- DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

[Senate Hearing 109-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2005

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:34 a.m., in room SD-138, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Thad Cochran presiding.
Present: Senators Cochran, Byrd, and Leahy.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENTS OF:
MICHAEL J. GARCIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT
ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR., DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator Cochran. The hearing will please come to order.
Today we begin our committee's review of the fiscal year 2006
budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. We will
consider specifically the request for programs and activities
of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and
Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
I am pleased to welcome the Director of U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services, Eduardo Aguirre; the Commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection, Robert Bonner; and the Assistant
Secretary of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Michael
Garcia.
Our committee will work with you to help ensure that we
provide the funds necessary for your agencies to carry out
their responsibilities and missions. For fiscal year 2006, the
President's budget requests $12.9 billion to fund the
organizations appearing before us today. This includes
mandatory and discretionary appropriations, user fee
collections, and trust funds.
We thank each of you for submitting to the committee copies
of your statements in advance. These will be made a part of the
record and we invite you to make any comments you think will be
helpful to the committee's understanding of the budget request.
Before hearing from the witnesses, I am pleased to yield to
Senator Leahy or other Senators who may wish to make opening
statements. Senator Leahy.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think these three agencies before us have the duty of
keeping our Nation safe, but also keeping our historic
commitment to legal immigration. I know I have to think about
the fact that my grandparents came, my maternal grandparents,
came to this country not speaking any English. If they had not
been here, their grandson would not be here, and how proud and
how happy they were to come.
I remember talking with my grandparents as a child and how
much it meant to them to be the first generations of Americans.
It has left a mark in my own mind. You look around this room,
look around anywhere else, look at your own backgrounds, and we
know that we are a Nation of immigrants. We have to keep being
able to do that.

BUDGET SHORTFALLS AND INCREASED STAFFING FOR THE BORDER PATROL

When we held hearings on these three agencies last year,
Mr. Chairman, they were facing substantial budget shortfalls.
They had imposed hiring freezes. I want to know where we stand
today on these issues. I am concerned that the administration
is ignoring Congress's clear and consistent call, call from
both Republicans and Democrats, for substantial increases in
staffing for the Border Patrol. The Border Patrol's presence on
our northern border--and I want to remind everybody we have a
northern border as well as a southern border; I live an hour's
drive from it--it was minimal before the September 11th
attacks. I think we had something like 300 agents stretched
over 4,000 miles of border. There is no other place in the
world similar to that.
I authored a provision in the Patriot Act to triple that
number. It has been achieved. A lot more needs to be done. The
President signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. That mandated increasing at least 2,000
Border Patrol agents for fiscal year 2006, 20 percent of them
for the northern border. But that is the good news and the
President did sign that bill for the 2,000, but his budget
provides only enough funding for 210. So he signed the bill
with great fanfare for 2,000 and put the budget in for 10
percent of it. And it appears none of them go to the northern
border.
So I hope Mr. Bonner will explain why the administration is
not heeding this Congressional mandate and whether he now
believes it is time to declare mission accomplished for the job
of protecting our northern border.

LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

Assistant Secretary Garcia and I have spoken a number of
times about the excellent work of the Law Enforcement Support
Center. We have visited this. This is the place that stores
information for State and local police. It provides immigration
status and identities of aliens any time of the day or night,
every day of the year.

FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST FOR CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
SERVICES

Of course, Mr. Aguirre, we talked before, I am concerned
about the President's proposed budget for Citizenship and
Immigration Services. It calls for a 50 percent cut in the
amount of directly appropriated funds for CIS. At the same time
the President says he will achieve his goal of reducing the
average wait time for applicants for immigration benefits to 6
months.
He has asked the Congress to enact a guest worker program
that is going to significantly increase the CIS workload. That
is fine, we can increase it, but if the administration is
cutting the manpower for this substantially, but wanting to add
to the workload, I do not know how you ever get here.

H2B VISA PROGRAM

I hope--the last thing is I hope the CIS and the
administration will support bipartisan efforts in Congress to
increase the cap for the H2B visa program. The Department
announced in January for the second straight year the statutory
cap has been reached and that is causing tourism-related
businesses across the country to go into justifiable panic and
concern.
We have a bipartisan group of 16 colleagues introducing S.
352, the Save Our Small and Seasonal Business Act of 2005. It
would allow aliens who obtained H2B visas in recent years to
reenter under that program. I hope the administration would
support it. It is a quick, easy, I think effective, cost
effective way of handling this.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Those are some of the concerns
I have. I thought I would express them here because I know we
are going to have votes in between and I may have to go back
and forth.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Byrd.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Excuse me, I am sorry.
Senator Leahy. Any time you want.
Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Well, today, Mr. Commissioner and also Mr. Assistant
Secretary and Director Aguirre, we hold the first hearing on
the President's budget for the Department of Homeland Security.
Chairman Cochran and I have worked together over the last 2
years to produce bipartisan legislation to fill critical gaps
in the security of our homeland. I commend Chairman Thad
Cochran for his excellent leadership of this subcommittee and
of any other committee or subcommittee that he chairs. I know
how well it is going to be run.
Today our witnesses will focus on issues related to border
security, immigration, and trade. For the third year in a row,
the President has submitted a budget for the Department of
Homeland Security that ignores the stark reality of the
resources needed to secure the homeland. The 9/11 Commission
report concluded this:
``More than 500 million people annually cross U.S. borders
at legal entry points, about 330 million of them non-
citizens.'' What a flow of humanity. ``Another 500,000 or more
enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands
of miles of land borders or remain in the country past the
expiration of their permitted stay.'' Now, that was the
commission talking.
The commission concluded that, quote: ``Two systemic
weaknesses came together in our border system's inability to
contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks:
one, a lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures as a
part of border security; and two, an immigration system not
able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less support
counterterrorism.''

INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT

In response to the commission's findings, Congress enacted
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In a
December 6, 2004, letter to the Congress urging final passage
of that Act, President Bush stated, ``I also believe the
conference took an important step in strengthening our
immigration laws by, among other items, increasing the number
of Border Patrol agents and detention beds.'' Close of
quotation.
As enacted, the Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new
Border Patrol agents and 800 new ICE investigators and the
funding of 8,000 new detention beds for illegal alien
immigrants. Yet, when the President submitted his budget
request months after sending that letter, virtually no new
funds were requested for any of these activities.
At the same time, the President's own terrorism experts are
extremely concerned about the threat posed by terrorists to our
borders. In written testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 16, 2005, the Department's Deputy
Secretary, Admiral James Loy, cited recently received
information as the reason for his concern about the threat
facing the Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious
situation'' and added: ``Several Al Qaeda leaders believe
operatives can pay their way into the country through Mexico
and also believe illegal entry is more advantageous than legal
entry.'' How about that, ``believe illegal entry is more
advantageous than legal entry for operational security
reasons.''

FUNDING ISSUE

Despite this testimony, there is virtually no funding in
the budget to increase our border security. In addition to
having a strong deterrent to illegal immigration at the border,
it is critically important for the Department to have the
resources to enforce our immigration laws. Therefore, I am very
troubled by the fact that 6 months into the fiscal year we have
not received a supplemental request or a reprogramming proposal
to address a shortfall in funding for immigration and customs
enforcement.
Since last spring, the Congress has been ringing the alarm
bell--ding-a-ling, ding-a-ling, ding-a-ling--that the
Department's primary investigative arm, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, ICE, faced significant budget shortfalls. To
partially address this problem, ICE last year instituted a
hiring freeze, significantly reduced spending, and took other
painful steps--bring on the aspirin--to cope with the
shortfall. There were even media reports that some apprehended
illegal aliens were being released because ICE could not afford
to cover the costs associated with holding these individuals.
Well, Congress stepped up to the plate. This man, Cochran,
he is on the ball. Congress stepped up to the plate by
providing ICE with $193 million more for the current fiscal
year than requested by the President. However, the hiring
freeze and other spending restraints remain in place halfway
through the new fiscal year. We are being warned by the
Department that ICE faces a funding gap of nearly $300 million
for the rest of this year.
Has the President found any room in his $81.9 billion
supplemental spending request to address this gap? No. He is
willing to request billions of dollars for foreign aid to build
the most expensive U.S. embassy in the world in Baghdad. I do
not plan to go there often. But he does not seem to be able to
find the funds to hire and support the men and women fighting
the war on terrorism here at home.
Today I sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff raising these
issues, and I hope that he will work with the White House to
send to the Congress a request that would implement the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission contained in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
[The information follows:]

Letter From Senator Robert C. Byrd

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, March 2, 2005.
Hon. Michael Chertoff,
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Chertoff: Congratulations are in order as you assume
the task of leading the Department of Homeland Security, an immense and
important burden. Sadly, the President, in his fiscal year 2006 budget
request for the Department, has not made your task any easier.
For the third year in a row, the President has submitted a budget
that ignores the stark reality of the steps needed to secure the
homeland.
The 9/11 Commission report concluded that:
More than 500 million people annually cross U.S. borders at legal
entry points, about 330 million of them noncitizens. Another 500,000 or
more enter illegally without inspection across America's thousands of
miles of land borders or remain in the country past the expiration of
their permitted stay. The challenge for national security in an age of
terrorism is to prevent the very few people who may pose overwhelming
risks from entering or remaining in the United States undetected.
Our investigation showed that two systemic weaknesses came together
in our border system's inability to contribute to an effective defense
against the 9/11 attacks: a lack of well-developed counterterrorism
measures as a part of border security and an immigration system not
able to deliver on it basic commitments, much less support
counterterrorism.
In response to the Commission's findings, Congress enacted the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. In his December 6,
2004, letter to Congress urging final passage of that Act, President
Bush stated, ``I also believe the Conference took an important step in
strengthening our immigration laws by, among other items, increasing
the number of border patrol agents and detention beds.'' As enacted,
the Act authorizes the hiring of 2,000 new Border Patrol agents and 800
new ICE investigators, and the funding of 8,000 new detention beds for
illegal aliens immigration. The President's letter called that ``an
important step.'' Yet that letter appears to be another empty
rhetorical gesture. When the President submitted his budget request 2
months after sending that letter, virtually no new funds were requested
for any of these activities.
At the same time, the President's own terrorism experts are
extremely concerned about the threat terrorists pose to our borders. In
written testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on February
16, 2005, the Department's Deputy Secretary, Admiral James Loy cited
recently received information as the reason for his concern about the
threat facing the Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious
situation'' and added, ``several Al Qaeda leaders believe operatives
can pay their way into the country through Mexico and also believe
illegal entry is more advantageous than legal entry for operational
security reasons.''
Mr. Secretary, I know that this budget was completed prior to your
coming onboard. I strongly encourage you to work with the White House
to formally request additional resources to implement the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act authorization enacted to respond to
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.
In addition to having a strong deterrent to illegal immigration at
the border, it is critically important for the Department to have the
resources to enforce our immigration laws. Therefore, I am very
troubled by the fact that, 6 months into the fiscal year, we have not
received a supplemental request or reprogramming proposal to address a
shortfall in funding for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Since
last spring, the Congress has been ringing the alarm bells that the
Department's primary investigative arm, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), faced significant budget shortfalls. To partially
address this problem, ICE last year instituted a hiring freeze,
significantly reduced spending, and took other painful steps to cope
with the shortfall. There were even media reports that some apprehended
illegal aliens were being released because ICE could not afford to
cover the costs associated with holding these individuals.
Congress stepped up to the plate by providing ICE with $193 million
more for the current fiscal year than requested by the President.
However, the hiring freeze and other spending restraints remain in
place halfway through the new fiscal year. We are being warned by the
Department that ICE faces a funding gap of nearly $300 million for the
rest of this year. Has the President found any room in his $81 billion
supplemental spending request to address this gap? No. He is willing to
add to the deficit to provide hundreds of millions of dollars to build
the most expensive U.S. embassy in the world in Baghdad, but he does
not seem to be able to find the funds to hire and support the men and
women fighting the war on terrorism here at home. To them, he suggests
they carpool to work.
Mr. Secretary, you really have your work cut out for you. Our
repeated entreaties to the President and his representatives to provide
the resources to meet these threats fall on deaf ears. I know that you
will do all that you can to get this Administration to put its money
where its rhetoric is. I wish for you success.
With kind regards, I am.
Sincerely yours,
Robert C. Byrd,
U.S. Senator.

Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

STATUS OF SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES 2 YEARS AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

I am going to ask our witnesses, in view of the fact that
it has been almost exactly 2 years--March 1, 2005, actually
would have been the second anniversary of the establishment of
the Department of Homeland Security--in your estimation from
what you know as administrators of these important agencies at
the Department, are we safer now 2 years later after the
Department of Homeland Security has been created than we were 2
years ago?
Mr. Garcia, would you like to start?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That is a
question I often hear in many different forms, and everybody
brings I think their own perspective.
Senator Cochran. I am going to ask each one to answer that
before you proceed with your statements. Tell us what you
think?

ICE RESPONSE

Mr. Garcia. I think we are safer, yes, and I bring
perspective I think that is somewhat unique to that answer. I
was a prosecutor in New York in the 1990s. I prosecuted many of
the terrorism cases before 9/11 and I saw terrible exploitation
of our immigration systems and our border security in those
cases. Now, as part of the Homeland Security Department, I am a
piece of the Government's response to those attacks in a
Department that was created to address the vulnerabilities that
were exposed by the 9/11 attacks.
From that vantage point, I can clearly say that we are
safer, and I see evidence of that, Mr. Chairman, every day. I
will speak mostly about the ICE contributions here and how my
agency has responded with creativity, using these new combined
authorities that we have been given in ICE. You look at the
systems and we have created--and I think Senator Leahy and
Senator Byrd may have mentioned--overstays and how there was no
tracking. We have created a Compliance Enforcement Unit that
sends out thousands of prioritized leads to look at deterrent
effect, to look at enforcing our immigration rules and bringing
integrity to the system as a whole.
We work very hard in benefits fraud with Director Aguirre's
folks to close those vulnerabilities that were exploited in the
past. So we are improving the integrity of the system.
Senator Cochran. Let me ask Mr. Bonner for his reaction to
that question before you proceed with your full statement.

CBP RESPONSE

Mr. Bonner. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all,
yes, America is absolutely unquestionably safer now than it was
before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security on
March 1, 2003. Our borders are more secure now than they were
before 2001--excuse me, March 1, 2003. Part of that is that one
of the truly big and important ideas of the Department of
Homeland Security was to create one front-line border agency
for our government that combined at our front line all of
Customs' powers and personnel, Immigration powers and
personnel, agriculture protection, and most importantly anti-
terrorism as a focus and a priority mission.
So as a result of that one step alone, unifying our border
agencies, whereas before March 1, 2003, they had literally been
fragmented at our borders, at our ports of entry, among four
different agencies of government reporting to three different
Departments, it is now one front-line border agency, that is
Customs and Border Protection, within the Department of
Homeland Security, with a priority mission which is nothing
less than keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of our
country.
So are we totally safe? No, but we are safer and more
secure because our borders are more secure.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre.

USCIS RESPONSE

Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, as the Director of the agency
that is responsible for administering immigration services, I
say unquestionably we are safer from the vantage point in which
I sit. We process 6 to 7 million applications a year and we
have implemented some national security components and fraud
deterrent components that were simply not there 2 or 3 years
ago. Therefore I think we have tightened the filter, if you
will, to determine those who may do us harm or who wish to take
advantage of our good nature. I think we are much better off.
There is no finish line to this effort, but I think we are
far, far beyond where we were a couple years ago.
Senator Cochran. Thank you very much.
Now you may proceed with your opening statements. Mr.
Garcia?

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GARCIA

Mr. Garcia. Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, Senator Leahy, it
is my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, or ICE, the largest investigative arm of
the Department of Homeland Security. The $4.36 billion request
underscores the vital role that ICE plays in the Department's
mission of ensuring the security of the American people.
In order to provide a better understanding of the
President's 2006 budget request for ICE, I would like to first
provide you with the context in which the request is made.
Specifically, I would like to share with you a few highlights
of significant ICE achievements as well as some of the
challenges we have faced.

SIGNIFICANT ICE ACHIEVEMENTS

ICE removed a record number, 160,000, illegal aliens from
the United States in 2004. More than half of those were
criminal aliens. We also arrested a record number of fugitive
aliens. In fact, that was an increase of more than 100 percent.
ICE conducted 7,600 money-laundering and other financial
investigations. ICE agents conducted more than 2,500
investigations into illegal exports that would have sent
sensitive technology and weapons components to Iran, Iraq,
China, and other nations. ICE arrested more than 5,000 sexual
predators since Operation Predator was launched and have
removed almost half of them from the United States. ICE agents
also made the first 11 arrests for child sex tourism, targeting
U.S. citizens who attempt to exploit children overseas.
ICE arrested more than 1,600 human smugglers and ICE's
Federal Protective Service officers made more than 4,000
arrests, a nearly 60 percent increase over the previous year.
ICE Federal Air Marshals logged millions of miles on tens of
thousands of flights and Air Marshals have completed advanced
training, an important benchmark to ensure professionalism and
peak performance.
Senator Leahy mentioned the Law Enforcement Support Center
in Vermont. That Center received more than 600,000 inquiries
from Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials last
fiscal year, a 12 percent increase over the year before. 15,000
detainers with police agencies nationwide on aliens were lodged
from Vermont alone.
I could continue with many, many additional examples of
achievements that ICE's employees have made. I would like to
note that ICE's accomplishments over the last 2 years, which I
believe are unprecedented in law enforcement, were brought
about despite significant challenges. In addition to the
challenges faced in creating a new law enforcement agency, ICE
has faced severe budget issues related to resource allocations.
During the organization of the new Department, the budgets for
component agencies, including those for overhead, information
technology support, legal support, and other administrative
functions, were broken apart in ways that were not entirely
consistent. As a result, in some cases ICE was paying for
services when the funds for those services had been allocated
to other agencies.

BUDGET ISSUES

When we realized the budget issues that would arise from
these allocation errors, we took swift action. ICE placed a
freeze on new hires. We limited expenditures to those deemed
mission essential and we moved to set clear priorities for
funding. We also worked with the Department to undertake a
budget review to determine what money was appropriately due to
ICE in return for shared services.
These measures got results. Diligent and conscientious
efforts on the part of our employees and field management
helped us to realize tens of millions of dollars in short-term
savings during fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE identified
and recouped more than $500 million from other agencies in the
second half of 2004. ICE also bought services from other DHS
components as part of the shared services concept, such as
human resources, logistics, and fleet management.
We are also in the process of systematically improving
financial management throughout the entire agency. Some changes
have been implemented and we expect to implement additional
improvement in the coming months. These steps have been further
outlined in a letter recently submitted to this committee.

COMMUNICATION WITH ICE EMPLOYEES

While this has been a challenging time for ICE, we have
made every effort to communicate the facts to our employees at
every opportunity through such measures as town hall meetings,
broadcast messages to all employees, and visits by myself and
other senior members of the agency's leadership to all of our
field offices.
Over the past 2 years, ICE employees have refused to be
defined by our challenges, but rather we have been defined by
our achievements, which represent the true story of our agency.
Our accomplishments represent the abiding commitment of all ICE
employees to meeting these challenges head-on and accomplishing
the critical mission with which we are charged.

FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

The proposed 2006 budget builds on the foundation of our
accomplishments while addressing many of the challenges
outlined above. The President's 2006 budget request seeks more
than $4.36 billion for ICE, which represents an increase of
more than 13 percent over fiscal year 2005. I would like to
briefly address these enhancements.

DETENTION AND REMOVAL

The President's 2006 budget proposal request seeks $176
million in enhancements for Detention and Removal operations.
These enhancements will be used to fund detention bed space and
management, Alternatives to Detention, Fugitive Operations, the
Institutional Removal Program and interior repatriation. This
funding will help ICE to continue to build on the vigorous
enforcement efforts we have developed in the last 2 years.

INVESTIGATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

The President's budget also seeks $171 million in
enhancements for ICE investigations and intelligence.
Specifically, the budget will replace funding for Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force activities. This enhancement
requests no additional positions or money, but proposes that
346 positions currently on board be paid by direct
appropriation instead of reimbursement from DOJ. In addition to
a base increase, the enhancement allows for maintenance of Visa
Security operations initiated in 2005 and support for one
additional Visa Security Unit overseas. It funds 143 positions
and training to successfully implement a worksite enforcement
component for the proposed temporary worker program.

FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS SERVICE

We are also seeking enhancements to increase staffing for
the Federal Air Marshal Service, funding for additional
attorneys required to improve the ability of ICE's legal
program to complete matters in Immigration Court, and money for
Department-wide secure classified and computer to computer
connectivity.

OVERVIEW OF ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

The President's 2006 budget request for ICE is a solid step
forward for this agency and ICE is dedicated to protecting the
homeland by enforcing immigration and customs laws, restoring
integrity to the immigration system, as we discussed before,
and ensuring the sanctity of our financial and trade systems.
We protect Federal property and we ensure the security in our
civil aviation.
That is a broad and diverse mission, but the men and women
of ICE are dedicated to building this agency into a model for
law enforcement in the 21st century. The 2006 budget request
provides us with the resources that will make this goal a
reality as we strive to secure the American homeland and
protect the American people.

prepared statement

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
Senator Leahy, for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Michael J. Garcia

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, and distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be with you today to discuss the
President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the largest investigative arm of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This $4.36 billion request
underscores the vital role that ICE plays in the Department's mission
of ensuring the security of the American people.
By integrating these various components in a single agency, ICE is
able to more effectively meet the threats of the post-9/11 world,
wherever these threats may arise--across our borders, within the
Nation's interior, in our financial systems, at Federal facilities
nationwide, in cyberspace, or civil aviation.
With ICE's broad authorities and expertise, we are prepared to
counter the threats posed by criminal and terrorist organizations in
ways not possible before the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security.

REVIEW OF ICE ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In order to provide a better understanding of the President's
fiscal year 2006 budget request for ICE, I would first like to provide
you with the context in which the request is made. Specifically, I
would like to share with you a few highlights of significant ICE
achievements as well as some of the challenges we have faced.
--Prioritizing Removals of Criminal and Fugitive Aliens.--As part of
our mission to restore integrity to the Nation's immigration
system, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO)
removed a record number of illegal aliens from the United
States, posting approximately 160,200 such removals. More than
half of those were criminal aliens. 7,200 fugitive aliens were
removed last fiscal year--an increase of 112 percent over the
previous year.
--Protecting U.S. Financial and Trade Systems.--The ICE Office of
Investigations conducted 7,670 money laundering and other
financial investigations in fiscal year 2004, resulting in more
than 1,368 arrests, 895 indictments and the seizure of more
than $202 million. These achievements stem from ICE's
Cornerstone initiative, in which we direct our expertise in
financial, trade, and intellectual property investigations
toward shutting down the schemes that criminal or terrorist
organizations use to earn, move, and store their assets.
--Checking Illegal Flows of Weapons and Sensitive Technology.--ICE
agents conducted more than 2,500 investigations into the
illegal export of U.S. arms and technology in fiscal year 2004.
These investigations protect national security by keeping
sensitive technologies and weapons--whether it's missile
components or night vision technology, laser scopes for
military rifles or sensitive software--out of the hands of our
Nation's adversary. In the last year, ICE investigated export
violations that would have sent sensitive technology and
weapons components to Iran, Iraq, China, and other nations.
These investigations not only contribute to the security of the
United States, but they serve to enhance the security of our
troops and allies around the globe as well.
--Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation.--Under Operation
Predator, ICE arrested more than 4,900 sexual predators since
the program was launched in 2003. We have ensured that 2,100 of
those predators were removed from the United States. ICE agents
also made the first 11 arrests for child sex tourism, targeting
U.S. citizens who attempt to exploit children overseas under
the PROTECT Act. Leads developed out of ICE investigations into
online child pornography have been provided to foreign law
enforcement authorities through ICE's 54 International Attache
offices. These leads have led to the arrest of approximately
850 child pornography subscribers overseas. ICE Attaches also
provided expertise and support to their law enforcement
counterparts in areas ravaged by the tsunami waves in southeast
Asia in December, to ensure that children were not victimized
by sexual predators or trafficking networks.
--Targeting Human Smuggling and Trafficking.--Another of ICE's top
priorities is to dismantle criminal organizations that smuggle
and traffic human beings for profit. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
arrested more than 1,630 human smugglers. Operation ICE Storm,
an initiative we launched in 2003 to target violent human
smuggling networks in Arizona, has brought charges against more
than 300 defendants and resulted in the seizure of more than $7
million. This unprecedented seizure of alien smuggling proceeds
is a direct result of the combination of our immigration and
customs authorities (particularly customs financial crimes
expertise). Law enforcement authorities in Arizona have
credited Operation ICE Storm with a dramatic decrease in
homicides and other violent crime in the Phoenix metropolitan
area.
--Improving Security at Federal Facilities.--ICE's Federal Protective
Service (FPS) made 4,426 arrests in fiscal year 2004--a 58
percent increase over the previous fiscal year. In addition,
FPS officers prevented nearly 550,000 prohibited items and
weapons from being carried into Federal facilities--a fourfold
increase over the previous year. FPS officers also responded to
430 bomb threats and more than 875 calls about suspicious
packages and other items. All of these achievements are key
components of the FPS mission to provide a safe and secure
environment for Federal workers and the American public.
--Enhancing Security in the Skies.--ICE's Federal Air Marshal Service
(FAMS) once again logged millions of miles on tens of thousands
of flights in fiscal year 2004, as part of the division's
enhanced mission of providing security in the air since 9/11.
All FAMS recruited and deployed since 9/11 have successfully
completed advanced training--an important benchmark to ensure
professionalism and peak performance.
--Stopping the Flow of Drugs into the United States.--ICE plays a
leading role in the Nation's war on drugs, with significant
results. In fiscal year 2004, ICE agents, working in
cooperation with our partners at other agencies, were involved
in the seizure of roughly 3.1 million pounds of illegal drugs
in fiscal year 2004--a 63 percent increase over the previous
year. Another key achievement stemming from an ICE
investigation was the extradition of one of the leaders of Cali
drug cartel from Colombia, as well as the arrest of several
leaders of the Norte Valle cartel.
--Providing Support and Assistance to the Law Enforcement
Community.--ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)
responded to more than 603,000 inquiries related to immigration
status from Federal, State, and local authorities in fiscal
year 2004--a 12 percent increase over the previous year. In
addition, the LESC placed more than 15,000 immigration
detainers with police agencies nationwide. These detainers
allow ICE to more efficiently remove aliens from the United
States once their jail term is expired.

CHALLENGES

I could continue with many, many additional examples. I would like
to note that ICE's accomplishments of the last 2 years--which I believe
are unprecedented in law enforcement--have taken place against a
backdrop of significant challenges.
First, we have faced the organizational and logistical challenges
inherent in bringing our various divisions together into an integrated
whole within the Department of Homeland Security. The challenges of the
DHS reorganization have been likened to ``trying to change the engine
in an airplane in mid-flight.'' We have certainly experienced those
challenges at ICE, where we have had to build a new agency almost from
the ground up--bringing together divisions from four separate agencies
into a single functioning unit, and melding the cultures and missions
of various units into a unified whole. This process was analogous to
that of building a new start-up company while performing a large-scale
merger and acquisition--with the notable difference that we had but a
few weeks to accomplish our merger, compared to the months, or years,
that would be devoted to a merger in the private sector. While the
reorganization is still ongoing, I am pleased to report that the
majority of these organizational and logistical challenges have been
met and addressed, thanks to the commitment, and perseverance of ICE
employees.
Another significant challenge that ICE has faced has been budget
issues related to resource allocations. During the reorganization of
the new department, the budgets for component agencies--including those
for overhead, information technology support, legal support, and other
administrative functions--were broken apart in ways that were not
entirely consistent. As a result, in some cases ICE was paying for
services when the funds for those services had been allocated to other
agencies. When we realized the budget issues that would arise from
these allocation errors, we took swift action. ICE placed a temporary
freeze on new hires; we limited expenditures to those deemed ``mission
essential''; and we moved to set clear priorities for funding. We also
worked with DHS to undertake a budget review to determine what money
was appropriately due to ICE in return for shared services.
These measures got results. Diligent and conscientious efforts on
the part of our employees and field management helped us to realize
$120 million in short-term savings during fiscal year 2004. In
addition, ICE identified and recouped more than $500 million from other
agencies in the second half of fiscal year 2004. ICE also bought
services from other DHS components as part of the shared services
concept such as HR, logistics and fleet management.
We are also in the process of systematically improving financial
management throughout the entire agency. Some changes have been
implemented, and we expect to implement additional improvements in the
coming months. We will update the Congress periodically with details on
our reforms in reports requested by the Committees.
While this has been a challenging time for ICE, we have made every
effort to communicate the facts to our employees at every opportunity--
through such measures as town hall meetings; broadcast messages to all
employees; and visits by myself and other members of the agency's
senior leadership to all of our field offices.
Over the past 2 years ICE employees have refused to be defined by
our challenges, but rather by our achievements, which represent the
true story of our agency. Our accomplishments represent the abiding
commitment of all ICE employees to meeting these challenges head-on and
accomplishing the critical mission with which we are charged.

BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006

The proposed fiscal year 2006 budget builds on the foundation of
our accomplishments while addressing many of the challenges outlined
above. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget request seeks more than
$4.36 billion for ICE, which represents an increase of 13.5 percent
over fiscal year 2005. This budget request will allow ICE to pursue our
priority missions--including the apprehension, detention, and removal
of illegal aliens; financial and trade investigations; protection of
Federal infrastructure; and protection of the civil aviation system--
with even greater effectiveness. In my testimony, I will address our
major program areas--Investigations, Detention and Removal Operations,
the Federal Air Marshal Service, and the Federal Protective Service--as
well as issues related to management, administration, and information
technology.

FISCAL YEAR 2006 ENHANCEMENTS

The President's fiscal year 2006 budget proposal request for ICE
Detention and Removal Operations will enhance public safety and
national security by ensuring that those aliens who pose the most
critical threats are removed from the United States first--a critical
objective in ICE's long-term strategy to restore integrity to the
Nation's immigration system. In addition, this funding will help ICE to
meet its detention needs, which are growing every year as we move to
aggressively enforce immigration laws. This funding will help ICE to
continue building on the vigorous enforcement efforts we have developed
in the last 2 years.
Detention and Removal Operations.--The DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) fiscal year 2006 President's budget seeks $176.0
million in enhancements for Detention and Removal Operations:
--$90 million/16 Full-Time Employees (FTEs) for Custody Management/
Bedspace. In many cases, apprehended aliens must be detained
while they go through immigration proceedings and until they
are removed. Custody Management provides safe, secure, and
humane confinement for these aliens. It also ensures that
aliens in ICE custody appear for their immigration hearings,
and then for their subsequent removal. This request would
provide $90 million to fund requirements of the Custody
Management budget activity, adding 16 FTE and increasing funded
bedspace by 1,920 beds. This enhancement will improve detention
efforts that ensure public safety and national security.
--$5.4 million/7 FTEs for the Alternatives to Detention program. The
Alternatives to Detention program places low-risk aliens under
close supervision, rather than into traditional detention,
serving as a cost-effective way to ensure their appearance for
an immigration hearing or for removal. ICE's Intensive
Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) is a community-based case
management program that is aimed at improving the appearance
rate of aliens at immigration hearings. This request includes
$5.4 million/7 FTE to expand the ISAP to two additional
locations.
--$8.9 million for Fugitive Operations. Approximately 465,000 aliens
have received final orders of removal but are not confirmed to
have departed the United States. This request includes $8.9
million to enhance case management resources that enable the
Fugitive Operations program to locate and apprehend fugitive
aliens in the United States. This investment will serve to
improve the integrity of the immigration enforcement process
that is instrumental in deterring the efforts of potential
absconders.
--$5.4 million/19 FTEs for the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).
Many removable aliens are currently incarcerated in Federal or
State prisons for criminal convictions. If these aliens are
released upon completion of their criminal sentence, they are
likely to avoid immigration removal proceedings. The IRP
ensures that these aliens are not released back into the
community before they are removed from the United States. The
$5.4 million requested would provide for Immigration
Enforcement Agents to enhance the IRP with staff support needed
to facilitate the removal of aliens following completion of
criminal sentences.
--$39.3 million for Interior Repatriation, as part of the Arizona
Border Control multi-agency effort. One of the major components
of enhanced border control is a focus on border safety through
the removal of migrants from the dangers associated with
crossing the border illegally. The United States, in
cooperation with the government of Mexico, has focused on the
use of every available tool to break the cycle of migrant
deaths in the dangerous terrain where human smugglers value
profits more than the human life they often sacrifice for
personal gain. One of the major tools agreed to by both
countries is the use of a voluntary interior repatriation
program. The interior repatriation program allows for movement
at the U.S. border of Mexican nationals who voluntarily return
to selected cities within the interior of Mexico by means of
commercial flights. Without this program, a significant number
of persons who are apprehended and returned to Mexico at the
border seek re-entry through dangerous border terrains, thus
repeatedly risking injury or death in the process.
--$24.0 million for the Office of Detention and Removal. This request
provides that the base budget for Detention Removal Operations
be adjusted by $24 million for salary costs and operating
expenses. These funds will augment support for increased
detention and removal activities to ensure the departure of
removable aliens from the United States through the fair
enforcement of immigration laws.
ICE's Office of Investigations and Office of Intelligence play a
vital role in advancing national security and homeland defense through
aggressive investigations and cooperation with other agencies to share
information on organized criminal activity and terrorist organizations.
ICE's investigators have a long history of targeting money laundering
networks; narcotics trafficking; criminal financial schemes;
counterfeiting and piracy; trade fraud; export violations; and other
financial and economic crimes. In addition, our investigators lead the
way in targeting child sexual predators, human traffickers, and child
labor violators. Our investigators are also at the forefront of
combating immigration violations, including enforcement of immigration
laws at worksites and shutting down organizations that provide
fraudulent documentation for a price.
Investigations and Intelligence.--The ICE fiscal year 2006
President's budget seeks $171.7 million in enhancements for
Investigations and Intelligence:
--$43.7 million/346 FTEs for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF) activities. This increase replaces funding
previously received on a reimbursable basis from the Department
of Justice (DOJ) for ICE's participation in the OCDETF program.
OCDETF is a Federal drug enforcement program that focuses on
the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking
organizations. OCDETF has been in existence since 1982 and
operates under the guidance and oversight of the Attorney
General. Employing the resources and expertise of 11 member
Federal agencies, along with support from State and local law
enforcement agencies, OCDETF has contributed to the successful
prosecution and conviction of more than 44,000 members of
criminal organizations and resulted in the seizure of cash and
property assets totaling more than $3.0 billion. This
enhancement requests no additional FTEs but proposes that 346
positions currently on board be paid by direct appropriation
instead of by reimbursable funding.
--$5.0 million/5 FTEs for Visa Security Program Expansion. The ICE
Visa Security Program provides follow-up investigations on visa
applicants seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose
of denying visas to terrorists, criminals, and persons of
special interest. Officers are assigned to posts to perform
this law enforcement review of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa
applications prior to visa issuance by consular officers of the
Department of State. This enhancement would allow ICE to
maintain operations initiated in fiscal year 2005 and support
one additional Visa Security Unit overseas.
--$18.0 million/72 FTEs for Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement. As
part of the President's proposed temporary worker program (TWP)
to match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers,
enforcement of immigration laws to ensure compliance is
required. The requested resources would fund 143 positions and
the required training to conduct employer audits, investigate
possible violations, and prepare criminal employer case
presentations. This funding more than doubles the resources
dedicated to the worksite enforcement effort.
--$105.0 million for the Office of Investigations. This request
includes $105 million for salary and support costs, including
vehicle and other equipment purchases.
--$3.5 million/24 FTEs for Legal Proceedings. This enhancement would
provide funding for additional attorneys and support staff
required to improve the ability of ICE's legal program to
complete matters in Immigration Court and help reduce the case
backlog.
--$11.3 million/1 FTE for the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). A
total of $37 million is required for the HSDN to provide for
secure classified, computer-to-computer connectivity. The HSDN
is expected to streamline and modernize the classified data
capabilities of DHS to facilitate high-quality and high-value
classified data communication and collaboration within DHS and
with other Federal agencies and organizations, including the
Department of Defense (DOD). Based on modern network and
telecommunications designs, the HSDN will optimize both the
classified data exchanges between DHS offices, and other
networks of classified data such as the Anti-Drug Network
(ADNET), Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), and Defense
Message System (DMS). The HSDN will provide a scalable
infrastructure, capable of supporting the growth and evolution
of the DHS mission. ICE's allotted portion in support of the
network is $11.3 million. Enhancement request includes one
position to serve as a liaison between ICE and DHS.
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has been charged with
providing security in the skies since 9/11. The President's budget
request will help FAMS to continue in that mission as we continue the
evolutionary process of integrating this key Homeland Security division
into the agency.
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).--The ICE fiscal year 2006
President's budget seeks $14.8 million in The Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS) has been charged with providing security in the skies
since 9/11. The President's budget request will help FAMS to continue
in that mission as we continue the evolutionary process of integrating
this key Homeland Security division into the agency.
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS).--The ICE fiscal year 2006
President's budget seeks $9.9 million in enhancements for the Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS). This enhancement request would allow the
FAMS to increase its staffing level to a level that will allow it to
meet its mission objective through the risk-based deployment of Federal
Air Marshals. In accomplishing this objective, FAMS works closely with
DHS and other Federal, State and local agencies and private industry to
develop, deploy and sustain a comprehensive intelligence-driven
approach and response to terrorist and related criminal threats against
the United States and its interests. FAMS provides critical support to
the DHS mission to prevent terrorist acts within the United States,
reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage from potential
attacks.

