we completed the Second Stage Review (2SR). Further, a 
few of our recommendations will require congressional action. We have 
submitted legislation accompanying the 2SR Report that, once passed, 
will effectuate the reorganization changes we believe are necessary for 
the Department's success. It is important that our draft legislation be 
passed in its current form.

                       INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

    Question. How will the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North 
America announced last month promote and foster a mutually beneficial, 
common security system along our borders?
    Answer. On June 27, in Ottawa, Canada, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff and Department of Commerce 
Secretary Carlos Gutierrez and their government counterparts in Mexico 
and Canada released the first report of the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership (SPP) of North America that identifies initial results, key 
themes and initiatives, and work plans that further promote the 
security and prosperity of North America. The SPP countries agreed to 
these, and other, North American security goals:
  --North American Trusted Traveler Program.--All three countries have 
        agreed to create a single, integrated program for North 
        American trusted travelers by 2008. Individuals applying for 
        trusted traveler status would be able to apply for the program 
        and pay relevant fees in one transaction. Enrolled participants 
        would have access to all established trusted travel lanes at 
        land crossings, airports and marine programs. A single North 
        American Trusted Traveler Program embodies the intent of the 
        SPP to establish optimum security goals while accelerating 
        legitimate cross-border trade and travel. The United States 
        will also be working cooperatively to identify Western 
        Hemisphere travel document standards required under the 
        Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
        (IRTPA).
  --Preparedness and Incident Management Systems Integration.--The 
        United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to transform North 
        American preparedness for response to large-scale incidents by 
        establishing protocols for incident management that impact 
        border operations within 12 months. Protocols will also address 
        maritime incidents, cross-border public health emergencies and 
        cross-border law enforcement response. The SPP countries have 
        also committed to ensure interoperable communications systems 
        and to participate in preparedness exercises that will 
        strenuously test these protocols. In addition, the three 
        countries will participate in a preparedness exercise in 
        anticipation of the 2010 Vancouver/Whistler Winter Olympics.
  --Border Enforcement.--The United States and Mexico will form joint 
        intelligence-sharing task forces along the U.S.-Mexico border 
        to target criminal gang and trafficking organizations and 
        reduce violence along the border. The United States and Canada 
        will coordinate maritime enforcement programs to address the 
        huge volume of boat traffic in our shared waterways.
  --Facilitated Flow of Legitimate Cargo and Travel Across Land 
        Borders.--The United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to 
        review our transportation and border facility needs, in 
        partnership with stakeholders, and develop a plan to prioritize 
        future port-of-entry-related infrastructure investments. All 
        three countries are considering programs to reduce transit 
        times and border congestion by expanding trusted traveler 
        programs to additional ports of entry and partnering with 
        public and private sector stakeholders to establish ``low-
        risk'' ports of entry for the exclusive use of those enrolled 
        in our trusted trade and traveler programs. The United States 
        and Canada, along with local stakeholders, are working to 
        reduce the transit times by 25 percent at the Detroit-Windsor 
        gateway within 6 months, and all three countries are exploring 
        ways to expand this innovative 25 Percent Challenge to other 
        North American land border crossings within the next 18 months. 
        By December of this year, the United States and Canada 
        governments expect to complete an agreement on a pre-clearance 
        pilot program at the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, NY, contingent on 
        Canadian legislative amendments. Within 6 months, both 
        countries will also develop a plan to expand the Vancouver 
        NEXUS-Air pilot program to other United States air pre-
        clearance sites in Canada and examine the feasibility of 
        expanding the eligibility for NEXUS-Air to include Mexican 
        nationals.
  --Shared Watchlists and Integrated Traveler Screening Procedures.--
        The United States, Canada and Mexico have agreed to strengthen 
        information sharing related to terrorists and criminals. 
        Effective information exchange among North American countries 
        is essential to strengthening our capability to prevent acts of 
        terror within and outside North America. The United States, 
        Canada and Mexico have also agreed to establish compatible 
        screening standards for land, sea and air travel to identify 
        and prevent high risk travelers and cargo before they depart 
        for North America. Additionally, recommendations will be made 
        on the enhanced use of biometrics in screening travelers 
        destined to North America. On an ongoing basis, the SPP will 
        enable all three countries to address and resolve gaps in 
        cross-border information sharing. Ultimately, all travelers 
        arriving in North America will experience a comparable level of 
        screening.
  --Maritime and Aviation Security.--The SPP countries will also be 
        working toward comparable standards for hold baggage and 
        passenger screening, implementing no-fly programs throughout 
        North America, and developing new protocols for air cargo 
        inspection. Likewise, we will also be working to develop 
        compatible maritime regulatory regimes and to strengthen 
        information sharing and coordinated operations in the maritime 
        domain.
    Question. What role will the Department have in this initiative?
    Answer. The Department is taking a lead role in implementing the 
SPP's Security Agenda, in cooperation with other Federal agencies. The 
Department has been tasked with convening working groups with Canada 
and Mexico to develop and implement concrete work plans and specific 
timetables to meet the broader goals associated with the SPP's Security 
Agenda. Additionally, the Department is continuing to work with the 
Department of Commerce, which is taking a lead role in the development 
and negotiation of a complementary Prosperity Agenda, and the State 
Department, who is taking a coordinating role to best align efforts.
    Question. Under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative recently 
proposed, how will the Department ensure that NEXUS is universally 
available on the Northern Border by the time the new document 
requirements are imposed at land ports of entry?
    Answer. To keep pace with the potential impact of the WHTI, DHS 
plans to expand the enrollment process as well as potentially opening 
additional ports of entry with regards to NEXUS program along the 
Northern Border. Concurrently, we are also examining potential resource 
needs to accommodate additional demands of these programs as a result 
of the WHTI. As part of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative 
(WHTI), DHS will be issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPRM) to solicit comments from the public and affected entities 
regarding the requirements and alternative documents that may be 
designated by the Secretary to demonstrate citizenship and identity for 
entry. As required by the President, we are and will continue to 
examine, in response to comments on the ANPRM, other potential 
documents that may be designated for the land border environment in 
advance of the January 1, 2008, deadline.
    Question. How is the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative going to 
work with US VISIT, since US VISIT is implementing the tracking of 
entries and exits across our borders?
    Answer. The Department will coordinate the implementation of the 
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative with US VISIT enrollment to 
facilitate travel and to ensure security at our Nation's borders.
    Question. Will US VISIT manage this initiative?
    Answer. US VISIT is playing an active role in this initiative.

                        MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING

    Question. Executive agencies need to rely on a stable bureaucracy 
to keep things running during leadership transitions. The Department 
has significant vacancies in top leadership positions and significant 
turnover in senior- and mid-level managers.
    Mr. Secretary, what is your time frame for putting your management 
team together?
    Answer. I agree that we do not want any unnecessary delays in 
filling these vacancies. At the same time, however, we want to make 
sure we get the right people to fill these positions. We want to bring 
people on board who have the energy, creativity, and a variety of 
perspectives to further the Department's mission and enable us to move 
to a next level of achievement. The President has forwarded several 
nominations to the Senate for consideration, and we will move as 
quickly as possible to fill remaining vacancies.
    Question. What disruptions are the current vacancies in confirmed 
leadership positions having on the Department?
    Answer. For every vacancy in a leadership position, an employee has 
been identified to serve in an Acting capacity until a person is 
confirmed to fill the position. While we are striving to fill vacancies 
as quickly as possible, these dedicated employees have risen to the 
challenge of fulfilling the requirements and obligations of these 
leadership positions and have maintained the Department's activities 
and efforts.
    Question. What is your assessment of the difficulties the 
Department has experienced attracting, hiring or keeping qualified 
personnel and what is being done to correct this situation?
    Answer. DHS faces many of the same problems with recruitment and 
retention that plague most Federal agencies--cumbersome recruitment and 
hiring processes, lack of competitive salaries, and poor performance 
management and recognition programs. Fortunately, our mission is 
inspiring to many, and we usually are able to attract well-qualified 
candidates in spite of these impediments. However, we need to continue 
to improve to stay competitive for the very best candidates.
    DHS has a Human Capital Strategic Plan that aggressively addresses 
effective recruitment, development, compensation, succession 
management, and leadership issues. A major priority in this Plan has 
been streamlining the DHS hiring processes to meet the Federal standard 
of 45 days. A common DHS recruitment brand with state-of-the-art 
recruitment materials has been established to ensure effective and 
consistent external representation of DHS in the hiring process. These 
initiatives will enable DHS to maintain viable recruitment networks, 
particularly in mission critical occupations.
    A consolidated DHS Workforce Plan was completed in March 2005 that 
establishes a baseline for workforce trend analysis for mission 
critical occupations. This Plan also enables component organizations to 
plan well in advance for upcoming recruitment needs. Where potential 
occupational gaps exist, human capital strategies will be identified 
and implemented.
    MAX, the new human resource system for DHS, will have both market-
sensitive pay and a robust performance management process, which will 
enable DHS to be more competitive in its recruitment process and more 
effective in retaining and motivating employees.

                      DEPARTMENTAL REORGANIZATION

    Question. Reorganizing seems to be a sport within the Department 
these days. At what point does continued reorganization impede the 
ability of the Department to get its job done?
    Answer. The Department's reorganization plan will significantly 
enhance, not impede, our ability to meet our current and future 
objectives. The Department recently passed its 2 year anniversary mark. 
In that short time, 22 separate agencies were brought together, and the 
work of integrating those agencies into a working structure began. We 
are now taking advantage of 2 years of experience, an opportunity 
unavailable to our predecessors, to implement a reorganization plan 
that takes the Department to the next level, best positions us to 
manage our current and future responsibilities, and helps us better 
adapt to current and future threats and disasters.
    Question. On the other side of this issue is the continued 
viability of the current organization of the border management 
agencies. DHS has moved organizations into ICE; it has moved 
organizations out of ICE. We have poured almost $800 million in 
additional resources into ICE over the last 2 years, including $276 
million in the Senate-reported fiscal year 2005 emergency supplemental. 
Is ICE a viable stand-alone organization or should it be broken up and 
have its responsibilities merged into other parts of the Department of 
Homeland of Security such as CBP?
    Answer. As you know, the Department looked at a variety of 
organizational issues as part of the second-stage review process, which 
helped clarify where the Department needs to be organizationally to 
ensure effective implementation of our critical missions. We considered 
whether ICE should remain a stand-alone entity, and decided that it 
should. We believe it's in the Department's best near and long-term 
interest that ICE not be merged with another component, CBP in 
particular. To reach this decision, we focused on the operational 
mission needs of both CBP and ICE, not on the near-term management 
challenges. I take seriously the challenges the Department has faced 
concerning ICE and appreciate the difficult but necessary choices 
Congress has made in providing new funding to address its needs. I am 
confident, however, that ICE has made substantial improvements in 
financial management this year. Not only have substantial new resources 
been provided, but a new management team is taking shape.

                      HOMELAND SECURE DATA NETWORK

    Question. The fiscal year 2006 President's budget contains the 
first request to the Appropriations Committees regarding the Homeland 
Secure Data Network (HSDN). Why should funds be appropriated for HSDN 
now when the Department has seen fit to absorb $79 million in the past 
2 years and not seek proper appropriated dollars for this purpose?
    Answer. Anticipating the need to share intelligence and other 
information securely to fulfill its homeland security mission and to 
ensure efficient and effective use of scarce funds, the DHS CIO 
streamlined and merged disparate classified SECRET network initiatives 
within the Department into a single secure network called the Homeland 
Secure Data Network (HSDN). Existing agency funds for these initiatives 
were used to stand up this critical infrastructure. However, the fiscal 
year 2006 funding request is needed to use the additional funds to 
expand HSDN into a major, secure information thoroughfare joining 
together intelligence agencies, law enforcement, disaster management, 
and front-line disaster response organizations in the common goal of 
protecting our Nation and its citizens. An expanded HSDN will provide 
Secret connectivity and the required efficient information sharing 
capability to the non-DOD government community.
    Question. Does DHS have the ability to share classified information 
today? If yes, why does a stand-alone system need to be built for DHS?
    Answer. Today only a few Homeland Security components have the 
ability to share classified information over the DOD's SIPRNet. The 
present HSDN capabilities currently support over 30 DHS sites and will 
expand classified connectivity to 60 DHS sites in the next 2 months. 
DHS, and the non-DOD, government sector (including other Federal, 
State, local and tribal government) require the infrastructure and the 
processes and procedures to share classified information wholly 
effectively. The HSDN is an essential step that will allow the 
efficient sharing of classified information required for the mission of 
protecting the homeland. DOD policy in the wake of September 11, 2001, 
has been to migrate non-Defense, homeland security classified 
communications off SIPRNet and onto the HSDN. The DOD policy is based 
on the desire to ensure the SIPRNet can effectively support the war-
fighting mission. DOD and DHS have established a joint, controlled 
interface between SIPRNet and DHS to provide for several levels on 
connection between HSDN and SIPRNet based on policy.
    Question. Why isn't the budget for this project consolidated? Why 
is it being funded by specific organizations of the Department?
    Answer. HSDN has rapidly evolved from an initially conceived agency 
specific network to a presently deploying DHS-wide network based on 
mission needs. HSDN is funded by charging each agency based upon the 
HSDN usage by that agency during a yearly time period. The working 
capital fund has served as a method to consolidate organizational 
element funding to support a single HSDN capability. The specific 
organization funding level will be adjusted as the usage requirements 
of each agency change over time.
    Question. What is the rationale for how much each agency is being 
charged for HSDN?
    Answer. The HSDN rationale for charging each agency is based upon 
the HSDN usage by each agency during a yearly time period. Presently, a 
formula has been developed that charges an agency based on its HSDN 
participation. Basically, this formula develops a percentage by agency 
based on the number of locations (sites) and the number of terminals 
(workstations) installed. The number of sites (large, medium and small) 
and seats is a usage-based cost model. Site size is an industry 
standard such applied by an internet service provider who charges are 
based on the size of your site (bandwidth of the connection). The usage 
is also determined by the number of seats. While some sites will allow 
multiple users for a single workstation, the number of seats sets the 
usage level at the site.
    Question. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate has in its budget the Information Sharing and Collaboration 
program. One of its responsibilities is ``fostering collaboration among 
various levels of government and the private sector through the 
creation of a secure information sharing environment capitalizing on 
existing opportunities''. How does this project relate to HSDN? Are 
these duplicative or complementary efforts?
    Answer. These are complementary efforts. In May 2004, my 
predecessor, Secretary Ridge, created the Information Sharing and 
Collaboration (ISC) initiative to coordinate and facilitate efforts 
throughout the Department and with our customers and partners, 
particularly the Federal, State, tribal and local governments, and the 
private and international sectors, to affect change and improve 
information sharing and collaboration to secure the homeland. Since 
then, the importance of information sharing has been made more evident 
through the publication of numerous reports (such as the 9/11 
Commission Report, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of 
the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and GAO 
studies), the issuance of new Executive Orders (for example, E.O. 
13356), and a new public law, Public Law 108-458, the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Section 1016 calls for the 
creation of an Information Sharing Environment, which will require the 
sharing of information at levels including unclassified, sensitive but 
unclassified, SECRET, and perhaps higher.
    Anticipating this need to share intelligence and other information 
securely to fulfill its homeland security mission, DHS is streamlining 
and merging disparate classified SECRET networks into a single, 
integrated network called HSDN. We envision that HSDN will become a 
major, secure information thoroughfare joining together intelligence 
agencies, law enforcement, disaster management, and front-line disaster 
response organizations in the common goal of protecting our Nation and 
its citizens. The ISC does not build systems or operate networks, such 
as the HSDN. The ISC initiative ensures system and network investments 
support DHS' information sharing mission.

            OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

    Question. The President's budget proposes to create the Office of 
Screening Coordination and Operations, or SCO, within the Border and 
Transportation Security Directorate. How do you see this new office 
contributing to the Department's ability to implement the 9/11 
Commission recommendation regarding a comprehensive screening system 
with system-wide goals?
    Answer. I support the concept of a Screening Coordination and 
Operations (SCO) Office, and developed plans through the 2SR process to 
meet the goals of the office. Consistent with the 9/11 Commission 
recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO office will develop a 
more unified, comprehensive and efficient system for the screening, 
credentialing, and redress for passengers and leverage current 
investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO will harmonize IT 
architecture, uniform redress policies, and provide coordinated or 
shared services such as card production, biometric/biographic 
databases, as well as set DHS standards for information technology 
enterprise architecture and global enrollment systems/processes. The 
SCO office will develop a consistent approach for outreach in the areas 
of privacy, civil rights, and will coordinate R&D efforts. DHS will set 
up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006, as reflected in the Department's 
revised fiscal year 2006 request.
    Question. Should the SCO have actual operational authority for 
various screening programs as proposed, or should it focus on the 
integration and coordination function, for example the development of 
the Department-wide credentialing standards necessary across so many 
programs involved in this activity?
    Answer. I support the concept of a SCO Office, and developed plans, 
through the 2SR process, to meet the goals of the office. Consistent 
with the 9/11 Commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO 
office will develop a more unified, comprehensive and efficient system 
for the screening, credentialing, and redress for passengers, while 
leveraging investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO will 
harmonize IT architecture, establish uniform redress procedures, and 
provide coordinated or shared services such as card production, 
biometric/biographic databases, common DHS standards for information 
technology architecture, and global enrollment systems/processes. The 
SCO office will develop a consistent approach for outreach in the areas 
of privacy, civil rights, and helping to ensure coordinated R&D 
efforts. DHS plans to set up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006.
    Question. At the same time that significant programs are being 
proposed to be moved from Customs and Border Protection and the 
Transportation Security Administration, the President's budget does not 
propose moving the operational responsibility for any of the programs 
that incorporate screening of applicants out of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS). In order to ensure that there is the 
closest possible coordination across screening programs, should CIS 
screening programs also be moved to the SCO? Why wasn't CIS included?
    Answer. I support the concept of a SCO Office, and developed plans 
through the 2SR process to meet the goals of the office. Consistent 
with the 9/11 Commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO 
office will develop a more unified, comprehensive and efficient system 
for the screening, credentialing, and redress for passengers and 
leverage current investments in screening systems and tools. The SCO 
will harmonize IT architecture, uniform redress policies, and provide 
coordinated or shared services such as card production, biometric/
biographic databases, as well as set DHS standards for information 
technology enterprise architecture and global enrollment systems/
processes. The SCO office will develop a consistent approach for 
outreach in the areas of privacy, civil rights, and will coordinate R&D 
efforts. DHS will set up the SCO office in fiscal year 2006, as 
reflected in the Department's revised fiscal year 2006 request.

                                US VISIT

    Question. How do you plan on addressing the issue of integration of 
the two fingerprint systems--IDENT at the Department of Homeland 
Security and IAFIS at the Federal Bureau of Investigation?
    Answer. The US VISIT Program, working closely with CBP and ICE, and 
the Departments of Justice and State, leads the IDENT/IAFIS integration 
efforts. DHS' systems receive daily updates from the FBI with 
information from a variety of criminal and threat-related databases. 
There are several different ongoing efforts to bring about 
interoperability between the IDENT and IAFIS.
  --DHS (US VISIT) established an integrated project team (IPT) with 
        the FBI (Criminal Justice Information Services or CJIS) to 
        address the policy, business requirements, and technical 
        aspects of integrating IDENT and IAFIS. This IPT has made 
        significant progress in resolving many of the long-standing 
        issues in the DOJ Office of the Inspector General's report. A 
        report, describing plans for interoperability, was submitted to 
        Congress on August 18, 2005.
  --Integrated IDENT/IAFIS workstations will be deployed to sites that 
        will have US VISIT--115 airports, 15 seaports, and 165 land 
        border ports of entry--as well as to specific ICE field office 
        locations, by the end of calendar year 2005.
  --DHS and DOJ have completed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to 
        resolve data access and privacy issues concerning FBI usage of 
        US VISIT data.
    Question. Are there any DHS/FBI jurisdiction issues hampering the 
integration effort?
    Answer. DHS and DOJ/FBI have achieved an effective working 
relationship on integration. As noted above, DHS (US VISIT) and FBI 
(Criminal Justice Information Services or CJIS) have established an 
integrated project team (IPT) to address the policy, business 
requirements, and technical aspects of integrating IDENT and IAFIS. 
This IPT has made significant progress in resolving many of the long-
standing issues originally referenced by the DOJ Office of the 
Inspector General. A report, describing plans for interoperability, was 
submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.

                      GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

    Question. Mr. Secretary, in your written testimony you used cargo 
container security as an example of an area where the Department could 
do a better job coordinating across all departmental efforts. What 
impact have the various programs the Department is running had on cargo 
container security so far? What can be done better?
    Answer. Since September 11, 2001, the various cargo security 
programs now operated by the Department have made great strides in 
moving us towards a system of security that prevents the use of the 
supply chain in a terrorist attack while enhancing supply chain 
efficiency and reliability. Before September 11, most cargo security 
efforts were centered at the port and based on local perceptions of 
risk. Today we have improved data reporting through the 24 Hour Rule 
supported by centralized targeting at National Targeting Center. This 
capability coupled with the Container Security Initiative has allowed 
us to revolutionize the customs function by allowing us to interdict 
threats before they leave for the United States.
    Our current programs and capabilities have laid the foundation for 
a truly 21st century international trade system, one that will support 
growth in international trade and our security interests. Other 
efforts, such as Operation Safe Commerce, the Advanced Container 
Security Device program and the Advance Trade Data Initiative, will 
provide us with the knowledge and tools to help us get there. To that 
end, I am reviewing the status of DHS's cargo security efforts, how 
they can be further strengthened and how we can further transform the 
system to ensure the United States security and economic needs are met.
    Question. What is the status of the final report on Operation Safe 
Commerce, and when will it be submitted to this Committee?
    Answer. The report on Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) requires 
submission of program information from OSC's three participating load 
centers. One participant's input was behind schedule but has recently 
been received. This information will be integrated into a report and 
distributed for review by relevant experts. We expect the report to be 
issued by the end of December 2005.
    Question. What more should be done in this area?
    Answer. I am reviewing the status of DHS's cargo security efforts, 
how they can be further strengthened and how we can further transform 
the system to ensure the United States security and economic needs are 
met.

                        AGRICULTURAL INSPECTIONS

    Question. The April 14, 2005, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Office of Inspector General Report regarding coordination between the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Agriculture 
indicates that coordination has been less than adequate for the last 2 
years. Specifically, the report mentions APHIS personnel being denied 
entry to ports-of-entry to conduct its required regulatory reviews. 
What are you doing to change this situation?
    Answer. CBP and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal 
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) signed in February 2005 
Appendix 8 to Article 8 of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between 
DHS and the USDA. The MOA establishes and enhances coordinated actions 
and operations between the two agencies and responds to many of the 
issues raised in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) report.
    CBP and USDA APHIS have forged a new working relationship and 
resolved many of the earlier port access issues. CBP, in conjunction 
with APHIS, has entered into several programs, such as the targeted 
program for imported cut flowers to apply inspection resources on a 
risk managed basis (i.e., focus on commodities that pose a higher risk 
to American Agriculture). Also, CBP and APHIS have worked together in 
numerous ways to synchronize and verify information and data collected 
about inspections such as the Joint Quality Assurance Program, which 
provides a quality assurance team to conduct port reviews. CBP and USDA 
employees are working together cooperatively and sharing information. 
CBP has worked with USDA to achieve the appropriate level of access to 
the ports of entry for APHIS personnel. As Congress has provided, the 
inspectional functions were transferred from USDA to CBP. CBP has set 
forth procedures that have facilitated USDA access to the ports to 
perform their functions.
    Question. The OIG report includes information of the lengthy time 
that was required to negotiate and sign official agreements between 
APHIS and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Several of these have 
taken more than 12 months. Additionally, APHIS reported that attempting 
to elevate issues within the Department of Homeland Security was not 
productive due to high turnover in the policy-making levels of DHS. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 split the agriculture responsibilities 
between these two agencies. If this is not working, should this 
situation be reevaluated?
    Answer. Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (the Act) 
transferred to DHS the inspectional functions of APHIS relating to 
agricultural import and entry inspection. By the provisions of the Act, 
the Secretary of USDA and the Secretary of DHS were required to execute 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to cover this transfer in more 
detail. The MOU was signed on February 28, 2003.
    Under the provisions of the MOU, the two agencies would work out 
further details of this relationship by the means of appendices to 
particular articles in order to allow for the development of procedures 
that would work for both agencies. To date CBP and APHIS have signed 
appendices to all the articles except for Article 4 that involves 
training in order to allow for the development of procedures that would 
work for both agencies. The time spent in developing the correct 
procedures has been well worth the delay as the training functions 
between the two agencies are working effectively. A completed Appendix 
for Article 4 is expected to be signed in early summer 2005.
    We have also developed procedures and mechanisms to work through 
issues as they arise in the future. The time taken to draft, negotiate 
and finalize these appendices has been a necessary part of a growing 
partnership between these two agencies. The organizational and 
functional task allocations are working. The agricultural program is 
being strengthened through training and cross training.

                       NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL

    Question. The Administration released the Interim National 
Preparedness Goal (the Goal) on March 31, 2005. States are required to 
update their State Homeland Security Strategies, by October 1, 2005, 
with an assessment of what gaps remain in each state's ability to meet 
the tasks and capabilities laid out in the Goal. The proposal put forth 
by the fiscal year 2006 President's budget would prioritize Federal 
funding received by State and local governments for first responders 
not just by threat and vulnerability, but also by ``essential 
capabilities'' as defined in the Goal. Each State is required to file 
an addendum by October 1, 2005, to its State Homeland Security Strategy 
to reflect how it will address the seven national priorities. Is this 
enough time for the States to do a thorough evaluation of what 
capabilities each has now?
    Answer. Yes, DHS believes that there is enough time for the States 
to complete a thorough evaluation of their current capabilities. 
Specifically, in fiscal year 2005, during year 1 of the implementation 
of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, States and urban 
areas are required to update their existing homeland security 
strategies. To meet this requirement, the Department is asking States 
and urban areas to review their existing strategic goals and objectives 
and bring them into alignment with the seven National Priorities 
outlined in the National Preparedness Goal by September 30, 2005. (The 
seven National Priorities are: (1) Implement the National Incident 
Management System and National Response Plan; (2) Expand Regional 
Collaboration; (3) Implement the Interim National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan; (4) Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration 
Capabilities; (5) Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities; 
(6) Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and Decontamination 
Capabilities; and (7) Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis 
Capabilities.) This first step in HSPD-8 implementation will not 
require States or urban areas to conduct a wholesale rewrite of their 
strategies, nor will they have to complete another risk and 
capabilities assessment as they did in fiscal year 2003. DHS completed 
guidance on completing this strategy in June 2005. More detailed 
information on this requirement was presented to State and urban area 
representatives at three National Preparedness Goal rollout conferences 
throughout April and May 2005. Additional details are also available to 
State and urban area representatives through their designated 
Preparedness Officers within the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
in the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness (OSLGCP).
    Question. An important aspect of the National Preparedness Goal has 
not been defined, the levels of capabilities for differently sized 
jurisdictions. How are Manchester, NH, and New York, NY, supposed to 
know what different types of capabilities that each should have for a 
chemical incident?
    Answer. The Interim National Preparedness Goal establishes the 
national vision and priorities that will guide DHS' efforts, in 
conjunction with appropriate stakeholders, to set measurable readiness 
benchmarks and targets to strengthen the Nation's preparedness. The 
Target Capabilities List is a set of 36 essential capabilities that 
should be developed and maintained, in whole or in part, by various 
levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks and major disasters. DHS, working with 
stakeholders, is currently developing national target levels for the 
capabilities and the role of Federal agencies, states, local 
jurisdictions, the private sector and non-governmental organizations in 
building and maintaining the network of capabilities across the country 
required for large-scale incidents. Local jurisdictions will be 
expected to build and maintain levels of capability appropriate to 
their risk. DHS has invited Federal agencies, State representatives, 
and national associations to participate in a series of workshops to 
set the target levels.
    Question. How will you encourage States to be thorough in their 
assessment of their capabilities?
    Answer. In out-year implementation of HSPD-8, States will be 
required to assess their current capabilities against target levels of 
capability that will be defined in the Target Capabilities List. 
However, in fiscal year 2005, the capability assessment will be 
conducted through a representative sampling of States and/or sub-state 
regions to test and validate the assessment process prior to nationwide 
implementation. As part of this representative sampling of 
capabilities, DHS will develop user-friendly tools based on the Target 
Capabilities List to ensure that both States and multi-disciplinary 
subject-matter expert teams conducting the assessments are thorough in 
their evaluation of capabilities. In addition, DHS will provide 
customized reports to States that link their existing capabilities and 
grant expenditure data to the National Priorities outlined in the 
National Preparedness Goal in order to assist States as they begin to 
implement HSPD-8.
    Question. What is the incentive for a State to close a gap if doing 
so results in less funding for that State?
    Answer. The Department believes there are sufficient incentives for 
States to build both regional and statewide capabilities and close 
identified gaps in overall preparedness. Enhanced preparedness to 
protect against, respond to, and recover from incidents of a national 
emergency, including terrorism, will ultimately result in minimizing 
the adverse impact on lives, property, and the economy that are 
inherent to a catastrophic event. The protection of citizens, critical 
infrastructure, businesses, and communities is a shared goal, requiring 
Federal, State, local, international, and private sector partnerships. 
Throughout the Nation, States are embracing this goal as the ultimate 
incentive, as they work to implement the National Preparedness Goal. 
Finally, the extent of ``unmet gaps'' will not be the sole determinant 
of DHS grant allocations.
    Question. How exactly does the Administration envision this 
working?
    Answer. The Interim National Preparedness Goal includes a vision, 
which is ``to engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their 
private and non-governmental partners, and the general public to 
achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, 
protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to 
minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy.''
    The Interim National Preparedness Goal and companion National 
Preparedness Guidance outline how the Nation will achieve this vision. 
The Guidance outlines a 10-step national process for Capabilities-Based 
Planning that will be used to identify target levels of capability, 
achieve them, and assess preparedness from the local to the national 
level. The Goal and Guidance establish seven National Priorities 
focused on developing some of the more critical capabilities from the 
Target Capabilities List for which the Nation is currently the least 
prepared (Information Sharing and Collaboration; Interoperable 
Communications; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 
Explosive (CBRNE) Detection, Response, and Decontamination; and Medical 
Surge and Mass Prophylaxis) and overarching initiatives (to implement 
the National Incident Management System, National Response Plan, 
Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, and expand regional 
collaboration) that will facilitate those efforts. The Guidance 
highlights existing Federal program efforts that support the seven 
National Priorities and describes a schedule of activities for States 
and urban areas to update assessments and strategies with Federal 
assistance.
    The process is collaborative, iterative, and risk-based. Homeland 
security is a shared responsibility and depends upon shared efforts. 
This approach will be implemented through multi-agency and multi-
discipline working groups at the national and regional (or multi-
jurisdiction) level. Federal preparedness assistance will explore ways 
to offer incentives and rewards for collaboration. This approach 
involves a continuous cycle of activity to refine our assumptions and 
planning tools and share best practices and lessons learned. This 
approach recognizes that while all jurisdictions are subject to some 
degree of risk, the capabilities and levels of capability that are 
needed to manage risk vary considerably across the Nation. Annual 
status reports will provide a more meaningful assessment of national 
preparedness. Data collection will simplify over time as tools are 
refined and consolidated. This approach will provide a sound basis for 
decisions at all levels of government to allocate resources based upon 
risk and need.
    Question. Will ``essential capabilities'' as defined by the 
National Preparedness Goal be considered equal to threat information, 
population density, or other factors?
    Answer. The development of the target capabilities, or ``essential 
capabilities,'' by Federal, State, local, and tribal entities and the 
private sector will be driven by relevant threat information, 
population size and density, critical infrastructure, and other 
factors. DHS is working with Federal, State, local, tribal, private 
sector, and non-governmental stakeholders to refine the Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) for re-issuance on October 1, 2005. This new 
version of the TCL will assign the capabilities by level of government 
and tiers (groupings of local jurisdictions). The primary purpose of 
the tiers is to account for reasonable differences in target levels of 
capability (or system-specific elements of capability) among groups of 
jurisdictions based on differences in risk factors such as total 
population, population density, and critical infrastructure.
    Question. Once a State obtains certain capabilities, how do we 
sustain that effort? Should the States be responsible for sustainment 
costs?
    Answer. As we have barely begun to assess current capabilities, it 
is premature to speculate about future funding requirements once the 
most significant gaps are closed. While maintenance of effort will 
largely be State and local responsibility, DHS will continue to assist 
States in building and sustaining the target capabilities. 
Additionally, every State and locality will have a role in achieving 
and sustaining the 36 capability target levels. However, the target 
capabilities are a planning tool, not a funding formula. Implementing 
Capabilities-Based Planning is a long-term effort that will help the 
Nation to achieve the capacity to perform all 36 target capabilities at 
the levels needed to effectively prevent, protect against, respond to, 
and recover from major events, especially terrorism. Not until States 
and urban areas have assessed and realigned their homeland security 
strategies and plans will DHS be able to fully determine which of the 
36 target capabilities will require additional funding.

                      FUNDING FOR FIRST RESPONDERS

    Question. Just in the last few weeks national news reports have 
questioned the use of first responder grants in relation to homeland 
security. In January of 2005, the Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Inspector General issued a report questioning how the 
Department prioritized port security grants.
    Given all of this, how confident are you that every dollar that has 
been allocated for homeland security grants has been well spent?
    Answer. In general, homeland security port security grants have 
been well spent. Recognizing that issues emerged with some projects, 
the Department disagreed and non-concurred with the IG's finding that 
projects received funding despite ranking ``average to worse'' during 
the evaluation process. Following TSA's second round of grant awards in 
2003, ODP made $75 million available for port security grants under the 
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). ODP, in consultation with TSA 
and SLGCP, utilized a risk-based approach, which differed from the 
program's original competitive process to select 14 eligible port areas 
and the corresponding funding amounts for each area. TSA then provided 
unfunded applications from its second round to ODP, which in turn, 
funded 86 projects. TSA provided what they considered to be the next 
projects that had been evaluated from the previous round that deserved 
funding. All of the 86 projects were funded based on TSA's 
recommendations.
    The Department has made significant efforts to improve the Port 
Security Grant Program in light of the Inspector General's (IG) report. 
The report recommended that the Department accelerate the acquisition 
of more information from applicants about the scope of their projects 
in an effort to expedite the spending of grant awards. We concur with 
this recommendation and will ensure that appropriate guidance on the 
submission of relevant information within specified timeframes is 
included in the application kit for the forthcoming fiscal year 2005 
Port Security Grant Program. Additionally, the IG report recommended 
that the Department ensure that the program has sufficient operational 
expertise to administer the program after the award is made. We concur 
with this recommendation as well, and have established a Transportation 
Infrastructure Security Division (TISD) within SLGCP to administer the 
fiscal year 2005 Port Security Grant Program. Given the reforms in 
response to the IG report, DHS port security grants will be managed 
even more effectively under the fiscal year 2005 Port Security Grant 
Program. Additionally, SLGCP has developed mechanisms intended to 
increase accountability of all grant programs, an effort recognized in 
a recent GAO Report entitled, ``Management of First Responder Grants 
Has Improved, but Challenges Remain'' (#05-121).
    Question. The Senate and the House Appropriations Committees asked 
for a report on homeland security grant spending. This report is to 
include information on what has been purchased with all of the grant 
dollars from fiscal years 2002 through 2004, whether these purchases 
complied with the State Homeland Security Strategies, and an 
explanation as to how this spending has enhanced the Nation's security. 
That report was due March 31, 2005, but it has not yet been submitted. 
When can we expect it?
    Answer. The congressional report on ``State and Local Government 
Preparedness and Funding for Fiscal Year 2002-Fiscal Year 2004'' was 
delivered to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on May 6, 
2005.
    Question. If the Department goes to a completely threat-based 
formula, are you comfortable with how threats are determined now? I 
know we can't talk in detail in an open forum--but what, if anything, 
would you change?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget proposes a risk-
based homeland security funding process, of which threat is one 
component along with consequence and vulnerabilities. DHS will consider 
risk factors such as threat, presence of critical infrastructure, 
vulnerability, population and population density, international 
borders, and ports of entry in making final award determinations. This 
process will be modeled on the fiscal year 2005 UASI program, which 
combined five variables designed to objectively prioritize funding for 
high-threat, high density urban areas. A threat estimate index 
developed from an estimate of credible threats and incidents as well as 
an index that considered law enforcement investigative activity and 
enforcement will be used. The difficulty of determining which States 
and urban areas most are at risk is subjective to some degree because 
of the nature of most intelligence information and the scarcity of data 
specifically identifying targeted states, cities and infrastructure. 
Therefore, the current allocation methodologies that consider threat 
information represent the best available combination of data, current 
understanding of threats, and expert judgment.
    Question. What restrictions are placed on the use of these grant 
funds?
    Answer. DHS released detailed guidance for the use of grant funds 
contained in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP). Specific guidelines on intended purpose and the allowance of 
certain types of expenditures vary between the six different programs 
contained in the HSGP. HSGP allowable costs are divided into planning, 
organization, equipment, training, and exercise categories. Management 
and administrative and certain operational costs are also allowed under 
certain programs. Allowable equipment categories for the fiscal year 
2005 HSGP are listed on a web-based Authorized Equipment List on the 
Responder Knowledge Base, which is sponsored by ODP and the Oklahoma 
City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism at 
http://www.rkb.mipt.org.
    The fiscal year 2005 HSGP guidance also details certain 
restrictions placed on the use of grant funds, which vary by program. 
For example, funding in the UASI and Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program programs may not be used for overtime to supplant 
ongoing, routine public safety activities of State and local emergency 
responders, and may not be used to hire staff for operational 
activities or backfill. However, these programs do allow up to 25 
percent of the awards to be used for operational expenses and overtime 
for periods of heightened alert, for personnel to participate in 
information, investigative and intelligence sharing activities related 
to homeland security, and finally, in the hiring of contractors/
consultants for participation in information/intelligence sharing 
groups. Another example of restriction on funds involves construction 
and renovation. Use of HSGP funds for construction is generally 
prohibited and is allowable only when it is a necessary component of 
(1) a security system at critical infrastructure facilities or (2) an 
emergency operations center (EOC). Details on other restrictions for 
certain types of equipment, training, and exercises are provided in the 
fiscal year 2005 HSGP guidance.
    Question. What audits have been done, or are underway, to ensure 
that these grant funds are used appropriately? What other controls does 
the Department have at its disposal to oversee the use of grant funds?
    Answer. During calendar year 2004, SLGCP was a part of over 14 
governmental audits, ranging from the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to the DHS Inspector General to the House Appropriations Survey & 
Investigations Staff (S&I). Many of these audits looked at the 
expenditure of grant funds by the States and territories. Some of these 
audits have provided final reports, and most of those reports reflect 
SLGCP's ability to efficiently process the grant, as well as provide 
programmatic assistance and oversight to the states. A recent GAO 
Report entitled, ``Management of First Responder Grants Has Improved, 
but Challenges Remain'' (#05-121) credits SLGCP with developing 
requirements intended to hold States and localities accountable for how 
grant expenditures were planned, justified, expended, and tracked.
    In order to assure fiscal and programmatic oversight, ODP 
Preparedness Officers have robust monitoring and reporting tools 
through which they can monitor expenditures by grantees. The Initial 
Strategy Implementation Plan and the Biannual Strategy Implementation 
Report provide detailed expenditure information by discipline, solution 
area (such as equipment or training) and project area. These reports 
require grantees to tie any expenditure of homeland security funds to 
goals and objectives outlined in their State or Urban Area Homeland 
Security Strategy. They also provide important data on what projects 
are being accomplished by States and localities. In addition to the 
almost daily contact with grantees, Preparedness Officers also perform 
a formal on-site monitoring visit to their States at least once a year, 
in accordance with program office protocols. This visit allows for both 
programmatic and financial compliance monitoring. The Department of 
Justice's Office of the Comptroller (OC) also performs random, risk-
based financial audits of SLGCP grantees. Each State Administrative 
Agency (SAA) also is subject to its own State audits. The combination 
of these external and internal inspections provides the required 
oversight over the use of SLGCP grant funds.

                      INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

    Question. The Federal Government has been working for many years to 
crack the nut of moving more quickly towards true interoperability. Do 
you see the creation of the Office of Interoperability and 
Compatibility as helping move towards that goal? Is this just another 
Office that will put forth a lot of effort and get very little 
advancement?
    Answer. The Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate's Office for 
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) has made significant 
achievements in helping the Federal Government move more quickly 
towards interoperability. The OIC was created to address critical 
interoperability issues relating to public safety and emergency 
response, including communications (the SAFECOM Program), equipment, 
training and other areas as needs are identified.
    Since its inception OIC has:
  --Released Version 1.0 of the first ever comprehensive Public Safety 
        Statement of Requirements (SoR) for Communications and 
        Interoperability (SoR), which defines the functional 
        requirements for public safety practitioners to communicate and 
        share information when needed, where needed, and when 
        authorized.
  --Developed the Interoperability Continuum, a tool designed to help 
        the public safety community and local, tribal, State, and 
        Federal policy makers address critical elements for success as 
        they plan and implement interoperability solutions. The 
        critical elements include governance, standard operating 
        procedures, technology, training/exercises, and usage of 
        interoperable communications.
  --Created the Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning 
        (SCIP) Methodology, based on lessons learned from assisting the 
        Commonwealth of Virginia in developing a strategic plan for 
        improving statewide communications interoperability. The SCIP 
        Methodology serves as a guide for States to consider as they 
        initiate statewide communications planning efforts.
  --Developed coordinated grant guidance which provides the public 
        safety community with consistent guidance, coordinated 
        application processes, similar requirements across grant 
        programs, and general guidelines for implementing a successful 
        wireless communications system. This guidance was incorporated 
        in the fiscal year 2003 FEMA and fiscal year 2003/fiscal year 
        2004 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant awards, 
        as well as ODP grant packages in fiscal year 2004.
  --Drafted a report as required by the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act that discusses DHS plans for 
        accelerating voluntary consensus standards for interoperable 
        communications.
  --Managed the RapidCom initiative, in which the Office worked with 
        ten urban areas to provide requested assistance to help improve 
        incident level interoperability capabilities and developed a 
        methodology for a communications table top exercise that is 
        replicable across urban areas.
  --Awarded a contract to develop and execute the nationwide 
        interoperability baseline study in January 2005. The purpose of 
        the study is to quantify the extent to which the Nation's 
        public safety first responders are interoperable technically 
        and operationally.
    With respect to other critical interoperability issues, the OIC has 
done the following:
  --Created the Risk Assessment Policy Group (RAP) from representatives 
        within DHS to address and resolve discrepancies in risk 
        assessment criteria and methodologies. RAP hosted a workshop 
        with stakeholders from the Department to clearly define the 
        scope of the risk assessment problem and to develop a strategy 
        for addressing the problem.
  --Created the Joint Evaluation and Testing Program (JET) to 
        coordinate Federal programs that conduct testing and evaluation 
        of public safety technologies. JET hosted a planning meeting 
        with representatives from DHS, the National Institute of 
        Standards and Technology, and the Department of Justice to 
        define the scope of the JET program.
    Question. The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness reports that in fiscal year 2004 more than $890 million of 
the grants given to States and locals were used in some way for 
interoperable communications, equipment, studies, etc. What is being 
done to help States and locals today to make better decision about 
investments in interoperable communications?
    Answer. SLGCP has leveraged the S&T Directorate's SAFECOM program's 
development of standards and grant guidance to help create the 
Interoperable Communication Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP). ICTAP 
is a technical assistance program designed to enhance interoperable 
communications between local, State, and Federal emergency responders 
and public safety officials. The goal of the ICTAP program is to enable 
local public safety agencies to communicate as they prevent or respond 
to a WMD attack. The ICTAP program provides free, on-site support using 
a systems engineering approach. The ICTAP technical assistance team 
works closely with the UASI site's Urban Area Working Group to assess 
the current communications infrastructure for gaps and to translate 
operational requirements into technical requirements that can be used 
to design an interoperable communications system.

                           AIR CARGO SECURITY

    Question. Does the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
have any cost estimates for screening 100 percent of the baggage and 
cargo on passenger planes?
    Answer. The total amount of cargo transported on passenger aircraft 
represents less than 25 percent of the total air cargo volume 
transported in the United States. TSA completed a study in 2002, ``The 
Air Cargo Security Scenario Analysis Report,'' that indicated that the 
cost of screening 100 percent of the cargo transported on passenger 
aircraft at the top 42 airports, which handle 95 percent of the total 
volume of air cargo transported in the United States, would cost $500 
million in the first year and $3.8 billion over 10 years.
    Question. Though you cannot deter every threat, do you believe 100 
percent screening of high-threat of bags and cargo is the best use of 
our Federal resources?
    Answer. TSA has taken a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air 
cargo screening. This approach helps the agency appropriately target 
screening efforts with the resources available. TSA believes that all 
cargo should be pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program 
or the Indirect Air Carrier Program, and that 100 percent of cargo that 
is identified as elevated-risk should be screened using appropriate 
technology and methods. Random inspections play an important, 
complementary role in the layered systems approach by managing risk 
without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.
    Currently all cargo that will be transported on passenger aircraft 
is pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program. Passenger 
air carriers, Indirect Air Carriers (IACs, or freight forwarders), and 
all-cargo carriers who transfer cargo to passenger planes all use the 
Known Shipper Program. TSA's Known Shipper Database has centralized the 
collection of data on about 450,000 known shippers and enabled vetting 
against government databases. To supplement the Known Shipper pre-
screening, air carriers are also required to conduct random screening 
of a certain percentage of air cargo.
    In 2005, TSA has developed an Air Cargo Security Roadmap that 
integrates many policy, operations, system, and regulatory enhancements 
to air cargo security. The cornerstone of this effort is the Freight 
Assessment System (FAS), which would enable TSA to better and more 
efficiently identify elevated-risk cargo for inspection. FAS will 
employ a sophisticated risk assessment engine to identify elevated-risk 
air cargo for inspection.
    Additionally, TSA has published a robust Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) for air cargo security. This NPRM is currently being 
developed into a final rule, which implements major security 
enhancements for indirect air carriers (IACs), all cargo carriers, 
passenger carriers, and airports.
    Finally, TSA oversees compliance with security requirements through 
a robust regulatory compliance program, which includes more than 900 
aviation security inspectors located throughout the United States.
    Question. How can we better tackle the issue of cargo security?
    Answer. TSA continues to make incremental and measured progress in 
the air cargo arena, among other things by prohibiting cargo from 
unknown shippers, significantly increasing the number of physical 
inspections of air cargo on passenger and all cargo aircraft, 
increasing its air cargo inspections workforce, strengthening the 
criteria for consideration as a known shipper, automating the 
validation of known shippers and indirect air carriers, and expediting 
research and development efforts to identify potential new 
technological solutions for the inspection of air cargo on passenger 
aircraft. TSA is also working closely with CBP to develop a targeting 
tool which will permit effective identification of elevated risk cargo 
with the ultimate goal of requiring the inspection of all such elevated 
risk cargo.
    Question. What is the right mix of screeners and technology when 
dealing with air cargo and how does the Department determine which 
resources to apply?
    Answer. TSA has taken a threat-based, risk-managed approach to air 
cargo screening. This approach helps the agency appropriately target 
screening efforts with the resources available. TSA believes that all 
cargo should be pre-screened for risk through the Known Shipper Program 
or the Indirect Air Carrier Program, and that 100 percent of cargo that 
is identified as elevated-risk should be screened using appropriate 
technology and methods. Random inspections play an important, 
complementary role in the layered systems approach by managing risk 
without unduly impeding the flow of commerce.
    TSA employees do not conduct the screening of air cargo. Rather, 
the screening is performed by air carriers and overseen by TSA. TSA 
issues regulatory requirements to air carriers in this area, and TSA's 
inspectors provide oversight and work to ensure that carriers are 
meeting their regulatory requirements.
    Question. What other means is TSA using to achieve more secure 
cargo-holds in passenger carriers?
    Answer. TSA is continuing efforts to design blast resistant cabin 
and cargo liners, as well as overhead bin mitigation technological 
solutions. The agency has completed initial feasibility studies for 
both passenger cabin and cargo hold liners. The results of the studies 
are promising. The agency is working on preliminary designs, and a 
prototype is expected by the end of calendar year 2005. TSA is also 
partnering with the FAA and aircraft manufacturers to determine which 
solutions are best suited for retrofitting existing aircraft with this 
new technology.
    Additionally, TSA is conducting a pilot program to evaluate the use 
of blast-resistant containers for cargo and baggage on passenger 
aircraft to fulfill the requirements of Section 4051 of Public Law 108-
458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The 
objective of the hardened unit load device (HULD) pilot program is to 
determine the feasibility, including operational impact, durability, 
cost, maintenance, training, blast containment, and logistics, of an 
HULD solution. The pilot program began in June 2005, and the data 
collection will last approximately 18 months from the start date.
    Question. How difficult is it for TSA to secure the air cargo 
processing ``footprint'' at the airports from the time of entry into 
the system maintaining a chain of custody until the moment of its 
loading onto a plane?
    Answer. Regulated airports already secure their air cargo 
processing ``footprint'' through security measures specified within 
their airport security program which identifies a portion of the 
airport as Secured Area, Security Identification Display Area, and 
Sterile Area. These security procedures are designed to prevent 
unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and ground 
vehicles within the air operations area. Current procedures require a 
personnel identification system which allows different levels of 
access, subjects individuals to employment history verification checks, 
and provides individual training.
    Question. What are other countries doing to address this issue?
    Answer. The United Nations' International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) establishes International Standards, Recommended 
Practices and Procedures covering the technical fields of aviation, 
including air cargo security.
    Countries or States, as commonly referred to by ICAO, are afforded 
a great deal of discretion to establish and implement measures to 
comply with standards directly related to air cargo security. The 
substance of ICAO's air cargo standards are as follows:
  --States shall ensure the implementation of measures at airports 
        serving international civil aviation to protect cargo and 
        baggage moved within an airport and intended for carriage on an 
        aircraft to safeguard such aircraft against an act of unlawful 
        interference.
  --States shall establish measures to ensure that cargo intended for 
        carriage on passenger flights are subjected to appropriate 
        security controls.
  --States shall establish measures to ensure that operators do not 
        accept consignment of cargo for carriage on passenger flights 
        unless the security of such consignments is accounted for by a 
        regulated agent or such consignments are subjected to other 
        security controls.
    The ICAO Security Manual provides guidance on how an ICAO Member 
State might comply with the standards. The methods of compliance 
provided in the guidance material are based on generally recognized 
practices and procedures common within the international civil aviation 
industry, but they are not the only means of compliance. ICAO 
recognizes that other methods of compliance may be equally appropriate.

                           TSA PASSENGER FEES

    Question. The President's budget request proposes increasing the 
passenger security fee by $3.00 from $2.50 to $5.50 for the first leg 
of an airline trip. Has TSA or the Department conducted any studies to 
determine what the flying public would pay in exchange for better 
aviation security?
    Answer. Yes. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 
enacted in November 2001, anticipated that the aviation industry, not 
the general taxpayer, would pay for airline security costs. To estimate 
the passengers' willingness to pay the additional cost of air 
transportation, TSA conducted an analysis that included comparing year-
to-year revenue collections, reviewing Department of Transportation 
data reported by the airlines themselves to estimate industry growth, 
utilizing the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) aviation industry 
forecast, and accessing major research studies that outline issues from 
airline fare structure to passenger demand and willingness to pay.
    TSA also conducted a review of current research on air passengers' 
willingness to pay for aviation security. Of particular interest to TSA 
was a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Corporation in 
August 2002 of airline passengers for the American Automobile 
Association (AAA). In that survey, approximately nine out of ten 
respondents indicated that they were willing to pay something more than 
the current passenger security fees. AAA's conclusion is as follows: 
``Americans remain committed to aviation security. It's one thing to 
demand increased security and to be unwilling to pay for it. No one 
likes to pay more for the goods or services we buy. But what this 
survey seems to say is that Americans not only want to feel secure when 
they fly, they are willing to pick up some of the cost, if necessary.''
    Question. What is the impact to the industry?
    Answer. TSA believes that the modest fee increases of this proposed 
budget should not undermine passenger traffic nor worsen the industry's 
health. U.S. air traffic reported for 2004 by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) is near or above the year 2000 levels. Despite the 
re-imposition of fees after a 4 month suspension under the Emergency 
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11), the 
DOT domestic passenger traffic statistics showed an increase from a 
total of 588 million in 2003 to 630 million in 2004--a 7.2 percent 
increase.
    TSA researched the impact the fee increase might have on airline 
profitability. TSA was unable to locate any study that conclusively 
linked a passenger fee increase, applicable to all airlines, with a 
measurable decline in airline profitability. The September 11 Security 
Fee is a uniform fee imposed on the passengers of all similar air 
carrier operations and flights. Consequently, the fee should not put 
individual airlines in a competitive disadvantage with one another. In 
fact, the security and other aviation fees comprise a larger percentage 
of the ticket price for low cost carriers, yet the low cost carriers 
are currently the most profitable among the domestic airlines.
    TSA regularly monitors the state of the aviation industry, 
including the level of operations and the financial status of the 
airlines. Here are two examples of informational sources TSA uses in 
order to accomplish this goal:
  --Various publications of the DOT Airline Fares Consumer Report were 
        analyzed, and it was found that the answer depends upon various 
        factors such as market size, number of carriers, and market 
        structure. The data shows that competition within the aviation 
        industry has a stronger influence on base fares than security 
        fees.
  --Canada has extensively researched the economic impact of its 
        passenger security fee called Air Travelers Security Charge. 
        Using both Canadian and U.S. data, the researchers concluded 
        that markets with traffic levels over 100,000 passengers are 
        relatively price inelastic (an increase in price results in 
        either no or virtually no reduction in demand.). The research 
        results did not find that the September 11 Security Fee impacts 
        airline profitability.
    Question. Does the passenger fee proposal require legislation or 
are there other options?
    Answer. The passenger security service fees were authorized by the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act and codified at 49 U.S.C. 
44940. Currently, 49 U.S.C. 44940(c) limits the passenger fee to $2.50 
per enplanement, not to exceed $5 per one-way trip. The proposal to 
increase the passenger fee would require 49 U.S.C. 44940(c) to be 
modified to set the new fee level at $5.50 per enplanement, not to 
exceed $8 per one-way trip.
    Question. The budget requests that this fee change be legislated on 
an appropriations bill. However, this should properly be submitted to 
the authorizing committees of jurisdiction. Has the President 
transmitted the proposed legislation to Congress for consideration and 
if not, why?
    Answer. The President provided a legislative proposal to modify 
this fee authority in the fiscal year 2006 budget. In Title V--General 
Provisions of the Appendix (page 526), the proposal states: ``SEC. 517. 
In Chapter 449 of title 49, United States Code, section 44940(c) is 
amended by striking `$2.50' and replacing it with `$5.50', and striking 
`$5.00' and replacing it with `$8.00'.'' This modification to the fee 
authority would allow TSA to implement the fee increases sought in the 
President's fiscal year 2006 Budget.
    Question. What will be the impact on DHS' programs and activities 
if this legislative proposal is not enacted as a general provision of 
the Appropriations Act or by the appropriate authorizing committee?
    Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry, 
passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is 
sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity 
of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is 
intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from 
the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work 
with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.
    Question. When would such a fee request have to be enacted to fund 
fiscal year 2006 activities?
    Answer. TSA estimates that if the fee were to be enacted in time to 
be effective at the beginning of fiscal year 2006, the agency will be 
able to raise as much as $1.879 billion in additional fees. If the 
proposal is enacted after October 1, the delay involved in providing 
the necessary updates in fees and guidance to the industry could result 
in reduced collections.
    Question. What new aviation security measures would you put in 
place utilizing the increased revenues or will these resources be used 
throughout the Department?
    Answer. The purpose of the fee increase is not to fund new 
activities. Rather, it is to offset funding from the general fund with 
fee revenue. Compared to the past and current level of 50 percent or 
less, the fee would contribute to offsetting nearly the full amount of 
TSA screening costs.
    These costs represent the vast majority of TSA's aviation security 
screening costs. TSA does not have the authority to offset any other 
costs with the aviation security fee collections. The increased fees on 
passengers, the users of the security screening, will ensure fee levels 
approaching near full recovery of the Federal cost to operate the 
system.

                     TSA AIR CARRIER SECURITY FEES

    Question. At the direction of the Committee, GAO has completed a 
review in order to validate the air carrier's estimates of their 
security costs in 2000. GAO found that the estimates, currently the 
foundation for the fees paid to the Department by the airlines, are 
$127 million too low. Due to these findings, Mr. Secretary, will you 
take action to collect the additional fees from the airlines?
    Answer. In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, (Public 
Law 108-334) Congress directed the GAO to determine how much air 
carriers spent on security screening in 2000--the basis for the fee 
imposed on airlines. GAO completed its review and issued a report on 
April 18, 2005. The report concludes that the amount of the industry-
wide passenger and property screening costs was between $425 million 
and $471 million, with a midpoint estimate of $448 million. The 
midpoint difference between what is collected now and what GAO 
indicates should be collected is $129 million. However, GAO's estimate 
did not include certain cost categories (e.g.; real estate, CAPPS, and 
positive bag match) due to the unavailability of information within the 
timeframe provided. The cost of these items could be significant. TSA 
is currently reviewing all the findings of the. Once TSA completes its 
review, the agency will proceed as quickly as practicable to address 
the issue.
    Question. Will TSA require legislation to change the air carriers' 
charges or can this be done through regulation?
    Answer. No legislation is required. The fiscal year 2005 Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act and the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 44940, provide sufficient 
authority for TSA to collect additional amounts from the air carriers. 
However, changes to the air carriers' fees would require changes to 
regulations currently in effect at 49 CFR Part 1511.
    Question. When must the regulation be in place in order to generate 
enough revenues to cover your costs in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. To collect the air carrier fee at the current level of 
approximately $315 million in fiscal year 2006, no new or changes in 
the regulation would be required. The $350 million estimated in the 
President's budget captures costs that are currently disputed or not 
reported altogether by air carriers due to bankruptcies. TSA is in the 
process of pursuing the amounts under dispute. The unreported and 
disputed costs will be determined and charged when TSA implements the 
new structure for the air carrier fee, for which rulemaking is 
currently in progress. Additionally, TSA is currently reviewing GAO's 
findings that the aviation security costs self-reported by the air 
carriers should be $448 million, $129 million more than originally 
reported by the industry.
    Question. Will your regulatory proposal focus on changing the basic 
structure of how airlines are charged for security costs or is it 
intended to focus on the difference between the actual revenue 
generated, $350 million, and TSA's target last year of $750 million?
    Answer. TSA is evaluating the current regulatory approach to 
determining if change is needed.
    Question. For fiscal year 2005, there are some that estimate the 
air carrier fee will generate only $315 million, not $350 million. What 
are you planning to do to address any shortfall?
    Answer. The $315 million represents a total rounded year 2000 cost 
figure reported by all carriers to TSA. The $350 million estimate 
captures costs that are currently disputed or not reported altogether 
by air carriers due to bankruptcies. TSA is in the process of pursuing 
the amounts under dispute. The unreported and disputed costs will be 
determined and charged when TSA implements the structure for the air 
carrier fee, for which rulemaking is currently in progress.
    Question. What activities will go unfunded or deferred as a result 
of the funding gap?
    Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry, 
passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is 
sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity 
of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is 
intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from 
the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work 
with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.

                         TSA CONTRACT SCREENERS

    Question. What analysis has the Department done to determine 
whether contracting for private screeners is cost-effective and equally 
or more effective in terms of security than a federalized force?
    Answer. TSA commissioned an independent evaluation of the five 
pilot airport passenger screening programs that was completed in April 
2004. The evaluation utilized a methodology that included the 
following:
    Evaluation Categories:
  --Security effectiveness: covert test results, Threat Image 
        Protection (TIP), and re-certification scores;
  --Customer/stakeholder satisfaction: customer surveys, stakeholder 
        surveys, and customer complaints; and
  --Cost: total cost the contractor charged for screening services 
        (including only contract payments and costs borne by TSA) 
        compared to estimates on how much would have been spent by TSA 
        had the agency conducted the screening operations at those 
        airports.
    The evaluation concluded that there was no statistical difference 
in any of the three evaluation categories between private and Federal 
screeners. In addition, as more airports transition to the Screener 
Partnership Program (SPP), TSA plans to continue to measure costs of 
Federal screening operations compared to private screening companies.
    TSA also commissioned an activity-based cost (ABC) study to provide 
improved visibility into the costs of specific business processes and 
activities, and the associated resources (e.g., people, technology) 
consumed by those processes and activities (i.e., cost per bag or 
person screened). The ABC study included ten randomly selected airports 
that utilize TSA screeners and the five pilot airports. The study will 
better enable TSA to identify and collect the cost and performance 
metrics needed to establish a successful, ongoing cost and performance 
management framework at TSA. The results of the ABC study will provide 
another means for TSA management to assess screening operations by 
airport.
    Question. Is TSA establishing a cost benchmark and collecting the 
right kind of information in order to evaluate the costs of providing 
Federal screeners vs. the costs of having contract screeners?
    Answer. TSA plans to develop a cost baseline for each airport that 
applies to participate in the SPP. This cost baseline will be used to 
evaluate cost proposals from private screening companies. The results 
of the TSA activity-based cost study will also support development of 
these baselines.
    Question. In what ways is it more effective for the government to 
use contract screeners?
    Answer. An independent evaluation concluded that there was no 
statistical difference between private and Federal screeners. TSA 
believes that the independent evaluation, along with the activity-based 
cost study, confirms that TSA has been successful in administering an 
effective private screening program that is capable of providing 
security screening services at levels required by the ATSA.
    Question. What incentives do you have in place and what are you 
doing to address the private sector's concerns about security liability 
related to the private screener workforce?
    Answer. In directing TSA to establish a contract screening pilot 
program (PP5), the ATSA required that the level of screening services 
and protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal to or greater than 
the level provided at an airport with Federal screeners. Consequently, 
as airports consider whether to continue with Federal screening or to 
apply to the SPP, their decisions can be based on their own preferences 
and criteria rather than considerations of security, resources, or 
level of service.
    ATSA states that TSA shall allow an airport operator to submit an 
application to have screening carried out by the screening personnel of 
a qualified private screening company. TSA is committed to developing a 
fair, balanced program that does the following:
  --Meets ATSA standards
  --Ensures security
  --Seeks to establish a strong public/private partnership
  --Provides significant opportunity for innovation, efficiency, and 
        cost savings to the taxpayer
  --Provides decentralized management
  --Incorporates best practices and lessons learned from recent studies 
        of the Pilot program, and continues to evaluate and learn on an 
        on-going basis
  --Is performance-based
  --Does not restrict airport participation
  --Respects Federal and private sector workforces
    Under ATSA, the decision to apply for private screening services 
lies with individual airport operators. However, should TSA approve the 
application, TSA will continue to oversee airport security, whether an 
airport has private contract screeners or Federal screeners.
    TSA does not provide specific liability limitations for private 
passenger and baggage screening services. However, vendors can apply 
for protections under the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act). Enacted as part of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, the SAFETY Act provides incentives for the 
development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating a 
system of risk and liability management. The purpose of the Act is to 
ensure that the threat of liability does not deter potential 
manufacturers/sellers from making anti-terrorism technologies 
available. The Act provides two types of benefits: (1) Designation as a 
Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (``QATT''), which among other 
benefits limits the seller's liability to the amount of available 
insurance, and (2) Certification as an Approved Product for Homeland 
Security, which allows the seller to assert the Government Contractor 
Defense. Sellers must apply for SAFETY Act protections and are 
evaluated in accordance with the statutory criteria. Protections under 
the SAFETY Act only apply when a QATT has been deployed in defense 
against, response to, or recovery from an act of terrorism. The Act 
contains a very broad definition of technology, which includes both 
tangible products and services as long as they designed, developed, 
modified, or procured for the specific purpose of preventing, 
detecting, identifying, or deterring act of terrorism.
    TSA is working with the S&T Directorate, which is charged with 
making determinations regarding the SAFETY Act. TSA understands that 
two of the private contract screening companies under the PP5 program 
have been granted designation under the SAFETY Act. TSA will also 
continue to work closely with DHS and the S&T Directorate regarding any 
decision DHS makes concerning the potential legal exposure of all 
entities participating in the Screening Partnership Program.
    Question. How well have the privatized screeners at the 5 pilot 
airports worked?
    Answer. TSA believes that private screeners and Federal screeners 
perform equally as well in screening passengers.
    Question. A recent article in Government Security News reports that 
the traveling public is more satisfied with the private screeners than 
the Federal screeners. Is this an accurate statement?
    Answer. This is not an accurate statement. TSA's annual customer 
service survey showed that for the second year in a row there was very 
little difference in the high degree of confidence and satisfaction air 
travelers have in TSA-trained screeners--Federal or private. For the 
second year in a row, air travelers gave consistently high marks to 
TSA's security screeners. Between 80 and 95 percent of passengers gave 
positive responses when asked about seven aspects of the Federal 
security screening process, which included thoroughness and courtesy of 
screeners as well as confidence in TSA's ability to keep air travel 
secure. In addition, TSA is meeting or exceeding passenger expectations 
for security line wait times.
    Question. This past November TSA opened the Program Management 
Office to assist airports in privatizing their screener workforce. How 
many applications for private screeners has this office received?
    Answer. As of May 2005, TSA has received seven applications from 
airport operators seeking to participate in the SPP. All five of the 
airports that participated in the private screening pilot program (PP5) 
have applied (San Francisco, Kansas City, Rochester, Jackson Hole, and 
Tupelo), along with two new airports (Elko, Nevada and Sioux Falls, 
South Dakota).
    Question. How many applications for private screeners at airports 
do you anticipate receiving?
    Answer. The decision on whether to apply to the SPP rests solely 
with the airport. Therefore, although several airports have expressed 
interest in participating in the program, TSA cannot speculate on how 
many will actually apply.
    Question. How did you determine the level of screening service to 
be provided at these 5 airports?
    Answer. The ATSA requires that the level of screening services and 
protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal to or greater than the 
level provided at an airport with Federal screeners. TSA will continue 
to set one standard for security for the entire commercial aviation 
system, whether an airport has Federal screeners or private screeners. 
TSA will ensure that standards are met through TSA security protocols, 
extensive contract oversight, conducting covert testing, and continuous 
oversight by Federal Security Directors and their staff in both Federal 
and SPP airports.
    Per ATSA, TSA is also required to supervise private screening 
services at each SPP airport. Private screeners must perform at the 
same or better level as Federal screeners and comply with Federal 
passenger and baggage screening standard operating procedures.
    ATSA also gives TSA the ability to terminate a contract with a 
private screening firm for repeatedly failing to perform. TSA will not 
hesitate to take action against airports using contract screeners if 
they fall below Federal security standards, and TSA will vigorously 
enforce the contract requirements.
    Question. Are the screening standards for the privatized airports 
negotiated or does TSA establish them?
    Answer. TSA applies the same rigorous security standards, referred 
to officially as Standard Operating Procedures, to private screeners as 
it does to the Federal screeners. Passenger and baggage security 
screening standards are non-negotiable.
    Question. Does the contract include paying for the annual 
recertification of screeners by the contractor as well as compensation 
and benefits?
    Answer. Yes. Screener annual re-certification training is conducted 
by and paid for by TSA. Private screener compensation and benefits are 
also funded by TSA up to the point required by the ATSA which mandates 
that private screeners receive compensation and benefits are not less 
than the compensation and benefits for Federal screeners.
    Question. Does the private screener workforce have access to 
Federal benefits or is this just strictly a contract for services 
provided?
    Answer. No, private screener workforce employees do not have access 
to Federal benefits. While the ATSA mandates that private screeners 
receive compensation and benefits that are not less than the 
compensation and benefits for Federal screeners, those benefits are not 
provided by the Federal Government. Screeners employed by private 
screening companies do receive benefits, and TSA monitors the overall 
pay and benefits package provided by private screening companies to 
ensure that the ATSA-mandated minimum is attained.
    Question. What changes would you recommend to the contract screener 
program?
    Answer. At the present time, TSA is not seeking changes to the ATSA 
regarding provisions to this program. TSA is open to and welcomes 
dialogue with airports and Congress on any improvements that could be 
made to the SPP. Some of the changes airports have indicated that they 
would like to see include the following:
  --Change ATSA's requirement that private screening compensation and 
        benefits be equal to or greater than Federal compensation and 
        benefits
  --Allow airports to share in any savings realized. For example, cost 
        savings realized at an airport with private screeners would be 
        used to enhance security screening at that airport
  --Investigate pooling worker's compensation insurance to reduce costs 
        through economies of scale
  --Investigate broadening the private screening contractor's scope of 
        responsibility to include other non-screening functions that 
        impact security screening (e.g., document checkers, baggage 
        handlers, bin runners, equipment maintenance, etc.)