CONCLUSION

The President's fiscal year 2006 budget request for ICE is a solid
step forward for the agency. ICE is dedicated to protecting the
homeland by enforcing immigration and customs laws; restoring integrity
to the immigration system; ensuring the sanctity of our financial and
trade systems; protecting Federal property; and ensuring security in
the air. That is a broad and diverse mission, but the men and women of
ICE are dedicated to building this agency into a model for law
enforcement in the 21st century. The fiscal year 2006 budget request
provides us with the resources that will make this goal a reality as we
strive to secure the American homeland and protect the American people.
We look forward to continuing to work with you to accomplish these
worthy objectives.
I would like to thank you, Chairman Cochran, Senator Byrd, and
Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to answering any questions that you may have.

Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Bonner, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. BONNER

Mr. Bonner. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd,
Senator Leahy. I am very pleased to be here this morning to
discuss the fiscal year 2006 budget request for U.S. Customs
and Border Patrol, or CBP. I am also very pleased to be here
with my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security,
both Director Aguirre of CIS and Mike Garcia, the Assistant
Secretary for ICE.
I particularly want to thank the members of this
subcommittee for your strong support of the work that CBP does
every day 24-7 to protect and defend the borders of our
country. As you know, CBP's priority mission is homeland
security and for a front-line border agency, which is what we
are, that means that CBP's priority mission is keeping
terrorists and terrorist weapons from getting into the United
States.
The budget request for 2006 in my view will provide
resources to perform our all-important priority mission, our
anti-terrorism mission, as well as our traditional missions,
which go from everything from interdicting illegal drugs at our
border to determining admissibility of people appearing at our
ports of entry to apprehending people illegally entering the
United States, protecting American agriculture, regulating
trade, as well as collecting about $27 billion in duties and
fees.

FISCAL YEAR 2004 WORKLOAD STATISTICS

The magnitude of our border task is reflected by just a few
statistics from fiscal year 2006, because in fiscal year 2004
CBP through its Border Patrol agents apprehended over 1.1
million people illegally entering our country or attempting to
enter our country, 1.1 million. By the way, you want to
translate that? It is about 3,000 each and every day of the
year, day and night.
CBP officers at our ports of entry and Border Patrol agents
collectively seized slightly over 2 million pounds, nearly 1
million kilograms, of illegal drugs attempting to be entered
through our ports of entry. That is 56,000, by the way,
separate seizures of illegal drugs at our borders last year.
We seized almost $46 million in cash and currency that was
leaving the United States, much of that of course is from the
proceeds of illegal drug trafficking. We just seized about $1.7
million in cash in a vehicle a couple of days ago that was
going outbound in a vehicle through the Port of Laredo back to
Mexico.
There were 450,000 aliens that were turned around at our
ports of entry. By that I mean they were not allowed to enter
the United States because they were determined to be
inadmissible. There were 78,000 fraudulent passports and other
documents that were seized and intercepted by CBP at our
borders.

ONE FACE AT THE BORDER

So it gives you an idea of the magnitude of the task, but
it also tells you what we are doing and that the job is getting
done. We have unified our work force to create one unified
front-line border agency for managing and securing and
controlling the borders of our country. We have developed a
comprehensive border strategy at our ports of entry for our CBP
officers and Agriculture specialists and between our ports of
entry, primarily our land borders with Mexico and Canada, with
our CBP Border Patrol agents.
The transfer of the air and marine operations to CBP last
November I believe further strengthens our effort to secure our
borders, to interdict drugs at and beyond our borders, and to
support our homeland security mission.

TRADE/TRAVEL FACILITATION

We have moved forward on important initiatives set in
motion after 9/11 to secure the movement of goods and people
across our border and our ports of entry without unduly
impeding the legitimate flow of trade, the flow of legitimate
trade and travel that is so important to our economy.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY

We are also deploying more technology at our ports of entry
and between them to help detect potential terrorists and
terrorist weapons, including potentially weapons of mass
destruction, and I am talking about nuclear devices and
radiological weapons, at our borders. This includes, by the
way, already the over 400 radiation portal monitors at many of
our major ports of entry. We are in phases three and four of
that project to deploy better radiation detection equipment at
our borders.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, because the personnel and
functions from the front-line border agencies of our you have
been unified into one border agency, our Nation's borders are
more secure and our Nation is safer than it was when we were
literally fragmented between four agencies and three different
departments of government that were responsible for our border.
With over 41,000 approximately FTE Customs and Border
Protection, about one-fourth of all the employees of the
Department of Homeland Security, is by far the largest actual
merger of people and functions taking place in the Department.

COMPREHENSIVE BORDER CONTROL STRATEGY

Having one border agency also allows us for the first time
in the history of our country to implement a comprehensive
border strategy, not just at our ports of entry but between our
ports of entry as well. Between our ports of entry--along the
Mexican border and the Canadian border--the strategic goal is
clear. That goal is to establish operational control of our
borders, which by the way I think was always an important goal
for our country, but is absolutely essential, as Senator Byrd
suggested in his comments. It is absolutely essential in the
post-9/11 era, in the era of global terrorism.
Now, to do this, by the way, it is not all about staffing.
It is also about the better use and deployment of technology.
It is about organizing ourselves better in terms of how we
protect and secure our border. To do this, we have done a
number of things that are not widely known. One is we have
centralized the Border Patrol command structure and increased
the use and deployment of technology, including remote camera
system and sensoring devices. We are pioneering as the first
law enforcement agency ever the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles, or UAV's, to establish literally an aerial patrol
over significant segments of our borders.
But we recognize that technology alone, by the way, is not
a substitute for well trained and dedicated Border Patrol
Agents. One of our goals of our strategy to control the border
is to increase our ability to more rapidly deploy Border Patrol
Agents to respond to weak spots along our borders with Mexico
and Canada.

CARGO/SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

Let me just say one other thing. Just shortly after 9/11,
U.S. Customs, now CBP, developed a strategy for securing the
movement of cargo to the United States and we did that through
essentially four interrelated initiatives: the 24-hour rule to
get advance information on all cargo coming into the United
States; the use of an automated targeting system to identify
the high-risk cargo, particularly for the terrorist threat, and
that is done at our National Targeting Center in Northern
Virginia; the container security initiative, an initiative that
partners with other governments to screen high-risk containers
before they are loaded on board vessels for the United States.
Currently there are 35 foreign seaports that are partnered with
us in CIS, including ports like Singapore and Rotterdam, and
most recently Shanghai, China.
Through the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT), our partnership with the private sector, many major
importers in the United States, oceangoing carriers and others,
to improve the security of the supply chain literally back to
the manufacturer, the foreign loading docks of manufacturers in
foreign countries, all the way to U.S. ports of arrival, in
exchange for benefits of faster processing that CBP can give to
goods of companies that have better secured their supply chain.
Those initiatives provide greater protection for our
country against potential terrorist attack and not a one of
those initiatives existed before 9/11.

prepared statement

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me make an opening
statement and for this opportunity to appear, and I look
forward to answering any questions you or the other members may
have.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Robert C. Bonner

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Chairman Cochran, Ranking Member Byrd, Members of the Subcommittee,
it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) fiscal year 2006 budget
request.
I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to the Committee for the
support it provided for important initiatives implemented by CBP last
year. That support enabled CBP to make significant progress in securing
our borders and protecting our country against the terrorist threat. As
the Commissioner of CBP, I look forward to working with you to build on
these successes.
As the frontline border agency, CBP's mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States. That
extraordinarily important priority mission means improving security at
our physical borders and ports of entry, but it also means extending
our zone of security beyond our physical borders--so that American
borders are not our first line of defense.
And we must do this while continuing to perform our traditional
missions well. These missions include apprehending individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of
illegal drugs and other contraband, protecting our agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases, protecting American
businesses from theft of their intellectual property, regulating and
facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and
enforcing U.S. trade laws. In fiscal year 2004, CBP processed almost 30
million trade entries, collected $27 billion in revenue, seized 2.2
million pounds of narcotics, processed 428 million pedestrians and
passengers, 121 million privately owned vehicles, and processed and
cleared 23.5 million sea, rail and truck containers.
We must perform all of this important security and border-related
work without stifling the flow of legitimate trade and travel that is
so important to our Nation's economy. In other words, we have ``twin
goals:'' Building more secure and more efficient borders.
The fiscal year 2006 budget for CBP totals $6.7 billion, including
$5.6 billion in appropriated resources and $1.1 billion from user fees.
The total program increase request for fiscal year 2006 is $261
million. This increase is paramount to help CBP fulfill its priority
mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
the United States. As Commissioner, I will continue to ensure funds are
devoted to support the traditional missions for which CBP is
responsible, including resources for the automation and information
technology programs that will improve overall operations of the agency.
Mr. Chairman, although I will touch on each of the priority
programs and initiatives in my statement, I want to point out that in
many cases, funds spent in one area have a direct and positive impact
on other areas. For example, funds spent on automation and information
technology provide invaluable assistance to our priority mission of
preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States. Also, funds spent on our priority anti-terrorism mission often
result in improvements in our effectiveness and efficiency in carrying
out our traditional missions, such as interdicting narcotics.
By way of summary of the fiscal year 2006 budget for CBP, I can
tell you that the program increases we are requesting include:
--$125 million to continue the deployment and enhancement of Weapons
of Mass Destruction Detection Technology to our Nation's ports
of entry (POE);
--$19.8 million for the continued deployment of surveillance and
intrusion detection technology along our Nation's land borders
through the America's Shield Initiative;
--$36.9 million to hire 210 new Border Patrol Agents thereby
increasing border security and enhancing control of the borders
between the ports of entry;
--$20 million to replace 12 of the Border Patrol's 58 Vietnam-era
vintage helicopters ensuring that Agents on the ground have
adequate and reliable air support;
--$5.4 million to enhance and improve the efficiency our cargo,
conveyance and passenger screening systems ensuring that
legitimate trade and travel crosses our borders without delay
and that terrorists and their weapons, criminals or contraband
are intercepted before entering the United States;
--$2.0 million for expansion of the Immigration Advisory Program to
additional overseas locations ensuring that terrorists,
criminals or persons traveling with fraudulent documents do not
board aircraft bound for the United States;
--$5.4 million to expand the Container Security Initiative to
strategically important foreign seaports;
--$8.2 million for the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism to
increase supply chain security and expedite the clearance of
legitimate trade;
--$1.0 million for the operating expenses associated with the Arizona
Border Control Initiative;
--$3.0 million for the operation of the Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT)/Integrated Automated Fingerprint
System (IAFIS) so that CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents
can positively identify known terrorists and criminals
attempting to enter the United States;
--$31.7 million to operate and maintain the long range radar system
in partnership with the Department of Defense, ensuring that
aircraft are detected and tracked as they attempt to enter U.S.
airspace; and
--$3.2 million to contribute to the development of the DHS-wide
Homeland Security Data Network.
In my statement, I will discuss these programs and others that CBP
has been working on during the past year, and outline the actions CBP
is planning to take in each area. I would like to begin, though, with a
brief update for the Subcommittee on the status of CBP after its second
year of existence as a consolidated agency within DHS.

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION--THE SECOND YEAR

Fiscal year 2004 was the first full year that CBP operated as the
single, unified border agency for the United States. From a strategic
and operational standpoint, this consolidation has significantly
increased our ability to execute our anti-terrorism and traditional
missions at our Nation's borders more effectively than ever before,
thereby enhancing the security of the United States, its citizens and
the economy. I believe firmly that the United States is safer today
than it was on September 11, 2001, because of the creation of CBP and
the efforts and vigilance of CBP's personnel.

Achieve One Face at the Border
With the creation of CBP, one agency has the responsibility for the
entirety of our country's borders, for all purposes, customs,
immigration, agriculture protection and, importantly, terrorism. This
means that for the first time in our Nation's history, we are able to
design a comprehensive strategy for our borders.
To create ``One Face at the Border,'' CBP had to unify and
integrate its operations and workforce. CBP is the largest merger of
people and functions taking place within the DHS. Nowhere was
unification more critical than at the ports of entry (POEs) where
19,000 legacy Customs, Immigration and Agriculture inspectors joined
together to carry out CBP's priority and traditional missions. To unify
the Inspector workforce at the POEs, CBP established a new frontline
team--the CBP officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist. In March 2004,
former Agriculture Inspectors became CBP Agriculture Specialists and in
July, all former Customs and Immigration Inspectors were converted to
the CBP Officer position with a new series, title and job description.
The two occupational groups wear the same uniform and have been unified
under a single compensation system for overtime and premium pay,
ensuring efficient and equitable assignment of work and compensation.
This consolidation was commemorated in August when the new CBP badges
with the DHS seal were issued to our personnel. Today CBP Officers and
CBP Agriculture Specialists are our frontline team at all of our
Nation's ports of entry and overseas pre-clearance locations.

Secure and Improve the Flow of Global Trade
For the first time ever, on December 9, 2004, the World Customs
Organization (WCO) Policy Committee endorsed a Framework of Standards
to secure and facilitate global trade. The WCO represents 164 Customs
administrations from around the world and accounts for 99 percent of
all global trade. The framework is based in large part on principles
designed and implemented by CBP in the aftermath of September 11,
including: the 24-Hour Rule; the Advanced Targeting System located at
the National Targeting Center; the Container Security Initiative, and
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The WCO
framework encourages cooperation among worldwide Customs
administrations to secure international supply chains and facilitate
the movement of legitimate trade and travel.

Develop and Implement a Comprehensive Border Control Strategy
As a sovereign Nation, it has always been important that we control
our borders. In light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the
continuing threat posed to our country by international terrorists, it
is now absolutely essential that we do so. and it is likewise essential
that we have a coherent and understood strategy for doing so. We are
developing a new Border Patrol strategy designed to achieve the goal of
operational control of the United States borders. This strategy will
build on the previous Border Patrol strategies, but will be enhanced to
reflect the current threat environment.
CBP's Office of Border Patrol is a vital part of CBP, responsible
for controlling the border between official ports of entry. In the last
2 years, the Border Patrol has made significant strides in improving
our ability to control our border and establish a substantial
probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they
attempt to illegally enter the United States between the ports of
entry. For example, CBP has tripled the number of Border Patrol Agents
on the Northern Border since 9/11, centralized the Border Patrol's
command structure, and deployed additional technology to improve border
enforcement operations, including cameras, electronic sensors, and
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
As important as these milestones are, we cannot afford to become
complacent or let down our guard. To meet the threat of global
terrorism, we must implement a layered, defense in-depth strategy to
protect our borders. New challenges and opportunities are on the
horizon for CBP. Our achievements over the past year and the
President's fiscal year 2006 budget will serve as the foundation to
meet them.

Integrate Air and Marine Operations
The fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Appropriations Act directed the transfer of missions and assets of the
Air Marine Operations (AMO) from Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) to CBP. The transfer will be completed in two phases. Phase One,
which was completed on October 31, 2004, moved AMO intact from ICE to
CBP. This included the transfer of operational responsibility and
responsibility for all AMO personnel, missions, commitments,
facilities, and assets to CBP.
Phase Two, which commenced in late November, is the integration of
all CBP air and marine personnel, missions, and assets. To accomplish
this, CBP is using the Transition Management Office (TMO) process that
was used successfully during the merger of the legacy CBP entities. CBP
has made significant progress in Phase Two. I am confident that upon
completion of this process, we will have a more integrated, effective
and efficient aviation and marine program.

Provide Assistance to the New Government of Iraq
In August, teams of CBP Officers and Border Patrol Agents were
deployed to the Jordanian International Police Training Center to train
officers of the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement. The Iraqis have
been provided with courses on border security tactics, human rights,
defensive tactics, weapons training, and vehicle searches; in addition
to basic customs and immigration activities. To date, CBP personnel
have assisted in the training of more than 2,100 Iraqi border control
officers. The training provided by CBP personnel will continue in the
aftermath of the recent elections and focuses on keeping saboteurs,
terrorists and armaments from crossing into or out of Iraq. The Iraqi
officials CBP trained are now putting these skills to use at their
country's borders and ports of entry.
meeting our twin goals: building more secure and more efficient borders
As the single, unified border agency of the United States, CBP's
mission is extraordinarily important to the protection of America and
the American people. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, CBP has developed numerous initiatives to meet our twin
goals of improving security and facilitating the flow of legitimate
trade and travel. The fiscal year 2006 budget will help us expand upon
those initiatives to ensure further protection of both the American
people and the American economy. Our strategy in implementing these
initiatives involves a number of factors, including: (A) constant
improvement of our targeting systems to better screen people and goods
entering and departing the United States; (B) extending our zone of
security outward by partnering with other countries; (C) extending our
zone of security outward by partnering with the private sector; (D)
deploying advanced inspection technology and equipment at our ports of
entry to improve our ability to detect weapons of mass destruction; and
(E) deploying advanced detection and monitoring equipment between our
ports of entry to detect illegal crossings of our land borders with
Mexico and Canada.

Enhancing Our Ability to Identify High-Risk People and Cargo
Information is one of the most important keys to our ability to
increase security without stifling legitimate trade and travel. Good
information enables us to more accurately identify--or target--what is
``high risk,'' defined as a potential threat, and what is low risk or
absolutely no risk whatsoever. The separation of high risk from no risk
is critical because searching and scrutinizing 100 percent of the cargo
and people that enter the United States would cripple the flow of
legitimate trade and travel to the United States. What is necessary and
advisable is searching 100 percent of the high-risk cargo and people
that enter our country. To do this, we need to be able to identify what
is high risk, and do so as early in the process as possible. CBP has
several programs and initiatives that help us accomplish that task.

Automated Targeting System
The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is used by National
Targeting Center (NTC) and field targeting units in the United States
and overseas, is essential to our ability to target high-risk cargo and
passengers entering the United States. ATS is the system through which
we process advance manifest and passenger information to pick up
anomalies and ``red flags'' and determine what passengers and cargo are
``high risk,'' and therefore scrutinized at the port of entry or, in
some cases, overseas.
The funding increases sought for ATS in the fiscal year 2006 budget
will allow for the continued improvement of the system as well as
provide it with the capacity to process the electronic data related to
the ever-increasing number of people and goods entering the United
States. For example, the funding will allow us to develop and implement
a version of ATS that, for the first time, will be able to identify
potentially high-risk travelers in passenger vehicles. It will also be
used to upgrade our passenger targeting system by improving the amount
of government data that the system can access and analyze as well as
provide us with the capacity to train more people on the use of the
system. On the cargo side, the funding will permit ATS to increase its
capacity and upgrade its capabilities by utilizing cutting edge
information analysis technologies developed by CBP and the private
sector.

Extending our Zone of Security Outward--Partnering with Other Countries
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States, CBP must extend our zone of
security outward--so that our borders are not the first line of defense
to keep terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the United States. We
have done this by partnering with other countries on our Container
Security Initiative (CSI), one of the most revolutionary and successful
homeland security initiatives developed and implemented after September
11, 2001.
Almost 25,000 seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at U.S.
seaports each day. That equates to nine million cargo containers
annually. Because of the sheer volume of sea container traffic and the
opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized shipping is
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. Under CSI, which is the first
program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign governments to
identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at foreign ports,
before they are shipped to our seaports and pose a threat to the United
States and to global trade.
The three core elements of CSI are:
--First, identifying ``high-risk'' containers, using ATS and the 24-
hour rule, before they set sail for the United States.
--Second, performing security inspections of ``high risk'' containers
at the foreign CSI port before they are shipped to the United
States.
--Third, using technology to perform security inspections of the
high-risk containers, including both radiation detection
equipment and large-scale imaging machines, to detect potential
terrorist weapons.
CSI continues to generate exceptional participation and support.
Right now, CSI is operational in 35 foreign seaports, including:
Rotterdam, the Netherlands; Le Havre and Marseilles, France;
Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany; Antwerp and Zebrugee, Belgium;
Singapore; Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe Japan; Hong Kong;
Gothenburg, Sweden; Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport, and
Tilbury United Kingdom; Genoa, La Spezia, Naples, Gioia Tauro and
Livorno Italy; Busan, Korea; Durban, South Africa; and Port Kelang and
Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia; Piraeus, Greece; Algericas, Spain; and Laem
Chabang, Thailand; Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver, Canada; and most
recently Shanghai, China.
I want to express my gratitude to the Committee members for their
support of CSI in fiscal year 2005. With the $5.4 million increase in
funding requested for fiscal year 2006, we will continue expanding CSI
capabilities to ports with strategic importance or ports through which
containers from high risk areas are transshipped. The fiscal year 2006
budget will allow for future expansion of the program to additional
high-risk or strategic foreign ports.

Immigration Advisory Program
The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) extends our zone of security
outward by screening passengers before boarding aircraft destined for
the United States. Immigration Advisory Program teams identify high
risk and terrorist watchlisted passengers using the Automated Targeting
System and are able to intervene by questioning high risk passengers at
overseas boarding areas of foreign hub airports. They are able to check
documentation of high-risk passengers prior to departure and make
preliminary decisions whether the passenger will be admissible to the
United States upon arrival. If potentially fraudulent identification or
immigration documents are identified, or the individual's purpose poses
a threat, the airline is advised not to board the passenger and the
host country law enforcement is contacted. The IAP teams have access to
the passenger screening information produced by CBP's NTC through the
vetting of passenger manifests against terrorist watch lists and
criminal databases. If a ``hit'' occurs or documents are found to be
deficient or fraudulent, the passenger is not allowed to board the
aircraft. There are two significant advantages to this approach. First,
terrorists, criminals or inadmissible aliens are not allowed to board,
thereby preventing their entry into the United States and/or the
inconvenience and expense of an in flight diversion of the aircraft.
Second, the United States Government avoids penalties and the costs of
detaining the individual before being deported and the airline avoids
the costs of transporting the individual back to the originating
airport.
IAP is currently operating on a pilot basis in Amsterdam's Schipol
Airport in the Netherlands and at Chopin Airport in Warsaw, Poland. The
fiscal year 2006 budget includes $2.0 million to expand IAP to two
additional overseas locations. I thank the Committee for their support
of this program in the fiscal year 2005 DHS Appropriations Act.

Extending our Zone of Security--Partnering with the Trade
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a
voluntary partnership between CBP and industry to secure international
supply chains from end-to-end. C-TPAT importers secure supply chains
from the foreign factory loading docks of their vendors to the port of
arrival in the United States. CBP, in return, offers C-TPAT shipments
expedited processing and provides C-TPAT participants with other
benefits.
As C-TPAT has evolved, we have steadily added to the rigor of the
program. In order to join C-TPAT, a company must conduct a self-
assessment of its current supply chain security procedures using C-TPAT
security criteria and best practices developed in partnership with
logistics and security experts from the trade. A participant must also
commit to increasing its supply chain security to meet minimal supply
chain security criteria. Perhaps most importantly, participants also
make a commitment to work with their business partners and customers
throughout their supply chains to ensure that those businesses also
increase their supply chain security. By leveraging the influence of
importers and others on different participants in the supply chain, C-
TPAT is able to increase security of U.S. bound goods to the point of
origin (i.e., to the point of container stuffing). This reach--to the
foreign loading dock--which is beyond the regulatory reach of the
United States Government, is critical to the goal of increasing supply
chain security.
C-TPAT is currently open to all importers, cross-border air, sea,
truck, and rail carriers, brokers, freight forwarders, consolidators,
non-vessel operating common carriers, and U.S. Marine and Terminal
operators. We are currently enrolling certain foreign manufacturers in
the C-TPAT program as well, and we will continue to develop ways to
include this important element of the supply chain in the program. The
intent is to increase point of origin to point of arrival security into
the supply chain with active C-TPAT links at each point in the
logistics process.
Although C-TPAT is a partnership, the risk is too great to simply
take participants at their word when it comes to their supply chain
security. We have created a cadre of specially trained supply chain
security specialists to validate the commitments made by C-TPAT
participants--to ensure that they are increasing supply chain security
as they have promised CBP. These specialists meet with personnel from
C-TPAT participants and their business partners and observe the
security of their supply chains, including security at overseas loading
docks and manufacturing plants, as well as transportation links
outbound to the United States. Through this process, we work with C-
TPAT participants to identify ways that they can further increase their
supply chain security and we ensure that companies that are not
honoring their commitments lose their C-TPAT benefits. As of January
12, 2005, C-TPAT had reviewed and verified the security profiles for
4,460 companies; there are more than 3,500 company profiles pending
acceptance. We have validated or are in the process of validating parts
of the supply chain of over 1,200 of the 4,460 certified partners, or
approximately 27 percent. Our fiscal year 2006 program increase request
of $8.2 million will enable outreach activities and continue
validations and verifications of C-TPAT certified partner profiles.

Using Technology to Detect Weapons of Mass Destruction at our Ports of
Entry
As trade increases, CBP's reliance on Non-Intrusive Inspection
(NII) technology to secure the borders becomes more and more critical.
Only by using NII technology to speed the inspections process for
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and contraband can CBP meet its twin
goals of increasing security and at the same time facilitating trade.
CBP uses various technologies in different combinations to
substantially increase the likelihood that a nuclear or radiological
weapon or weapons grade material will be detected. In addition, CBP
also uses NII technology to detect and interdict narcotics, currency
and other contraband secreted in large containers and commercial
shipments. Technologies deployed to our Nation's land, sea and air
ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems--
systems that can image the contents of an entire container in minutes.
These systems include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS),
Mobile VACIS, Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail VACIS, Mobile Sea
Container Examinations Systems and the Pallet Gamma-ray System. In
September 1996, our first large-scale NII system, a Truck X-ray, became
operational in Otay Mesa, California. Today, we have 145 large-scale
NII systems deployed.
In addition, we have developed and are implementing a comprehensive
radiation detection strategy at our ports of entry. Pursuant to that
Strategy, we are deploying nuclear and radiological detection equipment
to include personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radiation portal
monitors (RPMs) and radiation isotope identifier devices (RIIDs). In
combination with our layered detection strategy--working overseas to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and to detect them
before they are shipped to the United States--and our use of multiple
inspection technologies, these tools currently provide CBP with
significant capacity to detect nuclear or radiological weapons and
materials. We currently have over 400 RPMs deployed at our borders.
The fiscal year 2006 request includes $125 million to continue the
acquisition, deployment, and enhancement of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Detection Technology at our Nations ports of entry. These actions will
be coordinated with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which
is being established to develop, acquire and support the deployment of
the national nuclear detection architecture, including future
acquisition issues. CBP's radiation detection strategy will be
integrated into the overall strategy developed by DNDO.
Our investment in WMD Detection technology is paying off as
demonstrated by the following recent event. On January 26, 2005, at the
Los Angeles seaport a PRD activated in proximity to a vessel from Kwan
Yang, South Korea. A search of the vessel revealed that the source of
the radiation was located in the ship's engine room. Subsequent
screening with a Radiation Isotope Identifier and analysis by CBP
Laboratory and Scientific Services Personnel stationed at the NTC
revealed that the material was Cobalt 60, a material used in industrial
and medical applications. Following coordination with the Science and
Technology Directorate's Secondary Reachback Program, scientists were
dispatched from the Department of Energy Radiation Assistance Program
and it was confirmed that the radiation levels posed no threat to
safety and that it was emanating from a gauge in the ship's fire
extinguishing system. Although this alarm proved to be benign, the
event demonstrates CBP's improving ability to detect sources of
radiation in conveyances arriving at our borders and quickly take
appropriate action to resolve any potential threats. Indeed, since CBP
installed the first RPMs in May 2002, we have resolved over 10,000
radiation hits of vehicles or cargo shipments crossing our borders.

Detecting and Responding to Illegal Crossings Between our Ports of
Entry
America's Shield Initiative (ASI)
The America's Shield Initiative, formerly known as the Integrated
Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), is an effort to develop a
comprehensive and unified system of electronic surveillance of our
entire land borders. ASI is a critical part of CBP's strategy to build
smarter borders. This, in turn, is critical to the Border Patrol's
ability to increase its apprehension capabilities along our borders,
and thereby establish greater control of our borders. The deployment of
ASI is critical to prevent terrorists from entering the United States
and to achieve operational control of our Nation's borders.
I thank the Committee for the $64.2 million provided for ASI in the
fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act. These resources are being used to
solicit and award a contract for the nation-wide integration of legacy
ISIS capabilities and to deploy additional systems along our borders.
Nation-wide integrated ASI capabilities will provide the Border Patrol
with a tactical, command and control, situational awareness and
intelligence collection and management system. The $19.8 million
requested for fiscal year 2006 would enable CBP to broaden
substantially its ASI coverage of the northern and southern borders by
deploying the system where no coverage currently exists. In addition,
with the advent of ASI, system capabilities will be improved to enhance
the sensor and video surveillance capabilities of currently installed
components, integrate new, state of the market surveillance
technologies and increase interoperability with other law enforcement
agencies.
ASI acts as an important force-multiplier that allows CBP's Border
Patrol agents to remotely monitor the border and respond to specific
illegal border crossings rather than having to exhaustively patrol an
area adjacent to the border. By contrast, Border Patrol operations
without ASI support are not only less effective, they are more
resource-intensive and less safe for Border Patrol Agents. Expanding
the portion of the border covered by electronic surveillance,
integration of new components and technologies, and improved Agent
support equipment via the ASI program will provide the Border Patrol
with the increased ability to meet its and CBP's priority mission
threats.

Border Patrol Aircraft Modernization and Replacement
Aviation is one of the most effective force multipliers used in
securing our Nation's borders. Aircraft perform a multitude of missions
in this environment, including border surveillance, operational patrol,
personnel deployment to permit rapid response to intrusions, and
medical evacuation. In fiscal year 2004, CBP Border Patrol Aircraft
flew almost 46,000 hours, apprehending 96,341 persons and assisted in
seizing $103.6 million in illegal narcotics. This equates to 2.1
arrests and $2,259 in seized contraband for each flight hour. The
largest segment of the Border Patrol fleet is its helicopters;
including 58 that are Vietnam era vintage. The high level of fight time
is taking its toll on these important assets. New parts are no longer
manufactured, requiring that salvaged parts be used to repair broken or
damaged aircraft. The $20.0 million requested will allow CBP to begin
implementation of the fleet modernization and replacement plan through
the acquisition of 12 new helicopters. This initiative will improve
Border Patrol Agent safety and ensure that these valuable assets,
essential to effective border control, continue to be available to our
frontline personnel.

Border Patrol Agent Staffing
An increase of $36.9 million is included in the fiscal year 2006
budget to enhance Border Patrol staffing by 210 Agents. The additional
Agents will be deployed along the southwest border to areas with the
highest concentration of illegal entry activity. To date in, fiscal
year 2005, there has been a 15 percent increase in apprehensions along
the southwest border when compared to the aliens from the same time
period in fiscal year 2004. In addition, there has been an increase in
the number of Special Interest Aliens (SIA) and High-Risk Other Than
Mexican illegal entrant aliens that pose an increased threat to U.S.
national security. CBP has experienced significant operational success
in targeted areas. Additional Agents and supporting resources are
necessary to sustain and expand the progress made in border control
efforts.

Arizona Border Control Initiative-ABCI
This landmark program supporting the mission of CBP to detect and
deter terrorist activities and cross-border illegal trafficking of
people and drugs was initiated on March 16, 2004, in the Border
Patrol's Tucson Sector. Working in partnership with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), the government of Mexico, state, local,
tribal and Federal law enforcement organizations, the CBP Border
Patrol-led ABCI was designed to produce a safer and more secure
southwest border at one of the weakest segments of our border with
Mexico.
The goals of ABCI were and are to: (1) achieve operational control
of the Arizona border (2) support CBP's priority antiterrorism mission;
(3) significantly impair the ability of smuggling organizations to
operate; and (4) decrease the rate of violent crime and reduce the need
for social services in southern Arizona. In fiscal year 2004, as part
of ABCI, CBP repatriated 14,058 Mexican nationals on a voluntary basis
to the interior of Mexico by means of commercial flights. This is the
first successful interior repatriation effort, and it is a result of
cooperation of and coordination with the Government of Mexico. These
flights decreased the incidence of border crossing recidivism and
reduced the number of heat related exposure deaths in the Arizona
desert by 69 percent--from 45 in fiscal year 2003, to 14 in fiscal year
2004 (during the period of July 12th through September 30th). ICE will
assume responsibility for the interior repatriation flights in fiscal
year 2006. Our fiscal year 2006 budget request of $1.0 million will
assist in offsetting the costs of CBP's continued participation in the
ABCI. These resources will be used for Border Patrol Agent support
costs and other operational expenses including fuel, vehicle
maintenance, and overtime associated with increased border surveillance
within the Arizona area of operation.

Long Range Radar
The fiscal year 2006 CBP budget includes a total of $44.2 million,
an increase of $31.7 million over base resources for our share of the
joint agreement with the Department of Defense (DOD) to assume
financial responsibility for the operations and maintenance costs of
the primary component of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
long-range radar system. Beginning in fiscal year 2006, CBP and DOD
will share these costs equally.
Continued access to the primary component of the long-range radar
system is essential to our ability protect the United States from acts
of terrorism and drug smuggling via cross-border aviation. The FAA's
primary radar system is used to track aircraft that either do not have
transponders or have their transponders turned off in an attempt to
avoid radar detection. Most small, non-commercial aircraft do not have
transponders and these are the vehicle of choice for smugglers
attempting to bring loads of cocaine, marijuana and heroin to the
United States from Mexico and other source countries in Central and
South America.

IDENT/IAFIS
The Automated Biometric Identification System/Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System otherwise known as IDENT/IAFIS, was
established to merge the capabilities of the FBI's criminal master
fingerprint file and the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service's immigration violator database. These systems have been
integrated into one system that captures biometric and biographical
information through the use of a ``10 Print'' fingerprint machine and
computer based facial imagery. The goals of the system are to identify
repeat immigration offenders and identify criminals and previously
deported aliens who should be detained. IDENT/IAFIS provides CBP's
front line personnel with access to approximately 48 million criminal
history records dating back to the 1920's. All Border Patrol field
locations now have access to integrated IDENT/IAFIS and all CBP Ports
of Entry will have access to the system by the end of this year.
Previous studies indicate that combining IDENT and IAFIS checks
increases the probability of identifying criminal aliens by almost 10
percent. In addition, significant efficiencies are gained by being able
to electronically scan fingerprints to and get a response back from the
databases within ten minutes. From October 1, 2003, through August 31,
2004, IDENT/IAFIS technology assisted Border Patrol Agents in the
arrest of 138 homicide suspects; 67 kidnapping suspects; 226 sexual
assault suspects 431 robbery suspects; 2,342 suspects for assaults of
other types and 4,801 suspects involved with illegal drugs.
The Directorate of Border and Transportation Security has assumed
ownership of the IDENT/IAFIS system. The fiscal year 2006, $3.0 million
budget initiative will offset CBP's share of IDENT/IAFIS operations and
maintenance costs.

AUTOMATION/INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Mr. Chairman, no discussion of a successful strategy to protect the
American people and the American economy in the 21st century would be
complete without consideration of the central importance of automation
and information technology to CBP's mission.

Automated Commercial Environment
The Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) is an important project
for CBP, for the business community, for our country, and for the
future of global trade. If done properly, it will reform the way we do
business with the trade community. It will also greatly assist CBP in
the advance collection of information for targeting high-risk cargo to
better address the terrorist threat. And in doing so, it will help us
expedite the vast majority of low-risk trade.
The successful implementation of ACE has been and continues to be
one of my top priorities as Commissioner. Increasing support from
Congress and the Administration for ACE has been essential to the
development of the new system. Funding of $321 million in fiscal year
2005 has enabled us to continue development and begin to expand the
first installment of ACE benefits to the trade community. Indeed, since
my testimony last year, I can tell you that the development of ACE and
the efforts to put its capabilities to work on America's borders have
continued full throttle. We have over 350 importers, brokers, and
carriers using the ACE Secure Data Portal and, since June 2004, have
been collecting an increasing amount of duties and fees via the ACE
Period Monthly Statement. CBP is also operating a pilot test of the ACE
truck cargo release software in the port of Blaine, Washington, and
plans to expand this new capability to ports across our northern and
southern borders. In parallel with this development, CBP is working
with the DHS Chief Information Officer and the US-VISIT program to
ensure compliance with the DHS Enterprise Architecture and position the
ACE architecture so that it can be leveraged to support the broad
homeland security mission.
Included within the $321 million for ACE is $16 million dedicated
to continuing support of the International Trade Data System (ITDS).
ITDS is our mechanism for coordinating intergovernmental support for
ACE and ensuring that ACE meets the needs of government agencies with a
need for trade data and a stake in border security. To that end, the
ITDS Board of Directors has adopted a standard set of trade data as a
step toward realizing the concept of using the ACE portal as the
``single window'' into government for the trade community. We are
pleased to report that the original group of eight participating
agencies in ITDS has now grown to twenty-six. Representatives from
these agencies are actively involved in defining the releases of ACE
software.
I want to thank Congress again for its past support of ACE. The
continued support of ACE with $321 million in funding for fiscal year
2006 will enable us to keep pace with our schedule for future ACE
releases including:

Account Revenue and Secure Trade Data
ACE Release 5, scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2007 will
leverage the inherent capabilities of CBP's core financial system, SAP.
Release 5 will integrate the entry summary business process from
manifest receipt to entry liquidation. Through this release, ACE will
become the system of record for all entry summaries.

Screening and Targeting Capabilities
The Targeting Foundation scheduled for release during fiscal years
2005 and 2006 will extend ACE capabilities to entry summary processing
through enhanced links to the NTC and its systems. Advanced Targeting
capabilities will be expanded providing risk assessment and modeling,
data mining, link analysis and pattern recognition capabilities.

Homeland Security Data Network--HSDN
The Homeland Security Data Network addresses the Department of
Homeland Security's requirement for a system capable of managing and
disseminating sensitive and classified information in a secure
environment. The HSDN effort will streamline and modernize the
classified data transmission capabilities of DHS in order to facilitate
communication and collaboration within DHS and with other Federal
agencies including the Department of Defense. When implemented, the
HSDN will facilitate transmission of data between DHS offices and other
networks including the Anti-Drug Network (ADNET), Automatic Digital
Network (AUTODIN) and the Defense Message System (DMS). HSDN will
provide a scalable infrastructure, capable of supporting the growth and
evolution of the DHS mission. CBP's share of this DHS-wide initiative
is $3.2 million in fiscal year 2006.

OTHER TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

Although CBP's priority mission is preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, we know that we
must--and will--accomplish that priority mission while continuing to
perform our traditional missions well. Included among those missions
are our responsibilities for interdicting drugs, apprehending
individuals who enter the United States illegally, regulating and
facilitating international trade, and protecting U.S. agricultural and
economic interests from harmful pests and diseases.

Drug Interdiction
Our anti-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions are not mutually
exclusive, and one does not necessarily come at the expense of the
other. The initiatives we have put in place to prevent terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States have enabled us to be
more effective in seizing other illegal contraband, including illegal
drugs. Indeed, one of the first results we saw after implementing ATS
for commercial trucks on the land border was a large narcotics seizure
from a targeted shipment. And, it is worth noting that the lessons we
have learned in our battle against international drug trafficking will
help us in the fight against international terrorism.
It would be a grave mistake for drug traffickers and other
criminals to misinterpret our focus on terrorism as a weakening of
resolve on other fronts. If anything, we have made life even more
miserable for drug smugglers as we have intensified our overall
presence along America's borders. Our heightened state of security
along America's borders has strengthened, not weakened, our
counternarcotics mission. As we have added staffing for both inspectors
at the ports of entry and Border Patrol Agents between the ports of
entry, acquired more inspection technology, conducted more questioning
of travelers, and carried out more inspections of passengers and goods
in response to the terrorist threat, we have seized greater amounts of
narcotics. In fiscal year 2004, for example, we seized almost 2.2
million pounds of illegal drugs, and made some of the largest
individual seizures ever recorded by officers safeguarding our borders.
The CBP Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) protects the
Nation's borders and the American people from the smuggling of
narcotics and other contraband with an integrated, coordinated and
highly trained air and marine interdiction force. To accomplish the
mission, AMO's thoroughly trained interdiction assets are deployed
throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Air and Marine Operations Center
(AMOC) in Riverside California, provides command, control,
communications, and intelligence for those assets by assimilating
information from a wide array of sensors.
Effective coordination between inspectors at the ports of entry and
agents who carry out investigative activities is essential to the
success of our counternarcotics mission. For that reason, CBP will
continue to cooperate closely with special agents from ICE to carry out
this mission.

Apprehend Individuals Entering Illegally Between the Ports of Entry
CBP's Office of the Border Patrol is specifically responsible for
patrolling thousands of miles of Mexican and Canadian international
land borders. Its primary task is securing America's borders between
official ports of entry by preventing the illegal entry of people,
goods, and contraband across our borders.
The Border Patrol relies on agents, enforcement equipment (such as
a fleet of specialized aircraft and vehicles of various types),
technology (such as sensors and night vision cameras), tactical
infrastructure (such as roads and vehicle barriers), and intelligence
to carry out its mission. Applied in the correct combination, these
resources can effectively deter, detect, monitor, and respond to
illegal border crossings, as we have seen in locations such as the San
Diego Sector and during operations such as Desert Safeguard.
In fiscal year 2004, the Border Patrol played a key role in
safeguarding the United States from the entry of terrorists, criminals,
and illegal immigrants. Among the nearly 1.2 million people apprehended
by the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2004 were 643 aliens from special
interest countries.
CBP will continue to work with other agencies and the Mexican
Government to re-institute and increase the operational tempo of the
Arizona Border Control Initiative this year. Under this initiative, CBP
will aim to substantially reduce the number of illegal entries that
occur in Arizona, and, as a result, will reduce the number of deaths
that occur as aliens try to cross the Arizona desert. In turn, CBP will
increase its ability to apprehend potential terrorists seeking to enter
through the Arizona corridor.

Prevent Individuals from Entering Illegally at the Ports of Entry
With respect to preventing individuals from entering the country
illegally at the ports of entry, CBP continues to stop hundreds of
thousands of people a year who are inadmissible into the United States
for a variety of reasons, including prior immigration violations,
criminal history, or the possession of false or fraudulent documents,
and potential terrorists.
We are helped in this effort by our close work with the Department
of State to ensure CBP inspectors have the tools they need to verify
the identity of visa holders and the authenticity of visas issued by
the Department of State. Data on holders of immigrant visas is
transferred electronically to ports of entry. When the electronic
record is updated to reflect an immigrant's admission at a port of
entry, that data is transferred electronically to the Bureau of
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) for production of a
permanent resident card and creation of the immigrant file.
--In fiscal year 2004, CBP processed more than 262 million aliens
attempting to enter the United States through the ports of
entry; 643,091 were deemed inadmissible under U.S. law. CBP
Officers also intercepted: 78,255 fraudulent immigration
documents; recorded 1.8 million lookout intercepts; and,
apprehended 399 travelers for terrorism or national security
concerns. In addition, 19,740 criminal aliens attempting entry
were not admitted and 566 stowaways were intercepted.

Regulate and Facilitate International Trade
CBP maintains responsibility for regulating and facilitating
legitimate international trade. As I mentioned earlier, many of the
initiatives CBP implements serve the twin goals of increasing security
and facilitating trade. With the right level of industry partnership
and the right combination of resources, we can develop innovative
solutions that not only protect legitimate trade from being used by
terrorists, but also create a better, faster, more productive system
for moving goods and people across our borders and thus contributing to
U.S. economic growth. The key to the success of this effort is
partnerships, and we devote considerable time and effort to dialogue
and interact with both large and small enterprises engaged in trade.
We have two major venues for engaging the trade community on an
ongoing basis. The Commercial Operations Advisory Committee, created
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, is the primary group that
provides advice on the CBP issues. The Committee meets quarterly and
holds lively discussions on the full range of critical issues on our
common agenda. The COAC was particularly important in helping us
implement the Trade Act, and they most recently have worked on a series
of measures to implement the Maritime Trade Security Act and to improve
the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
Another key group of our private sector partners is the Trade
Support Network (TSN), whose members work on developing specific
requirements for the Automated Customs Environment to ensure ACE
delivers the critical functionality required by both CBP, the trade and
other government agencies. The TSN recently created a Supply Chain
Security Committee, which will be the focal point for helping us
identify information required to achieve the end-to-end view of the
supply chain and identify the parties capable of reporting that data.
As I have indicated, we have continued to work with the trade on
these security and trade facilitation matters over the past year, and
we will continue to do so in the year ahead. In fiscal year 2004, CBP
processed 27.6 million entries of goods, a 7.9 percent increase over
fiscal year 2003 levels and processed 23.5 million sea, truck and rail
containers entering the United States, an increase of 5.5 percent over
fiscal year 2003. CBP also collected more than $27 billion in revenue
in fiscal year 2004: second only to the Internal Revenue Service in the
Federal Government sector. CBP officers also completed 2,681 cargo
merchandise seizures totaling almost $233 million and effected 8,586
seizures of counterfeit commodities with a fair market value of $48.4
million
To increase our effectiveness and provide national direction over
trade concerns, CBP has a National Trade Strategy that focuses on
priority trade issues such as revenue collection, intellectual property
rights, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, textile enforcement,
and risks associated with intentional or unintentional contamination of
agricultural products. The goals of the National Trade Strategy are to
collect the appropriate duties, protect American businesses and our
economic interests from theft of intellectual property and from unfair
trade practices, and from the contamination of agricultural products by
aggressively targeting high-risk shipments. In addition, CBP is
responsible for key deliverables in the Administration's Strategy
Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP) initiative, a multi-agency effort to
improve protection of intellectual property rights, such as using state
of the art analytical techniques to target suspect shipments and using
post-entry audits.

Protect U.S. Agricultural and Economic Interests and the Food Supply
CBP also enforces the laws and regulations pertaining to the safe
importation and entry of agricultural food commodities into the United
States. The traditional goals of the Agriculture Inspections (AI)
program have been to reduce the risk of introduction of invasive
species into the United States, protect U.S. agricultural resources,
maintain the marketability of agricultural products, and facilitate the
movement of law-abiding people and commodities across the borders.
Accordingly, inspecting potentially high-risk travelers and cargo is
critical to keeping the prohibited items out of the United States,
monitoring for significant agricultural health threats, encouraging
compliance with regulations, and educating the public and importers
about agricultural quarantine regulations. In August, 2004, CBP
Agriculture Specialists at the Port of Miami, intercepted and
quarantined a shipment of habanero peppers infested with Mediterranean
Fruit Fly larvae at and the False Coddling Moth. This shipment was
manifested as coming from the Netherlands but was suspected of
originating elsewhere. The quick actions of the CBP Agriculture
Specialists prevented an incident that could have created severe
economic losses to Florida's burgeoning agricultural products industry.
With the creation of CBP, the AI program has expanded its focus to
include a new priority mission of preventing potential terrorist
threats involving agriculture. Indeed, the threat of intentional
introductions of pests or pathogens as a means of biological warfare or
terrorism is an emerging concern. To address this threat and to enhance
its traditional AI missions, CBP has already begun using the Automated
Targeting System, and its collective expertise regarding terrorism and
agriculture, to strengthen our ability to identify shipments that may
pose a potential risk to our agricultural interests.
In addition, CBP working closely with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to implement the Bioterrorism Act to guard against
threats to the food supply. The implementation of Phase III of the Act
requires that prior notice of importation or intent to import all food
to be consumed by humans be provided to both CBP and the FDA. Under the
BTA, food products shipped by truck require two hours advance notice,
by rail and air four hours and by sea eight hours. Enforcement of the
provisions of the BTA are designed to protect the food that is on every
table of every American household and to detect potential incidents of
bio- and agroterrorism involving food. These efforts have built on our
priority and traditional missions to make the food supply more secure,
and will be supported in part by the targeting funding sought in the
fiscal year 2006 budget.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, I have outlined a broad
array of initiatives today that, with your assistance, will help CBP
continue to protect America from the terrorist threat while fulfilling
our other important traditional missions. Because of your support, we
are far safer today than we were on September 11th. But our work is not
complete. With the continued support of the President, DHS, and the
Congress, CBP will succeed in meeting the challenges posed by the
ongoing terrorist threat and the need to facilitate ever-increasing
numbers of legitimate shipments and travelers.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be happy to
answer any of your questions.

Senator Cochran. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonner.
Mr. Aguirre, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF EDUARDO AGUIRRE

Mr. Aguirre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
Chairman Cochran, ranking member Byrd, and Senator Leahy. My
name is Eduardo Aguirre and I am the Director of USCIS. I
appear before you to discuss the President's USCIS budget
request for fiscal year 2006.

PROGRESS SINCE MARCH 2003

Yesterday, as was noted, USCIS celebrated its second
anniversary. Today I am looking forward to sharing with you our
tremendous progress since March 2003. We are delivering on the
President's promise to welcome immigrants with open arms, not
endless lines. Our remarkable progress is not an anomaly, but
rather a strong foundation and a new baseline from which to
grow in the coming years. We secure America's promise as a
Nation of immigrants by fundamentally reforming our tired
system of immigration services.

FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET REQUEST

USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the
Federal Government. Our 15,000 employees and contractors serve
applicants throughout our broad national and international
network. The President's fiscal year 2006 budget will allow us
to build upon the progress we have made. The budget includes a
total for USCIS of $1.854 billion, $80 million in appropriated
funds and $1.774 billion in fees. This budget will allow USCIS
to process over 7 million immigration benefit applications.
We note that fiscal year 2006 will be the final year of the
President's 5-year plan for backlog elimination. Our budget
includes a total of $100 million to support backlog elimination
efforts as well as improvements in applications processing.
This brings the 5-year total for this aggressive initiative to
$560 million. We are on track to achieve the President's
backlog elimination mandate.
As Will Rogers eloquently stated, even if you are on the
right track you will get run over if you just sit there. Thus,
we have taken and continue to take a hard reengineering look at
the way we currently conduct our business. Since my appointment
and confirmation as Director of USCIS, our leadership team has
continually reviewed our processes, identified opportunities
for streamlining and further improvement, and implemented
meaningful changes.
Let me plainly state that as we improve our ways we are
committed to never compromise national security in an effort to
increase productivity. From day 1, USCIS established three
crystal-clear priorities: One, eliminate the immigration
benefit applications backlog; two, enhance national security;
and three, improve customer service. Let me briefly touch upon
progress made on each of these priorities.

BACKLOG ELIMINATION

Eliminating the backlog. Operationally, fiscal year 2004
was truly an outstanding year for USCIS and we continue the
momentum so far in fiscal year 2005. We successfully reduced
the backlog to 1.365 million cases, down from a high of 3.8
million cases just a year ago in 2004. We increased overall
completions by 21 percent processed, met, or exceeded cycle
time targets in 15 of 16 major form types. We completed 109,000
asylum cases in fiscal year 2004, a 20 percent increase, and
also 53,000 refugees were admitted to the United States in
fiscal year 2004, an 86 percent increase.

NATIONAL SECURITY MISSION

Ensuring national security as well as preventing and
detecting fraud are essential elements of our mission. Our
newly created Fraud Detection and National Security Unit
developed a joint anti-fraud strategy with ICE. We enhanced our
background check process and we share information with key law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.

IMPROVEMENT IN CUSTOMER SERVICE

As an immigrant who once passed through the old INS system,
I insist that we treat those who come before USCIS with dignity
and respect. That brings me to improving customer service.
Therefore, we have promoted a customer service culture and
expanded many of the services available to customers online and
by phone. Electronic filing now supports 50 percent of the
total volume of benefit applications.
InfoPass, our web-based system, enables applicants to go
online in 12 different languages to schedule appointments. No
more endless lines outside our immigration offices. We expanded
phone services and access to customer's case status information
via our website.
Finally, in the past year USCIS has naturalized more than
7,000 military service members. This past October, I personally
led a USCIS team to Afghanistan and Iraq and launched overseas
naturalizations to our military.

PREPARED STATEMENT

In summary, although we have a long ways to go before our
destination, I note that we are on the right track and moving
forward to make USCIS an exemplary United States Government
agency. This concludes my opening remarks, prepared remarks. I
thank you for your support and for the invitation to testify
before this subcommittee, and of course would be happy to
answer your questions. Thank you, sir.
[The statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Eduardo Aguirre, Jr.

Good afternoon Chairman Cochran and Ranking Member Byrd and Members
of the Subcommittee. My name is Eduardo Aguirre and I have the honor of
serving as the first Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, within the Department of Homeland Security.
We are a welcoming Nation, and the hard work and patriotism of our
immigrants has made our Nation prosperous. Since USCIS was established
in March of 2003, we have made tremendous progress, which I will share
with you today, to deliver the President's vision of ``welcoming
immigrants with open arms . . . not endless lines.'' It is my sincere
belief that the progress we have made in the past year is not an
anomaly, but rather a strong foundation and a new baseline from which
to grow.
USCIS will continue to secure America's promise as a Nation of
immigrants by providing accurate and useful information to our
customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an
awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity
of our immigration system. Our vision is to strengthen America's future
by becoming a customer-focused innovator of benefits processing, a
catalyst for citizenship education, instruction and outreach, a
recognized and credible source of useful information, and a leading
contributor to the security of the United States.
USCIS has established three core values: integrity, respect, and
ingenuity. We shall always strive for the highest level of integrity in
our dealings with our customers, our fellow employees, and the citizens
of the United States. We will also demonstrate respect in all our
actions to ensure that everyone we affect will be treated with dignity
and courtesy regardless of the outcome of the decision. And we will
also use ingenuity, resourcefulness, creativity, and sound management
principles to strive for world-class results.
USCIS is one of the largest fee-funded agencies in the Federal
Government--charging fees for a variety of immigration benefits from
individuals seeking to enter, reside, or work in the United States.
Therefore, the actual cash flow for our business operations, including
a network of 250 local offices, Application Support Centers, Service
Centers, Asylum Offices, National Customer Service Call (NCSC) Centers,
Forms Centers, and Internet portals, varies from year to year with the
number of immigration benefit applications received.
In any typical work day, our workforce of 15,000 (one-third of whom
are contractors) will:
--Conduct 140,000 national security background checks.
--Receive 100,000 hits to our Internet website (www.uscis.gov).
--Answer phone inquiries from 80,000 callers at four National
Customer Service Centers.
--Process 30,000 applications for an immigration benefit.
--Answer in-person inquiries from 25,000 visitors to information
counters at 92 local offices.
--Issue 7,000 green cards.
--Capture 8,000 sets of fingerprints at 130 Application Support
Centers.
--Welcome 3,000 new citizens.
--Welcome 3,000 new permanent residents.
--Welcome nearly 200 refugees from around the world.
--Help American parents adopt nearly 80 foreign-born orphans.
--Process the naturalization application of 50 individuals serving in
the U.S. military.
--Grant asylum to 80 individuals already in the United States.
USCIS has established three priorities: (1) enhancing national
security, (2) eliminating the immigration benefit application backlog,
and (3) improving customer service. In our second year of operations,
we have successfully reduced the backlog to 1.5 million cases (down
from a high of 3.8 million cases in January 2004), expanded electronic
filing to support 50 percent of the total volume of benefit
applications, expanded InfoPass (a USCIS Web-based system that enables
the public to go online to schedule appointments), expanded phone
services to allow round-the-clock access via automated means, expanded
access to customers' case status information via the USCIS website, and
created the Fraud Detection and National Security Unit to work closely
with the appropriate law enforcement entities in responding to concerns
relating to aliens who may pose a threat to national security or public
safety.
The President's fiscal year 2006 budget will allow us to build upon
the progress we have made in the past year. The budget includes a total
for USCIS of $1.854 billion, $80 million in appropriated funds and
$1.774 billion in fees. The fiscal year 2006 budget will allow USCIS to
process over 7 million immigration benefit applications and is the
final year of the President's 5-year plan to achieve a 6-month cycle
time standard or less for all immigration benefit applications at every
USCIS office, including a total of $100 million to support backlog
elimination efforts as well as improvements in application processing.
This brings the 5-year total for this aggressive initiative to $560
million.
The USCIS fiscal year 2006 budget also includes two important fee-
related legislative proposals. One proposal involves the removal of a
statutory cap on the Temporary Protected Status processing fee. This
proposal will allow the fee to be adjusted above the current $50 to
recover full costs, subject to a fee review, similar to the way other
immigration benefit application fees are currently set. The other
proposal is a customer service enhancement that authorizes expansion of
premium processing service to non-employment based applications and
petitions. The Department is currently authorized to collect a $1,000
premium processing fee, in addition to the normal processing fee, for
employment-based applications and petitions. This proposal would
authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to set the premium
processing fee for certain non employment-based applications and
petitions, such as travel documents, advance parole, employment
authorization, re-entry permits, fiance adjudications, etc., not to
exceed $1,000, and in excess of $1,000 for the investor visa (EB-5)
program.

Eliminating the Backlog
Although we are on track to achieve the President's backlog
elimination mandate, we fully realize that funding alone will not
enable us to achieve this goal. As Will Rogers so simply stated, ``Even
if you're on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit
there.'' Thus, we have taken, and continue to take, a hard look at the
way we currently conduct our business. This commitment is not just one
of words, but one of action. Since my appointment and confirmation as
Director of USCIS, I have worked closely with the leaders in USCIS to
continually review our processes, identify opportunities for
streamlining and further improvement, and to implement meaningful
change. Let me assure you that USCIS will never compromise national
security in an effort to increase productivity.
In the past year, USCIS forwarded to the Congress a Backlog
Elimination Plan that outlines the roadmap to achieve the President's
mandate. We will continue to provide the Congress with quarterly
progress reports on our Backlog Elimination status and achievements.
Fiscal year 2004 was truly an outstanding year for USCIS. USCIS
increased overall completions by 17 percent over the fiscal year 2003
volume and met and/or exceeded cycle time targets in fifteen of sixteen
major form types. In addition, USCIS completed a total of 109,000
asylum cases in fiscal year 2004, representing a 20 percent increase in
productivity from the previous fiscal year, when it completed 91,000.
USCIS also worked steadily with its refugee program partners to
successfully meet refugee admissions levels designated by the President
while ensuring that the integrity and security of the program remained
intact. USCIS officers conducted refugee status interviews in 50
countries around the world and interviewed more than 70,000 refugee
applicants of at least 65 different nationalities. As a result of these
efforts, almost 53,000 refugees were admitted to the United States
during fiscal year 2004, an 86 percent increase over the previous
year's admissions.
USCIS will increase its focus on Information Technology through an
enterprise-wide transformation effort to ensure that long-term backlog
elimination goals are sustained, customer service is improved, fraud
detection and national security capabilities are enhanced, and a
technology environment is deployed to support new processes and
workflow aligned with the DHS mission and the Presidential mandate for
eGov standards. USCIS is currently undergoing an infrastructure upgrade
of its District and Service Center operations, upgrading its web
presence environment, and developing a new integrated case management
system to ultimately operate in a paperless adjudication environment.

Ensuring National Security
USCIS understands that ensuring national security and preventing
and detecting fraud are essential elements of its mission. As such, our
newly established Fraud Detection and National Security Unit (FDNS)
developed a joint anti-fraud strategy with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), hired and trained nearly 100 anti-fraud officers,
and is in the midst of implementing an anti-fraud initiative throughout
the United States. The FDNS is also leading the enhancement of USCIS'
background check process, which is aimed at identifying applicants,
beneficiaries, and petitioners who pose a threat to national security
and public safety prior to granting them immigration benefits. The FDNS
is also leading USCIS' information sharing initiative with key law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
The establishment of a Refugee Corps with an expanded management
support structure will provide a strong and effective overseas refugee
processing program that will more efficiently identify inadmissible
persons and those who are of national security interest without
compromising the U.S. Refugee Program's (USRPs) humanitarian
objectives. A Refugee Corps will ensure responsiveness to USRP
commitments and goals, while greatly reducing the need to draw on
scarce domestic program resources. It will also ensure the quality and
consistency of refugee adjudications and improve the detection of
refugee application fraud and the identification of security concerns
relating to refugee admissions.
USCIS also implemented the Safe Third Country Agreement on Asylum
with Canada to help strengthen public confidence in the integrity of
the immigration system and ensure that all asylum seekers will be
heard, that they will receive procedural safeguards, and that they not
be removed until either Canada or the United States has made a
determination on the protection claim, in accordance with national laws
implementing treaty obligations.

Improving Customer Service
The Office of Citizenship continues to focus on providing
information to immigrants at two key points in their journey towards
citizenship: when they first become Permanent Residents and later when
they are ready and eligible to begin the formal naturalization process.
In the past year, the Office of Citizenship introduced an orientation
guide entitled ``Welcome to the United States: A Guide for New
Immigrants.'' The guide, which will be available in 10 languages in
fiscal year 2005, contains practical information to help immigrants get
started in the United States, and provides information to assist
immigrants in the civic integration process. The Office of Citizenship
also held a series of focus groups across the United States during the
spring of 2004 to hear directly from local communities about their
strengths, gaps, and needs in the areas of immigrant integration and
citizenship preparation. The results of these focus group discussions
were published in a report called ``Helping Immigrants Become New
Americans: Communities Discuss the Issues.''
Additionally, we have been examining the standard of knowledge in
the current citizenship test to ensure that prospective and new
citizens know not only the facts of our Nation's history, but also the
ideals that have shaped that history. We also are working to
standardize testing procedures in an effort to ensure equitable and
more uniform results. Currently, a candidate in Los Angeles is, in all
likelihood, not tested the same way or asked the same questions as a
candidate taking the same exam on the same day in Boston.
We do not want to make the test more difficult. We do not want to
make it less difficult. We want to make it more meaningful in a way
that does not have an adverse impact on any particular group of
applicants. Therefore, we will carefully pilot test the revised
English, history, and government tests before implementing them. And we
will consult with our stakeholders to solicit their input, as we have
done throughout the process. Once the test development is done, the
Office of Citizenship will coordinate the creation of educational
materials to complement this important initiative.
Our plan is to begin implementing the new test and testing process
in 2007. Given the importance of the ultimate benefit for those
tested--U.S. citizenship--this process is not one that can or should be
rushed. We are committed to improving the current process and to
improving it in the right way.
In our commitment to modernize and enhance the delivery of
immigration services, InfoPass was launched in Miami in June of 2003.
InfoPass is a free, easy and convenient alternative to waiting in line.
It allows USCIS customers to go on-line and use an Internet-based
system to make an appointment to speak with an Immigration Information
Officer at a time that is convenient for the customer. InfoPass is now
available for customers at all USCIS District and sub offices.
Other conveniences available on www.uscis.gov include ``E-Filing''
for certain immigration applications, including the renewal and
replacement of ``green cards,'' (Form I-90). E-Filing provides a quick,
easy and convenient way for customers to complete, submit, and pay fees
for petitions and applications at any time, from any computer with
Internet access. As a further time saver, the USCIS Web site is now set
up to accept credit cards for the payment of application fees. To date,
USCIS has received more than 250,000 applications through its E-Filing
system. E-Filing now supports form types that account for 50 percent of
the total volume of benefits applications USCIS receives annually.
During fiscal year 2005, USCIS plans to combine E-Filing with the
Lockbox program to further streamline our internal processes. E-Filing
will also play a key supporting role in implementing Premium Processing
for additional form types; the newly enacted H1-B/L-1 Visa Reform Acts;
and an electronic adjudication initiative.
Additionally, the public is encouraged to use the Internet to check
the status of applications filed with any of USCIS' Service Centers.
Our Case Status Service Online, available in English and Spanish,
allows customers who have a receipt number for an application or
petition filed at a USCIS Service Center to check the status of their
pending case online through the USCIS website (USCIS.gov), or by
calling the toll-free telephone number of our National Customer Service
Center. The Case Status Online system offers customers the option of
establishing a portfolio of up to 100 cases that can be checked through
a single login 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Customers can also elect
to have USCIS automatically send an email informing them of any change
in status of a pending case.
In the past year, USCIS has responded to over 11,000,000 queries
for verification of immigration status. USCIS provides immigration and
employment authorization status information to over 126,000 government
and private sector users. By providing the best possible verification
services to thousands of agencies and employers, USCIS saves the
Government money by ensuring that only eligible aliens receive public
benefits. In addition, an employment verification pilot program
authorized in 1996 and reauthorized in 2004, helps to ensure that jobs
are available only to workers authorized to accept employment in the
United States.
As you are aware, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 2004 authorized overseas military naturalizations. In the past
year, USCIS has naturalized more than 7,000 military service members
both in the United States and overseas, and posthumously naturalized 39
service members who died in service to the United States.
Finally, USCIS committed itself to the global effort to recover
from the earthquake and tsunami by announcing temporary relief measures
for those individuals who are unable to return to their home country
due to the destruction and humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. USCIS
is expediting the processing of certain immigration benefit
applications, including requests for advance parole and relative
petitions for minor children from the affected areas. USCIS also is
more readily approving applications from visitors from the tsunami-
affected countries who requested a change or extension of their
nonimmigrant status.
This concludes my prepared remarks. I thank you for the invitation
to testify before this committee and I would be happy to answer any
questions.

Senator Cochran. Thank you, Mr. Aguirre.

ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

This morning National Public Radio did a report on
Alternatives to Detention and the program run by the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency using ankle
bracelets to keep up with and track noncriminal aliens as they
await the outcome of their immigration cases being considered
and disposed of. What is the utility of this method and do you
consider it more humane, more efficient, and less expensive
than detaining through forcible imprisonment, or whatever other
devices you have, those who you know may not be legally
entitled to be in our country? Mr. Garcia?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A timely topic as
there is a $5.4 million enhancement for that program in the
2006 request. We right now have eight sites where we do
Alternatives to Detention and we plan to expand that two more
for a total of ten.
This is a program, Mr. Chairman, that does exactly what it
says. It is an alternative to detention. These are illegal
aliens who would otherwise be subject to incarceration. The
program is in three steps: a 30-day period with an ankle
bracelet, a monitoring and reporting requirement. If the alien
complies, the bracelet comes off and then it is telephonic
interviews and home visits. After an additional period, it
becomes only telephonic interviews.
It is extremely cost-effective, estimated at a quarter of
the cost of detention space. It provides assistance to the
aliens in the process, linking them with pro bono services, et
cetera. And it asks for responsibility on the part of the
alien, who has voluntarily opted into this program, and that is
an important point. This is a voluntary program. But it asks
for responsibility on the part of the participants and if they
show that, then the conditions become less onerous over time.

USE OF RADIATION MONITORS

Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, we understand too the
importance of upgrading technologies in the Border Patrol area,
and you highlighted that in your statement. What is the success
that you anticipate from using radiation monitors? Is this a
technology that has been proven? I ask this in the context with
our experience in Iraq, where the weapons inspectors were using
radiation monitors there and David Kay made a point of saying
you can deploy these monitors, but after the sand and the heat
and the other influences of nature take place you might have a
useless piece of equipment there in the desert. Have you had
any experiences similar to that at CBP?
Mr. Bonner. Well, first of all, the main thing that we have
going in terms of detecting against a nuclear device or special
nuclear materials is a combination of technology that we would
deploy and we are deploying at our ports of entry principally.
So there is where we have radiation portal monitors. We have
completed the first two phases, which is the International Mail
Facility, so every package that comes in is screened. The
International Air Express Consignment Facilities are completed.
We have substantially deployed well over 200 portal monitors on
our northern border ports of entry with Canada. We are in the
process of now deploying a significant number along our
southern border ports of entry with Mexico, and we have started
deployment at some of our major seaports.
We have a long way to go here. But the question is are they
effective. Well, you need a combination of technology.
Radiation portal monitors are highly sensitive to both gamma
and neutron detection. In other words, you can have, without
getting into sort of the classified area here, you can have a
fair degree of confidence in the fact that you are going to
detect radiation. In fact, since we started deploying the
radiation portal monitors--and these are large things at our
ports of entry, through every--not just commercial truck, every
passenger vehicle that comes through--since we have started
deploying them, we have resolved over 10,000 radiation hits.
The good news to tell you is that those radiation hits
turned out to be negative. In other words, we resolved them to
be naturally occurring radiation sources or radioactive
material consistent with the shipment of goods. That might be,
by the way, a shipment of tiles, which very frequently emits
radiation that reads for thorium and so on.
So this is not the only thing, though. We combine that with
our targeting system, and our NII equipment, that is our large-
scale X-ray scanning machines, as well as isotope identifiers
and other personal radiation detector equipment, to give us a
combination of resources that improves our ability to detect
against a dirty bomb coming across our border and/or
potentially a nuclear device, which is obviously of the most
momentous consequence one can imagine.
We have found them to be effective. Now, we are looking
for--we are always looking for better technology to detect
against this issue.

SIX-MONTH AVERAGE FOR PROCESSING BENEFITS APPLICATIONS

Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, you mentioned reducing the
backlog of your benefit application cases down to 1.3 million
cases from a high of 3.8 million in January of 2004. I know you
have devoted special funding in this area, too. Once you do not
set aside dollars to bring down the backlog, are you going to
be able to maintain this 6-month average of processing
applications?
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, I am certain of that. I am certain
that we are going to meet the commitment to eliminate the
backlog by September 2006. In fact, I will be surprised if we
do not beat that by a little. And in the process, we have re-
engineered all our processes so that not only are we
eliminating the backlog and perhaps put it below a cycle time
of 6 months, but also making sure that we are taking care of
the applications that are coming in day in and day out.
So once this 5-year commitment expires, I do not feel that
we are going to need to go back to any appropriated funds for
this particular endeavor.
Senator Cochran. We have a vote that is occurring on the
floor of the Senate right now. But before we cut off the right
of any Senator to ask questions, I am going to proceed and
recognize Senator Byrd and Senator Leahy both if they wanted to
ask questions before we go vote.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesies
always.
First, let me ask unanimous consent that a letter from me
to the Honorable Michael Chertoff be included in the record
following my earlier statement.
Senator Cochran. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ANTIDUMPING/COUNTERVAILING DUTY COLLECTIONS

Senator Byrd. Thank you.
Commissioner Bonner, on December 17, 2004, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) issued its regular annual report on the
Byrd Amendment trade law. The annual report describes how
hundreds of millions of dollars in duties are not being
collected by Customs, and the agency has been unable to explain
why it cannot collect these funds.
In fiscal year 2003, the agency failed to collect $130
million in duties owed to the United States under the U.S.
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, and CBP failed to
collect an additional $260 million in fiscal year 2004. The
majority of that $390 million is the result of uncollected
duties on goods imported from China. The conference report
accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act for fiscal year 2005, which was enacted in October 2004,
included language that directed Customs and Border Protection
to submit a report to the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees by January 15, 2005, on the implementation of
recommendations that were made by the U.S. Treasury
Department's Inspector General concerning the Customs and
Border Protection's implementation of the Byrd Amendment trade
law.
The Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet received
that report. Why is this problem of noncollection growing, and
what are you doing to address it? Finally, do your efforts
respond to the recommendations of the Treasury Inspector
General?
Mr. Bonner. Let me first of all say, Senator Byrd, that we
are committed, I am personally committed, to improving our
collection efforts. I am troubled that we used to say when we
were settling cases that we were leaving too much money on the
table here that is not collected. It is not accurate to say
that we are unable to explain what the problem is. I think we
have a pretty good understanding of the problems and we have
taken some steps to improve our collections of antidumping and
countervailing duty assessments. But let me just identify a
couple of ways where we are moving forward. One of the problems
in terms of collections was the insufficiency of continuous
duty bonds for these kinds of high-risk shipments. These tend
to be, by the way, agriculture and seafood products, a lot of
it coming from China, but some other countries, and the
continuous duty bonds were not nearly sufficient when the
ultimate duty assessment was made by the Department of
Commerce.
So we have taken steps to raise the continuous duty bonds
on goods that are particularly those types of goods that are or
are very likely to be subject to antidumping duties, a final
order.
There were insufficient single entry bonds. In other words,
we did not have recourse. So we are more diligent. We now have
something that is very close to real-time monitoring of
shipments that are subject to preliminary orders of commerce or
potentially high-risk shipments of goods, and are raising the
single entry duty bonds to higher levels that are more
consistent with what we expect the ultimate duty assessment to
be.
By the way, just to let you know that we have taken not
just those two steps to increase the bond coverage, but we have
a better mechanism now for potentially identifying
circumvention of the antidumping duties. By the way, as you can
imagine, there is all sorts of circumvention. It is everything
from fraudulent misdescribing of the goods, so that it is not a
good that was subject to an antidumping order--we have had
that, by the way, with respect to catfish shipments mislabeled
as groupers. I know you are interested in this issue, Mr.
Chairman. But we have had that.
We have had sham companies that are set up and so forth. So
we have ratcheted up our enforcement effort through our
Commercial Enforcement Division and, frankly, are working very
closely with ICE in nine significant and hopefully potential
criminal prosecutions, but criminal investigation of fraud. We
think that it would be very important to bring additional cases
in this area for its deterrent value.
We are better coordinating with the Department of Commerce
so that we are actually in communication with them before even
a preliminary order comes out and we can take some steps.

DEFAULT OF A SURETY COMPANY

We have discussed with the Treasury Department one other
issue, and that was actual default of a surety company, which
was about $100 million of the total failure to collect. This
was a surety company that had been approved by the Treasury
Department and it defaulted on its surety bond obligations. So
we are working with Treasury to make sure that the surety
companies that are approved by the Treasury Department to write
customs bonds are financially viable when payment time comes
up.