                         TSA SCREENER TRAINING

    Question. How many hours of training does the average screener 
receive?
    Answer. The ATSA requires that all screeners complete a minimum of 
40 hours of classroom training and 60 hours of On-the-Job (OJT) 
training. In addition to this basic training requirement, TSA Federal 
Security Directors (FSD) also use a standard of 3 hours per week 
(measured on average over a calendar quarter) of scheduled duty time, 
per screener, to accomplish recurrent, administrative, and professional 
development training. The FSD must create a training schedule that 
meets the goal of the 3 hours per week standard as well as the specific 
performance and developmental needs of each individual screener. In 
addition, TSA provides screeners with additional skills directly 
related to specific screener duties. An example is the On-screen Alarm 
Resolution Protocol (OSARP) Training. OSARP allows screeners to 
evaluate items causing an alarm and to potentially clear those items 
without subjecting the bag to a secondary search. The training for 
OSARP totals 19.5 hours and includes classroom training, small group 
simulator training, hands-on individual simulator training, and OJT 
training.
    Question. Who conducts the training?
    Answer. Basic screener training is overseen by TSA's Office of 
Workforce Performance and Training (WPT). The training is provided by 
instructors under contract with TSA or by local TSA Approved 
Instructors (TAIs) when possible. On-the-Job, cross-over, recurrent, 
and specialized training is conducted by local TSA personnel (i.e., 
TAIs, Training Coordinators, Screener Supervisors) and via the Online 
Learning Center. Advanced training is initially provided by WPT 
contractors and then sustained by TAIs.
    Question. Does this training include anything regarding ethics and 
baggage theft?
    Answer. During the initial 100 hours of basic training, TSA 
requires all screeners to review and sign a Code of Conduct. This Code 
of Conduct emphasizes such issues as public trust and honesty. Once 
initially trained, screeners continually receive recurrent professional 
ethics training including the ``Customer Service Web-Based Training,'' 
which reinforces TSA's customer service principles and gives the 
screener training in various scenarios requiring effective customer 
service responses. Screeners are also provided the ``TSA Pledge to 
Travelers,'' which emphasizes TSA's dual mission of providing World 
Class Security and World Class Customer Service, assures the traveling 
public that they are entitled to a security screening experience that 
is professional and courteous, and that any experience to the contrary 
should be reported back to TSA. In addition, TSA has sent several 
communications to all employees (not just screeners) of their 
responsibilities on ethical conduct, including the restrictions under 
the Hatch Act related to the acceptance of gifts by Federal employees. 
All employees also receive a copy of and are required to sign TSA HRM 
Letter No. 735-1, Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and 
Conduct, which contains many of the Standards of Conduct provisions. 
Finally, to remind screeners of the consequences of unethical behavior, 
TSA has disseminated Management Directive 1100.75-3 informing screeners 
of the policies and procedures for disciplinary actions that could be 
taken against them.
    TSA is committed to providing comprehensive ethics training and is 
currently developing a general ethics course that is expected to be 
available via the Online Learning Center by the end of the third 
quarter of fiscal year 2005. This course will cover topics such as 
principles, misuse of position, gifts, and outside activities.
    Question. What is your response to the OIG's report regarding 
baggage theft by screeners?
    Answer. TSA's responses to the specific recommendations in the 
Inspector General's report are as follows:
    Recommendation 1.--Evaluate the adequacy of supervision, the 
physical layout of inspection stations, and the feasibility of 
installing electronic surveillance techniques near inspection stations.
    TSA continuously reviews procedures related to the screening of 
baggage including supervision of personnel, physical layout, and 
electronic surveillance techniques. The agency will continue to do so 
by implementing the congressional requirements of the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act concerning checked baggage 
screening area monitoring, which requires the Under Secretary for 
Border and Transportation Security to provide assistance, subject to 
the availability of funds, to public airports that have baggage 
handling areas that are not open to public view in the acquisition and 
installment of security monitoring cameras for surveillance of such 
areas in order to detect theft from checked baggage and to aid in the 
speedy resolution of liability claims against TSA.
    TSA's Office of Aviation Security Programs is working closely with 
the Office of the Chief Information Officer to plan and execute a 
program for the installation of electronic surveillance systems (ESS) 
to deter and detect incidents of baggage pilferage and claims arising 
from such incidents. $14 million has been made available for ESS 
systems in fiscal year 2005 and plans are being developed to either 
install ESS where none existed before or make use of or supplement 
existing airport systems to leverage available resources. TSA is 
working in partnership with airports to find the most cost effective 
means to install and maintain current and future ESS systems.
    Searching checked baggage in view of the passenger obviously 
mitigates incidents of pilferage, but as inspection stations move away 
from lobbies and into airport baggage handling areas, ESS will rise in 
importance as will emphasis on proper supervision of such areas.
    Recommendation 2.--Include a module on professional ethics in its 
screening training curriculum.
    A general ethics course is under development and should be 
available on the Online Learning Center in the next 4-6 weeks. This 
course will be mandatory for all TSA employees, with a second component 
required for all supervisors available during the same timeframe. New 
employees will have 90 days to complete this course. For existing 
employees, the training will be required within 6 months.
    On pages six and seven of the draft report, there is discussion of 
previous cases of prosecution against TSA screeners based on ``sting'' 
or surveillance evidence. The Office of Workforce Performance and 
Training will incorporate the occurrence of such incidents into an 
existing lesson that is currently taught in all three of the basic 
screener training courses (Dual Function Screener, Passenger, and 
Baggage).
    Currently, TSA screeners do receive some ethics training though 
they are not required to receive annual ethics training because they do 
not file financial disclosure reports. The field attorneys at the 
Office of Chief Counsel often make annual ethics training sessions for 
financial disclosure filers at their airports available to the screener 
workforce as well. TSA screeners received the TSA Guide to Major Ethics 
Rules as new employees. Also, all employees must sign the TSA HRM 
Letter No. 735-1, Interim Policy on Employee Responsibilities and 
Conduct, which contains many of the Standards of Ethical Conduct 
provisions. Field attorneys have also displayed ethics posters in TSA 
offices and breakrooms.
    Additionally, in 2003 and 2004, several articles in The Sentinel 
were published on ethics issues, including the 14 Principles of Ethical 
Conduct, gifts, buddy passes, and the Hatch Act. The Sentinel is a 
newsletter distributed to the entire TSA workforce.
    Recommendation 3.--Resume negotiating an agreement with the airline 
industry on shared liability for lost or stolen baggage claims.
    TSA recently resumed discussions with the airline industry based on 
the following set of objectives: (1) improve customer service, 
including communication to the passengers about where to file claims; 
(2) enhance detection of fraud, including duplicative claims; (3) 
facilitate cooperation in resolving exceptional claims when necessary; 
and (4) develop open channels of communication between the Claims 
Management Office and airline claims offices.
    At a meeting on January 11, 2005, the airlines were receptive to 
these proposed goals, and TSA provided a white paper to the airline 
community describing our proposed goals in June 2005. The airline 
associations will then share this paper with their members and provide 
feedback to TSA. The goal is to have a memorandum of cooperation that 
all domestic airlines are able to sign by late summer 2005.
    General Comment to the Report.--The topic of property inadvertently 
left out of bags is discussed on page 7 of the OIG report. TSA 
recognizes that this is a problem and has advised that this property be 
handled as lost and unclaimed property. Under lost and unclaimed 
procedures, property recovered after checked baggage has been screened 
will be inventoried and held for at least 30 days to provide the owner 
an opportunity to reclaim the property. Should it be unfeasible or 
impractical for the owner to reclaim the property in a timely fashion, 
and he or she has evidence that TSA opened his or her baggage through 
such means as a Notice of Inspection, the passenger may submit a claim 
for the missing property.
    Question. How do you track a screener's progress in terms of 
consistently utilizing the skills and delivering the appropriate and 
acceptable service and security they've been trained to deliver?
    Answer. As mandated in a February 2004 TSA Management Directive, 
all training accomplishments must be documented in TSA's centralized 
Online Learning Center (OLC). TSA management routinely monitors 
compliance with mandatory training requirements and recurrent training 
guidelines. Federal Security Directors (FSD) are responsible for 
ensuring compliance locally on an individual basis.
    The aforementioned management directive has been updated as part of 
the routine annual review cycle and was circulated for comment within 
TSA in May 2005. This update includes clear language on the 
responsibility of the training administrator to document all required 
training within 30 days (7 days for screener basic training), the 
supervisor's responsibility to ensure their employees have completed 
all required training, and the role of the course sponsor to monitor 
national compliance with program requirements. TSA intends to ensure 
that all employees complete the required amount of training by 
incorporating this requirement into the fiscal year 2006 Performance 
Agreements of all TSA supervisors.
    In May 2005, the OLC was enhanced to include a much more robust 
reporting engine that will provide Training Administrators and Course 
Sponsors with detailed accountability reports.
    Additionally, screeners must undergo re-certification each year. 
The re-certification program for 2004-2005 includes three separate 
paths: passenger, dual function, and baggage. Passenger screeners must 
pass three modules. Module 1 is a job knowledge, Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP)-specific test. Module 2 is an image test. Module 3 
contains practical skills demonstrations. Dual function screeners take 
both job knowledge tests for passenger and baggage screeners, an image 
test, and practical skills demonstrations. Baggage screeners must pass 
two modules, a job knowledge, SOP-specific test and practical skills 
demonstrations.
    To be re-certified, screeners have to pass all applicable modules 
of the Knowledge and Skills Assessment Program and achieve a rating of 
meets or exceeds' standards on their annual Personal Performance 
Assessment. Screeners are afforded one opportunity for remediation and 
retest. Following a retest, those screeners who fail to re-certify are 
terminated.
    Question. How do you hold the screeners accountable for 
inappropriate behavior?
    Answer. The responsibility and accountability for employee conduct 
issues rests with the Federal Security Directors at airports. TSA has 
implemented a leadership model that requires managers to address 
behaviors that fail to support the TSA mission and to work with 
employees to engage in appropriate behaviors or face consequences for 
continued patterns of misconduct. TSA has also implemented policies to 
implement single step termination procedures for high-risk offenses 
such as illegal drug use, alcohol on duty, and theft. TSA regards the 
commission of such offenses as posing a potential security risk. TSA is 
always mindful of ensuring that due process protections for employees 
are maintained and has appropriate appeal mechanisms for conduct 
matters to include the Disciplinary Review Board, the Agency Grievance 
process and appeals to the Office of Civil Rights. In addition, TSA has 
a Professional Review Board at headquarters to review and take 
appropriate action for misconduct involving senior level employees.
    Question. What are the penalties for poor performance?
    Answer. The penalties for poor performance range from counseling to 
removal depending upon the nature, cause, and severity of the 
performance deficiency. Additionally, screeners must undergo re-
certification each year. Failure to re-certify may result in 
termination or, in special cases, retraining.
    Question. In the worst case what is the threshold for removal from 
work?
    Answer. TSA has established mandatory termination procedures for 
offenses such as illegal drug use, alcohol on duty, and theft. TSA 
regards the commission of such offenses as posing a potential security 
risk. In addition, TSA has established policies for first offense 
terminations for matters affecting integrity and security at the 
airport such as sleeping on duty, violations of Standard Operating 
Procedures, security breaches, and criminal conduct.
    Question. With such a high workmen's compensation number--one of 
the highest of the Federal workforce--is there specialized training in 
place to address this?
    Answer. In early fiscal year 2003, TSA met Congressional deadlines 
to hire Federal airport passenger screeners and achieve checked baggage 
screening using Explosive Detection Systems. As the TSA screening 
workforce was deployed, it became apparent that injuries caused by 
lifting and quickly moving baggage were a serious problem. TSA 
initiated a safety program in the second quarter of fiscal year 2003 to 
address the high rate of injuries.
    Fiscal year 2004's rate increase from fiscal year 2003 is 
attributed, in part, to the processing of backlogged claims from 
incidents that actually occurred in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year 
2004, TSA began implementation of an Occupational Safety and Health 
program aimed at lowering TSA's injury and illness rate. By the 
midpoint of fiscal year 2004, a decrease in the number of claims could 
be seen, and the decrease appears to be continuing into fiscal year 
2005. Training, guidance, a nurse intervention program, and the 
availability of field safety support have contributed significantly to 
the decrease. For example, in the first 15 weeks of operation, the 
nurse intervention program at 21 pilot airports yielded savings of over 
$2.2 million.
    It is important to emphasize that airline baggage handling is among 
the most injury prone occupations in the private sector. TSA is 
committed to the well-being of its employees and is taking the steps 
necessary to reduce screener injuries by improving working conditions 
and appropriately managing the claims process.
    TSA has also distributed a safety awareness Web-Based Training 
(WBT) course both as a CD and via the Online Learning Center. This 
safety awareness WBT course covers such topics as proper lifting 
techniques, heat injury prevention, and checkpoint and checked baggage 
safety. In addition, training on radiation safety awareness is being 
developed.

                   TSA ``NO FLY'' LISTS/SECURE FLIGHT

    Question. How does one get on the ``no fly list'', and more 
importantly, how does someone get off the list?
    Answer. U.S. Government intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
collect, analyze, and evaluate data used to nominate subjects to the 
No-Fly List. Intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers within 
these organizations carefully review nominations based on the No-Fly 
List criteria and thoroughly evaluate the information during each step 
of the process. Watch List nominations often contain classified and/or 
sensitive law enforcement investigative information. Nominations that 
meet the established criteria are forwarded to the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center for 
inclusion in the TSC Data Base (TSDB) and for addition to the No-Fly 
List. Time sensitive nominations may be routed directly to the TSC if 
required.
    If it is determined that a person on the No-Fly List should no 
longer be identified as a No-Fly subject, they will be removed from the 
list. If additional intelligence data is developed or a subject has 
been interviewed by U.S. Government officials and deemed no longer a 
threat, an official request for removal must be submitted to the agency 
that placed the individual on the list. The original nominating agency 
will evaluate the data and determine whether the person stays on or is 
removed from the No-Fly List. The nominating agency will then make a 
formal request through the nomination chain requesting that the person 
be removed from the No-Fly List. In some cases, a review of the 
derogatory information associated with a No-Fly nomination may result 
in the subject being downgraded to the TSA Selectee List.
    The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is currently 
developing a redress process for addressing any situation where 
passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out 
for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This 
process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously 
placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with 
the nominating agency to review the derogatory information. The redress 
process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as 
appropriate.
    TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons 
who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity of their 
names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists. 
A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a 
completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA 
will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these 
procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a 
boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as 
other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the 
following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
    However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the 
watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers 
from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and 
identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This 
information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required 
identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly 
determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose 
name is actually on the watch lists.
    In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her 
inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after 
the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
    Question. What is TSA doing to address the fact that people are 
erroneously placed on the list or have mistaken identities?
    Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for 
persons who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity 
of their names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the 
watch lists. A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by 
submitting a completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA 
headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a determination 
of whether these procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-
in process for a boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification 
Form, as well as other information, has been posted on TSA's public 
website at the following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
    However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the 
watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers 
from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and 
identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This 
information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required 
identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly 
determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose 
name is actually on the watch lists.
    In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her 
inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after 
the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
    The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is currently 
developing a redress process for addressing any situation where 
passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out 
for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This 
process will also allow passengers who feel they have erroneously been 
placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with 
the nominating agency to review the derogatory information.
    Question. What's the appeal process for these people? Is it within 
or outside TSA?
    Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for 
persons who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity 
of their names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the 
watch lists. A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by 
submitting a completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA 
headquarters. TSA will review the submission and reach a determination 
of whether these procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-
in process for a boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification 
Form, as well as other information, has been posted on TSA's public 
website at the following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
    However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the 
watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers 
from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and 
identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This 
information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required 
identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly 
determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose 
name is actually on the watch lists.
    In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her 
inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after 
the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
    Question. Is there legal recourse for those mistakenly put on the 
list?
    Answer. The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is 
currently developing a redress process for addressing any situation 
where passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled 
out for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. 
This process will also allow passengers who feel they have erroneously 
been placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work 
with the nominating agency to review the derogatory information.
    Question. What is the Department doing to address the serious 
concerns about privacy and the use of personal passenger information?
    Answer. To protect passengers' personal information and civil 
liberties, TSA and the Secure Flight program will:
  --Limit the collection of personal information to only what conforms 
        to the relevant and necessary standard according to The Privacy 
        Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552 (a));
  --Limit access to the information to only those TSA employees and 
        contractors who have a ``need to know'' clearance in order to 
        perform their duties associated with Secure Flight operations;
  --Ensure that each employee and contractor associated with the Secure 
        Flight program has completed the TSA mandatory privacy training 
        prior to beginning work on the program;
  --Limit sharing of personal information to the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation (FBI) and intelligence agencies that need the 
        information for investigatory purposes related to aviation 
        security, in accordance with TSA's Privacy Act System of 
        Records Notice published for the program;
  --Include a built-in auditing mechanism to detect unauthorized access 
        to the personal information stored for the program;
  --Limit the retention of the data. TSA has requested that the 
        National Archives and Records Administration approve a 72-hour 
        retention period for the information collected and used for the 
        Secure Flight program unless a longer retention period is 
        requested by the passenger for redress; and
  --Include robust redress mechanisms to enable passengers to work with 
        TSA to resolve instances in which they think they are being 
        inappropriately selected for secondary screening or they are 
        having a difficult time obtaining boarding passes.
    Question. TSA has a program under development, called Secure Flight 
which takes personal passenger information and compares it to the ``no 
fly list'' in an effort to identify suspected terrorists traveling by 
air. How do you respond to concerns raised by both the DHS OIG and the 
GAO about the Department's handling and use of the personal passenger 
information related to Secure Flight? What are you doing to remedy the 
situation?
    Answer. To protect passengers' personal information and civil 
liberties, TSA and the Secure Flight program will:
  --Limit the collection of personal information to only what conforms 
        to the relevant and necessary standard according to The Privacy 
        Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552 (a));
  --Limit access to the information to only those TSA employees and 
        contractors who have a ``need to know'' clearance in order to 
        perform their duties associated with Secure Flight operations;
  --Ensure that each employee and contractor associated with the Secure 
        Flight program has completed the TSA mandatory privacy training 
        prior to beginning work on the program;
  --Limit sharing of personal information to the FBI and intelligence 
        agencies that need the information for investigatory purposes 
        related to aviation security, in accordance with TSA's Privacy 
        Act System of Records Notice published for the program;
  --Include a built-in auditing mechanism to detect unauthorized access 
        to the personal information stored for the program;
  --Limit the retention of the data. TSA has requested that the 
        National Archives and Records Administration approve a 72-hour 
        retention period for the information collected and used for the 
        Secure Flight program unless a longer retention period is 
        requested by the passenger for redress; and
  --Include robust redress mechanisms to enable passengers to work with 
        TSA to resolve instances in which they think they are being 
        inappropriately selected for secondary screening or they are 
        having a difficult time obtaining boarding passes.
    Question. Why did you discontinue development of Secure Flight's 
predecessor CAPPS II?
    Answer. On September 24, 2004, DHS announced its intent to 
implement a next generation aviation passenger pre-screening program 
called Secure Flight. Unlike CAPPS II, Secure Flight will focus only on 
identifying potential terrorist threats (those people on watch lists) 
and, if a decision is made to use commercial data, it will be utilized 
in a focused and limited manner. Under Secure Flight, TSA will take 
over from the air carriers responsibility for the comparison of 
domestic airline Passenger Name Record (PNR) information against 
terrorist watch lists. Secure Flight will meet DHS' goals of improving 
the security and safety of travelers on domestic flights, reducing 
passenger airport screening time, and protecting privacy and civil 
liberties. Consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), TSA will begin implementing Secure 
Flight in August 2005.
    TSA recently concluded initial system effectiveness testing for 
Secure Flight. The commercial data testing began on March 18, 2005, and 
preliminary test results for the commercial data testing are expected 
later in 2005.
    Secure Flight is designed to improve the efficiency of the 
prescreening process and reduce the number of people selected for 
secondary screening. TSA will compare domestic flight PNR information 
against records contained in the consolidated watch lists contained in 
the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB), including the expanded No Fly 
and Selectee lists. Consolidating these checks within the Federal 
Government will allow TSA to automate most watch list comparisons and 
apply more consistent, internal analytical procedures when automated 
resolution of initial ``hits'' is not possible. Secure Flight will help 
eliminate false positive watch list matches, improve passengers' 
experience under the existing system by helping move passengers through 
airport screening more quickly, reduce the number of individuals 
selected for secondary screening, and allow for more consistent 
response procedures at airports for those passengers identified as 
potential matches. Consequently, TSA will be able to concentrate its 
screening resources more efficiently.
    Finally, Secure Flight will only pre-screen travelers on domestic 
flights, while CBP will continue to vet passengers on international 
flights.

                       AIR TRAVELER SATISFACTION

    Question. TSA is one of DHS' most visible agencies since they 
interact with the air traveling public on a daily basis. What is the 
most common complaint TSA receives?
    Answer. TSA captures complaints reported at airports using TSA's 
web-based Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS). In April 
2005, the most common complaint recorded by TSA's PMIS was the addition 
of butane lighters to TSA's Prohibited Items List, which was required 
by IRTPA (Public Law 108-458), Section 4025.
    The most common complaint currently received by the TSA Contact 
Center (TCC) and recorded in the Inquiry Management System (IMS) 
involves the delays passengers experience during the airport check-in 
process as a result of having a name similar to, or the same as, 
individuals who are on a Federal watch list.
    Question. Recently, TSA completed a customer satisfaction survey, 
what did it find?
    Answer. The TSA developed the Customer Satisfaction Index for 
Aviation (CSI-A), which is a performance measure of our aviation 
screening program. The CSI-A score represents the customer satisfaction 
response based on a scale of zero to 100 percent where zero represents 
``very dissatisfied'' and 100 percent represents ``very satisfied''. 
The CSI-A provides customer service and maintains public confidence 
while maintaining a high level of security. There are three components 
of the CSI-A: passenger surveys conducted at airports, national poll 
results conducted by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), and 
complaints and compliments received by TSA.
    The CSI-A score for fiscal year 2005 is 79 percent. The following 
scores reflect the breakout of each component:
  --Passenger surveys conducted at airports=79 percent
  --National poll results=75 percent
  --Trend of complaints and compliments received by TSA=no significant 
        change in trends
  --The change in trends indicate the changes in feedback (complaint 
        and compliments) received by TSA via the Performance 
        Measurement Information System and the TSA Call Center. The 
        aforementioned trend indicated the changes in feedback against 
        time for fiscal year 2004.
    Highlights of the 2005 passenger satisfaction survey are as 
follows:
  --91 percent of passengers were satisfied with their overall 
        experience at the passenger checkpoint;
  --89 percent of passengers thought security was adequate, as opposed 
        to excessive; and
  --82 percent of passengers have confidence in TSA's ability to keep 
        air travel secure.
    Question. What other means are you using to validate the customer 
feedback findings of the survey?
    Answer. TSA collects customer feedback on a daily basis. Customers 
have two means through which to provide feedback on their experience--
providing the feedback while at the airport or contacting the TCC. 
Feedback received at airports is recorded using the web-based system 
known as the PMIS. PMIS enables TSA personnel at airports to record the 
feedback received from customers on a daily basis. In addition, PMIS 
offers airports the ability to record the number of compliments and 
complaints received according to a variety of categories. The 
categories are the same as those used by the TCC. Examples of 
categories include, but are not limited to: discourteous treatment, 
slow processing, and improper handling of property. This data in 
addition to the data from the TCC contributes to one of the three 
components of the Customer Satisfaction Index for Aviation.
    Question. What role does the TSA Contact Center play regarding 
customer service?
    Answer. The TCC serves as TSA's central customer service point of 
contact for all non-media public inquiries. These inquiries can be made 
to the TCC via telephone, facsimile, correspondence, and e-mail. The 
inquiries usually take the form of compliments, complaints, or requests 
for information on a particular issue or problem. For example, an 
individual may have a question regarding whether a particular item is 
prohibited in either checked or carry-on luggage and the Customer 
Service Representative (CSR) or agent will respond accordingly. If an 
individual has a complaint, the CSR will either attempt to resolve the 
matter or, if appropriate, refer the matter to a Customer Support and 
Quality Improvement Manager at the airport for appropriate action and 
follow-up with that individual. In addition, given the nature of the 
contact, a matter may need to be elevated to TCC management and/or 
referred to a program office within TSA for assistance. Furthermore, 
based on investigation or analysis of complaints and inquiries made to 
the TCC, recommendations are made to improve agency policies, 
procedures and practices.
    The TCC also performs a security role in protecting the Nation's 
transportation systems. For example, the TCC forwards to TSA's 
Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) any communications or 
contacts mentioning, referencing, or alleging threats or security 
vulnerabilities. The TSOC will then take appropriate action to resolve 
the issue.
    Question. What progress and improvements has TSA made using both 
the survey and the Center's feedback?
    Answer. All feedback received by the passengers is used to make 
management decisions. Trend analyses, such as review of the top three 
complaints, are provided and reviewed by senior leadership on a monthly 
basis. Specific issues that are the result of recent policy changes are 
also addressed, such as recent complaints on pat-down searches and the 
amended Prohibited Items List. TSA headquarters is also rolling out a 
pilot program at ten airports to test a standardized customer comment 
card. The card is designed to provide a means for convenient and quick 
feedback at the airport level.
    Question. How do you respond to the recent Government Security News 
article that passengers prefer private screeners' treatment of the 
passengers being screened?
    Answer. The TSA annual customer service survey showed that for the 
second year in a row there was very little difference in the high 
degree of confidence and satisfaction air travelers have in TSA-trained 
screeners--Federal or private. For the second year in a row, air 
travelers gave consistently high marks to TSA's security screeners. 
Between 80 and 95 percent of passengers gave positive responses when 
asked about seven aspects of the Federal security screening process, 
which included thoroughness and courtesy of screeners as well as 
confidence in TSA's ability to keep air travel secure. In addition, on 
average TSA is meeting or exceeding passenger expectations for security 
line wait times.
    Question. How are your wait times and your wait time web page 
working for TSA?
    Answer. TSA continually seeks to evaluate and understand factors 
that increase wait times and how our service and staffing models can 
decrease wait times and improve the screening process for passengers. 
All airports collect and report wait time data each hour of each day 
and on the half hour during peak hours of the day. This allows TSA to 
monitor the customer experience in order to ensure the traveling public 
is not overburdened with lengthy wait times while not compromising 
security. The wait time data is used to make improvements to checkpoint 
configurations and appropriate staffing levels.
    Since collection of wait time data, the national average wait time 
has decreased to less than three minutes. Similarly, the average wait 
time during peak periods has decreased by almost four minutes since 
January 2004.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Nationwide      Nationwide
                  Month                    average wait    average peak
                                               time          wait time
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 2004............................    3.35 minutes    14.0 minutes
April 2005..............................    2.95 minutes    10.1 minutes
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to using wait time internally to assist in identifying 
areas for improvement, TSA posts the wait time data on a public 
internet site available to travelers and the media. The URL can be 
found at http://waittime.tsa.dhs.gov/index.html. The web site provides 
the traveling public rolling average wait time by hour, by airport 
checkpoint, and by day of the week.
    Question. What recourse do complainants have?
    Answer. The recourse for complainants varies depending on the 
nature of the complaint. In the majority of cases, the matter is 
resolved by the Customer Service Representative (CSR) or agent who 
initially handles the inquiry by providing the individual with 
information as to why a particular action was taken or about processes 
currently in place. For example, in some cases, a TSA representative 
explains the redress process, usually used with claims or watch list 
issues, and provides the necessary forms. Unusual or less common 
complaints may need to be elevated to management and/or referred to the 
appropriate program office. This process ensures that TSA responds in a 
timely manner to inquiries received, while at the same time giving 
proper attention to any new trends or issues concerning TSA services. 
When an issue involves a particular airport, TSA refers the issue to a 
Customer Support and Quality Improvement Manager at the airport for 
appropriate action and follow-up with the complainant. The TSA Contact 
Center (TCC) is another vital tool and serves as TSA's central customer 
service point of contact for all non-media public inquiries. TSA 
headquarters is rolling out a pilot program at ten airports to test a 
standardized customer comment card. The card is designed to provide a 
means for convenient and quick feedback at the airport level. 
Additionally, TSA leadership contact information is on the website for 
program-related issues.
    Question. How many complaints does TSA receive and what's the 
average time for complaints to be resolved?
    Answer. At present, there is no single mechanism that captures all 
customer complaints, compliments, and inquiries. Currently, the system 
is not structured in a manner that separately breaks out numbers of 
compliments, complaints, and requests for information within any given 
subject matter category.
    The TCC handles approximately 40,000 non-media inquiries or 
contacts from the traveling public, including complaints, on a monthly 
basis. In addition, TSA receives complaints, as well as other types of 
contacts, through other channels. For example, the Claims Management 
Office (CMO) receives approximately 2,400 claims on a monthly basis. 
Customer comments also come into TSA through Customer Support and 
Quality Improvement Managers at airports. At this time, there is no 
system that centrally tracks the complaints received by TSA through its 
various channels.
    The time it takes to resolve any particular complaint varies 
depending on the nature of the complaint. In the majority of cases, the 
matter is resolved by the CSR or agent who initially handles the 
inquiry by providing the individual with information as to why a 
particular action was taken or about processes currently in place and 
the average talk time for these calls is approximately four minutes. 
The TCC does not currently track how long it takes to resolve a matter 
when an agent needs to elevate a call to a particular program office or 
the field for resolution.
    Question. Is there a customer service function in TSA to take 
complaints at each airport and if so what types of training do these 
employees receive?
    Answer. Many airports have a staff person assigned to manage the 
customer service function. The staff position is called Customer 
Support and Quality Improvement Manager (CSQIM). The CSQIM works 
closely with TCC to receive and respond to complaints and inquiries at 
the airport level.
    Some airports have forms available for customer comments at the 
checkpoints. TSA headquarters is rolling out a pilot program at ten 
airports to test a standardized customer comment card. The card is 
designed to provide a means for convenient and quick feedback at the 
airport level.
    Customer service courses are offered to CSQIM employees via the TSA 
online training center. Five customer service courses are now available 
(see descriptions below). An in-service training program, designed 
specifically for CSQIM employees, is being researched for future 
implementation.
    Excellence in Service.--Fundamentals for Managers will help you 
develop the skills needed to effectively relate to customers, fulfill 
their basic needs, and exceed their expectations. You will be provided 
with opportunities to differentiate between internal and external 
customers, take ownership for customers' needs, and make sure your 
customers are completely satisfied.
    In ``Excellence in Service.--Working with Upset Customers,'' you 
will learn how to successfully serve upset customers, calm upset 
customers, and deal with abusive customers. In addition, you will learn 
how to control your own emotions and reduce your level of stress.
    In ``Excellence in Service.--Communicating with Your Customers,'' 
you will learn how to build rapport with your customers, and discover 
how non-verbal communication is interpreted by customers. In addition, 
you will learn telephone skills, including how to project 
professionalism and how to provide quality customer service over the 
telephone. Finally, you will learn how to communicate effectively with 
your customers through e-mail.
    In ``Excellence in Service.--Providing Superior Customer Service,'' 
you will learn how to develop and maintain a positive attitude, show 
extra attentiveness to your customers, and use customer-friendly 
language. In addition, you will learn how to effectively solve 
customers' problems and benefit from their complaints.
    In ``Excellence in Service.--Establishing Service Standards,'' you 
will learn what customers really want from your organization and how 
they evaluate your service, as well as how to create and implement 
effective service standards. In addition, you will learn how to monitor 
your service standards and how to correct problems that cause service 
to fall below the standards.
    Question. Do you find that the complaints are related to TSA's 
security measures and the navigation through the airports or is it 
related to interactions with the airlines?
    Answer. The TCC is responsible for handling all non-media inquiries 
from the traveling public. Each contact is assigned a subject category 
based upon the nature of the call. Among the available subject 
categories, one captures ``Airline Issues'' and another captures 
``Airport Issues.'' Airline issues generally involve matters related to 
proper identification, gate and boarding passes, baggage match and 
weight/size allowance, airline employee/service complaints, and refunds 
(airline tickets, lodging). Airport issues generally involve matters 
related to airport grounds, parking, checkpoint, configuration and 
limitations. Other categories capture a variety of TSA-related topics. 
In March 2005, the TCC handled 2,245 contacts involving airline issues, 
which represents approximately 5 percent of the total contacts handled. 
With respect to airport issues, 179 contacts were handled in March 
2005, less than 1 percent of the total contacts. In addition to airline 
issues and airport issues, the TCC handled 9,106 contacts involving the 
No Fly list during March 2005.

                           R&D CONSOLIDATION

    Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget proposes to consolidate all 
research and development of the Department of Homeland Security into 
Science and Technology, with the exception of the Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO). Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the 
driving force is behind this consolidation?
    Answer. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequent 
legislation, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology has been 
tasked with coordinating and integrating all research, development, 
demonstration, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities of DHS and 
also to consolidate all Departmental research and development funding 
within the science and technology programs. The coordination and 
integration of RDT&E will: maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the Department's RDT&E capacity; develop and expand synergistic RDT&E 
programs that cut across the Department's activities; create a world-
class RDT&E capability; allow the other Directorates and organizational 
elements to eliminate within them the specialized management 
infrastructure required to manage organic RDT&E; and allow the other 
Directorates and organizational elements within DHS to focus on their 
operational missions.
    Question. What savings do you hope to realize as a result of the 
consolidation?
    Answer. This consolidation will bring under a single accountable 
authority the scientific and engineering personnel and other RDT&E 
resources of the Department. Coordination and integration of RDT&E will 
contribute to a synergistic environment wherein knowledge, 
capabilities, and initiatives can be leveraged and effectiveness and 
efficiencies can be enhanced.
    Question. How will the consolidation change the way in which 
research and development is carried out within the Department today?
    Answer. Consolidation will contribute to: maximize the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Department's RDT&E capacity; develop and 
expand synergistic RDT&E programs that cut across the Department's 
activities; create a world-class RDT&E capability; allow the other 
Directorates and organizational elements to eliminate within them the 
specialized management infrastructure required to manage organic RDT&E; 
and allow the other Directorates and organizational elements within DHS 
to focus on their operational missions.
    Question. What assurances can the Department provide to the 
Committee that the traditional mission of the Coast Guard will continue 
to flourish in the new consolidated research and development structure?
    Answer. Authorities for the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) RDT&E will rest 
within USCG, but the USCG RDT&E program will be coordinated with the 
overall departmental RDT&E program to maximize efficiency and minimize 
duplication of effort. There are significant efficiencies to be gained 
with an integrated RATE effort for the Department under a single 
accountable authority. The S&T Directorate is committed to and 
responsible for supporting the research, development, testing, and 
evaluation requirements to ehnance the USCG homeland and non-homeland 
security mission performance.
    Question. Why isn't the DNDO research and development included in 
this consolidation, would it not benefit as well?
    Answer. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) serves as a 
unique entity within the Department to consolidate all nuclear-
detection related activities, allowing for the development of an 
integrated office that will be responsible not only for research and 
development, but also for developing a global nuclear detection 
architecture and developing and implementing a domestic detection 
system, to include acquisition programs for detection assets and 
operational support functions. This integration, as well as 
coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will 
allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection 
architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport 
a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for 
illicit use.
    DNDO will continue to closely interface with the S&T Directorate on 
joint projects, as appropriate, for the development of technologies 
that may provide countermeasures against multiple threat types. The 
separation of the DNDO nuclear detection RDT&E from the RDT&E conducted 
within the S&T Directorate will be conducted so as to not have any 
detrimental effect on potential collaborative efforts that would be 
gained through the S&T consolidation effort. The goal is to make sure 
that this Nation maintains a preeminent research and development 
program to address the technical challenges in radiation detection 
science and technology, while at the same time capitalizing on the 
benefits of integrating this program with larger acquisition and 
operational support efforts.

                   DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE

    Question. Mr. Secretary, I understand from recent news reports that 
you established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 2 days after your 
arrival at the Department. Further, I understand this office was 
operational prior to your reorganization notification pursuant to the 
Homeland Security Act establishing this office directly under the 
Office of the Secretary. The Committee has also just received a 
reprogramming request to provide fiscal year 2005 resources to support 
this office. Where did you get the initial resources and staff to stand 
up this office?
    Answer. The DNDO is a part of a natural evolution of the DHS S&T 
Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio, which was 
appropriated $122.6 million in fiscal year 2005. Of this appropriation, 
$92.5 million was to be used to manage programs that directly fall 
within the mission space of the DNDO, as currently envisioned. The 
programs that currently are managed through this appropriation, along 
with the associated staff, will ultimately fall under the management of 
DNDO. Additionally, a number of other departments and DHS components 
have provided staff, on a non-reimbursable basis, to the DNDO 
transition team, which will eventually form the initial staff for the 
office.
    The defense of this Nation against a terrorist nuclear attack is 
one of the top priorities of the Department, and the attention that I 
gave this matter immediately upon my arrival should be indicative of 
that. I sent out a memo to the Department on March 16, outlining my 
intention to establish the DNDO, and directing senior members of the 
Department to support the transition and establishment of the office. 
This is a process that is still underway, rather than one that has been 
concluded. As part of this process, the Committee was notified, on 
April 13, of a single funding reprogramming to use existing DHS S&T 
funds, as appropriated, to cover operating costs of the new office for 
the remainder of fiscal year 2005. Simultaneously, I submitted, in 
accord with Sec. 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 
107-296), notification to Congress of the intent to establish the DNDO 
within the Department. On April 15, the President issued National 
Security Presidential Directive-43/Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-14, ``Domestic Nuclear Detection,'' directing the 
establishment of DNDO within the Department.
    Question. The Department is required to come before the Committee 
and receive advance approval for new initiatives, why wasn't the 
Committee notified in advance of the Office's establishment?
    Answer. On April 13, DHS submitted both an 872 notice and an fiscal 
year 2005 Reprogramming Report to appropriate Authorization and 
Appropriations Committee members. In anticipation of the notification 
to Congress, I previously announced to the Department my intent to 
create the office and established an acting director with authority to 
begin staffing the office from DHS and the other agencies involved, and 
to take necessary steps to be functional as soon as possible.
    Question. Can you tell the Subcommittee what has changed in the 
last year to warrant the creation of this office immediately; is it new 
intelligence, new authorities granted to Homeland, or new 
vulnerabilities uncovered?
    Answer. While there is currently no specific intelligence 
indicating when or where a nuclear attack might occur, it is expected 
to take several years to continue to develop and test effective, 
sustainable countermeasures and deploy and operate systems to interdict 
an attempted attack by our adversaries. With this in mind, it is 
important to take steps proactively to strengthen and consolidate 
efforts to be prepared if and when an attempt should come.
    Accordingly, acting now provides the Department with an opportunity 
to consolidate all nuclear-detection related activities and proceed 
with a fully integrated approach that will include not only research 
and development, but also the development of a global nuclear detection 
architecture and development and implementation of a domestic detection 
system, including acquisition programs for detection assets and 
operational support functions. This integration, as well as 
coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will 
allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection 
architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport 
a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for 
illicit use.
    Question. The Department is taking great pains to consolidate the 
research and development of the Department under the Science and 
Technology Directorate. Would you explain the rationale behind why 
DNDO's research and development should remain separate?
    Answer. The DNDO serves as a unique entity within the Department to 
consolidate all nuclear-detection related activities, allowing for the 
development of an integrated office that will be responsible not only 
for research and development, but also for developing a global nuclear 
detection architecture and developing and implementing a domestic 
detection system, to include acquisition programs for detection assets 
and operational support functions. This integration, as well as 
coordination with nuclear detection programs in other departments, will 
allow for the development of a single, global nuclear detection 
architecture to protect the Nation from attempts to import or transport 
a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for 
illicit use.
    DNDO will continue to closely interface with the S&T Directorate on 
joint projects, as appropriate, for the development of technologies 
that may provide countermeasures against multiple threat types. The 
separation of the DNDO RDT&E from the RDT&E conducted within the S&T 
Directorate will be conducted so as to not have any detrimental effect 
on potential collaborative efforts that would be gained through the S&T 
consolidation effort. The goal is to make sure that this Nation 
maintains a preeminent research and development program to address the 
technical challenges in radiation detection science and technology, 
while at the same time capitalizing on the benefits of integrating this 
program with larger acquisition and operational support efforts.

               ROLE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

    Question. As you step into the role of Secretary, Mr. Chertoff, how 
well do you think S&T is carrying out its strategic mission?
    Answer. Over these last few months I have closely reviewed the work 
of the S&T Directorate and believe it is doing very well in carrying 
out its mission. The most important mission for the S&T Directorate is 
to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and new capabilities so 
that the dedicated men and women who serve to protect and secure our 
homeland can perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently. The 
S&T Directorate uses a risk-based approach to prioritizing and 
planning, and identifies critical capability gaps before attempting to 
identify or develop technology solutions. The S&T Directorate then 
addresses the highest priorities that address the broad threat spectrum 
as well as supporting the needs of the Department's organizational 
elements.
    Question. During your short tenure, what are the areas of greatest 
concern to you?
    Answer. As I emphasized in my recent 2SR speech, the Department's 
success in meeting its strategic objectives requires a coordinated 
risk-based approach to planning and prioritizing its activities, and 
this approach is being implemented across the Department. Thus, the 
development and implementation of effective and efficient counter-
measures to biological, chemical and explosive threats continues to be 
an area of emphasis for the Department. Within the Department, the S&T 
Directorate has the lead in developing effective countermeasures for 
biological, chemical, radiological/nuclear, and explosives threat 
agents as well as providing support to the Department's organizational 
elements. The DNDO has the lead role in radiological/nuclear detection 
capabilities. Both the S&T Directorate and DNDO are committed to 
ensuring that the Nation is safer from these threat areas. 
Additionally, the S&T Directorate remains committed to providing the 
nation's emergency responders, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and other 
members of the responder community with innovative, affordable 
technologies.
    Question. How do we have any confidence that the Department, and 
S&T specifically, is heading in the right direction? Recent reports 
indicate that S&T has made little if any progress in actually 
increasing our security through research and strategic management of 
our limited research dollars.
    Answer. Clearly, the S&T Directorate works to ensure that the 
nation's Federal, State and local operational end-users have the 
necessary technological tools to protect and secure our homeland. The 
S&T Directorate acknowledges and accepts that technology research and 
development is not a 6 month process but rather a long-term investment 
of 18 months to 4 years for the technology to mature. The Directorate 
tends to aim further down the road to ensure that the research and 
development being conducted today is capable of dealing with emerging 
threats in the future. All of the S&T Directorate's programs began at 
the same time, March 2003 or soon thereafter, therefore the S&T 
Directorate has not yet reached full maturity in many of its critical 
ongoing efforts.
    The S&T Directorate also recognizes the need for technology 
solutions in the near term. The S&T Directorate's efforts to date have 
resulted in numerous products that are increasing our security. 
Included in these are:
  --BioWatch, a biological agent detection system, which protects the 
        nation's major population centers from the threat and 
        ramifications of a bioterrorist attack. BioWatch also provided 
        support during the G8, Democratic National Convention and 
        Republican National Convention;
  --Developed and transitioned PROTECT, a chemical detection system, to 
        the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for use in 
        the Washington subway system. PROTECT was also deployed to 
        Boston and New York for the Democratic and Republican National 
        Conventions and remains in the New York subway system;
  --Delivered the Threat Vulnerability Integration System (TVIS) and 
        the Threat-Vulnerability Mapper (TVM), to the Information 
        Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate;
  --Developed the BTS Technology Vision which include Border Watch, 
        Transportation Watch and Border Net which significantly 
        improves our ability to provide the information necessary to 
        secure our borders;
  --Selected four urban areas for the pilot of the Regional Technology 
        Integration (RTI) Initiative;
  --Developed a joint port and coastal surveillance prototype 
        designated HAWKEYE with the United States Coast Guard; and
  --Developed a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision 
        Support System (DSS) focused on prioritizing investment, 
        protection, mitigation, response, and recovery strategies 
        related to Critical Infrastructure Protection.
    Question. How is S&T assisting in the protection of our critical 
infrastructure and what relation does that have to the Department's 
efforts of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
office?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate supports the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate in the technical aspects 
of assessing threats to the nation's critical infrastructure. Through 
RDT&E, the S&T Directorate is providing specialized technical tools for 
intelligence analysis and knowledge synthesis. Analytical tools include 
software algorithms for data extraction, pattern discovery, semantic 
graph representation, visualization, and modeling and simulation. To 
support these tools, the S&T Directorate also provides tools to the 
IAIP Directorate, such as the Threat Vulnerability Integration System.
    Terrorist capability assessments, which are being performed by the 
national laboratories, also provide expert scientific data and 
background information analyses to the IAIP Directorate. The specially 
developed tools greatly extend the capabilities of the commercially 
available analytical products that are used by the IAIP Directorate. 
They are designed to work on massive, multimodal, and distributed data 
sets and to provide real-time, higher accuracy visualization and 
modeling capabilities.
    The S&T Directorate is also developing scientifically based, 
rational approaches for prioritizing critical infrastructure protection 
strategies, protection requirements, and resource allocations using 
modeling, simulation, and analyses to assess vulnerabilities, 
consequences, and risks; developing and evaluating protection, 
mitigation, response, and recovery strategies and technologies; and 
providing real-time support to decision makers during crises and 
emergencies.
    There are several significant examples of this partnership.
    For example, the S&T Directorate provides assistance to IAIP in 
evaluating the scientific and technical capabilities of terrorist 
groups and organizations to develop and deploy all WMD agents. This is 
an excellent example of a reciprocal supporting relationship, in that 
the IAIP Directorate needs S&T Directorate insight into technical 
issues, while the S&T Directorate needs IAIP Directorate insight into 
emerging threats. This ``swap'' of insight allows the S&T Directorate 
to meet its responsibility for the coordination of RDT&E needed to 
address those emergent threats.
    In addition, countermeasures for WMD (such as chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear threats) are addressed within the S&T 
Directorate--however this work supports and is developed in 
coordination with all of the operational elements of DHS including the 
IAIP Directorate.
    Furthermore, the S&T Directorate is developing the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System (CIP-DSS) in 
collaboration with several units of the IAIP Directorate and working 
with the IAIP Directorate's National Infrastructure Simulation and 
Analysis Center (NISAC) to validate and mature the model.
    The S&T Directorate has also developed the annual National Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (NCIP) R&D Plan in close coordination with 
the IAIP Directorate. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP), developed by the IAIP Directorate, and the NCIP R&D Plan are 
complementary documents, mutually supportive and coordinated.
    Finally, the S&T Directorate, in coordination the IAIP Directorate, 
is leading RDT&E efforts that will improve the security of the existing 
cyber infrastructure and provide a foundation for a more secure 
infrastructure. To protect these infrastructures, we must improve the 
security of the protocols that underlie Internet communications. 
Technological advances are necessary to protect against, detect, and 
respond to attacks on the nation's information infrastructure.
    The S&T Directorate has a number of cooperative programs with the 
IAIP Directorate linking cyber security research to critical 
infrastructure protection:
  --Process Control System Forum (PCSF).--This forum was established to 
        accelerate the development of technology that will enhance the 
        security, safety and reliability of process control system 
        (PCS) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
        systems.
  --Control System Security Test Center (CSSTC).--In collaboration with 
        the Department of Energy and its resources and testing 
        facilities, this program focuses on developing procedures for 
        enumerating the vulnerability of process control systems to 
        cyber attack and finding solutions to correct these weaknesses.
  --Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Awards.--In fiscal year 
        2004, 13 Phase I SBIR projects were awarded in the area of 
        process control system security. In fiscal year 2005, Phase II 
        SBIRs were awarded to a subset of the Phase I performers, on 
        the following topics: Advanced Security for SCADA Systems, 
        Protection of SCADA Systems Using Physics Based Authentication 
        and Location Awareness, Improved Security Information 
        Management for SCADA Systems, A Robust Secure Management System 
        for SCADA/EMS Operations, and A Toolkit for Next Generation 
        Electric Power SCADA Security Protection and Research.
    The Science and Technology Requirements Council is one process by 
which the IAIP Directorate and the other component units in DHS convey 
their RDT&E requirements to the S&T Directorate. Representatives from 
the IAIP Directorate also are members of the S&T Directorate's 
Integrated Product Teams, a key mechanism for coordination and planning 
of DHS RDT&E efforts.
    Question. What is on the horizon in terms of the newest threats and 
related countermeasures under development?
    Answer. The Department is working in close collaboration with the 
DOD, the FBI, members of the Intelligence Community and others to 
identify potential new threats, assess the nations vulnerabilities to 
these potential new threats, and the consequences if these potential 
new threats were successfully used against us. The S&T has the 
responsibility within the Department to incorporate the risk of these 
potential new threats into our overall RDT&E process and the 
development of appropriate countermeasures. Although details can not be 
provided herein, the S&T Directorate is addressing, for example, 
potential threats from genetically modified biological organisms and 
certain types of non-traditional chemical warfare agents to develop 
appropriate countermeasures.
    Question. Can you tell us how S&T has had a direct role in 
improving the security of the country?
    Answer. The nation's advantage in science and technology is a key 
element in securing the homeland. The most important mission for the 
S&T Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting-edge technologies and 
new capabilities so that the dedicated men and women who serve to 
protect and secure our homeland can perform their jobs more effectively 
and efficiently. However, the threats to our homeland remain diverse 
and daunting. The S&T Directorate constantly monitors current and 
emerging threats and assesses our vulnerabilities to them, develops new 
and improved capabilities to counter them and mitigate the effects of 
terrorist attacks should they occur. The S&T Directorate also enhances 
the conventional missions of the Department to protect and provide 
assistance to civilians in response to natural disasters, law 
enforcement needs, and other activities such as maritime search and 
rescue. Basically the S&T Directorate assists in making DHS operations 
science-based, intelligence-informed and technology-enabled.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, in the President's fiscal year 2006 
request is $110 million for the counter man-portable air defense 
systems, or Counter MANPADS. Can you give us an update on the status of 
this program?
    Answer. DHS is still on schedule to complete Phase II of the 
Counter MANPADS program and to provide its report to Congress and the 
Administration at the end of January 2006. This report will include a 
Concept of Operations, a maintenance approach, data on system 
effectiveness and reliability, options on how the system may be 
deployed, restrictions or regulatory changes required to comply with 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), and Life Cycle and 
Total Ownership cost estimates. BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman are 
scheduled to complete their system designs, including Critical Design 
Reviews in early summer of 2005. Following the review, the contractors 
will fabricate, install, and test their prototypes on commercial 
aircraft (late summer and fall of 2005).
    By the end of January 2006, each contractor will have delivered two 
complete units and demonstrated system performance, including the 
results of studies emphasizing the operational suitability and cost of 
its systems. They also will have integrated their equipment onto 
aircraft, and obtained FAA Supplemental Type Certifications for 
aircraft airworthiness with the countermeasure system installed.
    In addition, the requested $110 million provides for a Phase III 
program to improve operational, affordability, and maintainability 
issues. Based on interaction with airline stakeholders, an objective 
was established for system reliability that fits within the commercial 
airline heavy maintenance or major overhaul schedule of approximately 
3,000 flight hours (depending on commercial airplane types).
    A primary objective of the Phase III effort is to increase the 
reliability of the current countermeasure equipment by fielding a 
number of operational units and conducting laboratory reliability 
growth testing. DHS S&T estimates that the Phase III efforts will 
double current countermeasure equipment reliability to achieve the 
3,000 hour threshold across airplane types. Additionally, operational 
and maintenance concepts have been developed, including reducing the 
requirements of Minimal Equipment List (MEL) and commercial supply 
chain management practices, that will be evaluated during Phase III. 
Based on the results of Phase III operational fielding, reliability 
testing, and evaluation of operational and maintenance procedures, 
system design alterations will be developed with ITAR considerations in 
mind that will make fleet-wide fielding much more affordable and 
commercially viable.
    Question. Are there areas within S&T where the strategic placement 
of dollars would be most efficiently used?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate uses a risked-based approach to 
prioritizing and planning and identifies critical capability gaps 
before attempting to identify or develop technology solutions. The S&T 
Directorate then addresses the highest priorities across the broad 
threat spectrum as well as supporting the needs of the Department's 
organizational elements. The Directorate's R&D activities reflect the 
prioritization of efforts among the many possible threat agents and 
targets as well as technology development for supporting the 
organizational elements of the Department and the emergency responder 
community.

                   S&T UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

    Question. How does the University partnership effort improve DHS' 
ability to carry out its mission?
    Answer. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, looks to the 
university community to stimulate, coordinate, leverage and utilize its 
unique intellectual capital to address current and future homeland 
security challenges. To maximize the benefits of engaging the multi-
disciplinary research capacity of universities and to access current 
and future generations of researchers and practitioners, a number of 
focused activities have been established. These include multi-
institutional Centers of Excellence built around mission-critical 
homeland security areas; cooperative research activities with other 
Federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities; support of 
undergraduate, graduate and postdoctoral students to develop a cadre of 
talent committed to homeland security programs; and outreach to the 
broader education community. These activities will help ensure that DHS 
will have the scientific knowledge and talent to successfully address 
homeland security challenges.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, what unique role does S&T play with regard 
to university research and why is it important?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate continues to identify knowledge and 
capability gap areas that need to be addressed to deal with current and 
future homeland security threats and the development of countermeasures 
to those threats. Many of these areas are well suited to university 
research, development and educational capabilities. Universities 
provide state-of-the-art research experts experienced and successful in 
cross- disciplinary programs, access to national and local talent pools 
and a neutral setting to consider important policy issues. These 
capabilities and ensuing cross fertilization directly benefit the 
operational responsibilities of the S&T Directorate.
    Question. Are these projects that receive funding chosen by peer 
review and what does the Department gain by having funded a specific 
project?
    Answer. All projects funded within University Programs are the 
result of a rigorous and competitive peer and relevancy review process. 
This includes all research and educational programs. With regard to the 
Centers of Excellence, in selecting research areas, the S&T Directorate 
seeks input from a variety of sources. These sources include the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended; the National Research 
Council (NRC); the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs); 
other DHS directorates; and subject matter experts. DHS personnel 
interact extensively with the funded Centers of Excellence by serving 
on their review committees, attending workshops and exploring joint 
research initiatives. In this manner, DHS stays aware of their mission-
critical research.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, contained in the President's fiscal year 
2006 budget request is $22.9 million for the National Bio and 
Agrodefense Facility. What is the mission of this facility and why 
isn't it in the Center for Disease Control's or U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's budget request?
    Answer. HSPD-9 (``Defense of United States Agriculture and Food'', 
paragraph 24) states: ``The Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland 
Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-
art agriculture bio-containment laboratories that research and develop 
diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.'' The 
S&T Directorate currently has responsibility for one such facility, as 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the ``assets and 
liabilities'' of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) from 
USDA to DHS as of March 1, 2003. PIADC is currently the nation's only 
Bio-Safety Level 3 facility (BSL-3Ag) for research and diagnostic 
programs on foreign animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease 
(FMD). The bio-containment laboratories and animal facilities at PIADC 
are aged well beyond their originally designed life expectancy, and are 
in immediate need of re-capitalization or replacement. There is no BSL-
4 livestock capable laboratory at PIADC or elsewhere in the United 
States to work on high consequence zoonotic diseases in host livestock 
species. Therefore, planning for the National Biological and 
Agriculture Facility is the top S&T Directorate priority for bio-
containment facilities, and impacts ongoing and planned programs for 
biological countermeasures for foreign animal diseases (including 
assays and diagnostics, vaccines and therapeutics, and forensics).
    Recognizing the needs described above, the President requested $23 
million in fiscal year 2006 for the design and initiation of a National 
Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF). In preparation for this, we have 
undertaken a conceptual design study to better characterize the key 
programmatic requirements driving the NBAF design and to explore the 
cost benefit tradeoffs associated with each of these drivers. This 
conceptual design will explore three major NBAF options of increasing 
capability:
  --Keeps the scope the same as the current PIADC mission but builds 
        the facilities required to meet the needs of the first half of 
        the 21st century;
  --Expands the scope to include additional agriculture biocontainment 
        laboratories for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases as called 
        for in HSPD-9 above; and
  --Adds expanded test and evaluation facilities to support clinical 
        testing of medical countermeasures by the Department of Health 
        and Human Services (HHS).
  --DHS is committed to working with Congress, stakeholders, and 
        partner Federal Departments and agencies (e.g. USDA and HHS) in 
        the development of this new facility.

                        DHS INTELLIGENCE MISSION

    Question. Mr. Secretary, your written testimony states that you 
will work closely with the intelligence community and the Director for 
National Intelligence. Given that, what is Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate's role in the intelligence 
world since the enactment of the Intelligence Reform Act?
    Answer. This role is evolving. The Department makes many 
contributions to the Intelligence Community and we will continue to 
enhance those contributions. Systematic intelligence lies at the heart 
of everything that the Department does. Understanding the enemy's 
intent and capabilities affects how we operate at our borders, how we 
assess risk in protecting infrastructure, how we discern the kind of 
threats for which we must be prepared to respond. We are enhancing our 
ability to fuse that information and combine it with information from 
other members of the Intelligence Community, as well as information 
from our State and local and international partners.
    As I announced on July 13, 2005, I have proposed that the Assistant 
Secretary of Information Analysis become the Chief Intelligence Officer 
for the Department. My proposal is for the Chief Intelligence Officer 
to head a strengthened Intelligence and Analysis division that will 
report directly to me. This office will ensure that intelligence is 
effectively coordinated, fused and analyzed within the Department so 
that we have a common operational picture. It will also provide a 
primary connection between DHS and the Intelligence Community as a 
whole, and a primary source of information for state, local and private 
sector partners. The Department's unique access to information from our 
components, as well as our robust relationship with State, local, and 
tribal governments, as well as with the private sector, makes our 
enhanced contribution to the IC critical as we move forward.
    In addition, since the creation of the Director of National 
Intelligence, IAIP, through the Office of Information Analysis, has 
collaborated with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) on a number of initiatives. IA works closely with the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Among other things, we have provided IA 
intelligence analyst detailees to the NCTC, who are in a unique 
position to understand both intelligence information derived from our 
components and its impact on State and local governments, as well as 
the private sector. We also work closely with the NCTC to provide data 
and fuse critical information. We also participate in the WMD Working 
Group, (an outgrowth of the WMD Commission), the National Framework for 
Analytical Production working group, which is responsible for 
developing a national production framework for the IC, and on work 
dealing with human resource issues. IA will continue to develop a close 
working relationship with the ODNI as it strives to improve existing 
programs and put in place new initiatives that will further strengthen 
and protect our homeland.
    Question. Is it the opinion of the Department that IAIP's functions 
are enhanced or minimized by the Act?
    Answer. Greater integration of the Intelligence Community and a 
heightened emphasis on information sharing as a result of Public Law 
108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA), will strengthen the ability of DHS's Office of Information 
Analysis to carry out its mission. We are optimistic that these reforms 
will lead to greater collaboration in analysis and greater ease of 
exchanging information across all levels. The continued emphasis on 
information sharing directed by IRTPA, for example, will improve DHS 
IA's ability to carry out its mission to fuse and lead the Department's 
intelligence activities and to share and receive critical threat 
information with and from state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments and the private sector.
    Question. Can you tell the Subcommittee how the Homeland Security 
Operations Center's (HSOC) daily activities are changed by the 
Intelligence Reform Act?
    Answer. The daily activities of the HSOC are not changed by the 
Intelligence Reform Act. The HSOC will continue to provide general 
domestic situational awareness, a common operational picture, and 
support to the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) and DHS 
Leadership, as well as act as the primary conduit for the White House 
Situation Room and IIMG for domestic situational awareness. HSOC 
collects domestic related suspicious activity reports throughout the 
United States and shares that information with DHS stakeholders.
    Question. How will the HSOC perform its mission in light of this 
new Act?
    Answer. HSOC will continue to perform its core missions as it has 
in the past.
    Question. How has the Homeland Security Operations Center 
interfaced with the Terrorist Tracking Information Center which has 
been absorbed into the National Counterterroism Intelligence Center?
    Answer. The HSOC provides general domestic situational awareness, a 
common operational picture, and support to the IIMG and DHS Leadership, 
as well as acting as the primary conduit for the White House Situation 
Room and IIMG for domestic situational awareness. The HSOC will 
continue to collect domestic related suspicious activity reports, look 
at domestic terror threats and natural disasters, focusing efforts 
domestically. HSOC is the lead conduit to State and local agencies. 
HSOC anticipates being the primary conduit to NCTC for domestic 
situational awareness.
    Question. How will the Homeland Security Operations Center fit into 
the new intelligence community structure?
    Answer. The advent of the new intelligence community structure does 
not significantly change the daily activities of the HSOC. The HSOC 
acts as the ``ingest'' point for threat traffic and suspicious activity 
reporting to DHS, so it is integral that the information captured and 
exploited by the Office of Information Analysis (IA) staff in the HSOC 
is shared with the Federal Intelligence Community. This occurs on a 
constant basis through video teleconference (0100 Production Meeting 
hosted by NCTC, the 0800 and 1500 SVTC), telephone, JWICS email and 
fax. The IA staff in the HSOC works closely with the NCTC Operations 
Center/FBI Counterterrorism Watch to develop emergent traffic 
containing a domestic nexus. Additionally, the IA staff in the HSOC is 
prepared to provide situational awareness to the DNI Operations Center 
when it is operational.
    Question. Do you think the Department should have an Under 
Secretary of Intelligence to elevate its role within the intelligence 
community?
    Answer. As I announced on July 12, 2005, after conducting 2SR, I 
believe that the current Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis 
should become the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department, and 
that this component should report directly to me. I am confident that 
these changes will ensure an enhanced role for the Department's 
intelligence functions within the Intelligence Community.

                   CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

    Question. The Department recently released an interim report on the 
Nation's critical infrastructure, the purpose of which is to provide an 
outline for integrating critical infrastructure protection at the 
national level. How does this interim report lead to better protection 
of the Nation's critical infrastructure?
    Answer. DHS is coordinating, for the first time, the overall 
national effort to protect critical infrastructure. The Interim 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) describes a risk 
management framework that takes into account threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences to prioritize the nation's critical infrastructure and 
key resources (CI/KR). The NIPP delineates roles and responsibilities 
among Federal agencies; state, local, and tribal entities; as well as 
private sector stakeholders in carrying out infrastructure protection 
activities within and across the 17 CI/KR sectors established by HSPD-
7. The Interim NIPP is intended to foster sector-specific protective 
strategies and provides a mechanism for coordinating protective actions 
across sectors. It builds on the nation's existing critical 
infrastructure protection knowledge base while acknowledging the need 
to expand dialogue and partnerships with key public and private sector 
stakeholders to create an integrated, national critical infrastructure 
protection program.
    Question. My concern is that although the exercise is useful in 
developing a framework, when it gets down to the details, the momentum 
is lost and there never seems to be any achievements. How do you intend 
to use the interim report to translate into actual outcomes?
    Answer. The interim NIPP outlines the foundation, processes, and 
methodologies of the risk management framework. The interim NIPP will 
be replaced by the final version of the NIPP, which will include 
sector-specific plans with performance measures.
    Question. Did you seek the advice of States, locals and the private 
sector in the writing of this report?
    Answer. Yes, as part of the comment period during July and August 
of 2004, the preliminary draft NIPP was shared with State and 
Territorial Homeland Security Advisors and individual members of the 
private sector for review and comment. The comments from the review 
were taken into consideration during the development of the Interim 
NIPP. The period of time dedicated to reviewing the Interim Plan will 
include additional private sector and stakeholder engagement.
    Question. How does this report enable the Department to better 
identify which infrastructure is critical and what are the criteria for 
that determination?
    Answer. The NIPP risk management framework sets over arching 
security goals. Once security goals are set, the next step in the 
framework is to develop and maintain an inventory of the nation's 
assets. After an asset is identified and basic information on it is 
collected, DHS employs an initial screening methodology to determine 
whether or not it is of national consequence. Priority is given to 
those assets that, if attacked, could have a nationally significant 
effect.
    Question. How do you plan to get this report out to the public? Are 
you planning on doing town hall meetings, news articles or another 
forum?
    Answer. The success of the national infrastructure protection 
program, as framed and articulated in the Interim NIPP, is highly 
dependent on obtaining buy-in and participation from all audiences. DHS 
is responsible for leading and coordinating the national infrastructure 
protection program, while the responsibility for carrying out the 
protective activities is shared among Sector-Specific Agencies, asset 
owners/operators, and state, local, and tribal governments.
    State, local, and tribal entities and private sector stakeholders 
have an important role to play in protecting the nation's CI/KR. To 
ensure that assets within these areas are covered within the engagement 
and outreach process, these stakeholders must be aware of, and 
participate in, the implementation and the refinement of the Interim 
NIPP. The initial approach to engage state, local, and tribal entities 
and private sector stakeholders will be carried out by DHS, in 
coordination with the Sector Specific Agencies.
    Stakeholder outreach and engagement tactics differ greatly by 
audience and focus on each stakeholder's interests and role in the 
implementation of a national infrastructure protection program. 
Accordingly, the Interim NIPP engagement process is organized by 
audience group, specifically: intra-Federal stakeholders; state, local, 
and tribal stakeholders; private sector stakeholders; and the media and 
public.

                       IAIP HIRING DIFFICULITIES

    Question. Of concern to me is the amount of time it takes IAIP to 
hire and put in place new personnel. These are people who are charged 
with the intelligence and infrastructure protection functions of the 
Department. Why is it taking so long, and what can the Subcommittee do 
to help improve this situation?
    Answer. As a result of the competitive market for the cleared 
community and the unique skills and abilities needed in IAIP, an 
aggressive recruitment of these talented candidates has been necessary 
to drive toward our hiring goals. As noted, these candidates are 
filling important intelligence and infrastructure protection functions. 
The process of recruiting, selecting, and hiring candidates to meet the 
Directorate's needs is lengthy because of the multiple steps involved 
in this process to ensure a complete and thorough evaluation of 
candidates. However, over the past year IAIP has been successful in 
implementing improvements to shorten this process.
    Working closely with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 
improvements include the development of position descriptions and 
vacancy announcements that define the minimum requirements for each 
position. Once the position is posted and an applicant pool is created, 
a list of qualified candidates is then forwarded by OPM to hiring 
managers for comprehensive interviews and assessments. Once a selection 
has been made, a tentative offer is extended to the candidate 
contingent upon the successful completion of a security investigation.
    IAIP hiring managers take the time necessary in the selection 
process in order to ensure the specialized needs of the Directorate are 
met, particularly since many of the vacancies are highly sensitive 
positions.
    Even faced with the competitive market for qualified candidates and 
the time it takes to on-board candidates, IAIP has been successful in 
hiring 517 of the 803 FTE allotments to date and will continue to 
aggressively recruit to meet its hiring target.
    The Subcommittee has been very supportive in working with IAIP to 
understand the implications and expectations required to staff a highly 
qualified team. The approval to allow direct hiring authority has been 
instrumental in allowing us to aggressively identify, assess, and hire 
key staff. The continued active support of the Subcommittee is 
appreciated as IAIP works to achieve this target hiring goal.
    Question. Is the hiring time dependent on another agency to process 
background checks and clearances?
    Answer. Historically, DHS contracted collateral (SECRET and TOP 
SECRET) as well as TS/SCI security investigations through traditional 
venues such as Office of Personnel Management and Defense Security 
Systems (DSS). These venues also provide support to Federal, military 
and intelligence agencies. Due to high demand, they have continuously 
experienced severe backlogs, adversely impacting the timely processing 
of DHS requests.
    However, DHS has recently acquired a new venue for security 
investigations through CBP. CBP now processes TS/SCI clearances for DHS 
and, due to a smaller workload, has cut down the average time for a 
security background investigation (with no previous clearance) from 12-
18 months to as little as 6-8 weeks. This timeframe is competitive or, 
in many cases, faster than industry averages within the cleared 
community.
    Under the current projected timeline of the hiring process, the 
security clearance process accounts for 25 percent of the total hiring 
process cycle time on average. This is a significant reduction from 
previous projections (50-60 percent), and is attributed to recent 
changes in the sourcing of investigations to a new contractor agency.
    Question. Is the Department doing anything to help IAIP recruit 
qualified candidates for such a crucial role?
    Answer. DHS has been fully supportive of IAIP recruitment efforts 
and has included the Directorate in a variety of Department-wide 
recruitment events to attract qualified candidates. For example, the 
Department was successful in obtaining direct-hire authority for IAIP's 
hard to fill positions and the Equal Opportunity Office has partnered 
with IAIP to attend a Disability Career Fair and Asian Pacific American 
Federal Career Advancement Summit. IAIP also participated in a DHS-wide 
career fair at Walter Reed Army Medical Center to recruit disabled 
veterans in conjunction with the Department of Defense, as well as a 
DHS-wide Presidential Management Fellows job fair at the Washington 
Convention Center during the last week in March of this year.
    Question. Can you please submit your strategy to the Subcommittee 
on how you intend to address this problem?
    Answer. IAIP is working to implement new ways to improve the 
candidate selection process to support surge hiring efforts. These 
include:
  --Posting All Remaining Vacancies.--Work with hiring managers to 
        expedite the posting of all vacancies on the USAJOBS website;
  --Making Multiple Selections.--Encourage the practice of making 
        multiple selections from Cert Lists whenever possible;
  --Sharing Cert Lists.--Facilitate the sharing of Cert Lists are 
        shared among managers with similar hiring needs;
  --Supporting the Recruitment Campaign.--Encourage managers to attend 
        recruitment events; and
  --Conducting Panel Interviewing.--Identify Subject Matter Experts to 
        screen qualified candidates for hiring manager review and 
        selection.
    Through these efforts, IAIP will institute a systematic process for 
identifying volume hiring needs, matching those needs with available 
candidates, and mobilizing hiring managers to make multiple selections 
in a timely manner. In support of this strategy, IAIP is continuing 
efforts to broaden the candidate pool through an active recruiting 
campaign targeting specific hiring needs and an aggressive advertising 
campaign to publicize opportunities at IAIP.
    Question. Is the housing of IAIP personnel still an issue today?
    Answer. Yes, housing remains an issue for IAIP, but we are working 
to overcome them. Among the challenges faced by IAIP is the lack of 
permanent space. On any given day, there are more than 90 IA employees 
without a dedicated seat. Staff have been doubling, tripling, and 
quadrupling up in seats, working shifts and staggered hours to 
compensate for the deficit of Sensitive Compartmented Information 
Facility (SCIF) seating.
    To address its facilities situation, IAIP has developed a plan 
through fiscal year 2006 to place staff in swing and permanent seats on 
the NAC, and five floors of leased space at an office building in 
Arlington, VA. The Arlington location is currently partially occupied 
as swing space while floors are permanently constructed in a planned 
series. Two floors are nearing completion of permanent construction, 
with furniture and IT installation to follow. The entire project is 
scheduled for completion at the end of 2005. The location will 
eventually have 440 seats, and will house primarily the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (IP).
    On the NAC, IAIP will occupy part of Building, all of Building 19, 
and the first and second floors of Building 17. Ultimately, all of 
Building 19 will be SCIF and will house IA (to include seating for the 
positions requested in 2006) and the Office of the Under Secretary. 
Floors one and two of Building 19 are under demolition/power upgrade 
prior to renovation, which is currently scheduled to be completed in 
Winter of 2005, with the renovation beginning in the Summer of 2005 and 
continuing into the Spring of 2006.
    IAIP's total SCIF requirement will be met once the Building 19 
renovation is completed.