INITIAL PRELIMINARY ORDERS IN LIQUIDATION

So we have taken all these steps. Now, there is a lag time,
as you know, between the initial preliminary orders in
liquidation. So it is going to take some period of time before
we see substantial results here, but I do think we have taken
some very important steps to identify the problem and take
concrete actions that are going to improve, and I hope
substantially improve, our collection rate.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Commissioner, I am heartened by your
response. I know that you are very much alert to the problem.
It is complex, it is difficult, and I compliment you on the way
that you are working with other agencies and departments to
deal with this problem. I thank you. I urge you to continue to
work on it and to work even harder. I do appreciate your
efforts.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, let me close, because we are up
against the voting situation over there. Incidentally, I have
cast over 17,000 votes, but I do want to cast some today. I am
going to submit the remainder of my questions, if I may, to be
answered for the record.
I thank all the witnesses.
Senator Cochran. Thank you, Senator, for your contribution
to the hearing.

ICE HIRING IN FISCAL YEAR 2006

Senator Leahy. Just very quickly and I will put most of my
questions in the record. To Assistant Secretary Garcia: When
ICE was here last year it had severe budget problems, a hiring
freeze. Does the fiscal year 2006 request bring ICE back to
fiscal solvency? Will you be lifting the hiring freeze. If not,
when?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Senator Leahy. You are correct, we
were here last year, we had a hiring freeze. We have taken a
number of steps to address that. Working with the Department,
we continue to do that. We need to take further steps.
Secretary Loy testified a couple of weeks ago to that effect.
The 2006 as we have proposed it will move us forward. We
will be hiring in 2006.
Senator Leahy. All these temporary people who have been
there for 3 or 4 years, does that mean they can be looking for
permanent positions now?
Mr. Garcia. That is certainly our intention, Senator. I
know that there are a number of those temporary positions at
our Law Enforcement Support Center up in Burlington. As we have
discussed, I only see the role of that Center expanding and
becoming more important under our homeland security mission.
Senator Leahy. Does the budget cover what you need or are
you going to need reprogramming?
Mr. Garcia. Hard to answer because, as we go along I will
look at that. I have not been able to do that yet, obviously,
because of the lack of clarity on some of the budget issues and
the challenges we have been facing. But it is an issue that we
consider a top priority.

BORDER PATROL AGENT STAFFING INCREASES

Senator Leahy. Mr. Bonner, I mentioned before the budget
only asks for 10 percent of the mandated agents. You think we
need further agents on the northern border.
Mr. Bonner. Well----
Senator Leahy. Because you are only asking for 10 percent
of what Congress mandated.
Mr. Bonner. As you know, Senator, I am in full, violent
support of the President's budget request, which requests 210
Border Patrol agents in addition to, of course, replacing
attrition.
Senator Leahy. But none of them for the northern border?
Mr. Bonner. Well, you know, you did note----
Senator Leahy. We needed more.
Mr. Bonner. You did note and let me note that we had 360
Border Patrol agents on the northern border for the entire
border with Canada on 9/11. On March 1, 2003, that was up to
about 500.
One of the first actions I took was to direct Border Patrol
to meet the 1,000 goal, which they did actually in fiscal year
2003.
Senator Leahy. Do we need any more--this is what the bottom
line is. Do we need any more on the northern border? Do we have
enough on the northern border today?
Mr. Bonner. You mean beyond what we have in the request?
Senator Leahy. No, no. Do we have enough on the northern
border with the number we have today. There is no request for
the northern border. It is 210, 10 percent of what we mandated.
But that is not for the northern border.
Do we have enough on the northern border? It is an easy
answer, yes or no.
Mr. Bonner. We do not have enough agents. We do not have
enough technology to give us the kind of security we need on
the northern border.
Senator Leahy. I am just a lawyer from a small town in
Vermont. I do not understand. Is that a yes or a no?
Mr. Bonner. I am just a lawyer from a small town in Kansas,
so--
That moved to California at some point.
Senator Leahy. Here we are in the big city. Is it yes or
no?
Mr. Bonner. Well, we need more agents----
Senator Leahy. Help me out here.
Mr. Bonner. We need more agents. But look, I think it is
the right combination of people and technology, and essential
to this is the American Shield Initiative. The fiscal year 2006
budget includes $81 million for technology, for more
helicopters, and for UAV's for the Border Patrol. We need to do
a smarter and a better job. I think we can do that. The
President's request is for 210 more Agents. I do not know that
they are necessarily earmarked all for the southern border. If
you are asking me, I think probably most of them will go there.
Senator Leahy. We should have this discussion in greater
detail, because I am not happy. I do not think we are getting
the number, we are certainly not getting anywhere near the
number that the Congress mandated.

I-91 CHECKPOINT

I also want to have your staff and mine talk about this
checkpoint you have on Interstate 91 in Vermont, a long, long
distance from the border, that just stops honest Vermonters
that have been driving back and forth there forever and ever.
You had people--aliens that have been there for ever and
ever, they keep getting stopped over and over and over again.
There is a real suspicion of some racial profiling people who
have honestly, working in New Hampshire and Vermont for years
and years, and just continuously get stopped. They continuously
get asked the same questions as they got asked the day before.
The irony is, of course, if anybody wanted to circumvent
that they would just go out one of the back roads, and the
agents would never find them.
So let our staff talk about that. It is creating, both in
the ``Live Free Or Die'' State of New Hampshire and the former
independent republic of Vermont, it is creating a bit of a
concern. It is not going to do anything to stop people from
coming across the border, because they are not the ones getting
stopped.
Mr. Bonner. Could I briefly respond, though? That is that
part of the strategy is not putting everything on the line
itself. There has to be a second line of defense. It is not
that the checkpoint is necessarily going to--that terrorists
that might come across the Canadian border into the United
States. Part of the strategy of a checkpoint is lateral
enforcement from the checkpoint. It gives us a second line of
defense.
Senator Cochran. Senator, we have a vote.
Mr. Bonner. It is going to be important. It is an important
part of the overall strategy to get better control of our
borders, something you and I have a common interest in.
Senator Leahy. Yes. But when I have to stop and prove my
identification and I am a U.S. citizen, I know this is helping
somebody. It is sort of like security stopping Ted Kennedy a
dozen times from going on a plane because he is seen on a
terrorist list and the government does not know how the hell to
get him off it.
Thank you.
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cochran. This Senate hearing will stand in recess
until we go vote and we will return to resume our questioning
of the witnesses. We appreciate your indulgence.

NEW OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS

Thank you very much for your patience. I apologize for
having to go vote on the floor of the Senate during our
hearing.
The President's budget proposes to create the Office of
Screening Coordination and Operations within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. How do each of you see
this new office contributing to the Department's ability to
implement the 9/11 Commission recommendation? Mr. Bonner, let
us start with you.
Mr. Bonner. Well, I would say this, that certainly there
will be some benefits from thinking through this issue of
screening, particularly for the terrorist threat. So I expect
that it will assist in terms of coordinating those efforts,
understanding that there are fundamentally very different
screening opportunities that are presented depending upon which
homeland security agency you are talking about.
We have the broadest law enforcement authority of any law
enforcement agency in our country, Customs and Border
Protection, and that is because we have the full authority to,
without cause or suspicion, ask questions of anybody who is
crossing our border or entering our country through our
official entry points and certainly to arrest anybody who is
not. Secondly, we have the broad customs search authority,
which is the broadest search authority under the Fourth
Amendment of our Constitution, which permits us to search and
inspect luggage of everybody, by the way, U.S. citizens, non-
citizens, without cause, warrant, or suspicion.
So we have broad authorities, which we are using right now
in terms of being as intelligent as we can to perform that
priority mission of preventing terrorists from entering our
country. But I think nonetheless the Screening Coordination
Office should, I believe, play a helpful role.

VETTED TRAVELER PROGRAMS

There is another area, just briefly let me touch on it, Mr.
Chairman, where the Screening Coordination Office I think could
play a valuable role. That is, there are in place right now
essentially what I call trusted, vetted traveler programs.
Customs and Border Protection vastly expanded the Nexus program
at the Canadian border. We now have almost 80,000 people that
we have vetted. That is not only taking biometrics from them;
that is a personal interview to make sure that they pose no
terrorist threat or smuggling threat. We have a similar program
that we inherited from INS, the SENTRI program at the Mexican
border. We have FAST, the FAST program for commercial truckers
from both Mexico, coming from Mexico or Canada, and so forth.
We have mature actual programs. They are not pilots. We
have enrolled about 200,000 people into these programs. But on
the other hand, TSA is piloting a registered passenger program
and so forth. You need to look at the issue of what are the
biometrics that should be collected from each person that is
enrolled or is going to be considered to be a trusted or
registered individual for receiving some benefits. You need to
look at the biometric you use to identify them when they appear
at the border port of entry or when they appear at the airport
if it is a TSA issue and the like, and so forth.
I think the Screening Coordination Office could play a very
important role in getting those policy decisions, and they are
policy decisions, made and implemented in the most visionary
way possible, so that at the end of the day somebody that is
vetted in for one of these programs, let us say for the Nexus
program, would be cleared in for other kinds of trusted
passenger programs.
That is a big idea and I think the Screening Coordination
Office can and I hope will play a valuable role in harmonizing,
if you will, the technology issues for these different kinds of
trusted, vetted, or registered passenger or traveler programs.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, this was part of the
presidential commission, the National Commission on Terrorist
attacks, the 9/11 Commission's, recommendations, that there be
a centralized office created, designed to provide comprehensive
screening across, addressing common problems and setting common
standards in a systemwide operation. Do you see this office
contributing to the Department's ability to implement this
recommendation?
Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, absolutely.
Again, you tie it back to the 9/11 Commission report. I think
you also look at the staff report on terrorist travel, the
recommendations in there, incredibly important work, the
conclusion that terrorist travel is at least as important an
area or vulnerability as terrorist financing. This center
certainly moves us forward in addressing those vulnerabilities.
ICE will play a role, as we will CBP and CIS, in working with
that center. For example, as we discussed, people who are
screened who are turned back we now can follow through with
associates present in the country by looking at our systems and
our data.
We can use our forensic document lab to examine their
travel documents and provide bulletins and intelligence
analysis to the front-line folks by analyzing that travel
documentation that terrorists or other national security
threats use to try to enter the country.
So certainly centralization of the screening function, and
as importantly I think what will flow from that within the
Department and within the agencies.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, does this affect your agency
and how are you cooperating in this effort if so?
Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, it does affect our agency
because, of course, we are all in the immigration business to
one extent or another. Even though we are not on the
enforcement side, we are involved in the biometric of,
capturing biometrics of millions of applicants year in and year
out, and those biometrics of course are oftentimes being used
for law enforcement purposes where necessary.
I actually view the issue from a service standpoint, in
contrast to the enforcement standpoint. Any time you can have
consistency and coordination of the identification process and
the biometrics and so on, it can be an expedited opportunity
for those who do not have hits or do not have any reason to
feel the need of scrutiny.
So I think it would expedite the processing of the 97, 98
percent of those individuals that cross in and out. As you
probably know, USCIS is the organization that generates many of
the cards that are being used today. For instance, the Green
Cards are produced by us. We have put in those Green Cards--
permanent residency card--any number of biometric data for our
colleagues on the enforcement side to be able to work with.

OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS MISSION

Senator Cochran. Commissioner Bonner, should the Office of
Screening Coordination and Operations have actual operational
authority for various screening programs, as proposed, or
should it focus on the integration and coordination function
necessary across so many programs involved in the activity?
Mr. Bonner. I would say with respect to operations, you are
talking about the actual gathering of biometric data on
potential enrollees. You are talking about the actual interview
that we do and have done with a couple hundred thousand people.
I think that probably should be an operational function left
with the agency that is ultimately responsible for and going to
be held accountable for whatever benefit is being given.
If you took just the border issue in terms of our screening
at our ports of entry, international airports, land border,
ultimately CBP is operating these programs right now--the NEXUS
program, the SENTRI program. It may well make sense to leave
that operation at the agency level, in the agency that actually
is responsible.
Now, having said that, let me say we have a new Secretary
of Homeland Security, Mike Chertoff. By the way, I think
Secretary Chertoff is somebody who, based upon my past
experience, is going to be an extraordinary Secretary. He
ultimately makes the decision, not me, as to how you make this
distinction between what operational functions should remain at
the agency level and what, if any, systems functions should be
performed by the Screening Coordination Office.
I do not think that has been decided. Those are my views
subject to, of course, further guidance from Secretary
Chertoff.
Senator Cochran. Director Aguirre, what is your take on
that? Just from an opposite point of view, should the
Citizenship and Immigration Services programs, screening
programs, be moved to the Office of Screening Coordination and
Operations?
Mr. Aguirre. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that in the vacuum
of this hearing I can give you an accurate answer. I think the
issue of operations and the issue of ``who is responsible for
what'' needs to be weighed in the context of is it working
well/is it not working well/and how can it work better. So
within Homeland Security I think we have a number of components
that can always stand improvement, and to determine here and
now what is better or worse, I would be ad libbing.

INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT/BORDER PATROL STAFF INCREASES

Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, this request does not include
resources to fulfill the new Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act authorizations. Were the new authorizations
considered or was the bill enacted into law too late to be
considered when the fiscal year 2006 budget process was
completed inside the administration?
Mr. Bonner. That is a good question. I need to probe my
memory on it in terms of the time line. Obviously, as you know,
the process is that we did make a request that goes through the
Department process, and ultimately ends up getting a lot of
scrubbing and review. I actually participated in the
Departmental Resources Review Board. I am not on that Board,
but I was allowed to be present and to present the CBP budget
request.
I need to get back to you. I do not have the time line
clearly in mind, but I do not remember as I was presenting the
CBP budget to the Department that the intelligence bill I do
not believe had passed with that authorization level. In fact,
I am just reminded it was not signed until December 17, 2004.
So it may have been one of those things where the budget was
being put together before we even knew what the Congressional
intent was in the intelligence bill.
That said, by the way, let me say that--and I was
addressing this a little bit with Senator Leahy--we have in the
last 10 years or so, literally tripled the size of the Border
Patrol, from about 4,000 Border Patrol Agents in the mid-90's
to now, and with the President's request it will be just about
11,000 Border Patrol Agents.
There is a limit, by the way, in thinking of bringing new
agent resources on board, there is a limit to how much a law
enforcement organization like the Border Patrol can absorb.
There are limits to how many agents the Border Control can
recruit, hire, and train in a single year, and still maintain
its cohesiveness as a law enforcement organization.
But that is going beyond your question, Senator. I think
the answer is I do not believe that the 2000 number was out
there as the budget request was going forward.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISA REFORM ACT

Senator Cochran. Mr. Aguirre, the Visa Reform Act was
passed as part of the fiscal year 2005 Consolidated
Appropriations Act. That act tightens controls on the L1 visa
and expands the cap on the H1B visas. What steps have been
taken to begin implementation of that act?
Mr. Aguirre. Well, Mr. Chairman, on the L1B visas there is
a provision for additional resources, human resources, to be
ensured that we can prevent fraudulent applications on the L1B.
I think you are clearly aware that fraud is a major issue for
Immigration Services, and L1B visas in particular are ones that
we have felt, and I think the Congress has felt as well, that
it is vulnerable to fraud. Therefore we are putting additional
human resources and applying our fraud detection and national
security unit to make sure that the applications are properly
processed, and expedited in the normal process, but that we
identify if there are any indices of fraud that we can identify
appropriately.

L1 VISA INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE

Now, on the H1B applications, as you know, there is a
provision for an additional 20,000 applications, or the cap is
raised by 20,000. We are in the process of implementing that
number and within the next few days, if not weeks, we will have
an improved process to take advantage of that.
Senator Cochran. Has the L1 Visa Inter-Agency Task Force
been set up?
Mr. Aguirre. Senator, I am not aware of that, no, sir.

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES--CATFISH IMPORTS

Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, this committee is interested
in the progress to protect American industries from unfair
competition. You mentioned the catfish and grouper issue a
while ago. Of importance of course in our State and in the
South is the catfish industry and the enforcement of
antidumping orders in connection with Vietnamese tra and basa.
What are ICE and CBP doing now to enforce this antidumping
order?
Mr. Bonner. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that going back
to October of last year we began a special enforcement effort
to essentially identify the misdescription, mislabeling of
catfish, imported catfish that would be subject to antidumping
duties. We do have a laboratory science and services branch
where we were taking samples literally of imports that were
coming into the port of L.A., Long Beach, Miami, and the Port
of New York, and determining whether in fact they were what
they were represented to be. We found that there was
significant misdescription of a product that was being shipped
from Vietnam.
We have taken three important actions. One, based upon that
identification at the port levels, we have raised the
continuous duty bonds. We are requiring higher single entry
duty bonds with respect to product that we believe in fact was
subject to the countervailing duties, that is to say was in
fact catfish. We have required payment of additional duties. We
are actively pursuing what are called section 1592 penalty
actions against those importers who imported mislabeled, I
might say falsely and potentially fraudulently mislabeled
product. We are working with ICE, as I indicated to Senator
Byrd, to attempt to get further investigation through the ICE
special agents, and potentially we are hopeful to get criminal
prosecutions in at least some of these cases in conjunction
with the Department of Justice and the relevant U.S. attorney's
offices.
Clearly, we have taken some steps. We are moving out on
this issue because there is clearly some false labeling that is
taking place here to essentially circumvent and fraudulently
evade the antidumping duties.
Senator Cochran. Mr. Garcia, you have some responsibilities
in this area as well, do you not?
Mr. Garcia. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. ICE, as Commissioner
Bonner indicated, is responsible for investigations in this
area. We are committed to doing that. I know this crime has a
very real impact on industries in this country. I have spoken
with a number of members of Congress about those impacts in
their particular districts and particular industries.
I have seen a number of significant cases, and again
Commissioner Bonner touched on them, that have come across my
desk. I believe that we will be moving forward, again with the
relevant U.S. attorney's office, to seek to bring criminal
charges in a number of cases. We are using our overseas assets
very aggressively to root out some of the fraud that has been
going on in this area.
So we have made progress and we are committed to continuing
those enforcement efforts.

BORDER PATROL AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT

Senator Cochran. Mr. Bonner, the budget request includes
some money, $20 million, to begin replacing Border Patrol
helicopters. The plan calls for the full replacement of the air
fleet to be completed in 2010. Is the request that is included
in the budget sufficient to get you started in this direction?
Would additional resources allow you to speed up the
replacement of the fleet?
Mr. Bonner. I am happy to get started on the
recapitalization of the Border Patrol air assets. As I think
you know, Mr. Chairman, out of the 110 or so air platforms that
the Border Patrol has, roughly--this is a rough estimate as I
do not have the exact number, about 40 to 50 of those are
Vietnam vintage aircraft--the OH-6's, the small bubble
surveillance helicopters, as well as about maybe 10 or 12
Vietnam vintage Hueys.
It is a good start. As we move forward with the integration
of the Air and Marine Office in a better configuration with the
Border Patrol air assets, we are going to find that there are
some benefits there in terms of how we look at the air
resources we need.
But nonetheless, there is a significant amount of
recapitalization that is going to need to be done and this is a
start on it. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if there were more funding it
would help us get there faster.

INTEGRATION OF CBP AIR AND MARINE ASSETS

Senator Cochran. The integration of the air and marine
resources has begun, as you point out. What progress is being
made toward integrating the units with the Border Patrol?
Mr. Bonner. There is some good progress. First of all, of
course, the first phase of it was essentially the integration
or the transfer. In some ways I see it as a transfer back to
U.S. Customs, but anyway it was the transfer in November of
last year of the Air and Marine Operations (AMO) office to CBP.
That was phase one. That has been completed.
We are now into phase two. In phase two, I am using the
Transition Management Office process that we used very
successfully to unify and integrate CBP. It is a process that
essentially looks at the ways that we can now further integrate
essentially the air assets and also the marine assets that are
now all within CBP.
By the way, there have already been some very important
benefits from this, from the transfer of AMO to CBP in terms of
better operational coordination between the Border Patrol and
AMO and the like. But phase two will do this. It will better
integrate one procurement, for not just the Border Patrol and
not just for AMO, but for both. It will better integrate one
maintenance system for all aviation air assets, one training
system for all of our pilots, whether they are from the Border
Patrol or whether they were AMO pilots. Ultimately, as part of
this process, we are going to determine ways to better
operationally integrate the efforts of both of these air and
marine groups and assets.
I have had several briefings on this already. I believe
that we will be able to make some key decisions along the lines
I have described certainly in the next couple of months or so,
so that we are continuing to move forward with the best optimal
organization, if you will, of the sum total of the air and
marine assets that are now within CBP.
Senator Cochran. I appreciate very much the cooperation of
each of you and your agencies with our committee and the
requests that we submit for information from time to time.
Particularly, I appreciate your taking time to come here today
and participate in this hearing, which is very important for us
to have to get a full understanding of how you are allocating
the resources under the budget request and what the priorities
are.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

We want to help you succeed in your activities. So we thank
you very much for your cooperation with our subcommittee.
Senators may submit questions to you in writing and we ask you
to respond to those within a reasonable time for our committee
record.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]

Questions Submitted by Senator Thad Cochran

continued funding shortfalls--ice
Question. In September of 2004, this Committee approved a request
to transfer and reprogram $152 million in order to allow Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) ``to effectively manage its financial
position through year end''. In other words, the request was to move
$152 million to ensure that ICE did not have a shortfall.
This Committee worked with the Department to permanently move $193
million in base resources from Customs and Border Protection to ICE in
the fiscal year 2005 Appropriations Act. Admiral Loy recently testified
to the House Appropriations Committee that he expects there to be a
reprogramming request submitted soon to provide anywhere from an
additional $250 to $300 million to ICE in order to finish out fiscal
year 2005.
The cycle of stopgap solutions needs to end. Too much time seems to
have been spent trying to figure out how this situation came about--
what is termed ``mapping''--rather than trying to make sure this
problem is resolved so that we can move forward to ensure that an
agency vital to combating terrorism is solvent.
When will this Committee receive the transfer/reprogramming
proposal to address the fiscal year 2005 shortfall?
Answer. The notification of the proposed reprogramming was
transmitted to the Appropriations Committees on March 12, 2005, in a
letter dated March 11, 2005.
Question. Have Congressional initiatives funded in the fiscal year
2005 Appropriations Act been deferred until this problem is resolved?
Answer. In the proposed reprogramming, ICE is proposing to defer
$85.216 million of the $193.916 million in enhancements, i.e.,
Congressional initiatives, funded in the fiscal year 2005
Appropriations Act. Item 2, on page 5 of the Report of Proposed
Reprogramming Action discusses, in detail, the enhancements which are
being reduced from their original appropriated amounts. The
enhancements that have been reduced are shown below:
Fugitive Operations
The enhancement is reduced to $9 million from the appropriated $50
million level. This will allow funding of 42 positions instead of the
236 positions originally planned. The reduction will mean that fewer
Fugitive Operations teams can be deployed as originally planned.
Institutional Removal Program
The enhancement is reduced to $4 million from the appropriated $30
million level. This will allow funding of 37 positions instead of the
279 positions originally planned. Higher cost Special Agents will
continue to perform some institutional removal duties, instead of
replacing all of them with Immigration Enforcement Agents.
Compliance Enforcement Units
The enhancement is reduced to $11 million from the appropriated
level of $16 million. This will permit funding of 89 positions instead
of the 130 positions originally planned.
Alternatives to Detention
The enhancement is reduced to $2 million from the appropriated
level of $11 million. This will permit funding of 11 positions instead
of the 60 positions originally planned. Some capacity increases will
occur at each of the current eight Intensive Supervision sites, though
not to the anticipated levels.
Guantanamo Migrant Operations Center
The enhancement is reduced to $2 million from the appropriated
level of $6.2 million. The level should be sufficient to support the
Center's operations. (Note: remaining, fully-funded, enhancements
include $26.5 million for Detention Bed Space; $25 million for Benefit
Fraud; $14 million for the Visa Security Unit and the Office of
International Affairs; $6 million for the Immigration Court Backlog; $5
million for Worksite Enforcement; and, $4.2 million for the Cyber Crime
Center.)
Question. What assurance do we have that the fiscal year 2006
request for ICE will solve this problem permanently?
Answer. The full funding level requested in the President's Budget,
internally realigned for the impact of the fiscal year 2005
reprogramming request, will allow ICE to carry out its mission during
fiscal year 2006. We do not foresee the need for further reprogramming
or funding transfers among bureaus.
Question. ICE has now lived under a hiring freeze for close to a
calendar year. What impact is this having on the organization's ability
to carry out its mission?
Answer. ICE has had to implement several measures to ensure it
operates within existing resources. It has had to prioritize funding
requirements. In all cases, ICE has worked to ensure that mission
critical requirements have been funded with the intent of minimizing
any adverse impact on its national security related mission.
Question. There are significant resources requested for fiscal year
2006 to increase the base funding available to ICE: $105 million for
the Office of Investigations, $24 million for the Office of Detention
and Removals, and a significant portion of the $90 million for Custody
Management. What method was used to come up with these estimates?
Answer. Estimates were derived by looking at the entire operation
and determining that the resources of these offices/programs needed
increases in order to attain key operational goals.
Question. Will the fiscal year 2006 request provide ICE with the
funding necessary to enable it to lift the hiring freeze on October 1,
2005?
Answer. ICE continues to work closely with DHS, BTS, and OMB to
identify solutions to address its financial issues. One of ICE's
priorities is to implement financial solutions that will allow the
lifting of the hiring freeze. This work is ongoing and as a result, it
is too early to state whether the hiring freeze will be lifted on
October 1, 2005. An alternative may be to implement solutions that
would allow the freeze to be lifted later in the fiscal year.
Question. According to the just delivered ``ICE Financial
Management Overhaul'' report, ``The ICE Assistant Secretary brought in
a team from other components of DHS on a 90-day detail to help identify
solutions to ICE's financial issues. The team will make recommendations
to the Assistant Secretary by later this Spring.'' Its charter
includes: development of short-term recommendations to address fiscal
year 2005 funding issues; an action plan with key recommendations to
place ICE into a stable funding position for fiscal year 2006 and
beyond; and recommendations for policies and procedures that will
result in transparent budget and financial planning and execution. What
potential is there that these recommendations could cause significant
revisions to the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request?
Answer. The President's Budget includes the necessary funding to
ensure ICE can accomplish its mission to detect vulnerabilities and
prevent violations that threaten national security. As mentioned in the
``ICE Financial Management Overhaul'' report, the team is developing
recommendations to improve ICE's financial position in 2006.
As noted in your question, the final report is due to the Assistant
Secretary later this spring. The team's recommendations will be shared
with the ICE's new CFO and Budget Director. ICE appreciates your
interest in this effort and looks forward to working with you and your
staff where necessary to implement any recommendations.
Question. How is it that this organization is almost 2 years old
and is just now looking to develop sound financial planning policies
and procedures?
Answer. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security
represented a reorganization unprecedented in the Federal Government.
2005 represents the first year that ICE has focused on issues other
than transition and reconciliation. It is an opportune time to further
refine financial policies and procedures previously implemented and to
continue developing sound policies and processes as necessary.
Question. ICE has two outsourcing competitions on going--labor
management and intelligence support. Is this an area where ICE could
see significant cost savings?
Answer. Fiscal year 2005 would have been U.S. Immigration and
Custom Enforcement's (ICE's) initial full year of participation in
competitive sourcing since its inception. ICE intended to initiate its
original studies on a relatively small scale in order to properly
establish its competitive sourcing infrastructure. Significant cost
savings were not expected to be realized based on the fiscal year 2005
studies. More significant savings would be anticipated based on broader
studies under consideration for fiscal year 2006. ICE expects to be an
active participant in the initiative in fiscal year 2006.
Question. Please provide a chart with the on-board staffing level
for ICE, by position type, for September 30, 2004, and fiscal year 2005
through January 31, 2005, both excluding Air and Marine Operations.
Answer. Attached are the ICE on-board staffing charts for the end
of fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, through the pay period ending
February 5, 2005. Federal Protective Service positions are included,
but Federal Air Marshal Service positions are not included.
Highlighted changes from 2004 to 2005 are:
--An increase of 185 positions transferred from Customs and Border
Protection to ICE for International Affairs
--The movement of 112 Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
positions from reimbursable to direct
--The movement of 138 positions from reimbursable to direct

Question. Please provide updated fee projection charts for each fee
account for fiscal year 2006 as compared to fiscal year 2005, with the
chart for the Student Exchange Visitor Information System broken out by
month.
Answer. Attached are fee projection charts for ICE by fee account
for fiscal year 2006 versus fiscal year 2005.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fee accounts 2005 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Immigration User Fee.................... $100,000 $101,621
Breached Bond Detention Fund............ 114,000 115,260
Student and Exchange Visitor Program:
I-901 Revenues:
October......................... 1,459,215 2,039,431
November........................ 2,636,660 2,166,852
December........................ 3,451,620 3,135,481
January......................... 2,211,365 2,092,676
February........................ 1,970,220 1,485,072
March........................... 2,661,321 2,661,321
April........................... 4,452,487 4,452,487
May............................. 6,211,727 6,311,727
June............................ 7,225,460 7,509,932
July............................ 7,149,570 7,441,213
August.......................... 4,515,573 4,524,954
September....................... 2,072,375 2,072,375
-------------------------------
Total......................... 46,017,593 45,893,520
===============================
I-17 Revenues:
October......................... 30,659 1,050,960
November........................ 27,960 403,680
December........................ 38,416 187,920
January......................... 28,540 231,420
February........................ 33,330 320,740
March........................... 29,000 211,120
April........................... 29,000 372,940
May............................. 29,000 309,720
June............................ 29,000 161,240
July............................ 29,000 132,820
August.......................... 29,000 53,360
September....................... 29,000 62,640
-------------------------------
Total......................... 361,905 3,498,560
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Please provide a chart with the fiscal year 2006
annualization projections broken out by fiscal year 2005 initiative.
Answer. Please see table below.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enhancement Annualization One-time costs Net
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compliance..................................................... $13,743 ($9,710) $4,033
IRP............................................................ 28,478 (11,420) 17,058
Fugitive Ops................................................... 25,799 (11,543) 14,256
Alternatives................................................... 4,925 (2,856) 2,069
Bed Space...................................................... 2,869 (1,326) 1,543
Backlog........................................................ 13,256 (2,222) 11,034
Worksite....................................................... 3,044 (1,648) 1,396
------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................... 92,114 (40,725) 51,389
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Please provide detailed comprehensive justifications for
each program increase requested in the fiscal year 2006 President's
budget.
Answer.
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN)

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE's portion of HSDN \1\....................... .............. .............. 11,300 11,300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: There is no base budget for HSDN. However, the Department's Working Capital Fund assessment for fiscal
year 2005 is currently estimated to be $8.695 million. ICE contributed $3.2 million to the WCF in fiscal year
2004 for HSDN.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for HSDN totals $11.3 million and
1 FTE.
HSDN is a multi-agency, Department-wide project, funded from
contributions from participating agencies. For fiscal year 2005, ICE's
estimated contribution to HSDN is $8.7 million. In fiscal year 2004,
ICE contributed $3.2 million to HSDN. Although ICE contributes funding
for HSDN, the development, deployment, and management of the network is
the direct responsibility of the HSDN Program Office which also manages
all the funding for this ICE-sponsored initiative.
The HSDN is a secure communication network for transmission of
information classified up to SECRET. It has been designed to replace
several disparate legacy systems. HSDN will provide connectivity to the
Department of Defense (DOD) Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet) to all users. DOD has indicated that non-DOD agencies should
not use the SIPRNet as their primary classified communications medium.
HSDN will provide access to SIPRNet via controlled gateways, satisfying
this DOD concern. There are more than 400 DHS sites requiring HSDN
deployment. Funding of this initiative will provide access to as many
as 700 users in fiscal year 2006.
Funding for this request would support a HSDN coordinator to serve
as a liaison between ICE program offices and the DHS's Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, the HSDN program manager. The remaining
resources would be provided to S&T for costs associated with the HSDN
development process, including a survey of ICE locations, installation
of equipment, set-up of terminals, and activation of service to
terminals.
HSDN implementation was designed to follow a phased schedule. The
first phase--which included the design and approval of the overall
network design--has been completed. The second phase proposes the
installation of a limited number of terminals in 72 locations. Among
these, 13 are ICE locations which include facilities within the Office
of Intelligence and Office of Investigations. Equipment installation at
these ICE locations is expected to continue through fiscal year 2005.
The remaining HSDN implementation phases will encompass the
installation of all remaining locations including State and local
offices. ICE has identified an additional eighty-eight locations which
will have the HSDN installed in these remaining phases. These include
the remaining Special Agent in Charge Offices, most Resident Agent in
Charge Offices, Intelligence Collection and Analysis Teams, and
remaining Office of Intelligence locations.
Performance Impact.--Funding of this initiative will provide access
to HSDN as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Performance increase 2006 request 2007 request 2008 request 2009 request 2010 request
level level level level level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total number of HSDN users...... 700 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Visa Security Unit

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Visa Security Unit.............. .............. 10,000 10,000 15,000 5,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for VSU totals $5 million and 5
FTE.
The ICE Visa Security Unit (VSU) conducts in-depth review of visa
applicants wishing to enter the United States, with the goal of denying
visas to terrorists, criminals, and persons of special interest. Visa
Security Program officers are assigned to posts to perform this law
enforcement review of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applications
prior to visa issuance by consular officers of the Department of State.
For fiscal year 2005, the VSU's first year of funding, $10 million
was provided to: (1) establish permanent operations in Saudi Arabia;
(2) expand visa security operations to five additional high-risk
locations (locations are not named here due to law enforcement
sensitivity); and (3) hire 22 permanent positions (five at Headquarters
and 17 at the overseas posts).
The enhancement requested for fiscal year 2006 would support nine
additional positions ($4.827 million) and provide $173,000 for
Investigations Training. These resources would advance incremental
progress toward program expansion.
A $5 million enhancement to the base would:
--fund new overseas visa security post (to be selected based on
current risk), staffed by three permanent Visa Security
Officers, to expand the scope of visa security operations.
Overseas operations involve: conducting in-depth scrutiny of
high risk visa applicants; providing advice and training to
consular officers to enhance their ability to detect terrorist,
criminal, and otherwise fraudulent visa applicants through the
consular adjudication process; and initiating investigations
under DHS authority;
--hire two additional officers at Headquarters to provide operational
and administrative support to the overseas operations;
--hire four permanent officer positions to replace temporary duty
personnel currently investigating Security Advisory Opinions
(SAOs) and ``Section 306'' cases (visa applicants from a State
Sponsor of Terrorism);
--expand funding for Consular Training programs, including
Headquarters consular training program development, Rapid
Response Team capability, and consular evaluation program
development.
Performance Impact.--The Homeland Security Act authorizes the
Secretary of Homeland Security to assign employees of the Department to
diplomatic and consular posts at which visas are issued, unless the
Secretary determines that such an assignment to a particular post would
not promote homeland security. The Secretary must submit an annual
report to Congress that describes the basis for each determination that
the assignment of an employee of the Department at a particular post
would not promote homeland security.
Conducting the activities of the VSU in Saudi Arabia and expanding
to the locations designated as highest risk by the Secretary are
expected to generate an increase in homeland security outputs such as:
recommendations to refuse individual visa applications, generation of
investigative leads, additional lookouts and watch list entries,
identification of visa fraud schemes (including fraudulent documents,
businesses, organizations, and associates), delivery of formal and
informal training to consular officers, and other enforcement actions.
The outcomes associated with these outputs may include a decrease in
the vulnerabilities in the visa issuance process, increased integrity
of the immigration system, and a greater awareness of terrorist
suspects and activity patterns.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Fiscal year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Performance level 2005 est. request request request request request
level level level level level level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage security review of all 100 100 100 100 100 100
visa applications in Saudi Arabia
Percentage of high risk visa NA
applicants scrutinized at the non-
Saudi posts......................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Legal Proceedings

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006
2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base 2006 budget enhancements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Principal Legal Advisor......... 86,423 113,105 119,514 123,014 3,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Funding from the Salaries and Expense account only. Does not include reimbursable funding.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Legal Proceedings totals $3.5
million and 24 FTE.
Of the fiscal year 2005 enhancements, 16 attorney and 12 support
positions are scheduled for Headquarters while 38 attorneys and 8
support positions are targeted for the Field. The Headquarters
positions will be distributed among existing Headquarters teams dealing
with the following areas:
--Commercial and Administrative Law Division (primarily working on
Merit Systems Protection Board appeals, and defending Equal
Employment Opportunity claims generated by ICE clients (Federal
Protective Service (FPS) and Federal Air Marshals (FAMS)), and
handling bid protests primarily generated by FPS contracts;
--the National Security Law Division overseeing the litigation of
national security cases, providing legal advice to the Office
of Intelligence, and performing liaison activities with other
law enforcement agencies;
--the Customs Enforcement Law Division, dealing with policy issues,
and day to day monitoring of undercover operations, and ongoing
criminal investigations; the Enforcement Law Division, dealing
with a wide range of issues generated by the Office of
Detention and Removal, the Office of Investigations, FAMS, and
FPS, including statutory authority, search and seizure, use of
force, and parole and custody issues, and the Human Rights Law
Division, coordinating the litigation and advices the field on
human rights abuser and persecutor cases.
The fiscal year 2005 field positions will be devoted to the
following field areas:
--increased time and efforts spent on national security, predator and
persecutor cases at the field level;
--increased training of staff on national security and persecutor
issues;
--increased review of Notices to Appear prior to issuance or the
hearing date;
--more timely movement of ``change of venue cases'' between district
offices to cut down on adjournments because the agency
representative does not have the file;
--increased amount of time spent on preparing a case for hearing,
with a particular focus on review of alien evidentiary
submissions and investigation thereof so as to minimize the
number of adjournments required for document checks (by the
Forensic Document Laboratory, the Department of States, and
ICE/CIS offices abroad);
--increased emphasis on benefit and asylum fraud, including
development of criminal prosecutions, so as to discourage the
filing of fraudulent or frivolous applications;
--increased emphasis on responding to motions to reopen and filing
responses to alien briefs before the Board of Immigration
Appeals so as to diminish the number of non-meritorious cases
that are reopened, and to speed up appeal processing at the
Board of Immigration Appeals level.
These increased resources will also be used to assist the Office of
Immigration Litigation (OIL) and the Offices of the United States
Attorney (USAO) litigating Petitions of Review of removal orders and
habeas challenges to custody and removal.
Past, current, and planned deployment of resources (Attorneys/
Support):

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Planned fiscal Planned fiscal
Current year 2005 year 2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arlington....................................................... 11/4 13/4 14/4
Atlanta......................................................... 8/3 9/3 10/3
Baltimore....................................................... 10/4 11/4 12/4
Boston (Includes Hartford Office)............................... 19/6 21/6 23/7
Buffalo......................................................... 8/3 8/3
Chicago (Includes Kansas City Office)........................... 17/7 19/7
Dallas.......................................................... 10/4 10/4
Denver (Includes Helena and Salt Lake City Offices)............. 11/5 12/6 12/7
Detroit (Includes Cleveland, Cincinnati Offices)................ 12/4 14/5 16/6
El Paso......................................................... 10/4 11/4 12/4
Honolulu........................................................ 2/1 2/1
Houston......................................................... 18/7 19/7 20/7
Los Angeles (Includes Las Vegas Office)......................... 75/26 83/28 89/32
Miami........................................................... 52/18 56/19 60/22
Newark.......................................................... 21/7 23/7 24/8
New Orleans (Includes Memphis Office)........................... 14/5 16/5 17/5
New York........................................................ 75/26 77/27 80/29
Orlando......................................................... 11/4 12/4
Philadelphia.................................................... 15/5 16/6 17/7
Phoenix......................................................... 22/8 25/9 27/9
St. Paul (Includes Omaha Office)................................ 8/3 10/3 11/3
San Antonio (Includes Harlingen Office)......................... 22/8 23/8 23/9
San Diego....................................................... 25/9 25/9
San Francisco................................................... 41/14 43/14 45/15
San Juan........................................................ 3/2 3/2
Seattle (Includes Portland and Anchorage Offices)............... 11/4 11/4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EOIR's statistical data demonstrates that the largest pending case
load exists in descending order in Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San
Antonio (including Harlingen), San Francisco, Chicago, Boston
(including Hartford), Orlando, Arlington, and Philadelphia Many cases
from Harlingen are ultimately transferred through a change of venue
order to more urban locations.
The specific results expected by the investment of resources and/or
the impact of not providing the investment:
At present, six different entities (CIS--Asylum Offices and
Examinations; CBP--Inspections and Border Patrol; ICE--Investigations
and Detention and Removal) create the Notices to Appear (charging
documents) that form the basis for litigation before the immigration
court. With these expanded resources, ICE legal staff will be able to
review more ICE generated charging documents to ensure better quality.
It can also take more proactive steps to review charging documents
created by other offices prior to the first master calendar on these
cases, amending those charges that are legally deficient and filing
such amended charges with the court in advance of the hearing date.
This will lead to a reduction in adjournments. In addition, it will
also permit the ICE litigation staff to terminate any cases that may
have been improvidently brought.
Another source of adjournments (and hence backlog) stems from those
cases where venue of the hearing has been transferred from one district
to another. Frequently, because of a lack of support staffs, the needed
files are not forwarded to the gaining office on a timely basis. With
these added support resources, more focus can be made on those files,
which are the subject of a change in venue, with either the losing
office sending the file more expeditiously or the gaining office making
more determined efforts to obtain the needed file in advance of the
scheduled hearing date. These same support personnel can also more
readily assist Assistant Chief Counsel in administrative tasks, which
consume a great deal of attorney time best spent on moving a case
forward.
The nature of immigration court litigation case has grown
exceedingly complex. In the larger city offices, the vast majority of
cases before the court are asylum claims, which are very time intensive
to litigate. Unfortunately, asylum claims are frequently fraudulent and
can be used by unscrupulous individuals as a way to gain status in the
country. As part of the application process, aliens normally provide a
large number of documents in support of their claim, many of which may
have been manufactured. To attempt to ensure the process is not abused,
the Assistant Chief Counsel must conduct intensive alien file and
document review. The Assistant Chief Counsel attempts to make full use
of the Forensics Document Laboratory and other avenues of investigation
to determine if the claim/documentation is bona fide. The Assistant
Chief Counsel must also try to track down related alien files to
determine if the alien has applied for a benefit under a different
alien number/different name, locate alien files of relatives to
determine consistency of the claim, and run extensive record checks.
Assistant Chief Counsel also needs to contact victims in cases that are
brought under the ICE Predator Initiative to assure that they are
available to testify regarding the life long adverse impact these
actions caused to them to assure alien sexual violators are removed and
their relief applications are denied. With these additional attorney
resources, Assistant Chief Counsel will be in a better position to do
more complete and timely case review, and to request document checks,
make record checks, and review related files in a timely manner. This
in turn not only makes a better record on which the immigration judge
can base his/her decision; it speeds up resolution of the case because
all the crucial steps in the process are undertaken sooner.
Agency lawyers also work closely with the Office of the United
States Attorneys, and Office of Immigration Litigation litigators by
preparing litigation reports, reviewing records where remands are
proposed, preparing recommendations for further review where judicial
decisions are adverse to DHS interests and by providing guidance,
advice and assistance on complex immigration law issues.
In a related vein, in larger city offices, ICE tries to have joint
attorney-investigator focus on travel agencies and corrupt attorneys
who actively encourage and assist in the filing of fraudulent or
frivolous asylum cases. These cases clog the system and lead to
additional court backlog. Currently, these joint attorney-investigator
efforts have had to be more ad hoc and limited in nature. With these
additional attorney resources, the staff would devote more time and
effort to identifying the individuals who are the source of such
claims, and work more closely with the criminal investigators in
developing criminal prosecutions for the United States Attorneys
Offices.
Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement (TWP/WSE)

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
\1\ 2005 budget 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TWA............................................. .............. 5,000 23,000 18,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ No funding was devoted to ``Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement'' in fiscal year 2004, but approximately
$18 million was devoted to Worksite Enforcement in fiscal year 2004.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for TWP totals $18 million and 72
FTE
As part of the President's proposed temporary worker program to
match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers, enforcement
of immigration laws to ensure compliance is required. Under the
President's proposal, the temporary worker program would be open to new
foreign workers, and to the undocumented men and women currently
employed in the United States. The program would allow workers who
currently hold jobs unlawfully to participate legally in America's
economy, while not encouraging further illegal behavior.
The spend plan for the $5 million enhancement in fiscal year 2005
focuses on field training, employer outreach, and reconstituting the
Worksite Enforcement Program infrastructure within the Office of
Investigations in Headquarters in the final half of fiscal year 2005.
Resources requested for fiscal year 2006 will primarily fund the
deployment of FTEs to States (CA, TX, FL, NY, IL) having the greatest
population of unauthorized workers.
The $18 million enhancement (of which $16.216 million is required
in the Investigations Operations activity and $1.784 million is
required in the Investigations Training activity) would fund 140
Special Agent and 3 support positions.
Performance Impact.--The additional resources will broaden the
scope of the worksite enforcement program's strategic goals to include
protecting the jobs and wages of legal workers by identifying and
removing unauthorized workers. ICE will increase its presence at
worksites, concentrating on employers in specific industries and
geographical areas who intentionally violate the law or who have
historically hired large numbers of unauthorized workers. ICE will also
coordinate with Citizenship and Immigration Services to improve and
expand verification services (Basic Pilot Program) to employers
nationwide pursuant to the Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion
Act of 2003.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Performance measure Fiscal year 2006 request level 2007 request 2008 request
level level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrative Worksite Case Completions...... Base............................ + 20 percent + 30 percent
Criminal Employer Case Presentations.......... Base............................ + 20 percent + 30 percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OCDETF.......................................... 47,300 33,100 43,678 10,578
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: In fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005, OCDETF funding was reimbursable. In fiscal year 2006, funding
proposed to be directly appropriated to ICE.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for OCDETF totals $43.678 million
and 346 FTE.
Currently, funding for ICE OCDETF is provided on a reimbursable
basis from the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beginning in fiscal year
2006, funding is being requested via direct appropriations to ICE.
Funding requested would cover salary costs for 332 Special Agents
($41.840 million) and 14 Intelligence Research Specialists ($1.838
million) for a total of $43.678 million.
The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program is
a Federal drug enforcement program that focuses attention and resources
on the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking
organizations. OCDETF provides a framework for Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies to work together to target well-
established and complex organizations that direct, finance, or engage
in illegal narcotics trafficking and related crimes. Related crimes
include money laundering and tax violations, public corruption, illegal
immigration, weapons violations, and violent crimes. The OCDETF program
has been in existence since 1982 and operates under the guidance and
oversight of the Attorney General. Utilizing the resources and
expertise of 11 member Federal agencies, along with support from State
and local law enforcement partners, OCDETF has contributed to the
successful prosecution and conviction of more than 44,000 members of
criminal organizations and resulted in the seizure of cash and property
assets totaling more than $3.0 billion.
No new FTEs are being requested. Rather, existing personnel will be
paid by direct appropriation instead of by reimbursable funding.
In fiscal year 2004, ICE was reimbursed $47.3 million for costs
associated with OCDETF. The reimbursable agreement for fiscal year 2005
provides for up to $33.1 million--a decrease of $14.2 million.
Performance Impact.--This initiative is intended to restore funding
that was cut in fiscal year 2005, to ensure a consistent and more
reliable funding source for ICE OCDETF activities, and to establish an
appropriated base in lieu of reimbursable funding. This initiative is
intended to provide funding that supports dedicated resources engaged
in OCDETF activities and to maintain priority status for the program.
The impact resulting from the decrease in reimbursable funding in
fiscal year 2005 has ICE OCDETF requirements competing for funding--
including priority status--within the ICE operational base. As a
result, there can be no assurance that prior year performance levels
can be maintained or achieved. Direct appropriated base funding is
expected to support out-year ICE operations' planning that promotes the
continued collaboration with other OCDETF participating agencies to
achieve OCDETF goals and objectives.

$105 Million Base Increase for Investigations Operations

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006 budget Fiscal year 2006
2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base \1\ enhancements \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Investigations Operations..... 796,478 1,138,495 1,099,554 1,267,437 167,883
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: The President's budget proposes enhancements of $167.883 million to the Investigations Operations
budget activity. Of that amount, $105 million is a base increase, $4.827 million is for the Visa Security
Unit, $16.216 million is for Temporary Worker Worksite Enforcement, and $41.840 million is for OCDETF
activities.

The $105 million base increase will provide resources required to
fund base requirements for the Office of Investigations, including
salary costs, vehicle replacement, and other general expenses.
Performance Impact.--Improved infrastructure on which to support
continuation of investigative activities, both domestically and
internationally.

Detention Bed Space

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program Fiscal year fiscal year Fiscal year 2006 budget Fiscal year 2006
2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base \1\ enhancements \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRO-Custody Management \1\.... 550,912 697,855 594,169 727,769 108,600
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: There are three enhancements to the Custody Management program, totaling $90.0 million, $25.0 million,
and $18.6 million respectively. The $25.0 million for ABC/Interior Repatriation is excluded in this display,
as it is described separately.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Detention Bed Space totals
$108 million and 16 FTE.
The President's Budget requests an additional $90 million for
detention bed space and $18.6 million as a base increase for the
Custody Management program. Approximately $63 million of the $90
million is intended for the direct cost of providing an additional
1,920 beds. The balance of the $90 million request is intended to fund
32 new positions (16 FTE) to provide staff to support to those beds.
This increase in bed space responds to increased demand for detention
bed space generated by apprehending agencies (e.g., Border Patrol,
Inspections, Investigations, etc.). The $18.6 million increase will
provide resources required to fund base requirements for the Custody
Management budget activity within the Office of Detention and Removal.
The fiscal year 2005 appropriation provided an additional $26.5
million for 1,216 new beds and 28 positions (14 FTE) above fiscal year
2004 levels.
Detention capacity and the necessary resources are fundamental
components to the immigration enforcement mission. For the immigration
enforcement mission to be successful, detention capacity must be
considered at an appropriate ratio compared with resources provided for
investigations and apprehensions. Increased detention capacity will
improve the ability of ICE to verify alien identity, deter subsequent
illegal entry, dramatically increase removal rates, prevent criminal
aliens from returning to communities, and protect national security.
Criminal aliens comprise more than half of the total detained
population and we expect their numbers continue to rise due to enhanced
enforcement efforts like IRP (Institutional Removal Program) and 287(g)
expansion (local law enforcement authority to enforce immigration
violations). Criminal aliens comprise a significant portion of our
mandatory detention population (those individuals who have received
final orders of removal and whose removal is imminent, those who are
pending expedited removal activities, and those who are otherwise
required by law or policy to be detained). In recent months, ICE's
mandatory population has increased at a gradual, but steady rate due to
increased enforcement activities (particularly from Expedited Removal
initiative). As these targeted enforcement efforts continue, further
growth in our mandatory detention population is likely. ICE continues
to improve the efficiency of its detention program by consolidating
populations and improving capacity management. These measures are
anticipated to reduce costs by eliminating travel from detention
facilities to proceedings, reducing average time in detention, and
providing for more consistent and higher quality conditions of
confinement for the detained population.
ICE will continue to enforce its robust facility inspection program
and coordinate with our governmental organizations and non-governmental
organization partners in pursuit of maintaining acceptable and
appropriate conditions of confinement for the detained population. We
are committed to effectively enforcing our immigration laws and
protecting our Nation's security in a manner that affords the rights
and proper treatment obligated under our laws to detainees, including
those claiming asylum.

Fugitive Operations

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for the Fugitive Operations is
$8.88 million and 0 FTE.
The President's Budget requests an additional $8.88 million to
support increased efforts to apprehend fugitive aliens. While estimates
vary, the alien absconder population is more than 465,000 and that it
continues to grow at a rate of more than 40,000 absconders per year.
Experience with the current fugitive operations teams suggests that
each team yields at least 500 absconder apprehensions/case closures per
year. This success is very encouraging and expanding these efforts will
stem the growth of the alien absconder population and begin to reduce
the overall numbers of alien absconders at large.
ICE currently employs 16 fugitive operations nation-wide. Cities
with fugitive operations teams include: Los Angles (2 teams), Boston,
San Francisco, Miami, Houston, New York City (2 teams), Chicago, Newark
(2 teams), Detroit, Atlanta, Baltimore, San Diego, and Seattle.
The fiscal year 2005 reprogramming request reduced the $50 million
appropriated enhancement to $9 million. For fiscal year 2005, $9
million will support 42 full time positions (21 FTE) and additional
funding for bed space and operating costs associated with increased
apprehension activity.
This proposed enhancement is aligned to Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Objective 2.2, Enforce trade and immigration laws.
All increases in removal rates increase the control DRO has over
the removal alien population which contributes directly to national
security.

Institutional Removal Program (Criminal Alien Program)

[In thousands of dollars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Program Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006
2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base 2006 budget enhancement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRO-IRP......................... 17,467 31,512 33,706 39,041 5,335
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fiscal year 2006 Institutional Removal Program (IRP)
enhancement is $5.355 million and 19 FTE.
The President's Budget requests an additional $5.355 million to
expand the IPR program and to continue the transfer of the program from
the Office of Investigation to the Office of Detention and Removal
Operations. The fiscal year 2005 amount will complete the transition of
the State of New York and a sizable portion of the State of California.
The fiscal year 2006 amount will continue the staffing of California.
IRP, now referred to as ICE's Criminal Alien Program (CAP),
identifies aliens who are in criminal incarceration and processing them
for removal prior to their incarceration release. This is an effective
approach to preventing criminal recidivism and to ensure removable
aliens are actually removed once so ordered by an immigration judge.
Currently, the ICE Office of Investigations administers the IRP
program with a variety of resources (including job series 1811 criminal
investigators). The workload for each immigration enforcement agent
(IEA) is 300 charging documents served per year. This figure
encompasses the number of interviews and record checks of individuals
that are not amenable to removal but are of foreign birth. The plan for
CAP is to interview 90 percent or more of all foreign born inmates in
Federal, State and mega-county (populations over 1 million) areas.
287(g) (local law enforcement authority to enforce immigration
violations) and video teleconferencing will serve the outlying areas.
ICE has placed increased emphasis on complex criminal
investigations for its 1811 job series. In recognition of this,
Congress provided an additional $30 million in the fiscal year 2005
appropriation to initiate the transfer of IRP from OI to DRO. The
fiscal year 2005 reprogramming requests the enhancement be reduced to
$4 million. This will allow for 37 positions and thus, Special Agents
will continue to perform some institutional removal duties, instead of
replacing all of them with Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEA).
Criminal Alien Program (CAP) is the unification of the old
Institutional Removal Program (IRP) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension
Program (ACAP). All DRO activities in the incarcerated criminal alien
arena will be referred to simply as CAP in the future.

STAFFING MODEL

Based on recent production numbers from New York State Department
of Corrections (DOC) and Florida Department of Corrections, an IEA will
in a year will do 600 interviews in Southern tier States and 500
interviews in Northern tier States. The statistics from these two DOCs
suggest a higher percentage of naturalized foreign-born individuals in
southern tier States requiring more interviews to obtain the goal of
300 charging documents issued per agent.
The transition will focus on a state-by-state transition of
responsibility from OI to DRO. The first States, in order, are New
York, California, Texas, Florida and Illinois. The transition, to date,
is limited to the New York City Jail of Riker's Island.
New York.--The plan has been coordinated with NY State Department
of Corrections and New York City Department of Corrections, the two
largest non-Federal partners. Pre-existing system and partnerships with
Executive Office for Immigration Review and Bureau of Prisons exist
under legacy Institutional Hearing Program (IHP). Video
teleconferencing will cover traditional ACAP locations at smaller
county facilities. Equipment and staffing will be at newly completed
Castle Point Facility which offers space for increased staffing.
California.--Plans have been discussed to improve the efficiency of
identifying and starting removal proceedings for amenable aliens with
the California Department of Corrections. The system is currently in a
number of locations. Pre-existing system and partnerships with EOIR and
BOP exist under legacy IHP. Video teleconferencing will cover
traditional ACAP locations at smaller county facilities. Equipment and
staffing will be hired and located to meet the needs of the State of
California stretch the capacity of the New York VTC center. Due to the
costs of installing VTC equipment to local detention facilities, the
need will be relatively small in the first years and will be built up
as demand grows.
Arizona Border Control (ABC)/Interior Repatriation

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABC............................................. .............. .............. 39,349 39,349
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This fiscal year 2006 enhancement is $39.349 million for the ABC/
Interior Repatriation Program. With this funding, the Interior
Repatriation program will transfer from Customs and Border Protection
to ICE/DRO in fiscal year 2006. DRO is in the business of removals and
will use its experience to build on previous successes.
Interior repatriation (IR) is a component of the Arizona Border
Control initiative (ABCI). ABCI is a multi-pronged approach to
controlling the Arizona Border, which includes anti-smuggling
investigations, fugitive arrests, as well as controlling and arresting
illegal crossings. IR has a singular focus of the repatriating Mexican
nationals. IR's aim is promoting deterrence, reducing recidivism of
illegal crossings and thus reducing the number of deaths along the
Arizona border.
In fiscal year 2004, 14,058 undocumented immigrants were
voluntarily flown from Tucson, AZ, to the interior of Mexico from July
12 to September 30, 2004, after screening by DHS and a Mexican Consular
Official. During the IR, Border Patrol Agents interviewed 96,793
potential candidates.
Of those interviewed, 82,735 refused to participate. Of those who
declined to participate, 14,069 had been deemed ``at risk'' migrants.
These migrants as well as the other migrants who refused to participate
were processed either through voluntary return to the Arizona/Mexico
border or other removal mechanisms.
A total of 7 percent (1,008) of IRP participants were arrested
attempting re-entry into the United States during the IRP operation
dates. This is much lower than the Tucson sector's average recidivism
rate of 37 percent.
Interior repatriation can result in a dramatic reduction in the
number of deaths in the desert suffered by intending immigrants.
Interior repatriation efforts have resulted in strong U.S.-Mexico and
cooperation. Since the IR pilot last year, DHS has also implemented
expedited removal between ports of entry in the Tucson and Laredo
sectors, resulting in additional apprehensions in the Tucson area.
Alternatives to Detention

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base 2006 budget enhancements \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DRO-Alternatives.............. 8,659 12,202 12,733 23,533 10,800
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: There are two enhancements to the Alternatives to Detention program, each totaling $5.4 million.

The fiscal year 2006 enhancement for Alternatives to Detention
totals $10.8 million and 7 FTE.
The President's Budget requests an additional $5.4 million to
expand the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) and $5.4
million increase for the Alternatives to Detention program, for a total
of $10.8 million in enhancements. Alternatives to Detention include
intensive supervision, electronic monitoring, and telephonic voice
recognition. Currently, ICE (through the Office of Detention and
Removal Operations--DRO) is piloting several alternatives to detention
initiatives. Early indications are encouraging and suggest that these
approaches to monitoring aliens who are not in physical custody may
yield better appearance rates to immigration proceedings and better
rates of removal once an alien has been ordered removed. The program is
still too new to draw definitive conclusions. Over the next 6 to 12
months ICE will be collecting data and evaluating the efficacy of
various alternatives to detention strategies.
ICE began piloting this initiative in fiscal year 2004 and has
expanded the pilots in fiscal year 2005. Pilot cities include: Miami,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland, Denver, San Francisco, and others.
The fiscal year 2005 Budget provided $11 million to expand the number
of pilot locations and to fund 60 new full time positions (30 FTE). The
fiscal year 2005 reprogramming reduces the funding to $2 million which
permits funding for 11 new full time positions.
DRO will measure the performance of the ISAP program on three
levels: (1) Do aliens enrolled in ISAP have a greater rate of
appearance at hearings than the rate of a control group of non-detained
aliens not enrolled in ISAP? (2) If ordered removed or granted
voluntary departure, do aliens enrolled in ISAP surrender/depart at a
greater rate than a control group? (3) If the alien fails to surrender
for removal or otherwise fails to depart, are absconding aliens in ISAP
re-apprehended at a greater rate than that for a control group?
DRO and its ISAP contractor are collecting certain data to test the
hypothesis that the performance measures for aliens in ISAP will
indicate a greater success rate than the performance measures for a
control group of non-detained aliens. ``Success'' is defined as a
statistically significant increase in the appearance rates, surrender
rates, and re-apprehension rates. The hypothesis test will involve
standard statistical tests (such as ``t tests'') and commonly accepted
levels of statistical significance (generally the significance level in
social science research is set to .05). DRO expects it will have gained
a sufficiently large sample population to draw statistical inference
within the next 6 to 12 months.
DRO and its contractor will also collect data on the appearances at
hearings, surrenders for removal, departure from the United States,
number of re-apprehensions of absconders.
The ISAP population is non-criminal aliens that are not mandatory
detention, who live within a reasonable commuting distance of an ISAP
office, and who agree to the conditions of the program. DRO will select
a control group of non-detained aliens that are not participating in
ISAP. These aliens will be selected from Docket Control Offices that
have ISAP. The control group will closely match the ISAP group on such
relevant characteristics as country of origin, gender, and length of
stay in the United States.
General Explanation and Justification for the Initiative.--
Detention of all aliens that are apprehended and placed into removal
proceedings is not the only way to ensure that aliens appear at their
immigration hearings or for removal. Aliens who disappear from ICE
supervision pose a potential threat to public safety and national
security. To mitigate this flow of cases into the fugitive population,
ICE's DRO seeks to further develop alternatives to detention in two
ways. First, expansion of the ISAP to two additional locations in
fiscal year 2006. Each site is intended to accommodate 200 participants
daily. These additional resources would bring the total number of
participants nationwide on any given day to 2,000. The ISAP is a
community-based, case management program that provides close
supervision of illegal aliens emphasizing compliance with Immigration
Court requirements. Expansion of the program requires 14 positions (7
FTEs). In order to properly execute the alternatives to detention
program within DRO, positions must accompany program expansion. These
positions will be used to manage the alternatives to detention docket
including enrolling participants, managing the data, ensuring departure
from the United States as required, and acting as the local Contracting
Officer's Technical Representative.
This proposed enhancement is aligned to Department of Homeland
Security Strategic Objective 2.2, Enforce trade and immigration laws.
Performance Impact.--This is a cost-effective way to ensure that
aliens will appear for their immigration hearings or for removal. This
program will increase the integrity of the immigration enforcement
process by adding two additional ISAP locations, each intended to
accommodate 200 participants daily. ICE is still analyzing the results
of alternative to detention programs and will baseline the appearance
rates in fiscal year 2006 to begin measuring the true outcome of ISAP.
The goal of this program is in line with the strategic objective of
removing all removable aliens. The anticipated increase in appearance
rates will also mean fewer cases entering the fugitive population.
Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS)

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 2006 budget 2006
2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 base \1\ enhancement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FAMS............................ 610,290 662,900 678,994 688,860 9,866
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This enhancement will allow the FAMS to increase its staffing level
to a level that will allow it to meet its mission objective, the risk-
based deployment of Federal Air Marshals. FAMS works closely with DHS
and other Federal, State and local agencies and private industry to
develop, deploy and sustain a comprehensive intelligence-driven
approach and response to terrorist and related criminal threats against
the United States and its interests. FAMS provides critical support to
DHS' missions to prevent terrorist acts within the United States,
reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize damage from potential
attacks.
Additional information can be provided in a secure manner.
Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)

[In thousands of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Program 2004 budget 2005 budget 2006 budget 2006 change
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEVP............................................ 1,465 40,000 \1\ 58,100 \1\ 18,100
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These numbers have been revised since submission of the President's budget on February 7, 2005.

DHS Strategic Objective Supported: 2.2 Enforce Trade and
Immigration Laws
The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) was created to
restore integrity to the U.S. immigration system by ensuring that
international students, scholars, and exchange visitors studying in the
United States comply with the terms of their visas. One of SEVP's
primary functions is to track the immigration status of foreign
students and exchange visitors.
In fiscal year 2004, SEVP operated with two separate streams of
funding--a fee collection process for school certification and
appropriated dollars from counter-terrorism funds. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 mandated
the establishment and maintenance of a fee collection process to
support the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and
SEVP. To become a fully fee funded program, SEVP implemented a fee
collection process (the SEVIS I-901 Fee) on September 1, 2004. This fee
is paid by all prospective students and exchange visitors ($100 for
most and $35 for some exchange visitors) prior to seeking a visa at the
consulates and embassies overseas. The I-901 fee and the fees collected
from schools seeking certification to host nonimmigrant students (I-17
Fee), provides the full funding for SEVP, portions of the Compliance
Enforcement Unit (CEU), and the Department of State efforts.
In fiscal year 2005, SEVP projects it will collect $46 million from
the SEVIS I-901 fee and $362,000 from the I-17 school certification
fees. In addition, SEVP had a carryover balance of $2.6 million from
fiscal year 2004. Although SEVP projects to have total resources of
$49.0 million for fiscal year 2005, the execution level will remain at
$40 million to ensure continuity of funding for the program.
In fiscal year 2006, SEVP projects to collect $45.9 million from
the SEVIS I-901 fee and $3.5 million from the I-17 school certification
fees. The increase in I-17 school certification fees is based on SEVP
collecting initial fees as well as the re-certification fees whereas in
fiscal year 2005 they will only collect initial fees. In fiscal year
2006 SEVP will have a full cycle of SEVIS I-901 fees since its
inception in September 2004. SEVP projects to have total resources of
$58 million for fiscal year 2006 that includes a $9 million carryover
balance from fiscal year 2005.

The additional $18.1 million spending authority for fiscal year
2006 will allow SEVP to:
--Maintain staffing levels--the cost of salaries and benefits of
newly hired employees
--Continue to improve SEVIS with IT enhancements--allows SEVP to
accelerate the implementation of planned enhancements to
improve the batch and real time interface processing,
incorporate historical data from the SEVIS predecessor (CIPRIS)
and implement a user-friendly reporting tool. This increase in
funding will also allow SEVP to develop a search tool for the
historical data.
--Conduct analysis of current fee structures (I-901 SEVIS fee and I-
17 school certification)--fee studies for both the I-901 SEVIS
fee and the I-17 school certification were conducted in early
2000
SEVP will continue to perform the following functions:
--Certify schools desiring to participate in SEVIS
--Provide law enforcement with current information on F, M and J
nonimmigrants
--Conduct outreach to the academic community
--Accept and process fee payments
--Enhance the functionality of the SEVIS system
--Write policies and regulations to implement statutory requirements
--Train users of the SEVIS system
--Assist ports of entry, DoS consular officials, schools and program
sponsors with the entry and stay of F, M and J nonimmigrants

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year
Performance Increase 2006 request 2007 request 2008 request
level level level
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent of F, M, and J nonimmigrant information maintained in 100 100 100
SEVIS..........................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Are there any services that ICE is being assessed working
capital fund charges for in fiscal year 2004 or fiscal year 2005 that
are not directly utilized by ICE? Is ICE being charged for services on
a basis proportionate to its usage?
Answer. According to the DHS Working Capital Fund reimbursable
agreements, ICE will only be billed for actual services received. This
was true for fiscal year 2004 WCF billings, and is expected for fiscal
year 2005 billing. DHS provided detailed proration guidance with the
fiscal year 2005 anticipated WCF billings. ICE agrees with DHS
proration of WCF costs.

OFFICE OF SCREENING COORDINATION AND OPERATIONS (9/11 COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATION)

Question. The President's Budget proposes to create the Office of
Screening Coordination and Operations within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. CIS has significant screening and
identification capabilities and needs, yet the President's budget does
not propose moving the operational responsibility for any of those
programs out of CIS. In order to ensure that there is the closest
possible coordination across screening programs, should CIS screening
programs be moved to the Office of Screening Coordination and
Operations?
Answer. The Office of Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO)
is the first step in implementing the requirements of HSPD-11, which
directs DHS to review and integrate all screening requirements across
the Federal government. USCIS operational requirements and other
security elements are being reviewed within the Department, and where
deemed appropriate, may be incorporated within the purview of the SCO.

TERRORIST TRAVEL (9/11 COMMISSION REPORT)

Question. In addition to the formal 9/11 Commission Report, the
Commission issued two staff monographs, one of them on Terrorist
Travel. While no specific recommendations were made, the report reached
interesting conclusions. One conclusion was that ``Border inspectors
today still do not have basic intelligence and operational training to
aid them in detecting and preventing terrorist entry.'' They are not
talking about people who are on watchlists, but providing inspectors
with training to detect terrorists not on the watchlist. What steps is
CBP taking to incorporate the information uncovered by the 9/11
Commission staff on terrorist travel into basic training for CBP
officers?
Answer. CBP has established anti-terrorism response protocols to
more effectively handle potential terrorism threats identified by CBP
personnel. These national-level CBP policies operate both for a CBP
Officer questioning a person applying for admission at a port of entry
and for a Border Patrol Agent processing an individual who's been
apprehended after crossing the border illegally to ensure consistent
application throughout the border. CBP has also developed specific
anti-terrorism training for passenger processing that includes specific
instruction in behavioral analysis, deception detection and eliciting
information.
The integrated curriculum for new CBP Officers includes three (3)
specific components: Pre-Academy, Academy Basic training at Glynco, GA,
and post-Academy training conducted at the Ports of Entry (In-port
training). Academy Training courses for new CBP Officers include new
anti-terrorism passenger training and fraudulent document detection.
Most importantly, the role of an Officer in CBP's priority mission,
anti-terrorism, is taught on day one and reiterated throughout the
curriculum.
Under our new curriculum, our basic trainees receive 16 hours in
fraudulent document training at the Academy that culminates with a
graded practical exercise during which trainees examine characteristics
of unique documents and determine if the documents are genuine,
counterfeit or altered. The course highlights fraud indicators that may
be present in evaluating any document for authenticity. Security
features of United States entry documents and imposter detection are
emphasized as well. Trainees that fail to successfully complete the
course are removed from training. All instructors teaching this course
have received training from the Forensic Document Lab.
With regard to questioning techniques, we use practical exercises
throughout a trainee's 15 weeks at the Academy. With the help of role
players, students are presented with scenarios based on primary
inspection situations. During the labs and graded practical exercises,
trainees review documents presented, question role players about their
visit to the United States and make ``refer or release''
recommendations. Interviewing labs require trainees to practice
observational skills and questioning skills, while applying their job
knowledge of documentation requirements, immigration issues, customs
exemptions, prohibited and restricted articles, and agricultural
issues.
Question. Has CBP considered asking the 9/11 Commission staff to
put together a seminar on its findings for all current inspectors,
allowing them to sharpen their skills?
Answer. CBP is open to new training concepts, and though we are not
sure that using former Commission staff for training CBP inspectors is
an optimal approach, we will keep such ideas in mind as we continue to
refine training programs.
Question. The report on Terrorist Travel also calls attention to
the lack of ``viable options to prevent documents known to be
fraudulent from being returned to travelers denied entry into the
United States''. What additional authority would CBP need to be able to
confiscate or in some way invalidate fraudulent documents prior to
denying entry to someone?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented on
January 1, 2005, under existing legal authority, a comprehensive
program for the seizure and systematic processing of fraudulent travel
documents presented for admission into the United States. Key parts of
that program include the requirement that no fraudulent travel document
be returned to the subject presenting the document and the mandatory
forwarding of all seized documents to CBP's newly established
Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit for intelligence collection and final
disposition (return to issuing authority for destruction). Subjects
from whom fraudulent documents have been seized are now issued a Single
Journey Letter (SJL) to facilitate their return travel. The SJL
conforms with all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Annex 9 standards for issuance of such documents. It includes
interdiction and biographic information as well as the subject's
photograph and fingerprints from both right and left index fingers.
Question. The report also states ``There is no programmatic effort
to focus on terrorist travel facilitators, and special agents lack the
resources and authority to pursue visitors for immigration violations
associated with terrorist activity''. What is the Department's position
on this statement? What can be done to change this?
Answer. ICE has special agents assigned to CBP's National Targeting
Center (NTC), the FBI's Foreign Terrorist Travel Task Force (FTTTF) and
the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section. All three locations
have developed specialized databases to facilitate the investigation of
terrorist travel and terrorist travel facilitators. ICE Attaches
assigned to posts around the world, and the ICE special agent assigned
to the Department of Defense Central Command, are also well-positioned
to act upon information relating to terrorist travel facilitators.
Question. One of the most interesting findings included in the
report on Terrorist Travel, was related to the U.S. Department of
Justice's Absconder Apprehension Initiative, started in 2001. Today,
this initiative has become the responsibility of ICE's Fugitive
Operations Program.
Of the almost 6,000 aliens determined to be the highest priority to
track down and remove, 5 percent had been granted U.S. citizenship or
had become legal permanent residents after being ordered deported. Can
ICE and CIS guarantee that this can never happen again? What steps have
been taken to ensure that this cannot happen again?
Answer. ICE works to ensure that data is shared and has developed
and implemented agreements with CIS to share data. ICE also routinely
runs CIS cases against the fugitive database. In addition, CIS has
access to the Deportable Alien Computer System (DACS), which tracks all
cases under removal proceedings.
Question. Is all of the relevant information that each organization
has in its records being shared today? Is the Department confident that
someone who has been ordered deported from this country can not be
granted U.S. citizenship while an absconder?
Answer. The information regarding who is an absconder is readily
available for queries and searches for CIS to determine if an applicant
is considered an absconder or fugitive. An applicant for citizenship
has the burden of establishing that he was lawfully admitted for
permanent residency in the United States. The Naturalization
application requires additional identity and security checks; a
definitive response from the FBI background checks, and IBIS checks. In
addition, all applications are processed in accordance with established
Naturalization Quality Procedures (NQP).
Question. When someone is found to be attempting to fraudulently
obtain U.S. citizenship, through the use of a false name or some other
method, why does it take so long to bring them to justice?
On February 10, 2005, Mostofa Kamal, aka Shaheen Sardar, a native
of Bangladesh, was arrested in New York. He entered this country in
1994, over 10 years ago. He was ordered to leave the United States in
1997. This individual made his first fraudulent request for benefits in
1997. Mr. Kamal was interviewed by CIS in connection with his
application for U.S. citizenship in November of 2004, an application
that was received by CIS in August of 2003, but he was only arrested 3
weeks ago. The Department has known for sometime where he was--employed
by the New York City Police Department as a Traffic Enforcement Agent.
What is the issue? Is it resources, priorities? Why do these cases drag
on so long before ICE arrests someone?
Answer. In the referenced case, the subject had previously entered
the United States in 1993 under a false name and made claims to
political asylum. His asylum claim was denied, and an Immigration Judge
granted him Voluntary Departure with an alternate order of deportation
should he not depart by the specified date in May of 1996. In 1997, he
changed his name (name referenced in question), married a U.S. citizen,
and applied for a benefit through that relationship. Based on that
relationship, he left the United States, reentered, and was admitted to
the United States as a Lawful Permanent Resident in 2000. He, in
effect, caused an alternate order of deportation when he departed the
United States to pick up his Visa. As a result of the name change, the
fraud had not been detected. In continuance of this fraud, the subject
applied for citizenship, for which he passed all stages in the process
and was awaiting a naturalization date. The fraud was discovered. In
February 2005, he was presented for criminal prosecution in the
Southern District of New York for committing naturalization fraud.
It may take many years for an individual to exhaust his legal
administrative remedies. Normally, arrests would not take place while
there is an adjudicative or administrative judicial process being
pursued and would only take place if the subject were considered likely
to abscond. Generally, single scheme frauds are not accepted for
criminal prosecution unless there are extraordinary circumstances that
would sway the U.S. Attorney's office to consider it.