                    IAIP COORDINATION OF PROTECTION

    Question. How does the Department plan to get the necessary support 
of State and local governments and private sector to protect our 
critical infrastructure when dollars are tight?
    Answer. DHS relies on strong and cooperative relationships with 
State and local governments and private sector partners to advance 
overall National protective strategies. The Department understands that 
local law enforcement, first responders, and the overall readiness and 
response community have the day-to-day responsibility to protect our 
citizens and infrastructures. The Federal Government must continue to 
partner with State and local officials and key leaders in the private 
sector to ensure available funding is appropriately allocated and 
correct policies and procedures are in place.
    The Department will continue to cultivate and expand its outreach 
and information sharing components to enhance its relationships with 
state/local and private sector partners. By continuing to build upon 
these vital relationships, the Department plans to continually provide 
the information, policy guidance and risk assessment methodologies 
necessary to help owners and operators bolster physical and cyber 
security plans.
    Question. How does the Department coordinate with all other efforts 
by the Federal Government and State and locals, including 
municipalities to ensure that each entity is putting in place the most 
effective security measures for a specific piece of infrastructure?
    Answer. As part of an ongoing, government-wide effort to protect 
national infrastructure, DHS is working on several initiatives with 
other Federal departments, state, local, and tribal governments, and 
the private sector. These initiatives are designed to protect against 
known and potential threats; reduce critical infrastructure 
vulnerabilities in a comprehensive and integrated manner; maximize 
efficient use of resources for infrastructure protection; build 
partnerships among Federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and 
international stakeholders; and continuously track and improve national 
infrastructure protection.
    In the first of these initiatives, the Department is providing the 
private sector, law enforcement entities, and State homeland security 
personnel with technical and material assistance to develop and 
implement Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs) around critical 
infrastructure and key assets. To formulate these plans, owners and 
operators and local law enforcement work together to identify asset 
vulnerabilities, gaps in protection, and means of mitigating these 
vulnerabilities.
    The Department is also in the process of deploying all 68 
Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) to 60 metropolitan areas throughout 
the United States. These security specialists serve as DHS 
representatives permanently assigned in the field. The mission of the 
PSA is to represent the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) in 
local communities throughout the United States, serving as a liaison 
between DHS, the private sector, and Federal, state, local, and tribal 
entities; acting as IP's on-site critical infrastructure and 
vulnerability assessment specialist; providing expertise and support to 
the Principal Federal Official(s) responsible for National Special 
Security Events; and providing real-time information on facility 
significance and protective measures. PSAs continue to assist local 
entities in putting in place the most effective security measures for 
specific pieces of infrastructure.
    DHS is also providing terrorism prevention training to private 
sector, law enforcement entities, and State homeland security 
personnel. To date, over 5,600 security personnel have participated in 
the training courses. Courses relate terrorist threats and tactics to 
one of several different topics including buffer zone protection plans, 
soft targets, bombs, underwater hazardous devices, police S.W.A.T. team 
response, and counter surveillance and emerging threats. This training 
program provides baseline knowledge for a law enforcement protecting 
critical infrastructure.
    Finally, Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs) are groups being 
established for each sector that consist of Federal representation 
involved in the security of all 17 sectors defined by the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The GCCs will serve as a 
counterpart to industry-sponsored Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC). 
GCCs, which include a number of agencies with sector infrastructure 
protection responsibilities, will coordinate with the SCC and work to 
ensure the implementation of effective sector strategies and 
initiatives to support the nation's homeland security mission.
    Question. What are IAIP and the Department doing about 
cybersecurity, particularly when it is not governed by any one actor 
but affects everyone?
    Answer. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) of IAIP's 
Office of Infrastructure Protection was created to address cyber 
security issues and the priorities laid out in the National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace. In addition, HSPD-7 called upon the Department to 
establish a national focal point for cyber security, which is the 
mission of NCSD. Both the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and 
HSPD-7 recognize that cyber security is not just one entity's concern 
or jurisdiction, and both call upon DHS to be a focal point and work 
with partners in other Federal agencies, academic institutions, the law 
enforcement and intelligence communities, the private sector, and the 
general public to improve our cyber security posture.
    NCSD's mission, in cooperation with public, private, and 
international entities, is to secure cyberspace and America's cyber 
assets. In order to fulfill that mission, NCSD has laid out goals that 
reflect and guide its priorities and programs, as follow:
  --Goal 1.--Establish a National Cyber Security Response System to 
        prevent, predict, detect, respond to, and reconstitute rapidly 
        after cyber incidents.
  --Goal 2.--Work with public and private sectors to reduce 
        vulnerabilities and minimize the severity of cyber attacks.
  --Goal 3.--Promote a comprehensive national awareness program 
        empowering all Americans to secure cyberspace.
  --Goal 4.--Foster adequate training and education programs to support 
        the nation's cyber security needs.
  --Goal 5.--Coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement 
        communities to identify and reduce threats to cyberspace.
    In addition to the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives, National Security Presidential 
Directives, the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 
provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the effectiveness of 
information security controls over information resources that support 
Federal operations and assets; recognizes the highly networked nature 
of the current Federal computing environment and provides effective 
government wide management and oversight of the related information 
security risks, including coordination of information security efforts 
throughout the civilian, national security, and law enforcement 
communities; provides for development and maintenance of minimum 
controls required to protect Federal information and information 
systems; provides a mechanism for improved oversight of Federal agency 
information security programs; acknowledges that commercially developed 
information security products offer advanced, dynamic, robust, and 
effective information security solutions, reflecting market solutions 
for the protection of critical information infrastructures important to 
the national defense and economic security of the Nation that are 
designed, built, and operated by the private sector; and recognizes 
that the selection of specific technical hardware and software 
information security solutions should be left to individual agencies 
from among commercially developed products. Each agency operating or 
exercising control of a national security system shall share 
information about information security incidents, threats, and 
vulnerabilities with the Federal information security incident center 
US-CERT to the extent consistent with standards and guidelines for 
national security systems, issued in accordance with law and as 
directed by the President.
    FISMA, Section 3546 states that the Federal information security 
incident center, US-CERT, will perform the following functions:
  --Provide timely technical assistance to operators of agency 
        information systems regarding security incidents, including 
        guidance on detecting and handling information security 
        incidents;
  --Compile and analyze information about incidents that threaten 
        information security;
  --Inform operators of agency information systems about current and 
        potential information security threats and vulnerabilities; and
  --Consult with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
        agencies or offices operating or exercising control of national 
        security systems (including the National Security Agency), and 
        such other agencies or offices in accordance with law and as 
        directed by the President regarding information security 
        incidents and related matters. In accordance with DOD Directive 
        O-8530-1, all DOD services and agencies are to report incidents 
        to the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), 
        which will, in turn, coordinate directly with the US-CERT.
    The DHS approach to cybersecurity is one of coordination and 
collaboration. Therefore, in each of its cybersecurity efforts, DHS 
works with key stakeholders and subject matter experts, both within the 
Department and with external constituencies on a Federal, State, local, 
and international level.

                           OFFICE OF SECURITY

    Question. What is the Department doing to streamline the process of 
security clearances to prevent a backlog?
    Answer. The Department grants access to classified information in a 
timely manner. There is no adjudicative backlog in the granting of 
security clearances at the present time.
    The Department is continually working to improve the process of 
conducting and adjudicating background investigations and granting 
security clearances. DHS is coordinating with other departments and 
agencies in the personnel security community to accomplish this goal.
    Reciprocity.--DHS, like other Executive Branch Departments and 
agencies, complies with the requirements of Executive Order 12968, 
which establishes a uniform Federal personnel security program for 
employees who require access to classified information. The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act and Executive Order 
12968 require that background investigations and eligibility 
determinations should be mutually and reciprocally accepted by Federal 
agencies. Since its inception, DHS has conformed to this reciprocity 
requirement.
    Interim Secret Security Clearances.--The Department grants interim 
access to certain classified information following favorable completion 
of a preliminary investigation. This interim Secret clearance permits 
DHS employees to begin their service expeditiously. In addition, the 
Department is working diligently with the Office of Personnel 
Management to accelerate the investigative process for Top Secret 
security clearances by obtaining delegations of authority and 
prioritizing cases.
    Certain Investigative Authority.--DHS has obtained certain 
investigative authority that expedites background investigations and 
re-investigations for Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented 
Information (SCI) security clearances. The Department has utilized the 
personnel security services of CBP in the Border and Transportation 
Security Directorate to conduct these background investigations for DHS 
Headquarters applicants. In this way, DHS has been able to avail itself 
of process improvements, technological advances, and other management 
efficiencies.
    Additional Adjudicators.--The DHS Office of Security (OS) is hiring 
additional Federal employees as security clearance adjudicators to meet 
the Department's growing needs.
    Streamlining the Process.--In addition, DHS has taken the following 
steps to streamline and improve the quality of the security clearance 
process:
  --The Department is focusing its background investigations on the 
        areas most relevant to the current threats facing the country 
        and the Department;
  --The Department is applying resources in the early phases of the 
        investigation to maximize limited investigative resources and 
        minimize wasteful expenditure on candidates unlikely to be 
        favorably adjudicated;
  --The Department is strategically placing employees to assist other 
        Federal agencies at key points of the investigative process;
  --The Department is automating many aspects of the personnel security 
        process, including the deployment of Electronic Questionnaires 
        for Investigations Processing (EQIP), an automated tool that 
        allows applicants to complete the form online, thus reducing 
        the processing time and minimizing the error rate; and
  --A team of human capital and personnel security experts are working 
        to increase efficiency by educating managers and prospective 
        employees about the requirements of the security clearance 
        process.
    Question. A pending fiscal year 2005 reprogramming request proposes 
to transfer $6.6 million from the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Directorate to the Office of Security. Will 
the fiscal year 2006 request of $39.4 million for the Office of 
Security fully fund the Office of Security so that it does not require 
transfers from other DHS components to carryout its important 
operations?
    Answer. It is projected that the increase of $39.445 million for 
fiscal year 2006 will be sufficient for the currently-anticipated 
requirements of the Office of Security. It should be noted, however, 
that the proposed House version of the fiscal year 2006 Homeland 
Security Appropriations Bill cut of $10 million would have a drastic 
effect on important operations. If this occurs, the Office of Security 
will again require a transfer of funds from other components or be 
forced to cut services.
    Question. How will the Office of Security assist with the 
Department's efforts to improve information sharing with State and 
local governments and private industry?
    Answer. The Office of Security (OS) aims to facilitate the sharing 
process, while ensuring that the dissemination of information is 
conducted through secure processes and channels to trustworthy 
individuals. OS continues to play an integral role in the Department's 
efforts to improve information sharing at all levels through a number 
of initiatives.
    OS has assisted in the following ways:
  --Security Clearances.--OS has established and implemented processes 
        to facilitate the issuance of security clearances to state, 
        local and private sector personnel, in coordination with the 
        SLGCP and the Infrastructure Coordination Division of the IAIP 
        Directorate.
  --Communications Security.--OS has developed standards and a process 
        for the deployment of secure communications equipment, in 
        coordination with SLGCP and the DHS Chief Information Officer;
  --Computer Security Standards.--OS has developed and implemented 
        standards that support the deployment of computer equipment for 
        classified information disseminated to selected State and local 
        government locations;
  --Security Policy Guidance.--OS has issued policy and procedural 
        guidance to support the sharing of information and encourage 
        secure dissemination to the intended audience; and
  --Security Training.--OS has prepared and distributed educational and 
        awareness products to designated State and local government 
        personnel and private-sector officials.
    OS has played a significant role in the creation of proposed 
national standards for the sharing and safeguarding of homeland 
security information.
    Question. What coordination will take place between the Office of 
Security, the Chief Information Officer, and the Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate to ensure that sensitive 
security materials do not fall into the wrong hands?
    Answer. The Office of Security (OS) continues to coordinate with 
the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the IAIP Directorate to 
ensure that information shared with state, local and private sector 
partners is afforded the appropriate protections commensurate with the 
level of sensitivity.
    In addition to the five areas listed in the previous response, OS 
has: (1) contributed to the development of policies and procedures for 
the deployment of the HSDN and is an active participant in the Homeland 
Security Accreditation Working Group, developing guidelines regarding 
appropriate physical security standards, security clearance 
verifications, and security training for the HSDN program; (2) provided 
guidance regarding the ``Need to Know'' requirements for the network. 
In addition, OS has contributed to the creation of a Homeland Security 
Information Network-Secret (HSIN-S) Users Manual to ensure proper 
security standards for information disseminated through the system; (3) 
involved in a comprehensive review of information sharing laws, 
Executive Orders, regulations and guidance, and it has participated in 
the creation of national standards for the protection of sensitive and 
classified homeland security information; and (4) participated in 
weekly meetings with the IAIP Information Sharing and Collaboration 
Office, a program established to coordinate and facilitate information 
sharing throughout DHS and with its partners.

                           REGIONS INITIATIVE

    Question. Why has the report required by section 706 of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 not been submitted to Congress?
    Answer. The report required by section 706 of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 was submitted in February 2004 as requested.
    Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget justification proposes a 
traveling cadre from the Office of Security that will provide security-
related support to regional offices. However, there is no funding 
identified for this activity. How will the Office of Security provide 
assistance to these offices without funding?
    Answer. The Office of Security is requesting a total of $168,131 
for travel in the line item fiscal year 2006 budget. This money will be 
used by Office of Security personnel to support all travel requirements 
within the office.

                                I-STAFF

    Question. The Operational Integration Staff and the proposed Office 
of Policy, Planning, and International Affairs appear to be working 
toward the same goal of developing cohesiveness among DHS components. 
How are the roles of the integration staff distinguished from those of 
the proposed Office of Policy, Planning, and International Affairs?
    Answer. The new Office of Policy will lead the Department in both 
strategic policy development and oversight of all program policy 
efforts, while consolidating programs with significant policy 
responsibilities into one cohesive office. The new Office of Operations 
will provide the Department with a coordinated cross-cutting operation 
function. The Operation Integration Staff, consequently, will no longer 
be needed, and most of its current employees will be merged into the 
Offices of Policy or Operations
    Question. The Department has placed the Operational Integration 
Staff in charge of coordinating the security plans for homeland 
security events that are not designated National Special Security 
Events (NSSEs). Please provide an overview of the plan for operational 
command and control for such events?
    Answer. Special Event security is the responsibility of law 
enforcement agencies with jurisdiction at the event location. The lead 
agency will normally be the local law enforcement agency. However, a 
Federal agency may assume the lead role, as with an event at a national 
park. Generally, because multiple agencies and jurisdictions are 
involved, a coordinated and integrated approach to event security is 
involved. As directed by both the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
HSPD-5--``Management of Domestic Incidents,'' the Department of 
Homeland Security promulgated the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS). The NIMS provides a command and control framework within which 
government and private entities at all levels can work together across 
each phase of incident management: prevention, preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. Specifically, the NIMS requires the formation 
of a Unified Command to facilitate coordination for incidents and 
potential incidents involving multiple agencies with independent 
jurisdictional authority. The Unified Command allows agencies with 
different legal and functional authorities and responsibilities to work 
together in an integrated fashion without affecting individual agency 
authority, responsibility, or accountability. For Special Events below 
the NSSE threshold, the responsibility for security planning resides 
entirely within this Unified Command.
    The NIMS also recognizes the need for support and coordination for 
an event and establishes a multi-agency coordination system comprised 
of local and State Emergency Operations Centers and coordination 
entities. Under normal circumstances, there is no similar standing 
Federal coordination entity at the local level, but certain special 
events below the NSSE threshold create a significant need for Federal 
interagency coordination. In such cases, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security appoints a Federal Coordinator to serve as the principal 
Federal point of coordination. As requests for Federal assistance are 
answered and as Federal agencies adapt their independent authorities, 
the Federal Coordinator captures this integrated strategy in the form 
of a Special Event Integrated Federal Support Plan. The Federal 
Coordinator then coordinates support and information sharing at the 
special event and responds to unforeseen support needs and events.
    The NIMS protocol does not change the existing command and control 
architecture at the Unified Command level for agencies supporting the 
Unified Command, or for agencies forced to adapt their independent 
operations as a result of an event.
    Question. What role (if any) will the Secret Service have in non-
NSSE events?
    Answer. For non-NSSE events, i.e., DHS-established levels of 
Special Events Homeland Security (SEHS), the role of the Secret Service 
will vary dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the particular 
event. For events that receive a designation of Level I or Level II and 
have a traditional protectee of the Secret Service in attendance, the 
Secret Service will implement appropriate protective protocols and may 
serve as the Federal Coordinator. For events that receive a designation 
of Level I or II that do not have a traditional Secret Service 
protectee in attendance, the Secret Service may offer available 
protective assets, as appropriate.
    When the event receives a lower designation and a protectee will 
attend, the Secret Service will implement appropriate protective 
protocols; in those instances when no protectee will attend, the Secret 
Service may offer protective event management training, as appropriate.
    Question. What is the budget for the Operational Integration Staff 
for fiscal year 2005? Where are those funds coming from?
    Answer. As directed by the language in the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami 
Relief Act, 2005, further funding is not available for the Operational 
Integration Staff in fiscal year 2005 unless funds are reprogrammed. 
Travel and incidental costs were borne by the components of those on 
detail to these efforts.

                            HUMAN RESOURCES

    Question. In developing a human resources system that is mission-
centered and performance-focused, how will the creation of open pay 
ranges and performance pay pools assist the Department in meeting its 
operational needs?
    Answer. A major objective of open pay ranges is to provide DHS 
management with the flexibility to compete with other employers 
(private, Federal, State and local), and to attract, hire, and retain 
the best candidates for positions within the Department. DHS management 
will have increased flexibility in negotiating employee salaries. Under 
a pay-for-performance system, the objective is to truly compensate 
those employees who have made significant contributions to 
accomplishing the agency's mission. Employees will play a major role in 
determining their eligibility for performance adjustments based upon 
their work performance. The intent is to motivate employees to perform 
their very best; as a result, this incentive should assist 
significantly in enhancing agency effectiveness and employee retention.
    Question. A total of $53 million is included for Max HR in the 
fiscal year 2006 budget request. What is the total projected cost of 
the Max HR system?
    Answer. The total anticipated cost for the period fiscal year 2005-
2008 is $250 million. This amount is broken down as follows:
    The total funding includes $43 million for training 100,000 
employees, which is essential to ensure that the new HR flexibilities 
achieve the desired results. This funding will train all Department 
executives, managers, supervisors, and employees on all aspects of the 
new system and their responsibilities as leaders in the DHS 
environment, and to provide the framework for all of the components to 
work together as one Department of Homeland Security. Comprehensive 
training also will be provided for HR professionals throughout DHS 
whose roles and responsibilities are impacted by implementation of the 
new HR provisions.
    Additionally, $56 million in funding will be used for detailed 
systems design and implementation support and to provide access to 
experts who are assisting in designing the new DHS performance 
management system, job evaluation system (including the creation of job 
clusters), compensation system (including new pay ranges and market pay 
processes), and linkages for pay and performance. This in-depth 
expertise is required to ensure DHS creates a program that 
appropriately links pay, competencies, performance, and labor market, 
and through this linkage, improves DHS' mission performance and 
accountability.
    $100 million will be required to fund the initial conversion of 
over 90,000 employees from the General Schedule pay system to newly 
created market-based pay ranges. This amount will cover one-time 
conversion costs for employees included in three implementation phases. 
Phase 1 of the DHS pay conversion, which is scheduled for January 2006, 
covers employees in DHS HQTRS, S&T, IAIP, OS, U/S MGMT, U/S BTS, FLETC, 
and EP&R, and is estimated to cost $10 million. Phase 2, which will 
occur in January 2007, will include U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Coast 
Guard (civilians). Phase 3, the largest phase covering CIS, CBP, and 
ICE, will occur in fiscal year 2008.
    A total of $9 million is required to fund the new Homeland Security 
Labor Relations Board (HSLRB) in fiscal year 2005 and 2006. The Board 
has been established in fiscal year 2005 as an independent entity that 
will report to the Office of the Secretary. The HSLRB resolves labor-
management disputes and is integral to the deployment of the labor 
relations section of the regulations. $42 million for program 
management funding is required for program evaluation and to manage 
appropriate cost, schedule, and control activities at the Departmental 
level, ensuring that the system investment is managed appropriately and 
at a good value. Program management funding will provide for earned 
value management assessments and risk management. This funding will 
also ensure the development of a robust metrics and program management 
evaluation framework that will be used to gauge overall program 
success. In addition, department-wide communications about MAXHR will 
be funded from the program management account.
    Question. The budget request for fiscal year 2006 includes $10 
million to fund the initial conversion of some Homeland Security 
employees from the General Schedule to newly created market-based pay 
ranges. Does the Department expect any delays in this conversion to the 
new system?
    Answer. We expect to be on schedule in converting to the new 
system. DHS employees will be converted to the new pay system in three 
phases. Phase 1 occurs in January 2006; Phase 2 occurs in January 2007 
and Phase 3 occurs in January 2008.

                                  NAC

    Question. The budget request provides $26.1 million to continue 
expansion of the Department's presence at the Nebraska Avenue Complex. 
What is the Department's estimated timeline for standing up a fully 
operational Nebraska Avenue Complex?
    Answer. We expect to be 70 percent to 80 percent occupied at the 
NAC within 6 to 9 months of the U.S. Navy vacating the site based on 
minor renovations to the site as planned and barring any significant 
infrastructure changes as found during earlier moves within the NAC. 
The U.S. Navy is expected to vacate the site by December 31, 2005, so 
we would expect to be 70 percent to 80 percent occupied between May 
2006 and August 2006.
    We expect to be 100 percent occupied at the NAC within 18 to 24 
months (May 2007-October 2007) of the U.S. Navy vacating the site based 
on the planned major renovations of several buildings at the NAC.
    Question. Is there a timeline for the United States Navy to be 
completely relocated to another facility?
    Answer. Yes, December 31, 2005.
    Question. Are there projected cost estimates on what the Department 
will be required to pay for relocation of Navy activities?
    Answer. Yes, the original U.S. Navy relocation cost estimates were 
established between GSA, U.S. Navy, and DHS with OMB review. DHS' share 
to relocate the U.S. Navy was estimated to be approximately 
$30,800,000. Of this amount, $12,500,000 was obligated for this purpose 
in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. DHS obligated $12,000,000 
year to date in fiscal year 2005 and expects to obligate the remaining 
$6,300,000 in fiscal year 2005 for a total obligation of 18,300,000 in 
fiscal year 2005.

                   FINANCIAL AND PROCUREMENT CONTROLS

    Question. What is included in the fiscal year 2006 budget request 
to improve the CFO's oversight and controls of the Department's 
bureaus?
    Answer. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) fiscal 
year 2006 budget request includes substantial increases that will 
enable OCFO to increase its level of oversight and control of the DHS 
components. OCFO has requested two additional FTEs and $305,000 to 
increase budget execution oversight of the components. Whereas OCFO 
conducted mid-year budget execution reviews of the components in fiscal 
year 2005, the additional staff will allow us to conduct quarterly 
reviews in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. More staff in the OCFO budget 
division will allow a redistribution of desk officer portfolios; 
reduced portfolio sizes will allow all OCFO budget desk officers to 
work more closely with component budget personnel and to intensify 
oversight of the components' budget execution. This will allow for more 
timely identification and resolution of problems in components that 
require additional oversight. One additional FTE and $152,000 will 
augment the OCFO's appropriations liaison staff and ensure timelier 
fulfillment of the appropriations committees' requests.
    The request for OCFO also includes five additional FTE and 
$763,000, and $4,000,000 for technical assistance to implement the DHS 
Financial Accountability Act. In order to implement the Act, the DHS 
OCFO will design and implement DHS-wide policy, procedures, and 
internal controls. The goals of the Act imply that DHS must accelerate 
consolidation of financial operations. Additional FTE and funding will 
enable the OCFO to increase financial policy guidance and for OCFO 
financial analysts and contractors to work closely with the components' 
financial operations on internal control and standardization projects. 
Increased interaction will lead to more consistent and better financial 
performance at DHS.
    Question. The budget request proposes funding of $9 million, an 
increase of $1 million, for the Chief Procurement Officer. As the 
majority of the funds for this office have been proposed through the 
Working Capital Fund, are there sufficient funds for the Procurement 
Office in the fiscal year 2006 budget request?
    Answer. Yes, the fiscal year 2006 increase of $1 million for the 
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) is sufficient. The OCPO 
provides acquisition policy, oversight, strategic sourcing, competitive 
sourcing, integrated systems, and grants policy support for the entire 
Department. The Office of Procurement Operations, a direct report to 
the OCPO, is funded separately through the working capital fund and 
provides operational contracting support to 35 major organizational 
components including S&T, IAIP, the Offices of the Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary, and the Under Secretary for Management.
    Question. The Department's organizational structure places the 
Chief Procurement Officer under the Office of the Under Secretary for 
Management, while other offices like the Chief Financial Officer are 
funded separately. Would altering this structure to make the Chief 
Procurement Officer a direct report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security help to improve this office's ability to provide oversight to 
all Department procurements?
    Answer. To ensure the administrative functions of the Department 
are properly integrated, the OCPO should continue to report directly to 
the Under Secretary of Management and the OCPO's budget should remain a 
part of the USM budget. Changing the OCPO's reporting structure and/or 
segregating the OCPO's budget would have no material impact on the 
Department's ability to provide oversight of the procurement program.

                               DEEPWATER

    Question. Mr. Secretary, the Coast Guard has submitted to Congress 
a revised baseline of its Deepwater acquisition plan. How confident are 
you that the Coast Guard has accurately reestimated the use of its 
assets in this post 9/11 environment?
    Answer. The original Deepwater System contracted in 2002 was based 
on the Coast Guard's 1998 mission demand. I am confident that the 
revised Deepwater implementation plan reflects the changed requirements 
of the Deepwater system needed in the post-September 11 environment.
    We revised the Deepwater implementation plan based on a 
comprehensive performance gap analysis that identified new capabilities 
that the Coast Guard needed to carry out its responsibilities under the 
DHS Strategic Plan. The original, pre-September 11 Deepwater Program 
was then modified to incorporate these improved post-September 11 
capabilities. The revised plan includes retaining, upgrading, and 
converting aviation legacy assets as part of the final asset mix and 
adjusting the program's overall asset delivery schedule to align with 
operational priorities. The revised plan also includes those 
capabilities necessary to provide maritime domain awareness and operate 
successfully in the post-September 11 threat environment. To help 
ensure the new plan meets broader national and departmental maritime 
homeland security and interoperability requirements, my staff carefully 
reviewed and analyzed the revised baseline prior to its approval by the 
DHS Investment Review Board (IRB). The Department's Joint Requirements 
Council and IRB also reviewed and approved the plan. The level of 
analysis and critical thinking that is reflected in the revised 
Deepwater plan exceeds that of any project that the Department has ever 
undertaken. For these reasons, I am confident that it will deliver the 
post-September 11 capabilities needed.
    Question. Do you believe there will be further revisions to this 
plan? If so, why?
    Answer. The revised implementation plan provides us with the right 
mix of assets to ensure its readiness to address current threats. 
However, the implementation schedule and the planned acquisitions will 
necessarily adapt to changes in annual appropriation levels and changes 
in other variables, such as technology upgrades and legacy asset 
conditions. The revised capabilities and capacities presented within 
the revised implementation plan are the result of nearly 2 years of 
analysis, gap assessment, and third party validation after September 
11, 2001.
    Question. A review of the fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006 
budgets indicates that the percent of Deepwater funds spent to sustain 
legacy ships, aircraft and communications systems climbed each year 
from 7 percent in the fiscal year 2003 budget to 25 percent in the 
fiscal year 2006 budget. This is very troubling given that the 
objective of the program is to reduce the cost of maintaining legacy 
assets within the Deepwater system. What can be done to reverse this 
trend and bring new ships and aircraft into the fleet sooner?
    Answer. Full support of the President's fiscal year 2006 Deepwater 
budget request is critical to ensuring urgent legacy asset projects, 
such as HH-65 re-engining, are funded to immediately correct existing 
deficiencies while providing significant recapitalization funding for 
procurement of assets to replace those that are rapidly declining.
    The Department is taking steps to mitigate legacy asset costs 
through advancing recapitalization of certain asset classes within the 
Deepwater program. For example, the fiscal year 2006 Deepwater request 
includes $108 million to advance acquisition of the Offshore Patrol 
Cutter by completing the design and purchase of long lead materials for 
the first cutter. The revised Deepwater plan also advances the 
acquisition of the Fast Response Cutter.
    In addressing legacy asset maintenance issues, the Department has 
to balance four factors: operational needs, legacy fleet status, 
current Deepwater acquisition priorities, and available funds. Through 
sound resource planning and performance assessments we will invest the 
necessary resources to sustain operational assets until they can be 
replaced/recapitalized through the Deepwater project.
    Question. Is it true that the Coast Guard's major cutters and much 
of your aircraft fleet are simply beyond their reasonable service life?
    Answer. Many Coast Guard legacy assets are aging, technologically 
obsolete, and require replacement and modernization. The majority of 
these assets will reach the end of their planned service life by 2010. 
Coast Guard cutters and aircraft are failing at an alarming rate. 
However, with proper maintenance and sustainment support, the Coast 
Guard plans to sustain legacy assets at a level that will allow them to 
capably perform their missions until they are replaced by their 
Deepwater counterparts.
    The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget requests $966 million for 
the Deepwater program, which includes critical funding necessary to 
address immediate legacy asset sustainment issues that threaten the 
performance of Coast Guard missions, including HH-65 re-engining and 
the Medium Endurance Cutter Mission Effectiveness Project (MEP). Full 
support of the President's Budget is critical to sustaining Coast Guard 
operational performance.
    Question. Two years ago, at Congress' request, the Department 
provided an assessment of the feasibility of accelerating the Deepwater 
program. At the proposed fiscal year 2006 funding level of $966 million 
can we expect to accelerate the program?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Deepwater budget request 
of $966 million represents a 33 percent increase over the fiscal year 
2005 enacted funding level of $724 million. It advances the delivery of 
the Fast Response Cutter by 10 years and the Offshore Patrol Cutter by 
5 years, while beginning the conversion of legacy assets to meet post-
September 11 mission requirements. Because of the additional 
capabilities and revised asset mix included in the revised Deepwater 
implementation plan, the total program is planned for completion 
completed in 25 years.
    Question. What funding level would be required in fiscal year 2006 
and future years to complete the plan within 10 years?
    Answer. The President's Budget and the Department support the 
revised Deepwater implementation plan and the funding stream that 
acquires it in 25 years at $24 billion. To complete the plan within the 
next 10 years would require an annual funding stream between $1.7 
billion to $2.2 billion per year.
    Question. What, if any, improvements in operational effectiveness 
do you expect once Deepwater is fully implemented?
    Answer. The post-September 11 Deepwater system will significantly 
enhance the Coast Guard's operational effectiveness. The initial 
Deepwater implementation plan was designed to meet the Coast Guard's 
missions in 1998. The post-September 11 asset capabilities included in 
the revised Deepwater implementation plan not only ensure the Coast 
Guard can meet its new maritime homeland security missions, but also 
enhance the Coast Guard's ability to meet its traditional mission 
requirements. Specific operational enhancements contained in the 
revised Deepwater plan include:
  --Improved maritime security capabilities on selected Deepwater 
        cutters, including greater speed, larger flight deck, and 
        automated weapons systems to reduce maritime risk and enhance 
        response to terrorist threats;
  --Network-centric command, control, computer, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems to improve 
        maritime domain awareness and interoperability;
  --Helicopter airborne use of force and vertical insertion 
        capabilities to provide warning and or disabling fire at sea 
        and in ports, waterways, and coastal regions and to enable the 
        delivery of boarding teams to board and take control of non-
        compliant vessels;
  --Improved long-range surveillance capability to support maritime 
        domain awareness and reduce the maritime patrol aircraft flight 
        hour gap;
  --Enhanced all-weather self-defense capabilities on select assets; 
        and
  --Improved Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear/Explosive 
        threat response on select Deepwater assets.

                      HH-65 HELICOPTER RE-ENGINING

    Question. What is the status of the HH-65 re-engining project? Be 
specific in terms of how many engines have been replaced.
    Answer. In August 2004, the first re-engined HH-65 was delivered to 
the Coast Guard at Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, for operational 
testing and evaluation. As of the September 1, 2005, 10 re-engined HH-
65Cs had been delivered for full operational status to Air Station 
Atlantic City, NJ, (5), Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, (1), and 
Air Station Savannah, GA, (4). To accelerate the HH-65 re-engining 
project the Coast Guard and its contractor, Integrated Coast Guard 
Systems (ICGS), have examined the quality and suitability of a second 
re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. In August 2005, this 
facility delivered its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast Guard. 
This aircraft was determined to meet needed quality and suitability 
parameters and the Coast Guard contracted with ICGS to re-engine an 
additional 11 aircraft at the Columbus facility. The Coast Guard plans 
to have all 84 operational aircraft re-engined in early 2007.
    Question. Can all the engines be recapitalized within the specified 
timeframe given the current capacity at Elizabeth City, NC?
    Answer. Given the current capacity at Elizabeth City, NC, the re-
engining project cannot be completed within the specified timeframe. In 
order to complete re-engining the operational fleet of 84 helicopters 
by February 2007, the Coast Guard's Deepwater contractor, Integrated 
Coast Guard Systems, will rely upon a second re-engining facility at 
Columbus, MS.
    Question. What will have to be done by the Coast Guard to meet the 
Congressional direction to re-engine the entire fleet within that 
required 24 month time period?
    Answer. Provided the President's request of $133.1 million for HH-
65 re-engining in the fiscal year 2006 budget is fully funded, the 
Coast Guard plans to complete re-engining of the operational fleet of 
84 aircraft by February 2007. This is the fastest possible timeline 
based on the availability of engine kits and parts, increased 
production at the Coast Guard's Aviation Repair and Supply Center, and 
additional production capacity at a second facility. ICGS is assessing 
the quality and suitability of a second facility in Columbus, MS. That 
facility is now re-engining a single aircraft that is scheduled to be 
completed in September 2005.
    Question. Will a second line be required?
    Answer. In order to finish re-engining as quickly as possible and 
to meet the February 2007 timeline, a second line will be required.
    Question. What lessons have been learned from the test helicopter 
currently being re-engined at the second line which the subcontractor 
has established at its site?
    Answer. It is too early in the process to assess lessons learned. 
To accelerate the HH-65 re-engining project, the Coast Guard and its 
contractor, ICGS, are examining the quality and suitability of a second 
re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. This facility is expected 
to deliver its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast Guard in 
September, 2005. Before making a final determination on the suitability 
of the facility the Coast Guard is evaluating the second facility's 
capabilities to control cost, meet schedule requirements, and employ 
standardized industrial processes.
    Question. What value do you see in having a second line outside the 
Coast Guard's depot-level maintenance facility?
    Answer. Using a second production facility will allow completion of 
the re-engining of all 84 operational HH-65s by February 2007.
    Question. What are the challenges of a second line?
    Answer. The second facility has not yet been certified as providing 
a quality product at a reasonable price. Also, as in any lead asset 
production, there is a substantial learning curve. Other challenges 
include:
  --Validation of capability;
  --Cost control;
  --Avoidance of schedule delays;
  --Parts availability; and
  --Standardized industrial process.

                           COAST GUARD/C-130

    Question. In the past, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 
funded the acquisition of 6 new C130Js, which are the next generation 
beyond the C-130Hs, and began funding to missionize these planes in 
fiscal year 2005. The President's budget proposes missionization costs 
to be borne by the Coast Guard in fiscal year 2006. The cost of these 
planes has been outside the original Deepwater plan, but now the 
associated missionization costs are included in the revised Deepwater 
plan.
    What legacy sustainment issues are you experiencing with the C-130H 
fleet?
    Answer. On April 20, 2005, the Coast Guard submitted a legacy asset 
report to Congress, as directed in the Conference Report accompanying 
the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Bill. This report includes the 
HC-130H AC&I projects that the Coast Guard has included in the fiscal 
year 2006 budget request and anticipates requesting in future budget 
submissions. The primary HC-130H sustainment issues are as follows:
    APS 137 Surface Search Radar ($75M, cost reflects conversion on 27 
aircraft). The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 Deepwater budget includes 
$9 million to start the replacement effort for the HC-130H's APS 137 
search radar
    Avionics Modernization and Rewiring ($144M, cost reflects 16 
aircraft). The HC-130H requires a modernized and supportable cockpit. 
This cockpit modernization will prepare the aircraft for the inevitable 
U.S. Airspace restrictions due to increased traffic and the Open Skies 
policy of route traffic control. Logistically, the aircraft's current 
cockpit instrumentation will become unsupportable within this decade. 
With plans for the HC-130H to operate until 2033, this will be a 
necessary upgrade. Over 500 other DOD aircraft are conducting the same 
modification. DOD modernization plans will significantly reduce the 
availability and or support of older parts, resulting in increased 
repair costs of the existing system.
    Center Wing Box Structural Issues. In March 2005, the C-130 
manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Aero (LMA), changed the inspection 
guidelines for C-130 wing boxes based on cracking found in Air Force C-
130s of about the same age as some of the Coast Guard HC-130Hs. The 
wing box problem is not unique to the Coast Guard, but applies to all 
C-130's world wide. As a result of flight hour limitations and or 
restrictions identified in LMA Service Bulletin (SB1), the five Coast 
Guard 1500 series airframes are limited to restricted operations until 
they are properly inspected over the next 6 months. A second service 
bulletin is due this month from LMA that will provide the inspection 
criteria. The estimated cost of completing the 1500 series inspections 
is $2 million total. The remaining 22 aircraft are newer and will be 
due for inspections over the next 2 years.
    Question. Now that the missionization of the Coast Guard's C-130 
fleet is included in the Deepwater plan, what are the future costs to 
complete this undertaking?
    Answer. The Coast Guard plans to have all six C-130J aircraft 
missionized and available for maritime patrol aircraft work by the end 
of 2008 at a cost not to exceed $120 million. Funds to complete this 
missionization were previously provided outside of Deepwater. 
Additional missionization costs within Deepwater are not currently 
anticipated. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request also 
includes $5 million to fund the Aircraft Project Office, which manages 
the C-130J pilot and air crew training, logistics use, and 
missionization oversight while the aircraft are transitioning to full 
operational use. As indicated in the fiscal year 2006-2010 Capital 
Investment Plan (page 116 of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 
Congressional Justifications), this cost will recur at $5 million per 
year through project completion in fiscal year 2008.
    Question. Why were these costs omitted in the original Deepwater 
plan?
    Answer. The Congressional Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-710) of 
June 2000 stated ``That the procurement of maritime patrol aircraft (C-
130J funded under this heading) shall not, in any way, influence the 
procurement strategy, program requirements, or down-select decision 
pertaining to the Coast Guard's Deepwater Capability Replacement 
Project.'' Based on this direction the Coast Guard did not include the 
C-130J in the original Deepwater plan.
    Question. Since the acquisition and initial missionization costs of 
the C-130Js were incurred by the Department of Defense, do you believe 
that any future costs should also be borne by that Department?
    Answer. Department of Defense funding already received in past 
years is sufficient to complete missionization of the C-130J aircraft. 
The President's 2006 budget includes a request for $5 million for the 
Coast Guard to fund the Coast Guard Aircraft Project Office, which will 
manage the C-130J pilot and crew training, logistics use, and 
missionization oversight while the aircraft are transitioning to full 
operational use.
    Question. Why shouldn't the Department of Defense continue to 
complete this effort?
    Answer. Funding to acquire and fully missionize the Coast Guard's 
six C-130J aircraft has already been provided through Department of 
Defense appropriations. The remaining funds required to complete the 
project, as outlined on page 116 of the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 
Congressional Justifications, should be borne by DHS appropriations 
since they will be used to train Coast Guard C-130J pilots and crews, 
fund Coast Guard logistics support, and transition the aircraft to 
operational use for Coast Guard missions.

                        RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

    Question. Has the Coast Guard R&D program been able to successfully 
support the Coast Guard's traditional mission areas since the Coast 
Guard is now an entity under the Department of Homeland Security?
    Answer. Yes, the Coast Guard Research and Development program has 
been able to continue research in non-homeland security (traditional) 
mission areas. Presently, the Coast Guard is concentrating much of the 
traditional mission R&D effort on aquatic nuisance species remediation. 
The Coast Guard is also continuing research and development in other 
non-homeland security mission areas such as Aids to Navigation, Search 
and Rescue, Maritime Safety, and Marine Environmental Protection.
    Question. How successful has the Coast Guard R&D program been in 
competing for DHS Science and Technology funding in addition to its own 
R&D budget?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has been successful in competing for DHS 
S&T funding for homeland security-related projects. In accordance with 
established S&T protocols, the Coast Guard Portfolio Manager at S&T 
submits the Coast Guard Maritime Security requirements to the DHS S&T 
Executive Review Team for evaluation and funding. To date, the Coast 
Guard has received over $6.5 million of funding from the S&T 
Directorate in fiscal year 2005.
    Question. Do you have any concerns about having this program 
transferred to the Science and Technology Directorate?
    Answer. No, a collaborative relationship between the Coast Guard 
and the S&T Directorate is both viable and valuable. Integration of 
funding and research requirements will maximize the effectiveness of 
both homeland and non-homeland security research.
    Question. How can you ensure those Members with concerns about 
traditional mission research that the Science and Technology 
Directorate (S&T) will place the same level of consideration on those 
areas of research as the Coast Guard does?
    Answer. Retaining the Coast Guard's capabilities in both homeland 
and non-homeland security mission areas is of critical importance to 
DHS. Equally important is the retention of the Coast Guard's research 
and development capability in both homeland and non-homeland security 
(traditional) missions. The S&T Directorate is committed to and 
responsible for supporting the research, development, testing, and 
evaluation requirements for the entire Department, which includes 
enhancing the Coast Guard's homeland and non-homeland security mission 
performance. For example, to date the S&T Directorate has provided 
$7.56 million toward Project Hawkeye, an initiative that will enhance 
performance across the entire spectrum of Coast Guard missions by 
improving Maritime Domain Awareness.
    Question. If Coast Guard R&D is transferred into S&T, what role 
does the Department plan for the Coast Guard Research and Development 
Center in Connecticut to continue to play in the future?
    Answer. The Coast Guard R&D Center is the sole Government entity 
performing research and development in the area of Aids to Navigation, 
Search and Rescue, Maritime Safety, and Marine Environmental 
Protection. The Coast Guard R&D Center will continue to be the critical 
link to ensure the Coast Guard has the essential research, development, 
testing, and evaluation requirements to succeed in both its homeland 
and non-homeland security mission areas.
    Question. What follow-on actions is the Coast Guard taking in 
response to the Congressionally-mandated study of Coast Guard R&D?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is taking several of the study's 
recommendations for action. Key items include: the development and 
implementation of an overarching Research and Development strategy; 
continued outreach to other government agencies, industry and academia 
to establish partnerships; and improved alignment with the Coast Guard 
Acquisition Program.

                 COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

    Question. Why has Rescue 21 been delayed so significantly? The GAO 
has been very critical of the Coast Guard's acquisition management team 
known as Deepwater. Isn't this just another example of the Coast Guard 
not being able to manage large acquisitions?
    Answer. Rescue 21's delay in achieving initial operating capability 
(IOC) is due to problems experienced by General Dynamics C4 System 
(GDC4S). Those problems have been twofold in: (a) completing software 
development needed to integrate the multiple commercial items into a 
consolidated control interface and (b) resolving performance issues 
stemming from System Integration Testing (SIT). Software integration 
and SIT issues have been resolved and the project is ready to enter 
full rate production upon approval.
    The Coast Guard does not consider this delay a result of 
mismanagement as it has closely followed Coast Guard and DHS 
acquisition processes, as highlighted by the GAO Report 03-1111 Coast 
Guard's Rescue 21 Faces Challenges. GAO noted that the Coast Guard has 
developed key documentation used for managing system requirements and 
that the Coast Guard has a system in place for identifying, 
prioritizing, and minimizing risks.
    The Coast Guard has successfully managed and executed several 
comparable acquisitions in the past. Recent projects such as Seagoing 
Buoy Tenders ($618 million), Coastal Patrol Boats ($327 million), and 
the Great Lakes Icebreaker ($140 million) were each remarkably 
successful. The Coast Guard will continue to seek out process 
improvements and apply past lessons learned to manage the Rescue 21 
acquisition.
    Question. Please provide an update on achieving full operating 
capability. What capabilities will Rescue 21 have at the end of fiscal 
year 2006?
    Answer. Provided Rescue 21 is funded consistent with the Coast 
Guard's Capital Investment Plan outlined on page 116 of the Coast 
Guard's fiscal year 2006 Congressional Budget Justification, the Coast 
Guard expects Rescue 21 to reach full operating capability in fiscal 
year 2007. At the end of fiscal year 2006, deployment of Rescue 21 to 
all continental U.S. coastal regions will be complete.
    Question. When will Rescue 21 transition to replace the National 
Response Distress System (NRDS), which is being supplanted by Rescue 
21?
    Answer. The Rescue 21 system will be deployed incrementally in all 
Coast Guard Sector/Group Regions. Following deployment and testing 
within each Coast Guard Sector/Group Region, the legacy NDRS in the 
affected region, will be removed and the Rescue 21 system will become 
operational. Nationwide deployment is expected to be complete in fiscal 
year 2007.
    Question. When is NRDS expected to come offline?
    Answer. The Rescue 21 system will be deployed incrementally in all 
Coast Guard Sector/Group Regions. Following deployment and testing 
within each Coast Guard Sector/Group Region, the legacy NDRS, in the 
affected region, will be removed and the Rescue 21 system will become 
operational. Nationwide deployment is expected to be complete in fiscal 
year 2007.
    Question. Please provide an update of your planned Vessel Tracking 
System installation recapitalization schedule. When will the project be 
completed?
    Answer. The Ports and Waterways Safety System (PAWSS) installation/
recapitalization has been completed in five ports with two additional 
ports to be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005, 
pending completion of remote site leases. Project closeout and 
transition of all systems to long-term operations and support will 
occur by the end of fiscal year 2006. Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) capability, which is an integral part of PAWSS, has been 
installed in all nine scheduled Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) ports.
    Question. How will funding interruptions affect the project 
schedule, for instance, if funding is not provided in fiscal year 2006 
what will not get done?
    Answer. VTS systems in Puget Sound and San Francisco will not be 
recapitalized with funding provided to date. The Coast Guard's fiscal 
year 2006 Unfunded Priorities List includes $17 million for the PAWSS, 
the funding required to complete VTS recapitalization in these ports.
    Question. Please provide an update on the progress/status of 
implementation of the nationwide Automated Identification System (AIS), 
especially as it relates to the maintenance of the Coast Guard's common 
operating picture.
    Answer. The Nationwide AIS project has been approved and chartered 
by the DHS. The project is in the requirements and planning phase of 
the acquisition process.
    Concurrently, numerous initiatives are underway to provide 
prototype and interim AIS capability to provide AIS data to the 
National Maritime Common Operational Picture (COP). The progress to 
date includes:
  --Installation of AIS capability at all Vessel Traffic Services (9 
        sites).
  --Deployment of receive-only AIS sites in key locations in Alaska (8 
        of 11 AIS sites).
  --Deployment of 4 prototype AIS receivers on National Oceanic 
        Atmospheric Administration weather buoys to provide AIS 
        tracking of vessels offshore of the United States.
  --AIS receiver installations for research & development purposes:
  --On Oahu that provides extensive coverage of the major Hawaiian 
            Islands;
  --In San Francisco Bay, CA;
  --In Miami, Port Everglades and Key West, FL; and
  --In Long Island Sound, Cape May NJ, and the Cape Cod Canal.
  --Installation of AIS sites on offshore platforms in the Gulf of 
        Mexico to monitor traffic inbound to Gulf ports (3 of 4 planned 
        AIS sites installed).
  --Deployment of AIS receiver as part of a concept validation on a low 
        earth orbit satellite for long-range AIS vessel tracking to be 
        launched in the second and third quarter fiscal year 2006.
    Question. How does AIS implementation fit with Ports and Waterways 
Safety System (PAWSS) and Rescue 21?
    Answer. The Coast Guard, thru the PAWSS project, has deployed AIS 
capability in all nine VTS areas. Rescue 21 replaces the Coast Guard's 
antiquated short range command and control communications systems and 
it does not include AIS. The Nationwide AIS project will share 
infrastructure with Rescue 21 wherever site and technical compatibility 
will allow, e.g., towers.
    Question. How is it different from PAWSS?
    Answer. The AIS is a cooperative vessel tracking system whereby 
vessels transmit their position, identification, speed, course, cargo, 
and other information to vessels in their area and shoreside receivers 
within range of the system. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 specifies AIS carriage requirements for certain vessels navigating 
U.S. waters. The Nationwide AIS project will implement necessary 
infrastructure to receive AIS transmissions from shipboard systems and 
distribute this data to the Coast Guard's Common Operational Picture to 
enhance maritime domain awareness.
    The PAWSS project was established to build new Coast Guard Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS) systems and to modernize and recapitalize 
existing ones. The Coast Guard operates VTS in nine U.S. ports to 
provide traffic information, traffic organization, and navigation 
assistance services necessary to fulfill the Coast Guard's statutory 
maritime safety and environmental protection responsibilities under the 
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972. PAWSS/VTS employ AIS, among 
other surveillance systems to monitor and access information on vessel 
movements within a VTS area.
    A table highlighting the basic tenants of each project is provided 
below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Compare/Contrast            Nationwide AIS           PAWSS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACRONYM.........................  Automatic           Ports and
                                   Identification      Waterways Safety
                                   System.             System
Primary User....................  U.S. Coast Guard,   U.S. Coast Guard,
                                   Commercial          Commercial
                                   vessels.            vessels
Focus...........................  Pre-9/11--Safety:   Pre-9/11--Safety
                                   for ship to ship   Post-9/11--Safety
                                   to communicate      and Security
                                   rules of the road.  (Maritime Domain
                                  Post-9/11--Safety    Awareness)
                                   and Security--
                                   Maritime Domain
                                   Awareness (MDA).
Purpose.........................  Track vessels       Manage vessel
                                   approaching,        traffic in nine
                                   entering, and       U.S. ports
                                   transiting U.S.
                                   navigable waters.
Project.........................  Enhance the         Provide Vessel
                                   nation's maritime   Traffic Service
                                   domain awareness,
                                   safety, and
                                   security.
Line of Sight Transmissions.....  Send and receive:   Send and Receive
                                   Data, ship-to-      (& share): Voice
                                   ship, ship-to-      & Data, AIS-
                                   shore, shore-to-    based; radar &
                                   ship.               cameras
Location........................  Ports, waterways    9 U.S. ports: one
                                   and coastal areas   each in AK, NY,
                                   out to 2000         MI, CA, WA; two
                                   nautical miles      each in LA and TX
                                   via towers,
                                   buoys, off-shore
                                   platforms, e.g.,
                                   oil rigs, &
                                   satellite(s).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Is PAWSS still needed or is it being phased out?
    Answer. The PAWSS, as an acquisition project, is being phased out. 
The Coast Guard established PAWSS as an acquisition project to build 
new Coast Guard VTS and modernize existing systems. The PAWSS project 
resulted in two new VTS's, recapitalized five of the existing VTS's 
completely, and partially modernized two others (Puget Sound, WA and 
San Francisco, CA).
    While there will be no more acquisitions completed through the 
PAWSS project, the Coast Guard VTS will still operate, providing 
navigation services and ensuring safety and environmental protection of 
U.S. waters as required by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.
    Question. How is AIS different from Rescue 21?
    Answer. The AIS is a cooperative vessel tracking system whereby 
vessels transmit their position, identification, speed, course, cargo, 
and other information to vessels in their area and shoreside receivers 
within range of the system. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 specifies AIS carriage requirements for certain vessels navigating 
U.S. waters. The Nationwide AIS project will implement necessary 
infrastructure to receive AIS transmissions from shipboard systems and 
distribute this data to the Coast Guard's Common Operational Picture to 
enhance maritime domain awareness.
    The Rescue 21 project will replace the existing and obsolete 
National Distress and Response System (the system used by the boating 
public to hail the Coast Guard when in distress) and provide the Coast 
Guard with a modern coastal command, control, and communications 
system. Rescue 21 will be capable of monitoring the international VHF-
FM distress frequency to improve search and rescue response operations 
and communications with Coast Guard and other Federal, state, and local 
first responders and commercial recreational boats.
    A table highlighting the basic tenants of each project is provided 
below:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Compare/Contrast            Nationwide AIS         Rescue 21
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACRONYM.........................  Automatic           Formerly: National
                                   Identification      Distress and
                                   System.             Response System
                                                       (NDRS)
Primary User....................  U.S. Coast Guard,   U.S. Coast Guard,
                                   Commercial          commercial,
                                   vessels.            boating public
Focus...........................  Pre-9/11--Safety:   Pre-9/11--Primary--
                                   for ship to ship    Safety
                                   to communicate     Secondary--support
                                   rules of the road.  all other CG/DHS
                                  Post-9/11--Safety    missions
                                   and Security--     post-9/11--same
                                   Maritime Domain
                                   Awareness (MDA).
Purpose.........................  Track vessels       Command, control,
                                   approaching,        and communication
                                   entering, and       system to allow
                                   transiting U.S.     USCG to hear and
                                   navigable waters.   locate mariners
                                                       in distress
Project.........................  Enhance the         Modernize the
                                   nation's maritime   USCG's legacy
                                   domain awareness,   NDRS
                                   safety, and
                                   security.
Line of Sight Transmissions.....  Send & receive:     Send and receive:
                                   Data, ship-to-      Voice and Data
                                   ship, ship-to-
                                   shore, shore-to-
                                   ship.
Location........................  Ports, waterways    Towers and vessels
                                   and coastal areas   in 46 regions
                                   out to 2000         throughout the
                                   nautical miles      United States,
                                   via towers,         including Guam
                                   buoys, off-shore    and Puerto Rico
                                   platforms, e.g.,
                                   oil rigs, &
                                   satellite(s).
------------------------------------------------------------------------

            FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC)

    Question. Mr. Secretary, as you complete your top to bottom review 
of the Department, what emphasis will you place on the need to provide 
basic and advanced training to law enforcement personnel at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center?
    Answer. Standardized, high quality training is an exceptionally 
critical component in the success of the DHS responsibilities. The 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is the government's 
principal provider of interagency law enforcement training and is DHS's 
primary source for intradepartmental law enforcement training. FLETC 
already has accelerated the number and types of training programs being 
offered in concert with its Partner Organizations since the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While basic training continues to be the 
first scheduling priority for FLETC, there has been a greater emphasis 
placed upon relevant advanced training to meet the post-September 11 
focus on security of the homeland. FLETC has undertaken an initiative 
for Counterterrorism and Practical Applications Training, which 
provides hands-on experience for trainees at all levels to handle first 
responder situations, prevention and appropriate follow-up 
investigative measures. Further, FLETC has a major role in 
international, State and local training with an emphasis on 
strengthening coordination with Federal law enforcement entities, to 
include intelligence sharing training. Under DHS's auspices, the 
Department anticipates relying heavily upon the enhanced and innovative 
training and increased physical plant capacities now available at the 
four FLETC sites in Charleston, SC; Cheltenham, MD; Artesia, NM and 
Glynco, GA.
    Question. Do you anticipate opportunities for cross-training of law 
enforcement personnel?
    Answer. One of the principal reasons for the creation of DHS is to 
continuously improve the overall cooperation, coordination information 
sharing and interoperability of law enforcement components at all 
levels related to security for the United States. To help bring about 
this improvement, DHS is encouraging greater measures that are intended 
to breakdown traditional organizational and cultural barriers. Cross-
training and shared training experiences of multiple agencies is 
becoming more the norm. FLETC's approach to consolidated training, 
which emphasizes common understanding and cooperation through mixed 
class association, affords agencies the opportunity to benefit from 
mutual experiences. Many of FLETC's basic and virtually all of its 
advanced programs are scheduled to accommodate multiple training 
organizations. In the area of counterterrorism training, subjects such 
as weapons of mass destruction, critical infrastructure, crisis 
management and land and seaport security are open to all agencies with 
those needs. These include DHS, Department of Justice, Department of 
Defense and many others across the spectrum of law enforcement. DHS 
expects to expand and enhance training that is relevant and 
contemporary to the evolving needs of all agencies that are involved 
with the homeland security.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, will your assessment examine the various 
training facilities owned or used by Departmental entities to ensure 
that they are being fully utilized and not duplicative of each other?
    Answer. Training facilities, per se, were not themselves a specific 
focus of the review. Training has several different elements in DHS, 
from the general training of our employees, to our law enforcement 
academy, and to our training centers for first responders. Our plan 
brings together DHS' key preparedness programs, including first 
responder training programs. The U.S. Fire Administration and the Noble 
Training Center are moved into a new Preparedness Directorate, along 
with the training programs such as those at Ft. McClellan. The purpose 
for creating this Directorate, and for pulling these programs together, 
is to give our existing preparedness efforts--including training and 
exercises--a focused direction. With these programs in one Directorate, 
DHS will be in a better position to ensure that they are being fully 
utilized without being duplicative.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, the war on terror requires a new approach 
to training law enforcement personnel. Do you foresee the need to 
provide new types of training infrastructure or counterterrorism 
training facilities that mirror our existing vulnerabilities?
    Answer. Yes, the future operating environment of DHS will include 
continuing and increasingly sophisticated terrorist threats to our 
nation. Post-September 11, the FLETC, the primary law enforcement 
training organization for the DHS, began vigorously reviewing its 
training programs and developing and/or revising programs and 
facilities as appropriate to better prepare agents and officers in 
executing their duties in the Global War on Terrorism. The FLETC 
developed a plan and is currently in the planning design and execution 
construction phase for this type of infrastructure. The practical 
application counterterrorism training facility design is based on the 
FLETC and its Partner Organizations expertise on anti/counterterrorism 
operations and related training requirements to defeat terrorism. The 
FLETC offers the most current law enforcement training curricula 
available anywhere and has the instructional experience and expertise 
to meet the challenges set forth by our adversaries. However, to 
accentuate our training and meet these challenges, we continually 
upgrade our tactical facilities and construct training facilities that 
are responsive to the stated needs of the agencies engaged in the war 
on terrorism. The FLETC trains officers and agents from 81 Partner 
Organizations. It is imperative that we attempt to replicate the types 
of environments that our officers will surely encounter, to enhance 
their probability of survival and the success of guarding our homeland.
    Consolidated training, the concept on which the FLETC was 
established, allows agencies with divergent missions to train together, 
in a consistent manner. This proposed training facility will meet the 
Department's primary goals to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce 
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur. This initiative represents the 
proactive ``imagination,'' cited in the 9/11 Commission's report, 
needed to combat terrorism effectively.
    The FLETC and DHS have been called upon by the Military to provide 
up-to-date Counterterrorism training. As the Military's mission 
changes, they have been expected to perform more like a Law Enforcement 
Officer rather than a soldier. The urban environments and circumstances 
that our soldiers face replicate the Use of Force decisions that our 
police officers face everyday. This mission change has forced the 
necessity for greater interaction between Law Enforcement and the 
Military. The FLETC has and continues to be a willing partner in 
meeting these challenges.
                                 ______
                                 

              Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

                           AVIATION SECURITY

    Question. The Department's inspector general released a report 
yesterday stating that there has been a lack of improvement over the 
last year in detecting dangerous items--including guns, knives, 
explosives--at airport security checkpoints. What role will next 
generation detection systems play in improving airport security?
    Answer. TSA has designed its passenger checkpoint technology 
portfolio to incorporate solutions that will help improve explosives 
and weapons detection at its checkpoints. The next generation of 
checkpoint technology will automate the detection of explosives that 
might be concealed on an individual's body, as well as within the 
carry-on baggage/items they are carrying. Additionally, TSA is 
exploring body imaging technologies that will allow screeners to detect 
weapons (metallic and non-metallic) and explosives that an individual 
might attempt to hide on their person.
    Question. Pilot programs at our airports play a critical role in 
moving technology from the research stage to practical deployment. What 
is the status of pilot programs for aviation security checkpoint 
detection technology, and when will these pilot programs begin?
    Answer. TSA has initiated a number of operational testing and 
evaluation pilot projects involving the next generation of checkpoint 
technologies to expand TSA's explosives detection capabilities. 
Highlights from ongoing pilot programs are as follows:
    Explosive Trace Portals (ETP).--TSA has deployed 15 ETPs to 14 
airports nationwide to evaluate their operational efficiency and 
effectiveness for screening passengers for explosives. These pilots 
have been initiated at the following airports and are scheduled to 
continue through summer 2005: Rochester, NY; JFK, NY; Gulfport, MS; 
Baltimore, MD; Jacksonville, FL; Phoenix, AZ ; Miami, FL; Providence, 
RI; Las Vegas, NV (2 units); Los Angeles, CA; San Francisco, CA; 
Boston, MA; Tampa, FL; and San Diego, CA. TSA has allocated $28.3 
million for the purchase and installation of additional trace portals 
in fiscal year 2005.
    Explosive Trace Detection Document Scanners.--TSA is operationally 
testing and evaluating an explosives detection document scanner at 4 
airports: Ronald Reagan Washington National (DCA), Los Angeles 
International (LAX), John F. Kennedy International (JFK), and Chicago 
O'Hare International (ORD). The current technology requires that the 
screener manually handle the travel document to obtain the sample 
needed for analysis to determine if traces of explosives are present. 
Based on the preliminary results of the pilot at the four airports, TSA 
has determined that an automated solution better suits operational and 
security needs. Consequently, the project has been refocused to develop 
a technology solution that will meet those needs. A pilot project for 
the automated prototype will be scheduled as soon as that product is 
determined ready for an operational test and evaluation.
    Question. There is a critical need to identify new and emerging 
technology, in addition to explosive detection systems, to provide 
enhanced security protections at our nation's airports. Could you tell 
us what other progress the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
has made in identifying appropriate technology to improve the security 
and efficiency of the current airport passenger screening process?
    Answer. In addition to the operational test and evaluation pilots 
underway using explosives detection trace portals and explosives 
detection document scanners, TSA has a number of R&D projects underway 
to expand both weapons and explosives detection capabilities. These 
projects include, but are not limited to:
  --Whole Body Imaging Technology.--TSA continues to examine the 
        feasibility of using a whole body imaging technology to improve 
        the detection of explosives and prohibited items on persons. 
        Ongoing efforts with two vendors has led to the development of 
        a device that is capable of producing a generic body image that 
        effectively highlights security threats on persons while not 
        unduly infringing on their privacy. TSA is currently working on 
        the details for the pilot phase, including vendor capabilities 
        to support a timetable, selection of the pilot locations, and 
        the operating policy for screening with this technology.
  --Explosives Detection System (EDS) for carry-on baggage.--TSA has 
        conducted preliminary evaluations of an automated EDS for 
        carry-on baggage and is currently collecting engineering data 
        with the unit to promote further development. This technology 
        will automate the detection of explosives in carry-on baggage, 
        similar to the capabilities TSA has achieved for checked 
        baggage screening. Simultaneously, we have a robust ongoing R&D 
        project to develop a technology that will automate the search 
        not only for explosives in carry-on baggage, but for weapons as 
        well.
  --Cast and Prosthetic Device Scanner.--TSA is working to develop a 
        technology solution to more effectively screen cast and 
        prosthetic devices for weapons and prohibited items. TSA 
        expects to pilot the technology in the first quarter of fiscal 
        year 2006.
  --Explosives Detection Bottle Scanners.--TSA is working with industry 
        to evaluate the effectiveness of bottle scanners to screen for 
        liquid explosives. TSA has issued a solicitation to industry to 
        submit products for lab evaluation.
    national center for critical information processing and storage
    Question. The National Center for Critical Information Processing 
and Storage at Stennis Space Center performs the important function of 
providing a secure and reliable system to process, manage, and secure 
data for the Federal Government. Could you update us on the status of 
that project?
    Answer. Construction of the DHS data center at Stennis Space Center 
has been delayed. The Naval Oceanographic Office had been experiencing 
difficulties issuing a construction contract prior to Hurricane 
Katrina. The Naval Oceanographic Office now reports that, due to 
Hurricane Katrina, work crews are not available for the limited 
construction effort that is under contract (demolition and roofing). 
The delay to the project is not yet fully quantifiable. The DHS 
construction effort must now compete for resources with regional 
reconstruction efforts.
    Question. Specifically, when will the additional $30 million of 
fiscal year 2005 be available for build-out and construction at 
Stennis?
    Answer. The Stennis Procurement Package was released by DHS on May 
13, 2005.
                                 ______
                                 

               Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

     TRANSPORTATION OF BUTANT STOVES (WITHOUT BUTANE) ON AIRPLANES

    Question. Constituents have contacted me to complain about TSA. 
Alaskans have attempted to carry on butane stoves onto airplanes within 
their luggage. The stoves, although no butane was present, were 
confiscated by TSA. These stoves are used for camping and general use 
in rural Alaska; the stoves do not pose a threat to anyone on a plane.
    Why is TSA disallowing passengers from carrying butane stoves, 
without butane, in their luggage?
    Answer. Under regulations issued by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), there are restrictions in place on the transport 
of hazardous materials on board any aircraft. With regard to the 
transportation of butane stoves as checked baggage, in accordance with 
the baggage screening standard operating procedure (SOP), if a TSA 
screener finds a stove that potentially has fuel inside, an airline 
employee is notified so that a determination may be made regarding the 
contents of the stove. Typically, the airline employee removes the fuel 
bottle(s) from the stove, after which the stove can be transported in 
checked baggage. If the fuel bottle cannot be removed, in general, it 
will not be allowed to be transported. In some small locations in 
Alaska where the transport of camp stoves is prevalent and it is 
relatively easy to contact the passenger, the airline employee will 
contact the passenger and give that person the option to empty and 
clean the bottle before accepting the stove for transport. However, an 
unused camp stove still in the box with no fuel or emanating fumes 
should not be refused transport.

                         FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT

    Question. I'm informed the Coast Guard plans to deploy C-130s to 
Shemya or Galena to increase surveillance and enforcement of fisheries 
laws inside the Maritime Boundary Line. A report issued in 2004 
indicated the Coast Guard could not render its deployment throughout 
the high threat season because of the lack of facilities in the 
Aleutians. Last year, I included language in the Homeland bill to 
direct the Coast Guard to include in its budget submission the funds 
necessary to provide support facilities for Shemya, Galena, Cold Bay 
and other western Aleutian Islands. The Coast Guard was not able to 
follow Congressional direction and the costs were not included in the 
budget submission.
    What are the costs estimates associated with this problem?
    Answer. Increased regulation and management on the Russian side of 
the Maritime Boundary Line (MBL) have significantly decreased the need 
to forward deploy C-130 aircraft for MBL patrols. MBL enforcement 
flights originating from Air Station Kodiak are proving effective. At 
the same time, the need for forward-deployed HH-60's appears to be 
increasing to meet search and rescue and fisheries enforcement mission 
needs in Western Alaska waters.
    HH-60 forward deployments often occur from locations such as Dutch 
Harbor, Cold Bay and St. Paul Island. Although highly effective, these 
forward deployments often present our crews with challenging conditions 
because of sub-standard facilities--and inadequate commercial 
infrastructure to properly support these deployments. Addressing these 
deficiencies is a Coast Guard priority.
    The Coast Guard recently initiated a formal planning effort to 
develop alternatives and identify resources needed to respond to these 
changing mission needs. Most of these facilities are not Coast Guard-
owned, so innovative public-private partnerships may be necessary to 
allow infrastructure improvements. The Coast Guard will keep the 
Committee advised of progress on this planning effort. The Coast Guard 
can not accurately predict costs at this early stage in the planning 
process.

                                  UAVS

    Question. What are the Coast Guard's plans for using Predator 
medium endurance unmanned aerial vehicles for fisheries enforcement and 
search and rescue activities in Alaska?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has no immediate plans to use Predator 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for operational service in Alaska. The 
recent proof of concept exercise demonstrated promise for a maritime-
configured UAV, but identified shortcomings must be addressed to make 
this a Coast Guard mission capable asset. Among the technical 
challenges that still must be resolved are reliable communications and 
aircraft control at high latitudes, integration of on-board sensors, 
limited all-weather operations (including icing and crosswind limits), 
and compliance with Federal Aviation Administration air control 
requirements.
    UAVs remain a critical future element of the Coast Guard's 
Deepwater program. The Coast Guard is partnering with other DHS and DOD 
agencies to carry out further evaluation programs and take advantage of 
technology improvements that will ultimate make UAVs suitable for use 
in the maritime environment.
    Question. Does the Department plan to utilize the two previous 
Alaskan UAV demonstrations for further testing in Alaska or Hawaii?
    Answer. DHS is working with the DOD to plan additional UAV testing 
in all operational environments to demonstrate the UAV concept to 
support a variety of missions. A cooperative effort between the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Coast 
Guard to test UAV use in Hawaii, combining scientific research with 
maritime sensor validation, was recently cancelled due to lack of NOAA 
funding. The Coast Guard will continue to establish partnerships that 
may yield opportunities for future Hawaii-based testing.
    Further demonstrations in Alaska can be planned when UAV technology 
matures to resolve the key issues of reliable communications and 
aircraft control at high latitudes and all-weather operations 
(including icing and crosswind limits). Prior Coast Guard UAV testing 
in Alaska has demonstrated that these limitations restrict UAV 
operations in Alaska.
    Question. Does the Department have any plans to use UAV's to help 
TSA provide surveillance to non-aviation modes of transportation such 
as the Trans Alaska Pipeline System?
    Answer. UAVs offer a range of capabilities that are suitable 
throughout DHS. The UAV capability for 24-hour, all weather 
surveillance is particularly useful in border security applications, 
critical infrastructure protection, transportation security, or in 
support of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) maritime domain awareness missions. 
In April 2004, the DHS/UAV working group submitted a report to Congress 
addressing the applicability of UAVs in various homeland security 
applications.
    As part of a USCG Predator 2 UAV demonstration in July 2004, TSA 
coordinated with the USCG to fly over designated sites on the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline (TAPS). The purpose of the TAPS demonstration was to 
evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of the UAV and associated 
sensors for pipeline surveillance. This effort provided additional 
evidence of the utility of UAVs as part of a layered surveillance 
effort. TSA will continue to evaluate the use of UAVs with regard to 
pipeline surveillance and looks forward to working with Congress on the 
issue.
                                 ______
                                 

            Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

               BORDER NEEDS--SECURITY UPDGRADES AT PORTS

    Question. America has 197 land ports of entry, and it has been 
almost 20 years since we launched a major effort to upgrade 
infrastructure at those ports. That last effort occurred in 1986, when 
former Senator DeConcini and I developed the Southwest Border 
Improvement Program to improve border infrastructure so that States 
could better take advantage of commerce and trade opportunities with 
Mexico. That was almost 15 years prior September 11, 2001.
    Since September 11, we have placed increasing emphasis on upgrading 
security for our airports, seaports, and critical infrastructure. It is 
imperative that we also improve land port security. To that end, I will 
introduce a bill authorizing additional funds for investment in our 
nation's border crossings.
    Have you considered what kinds of improvements are necessary at our 
land ports of entry and how much these upgrades might cost?
    Answer. DHS is in the midst of a systems-level review of its border 
control architecture to identify the right mix of personnel, technology 
and infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the border. DHS 
will identify a program manager to oversee the development of a 
specific set of border security plans. The Department will be in a 
better position to comment on this question following the conclusion of 
this review.
    Question. Specific improvements are needed at the Columbus port of 
entry in New Mexico, and the General Services Administration (GSA) has 
proposed construction on the Columbus project to begin in 2007 or 2008. 
Do you support GSA's recommendation and will you make every effort to 
keep the project on track for construction?
    Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level 
review of its border control architecture. This review is intended to 
help the Department identify the right mix of personnel, technology and 
infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the border. The 
Department will be in a better position to comment on this question 
following the conclusion of this review.

                      BORDER NEEDS--UAV TECHNOLOGY

    Question. In last year's intelligence reform bill, I called for the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop a plan for using Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (``UAVs'') on America's southwest border.
    In New Mexico, we have some experience with UAVs because our 
university near the southwestern U.S. border operates a UAV validation 
and test facility sponsored by the Department of Defense. Because of 
the established presence of UAVs at New Mexico State University, and 
because of our location as a border state, I believe New Mexico would 
be an asset in the use of UAVs for surveillance.
    What are your views concerning the use of UAVs for securing remote 
areas of our borders?
    Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level 
review of its border control architecture. DHS is also currently 
working to begin the process of procuring UAVs. The Department's 
objective is to get that done in a matter of months and start to deploy 
UAVs and have them flying over the border. That said, DHS cannot rely 
exclusively on UAVs, and manned vehicles and helicopters will also play 
a role.
    Question. How many UAVs does DHS currently own?
    Answer. As of August 20, DHS currently does not own any UAVs.
    Question. Where are these UAVs stationed?
    Answer. As of August 20, DHS currently does not own any UAVs.
    Question. Will your staff evaluate evaluate the existing UAV 
facility at New Mexico State University and the Las Cruces 
International Airport as a potential home for the Department's UAV 
program?
    Answer. As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level 
review of its border control architecture. The Department will be in a 
better position to comment on this question following the conclusion of 
this review.

                       BORDER PERSONNEL--MANPOWER

    Question. As you know, adequate staffing at our nation's land ports 
of entry is essential for the safety of parties involved in the flow of 
traffic across the border and for efficient commerce.
    Last year's legislation that reorganized our intelligence community 
called for an increase in border patrol agents, and President Bush's 
fiscal year 2006 budget requests funds to hire an additional 210 
agents.
    Have you studied where placing these agents would be most 
beneficial?
    Answer. Emergency Supplemental Legislation and President Bush's 
fiscal year 2006 Budget call for the hiring of an additional 710 agents 
by the end of fiscal year 2006, and CBP is taking aggressive steps to 
recruit, hire and train candidates to fill these spots. The hiring of 
these new agents comes in addition to the standard attrition hires that 
supplement the several hundred agents who retire, transfer, or leave 
for medical reasons over the course of a year. New agent positions will 
be allocated based on risk-based priorities.
    Question. When might these new agents be hired and put in place?
    Answer. There is currently an open recruiting announcement to 
obtain additional potential new employees.
    Question. How can we better retain existing border patrol officers 
so that as we place these new agents along our borders, we are not 
losing agents with experience?
    Answer. CBP is currently examining methods that can be used to 
retain seasoned agents. The current attrition rate for experienced 
agents (GS-9 and higher) is less than 5 percent.

                  BORDER PERSONNEL--TRAINING AT FLETC

    Question. One of the Federal Government's premier training sites 
for law enforcement officers is located in New Mexico. Many Federal law 
enforcement officers have trained at the Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center in Artesia (FLETC-Artesia), including Air Marshals and 
Federal Flight Deck Officers.
    Additionally, both basic and advanced training for Border Patrol 
Agents is now conducted at FLETC-Artesia. I lauded the Department's 
decision to consolidate border patrol training in Artesia because it 
makes sense to have all training at one facility. Additionally, 
training border patrol officers in a border State gives trainees a 
first-hand look at the area they are charged with protecting.
    What, if anything, does the Department need from FLETC-Artesia?
    Answer. FLETC is proceeding to put into place the temporary 
structures and staffing directed in the recently enacted fiscal year 
2005 Supplemental. As more information and details are developed on 
additional training needs we will keep the Congress apprised.
    Question. Has DHS considered taking border patrol trainees to the 
Mexico border as part of their overall training?
    Answer. FLETC uses scenario base training utilizing Spanish 
speaking role players in a controlled environment identical to that 
seen on the southwest border. This scenario based training affords 
trainees the opportunity to correct mistakes and become comfortable 
with assigned duties prior to assignment in a U.S. Border Patrol 
sector. This system of training is more flexible and less costly than 
providing visits during basic training to border sites. The Border 
Patrol also employs a system of supervision and on-the-job experience 
for newly graduated agents.
    Question. If new facilities were constructed at FLETC-Artesia, 
would you support legislative language to streamline the design, 
engineering and construction of those facilities?
    Answer. The Department is always open to considering legislative 
methods that streamline and improve our processes while promoting full 
and open competition.

              NEW MEXICO CAPABILITIES--TRAINING AT PLAYAS

    Question. Secretary Chertoff, last fall New Mexico Tech opened the 
Playas Training Center. DHS played an integral part in this center by 
providing the funding for New Mexico Tech to purchase Playas, a small 
town in Southwest New Mexico that was virtually abandoned when the 
copper smelting operation in the area was shut down in 1999.
    Playas' remote location and open space makes it an ideal place for 
New Mexico Tech to develop a wide range of research and training 
activities to support homeland security efforts nationwide.
    What new training activities could DHS use at Playas?
    Answer. It is my understanding that Playas will be jointly 
developed by the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology and the 
New Mexico State University. As you are aware, ODP has funded the New 
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology since fiscal year 1998 as 
part of the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. As part of the 
Consortium, the New Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology supports 
ODP's mission of assisting State and local governments plan and prepare 
for incidents of domestic terrorism by providing critical training to 
the Nation's first responders. The State of New Mexico used State funds 
rather than Federal homeland security funds to purchase the Playas 
Training Center. Nevertheless, ODP does have a use agreement in place 
with New Mexico Tech to use the Playas Training Center over a 5-year 
period. As the Playas Training Center is further developed, the 
Department's ODP will coordinate with New Mexico Tech officials to 
determine the types of training initiatives that could be supported by 
the Playas Training Center.
    Question. How much is included in the President's fiscal year 2006 
budget for training first responders?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget request for SLGCP 
includes over $83 million for the State and Local Training Program. 
Through this funding, SLGCP will continue to develop and deliver state-
of-the-art training programs through its coalition of ``Training 
Partners.'' This coalition, comprised of government facilities, 
academic institutions and private organizations provide a variety of 
specialized training for emergency responders across the country. The 
fiscal year 2006 funding request will support SLGCP's Continued and 
Emerging Training Program, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and 
the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. In addition, a portion 
of SLGCP grants to States and urban areas are also devoted to training.
    FEMA also conducts an extensive array of training for emergency 
personnel through the National Fire Academy, the Emergency Management 
Institute, and the Noble Training Center with a budget that totals 
approximately $15 million. Other DHS components, such as the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center, also provide training for selected 
State and local personnel.
    Question. What are your thoughts on providing standardized training 
for all first responders, at both the Federal and local level, in a 
facility like the one at Playas?
    Answer. The New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, 
including its training facility at Playas, already supports ODP's 
training efforts through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium. 
As such, these facilities will comply with all training standards 
required for ODP training.
    Standards for training encompass the instructional design of the 
training, the quality of training content, the effectiveness of the 
instructors, as well as successful knowledge transfer measured through 
student evaluation. With respect to development of training programs, 
the ODP Training Division has adopted the industry standard 
instructional systems design approach of analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and evaluation (ADDIE) as detailed in the ODP Strategy 
for Blended Learning. The ADDIE approach for instructional design 
ensures a valid training need is identified, the most effective 
methodology for instruction is identified, and training content is 
monitored for accuracy and effectiveness throughout the process.
    The development of training content based on effective needs 
analysis is also based upon performance standards. DHS efforts in this 
area related to training for emergency responders began with the ODP 
Training Strategy developed in 2002, which provided guidance on who 
should be trained to perform what tasks, using what methodologies to 
maximize training efficiencies. The strategy further addressed 
effective methods for evaluating competency and performance after 
training was completed and what gaps needed to be remedied. This work 
led to the ODP-developed Emergency Responder Guidelines, which were 
promulgated in August 2002. These are currently undergoing revision to 
reflect a broader range of response disciplines and the private sector.
    Additionally, as the executive agent for the development and 
implementation of HSPD-8, ``National Preparedness,'' SLGCP has 
developed and promulgated an Interim National Preparedness Goal (NPG). 
The Interim NPG, which was released on March 31, 2005, was developed 
using capabilities-based planning. Capabilities are combinations of 
resources that provide the means to achieve a measurable outcome 
resulting from performance of one or more critical tasks, under 
specified conditions and performance standards. The Target Capabilities 
List identifies 36 Target Capabilities and is currently available.
    ODP's Training Division, along with our training partners, is in 
the process of examining the capabilities associated with the national 
priorities included in the Interim National Preparedness Goal to align 
training curricula to these national priorities and the related 
capabilities. It is the Department's goal and expectation to have its 
training courses aligned with the national priorities in fiscal year 
2006.
    Further, with respect to professional standards, ODP requires its 
training partners, State Administering Agencies, and Federal partners 
to adhere to and incorporate the following professional standards in 
training curricula to which they are applicable:
  --29 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR)1910.120, Hazardous Waste 
        Operations and Emergency Response;
  --29 CFR 1910.134, Respiratory Protection;
  --National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 471, Recommended 
        Practice for Responding to Hazardous Materials Incidents;
  --NFPA 472, Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous 
        Materials Incidents;
  --NFPA 473, Standard for Competencies for EMS Personnel Responding to 
        Hazardous Materials Incidents;
  --NFPA 1006, Standard for Rescue Technician Professional 
        Qualifications;
  --NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
        Continuity Programs 2004, specifically Chapter 5, section 5.12; 
        and
  --NFPA 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Rescue 
        and Search Incidents.
    Question. Will the Department work to make State homeland security 
directors aware of the Playas Training Facility in an effort to help 
local first responders receive adequate training?
    Answer. ODP is undertaking a web-based information portal 
initiative, the First Responder Training portal, that will be the 
primary location for information and resources serving the first 
responder community in support of the DHS strategic goal of improving 
the nation's ability to prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from emergency situations and events. The portal will create a 
functional tool to support the development and delivery of efficient, 
effective and consistent first responder training. Registered under the 
domain name of firstrespondertraining.gov, the website will provide a 
single, authoritative link for the first responder community and will 
include collaboration tools and information on training, grants, 
equipment, and standards.
    This portal will complement FEMA/U.S. Fire Administration's (USFA) 
existing on-line training portals, the Emergency Management Institute's 
Independent Study website, and the USFA National Emergency Training 
Center (NETC) Virtual Campus, which together offer more than 60 courses 
for emergency personnel and has registered more than 350,000 course 
completions already this fiscal year. The NETC Virtual Campus courses 
are intended for Federal, state, and local officials including 
emergency management personnel, fire service personnel, police, public 
works, health officials and first responders, and also DHS personnel, 
and the general public.
    The ODP First Responder Training portal and FEMA's on-line training 
facilities will provide consistent delivery of training to large 
audiences and will be used as a delivery mechanism by our partners to 
continue to enhance the capacity of the emergency responder community. 
Additionally, this web-based training will: accommodate students with 
disabilities by use of assistive technologies; be designed to support 
small group work and collaboration; provide multi-purposed training and 
resources; have the capability to restrict access to only authorized 
users; offer students the opportunity to remediate materials until 
proficient or ``opt out'' of content they have already mastered; and be 
linked through other initiatives currently underway to track user 
activity and accurately provide student transcripts.
    The framework and inter-workings of the overall system are nearing 
completion. A pilot test, testing functionality and usability for 
internal users/developers (training partners) and external users 
(students from the first responder communities), will begin in June 
2005. Results from the pilot test will be used to make improvements to 
the system and to determine the effectiveness of the technology in 
support of ODP's National Training Program.
    Prior to the development of the First Responder Training portal, 
ODP developed a Training Course Catalog, as well as comprehensive 
guidelines associated with attending ODP-sponsored training courses. 
This information is available to the Nation's first responder community 
through a number of different means, including ODP's publicly-available 
website (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp) as well as through routine 
interaction with ODP's State Preparedness Officers and the nation's 
first responder community. As New Mexico Tech develops training courses 
at Playas Training Center, ODP will make this information available 
through its various outreach mechanisms, including the First Responder 
Training portal.
    New Mexico Capabilities--Dirty Bomb Training
    Question. New Mexico Tech has also joined with New Mexico State 
University (``NMSU'') to propose an expansion of the anti-terrorism 
training program for first responders. This expansion would include a 
course about radiological dispersal devices (also known as dirty 
bombs).
    I believe this proposal has merit because the aftermath of a dirty 
bomb attack is one of our gravest anticipated terrorist attacks, and 
our first responders need appropriate training to respond to such a 
threat. New Mexico Tech and NMSU's Carlsbad Environmental Monitoring 
and Research Center have the scientific expertise, radiological 
handling capabilities, radioactive material license, and trained staff 
to address both the scientific and training aspects of dirty bombs, and 
collaboration between these universities and New Mexico's national 
nuclear weapons labs could provide ideal training first responders to 
counter dirty bomb risks.
    What dirty bomb training do Federal first responders currently 
receive?
    Answer. FEMA/USFA's Emergency Management Institute (EMI), as well 
as the National Fire Academy, offers a full range of courses that 
prepare state, local, and tribal emergency personnel to deal with the 
aftermath of all types of events involving radiological materials. EMI 
courses such as ``Radiological Emergency Response Operations'' and 
``Advanced Radiological Incident Operations'' and the NFA's Command and 
Control of Emergency Incidents provide specific instruction in how to 
prepare for such events.
    Although there is no specific course dedicated to radiological 
dispersal devices, several courses delivered by members of the National 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) cover radiological dispersal 
devices in their course curriculum. The extent to which radiological 
dispersal devices are covered in the various courses ranges from a five 
minute overview to a detailed 2.5 hour block of instruction. States, 
territories, and urban areas may use SLGCP-certified training to 
enhance the capabilities of State and local emergency preparedness and 
response personnel as it adheres to the State's Homeland Security 
Strategy. The target audience for SLGCP-certified training courses 
includes State and local emergency preparedness, prevention and 
response personnel; emergency managers; and public/elected officials 
within the following disciplines: fire service, law enforcement, 
emergency management, emergency medical services, hazardous materials, 
public works, public health, health care, public safety communications, 
governmental administrative, cyber security, and private security 
providers.
    Question. Could New Mexico Tech's training facility in Playas, New 
Mexico be the ideal place to base such training?
    Answer. As you are aware, ODP has funded the New Mexico Institute 
of Mining and Technology since fiscal year 1998 as part of the National 
Domestic Preparedness Consortium. As part of the Consortium, the New 
Mexico Institute for Mining and Technology supports ODP's mission of 
assisting State and local governments plan and prepare for incidents of 
domestic terrorism by providing critical training to the nation's first 
responders. ODP periodically reviews its training requirements and 
builds on the strengths of its training partners. Currently, nuclear 
and radiological training primarily falls under the Department of 
Energy's Nevada Test Site (NTS). However, ODP will review any unique 
capabilities the Playas Training Center may offer.

                   RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY--GENERALLY

    Question. The Department of Homeland Security has used many 
different resources to implement innovative protective measures across 
the country. We have improved security nationwide through the 
Department's Science and Technology Directorate, the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, Centers of Excellency, and similar divisions and 
initiatives.
    The Department's leadership in developing innovative tools and 
technologies to protect our Nation is one of the most important roles 
the Department plays. However, with so many groups working on 
developing new technologies, it may prove difficult to select the best 
technology available.
    How does DHS intend to most effectively integrate and leverage 
existing efforts and capabilities to ensure that the best technologies 
available are utilized?
    Answer. Last year, the S&T Directorate developed and documented a 
robust RDT&E process. The goal of the RDT&E process is to provide a 
clearly defined, repeatable method for assessing needs and risk, 
planning, allocating resources and executing programs to produce high-
impact, cost-effective and critically needed homeland security 
technology solutions.
    The S&T Directorate's RDT&E process uses a risked-based approach to 
planning and identifies critical capability gaps before attempting to 
identify or develop technology solutions. In developing solutions, the 
process engages the end-user throughout requirements definition, 
development, testing and transition. The process considers the product 
life cycle from the outset, including planning and budgeting for 
production, deployment, operations and support. It is this process 
which allows us to prioritize both within and across fields.
    Integration of existing efforts and capabilities occurs in several 
key areas. For example, the S&T Directorate collaborates with academia 
through the Centers of Excellence program and its associated Integrated 
Network of Centers, which is establishing a national network of 
affiliated universities. Additionally, the S&T Directorate has a 
sizeable number of interactions and programs with individual 
universities on specific research topics and needs.
    The S&T Directorate also maximizes and leverages the existing 
capability base of the national laboratory complex. The Directorate 
engages all the national laboratories on a case-by-case basis, to tap 
into unique technical expertise that is critical to accomplishing 
portfolio objectives and goals. The Directorate also relies on national 
laboratory technical experts as needed throughout the RDT&E processes 
based on their years of experience applying technologies and processes 
to field applications. This technical and practical expertise is used 
to accelerate spiral development of technologies for transitioning 
capabilities to operational end-users.
    The S&T Directorate solicits proposal from industry and uses a full 
range of contracting vehicles and its authority under the Homeland 
Security Act to engage businesses (large and small), Federally funded 
research and development centers, universities, and other entities in 
development of advanced technologies for homeland security. The 
contracted research and development work now underway is the S&T 
Directorate's main form of collaboration with industry and academia.
    Question. Under your leadership, how will the Science and 
Technology Directorate collaborate with academia, industry and our 
national labs?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate collaborates with academia through the 
Centers of Excellence program and its associated Integrated Network of 
Centers, which is establishing a national network of affiliated 
universities. Additionally, the S&T Directorate has a sizeable number 
of interactions and programs with individual universities on specific 
research topics and needs.
    The S&T Directorate solicits proposals from industry and uses a 
full range of contracting vehicles and its authority under the Homeland 
Security Act to engage businesses (large and small), Federally funded 
research and development centers, universities, and other entities in 
development of advanced technologies for homeland security. The 
contracted research and development work now underway is the S&T 
Directorate's main form of collaboration with industry and academia.
    The S&T Directorate maximizes and leverages the existing capability 
base of the national laboratory complex. The Directorate engages all 
the national laboratories on a case-by-case basis, to tap into unique 
technical expertise that is critical to accomplishing portfolio 
objectives and goals. The Directorate also relies on national 
laboratory technical experts as needed throughout the RDT&E processes 
based on their years of experience applying technologies and processes 
to field applications. This technical and practical expertise is used 
to accelerate spiral development of technologies for transitioning 
capabilities to operational end-users.
    The S&T Directorate engages all the national laboratories on a 
case-by-case basis, to tap into unique technical expertise that is 
critical to accomplishing portfolio objectives and goals. The 
Directorate also relies on national laboratory technical experts as 
needed throughout the RDT&E processes based on their years of 
experience applying technologies and processes to field applications. 
This technical and practical expertise is used to accelerate spiral 
development of technologies for transitioning capabilities to 
operational end-users.
    For example, the Countermeasures Test Beds (CMTB) program operates 
in close partnership with a number of Federal and national laboratories 
to execute its mission of testing and evaluating all threat 
countermeasures and systems. The following national labs participate in 
all CMTB Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E) efforts and enable 
deployments in response to heightened alert conditions as necessary. 
Multi-lab teams are encouraged to ensure objectivity and a healthy 
interchange of ideas.
    As another example, the Office of Interoperability and 
Compatibility (OIC) is currently leveraging the resources of Eastern 
Kentucky University in developing effective test methodologies for 
equipment and to provide technical assistance to States and localities 
under the SAFECOM Program. At the same time, OIC has enlisted a 
consortium of well over one hundred universities and colleges to 
support the annual conference on Technologies for Public Safety in 
Critical Incident Response, jointly sponsored by DHS and the DOJ. 
Industry associations participate in SAFECOM Program activities, 
especially in standards development efforts. OIC has established a 
monthly vendor process which allows for constant communication and 
collaboration with our industry partners. Additionally, OIC/SAFECOM 
will be conducting an industry summit in late fall to allow for ever 
greater collaboration.
    Additionally, the BioSecurity program currently works closely with 
academia, industry and the national labs to fulfill its national 
mission.
    Question. How will you allocate funding to national laboratories, 
universities, and industry in a competitive and transparent manner?
    Answer. The S&T Directorate supports seeking the best sources to 
accomplish DHS RDT&E goals through full and open competition.
    Individual national laboratories have recognized expertise in 
specific technical fields built up from years of experience in national 
defense technology development. Recognizing those areas of expertise, 
integrated technical programs have been formed from multiple 
laboratories to solve problem sets related to their expertise. The 
laboratories assist in leading the formation of the technical teams 
addressing specific problem sets. The S&T Directorate uses a 
performance based approach to ensuring quality programs. As such, 
annual external reviews are conducted with subject-matter experts and 
end-user reviewers to evaluate the performance and outcomes of 
individual programs. Results from these reviews are documented and used 
to inform decisions on the next fiscal year's program execution plans.
    All funds allocated by University Programs to universities and 
individuals at universities are the product of a highly competitive 
merit-based selection process. A large number of subject matter experts 
from government, industry and academia use well-established and 
documented peer review selection procedures in making funding 
recommendations.
    All S&T Directorate Broad Agency Announcements and Small Business 
Innovation Research solicitations are public and competitive. All are 
published on the official Federal Government procurement website (and 
simultaneously on the S&T Directorate's HSARPA websites) and each 
contains explicit instructions on how to submit white papers and 
proposals. The criteria by which these submissions will be evaluated 
for technical merit are published in each solicitation. The source 
selection plan which guides the panel of experts who evaluate the 
submissions is approved at the same time the solicitation is published 
and records of their final decisions are retained. Selections for 
funding are typically made on technical merit, relevance to DHS 
mission, available funding, and programmatic considerations by a source 
selection authority.
    Also, the S&T Directorate works to ensure all of its program 
offices allocate funding to national and Federal laboratories, 
universities, and industry where appropriate, following the competitive 
guidelines outlined in the Federal Acquisition Requirements. The S&T 
Directorate continually monitors all program aspects to determine best 
value and cost effectiveness. As the S&T Directorate works to mature 
and transition mature technologies to the user community, a competitive 
process is used.

                     RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY--NISAC

    Question. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis 
Center, or NISAC, is funded by DHS to evaluate the effects of 
disruptions to America's infrastructure, and much of NISAC's work is 
done by New Mexico's two National Laboratories: Sandia and Los Alamos.
    I strongly believe in NISAC's efforts and capabilities, but I do 
not believe the program is being used by the entire Department of 
Homeland Security to its full extent.
    What are your plans to coordinate the Department's Directorates so 
NISAC is utilized by the entire Department?
    Answer. The Department's National Infrastructure Simulation and 
Analysis Center (NISAC) is a program in the DHS IAIP Directorate. Since 
its inception, NISAC has had the mission to provide comprehensive 
modeling and simulation capabilities for the analysis of critical 
infrastructures, their interdependencies and complexities, and the 
consequences of disturbances. This mission and NISAC's expertise 
directly support the modeling, simulation, and analysis initiatives of 
DHS. For fiscal year 2005, IAIP will continue to expand NISAC's 
operational development of a suite of infrastructure modeling, 
simulation and analytic capabilities with an emphasis on 
interdependencies and consequences of infrastructure disruptions for 
the Nation as a whole.
    At present, IAIP is coordinating ongoing NISAC work with the S&T 
Directorate, the Coast Guard, FEMA, BTS, and TSA, as well as with the 
Departments of Transportation and Energy, on multiple projects that 
concern the nation's infrastructure. The NISAC program office will 
continue its efforts to broaden the awareness of the NISAC program 
throughout DHS to ensure this national resource is properly tasked with 
the most urgent and complex problems concerning infrastructure 
dependencies and interdependencies. IAIP will continue to fully 
utilize, and if warranted expand, the existing capabilities of NISAC 
with IAIP acting as the central coordinator for NISAC efforts in 
keeping with IAIP's national charter of coordinating and leading 
efforts for the understanding and protection of the nation's 
infrastructure. Moreover, as the Department's ability to execute risk 
assessment continues to mature, NISAC will become more and more 
integrated into the full range of Federal risk management programs.
    Question. How will you work with the Director of National 
Intelligence to make NISAC's capabilities available to the intelligence 
community through a formal relationship, as required by last year's 
intelligence reform bill?
    Answer. IAIP is continually improving the integration between the 
organizations that develop the three components of our Strategic Risk 
Analysis; which are consequence, vulnerability and threat or 
attractiveness. A prime example of this effort is ensuring that the 
intelligence component of DHS, the Office of Information Analysis, 
currently in IAIP, is aware of NISAC's capabilities and, as a 
byproduct, the resident expertise at the national laboratories. As the 
NISAC products are more fully developed and matured, this integration 
will increase.
    As a continuation of this integration, we will engage with the 
Director of National Intelligence to make him aware of a variety of 
efforts the Department has underway that will benefit from his efforts, 
NISAC included. We will seek a formal relationship for information and 
capability sharing as warranted, between non-DHS elements of the 
intelligence community and the Department, including the NISAC.
    Question. What do you need from Congress to fully implement NISAC's 
capabilities?
    Answer. Congress's continued support for all of the Department's 
programs that seek to reduce the risk of terrorism to the Nation are 
greatly appreciated. All of these programs are essential, including the 
Department's National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center.

   RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY--DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE (DNDO)

    Question. The Department has a new office tasked with deploying 
radiation detection technologies and systems designed to detect 
attempts to smuggle nuclear materials or weapons into the United 
States. As such, the Domestic Nuclear Detention Office, is likely to 
play a critical role in testing and evaluating current and next 
generation technologies to assure that DHS agencies have the most 
effective and accurate tools.
    How does DNDO intend to balance the needs between rapidly deploying 
detection systems and developing technologies that can best fulfill its 
mission?
    Answer. The DNDO will include, as part of its staff, an Office of 
Systems Engineering, which will be dedicated to development of the 
global systems architecture, as well as a comprehensive systems 
engineering capability. This office will be tasked with providing 
quantifiable analysis of issues such as this and providing cost-benefit 
analysis, when appropriate, to determine the relative advantages gained 
by deploying current technologies or developing additional 
capabilities.
    Additionally, beyond the DNDO office structure, the DNDO will also 
utilize the Department's robust, two-tiered validation process for 
large-scale programs, consisting of a Joint Requirements Council and an 
Investment Review Board, which have final approval to authorize 
deployment or development programs.
    Question. How do you plan to develop and support the nuclear 
facilities and infrastructure needed to test and evaluate evolving 
technologies, missions, and operational concepts?
    Answer. The DNDO will continue to proceed with the design and 
construction of the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and 
Evaluation Complex (RadNucCTEC) at the Nevada Test Site. The 
construction of this facility, begun within the DHS S&T Radiological 
and Nuclear Countermeasures portfolio, will bridge the gap between 
``bench-top testing'' performed by developers and operational field 
testing conducted during pilot deployments, providing the unique 
capability to test systems in a near real-world environment against 
actual special nuclear materials in authentic configurations. 
Construction is expected to begin in June 2005 and be completed by the 
end of fiscal year 2006.
    Additionally, DNDO will continue to utilize the DHS S&T 
Countermeasures Test Bed (CMTB) for operational testing and evaluation. 
CMTB will provide a critical, objective testing environment to evaluate 
technologies and concepts of operation for nuclear and radiological 
detection in key operational venues.
    Question. With the creation of DNDO, will the efforts to prevent 
and respond to radiological dispersion devices be retained in the 
Science and Technology Directorate, moved into DNDO, or shared between 
these two DHS divisions?
    Answer. Many experts consider a nuclear attack to be less likely 
than the release of a radiological dispersion device (RDD). However, a 
nuclear attack would be many times more devastating than one employing 
an RDD, both in terms of economic impact and casualties. While the 
primary focus of DNDO is, therefore, to develop and acquire systems and 
capabilities for the detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) and 
nuclear devices, most nuclear threat detection systems will also detect 
radiological threats, because of the similarity in nature of 
radioactive signatures of special nuclear materials nuclear devices and 
radiological materials usable in an RDD.
    As such, the division of responsibilities for prevention and 
response for RDDs between DNDO and the S&T Directorate is the same as 
that for nuclear devices or materials. DNDO will be responsible for the 
development of the detection architecture, as well as the systems to be 
deployed, for the prevention of an attack. Additionally, DNDO will be 
responsible for the development of training and response protocols in 
the event of an alarm. However, DNDO will not be responsible for the 
development of incident management or decontamination technologies; 
these programs will remain in the S&T Directorate.
    Question. What role will national weapons labs play in DNDO?
    Answer. DNDO will continue to work with the Office of National 
Laboratories in the S&T Directorate to make sure that work is properly 
coordinated and that all of the national laboratories, including the 
weapons labs, receive clear guidance and direction on efforts they 
conduct with DNDO or the S&T Directorate.
    DNDO recognizes that the national weapons laboratories have long 
been one of this nation's preeminent sources of critical nuclear 
expertise. That expertise, along with the expertise found in academia 
and industry, will be vital to responding to the threat posed by 
nuclear and radiological weapons or materials and in developing 
transformational capabilities to significantly enhance the U.S. 
capability to protect against this threat.
                                 ______
                                 

             Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

                            DRUG TRAFFICKING

    Question. The President has said, ``trafficking in drugs finances 
the work of terrorists, sustaining terrorists and that terrorists use 
drug profits.'' Given the President's view, I am surprised that he has 
included almost no initiatives in your budget to disrupt the drug 
trade. Why?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget includes $3.455 
billion that affects or may affect the counternarcotics activities of 
the Department or any of its subdivisions, or that affects the ability 
of the Department or any subdivision of the Department to meet its 
responsibility to stop the entry of illegal drugs into the United 
States.
    Within that $3.455 billion total, approximately $2.937 billion has 
been identified as National Drug Control Budget Funds--funds for those 
Department programs and initiatives that directly support Priority III 
of the President's National Drug Control Strategy (Disrupting the 
Market: Attacking the Economic Basis of the Drug Trade). This funding 
will provide the Department with resources to strengthen and focus its 
illegal drug market disruption efforts while, at the same time, 
dedicating new resources for emerging threats. In addition to these 
funds, approximately $480.5 million has been identified as other 
potential expenditures that also may affect the counternarcotics 
activities of the Department.
    These funds support counternarcotics programs and counternarcotics-
related activities that can build on the Department's many 
accomplishments towards stopping the entry of illegal drugs into the 
United States.

                             LOBBYING RULES

    Question. On November 23, the Office of Government Ethics, in 
response to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) request, relaxed 
lobbying prohibitions for former ``senior employees'' of the 
Department. Up until November 23 of this year, any former ``senior 
employee'' of DHS was barred from lobbying any individual or office in 
DHS for 1 year. A senior employee is any individual whose rate of basic 
pay is equal or greater than 86.5 percent of the rate for level II of 
the Executive Schedule. The 2004 salary for an Executive Level II 
employee is $158,100, 86.5 percent of which is $136,756.
    The revised rule by the Office of Government Ethics designates 
seven distinct and separate components in DHS for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 
207(c), which covers conflict of interest restrictions for senior 
Federal officials in post-employment. The components designated are: 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Coast Guard; Secret 
Service; Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); Science & 
Technology (S&T) Directorate; Information, Analysis & Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) Directorate; and Emergency Preparedness & Response 
(EP&R).
    By designating seven distinct and separate components in DHS, any 
former official who worked in one of those seven components is now 
permitted to immediately lobby anywhere in DHS except for the component 
for which they were employed. It also allows senior officials who 
worked for DHS, but not in one of the seven designated components, to 
immediately lobby anyone in those components designated as distinct and 
separate. For instance, a senior employee who worked in the Office of 
the Secretary for Tom Ridge can immediately lobby any of the DHS 
organizations cited above. Those seven components alone comprise over 
$19 billion and nearly 60 percent of the Department's funding.
    Why did DHS request this change to the lobbying rules?
    Answer. The recommendations were made to appropriately tailor the 
application of the 1-year cooling-off restriction to the circumstances 
existing within the newly created Department of Homeland Security. 
Section 207 of title 18 of the United States Code is not intended as a 
blanket bar to former employees from dealing with the Government after 
separation. Rather, it represents a carefully crafted balance between 
preventing improper peddling of influence in the government by former 
government officials on the one hand, and permitting the continued 
availability to the government of the experience and training of former 
government officials. In a dynamic, forwarding leaning agency such as 
DHS, with a mission to protect the homeland, it is essential that the 
agency attract top notch people who are facile and knowledgeable about 
innovative technology. The DHS mission requires that these leaders in 
the fields populate the whole of DHS Headquarters and its components.
    The statute is composite of a series of very fact specific 
prohibitions based on conclusions of improper over-reaching as 
determined though the lens of that balancing. Congress recognized the 
potential subsection 207(c) has to unduly restrict appropriate post-
Government-service interaction by former employees with the government 
by carving out exceptions to it, i.e., subsection 207(c)(2)(B)(in the 
cases of special government employees), subsection 207(c)(2)(C)(in 
cases of difficult-to-fill positions), subsection 207(h)(in cases of 
elements of an agency where there exists ``no potential for use of 
undue influence or unfair advantage based on past Government 
service''), and subsection 207(j)(Exceptions).
    The recommendations that DHS made to the Director, Office of 
Government Ethics, in December 2003, were based on the following:
  --OGE criteria for making such recommendations;
  --how the Department was structured and operating;
  --how the legacy agencies had treated the organizational elements 
        previously; and
  --how subsection 207(c) is applied generally through the Executive 
        Branch.
    Several features of the Department were clear for the purposes of 
these recommendations. United States Secret Service, the United State 
Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Agency, and the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center were focused on discrete independent 
missions of the Department, most statutorily so, and had extensive 
independent administrative structures. The three directorates, Science 
and Technology, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and 
Emergency Preparedness and Response, posed a more nuanced picture, but 
presented the same distinct, self-contained mission focuses.
    Equally clear in the opposite direction was that the significance 
of the missions entrusted to the Border and Transportation Security 
Directorate and its subordinate elements and the extensive vertical and 
horizontal interaction between them made them so inter-related and 
inter-dependent as to foreclose designating them as separate.
    Given those conclusions and comparing how other agencies treated 
their components, we recommended the designation of those seven 
components as separate for the purposes of the 1-year cooling-off 
period.
    Question. How is this change beneficial to the Department, the U.S. 
taxpayers, and our national security?
    Answer. The Department's exercise of this statute greatly enhances 
national security, benefits the taxpayers of the United States, and is 
invaluable in the accomplishment of the Department's mission. Detection 
of threats by passage of people and cargo into the United States by 
air, sea, or land is dependent upon innovative human and technological 
systems that are used by components throughout the Department. These 
systems were developed by career and non-career Federal employees 
working as a team. The career employees contribute their expertise and 
experience in government operations and the non-careerist often 
contribute their expertise and experience in technology developed in 
the private sector. It is a proven successful synergy, not quite 
perfect, but the best in the world.
    Our nation's security and the taxpayer will be the ultimate losers 
if the country's professionals and leaders are kept from joining 
Federal agencies initially or, upon return to the private sector, are 
precluded from bringing their skills and experience to bear on these 
important issues because of a failure to appropriately tailor the post-
Government-service restriction. The departing leaders take with them an 
understanding of the threat, what is needed to combat the threat, and 
how the Department is working to counter the threat. The threat is not 
stagnant, and it is counterproductive to overly restrict the work of 
those who are among the most able to ensure close cooperation and 
understanding between the Federal and non Federal entities to make our 
country safe.
    We believe that the combination of the relaxation of the 
restriction imposed by section 207(c) granted by the designation of 
separate components and the existence of the additional restriction 
applicable to very senior personnel, the inapplicability of separate 
component designation to our former employees who were paid pursuant to 
the Executive Schedule, and the application of subsection 207(d), we 
have achieved the balance that was desired by the drafters of section 
207. Of course, we must certify annually to the Director, United States 
Office of Government Ethics, that our designations remain appropriate.

                            DHS HEADQUARTERS

    Question. In addition to the $25 million GSA is requesting to 
locate CG headquarters at St. Elizabeth's campus in Anacostia, there is 
a $13 million request for ``St. Elizabeths West Campus 
Infrastructure''. The West Campus alone has 182 acres and includes 61 
buildings. The justification says ``the site is aptly suited to provide 
a high security campus for Federal agencies.''
    What are the Department's plans for the St. Elizabeth site?
    Answer. The Department's plans for the St. Elizabeth site are to 
ensure that the Coast Guard headquarters is properly planned and 
executed to provide additional expansion capability should the need 
arise for additional occupancy.
    Question. How are these plans related to the current efforts to 
outfit the Nebraska Avenue complex?
    Answer. The requirements for adjacency and mission needs being 
established at the NAC would be utilized should the opportunity for 
expansion be available at the St. Elizabeth site.

                      AVOIDING FUTURE FUND LAPSES

    Question. Why did the Department Management account allow $9.3 
million to lapse at the end of fiscal year 2004 and what specific 
systems have been put in place to make sure that this does not happen 
again?
    Answer. The Department did not intentionally allow funding to lapse 
in fiscal year 2004. The fiscal year 2004 unobligated balance for the 
Departmental Management account was due primarily to slower than 
anticipated hiring, resulting in personnel lapse. In fiscal year 2004, 
the infrastructure and organization to manage budget execution for 
Departmental Management was not fully developed. The transition to a 
new accounting system and financial services provider in fiscal year 
2004 created additional challenges and complexities, along with a 
learning curve, which made it difficult for financial managers to track 
spending during the year. In fiscal year 2005, we now have more staff 
and contractors onboard to perform budget execution activities for the 
Departmental Management account and can provide more useful data to 
managers to manage their budgets more efficiently and effectively.
    Question. Do you plan to seek authority to reprogram the lapsed 
funds?
    Answer. The Department submitted a request as part of the ICE 
reprogramming package to use the lapse authority under Section 504 to 
transfer $2.8 million from fiscal year 2004 lapsed funding from the 
Departmental Management account to ICE for its funding shortfall. This 
reprogramming request was overtaken by the fiscal year 2005 Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
Terrorism and Tsunami Relief, H.R. 1268 recent Supplemental that was 
passed that rescinded a total of $3.8 million from Departmental 
Management that was proposed in the ICE programming, including the $2.8 
million from the fiscal year 2004 lapsed monies.

                  CLASSIFIED VS. SENSITIVE INFORMATION

    Question. Late last year there were articles in various papers, 
including The Washington Post, regarding how the Department handles 
information it determines to be ``sensitive'' versus actually 
``classified'' material. It has required Federal Government employees, 
including congressional staff with ``Top Secret'' clearances, to sign 
confidentiality documents demanding that these previously cleared 
personnel not reveal information that, technically, is not 
``classified''. Most recently, on December 13, 2004, the Heritage 
Foundation released a report entitled, ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the 
Department of Homeland Security''. One of its conclusions calls for the 
Department to develop a ``consistent policy and legislation that 
encourages the sharing of unclassified but security-relevant 
information between the private sector and the government.'' This might 
also include the dropping or reconsideration of the documents security 
classification known as ``Sensitive Security Information.''
    What public law created the classification known as ``Sensitive 
Security Information''?
    Answer. Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA), Public Law 107-71 (November 19, 2001), which 
established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). ATSA 
transferred the responsibility for civil aviation security from the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to TSA. Among the statutory 
authorities previously administered by FAA that ATSA transferred to 
TSA's purview was the authority in 49 U.S.C.  40119, governing the 
protection of certain information related to transportation security.
    On February 22, 2002, TSA published a final rule transferring the 
bulk of FAA's aviation security regulations to TSA, including FAA's SSI 
regulation, which now is codified at 49 CFR Part 1520.
    In addition, on November 25, 2002, the President signed into law 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), Public Law 107-296, which 
transferred TSA to the newly established DHS. In connection with this 
transfer, the HSA transferred TSA's SSI authority under 49 U.S.C.  
40119 to 49 U.S.C.  114(s), and amended section 40119 to vest similar 
SSI authority in the Secretary of DOT. [See Section 1601 of the HSA.]
    It should also be noted that Sensitive Security Information (SSI) 
is not a classification, and information designated as SSI is not 
considered as classified national security information.
    Question. Is the Department, as part of your overall review of its 
operations, actively considering the Heritage Foundation 
recommendations on protecting sensitive information? If not, why not?
    Answer. Yes. The Department has carefully reviewed a number of 
recommendations and proposals regarding information sharing, and it is 
working to develop and establish a consistent prudent strategy on the 
subject. The guiding principle must balance the need to share 
information with appropriate individuals, while still protecting the 
sensitive nature of the underlying information.

                         CONTRACTING OUT REPORT

    Question. The fiscal year 2004 Appropriation Omnibus (H.R. 2673) 
Division F--Departments of Transportation and Treasury, and Independent 
Agencies, Title VI Section 647(b), contained the following reporting 
requirement: ``Not later than 120 days following the enactment of this 
Act and not later than December 31 of each year thereafter, the head of 
each executive agency shall submit to Congress a report on the 
competitive sourcing activities on the list required under the Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 31 U.S.C. 
501 note) that were performed for such executive agency during the 
previous fiscal year by Federal Government sources.
    The Committee received this report on February 3, 2005. The report 
states that two public-private competitions, which were started in 
September of 2004, are scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2005. In 
addition, the report states that additional competitions are scheduled 
to be held in fiscal year 2005 which will involve up to 1,397 FTE.
    Please provide the Committee an updated report containing the most 
recent fiscal year 2005 information as well as any plans for public-
private competitions in fiscal year 2006.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2005, DHS is currently completing the 
competitions involving 357 FTE. This includes competitions being 
conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), CBP, and the FLETC. DHS is 
currently reviewing proposals for the completion of competitions in 
fiscal year 2006.
    The DHS's annual Reports to Congress, as required by Section 647(b) 
of Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, fiscal year 2004 
(Public Law 108-199) are available on our web-site at: http://
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=37&content=3933
    Question. For fiscal year 2004 (actual), fiscal year 2005 
(estimate), and fiscal year 2006 (request), how many positions in the 
Department (broken down by agency) were competed and how much did the 
competitions cost.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2004, DHS completed three public-private 
competitions, in accordance with the OMB Circular A-76, involving 144 
FTE at the USCG. Two DHS competitions that were scheduled for 
completion in fiscal year 2004 were cancelled in fiscal year 2004:
  --The USCG's competition of its military travel support function (36 
        FTE) was cancelled due to the development of E-Travel 
        technologies that will obviate the current approach to this 
        service requirement;
  --The Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) competition of its 
        Immigration Information Officer (IIO) function (1,350 FTE) was 
        cancelled to give more time and resources to the elimination of 
        immigration service backlogs and, as a matter of law. DHS 
        announced two ICE competitions for completion in fiscal year 
        2005. These competitions involved 97 FTE, but were also 
        cancelled due to funding shortages.
    Savings generated by the three completed fiscal year 2004 USCG 
competitions are estimated at $12.3 million over a 5 year period. All 
three competitions were retained in-house. The incremental cost of 
conducting these USCG studies is estimated at $1.3 million and reflects 
the costs incurred in gearing up the competition program in the USCG. 
In addition, four FTE are associated with DHS' fiscal year 2004 fixed 
costs--spread across the agency--and are estimated at $450,000 per 
year. The DHS fixed program cost estimate includes dedicated resources 
to provide central policy, planning, and implementation oversight, yet 
excludes annual FAIR Act inventory costs. The estimated one-time DHS 
cost of conducting the fiscal year 2005 competitions involving 356 FTE 
is $1.9 million, with expected annual savings in excess of $5 million. 
The estimated one-time cost of conducting the fiscal year 2006 
competitions is not known, as we have not yet finalized those plans.
    Question. How many positions were subsequently contracted out as a 
result of the competition?
    Answer. While there have been significant efficiency and quality of 
service gains on the part of the government as a result of engaging in 
the fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 competitions, to date no 
positions have been converted to contract performance.

                      DETAILEES TO THE WHITE HOUSE

    Question. How many DHS employees (including the component agencies) 
are currently detailed to the White House (including all Executive 
Office of the President agencies)? Provide the committee a list 
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to; 
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end 
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if the agency is 
reimbursed.
    Answer.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Detail     Detail End                            Reimbursable
             Detailed To                 Originating Agency      Grade/Step or Salary    Start Date      Date         Purpose of Detail          Y/N
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSC.................................  DHS/IAIP...............  GS 12-01 ($62,886).....    3/20/2004   12/30/2005  Communications and Media           N
                                                                                                                   Relations. Was part of
                                                                                                                   GSA technology office
                                                                                                                   that was absorbed by
                                                                                                                   DHS in early 2003.
NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    6/14/2004    6/13/2006  White House Situation              N
                                                                                                                   Room Duty Officer.
NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    6/21/2004    6/20/2005  Counternarcotics........           N
NSC.................................  DHS/USCG...............  MILITARY...............    10/6/2003    6/10/2005  White House Situation              N
                                                                                                                   Room Duty Officer.
NSC.................................  USSS...................  GS 14-02 ($91,315).....    4/18/2005    4/17/2006  Combating Terrorism.....           N
ONDCP...............................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    7/15/2004    7/15/2005  Office of Supply                   N
                                                                                                                   Reduction.
WHO.................................  DHS/TSA................  K-00 ($111,038)........    5/21/2004    9/30/2005  Support the WHO mission.           N
WHO.................................  DHS....................  .......................    7/24/2004    1/19/2006  Support the WHO mission.           N
WHO.................................  DHS/USSS...............  GS 14-04 ($97,206).....    6/22/2004    9/30/2005  Support the WHO mission.           N
WHO.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    9/22/2004    1/19/2006  Support the WHO mission.           N
OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    5/17/2005    7/15/2007  Military Aide to the               N
                                                                                                                   Vice President.
OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    6/16/2003     7/1/2005  Special Advisor,                   N
                                                                                                                   Homeland Security.
OVP.................................  U.S. Coast Guard.......  MILITARY...............    4/22/2003    6/29/2005  Military Aide to the               N
                                                                                                                   Vice President.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      DETAILEES TO THE DEPARTMENT

    Question. How many employees of DHS component agencies are 
currently detailed to the Department? Provide the committee a list 
containing the originating agency; the office they are detailed to; 
salary grade/step; length of detail (including beginning and end 
dates); purpose of the detail; and indicate if this agency is 
reimbursed.
    Answer. The table below provides the requested data, which is a 
snapshot of detailees on-board as of March 31, 2005. This data 
submission was done in April 2005 and projected end dates that could 
have ended by the time this report was submitted.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Grade/Step     Detail     Detail End                                                                              Reimbursable
             Detailed To                  Originating Agency      or Salary    Start Date      Date                                  Purpose of Detail                                   Y/N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USM/CIO..............................  BTS.....................     $117,809     6/1/2004     6/1/2005  DHS Infrastructure trans support..........................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $149,200    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  BTS.......................................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $121,274     9/2/2003     9/2/2005  Cargo/Trade Policy........................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809     9/7/2004     9/6/2005  Border Patrol Liaison.....................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    2/23/2003      ( \1\ )  Counternarcotics Projects.................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $100,152    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  CIO Assistant.............................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................      $94,260    12/6/2004    12/7/2005  Agency Liaison Officer....................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    10/7/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    5/15/1995      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     9/2/2003     9/2/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651     5/1/2004     5/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/18/1998  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    10/1/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/16/1993  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    5/16/2004    5/16/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   11/19/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/13/1998  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651   10/27/2003   10/27/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    11/6/1990  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/25/2000  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    3/22/2004    3/22/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   12/23/2000  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     6/1/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/29/1997  ...........  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    1/25/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    2/24/2004      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    7/30/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/27/2001    8/27/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $57,280    4/15/2002    4/15/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    7/14/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................     $131,671    10/1/2004      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    1/10/2005    7/10/2005  Terrorist Screening Ctr...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   11/28/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $73,364   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $75,460   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $62,886   11/17/2003    5/31/2005  Support to IAIP Terrorist Screening Center................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    9/12/2003      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   12/12/2004    6/14/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    3/20/2005    3/20/2006  COMSEC....................................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $52,468    3/21/2005    3/21/2006  Visa Security Program.....................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $124,274     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $43,724    11/1/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $61,213   10/23/2004    3/31/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $97,213     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    9/20/2004     6/1/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $68,209   11/17/2004    4/29/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    12/7/2004          TBA  Assist ICE HR Officer.....................................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $62,886    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $57,715    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $64,981    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OPA..................................  CBP.....................     $128,205    1/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs............................................................           N
USCG.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274     8/4/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to USCG...........................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $114,344     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  OCFO......................................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $103,947   10/20/2003   10/19/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $106,044    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  CBP.....................     $100,152    4/28/2004      ( \1\ )  New HR system: communications team........................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $100,152     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Infrastructure Transformation Office......................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $117,344   11/10/2003    6/30/2005  Program manager--HSDN.....................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $149,200    10/6/2004    7/31/2005  CIO.......................................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................      $43,365    11/9/2004    9/15/2005  CIO support...............................................................           N
S&T..................................  CG......................      $84,751    6/30/2004    6/30/2007  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................      $89,736     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..........................................................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $100,152    2/22/2005    6/21/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
S&T..................................  DHS.....................      $59,464    11/1/2004    6/30/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $117,809    1/14/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/NAC.................     $100,152    1/31/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
NCR..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $135,136      Unknown      ( \1\ )  Nat Cap Reg mission support...............................................           N
OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................      $84,751     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................     $100,152     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $117,809     2/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $117,809    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,152    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600     3/1/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
FLETC................................  Federal Air Marshal           $96,474     2/7/2005     2/7/2006  On the job Training.......................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    10/1/2003    10/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651   10/20/2003   10/20/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    11/1/2003    11/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
IAIP.................................  FEMA....................     $114,882  ...........  ...........  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  FEMA....................     $135,136  ...........  ...........  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
OSLGC................................  FEMA....................         13/3    1/27/2003          TBD  Support to State and Local Coordination and Outreach......................           N
USM/CFO..............................  FEMA....................     $100,152     8/1/2004     5/1/2005  Support GAO/IG Liaison Office.............................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  FEMA....................      $84,751     5/3/2004    1/31/2005  Design of new DHS Personnel HR management system..........................           N
ODP..................................  FEMA/Region III.........      $82,259    7/11/2004      ( \1\ )  Implementation of ODP Program into DHS--move from FEMA Citizen Corp         ............
                                                                                                         Assistance.
BTS..................................  FLETC...................     $100,152     8/1/2003     8/1/2005  FLETC Liaison.............................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  FLETC...................     $100,152     2/1/2005     2/1/2006  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    4/12/2004    4/12/2006  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    3/10/2003      ( \1\ )  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145   11/30/2004      ( \1\ )  Protective detail.........................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $44,495   10/22/2003      ( \1\ )  Scheduling Support for Under Secretary....................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $69,000    3/14/2005    9/15/2005  FAMS Liaison..............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     9/2/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003      ( \1\ )  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145    2/27/2005    6/25/2005  Protective detail.........................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/3/2004     8/3/2005  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003      ( \1\ )  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  Setting up office w/detailees from bureaus (Office of Screening and         ............
                                                                                                         Coordination).
CBP..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2005      ( \1\ )  Liaison to NTC............................................................           N
CBP..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751   12/15/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
CIS..................................  ICE.....................      $59,464     4/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Long-term detail to provide paralegal services............................           N
DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  DHS/CFO...................................................................           N
DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Rep to Interpol as Dep Dir for OIA........................................  ............
FEMA.................................  ICE.....................      $49,145     8/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Protective detail.........................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    9/19/2004    9/19/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/15/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    5/20/1996      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/1988      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2004     9/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    3/10/2002     3/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/23/2003    12/6/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    11/4/2001    11/4/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/8/2003     9/7/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FTTTF................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Liaison; NSEERS Tracking..................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/12/2004      ( \1\ )  Serve as ICE rep and subject matter expert................................  ............
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003      ( \1\ )  ICE/BTS Liaison...........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/11/2004      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     6/1/2004     6/1/2006  ICE Liaison...............................................................           Y
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    Jan. 2000      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--DOS Liaison......................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $69,000     7/4/2005      ( \1\ )  Intelligence Sharing HSOC.................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003     3/1/2006  Support to IAIP mission--DHS Liaison to FBI...............................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    2/19/2002      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC.............................................           Y
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC desk officer................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
ICE..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     3/1/2002      ( \1\ )  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
OLA..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Leg Affairs liaison to Immigration........................................           N
OPA..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to Public Affairs.................................................           N
USCG.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/1/2004      ( \1\ )  Coast Guard Liaison.......................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................  ...........      7/12/04       7/8/05  Provide on-site geospatial technical support..............................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $100,152    12/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Program management and acquisition support................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $117,809    10/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Director, Infrastructure Transformation Office............................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $56,600     6/7/2004     6/7/2005  Provides admin support services to the AA at BTS..........................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................        SW-02     2/1/2004      ( \1\ )  BTS Deputy Chief of Staff.................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    2/17/2004      ( \1\ )  Transportation Security Policy Advisor....................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/13/2004   12/13/2005  TSA Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/31/2004   12/13/2005  Serves as TSA liaison to BTS..............................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    7/26/2004     4/2/2005  Provides legislative policy assistance to AA..............................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $38,900    2/28/2005    10/4/2005  Correspondence Analyst....................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    8/11/2003    8/11/2006  International Affairs.....................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    3/23/2003      ( \1\ )  National Counter Terrorist Center on SpecialProject.......................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $46,400     2/2/2004      ( \1\ )  Speech Writer.............................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Special Asst to Under Secretary...........................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    9/26/2004    9/26/2005  Establishing the Office of Screening Coordination for DHS/BTS.............           N
DHS-OPL..............................  TSA.....................      $84,150    2/13/2005    6/13/2005  Serves as a special assistant for senior level officials TOPOFF3 Program..           N
IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    10/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Task force to review ICE budget...........................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Assisting with ICE budget audit...........................................           N
OGC..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     8/8/2005     8/8/2007  Provide legal advice concerning border and transportation security issues            N
                                                                                                         especially as they involve TSA.
OPA..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/3/2003      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs assisting on special project (requested by Dennis Murphy)..           N
Security.............................  TSA.....................     $100,600   12/12/2004     4/2/2005  Requested for special project on security initiatives at the Chief                   N
                                                                                                         Security Office.
USM..................................  TSA.....................     $120,250   12/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Acting Deputy Director Business Transformation office--Selected for DHS              N
                                                                                                         position, awaiting clearance through security process.
USM..................................  TSA.....................     $158,568    8/30/2004    9/30/2005  Acting Dir, Business Transformation Off...................................  ............
USM/CFO..............................  TSA.....................     $100,152    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $149,200     4/3/2005      ( \1\ )  Support Solutions Engineering COE.........................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $152,824    7/13/2003     4/1/2005  Acting Deputy CIO.........................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,844    7/13/2003      ( \1\ )  DHS/BTS Integration.......................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $110,278     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $145,482   10/27/2004      ( \1\ )  TSA representative to the Information Technology Officer..................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $138,093     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,454    7/13/2003      ( \1\ )  INFRASTRUCTURE program support............................................           Y
IAIP.................................  USCG....................     $136,490    9/19/2003    9/19/2005  HSC Watch Augmentation....................................................           N
OGC..................................  USCG....................      $82,937     3/1/2005     3/1/2007  Assist with international issues and with Team Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.           N
Security.............................  USCG....................      $56,128    12/1/2004      Ongoing  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
Security.............................  USCG....................      $82,937    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
Security.............................  USCG....................      $71,269    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
Security.............................  USCG....................      $74,560    12/1/2004      ( \3\ )  State and Local Investigations............................................           Y
USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................     $101,613     8/1/2004     8/1/2005  Support Budget Office.....................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................      $82,937     1/5/2005     4/1/2005  ICE Tiger Team............................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  USCG....................     $156,886  ...........      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           Y
IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Operations Center............................           N
IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Information Analysis Section.................           N
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $87,244     1/3/2005      ( \1\ )  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications--detail           N
                                                                                                         lasts until this case goes to trial.
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $75,460     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraudinvestigation).
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $41,361     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $64,981    3/14/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
BTS..................................  USSS....................      $97,206    2/21/2004    8/21/2005  Border & Transp. Security.................................................           N
DHS/IAIP.............................  USSS....................      $91,315     6/1/2004    12/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
FEMA.................................  USSS....................      $91,315   10/17/2004    4/17/2005  DEST Program..............................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     8/1/2003    8/10/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    3/20/2005    3/20/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     1/1/2003     1/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $58,564     6/1/2000     6/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/1/2003     2/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $63,040    1/12/2004    1/12/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/9/2004     2/9/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    10/6/2002    12/6/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751   10/19/2003    5/29/2005  Nat. CounterTerrorism Ctr.................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      UND--LT     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $77,274    3/13/2005    6/11/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $114,344     5/7/2004    7/10/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $40,179     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     UND--Off     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    11/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     5/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $97,206     2/8/2004     8/8/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $103,947     9/1/2004     9/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $87,244    2/27/2005    5/28/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $110,878     6/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission--Investigations...................................           Y
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $36,157     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $74,782     3/6/2005     6/4/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $79,766     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152    10/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
OSLGC................................  USSS....................      $88,000    10/3/2004     4/3/2005  Law Enforcement Liaison...................................................           N
S&T..................................  USSS....................     $100,152     2/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           N
S&T..................................  USSS....................      $97,206     1/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Providing technical expertise to S&T--Protective Research (INT)...........           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $97,206    7/21/2003    7/21/2005  Counter Intelligence......................................................           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $88,000     2/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Provides physical security to DHS facilities..............................           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $94,000    2/23/2003    8/23/2005  Phy. Sec & Access Ctrl....................................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $91,315    3/10/2004     4/1/2005  New HR system: pay and performance team...................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $82,259     2/1/2005    5/16/2005  Hiring and transition response team.......................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  BTS.....................     $117,809     6/1/2004     6/1/2005  DHS Infrastructure trans support..........................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $149,200    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  BTS.......................................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $121,274     9/2/2003     9/2/2005  Cargo/Trade Policy........................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809     9/7/2004     9/6/2005  Border Patrol Liaison.....................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    2/23/2003      ( \1\ )  Counternarcotics Projects.................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................     $100,152    7/27/2004    7/27/2005  CIO Assistant.............................................................           N
BTS..................................  CBP.....................      $94,260    12/6/2004    12/7/2005  Agency Liaison Officer....................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    10/7/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    5/15/1995      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     9/2/2003     9/2/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651     5/1/2004     5/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/18/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    10/1/2002      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    2/16/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    5/16/2004    5/16/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   11/19/2001      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/13/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651   10/27/2003   10/27/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    11/6/1990      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638      ( \2\ )      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/25/2000      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    3/22/2004    3/22/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638   12/23/2000      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638     6/1/1998      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    9/29/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    1/25/1993      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    2/24/2004      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    7/30/1997      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $81,638    8/27/2001    8/27/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $57,280    4/15/2002    4/15/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  CBP.....................      $68,651    7/14/2003      ( \1\ )  Instructor................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................     $131,671    10/1/2004      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    1/10/2005    7/10/2005  Terrorist Screening Ctr...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   11/28/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $73,364   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $75,460   11/29/2004    5/17/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $62,886   11/17/2003    5/31/2005  Support to IAIP Terrorist Screening Center................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    9/12/2003      ( \1\ )  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $69,173   12/12/2004    6/14/2005  HSOC......................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274    3/20/2005    3/20/2006  COMSEC....................................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $52,468    3/21/2005    3/21/2006  Visa Security Program.....................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $124,274     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $43,724    11/1/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $97,213     5/5/2004     5/5/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $91,315    9/20/2004     6/1/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................      $68,209   11/17/2004    4/29/2005  Visa Security Unit........................................................           N
ICE..................................  CBP.....................     $117,809    12/7/2004          TBD  Assist ICE HR Officer.....................................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $62,886    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $57,715    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OIA..................................  CBP.....................      $64,981    1/15/2005    4/30/2005  Border Security Training Team (Jordan)....................................           N
OPA..................................  CBP.....................     $128,205    1/26/2004      ( \1\ )  Public Affairs............................................................           N
USCG.................................  CBP.....................      $77,274     8/4/2003      ( \1\ )  Support to USCG...........................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $114,344     1/1/2004      ( \1\ )  OCFO......................................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $103,947   10/20/2003   10/19/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  CBP.....................     $106,044    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  CBP.....................     $100,152    4/28/2004      ( \1\ )  New HR system: communications team........................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $100,152     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Infrastructure Transformation Office......................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $117,344   11/10/2003    6/30/2005  Program manager--HSDN.....................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................     $149,200    10/6/2004    7/31/2005  CIO.......................................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CBP.....................      $43,365    11/9/2004    9/15/2005  CIO support...............................................................           N
S&T..................................  CG......................      $84,751    6/30/2004    6/30/2007  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           Y
OGC..................................  CIS.....................     $110,878     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Provide substantive immigration expertise to DHS OGC, focusing on issues             N
                                                                                                         relating to immigration benefits and related USCIS issues.
USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................      $89,736     3/1/2003      ( \1\ )  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           N
USM/CIO..............................  CIS.....................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..........................................................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $100,152    2/22/2005    6/21/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
S&T..................................  DHS.....................      $59,464    11/1/2004    6/30/2005  Providing admin support to HHS............................................           Y
S&T..................................  DHS.....................     $117,809    1/14/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/NAC.................     $100,152    1/31/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................      $84,751     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
OSLGC................................  DHS/ODP.................     $100,152     2/7/2005     8/6/2005  Support to OSLGCP.........................................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/ODP.................     $117,809     2/7/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $117,809    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,152    1/10/2005      ( \1\ )  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600    1/10/2005   Indefinite  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
S&T..................................  DHS/TSA.................     $100,600     3/1/2005   Indefinite  Support DNDO Transition Team for Stand-up.................................           N
FLETC................................  Federal Air Marshal           $96,474     2/7/2005     2/7/2006  On the job Training.......................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    10/1/2003    10/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651   10/20/2003   10/20/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
FLETC................................  Federal Protective            $68,651    11/1/2003    11/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
                                        Service.
OSLGC................................  FEMA....................         13/3    1/27/2003          TBD  Support to State and Local Coordination and Outreach......................           N
USM/CFO..............................  FEMA....................     $100,152     8/1/2004     5/1/2005  Support GAO/IG Liaison Office.............................................           N
ODP..................................  FEMA/Region III.........      $82,259    7/11/2004   Indefinite  Implementation of ODP Program into DHS--move from FEMA Citizen Corp                  N
                                                                                                         Assistance.
BTS..................................  FLETC...................     $100,152     8/1/2003     8/1/2005  FLETC Liaison.............................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  FLETC...................     $100,152     2/1/2005     2/1/2006  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    4/12/2004    4/12/2006  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    3/10/2003   Indefinite  Immigration Policy Advisor................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145   11/30/2004   Indefinite  Protective detail.........................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $44,495   10/22/2003   Indefinite  Scheduling Support for Under Secretary....................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $69,000    3/14/2005    9/15/2005  FAMS Liaison..............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     9/2/2003   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003   Indefinite  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $49,145    2/27/2005    6/25/2005  Protective detail.........................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/3/2004     8/3/2005  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    6/29/2003   Indefinite  Advance Work for Under Secretary..........................................           Y
BTS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  Setting up office w/ detailees from bureaus (Office of Screening and                 N
                                                                                                         Coordination).
CBP..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2005   Indefinite  Liaison to NTC............................................................           N
CBP..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751   12/15/2003   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
CIS..................................  ICE.....................      $59,464     4/1/2004   Indefinite  Long-term detail to provide paralegal services............................           N
DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2004     7/1/2005  DHS/CFO...................................................................           N
DHS..................................  ICE.....................     $117,809     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Rep to Interpol as Dep Dir for OIA........................................           N
FEMA.................................  ICE.....................      $49,145     8/1/2004   Indefinite  Protective detail.........................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    9/19/2004    9/19/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/15/2003   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    5/20/1996   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/1988   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     3/1/2001   Indefinite  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2004     9/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    3/10/2002     3/1/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    1/23/2003    12/6/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638    11/4/2001    11/4/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  ICE.....................      $81,638     9/8/2003     9/7/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     7/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/12/2004   Indefinite  Serve as ICE rep and subject matter expert................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $71,269    8/24/2003   Indefinite  ICE/BTS Liaison...........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Interpol Liaison..........................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    1/11/2004   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     6/1/2004     6/1/2006  ICE Liaison...............................................................           Y
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    Jan. 2000   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--DOS Liaison......................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $69,000     7/4/2005   Indefinite  Intelligence Sharing HSOC.................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003     3/1/2006  Support to IAIP mission--DHS Liaison to FBI...............................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $117,809    2/19/2002   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC.............................................           Y
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152    11/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission--HSOC desk officer................................           N
IAIP.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     3/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
ICE..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     3/1/2002   Indefinite  ICE Liaison...............................................................           N
OLA..................................  ICE.....................      $84,751     1/1/2004   Indefinite  Leg Affairs liaison to Immigration........................................           N
OPA..................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to Public Affairs.................................................           N
USCG.................................  ICE.....................     $100,152     8/1/2004   Indefinite  Coast Guard Liaison.......................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................  ...........      7/12/04       7/8/05  Provide on-site geospatial technical support..............................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $100,152    12/1/2003   Indefinite  Program management and acquisition support................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  ICE.....................     $117,809    10/1/2003   Indefinite  Director, Infrastructure Transformation Office............................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $56,600     6/7/2004     6/7/2005  Provides admin support services to the AA at BTS..........................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................        SW-02     2/1/2004   Indefinite  BTS Deputy Chief of Staff.................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    2/17/2004   Indefinite  Transportation Security Policy Advisor....................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/13/2004   12/13/2005  TSA Liaison...............................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150   12/31/2004   12/13/2005  Serves as TSA liaison to BTS..............................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    7/13/2003    1/22/2005  Operations Executive Assistant............................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    7/26/2004     4/2/2005  Provides legislative policy assistance to AA..............................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $38,900    2/28/2005    10/4/2005  Correspondence Analyst....................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    8/11/2003    8/11/2006  International Affairs.....................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    3/23/2003   Indefinite  National Counter Terrorist Center on special project......................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $46,400     2/2/2004   Indefinite  Speech Writer.............................................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/7/2005   Indefinite  Special Asst to Under Secretary...........................................           N
BTS..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    9/26/2004    9/26/2005  Establishing the Office of Screening Coordination for DHS/BTS.............           N
DHS-OPL..............................  TSA.....................      $84,150    2/13/2005    6/13/2005  Serves as a special assistant for senior level officials TOPOFF3 Program..           N
IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  TSA.....................      $69,000    10/1/2003   Indefinite  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Task force to review ICE budget...........................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150    5/30/2004    5/30/2005  Provide legal support to FAMS at ICE......................................           N
ICE..................................  TSA.....................     $100,600    1/10/2005     4/9/2005  Assisting with ICE budget audit...........................................           N
OGC..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     8/8/2005     8/8/2007  Provide legal advice concerning border and transportation security issues            N
                                                                                                         especially as they involve TSA.
OPA..................................  TSA.....................      $84,150     3/3/2003   Indefinite  Public Affairs assisting on special project(requested by Dennis Murphy)...           N
Security.............................  TSA.....................     $100,600   12/12/2004     4/2/2005  Requested for special project on security initiatives at the Chief                   N
                                                                                                         Security Office.
USM..................................  TSA.....................     $120,250   12/26/2004   Indefinite  Acting Deputy Director Business Transformation office--Selected for DHS              N
                                                                                                         position, awaiting clearance through security process.
USM..................................  TSA.....................     $158,568    8/30/2004    9/30/2005  Acting Dir, Business Transformation Off...................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  TSA.....................     $100,152    10/1/2003    10/1/2005  Support eMerge project....................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $149,200     4/3/2005   Indefinite  Support Solutions Engineering COE.........................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $152,824    7/13/2003     4/1/2005  Acting Deputy CIO.........................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,844    7/13/2003   Indefinite  DHS/BTS Integration.......................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $110,278     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $145,482   10/27/2004   Indefinite  TSA representative to the Information Technology Officer..................           N
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $138,093     4/3/2005    9/30/2005  Information Technology....................................................           Y
USM/CIO..............................  TSA.....................     $141,454    7/13/2003   Indefinite  INFRASTRUCTURE program support............................................           Y
IAIP.................................  USCG....................     $136,490    9/19/2003    9/19/2005  HSC Watch Augmentation....................................................           N
OGC..................................  USCG....................      $82,937     3/1/2005     3/1/2007  Assist with international issues and with Team Telecom/CFIUS legal issues.           N
USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................     $101,613     8/1/2004     8/1/2005  Support Budget Office.....................................................           N
USM/CFO..............................  USCG....................      $82,937     1/5/2005     4/1/2005  ICE Tiger Team............................................................           N
USM/CIO..............................  USCG....................     $156,886  ...........   Indefinite  Support DHS' Infrastructure Transformation Office.........................           Y
IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Operations Center............................           N
IAIP.................................  USCIS...................      $74,782    3/21/2005    5/21/2005  To assist in setting up DHS' Information Analysis Section.................           N
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $87,244     1/3/2005   Indefinite  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications--detail           N
                                                                                                         lasts until this case goes to trial.
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $75,460     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $81,747    2/28/2005     3/4/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $41,361     3/7/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
ICE..................................  USCIS...................      $64,981    3/14/2005     5/6/2005  To assist ICE in prosecuting Operation Jakarta Asylum Applications (a 2              N
                                                                                                         year asylum fraud investigation).
BTS..................................  USSS....................      $97,206    2/21/2004    8/21/2005  Border & Transp. Security.................................................           N
DHS/IAIP.............................  USSS....................      $91,315     6/1/2004    12/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
FEMA.................................  USSS....................      $91,315   10/17/2004    4/17/2005  DEST Program..............................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     8/1/2003    8/10/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    3/20/2005    3/20/2008  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $68,651     1/1/2003     1/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $58,564     6/1/2000     6/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/1/2003     2/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $63,040    1/12/2004    1/12/2007  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     2/9/2004     2/9/2009  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638    10/6/2002    12/6/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2006  Instructor................................................................           N
FLETC................................  USSS....................      $81,638     9/1/2003     9/1/2005  Instructor................................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751   10/19/2003    5/29/2005  Nat. CounterTerrorism Ctr.................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      UND--LT     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $77,274    3/13/2005    6/11/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $114,344     5/7/2004    7/10/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $40,179     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     UND--Off     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    11/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     5/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $97,206     2/8/2004     8/8/2005  Protective Research (IAIP)................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $103,947     9/1/2004     9/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $87,244    2/27/2005    5/28/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751    12/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $110,878     6/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission--Investigations...................................           Y
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $36,157     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809    12/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $74,782     3/6/2005     6/4/2005  HS Operations Center......................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $79,766     5/1/2004     5/1/2005  Investigations............................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $100,152    10/1/2002      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................      $84,751     1/1/2004      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
IAIP.................................  USSS....................     $117,809     1/1/2003      ( \3\ )  Support to IAIP mission...................................................           N
OSLGC................................  USSS....................      $88,000    10/3/2004     4/3/2005  Law Enforcement Liaison...................................................           N
S&T..................................  USSS....................     $100,152     2/1/2003   Indefinite  Providing technical expertise to S&T......................................           N
S&T..................................  USSS....................      $97,206     1/1/2003   Indefinite  Providing technical expertise to S&T--Protective Research (INT)...........           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $97,206    7/21/2003    7/21/2005  Counter Intelligence......................................................           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $88,000     2/1/2003   Indefinite  Provides physical security to DHS facilities..............................           N
Security.............................  USSS....................      $94,000    2/23/2003    8/23/2005  Phy. Sec & Access Ctrl....................................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $91,315    3/10/2004     4/1/2005  New HR system: pay and performance team...................................           N
USM/CHCO.............................  USSS....................      $82,259     2/1/2005    5/16/2005  Hiring and transition response team.......................................           N
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Indefinite.
\2\ N/A.
\3\ Ongoing.

                           HIRING JOURNALISTS

    Question. In January 2005, President Bush ordered his Cabinet 
secretaries not to hire columnists to promote their agendas. At a news 
conference President Bush said, ``All our Cabinet secretaries must 
realize that we will not be paying commentators to advance our agenda. 
Our agenda ought to be able to stand on its own two feet.''
    Are all DHS agencies in compliance with the Administration's policy 
and the legal prohibitions on using appropriations for contracting with 
journalists to promote legislation or policy?
    Answer. Yes, all DHS Agencies are in compliance.

                INTELLIGENCE REFORM BILL AUTHORIZATIONS

    Question. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
authorized substantial enhancements to a variety of DHS programs, 
including immigration enforcement, aviation security, and other 
provisions. Identify the funding requested in the President's fiscal 
year 2006 budget for each of the following authorizations contained in 
the Act. In your response, include a chart which compares the funding 
authorized, by section of the bill, to the funding included in the 
President's fiscal year 2006 budget.
Immigration Enforcement
  --Section 5202 & 5203.--Authorizes, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal 
        year 2010 subject to the availability of appropriations, an 
        increase of 10,000 additional Border Patrol Agents (2,000 per 
        year) and an increase of 4,000 Immigration and Customs 
        Enforcement (ICE) investigators (800 per year).
  --Section 5204.--Authorizes, from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 
        2010 subject to the availability of appropriations, an increase 
        of 40,000 beds (8,000 per year) available for immigration 
        detention and removal.
  --Section 5101 through 5104.--The Secretary of Homeland Security may 
        carry out a pilot program to improve border security between 
        ports of entry along the northern border. Required features of 
        this pilot project include the use of advanced technologies to 
        improve border security.
  --Section 5201.--Within 6 months of enactment of this Act, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit a comprehensive 
        plan for the systematic surveillance of the southwest border of 
        the United States by remotely piloted aircraft.
  --Section 7210 & 7206.--The bill amends the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act by mandating by January 1, 2008 pre-inspection 
        stations are established in at least 25 additional foreign 
        airports and by December 31, 2006 at least 50 airports shall be 
        selected for assignment of immigration officers to assist air 
        carriers detect fraudulent documents at foreign airports. $25 
        million is authorized in fiscal year 2005 and $40 million in 
        fiscal years 2006 and 2007 respectively for this purpose.

Aviation Security
  --Section 4013.--$250 million for research, development, and 
        installation of detection systems and other devices for the 
        detection of biological, chemical, radiological, and explosive 
        material.
  --Section 4024.--$100 million for research and development of 
        improved explosive detection systems.
  --Section 4052.--$200 million for each of fiscal years 2005-2007 for 
        improving aviation security related to the transportation of 
        cargo on passenger and cargo aircraft.
  --Section 4052.--$100 million for each of fiscal years 2005-2007 for 
        research and development in advancing cargo security 
        technology. Within these funds, the Secretary shall also 
        establish a competitive grant program to encourage the 
        development of advanced air cargo security technology.
  --Section 4014.--Up to $150 million for each of fiscal years 2005 and 
        2006 to set up a pilot program (minimum 5 airports) to deploy 
        and test advanced airport checkpoint screening devices and 
        technology as an integrated system.
  --Section 4019.--Increases the statutory allocation for expiring and 
        new Letters of Intent (LOIs) from $250 million to $400 million.
  --Section 4011.--$20 million for research and development of advanced 
        biometric technology applications to aviation security, 
        including mass identification technology.
  --Section 4011.--$1 million for the establishment of a competitive 
        center of excellence to expedite the use of biometric 
        identifiers.
  --Section 4011.--Directs that a law enforcement officer travel 
        credential be created that incorporates biometric identifier 
        technology that is uniform for all law enforcement officials 
        seeking to carry a weapon on board an aircraft. The bill 
        authorizes such sums as may be necessary to carry out this 
        directive.
  --Section 4020.--Directs DHS to provide, subject to the availability 
        of funds, monitoring cameras for surveillance at airports that 
        have checked baggage screening areas that are not open to 
        public view in order to deter theft from checked baggage and to 
        aid in the speedy resolution of liability claims against the 
        Transportation Security Administration.
  --Section 4051.--$2 million for TSA to carry out a pilot program to 
        evaluate the use of blast-resistant containers for cargo and 
        baggage on passenger aircraft to minimize the potential effects 
        of detonation of an explosive device.
  --Section 4016.--$83 million for the 3 fiscal-year period beginning 
        with fiscal year 2005 to increase the number of Federal air 
        marshals.
  --Section 4012.--Directs TSA to begin to assume the function (not 
        later than 180 days after testing the system is completed) of 
        comparing passenger information to no fly lists, utilizing all 
        appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated 
        terrorist watchlist, including international flights.