ARIZONA BORDER CONTROL INITIATIVE

Question. The Arizona Border Control (ABC) Initiative has been
underway for almost a full 12 months. What are the results of this
initiative so far? Has it been a success?
Answer. The Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI) has been very
successful. Initial successes have established a foundation to expand
on during fiscal year 2005 in order to achieve operation control of the
Arizona/Mexico Border under control. Intelligence and arrest trends
collected through ABCI indicate that alien smugglers have been forced
to change their operating procedures as a result of ABCI. Selected
statistics associated with ABCI are as follows:
--42 percent increase in arrests over the previous year
--105 percent increase in narcotics seizures over the previous year
--26 percent decrease in migrant deaths
--22 percent increase in Immigration Felony Prosecutions
--461 percent increases in vehicle seizures
--350 percent increase in weapons seizures
Question. What lessons from the ABC initiative can now be
incorporated into the operations of CBP, ICE and others across the
Nation?
Answer. Lessons learned that can be incorporated throughout the
Nation include:
--Development of Planning Cell Committees of agency leadership
personnel to coordinate the creation of operation plans to
foster a seamless flow of information and to establish
operating coalitions.
--Establishing a coordinated leadership structure with an emphasis on
information and intelligence sharing and ensuring that
sufficient resources are deployed is a requirement for success.
--Integrating operations between all BTS entities, State, local,
tribal agencies and foreign governments achieve better results
than working alone.
--Integrating ground-based surveillance technology, air surveillance,
and ground personnel creates a ``defense in depth'' posture,
which inhibits the ability of criminal enterprises to operate
freely along the U.S./Mexico Border.
Question. Funding for this initiative has been requested in the
fiscal year 2006 budget request. Should this initiative now be regarded
as a permanent resource enhancement?
Answer. The $1 million increase included in the fiscal year 2006
President's Budget for the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI)
should be considered to be a permanent increase to CBP's base funding.
These additional resources are required to meet the objectives of the
ABCI.
Question. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles as a part of the ABC
initiative has been considered very successful. However, the contract
vehicle that the Science and Technology Directorate was using to
provide the UAVs has ended, and there is no UAV coverage while CBP
evaluates how best to continue this project. When does CBP expect to
have this issue resolved so that UAV coverage can be put back into
place in the Tucson Sector?
Answer. CBP is currently refining requirements to issue a request
for proposals (RFP) to the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry. The
contract will specify delivery of the system within 30 days of contract
award, which will allow CBP to establish a UAV initial operating
capability on the Southern Border in support of the Arizona Border
Control Initiative. CBP expects to award a contract for UAV procurement
in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2005.

ASYLUM AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL

Question. The United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom recently issued a report entitled ``Asylum Seekers in Expedited
Removal''. The report contains a number of recommendations for the
Department of Homeland Security. The report raised specific issues on
the difficulty of applying the standards for asylum and credible fear
in a consistent manner across the Department. Has a working group or
other mechanism been put in place to look into how the standards are
applied and ensure consistent treatment of asylum seekers?
Answer. Since the inception of the expedited removal process in
1997, a standing inter-agency working group has addressed expedited
removal issues. The Expedited Removal Working Group is an established
forum for discussing all issues relating to expedited removal and
comprises experts from each of the affected DHS entities (U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Customs and Border Protection,
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement).
Pursuant to former Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy's concurrence
with a joint memorandum from former Undersecretary of Border and
Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson, USCIS Director Eduardo Aguirre,
and Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Daniel Sutherland, the
Expedited Removal Working Group has been tasked with coordinating
review of the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom report, ``Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal.'' The working
group also will draft the Department's responses to the report's
recommendations. The working group will report on its review and
proposed responses to BTS, USCIS, and CRCL, and their report then will
be forwarded to the Secretary.
Question. The report also raised concerns about the detention
policies and facilities used for the majority of asylum applicants.
CBP, ICE, and CIS must all balance the national security needs of this
country with the humanitarian needs of legitimate asylum applicants. In
fact, almost at the same time that this report was made public, the
11th defendant in a significant case ``Operation Jakarta'' involving
asylum fraud and document fraud pleaded guilty in a Federal court in
Virginia. What is being done to review these programs and evaluate the
specific recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security established a working
group to review and respond to the recommendations suggested by the
Commission. The working group will issue an evaluation on those
recommendations this summer.
Question. What steps have been taken as a result of ``Operation
Jakarta'' to track down anyone who received benefits fraudulently
because of this criminal enterprise and remove them from the United
States?
Answer. During the course of the criminal investigation, the USCIS
Asylum Offices have reviewed 12,000 Indonesian asylum cases in order to
identify all fraudulent cases related to ``Operation Jakarta.''
Approximately 800 principal asylum cases were directly linked to the
perpetrators of the fraud and will be processed for termination. Due to
the high volume of fraud cases, the Asylum Offices have created teams
of Asylum Officers to process the cases expeditiously. As the cases are
terminated, the individuals will then be referred for judicial review
to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). All of the
individuals that applied for and/or received benefits associated with
this fraud will be entered as ``lookouts'' in the Treasury Enforcement
Communications Systems (TECS).

USE OF STOLEN PASSPORTS--INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

Question. In December of 2004, the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General issued a report entitled ``A
Review of the Use of Stolen Passports from Visa Waiver Countries to
Enter the United States''. Both ICE and CBP concurred with the
recommendations in this report. What progress has ICE and CBP made to
implement those recommendations?
Answer. ICE and CBP have implemented coordinated standard operating
procedures to ensure ICE receives information on all individuals
present in the United States who entered on a lost or stolen passport.
On January 28, 2005, the Director of the National Targeting Center
(NTC) sent the ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) a letter
confirming the agreement between ICE and CBP. CBP will ensure lookouts
are placed on all lost or stolen passports, conduct appropriate
database queries, and forward information to the CEU on anyone present
in the United States who entered on a lost or stolen passport.
Question. Please provide the Committee with a detailed, item by
item, breakout of any fiscal year 2004 representation funds that were
allocated to CBP, CIS, ICE, and the Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security.
Answer. The requested information has been provided in the tables
below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Organizational element 2004 Fiscal year
appropriated 2004 obligated
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Under Secretary for BTS....... .............. ..............
CBP..................................... $40,000 $37,661
ICE..................................... 15,000 6,837
USCIS................................... 5,000 4,953
------------------------------------------------------------------------

FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUMMARY OF RECEPTION & REPRESENTATION FUND OBLIGATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Event Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Customs and Border
Protection

30-Oct-03....................... Official luncheon $381.14
held in honor of
U.S./Mexico Border
Partnership
Meeting.
13-Nov-03....................... Protocol Supplies.. 170.98
03-Nov-03....................... Refreshments served 74.82
at the Operation
Safe Commerce
Meeting.
08-Nov-03....................... Sponsor the 150.00
Ministers from
Trinidad & Tobago
at the Marine
Corps Ball in
Trinidad in
furtherance of
CMAA negotiations.
12-Nov-03....................... Refreshments for 21.09
meeting hosted by
Deputy
Commissioner with
Mexican Delegation.
17-Nov-04....................... Official Dinner in 402.82
honor of Lars
Karlsson, 2nd
Deputy Director
General, Sweden
Customs.
19-Nov-03....................... Official Dinner 923.55
with officials
from New Zealand
during CIS
Discussions.
02-Dec-04....................... Official reception 326.97
for the opening of
the CSI Port in
Durban, South
Africa.
12-Dec-03....................... Protocol Supplies-- 1,200.00
Commissioner of
Customs office.
18-Dec-04....................... Official Reception 10,523.50
hosted by
Commissioner of
Customs in honor
of foreign
dignitaries and
high level
officials from
various Embassies.
21-Jan-04....................... Honorary Award Item 95.00
for WCO Regional
Security
Conference in
Senegal.
21-Jan-04....................... Official luncheon 148.00
hosted by Chief De
La Vina in honor
of Mexican
Officials,
Fernando Creixell
and Agustin Caso.
23-Jan-04....................... Official luncheon 213.68
in honor of Canada
Border Security
Agency, President
Alain Jolicoeur
and Director Greg
Boatbe.
28-Jan-04....................... International 3,473.00
Customs Day
Reception.
29-Jan-04....................... Official dinner 1,487.20
hosted by
Secretary Ridge in
honor of Canadian
Prime Minister and
delegation.
24-Feb-04....................... Official Luncheon 608.00
for Italian
Delegation during
CSI Program Review.
03-Mar-04....................... Flowers sent on 219.06
behalf of Customs
and Border
Protection upon
the death of
Comptroller of
Customs, Robin
Dare (New Zealand).
24-Mar-04....................... Official luncheon 125.13
hosted by Acting
Assistant
Commissioner,
International
Affairs in honor
of Mr. Kaci Abes,
Director, External
Cooperation &
Relations.
22-Apr-04....................... Protocol Supplies 261.52
for US/EU Signing.
28-Apr-04....................... Official Luncheon 379.10
hosted in honor of
US/EU signing and
the Joint Customs
Cooperation
Committee.
08-May-04....................... Protocol Supplies-- 10.60
Office of Trade
Relations.
13-May-04....................... Official luncheon 592.62
hosted in honor of
Mr. Mu Xin-Sheng,
Minister, General
Administration of
China Customs and
his delegation.
24-May-04....................... Refreshments during 616.92
meetings held with
the European
Community & U.S.
Expert Groups on
Container Security.
08-Jun-04....................... Dinner hosted by 450.00
Commissioner
Bonner in honor of
the U.S./Canada
Shared Border
meeting.
08-Jun-04....................... Official luncheon 514.30
hosted by
Commissioner
Bonner in honor of
U.S./Canada Shared
Border meeting.
08-Jun-04....................... Official Reception 1,967.06
hosted by
Commissioner
Bonner at the U.S./
Canada Shared
Border Meeting.
14-Jun-04....................... Official luncheon 216.25
hosted by
Commissioner
Bonner in
conjunction with
the U.S./Mexico
Bilateral Meeting.
16-Jun-04....................... Official luncheon 562.50
hosted by Acting
Assistant
Commissioner,
International
Affairs in honor
of high level
Georgian Officials.
22-Jun-04....................... Official luncheon 323.01
hosted by Acting
Assistant
Commissioner, INA
for the New
Zealand delegation
attending the WCO
Policy &
Commission
meetings..
25-Jun-04....................... Official luncheon 421.65
and toast hosted
by Commissioner
Bonner at the
signing of the CSI
agreement with the
Hellenic Republic.
28-Jun-04....................... Official Luncheon 495.00
hosted by
Commissioner
Bonner for high
level French
Customs officials.
14-Jul-04....................... Refreshments for 297.01
CSI Global
Targeting Assembly
of Technical
Experts Conference.
27-Jul-04....................... Official luncheon 878.41
hosted by Acting
Deputy AC, INA for
attendees of the
U.S./Australia
Regional Movement
Alert List System
Conference.
04-Sep-04....................... Protocol Supplies-- 27.73
Director, Trade
Relations.
15-Sep-04....................... Refreshments during 106.60
conference with
Russian officials
and CBP on
Passenger Name
Record
connectivity.
22-Sep-04....................... Protocol Supplies-- 290.76
AC, INA and
Commissioner
Bonner's Office.
22-Sep-04....................... CSI PTP, Malaysia 301.62
Luncheon.
23-Sep-04....................... Honorary Award 8,404.74
Items for Foreign
Officials.
------------------
Total Obligation.......... ................... 37,661.34
==================
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement

11-Dec-03....................... Assistant Secretary 1,325.89
Holiday Reception
for members of
Congress and other
dignitaries.
3-Feb-04........................ International 717.75
Attache briefing w/
light refreshments
hosted by the
Federal Air
Marshal Services.
Dignitaries and
honorable guests
traveled from
Netherlands,
Austria, Japan,
China, Belgium,
Egypt,
Philippines,
Brazil, New
Zealand, Hungary,
et.al.
2-Mar-04........................ Breakfast with 205.53
Danish Minister at
ICE.
3-Mar-04........................ ICE One Year 299.06
Anniversary Event
attended by
Captains, Chiefs
of Police, State
Police Officials,
and
representatives of
other Federal
Agencies.
20-May-04....................... Luncheon event for 416.75
the Office of the
Assistant
Secretary with
local officials
and dignitaries
who made
substantial
contribution to
Nation or DHS.
8-Jun-04........................ Detention and 203.66
Removal Operations
Dinner during Four
Country Conference
in San Diego, CA
to address mutual
immigration and
removal issues.
Hosted by DRO;
attendees included
representatives
from the Embassy
of Australia;
Canada Border
Protection Agency;
United Kingdom
Immigration
Service; and other
foreign officials.
20-Aug-04....................... Opening ceremony 490.00
for ICE Air and
Marine Operations--
Bellingham Branch;
attended by U.S.
Senator Patty
Murray, U.S.
Representative
Rick Larsen, and
other
Congressional
representatives.
Purchase of food 476.08
and beverage items
for AMO ceremony.
18-Sep-04....................... ICE Air and Marine 2,702.13
Operations
briefing and site
visit for
Congresswoman Kay
Granger and
others. Includes
purchase of
refreshments for
the event.
------------------
Total Obligation.......... ................... 6,836.85
==================
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services

Kitchenware 389.07
supplies for
Director's suite,
for hosting VIPs
and dignitaries.
Honorary award 998.93
items (coasters)
for VIPs and
dignitaries.
Official luncheon 25.77
with dignitary
Eduardo Ibarolla
and Director
Aguirre.
Official dinner 220.96
with incoming
Mexican Ambassador
Icaza and Director
Aguirre to
establish
professional
rapport.
Honorary award item 79.95
(Cufflinks) for
guest speaker at
USCIS 2004
Director's
Leadership
Conference.
Honorary Award 1,075.95
Items (Cufflinks)
for senior
representative and
foreign
dignitaries during
official travel
and visits.
Honorary Award 1,135.00
Items (Lapel Pins)
for distribution
by Director
Aguirre during
official travel
and visits.
Honorary Award 1,000.00
Items (Pewter
bowls and
platters) for high-
level dignitaries.
Official Luncheon 27.52
with senior-level
guest (Alecia
Casteneda) to
establish
professional
interagency
rapport.
------------------
Total Obligation.......... ................... 4,953.15
------------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURE ELECTRONIC NETWORK FOR TRAVELERS RAPID INSPECTION PROGRAM
(SENTRI)

Question. In June of 2004 the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a report on the Secure
Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection program, known as
SENTRI. CBP agreed with the recommendations made by the Inspector
General. Please provide an update on the progress that has been made in
implementing each of the OIG's recommendations regarding the SENTRI
program.
Answer. On January 24, 2005, a new Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) Manual was sent to the San Diego, CA, and El Paso, TX, Field
Offices for the administration of the SENTRI program that addressed the
majority of the recommendations in the OIG's report, including stating
clearly the program eligibility criteria, establishing procedures for
background checks and their resolution, developing minimum documentary
requirements, separation of duties between initial enrollment and final
approval, monitoring continued eligibility, and recording SENTRI
violations. Certain other recommendations, relating to the Global
Enrollment System and integration with related information systems are
awaiting technical upgrades to achieve completion.

IMMIGRATION ADVISORY PROGRAM

Question. The Immigration Advisory Program is designed to improve
border security against the threat of terrorism by enabling CBP to
identify and intercept suspected terrorists and undocumented passengers
before they board planes bound for the United States from overseas
locations. The pilots established in Amsterdam and Warsaw in 2004
appear very promising. The fiscal year 2006 request includes funds to
expand this program to two additional airports. Can, or should, this
program be expanded more quickly?
Answer. Based on the results from Amsterdam and Warsaw through
February 28, 2005, CBP believes the IAP should be expanded and has
great potential for similar success at other large European, Latin
American, and Asian hub airports. IAP expansion is dependent on
reaching a bilateral agreement with the host country government and
will be rolled out as expeditiously as possible while ensuring
operational connectivity to port of entry operations.
Question. Please provide any evaluations or reports on the
effectiveness of the IAP pilots.
Answer. Accomplishments for June 5, 2004, to February 28, 2005, for
Amsterdam and September 5, 2004, to February 28, 2005, for Warsaw
follow:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Board Advisements.................................... 222
Fraud Intercepts........................................ 34
NTC Targets Confirmed................................... 16
CBP Costs Avoided....................................... $334,554
Potential Carrier Savings............................... $414,150
------------------------------------------------------------------------

CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM

Question. The fiscal year 2006 budget requests an additional $8.2
million to expand the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT). The fiscal year 2006 President's budget states that as of
January 12, 2005, CBP had reviewed and accepted the security profiles
of 4,460 companies, making these companies certified partners. The next
step in the process is validation. According to information that was
submitted for the record after last year's hearing, CBP planned to
complete 400 validations of C-TPAT certified partners in fiscal year
2004. Was that goal met last fiscal year (fiscal year 2004)?
Answer. CBP initiated 500 validations and completed 287 during
2004. As of March 25, 2005, over 540 validations have been completed,
with an additional 400 underway or in various stages of completion. CBP
anticipates that over 900 validations will be completed by the end of
fiscal year 2005.
In fiscal year 2004, CBP created a new position, Supply Chain
Specialist (SCS), and sought to recruit qualified officers throughout
the year. CBP continues to aggressively recruit permanent Supply Chain
Specialists, and has trained field officers to help assist in the
initiation of validations.
Question. What is the target number of validations CBP plans to
complete in fiscal year 2005?
Answer. CBP will complete 500 validations in fiscal year 2005, for
a total of 900 since the inception of program.
The overwhelming response by the trade community (volume of
applications) forced CBP to reconsider the original goal to validate
all certified members within a 3-year period.
CBP's strategy is for C-TPAT to determine and prioritize which
sectors of membership will be selected for validations, selecting
individual companies based upon a standardized risk assessment, and
identifying ``company specific'' high-risk supply chains to better
focus our efforts/resources.
Question. How many more validations will CBP be able to complete
each year with the new resources that have requested?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 request of $8.2 million will allow CBP
to conduct as many as 600 more validation trips per year. Oftentimes,
multiple validations are conducted on a single trip.
CBP anticipates having 100 Supply Chain Specialists (SCSs) on board
by the end of fiscal year 2005. Each SCS is expected to complete 17
validation trips per year, with more than one validation conducted per
trip. With 100 SCSs on board, CBP anticipates completing 1,700
validation trips per year. When fully staffed with SCSs, CBP could
complete 2,669 validation trips per year.
Question. Last year, the Committee was informed that validations of
foreign manufacturers would begin in calendar year 2004. Was that
review of foreign manufacturers begun last year (calendar year 2004)?
Answer. During calendar year 2004, CBP initiated 500 validations of
importers' foreign supply chains, which includes foreign manufacturers,
and completed 287.
Validations of the Mexican manufacturer enrollment sector began in
earnest in March 2005. Additional validations of Mexican manufacturers
are being planned for June 2005.

AMERICA'S SHIELD INITIATIVE

Question. The President's fiscal year 2006 Budget includes a
request of $19.8 million for the America's Shield Initiative (ASI).
These funds will allow CBP to begin deployment of next generation
technology for electronic surveillance along our Nation's land borders.
CBP is working on awarding a contract for the integration of ASI
sometime this year. At the same time, CBP needs to operate and maintain
the equipment that is in the field today. There are currently
significant critical operational breakdowns, cameras with unusable
pictures, cameras down due to lightening strikes, camera control
problems, cameras that have been replaced but are missing enclosures.
In fact, the maintenance contract for the current installations lapsed
in September of 2004, and CBP is still working on finalizing the
replacement of those services. What is the plan to get the maintenance
backlog taken care of?
Answer. As noted, CBP is moving ahead with plans to develop and
implement the America's Shield Initiative (ASI), which will provide a
more comprehensive, integrated solution to electronic surveillance the
border. But simultaneously, CBP is still working to ensure that
existing border surveillance infrastructure remains operational. For
example, with regard to operational Remote Video System (RVS)
installations in the field, activities are underway to address repair
issues for operational sites. In addition, data and lessons learned
from these current activities are being used to provide baseline data
towards the development of an interim operations, maintenance, and
repair program. This interim program will provide maintenance and
repair support to existing field equipment pending the development and
implementation of a maintenance and repair program that will support
both existing and new field equipment.
Currently within CBP, the ASI Program Management Office (PMO), the
National Emergency Equipment Repair and Maintenance Program (NEEMR),
and the Tactical Communications Organization (TCO) have partnered to
address several of these repair issues. For example, NEEMR, TCO, and
the ASI (PMO) partnered to address the lightning strike incident that
occurred at the Douglas, AZ Border Patrol RVS site. A team consisting
of these three components responded to repair this installation. That
activity was initiated at the beginning of February and concluded at
the beginning of March. The result of this activity was the repair of
the installation to a pre-lightning strike state, an assessment of
current installation issues, and a collection of significant amount of
baseline data regarding how these components worked together.
Question. When will the maintenance backlog be cleared up?
Answer. Establishing the ASI Program Management Office and the
partnership with the National Emergency Equipment Repair and
Maintenance Program (NEEMR) and the Tactical Communications
Organizations (TCO), and awarding contracts for parts and equipment
repair to original equipment manufacturers has significantly reduced
the maintenance backlog. CBP believes that the maintenance backlog will
be completely eliminated during the summer of 2005.
Question. This fiscal year, the plan for ASI calls for spending $10
million on surge technology. Please provide an explanation of what this
is and what the plans are for this surge technology?
Answer. Surge technology is surveillance equipment that can be
rapidly deployed in self-contained system packages that have the
mobility and deployment capabilities to allow it to be positioned in a
very short period of time to support changes in national operational
needs. The plan at this time is to procure vehicle-mounted ground radar
equipment that is co-mounted with a cooled, thermal imaging system that
can sense and identify a vehicle as well as a human over 5 miles away.
A system of this type will allow the detection and tracking of multiple
items-of-interest and provides vectoring information to agents on the
ground. By virtue of their mobility and transportability, CBP will be
able to deploy these assets to the geographic regions or corridors that
align with the current, nationally-assessed threat environment.
Question. CBP also plans to spend $10.6 million for replacement/
repair of ground sensors in fiscal year 2005. Given that plans are in
place to possibly award an integration contract to upgrade all of this
technology, why are we replacing ground sensors now? Is it possible we
will be replacing these again with something new in just a year or two?
Answer. In the early 1990's, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) modified the spectrum range of commercial and government
frequency usage. As such, CBP is required to change its systems to
support the FCC frequency spectrum allocation requirements. CBP's
Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is purchasing new unattended ground
sensors to further augment its already deployed sensor fleet, to meet
operational objectives, and to meet these FCC requirements.
An objective of this procurement effort is to ensure compatibility
with any future systems that are acquired. Replacement of newly
procured unattended ground sensors in a year or two is not anticipated.
An objective of this procurement is to ensure that these sensors will
readily integrate with future systems.
A cost analysis is being performed regarding the ability to upgrade
our currently deployed unattended ground sensors that were procured and
deployed prior to the FCC frequency spectrum allocation modification.
This effort is also being undertaken in such a manner as to ensure that
these upgrades are made to meet FCC requirements and future systems
integration.
Question. What is the timeline for initiating and completing all
identified ground sensor repairs?
Answer. A proposal has been developed to augment sensor
capabilities in Tucson Sector with 1,240 new digital sensors. As these
sensors are deployed, the ``old'' sensors that are replaced, or rotated
in from the field will, be assessed for redeployment to other Sectors
as needed and in alignment with current enforcement objectives and
national threat assessments. The project is scheduled to begin June
2005, with projected completion March 2008.

AUTOMATED COMMERCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Question. CBP has been working on modernizing the information
technology systems that it uses for some time. The most significant
project is the Automated Commercial Environment, known as ACE. Last
year, CBP released the re-baseline estimate for completion of the ACE
system. The new schedule has ACE being fully deployed in 2011, and
costing an additional $1 billion. How confident is CBP that this new
timeline can be accomplished?
Answer. CBP is confident the project can be completed in that time
frame. That said, the new proposed baseline is presently under review.
CBP will continue to strive to find ways to deliver ACE better, sooner,
and at less cost. In addition, CBP has worked to improve ACE
management. The staffs of legacy systems were merged into the CBP
Modernization Office last December. The merger greatly increased the
number of government staff on the program, as well as available subject
matter expertise and IT project management skills. This will help keep
the program on budget and schedule.
CBP now also has the advantage of working with an operational
system. Release 3, implemented in June 2004, is fully operational and
has already increased the amount of duty collected via Periodic Monthly
Statement from $80,000 in June to over $109 million in February 2005.
The Release 4 pilot in Blaine, Washington although currently
experiencing some technical problems, has processed over 40,000 trucks.
Having these ACE systems operating in ``real-world'' CBP environments
provides excellent experience and feedback for the program team, and
provides a solid base on which to build future capabilities.
Question. What is the status of the pilot in Blaine, Washington, of
e-Manifest Trucks?
Answer. The ACE truck cargo/eManifest pilot was initiated in
Blaine, Washington, on December 12, 2004. The system was very well
received by the CBP Officers in the port, demonstrating a number of
improvements over previous systems. However, system issues were
uncovered, which caused delays in the processing of trucks. This
resulted in a temporary halt to the pilot in late December in order to
implement necessary changes.
The ACE pilot was re-started in mid-January with improved
capabilities and significant streamlining of the cargo screening and
release functions. With these changes, ACE has been processing trucks,
on average, more quickly than the different release systems that had
been in use prior to ACE. Average truck processing times were in the 70
second range.
Additional problems with the pilot were uncovered in early March.
These problems were manifested as a result of the increased volume of
trucks being processed (over 40,000 trucks had been processed with
ACE). The problems have been corrected, and the revised system has been
tested. Since the testing results were positive, CBP re-started the
pilot April 4.
Part of the reason for difficulties with the pilot has been the low
volume of electronic manifests submitted by carriers and service
providers. A combination of difficulties with the CBP eManifest
certification process and the effort required by the trade participants
to make changes to their systems have led to the low participation.
However, for those eManifests that have been submitted, ACE has
performed extremely well, demonstrating the full promise of the system.
CBP is working closely with the carrier community to increase, as
quickly as possible, their use of eManifests.
CBP firmly believes that the current problems with the ACE pilot
will be quickly corrected and the pilot will be operating successfully
in the Port of Blaine. Plans have been developed to expand ACE to
additional ports on the northern and southern land borders. Efforts are
also underway to support 28 new carriers and service providers who have
state their intentions to begin providing eManifests.

AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS--RECAPITALIZATION

Question. A request for funding to begin the re-capitalization of
the Border Patrol air fleet was included in the fiscal year 2006
budget, but there is no request for the replacement of Air and Marine's
fleet. When can we expect to see such a request?
Answer. A program increase for re-capitalization of the Air and
Marine Operations (AMO) fleet is not included in the fiscal year 2006
President's Budget, however, the fiscal year 2006 AMO base budget does
include approximately $55 million for the procurement of replacement
aircraft and deployment of new aircraft to CBP air wings.
Modernization of CBP air and marine assets is a priority in order
to meet expanded missions in the areas of detection, surveillance,
deterrence and apprehension, search and rescue, interdiction and
Airspace Domain Security.
CBP is currently conducting a review of AMO and Border Patrol air
and marine missions, operations and assets with the objective of
determining how best to allocate and manage resources. It is
anticipated that areas of both integrated and distinct aviation and
marine missions will be defined, and opportunities for combining fleet
modernization requirements will be identified. The existing AMO and
Border Patrol modernization plans will be reviewed in the context of
supporting the updated mission needs resulting from the transition
analysis. All opportunities for commonality of aircraft, vessels,
facility locations, command and control, maintenance and procedural
standards are being reviewed. Potential benefits include enhanced
threat engagement, procurement cost efficiencies, reduced life cycle
costs, increased mission readiness and operational performance.
Development of a unified recapitalization plan for all CBP air and
marine assets is will commence following completion of the integration.

WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT

Question. The President's budget requests $18 million for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to double the resources
devoted to worksite enforcement. The President's budget does not
request any additional investigators for this program. Are there a
sufficient number of investigators to pursue any leads or cases that
may be developed?
Answer. ICE's fiscal year 2006 President's Budget requests $18
million for the temporary worker program to fund 140 agents and
investigations training. It is proposed that the agents be assigned to
field offices nationwide primarily to conduct employer audits, examine
and prioritize leads, prepare and deliver Notices of Inspection and
Notices of Inspection Results, and develop employer cases involving
administrative fines. Agents would be assigned to field offices in the
States with the greatest number of unauthorized workers.
The requested resources would enable ICE to increase its presence
at worksites in specific industries and geographical areas,
concentrating on employers who intentionally violate the law or who
have historically hired large numbers of unauthorized workers.
Question. Please provide the Committee with a description of ICE's
current worksite enforcement program, including what authorities are
being enforced and how the program is run.
Answer. ICE worksite enforcement program activities focus primarily
on removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure
facilities to reduce the risk of terrorist attack from insiders. This
may be accomplished through screening and arrest operations to identify
and remove the unauthorized workers, as well as through strategic
partnering with employers and the law enforcement entities controlling
facility access. ICE worksite enforcement activities also target
criminal employers whose violations have a nexus to human smuggling,
immigration document or benefit fraud, and worker exploitation.
The authorities being enforced generally include one or more of the
civil and/or criminal provisions of INA 274A (Unlawful Employment of
Aliens). Many criminal employer investigations also charge violations
relating to harboring, smuggling, and document fraud.
Question. Please provide the Committee with a breakout of worksite
enforcement workload of administrative cases versus criminal
investigations for fiscal years 1999 through 2004, including a breakout
of the FTE devoted to this area by type of employee for those same
years.
Answer. Please see table below.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Performance category --------------------------------------------------------------------------
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Criminal Employer Cases.............. \1\ 182 \1\ 109 \1\ 239 \1\ 21 \1\ 4 \3\ 59
Notices of Intent to Fine Issued..... \1\ 443 \1\ 213 \1\ 141 \1\ 73 \1\ 16 \1\ 3
Number of Fines Collected............ \4\ 890 \4\ 478 \4\ 292 \4\ 115 \4\ 54 \4\ 64
Fine Amounts Collected............... \4\ $3,690, \4\ $2,234, \4\ $1,599, \4\ $509,8 \4\ $212,3 \4\ $118,5
575 181 323 35 22 28
Worksite Arrests..................... \5\ 2,849 \5\ 953 \5\ 418 \6\ 816 \6\ 505 \6\ 642
Investigative Work Years (Work \5\ 278 \5\ 202 \5\ 134 \5\ 152 \5\ 105 \5\ 90
Year=1,695 hours)...................
Case Completions..................... \5\ 3,844 \5\ 1,966 \1\ 1,595 \1\ 2,061 \1\ 1,490 \7\ 523
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: LYNX.
\2\ Source: TECS.
\3\ Calculated utilizing Treasury Enforcement Comms System(TECS) records (criminal employer cases opened).
\4\ Source: Debt Management Center.
\5\ Source: PAS.
\6\ Manually calculated utilizing internal reports submitted by field offices.
\7\ Manually calculated based upon the number of completed cases in LYNX and the number of cases reported closed
in TECS.

VISA SECURITY UNIT

Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $5 million
to expand the Visa Security Unit. The recently submitted ``Visa
Security Program: Annual Report for 2003-2004'' talks about the
critical need for coordination and training with the Department of
State Consular Affairs and CBP. What mechanisms are in place to ensure
that there is the closest possible cooperation in this program?
Answer. The Visa Security Program (VSP) within ICE is responsible
for implementing Section 428(e) of the Homeland Security Act, which
calls for the deployment of DHS officers to visa-issuing posts, unless
such a deployment would not benefit homeland security. One of their
principal duties under Section 428(e)(1) is to provide advice and
training to consular officers regarding specific security threats
relating to the adjudication of individual visa applications or classes
of applications. DHS Visa Security Officers in Saudi Arabia are
currently providing this training, and upcoming deployments of Visa
Security Officers will expand this activity to additional posts. In
addition, ICE and the Department of State have designated points of
contact at Headquarters who coordinate closely on issues including
consular training. A representative from the Visa Security Program has
briefed each graduating class of consular officers since October 2004.
VSP also coordinates with CBP on several operational levels. Visa
Security Officers regularly utilize the National Targeting Center as a
supporting element in their in-depth review of visa applications. In
addition, CBP officers have served temporary details at Headquarters
and in the field. Finally, VSP has opened announcements for permanent
positions to both ICE and CBP officers in order to recruit officers
with a full range of immigration enforcement skills to serve overseas
as Visa Security Officers.
The President's requested increase of $5 million in fiscal year
2006 will fund expanded VSP operations in the field and at
Headquarters, to include its consular training responsibilities.
Question. In August of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security's
Office of Inspector General issued an evaluation of DHS activities to
implement section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. This
evaluation included a number of recommendations to improve the workings
of the Visa Security Officers. What is the status of implementing each
of the recommendations in that report?
Answer. Since the DHS Inspector General's (IG) evaluation in late
2003, shortly after the initial deployment of officers to Saudi Arabia,
Visa Security Program operations in Saudi Arabia have made significant
progress. Of the IG's twelve recommendations, three had been closed at
the time of the report's publication. The remaining nine
recommendations were resolved, and remain open while they are
implemented. Below is an update on each of the IG's recommendations.
Recommendation 1.--Develop a curriculum of homeland security
training for consular officers consistent with the requirement in
Section 428(b)(1) of the Act.
ICE is working to develop homeland security training for consular
officers. A VSP's program development staff member has attended the
Basic Consular Training Program at the Department of State's (DOS)
National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) as a basis for ICE's
recommendations to DOS about consular training. VSP staff also held a
curriculum development conference with training experts from the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) and ICE Academy to plan
the development of the consular training program. Since October 2004,
VSP leadership has been addressing each graduating class from the Basic
Consular Training Program, to introduce them to the visa security
mission and to prepare them to work with Visa Security Officers in the
future.
Recommendation 2.--Develop a training program for Visa Security
Officers (VSOs) that includes foreign languages, country studies, and
interview and fraud detection techniques.
Working with the ICE Academy and FLETC, VSP developed a 4-week
training curriculum for Visa Security Officers, incorporating the IG's
content recommendations. With specific regard to language training,
ICE's VSO selection criteria will continue to emphasize language
ability, and VSP will continue to exercise best efforts to provide
additional language training where necessary.
Recommendation 3.--In coordination with DOS, develop performance
standards to evaluate consular officers.
ICE continues in an audit capacity, to advise DOS on consular
performance evaluation. A VSP staff member recently attended Basic
Consular Training to assess how consular officers currently are trained
and evaluated.
Recommendation 4.--Develop written criteria for assigning VSOs to
other countries.
Closed. ICE established such criteria in early 2004, and the OIG
closed this recommendation as it published the report in August 2004.
Recommendation 5.--Assign responsibility to develop and publish the
report to Congress required by Section 428(e)(4).
ICE/VSP will prepare the report, and BTS will submit the report to
Congress.
Recommendation 6.--Conduct a study of the personnel management
techniques used by other agencies with a global workforce and evaluate
ways to facilitate the overseas rotations of DHS employees.
DHS is continuing to evaluate its international presence. No
specific policy recommendations have yet been announced.
Recommendation 7.--Discontinue the practice of filling the VSO
positions with temporarily assigned officers and move toward filling
the positions with permanently assigned officers.
VSP has announced and selected positions for Saudi Arabia. VSP will
announce permanent positions for all future offices.
Recommendation 8.--Establish criteria for selecting VSOs based on
required experience and skill sets to support the visa security
operation.
Closed. ICE established such criteria in early 2004, and the OIG
closed this recommendation as it published the report in August 2004.
Recommendation 9.--Establish a funding mechanism to ensure that the
visa security operations receive all required support and that DOS is
promptly reimbursed for the support that it provides.
VSP has received funding in fiscal year 2005 for its existing posts
in Saudi Arabia and for expansion to four additional locations. This
will become the base for fiscal year 2006 and the out-years for all
locations opened in or already in operation as of fiscal year 2005. To
facilitate administrative coordination, DOS and VSP recently signed a
Memorandum of Agreement that explains how reimbursements and other
administrative matters will be handled.
Recommendation 10.--Propose a technical correction to Section
428(i) to align it with Section 428(e) and permit DHS to review only
those applications with homeland security interest in Saudi Arabia.
Closed. The OIG agreed with ICE's position that the legal
requirement to review all visa applications in Saudi Arabia should not
be modified. The OIG closed this recommendation as it published the
report in August 2004.
Recommendation 11.--Evaluate the possible benefit of analyzing the
existing visa applications in DOS files of young Saudi males who were
issued visas in the 2 year period prior to September 11, 2001. BTS
should coordinate with DOS, the FBI, and other Federal agencies, as
necessary, before making a determination about whether, or how, to
proceed to analyze the applications.
ICE agrees that there may be value in reviewing certain
applications submitted in Saudi Arabia in the 2 years prior to
September 11, 2001. DHS is still evaluating whether or how to proceed
with such an analysis.
Recommendation 12.--Develop an interface between BTS and DOS
computer systems that permits a fast and efficient method to automate
the visa security name check process and eliminate the duplicative data
entry for database checks.
ICE has been working with DOS to improve information sharing and
access and has succeeded in virtually eliminating the manual data entry
that the IG observed in late 2003/early 2004. VSP is working with DOS
to further enhance regular information sharing and expects the new
process to be in place in the third quarter of fiscal year 2005.