Other Provisions
  --Section 7303.--Authorizes the Secretary of DHS to provide $22.1 
        million in fiscal year 2005, $22.8 million in fiscal year 2006, 
        $23.5 million in fiscal year 2007, $24.2 million in fiscal year 
        2008, and $24.9 million in fiscal year 2009 to enhance public 
        safety interoperable communications at all levels of 
        government. The Secretary may establish an Office for 
        Interoperability and Compatibility within the Science and 
        Technology Directorate to carry out these duties.
  --Section 7304.--Directs DHS to establish a minimum of 2 pilot 
        projects in high threat urban areas or regions for the purpose 
        of developing a regional strategic plan to foster interagency 
        communication and to coordinate the gathering of all Federal, 
        State, and local first responders in that area.
  --Section 7407.--Amends the Homeland Security Act requirement related 
        to counternarcotics enforcement. Instead of having one senior 
        official in the Department coordinating counternarcotics 
        policy, an ``Office Counternarcotics Enforcement'' is created 
        with an authorization of $6 million.
  --Section 7215.--Directs the Secretary to establish a terrorist 
        travel program to oversee the analysis, coordination, and 
        dissemination or terrorist travel intelligence and operation 
        information.
  --Section 4071.--Directs the Secretary to implement a system for 
        screening the names of cruise ship passengers and crew against 
        Federal terrorist watch lists.
    Answer.

  INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 IMPLICATIONS
                 FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Authorized Funding    2006 Budget Funding
        Subject area                  Level                 Level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AVIATION:
    Law enforcement officer   Directs that a law    The fiscal year 2006
     uniform biometric         enforcement officer   Budget does not
     travel credential         travel credential     request any
     (Section 4011(a)).        be created that       dedicated funding
                               incorporates          for this specific
                               biometric             purpose. Necessary
                               identifier            resources would be
                               technology that is    provided with
                               uniform for all law   existing funds or
                               enforcement           through fees.
                               officials seeking    This activity is a
                               to carry a weapon     sub-set of the
                               on board an           Registered Traveler
                               aircraft. The bill    pilot and funds
                               authorizes such       were identified
                               sums as may be        within the
                               necessary to carry    Registered Traveler
                               out this directive.   program in fiscal
                                                     year 2005 to begin
                                                     the Registered
                                                     Armed LEO pilot.
                                                     The fiscal year
                                                     2005 enacted
                                                     appropriations
                                                     funded Registered
                                                     Armed LEO
                                                     activities, and TSA
                                                     anticipates using
                                                     the results of the
                                                     pilot as a platform
                                                     for the final LEO
                                                     biometric travel
                                                     card. Results of
                                                     the pilot will be
                                                     considered to
                                                     evaluate resources,
                                                     needs, and funding
                                                     options as the
                                                     program moves
                                                     forward.
    Biometric technologies    $20 million for       The fiscal year 2006
     for aviation--R&D         research and          Budget does not
     (Section 4011(b)).        development of        request any
                               advanced biometric    dedicated funding
                               technology            for this specific
                               applications to       purpose within
                               aviation security,    broader R&D request
                               including mass        levels.
                               identification
                               technology.
    Biometric Center of       $1 million for the    The fiscal year 2006
     Excellence (Section       establishment of a    Budget does not
     4011(d)).                 competitive center    request any
                               of excellence to      dedicated funding
                               expedite the use of   for a Biometric
                               biometric             Center of
                               identifiers.          Excellence.
    Airline Passenger         Directs TSA to begin  The fiscal year 2006
     Screening (Section        to assume the         Budget requests $81
     4012).                    function (not later   million for the
                               than 180 days after   development of the
                               testing the system    Secure Flight
                               is completed) of      prescreening
                               comparing passenger   system.
                               information to no
                               fly lists,
                               utilizing all
                               appropriate records
                               in the consolidated
                               and integrated
                               terrorist
                               watchlist,
                               including
                               international
                               flights.
    Checkpoint portal         $250 million for      The fiscal year 2006
     detection systems--R&D    research,             Budget for
     and deployment (Section   development, and      explosives
     4013).                    installation of       detection as a
                               detection systems     countermeasure
                               and other devices     against aviation,
                               for the detection     suicide and vehicle
                               of biological,        bombs: $88 million
                               chemical,             of the $124 million
                               radiological, and     (Research and
                               explosive material.   Development (R&D)
                                                     consolidation
                                                     budget + Science
                                                     and Technology
                                                     (S&T) Explosives
                                                     Countermeasures
                                                     portfolio budget),
                                                     but nothing
                                                     specific for
                                                     ``checkpoint portal
                                                     detection
                                                     systems''.
    Integrated checkpoint     Up to $150 million    The President's
     screening system pilots   for each of fiscal    fiscal year 2005
     (Section 4014).           years 2005 and 2006   Budget included
                               to set up a pilot     $28.3 million for
                               program (minimum 5    fielding emerging
                               airports) to deploy   technology
                               and test advanced     equipment at
                               airport checkpoint    checkpoints. As a
                               screening devices     result of this
                               and technology as     funding, 147 static
                               an integrated         trace portals
                               system.               (which are
                                                     passenger screening
                                                     sub-systems using a
                                                     whole body portal
                                                     to inspect
                                                     passengers for
                                                     concealed
                                                     explosives using an
                                                     automated, non-
                                                     contact trace
                                                     sampling and
                                                     processing system)
                                                     will be deployed in
                                                     fiscal year 2006 at
                                                     approximately 40
                                                     airports. The
                                                     fiscal year 2006
                                                     request includes
                                                     $43.7 million in
                                                     additional funds to
                                                     complete the
                                                     fielding of this
                                                     capability, which
                                                     will total $100
                                                     million to address
                                                     this activity over
                                                     the 2-year period.
    In-line checked baggage   Increases the         The fiscal year 2006
     screening (Section        statutory             Budget includes
     4019).                    allocation for        $260.5 million to
                               expiring and new      support the eight
                               Letters of Intent     existing Letters of
                               (LOIs) from $250      Intent (LOI)
                               million to $400       airports. Of this
                               million.              amount, $240.5
                                                     million is for
                                                     direct
                                                     reimbursements and
                                                     $20 million is for
                                                     equipment and
                                                     installation. The
                                                     fiscal year 2006
                                                     request proposes to
                                                     continue sourcing
                                                     LOIs from the $250
                                                     million
                                                     appropriated from
                                                     the Aviation
                                                     Security Capital
                                                     Fund at a 75
                                                     percent Federal
                                                     cost share rate.
                                                     Additionally, the
                                                     request includes
                                                     $134 million to
                                                     purchase and
                                                     install Explosive
                                                     Detection Systems
                                                     and Electronic
                                                     Trace Detection
                                                     equipment at non-
                                                     LOI airports, for a
                                                     total expenditure
                                                     of $394 million.
    Checked Baggage           Directs DHS to        The fiscal year 2006
     Monitoring Area           provide, subject to   Budget includes
     (Section 4020).           the availability of   $10.1 million to
                               funds, monitoring     provide assistance
                               cameras for           to airports to
                               surveillance at       install security
                               airports that have    monitoring cameras
                               checked baggage       for surveillance of
                               screening areas       checked baggage
                               that are not open     screening areas
                               to public view in     that are not open
                               order to deter        to public view. The
                               theft from checked    Transportation
                               baggage and to aid    Security
                               in the speedy         Administration
                               resolution of         (TSA), in
                               liability claims      partnership with
                               against the           airports, generally
                               Transportation        provides for
                               Security              purchase and
                               Administration. The   installation of a
                               bill and current      camera system, with
                               policy provides       the partnering
                               ``such sums''.        airport agreeing to
                                                     maintain the
                                                     installed system.
    Aviation explosives       $100 million for      The S&T Directorate
     detection equipment R&D   research and          has an fiscal year
     (Section 4024(b)).        development of        2006 budget request
                               improved explosive    of $45.9 million
                               detection systems.    for the TSA budget
                                                     line for next
                                                     generation
                                                     explosives
                                                     detection systems.
                                                     The S&T Directorate
                                                     will coordinate
                                                     with TSA regarding
                                                     the development of
                                                     the next generation
                                                     of explosives
                                                     detection systems.
    Blast Resistant Cargo     $2 million for TSA    The fiscal year 2006
     Containers (Section       to carry out a        Budget requests
     4051).                    pilot program to      $4.4 million.
                               evaluate the use of
                               blast-resistant
                               containers for
                               cargo and baggage
                               on passenger
                               aircraft to
                               minimize the
                               potential effects
                               of detonation of an
                               explosive device.
    Air cargo security        $200 million for      The fiscal year 2006
     activities (Section       each of fiscal        Budget includes $40
     4052).                    years 2005-2007 for   million for air
                               improving aviation    cargo security,
                               security related to   which will allow
                               the transportation    the Transportation
                               of cargo on           Security
                               passenger and cargo   Administration
                               aircraft.             (TSA) to continue
                              $100 million for       making incremental
                               each of fiscal        and measured
                               years 2005-2007 for   progress toward our
                               research and          air cargo security
                               development in        goals.
                               advancing cargo      The S&T Directorate
                               security              has an fiscal year
                               technology. Within    2006 budget request
                               these funds, the      of $29.578 million.
                               Secretary shall       The budget request,
                               also establish a      although not
                               competitive grant     developed by the
                               program to            S&T Directorate,
                               encourage the         was agreed upon by
                               development of        the S&T Directorate
                               advanced air cargo    as the amount
                               security technology.  moving forward for
                                                     air cargo RDT&E.
                                                     The S&T Directorate
                                                     will continue to
                                                     award grants under
                                                     a competitive
                                                     process to further
                                                     aviation
                                                     consolidated cargo
                                                     screening RDT&E.
    Federal Air Marshals      $83 million for the   The President has
     (FAMS) staffing           3 fiscal-year         requested $9.86
     (Section 4016).           period beginning      million in new
                               with fiscal year      funding in fiscal
                               2005 to increase      year 2006 to enable
                               the number of         the hiring of
                               Federal air           additional Federal
                               marshals. Subject     Air Marshals to
                               to the availability   provide even
                               of appropriations.    greater coverage of
                                                     targeted critical
                                                     flights and to
                                                     otherwise increase
                                                     mission
                                                     capabilities. The
                                                     total budget for
                                                     FAMS is $689
                                                     million.
    Pre-clearance Stations    The bill amends the   There are currently
     and Immigration           Immigration and       14 pre-clearance
     Security Initiative       Nationality Act by    stations funded in
     (Section 7210 & 7206).    mandating by          the fiscal year
                               January 1, 2008 pre-  2006 Budget. The
                               inspection stations   fiscal year 2006
                               are established in    Budget request is
                               at least 25           $2 million
                               additional foreign
                               airports and by
                               December 31, 2006
                               at least 50
                               airports shall be
                               selected for
                               assignment of
                               immigration
                               officers to assist
                               air carriers detect
                               fraudulent
                               documents at
                               foreign airports.
                               $25 million is
                               authorized in
                               fiscal year 2005
                               and $40 million in
                               fiscal years 2006
                               and 2007
                               respectively for
                               this purpose.
MARITIME:
    Vetting of cruise ship    Directs the           The fiscal year 2006
     passengers (Section       Secretary to          Budget does not
     4071).                    implement a system    request any
                               for screening the     dedicated funding
                               names of cruise       for this specific
                               ship passengers and   purpose. Necessary
                               crew against          resources are
                               Federal terrorist     provided with
                               watch lists. No       existing funds.
                               specific funding     On April 7, 2005,
                               authorization is      CBP published the
                               provided.             Advance Passenger
                                                     Information System
                                                     (APIS) Final Rule
                                                     within the Federal
                                                     Register (70 FR
                                                     17820). The CBP
                                                     Final Rule
                                                     incorporates
                                                     passenger and crew
                                                     manifest
                                                     requirements from
                                                     CBP with the Notice
                                                     of Arrival
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     United States Coast
                                                     Guard (USCG). The
                                                     CBP Final Rule
                                                     requires that sea
                                                     carriers
                                                     electronically
                                                     submit certain data
                                                     on all passengers
                                                     and crew members
                                                     prior to entry to
                                                     or departure from
                                                     the United States.
                                                     The data that must
                                                     be provided
                                                     includes
                                                     biographical data
                                                     and vessel
                                                     information for
                                                     each passenger or
                                                     crewmember. Working
                                                     with the USCG, CBP
                                                     developed the
                                                     Electronic Notice
                                                     of Arrival/
                                                     Departure System
                                                     (eNOA/D), an
                                                     Internet portal
                                                     available on the
                                                     National Vessel
                                                     Movement Center
                                                     (NVMC) web site.
                                                     Using this portal,
                                                     commercial vessel
                                                     owners, operators
                                                     or agents can
                                                     transmit one
                                                     electronic message
                                                     and comply with the
                                                     CBP APIS
                                                     requirement for
                                                     passengers and crew
                                                     and the USCG Notice
                                                     of Arrival
                                                     requirements for
                                                     vessels. eNOA/D
                                                     became operational
                                                     and available to
                                                     the industry during
                                                     February 2005.
                                                     CBP's efforts on
                                                     the eNOA/D system
                                                     have been
                                                     accomplished with
                                                     existing funds.
BORDER PROTECTION:
    Advanced Technology       The Secretary of      The fiscal year 2006
     Northern Border           Homeland Security     Budget does not
     Security Program          may carry out a       request any
     (Section 5101-5104).      pilot program to      dedicated funding
                               improve border        for a specific
                               security between      pilot. Necessary
                               ports of entry        resources will be
                               along the northern    provided with
                               border. Required      existing funds. The
                               features of this      fiscal year 2006
                               pilot project         Budget requested
                               include the use of    funding for $19.8
                               advanced              million added to
                               technologies to       the base funding of
                               improve border        $31.3 million to
                               security. There is    improve border
                               authorized to be      security using
                               appropriated ``such   advanced
                               sums as may be        technologies on
                               necessary to carry    both the northern
                               out the pilot         and southern land
                               program''.            borders. Also
                                                     included in the
                                                     fiscal year 2006
                                                     CBP budget are $20
                                                     million for
                                                     aircraft
                                                     recapitalization,
                                                     $10 million in base
                                                     funding for UAVs,
                                                     and funding for
                                                     technical
                                                     infrastructure. The
                                                     America's Shield
                                                     Initiative (ASI)
                                                     program will
                                                     evaluate and
                                                     determine the
                                                     optimal mix of
                                                     technology for
                                                     meeting security
                                                     requirements of
                                                     both land borders.
    Border surveillance       Within 6 months of    The fiscal year 2006
     (Section 5201).           enactment of this     Budget requests $10
                               Act, the Secretary    million for
                               of Homeland           unmanned aerial
                               Security shall        vehicles.
                               submit a
                               comprehensive plan
                               for the systematic
                               surveillance of the
                               southwest border of
                               the United States
                               by remotely piloted
                               aircraft. The
                               Secretary of
                               Homeland Security
                               shall implement the
                               plan as a pilot
                               program as soon as
                               sufficient funds
                               are appropriated
                               and available for
                               this purpose.
    Border Patrol agents      Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
     (Section 5202).           fiscal year 2006 to   Budget requests 210
                               fiscal year 2010      new agents and
                               subject to the        $36.9 million.
                               availability of
                               appropriations, an
                               increase of 10,000
                               additional Border
                               Patrol Agents
                               (2,000 per year).
ENFORCEMENT:
    Immigration and Customs   Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
     Enforcement               fiscal year 2006 to   Budget requests 150
     investigators (Section    fiscal year 2010      agents and $18
     5203).                    subject to the        million.
                               availability of
                               appropriations, an
                               increase of 4,000
                               Immigration and
                               Customs Enforcement
                               (ICE) investigators
                               (800 per year).
                               Subject to the
                               availability of
                               appropriations.
    Detention bed space       Authorizes, from      The fiscal year 2006
     (Section 5204).           fiscal year 2006 to   Budget includes an
                               fiscal year 2010      increase of $90
                               subject to the        million for
                               availability of       detention beds and
                               appropriations, an    detention and
                               increase of 40,000    removal officers.
                               beds (8,000 per       This increase will
                               year) available for   fund 1,920 beds.
                               immigration           Overall, the fiscal
                               detention and         year 2006 Budget
                               removal. Subject to   provides $1.5
                               the availability of   billion for
                               appropriations.       detention and
                                                     removal activities.
                                                     The budget also
                                                     includes an
                                                     enhancement of $39
                                                     million for the
                                                     detention and
                                                     repatriation costs
                                                     of the Arizona
                                                     Border Control
                                                     Initiative.
OTHER:
    Public Safety             Authorizes the        The fiscal year 2006
     Interoperable             Secretary of DHS to   Budget requests
     Communications (Section   provide $22.1         $20.5 million for
     7303).                    million in fiscal     the S&T
                               year 2005, $22.8      Directorate's
                               million in fiscal     Office of
                               year 2006, $23.5      Interoperability
                               million in fiscal     and Compatibility
                               year 2007, $24.2      (OIC) to enhance
                               million in fiscal     public safety
                               year 2008, and        interoperable
                               $24.9 million in      communications.
                               fiscal year 2009 to
                               enhance public
                               safety
                               interoperable
                               communications at
                               all levels of
                               government. The
                               Secretary may
                               establish an Office
                               for
                               Interoperability
                               and Compatibility
                               within the Science
                               and Technology
                               Directorate to
                               carry out these
                               duties.
    Regional Strategic Plan   Directs DHS to        The fiscal year 2006
     (Section 7304).           establish a minimum   Budget requests
                               of 2 pilot projects   $20.5 million for
                               in high threat        the Department of
                               urban areas or        Homeland Security's
                               regions for the       S&T Directorate's
                               purpose of            OIC to enhance
                               developing a          public safety
                               regional strategic    interoperable
                               plan to foster        communications
                               interagency           through SAFECOM, a
                               communication and     program of OIC.
                               to coordinate the
                               gathering of all
                               Federal, State, and
                               local first
                               responders in that
                               area.
    Counternarcotics          Amends the Homeland   The fiscal year 2006
     Enforcement (Section      Security Act          request for the
     7407).                    requirement related   Office of
                               to counternarcotics   Counternarcotics
                               enforcement.          Enforcement is
                               Instead of having     $1.86 million.
                               one senior official
                               in the Department
                               coordinating
                               counternarcotics
                               policy, an ``Office
                               Counternarcotics
                               Enforcement'' is
                               created with an
                               authorization of $6
                               million.
    Terrorist Travel Program  Directs the           The fiscal year 2006
     (Section 7215).           Secretary to          Budget does not
                               establish a           request any
                               terrorist travel      dedicated funding
                               program to oversee    for this specific
                               the analysis,         purpose. Necessary
                               coordination, and     resources would be
                               dissemination or      provided with
                               terrorist travel      existing funds.
                               intelligence and
                               operation
                               information.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD (MSPB)

    Question. The final regulation restricts the ability of the MSPB to 
mitigate penalties selected by DHS. The final rule says, ``Our intent 
is to explicitly restrict the authority of MSPB to modify those 
penalties to situations where there is simply no justification for the 
penalty. MSPB may not modify the penalty imposed by the Department 
unless such penalty is so disproportionate to the basis for action as 
to be wholly without justification.'' This standard is exceptionally 
high. Why was such a departure from the current authorities of the MSPB 
necessary?
    Answer. Under current MSPB case law, penalties can be mitigated 
down if they are ``unreasonable.'' Problems with this include that it 
is subjective and it may result in many employees returning to the 
workplace after the MSPB ``suspension'' instead of being removed as 
recommended by management.
    DHS believes that management decisions should be given great 
deference with regard to discipline, especially with removals, because 
an undesirable employee returning to the workforce creates morale 
problems at the least; at the worst, a returning employee interferes 
with the agency's mission to protect the homeland.
    MSPB's ability to mitigate a penalty only if the punishment is ``so 
disproportionate as to be wholly without justification'' is a 
compromise because it gives greater deference to DHS, still protects 
employee due process, and ensures that disciplinary actions are not 
initiated irresponsibly.
    Question. Is the Department concerned that these extreme measures 
will adversely affect employee morale and reduce employee confidence 
that they will be treated fairly?
    Answer. DHS understands that many employees are wary of the unknown 
and is currently in the process of rolling out significant training 
efforts aimed at communicating with employees, training managers, and 
executives on the new human resource system and the expectations for 
those managers regarding the system. Fair treatment is critical to the 
success of the new system and is a key component of our implementation 
and ongoing evaluation processes.
    Question. What evidence is there that the existing MSPB authorities 
have adversely affected agency missions?
    Answer. The Department's priority homeland security mission 
requires that it maintain an exceptionally high degree of order and 
discipline in the workplace. This order and discipline is undermined 
when disciplinary decisions are mitigated by MSPB judges on the 
existing ``reasonableness'' standard. Indeed, the mere threat of such a 
low standard for mitigation causes agency managers to second guess 
themselves and hesitate to discipline employees even when such 
discipline is clearly warranted. The Department has therefore 
instituted a higher standard for mitigation of penalties aimed at 
providing managers with the confidence to institute disciplinary 
actions where required in support of the agency's homeland security 
mission. To allow very poor performers to continue in the workplace is 
unacceptable and can negatively affect all agency operations.

                         CONCERNS OF EMPLOYEES

    Question. A number of DHS employees have strong concerns about the 
final DHS personnel regulations, which were published in the Federal 
Register on February 1, because the regulations diminish employees due 
process rights and restrict collective bargaining. What is the 
Department's opinion on the objections raised by the front line DHS 
employees, and what will the Department do to address the concerns 
expressed by these Federal employees?
    Answer. The new HR system does maintain due process and is 
consistent with the Homeland Security Act's promise to preserve 
collective bargaining rights. It also is responsive to DHS' unique 
mission needs. DHS understands that employees have concerns about the 
new human resources systems and has embarked on robust efforts to 
inform employees and train managers about the new system, including 
through continuing collaboration with DHS labor unions. Through focus 
groups, the ``Ask MAX'' question response system and employee surveys, 
DHS is keeping a close watch on employee opinions and through the 
formal program evaluation process will be measuring the results and 
outcomes of the new system. If necessary, the system can be fine-tuned 
to make mid-course corrections.

          INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DISPUTES

    Question. As part of the new personnel regulations, the 
responsibility for deciding collective bargaining disputes will lie 
with a three-member internal DHS Labor Relations Board appointed by the 
Secretary. Currently, throughout the Federal Government, collective 
bargaining disputes are decided by the Federal Labor Relations 
Authority (FLRA), an independent body appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate. How does DHS/OPM believe that the internal 
labor relations board meets the statutory mandate of the Homeland 
Security Act that DHS employees may, ``organize, bargain collectively, 
and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing in 
decisions which affect them'' ?
    Answer. The Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB) is an 
independent Board similar to the FLRA, but appointed by the Secretary 
with nominees recommended by the DHS labor organizations. All nominees 
must be independent citizens who are known for their integrity and 
impartiality in addition to having expertise in labor relations, law 
enforcement, or national/homeland or other related security matters. 
The HSLRB hears cases involving the duty to bargain and the DHS 
homeland security mission, with the FLRA hearing all other cases (for 
example, appropriate unit determinations and unfair labor practice 
charges involving exercise of employee rights) and reviewing the 
HSLRB's substantive decisions. The FLRA review is then subject to 
judicial review. These substantive and procedural attributes of the 
HSLRB ensure that DHS, DHS employees and DHS labor organizations obtain 
an impartial adjudication of labor relations cases while recognizing 
the Department's priority homeland security mission.

              MANDATORY TERMINATION WITH NO OUTSIDE REVIEW

    Question. The final regulations provide the Secretary with 
discretion to create a list of Mandatory Removal Offenses (MRO) that 
will only be appealable on the merits to an internal DHS Mandatory 
Removal Panel (MRP) appointed by the Secretary. In addition, the 
regulations provide the Secretary with the sole discretion to mitigate 
a removal penalty. How can the agency expect front line employees to 
have any confidence in a personnel system where the most serious 
matters are charged and adjudicated by the Secretary and his appointed 
``Removal Panel''?
    Answer. Currently DHS is taking no action to implement MROs. On 
August 15, 2005, Judge Collyer of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia requested that DHS and OPM delay implementation. On August 
12, 2005, Judge Collyer issued an order enjoining one provision within 
the appeals subpart of the regulations but permitting DHS to move 
forward with the rest of the adverse actions and appeals provisions. 
The Department and OPM are currently working to set a revised timeline 
for making the adverse actions and appeals subparts operative in light 
of the ruling.

                       TASKING THE FLRA AND MSPB

    Question. What particular statutory authority enabled the final 
regulations to give the FLRA and the MSPB new duties and rules of 
operation? The FLRA and the MSPB are independent agencies.
    Answer. The Homeland Security Act provided an amendment to Title 5, 
United States Code, that authorized the Secretary of DHS and the 
Director of OPM to establish a human resources management system for 
DHS that waives or modifies certain provisions of Title 5. Included 
among the provisions that can be waived or modified are chapters 71 and 
77, which prescribe the operations of the FLRA and MSPB respectively. 
After consulting with FLRA and MSPB, the Secretary and the Director 
relied upon this grant of authority, found in 5 U.S.C. 9701, to 
promulgate regulations that modify chapters 71 and 77 and alter the way 
the FLRA and MSPB handle DHS cases.

                        TRAINING OF SUPERVISORS

    Question. One of the continuing concerns surrounding the final DHS 
personnel regulations is the fact that many personnel decisions, 
especially pay, will now be based on factors under the control of local 
supervisors and directors. How does DHS plan to address the concerns of 
front line officers that supervisors, who will be granted a tremendous 
amount of pay and performance evaluation discretion under the new 
personnel regulations, will be properly trained to ensure transparency 
and fairness for all front-line personnel?
    Answer. Performance ratings will continue to be determined by local 
supervisors, just as it occurs in today's performance management 
process. The concept of a second level reviewing official has been 
retained as an inherent check and balance. A comprehensive training 
program will be undertaken to train supervisors and managers to make 
meaningful distinctions in performance and, just as important, to 
articulate clear performance expectations, which will be used to track 
performance. An automated performance management system will make the 
administration of the system more transparent to employees and will 
facilitate self-assessment and peer review capabilities that can serve 
as important information sources for the supervisor's consideration. 
Additionally, we envision that performance pay pools will be centrally 
established and managed at higher organizational levels, thus 
mitigating the influence of a single supervisor on the pay side of the 
process. A Department-level Compensation Committee, including DHS union 
representation, also will have considerable influence on the pay for 
performance program and its administration.
    Question. In addition, this system will take more training and 
administrative time. How will those increased administrative costs be 
paid for?
    Answer. The vast majority of administrative costs associated with 
training will be funded through requested appropriations specified for 
implementation of the new HR system and managed by the DHS Chief Human 
Capital Office for the Department-wide training initiative. As part of 
the new system, DHS will provide automated tools, e.g., a new 
electronic performance management system, to assist management 
officials in program administration.
    Question. Won't resources be taken from frontline Homeland Security 
positions?
    Answer. The expectation is that resources will be provided in 
requests for appropriations specifically identified to support 
implementation of the new HR system. Individual Department components' 
mission budgets are not expected to be impacted. We believe time spent 
in training on effective performance management and in coaching and 
providing feedback to employees is time well spent that generates 
positive returns in overall agency effectiveness.

                          PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

    Question. As you know, DHS employees' pay will be shifting from the 
current GS-scale pay system to a pay-for-performance system under the 
new DHS personnel regulations. How can a credible pay-for-performance 
pay system work in an agency, such as DHS, that requires a tremendous 
amount of teamwork to successfully accomplish agency missions?
    Answer. Performance work plans will contain measurable performance 
elements that specifically address teamwork or similar concepts for 
those occupations requiring such attributes. Employees in those 
occupations will know that performance that demonstrates teamwork will 
be rewarded.
    Question. Is the Department aware of any large scale pay-for-
performance system that has been successfully implemented in a law-
enforcement environment?
    Answer. While we are unaware of a large scale pay-for-performance 
system in a law enforcement environment, that certainly does not 
prevent us from developing one. Pay-for-Performance is the concept of 
providing a pay increase based on ``performance'' (e.g. achievement of 
a performance goal or positive performance appraisal rating). 
Organizations tie pay to performance in various ways. They may base pay 
on measures of individual, team, or organizational performance. We feel 
this concept can work well in a law enforcement environment. Research 
involved in designing the system entails review and evaluation of 
private, other Federal, State and local systems that have such 
programs. Our design work includes program evaluation aspects in order 
to periodically monitor, evaluate, and revise the system, as warranted 
to ensure that objectives are being attained.

          SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA

    Question. On March 23, President Bush held a press event in Waco, 
Texas with Mexican Pres Foxx and Canadian Prime Minister Martin where 
he announced a grant program for the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership of North America.
    The parties to the partnership were tasked to set specific, 
measurable, and achievable goals and implementation dates to develop a 
common security strategy to further secure North America, including 
preventing and responding to threats within North America and 
streamlining the secure and efficient movement of legitimate and low-
risk traffic across our shared borders.
    Will we be receiving a budget amendment to provide the resources 
for Customs and Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement to implement this partnership or was this 
announcement an exercise in public relations?
    Answer. On March 23, 2005, in Waco, Texas, President Bush, along 
with Canadian Prime Minister Martin and Mexican President Fox, unveiled 
the Security and Prosperity Partnership for North America (SPP), a 
blueprint for a safer and more prosperous continent. The three leaders 
instructed each nation to establish ministerial-level SPP working 
groups. I chair the security component, and the prosperity component is 
chaired by Department of Commerce Secretary Gutierrez. Department of 
State Secretary Rice is working to ensure the two components are 
integrated and that the SPP advances U.S. foreign policy goals and 
enhances our strong relationships with Canada and Mexico.
    The SPP will complement, rather than replace, existing bilateral 
and trilateral fora and working groups that are performing well. The 
issues of immigration and trade disputes will be dealt with outside the 
SPP through existing treaties and congressional action.
    Following the March 23 announcement, DHS and Commerce conducted a 
series of Congressional briefings and other stakeholder outreach 
sessions.
    On June 27, I and Gutierrez and our government counterparts in 
Mexico and Canada released the first report of the SPP that identifies 
initial results, key themes and initiatives, and work plans that 
further promote the security and prosperity of the continent.
    At this time, DHS anticipates accomplishing the fiscal year 2006 
initiatives contained in the SPP within available resources. We would 
like to reserve the opportunity to address some longer term priorities 
as part of the normal budgeting process in the future. We continue to 
be interested in input from the Congress, industry and other 
stakeholders as we implement the SPP.

                            DHS REPORTS DUE

    Question. In the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations 
Act and associated reports, Congress directed the Department to report 
to the Committee on a number of important issues. To date, 70 percent 
of the reports currently due to the House & Senate Committees on 
Appropriations have not yet been received. What is the Department's 
plan for increasing the rate of timely submission of Congressionally 
required reports?
    Answer. The Department continues to place a significant priority on 
providing timely information and reports to Congress. Of the reports 
mentioned above, approximately 40 percent of those outstanding reports 
are past due, and the Department has been working diligently to 
expedite transmittal of those reports. Since the hearing on April 20th 
through July 13th, the Department has reduced the overall number of 
outstanding reports by approximately 30 percent. As of July 13, the 
Department has submitted 143 reports for fiscal year 2005 to the 
Congressional Appropriation Committees.
    The status of reports is constantly monitored and regular progress 
is tracked and evaluated. Furthermore, Congressional reports are 
discussed regularly at several high-level management meetings, 
including the DHS Management Council, Chief Financial Officers Council, 
and Budget Officer meetings. In addition, the Department has reviewed 
and implemented strategies to streamline and improve the clearance 
process.

                       CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

    Question. From the fiscal year 2004 enacted budget to the fiscal 
year 2006 President's request, the CIO's budget has increased 
substantially. The President's budget for fiscal year 2006 requests 
$303.7M for this office. What safeguards has the Department put in 
place to ensure that this funding has the proper government management 
and oversight?
    Answer. The Department is using two parallel processes to ensure 
proper governance and management of its funding, the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, mandated by 
Management Directive (MD) 1330, and the Investment Review Process 
(IRP), mandated by MD 1400.
    The PPBE process has four steps:
  --Planning.--The Office of the CIO (OCIO) develops information 
        technology (IT) strategic plans and these plans are reviewed to 
        ensure alignment with the Department's overall strategic plan.
  --Programming.--The OCIO enters its budget year plus 4 years funding 
        requirements into the Future Years Homeland Security Program 
        (FYHSP) system for review, program evaluation, and analysis by 
        Departmental management.
  --Budgeting.--The OCIO budget is reviewed and the OCIO enters budget 
        justification information for all of its IT investments into 
        the Investment Management System (IMS) for scoring and 
        portfolio review by Departmental management.
  --Execution.--All spending plans are reviewed before and during the 
        execution year by Departmental management. Also, each 
        individual expenditure is reviewed at multiple Levels within 
        the OCIO and by Departmental management before execution, and 
        is tracked through the Federal Financial Management System 
        (FFMS) and the Procurement Request Information Management 
        System (PRISM).
    The Investment Review Process (IRP) consists of a layered review 
process, depending on the Level and life cycle phase of the investment. 
Specifically, the IRP consists of the following:
  --Investment Review Board (IRB).--The IRB provides decision authority 
        for Level 1 investments that have an acquisition cost of over 
        $100 million and IT investments with a life cycle cost of over 
        $200 million.
  --Joint Requirements Council (JRC).--The JRC provides decision 
        authority for Level 2 investments that have an acquisition cost 
        between $50 million and $100 million, and IT investments with a 
        life cycle cost between $100 million and $200 million.
  --Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB).--The EAB conducts a full 
        review of Level 3 IT investments with an acquisition cost 
        between $5 million and $50 million, and a life cycle cost 
        between $20 million and $100 million and conducts a limited 
        review of Level 4 IT investments (investments with an 
        acquisition cost below $5 million and a life cycle cost below 
        $20 million). The EAB operates within the OCIO and ensures the 
        existence of an effective IT governance process in accordance 
        with DHS architecture principles. As part of its overall 
        governance strategy, the EAB conducts milestone reviews of 
        investment initiatives to help manage architectural alignment 
        within DHS and serve as the conduit for receiving, analyzing, 
        and disseminating information. This process also supports the 
        DHS CPIC (Capital Planning and Investment Control), 
        acquisition, and budget processes, and serves to identify, 
        evaluate, select, align, and approve investments, technologies, 
        and policies for use in DHS.

                          MEETING WITH UNIONS

    Question. During your confirmation hearing on February 2, 2005, you 
testified that you would meet with the representatives of the various 
union members working in the Department. Have you met with the unions?
    Answer. Yes. In April, I met with the President of the National 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the President of the American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE). These are the two largest 
unions represented in DHS, and the only two with national consultation 
rights at the Department.

                      HEARINGS ON THE PATRIOT ACT

    Question. The PATRIOT Act was enacted in haste, with minimal 
debate, in a time of crisis.
    Legislation called the SAFE Act has been introduced by Senators 
Feingold, Craig, Durbin and others to modify certain provisions of the 
PATRIOT Act. While I support review of the provisions referenced in the 
SAFE Act, I would prefer that all provisions of the law be subject to 
examination in hearings held by all relevant committees of jurisdiction 
in the House and Senate. This law was never subject to substantial 
debate. In prior meetings with you, you have assured me that you would 
support hearings on the Patriot Act.
    Do you continue to support broad ranging hearings to examine, in 
depth, the provisions of the PATRIOT Act?
    Answer. The USA PATRIOT Act provides invaluable tools for 
protecting Americans from terrorist attacks while safeguarding civil 
liberties and preserving the important role of congressional and 
judicial oversight. The USA PATRIOT Act has been the subject of 
numerous hearings in the Congress. I am committed to working with 
Congress on all issues that relate to the Department, including 
matters, like the USA PATRIOT Act, that are crucial to terrorism 
prevention.

                 INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PATRIOT ACT

    Question. As you know, when the PATRIOT Act was enacted, the 
Congress included sunsets on certain surveillance powers so the 
Congress could evaluate how those powers had been used before deciding 
wether to extend them or make them permanent. Some of those provisions 
scheduled to expire at the end of this year are not controversial. 
Other provisions are controversial, and some that are not even subject 
to sunset have been criticized for infringing on the privacy rights and 
civil liberties of law-abiding American citizens.
    Are you committed to working with the Congress to ensure that we 
have the information we need from the Administration and the Department 
of Homeland Security in particular, so the Congress may make an 
informed decision about whether to renew those provisions that will 
expire at the end of this year or make other changes to the PATRIOT 
Act?
    Answer. I am committed to ensuring that the Department continues to 
provide Congress with the appropriate information it needs.

                        CONSULTING WITH CONGRESS

    Question. Attorney General Ashcroft engaged in minimal consultation 
with the Congress and members on both sides of the aisle on the PATRIOT 
Act and other key pieces of legislation considered in the wake of 9/11. 
A full draft bill, known as PATRIOT II, became public before any 
discussions with interested Members of Congress had taken place, and 
while the proposed bill was later disavowed as merely a draft, many of 
the proposals contained in it were subsequently included in other 
Administration proposals.
    Now that you have been confirmed, will you continue to consult 
closely with Congress and Members on both sides of the aisle before 
rolling out new legislative proposals to expand Federal law 
enforcement, surveillance, and other powers that might curtail 
constitutional rights and protections?
    Answer. I will continue to engage actively in the consultation 
process as we seek to offer new programs and legislative proposals.
    Question. What actions are you taking in your role as head of the 
Department of Homeland Security to ensure that such consultation 
occurs?
    Answer. I have conveyed to the DHS Senior Leadership and the 
appropriate offices within the Department of the importance of 
consulting with Congress and keeping Members informed of programs, 
policy, and operational activities within the Department. My 
expectation is that they will do so in a timely fashion.

                             SECURE FLIGHT

    Question. On March 28, 2005, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) released a report entitled, ``Secure Flight Development and 
Testing Under Way, but Risks Should be Managed as System Is Further 
Developed''. The GAO was mandated to do this report by the fiscal year 
2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. In essence, the report found 
that Secure Flight is not ready for primetime. Only one of the ten 
specific aspects of the development and implementation of Secure Flight 
has been met.
    Mr. Secretary, I want to make the skies safer for all passengers 
who fly on commercial aircraft. But I also want to ensure that those 
individuals who fly have their legitimate privacy rights and civil 
liberties protected. And I want to ensure that whatever pre-screening 
system is developed is safe from abuse by outside or unauthorized 
entities. My main concern with Secure Flight--and its predecessors--is 
that I have not yet been convinced that these protections are in place. 
Indeed, the GAO has not yet been convinced either. Four of the ten 
areas the Congress mandated the GAO review are specifically focused on 
privacy, safety and redress. The best that the GAO can say about the 
status of these items is that they are ``under way''.
    It is not yet clear that the new Secure Flight program will create 
a redress process for passengers to correct erroneous information, nor 
is it clear that it will include security measures to protect the 
system from unauthorized access.
    Over $130 million and more than 3 years have been spent to date on 
Secure Flight and its predecessors. I understand your plan is to begin 
initial testing of this program late this summer using passenger data 
from two airlines. If in April 2005 the best that can be said of the 
program is that it is ``under way'', what will be the likelihood that 
Secure Flight will truly be ``under way'' in August 2005?
    Answer. As we have stated, TSA intends to have Secure Flight 
underway later in 2005. At the request of the air carriers, TSA shifted 
its planned August launch date to September to account for the busy 
Labor Day holiday travel weekend. In addition, TSA made further 
adjustments to the implementation plan for Secure Flight to ensure that 
all regulatory and privacy documents comply with all applicable 
statutes and guidelines, as well as airline requests regarding 
technical guidance. In addition, the decision not to include commercial 
data in the initial rollout of Secure Flight caused further adjustments 
in the schedule, as did the ongoing uncertainty regarding the program's 
budget for fiscal year 2006. Under the revised implementation schedule, 
TSA expects to be in compliance with the requirement of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) to 
implement passenger prescreening within 180 days of completion of 
testing.
    Question. Mr. Secretary, can you commit to us that Secure Flight 
will not be deployed until all ten of these areas of concern are 
addressed?
    Answer. TSA is working to meet the deadline in the IRTPA to begin 
to assume the watch list screening function from air carriers. As we 
move forward, TSA is continuing to cooperate with GAO to address the 
outstanding policy and operational items the agency is required to 
resolve under the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public 
Law 108-334), prior to implementation. TSA will show that it has 
addressed those items, as well as each of the additional GAO 
recommendations in its March 2005 report, prior to deployment of the 
program.
    Question. In recent weeks, data storage systems for major companies 
which track and store commercial data on individual citizens have been 
compromised. Both ChoicePoint and LexisNexis have admitted that their 
databases have been accessed by unauthorized, outside entities--
potentially exposing hundreds of thousands of Americans to identity 
theft. I have long been concerned about the privacy implications for 
citizens by the possible use of commercial databases for passenger 
screening activities. These unauthorized intrusions by outside hackers 
and other unscrupulous individuals only serve to enhance my concerns. 
The GAO has noted that Secure Flight's system safeguards and other 
protections from unauthorized access have not yet been developed nor 
tested. However, I understand that the use of commercial databases, 
such as these, remain under consideration for the purpose of verifying 
a potential traveler's identity.
    Given these recent incidents, are you reconsidering the use of 
commercial databases?
    Answer. TSA conducted a very limited test to determine whether the 
use of commercial data could improve the effectiveness of the watch 
list comparisons undertaken in the Secure Flight program as well as to 
assist with the identification of passenger information that is 
incorrect or inaccurate.
    In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-
334, Section 522(d)), Congress mandated that prior to commercial data 
testing, TSA would be required to develop measures to assess the impact 
of using commercial data on aviation security, and that the GAO is to 
review those measures. TSA is complying with all Congressional requests 
on this issue and the GAO will continue to evaluate TSA's development 
of performance measures throughout the test phases.
    TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by privacy 
and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on the use 
of any passenger information provided by commercial data sources. TSA 
will not incorporate the use of commercial data into Secure Flight 
unless testing confirms that:
  --it enhances security;
  --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any 
        category of persons; and
  --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put 
        in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain 
        wrongful access to or use passenger personal information 
        inappropriately.
    TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure 
Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of 
results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new 
System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the 
use of commercial data.
    Results of the testing, the comparisons of Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) information against names in the Terrorist Screening Database and 
the use of commercial data, will be as publicly transparent as possible 
without compromising national security. Testing and eventual 
implementation will be governed by strict privacy protections including 
passenger redress procedures, data security mechanisms, and limitations 
on use.
    Question. What can be done to ensure the security of these 
databases and the integrity of the system?
    Answer. TSA conducted a very limited test to determine whether the 
use of commercial data could improve the effectiveness of the watch 
list comparisons undertaken in the Secure Flight program as well as to 
assist with the identification of passenger information that is 
incorrect or inaccurate.
    TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by privacy 
and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on the use 
of any passenger information provided by commercial data sources. TSA 
will not incorporate the use of commercial data into Secure Flight 
unless testing confirms that:
  --it enhances security;
  --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any 
        category of persons; and
  --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put 
        in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain 
        wrongful access to or use passenger personal information 
        inappropriately.
    TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure 
Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of 
results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new 
System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the 
use of commercial data.
    Results of the testing, the comparisons of PNR information against 
names in the Terrorist Screening Database and the use of commercial 
data, will be as publicly transparent as possible without compromising 
national security. Testing has been governed by strict privacy 
protections including data security mechanisms, and limitations on use. 
Secure Flight has a written data control policy for this very purpose. 
All personnel who handle passenger data are required to sign a Non 
Disclosure Agreement (NDA) specific to the Secure Flight program and 
must successfully complete a privacy training course. Accountability 
for data is accomplished by assigning a control number to each disk, 
tape, or document on which the data is stored. In addition, a Chain of 
Custody process is in place to record and track data transfers by hand 
receipt. Finally, stand alone Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) has 
been identified to be used on this project. Authorization to load/
install/read any PNR data is restricted to GFE designated and 
documented to process PNR data, and none of those machines is capable 
of transmitting data outside of the facility.
    The Commercial Data Test also required the contractor to comply 
with the security requirements, regulations, and privacy protections 
for all records used, accessed, or contacted, as well as the data 
handling procedures in the Security Standard Operating Procedures and 
the Data Security and Control Policy. The contractor is required to 
comply with security requirements to maintain their Secure Facility 
Clearance.
    Finally, the Secure Flight system will be subject to certification 
and accreditation prior to achieving Authority to Operate (ATO) in 
early fall 2005. TSA and DHS Chief Information Security Officers 
require all information and system security is in working order prior 
to ATO of the initial operating capability with initial air carriers.

                     SECURE FLIGHT--MOVEMENT TO SCO

    Question. What impact will moving the operation of Secure Flight to 
the proposed Screening and Credentialing Operations office have on its 
implementation?
    Answer. We support the concept of a Screening Coordination and 
Operations (SCO) Office, and requested, through the 2SR process, 
recommendations to best meet the goals of the office. Consistent with 
the 9-11 commission recommendations, HSPD-11 and HSPD-12, the SCO 
office would support the development of a more unified, comprehensive 
and efficient system for the screening, credentialing, and redress for 
passengers, while leveraging and optimizing investments in screening 
systems and tools. The SCO would be supported by a management approach 
that would lead to harmonized IT architecture, uniform redress, and 
provision of coordinated or shared services such as card production, 
biometric/biographic databases, and global enrollment systems/processes 
that adhere to standards set by DHS with close linkage to policy 
decisions and overall information technology enterprise architectures. 
The SCO office would also ensure a consistent approach also for 
outreach in the areas of privacy, civil rights, and helping to ensure 
coordinated R&D efforts. DHS plans to set up the SCO office in fiscal 
year 2006.
    Question. Do you have concerns that further rearranging the 
organizational chart will further slow the development and operation of 
Secure Flight?
    Answer. The exact roles, responsibilities, and composition of the 
SCO are currently under review and further definition and refinement of 
the SCO concept will be developed based on that review. An 
implementation and transition plan for the SCO will also be developed 
based on that review.
    Question. If it is moved, who will actually maintain and operate 
the system--the SCO or TSA?
    Answer. The exact roles, responsibilities, and composition of the 
SCO are currently under review and further definition and refinement of 
the SCO concept will be developed based on that review.
    Question. Have you experienced any delays in receiving timely 
security information from the Terrorist Screening Center (which is run 
by the FBI) for Secure Flight or your other screening programs?
    Answer. No, TSA has not.

                       SECURE FLIGHT AND PRIVACY

    Question. Mr. Secretary, I'm concerned about reports from February 
and the end of March in which TSA officials, including a TSA 
spokesperson, declared that Secure Flight will be implemented in August 
with two airlines nationwide. That implementation would appear to 
violate the law as mandated by  522 of the fiscal year 2005 Department 
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act that prohibits the spending of 
any sums appropriated on other than a test basis for Secure Flight 
unless and until the GAO certifies to Congress that 10 criteria are 
met. Is that implementation with two airlines scheduled to end at a 
certain time so that it can be evaluated?
    Answer. TSA is proceeding with demonstrating initial operating 
capability for Secure Flight later this year. This timeframe is 
consistent with the requirements laid out in IRTPA. In addition, TSA 
intends to provide proof that each of the ten identified areas of 
concern and the six GAO recommendations have been addressed before the 
planned initial operating capability is implemented. Evaluations of the 
performance of the program with the launch carriers will be conducted 
prior to the program integrating additional airlines. A specific 
timeline is still under development to ensure that all appropriate 
evaluation takes place.
    Question. Will the passengers flying those two airlines come late 
August be able to distinguish between a test run of Secure Flight and 
the real thing?
    Answer. The passengers flying on the initial airlines will not be 
able to distinguish between the test run of Secure Flight and the 
``real thing.'' During the first phase of implementation, the carriers 
will continue their normal vetting activities and a parallel operations 
activity will be running in conjunction with TSA to confirm the 
effective processing of related data without disruption to ongoing 
business operations. Once the systems have performed in parallel for a 
period of time, and the acceptable stabilization has occurred, TSA will 
work with the carriers to ensure a smooth transition in taking over 
from them the full watch list vetting function.
    Question. Do you anticipate that the Secure Flight program will, 
when finally implemented, use private companies to aggregate data on 
passengers and perform verification checks?
    Answer. This is undetermined. TSA conducted a very limited test to 
determine whether the use of commercial data could improve the 
effectiveness of the watch list comparisons undertaken in the Secure 
Flight program as well as to assist with the identification of 
passenger information that is incorrect or inaccurate.
    In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005 (Public Law 108-
334, Section 522(d)), Congress mandated that prior to commercial data 
testing, TSA would be required to develop measures to assess the impact 
of using commercial data on aviation security, and that GAO is to 
review those measures. TSA is complying with all Congressional requests 
on this issue; GAO will continue to evaluate TSA's development of 
performance measures throughout the test phases. The limited commercial 
data testing concluded in July 2005.
    TSA's testing of the use of commercial data is governed by strict 
privacy and data security protections, including strict prohibitions on 
the use of any passenger-provided information by commercial data 
providers. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into 
Secure Flight unless testing confirms that:
  --it enhances security;
  --it does not result in inappropriate differences in treatment of any 
        category of persons; and
  --robust data security safeguards and privacy protections can be put 
        in place to ensure that commercial entities do not gain 
        inappropriate access to or use passenger personal information 
        inappropriately.
    TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure 
Flight program prior to the completion of testing, assessment of 
results, final approval by the Administration, and publication of a new 
System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the 
use of commercial data.
    Results of the testing, both of the comparisons of PNR information 
against names in the Terrorist Screening Database and the use of 
commercial data, will be as publicly transparent as possible without 
compromising national security. Testing and eventual implementation 
will be governed by strict privacy protections including passenger 
redress procedures, data security mechanisms, and limitations on use.
    Question. How many companies could provide the data broker and data 
aggregation function to accomplish Secure Flight passenger 
verification?
    Answer. This is undetermined at this point. TSA will not 
incorporate the use of commercial data into the Secure Flight program 
prior to the completion of testing, assessment of results, final 
approval by the Administration, and publication of a new System of 
Records Notice and Privacy Impact Assessment announcing the use of 
commercial data.
    Question. Will you examine whether the private companies bidding 
for this work have had data spills, or data breaches caused by identity 
thieves?
    Answer. This is undetermined at this point. However, as with all 
contracts, TSA would set standards, establish program priorities and 
direction, establish policies, make program decisions, and monitor 
contractor performance. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial 
data into the Secure Flight program prior to the completion of testing, 
assessment of results, final approval by the Administration, and 
publication of a new System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact 
Assessment announcing the use of commercial data.
    Question. What penalties will the Secretary impose on the company 
DHS and TSA eventually contracts with to perform passenger verification 
for Secure Flight if that company fails to properly safeguard data 
transferred as part of Secure Flight?
    Answer. This is undetermined at this point. However, as with all 
contracts, TSA would set standards, establish program priorities and 
direction, establish policies, make program decisions, and monitor 
contractor performance. TSA will not incorporate the use of commercial 
data into the Secure Flight program prior to the completion of testing, 
assessment of results, final approval by the Administration, and 
publication of a new System of Records Notice and Privacy Impact 
Assessment announcing the use of commercial data.
    Question. I am concerned about recent GAO reports that show a lack 
of progress regarding establishing a transparent, concrete and workable 
system of due process and redress for passengers wrongly selected for 
extra scrutiny who might miss a flight and those who are wrongly put on 
a no fly list.
    Mr. Secretary, please share with us what efforts you will take to 
ensure that the government's own watch lists and databases used for 
Secure Flight contain accurate information about would-be passengers.
    Answer. U.S. Government intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
collect, analyze, and evaluate data used to nominate subjects to the 
No-Fly List. Intelligence analysts and law enforcement officers within 
these organizations carefully review nominations based on the No-Fly 
List criteria and thoroughly evaluate the information during each step 
of the process. Watch List nominations often contain classified and/or 
sensitive law enforcement investigative information. Nominations that 
meet the established criteria are forwarded to the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) 
for inclusion in the TSC Data Base (TSDB) and for addition to the No-
Fly List. Time sensitive nominations may be routed directly to the TSC 
if required.
    If it is determined that a person on the No-Fly List should no 
longer be identified as a No-Fly subject, they will be removed from the 
list. If additional intelligence data is developed or a subject has 
been interviewed by U.S. Government officials and deemed no longer a 
threat, an official request for removal must be submitted to the agency 
that placed the individual on the list. The original nominating agency 
will evaluate the data and determine whether the person stays on or is 
removed from the No-Fly List. The nominating agency will then make a 
formal request through the nomination chain requesting that the person 
be removed from the No-Fly List. In some cases, a review of the 
derogatory information associated with a No-Fly nomination may result 
in the subject being downgraded to the TSA Selectee List.
    The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is developing a 
redress process that will address any situation where passengers 
believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out for 
additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This 
process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously 
placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. The Office of 
Transportation Security Redress will work to ensure that passengers 
erroneously placed on the watch lists are in fact provided relief. The 
redress process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as 
appropriate.
    TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons 
who are flagged for additional screening due to the similarity of their 
names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists. 
A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a 
completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA 
will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these 
procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a 
boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as 
other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the 
following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
    However, this clearance process will not remove a name from the 
watch lists. Instead, this process distinguishes legitimate passengers 
from persons who are on the watch lists by placing their names and 
identifying information in a cleared portion of the lists. This 
information is transmitted to the airlines. Following TSA-required 
identity verification procedures, airline personnel can then quickly 
determine that these passengers are not the person of interest whose 
name is actually on the watch lists.
    In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her 
inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction after 
the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.
    Question. And tell us what concrete redress policies you envision 
for passengers wrongly detained for additional screening who might miss 
a flight or those wrongly placed on a no-fly list.
    Answer. The TSA Office of Transportation Security Redress is 
developing a redress process that will address any situation where 
passengers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly singled out 
for additional screening under the future Secure Flight program. This 
process will also allow passengers who feel they have been erroneously 
placed on the watch lists to undergo a case review. TSA will work with 
the nominating agency to review the derogatory information. The redress 
process will be coordinated with other DHS redress processes as 
appropriate.
    TSA has developed and implemented a clearance protocol for persons 
who are flagged for additional screening due the similarity of their 
names to those of individuals who are appropriately on the watch lists. 
A passenger may initiate the clearance protocol by submitting a 
completed Passenger Identity Verification Form to TSA headquarters. TSA 
will review the submission and reach a determination of whether these 
procedures may aid in expediting a passenger's check-in process for a 
boarding pass. The Passenger Identify Verification Form, as well as 
other information, has been posted on TSA's public website at the 
following web address: http://www.tsa.gov/public/
display?theme=157&content=09000519800fb8af
    It is important to keep in mind that this clearance process will 
not remove a name from the watch lists. Instead, this process 
distinguishes passengers from persons who are in fact on the watch 
lists by placing their names and identifying information in a cleared 
portion of the lists. This information is transmitted to the airlines. 
Airline personnel can then more quickly determine when implementing 
TSA-required identity verification procedures that these passengers are 
not the person of interest whose name is actually on the watch lists.
    In addition, an individual may seek to challenge his or her 
inclusion on a watch list in a court of competent jurisdiction, after 
the redress and appeals process within TSA has been exhausted.

         US VISIT: WHEN WILL WE HAVE A REAL ``EXIT'' COMPONENT?

    Question. The former DHS Under Secretary, Asa Hutchison, announced 
with great fanfare meeting the December 31, 2004 deadline to have the 
foreign visitor visa entry-exit system, known as US VISIT, up and 
running at the 50 largest land-border ports of entry. This is a 
positive accomplishment and I am pleased that the Department has taken 
seriously our mutual interest in knowing who is entering this country 
and in keeping out those who should not be allowed entrance.
    However, I remain concerned that very few taxpayers know that while 
we may know who is entering the United States at our airports, 
seaports, and some land border ports, we continue NOT to know who is 
exiting the United States. That's right--there is almost no ``exit' 
component to the US VISIT system--a system which used to be called 
``entry-exit''. We have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on this 
system--and another $390 million is requested for US VISIT in the 
President's fiscal year 2006 budget, and yet we still are not able to 
capture data on which visitors are exiting the country.
    How can we know if someone has overstayed their permitted time in 
this country if we do not know that they have left?
    Answer. US VISIT is exploring different departure confirmation 
alternatives where biometrics are collected on exit, in addition to the 
biographic information, at 12 air and 2 sea port pilot locations. After 
evaluating these exit procedures, DHS will select the most effective 
process(es) and technologies to implement at airports and seaports 
nation-wide.
    Currently the US VISIT system collects both biographic and 
biometric data on eligible (nonimmigrant) alien arrivals and departures 
and stores the data in the Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS).
  --Biographic data is primarily collected through the submission of 
        passenger manifests by the transportation carriers, with 
        additional arrival and departure information collected by 
        officers at U.S. ports-of-entry.
  --Biometric data (digital fingerscans and photographs) are collected 
        at consular posts during visa interviews, at U.S. air and sea 
        ports-of-entry during admission, and at a limited number of 
        pilot locations at air and sea ports during departure.
  --US VISIT analyzes the data in ADIS to prepare the Annual Report on 
        Integrated Entry and Exit Data System, as required by the Data 
        Management Improvement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-215) and the 
        Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act (Public Law 106-396). The 
        report is due on December 31 each year. The report for 2004 was 
        transmitted to the Hill on August 19, 2005.
  --During the last 3 months of the reporting period ending in 
        September 2004, the system consistently matched 90 percent of 
        exit records to entry records using biometrics due to the 
        increased number of visitors enrolled in US VISIT at the time 
        of admission. The system successfully matched approximately 10 
        percent more exit records than when using biographic data 
        alone.
  --US VISIT then analyzes those remaining records to determine if 
        stays were legally extended, there were approved changes in 
        status, or information existing in other systems that would 
        indicate that the individual did not overstay.
  --Once US VISIT reviews all the information, those who are 
        ``confirmed overstays'' are referred to ICE's Compliance 
        Enforcement Unit for further vetting. Based on the outcome of 
        its analysis, ICE may refer unresolved cases to the field for 
        investigation. From January 2004 through August 2005, ICE has 
        arrested almost 70 individuals based on overstay information 
        provided by US VISIT.
  --DHS also will leverage new technology in the land environment to 
        capture information about and departures. Our first proof of 
        concept using this new technology, radio frequency 
        identification (RFID), began August 4, 2005, at three land 
        border ports of entry along the Northern and two along the 
        Southern borders. This technology can detect a visitor at a 
        distance and provide primary inspection officers with entry 
        information as well as provide a mechanism for an accurate and 
        timely record of exits. The proof of concept testing at the 
        ports of Nogales East and Nogales West in Arizona, Alexandria 
        Bay in New York, and the Pacific Highway and Peace Arch in 
        Washington will continue through 2006.
    Question. What are the threats from not knowing who left?
    Answer. These threats are difficult to measure. Where we develop a 
lead that someone is associated with a terrorist group after that 
person has entered the country ICE coordinates its investigative 
activity with necessary entities to take appropriate action. In 
addition, one of the purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) is to exclude and remove criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers, 
and those who would work and live in United States illegally, from the 
United States. Individuals who overstay their visas contribute to the 
denigration of the integrity of our immigration system--that is why US 
VISIT works with ICE to locate and apprehend these immigration 
violators.
    Question. When will we have a robust ``exit'' capability at our 
airports and at our land borders?
    Answer. US VISIT is exploring different biometric departure 
confirmation alternatives at 12 airports and two seaports. The exit 
pilots require foreign visitors to check out at an exit station or with 
a US VISIT exit attendant at the departure gate at the port. After 
evaluating these exit procedures, DHS will select the most effective 
process(es) and technologies to implement at airports and seaports 
nationwide.
    Question. How much more will this cost and when will this system be 
completed?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2005 investment includes resources to 
modernize our immigration and border management systems and provide 
greater interoperability for immigration and border management data. In 
fiscal year 2005, we will increase interoperability technology and 
introduce basic common service-oriented architecture functionality to 
enable delivery of expanded person-centric view capabilities. We are 
currently developing the business requirements for the first phase of 
this strategy.
    The fiscal year 2006 request includes resources to improve our 
immigration and border managements systems, as well as the continued 
deployment of US VISIT at our land borders. The fiscal year 2006 
request includes operation and maintenance of current and 2005 
investments, including: initial implementation of the entry and exit 
solution at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs); implementation and 
integration of border technology to the busiest land POEs; and 
deployment of biometric travel document readers at air, sea, and land 
POEs.

                                US VISIT

    Question. In the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
reprogramming request submitted to Congress on March 11, 2005, the 
Department offered up as a ``bill payer'' a portion of the US VISIT 
``management reserve.'' The US VISIT program office had vociferously 
advocated for this reserve. The Department suggested that this reserve 
could be reduced by $17 million to meet the ICE funding shortfalls 
which had been known by the Department for sometime.
    Does this mean that the US VISIT management reserve is a lower 
priority to the Department? Will we see this reflected in the next US 
VISIT spend plan we expect to see regarding the fiscal year 2006 funds?
    Answer. All components within DHS were asked to review their 
budgets to determine if they could help address ICE funding needs. 
Management reserve within US VISIT exists to address unforeseen funding 
issues as they arise. This helps reduce program risk. Because of the 
nature of the purpose of management reserve, it is difficult to 
determine with certainty how much is needed in any given year. To 
reduce programmatic risk on ICE programs, it was appropriate to propose 
to accept temporary higher risk for US VISIT. However, a normal level 
of management reserve must be an integral part of the program into the 
future.
    The recently enacted fiscal year 2005 supplemental for ICE 
eliminated the need to reprogram funding from US VISIT for this 
purpose.

                      TWIC PROGRAM--WHY THE DELAY?

    Question. During his confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on March 8, 2005, 
then Deputy Secretary-nominee, Michael Jackson, said he did not 
understand why it was taking so long to get the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credential (TWIC) program up and running. He said, 
``It's not rocket science.'' A number of states, notably Florida, have 
already moved forward with their own credentialing programs for their 
State workers. Mr. Secretary, if this program is not ``rocket 
science'', what is causing the delay? Congress has provided upwards of 
$65 million towards the program, pilot projects are underway, and 
thousands of workers are waiting. Why the delay? Is this delay the 
result of resource-constraints, policy decisions, privacy protections 
(or lack of clarification of privacy protections) decisions, some 
combination all of these, or something else?
    Answer. TSA acknowledges that the TWIC prototype has proceeded 
slower than expected. Technical and contractual issues have delayed 
rollout of the final TWIC card model and installation of final version 
biometric access control readers. Those issues are now solved. 
Enrollments and card production are ramping up at East and West Coast 
sites. The Florida rollout has been slowed as the State of Florida's 
team worked to resolve issues unique to Florida due to the need to 
comply fully with the Florida Uniform Port Access Credential (FUPAC) 
Act. Working with both State personnel and the prototype contractor the 
program has been successful in addressing and solving these problems. 
The ability to discover and resolve problems during the prototype phase 
rather than during implementation has been a welcome and valuable 
result and will benefit the program as it moves forward.
    The TWIC Program achieved initial operating capability (IOC) for 
each region on November 17, 2004. IOC was defined as having functional 
enrollment capability and at least one operational TWIC reader at one 
or more sites within the region. Presently, TWIC is in Phase III-
Prototype whereby TSA is evaluating a full range of business processes, 
policies and requirements for an end-to-end solution that includes 
sponsorship, claimed identity verification, criminal history records 
checks (in the State of FL only) and card production, personalization, 
and issuance as well as revocation. Once Phase III-Prototype is 
complete, TSA will conduct further analysis and make recommendations 
regarding the nature and scope of Phase IV-Implementation.

                 EXPEDITED TRAVELER EXPANDING OVERSEAS

    Question. The Department announced the creation of pilot expedited 
traveler program at Schipol Airport in Amsterdam, yet there has been no 
decision made on expanding or making permanent the limited pilot tests 
of the Registered Traveler program here in the United States. Why is 
there a delay with expanding the domestic Registered Traveler program?
    Answer. While both programs enhance the security of civilian 
aviation, the two programs serve different purposes. The International 
Register Traveler Program is intended to enhance the already-existing 
requirement that CBP inspect and interview travelers seeking to enter 
the United States, and the program enhances CBP's ability to make 
admissibility decisions by separating out low-risk travelers. It builds 
on legacy trusted traveler programs--e.g., SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST, INS 
PASS. The domestic registered traveler program, by contrast, is a pilot 
program to improve the aviation security screening process by helping 
TSA align screeners and resources with potential risks.
    Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has been 
aggressively testing the Registered Traveler (RT) concept of running 
threat assessment and identity verification checks on eligible 
volunteers in order to provide them with an expedited clearance through 
security checkpoints. TSA is currently running pilot programs at five 
Federally managed sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and 
Washington, D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September 
2005. TSA has also worked with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority 
(GOAA) to launch a pilot at Orlando International Airport that is 
assessing the feasibility of incorporating a private sector component 
into the RT concept.
    Results of these pilots will be analyzed to determine the program's 
effect on security and service, enabling the Department to make 
decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and 
deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be 
linked to the Department's decision.
    Question. If we're not sure the domestic program is going to work--
or how exactly it should be structured--why are you starting an 
international version at this time?
    Answer. While both programs enhance the security of civilian 
aviation, the two programs serve different purposes. The International 
Register Traveler Program is intended to enhance the already-existing 
requirement that CBP inspect and interview travelers seeking to enter 
the United States, and the program enhances CBP's ability to make 
admissibility decisions by separating out low-risk travelers. It builds 
on legacy trusted traveler programs--e.g., SENTRI, NEXUS, FAST, INS 
PASS. The domestic registered traveler program, by contrast, is a pilot 
program to improve the aviation security screening process by helping 
TSA align screeners and resources with potential risks.
    Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has been 
aggressively testing the Registered Traveler (RT) concept of running 
threat assessment and identity verification checks on eligible 
volunteers in order to provide them with an expedited clearance through 
security checkpoints. TSA has run pilot programs at five Federally 
managed sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and 
Washington, D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September 
2005. TSA has also worked with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority 
(GOAA) to launch a pilot at Orlando International Airport that is 
assessing the feasibility of incorporating a private sector component 
into the RT concept.
    Results of these pilots are being analyzed to determine the 
program's effect on security and service, enabling the Department to 
make decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and 
deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be 
linked to the Department's decision.

                  LACK OF FUNDING FOR BORDER SECURITY

    Question. During the hearing, you stated that the President's 
budget for fiscal year 2006 both hires 210 new Border Patrol agents, 
hires more immigration investigators and provides 1,920 new detention 
bed spaces and, at the same time, provides sufficient funds to backfill 
and hire the positions that were lost during the current fiscal year.
    Are you guaranteeing that the budget request hires both all fiscal 
year 2005 attrited Border Patrol positions and 210 new Border Patrol 
agents?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2005 Emergency Supplemental provides 
funding for 500 additional Border Patrol agents. CBP has until the end 
of fiscal year 2006 to fill these positions. However, CBP plans to hire 
these positions aggressively. For fiscal year 2005, CBP will backfill 
its fiscal year 2005 attrited positions and hire approximately 400 (of 
the 500) additional agents.
    For fiscal year 2006, the President's Budget requests 210 
additional Border Patrol agents. Both House and Senate Appropriations 
bills add 790 Border Patrol agents on top of this (for a total of 
1,000). If enacted, CBP would hire these positions and backfill 
estimated attrition (approximately 600 positions).
    With that said, the total impact of the fiscal year 2005 
Supplemental and the anticipated fiscal year 2006 budget will result in 
1,500 new Border Patrol agents by the end of fiscal year 2006. CBP will 
also hire for the backfill of attrition. CBP has the capacity to hire 
and train this level.
    With respect to ICE, the fiscal year 2006 President's Budget, when 
combined with projected carryover balances from the fiscal year 2005 
Emergency Supplemental, contains sufficient funding to support 376 
fiscal year 2005 attrition hires. In addition, the fiscal year 2006 
President's Budget includes an increase of $90 million to support 1,920 
beds.
    Question. And at what point in fiscal year 2006 will the Border 
Patrol have hired and trained the same staffing level at the start of 
fiscal year 2005 positions, plus the 210 new agents?
    Answer. CBP ended fiscal year 2004 with 10,817 Border Patrol (BP) 
agents. For fiscal year 2005, CBP plans to maintain that staffing level 
as well as beginning to add the 500 new agent positions provided in the 
fiscal year 2005 supplemental. For fiscal year 2006, CBP plans to add 
the 210 new agents in the President's Budget and replace all attrition 
positions. Hiring for the additional BP agents is a high priority.

                            BORDER SECURITY

    Question. The Heritage Foundation's December 13, 2004 report 
recommends that the Department ``conduct a national assessment of the 
resources required for effective border security.'' Is this 
recommendation a part of your comprehensive review of the Department 
and its priorities?
    Answer. The Department has been working aggressively outside of the 
Second Stage Review process to assess our long-term border needs, 
including the resources needed to secure substantial improvement in 
control of our borders. Complimentary Second Stage Review efforts 
examined needs in such areas as cargo security and passenger screening. 
The Department also is developing a plan for an independent, outside 
entity to examine border resource needs. All of our efforts will 
coalesce into the development of a long-term border security and 
immigration reform plan.

            IMPACT OF REAL ID ON BACKLOG REDUCTION/WORKLOAD

    Question. The House attached Rep. Sensenbrenner's REAL ID 
immigration bill (H.R. 418) to the Emergency Iraqi War Supplemental. 
This bill includes many of the provisions in the original House draft 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
    Unlike some rhetorical Bush Administration amnesty, the specifics 
of this legislation are known. The Administration supports the REAL ID 
legislation.
    If the conferees decide to include the provisions of this bill in 
the Supplemental, what impact would it have on Citizenship and 
Immigration Service's abilities to meet its backlog reduction goals and 
what resources would be required to implement the Act?
    Answer. Based upon our review, the Real ID legislation should have 
no impact on the backlog elimination plan. The additional fee revenues 
as a result of this legislation ensure the timely processing of these 
cases.
    The verification and adjudications functions of USCIS are 
organizationally separate. The verification workload is handled by 
Immigration Status Verifiers (ISVs) in the USCIS Records program, who 
are dedicated and specially trained for that function. USCIS does not 
intend to divert adjudications resources to implement the REAL ID Act. 
Therefore, backlog elimination goals will not be impacted.

                            PASSPORT PRIVACY

    Question. As the State Department is looking into the issue of 
possibly embedding personal data in the next generation of U.S. 
passports, what if any discussion has the Department's Privacy Officer 
had with State Department officials about the protection of the privacy 
of U.S. citizens?
    Answer. The Chief Privacy Officer for DHS has a very good working 
relationship with officials from the Department of State on matters of 
mutual concern, including lost and stolen passports and appropriate 
privacy notices for international travelers. While the Privacy Officer 
has made her views known to the State Department on numerous privacy 
matters, the precise question of how to protect personal information in 
the next generation of U.S. passports is one that is being worked on 
primarily by the Department of State, which has the lead authority for 
matters pertaining to passports. Of course, the DHS Chief Privacy 
Officer will work collaboratively with the State Department to ensure 
that implementation of any decisions protect the privacy of U.S. 
citizen's information.

                        CARGO CONTAINER SECURITY

    Question. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 
Appropriations Act notes that over $200 million has been spent over the 
past 3 years on various projects designed to secure cargo containers 
entering this country. It also calls on the Under Secretary for Border 
and Transportation Security to report to the Congress no later than 
February 8, 2005 on which DHS entity will have primary responsibility 
for cargo container security and the setting of shipping industry 
standards. To date we have not yet received that report. When can we 
expect to see it?
    Answer. This report was submitted to Congress on May 31, 2005.
    Question. Are funds included in the President's budget request to 
achieve this goal?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes $138 
million for the Container Security Program.

                  SUPPLY CHAIN AND CONTAINER SECURITY

    Question. We received part one of the Supply Chain and Container 
Security report required by House Report 108-541. It states that the 
Container Security Initiative Division in headquarters ``is staffed 
with a majority of CBP employees and a small number of ICE Special 
Agents.
    Please provide the total number of the CSI Division headquarters 
staff and the number of those who are ICE Special Agents. Also, at 
which--if any--of the overseas CSI ports do we have both an ICE and a 
CBP attache?
    Answer. The Container Security Initiative (CSI) Division 
headquarters staff consists of 52 full time employees, four of which 
are ICE Special Agents. At this time, there are no CSI ports with both 
an ICE and a CBP Attache.

                          MERGING CBP AND ICE

    Question. You currently are conducting a ``top to bottom'' review 
of the Department, its structure, and its operations. Recent reports, 
including a December 13, 2004 Heritage Foundation report, bemoan the 
artificial division of Customs and immigration inspectors from Customs 
and immigration agents and recommend that CBP and ICE be merged. What 
is the status of the Department's discussion on these recommendations? 
When will the Congress learn of your intentions, if any, in this 
regard?
    Answer. We are not merging ICE and CBP; however, we do see the need 
to ensure that these organizations coordinate better. We will continue 
to work closely with the leaders of ICE and CBP to improve cooperation 
and coordination between these agencies. In deciding to not merge the 
two agencies, we considered view points from a variety of sources, 
including think tanks, as well as the Department's Inspector General, 
Members of Congress, and other valuable stakeholders.
    As you know, the Department looked at a variety of organizational 
issues as part of the Second-Stage Review process, which helped clarify 
where the Department needs to be organizationally to ensure effective 
implementation of our critical missions. We considered whether ICE 
should remain a stand-alone entity, and decided that it should. We 
believe it's in the Department's best near and long-term interest that 
ICE not be merged with another component, CBP in particular. To reach 
this decision, we focused on the operational mission needs of both CBP 
and ICE, not on the near-term management challenges. I take seriously 
the challenges the Department has faced concerning ICE and appreciate 
the difficult but necessary choices Congress has made in providing new 
funding to address its needs. I am confident, however, that ICE has 
made substantial improvements in financial management this year. Not 
only have substantial new resources been provided, but a new management 
team is taking shape.

                              IDENT/IAFIS

    Question. The integration of the fingerprint databases created, 
maintained, and used by the Department of Homeland Security and the 
FBI--among other Federal agencies--continues to be a priority concern 
for the Congress and the members of this Subcommittee. Border Patrol 
agents daily compare the fingerprints of illegal aliens apprehended at 
our borders against these databases. And Customs and Border Protection 
inspectors--at a growing number of ports of entry--compare the 
fingerprints of visa holders and others wishing to enter this country 
against these same databases via the US VISIT system.
    That is why I was concerned about the latest Department of Justice 
Inspector General report on this subject. It stated that of the 118,000 
visitors daily entering this country who are subject to US VISIT, an 
average of about 22,350 individuals are referred for secondary 
inspection.
    According to DHS, by the end of this fiscal year, it expects to 
directly check only about 800 individuals each day against the full FBI 
fingerprint database known as the IAFIS Criminal Master File. This is 
just 0.7 percent of the 118,000 daily visitors. The vast majority of 
the visitors, 99.3 percent, will be checked only against the US VISIT 
watch list. These persons will not be checked directly against the full 
IAFIS Criminal Master File. Why is that the case? Why are so few people 
being run against these valuable investigative tools?
    Answer. The Department continues to work closely with the 
Department of Justice to improve the integration and interoperability 
of our fingerprint databases and we have established an integrated 
project team. Currently, the FBI updates DHS' records with information 
from a variety of criminal and threat-related databases. Based on 
updates to the US VISIT system during the time period between January 
2004 and the end of August 2005, officers have taken adverse action 
against more than 800 individuals during US VISIT processing on entry. 
In addition, integrated DHS Automated Biometric Identification System 
(IDENT) and FBI Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) workstations will be deployed to all POEs with significant 
passenger volume, as well as to ICE locations by the end of calendar 
year 2005. A report, describing plans for interoperability, was 
submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.
    On July 13, 2005, I announced a decision that first-time visitors 
to the United States will be enrolled in the program by submitting ten 
fingerscans--a key step to achieving interoperability between IDENT/
IAFIS. We have worked with the Departments of State and Justice to 
develop an implementation plan for the Initial Transition to 10 Print 
Plan which addresses interoperability as well as migration to 10 
fingerscans. In addition, the capability to capture 10 fingerscans will 
allow us to increase accuracy for matching individuals against watch 
lists and previous enrollment records; improve DHS's ability to match 
enrollees against latent prints; and allow DHS to focus more time and 
attention on individuals who might be potential risks to the country.
    Question. The Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act directs the Department to fund the 
full cost associated to achieve real time interoperability with the US 
VISIT system. Yet there does not appear to be any funding in the budget 
to either establish real time interoperability of the DHS and Justice 
fingerprint databases, or an expansion of the current DHS system of 
capturing 2-fingerprints versus movement towards a 10-print system.
    Why is there no specific funding in the budget to improve the 
interoperability of IDENT/IAFIS and US VISIT?
    Answer. On July 13, 2005, I announced a decision that visitors to 
the United States will be enrolled in the US VISIT program by 
submitting 10 fingerscans. DHS is working with the Departments of State 
and Justice to develop an implementation plan that will address 
interoperability as well as migration to 10 fingerscans and cost 
estimates.
    There are several different ongoing efforts to bring about 
interoperability between the IDENT/IAFIS systems. Integrated IDENT/
IAFIS capabilities were deployed to all Border Patrol stations ahead of 
schedule in fiscal year 2004 and additional deployment to all POEs with 
significant passenger volume and ICE offices will be completed by the 
end of calendar year 2005. The US VISIT program will use $9.3 million 
of fiscal year 2005 resources to complete the deployment of IDENT/IAFIS 
access configuration at 115 airports, 15 seaports, and 165 land border 
POEs, as well as to specific ICE locations.
    The fiscal year 2006 budget request includes resources for improved 
interoperability and the integrated project team will develop cost 
estimates for primary integration and development associated with 
IDENT/IAFIS interoperability as it develops its plan.

                        IDENT/IAFIS INTEGRATION

    Question. In the Department's ``2004 Year End Review'', it is noted 
that the Integrated Automated Fingerprint System (IAFIS) was 
operational at all Border Patrol stations 3 months ahead of schedule. 
This is a positive first step. However, nowhere in the report does the 
Department discuss the progress at fully integrating the IAFIS and 
IDENT fingerprint databases. The statement of managers accompanying the 
conference report on the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act discusses 
at length the strong congressional interest having these databases 
fully integrated. In fact, this was a topic that generated much 
bipartisan discussion during one of our hearings last year. Chairman 
Gregg again stressed its importance during our hearing with you this 
year.
    Integration has also been the subject of at least three Department 
of Justice inspector general reports.
    Who in the Department has the lead on this subject?
    Answer. The US VISIT Program, working closely with DHS components 
such as CBP and ICE, and the Departments of Justice and State, leads 
the efforts for full IDENT/IAFIS interoperability within the 
Department.
    Question. What is the timeline for accomplishing this integration 
and how much will it cost?
    Answer. DHS (US VISIT) and FBI/CJIS have established an IPT to 
address the policy, business requirements, and technical aspects of 
integrating IDENT and IAFIS. This IPT has made significant progress in 
resolving many of the long-standing issues originally referenced by the 
DOJ Office of the Inspector General. A report, describing plans for 
interoperability, was submitted to Congress on August 18, 2005.
    Question. Are sufficient/any funds included in the President's 
budget request for this activity?
    Answer. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice will 
develop future budgets to support any necessary level of funding for 
IDENT/IAFIS interoperability.

                    VEHICLE FLEET MANAGEMENT REPORT

    Question. Senate Report 108-280 required the submission by February 
8, 2005 of a vehicle fleet management report. That report has yet to be 
submitted. It is difficult for the Congress to provide funds for new 
and replacement vehicles when we have little confidence that decisions 
to purchase these vehicles are being made in a methodical and reasoned 
manner. When can we expect to receive this overdue report? Also, please 
break out by type/category of vehicle the funds requested in the budget 
for new and replacement vehicles for the various CBP entities.
    Answer. The requested report is now being reviewed and will be 
submitted to Congress as soon as possible. The type and number of 
vehicles to be purchased will be based on the operational priorities of 
the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2006.

                      AMO FLEET MODERNIZATION PLAN

    Question. House Report 108-541 required submission of a report on 
the costs and benefits associated with a service life extension program 
of the P-3 Orion aircraft 30 days after enactment of the act. To date 
we have not received this report. Please provide us with this report as 
well as the status of Air and Marine Operations long-term procurement 
plan for new and replacement air and marine assets, including P-3.
    Answer. A technical and operational review of responses received in 
reply to the CBP Request for Information (RFI) issued on February 28, 
2005, has been completed. This review concluded that while there are 
viable alternatives to either replace or remanufacture the CBP/AMO P-3 
fleet, this effort should be part of a formal acquisition process 
associated with CBP/AMO's overall modernization initiative. CBP's long-
term modernization plan will be developed as a component of the CBP air 
asset integration study to be completed in the summer of fiscal year 
2005.

                     APHIS--FOOD SAFETY INSPECTORS

    Question. Since the announcement of the creation of the Department, 
I have been concerned that ``core'' missions of the various legacy 
agencies would get lost because of the new Department's primary focus 
on homeland security. One area of concern is agriculture inspection 
operations at our borders.
    Border inspection responsibilities, including 2,500 frontline 
inspectors, were transferred from the Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) to DHS in March of 2003.
    According to a recent U.S. Department of Agriculture Inspector 
General report, APHIS could not assure that the DHS process for 
agriculture inspection operations contains adequate controls to 
safeguard U.S. Agriculture against entry of foreign pests and disease. 
It also noted that there was a reported 32 percent drop in the number 
of pest inspections following the transfer to DHS. What is the 
Department doing to correct this?
    Answer. The effort to bring up the number of CBP agricultural 
specialists to the level transferred from APHIS is a priority and CBP 
has made significant progress. According to the Determination Order 
that actually transferred personnel from APHIS, 1,872 agricultural 
specialists including canine were sent to DHS CBP. Of these positions, 
316 were vacancies. In fiscal year 2005, the hiring of additional 
Agriculture Specialists is a priority. The USDA Professional 
Development Center (PDC), the APHIS entity responsible for training new 
CBP agricultural specialists, has scheduled 20 classes from May 2004 
through February 2006. Seven classes have graduated as of April 22, 
2005, with 203 graduates deployed to 62 POEs. It is projected that CBP 
will have 500 graduates by February 2006.
    In addition to training more agricultural specialists, under CBP's 
``One Face at the Border'' initiative, all CBP Officers at the POEs are 
used to perform the vast number of functions that CBP is charged with 
carrying out. In terms of agricultural inspections, CBP officers are 
being cross-trained, learning basic agriculture procedures for the land 
border, mail, cargo, maritime, and air passenger pathways to increase 
the value of referrals and supplement the work of the Agriculture 
specialists.
    CBP has noticed that several positive developments have resulted in 
a greater level of compliance in agricultural importations. Offshore 
mitigation strategies by APHIS to minimize the number of pests even 
reaching the United States are working. CBP, in conjunction with APHIS, 
has entered into several programs, such as a targeted program for 
imported cut flowers that decreased the number of inspections because 
the scientific data indicates that such commodities pose a much lower 
risk to American agriculture. During the same period, interceptions of 
prohibited animal by-products went up by 26 percent and prohibited meat 
and poultry by 6 percent.
    In summary, as the vacancies are filled with newly trained 
specialists, CBP will create a sufficient workforce of agricultural 
specialists to target and intercept prohibited material, and report all 
insects found in CBP seizures. When this occurs, the interception rate 
will more precisely reflect the true level of CBP efforts. CBP has 
asked USDA to supply additional insect pest detection training at POEs 
based on the specific pest pathways of concern.
    Question. Is the Department working with APHIS to establish a 
method to coordinate information regarding inspections?
    Answer. DHS-CBP has been working with and coordinating with USDA-
APHIS in numerous ways to synchronize and verify information and data 
collected about inspections. The following are some of the ways CBP and 
APHIS have worked together.
Joint Quality Assurance (QA) Program
  --CBP and APHIS have formed a joint QA team and began conducting port 
        reviews together.
  --QA reviews will assist the Directors, Field Operations and improve 
        our credibility among agricultural stakeholders.
  --CBP's Agricultural Inspections Policy and Programs (AIPP) conducted 
        successful Joint APHIS QA reviews at the Port of Philadelphia, 
        December 7 and 8, 2004, and the Port of Miami, April 18-22, 
        2005.
  --Plans and dates are being developed to conduct Joint QA reviews 
        once a month for the remainder of fiscal year 2005.
  --The QA team produces recommendations that are conveyed to CBP 
        management for consideration and action.
Creation of selectivity criteria and rule sets for agricultural 
        targeting
  --CBP AIPP and APHIS are working together to develop rule sets for 
        targeting and prevention of Agro/Bio Terrorism.
  --Plans are in place to hire two CBP Agriculture Specialists to be 
        assigned to the National Targeting Center (NTC).
  --CBP assisted APHIS in the placement of one employee at the NTC to 
        target and help prevent Agro/Bio Terrorism.
  --CBP has engaged and included APHIS in discussions about developing 
        selectivity criteria for agricultural products.
USDA access to CBP databases
  --CBP has been instrumental in negotiating an agreement with USDA to 
        share data and databases between the agencies.
  --CBP has granted access for certain USDA offices to relevant CBP 
        databases.
  --The combination of USDA databases and CBP databases and electronic 
        systems will add to our capability to measure agricultural risk 
        worldwide, target, develop new rule sets, and build CBP's 
        expertise and capacity for early threat detection.
Communications within CBP
  --CBP is making efforts to redesign and improve the Agriculture 
        Inspection section of the cbp.gov website to be an effective 
        means of communication within CBP.
  --The intranet site, cbp.net, is being redesigned to highlight joint 
        actions and important efforts with USDA/APHIS.
  --CBP uses a system of alerts and musters as well as other CBP 
        systems to notify the ports of issues of immediate concern.
Joint Operations with USDA--Measurement Driven Special Operations 
        (MDSO)
  --Fifty joint MDSO's are proposed for the remainder of fiscal year 
        2005.
Management Inspection Division (MID)
  --CBP used the MID to establish audit protocols that target mission 
        critical agriculture functions.
  --Planning inspections at JFK, Miami, Los Angles and Newark 
        International Airports: International Mail, Pest Interceptions 
        (Cargo), Pest Interceptions (PAX), Cargo Control (Agriculture), 
        Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring (AQIM).
  --Proposed MID Inspections at Port Elizabeth, Baltimore, and Buffalo: 
        AQIM.
  --Proposed MID Inspections Nogales, El Paso, Blaine, and Puerto Rico: 
        AQIM.
Self-Inspection Reporting System (SIRS)
  --CBP AIPP also uses the SIRS to monitor the agricultural program and 
        to identify areas for improvement.
  --CBP AIPP has developed self-inspection worksheets based on Office 
        of Field Operations (AIPP) policies based on USDA regulations, 
        rules, policies, and needs.
  --For example, worksheets target Data Management, Cargo Control, Pest 
        Exclusion, International Mail, and Clearance of Conveyances.
    Question. The report claims that the Department has denied APHIS 
access to port locations when access was requested, even to perform 
duties for which APHIS still has regulatory responsibility. Is this 
true and, if so, why was this access denied?
    Answer. CBP and USDA-APHIS have forged a new working relationship 
and resolved many of the earlier port access issues. CBP and USDA 
employees are working together cooperatively and sharing resources. CBP 
has worked with USDA to achieve the appropriate level of access to the 
POEs for their personnel. As Congress has provided, the inspectional 
functions were transferred from USDA to CBP. CBP has set forth 
procedures that have facilitated USDA gaining access to the ports to 
perform their functions.
    CBP and USDA-APHIS signed in February 2005 Appendix 8 to Article 8 
of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DHS and the USDA. The MOA 
establishes and enhances coordinated actions and operations between the 
two agencies and responds to many of the issues raised in the OIG 
report.
    Question. The report also states that APHIS and the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) do not require DHS to notify FSIS of all 
incoming shipments, which could allow the shipments to bypass FSIS re-
inspection. Is this correct and, if so, why?
    Answer. DHS and USDA are currently developing a MOA to address the 
data needs of the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) as well as 
other USDA agencies.
    In conjunction with FSIS, CBP has developed rule sets within our 
targeting systems to assist with the notification process. CBP and FSIS 
meet once a week to discuss food safety issues and FSIS has assigned an 
employee to work at CBP 2 days a week as a liaison. CBP is working very 
closely with FSIS to make sure that they are properly notified about 
arriving meat shipments. USDA and FSIS are also working together to 
update USDA manuals that would require notification of such shipments 
to FSIS.
    Question. Has the Department provided adequate data on staffing 
levels and deployment of agriculture inspectors to APHIS for 
evaluation?
    Answer. We are unaware of any formal APHIS request for such 
information nor what type of evaluation is contemplated by the 
question. However, CBP shares data concerning staffing levels and 
deployment of CBP agriculture inspection personnel with APHIS regarding 
training needs for newly hired CBP agriculture specialists in 
cooperation with CBP and is thus aware of the numbers of new hires.
    CBP and APHIS also conduct joint QA port reviews that explore 
staffing as a standard element. APHIS has identifiers and other 
personnel at the ports that can verify the staffing levels.

                      PULSED FAST NEUTRON ANALYSIS

    Question. On April 13, 2005, my staff received a report regarding 
the PFNA program called for by House Report 108-280. This overdue, four 
paragraph report stated that the contractor testing of this program, 
which was supposed to have begun in June 2004, been completed by 
October 2004, with a report issued by December 2004, has ``set a firm 
date of April 18, 2005, for the test to begin.'' That date has now 
passed. Did the test start on April 18, 2005? If not, when did or will 
the test begin? Can you confirm that ``the testing will be completed by 
August 19, 2005, and (that) the test report should reach Congress by 
November 2005''?
    Answer. The operational evaluation of the Pulsed Fast Neutron 
technology commenced on May 2, 2005, and is scheduled to run for 4 
months. An evaluation of the test is expected to be issued in November 
2005.

                    USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

    Question. I understand that the Department has issued a Request for 
Information to private industry to determine the capability and 
availability of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems for use in border 
control and enforcement. What is the deadline for industry response?
    Answer. The RFI for the UAVs was issued on April 13, 2005, and 
responses were due on April 29, 2005. CBP received 14 responses.
    Question. Have you engaged in a dialogue with the private sector 
about your needs and requirements in this area?
    Answer. As noted above, CBP initiated dialogue with the private 
sector on UAV capabilities and CBP performance requirements through the 
RFI.
    Question. Do you plan to engage in down select and fly-off between 
competing systems?
    Answer. We do not plan to engage in fly-offs between competing 
systems during down select for the following reasons: the time 
constraint to establish an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in fiscal 
year 2005 does not allow for this, market research resulted in a 
decision to procure mature commercial off the shelf technology, the 
development of a refined CBP UAV Performance Specification clearly 
outlines system requirements, and the RFI included the CBP Performance 
Specification.
    Question. When do you expect a Request for Proposal to come forward 
and what is the target date to begin acquisition of a system?
    Answer. CBP released a Pre-solicitation notice on May 10, 2005, 
that was followed by an RFP on June 21, 2005, which closed on July 20, 
2005. CBP is in the process of evaluating proposals and anticipates a 
contract award on or about August 29, 2005.
    Question. During the period June through September, 2004, there was 
a pilot program that successfully demonstrated the value of UAVs under 
the Arizona Border Control Initiative. What were the results of that 
demonstration and will the lessons learned be incorporated into the 
Department's long-term acquisition strategy?
    Answer. The pilot program demonstrated that the UAVs had some 
operational effectiveness, but will require further evaluation to 
determine its optimal deployment. Some of the evaluation criteria were 
incorporated into the Request for Proposals issued for the purchase of 
UAVs for CBP. Lessons learned have been incorporated into both the 
present and long-term DHS acquisition strategies.
    Question. I understand that one of the lessons learned from last 
summer's pilot program was that the initial speed to ``get something 
flying'' resulted in some inefficiencies in operation of the system 
(such as the location of where it was operated and the limited hours it 
was able to fly) which might have been avoided with proper planning. 
Are things like this being taken into consideration as you move forward 
with the program?
    Answer. Yes, the lessons learned from the pilot program are being 
considered as we move forward with the present acquisition. Much 
attention is being focused on system acquisition, operational 
procedures and UAV basing to afford DHS the best solution to 
effectively meet our requirements.
    Question. In view of the continuing flood of illegal aliens across 
the Southwestern Border and the reported success demonstrated with the 
2004 UAV program, why hasn't the Department used the $10 million 
Congress appropriated for UAVs in fiscal year 2005 to restart the 
demonstration program as an effective enforcement and learning tool 
while the long term UAV program is developed?
    Answer. The Department has evaluated the lessons learned from the 
two prior UAV deployments and has established UAV requirements that, 
although mindful of other DHS users, meet CBP's specific needs. A 
request for proposals was issued in June 2005, and follows the request 
for information that closed on April 29th. The $10 million in fiscal 
year 2005 is to be used for a UAV acquisition and subsequent deployment 
of a UAV system that will serve as the DHS UAV initial operating 
capability along the Southern border this fiscal year. In the interim, 
CBP has deployed a Cessna 206 and two Piper Cheyenne airplanes (all 
equipped with electro optical and infrared sensors) to the Arizona 
desert to adequately provide aerial surveillance until CBP can acquire 
and field its own UAVs.
    As noted above, DHS is in the midst of a systems-level review of 
its border control architecture to identify the right mix of personnel, 
technology and infrastructure to help achieve effective control of the 
border.
    Question. If it chose to do so, how soon could the Department 
restart that demonstration?
    Answer. Since all necessary support requests have since expired, 
CBP would have to re-negotiate Letters of Procedure with all other 
airspace managers, a Request for Assistance from the Department of 
Defense (DOD) to allow us the use of Ft. Huachuca's facilities and 
logistics, and a Certificate of Authorization issued by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to allow UAVs to operate in the National 
Airspace System. The earliest the demonstration could be restarted is 
60 days from deciding to do so.

                     DHS ``BRANDING'' NOT COMPLETED

    Question. The Department claims great success with some of its 
systems integration, including that of its legacy e-mail systems. 
However, my staff was surprised to learn that one legacy agency--the 
Federal Protective Service (which transferred over in its entirety from 
the General Services Administration)--still uses ``gsa.gov'' for its e-
mails as opposed to the DHS ``branded'' ``dhs.gov''. What is most 
troubling is that the FPS must continue to pay GSA for its e-mail 
services while also being billed by DHS (or ICE) for these same 
services--which it is not receiving. Why is there a delay in fully 
integrating FPS into the Department's operations?
    Answer. Fiscal year 2005 resources were committed early in the year 
to expedite the conversion, which was over 80 percent complete as of 
March 31, 2005. The remaining Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
locations were converted by August 19, 2005.
    Question. How much has FPS had to pay to GSA for this service this 
fiscal year to date?
    Answer. Fiscal year 2005 GSA charges for FPS information technology 
support through August 1, 2005, totaled $5,837,498. All FPS offices 
with the exception of FPS HQ have been converted to the DHS Network. 
FPS Headquarters is scheduled to relocate from GSA (18th/F) to ICE 
Headquarters as of August 22, 2005. FPS will reimburse ICE OCIO for 
services provided.
    Question. Since the Department has made claims that all agencies 
are on the same e-mail system, will the FPS be ``made whole'' or 
otherwise reimbursed as a result of these double payments?
    Answer. The FPS will fund conversion costs to the DHS email system. 
FPS has not made, nor will it make, double payments.

                                 C-TPAT

    Question. In your statement for the record you say that C-TPAT is 
due for an increase of $8.2 million and that these funds ``will be used 
to enhance our ability to conduct additional supply chain security 
validations.'' Is that the sole purpose for the increase, or will the 
program also be expanded with these funds?
    Answer. CBP intends to use these funds to support the validation 
process.
    Staffing for this program was significantly increased in fiscal 
year 2005 (120 new positions provided for conducting validations), 
which will allow CBP to conduct validations of all high-risk supply 
chains. An aggressive hiring drive to recruit permanent Supply Chain 
Specialists (SCSs) is underway, and CBP anticipates having 100 
permanent SCSs on board at the end of fiscal year 2005. Additionally, 
CBP has trained 38 field officers to help with the initiation of 
validations.
    As of August 15, 2005, the C-TPAT program has completed validations 
of 16 percent of certified members, and has validations underway on 
another 36 percent of certified members.
    As of August 15, 2005, the C-TPAT program has over 9,700 
applicants, of which 5,174 have been accepted and are certified. With 
an average of 2,000 to 3,000 new applicants each year, C-TPAT 
anticipates continued program growth and expansion through fiscal year 
2006 and beyond.
    Question. Please describe the ``security validations'' that will be 
conducted with the proposed increase.
    Answer. Validations begin with a domestic corporate meeting. 
Foreign site visits typically include a corporate meeting with foreign 
manufacturer corporate personnel, and a tour of appropriate 
manufacturing, shipping/consolidation and port facilities. Validations 
conclude with a close out meeting between CBP SCSs and the certified 
member's Point(s) of Contact(s). The Validation Report issued by the 
CBP SCS contains sections on Findings, Recommendations and Best 
Practices.
    CBP initiates validations based on risk, using a quantitative risk 
assessment tool to identify certified members with high-risk supply 
chains. CBP uses a validation selection methodology that relies upon 
quantifiable data coupled with an objective assessment of the submitted 
security profile to determine the top priorities for validations. 
Validation resources are then directed accordingly.
    CBP uses a risk-based approach to validate the security 
enhancements that have been committed to by C-TPAT members, to evaluate 
the status and effectiveness of key security measures in the 
participant's profile, and make recommendations where appropriate. In 
particular, CBP is placing emphasis on the importer and carrier 
sectors, and has modified its validation approach to maximize resources 
and increase efficiencies, such as validating multiple foreign 
suppliers within a geographic proximity.
    Moreover, CBP has enhanced its ability to record and measure 
validation results by developing the Automated Validation Assessment 
Tool, which is an electronic questionnaire that automatically scores 
and weighs the findings of the Supply Chain Specialist to produce an 
overall assessment of the supply chain security measures in place. Any 
identified weaknesses must be corrected in order to retain program 
benefits.
    Once the Validation is completed, the C-TPAT partner's role in the 
process continues as follows:
  --Communication on supply chain security issues continues with CBP 
        and the assigned SCS;
  --Continual self-assessments of supply chain and security processes 
        and procedures are performed;
  --A pro-active approach is maintained with regard to supply chain 
        security and membership in C-TPAT.

                          ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

    Question. I am concerned that illegal immigrants continue to find 
new ways into this country. I understand that since the Navy stopped 
training and steaming in Vieques, Puerto Rico that there has been a 
surge of illegal immigrants coming to the United States through the 
Eastern Caribbean into Puerto Rico. What are you doing to close this 
gap?
    Answer. CBP arrest statistics do not substantiate a surge of 
illegal immigrants through the Eastern Caribbean.
    The Office of Border Patrol has one Station and Sector located in 
Ramey, Puerto Rico. This Sector and Station are located on the Western 
side of Puerto Rico and respond to their primary threat, which is 
illegal smuggling through the Mona Passage from the Dominican Republic. 
Ramey Sector has integrated its Intelligence Unit with other DHS 
partners to monitor traffic in its area of operation. The Ramey Border 
Patrol Sector enjoys a cooperative relationship with the U.S. Coast 
Guard and local Puerto Rican Maritime Police Forces (FURAS). The Coast 
Guard, Puerto Rican Police, CBP's Air and Marine Office all cooperate 
on interdictions and landings and share intelligence in a timely 
manner.
    Question. Has there been an increase in the number of illegal alien 
interdictions or other evidence of an increased flow of illegal aliens 
to Puerto Rico or Florida from the Eastern Caribbean?
    Answer. As noted above, CBP arrest statistics do not indicate that 
there is an increase in alien apprehensions from countries located in 
the Eastern Caribbean area or an increase in the flow of illegal aliens 
from the Eastern Caribbean to Puerto Rico and Florida.
    Question. What is the status of discussions to open a Border Patrol 
Substation in the U.S. Virgin Islands?
    Answer. CBP's priority mission is to prevent the entry of 
terrorists and terrorist weapons into the United States, and agency 
resources are allocated on the basis of risk assessment. The Northern 
Border represents a significant terrorist risk due to the presence of 
terrorist groups within Canada. In addition, aliens from special 
interest countries have been apprehended crossing the Southern Border 
using traditional alien smuggling routes. These indicators have to date 
not been manifested in the Caribbean. Therefore, although CBP continues 
to work closely with the U.S. Coast Guard to detect and interdict alien 
and drug smuggling activity in the Caribbean, CBP has not deployed 
additional resources in the area. CBP's Office of Intelligence is 
currently conducting a comprehensive risk analysis of the Caribbean, 
which will form the basis for making a future decision regarding the 
location of Border Patrol stations in the region.

          COLLECTION OF ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES

    Question. Senate Report 108-280 included specific language that 
directed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to submit a report to the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees by February 8, 2005. The 
report was to provide a coordinated plan, including legislative or 
regulatory changes proposed by CBP, if necessary, to increase CBP's 
collection of antidumping and countervailing duties owed to the United 
States. The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet received that 
report. Will the report be delivered prior to the Subcommittee marking 
up the fiscal year 2006 bill in June?
    Answer. The report was sent to the Committee on July 7, 2005.
    Question. On December 17, 2004, Customs and Border Protection 
issued its regular Annual Report on the Combined Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act (CDSOA). The Annual Report described how hundreds of 
millions of dollars in duties are not being collected by Customs, and 
the agency has been unable to explain why it cannot collect these 
funds. In fiscal year 2003, the agency failed to collect $130 million 
in duties owed the United States under the U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws, and CBP failed to collect an additional $260 
million in fiscal year 2004. The majority of that $390 million is the 
result of uncollected duties on goods imported from China.
    What is CBP doing to solve this problem?
    Answer. CBP disburse annually all antidumping duties available from 
entries that have been finally liquidated to domestic petitioners. The 
disbursements are made within 60 days of the end of the fiscal year.
    CBP recognizes that imports of antidumping merchandise pose a 
financial risk to domestic industry. We share the concern regarding the 
lack of funds available for disbursement to domestic petitioners of 
antidumping duties. Therefore, CBP has instituted several aggressive 
actions to mitigate the collection risks going forward. We have a high 
degree of confidence that for entries received after the initiation of 
these new measures, the collection rate will improve.
  --Amendment to the Continuous Bond Guidelines.--As of July 9, 2004, 
        CBP has increased the continuous bond amount for importers of 
        agriculture/aquaculture products subject to antidumping cases. 
        The bonds will be set at a much higher rate, providing 
        additional coverage in the event that an importer defaults. The 
        new and proactive approach by CBP will provide the highest 
        level of protection against default and directly addresses 
        instances where the final liquidation rate is much higher than 
        the initial deposit rate made at time of entry.
  --Integration With Other Agencies.--CBP has recently begun working 
        with the Department of Treasury to address the financial risks 
        associated with sureties. Treasury conducts quarterly solvency 
        evaluations of sureties and provides approval of the sureties 
        to write customs bonds. By working together, we have developed 
        a mechanism by which CBP can provide Treasury with data about 
        sureties that are heavily weighted in ``high-risk'' 
        transactions, such as antidumping. Treasury will incorporate 
        this information in their solvency evaluation to mitigate the 
        risk of surety bankruptcy. In addition, CBP is closely working 
        with the Department of Commerce to find workable solutions to 
        the challenges we face in collecting antidumping duty.
  --Increased Monitoring of Imports.--CBP has taken measures to 
        increase the monitoring of entries of agriculture/aquaculture 
        products subject to antidumping duties. This monitoring 
        provides a means to ensure compliance with bonding 
        requirements, aids in the identity of surety risks, and helps 
        thwart circumvention attempts. The closer scrutiny allows CBP 
        to quickly identify new importers, particularly sham or shell 
        companies. The monitoring provides CBP with the opportunity to 
        raise bonds on these entities at once. By stepping up the 
        monitoring of agriculture/aquaculture imports, CBP is also in a 
        position to recognize shifts in patterns that may indicate 
        circumvention attempts.
    We believe that the new bonding methodology, working with other 
agencies, and closely monitoring imports will have a positive impact on 
the collections of antidumping duty, making more funds available for 
disbursement to the domestic industry.
    CBP has taken a number of steps to ensure that the appropriate 
antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) revenue is collected. 
CBP has initiated centralization of all AD/CVD continuous bond activity 
for the bond program under the Revenue Division, Office of Finance, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection in Indianapolis, Indiana. This 
establishes more uniform, consistent and effective management of 
continuous bonds involving AD/CVD. Also, AD/CVD bond formulas have been 
amended with an objective to minimize AD/CVD revenue losses as a result 
of bond insufficiency. The first commodity subject to this new bonding 
formula is shrimp.
    Question. Why is this problem of non-collection growing, and what 
is CBP doing to address it?
    Answer. Final liquidation for AD/CVD occurs several months, 
sometimes years after actual entry of the merchandise. The significant 
increase in uncollected antidumping duties seen in fiscal year 2003 
reflected the first series of liquidation instructions for cases 
covering the types of merchandise we now understand to be problematic 
for collection; agriculture/aquaculture merchandise. These liquidation 
instructions covered entries going back as far as 1997 and 1998. The 
increase in uncollected antidumping duties in fiscal year 2004 reflects 
the growth in imports that was seen in years after the initiation of 
the cases, particularly the crawfish case. CBP is confident that 
collection rates will increase for entries received after the 
implementation of the measures highlighted in above.
    CBP has taken several measures to maximize collection of AD/CVD 
revenue. Continuous bonds covering new AD/CVD merchandise are being 
managed as a part of the overall centralization of continuous bonds at 
the Revenue Division, Office of Finance, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection in Indianapolis, Indiana. Also, AD/CVD bond formulas have 
been amended with an objective to minimize AD/CVD revenue losses from 
bond insufficiency. However, uncollected revenue will occur as a result 
of entry activity during years prior to affecting these new measures. 
As an example, although the Revenue Division has processed over 25,000 
continuous bonds from the beginning of the centralization effort that 
began August 12, 2003, not one bond has been subject to a collection 
action. Collection action is dependent on liquidation of the formal 
entry summaries covered by the bond. Liquidations may occur up to 
several years following the initial entry date. In addition, the 
amended AD/CVD bonding formula currently covers only shrimp.
    Question. In past correspondence with my office, Commissioner 
Bonner indicated that CBP supported legislation that Senator Cochran 
and I introduced in the last Congress--and that we have reintroduced in 
the 109th Congress--to solve this problem of non-collection. That 
legislation, which passed the Senate unanimously last year, would 
require cash deposits instead of bonds in certain antidumping reviews. 
Would you be willing to express your support for this legislation 
directly to House Ways & Means Chairman Bill Thomas and other Members 
of the Congress, including the House leadership?
    Answer. The Department and CBP are taking steps necessary to 
collect appropriate duties and provide appropriate funds to U.S. 
companies and workers through the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act 
(CDSOA) disbursements. We agree that cash deposits in lieu of single-
entry bonds may provide greater coverage and are less of an 
administrative burden. We are taking steps to provide greater security 
for the collection of AD/CVD within the framework of existing 
legislation, and are working with the Department of Commerce to apply 
more innovated methods to address these and other risks from imports 
subject to antidumping and countervailing orders. We look forward to 
continuing to work with Congress on ways to improve our performance in 
this area.
    Question. As mentioned previously, in the past, U.S. industries 
like the U.S. crawfish industry have discovered only very late in the 
year that millions of dollars of antidumping duties for some reason 
have not been collected in their cases against Chinese imports as 
required by law. And, because CBP's failure to collect these duties has 
been discovered late in the year, the non-collection problem in these 
cases could not be addressed in time to enable the industries to obtain 
their yearly distribution of funds under the CDSOA. As a consequence, 
the U.S. crawfish industry, for example, last year failed to receive at 
least $54.4 million it otherwise would have received in duties paid the 
U.S. Government by Chinese importers. It is my understanding that CBP's 
Office of Information Technology (OIT) is fully capable of running an 
already existing program much earlier in each calendar year, (meaning 
by the end of March at the latest), which would enable both CBP and 
U.S. industries to learn, much earlier, if millions of dollars in 
duties are not being collected by CBP from U.S. importers of foreign, 
dumped products.
    Why can't CBP's OIT determine by the end of this month if there are 
cases in which CBP is not collecting duties owed the U.S. Government 
and make that information publicly available as early as possible?
    Answer. CBP has responded to the revenue risk posed by the 
inability to collect certain AD/CVD duties through several means, one 
of which is the monitoring the AD/CVD bills and collections on a more 
regular basis. For the distribution of these funds to take place 
timely, it is necessary not only to monitor the timely collection of 
AD/CVD duties but also to ensure our revenue collection system is 
protected from possible circumvention and corporate solvency schemes 
designed to enter AD/CVD goods into the U.S. market with the intention 
of never paying the proper duties at time of liquidation.
    On a monthly basis, CBP is performing a risk-based review of 
outstanding bills for AD/CVD duties. The information has proven 
effective in identifying high-risk companies for AD/CVD evasion as well 
as improves the timeliness of our reviews. CBP is also focused on the 
long-term issue of the company's financial solvency and their ability 
to pay outstanding AD/CVD bills. The continuous bond guidelines for 
imports of certain agriculture/aquaculture imports were amended in July 
2004 to address just such an issue. Working with the Department of 
Commerce, we are addressing the AD/CVD issues that pose the greatest 
risk.
    Question. Again, two of the problems that CBP has exhibited with 
respect to its administration of the CDSOA are (1) CBP failure to 
collect duties rightfully owed; and (2) its failure to pay duties 
already collected in a timely fashion to eligible U.S. companies and 
their workers. With respect to the second problem, CBP sometimes holds, 
in what are called ``clearing accounts,'' duties that are collected 
over many years--but for which the agency is awaiting final 
``liquidation instructions'' from the Commerce Department prior to 
distribution. Often, the Commerce Department claims that such 
instructions have been sent, but CBP does not know they have been sent 
or never receives them. It has been proposed that one solution to this 
problem would be for CBP to publish the amount of funds held in CBP's 
clearing accounts, by administrative review period, so that CBP and 
Commerce can work together to determine which funds should have been 
liquidated and be available for distribution to eligible U.S. 
producers. CBP, in certain circumstances, has provided such information 
to Members of Congress upon request, but has refused to provide such 
information generally.
    Will you commit to identifying (i.e., publishing) the amount of 
funds held in clearing accounts by administrative review period?
    Answer. The AD/CVD modules within the Automated Commercial System 
(ACS) do not provide information by administrative review periods; 
therefore, CBP cannot currently track entries in this manner. CBP has 
provided information of this type in certain circumstances through a 
manual review process. CBP is working towards including functionality 
in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) to identify and track AD/
CVD data to ensure timely and accurate liquidation.
    The OIG expressed concern about approximately one million entries 
suspended by CBP. As a result of this finding, CBP developed a plan to 
isolate those suspended entries that were beyond the normal timeframes 
of an AD/CVD case. Once identified, CBP worked with the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) to obtain liquidation instructions for these entries. To 
date, CBP has reduced the national inventory by 80,000 entries. CBP 
plans to continue to work with DOC to reduce the inventory 
substantially.
    In fiscal year 2005, CBP is concentrating on the liquidation of 
remaining AD/CVD entries entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended. 
This action will remove approximately 50,000 entries representing over 
$46 million in deposits on 222 cases from the ``official'' inventory. 
By the middle of fiscal year 2006, CBP plans to liquidate the remaining 
50,000 or so entries.
    Another reason that monies remain in the ``clearing accounts'' and 
are unavailable for distribution via CDSOA is the number of protests on 
bills issued by CBP. Payment of a protested bill is deferred until the 
protest decision is rendered. Currently, many protests of AD/CVD 
liquidations are suspended pending the final decision by the Federal 
Appeal Court on International Trading.
    Question. Will you commit similarly to identifying the reasons for 
the lack of liquidation in cases where liquidation has not occurred for 
more than 4 years, and provide specific information with respect to 
those cases showing the amounts that remain unliquidated accompanied by 
an explanation of CBP's understanding of why the amounts have not been 
liquidated?
    Answer. Again, the AD/CVD modules within the ACS do not provide 
information by administrative review periods; therefore, CBP cannot 
track entries this way. This functionality will be programmed into the 
ACE and should be available by the end of fiscal year 2007.
                                staffing
    Question. What was the CBP on-board strength (including AMO) on 
September 30, 2004? What was it on March 31, 2005? Provide the same 
data for the Border Patrol.
    Answer. Air and Marine Operations employees were not transferred to 
CBP until October 31, 2004. The attached chart therefore provides on-
board strength at two snapshots in time to reflect this transfer.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            October 2,
                                               2004        April 2, 2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Total CBP staffing

CBP total...............................          40,934          41,717

      Border patrol agent staffing

Border patrol Agents total \1\..........          10,817          10,859
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These amount are also included in the CBP totals above.

                          DETENTION FACILITIES

    Question. One of the primary functions of the Bureau of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is to serve as this country's interior 
line of defense by apprehending illegal entrants and detaining them 
pending the outcome of an administrative determination of their status. 
However I understand that ICE is considering closing the only secure, 
non-criminal detention center in New York City--the very site of the 
2001 terrorist attacks--because of an apparent decision to focus the 
bulk of the agencies efforts on only identified criminal aliens and 
other high-risk illegal immigrants. This concerns me greatly because I 
understand that the vast majority of the individuals detained at this 
New York City detention facility would be released on their own 
recognizance into the New York City area.
    Why is DHS proposing to close this detention facility in New York 
City? Is this because of a lack of funds? Are there not enough aliens 
needing to be detained which necessitates the closure of this facility?
    Answer. In a continuing effort to consolidate detention capacity 
where possible in order to increase operational efficiency, ICE has 
decided not to exercise the next available option to extend contract 
performance at the Queens CDF.
    The current contract was awarded to GEO on March 27, 2002. The 
Queens CDF provides detention housing and transportation of non-
criminal detainees in the custody of ICE. A significant population 
designated to the Queens CDF is comprised of asylum seekers apprehended 
at POEs in the New York area.
    The indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract includes a 
guaranteed minimum detainee population of 150 ($219.02 per manday) and 
a maximum capacity of 200 ($9.17 per manday exceeding 150 beds). The 
contract consists of a base year and 4-1 year options, exercised at the 
unilateral discretion of the government. The contract is currently 
performing within Option Year 2.
    A recent assessment determined that a substantial number of the 
population routinely designated to the Queens CDF could be adequately 
managed through a combination of bonds, orders of own recognizance, 
and/or the increased use of alternatives to detention (e.g., electronic 
monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.). All non-detention options will 
be applied based on established ICE standards. The remaining population 
requiring detention can be consolidated into substantially lower cost 
detention capacity available to ICE via commercial contracts and 
agreements with local government service providers. Other efficiencies 
will accrue from the consolidation of detainees, staff, the 
administrative hearing process, support programs, etc. These increased 
efficiencies will permit ICE to apply funds toward detaining higher 
priority cases.
    It should also be noted that various non-governmental organizations 
have previously expressed concern regarding conditions of confinement 
at the Queens facility (See February 8, 2005 CIRF report, ``Report on 
Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal).
    Utilizing all available options to manage the non-criminal alien 
population apprehended in the New York area and consolidating the 
population requiring detention into lower cost facilities, will result 
in improved efficiency in the ICE detention program.
    Question. I understand that ICE makes an initial determination as 
to the level of risk of the illegal alien and that such a determination 
often is conducted at the point of entry which, in the case of this 
facility, is JFK International Airport.
    How often does ICE make an initial determination that an individual 
is a ``low-risk'' illegal immigrant and then, after further 
investigation, determine that the individual should have been 
classified as ``high-risk?''
    Answer. The law enforcement databases used to track alien detention 
do not allow for us to determine the number of aliens who were 
initially considered ``low risk'' and are then later considered ``high 
risk''. These categories are used as guidelines in making the detention 
decision, but are not recorded as such in these databases.
    Question. I believe these non-criminal detention facilities serve 
several purposes, one of the most important of which is holding those 
potentially high-risk individuals who fall through the cracks during 
the initial screening and who initially are misclassified as low-risk. 
Furthermore, I believe that facilities such as the one in New York City 
serve a very important deterrent effect. I understand that JFK Airport 
was a popular entry point for illegal immigrants prior to the opening 
of this New York City detention facility.
    Does DHS believe that these types of facilities serve a deterrent 
effect and, more importantly, serve to catch high-risk individuals who 
might slip through the initial screening process?
    Answer. Detention and removal are deterrents to illegal 
immigration. However, detention resources must be effectively managed 
to ensure that secure capacity is available to accommodate cases 
according to our detention priority continuum. It has been determined 
that a substantial number of the population routinely designated to the 
Queens CDF could be adequately managed through a combination of bonds, 
orders of own recognizance, and/or the increased use of alternatives to 
detention (e.g., electronic monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.). 
All non-detention options will be applied based on established ICE 
standards. The remaining population requiring detention will be 
consolidated into substantially lower cost detention capacity available 
to ICE via commercial contracts and agreements with local government 
service providers. Other efficiencies will accrue from the 
consolidation of detainees, staff, the administrative hearing process, 
and support programs. These increased efficiencies will result in 
savings that can be applied to other immigration enforcement 
activities.
    Question. Given the importance of these types of facilities, how 
can DHS justify their closure in New York City, especially when the 
only other facility in the general vicinity is designed to hold 
criminal aliens and which I understand operates at or near capacity?
    Answer. A recent assessment determined that a substantial number of 
the population routinely designated to the Queens CDF can be adequately 
managed through a combination of bonds, orders of own recognizance, 
and/or the increased use of alternatives to detention (e.g., electronic 
monitoring; telephonic reporting, etc.). All non-detention options will 
be applied based on established ICE national standards. The remaining 
population requiring detention can be consolidated into substantially 
lower cost detention capacity available to ICE via commercial contracts 
and agreements with local government service providers. All cases 
requiring detention will be designated to appropriate conditions of 
confinement. Efficiencies will accrue from the consolidation of 
detainees, staff, the administrative hearing process, and support 
programs. ICE can use the savings from these increased efficiencies to 
detain higher priority cases.

                    MEASURES FOR DETERMINING BUDGETS

    Question. What is the ratio or other measurement by which ICE 
determines how many detention beds are required in a given year? For 
instance, is there a ratio or determination made such that if one 
assumes that one Border Patrol agent is responsible for x apprehensions 
of illegal aliens then there is a need for y detention beds? And is 
there a similar ratio or measurement between the amount of bed space 
required because of the investigation success rate of ICE immigration 
investigators?
    Answer. The Department is working aggressively to develop a 
comprehensive border control strategy that responds more effectively to 
alien apprehensions and the overall flow of illegal crossings. As 
fundamental improvements to the system are implemented through this 
strategy, we will implement systematic modeling that can more 
accurately link resources with apprehensions and other measures of 
demand.

                          WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

    Question. For Worksite Enforcement, how does ICE determine how it 
will focus its resources? For example, which areas or industries will 
be targeted?
    Answer. Since September 11, 2001, ICE Worksite Enforcement 
activities have focused primarily on removing unauthorized workers from 
critical infrastructure facilities to reduce the risk of terrorist 
attack from insiders. ICE Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
operations are generally initiated at the local level and are based 
upon factors such as the type and number of infrastructure facilities 
present in each Special Agent-in-Charge jurisdiction (seaports, 
airports, military bases, defense contractors, nuclear plants, etc.) 
and upon specific or general threat information received from various 
intelligence sources, the general public, and from other law 
enforcement agencies.
    ICE Worksite Enforcement activities also target criminal employers 
whose violations have a nexus to human smuggling, immigration document 
or benefit fraud, and worker exploitation. The authorities being 
enforced generally include one or more of the civil and/or criminal 
provisions of INA 274A (Unlawful Employment of Aliens). Many criminal 
employer investigations also result in the charging of violations 
relating to harboring, smuggling, and document fraud. The fiscal year 
2006 Budget includes an increase of $18 million and an additional 140 
agents to support the Temporary Worker Program.

                              CYBER CRIMES

    Question. For fiscal year 2005, Congress provided $4.2 million for 
additional cyber crime forensic infrastructure and expansion of the 
Cyber Crime Center to ICE field offices. What is the status of this 
effort?
    Answer. This funding provides for the creation of a wide area 
storage network for the ICE Computer Forensic Program. Upon award, disk 
storage arrays will be installed in four or five (final numbers are 
contingent upon final pricing) ICE field offices to provide storage for 
digital evidence under examination.
    The ICE Cyber Crime Center has conducted a thorough market and 
technical analysis and is in the final stages of making a vendor 
selection.
    An inter-agency agreement has been established with the U.S. Bureau 
of Public Debt (BPD) to utilize their existing IT procurement vehicle 
to make the contract award. The statement of work and performance work 
standard documents have been forwarded to BPD on August 18, 2005. It is 
anticipated that the contract will be awarded to TKC Communications of 
Fairfax, VA, an Alaskan native corporation, shortly. Once awarded, site 
surveys, selection, and installations will begin in earnest.
    Question. Have any of these funds been obligated?
    Answer. None of the $4.2 million has been obligated.
    Question. Have any additional personnel been hired?
    Answer. No additional personnel will be hired with the $4.2 
million.
    Question. To which field offices, if any, will the Center expand?
    Answer. This answer contains infomrmation considered Law 
Enforcement Sensitive and has been provided to the Committee under 
separate cover.

                           PASSENGER AIR FEES

    Question. The Administration's budget for DHS proposes a 
significant increase to the security fee passengers pay by more than 
doubling the cost for the first leg of a flight from $2.50 to $5.50. 
These fee collections, if approved, would be used to pay for 
approximately 83 percent of the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the 
Transportation Security Administration. According to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), this proposal would generate $1.680 billion in 
additional funding for fiscal year 2006.
    Will a legislative proposal be sent to the authorizing committees 
with jurisdiction over this issue, and if so, when?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget provided a 
legislative proposal to modify this fee authority. In Title V--General 
Provisions, the proposal states, ``SEC. 517. In Chapter 449 of title 
49, United States Code, section 44940(c) is amended by striking `$2.50' 
and replacing it with `$5.50', and striking `$5.00' and replacing it 
with `$8.00'.'' This modification to the fee authority would allow TSA 
to implement the fee increases sought in the President's fiscal year 
2006 Budget. TSA will work with the Appropriations Committees of the 
House and the Senate, as well as the appropriate authorizing committees 
in both bodies, to ensure enactment of the proposed security service 
fee increase.
    Question. Second, if the proposed fee is not approved, will the 
Secretary urge the President to submit a budget amendment to fill the 
$1.7 billion funding gap?
    Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry, 
passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is 
sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity 
of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is 
intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from 
the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work 
with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.
    Question. Finally, what programs and activities does the Department 
propose be cut if the fee increase is not authorized by Congress?
    Answer. The sharing of aviation screening costs between industry, 
passengers, and Government is essential to ensure that there is 
sufficient funding for existing and emerging threats to the integrity 
of the aviation security infrastructure. The proposed increase is 
intended to shift the burden of paying aviation screening services from 
the general taxpayer to the airline passenger. The Department will work 
with Congress to ensure that security priorities are met.

                               AIR CARGO

    Question. Public Law 108-458, which was signed into law by the 
President on December 17, 2004, included an authorization for $100 
million in fiscal year 2006 to accelerate the development of 
technologies to screen air cargo. The Administration's budget proposes 
that air cargo screening technology development be funded through the 
Science and Technology directorate, but funding is cut by $45 million 
from last year and funding is $70 million below the amount authorized 
in the Intelligence Reform Act. How is a cut of this magnitude 
justified? Has there been a break through in the development of 
detection technology for air cargo that justifies the proposed cut?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget transfers $109 
million in R&D funds from TSA to the S&T Directorate. Of this amount, 
$29.578 million is dedicated to projects that will address air cargo 
screening capabilities. TSA retains $23 million in its fiscal year 2006 
request to continue analyzing EDS products emerging from the Phoenix 
Phase II R&D program, piloting passenger screening projects, including 
next generation trace portal and automated checkpoint EDS, continuing 
EDS cargo break bulk evaluation, and conducting cargo technology field 
evaluations for field experiments.
    The S&T Directorate does not plan to fund consolidated air cargo 
technology development outside those efforts captured by our broad R&D 
program, or captured in other efforts within the directorate, such as 
RFID technology, unless air cargo pilots demonstrate the need and 
utility in specific cases, and focus instead on break-bulk inspection. 
Given a break-bulk inspection paradigm, the same technologies being 
explored for package or luggage inspection apply to cargo screening--
and thus it is straightforward to include consideration of any specific 
requirements, e.g., size and throughput, into our broad R&D program.
    With the fiscal year 2006 R&D funds, the S&T Directorate plans to 
conduct broad R&D that is applicable across the spectrum of baggage, 
package, and cargo screening. The S&T Directorate estimates that the 
funding required in fiscal year 2006 to complete the assessment of the 
efficacy of specific existing methodologies for particular cargo 
commodities, and to test screening procedures in the laboratory would 
be approximately $5 million. The Phoenix project is aimed at reducing 
false alarm probabilities in EDS systems, which is clearly beneficial 
to both baggage and package inspection. Other relevant RDT&E efforts 
within the aviation explosives detection efforts include 
nanotechnology-based sensors, CT array-based imaging (as opposed to 
rotating scans), and improved trace systems. Some of the TSA R&D 
projects funded in fiscal year 2005 will continue into fiscal year 2006 
through completion of prototypes. These projects may continue to be 
funded by the S&T Directorate if they meet certain criteria, 
particularly in the area of break-bulk inspections.
    Question. Public Law 108-458 authorizes $200 million per year for 
TSA to improve aviation security related to the transportation of cargo 
on both passenger aircraft and all-cargo aircraft. Why doesn't the 
fiscal year 2006 request include additional funding for air cargo 
security?
    Answer. TSA's request for air cargo resources is at an appropriate 
level to ensure air cargo security and recognizes non-recurring system 
development costs while at the same time meeting all of the necessary 
transportation security priorities.
    Question. Are there plans to increase the number of inspectors?
    Answer. TSA currently employs 196 cargo inspectors. Three others 
have been selected and are in the final stages of the hiring process.
    Question. Is TSA satisfied with 200 air cargo inspectors?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request is a 
reflection of the resources required to ensure air cargo security and 
recognizes non-recurring system development costs while at the same 
time meeting all of the necessary transportation security priorities. 
Going forward, TSA will evaluate the needs and resources available to 
determine whether additional inspectors would be appropriate.

                           PRE-PACKAGED NEWS

    Question. On March 16, the Washington Post printed an editorial 
entitled Viewer Beware. The editorial questioned the use of government-
packaged and government funded news reports to look and sound like 
regular television reports. The editorial stated ``Although this 
Administration apparently isn't the first to use video news releases, 
it seems more enamored of them than its predecessors. For example: A 
spot commissioned by the Transportation Security Administration lauds 
``another success'' in the Bush Administration's drive to strengthen 
aviation security,'' which the reporter describes as ``one of the most 
remarkable campaigns in aviation history.'' Unbeknownst to the viewer, 
the so called reporter was no reporter at all. She was a contractor 
hired by TSA. This type of pre-packaged reporting has occurred in other 
agencies as well, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(ONDCP) and the Department of Health and Human Services.
    In every year since 1951, Congress has included a provision in the 
general government appropriations act which states the following: ``No 
part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be 
used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not 
heretofore authorized by Congress.''
    In recent cases involving prepackaged news stories by ONDCP and the 
Department of Health and Human Services, GAO concluded that those 
prepackaged news stories violated the publicity or propaganda 
prohibition. GAO did not receive a request to review the TSA story, but 
it was developed in a similar manner.
    The Senate recently approved by a vote of 98-0 an amendment to the 
emergency supplemental to prohibit Federal funding of pre-packaged news 
stories unless the story includes a notification that it was created 
and funded by a Federal agency.
    Do you agree that pre-packaged news segments produced by any DHS 
office should include a clear notification to the audience that the 
story was prepared or funded by that Federal agency?
    Answer. DHS has a unique responsibility to provide Americans with 
important information they can use to be prepared for disasters, 
terrorist attacks or even to better navigate security procedures at our 
airports and ports-of-entry. Video news releases can serve as one tool 
for accomplishing this objective. We agree with the Administration's 
previously articulated position that Federal agencies should be open 
about their activities and that DHS-produced Video News Releases (VNRs) 
should be clearly marked.

                    SCREENING WORKFORCE PERFORMANCE

    Question. The DHS Inspector General recently released results of an 
audit on Transportation Security Administration screener performance.
    The IG's audit indicated that the problems will most likely persist 
without greater use of new technology. The IG recommended that the TSA 
administrator aggressively pursue the development and deployment of 
innovations and improvements such as the backscatter x-ray and 
explosive trace detection portals to help the screener workforce better 
detect weapons and explosives. However, the Department's fiscal year 
2006 budget actually reduces the amount of money included for Next-
Generation explosive detection systems from $54 million to $49 million 
and significantly below the $100 million authorized in the Intelligence 
Reform Act.
    In light if the sobering results of the IG audit, how can you 
justify reducing the amount of funding for the development and 
deployment of innovative detection technologies?
    Answer. The TSA recognizes that additional resources must be 
devoted to address this critical vulnerability and improve the 
effectiveness of checkpoint screening. As it relates to deployment, TSA 
will have the ability to screen elevated risk passengers for explosives 
at all passenger checkpoints by January 2006. TSA will devote a total 
of $100 million to this initiative in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. In 
fiscal year 2005 TSA received $28.3 million to field emerging 
technology equipment at checkpoints. For fiscal year 2006, TSA is 
requesting a total of $72 million (an increase of $43.7 million over 
the fiscal year 2005 base amount) for emerging checkpoint explosives 
technology. In fiscal year 2005, TSA devoted $54 million for research 
and development (R&D) on Next Generation Explosives Detection Systems 
(EDS). The fiscal year 2006 Budget proposes to transfer TSA's R&D 
function to the S&T Directorate.

                          TSA SPENDING ABUSES
 
   Question. The DHS Inspector General recently released a report that 
highlighted a laundry list of disturbing financial purchases relating 
to the creation of the Transportation Security Operations Center. For 
instance, $252,000 was spent on artwork, $30,000 was spent on expensive 
silk plants, money was used to buy leather brief cases and coffee pots, 
and over $83,000 in overpayments remains unaccounted for. There are 
even seven kitchens in the building for just 79 Federal employees 
located there. This report follows on the heels of the IG's findings 
last year that TSA provided excessive bonuses to its executives.
    In response to these findings, A TSA spokesman said that ``a new 
management structure'' has been put in place ``to strengthen its 
acquisition program to ensure responsible stewardship of taxpayer 
dollars.'' Please explain in detail what steps have been taken to 
change TSA's management structure to prevent such abuses from 
continuing.
    Answer. Since its inception, TSA has worked to develop and 
implement a more responsive and robust acquisition program based on 
sound business management practices. The elevation of the Office of 
Acquisition within the agency is a key indicator of our commitment. 
Since the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) lease 
process was initiated, the Office of Acquisition has been elevated to 
the Assistant Administrator level, equivalent to the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) rather than as a sub-program within the CFO's office. In 
late 2003, the Office of Acquisition stood up an Acquisition and 
Program Management Support division to focus on certifying, training, 
and providing day-to-day assistance to and for TSA's program managers. 
Well over 1,200 TSA employees have been trained to date in key 
acquisition topics and the Program Management certification program is 
robust.
    At the beginning of fiscal year 2005, TSA took the following steps 
to help strengthen and mature its acquisition program in four key 
areas.
  --Continue to support the TSA mission with efficient, expeditious, 
        and accurate contracts. TSA recognizes that the agency's 
        ability to attract, recruit, and retain qualified acquisition 
        personnel to support contracts is critical to fulfilling its 
        mission. Initial staffing in the Office of Acquisition was 
        barely adequate to award contracts in time to meet 
        Congressional deadlines, much less commence good business 
        processes. Over the past year, TSA has raised the Office of 
        Acquisition's staff ceiling by nearly 30 percent. Additionally, 
        a percentage of TSA's budget has been earmarked for contract 
        oversight, which includes support from the Defense Contract 
        Audit Agency and Defense Contract Management Command, and 
        independent contractor support.
  --Significantly improve acquisition and program planning. The Office 
        of Acquisition is focused on strengthening the program planning 
        function. The office developed and now coordinates an 
        Investment Review Board process that drives successful program 
        decisions by providing direct subject matter expert support to 
        program managers. Additionally, the office provides direct 
        support to program offices to assist them in developing sound 
        acquisition and program strategies.
  --Significantly improve program management and administration. Well-
        trained, certified program managers are fundamental to robust 
        acquisition programs. These managers were, initially, in short 
        supply at TSA. To address immediate knowledge gaps in key 
        areas, the Office of Acquisition rolled out a set of workshops 
        in October 2003. In early 2004, TSA worked with DHS to 
        implement a Program Management certification program and the 
        first TSA applications were received in June of 2004. Moreover, 
        the Office of Acquisition developed a Management Directive 
        regarding acquisition planning, review, and reporting that 
        significantly tightens up the overall process.
  --Build and mature the TSA acquisition infrastructure. TSA is focused 
        on these two infrastructure areas: human resources and systems.
    Human Resources.--In addition to increased staff, the Office of 
Acquisition is developing a longer-term strategic human capital plan to 
manage recruitment and retention issues, provide for career 
development, and succession planning. The plan will provide a roadmap 
for strengthening the current workforce (training, communication, 
professional development), as well as outline strategies to recruit 
highly qualified individuals and manage attrition. Simply put, the 
strategy will outline a plan to develop the right people with the right 
knowledge and skills for each of TSA's acquisition programs.
    Systems.--On the systems level, TSA is implementing PRISM, an 
integrated finance and procurement system which will streamline and 
strengthen our processes and integrate acquisition with finance and 
asset management.

                            AIR CARRIER FEES

    Question. The Government Accountability Office recently estimated 
that 2000 passenger and property screening costs incurred by air 
carriers was $448 million, $129 million less than what the air carriers 
paid to TSA. What plan of action will be taken by TSA as a result of 
GAO's estimates?
    Answer. In the Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, (Public 
Law 108-334) Congress directed the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to determine how much air carriers spent on security screening in 
2000--the basis for the fee imposed on airlines. GAO completed its 
review and issued a report on April 18, 2005. The report concludes that 
the amount of the industry-wide passenger and property screening costs 
was between $425 million and $471 million, with a midpoint estimate of 
$448 million. The midpoint difference between what is collected now and 
what GAO indicates should be collected is $129 million. However, GAO's 
estimate did not include certain cost categories (e.g.; real estate, 
CAPPS, and positive bag match) due to the unavailability of information 
within the timeframe provided. The cost of these items could be 
significant. The TSA is currently reviewing all the findings of the 
report and developing a suitable overall implementation strategy for 
the air carrier fee.

                       SECTION 605 OF VISION 100

    Question. The TSA budget proposes to defer use of allocation 
formulas required by Section 605 of Vision 100. Please provide a list, 
by airport, of all requests for assistance under the allocation formula 
program versus funding provided via Section 605. This list should 
distinguish between large hub airports, medium hub airports, and small 
hub airports.
    Answer. TSA has received a number of requests from airports for 
funding to support construction of, or reimbursement for, in-line 
checked baggage screening solutions. Below is a list of the airports 
that have made these requests:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Airports that have requested
                                           funding for an Inline System   Category              Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BWI......................................  Baltimore-Washington                  L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
DCA......................................  Ronald Reagan Washington              L   ...........................
                                            National Airport.
DTW......................................  Detroit International                 L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
EWR......................................  Newark International Airport          L   ...........................
FLL......................................  Ft. Lauderdale-Hollywood              L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
HNL......................................  Honolulu International                L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
IAD......................................  Washington-Dulles                     L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
IAH......................................  George Bush Houston                   L   ...........................
                                            Intercontinental Airport.
JFK......................................  John F. Kennedy                       L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
LGA......................................  LaGuardia Airport...........          L   ...........................
MCO......................................  Orlando International                 L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
MDW......................................  Chicago Midway International          L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
MIA......................................  Miami International Airport.          L   ...........................
MSP......................................  Minneapolis-St. Paul                  L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
OAK......................................  Metropolitan Oakland                  L   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
ORD......................................  Chicago O'Hare International          L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
PHL......................................  Philadelphia International            L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
SAN......................................  San Diego International               L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
SFO......................................  San Francisco International           L   ...........................
                                            Airport (reimbursement).
SLC......................................  Salt Lake City International          L   ...........................
                                            Airport.
TPA......................................  Tampa International Airport.          L   Current in-line system
ANC......................................  Anchorage International               M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
BDL......................................  Bradley International                 M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
BNA......................................  Nashville International               M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
CLE......................................  Cleveland-Hopkins                     M   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
MCI......................................  Kansas City International             M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
MKE......................................  General Mitchell Milwaukee            M   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
OGG......................................  Kahului Airport Maui........          M   ...........................
PDX......................................  Portland International                M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
PVD......................................  Providence T F Green State            M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
RSW......................................  Southwest Florida Fort Myers          M   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
SAT......................................  San Antonio International             M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
SJC......................................  San Jose International                M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
SMF......................................  Sacramento International              M   ...........................
                                            Airport.
SNA......................................  Orange County John Wayne              M   Current in-line system
                                            Airport.
BIS......................................  Bismark Municipal Airport...          N   ...........................
LNK......................................  Lincoln Municipal Airport...          N   ...........................
ACY......................................  Atlantic City International           S   ...........................
                                            Airport.
GEG......................................  Spokane International                 S   ...........................
                                            Airport.
GPT......................................  Gulfport-Biloxi                       S   ...........................
                                            International Airport.
MDT......................................  Harrisburg International              S   Current in-line system
                                            Airport.
PSP......................................  Palm Springs International            S
                                            Airport.
TLH......................................  Tallahassee Regional Airport          S   ...........................
VPS......................................  Okaloosa Regional Airport...          S   ...........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category: small (s), medium (m), large (l) or non-hub (n).

                             BASE DECREASES

    Question. On page 38 of the TSA budget request, there is a 
reduction of $15.9 million for ``management and technology 
efficiencies'' and a reduction of $53.9 million for a ``base 
realignment adjustment.'' There is no additional justification or 
information relating to those reductions. Provide a detailed 
justification for those decreases including a list of all management 
and technology efficiencies and how realigning the base saves $53.9 
million.
    Answer. The attached spreadsheet provides a detailed explanation of 
program reductions and base adjustments that resulted in $53.9 million 
in savings.



               EMERGING CHECKPOINT EXPLOSIVES TECHNOLOGY

    Question. For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, provide a deployment 
schedule, including the identification and cost of the technology 
acquired, the manufacturer of the technology, and the airports at which 
the technology has been or will be deployed.
    Answer. The following list of airports (Fig. 1) will have 
checkpoint Explosives Detection Trace Portals deployed by January 2006. 
TSA is deploying the systems concurrently, therefore the list does not 
reflect any sort of priority. The timing for deployment between now 
through January 2006 will depend on the results of site surveys that 
are currently underway and the production capabilities of the vendor.
    TSA will be purchasing two different portals, the GE Ion Track 
Entry Scan and the Smiths Sentinel, and the results of the site surveys 
will help TSA determine which of the two technologies is best suited 
for each of the airports listed. TSA is planning to purchase equal 
numbers of each of the two products.
    In fiscal year 2005, TSA received $28.3 million to field emerging 
technology equipment at checkpoints. For fiscal year 2006, TSA is 
requesting a total of $72 million (an increase of $43.7 million over 
the fiscal year 2005 base amount) for emerging checkpoint explosives 
technology.
    In support of checked baggage screening, the following list of 
airports (Fig. 2) will have the Reveal Technologies CT-80 deployed by 
January 2006. Like the checkpoint Explosives Trace Detection Portal, 
TSA's intent is to deploy the CT-80s concurrently, therefore this list 
does not reflect any sort of priority. The timing for deployment 
between now through January 2006 will depend on the results of site 
surveys that are currently underway and the production capabilities of 
the vendor. Consistent with the direction provided in the Homeland 
Security Appropriations Act, 2005, $30 million will be spent for 
purchase and installation of this capability.

                FIG.1--EXPLOSIVES DETECTION TRACE PORTALS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Airport
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATL.......................................  Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta
                                             International
BOS.......................................  Boston Logan International
BWI.......................................  Baltimore/Washington
                                             International
CLE.......................................  Cleveland-Hopkins
                                             International
CLT.......................................  Charlotte/Douglas
                                             International
CMH.......................................  Port Columbus International
CVG.......................................  Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
                                             International
DCA.......................................  Ronald Reagan Washington
                                             National
DEN.......................................  Denver International
DFW.......................................  Dallas/Ft. Worth
                                             International
DTW.......................................  Detroit Metropolitan Wayne
                                             County
EWR.......................................  Newark Liberty International
FLL.......................................  Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood
                                             International
HNL.......................................  Honolulu International
IAD.......................................  Washington Dulles
                                             International
IAH.......................................  Houston Intercontinental
IND.......................................  Indianapolis International
JFK.......................................  John F. Kennedy
                                             International
LAS.......................................  McCarran International
LAX.......................................  Los Angeles International
LGA.......................................  LaGuardia International
MCI.......................................  Kansas City International
MCO.......................................  Orlando International
MDW.......................................  Chicago Midway International
MIA.......................................  Miami International
MSP.......................................  Minneapolis-St. Paul
                                             International
OAK.......................................  Metropolitan Oakland
                                             International
ORD.......................................  Chicago O'Hare International
PBI.......................................  Palm Beach International
PDX.......................................  Portland International
PHL.......................................  Philadelphia International
PHX.......................................  Phoenix/Sky Harbor
                                             International
PIT.......................................  Pittsburgh International
RDU.......................................  Raleigh-Durham International
SEA.......................................  Seattle-Tacoma International
SFO.......................................  San Francisco International
SJU.......................................  Luis Munoz Marin
                                             International
SMF.......................................  Sacramento International
SNA.......................................  John Wayne Airport-Orange
                                             County
STL.......................................  Lambert-St. Louis
                                             International
TPA.......................................  Tampa International
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  FIGURE 2.--REVEAL TECHNOLOGIES CT-80
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Airport
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABE.......................................  Lehigh Valley International
ACY.......................................  Atlantic City International
ALB.......................................  Albany International
BGR.......................................  Bangor International
BIL.......................................  Billings Logan International
BTV.......................................  Burlington International
CHS.......................................  Charleston AFB/International
ELP.......................................  El Paso International
EYW.......................................  Key West International
FAI.......................................  Fairbanks International
GPT.......................................  Gulfport-Biloxi
                                             International
GSP.......................................  Greenville-Spartanburg
                                             International
HGR.......................................  Hagerstown Regional-Richard
                                             A Henson Field
HPN.......................................  Westchester County
HSV.......................................  Huntsville International-
                                             Carl T Jones Field
ISP.......................................  Long Island MacArthur
LGB.......................................  Long Beach/Daugherty Field
MRY.......................................  Monterey Peninsula
OMA.......................................  Eppley Airfield
ORF.......................................  Norfolk International
PIE.......................................  St. Petersburg-Clearwater
                                             International
RNO.......................................  Reno/Tahoe International
ROC.......................................  Greater Rochester
                                             International
SWF.......................................  Stewart International
SYR.......................................  Syracuse Hancock
                                             International
TYS.......................................  McGhee Tyson
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Has the checkpoint technology that has been deployed been 
verified by the Science & Technology Directorate?
    Answer. TSA works closely with the S&T Directorate and discusses 
its ongoing R&D efforts to ensure the S&T Directorate is not only aware 
of but supports TSA's efforts related to technology development.
    hazardous materials endorsement for commerical driver's license
    Question. On January 13, 2005 a final rule was published in the 
Federal Register which established a fee for individuals who apply for 
or renew a hazardous materials endorsement for a commercial driver's 
license. According to the final rule, TSA intends to use fees collected 
under this rule to pay for the costs of the security threat assessments 
and the costs of collection and transmission of finger prints and 
biographical information.
    Please provide the committee with an estimate of the amount of 
money these new fees are expected to bring in.
    Answer. By law, the fees for individuals who apply for or renew a 
hazardous materials endorsement for a commercial driver's license 
cannot be collected in excess of the expenses to run the program. 
Accordingly, the program is expected to cost about $9 million in fiscal 
year 2005 and approximately $28 million in fiscal year 2006. The 
original fiscal year 2006 estimate of $44 million was adjusted mainly 
due to the change in the estimated HAZMAT applicant population.