OVERHEAD COST SHARING

Question. Last fiscal year and this fiscal year, ICE plans to
charge a portion of the headquarters overhead costs to the Federal
Protective Service (FPS) and the Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). On what
basis were the overhead charges calculated to ensure that those
organizations were paying for services they received on a basis
proportionate to their usage?
Answer. Early in the fiscal year, FPS and/or FAMS were expected to
provide funding for overhead based for the actual costs for services.
The headquarters (HQ) overhead costs are allocated to the ICE
components using full-time equivalents (FTE), at the beginning of the
fiscal year, to construct the proration percentages. Following a review
of the overhead costing issue for the FAMS and FPS, a final decision
was made that the FAMS and FPS would only pay for services actually
being utilized. However, they will not be assessed an overhead charge
in fiscal year 2005.
Question. Will this become a permanent charge to FPS and FAMS? If
so, why are no additional resources being requested to ensure that the
funds are available to pay these bills?
Answer. All ICE Programs, Projects and Activities (PPAs) should be
expected to share HQ overhead costs for the overhead services that ICE
provides. However, for fiscal year 2005 there will not be an assessment
for FPS and FAMS.
HQ overheads are covered out of base appropriated funds.
Additionally, every new enhancement request includes funds for HQ
overhead in the modular costs used to compute the enhancement.
Question. Will this have an adverse impact on the ability of the
FAMS to maintain its staffing levels?
Answer. No, the FAMS are not being assessed an overhead charge.

FUGITIVE OPERATIONS

Question. The President's budget requests an increase of $8.8
million to expand the capabilities of the fugitive operations teams. In
answer to questions submitted after last year's hearing, ICE stated
that the strategic plan called for the elimination of the 400,000
fugitive backlog within 10 years based on significant increases in the
fugitive program.
What impact are the continued funding shortfalls having on the
Office of Detention and Removals' ability to implement that plan?
Answer. ICE continues to track and apprehend fugitives and continue
to surpass goals and previous year's statistics. However, some existing
teams need additional staff that have not yet been hired, and no new
teams have been deployed. When corrected later this year, this delay
will have no effect in meeting the 10-year plan.
Question. Does the fiscal year 2006 budget request include
sufficient resources for ICE to continue making progress in locating
and deporting absconders?
Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2006 Budget will allow ICE to show
significant progress in locating, apprehending and removing absconders.
Question. Has ICE been able to move ahead with the data integrity
projects related to the absconder records despite the funding
situation? What results have been seen from the data integrity
projects?
Answer. ICE has been investigating data integrity issues with the
records of absconders. ICE drew random samples of records of aliens
with an unexecuted order of removal that did not indicate that the
alien was an absconder. There are approximately 130,000 such alien
records (does not include aliens with an acceptable reason for an
unexecuted order). The samples indicated that almost 70 percent of
those aliens were absconders. The absconder statistics have been
revised accordingly. DRO estimates that the absconder population on
September 30, 2004, was 465,353 aliens.
ICE believes that the new data system to track aliens in removal
proceedings (EREM) will address many of the data integrity concerns.
The data system will be easier to use which will encourage completeness
and accuracy. It will also be more tightly integrated with the work
process used in an alien's case.

FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS

Question. On January 27, 2005, ICE announced the creation of the
Federal Air Marshals (FAMS) Advisory Board. The advisory board will
provide information and recommendations on key FAMS policy and
operational issues. Some of the issues the FAMS Advisory Board will
initially address are hiring, dress code, technology, the FAMS role in
airport security and the FAMS career ladder within ICE. When does ICE
expect that the advisory board will begin making recommendations on
some of these issues?
Answer. While it is difficult to predict with specificity when the
FAMS Advisory Board will be prepared to make recommendations, the Board
is currently meeting on a regular basis. One of the objectives of the
Board is to increase the pace of the FAMS integration into ICE. To that
end, the Board hopes to be in a position to make recommendations in the
near future.

INSTITUTIONAL REMOVAL PROGRAM

Question. What progress has been made in transitioning the
Institutional Removal program from the Office of Investigations to the
Office of Detention and Removals?
Answer. In the planning for the transition of responsibility from
the Office of Investigations (OI) to Detention and Removal Operations
(DRO), a review of performance standards and available resources was
completed.
This review found less than 50 percent of criminal aliens were
being identified and removed from the United States (comparing State
Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) numbers to the Performance
Analysis System (PAS)).
The prior performance standard based on the number of aliens
removed is not reflective of the function of the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP). The performance standard for DRO will be the percentage of
incarcerated foreign born screened for removal. A performance level of
90 percent of all foreign-born incarcerated in Bureau of Prisons, State
department of corrections and mega-counties (areas with populations
over 1 million) will provide a high level of coverage throughout the
United States. Smaller population areas would be encouraged to
participate in 287(g) programs or video teleconferencing with newly
established VTC centers.
After careful consideration, DRO determined that a state-by-state
approach would be the most effective way to ensure a successful
transition. By approaching the transition on a State level, staffing
plans and proactive communications with relevant State agencies can
enhance the productivity and workflow.
The State of New York was determined to be the first State to
transition because of the existing work force available in DRO to
assist in covering the City of New York. DRO assumed sole
responsibility for the City of New York Department of Corrections (NYC
DOC) on December 17, 2004. With ten facilities, one satellite facility
in Bronx, 120,000-130,000 inmates admitted annually and with an average
daily population of 15,000, NYC DOC is one of the largest detention
programs in the United States.
The transition at NYC DOC has been remarkably smooth and in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2005, improvements have been substantial.
In the last quarter of fiscal year 2003, prior to the transfer, 921 of
3,542 incarcerated aliens were screened (26 percent). In the first
quarter of fiscal year 2005, there were 1,866 of the 2,696 incarcerated
aliens screened (69 percent). Though well below the stated performance
level; significant progress has been made without additional staffing.
As staffing becomes available, NYC DOC operations will achieve the
target level of screening.
The State of New York effort has provided an excellent blueprint
for subsequent transfers, and using the lessons learned, DRO has
completed transfer plans for California, Florida, Illinois, Arizona and
New Mexico.
Question. Are there other ways ICE could be working with State and
local officials to improve communication in order to identify
incarcerated aliens in a more timely manner?
Answer. In the planning for the transition of responsibility from
the Office of Investigations (OI) to Detention and Removal Operations
(DRO), a number of possible communications enhancements have been
explored by DRO.
The most basic approach to improve communications is and continues
to be open, face-to-face dialogue with the local and State officials to
determine the needs and requirements of both parties, to establish an
approach to accomplish the mutual goals, and to maintain an open line
of communication between the parties.
During the planning for the State of New York, ICE met with State
officials that oversee the entire New York State Department of
Corrections, Parole and Probation and the State Police. These
discussion have led to an enhanced streamlined approach to processing
aliens, centralized release of aliens to ICE custody, created a
procedure for State of New York Parole to compare information and
update their information based on removal information and opened the
dialogue to continue improvements in the areas of conviction documents,
appeal processes in State courts and new procedures for automated
immigration status checks. Dialogue has already been started with the
State of California and a meeting between ICE/DRO and the Assistant
Chief of Staff of the Governor's office has been planned for the end of
March.
ICE has also investigated whether the 287(g) program by State and
local governments is another opportunity to train local law enforcement
in the authorities as well as what the information provided to them
means. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and supportive data
bases can be confusing to experienced officers, much less individuals
that have not had years of experience in these issues. The formalized
training allows for concise communication of status to ensure proper
enforcement of the INA. Expansion of the 287(g) program has a direct
impact on the DRO program through the additional identification of
individuals amenable to removal.
The PEGASUS program is operated under a COPS grant and allows a new
venue to share information with local and State authorities. The
program provides Sheriffs and municipal law enforcement with secure
access to other participating law enforcement agency databases. Through
recent presentations, DHS is considering how best to incorporate parts
of our databases to assist identification of aliens amenable to removal
as well assist DHS in our mission. The databases in question would
definitely include the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) and would
allow an automatic data search system via a ``pointer system''. The
possibilities of an automated system would greatly enhance the
identification of aliens in removal proceedings and those already
removed. The extent of the data sharing that DHS is willing to consider
is still under review.
The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) continues to provide a
one-stop location for searching several data systems. The LESC,
currently operated by OI, accepts queries from a multitude of law
enforcement agencies and sends responses back to the originating
agency. In cases where the alien in question is identified as a
removable alien, a detainer is placed by the LESC for the local DHS
office to pursue appropriate removal action.

FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE

Question. The Federal Protective Service (FPS) has been in the
midst of a very difficult transition from the General Services
Administration's (GSA) financial management system to that of ICE.
Given the financial problems of ICE, which extend to not having
proper internal fund controls, why wasn't more consideration given to
having FPS continue to use the GSA financial system for at least 1 more
year, or until eMERGE2 was ready?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Under
Secretary for Management, initially directed that the FPS transition
from the GSA financial management system be completed by October 1,
2003. Following the initial review of the unique financial management
requirements needed to support the FPS offsetting collections program,
the transition date was extended to October 1, 2004. At the time that
this decision was made, ICE felt that the additional year for planning
the transition would be sufficient to avoid any major problems. The GSA
and ICE Financial Management staffs worked closely to plan for a smooth
transition. However, the technical financial and accounting differences
between the GSA and ICE financial systems proved to be much greater
than either agency had anticipated. The ICE Financial management staff
has been following an aggressive plan and timetable to complete the FPS
transition by September 30, 2005.
With regard to the specific financial situation, specific planning
milestones called for a successful transition of FPS to ICE, as agreed
with GSA, FPS and ICE. This plan was successful, with the only
contributing factor being data transmission problems from GSA. That
situation exacerbated payment problems in the ICE transition. Much of
the data from the GSA financial system has had to be manually uploaded
into the ICE system, requiring additional quality assurance steps to
maintain the highest level of data integrity.
Question. The current remediation plan for fixing the financial
problems at FPS call for the reconciliation of payments to be finished
by March 31, 2005. How will this plan solve all of the problems and
ensure that contractors will get paid in a timely manner?
Answer. In addition to a full reconciliation of FPS payments, ICE
is convening a high level working group to address the financial
problems at FPS. This group will evaluate and make appropriate changes
in the business process flow to ensure that contractors are paid timely
and that financial events are properly and timely recorded. ICE will
continue to work with GSA to resolve any discrepancies in the balances
transferred. A full reconciliation of financial activities is
anticipated by September 30, 2005.

HUMAN SMUGGLING

Question. What is ICE doing in the area human smuggling? What has
happened in the Carreto case that was the subject of a recent CBS News
report?
Answer. Recognizing that global human smuggling is of the nature of
organized crime, ICE has employed Task Force methodologies to attack
and dismantle the operations and networks that profit from these
crimes. An example of this methodology is Operation ICE Storm in
Phoenix, Arizona. ICE, in conjunction with partners in the Federal,
State, local and foreign law enforcement community, has initiated a
task force to address widespread violence, kidnapping, extortion, and
other crimes associated with human smuggling. By vigorously applying
its money laundering authorities, ICE and our State and local and
partners in Arizona have deprived human smuggling organizations of
nearly $7.3 million of their criminal proceeds. Since the inception of
ICE Storm in October 2003, over 320 persons have been prosecuted for
human smuggling and related crimes and over 170 firearms have been
seized. Over 6,700 smuggled aliens have also been arrested and removed
from the United States.
ICE is fully supporting the Arizona Border Control (ABC)
Initiative, which was developed to focus on criminal organizations and
supporting infrastructures that are currently exploiting the Arizona
region. ICE's role in this initiative, which is being coordinated
closely with other BTS components as well as State, local and foreign
law enforcement agencies, focuses on interdiction and investigation
efforts to target human and contraband smuggling organizations
operating near the Arizona/Mexico border. To date, a total of 635
individuals have been prosecuted as a direct result of those
enforcement efforts. In addition to what has already been seized under
ICE Storm, approximately $2.1 million in U.S. currency has been seized
and 26 weapons have been removed from the streets.
Since July 2004, ICE has implemented the LAX Initiative, which was
developed to address the human smuggling organizations using the Los
Angeles International Airport. This operation targets not only the
vulnerabilities of airline and border security, but related financial
institutions and support industries directly affected by the identified
criminal activity. ICE has seized approximately $1.2 million in U.S.
currency, 486 undocumented aliens have been arrested, and there have
been 11 Federal prosecutions in connection with these enforcement
efforts.
At this time, we cannot comment on the Carreto case, since it is an
ongoing criminal investigation.

BACKLOG REDUCTION PLAN

Question. CIS has reduced the benefit application backlog to 1.5
million cases, down from a high of 3.8 million cases in January of
2004. What is the plan for maintaining a 6-month average processing
time--once dollars are no longer specifically set aside for this
purpose?
Answer. USCIS is in the process of reengineering its business
practices to ensure that it will be more efficient and effective. USCIS
also plans to invest in IT transformation efforts, including a new case
management system, to build the necessary infrastructure to ensure that
backlogs do not return for the foreseeable future. Finally, USCIS has
recently completed an in-depth staffing requirements analysis which
will ensure that each USCIS office receives the appropriate amount of
staff necessary to maintain the 6-month cycle time standard.
Question. What assurances do we have that the productivity gains
are not coming at the expense of quality, that the right decisions are
still getting made by the adjudicators?
Answer. Backlog elimination efforts will not come at the expense of
national security or adjudicative integrity. USCIS has struck a solid
balance in this area by ensuring that processes facilitate legal
immigration, while preventing those who would misuse the system from
entering or remaining in the United States. It is imperative that the
integrity of the benefits process not be compromised in the effort to
stimulate additional productivity.
Efforts to benchmark and assure quality are at the heart of every
production initiative. For example, USCIS is committed to attacking
benefit fraud and has created an Office of Fraud Detection and National
Security (FDNS) specifically to lead USCIS efforts in this area. FDNS
will assist USCIS adjudicators in verifying applicant and petitioner
information, and will work cooperatively with ICE to ensure that fraud
schemes are identified and referred to ICE for criminal investigation
and prosecution. USCIS field officers have been instructed to issue
Notices to Appear for removal proceedings in instances where an
applicant or beneficiary has attempted to defraud the government.

CUSTOMER SERVICE

Question. In order to improve customer service, CIS is working on
improving the ability of beneficiaries to interact with the Department
of Homeland Security electronically. USCIS has now expanded electronic
filing to support 50 percent of the total volume of benefit
applications. When is the next expansion of the online filing of
benefit applications planned?
Answer. The e-filing system currently includes 8 application form
types, which represent approximately 50 percent of the USCIS workload.
The e-filing application volume has doubled each year since its
inception. The current phase entails enhancing system functionality and
capabilities, which will include accepting Premium Processing filings
of the Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140) in the third
quarter of this fiscal year.
Question. Which applications does CIS plan to add next?
Answer. USCIS intends to expand e-filing, but has not yet
determined which applications will be targeted for the next e-filing
phase.
Question. What are the current plans for re-designing and re-
launching the CIS website?
Answer. USCIS is creating a consolidated ``Customer Service
Portal'' to integrate and align all public-facing USCIS websites. The
current USCIS web configuration of ``core'' USCIS.gov content was
completed in 1998. While the core content is continually refreshed, its
underlying information architecture (IA) has never been refreshed.
Moreover, three additional USCIS customer service websites, each adding
a valuable new service, were appended onto USCIS.gov. However, their
development was not integrated into the core website due to technical
limitations at the time.
This new project will enhance the ability to manage the USCIS.gov
web content; enforce the DHS branding guidelines; standardize the
presentation of all USCIS.gov web content as being part of ``One Voice,
One Face, Many Channels,'' and help initiate the development of a
comprehensive USCIS-wide web governance.
The development of the USCIS customer service portal will be
conducted in phases. The initial phase of the project seeks to enhance
USCIS.gov content by developing a comprehensive information
architecture (IA) within which all current and anticipated USCIS.gov
web content and e-services may be organized. The initial phase includes
standing up a refreshed, customer-oriented USCIS.gov in the newly
developed environment, with emphasis placed on the requirements of the
USCIS Office of Communications. Additional phases will concentrate on
the development of the consolidated web portal, and the requirements of
other organizations providing content to USCIS.gov and integrating, to
the degree possible, content from the three service-oriented websites,
InfoPASS, Customer Relationship Interface System (CRIS), and e-Filing
into USCIS.gov. As of March 2005, the project has been funded by the
USCIS Senior Review Board. A Statement of Work for all phases of the
project is currently being drafted, and USCIS anticipates awarding the
contract in fiscal year 2005.
Question. What is the status of the initiative to begin electronic
adjudication of Temporary Protected Status applications?
Answer. The electronic adjudication of Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) applications began with the re-registration of TPS applicants
from Honduras and Nicaragua on November 6, 2004, and continued with
applicants from El Salvador on January 5, 2005. The next designated TPS
country eligible for electronic adjudication is unknown at this point
in time.

OFFICE OF FRAUD DETECTION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Question. Please provide a detailed update on the establishment and
expansion plans for the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security
(FDNS).
Answer. USCIS Director Eduardo Aguirre created the Office of Fraud
Detection and National Security (FDNS) to implement two high priorities
that support the USCIS mission:
--Conducting effective background checks on persons seeking
immigration benefits, and;
--Detecting and combating immigration benefit fraud.
Background: In fiscal year 2004, FDNS developed and implemented a
joint anti-fraud strategy and initiative with the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). To support this effort, the FDNS
developed the necessary policies, procedures, and organizational
structure. This included incorporating the staffs of the Service Center
Fraud Detection Units (FDU) with the allocation, deployment, hiring,
and training of over 150 new employees at field and headquarters
locations throughout the interior United States starting in fiscal year
2004. The present staff of the FDNS is 222 permanent and term
appointment employees. Of the new employees, 110 are field office
Immigration Officers located within Districts, Sub-offices, Regional
offices, and Headquarters. Within the FDUs and Headquarters, FDNS has
61 Intelligence Research Specialists and 30-term appointment
Investigative Assistants. The remaining staff provides administrative
and management support to the field officers and are located within the
FDUs and Headquarters offices. Utilizing fees generated from the H-1B
and L Visa Reform Act of 2004, USCIS plans to fill 160 FDNS positions.
These new positions will enable FDNS to make adjustments to current
staffing and provide specific levels of support for both the anti-fraud
and national security operations.

Fraud
The primary objective of the anti-fraud operation is to detect and
combat immigration benefit fraud by referring articulated leads to ICE
for criminal investigation, and conducting administrative inquiries
when ICE rejects a request for investigation. The primary duty of an
FDNS Immigration Officer (IO) is to review fraud-based leads referred
by adjudicators and other sources. This review consists of performing a
variety of system checks, including data mining; conducting field
administrative inquiries, which includes interviewing various entities;
and supporting criminal investigations conducted by ICE and
prosecutions by U.S. Attorneys. It also includes placing individuals in
removal proceedings when fraud is verified, collecting and analyzing a
variety of intelligence data, and posting look-outs on individuals
involved in fraud conspiracies. By removing cases containing elements
of fraud from the mainstream adjudications process, adjudicators are
able to concentrate their expertise on applicants and petitioners
deserving of, and eligible for, the benefits sought. Thus, this anti-
fraud effort will improve the quality of adjudications, increase
productivity, and reduce cycle times. The 160 new positions will enable
FDNS to:
--Place FDNS IOs in the largest districts and each center, where the
overwhelming majority of immigration benefit fraud exists, as
well as in most of the sub-offices.
--Put a position in the Department of State's Fraud Prevention
Program Office in Washington, DC, to enhance inter-departmental
fraud detection and planning efforts.

National Security
Shortly after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, USCIS
implemented a policy requiring the completion of background checks on
applicants, petitioners, beneficiaries, and other individuals seeking
immigration benefits. The National Security Unit has developed, and is
implementing, a new policy and process pertaining to the
identification, reporting, and resolution of IBIS national security
hits. The Interagency Border Information System (IBIS) is the primary
tool used to conduct background checks on applicants, petitioners,
beneficiaries, and other individuals seeking immigration benefits.
Currently, FDNS is conducting a pilot to test the electronic/paperless
resolution of background checks and the entry and check of all aliases
at the front end of the adjudication process.
Question. How are the relationships working with the Department of
State and Immigration and Customs Enforcement?
Answer. ICE and the Department of State (DOS) have a productive
working relationship and coordinate on issues of visa security as well
as critical law enforcement issues often involving foreign governments.
For example, ICE is working closely with DOS to develop and implement a
``diplomatic'' strategy to encourage several countries to accept
repatriation of their citizens when they are ordered removed from the
United States. Additionally, ICE works closely with DOS and other
agencies as members of the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center to
synthesize intelligence, law enforcement and other information to bring
effective international action against smugglers, traffickers of
persons and criminals facilitating terrorists' clandestine travel. In
U.S. embassies around the world, a network of ICE attaches, who with
DOS, are working with their counterparts in foreign law enforcement
agencies combating transnational crimes involving national security,
financial, smuggling, illegal arms exports, forced child labor, child
pornography, human trafficking, intellectual property rights,
commercial and immigration fraud violations. ICE looks forward to
continuing and expanding the collaborative relationship with DOS to
further safeguard our borders and the American people.
Question. Please explain what the FDNS fraud tracking system will
be? Who will have access to this system? What are the timeline and
major milestones for development of the system?
Answer. FTS Requirements:
--The ability to maintain and report on fraud lead and case data in a
central repository that is available at a national level to all
FDNS staff and authorized external agencies
--The ability to reference benefits application data related to the
subject of a case
--The ability to share case and lead data on validated fraud cases
with fraud investigators at ICE
--The ability to perform reactive and ad-hoc data searches against
benefits claims data
--The ability to perform data mining analysis on benefits claim data
--The ability to define fraud profiles and apply them against
incoming application receipts
--The ability to track fraud profile matches and analyze data
commonalities
--The ability to generate and report information for management use
--The ability to generate and automatically report G22 statistics for
FDNS
Access.--FTS is being sized to accommodate up to 500 simultaneous
users. This will accommodate the current 222 FDNS field staff,
supervisors, managers and support staff located in geographically
disparate locations nationwide, but also potential expansion. It will
also accommodate information sharing with other agencies such as the
FBI, CIA, Department of State, and other DHS and intelligence entities
with need to access this information for national security and law
enforcement purposes.

MILESTONES AND TIMELINES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Days Start End
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discovery Stage................................................. 7 2/18/05 3/17/05
Design Stage.................................................... 13 2/18/05 3/25/05
Configuration Stage............................................. 18 3/10/05 4/04/05
Validation Stage................................................ 15 3/22/05 4/11/05
Deployment Stage................................................ 4 4/12/05 4/15/05
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Question. Please provide a detailed plan for the development and
rollout of the benefit fraud assessment tool, including timelines and
milestones.
Answer. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (CIS) Fraud
Detection and National Security (FDNS) Unit will implement a Benefit
Fraud Assessment program (BFA). This program was approved in February
2005, and will be implemented in various phases through October 2005.
ICE supports FDNS conducting the BFA so that ICE can direct its
resources to investigating/prosecuting actual benefit fraud violators.

OFFICE OF CITIZENSHIP

Question. Please provide the following information regarding the
Guide for New Immigrants: which languages will the guide be produced
in; how many will be printed in each language in the initial run; how
will the guides be distributed electronically and physically; what is
the timeline for translating the guide into each of the planned
languages; and what is the timeline for producing hard copies in each
language.
Answer. To ensure that immigrants from a variety of language groups
have access to the Guide, the Office of Citizenship will translate the
English version of the Guide into ten (10) languages--Spanish, Chinese,
Vietnamese, Tagalog, Portuguese, Russian, French, Korean, Haitian
Creole, and Arabic.
Hard copies of the Spanish and English versions of the Guide will
be available for purchase through the Government Printing Office (GPO),
and all other versions will be accessible online. In order to initially
market the product, the Office plans to print approximately 250,000
copies of the English guide and 150,000 copies of the Spanish guide.
In addition of the current availability of the English Guide online
(additional languages to be posted as translations are completed) the
Office is coordinating a national mailing list of community and faith-
based organizations, immigration service providers, State and local
contacts and adult educators in an effort to disseminate the Guide
nationally. USCIS Community Liaison Officers and local field Directors
will also receive copies of the Guide for additional local
dissemination. GPO order forms will also be included as part of the
dissemination effort. In addition to planned dissemination efforts, the
Office also plans to implement a comprehensive outreach/public
education effort in key communities. These events will be strategically
located according to where the centers of the various foreign language
communities are. Plans include high-profile events in: Los Angeles for
the Spanish version (May); San Francisco for the Chinese, Tagalog, and
Vietnamese versions (May); New York City for the Russian and Korean
versions (July); and Detroit/Dearborn for the Arabic version (August).
Spanish translation should be completed in April; Chinese, Tagalog
and Vietnamese will be completed in May; Russian, Korean and Arabic
will be completed in June; and Portuguese, Haitian Creole and French
will be completed in July.
Hard copies of the English and Spanish guides will be available in
June. All other translation will be available online late summer. There
are currently no plans to print hard copies of the additional
languages.

STAFFING

Question. Please provide a complete FTE staffing plan for fiscal
year 2005 and 2006, including but not limited to; location (i.e.,
District Office, Service Processing Center, etc), position type (i.e.,
Immigration Information Officer, Adjudicator, etc), and physical
location (i.e., Burlington, VT; Dallas, TX; etc).
Answer. Please see tables provided below.

Question. Please provide a breakout of attrition rates for each of
fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 by type of position and location.
Answer. USCIS only has attrition rates for fiscal year 2004. For
the major position types, they are:
--Adjudications Officer: 2.3 percent
--Asylum Officer: 6.1 percent
--Asylum/Adjudications Clerk: 2.3 percent
--Immigration Information Officer/Customer Service
Representative: 1.2 percent
Data is not available by location.
Question. Please provide a chart with the numbers and types of
employees that have been trained at Glynco, GA for each of fiscal years
2003, 2004, and 2005.
Answer:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Position type Fiscal year 2005
2004 (estimate)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adjudication Officer.................... 751 1,098
Asylum Officer.......................... 116 170
Immigration Information Officer......... 142 207
Other................................... 58 85
-------------------------------
Total............................. 1,067 1,560
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year 2003 data is not available.

CALL CENTERS

Question. Please provide a chart with the number of contractors
assigned to each call center for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
Answer. USCIS does not determine the number of contractors assigned
to each contract call center. Under our contract, the vendor is
required to have sufficiently trained staff to meet our performance
requirements, and is responsible for determining the placement and size
of each of its operations.
Question. Please provide a chart for each of fiscal years 2004 and
2005 of the total number of calls received by call center, broken out
by type of call.
Answer. USCIS has two kinds of call centers. Contract call centers,
which provide initial live assistance, and USCIS staffed call centers,
which answer questions that cannot be answered by the contract staff.
Our contract call centers operate as one. We do not route calls to
our general customer service line based on the nature of the call, but
based on agent availability. Calls are routed to the next available
agent with the appropriate language skills regardless of location.
Thus, staff scheduling, availability and performance affect call
routing, not the nature of the call. USCIS, therefore, does not track
information by type of call.
The table below shows the volumes and percentage of live assistance
calls handled by staff at each of the four (4) contract call centers
for fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 (through mid-March).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 2005 (through mid-March)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Volume Percent Volume Percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Phoenix, Arizona................................ 1,269,059 16.0 531,867 17.1
Lawrence, Kansas................................ 1,534,164 19.3 636,945 20.4
Corbin, Kentucky................................ 4,800,717 60.5 1,809,688 58.1
Arlington, Virginia............................. 334,911 4.2 138,153 4.4
Total live assistance calls handled by contract 7,938,851 .............. 3,116,653 ..............
call centers...................................
Total calls received to USCIS................... 21,295,256 .............. 8,454,022 ..............
Percent of total calls that were handled by .............. 37.3 .............. 36.9
contract call centers..........................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

______

Questions Submitted by Senator Ted Stevens

ICE--CYBER CRIME CENTER

Question. Last year, $4.2 million was secured in the fiscal year
2005 Homeland Security Appropriations Act to expand the ICE Cyber Crime
Center to ICE field offices. Are these funds at risk of being diverted
to address the base budget shortfall within ICE this fiscal year?
Answer. At this time, it is ICE's intent to execute the entire $4.2
million in fiscal year 2005 for the purpose for which it was
appropriated.

IMMIGRATION SERVICES

Question. With the split of immigration and enforcement functions
precipitated by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
Alaska's capitol, Juneau, was left with no personnel to provide
immigration services. Without immigration services, immigrants are
forced to fly to Anchorage to access services. What steps have been
taken by the Homeland Security Department to ensure Juneau's need for
immigration services will be met?
Answer. Since the creation of USCIS, the agency has met the needs
of Juneau and other distant communities of Alaska by sending an officer
2 or 3 times each year on periodic circuit rides to conduct benefits
interviews, naturalization ceremonies, and community outreach. USCIS
has recently expanded the circuit rides to 4 times a year, even though
there were only 400 Naturalization and Adjustment of Status cases in
the entire District in the first quarter of this year. The most recent
trip was in November 2004, and there are trips to Juneau scheduled for
April, August, and October of 2005. The current cycle times are just
over 6 months for naturalization, and just under 6 months in Adjustment
of Status cases.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Pete V. Domenici

LAND PORT OF ENTRY

Question. America has 197 land ports of entry, and it has been
almost 20 years since we launched a major effort to upgrade
infrastructure at those ports. That last effort occurred in 1986--
almost 15 years prior September 11, 2001.
Since September 11, we have placed increasing emphasis on upgrading
protective measures for our airports, seaports, and critical
infrastructure. It is imperative that we also improve land port
security if we are going to be successful in the war on terror. To that
end, I intend to introduce a bill which will authorize additional funds
for investment in our Nation's border crossings.
Have you considered what kinds of improvements are necessary at our
land ports of entry and how much these upgrades might cost?
Answer. CBP has initiated a Construction Master Planning Process
that will allow for increased security at the Nation's borders by
providing critical facility and infrastructure improvements that are
prioritized using a rigorous capital investment planning process.
The planning methodology and resulting allocation of construction
projects will optimize available resources to support the expanded
methods of CBP operations and comprehensive border enforcement
strategy. The construction planning process aligns with the DHS mission
and strategy, forecasted future growth, identify and justify required
projects and estimate their associated costs. The CBP Construction
Master Planning Process was developed in response to the reporting
requirements included in House Report 108-774 and House Report 108-541.
Question. Based on your experience at CBP, what do you believe are
the three top priorities for securing our land ports?
Answer. Since September 11, 2001, CBP has tightened procedures for
entry into the United States at all ports of entry, based on three
strategic priorities:
--Advance Information and Risk-Targeting.--CBP has moved forward with
programs that provide information regarding cargo and
passengers as far in advance of arrival to the United States as
possible, and systems to review this information and develop
targeted response to high-risk cargo and individuals. These
programs and systems include C-TPAT, CSI, advance cargo
manifests, Advance Passenger Information Systems, all screened
through our National Targeting Center.
--State of the Art Technology.--CBP is investing in state-of-the-art
technology, including non-intrusive radiation detection
systems, making additional information systems available to
inspectors at the ports of entry, and addition of biometric and
other systems to enhance security.
--Training.--CBP has significantly revised and reprioritized our
training for CBP Officers based on operational priorities,
beginning with the establishment of anti-terrorism protocols
for all ports of entry and developing and implementing anti-
terrorism training for all CBP Officers.
Question. Specific improvements are needed at the Columbus port of
entry in New Mexico, and I understand that the General Services
Administration (GSA) has proposed that construction on the Columbus
project begin in 2007 or 2008. Do you support GSA's recommendation and
will you keep the project on track for construction?
Answer. CBP has requested GSA to modernize and expand the border
station in Columbus, NM. The existing facility constructed in 1987, is
a full service port of entry with pedestrian, non-commercial and
commercial traffic. It is the only 24-hour border crossing point for
pedestrians and privately owned vehicles in New Mexico. The facility is
in need of significant renovation and expansion to safely process the
increased volume of traffic that has occurred since originally
constructed.
CBP has requested GSA to include this project at the earliest
opportunity. If approved for design in fiscal year 2007, construction
should begin in fiscal year 2009.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby

OPERATION PREDATOR

Question. Mr. Secretary, first, let me thank you again this year
for ICE's efforts to stop the exploitation of children. I understand
that Operation Predator has had many successes and I am glad to hear of
its achievements. I believe it is a critical program and I hope it
continues to be successful. We should continue to do all within our
power to ensure that children around the world are protected from those
individuals that would harm them and shamelessly exploit them for
simple pleasure and monetary gain.
To that end, I ask that you share with the Committee some of ICE's
other efforts to eliminate the abuse and exploitation of children. I
know that you have many partners in this effort. I would appreciate you
expounding on your opening statement as to what ICE is doing and who
you are working with to accomplish these goals.
Answer. In addition to Operation Predator, ICE attempts to
eliminate the abuse and exploitation of children by enforcing the laws
related to Forced Child Labor (FCL). ICE has implemented a proactive
outreach schedule targeting an audience comprised of leaders in
domestic industry and their employees/agents responsible for foreign
purchases and related internal security procedures. Our goal is to
educate this community, promote voluntary compliance, and encourage
vigilance and reporting of suspected violators. The ICE FCL program
staff regularly attends other United States Government agency, foreign
government, and non-governmental organization functions related to
forced or indentured child labor. In particular, FCL program staff
attends and participates in monthly meetings with the National Child
Labor Coalition, an organization that exists to serve as a national
network for the exchange of information regarding children in an effort
to end child labor exploitation by promoting progressive initiatives
and legislation; established contacts with various domestic industry
trade show representatives and coordinated participation in commodity
specific events; and published the Forced Child Labor Advisory and
accompanying pamphlet, produced in English and translated into 5
foreign languages for distribution in training and outreach activities.
ICE currently has 20 open investigations related to allegations of the
importation of products manufactured or produced with forced or
indentured child labor. During fiscal year 2005, three new
investigations were opened, twelve were closed, and one investigation
is in pending status.
During 2004, ICE hosted two international symposiums on FCL and
related child exploitation issues as defined in the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 182. These symposiums hosted in Singapore
and Johannesburg, South Africa, were geared at educating foreign law
enforcement partners on U.S. laws, promoting information sharing, and
enhancing networking vital to successful investigations, and included
presentations and training on: Forced Child Labor, the Protect Act and
Operation Predator, Child Pornography, Basic Computer Forensics and
Investigative Techniques, and Child Sex Tourism. In addition, at the
Johannesburg, South Africa conference, a block of training was
conducted by ICE on human smuggling and trafficking particularly with
regard to children on the African continent.
In regard to human smuggling and trafficking into the United
States, ICE does not keep statistics delineating children versus
adults. However, in terms of all human trafficking (men, women, and
children), many of these victims are lured from their homes with false
promises of well-paying jobs; instead, they are forced or coerced into
prostitution, domestic servitude, or other types of forced labor. ICE,
with its wide range of authorities, expertise and capabilities attacks
human trafficking organizations through the aggressive use of human
trafficking, smuggling and money laundering statutes, as well as
identification and seizure of criminal proceeds and assets. Each and
every allegation received by the ICE FCL program is researched,
analyzed, and referred to the appropriate domestic or foreign office
for further investigation. ICE's education and outreach process
provides guidance to ICE agents in distinguishing the clear differences
between human smuggling violations and human trafficking. This process
has enabled ICE agents, our State and local law enforcement partners
and community groups to better understand and identify trafficking
violations and to better care for victims. ICE office of investigations
has also conducted extensive outreach and training with our law
enforcement partners abroad. Coordinating with the ICE Attaches in
numerous countries, ICE works to combat trafficking organizations, in
source and transit nations, as well as in the United States.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Question. Among each of your roles, is the charge to secure our
borders and to control illegal immigration. Estimates of the number of
illegal immigrants range greatly. Some say 8 million others say
millions more. I believe that we all know that 8 million is an
extremely conservative estimate.
What is your best estimate on the number of illegal aliens
currently residing in the country?
Answer. It is estimated that the number of illegal aliens currently
residing in the country is most likely between 11-12 million.
Question. How many new illegal aliens entered the country last
year?
Answer. The total for ``first time'' illegal aliens, in fiscal year
2004, making entry into the United States between the ports of entry is
608,073. These numbers are derived from using the data provided in the
Enforce Integrated Database (EID). This data is based on persons
identified by biometric data (fingerprints) as first time
apprehensions.
Question. Is that an increase or a decrease from the previous year?
Answer. There was a 20 percent increase in first-time
apprehensions/entries into to the United States in fiscal year 2004
compared to fiscal year 2003.
Fiscal year 2004--608,073.
Fiscal year 2003--504,889.
Question. If we are so uncertain about the numbers, doesn't that
seem to indicate that we are not doing enough to secure our borders and
our homeland?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is enhancing and
planning operations in areas along the borders which pose the greatest
threat to national security. With the development and implementation of
the Border Patrol's National Strategy, a measured but aggressive
approach is being taken to increase border security. The guidelines and
goals outlined in the National Strategy have been translated into the
CBP/USBP implementation plan.