                           PRIVATE SCREENERS

    Question. The budget proposes an increase of $15 million to 
continue the privatized screening contracts at the current service 
levels. Explain why an additional $15 million is necessary when, 
currently, only one airport has applied for a private screening 
workforce. Does TSA still anticipate the current number of airports 
participating in privatized screening contracts to remain the same?
    Answer. As of May 2005, the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) had 
received a total of seven applications, which includes the original 
contract screening pilot program (PP5) airports (San Francisco, Kansas 
City, Rochester, Jackson Hole and Tupelo), and two new airports (Elko, 
Nevada and Sioux Falls, South Dakota).
    In directing TSA to establish PP5, ATSA required that the level of 
screening services and protection provided at the PP5 airports be equal 
to or greater than the level provided at an airport with Federal 
screeners. Similarly, contract screeners must receive compensation and 
other benefits that are not less than the compensation and other 
benefits provided to Federal personnel. In accordance with these 
requirements, TSA strives for a level playing field between airports 
with private contract screeners under PP5 and the SPP and airports with 
Federal screeners. Consequently, as each airport considers whether to 
continue with Federal screening or to apply for the SPP, it can base 
its decision on its own preferences and criteria rather than 
considerations of security, resources, or level or service.
    The additional $15 million requested is reflective of the increased 
cost of providing screening services at the levels required under ATSA. 
TSA is not funding services in addition to those provided in previous 
years except where consistent with changes in the Standard Operating 
Procedure made effective throughout the Nation's commercial aviation 
system.
    In fiscal year 2005, a reprogramming increase of $23 million was 
made to support the cost of providing PP5 airports with the level of 
screening required for all commercial airports under ATSA. This 
reprogramming supported increased insurance premium costs for worker's 
compensation, terrorism and health insurance premiums, ATSA-guaranteed 
screener pay parity, and operational requirements relating to 
flexibilities granted to contractors in the areas of recruitment, 
hiring, and training.
    Question. Are any of the airports currently participating planning 
or considering opting out of the private screening program?
    Answer. TSA has received applications from all five private 
screening pilot airports to participate in the SPP.
    Question. Are other airports not currently participating in the 
program planning to opt in?
    Answer. While several airports have expressed interest to TSA about 
participating in the SPP, to date, only Elko Regional Airport and Sioux 
Falls Regional Airport have formally applied.

            FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REPAIR STATION INSPECTIONS

    Question. The budget request includes $6 million for Foreign and 
Domestic Repair Station Inspection Operations. Does TSA have a schedule 
to inspect the 664 Foreign and Domestic Repair Stations? If so, provide 
the schedule to the Committee.
    Answer. TSA has developed a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
that will increase security at both foreign and domestic repair 
stations. The NPRM is currently under Departmental review and is 
expected to be released for public comment in late summer of 2005. The 
agency has not yet developed a firm schedule for auditing all foreign 
repair stations. TSA is currently developing a survey document that 
will be sent to repair stations to assess their operations. This effort 
will assist in determining which repair stations pose the greatest 
potential risk and should be given priority for audits. TSA is also 
developing the necessary assessment tools for use by the inspectors 
during their visits to repair stations.
    TSA fully expects to have developed the assessment tools necessary 
for the auditing effort by the time the final rule for repair station 
security is released, which TSA expects to occur by spring 2006. The 
actual schedule of audits will be dependent upon the initial survey of 
repair stations, which will begin as soon as the final rule is 
released.
    Question. Is $6 million and 31 FTE the full amount necessary to 
inspect all Foreign and Domestic Repair Stations and the domestic 
maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities in the United States? If 
not, how much is needed to comply with ``Vision 100?''
    Answer. TSA would like to note that the $6 million and 31 FTE are 
earmarked solely for audits of foreign repair stations, of which there 
are approximately 650. There are approximately 4,500 repair stations in 
the United States, and current plans are to cover domestic audits with 
the existing force of Aviation Security Inspectors (ASI). Approximately 
950 ASIs are presently assigned to geographical areas across the United 
States and inspect all facets of regulated aviation assets, not just 
repair stations.
    The hiring projection with the $6 million requested in the fiscal 
year 2006 Budget is 12 inspectors, one program manager, and one program 
analyst. It is anticipated that additional foreign repair station 
inspectors, plus a manager and analyst, will be hired over a three-year 
time period. The hiring and operating projection costs of the program 
for its second and third years will be more accurately approximated 
after TSA assesses the costs of the initial year of the program.

                                TSA R&D

    Question. The budget proposes to consolidate TSA R&D activities 
within the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate. However, only $109 
million is proposed for fiscal year 2006 within the S&T budget. TSA's 
budget maintains $23 million for operation R&D activities, such as 
pilot projects. Please explain why the program is proposed to be cut by 
$46 million and what impact that would have on ongoing R&D activities 
and those planned prior to the transfer proposal.
    Answer. The $46 million consists of the following reductions: $25 
million from Air Cargo R&D and $21 million from Explosives Detection 
Equipment (EDS) R&D. The reductions are appropriate given maturing 
technology in both areas, which, for example, will result in the 
deployment of Explosive Detection Trace Portals to 41 airports by the 
end of January 2006.
    Overall, the reductions will have minimal effect on the R&D 
activities that would have been undertaken by TSA because those 
activities were budgeted by TSA and included in the proposed amount of 
$109 million.

                          REGISTERED TRAVELER

    Question. Last year, TSA indicated that, assuming there was 
sufficient national interest in the program, the $15 million provided 
in fiscal year 2005 would be used for start-up operational costs and 
future funding would be generated by fees incurred by participants. 
What is the amount anticipated in fiscal year 2006 from offsetting 
collections?
    Answer. TSA envisions a fully operational RT Pilot Program to be 
fee funded. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget proposal includes 
$22.5 million from potential offsetting collections for RT, which was 
consolidated into the proposed SCO. However, TSA will need to implement 
a fee rule to accept fees for RT.
    Question. What is the timeline and deployment schedule for 
implementing this program beyond the pilot stage?
    Answer. Through a series of concurrent stand-alone pilots, TSA has 
been aggressively testing the RT concept of running threat assessment 
and identity verification checks on eligible volunteers in order to 
provide them with an expedited clearance through security checkpoints. 
TSA is currently running successful programs at five Federally managed 
pilot sites (Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Houston, Boston, and Washington, 
D.C.), which are scheduled to be completed in September 2005. TSA is 
concurrently working with the GOAA to launch a sub-pilot at Orlando 
International Airport in summer 2005 that will assess the feasibility 
of incorporating a private sector component into the RT concept.
    Results of these pilots will be analyzed to determine the program's 
effect on security and service, enabling the Department to make 
decisions about full scale implementation of RT. Any timeline and 
deployment schedule for implementing RT beyond the pilot stage will be 
linked to the Department's decision.

                            DEEPWATER BUDGET

    Question. Virtually the entire increase requested for Deepwater in 
fiscal year 2006 is just to sustain legacy assets. The revised 
Deepwater plan indicates that the lifecycle costs to sustain legacy 
assets could cost anywhere between $828 million and $1.8 billion. Why 
is there such a large difference between these two amounts?
    Answer. The difference the two amounts is a function of time and 
money. The lower number reflects a lower total acquisition cost ($19 
billion) over a shorter implementation period (20 years). The higher 
legacy asset funding amount reflects a higher total acquisition cost 
($24 billion) over a longer implementation period (25 years). The 
shorter plan invests less funding in legacy sustainment, decommissions 
legacy assets sooner, but commissions fewer new assets. The longer plan 
invests more in legacy sustainment to keep the assets in commission 
longer, invests more in technology refresh/obsolescence prevention 
(i.e. life cycle costs), and delivers more new assets. Earlier 
decommissioning of legacy assets translates into lower legacy 
sustainment costs, but equates to a lower number of assets to perform 
Coast Guard missions both during build out and upon completion.
    Question. What is the Coast Guard doing to better plan and prepare 
for legacy asset sustainment?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has a detailed plan for maintaining its 
legacy cutters and aircraft. Coast Guard men and women are well trained 
to maintain and continually upgrade Coast Guard aviation, surface, and 
shore infrastructure assets. A mature project planning and execution 
program exists within the Coast Guard to provide routine unit-level and 
depot-level maintenance. Where expertise or infrastructure doesn't 
exist organically within the service, the Coast Guard uses contracted 
resources to provide the requisite maintenance support. Maintaining a 
high proficiency level amongst the Coast Guard's ``maintainers'' is 
critical to the long-term health of the service. One of the service's 
guiding principles is to maintain a core competency of maintenance 
expertise amongst Coast Guard (military and civilian) members to ensure 
service readiness, especially during periods of national emergency.
    The Coast Guard maintains its legacy aircraft and vessels using 
organic maintenance and repair infrastructure in conjunction with 
contracted depot-level maintenance activities. These operating expense 
(OE) funded maintenance efforts are complemented by periodic 
Acquisition, Construction and Improvement (AC&I) projects which either 
enhance/sustain asset capabilities and extend asset service lives, or 
replace assets.
    On April 20, 2005, the Coast Guard submitted a legacy asset report 
to Congress, detailing the Coast Guard's legacy asset issues. This 
report reflects legacy cutter and aviation AC&I projects that the Coast 
Guard has included in the fiscal year 2006 Budget request and 
anticipates requesting in future budget submissions.
    Question. The Coast Guard's capital investment plan indicates that 
the Deepwater budget will be decreased by $214 million in fiscal year 
2007. How can you propose such a cut in light of increasing mission 
demands and the ``declining readiness'' of existing assets?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget requests $966 
million for Deepwater, $242 million above the fiscal year 2005 enacted 
levels, to fund critical modernization initiatives such as production 
of the third National Security Cutter and design and long lead material 
purchase for the Offshore Patrol Cutter while addressing immediate 
legacy asset issues such as HH-65 re-engining and Medium Endurance 
Cutter mission effectiveness programs. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 
2006-2010 Capital Investment Plan contains $752 million for Deepwater 
in 2007 to highlight the one-time nature of several of these 
investments in legacy asset conversions and sustainment projects.
    Question. The GAO recently testified that the Coast Guard has 
acknowledged that it needs to develop condition measures that more 
clearly demonstrate the extent to which asset conditions affect mission 
capabilities, but such measures have not been finalized or implemented. 
What is the Coast Guard's schedule for putting such measures in place?
    Answer. To track the condition of the its cutters, the Coast Guard 
currently measures a Percent of Time Free (POTF) of major casualties 
measure that shows the general decline in condition of Deepwater legacy 
assets between 2000 and 2004. To track the condition of the its 
aircraft, the Coast Guard currently measures aircraft availability 
rates. However, as GAO has pointed out, ``the Coast Guard's available 
condition measures are inadequate to capture the full extent of the 
decline in the condition of deepwater assets with any degree of 
precision.'' and Justice Issues, testified to the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure that, ``Other evidence we gathered, 
such as information from discussions with maintenance personnel, point 
to conditions that may be more severe than the available measures 
indicate.''
    The Coast Guard acknowledges that it needs better condition 
measures to more accurately depict the condition of its assets. To 
address this issue, the Coast Guard is developing condition measures 
that more clearly link cutter condition to mission capability. This 
effort is scheduled for completion by the end of fiscal year 2005.
    In fiscal year 2004, a team of personnel was assembled from 
engineering support activities in both Atlantic and Pacific Areas to 
work with Coast Guard Headquarters to construct an asset condition 
matrix that incorporates engineering casualty reporting (CASREP) data 
and performance data maintained in the Coast Guard's Readiness 
Management System (RMS). To do so, the team is identifying/linking 
thousands of shipboard engineering subsystems across every cutter class 
and their direct impact/contribution to each Coast Guard mission.
    By establishing a clear relationship between engineering subsystems 
and mission performance, the Coast Guard will be better able to 
identify return on its maintenance investments and determine the best 
use of limited maintenance resources.
    The Coast Guard is currently working to develop a comparable 
measure for its aviation assets; however, it has not established a 
timeline for implementation.
    Question. The GAO report also noted that certain legacy costs, such 
as maintaining the 378-foot class through 2016 instead of 2013 as 
originally planned, is not addressed in the revised Deepwater budget 
baseline. How much funding will this require and are there other legacy 
assets that need further maintenance but are not included in the 
revised Deepwater plan?
    Answer. Legacy asset sustainment is a Coast Guard stewardship 
priority that requires judicious balancing of current and future 
demands on limited AC&I investment resources. One of the primary 
determining factors is how long the asset class will remain in service. 
The 378-foot High Endurance Cutters (WHEC) are the first legacy cutters 
expected to be removed from service as the National Security Cutters 
(NSCs) are deployed. Therefore, the Department and the Coast Guard have 
invested AC&I funds toward acquisition of NSCs vice sustaining WHECs. 
Until they are decommissioned, WHECs will be sustained through routine 
depot level maintenance funded within the Coast Guard's Operating 
Expense Appropriation. The 210-foot and 270-foot medium endurance 
cutters are projected to remain in service longer, therefore 
substantial AC&I investments are being made in these classes in the 
form of Mission Effectiveness Program funds sought in fiscal year 2006 
and in the out-years. Similar legacy sustaining initiatives are funded 
in the Deepwater implementation plan for aircraft that will remain in 
the Coast Guard's final Deepwater inventory. Additional details on the 
Coast Guard's plan to sustain its legacy assets are provided in a 
report that was submitted to Congress on April 20, 2005.
    Question. What measures have the Coast Guard put in place to ensure 
that competition is built into Deepwater acquisition decisions?
    Answer. From the beginning of the acquisition process, the Coast 
Guard has ensured competition has been built into the Deepwater 
program. The GAO recently reported that all assets originally planned 
for the first five years of the contract were properly competed through 
the initial contract award process that resulted in selection of 
Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) as the Deepwater contractor. 
Beyond the initial contract award process, the Coast Guard has taken 
several steps, including implementing GAO recommendations to ensure 
acquisitions decisions are adequately competed. There are many examples 
of competition in subcontracts that can be provided, if desired. For 
example, where changes to the original proposal have been introduced 
into the acquisition, the Coast Guard ensures that a competitive price 
determination is made. The price of this change order must be 
determined to be fair and reasonable before the Coast Guard will 
approve ICGS action. The Coast Guard monitors ICGS' use of the open 
business model as required by their internal procedures for second-tier 
subcontractors. ICGS also requires the first-tier subcontractors to 
encourage 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers to promote competition.
    Question. What is the cost comparison of re-engining the existing 
fleet of HH-65 aircraft versus the procurement of a new aircraft 
outfitted to perform the same mission?
    Answer. Re-enginging an HH-65 helicopter costs approximately $3 
million. It would cost approximately $19 million to buy a new, 
commercial aircraft capable of performing the missions of a re-engined 
HH-65. Under the revised Deepwater implementation plan, HH-65 
helicopters will receive additional upgrades to become multi-mission, 
cutter helicopters. The total cost of the re-engining and the upgrade 
to Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter (MCH) is slightly less than $7 
million per unit. To replace the entire HH-65 fleet would cost $1.8 
billion vice $636 million for upgraded HH-65s, three times as much. It 
should also be noted that when the Coast Guard made the decision to re-
engine the HH-65s it was in the face of a crisis in engine safety and 
reliability. Timely resolution of that crisis did not allow for 
acquisition of a replacement fleet. Further, HH-65 re-engining was 
already planned as part of the Deepwater solution. Re-engining was the 
most timely, cost-effective short and long-term solution.
    Question. What is the status of the HH-65 re-engining process?
    Answer. In August 2004, the first re-engined HH-65 was delivered to 
the Coast Guard at Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, for operational 
testing and evaluation. As of the first of September 2005, 10 re-
engined HH-65Cs had been delivered for full operational status to Air 
Station Atlantic City, NJ, (5), Aviation Training Center Mobile, AL, 
(1), and Air Station Savannah, GA, (4). To accelerate the HH-65 re-
engining project the Coast Guard and its contractor, Integrated Coast 
Guard Systems (ICGS), have examined the quality and suitability of a 
second re-engining facility located in Columbus, MS. In August 2005, 
this facility delivered its first re-engined aircraft to the Coast 
Guard. This aircraft was determined to meet needed quality and 
suitability parameters and the Coast Guard contracted with ICGS to re-
engine an additional 11 aircraft at the Columbus facility. The Coast 
Guard plans to have all 84 operational aircraft re-engined in early 
2007.
    Question. Will the 24 month schedule be met?
    Answer. Provided the President's fiscal year 2006 request of $133.1 
million for HH-65 re-engining is fully funded, the Coast Guard's plan 
is to complete re-engining the operational fleet of 84 helicopters by 
February 2007. This is the fastest possible production schedule based 
on the availability of engine kits and parts, maximum production at 
Coast Guard Aviation Repair and Supply Center, additional production 
capacity that may become available at a second facility, and number of 
aircraft that can be removed from operational service at any given 
time.
    Question. What is the current timetable?
    Answer. The first re-engined HH-65 was delivered for operational 
test and evaluation in August 2004. Regular production delivery of 
operational HH-65 began in April 2005, when the second HH-65 was 
returned to operational status at Air Station Atlantic City, NJ. Four 
others are scheduled for delivery in May 2005. In fiscal year 2005, a 
total of 29 conversion starts are planned. In fiscal year 2006, 51 
conversion starts are planned. All 84 operational aircraft are 
scheduled for completion early in fiscal year 2007. Re-engining of all 
95 HH-65s is scheduled to be completed in 2007.
    Question. What barriers exist that could the Coast Guard from 
meeting this schedule?
    Answer. The current timetable, resulting in completing the re-
engining of the Coast Guard's operational fleet of 84 HH-65 
helicopters, is based on the best outcome of a number of variables. To 
achieve this schedule there must be:
  --Full support of the President's Budget request for $133.1 million 
        in fiscal year 2006 funding for re-engining;
  --Maximum availability of engine kits and parts;
  --Effective mitigation of operational needs to maximize the number of 
        aircraft that can be removed from operational service at any 
        given time;
  --The highest possible production at Coast Guard Aviation Repair and 
        Supply Center; and
  --Additional production capacity at a second facility.
    If any of these variables are not optimal, then the schedule will 
not be met.
                      deepwater program management
    Question. For fiscal years 2005 and 2006, provide a detailed spend 
plan for program costs for ICGS Management and Government program 
management/ICGS.
    Answer.

                SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION BUDGET
                          [Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                Activity                       2005            2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Systems Engineering:
    Performance Engineering (Measurement               6               6
     & Modeling) \1\....................
    Engineering and Process Management                15              16
     \2\................................
Integration Management:
    Systems Operations Management \3\...              17              17
    Data Management \4\.................               2               2
Award Fee Pool..........................               3
                                         -------------------------------
      Total.............................              43              45
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Performance Engineering.--In accordance with Deepwater's performance-
  based acquisition, Performance Engineering includes the efforts
  required to measure the degree to which the Integrated Deepwater
  System achieves the overarching goals of maintaining and improving
  operational performance while managing total ownership costs within an
  aggressive baseline. Risk reduction is achieved through modeling,
  simulation, and analysis coupled with test & evaluation to assess the
  appropriate mix and capabilities of Deepwater assets to achieve the
  desired operational performance.
\2\ Engineering and Process Management.--Engineering Management consists
  of the overarching technical management team responsible for
  translating Coast Guard operational and performance requirements into
  a cohesive Implementation Plan and managing all the technical efforts
  required to develop, deliver, deploy, and maintain the Deepwater
  assets critical to achieving the Implementation Plan. Correspondingly,
  Process Management is responsible for leading the identification,
  evaluation, implementation and improvement of Deepwater technical
  engineering processes deemed critical to the successful execution of
  the Implementation Plan.
\3\ Systems Operations Management.--The Systems Operations Management
  effort includes the industry program management tasks required to
  direct and control all organizational functions including engineering,
  business management, contract management, quality management,
  configuration management, and data management. An Integrated Deepwater
  System Program Management Team (including C4ISR, Surface, Aviation,
  and Integrated Logistic Systems management teams) ensures effective
  cost control, schedule, and technical performance required to maintain
  the System-Of-Systems approach necessary for the Coast Guard to
  perform its specified missions.
\4\ Data Management.--The Data Management effort includes tasks required
  to provide configuration control infrastructure for all data across
  the program. A program-wide Integrated Product Data Environment is
  utilized to integrate the efforts of geographically-separated
  engineering teams using a common toolset to enable rapid collaboration
  and sharing of consistent information.
Deepwater Program management funds are used for technical support from
  private sector and other government agencies not available within the
  Coast Guard.


                  GOVERNMENT PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BUDGET
                          [Dollars in millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Fiscal year     Fiscal year
                Activity                       2005            2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical Performance Support:
    Technical Engineering Support \1\...            19.1            20.1
    Operational Tests and Evaluation \2\             3.8             4.0

Program Management Support:
    Financial Management \3\............             3.0             3.1
    Transition Support \4\..............             4.6             4.9
    Management Support \5\..............             2.6             2.7
    Performance Metrics/Measurement                  2.2             2.3
     Support \6\........................
    Information Technology \7\..........             2.7             2.9
                                         -------------------------------
      TOTAL.............................            38.0            40.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Technical Engineering Support.--Aeronautical, electronics and naval
  engineering; logistic systems, Command and Control, weapons system
  certification, and other expertise not available from Coast Guard
  resources.
\2\ Operational Tests and Evaluation.--Navy's Commander Operational Test
  and Evaluation Forces is the technical advisor to the Coast Guard
  responsible for management of independent tests for the early review
  and assessment of Integrated Deepwater System asset operational
  performance.
\3\ Financial Management.--Includes independent analysis and support of
  the Defense Contract Auditing Agency, other Defense Contract support,
  performance/risk management, financial systems management provided to
  asset level Program Management Representative Offices for independent
  cost analysis and pricing.
\4\ Transition Support.--Augments Coast Guard teams for delivery of new
  assets, existing infrastructure changes, developing document
  configuration and management, graphics support, and support for
  training infrastructure analysis, manpower analysis, operations
  doctrine development, architecture analysis.
\5\ Management Support.--Provides for program specific training, project
  management and outreach initiatives as recommended by Government
  Accountability Office.
\6\ Performance Metrics/Measurement Support.--Modeling, simulation, and
  analysis of various inputs to include Total Ownership Cost,
  Operational Performance, and Earned Value Management Processes.
\7\Information Technology.--Specialized information technology to
  support Deepwater Program management.

          MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION

    Question. On July 1, 2004, port facilities and vessels were 
required to submit security plans to the Coast Guard and to be in 
compliance with those plans. The Coast Guard has now inspected 
approximately 2,900 regulated facilities. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) recently concluded that it is unclear if the Coast Guard's 
inspection process has been effective or not. Can you describe what the 
Coast Guard is doing to ensure that these facilities are following 
through on their security plans?
    Answer. The Coast Guard ensures that facilities operate in 
accordance with their approved security plans through annual exams and 
spot checks. The Coast Guard continues to work constructively with GAO 
to insure Coast Guard requirements and procedures are sustainable and 
that they make a positive impact on the security of the maritime 
transportation system. The requirement for an evaluation of vessel and 
facility security plans is one tool to reduce vulnerabilities in this 
critical system--the vast majority of which is owned and operated by 
the private sector. To ensure that regulatory and inspection frameworks 
continue to serve the intended objectives, regular evaluations and 
performance metrics are being developed to assess their effectiveness. 
For example, the Coast Guard plans to begin an evaluation of its 
facility inspection efforts in June 2005, complete the field portion of 
the evaluation in September 2005, and produce a final evaluation in 
December 2005.
    Question. Last year, GAO reported that many facility and vessel 
owners said it would be difficult to obtain the financial resources to 
fully mitigate their known vulnerabilities. GAO reported that one 
official at a major port indicated that some security vulnerabilities 
were not included in its facility plan because funding was not 
available to address them. What is the Coast Guard doing to ensure that 
the inspection process is just not a ``paper exercise'' and one that 
addresses vulnerabilities?
    Answer. The Coast Guard has several policies in place that provide 
for a meaningful inspection process and ensure facilities fully address 
vulnerabilities.
    Prior to final Facility Security Plan (FSP) approval, Coast Guard 
Captains of the Port review and evaluate each submitted Facility 
Security Assessment (FSA), ensuring the FSPs identify and addressed all 
vulnerabilities. This evaluation includes an on-site survey by the 
Coast Guard.
    After approving the FSP, the Coast Guard annually inspects each 
facility for MTSA compliance. The Coast Guard developed specific 
inspection policies to ensure that:
  --The facility complies with its FSP;
  --The approved FSP adequately addresses the performance-based 
        criteria outlined in the regulations;
  --The adequacy of the FSA and the Facility Vulnerability and Security 
        Measures Summary (CG-6025); and
  --Measures in place adequately address the vulnerabilities.
    To carry out the inspections, qualified Coast Guard facility 
inspectors use a published, comprehensive inspection guide to identify 
deficiencies and any vulnerability not previously disclosed.
    Question. With no port security grant program, how can ports know 
that resources are available to implement the MTSA?
    Answer. DHS has administered a total of four port security grant 
rounds since fiscal year 2002. The Coast Guard has played a significant 
role in all four grant rounds, participating at every step of the 
process, from field recommendations to the grant awards--which have 
totaled over $560 million since September 11, 2001.
    In 2004, Secretary Ridge designated the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) as the Department's 
``one-stop shop'' to centralize State and local terrorism preparedness 
and grant administration with other emergency preparedness grant 
programs, including the Port Security Grant Program previously 
administered by the TSA. The centralization will provide better service 
to key stakeholders and provide a more effective overall homeland 
security grant program. The Coast Guard will maintain an important and 
active role in the port security grant process. $150 million was 
appropriated for fiscal year 2005 (Round 5) port security grants. A 
fact sheet regarding round 5 is available upon request. Additional 
information on the port security grant program can be found at the 
following internet address:

    HTTPS://WWW.PORTSECURITYGRANTS.DOTTSA.NET/TSADOTNET/DEFAULT.ASPX
                            REQUIREMENTS GAP

    Question. The Coast Guard's budget references a July 2004 ``Call to 
Action'' from the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator. That report noted that 
actionable intelligence has never been better but the United States is 
frequently unable to pursue identified interdiction opportunities. An 
example of this is the amount of operational hours that are available 
for the Coast Guard's Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
    To meet the operational requirements cited in the Coast Guard's MPA 
requirements study, the Coast Guard would have to double the amount of 
maritime patrols from the current capability of 32,000 hours. Your 
budget includes an increase of only 1,500 maritime patrol hours for 
homeland security, counter-drug, and other mission areas. Why does such 
a large gap in requirements exist and what will it take to close it?
    Answer. The Coast Guard fixed wing requirements were determined by 
calculating the post-September 11 mission needs above the 1998 Coast 
Guard multi-mission baseline. The 1998 baseline was 44,400 hours. The 
additions are: 5,139 hours for counter-drug (CD) hours based on Joint 
Inter-Agency Task Force South analysis of the Department of Defense and 
multi-national drawdown in CD forces; 18,195 hours for maritime 
security long range surveillance under moderate, high and imminent 
threat periods; and 285 hours for Coast Guard Strike Force and Maritime 
Safety and Security Team transport. Given that 32,400 flight hours are 
available from Coast Guard fixed wing aircraft in fiscal year 2005, 
this leaves a gap of 34,454 hours.
    The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006 budget includes several 
initiatives to help mitigate the current Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) 
shortfall:
  --$16.5 million is requested for C-130H augments, providing an 
        additional 1,500 annual C-130H MPA flight hours. Funding will 
        also provide for dedicated aviation sensor personnel and 
        enhanced sensors to improve effectiveness in high-threat zones, 
        and permanently establish forward operating and logistics 
        support for MPA operating in the Central/South American region 
        to maximize time ``on station'' and reduce aircraft downtime 
        due to unscheduled maintenance.
  --$12.6 million is requested for 1200 additional annual operations 
        flight hours for C-130Js to conduct proficiency training and 
        logistics flights--freeing up missionized C-130Hs to conduct 
        MPA missions.
  --$5 million is requested to continue the missionization of the 6 C-
        130Js, through operation of the Aircraft Project Office, which 
        are estimated to be completely missionized by 2008.
  --$8.7 million is requested to staff and support the first two CASA 
        aircraft in advance of delivery and full operating capability 
        anticipated in 2007.
    The MPA gap will likely persist until the Deepwater system 
(including the CASAs, C-130s, and unmanned aerial vehicles) is fully 
built out.
    Question. What other major Coast Guard assets have a gap between 
capabilities and mission requirements?
    Answer. The significant capability gaps faced by the Coast Guard's 
major assets in the post-September 11 environment were the catalyst for 
the Deepwater Performance Gap Analysis and subsequent Mission Need 
Statement and the revised Deepwater Implementation Plan. These gaps are 
quantified both under capability--the attributes of individual assets, 
and capacity--force structure/fleet size. The following table depicts 
the capabilities and capacity for the Deepwater fleet to begin to close 
these gaps.
    In addition to the MPA gap, a capacity gap exists with the patrol 
boat fleet. Considering available 110-foot and 123-foot patrol boats 
and 179-foot patrol coastals on loan from the U.S. Navy, total patrol 
boat available hours reached it lowest point of approximately 75,000 in 
2004. This is considerably lower than the 1998 baseline of 
approximately 100,000 hours, and is a result of having cutters deployed 
to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and cutters out of service for the 110-123 
foot conversion program. With the advancement of the fast response 
cutter design and construction, the Coast Guard should reach the 1998 
baseline again between 2013 and 2015.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Original Mission Needs                                     Revised Mission Needs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Fleet                                                      Fleet
               Asset                   Size                     Capabilities                      Size                     Capabilities
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Security Cutter (NSC)/             8  Deepwater Interoperability....................          8  DHS/DOD/Rescue 21 (R21) Interoperability
 Maritime Security Cutter, Large               Basic CG Command and Control (C2) Feed........             Remote/Integrated Anti-Terrorism/Force
 (WMSL).                                       Forward Looking Infrared......................              Protection (AT/FP) Weapons
                                                                                                          Redundant/Hardened/Improved C2
                                                                                                          Underwater Detection
Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)/              25  Deepwater Interoperability....................         25  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
 Maritime Security Cutter, Medium              22 kt Speed...................................             CG COP Connectivity
 (WMSM).                                       Standard Flight Deck..........................             ..............................................
                                                                                                          Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                    .........  Threat Receiver...............................  .........  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear &
                                               30mm Gun......................................              Explosive (CBRNE) Detection
                                               Manual Small Arms.............................             Enhanced Maritime Patrol Surveillance
                                                                                                           Capability
                                                                                                          Nation-wide DHS Strategic Lift
Fast Response Cutter (OPC)/                58  Deepwater Interoperability....................         58  DHS/DOD/R21 interoperability
 Maritime Patrol, Coastal (WPC).               30mm Gun......................................             Remote Weapons & AT/FP Suite
                                               Baseline C4 Suite.............................             Redundant, Hardened C4
                                               Threat Receiver...............................             Defense Survivability
                                               20-yr Steel Hull..............................             40-yr Composite Hull
                                                                                                          CBRNE Detection & Defense
                                                                                                          Underwater Detection
Short Range Prosecutor (SRP)......         42  Deepwater Interoperability....................         33  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
Long Range Interceptor (LRI)......         82  Deepwater Interoperability....................         91  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
Long Range Surveillance Aircraft            6  Deepwater Interoperability....................         22  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
 (LRS)/ HC-130H/J.                             Basic CG C2 Feed..............................             CG COP Connectivity
                                               Forward Looking Infrared......................             Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                          CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                          Enhanced Maritime Patrol Surveillance
                                                                                                           Capability
                                                                                                          Nation-wide DHS Strategic Lift
Multi-Mission Cutter Helicopter            93  Deepwater Interoperability....................         95  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
 (MCH)/HH-65C.                                                                                            CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                          CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                          Airborne Use of Force
                                                                                                          Vertical Insertion/Delivery
Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft         35  Deepwater Interoperability....................         36  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
 (MRS)/CASA CN-235.                                                                                       CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                          Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                          CBRNE Detection
Medium-Range Recovery Helicopter           42  Deepwater Interoperability....................         42  DHS/DOD/R21 Interoperability
 (MRR)/MH-60T.                                                                                            CG COP Connectivity
                                                                                                          Integrated Electo-Optical/Infrared System
                                                                                                          CBRNE Detection
                                                                                                          Airborne Use of Force
                                                                                                          Vertical Insertion/Delivery
Vertical Take-off & Landing UAV            69  ..............................................         45  CBRNE Detection
 (VUAV).
High Altitude & Endurance UAV               7  ..............................................          4  ..............................................
 (HAEUAV).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

    Question. In the fiscal year 2003 Supplemental, Public Law 108-11, 
Congress appropriated $38 million to conduct vulnerability assessments 
at all tier I strategic seaports. Of that amount, $16.8 million remains 
unobligated. Why hasn't this funding been spent?
    Answer. Prior to enactment of Public Law 108-11, the Coast Guard 
received supplemental funding and was able to conduct Port Security 
Assessments (PSAs) at 13 of the 55 strategic ports. The average cost of 
these assessments was $900,000 per port. The $38 million appropriation 
was to complete remaining port assessments based on this per-port 
average.
    In response to various maritime security initiatives, such as the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard revised 
the PSA methodology to ensure that the PSAs provided the greatest value 
to the port without being redundant to the other initiatives and 
programs. This updated methodology resulted in a reduction of costs 
from $900,000 to approximately $300,000 per port.
    As of September 14, 2005, the Coast Guard has expended $22.9 
million for the completion of PSAs of the Coast Guard's 55 militarily 
and economically strategic ports, as well as for important port 
security initiatives such as special technical assessments, development 
of a Geographic Information System (GIS) viewer, Coast Guard 
participation in the Comprehensive Review of nuclear power plants, and 
PSA Program operational costs. The remaining $16.6 million will be 
expended during the remainder of fiscal year 2005 and 2006 to continue 
refining port security assessments and our knowledge of port-specific 
vulnerabilities through specific technical or infrastructure 
assessments (bridges, tunnels, dangerous cargo, etc.). This additional 
work is critical to address needs that were identified in the course of 
the initial port assessments. It will provide important amplifying 
information to Coast Guard Captains of the Port and the Area Maritime 
Security Committees allowing them to address effectively port-specific 
vulnerabilities that have been identified.
    Question. How many assessments of tier I ports have been completed 
to date and what is the schedule to complete all Tier I ports?
    Answer. All Tier I PSAs are complete. The Coast Guard has completed 
PSAs at each of the previously identified 55 militarily and 
economically strategic U.S. ports, of which ``Tier I'' ports are a 
subset.

                        PORT SECURITY ESTIMATES

    Question. Last year, in response to a question for the record on 
port security, the Committee was told that Department of Homeland 
Security spending on port security increased by $224 million (13 
percent) in the President's Budget, from $1,661 million in 2004 to 
$1,885 million in 2005. Within the 2005 total is $1,675 million for 
Coast Guard port, waterway, and coastal security activities, including 
over $100 million for expenses related to the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA). How was that funding level determined?
    Answer. The $1,675 million for Coast Guard Ports, Waterways, and 
Coastal Security (PWCS) activities in fiscal year 2005 was incorrectly 
stated in last year's question. The 2005 operating expense budget 
estimate for PWCS activities estimated in the Coast Guard's 2005 Budget 
congressional justifications as $1,501 million. The Coast Guard 
develops estimates of mission-specific spending using an activity based 
Mission Cost Model. The $101 million increase to implement MTSA 
attributable to PWCS was included in the $1,501 million estimate.

                      PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM

    Question. The Coast Guard authorization Act for 2005, which was 
signed into law by the President on August 9, 2004, authorized $35 
million for the Secretary to fund pilot programs and award grants to 
investigate new methods and technologies to better secure our ports. 
The law specifically cites the need to examine new technologies such as 
those that can accurately detect explosives, chemical or biological 
agents, and nuclear materials. The law calls for the examination of new 
methods for securing our ports such as the use of satellite tracking 
systems and tools to mitigate the consequences of a transportation 
security incident. The fiscal year 2006 request does not include 
funding for this program. What intelligence led the Coast Guard to 
believe that such a program was unnecessary?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is aggressively moving to implement new 
technologies in order to better secure our ports. Rather than pilot 
programs or grants, the Coast Guard believes it more prudent in the 
near term to expend limited resources on the deployment of important 
proven technologies while other DHS components responsible for 
development of cross-cutting technologies and private sector grant and 
research programs administer pilot and grant programs, notably the S&T 
Directorate and SLGCP. S&T, in particular, has a wealth of research and 
development expertise as well as an active university research program 
to pursue technology enhancements across all homeland security 
requirements. Concurrently, SLGCP is overseeing the administration of a 
port security grant program that has awarded over $560 million in port 
security grants already, and will award another $150 million in fiscal 
year 2005.
    In the near term, the Coast Guard is focused on enhancing Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is defined as ``the effective understanding 
of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could 
impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United 
States.'' Effective MDA is a critical enabler to national maritime 
security strategies and supports the full range of Coast Guard 
missions.

                      COVERT SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT

    Question. What is the Coast Guard's definition of a ``covert 
surveillance aircraft''?
    Answer. The 2005 DHS Appropriations Act conference report defines 
the manned covert surveillance aircraft as a ``medium to short range, 
fixed wing surveillance aircraft.'' In the context of the Coast Guard's 
Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft (MCSA) acquisition project, 
``covert'' is defined as ``the capability to operate quietly and 
surreptitiously enough to enable the surveillance, detection, 
classification and identification of a maritime target without the 
target's inhabitants becoming aware of the aircraft's presence.''
    Question. How will a covert surveillance aircraft serve the Coast 
Guard's mission?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is developing the operational requirements 
documents that will define the missions and operating parameters for a 
manned covert surveillance aircraft. The Coast Guard is also examining 
how this aircraft will fit into the Deepwater system, given that the 
Deepwater implementation plan accounts for the service-standard fixed, 
rotary wing and unmanned aircraft necessary to meet projected Coast 
Guard mission needs documented in the revised Mission Needs Statement.
    Question. How much does the Coast Guard estimate the cost of a 
covert surveillance aircraft to be?
    Answer. The rough order of magnitude acquisition cost of a fully 
missionized, FAA-certified manned covert surveillance aircraft is 
estimated to be $8 million.
    Question. What is the timeline for acquiring a covert surveillance 
aircraft or aircrafts for operational use?
    Answer. The procurement timeline is currently being constructed 
with the Manned Covert Surveillance Aircraft acquisition team. The 
following table provides the best estimate of initial operating 
capability (IOC).

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Requirements Document Written   July 2005
 & Approved.
Release of Request for Proposal...........  September 2005
Aircraft Award............................  January 2006
Airworthiness Certification Test/           January 2007
 Evaluation Commencement.
Initial Operating Capability..............  January 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Are there existing platforms available on the commercial 
market that would meet the Coast Guard's specifications for a covert 
surveillance aircraft? If so, please describe them.
    Answer. Currently, the Coast Guard is developing the operational 
requirements and specifications for the Manned Covert Surveillance 
Aircraft. Once these are defined and approved, the Coast Guard will 
conduct a formal market survey and or request for proposal to determine 
the availability of any suitable aircraft in the commercial market that 
meets its requirements.

                    AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM

    Question. The Coast Guard has obligated $7.5 million to a contract 
with a commercial low earth orbit satellite communications provider for 
the installation of AIS capability on a concept validation satellite 
and design for installation on future satellites. What type of coverage 
does this provide to the Coast Guard?
    Answer. The deployment of a concept validation payload aboard a 
commercial low earth orbit satellite is a prototype for the receipt of 
AIS signals via satellites from vessels within 2000 nautical miles of 
the U.S. coast.
    Question. The AIS budget provides for approximately $30 million per 
year over the next five fiscal years (including fiscal year 2006). 
Could this acquisition program be accelerated if additional funding 
became available?
    Answer. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2006-2010 Capital Investment 
Plan calls for project completion in 2011; however, the project could 
be completed sooner if additional funding is provided.
  coast guard support of nsf research operations in the polar regions
    Question. The budget request for the National Science Foundation 
includes $48 million in budget authority to operate and maintain the 
399 foot Polar Icebreakers. This amount does not include funding such 
as extraordinary maintenance costs. In fiscal year 2005, these 
extraordinary maintenance costs are estimated to be $18 million. The 
budget indicates that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is being 
discussed to address these additional costs. What is the status of the 
MOU between the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the U.S. Coast 
Guard?
    Answer. The Coast Guard and NSF are currently negotiating to 
conclude an MOU for fiscal year 2006.
    The $48 million NSF budget authority represents the base funding to 
operate and maintain the 399 foot POLAR STAR and POLAR SEA and the 420 
foot HEALY. The MOU will reflect an agreement between NSF and Coast 
Guard for NSF to pay for all personnel, maintenance and operational 
funds necessary to manage the polar icebreaking program.
    The Administration plans to maintain current polar icebreaker fleet 
capabilities at least until a new national polar icebreaker 
requirements policy decision is made.
    Question. Please provide a historical breakdown, by fiscal year, of 
the costs to support the NSF's scientific and operational programs in 
the Polar Regions, including maintenance costs, and how much the NSF 
reimbursed for those costs in each fiscal year.
    Answer. In recent years, the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet has 
devoted, on average, 82 percent of its operational time in support of 
the NSF. The chart below attributes NSF's percentage of operational 
time to the total annual funding for the icebreakers (including 
maintenance costs).
    The following table provides a historical breakout of Coast Guard 
polar icebreaking support costs, those costs attributable to NSF 
activities, and the amounts reimbursed by NSF to the Coast Guard per 
the MOA between the two agencies.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Total Costs       Percent
                                                   Reimbursement    required to     Operational       Cost to
                   Fiscal year                      Amount from       support      time devoted     support NSF
                                                        NSF         cutters \1\       to NSF         programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999............................................      $2,711,732     $31,397,056              76     $24,004,075
2000 \2\........................................       2,145,242      40,971,438              80      32,777,150
2001............................................       4,966,672      41,899,046              64      26,839,661
2002............................................       5,961,684      49,195,000              93      45,643,381
2003............................................       8,165,647      50,501,309              91       45,925531
2004............................................      12,422,190      57,585,544              89      51,189,137
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: Costs include actual unit level operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs, depot level maintenance
  costs, and personnel costs for the salaries and benefits attributable to the people assigned to the cutters.
  These costs have grown to exceed budgeted amounts due to extraordinary maintenance costs required to sustain
  the polar icebreaking fleet. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposes transfer of the Coast Guard's
  base funding (using budgeted amounts) to support operation and maintenance of these cutters.
\2\ Reflects the addition of the HEALY as the third Coast Guard icebreaker.

    Question. If a Memorandum of Understanding is not reached and the 
NSF decides to contract out for their icebreaking needs in the polar 
region, would the Coast Guard need to maintain the Polar Sea and the 
Polar Star icebreakers?
    Answer. On August 8, 2005, the Coast Guard signed an MOU with NSF 
to ensure that the polar icebreaking fleet will be operated and 
maintained in fiscal year 2006.
    Question. If so, what functions would they serve and what would be 
the costs in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. The polar class icebreakers (POLAR SEA and POLAR STAR) have 
been and will continue to primarily support the U.S. Antarctic Program 
re-supply effort (Operation Deep Freeze) each year. Due to Antarctic 
ice conditions, the age of the vessels and the breakers' increasing 
maintenance needs since 2001, these two vessels are no longer able to 
support simultaneously the U.S. Antarctic Program. Pending additional 
funding from the NSF in fiscal year 2006, POLAR SEA will continue the 
second year of a 2-year maintenance availability to ensure readiness 
for the Operation Deep Freeze 2007 deployment to Antarctica. POLAR STAR 
is currently scheduled to support the 2006 Operation Deep Freeze 
mission. HEALY is scheduled to support Arctic research, typically 
lasting from May to November of each year. The fiscal year 2006 base 
funding and overall costs are outlined below:

                           FISCAL YEAR 2006 COAST GUARD POLAR ICEBREAKER BASE FUNDING
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Fiscal year
               Projected costs AFC                  Cost center      POLAR SEA      2006 POLAR         Total
                                                       HEALY                           STAR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training & Recruiting...........................        $210,512        $355,244        $355,244        $921,000
Military Personnel..............................       5,936,630       9,547,685       9,547,685      25,032,000
Depot Level Maintenance.........................       4,498,926       4,493,037       4,493,037      13,485,000
Operating and Maintenance.......................       3,586,000       2,000,000       2,000,000       7,586,000
Central Accounts................................         109,000         183,500         183,500         476,000
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
      Grand Total...............................      14,341,068      16,579,466      16,579,466      47,500,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    FISCAL YEAR 2006 PROJECTED COSTS REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN POLAR ICEBREAKER FLEET ABOVE THE BASE FUNDING LEVEL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Fiscal year
               Projected costs AFC                  Cost center      POLAR SEA      2006 POLAR         Total
                                                       HEALY                           STAR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Depot Level Maintenance.........................      $7,100,000      $9,700,000        $500,000     $17,300,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. If not, what would be the cost for the Coast Guard to 
mothball or dispose of the two icebreakers?
    Answer. The Coast Guard estimates that the cost to mothball or 
dispose of each Polar Class Icebreaker is $750,000 per hull, for a 
total of $1.5 million.
    The estimated personnel transfer cost if the two icebreakers are 
decommissioned is $700,000.
    Question. What are the long-term costs to maintain the Coast 
Guard's Polar Icebreakers?
    Answer. The two heavy polar icebreakers are nearing the end of 
their service lives and require major systems overhauls to continue to 
operate in a cost-effective manner. The Coast Guard has not developed 
detailed analyses of the costs associated with the long-term costs of 
recapitalizing the heavy polar icebreaking fleet. As the national needs 
for heavy polar icebreaking are more thoroughly studied by the National 
Academies of Sciences (NAS), the Coast Guard will inevitably be 
involved in developing long-term cost estimates for heavy polar 
icebreaking.
    Since the Healy medium-duty polar icebreaker is a relatively new 
vessel, there are no significant long-term maintenance costs above the 
budgeted base amounts for that ship.
    Question. What efforts are underway to fund a replacement vessel or 
overhaul one or more of the existing vessels to support the long-term 
needs of the scientific community?
    Answer. There are no plans to replace or overhaul CGC HEALY, which 
was commissioned in 2000.
    In accordance with the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security 
Appropriations Bill Conference Report, the NAS will be conducting a 
polar icebreaker study, with an interim report expected during November 
2005 and completion of the final report anticipated during July 2006. 
The NAS study report could be used as the basis for an update of the 
1990 Presidential Decision Determination on national polar icebreaker 
requirements policy.
    Question. What would the cost be and the amount of time necessary 
to acquire a new polar icebreaker?
    Answer. Initial rough estimates indicate that one new polar 
icebreaker, with the equivalent heavy icebreaking capabilities as the 
Polar Class icebreakers, would cost approximately $600 million and 
would require 6 years to construct.
    Question. The Coast Guard is absorbing roughly $9 million in fiscal 
year 2005 to meet key milestones in the maintenance of the Polar Sea. 
Is critical maintenance in other areas being delayed or canceled to 
meet the needs of the Polar Sea?
    Answer. Yes, the $9.2 million for extraordinary maintenance of the 
POLAR SEA will be absorbed within the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2005 
maintenance funds, requiring deferral of critical maintenance in other 
areas, such as replacement of aging and obsolete subsystems onboard 
Coast Guard legacy cutters.
    Question. If so, please describe those delays and the impact they 
will have on the Coast Guard fleet.
    Answer. As the end of fiscal year 2005 approaches, and the level of 
fleet-wide unscheduled maintenance activity becomes clearer, specific 
maintenance activities will be identified for deferral by Coast Guard 
maintenance managers as they shift resources to deal with their most 
immediate fleet maintenance challenges.
    Question. Section 888 of Public Law 107-296 ensures that Coast 
Guard ``functions and capabilities be maintained intact and without 
significant reduction.'' Under what authority does the proposal to 
transfer funding for icebreaking operations to the NSF fall under?
    Answer. Subsection 888(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
provided that: ``the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the 
Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and 
without significant reduction after the transfer of the Coast Guard to 
the Department, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
    The proposed shift of appropriations for polar icebreaking, if 
enacted, does not remove any of the authorities, functions, or 
capabilities of the Coast Guard. Since NSF and the Coast Guard have a 
signed MOU ensuring funding for the icebreaking program in fiscal year 
2006, the Coast Guard will continue to perform its polar icebreaking 
mission. Furthermore, the proposed shift of appropriations, if enacted, 
would be the result of a ``subsequent act'' of Congress, in the terms 
of Subsection 888(c).

                               RECRUITING

    Question. What is the Coast Guard's goal for recruiting active duty 
personnel in fiscal year 2006? Provide a chart showing the total number 
of recruits in each of the past 10 years for active duty personnel and 
reserves and compare them against the Coast Guard's targets for those 
years.
    Answer. The following tables show the total number of Coast Guard 
active duty and reserve recruits in each of the past 10 years compared 
with the Coast Guard's targets for those years.

                   COAST GUARD ACTIVE DUTY RECRUITING
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Year                        Targets        Accessed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996....................................           3,300           3,299
1997....................................           3,900           3,697
1998....................................           4,464           3,962
1999....................................           4,150           4,159
2000....................................           4,700           4,721
2001....................................           4,300           4,332
2002....................................           4,800           5,169
2003....................................           4,475           4,488
2004....................................           3,800           3,809
2005....................................           4,110       \1\ 4,110
2006....................................       \1\ 4,200       \1\ 4,200
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Projected.


                     COAST GUARD RESERVE RECRUITING
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Year                        Targets        Accessed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996....................................             350             229
1997....................................             430             303
1998....................................           1,313             554
1999....................................             900             801
2000....................................             900             692
2001....................................             700             424
2002....................................             718             585
2003....................................           1,150             880
2004....................................             940             911
2005....................................             950         \1\ 800
2006....................................         \1\ 900         \1\ 900
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Projected.

                                C-130JS

    Question. In March, the Coast Guard placed interim limitations on 
the HC-130H 1500 series aircraft. What is the status of these 
restrictions?
    Answer. The HC-130H 1500 series aircraft are operationally 
restricted/limited based on potential cracking in the center wing box 
based on effective wing age. The restrictions on the five Coast Guard 
1500 series aircraft are similar to restrictions imposed on United 
States Air Force aircraft of similar vintage and use rate. The 
restrictions are designed to limit wing loading by limiting fuel, cargo 
and airspeed under certain conditions. These restrictions will remain 
in place until Lockheed Martin Aero (LMA) Service Bulletin (SB2) is 
developed and the required inspections are completed. SB2 is expected 
on May 30. Each aircraft inspection will take approximately 1 month to 
complete. If serious structural cracking is found during inspections, 
the Coast Guard will determine whether to refurbish the affected 
aircraft to keep them in service well into the future or if there are 
other alternatives.
    Question. What impact have these restrictions had on the Coast 
Guard?
    Answer. The restrictions currently impact only the five 1500-series 
C-130s at Coast Guard Air Station Elizabeth City and have resulted in 
some degradation of the unit's ability to perform long-range search and 
rescue, maritime patrol, logistics and International Ice Patrol 
missions. These operational restrictions are based on reduced fuel and 
cargo loads similar to those imposed on United States Air Force 
aircraft of similar vintage and use rate. The restrictions reduce the 
maximum endurance of the aircraft from 12 to 7.5 hours, reduce the 
maximum cargo capacity from 45,000 to 10,000 lbs, require slower 
airspeed when in the vicinity of turbulence and require greater fuel 
reserves. These restrictions have been mitigated by incorporating more 
refueling stops and or using newer 1700-model C-130s without 
restrictions.
    Question. What are the Coast Guard's plans to remedy the structural 
problems, including necessary funding?
    Answer. There are no known structural problems to be remedied. The 
1500 series aircraft are operationally restricted/limited based on the 
potential of cracks in the center wing box based on effective wing age. 
LMA is currently developing the procedures to inspect the wings to 
determine if cracks exist. If inspections find no evidence of 
structural cracking, the operational restrictions will be adjusted or 
removed. If serious structural cracking is found during inspections, 
the Coast Guard will determine whether to refurbish the affected 
aircraft to keep them in service or if there are other alternatives. 
Cost estimates to effect necessary repairs will be based on the results 
of the inspections.

                                SIPRINET

    Question. The Coast Guard is in the process of increasing its 
SIPRNET presence to include all of its major shore side operational 
units (Areas, Districts, Sectors, & Air Stations). Approximately half 
of the planned shore side Coast Guard units (80 out of 156) currently 
have SIPRNET connectivity. What is the funding level for this activity 
in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. The Coast Guard SIPRNET Program is fiscal year 2006 base of 
funds is $9.5 million. This includes funding for recurring circuit 
costs, contract labor costs, new installations, and equipment 
recapitalization.
    Question. What is the current schedule to provide connectivity to 
the remaining units?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is currently planning to fund the 
installation of 23 new sites during fiscal year 2006. The Coast Guard 
anticipates completing SIPRNET installations at all 152 sites by fiscal 
year 2009.
    Question. Could the schedule be accelerated if additional funding 
became available in fiscal year 2006?
    Answer. Additional funding in fiscal year 2006 would not accelerate 
the installation schedule. The installations are currently scheduled at 
maximum install rate due to the time required to build the facilities 
and installation contractor resource capabilities.

           MARITIME SECURITY CUTTER--LARGE OPERATIONAL COSTS

    Question. The Coast Guard is expecting the first WMSL to be 
delivered in May 2007. Please provide a spend plan and timeline related 
to the funding necessary for pre-commissioning familiarization and 
training for core personnel.
    Answer. The timeline for pre-commissioning training and 
familiarization is as follows:
  --Phase I: Winter/Spring 2005.--Five crewmembers reported to 
        Pascagoula for pre-arrival training, ship engineering 
        familiarization, and doctrine development. Cost: $151,352
  --Phase II: Summer/Fall 2006.--96 crewmembers report to Alameda (the 
        ship's homeport) to conduct pre-arrival training, which is 
        provided at various government and commercial facilities around 
        the country. Following pre-arrival training, these crewmembers 
        will proceed to Pascagoula for pre-commissioning 
        familiarization. Cost: $1,830,816
  --Phase III: Winter/Spring 2007.--Remaining 61 crewmembers report to 
        Alameda then immediately proceed to Pascagoula for pre-
        commissioning familiarization. Cost: $1,063,930
  --May 2007.--First National Security Cutter/Maritime Security Cutter 
        Large (WMSL) is delivered to the Coast Guard.
    The travel and subsistence cost for crewmembers to complete the 
initial pre-arrival and pre-commissioning training is estimated at $3.1 
million.

                         RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

    Question. Section 888 of Public Law 107-296 ensures that Coast 
Guard ``functions and capabilities be maintained intact and without 
significant reduction.'' Under what authority does the proposal to 
shift Cost Guard R&D functions to the S&T Directorate fall under?
    Answer. Subsection 888(c) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
provided that: ``the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the 
Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and 
without significant reduction after the transfer of the Coast Guard to 
the Department, except as specified in subsequent Acts.''
    The proposed shift of appropriations for Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation from the Coast Guard to the S&T directorate, if 
enacted, would be the result of a ``subsequent Act'' of Congress, in 
the terms of Subsection 888(c).
    Question. How would the proposed transfer improve the ability of 
the Coast Guard to accomplish its missions?
    Answer. The consolidation of Research and Development (R&D) funding 
at the Department level will maximize effectiveness of R&D activities 
across the Department by minimizing redundancies. Through the Coast 
Guard portfolio manager at S&T, the Coast Guard will continue to 
develop and provide homeland and non-homeland security research 
requirements which support all of the Coast Guard's homeland and non-
homeland mission programs.

                             ATTRITION RATE

    Question. What is the current attrition rate for Secret Service 
agents and Uniformed Division Officers?
    Answer. In fiscal year 2004, the attrition rate for special agents 
was 6.28 percent, and for Uniformed Division officers 7.6 percent. The 
Secret Service expects that the attrition rate for fiscal year 2005 for 
special agents will be 5.2 percent, and for Uniformed Division officers 
8.5 percent.

                             OVERTIME RATE

    Question. What is the current monthly overtime rate for Secret 
Service agents?
    Answer. The current average monthly overtime rate for Secret 
Service agents is 71 hours.

                              PAY INCREASE

    Question. The budget includes funding for a 2.6 percent pay 
increase for Secret Service employees in 2006, but the Administration 
requested a 2.1 percent across the board pay increase for Federal 
employees. Why is the Secret Service budgeting for a higher pay 
increase?
    Answer. The Secret Service's fiscal year 2006 budget includes 
funding for a 2.3 percent pay increase for Federal employees. This is 
the same percentage increase proposed by the Administration.
    Question. What is the cost difference between a 2.1 percent pay 
increase and a 2.6 percent pay increase?
    Answer. A 2.1 percent pay increase would require $11,752,000, and a 
2.6 percent pay increase would require $14,550,000, a difference of 
$2,798,000. The Secret Service request was $12,871,000 or 2.3 percent.

                            WHITE HOUSE MAIL

    Question. The budget includes $16.365 million to process White 
House mail. What is the status of the Department's efforts to develop a 
long-term plan for a fully operational White House Mail facility?
    Answer. In the summer of 2004, the U.S. Secret Service and the 
General Services Administration (GSA) initiated the planning of a 
permanent White House mail facility.
    The stakeholders utilized two previous studies in order to begin 
their effort. In 2003, the Secret Service commissioned Science 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to develop a full-scale 
mail screening facility in concept. In addition, GSA conducted a site 
selection study in which they identified four feasible locations in the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area for a White House mail facility.
    In October 2004, GSA procured the services of HDR, an architectural 
engineering and consulting firm, to complete a Program Development 
Study (PDS). The PDS, which was completed in February 2005, reflects 
the efforts of the team to define the feasibility, analyze needs, 
prepare cost analysis and program requirements for the program. A mail 
screening facility proposal was defined by the PDS. Three sites located 
at the Anacostia Naval Annex were selected as most feasible. The PDS 
estimated the cost for construction at $33.5 million.
    Since the completion of the PDS, the development team has worked 
closely with GSA to identify a potential future site for the White 
House mail screening facility. GSA is working with the Navy Real Estate 
Office to assess the availability of property at the Anacostia Naval 
Annex, in Washington, D.C. adjacent to other White House support 
facilities for this purpose. Upon identification of available Federal 
property, GSA will conduct environmental and design studies of the 
potential site. This information will be used to determine the GSA 
facility acquisition plan (lease/build) and project the new facility's 
operational costs.
    Question. What is the percentage of mail addressed to the White 
House that doesn't reach its destination?
    Answer. For the 14-month period beginning in March 2004 and ending 
April 2005, the White House mail screening facility received 
approximately 1,730,000 pieces of mail, flats or parcels. Of these, 
288,800 items (or 16 percent) were classified as junk mail and, 
therefore, not processed at the facility. Of the remaining 1,441,200 
processed mail pieces, 1,441,000 (or 99.9 percent) pieces were 
delivered to the complex.
    The two hundred pieces of mail (or less than 1 percent) not 
delivered to the complex were identified by the facility as containing 
an unknown substance or an overt threat and were referred to the Secret 
Service Intelligence Division for investigation. In addition, 29 
referrals were made to Secret Service field offices due to items 
received at the facility and two arrests were made.

                        EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND

    Question. The latest report (date) from OMB on the status of the 
$40 billion Emergency Response Fund, enacted 3 days after 9/11, shows 
that the Secret Service has an unobligated balance of $6 million. Why 
have the funds not been used and what are your plans for the 
unobligated funds?
    Answer. As of October 2004, the Secret Service had no unobligated 
balance from the Emergency Response Fund.

                       NATIONAL RESPONSE PLANNING

    Question. DHS has recently released the National Incident 
Management System Plan, the Nation Preparedness Goal and begun the roll 
out of the National Response Plan which will better guide the spending 
of Federal resources like the over $11 billion Congress has 
appropriated for first responders programs. With this additional 
guidance, what changes have you seen/do you expect to see in the local 
requests for projects that will prevent wasteful spending?
    Answer. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) integrates 
effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a 
comprehensive national framework for incident management. The NIMS will 
enable responders at all levels to work together more effectively to 
manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size or complexity. 
The Department is requiring that states and territories begin work on 
compliance with the NIMS as part of their fiscal year 2005 grant 
funding.
    The National Response Plan (NRP) establishes a comprehensive all-
hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage 
domestic incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures 
from incident management disciplines--homeland security, emergency 
management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, 
responder and recovery worker health and safety, emergency medical 
services, and the private sector--and integrates them into a unified 
structure. It forms the basis of how the Federal Government coordinates 
with State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during 
incidents.
    The National Preparedness Guidance, issued on April 27, 2005, 
addresses the implementation of the NIMS and the NRP, as one of the 
overarching national priorities. DHS is now beginning to work with 
states, territories, and urban areas to update their existing State and 
urban area homeland security strategies to bring them into alignment 
with the seven national priorities. This alignment with the national 
priorities will enable States and territories to continue expending 
funds in accordance with the goals and objectives already outlined in 
the strategies. With this, DHS expects a greater emphasis on training 
and exercises to further implement the NRP and NIMS within the States 
and territories. Historically, there has been a higher trend towards 
the purchase of specialized equipment, but DHS believes that the States 
are undertaking training and exercise programs that typically require 
longer-term planning.
    Question. How have the State and local entities reacted to the 
changes?
    Answer. State and local entities have had many questions about the 
publication of all three of these documents. Understandably, they do 
not always clearly understand the intent of the documents and how they 
are related to the grant funding that they receive. Likewise, they are 
concerned about the resources they will need at the State level to 
ensure compliance. Anticipating such concerns, DHS created on-line 
training materials through FEMA/USFA's Emergency Management Institute 
and National Fire Academy's Distance Learning Programs that cover both 
NIMS and the NRP. To date, more than 200,000 personnel have completed 
these training courses. In order to further articulate these 
requirements, the Department has scheduled several rollout conferences 
for the NIMS and NRP across the country to educate the State and local 
stakeholders. The NIMS Integration Center (NIC) is responsible for 
orchestrating NIMS implementation and NIMS compliance. Through 
training, exercises, and technical assistance, the NIC is working to 
ensure that our state, local, and tribal partners understand NIMS and 
take the appropriate steps to implement it in their communities. In 
addition to the NIMS and NRP outreach, the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP), within SLGCP, has scheduled three additional 
meetings on the National Preparedness Guidance so that States and 
territories understand the imbedded requirements. We also are offering 
technical assistance packages that are customized to each State and 
territory. ODP is committed to providing additional education and 
outreach to our grantees as we move forward in implementing the seven 
national priorities codified in the National Preparedness Guidance.

                    SLOW PACE OF GRANT DISTRIBUTIONS

    Question. On October 18, 2004, the President signed into law the 
fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. The majority of 
the grants funds have just recently been made available for application 
this month: 6 months since the Act was signed into law. Rail security 
funds were made available on April 5, 2005. Transit security funds were 
also just made available on April 5, 2005. Port security funds, as of 
April 20, 2005, still have not been made available for application. The 
State Homeland Security Grant Program is the only program that has 
awarded funding and that is because the Congress required it by law. 
None of the other fiscal year 2005 homeland security grant funds have 
actually been distributed.
    Why is it taking so long to get the money out the door?
    Answer. The responsibility for most non-aviation grant programs was 
transferred from the TSA to SLGCP during fiscal year 2004. This 
resulted in a transition period while programs and staff adapted to 
different processes and new automation. More importantly, the 
Department has used this time to work with Federal partnering agencies 
and applicable state, local, and private sector stakeholders to 
redesign these programs to include a more risk-based approach to 
allocation of funding that aligns with Administration priorities as 
described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 and the 
recently released National Preparedness Goal. The Department is 
committed to awarding grants earlier in the year while maintaining 
effective oversight.
    Question. What steps are being taken to expedite the process?
    Answer. Completion of the programmatic redesign process coupled 
with automation of the application submission, reporting, and payment 
processes for these programs will result in greatly enhanced processing 
capabilities for future program funding. In addition, SLGCP has 
established the Transportation Infrastructure Security Division to 
manage these programs. The Division is in the process of filling 
remaining vacancies and consequently will be in a greatly strengthened 
position for management and administration of future grant programs.
    Question. When will funding be awarded for Intercity Passenger Rail 
Security, Transit Security, Intercity Bus Security and Port Security 
grants?
    Answer. The current schedule for each program is as follows: 
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Program--awarded July 18, 2005; 
Transit Security Grant Program--awarded July 15, 2005; Intercity Bus 
Security Grant Program--first round of awards were awarded on August 9, 
2005, and the final round of awards will be awarded on September 30, 
2005; Port Security Grant Program--awarded September 1, 2005.
    Question. As part of your Department review, will you commit to 
expediting the grant making process so that money that is supposed to 
make Americans safer does not sit in the Treasury in Washington, DC?
    Answer. The Department takes its responsibility very seriously for 
protecting Americans and the critical transportation infrastructure 
they depend on. As stated previously, the recent redesign of these 
programs, coupled with the newly instituted SLGCP Transportation 
Infrastructure Security Division and automation of the application, 
reporting, and payment processes for these programs will result in 
significantly enhanced capabilities relative to the management and 
administration of these programs. In addition, SLGCP is also in the 
process of establishing an Office of Grants Operations that will 
further streamline financial management activities associated with 
these grants.

                           PORT/RAIL/TRANSIT

    Question. According to the American Public Transportation 
Association, there are approximately 9.6 billion transit trips annually 
and people use public transportation vehicles over 32 billion times 
each workday. This is more than 16 times the number of aviation 
passengers, and yet the Department continues to spend less than 10 
percent of its transportation security resources on non-aviation 
security. The President's Budget Request proposes that individual grant 
programs for port, rail/mass transit, bus, and truck security grant 
programs be eliminated and collapsed into a new grant program called a 
``Targeted Infrastructure Protection Grants'' program. Because none of 
the previous individually appropriated grant programs are specified in 
this new account--ports will compete against rail and mass transit, and 
other infrastructure for $600 million. For mass transit security alone, 
the American Public Transportation Association estimates a need for $6 
billion in transit security. Not only does this insufficient request 
show a lack of support for modes of transportation other than air 
travel security but it further frustrates the officials responsible for 
securing people's safety on these modes by pitting them against each 
other for scarce resources. We currently spend $5 billion on aviation 
security. This proposal continues a disturbing pattern by the 
Department of focusing on the last battle--aviation security--and less 
on non-aviation modes of transportation.
    How does the agency really expect that this request furthers the 
mission of homeland security when we are only as strong as our weakest 
link?
    Answer. Enhancing the security of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure, including transportation, continues to be a high 
priority for the Department, which is why the Department proposed the 
development of a Targeted Infrastructure Protection (TIP) Program. This 
program would consolidate Port Security, Rail/Transit Security, 
Intercity Bus Security, and Trucking Industry Security grant programs 
into a single larger program. Because it is unrealistic to anticipate 
infrastructure threats and protection needs nearly 12 months in 
advance, the Secretary requires flexibility to target valuable TIP 
resources to address emerging needs, risks, and national priorities. 
Moreover, funds for this program will also allow the Department to 
build on and leverage partnerships with other Federal agencies and 
industry that seek to advance the State of the Nation's preparedness 
through better security solutions and information sharing approaches. 
Because the program is designed to provide us with maximum flexibility 
at the appropriate time, the Department is confident that the TIP will 
help further the mission of securing the homeland. The Administration 
requested a nearly 50 percent increase in total infrastructure funding 
in order to reduce concerns about ``competition'' among various 
sectors.

                              ALL-HAZARDS

    Question. The fine men and women of FEMA have recently responded to 
wildfires in Alaska, mudslides in California, and hurricanes in Florida 
in an unprecedented period of activity. As the backbone of the nation's 
all-hazards emergency management system the Emergency Management 
Performance Grants (EMPG) Program, now administered by the Office of 
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, is the only 
direct source of Federal funding to assist State and local governments 
with planning and preparedness activities associated with natural 
disasters. Congress saw fit last year to reject the President's 
proposal to cap allowable salary expenses and to shift the program away 
from its all-hazards philosophy. Secretary Chertoff said on March 2 of 
this year ``while fighting terrorism was the reason for the 
department's creation, it is not our sole function,'' which implies 
that all-hazards prevention, preparedness, response and recovery is a 
priority of DHS. Yet, a proposed $10 million cut in the EMPG program 
appeared in the Budget Request.
    Why is it that the President proposes a $10 million cut in this 
program?
    Answer. The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request of $170 
million for the Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) Program 
remains consistent with the fiscal year 2005 request and demonstrates a 
continued strong commitment and support to the nation's emergency 
prevention and response community through an all-hazards approach. In 
fiscal year 2006, EMPG will provide support for State and local 
emergency management departments and agencies based on identified needs 
and priorities for strengthening their emergency management 
capabilities, while addressing homeland security concerns. Further, the 
integration of EMPG into the Homeland Security Grant Program umbrella 
results in synergies with other related homeland security assistance 
programs. In addition, this integration also has facilitated efforts by 
states/local jurisdictions to leverage homeland security assistance to 
accomplish goals and objectives in their homeland security strategies.

                           FIRE GRANT FUNDING

    Question. Each day firefighters put themselves in harm's way to 
protect property and help citizens in time of need. There are currently 
over 1 million active firefighters in the United States, and about 73 
percent of those volunteer. According to the U.S. Fire Service, many 
fire departments report shortfalls in facilities, equipment, and 
training of personnel particularly volunteer companies in rural 
communities. An estimated one-third of firefighters per shift are not 
equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus. In communities under 
10,000 in population that have at least one building 4 stories high or 
higher, 10 percent are estimated to have no ladder or aerial apparatus. 
The assessment also found that overall fire departments can only equip 
about half of the emergency responders on a shift with portable radios. 
Additionally, 21 percent of fire departments, nearly all of them 
predominately volunteer departments, have four or fewer firefighters 
available in a mid-day fire house which means it is likely that the 
departments fail to deliver the minimum of 4 firefighters needed to 
safely initiate an interior attack on a fire. Fiscally stressed 
communities make every effort to support public servants but State and 
local funding simply is not there. Yet, the President proposes to 
reduce firefighter grants from $715 million to $500 million. In 
addition, he proposes to eliminate funding for the SAFER program, which 
Congress authorized to help communities hire firefighters.
    Please explain how the President's proposed 30 percent cut in 
funding helps fill these gaps.
    Answer. The Department's fiscal year 2006 Budget request reflects a 
strong commitment to our nation's fire service by providing $500 
million for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. This request 
is consistent with the Administration's budget request since fiscal 
year 2003 and reflects the appropriate balance of funding priorities 
among DHS grant programs. Further, this program has been in existence 
for 5 years and has 4 years of grant experience. In its 
reauthorization, Congress directed that an update to an assessment of 
the needs of the fire service be done, as the prior assessment does not 
reflect the impact of more than $2 billion in grant funding that DHS 
has provided to the nation's fire service over the last 3 years, both 
through Assistance to Firefighter Grants and Homeland Security Grants. 
In fact, the nation's fire service has received more DHS grant funding 
than any other public safety discipline. This report is expected to be 
completed in February or March 2006. In addition, Firefighting 
Operations and Support for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 
other emergencies is among the national target capabilities identified 
in the forthcoming National Preparedness Goal. Finally, it is important 
to note that there is significant funding available for similar 
purposes included in other programs, such as the State Homeland 
Security Program and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.
    Question. Also, please explain why the President proposes to 
terminate the SAFER firefighter hiring program.
    Answer. The Administration has requested significant funds over 
several years to support public safety preparedness at the State and 
local levels of government. Over the last 3 years, Congress has 
appropriated and DHS has granted over $12 billion to support training, 
exercising, and equipping public safety personnel, including 
firefighters, across the nation. The Administration maintains that 
hiring firefighters should remain a local responsibility, as local 
resources will eventually be needed to retain newly hired personnel. To 
that end, Federal support should focus on enhancing local capacities 
through training, equipment, and exercises; and not building inherently 
local capacities.

                    INTEROPERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS

    Question. Over $800 million in grant funding has been distributed 
for interoperability projects. The next largest specific first 
responder category--at less than half of that--is regional response 
teams funding. The Intelligence Reform Act authorizes a new DHS grant 
program for interoperability as well as a pilot program and the ability 
to establish and Office of Interoperability and Compatibility.
    What lessons learned or best practices has the agency gleaned from 
the fiscal year 2003 demonstration with COPS and FEMA?
    Answer. The ``fiscal year 2003 demonstration'' refers to the 
competitive grant program that COPS, FEMA, and SAFECOM collaborated on 
to maximize the funding available for interoperable communications 
equipment. The program provided competitive funding to local 
jurisdictions to demonstrate effective solutions for achieving 
interoperability. The lessons learned from this program have been 
incorporated into SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance.
    SAFECOM, a program of the S&T Directorate's Office for 
Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC), is the umbrella program 
within the Federal Government that oversees all initiatives and 
projects pertaining to public safety communications and 
interoperability. SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance provides the 
public safety community with consistent guidance, coordinated 
application processes, similar requirements across grant programs, and 
general guidelines for implementing a successful wireless 
communications system. This guidance seeks to incorporate best 
practices and lessons learned from the fiscal year 2003 demonstration 
program. The guidance was incorporated in the fiscal year 2003 FEMA and 
fiscal year 2003/fiscal year 2004 COPS grant awards, as well as ODP 
grant packages in fiscal year 2004. Examples of the lessons learned 
which are incorporated into the grant guidance include:
  --General criteria relating to public safety communications grants;
  --Criteria specific to block grants allocated to states;
  --Additional criteria based on the lifecycle of public safety 
        communications projects;
  --Additional guidelines, examples, and resources for improving public 
        safety communications and interoperability, and implementing a 
        wireless communication system; and
  --A thorough list of questions that applicants can use to help ensure 
        that they have taken into account the needs of public safety, 
        potential partners, and considered short and long-term goals.
    SAFECOM's coordinated grant guidance is available at 
www.safecomprogram.gov.
    Question. Outside of equipment acquisition what are the obstacles 
to interoperability?
    Answer. While equipment acquisition is a substantial obstacle, 
there are many other significant challenges to achieving 
interoperability. In a February 2003 report, the National Task Force on 
Interoperability identified five key challenges facing the development 
of interoperability, including: limited and fragmented radio spectrum, 
lack of coordination and cooperation, limited and fragmented funding, 
incompatible and aging communications equipment, and limited and 
fragmented planning.
    DHS understands the complexity of the problem of interoperability. 
The OIC, through SAFECOM--the umbrella program within the Federal 
Government that oversees all initiatives and projects pertaining to 
public safety communications and interoperability--has developed the 
Interoperability Continuum to serve as a framework for addressing the 
obstacles to interoperability, beyond just equipment. The Continuum 
helps the public safety community and local, tribal, state, and Federal 
policy makers address critical elements for success as they plan and 
implement interoperability solutions. These elements include 
governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training/
exercises, and usage of interoperable communications. Making progress 
in each of the five critical elements is crucial to the Department 
providing guidance to overcome the obstacles to interoperability.

                       INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS

    Question. What is the status of national standards for 
interoperable communication?
    Answer. DHS has made significant strides in the development of 
national standards and requirements for interoperable communications 
through SAFECOM. SAFECOM has developed accelerated standards for public 
safety interoperable communications, and drafted a report as required 
by IRTPA that discusses DHS plans for accelerating standards. This 
report includes a schedule of milestones and achievements. The report 
is moving through the clearance process and will be sent to Congress 
immediately therafter.
    DHS recognizes that the development of standards can only occur 
within the context of an architectural framework. The SAFECOM process 
for identifying and developing standards begins with development of a 
practitioner-accepted statement of requirements which then drives the 
development of a Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF). SAFECOM 
released Version 1.0 of the first comprehensive Public Safety 
Communications and Interoperability Statement of Requirements (SoR) in 
2004. Developed with public safety practitioner input, the SoR defines 
the functional requirements for public safety practitioners to 
communicate and share information when it is needed, where it is 
needed, and when authorized. SAFECOM, in cooperation with the National 
Institute of Standards Technology's (NIST) Office of Law Enforcement 
Standards (OLES), completed a draft of the PSAF, currently being 
reviewed for publication. The architectural framework outlines what the 
overall structured approach is for facilitating interoperability and 
indicates how the architecture will operate through the development of 
interface standards.
    Since the release of v1.0 of the Public Safety Communications and 
Interoperability SoR, SAFECOM has undertaken the development of v1.1 of 
the SoR. SoR v1.1 will reorganize the requirements contained within 
v1.0 into a layered structure, reclassifying the requirements into 
Network Functional Requirements, Device Functional Requirements, and 
Application/Services Functional Requirements. SAFECOM is currently 
vetting v1.1 of the SoR with the public safety practitioner community 
and anticipates releasing v1.1 to the public upon completion of that 
vetting process.
    Development of v2.0 of the SoR is currently underway. SoR v2.0 will 
add additional quantitative values to the functional requirements 
contained in v1.1, as well as address NIMS compliance. SAFECOM 
anticipates that it will be able to vet the draft of this version with 
the public safety community beginning in early 2006.
    Question. What other equipment does DHS plan to publish standards 
for and when will those standards be published?
    Answer. The Standards Portfolio in the S&T Directorate is working 
with voluntary consensus standards organizations and the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop standards in 
many areas of homeland security. In the CBRNE area, standards should be 
published in fiscal year 2005-fiscal year 2006 for: radiation detection 
(portal monitors, neutron detectors, training and data format); 
suspicious powder protocols, trace explosive detection; and chemical 
agent vapor detection. Standards for CBRNE personal protective 
equipment for emergency responders are being developed for: powered air 
purifying and self contained breathing respirators; chemical/biological 
hot and warm zone ensembles; personal alert safety systems; thermal 
exposure measurement; law enforcement PPE; and a bomb suit. Standards 
are also in development for biometric evaluation protocols, user 
interface guidelines, image quality. Standards efforts are in progress 
for: building security personal identity verification and access 
control; gaseous air cleaning; economic standards for security-related 
issues; and design/economics for structural integrity. Check lists for 
security of information technology products and PDA forensic tools have 
been published. Finally, SAFECOM is working with NIST's OLES and other 
Federal partners to accelerate the publishing of relevant radio 
standards for public safety interoperable communications in fiscal year 
2006-fiscal year 2007. Standards for the Inter-Sub-System-Interface, 
Console Interface, and Fixed Station Interface will pave the way for 
future seamless communications. Standards for basic functionality will 
be published by the second quarter of fiscal year 2006, with the 
balance of the functions being published by the second quarter of 
fiscal year 2007.

                        NON-PROFIT GRANT FUNDING

    Question. In fiscal year 2005, $25 million was provided for non-
profits for security at high-threat facilities. Who have these awards 
been distributed to, for how much and for what purpose?
    Answer. The $25 million was provided to protect nonprofit 
organizations located in the top 18 urban areas receiving funds in the 
fiscal year 2005 UASI program. These funds are to be used for target 
hardening, which includes the acquisition and installation of security 
equipment in real property (including buildings and improvements) owned 
or leased by a nonprofit organization, specifically in response to a 
risk of terrorist attack. Specific allocations for urban areas are 
available in the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP) program guidelines and application kit, which can be found at 
the following website address: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/fundopps.htm
    Question. Do funds remain available for obligation? If so, how 
much?
    Answer. Upon receipt of fiscal year 2005 funds awarded through the 
HSGP, States were required to issue a solicitation within 60 days of 
the award date for organizations to apply for funds allocated for 
nonprofit organizations. States are currently in the process of 
finalizing these awards.

                      EMS FIRST RESPONDER FUNDING

    Question. In response to a request of the Appropriations Committee, 
the Department recently submitted a report entitled, ``Support for EMS 
Provided by the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
and Preparedness'' which indicates that under the funding provided for 
our first responders, the Emergency Medical Services only receives 
about 4 percent of the total.
    What information does the Department have that tells us whether 4 
percent is an adequate share to prepare the professionals who will 
provide emergency medical care to victims at the scene of a potential 
attack or terrorist event?
    Answer. SLGCP provides training, funds for the purchase of 
equipment, support for the planning and execution of exercises, 
technical assistance, and other support to assist states, urban areas, 
and local jurisdictions in preventing, planning for, and responding to 
acts of terrorism. SLGCP established and maintains several programs 
that provide these services to emergency responders, including the 
HSGP, the UASI, and the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. SLGCP 
grant funds can be used to enhance emergency responder capabilities, 
including EMS, in accordance with the goals and objectives identified 
in the State or urban area's homeland security strategy. Additionally, 
fire department-based EMS providers have been, and continue to be, 
eligible for assistance under the Assistance to Firefighters Grant 
Program.
    The readiness of EMS is vital to ensuring prompt and appropriate 
emergency care and transportation as a component of the overall 
response to a terrorist incident. Therefore, it is essential that EMS 
agencies receive support and assistance from the States and be 
integrated into planning efforts and working groups to enhance the 
overall preparedness of state, urban area, and local public safety 
personnel to prevent, respond to and assist in the recovery from 
terrorist incidents. SLGCP funds for EMS agencies are allocated through 
the state's State Administrative Agencies (SAA), in accordance with 
each state's homeland security strategy. These strategies are based 
upon comprehensive assessments that address the specific 
vulnerabilities, threats, capabilities and needs in each state. In 
recognition of each state's unique threat, need, and vulnerability 
assessments, the Department does not dictate a specific percentage of 
funds that should be allocated to supplant EMS services. Instead, the 
Department supports a distribution strategy capable of addressing the 
distinctive needs of EMS agencies by allowing specific allocation 
amounts to be determined at the discretion of each state. However, in 
recognition of the important role played by EMS providers, the 
Department issued an Information Bulletin on May 6, 2004. The 
Information Bulletin reminded States that EMS providers are eligible to 
receive funding under the State HSGP and UASI programs.

                    PORT SECURITY GRANT COORDINATION

    Question. What coordination is occurring among states, local port 
authorities and the Captains of the Port, to ensure all vested parties 
are aware of grant determinations and that the limited resources are 
maximized when port security grants are made to independent terminal 
operators?
    Answer. As part of the transition of the Port Security Grant (PSG) 
Program from TSA to SLGCP, the Department has completely redesigned the 
process to focus on the risk-based prioritization of ports and 
allocation of the funds to address specific national port security 
priorities from a port-wide perspective. Redesign of the program was a 
collaborative process between SLGCP, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP), 
the Maritime Administration (MARAD) within DOT, and the American 
Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), among others. As part of this 
process the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) will coordinate a field 
review of all projects submitted for funding consideration. This field 
review will be conducted in coordination with the MARAD Region 
Director, the SAA responsible for the state's Homeland Security 
Strategy, and appropriate members of each port area's Area Maritime 
Security Committee (which includes representatives of the local port 
authorities) to ensure that a port-wide approach to risk reduction is 
taken and that scarce resources are maximized. Lastly, when 
determinations of funding have been made, a consolidated list of 
projects for each port area will be provided to the COTP, MARAD Region 
Director, SAA, and relevant members of the Area Maritime Security 
Committee.

                          TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

    Question. How much of the $50 million appropriated for the 
Technology Transfer Program has been awarded, to whom and for what 
projects?
    Answer. The Technology Transfer Program is known as the Commercial 
Equipment Direct Assistance Program (CEDAP). The legislation set aside 
$10 million for testing and evaluation of commercially available 
equipment to determine appropriateness for inclusion in the CEDAP 
program. The remaining $40 million was dedicated to the CEDAP program.
    On March 22, 2005, SLGCP officially opened the CEDAP to 
applications. The applications are competitive and must be consistent 
with the State homeland security plan. This first pilot test of the 
program ended May 5, 2005, with applications from 1,500 agencies for 
$34.4 million in equipment. The first award to 214 agencies of $2.0 
million in equipment and training will take place June 15, 2005. (See 
table below.)
    Phase II of the CEDAP program will begin with the opening of the 
application process in the summer of 2005. Award of the equipment and 
hands on training for the accepted applicants will take place early in 
the fall of 2005.

                                     CEDAP AWARDS, ROUND #1--AGENCY BY STATE
                                              [Total Agencies: 214]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          State/Agency                    City               Technology              Type            Unit Cost
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama:
    Alexander City Fire           Alexander City.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...      $12,500.00
     Department.
    Atmore Police Department....  Atmore.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Brick Hatton Volunteer Fire   Town Creek.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Calera Fire Department......  Calera.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Calera Police Department....  Calera.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Cherokee Rescue Squad.......  Cherokee...........  Search Camera Victim   Emergency Medical        14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.        Services.
    Cherokee Volunteer Fire       Cherokee...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Fighters.
    Choctaw County Emergency      Butler.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
     Management Agency.                                                        Management.
    Cottonwood Police Department  Cottonwood.........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Daphne Police Department....  Daphne.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Georgiana Police Department.  Georgiana..........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Guntersville Fire/Rescue....  Guntersville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Jasper Police Department....  Jasper.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Margaret Fire and Rescue....  Margaret...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Phoenix City Police           Phoenix City.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Russell County Sheriff's      Phoenix City.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
     Department.
Alaska:
    Kodiak Police Department....  Kodiak.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
Arizona:
    Safford Police Department...  Safford............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
Arkansas:
    Clinton Police Department...  Clinton............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Ouachita County Sheriff's     Camden.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Sherwood Police Department..  Sherwood...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
California:
    Greenfield Police Department  Greenfield.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Humboldt County Sheriff's     Eureka.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Mariposa County Sheriff's     Mariposa...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    Monterey Peninsula Airport    Monterey...........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
     Police.                                            Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    San Rafael Police Department  San Rafael.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Colorado:
    Idaho Springs Police          Idaho Springs......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Manitou Springs Police        Manitou Springs....  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
Connecticut:
    Mohegan Tribal Fire           Uncasville.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
     Department.
    Putnam Police Department....  Putnam.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Torrington Police Department  Torrington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Town of Stafford............  Stafford...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
Delaware:
    Elsmere Bureau of Police....  Elsmere............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    New Castle Police Department  New Castle.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Florida:
    Florida Gulf Coast            Fort Myers.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     University Police.
    Havana Police Department....  Havana.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Kissimmee Police Department.  Kissimmee..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Winter Springs Police         Winter Springs.....  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
Georgia:
    Austell Police Department...  Austell............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Jackson County Sheriff's      Jefferson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
Idaho:
    Madison County Sheriff's      Rexburg............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Rexburg Police Department...  Rexburg............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Illinois:
    Elkville Volunteer Fire       Dowell.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Homewood Police Department..  Homewood...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Olney Fire Department.......  Olney..............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
Indiana:
    Francesville Volunteer Fire   Francesville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Hudson Marshal's Office.....  Hudson.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Wayne County Sheriff's        Richmond...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
Iowa:
    Cedar Falls Police            Cedar Falls........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
     Department.                                        Locator System.
    Eldridge Volunteer Fire       Eldridge...........  CEDAP Personal         Fire Department...        4,140.00
     Company, Inc..                                     Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Marion County Sheriff's       Knoxville..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    Poweshiek County Emergency    Grinnell...........  CEDAP Personal         HAZMAT............        4,140.00
     Management Agency.                                 Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Scott County Sheriff's        Davenport..........  Thermal Imager.......  Public Safety.....       12,500.00
     Office.
    Sheldon Police Department...  Sheldon............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Kansas:
    Rose Hill Police Department.  Rose Hill..........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Washington County Sheriff's   Washington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
Kentucky:
    Bourbon County Sheriff's      Paris..............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Office.
Louisiana:
    District 8 Fire Department..  Rayville...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Grant Parish Sheriff's        Colfax.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
     Office.                                            Locator System.
    Jackson Parish Sheriff's      Jonesboro..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Lincoln Parish Sheriff's      Ruston.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Richland Parish Sheriff's     Rayville...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    Rosepine Police Department..  Rosepine...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    St. James Parish Sheriff's    Vacherie...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
     Office.                                            Locator System.
    West Monroe Police            West Monroe........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
Maine:
    Ashland Police Department...  Ashland............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Westbrook Fire Rescue         Westbrook..........  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
     Department.                                        Locator System.
Massachusetts:
    Burlington Police Department  Burlington.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Fairhaven Police Department.  Fairhaven..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Gardner Police Department...  Gardner............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Granby Police Department....  Granby.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Nantucket Fire Department...  Nantucket..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Norwood Fire Department.....  Norwood............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Plymouth Police Department..  Plymouth...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Saugus Emergency Management   Saugus.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
     Agency.                                                                   Management.
    Wayland Police Department...  Wayland............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Michigan:
    Gogebic County Emergency      Bessemer...........  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
     Management.                                                               Management.
    Grosse lle Police Department  Grosse Ile.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Hampton Township Fire         Essexville.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Harper Woods Police           Harper Woods.......  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
     Department.                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Kent County Sheriff's         Grand Rapids.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
Minnesota:
    Annandale Fire Department...  Annandale..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Cleveland Police Department.  Cleveland..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Douglas County Sheriff's      Alexandria.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Elk River Police Department.  Elk River..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Hector Police Department....  Hector.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Mentor Volunteer Fire and     Mentor.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Fire Department...        3,700.00
     Rescue.
    Nicollet County Sheriff's     St. Peter..........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
     Office.                                            Locator System.
    Red Lake County Sheriff's     Red Lake Falls.....  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office/OEM.
    Winona County Sheriff's       Winona.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Winona Police Department....  Winona.............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
Mississippi:
    Clarkdale Fire & Rescue.....  Meridian...........  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    North Haven Volunteer Fire    New Albany.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Tippah County Sheriff's       Ripley.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
Missouri:
    Buchanan County Sheriff's     St. Joseph.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    JasCo Metropolitan Police     Oronogo............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Jonesburg Police Department.  Jonesburg..........  Advanced Portable      Law Enforcement...       10,200.00
                                                        Detector.
    Kelso Police Department.....  Kelso..............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Madison County Sheriff's      Fredericktown......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Park Hills Police Department  Park Hills.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Sni Valley Fire Protection    Oak Grove..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     District.
    Terre du Lac Fire and Rescue  Bonne Terre........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
Nebraska:
    Cuming County Sheriff's       West Point.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Grand Island Police           Grand Island.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Hall County Sheriff's         Grand Island.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Hay Springs Police            Hay Springs........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Keith County Sheriff's        Ogallala...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Platte County Sheriff's       Columbus...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Wayne County Sheriff's        Wayne..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
New Hampshire:
    Allenstown Police Department  Allenstown.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Durham Police Department....  Durham.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
New Jersey:
    Cinnaminson Township Police   Cinnaminson........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Clark Police Department.....  Clark..............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Franklin Township Police      Pittstown..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Glen Ridge Police Department  Glen Ridge.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Magnolia Police Department..  Magnolia...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Ridgefield Police Department  Ridgefield.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Sea Girt Borough Police and   Sea Girt...........  Advanced Portable      Other.............       10,200.00
     Fire Departments.                                  Detector.
    Washington Township Police    Robbinsville.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Waterford Township Fire       Atco...............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Waterford Township Police     Atco...............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
New York:
    Harriman Police Department..  Harriman...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Melrose Fire District.......  Melrose............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    New Windsor Police            New Windsor........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
North Carolina:
    Beaufort Police Department..  Beaufort...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Forest City Fire Department.  Forest City........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    McDowell County Emergency     Marion.............  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
     Management.                                                               Management.
    Rocky Mount Police            Rocky Mount........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Rutherfordton Fire            Rutherfordton......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Trent Woods Police            Trent Woods........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
North Dakota:
    New England Fire Department.  New England........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Stark County Sheriff's        Dickinson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
Ohio:
    Akron Police Department.....  Akron..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Beavercreek Police            Beavercreek........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Northwest Ambulance District  Geneva.............  Advanced Portable      Emergency Medical        10,200.00
                                                        Detector.              Services.
Oklahoma:
    Enid Fire Department........  Enid...............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Marlow Police Department....  Marlow.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Owasso Fire Department......  Owasso.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Woodward Police Department..  Woodward...........  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
Oregon:
    Cascade Locks Fire &          Cascade Locks......  Thermal Imager.......  Other.............       12,500.00
     Emergency Medical Services.
    Hubbard Police Department...  Hubbard............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Illinois Valley Fire          Cave Junction......  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     District.
    Malheur County Sheriff's      Vale...............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Oakland Rural Fire District.  Oakland............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Turner Police Department....  Turner.............  CEDAP Personal         Law Enforcement...        4,140.00
                                                        Protective Equipment
                                                        Kit.
    Turner Rural Fire Protection  Turner.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     District.
Pennsylvania:
    Bristol Township Police       Bristol............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Millersville Borough Police   Millersville.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Wilkes-Barre Police           Wilkes-Barre.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Wilkes-Barre Township Police  Wilkes-Barre.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
Rhode Island:
    Bristol Police Department...  Bristol............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Cumberland Hill Fire          Cumberland.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     District.
    North Smithfield Fire &       North Smithfield...  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Rescue Service.
    Pawtucket Fire Department...  Pawtucket..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
South Carolina:
    Hardeeville Fire/Rescue.....  Hardeeville........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
Tennessee:
    Lenoir City Police            Lenoir City........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Martin Fire Department......  Martin.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Milan Police Department.....  Milan..............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
Texas:
    Arp Marshal's Office........  Arp................  Thermal Imager.......  Emergency                12,500.00
                                                                               Management.
    Bosque County Constable's     Meridian...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office--Precinct 1.
    Brownsboro Police Department  Brownsboro.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Clifton Volunteer Fire        Clifton............  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
     Department.                                        Locator System.
    Cockrell Hill Police          Dallas.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Conroe Fire Department......  Conroe.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Crims Chapel Volunteer Fire   Henderson..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Gainesville Police            Gainesville........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Hillsboro Fire/Rescue.......  Hillsboro..........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Jacksboro Police Department.  Jacksboro..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Marietta Volunteer Fire       Marietta...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Meridian Fire Department....  Meridian...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Valley Mills Police           Valley Mills.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Victoria Police Department..  Victoria...........  Advanced Portable      Law Enforcement...       10,200.00
                                                        Detector.
    Wichita County Texas          Wichita Falls......  Search Camera Victim   Emergency                14,620.00
     Emergency Management.                              Locator System.        Management.
    Winters Police Department...  Winters............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
Utah:
    Cedar City/Iron County Fire   Cedar City.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Emery County Sheriff's        Castle Dale........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    Helper Police Department....  Helper.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Morgan County Sheriff's       Morgan.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
Virginia:
    Amherst County Sheriff's      Amherst............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Buena Vista Police            Buena Vista........  Night Vision Kit.....  Public Safety.....        3,700.00
     Department.
    Cumberland County Sheriff's   Cumberland.........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Emporia Police Department...  Emporia............  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Henry County Sheriff's        Martinsville.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    King George Sheriff's Office  King George........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
Washington:
    Bainbridge Island Police      Bainbridge Island..  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Department.
    Chelan County Sheriff's       Wenatchee..........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Columbia County Sheriff's     Dayton.............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Office.
    Colville Police Department..  Colville...........  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Colville Tribes Fire Rescue.  Nespelem...........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Jefferson County Sheriff's    Port Hadlock.......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
     Office.
    Kettle Falls Police           Kettle Falls.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Lakewood Police Department..  Lakewood...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Pierce County Fire District   Orting.............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     18.
    San Juan County Sheriff's     Eastsound..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Fire Department...        3,700.00
     Office.
    San Juan Fire District 3....  Friday Harbor......  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Stevens County Fire District  Hunters............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     2.
    Stevens County Fire           Clayton............  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Protection District 1.
    Stevens County Sheriff's      Colville...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Emergency Medical         3,700.00
     Ambulance.                                                                Services.
    Sumas Police Department.....  Sumas..............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Tumwater Police Department..  Tumwater...........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Walla Walla Police            Walla Walla........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
     Department.                                        Locator System.
Wisconsin:
    Auburndale Joint Fire and     Auburndale.........  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Rescue Department.
    Chippewa Falls Fire and       Chippewa Falls.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
     Emergency Services.
    Chippewa Falls Police         Chippewa Falls.....  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Chippewa Fire District......  Chippewa Falls.....  Thermal Imager.......  Fire Department...       12,500.00
    Cottage Grove Police          Cottage Grove......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Fox Valley Metro Police       Little Chute.......  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Department.
    Germantown Police Department  Germantown.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    McFarland Police Department.  McFarland..........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Mishicot Police Department..  Mishicot...........  Search Camera Victim   Law Enforcement...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Park Falls Police Department  Park Falls.........  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
    Sharon Police Department....  Sharon.............  Thermal Imager.......  Law Enforcement...       12,500.00
    Stanley Fire Department.....  Stanley............  Search Camera Victim   Fire Department...       14,620.00
                                                        Locator System.
    Vernon County Emergency       Viroqua............  Night Vision Kit.....  Law Enforcement...        3,700.00
     Management.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. What success have come out of the technology transfer 
program?
    Answer. The first award to 214 agencies of $2.0 million in 
equipment and training took place on May 19, 2005. The second award 
will take place in the coming weeks. A detailed evaluation is under 
development to determine the impact and cost effectiveness of the CEDAP 
program.

                             CITIZENS CORP

    Question. For what, specifically, will the increase of $35 million 
for Citizens Corp in the fiscal year 2006 President's Request be used?
    Answer. The Citizen Corps Program (CCP) is the Department's grass-
roots initiative to actively involve all citizens in hometown security 
through personal preparedness, training, and volunteer service. CCP 
funds support Citizen Corps Councils with efforts to engage citizens in 
preventing, preparing for, and responding to all hazards, including 
planning and evaluation, public education and communication, training, 
participation in exercises, providing proper equipment to citizens with 
a role in response, and management of Citizen Corps volunteer programs 
and activities. State and local governments have embraced the concept 
of Citizen Corps. They are developing the management capacity of the 
Councils, conducting public education, providing training for citizens, 
and engaging citizens through volunteer programs. However, there is a 
need to expand this effort to ensure that citizens are integrated in 
all aspects of State and local government preparedness, response and 
recovery and to support more significant community outreach through 
schools, private and public sector worksites, faith-based 
organizations, recreational outlets, and local media. The requested $50 
million is critical to meet the demand and build the capacity of 
preparing, training, and involving citizens. In the end, this will 
result in the development of a fully-prepared community, with citizens 
who are fully aware, trained and practiced on how to detect, deter, 
prepare for, and respond to all hazards and threats.

                             BEST PRACTICES

    Question. As the Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
and Preparedness discovers lessons learned and best practices across 
the Nation regarding procurement and allocation of grant funding, are 
those practices being collected and made available for State and local 
governments to benefit?
    Answer. SLGCP currently has several avenues to identify and share 
grant-related best practices and lessons learned with its State and 
local grantees.
  --The office has analyzed the states' and territories' narrative on 
        management capabilities responses included in the fiscal year 
        2005 HSGP applications, including information on allocation of 
        grant funding. SLGCP will provide each respondent with a 
        written overview summary analysis that highlights best 
        management practices and lessons learned. This overview will 
        allow States to learn about approaches that are working 
        successfully in other states. In addition to the overview, 
        SLGCP will also provide a state-specific analysis of the 
        management capabilities outlined in the applications.
  --SLGCP is developing a Program Management Handbook that includes 
        guidelines for building strong program management 
        infrastructures. These guidelines have been written to provide 
        a common, flexible framework with potential for customization 
        at the state, regional, and local levels. Best practices in 
        program management will be collected and disseminated to 
        support the implementation of the capabilities outlined in the 
        Handbook.
  --ODP is exploring ways to provide procurement assistance including 
        identification and dissemination of procurement best practices 
        to help States develop streamlined procurement practices. 
        Currently under development is procurement technical assistance 
        including informational materials, tools and templates, and 
        customized on-site guidance.

              AIRBORNE RAPID IMAGING FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT

    Question. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center, the State of New York utilized a technology 
that provided maps to first responders showing location, elevation, and 
temperature ranges of features on the ground within 8-10 hours after 
data collection. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of State 
and local Government Coordination and Preparedness provided $3 million 
in 2004 to demonstrate and further improve this technology by reducing 
turn around time through a system called the Airborne Rapid Imaging for 
Emergency Support (ARIES).
    What were the results of the ARIES flight demonstration that was 
conducted last November?
    Answer. The Airborne Rapid Imaging for Emergency Support (ARIES) 
program was a DHS-funded initiative to explore the technical 
feasibility of providing near real-time map-quality imagery for first 
responders in the event of a crisis. The program began in the spring of 
2004 and culminated with a technical demonstration on November 17, 2004 
at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey. The objectives of the demonstration 
were as follows:
  --Demonstrate the capacity to obtain digital imagery rapidly using 
        commercial aircraft in a simulated emergency event.
  --Downlink this imagery directly from the aircraft to a receiving 
        station using micro millimeter wave technology.
  --Process the raw, uncorrected imagery in a portable environment for 
        use by existing DHS systems within 3 hours of acquisition.
  --Distribute the imagery to multiple agencies for emergency needs.
  --Provide on-site visualization, tracking, and information gathering 
        capabilities to assist with any emergency response 
        requirements.
    The demonstration satisfied the technical criteria for four of the 
five components. Distribution of the imagery was not successfully 
demonstrated. This was a technical demonstration that did not address 
the utility of ARIES' orthorectified imagery products to emergency 
responders.
    Overall, the ARIES program proved the technical feasibility of the 
concept. A final program report including a costing analysis of the 
ARIES concept was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis. The 
report is in the final review process and will be made available upon 
completion.
    Question. What is the current capability in Federal, state, or 
local government organizations or private industry to provide 
integrated digital imagery, lidar, and thermal information to first 
responders?
    Answer. Many types of imagery, acquired for particular uses, are 
available commercially to support first responders. The capability of 
various organizations to deliver this imagery directly to first 
responders varies significantly from State to state. However, the 
capability of first responders to receive it and do sophisticated 
analysis is limited because there is no end-to-end system in place to 
acquire process and deliver imaging products to the first response 
community. The DHS Geospatial Management Office (GMO) is currently 
conducting pilot programs to demonstrate delivery of geospatial 
products to first responders using wireless hand held devices.
    Question. What is the Department's need and plan to advance and 
utilize this technology?
    Answer. According to the DHS GMO, the simultaneous collection, 
processing and integration of Digital Electro-optical (EO) Imagery, 
Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) elevation data and Thermal Infrared 
(TIR) Imagery from a single aerial platform was demonstrated in the 
ARIES pilot. The ARIES demonstration provided a unique capability 
determined to be necessary in the aftermath of September 11. Imaging 
technologies are collected and used by Federal, State or local 
organizations in a variety of mapping applications or special studies. 
Currently, however, the acquisition, dissemination and use of airborne 
and space-borne sensor information for emergency response are mostly 
uncoordinated among levels of government, across jurisdictions and 
between mission areas.
    The DHS GMO is responsible for providing leadership and 
coordination in meeting the geospatial information requirements of 
those responsible for planning, prevention, mitigation, assessment and 
response to emergencies, critical infrastructure protection, and other 
functions of the Department. The GMO is working with the DHS components 
as well as other Federal, State and local organizations to understand 
the geospatial information needed to support their missions. The GMO 
developed the Geospatial User Needs Assessment Report which identified 
many of the needs. The GMO has also produced and is maintaining the 
Geospatial View of the Geospatial Enterprise Architecture which is a 
current view of the as-is and target geospatial information technology 
architecture for DHS. The DHS Geospatial Architecture view is 
referenced in the fiscal year 2005 HSGP and is being used as a model 
for the emerging Geospatial Profile. As the DHS and HLS architecture 
mature, rapid geospatial imagery acquisition requirements will be 
identified and services will be acquired.

                           HAZARD MITIGATION

    Question. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program provides critical 
funding to States following a declared natural disaster to assist them 
in reducing future disaster losses. The funding is an amount equivalent 
to a percentage of eligible FEMA funds. The funds provided are 75 
percent Federal and 25 percent local or State. Since the passage in 
December 2000 of the Disaster Mitigation Act which amended the Stafford 
Disaster Relief Act, FEMA has encouraged States to put forth the 
additional effort required to obtain an approved enhanced plan. Those 
with an enhanced plan would be eligible for an amount equivalent to up 
to 20 percent of eligible FEMA funds. Based on this incentive numerous 
States are working to obtain this goal. The fiscal year 2006 
President's Budget proposes language to reduce the percentage to up to 
12.5 percent.
    Since this incentive has been in the law for 4 years, why are you 
requesting this change now that some States have put forth significant 
commitment of already overburdened resources to achieve enhanced 
status?
    Answer. The President's Budget request preserves the 5 percent 
incentive for developing enhanced mitigation plans. The Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) now uses a 7.5-percent multiplier to 
calculate the amount of mitigation money available to a State after a 
disaster declaration, when the State has an approved basic mitigation 
plan. When the State has an approved enhanced mitigation plan, it is 
eligible for up to 12.5 percent. Both the Administration and Congress 
agreed to the 7.5 percent basic formula, which was changed from 15 
percent when Congress created the Pre-disaster Mitigation (PDM) program 
to provide additional funding for mitigation activities on a nationally 
competitive basis.
    The incentive was 5 percent when the program used a 15 percent 
baseline and when HMGP represented the primary means for States to 
receive Federal mitigation funds. The incentive remains 5 percent now. 
Under the old plan, only the States in which a disaster was declared 
were eligible. However, the availability of PDM grant funds allows the 
States to compete for mitigation funds without a Presidential disaster 
declaration. The budget request of up to 12.5 percent HMGP for the 
States with enhanced mitigation plans preserves the 5 percentage point 
incentive authorized in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
    Question. Which States have approved plans and which States are in 
the process of working on enhanced plans?
    Answer. All 50 States now have approved State Mitigation Plans. In 
addition, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands have approved state-
level mitigation plans. (The Federated States of Micronesia is the only 
non-Tribal jurisdiction without an approved plan. FEMA Region IX 
expects to be able to approve it soon.)
    There are currently four States with approved enhanced mitigation 
plans: Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington. FEMA has recently 
reviewed enhanced plans from Maryland and Pennsylvania; however, they 
require revision prior to approval. The following States have advised 
FEMA that they may submit enhanced plans for review and approval within 
the next 6 months: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin. Arizona, California, Delaware, North Dakota, and Utah have 
expressed interest in developing enhanced mitigation plans, but, to 
date, such plans have not been received.
    Question. Were the States advised that you intended to reduce the 
incentive?
    Answer. The fiscal year 2006 President's Budget is the first time 
that a specific percentage, other than 20 percent, has been 
communicated to the States working on enhanced plans. The incentive for 
an enhanced plan, however, remains 5 percent.

                        FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION

    Question. What is the schedule, by state, for implementation of the 
Flood Map Modernization Program?
    Answer. The schedule varies from State to State and changes from 
year to year. FEMA has developed a strong business planning process in 
which it works with the States and with other significant mapping 
partners to identify and schedule mapping projects jointly. FEMA then 
works with its partners to execute the plan based on the funding 
appropriated and makes adjustments twice a year to align schedules with 
current realities. FEMA balances stakeholder input with national and 
regional flood mapping needs to develop a nationwide plan for flood map 
update schedules and anticipated budgets. FEMA used stakeholder input 
to develop the initial plan, and received additional feedback on the 
plan that will be addressed in future updates. The current Multi-year 
Flood Hazard Identification Plan (MHIP), detailing the 5 year schedule 
and budget for developing the updated flood hazard data and maps, can 
be accessed online at http://www.fema.gov/fhm/mh_main.shtm.
    Question. Are we on track to complete this project within the 
projected timeframe of completion in fiscal year 2008 within the budget 
that has been appropriated and requested?
    Answer. FEMA is on track to complete the project by 2010, should 
the funding requested through 2008 be provided. That is, studies funded 
in 2008 are expected to be complete by 2010. The digital flood hazard 
data will meet quality standards contained in the MHIP. However, 
stakeholders have identified additional engineering requirements beyond 
what can be accomplished within this project. Data on these additional 
engineering requirements are being collected as FEMA coordinates with 
States and communities during the nationwide mapping effort. These data 
will provide the basis for evaluating future resource needs.
    Question. What sort of cooperation is happening with State and 
local governments?
    Answer. The map modernization effort is built upon constant 
collaboration between FEMA Headquarters and FEMA Regions I-X, the 
States and local entities, and the business planning process 
facilitates this collaboration. Many FEMA mapping partners are 
contributing not only to the flood map production process, but to the 
planning process as well. In fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004, 
FEMA provided more than $92 million directly to its Cooperating 
Technical Partners (CTPs) to develop flood map data in support of map 
modernization. Also, in 2002, as part of its broader effort to 
incorporate local, state, and regional involvement in flood mapping, 
FEMA asked the states, territories, and some CTPs with multi-
jurisdictional responsibility for floodplain management to prepare map 
modernization plans. The plans included extensive flood mapping needs 
assessments that were developed pursuant to FEMA and other criteria. In 
early fiscal year 2004, FEMA made funds available through the Flood Map 
Modernization Management Support (FMMMS) program to these same entities 
to upgrade and update their plans. FEMA received a total of 55 plans 
covering 48 States and four of the five water management districts in 
Florida. FEMA also received plans from the District of Columbia and two 
Territories.
    The FMMMS program, with more than 50 partners, provides a means to 
ensure that partners can support Flood Map Modernization through 
administration and management activities. These activities, although 
not directly resulting in the production of a flood map, increase 
partners' investment and capability to manage their flood hazard data, 
strongly bolster the efforts of mapping partners, and ensure a 
tailored, local focus within a national program. Two of the most vital 
outcomes of FMMMS are the partners' ability to review program planning 
policy and guidance and their identification of needs as a part of 
their business planning process.
    Question. What will the maintenance cost of this program be once 
the modernization piece is completed?
    Answer. FEMA is currently estimating maintenance costs and will 
provide this information to the Office of Management and Budget as 
scheduled. The strong partnerships, business planning processes, and 
flood mapping technologies deployed as part of Flood Map Modernization 
will allow FEMA to improve its estimated maintenance costs as the 
program draws to completion. FEMA will continue to work with the States 
and communities to define the most efficient and effective approach for 
providing and maintaining up-to-date flood hazard information for the 
nation.

                        CERRO GRANDE FIRE CLAIMS

    Question. What is the unobligated balance of the Cerro Grande fire 
claims fund?
    Answer. As of April 30, 2005, the unobligated balance of the Cerro 
Grande fire claims fund is $36,559,305.
    Question. Is there a deadline for claims? If so, what is it?
    Answer. The deadline for filing claims (other than mitigation 
claims) with the Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims was August 28, 
2002. The deadline for filing mitigation claims was August 28, 2003.
    Question. If it has passed, what is the remaining balance of the 
fund?
    Answer. As of April 30, 2005, the remaining unobligated balance of 
the Cerro Grande fire claims fund is $36,559,305.
    Question. How many claims totaling how much are left to be resolved 
and what is the timeline for resolving those claims?
    Answer. FEMA has successfully processed 21,453 claims, including 
all administrative appeals. There are two claims left to be resolved. 
Those claims, totaling $5,249,866, were filed in the United States 
District Court for New Mexico. The resolution of these two cases 
depends on the schedule of the United States District Court. All of the 
4,529 subrogation claims have been processed, and 70 percent of each of 
those claims has been paid, leaving $34,509,270 as the remaining 
subrogation liability. The subrogation claims will be paid with funds 
remaining after the adjudication of the two claims in Federal Court.

                     PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION GRANTS

    Question. Last year the Conferees expressed concern over the slow 
progress in awarding fiscal year 2003 Pre-disaster Mitigation Grants 
and over the unobligated balances that remained in the program. How 
much fiscal year 2004 funding has been released to date and how much 
remains unobligated in the program?
    Answer. To date, FEMA has not released any fiscal year 2004 
competitive grant funding ($131 million). Since the PDM funds are 
available until expended, FEMA is combining the remaining fiscal year 
2003 funds with the fiscal year 2004 funds and with the fiscal year 
2005 appropriation into a streamlined fiscal year 2005 PDM competitive 
grant program. Of the fiscal year 2004 appropriation of $149 million, a 
total of $137 million (competitive grants, administrative, and 
miscellaneous funding) remains unobligated.
    Question. For fiscal year 2005 funds, why is it taking so long to 
distribute the funds and how can the program be expedited?
    Answer. After completing the first competitive PDM process, FEMA 
began awarding the fiscal year 2003 grants in April 2004. The fiscal 
year 2003 appropriation, authorized in February 2003, directed FEMA to 
implement a PDM grant program in three parts: (1) a nationally 
competitive PDM grant program for state, territory, local government, 
and Indian tribal government projects and plans; (2) a nationally 
competitive PDM grant program for disaster-resistant university 
projects and plans; and (3) a one-time planning grant allocation to the 
states and territories. The PDM grants are awarded based on the results 
of a three-phase competition--eligibility and completeness review, 
technical evaluation, and national evaluation team review. The 
applications are ranked and announced, and subsequently, the applicants 
are notified that their application has been selected for funding. Once 
this takes place, the grant award process can begin. The majority of 
the fiscal year 2003 funds have been awarded; however, an additional 
$18.5 million will be awarded when ongoing Federally required 
environmental and historic preservation compliance reviews are 
complete. FEMA anticipates that this will be no later than the end of 
fiscal year 2005. At that point, FEMA will have funded all eligible 
fiscal year 2003 grant applications and approximately $11 million in 
fiscal year 2003 funds will remain.
    In response to the announcement of funds available for fiscal year 
2005, FEMA received 821 applications totaling nearly $517 million. FEMA 
conducted eligibility and completeness reviews in March 2005. Technical 
reviews in the areas of engineering, cost effectiveness, and 
environmental and historic preservation were conducted in March and 
April 2005. The National Evaluation will be conducted May 17-June 3, 
2005. Representatives from 27 states, 3 tribes, and 1 territory will 
participate in the National Evaluation process.
    Based on the eligibility, completeness, and technical reviews 
completed to date, FEMA expects that the selection of grants for award 
will be completed in June, after which pre-award activities and the 
obligation of grant awards will begin. Grants will be selected so that 
ultimately, all funds from fiscal year 2005 and prior years will be 
obligated.
    Federal environmental and historic preservation compliance 
requirements for project grants, as well as state-level grant 
processing requirements, are significant factors that can delay the 
obligation of grant funds to selected grantees. FEMA will work with 
grantees to complete these requirements expeditiously; however, for 
those grants that cannot be obligated in fiscal year 2005, FEMA will 
work to complete the requirements and to obligate the grant funds as 
early as possible in fiscal year 2006.

                             FEMA PERSONNEL

    Question. Recently FEMA has experienced a large number of 
vacancies. In fiscal year 2004 and to date in fiscal year 2005 how many 
vacancies has FEMA experienced in headquarters and in the regions?
    Answer. At the end of fiscal year 2004, there were approximately 
357 vacancies agency-wide (not including Stafford Act employees). By 
mid-year of fiscal year 2005, FEMA had approximately 342 vacancies 
agency-wide.
    Question. Were any of those vacancies eliminated or transferred to 
other parts of DHS?
    Answer. Yes, some of the vacancies were transferred to the SLGCP at 
the start of fiscal year 2005.
    Question. Is so, what is the total number eliminated, and the total 
number transferred and to where?
    Answer. Sixteen vacancies were transferred to SLGCP at the start of 
fiscal year 2005.
    Question. How many vacancies does FEMA have as of April 20, 2005?
    Answer. As of April 20, 2005, FEMA has approximately 342 vacancies.
    Question. What is the current plan at FEMA for filling vacancies?
    Answer. FEMA will continue to fill vacancies and to maintain 
staffing levels sufficient to sustain its mission.
    Question. How has the vacancy of so many positions affected the 
ability to prepare and respond to disasters?
    Answer. FEMA still is able to maintain its mission capability.

                  IA'S ROLE IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

    Question. In February 2004, the DHS IG noted that the mission of 
the IAIP Risk Assessment Division (RAD) overlaps in many ways with the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), now called the National 
Counterterrorism Center. The TTIC was created through executive order 
in 2003. In August 2004, the IG noted that DHS is not playing a lead 
role in consolidating terrorist watch list information even though the 
Homeland Security Act called for DHS to play a major role in watch list 
consolidation. In December of 2004, the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act was signed by the President making sweeping 
changes in the intelligence community.
    With the Intelligence Reform Act and other executive orders 
stripping away most of the responsibilities of IA and placing them with 
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening 
Center, what role does IA play in the intelligence community?
    Answer.
The Role of DHS Office of Information Analysis in the Intelligence 
        Community
    DHS Office of Information Analysis (IA) plays a leading role in the 
intelligence community for homeland security intelligence. The Office 
provides border, infrastructure, maritime and domestic threat analysis; 
fuses unique information from our components and our non-traditional 
stakeholders; and serves as the primary intelligence information 
provider to state, local, territorial and tribal governments and the 
private sector, as well as their advocate for intelligence information 
within the intelligence community. As I announced on July 12, 2005, I 
am committed to enhancing this role.
    DHS IA's role as a leader of homeland security intelligence within 
the intelligence community is likewise enhanced by the IRTPA 2004 and 
other executive orders; the greater integration of the intelligence 
community as a result of IRTPA 2004 will strengthen the ability of DHS 
IA to carry out its mission.
IRTPA 2004 and the Integration of the Intelligence Community
    DHS IA is aggressively integrating into the intelligence community 
to ensure we can maximally contribute to the nation's security, 
especially in our unique areas of expertise (producing unique analysis 
and providing unique information), and to ensure we are able to most 
effectively leverage the expertise and support of the intelligence 
community on behalf of the Homeland Security mission and its 
stakeholders, especially those non-traditional stakeholders such as 
State, local, territorial, and tribal governments and the private 
sector (with whom we have unique partnerships).
Integrating DHS IA Unique Analytic Expertise into the Intelligence 
        Community
    DHS IA has ``forward deployed'' DHS intelligence analysts to our 
intelligence community partners, to include the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and to non-intelligence community members such as the TSC.
    These seasoned analysts are able to ensure our intelligence 
community partners have the benefit of our unique DHS analytic 
expertise in Border Security Intelligence, Infrastructure Security 
Intelligence, Maritime Security Intelligence (esp. through our Homeland 
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Assessment Center), and Domestic Threat 
Intelligence.
    We frequently collaborate with our partners when expertise is 
required in our unique analytic areas and we are fully engaged in 
ongoing community efforts to develop community production plans 
reflective of an efficient application of the community's resources. 
For example, DHS IA is fully participating in the NCTC led effort to 
develop a communitywide counterterrorism production plan; we are taking 
the lead in those areas that make use of our unique DHS analytic areas 
(borders, infrastructure, maritime and domestic threat, as appropriate) 
and partnering with other organizations on those topics that will be 
strengthen by including our experts' input.
Working with NCTC and TSC on Analysis
    DHS IA has been a strong partner in NCTC since its inception as the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center in January 2003. On a daily basis 
we levy the expertise resident in the NCTC to answer the needs of our 
customers--we focus on ensuring the best counterterrorism analysis in 
the government is put into a form, context and classification that is 
useful for our state, local, territorial and tribal governments and 
private sector partners. At the same time, we provide our substantial 
expertise to the NCTC on areas where we are the experts: borders, 
infrastructure, maritime, and domestic threat analysis. The result of 
this partnership is that we work together on many joint products--
bringing the best expertise in the government to bear on behalf of our 
customers.
    DHS IA took a lead role in helping stand up the TSC, providing 
staff and support (to include a senior manager). Our experienced 
analysts in the TSC help ensure the success of its vital work in 
watchlist consolidation.
    DHS IA also conducts a valuable alternative analysis program; our 
Red Cell provides alternative analytic perspective to complement--and 
challenge--NCTC and others findings. Our Red Cell has received 
compliments for its insightful and adventurous thought--and this work 
is an essential component of the alternative analytic capability 
required under IRTPA 2004.
Integrating DHS IA Unique Information into the Intelligence Community
    In parallel with our efforts to integrate DHS unique analytic 
expertise into the intelligence community, we are also moving forward 
in ensuring our vast DHS unique information holdings are made available 
to the intelligence community through direct access and quality 
reporting.
    DHS has vast information holdings, unique to this department, 
either as a result of our operational elements' investigations and 
enforcement operations or as a result of our unique position as the 
primary interface between the Federal Government and the State, local, 
territorial and tribal governments and private sector.
    DHS IA is working to ensure analysts throughout the intelligence 
community have access to our information holdings, while respecting the 
privacy and civil liberties of our citizens. In several cases, the 
Department has made operational elements' data holdings directly 
available to partner organizations in the intelligence community. In 
addition, DHS IA is establishing a reports officer program, focused on 
drawing information out of the department's information holdings and 
placing them into traditional intelligence community channels, through 
the Intelligence Information Reports vehicle. DHS IA has deployed 
trained reports officers into key departmental operational nodes to 
report counterterrorism information derived from border enforcement 
efforts and immigration investigations to the intelligence community. 
In the future, DHS IA will deploy trained reports officers throughout 
the components--and out into State and Local Fusion Centers--to ensure 
the all the department's relevant information is made available to 
those who need it, in a timely manner and in the channels analysts in 
the intelligence community are comfortable with and expect to receive 
reporting.
Integrating DHS IA Unique Partnerships into the Intelligence Community
    DHS IA has been charged to be the primary Federal Government 
intelligence information provider to the State, local, territorial, and 
tribal governments and the private sector (a responsibility re-
emphasized by IRTPA 2004)--and to be their advocate within the 
intelligence community. On a daily basis we are integrating our support 
for these customers into the larger intelligence community by working 
to ensure the free flow of information and products from the 
intelligence community out to our customers, by providing actionable 
intelligence, and by contextualizing intelligence to explain the 
product to our customers in terms they understand and working with our 
partners to produce the reports at the classification levels our 
stakeholders can use.
    We are also continually working to ensure our customers' 
requirements--whether they are for information or for finished analytic 
production--are represented in the intelligence community requirements 
statements, collection decks, and production plans. Our work in 
integrating the homeland security intelligence requirements of the 
state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and the private 
sector into the intelligence community requirements system is the first 
time these requirements have been systematically included and advocated 
for in the intelligence community.
IRTPA 2004 and DHS IA Departmental Responsibilities
    In addition to our lead role for homeland security intelligence 
within the intelligence community, DHS IA maintains several key 
departmental support responsibilities--including a new role of leading 
and managing the departmental intelligence activities.
    Some of these key departmental roles include:
  --Providing direct support to the Secretary and department senior 
        staff for policy, programmatic, and operational decision 
        making.
  --Developing the plans, programs and policies required to build a 
        unified, integrated DHS intelligence capability, which the 
        Secretary has said will lie at the heart of the department's 
        risk-based approach to securing the homeland.
  --Supporting the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). IA will 
        continue to provide specific intelligence to the Secretary and 
        the White House to enable timely changes in the threat level 
        and support dissemination of this information to stakeholders. 
        We will contribute to the function of Indications & Warning 
        (I&W) in partnership with the HSOC.
  --Building out of the intelligence infrastructure for DHS 
        headquarters.
  --Developing an Education, Training, and Career Workforce Management 
        Program for DHS analysts and intelligence professionals.
    Finally, early reviews by the DHS OIG and concerns resulting from 
the changing roles and responsibilities of the NCTC and other 
organizations due to IRTPA 2004 and other executive orders are not 
reflective of the successes DHS IA has demonstrated as a leader within 
the intelligence community for homeland security intelligence. As 
stated above, our value added comes in our unique data and analytic 
expertise (border, infrastructure, maritime, and domestic threat 
analysis--analysis that has distinguished itself on several occasions 
and led the community toward the appropriate threat characterization), 
in providing our unique information (information never before available 
to the intelligence community and by which we have already contributed 
to successes in other agencies), and in partnering with our 
stakeholders--especially in our unique role as the primary Federal 
Government intelligence information provider to the state, local, 
territorial, and tribal governments and the private sector and in our 
role as their advocate within the intelligence community.
    We remain focused on our mission of leading the DHS intelligence 
activities in support of the department and its components, and for the 
full benefit of the state, local, territorial, and tribal governments 
and the private sector, to secure the homeland, defend our citizenry, 
and protect our critical infrastructure.
    Question. What role does the Homeland Security Operations Center 
(HSOC) serve in comparison to the NCTC?
    Answer. In contrast to the NCTC, the HSOC provides general domestic 
situational awareness, a common operational picture, and support to the 
IIMG and DHS Leadership, as well as acting as the primary conduit for 
the White House Situation Room and IIMG for domestic situational 
awareness. The HSOC will continue to collect domestic related 
suspicious activity reports, look at domestic terror threats and 
natural disasters, focusing efforts domestically. HSOC is the lead 
conduit to State and local agencies.
    Question. The FTE levels authorized for IAIP appear to be based on 
the larger role in intelligence gathering and analysis that was 
envisioned when IAIP was established. What is the justification to 
carry such a high number of FTE for intelligence analysis now that many 
functions envisioned by the Homeland Security Act have been placed at 
other agencies?
    Answer. IAIP's mission is an entirely new one, and it is a 
manpower-intensive effort owing to the vast size and scope of the 
threats to the homeland. IAIP is performing an intelligence mission 
never before attempted, and it is a mission that includes Federal, 
state, local, tribal entities as well as privately-held interests. 
Additionally, IAIP is responsible for intelligence pertaining to 
securing the borders of the United States, which is in itself an 
enormous undertaking. DHS and IAIP have been given the mission of 
producing intelligence analysis and products that simply did not exist 
before, and to do so with a ``target set'' that is staggering in its 
size and complexity. While the need to conserve resources is clear, the 
need to perform the analyses needed to ensure that our Homeland is 
prepared to detect, intercept, withstand, and, if necessary, recover 
from a terrorist attack is even more vital.

                           CHEMICAL SECURITY

    Question. Last year, I asked Secretary Ridge about his plans to 
address security at chemical plants and he told me that the private 
sector was taking care of it. Yet, the Department has no benchmarks to 
determine whether the private sector is taking steps to secure its 
facilities. In response to this apparent gap in our security, last 
year, I asked GAO to determine what steps are being taken by the 
private sector to protect the American people. The GAO concluded that 
for 93 percent of the industry, it is uncertain whether facilities are 
improving security at all. Only 1,100 of the 15,000 chemical facilities 
identified by the Department of Homeland Security are known to adhere 
to voluntary industry security procedures.
    It has been more than 2 years since the GAO urged the EPA and DHS 
to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of our chemical 
plants. Yet, little has been done.
    What are your plans to enhance security for the chemical sector?
    Answer. As part of the development of the NIPP, the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (IP) has been tasked with authoring the 
Chemical Sector Specific Plan (SSP), which will outline the strategic 
guidance for securing the Chemical Sector.
    While the Chemical SSP is being developed, DHS continues to work 
within the Chemical Sector to enhance overall protective capability 
through several ongoing initiatives. To help guide the resource 
targeting of these initiatives, the Department is applying a risk 
management process that examines the likelihood of a given event and 
its potential consequences. This approach allows for the Department's 
protective efforts to be directed at those chemical facilities posing 
the greatest potential danger to the American public. Examples of these 
protective efforts include the following:
  --Site Assistance Visits (SAVs).--SAVs are visits to critical 
        infrastructure facilities by DHS protective security 
        professionals in conjunction with subject-matter experts and 
        local law enforcement (LLE) to assist asset owner/operators in 
        assessing vulnerabilities at their facilities. To date, SAVs 
        have been conducted at 38 chemical facilities.
  --Buffer Zone Protection Plans (BZPPs).--BZPPs identify and recommend 
        security measures for the area surrounding a facility (the 
        ``Buffer Zone''), making it more difficult to plan or launch an 
        attack. DHS trains LLE personnel on how to assess Buffer Zone 
        security and provides a standardized template for use in the 
        creation of a BZPP. To date, DHS has received BZPPs for 111 
        chemical facilities, with BZPPs expected to be completed for 
        the 289 highest-risk chemical facilities by the end of fiscal 
        year 2005. In conjunction with the BZPP program, $14.5 million 
        in grants have been provided to first preventers responsible 
        for the protection of chemical facilities
  --Educational Reports.--Based on data gathered from SAVs and BZPPs, 
        DHS has developed three types of educational reports for use by 
        LLE and asset owner/operators to learn how to better secure CI/
        KR assets. Characteristics and Common Vulnerabilities reports 
        (CVs) identify common characteristics and vulnerabilities at 
        specific types of CI/KR. Potential Indicators of Terrorist 
        Activity reports (PIs) provide information on how to detect 
        terrorist activity in areas surrounding CI/KR. Protective 
        Measure (PM) reports identify best practices and other 
        protective measures for use at specific CI/KR types. CVs and 
        PIs have been developed for Chemical Facilities, Chemical 
        Storage Facilities, and Chemical and Hazardous Materials 
        Transportation. A PM report has been developed for the Chemical 
        and Hazardous Materials Industry.
  --Facility Security Assessments/Facility Security Plans (FSAs/
        FSPs).--Pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
        2002 (MTSA), owners of chemical facilities located along 
        waterways are required to complete FSAs and FSPs and submit 
        them to the USCG for review and approval. FSPs must include 
        security measures and procedures for responding to security 
        threats. To date, USCG personnel have visited over 230 chemical 
        facilities under the MTSA.
  --Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 
        (RAMCAP).--DHS, in conjunction with the American Society for 
        Mechanical Engineers, is developing the RAMCAP, a risk 
        assessment methodology that will allow asset owners/operators 
        to assess the security of their critical assets. Results from 
        RAMCAP assessments will allow comparison of assets from across 
        sectors, allowing for better prioritization of national CI 
        protective efforts. The Chemical Sector module will be 
        completed by the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2005.
  --Webcams.--Web-based cameras have been installed at ten high-risk 
        chemical facilities in order to enable LLE and DHS to conduct 
        remote surveillance of the buffer zone surrounding each 
        facility during elevated threat levels.
  --Tabletop Exercises.--As part of DHS-IP's Exercise Program, tabletop 
        exercises have been conducted at six chemical facilities. The 
        findings from these exercises are compiled in After Action 
        Reports which serve as a basis for planning future exercises; 
        upgrading security plans and operating procedures; and taking 
        corrective actions.
  --TIH Rail Security.--DHS, in conjunction with DOT, is supporting a 
        variety of efforts to improve security for Toxic-by-Inhalation 
        Hazards (TIH) rail shipments. These efforts include studying 
        ways to make HAZMAT rail cars less identifiable; conducting 
        vulnerability assessments for the high-risk urban areas where 
        the largest quantities of TIH chemicals move by rail; a DC Rail 
        Pilot Project involving a ``virtual fence'' with various 
        sensors and monitors to help secure the DC rail corridor from 
        potential incidents involving HAZMAT; and establishing TIH 
        HAZMAT teams in the DC area.
  --Training.--DHS provides various training courses to asset owner/
        operators, State and local government officials, and LLE 
        agencies responsible for the protection of chemical facilities. 
        Such courses include: Terrorism Awareness and Prevention; 
        Advanced Bomb Technician Training; Surveillance Detection; SWAT 
        Operations; and Underwater Hazardous Device Search Training.
  --Private Sector Initiatives.--In addition to protective activities 
        led by DHS or other Federal entities, asset owner/operators in 
        the Chemical Sector are voluntarily undertaking a variety of 
        security initiatives. Chief among these is performance of self-
        assessments using the Responsible Care Security Code (Security 
        Code). This code, developed by one of the Chemical Sector's 
        largest trade associations, is designed to help chemical 
        facilities improve their security using a risk-based approach 
        to identify, assess, and address vulnerabilities; prevent or 
        mitigate incidents; and enhance training and response 
        capabilities. Implementation of the Security Code is a 
        prerequisite for membership in some of the sector's largest 
        industry associations. Recently, DHS reached a tentative third 
        party verification agreement with two of these associations 
        (the American Chemistry Council and the Chlorine Institute).
    Question. Will legislation be proposed to Congress that sets 
security standards across the industry?
    Answer. At this time, our non-regulatory partnerships with industry 
are producing results. However, DHS has concluded that the existing 
patchwork of authorities does not permit us to regulate the industry 
effectively. Accordingly, DHS has agreed to work with Congress to 
assess the need for a carefully measured, risk-based regulatory regime 
in the chemical sector designed to close the existing gaps and develop 
enforceable performance standards to reduce risk across the chemical 
sector.
    Question. Do you agree that the Department must establish 
benchmarks to assess both the private sector's and Federal Government's 
role in securing the chemical sector?
    Answer. DHS believes facility chem site security should be based on 
reasonable, clear, equitable performance standards. Enforceable 
performance standards should be based on the types and severity of 
potential threats posed by terrorists, and facilities should have the 
flexibility to select among appropriate site-specific security measures 
that will effectively address those threats.

                      BUFFER ZONE PROTECTION PLANS

    Question. DHS recently released $92 million in Buffer Zone 
Protection Plan grants. Of the 1,849 grants, provide a chart that shows 
the distribution of grants and the funding by critical infrastructure 
sector.
    Answer. Please see table below.

                             BREAKDOWN OF BZPPS BY SECTOR FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004-2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Number of      Percent of        Approx.
                             SECTOR                                  sites \1\         sites        funding \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture & Food..............................................               5            0.27        $250,000
Banking & Finance...............................................              41            2.20       2,050,000
Chemical & Hazardous Materials Industry.........................             272           14.62      13,199,870
Commercial Assets...............................................             880           47.29      43,592,631
Dams............................................................               7            0.38         350,000
Defense Industrial Base.........................................               6            0.32         300,000
Emergency Services..............................................               5            0.27         202,975
Energy..........................................................             213           11.45      10,550,954
Government Facilities...........................................             142            8.28       7,100,000
Information Technology..........................................               5            0.27         250,000
National Monuments & Icons......................................              10            0.54         500,000
Nuclear Power Plants............................................              92            4.94       4,423,802
Postal Shipping.................................................               2            0.11         100,000
Public Health...................................................              23            1.24       1,117,506
Telecommunications..............................................               5            0.27         250,000
Transportation..................................................              98            5.27       4,836,168
Water...........................................................              43            2.31       2,150,000
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      TOTALS....................................................           1,849          100.00     $91,223,906
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The exact composition of the fiscal year 2004-05 BZPP list is still evolving; the current sector breakout is
  a snapshot, but will not change substantially.
\2\ Subject to prioritization decisions of 18 States and 1 territory that have elected to prioritize their
  assets, an exact sector breakdown is not currently available. A total of $91,315,793 is available under the
  grant program.

    Question. Does DHS plan to broaden the criteria for receiving 
grants to include the gross consequence of an attack and other 
vulnerabilities?
    Answer. In determining where to target its protection resources, 
DHS applies a risk management process that examines the likelihood of 
attack and its potential consequences. This approach allows the 
department's protective efforts to be directed at those facilities 
posing the greatest potential danger to the public. DHS is continuing 
to improve data collection in support of risk analysis, and to refine 
our risk assessment methodologies to ensure resources are being spent 
where they are most needed.

                      MANAGEMENT & ADMINISTRATION

    Question. The fiscal year 2006 congressional justification shows 
that $1 million will be spent on ``Purchases from Government Accounts'' 
and $19 million for fiscal year 2006. In response to reprogramming 
questions, IAIP adjusted the number for ``Purchases from Government 
Accounts'' to $20.2 million. Provide a detailed chart on what the $20.2 
million will buy in fiscal year 2005 and what the $19 million will buy 
in fiscal year 2006.
    Answer. In fiscal year 2005, the reprogramming of $20.2 million 
into ``Purchases from Government Accounts'' includes funding for 
facilities, Project Management Office, and IT costs. In fiscal year 
2006, the $19 million in ``Purchases from Government Accounts'' will 
fund the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN).

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2005:
    Homeland Secure Data Network........................      $7,500,000
    Shared Services.....................................       2,000,000
    Facilities..........................................       4,500,000
    WCF Contribution....................................       7,700,000
    IT NCR ops..........................................         500,000
                                                         ---------------
      Total.............................................      22,200,000
                                                         ===============
Fiscal year 2006: Homeland Secure Data Network..........      19,400,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. Explain the large increases in fiscal year 2006 for 
equipment and land and structures.
    Answer. The $38 million funding request does not support the design 
and construction phases of facilities projects. Department Operations 
requests funds for the facilities design, basic tenant improvements 
(construction/renovation), physical security upgrades, and emergency 
power requirements for facilities IAIP will occupy at the Nebraska 
Avenue Complex (NAC). The IAIP facilities funding is requested to 
support the costs of occupying facilities, both on and off the NAC, 
once they are ready, including fit out costs such as furniture, 
computers and other Information Technology (IT), and the operations and 
maintenance costs (rent, security, IT support) associated with occupied 
facilities. Specifically, the operations and maintenance portion of the 
IAIP facilities funding covers electric costs for additional air 
conditioning required due to the technology requirements in IAIP spaces 
(HSOC and server requirements), maintenance for the secure, up to date 
unclassified and classified Local Area Networks, IT desktop services, 
as well as required janitorial services. The tenant improvement portion 
of this funding covers the mentioned fit out costs and ensures 
facilities capable of meeting both the classified and unclassified 
space and technology requirements in recognition of the fact that IAIP 
is an IT and security intensive tenant. These costs include IT 
infrastructure and cabling, IT equipment, security, IT certification 
and accreditation, furniture, data migration and relocation costs. The 
request does not pertain to land, as IAIP is a tenant in GSA-controlled 
facilities.

                           CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

    Question. In response to fiscal year 2005 reprogramming inquiries, 
IAIP reported that there are 564 contractors supporting the program 
function of IAIP, 138 of which are funded through the Management & 
Administration account and 426 through the Assessments and Evaluations 
Account.
    Of the 426 in the A&E account, what is the distribution of contract 
support by portfolio?
    Answer. Please see chart below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Contract
                         Account                              support
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Management & Administration.............................             138
                                                         ===============
Assessments and Evaluations.............................             426
    Homeland Security Operations Center.................              32
    Critical Infrastructure Outreach and Partnerships...              74
    Cyber Security......................................              78
    NS/EP Telecommunications............................              32
    National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis                   24
     Center; Protective Actions; Critical
     Infrastructure; Identification and Evaluation;
     Biosurveillance....................................
    Threat Determination and Assessment; Evaluations and             186
     Studies; Infrastructure Vulnerability and Risk
     Assessment.........................................
                                                         ===============
      Total.............................................             564
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question. What makes these positions not inherently governmental 
positions?
    Answer. The support personnel listed against the programs are 
performing services consistent with Appendix B to Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy (OFPP) policy letter 92-1. On-site contractor 
personnel only perform support functions to IAIP and do not perform any 
activities that are considered inherently governmental. IAIP is 
currently covering significant portions of the workload associated with 
open authorized FTE positions (which are inherently governmental) 
through significant workload sharing of on-board FTE and use of 
contractors to support non inherently governmental functions of those 
same FTEs. The mix of contractor support staff will change as programs 
progress and as new tasks are levied, and workloads will redistribute 
to more logical and efficient workflows as FTEs come on-board. Although 
the current work flow arrangements are difficult, they are working due 
to the dedication and professionalism of the current FTE workforce. 
IAIP is aware of its responsibilities under the FAIR Act (A-76) and we 
annually review functions for inherently governmental versus commercial 
activities.

                      ASSESSMENTS AND EVALUATIONS

    Question. The budget request shows--$137.404 million in Adjustments 
to Base. For each adjustment on page 76 of the congressional 
justification for IAIP, explain the reduction or increase.
    Answer. Please note that all dollars are in thousands.

          CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Description                           Adjustment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A decrease of $4,789 is due in part to contractor               ($4,789)
 savings created by the increased number of FTE
 positions for Field Security Detachments.
 Additionally, further savings are garnered by the
 joint funding of Protective Security Task Forces
 (PSTFs) between Critical Infrastructure Identification
 and Evaluation (CIIE) and Public Actions (PA). There
 are elements of the PSTF program that align with CIIE
 such as the identification of critical infrastructure
 and the CI/KR expertise of the PSTF team members.
 However, the overarching emphasis of the PSTF mission
 is the implementation of protective measures at high
 priority CI/KR in light of emerging threats. In fiscal
 year 2006 the program will be funded jointly between
 CIIE and PA, but the entire program will be
 transitioned to PA in fiscal year 2007. This is an
 attempt of IP to better align our programs with the
 budget structure......................................
A decrease of $899 will be transferred to S&T to                   (899)
 support Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
 Testing within Cyber Security, responsible for
 securing the U.S. industrial systems that have become
 increasingly dependent on powerful, electronic
 communications tools, the internet, and supervisory
 control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems..........
                                                        ----------------
      Total Adjustments to Base........................          (5,688)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER ADJUSTMENTS TO
                                  BASE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Description                           Adjustment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel, includes all costs of transportation of                     ($5)
 persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental
 travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel
 regulations. In fiscal year 2004 travel for
 Headquarters personnel was funded from M&A, but has
 been transferred to A&E for fiscal year 2005 and
 fiscal year 2006......................................
Advisory and Assistance Services; the fiscal year 2006           (3,995)
 request includes decreases due to decreases in program
 advisory services and transfers of shared service
 expenses from A&E back to M&A.........................
                                                        ----------------
      Total Adjustments to Base........................          (4,000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                   BIOSURVEILLANCE ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Description                          Adjustment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Technical Adjustments...................................            $147
                                                         ---------------
      Total Adjustments to Base.........................             147
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS ADJUSTMENTS TO BASE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Description                           Adjustment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fiscal year 2006, the PA program is reduced by              ($53,000)
 $53,000 to establish the new TIP program administered
 by the SLGCP. TIP grants will be used by state/local/
 territorial/tribal entities to procure goods and
 services determined necessary by IAIP's BZPP process.
 Previously, these goods and services which reduce the
 vulnerability to terrorist threats around certain high
 vulnerability critical infrastructures and key assets
 within the state/local/tribal jurisdiction were funded
 by assistance from IAIP. The TIP program will also
 result in a $3,000 savings in program consultation
 support costs.........................................
A decrease of $41,500 for Emerging Pilot Projects and    ...............
 Technology Application Pilots saving initiative.......
Technology pilots will be a cooperative effort with S&T  ...............
 for the development of new technologies for protective
 measures. This effor