VISA OVERSTAYS

Question. Another major problem with our immigration system is the
fact that many of those people currently counted as illegals actually
entered the country legally, but have overstayed their visas.
Does the Department have any recent numbers on visa overstays?
Answer. The US-VISIT Program Office conducted an analysis of
biometric entry and exit data for the first 9 months of the program
(January 5, 2004 to September 30, 2004) and initially, the findings
indicate that, for visa holders on whom biometrics are collected at
both entry and exit, nearly 90 percent exit the country before their
periods of admission expire. In addition, US-VISIT's preliminary
findings show that there is no exit record for less than 1 percent of
these visa holders. Due to current limitations in capabilities to
capture complete entry and exit data on all visa holders, the small
sample size, and the abbreviated period covered by the analysis, US-
VISIT is unable to provide more detailed findings.
Question. How many temporary visa holders never return to their
home country?
Answer. Except for the preliminary information mentioned in the
previous question, US-VISIT does not yet contain all the technological
elements that would readily provide this type of status information.
However, according to a report from the Office Immigration Statistics
using data from the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), a total of
23.6 million nonimmigrant departures were recorded by NIIS during 2003.
Of those, 22.1 million or 94 percent were matched to an arrival and
showed valid arrival and departure dates.
The proportion of all admissions matched varies among the broad
categories of admission. Short-term visitors had the highest match rate
(95 percent), followed by diplomats and other representatives (93
percent), students and temporary workers (88 percent), and expected
long-term residents (87 percent). Records missing the category of
admission have the highest non-match rate (48 percent) but as a group
represented less than one percent.
The report also gives length of visit estimates. Nonimmigrants
included in NIIS who departed in 2003, remained in the United States an
average, or mean, of 34 days, or just under 5 weeks, per visit. The
median length of visit was 8 days, indicating half of all departing
nonimmigrants remained in the country for 8 days or less. Over 95
percent of departing nonimmigrants remained for less than 6 months per
trip, with approximately 4 percent remaining between 6 months and 1
year, and 1 percent remaining 1 year or more.
Question. Can you tell us what percentage of the total illegal
population is visa overstays?
Answer. It is very difficult to accurately estimate either
population. The fiscal year 2006 US-VISIT budget request includes $24
million for the person-centric view that would begin the transformation
of these systems so as to provide timely and accurate visibility to all
DOS and DHS officers associated with the visa process regarding those
who chronically overstay, or are overstaying for extended periods.
Question. Given that these people make up a large percentage of our
illegal population, has any consideration been given to strengthening
the vetting process? What I mean by that is, if a large percentage of
those people obtaining visas are not returning do you think there a
breakdown somewhere in the process?
Answer. Managing the entry, stay and departure of alien visitors is
a major component of controlling our borders and requires collecting
information regarding the movement of aliens in, through, and out of
the United States. The information in the US-VISIT system is available
to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at ports of entry,
special agents in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
adjudications staff at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS)
services offices, U.S. consular offices, and other law enforcement
agencies. Such information allows these officers to identify and take
action against those who violate the law, to locate individual aliens
of interest to law enforcement entities, to validate the immigration
status of aliens so that only eligible persons receive immigration
benefits, and to intercept terrorists and other persons who should not
be allowed into the country. Additionally, the United States Government
(USG) will be able to use this data to make informed policy and
management decisions regarding enforcement prioritization,
participation in visa waiver programs, or immigration benefit programs.
Collecting exit information through US-VISIT will strengthen the
vetting process by giving officials who issue visas timely, accurate
and comprehensive visibility into an applicant's compliance patterns,
so that appropriate action can be taken on the visa request. Once all
of the elements of the exit/entry system are in place (i.e., at all
land, air and sea points of entry, including immigration status
information capabilities), we will have the ability to accurately
assess and investigate the overstay population.
Question. Following-up on that what is your agency doing now and
what are you planning to do in the future to ensure that this does not
continue to be a problem?
Answer. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS the
responsibility for several significant national security programs/
initiatives to track nonimmigrant aliens' compliance with the terms and
conditions of their admission to the United States. These programs/
initiatives include: the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS), the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System
(NSEERS), and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) program. ICE formed the Compliance Enforcement
Unit in June 2003, to investigate criminal and administrative
violations identified through these programs. The CEU receives violator
data from these programs/initiatives, analyzes the data and sends
proactive investigation requests to field offices to locate and remove
the violators. The CEU will continue to exploit the benefits of these
programs/initiatives.
Additionally, the fiscal year 2005 budget provides for the hiring
of additional ICE criminal investigator positions to be assigned to
compliance enforcement units across the country. ICE plans to staff
these additional positions in field offices to support compliance
enforcement investigations generated by the ICE Headquarters CEU. The
positions will support compliance enforcement of the US-VISIT, NSEERS,
and SEVIS programs based on current enforcement need projections.
Question. I know that US-VISIT is slowly being implemented.
What progress has been made to date and what assurances can you
give us that we know who is legally entering the United States?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has met the December
31, 2003, and December 31, 2004, Congressional deadlines to deploy an
entry-exit program that strengthens security and facilitates travel for
legitimate visitors while protecting their privacy and ensuring the
integrity of our immigration system. In conjunction with the Department
of State's Biometric Visa Program, we are creating a continuum of
security measures that begins before individuals enter the United
States and continues through their arrival and departure from the
country. US-VISIT also works with commercial carriers to receive
notification of passenger lists before passengers arrive in and depart
from the United States.
Since its beginning on January 5, 2004, US-VISIT has implemented
entry procedures at 115 airports, 14 seaports, and in the secondary
inspection areas of the 50 busiest land ports of entry. In September
2004, US-VISIT was expanded from individuals with visas to include
processing of visitors traveling to the United States under the Visa
Waiver program. US-VISIT processed over 20 million foreign travelers
from January 5, 2004, to February 24, 2005, and has prevented 536
criminals and immigration violators, including Federal and State prison
escapees, from gaining admission to the United States.
US-VISIT is protecting our visitors by making it virtually
impossible for anyone else to claim their identity should their travel
documents to be stolen or duplicated. Our fingerprint matching system
has an accuracy rate (True Acceptance Rate or TAR) of 99.6 percent for
one-to-one verification and a TAR of 96 percent for one-to-many
identification. DHS is currently working with National Institute of
Standards and Technology and industry leaders on several initiatives to
examine mechanisms to increase the level of accuracy.
Later this summer, US-VISIT will conduct tests using automatic
identification (Radio Frequency Identification Technology or RFID) at
land ports of entry to capture entry/exit information. US-VISIT is on
track to deploy entry procedures to the remaining land ports of entry
by December 31, 2005, meeting the Data Management Improvement Act
(DMIA) mandate.
The work of US-VISIT will extend far past these current efforts. In
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Congress
included requirements and actions to be taken by DHS, the Department of
State and US-VISIT with the goal of completing a biometric entry and
exit data system as expeditiously as possible. US-VISIT is preparing a
Strategic Plan that will describe how a single, unified approach to
immigration and border management--a U.S. Immigration and Border
Management Enterprise--will look and operate in the future. The Plan
will include the overarching vision for how the United States
Government will manage immigration and its borders, as well as how
data, facilities, and information technology will contribute to the
Enterprise mission.
Question. Conversely, I believe it is important that we know who is
leaving the country. Specifically, that ties directly into the visa
overstays. If we know that people are leaving we will have a very good
accounting of the number of folks that have chosen to stay here
illegally. Can you tell us what progress has been made on implementing
the exit portion of the program?
Answer. In the air and sea environments, DHS is currently
collecting biographic arrival and departure data through electronic
manifests submitted by the transportation carriers and is using this
data to identify alien travelers whose authorized periods of admission
have expired and for whom no matching departure information is
available. This information is already being shared with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). US-VISIT is working
collaboratively with the ICE Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) to
research existing data limitations and develop protocols and procedures
to effectively vet these records through additional data sources to
develop more complete, accurate and actionable information.
Additionally, US-VISIT is conducting pilots to determine the most
effective means of capturing exit information.
Airport and Seaport Pilots.--US-VISIT is currently piloting three
alternative methods of biometric departure confirmation at one seaport
(Miami International Cruise line Terminal) and eight airports (Chicago
O'Hare; Baltimore Washington International; Denver International;
Dallas/Fort Worth International; Newark Liberty International; Luis
Munoz International in San Juan, Puerto Rico; San Francisco
International; and Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County). DHS anticipates
making a decision on the best method(s) to implement shortly, and
determining a schedule to expand biometric exit.
Automated Land Border Entry-Exit.--Later this spring, US-VISIT will
begin testing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. Using
an automatic identifier, RFID technology can detect a visitor at a
distance and provide primary inspection with entry information as well
as provide a mechanism for an accurate and timely record of exits. By
July 31, 2005, testing will begin at the ports of Nogales East and
Nogales West in Arizona, Alexandria Bay in New York, and the Pacific
Highway and Peace Arch in Washington. Testing will continue through the
spring of 2006.
Question. When does the Department expect the entire program to be
fully operational?
Answer. DHS will complete deployment of an initial biometric-based
entry and exit program at all U.S. ports of entry by the end of 2005,
meeting the requirements established by legislation. It is important to
note that the Data Management Improvement Act, which established the
majority of initial deadlines, only required the integrating of
existing arrival and departure information--it did not require the
collection of new information, such as biometrics. The Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act contained a requirement to
biometrically compare and authenticate certain travel documents by
established dates. DHS, recognizing the importance of biometrics in the
process, added the requirement to collect biometric information, and is
establishing additional procedures, beyond those required by statute,
to enhance security.
Ultimately, US-VISIT will manage data on foreign nationals covering
their interactions with U.S. officials before they enter, when they
enter, while they are in the United States, and when they exit. This
comprehensive view of immigration and border management will create a
virtual border and will improve interactions with foreign nationals. In
its strategic plan (required under the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004) US-VISIT will describe how the U.S.
Immigration and Border Management Enterprise will look and operate in
the future.
Question. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me how many people were
detained or deported for overstaying their visas last year? Does ICE
take proactive measures towards apprehending overstays?
Answer. Statistics obtained from ICE's administrative booking
system, ENFORCE, revealed that in fiscal year 2004, 3,784 nonimmigrants
were processed for removal from the United States under the charge of
INA 237(a)(1)(C)(i), violation of nonimmigrant status or condition of
entry. The INA does not have a specific charge for visa overstays. The
above number will include individuals that violated their nonimmigrant
status by overstaying their visa, as well as other nonimmigrant
violators. These other nonimmigrant violators include: student visa
violators, individuals found working without authorization, and
nonimmigrants that have violated their status by committing a crime.
The Compliance Enforcement Unit (CEU) receives violator data from
NSEERS, US-VISIT, and SEVIS. The CEU analyzes the data and sends
proactive investigation requests to field offices to locate and remove
the violators. In fiscal year 2004, the CEU sent out over 2,050 visa
overstay leads generated by NSEERS, US-VISIT, and SEVIS to ICE SAC
offices throughout the country. The CEU will continue to receive and
assign overstay leads to ICE SAC offices for investigation.
Question. What are the ramifications and penalties for overstaying
a visa? There must be a way to keep track of these folks.
Answer. A nonimmigrant that has failed to maintain the status in
which he/she was admitted, or fails to comply with the conditions of
any such status, to include nonimmigrants that stay beyond their period
of admission, is subject to removal from the United States under the
charge of INA 237(a)(1)(C)(i), violation of nonimmigrant status or
condition of entry.
DHS implemented the US-VISIT program in January 2004, to address a
Congressional mandate to implement a nationwide entry-exit tracking
system. Once fully implemented, US-VISIT will biometrically document
the entry and exit of all foreign visitors to the United States. The
CEU works closely with the US-VISIT Program to identify potential visa
overstay violators and to conduct the necessary follow up
investigations.

BORDER SECURITY

Question. Every year, I travel to every county in Alabama to hear
the issues of my constituents and one of their greatest and most
frequent concerns is immigration and more to the point illegal
immigration. Every year I feel compelled to tell my constituents that
while we are making progress we are nowhere near where we need to be.
What is the Directorate doing to make our borders more secure and
to eliminate the influx of illegal aliens?
Answer. ICE is a key player--along with our partners at U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS)--in the Department's mission to secure the
borders and restore integrity to the Nation's immigration system. That
is a mission ICE takes very seriously--as the tragic results that can
follow when those wishing to do us harm breach the Nation's border
security and exploit immigration laws. The key to this effort is
prioritization--systematically attacking the most serious threats
first. Specifically, ICE has made the apprehension and removal of
dangerous criminal aliens and national security threats our top
enforcement priority. This is not to suggest that ICE does not fully
and consistently enforce the law in other situations but that ICE
focuses on addressing the serious threats that individuals with
possible terrorist associations, fugitive alien absconders, violent
criminal aliens, sexual predators, and others pose to our communities,
our families, and our Nation. ICE's objective is to strategically
target our resources and authorities on the most dangerous aliens in
order to remove them from the streets before they can do harm.
It's a strategy that is getting results. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
removed more than 160,200 aliens with more than half of them having
prior criminal convictions and 18 fugitive absconder teams across the
Nation who apprehended more than 11,000 fugitives last year. ICE
created a ``Most Wanted'' list of the most dangerous criminal aliens,
which has been a valuable tool for generating tips and leads. From the
original list, nine of the ten were captured within a few weeks, and
the tenth was determined to have already left the country. Under ICE's
``Operation Predator,'' which targets pedophiles, child sex tourists,
and child pornographers we have arrested more than 5,000 child sex
predators who exploit children for pleasure or profit. Approximately 40
percent of the predators arrested under this program have been illegal
aliens, and an additional 20 percent have been visitors to the United
States who were ``out of status,'' meaning that they had overstayed or
otherwise violated the terms of their admission.
Another priority is to dismantle criminal organizations that
smuggle and traffic human beings for profit. In fiscal year 2004, ICE
arrested more than 1,630 human smugglers. Operation ICE Storm, an
initiative launched in 2003 to target violent human smuggling networks
in Arizona, has brought charges against more than 300 defendants and
resulted in the seizure of more than $7 million. This unprecedented
seizure of alien smuggling proceeds is a direct result of the
combination of ICE's immigration and customs authorities (particularly
customs expertise in financial crime investigation). Law enforcement
authorities in Arizona have credited Operation ICE Storm with a
dramatic decrease in alien-related kidnappings and other violent crime
in the Phoenix metropolitan area.
ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) responded to more than
603,000 immigration status inquiries from Federal, State, and local
authorities in fiscal year 2004 and placed more than 15,000 immigration
detainers with police agencies nationwide allowing ICE to more
efficiently remove aliens from the United States once their jail term
has expired. ICE is also fostering innovative new relationships through
our 287(g) program, which delegates authority for immigration
enforcement to State and local law enforcement. Under the terms of
Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Sec. 113, April
30, 1996), State and local authorities can request this authority for
their jurisdictions. Once this agreement is in place, ICE provides
officers with a 5-week training program in immigration issues, and
provides supervision and support for State and local officers engaged
in immigration enforcement. These authorities are currently in effect
in Florida and Alabama.
The examples above are just a sampling of the critical immigration
enforcement accomplishments of ICE. By aggressively enforcing our
immigration laws and targeting criminals, ICE seeks to deter criminal
and terrorist organizations that threaten our way of life. ICE will
continue to work with its partners at the Federal, State, and local
levels to secure the borders and protect the homeland.
Question. How many aliens have been detained and deported in the
last year?
Answer. Based on data reported in the Deportable Alien Control
System (DACS), as of January 2005, ICE removed/deported 161,090 aliens
in fiscal year 2004. This number of final order removals is made up of
criminals and non-criminals, detained and non-detained aliens. This
does not include any voluntary removals, nor does it include any
expedited removals, largely handled by the bureau of Customs and Border
Protection. Virtually all of these removals were detained at least 1
day prior to their removal.
Based on data reported in DACS, as of January 2005, 235,449 aliens
were detained at some point during fiscal year 2004. Some of these
aliens were detained and then released to the community (bond,
supervision, recognizance, etc). Others were granted voluntary
departure, or transferred to other law enforcement agencies. Finally,
some are still in detention for various reasons.
Question. If a Mexican citizen looking for work can pay a fee to a
coyote to traverse our border, what is to keep a terrorist that would
do us harm from doing the same thing?
Answer. ICE recognizes that criminal organizations operating
worldwide are responsible for smuggling and trafficking tens of
thousands of illegal aliens and thousands of pounds of illegal
narcotics into the United States. These organizations generate millions
of dollars in illicit profits that are moved through wire services,
laundered through front businesses and transported out of the country.
By exploiting vulnerabilities in border integrity, criminal
organizations, whether they smuggle humans, illegal narcotics, illegal
arms, or other contraband, are an unquestionable threat to the security
of the United States.
ICE has developed a full range of investigation and enforcement
methodologies to confront the problem at every point--in source and
transit countries, on the seas, at the Nation's borders and ports, and
in the U.S. interior. In U.S. embassies throughout the world, ICE
Attaches work with consular officials and with foreign law enforcement
to better coordinate investigations, gather intelligence and follow the
money trail to seize millions of dollars in profits from these
organizations. ICE is also integrating intelligence and enforcement
efforts and is mobilizing other governments and international
organizations in the fight against human smuggling and trafficking.
ICE has played a significant role in the newly established Human
Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC). The HSTC is a joint initiative
between the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State,
the Department of Justice, and members of the national Intelligence
Community. The HSTC serves as an intelligence fusion center and
information clearing-house, with the goal of converting intelligence
into effective action.

TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAM AND BACKLOG ELIMINATION PROGRAM

Question. I remain very concerned with the so called Temporary
Worker Program that the President has proposed. Last January, we heard
about this program and despite the claims to the contrary it seemed a
lot like amnesty. The only difference I can see is that the illegals
must have jobs in the United States. Beyond that, these people will be
given permission to work and stay even if only temporarily, in the
United States despite the fact that they are under the law, criminals.
I told you last year that I do not believe in rewarding bad behavior
and I still feel the same way today. Under this plan, over 8 million
people would have an instant status adjustment. I find this
particularly troubling considering the severe backlog of people who are
following the law and waiting sometimes years to be allowed to come to
the United States.
Director, I know you spoke about the efforts to eliminate the
backlog in your testimony and I do appreciate the progress made, but
there is much more to be done.
What are we going to do to rectify these problems?
Answer. The President has stated a Temporary Worker Program (TWP)
must be guided by four basic principles: that America must control its
borders; that immigration laws should serve the economic needs of our
country; that we must not give unfair rewards to illegal immigrants in
the citizenship process or disadvantage those who came here lawfully,
or hope to do so; and, that new laws should provide incentives for
temporary, foreign workers to return permanently to their home
countries. In designing such a program, we must remain mindful of these
principles--and, in doing so, address the common and important concerns
that you point out.
The President is also committed to achieving our backlog
elimination goals by the end of fiscal year 2006, which USCIS is on
track to achieve. A well designed and managed and funded Temporary
Worker Program would not adversely affect our backlog elimination
efforts. To ensure this outcome, the TWP program design must be
cognizant of a variety of factors, including current benefit
authorities, options for cost recovery via fees, eligibility criteria,
employer/government partnership opportunities, and application process
requirements.
Question. I understand that the backlog at different service
centers varies, in some cases by months if not years, what is the
problem and how do we fix it?
Answer. USCIS has recently submitted a report to the Congress on
this subject, which speaks to a staffing analysis recently completed
that will help guide the distribution of resources to ensure that
Service Centers can meet and maintain backlog elimination goals.
Question. I am also painfully aware that my abilities to assist my
constituents through casework has been greatly hindered since at least
September of 2003 when the Alabama Delegation contacted the Secretary
regarding staffing at your Atlanta office. To date, my staff has
trouble receiving prompt replies to inquiries made in Atlanta. Often we
can do little more than provide them the information they already have
available to them through your website. What can we do to ensure that
congressional inquiries to your service offices are acted on promptly?
Answer. USCIS places a high priority on effectively serving its
customers. Members of Congress and their staff often contact the agency
in order to facilitate the resolution of constituent immigration
casework. Many times, it is through a congressional inquiry that a case
that has gone off track is identified and resolved. Often these
inquiries can help us identify trends where changes in operational
practices or policies would be appropriate.
Each USCIS District Office and Service Center has staff dedicated
to working with congressional staff. USCIS Congressional Relations has
established national standards for responding to congressional
inquiries. Telephonic inquiries should be acknowledged or resolved by
close of business the next business day, written inquiries should be
responded to within 30 days and email inquiries should be responded to
within 10 days. Atlanta has been meeting these standards. Still, there
are extenuating circumstances where the complete resolution may take
longer or where there may be information identified in national
security background checks that cannot be disclosed to congressional
offices on individual applicants in order to ensure that ongoing
investigations or national security are not compromised.
When we identify a customer service or operational problem specific
to a particular field office, a multi-programmatic Field Assessment
Team is deployed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of operational
effectiveness and responsiveness identifying areas needing improvement,
action plans, and specific follow up. In the case of the Atlanta
District, such a study was conducted and follow up takes place on a
monthly basis. In addition, USCIS has conducted a field study to
determine workload and workforce allocation. Through this study, many
offices were identified as understaffed and new staff is being hired.
As a result of this study, the Atlanta District will be hiring new
adjudications staff this year. As new staff come on board and backlogs
are reduced, the need for congressional inquires should likewise
diminish. The Atlanta District has informed us that they are current
with all congressional inquires. If there are any outstanding cases
within your office we would be happy to work with your staff on
resolving those cases.

IMPORTED SHRIMP INDUSTRY

Question. I know actions are being taken against the imported
shrimp industry in response to a dumping determination by the ITC and
Dept. of Commerce. Can you tell me what efforts ICE and CBP are being
taken in regards to the dumping of shrimp?
Answer. Although the Department of Commerce (DOC) and U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) share the joint responsibility for
antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) orders, the
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of these orders
belongs to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).
In July 2004, CBP amended its continuous bond guidelines
specifically for agriculture/aquaculture AD/CVD merchandise as a
response to the high-risk nature of these imports. A significant number
of shipments were found to have circumvented the AD/CVD cases through
incorrect country declarations, undervaluation, and insufficient surety
bond coverage, thereby preventing CBP to collect the appropriate duties
and make the proper distributions.
The first new case affected by these amended guidelines is shrimp
from China, Vietnam, Thailand, India, Ecuador and Brazil. CBP has
performed a risk-based analysis on the continuous bonds used by
importers of this product to identify circumvention schemes and sham
companies. To date this effort has been successful, with CBP revoking
over 100 continuous bonds for failing to respond to requests for
information. CBP has also worked closely with many importers who are
willing to comply with the new bond guidelines to appropriately set new
bond amounts to cover the potential financial risk associated with the
AD/CVD entries. In addition, CBP is also monitoring imports associated
with this case on a monthly basis to identify new importers, misuse of
more favorable AD/CVD rates, misdescription of goods, all to avoid
paying proper AD/CVD duties.
CBP is also deploying field officers located at Southeast Asian
attache offices to determine if the production capabilities exist for
this commodity. When problems are discovered, CBP will make the
appropriate referral to ICE for further investigation and action.

BORDER PATROL VEHICLES

Question. As you know, the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security
Appropriations conference report calls for a comprehensive border
patrol vehicle fleet management plan by February 8, 2005. Can you
please inform the Committee of the status of this report, and
specifically the findings with respect to extreme terrain border
regions?
Answer. CBP has developed a draft comprehensive plan that was
delivered to the Committee on June 28, 2005. Field implementation of
the extreme terrain program has begun. The Program consists of four
steps: (1) terrain mapping; (2) the evaluation and development of an
off-road vehicle fleet; driver training; and sector management
orientation. The first step, terrain mapping, involves retrofitting
severe and enhanced mobility vehicles with specialized equipment to
measure and pinpoint terrain severity using a global positioning
system. Agents who have received advanced off-road training operate the
vehicles in performing their regular duties, and CBP thus obtains
accurate information about terrain severity that will be used to
develop the optimal off-road fleet. A total of 10 Border Patrol Sectors
were selected for the terrain mapping step in this Program. Mapping
started in San Diego Sector in June 2004, and has been expanded to
include the El Centro, Yuma, and Tucson Sectors. The following
additional Sectors are scheduled to begin mapping this fiscal year:
Marfa, El Paso, El Rio, Laredo, McAllen, and Blaine.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM: FURTHER EXTENSION

Question. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002, which President Bush signed into law on May 14, 2002, established
October 26, 2004, as the deadline by which the 27 existing ``visa
waiver'' countries must have machine readable passports in order for
their citizens to enter the United States without a visa. The Congress
passed legislation last year pushing back that deadline until October
26, 2005.
Does the Department believe that additional time is required for
these visa waiver countries to come into compliance with the machine
readable passport requirements? If so, has authorizing legislation to
achieve this goal been introduced?
Answer. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act
provisions are related to machine-readable passports that are tamper-
resistant and incorporate biometric and document authentication
identifiers that comply with applicable biometric and document
identifying standards established by the International Civil Aviation
Organization. Last year the Administration requested a 2-year extension
of the deadline requiring Visa Waiver Program (VWP) nationals to
present biometric passports. Congress provided a 12 month extension to
give countries designated to participate in the VWP additional time to
implement the required passport changes. Given that, DHS and DOS have
continued to work closely with VWP participants to review the progress
that has been made toward compliance with the new requirement and
deadline. We will be able to report on this progress to Congress
shortly, though there are still concerns with the current deadline. I
look forward to working with you to determine the best solution to both
enhance the security of the VWP and enable facilitation of legitimate
travel.
Question. Former Secretary Ridge stated in one of his departing
interviews that the United States most likely should impose the same
requirements regarding biometric identities on U.S. passports. Has the
machine readable requirement imposed on foreign visas resulted in
negative treatment of U.S. travelers abroad?
Answer. The Visa Waiver Permanent Program (Public Law 106-396)
imposed a requirement that VWP travelers have machine-readable
passports (with the biographic, not biometric, data being available in
a standard manner) for VWP entry on or after October 1, 2007, and that
participating VWP countries certify that they are issuing machine-
readable documents no later than October 1, 2003. Public Law 107-56,
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 advanced the deadline for use of machine-
readable travel documents by VWP applicants from October 1, 2007, to
October 1, 2003, but provided for the Secretary of State to waive the
requirement until October 2007. In September 2003, the Secretary
extended the deadline for individuals to present machine-readable
documents to October 26, 2004. The requirement for nationals of VWP
countries to present machine-readable passports to enter the United
States under the VWP after October 26, 2004, has not resulted in any
reported negative treatment of U.S. travelers abroad.
Additionally, U.S. visas now contain biometrics (i.e. two
fingerprints and a digital photograph). European Union nations are
discussing options for implementing biometric visa programs as well.

IMPACT OF BUSH AMNESTY ON BACKLOG REDUCTION/WORKLOAD

Question. Your agency's budget request states that, if Congress
provides the minimal discretionary funding you are requesting, you are
on track to meet the goal of reducing to 6 months the processing
backlog for immigration documents.
The President continues to advocate for an amnesty for illegal
aliens already resident in this country under the guise of an
immigration reform proposal. I am concerned about the impact on your
meeting these backlog reduction targets of any immigration proposal. We
discussed this issue at last year's hearing, and you responded that any
impacts on your agency's goals and operations would depend in large
part on what Congress did in response to the President's immigration
``reform'' proposal. He raised the immigration issue again in his State
of the Union address. However, we in the Congress continue to await his
``proposal''. When will Congress get the President's immigration reform
proposal and what impact would his immigration ``proposal'' have on
your backlog reduction proposal?
Answer. The President has outlined his vision for a Temporary
Worker Program (TWP) and said that it must be guided by four basic
principles: that America must control its borders; that immigration
laws should serve the economic needs of our country; that we must not
give unfair rewards to illegal immigrants in the citizenship process or
disadvantage those who came here lawfully, or hope to do so; and, that
new laws should provide incentives for temporary, foreign workers to
return permanently to their home countries. The key to processing
temporary worker petitions quickly and efficiently is simplicity in the
design. A well designed and managed Temporary Worker Program would not
adversely affect our backlog elimination efforts. To ensure this
outcome, the TWP program design must be cognizant of a variety of
factors, including current benefit authorities, options for cost
recovery via fees, eligibility criteria, employer/government
partnership opportunities, and application process requirements.
Question. Rep. Sensenbrenner has promised to attach his immigration
bill (H.R. 418) to the Emergency Iraqi War Supplemental. This bill
includes many of the provisions in the original House draft of the
Intelligence Reform Act.
Unlike some rhetorical Bush Administration amnesty, the specifics
of this legislation are known. If the provisions of this bill are
included in the Supplemental or some other piece of legislation, what
impact would it have on your agency's abilities to meet your backlog
reduction goals?
Answer. This bill would not impact USCIS' ability to meet backlog
elimination goals.

CIS LOCAL OMBUDSMAN

Question. Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act called for the
establishment of at least one CIS ombudsman's office in each state. Has
CIS complied with the Act? If not, when does the Department plan to do
so?
Answer. HSA 452 establishes the Office of the Citizenship and
Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISO), an entity independent of USCIS
and reporting directly to the DHS Deputy Secretary. HSA 452(e)(1)(A)
states that the Ombudsman shall have the responsibility and authority
``to appoint local ombudsmen and make available at least one (1) such
ombudsman for each State.''
For fiscal year 2005 the CISO is authorized a total of 24 full-time
employees (FTE), and the majority of these employees are planned to be
onboard during the third quarter of the fiscal year. For fiscal year
2004 the CISO was authorized a total of eight (8) FTE. The fiscal year
2006 Budget maintains the CISO at the 24 FTE level.
The CISO has established a ``Local Ombudsman Pilot Program'' which
is partially staffed at present but planned to be fully staffed by
April 30, 2005. The pilot program is to design and develop a workable
local ombudsman office which will have specific operational
responsibilities over a defined geographic area. The pilot program will
establish personnel certification and training requirements, determine
liaison responsibilities and limitations, finalize facilities
requirements and provide a controlled model for future local ombudsman
office placements. The pilot program will commence upon the arrival to
CISO of the new hire personnel to complete the staffing of the pilot
local ombudsman office (``Beta Office''). The pilot program is
estimated to last for a minimum of 9 months, however that time may
expand or contract depending on the results attained. The following is
a list of tasks to be accomplished during the pilot program:
--Develop personnel job descriptions based on actual job
requirements.
--Conduct a task and skill analysis for each job position to
determine the required skills and knowledge for incumbents, as
well as to determine individual training requirements for
incumbents.
--Design and develop a local ombudsman training and certification
program.
--Determine the requisite support equipment necessary for local
ombudsman operations.
--Determine the most efficient data transfer arrangement between the
Beta Office and the Ombudsman Information Management System
(OIMS) to allow for: (1) inquiries and USCIS actions to be
received by the Beta Office from OIMS; (2) Beta Office inputs
to OIMS; (3) and statistical data and analyses provided in both
directions.
--Develop and establish inter-office and intra-office liaison
methodologies and procedures, with particular emphasis on: (1)
Beta Office to Analysis Branch; (2) Beta Office to Executive
Officer staff; (3) Beta Office to OIMS staff; (4) Beta Office
to USCIS office(s) in geographic area of responsibility; and
(5) Beta Office to individuals/employers as appropriate.
--Develop reporting vehicles for Beta Office operations and
productivity.
--Baseline Beta Office operations, duties and tasks under appropriate
quality assurance standards.
--Develop and produce procedural manuals to baseline Beta Office
operations, duties and tasks.
--Other tasks to be identified throughout the pilot program duration.

NATIONAL BORDER SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Question. The Heritage Foundation issued a December 13, 2004 report
entitled ``DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,''
which made a number of recommendations. One of them recommended that
the Department of Homeland Security ``conduct a national assessment of
the resources required for effective border security.''
Given the comments by Deputy Secretary Loy and other about the
threat facing our borders from a variety of groups, including Al Qaeda,
is the Department actively conducting such an assessment and, if not,
why not?
Answer. Under the goal of Prevention within the United States
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, one of the primary
objectives is to: ``Secure our borders against terrorists, means of
terrorism, illegal drugs and other illegal activity. We interdict
terrorist activities by targeting unlawful migration of people, cargo,
drugs and other contraband, while facilitating legitimate migration and
commerce. The Department will enforce border security in an integrated
fashion at ports of entry, on the borders, on the seas and before
potential threats can reach our borders. Through the continued
deployment of the appropriate balance of personnel, equipment and
technology we will create ``smart borders.'' Not only will we create
more secure United States borders, but in conjunction with
international partners, we will extend our zones of security beyond our
physical borders identifying, prioritizing and interdicting threats to
our Nation before they arrive. We will develop and provide resources
for a cohesive, unified enforcement capability that makes our border
security effective, smarter and stronger.''
DHS operating elements all share in this requirement and are
conducting assessments within their area(s) of responsibility. For
example, the Border Patrol has developed America's Shield Initiative,
which will methodically assess the highest risk illegal border crossing
corridors and, taking into account the topography and other natural
barriers, allocate an efficient suite of aerial or ground sensors,
personnel and equipment, to best secure the areas between the ports of
entry. At the ports of entry, CBP is using and developing enhanced
targeting systems and personnel to inspect the highest risk cargo,
people and conveyances. In addition, radiation portal monitors are
being deployed at our ports to screen cargo for potential weapons of
mass effect. One of the tools enforcement officers at the border also
employ is the United States--Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) program which incorporates biometrics (finger
scans) into entry documentation to ensure we are only letting in those
visitors with valid visas who have been cleared against terrorist
watchlists and data bases holding fingerprints for criminals. Our
national drug control strategy and related annual drug budget also
contains information on the trans-national drug threat and resources
devoted to combating this problem which complements our border security
initiatives. These are a few examples of the family of plans, periodic
reviews, acquisitions and programs that collectively contain the
assessments and resource requirements for national border security.
Annually, those requirements work their way through the budget process
producing allocations to address the highest priority security
concerns.

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

Question. Last year, Congress provided $5 million for a worksite
enforcement program. For fiscal year 2006, you are requesting $18
million for the same purpose. How have you used the fiscal year 2005
funds? Please describe how the requested fiscal year 2006 funds will
contribute to immigration enforcement.
Answer. ICE will increase its presence at worksites, concentrating
on employers in specific industries and geographical areas who
intentionally violate the law or who have historically hired large
numbers of unauthorized workers. ICE will also coordinate with
Citizenship and Immigration Services to improve and expand verification
services (Basic Pilot Program) to employers nationwide pursuant to the
Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003.

DETENTION BEDSPACE

Question. For the current fiscal year, Congress provided funding to
fill 20,660 detention beds--yet the total beds that you are filling
each week thus far is averaging 2,000 below the funded total. Why are
these beds not being filled? What types or categories of aliens are not
being held?
Answer. ICE Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) is detaining
within its budget.
National security cases and criminal aliens are ICE's priority in
immigration enforcement. Daily, ICE is at 100 percent capacity of its
available allocated funding for detention bed space, the majority of
those detained being criminal aliens. This aggressive enforcement
posture is reflected in last year's record 160,284 alien removals,
including record 84,400 criminal aliens removed from the United States.
ICE conducts case-by-case determinations on who will be processed for
removal and who will be detained or released. ICE must also carefully
consider the conditions of release and factor in community safety
especially with regards to criminal aliens. ICE will continue to
aggressively enforce immigration laws against criminal aliens and other
aliens who pose security threats to the country and expects to continue
to achieve increased removals.
Question. Please provide the cost assumptions ICE would use
regarding hiring the first year (fiscal year 2006) authorized level in
the Intelligence Reform Act (800) for ICE investigators as well as the
fiscal year 2007 annualization of those positions. Also, please provide
the same information for the costs associated with meeting the first
year authorized levels for detention bedspace (8,000).
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Budget includes substantial increases
for increased detention and removal activities. The fiscal year 2006
Budget includes $90 million for detention beds and additional detention
and removal officers. This increase will fund 1,920 beds. In addition,
the Budget provides $1.5 billion for detention and removal activities,
$236 million (19 percent increase) over the 2005 enacted level. In
addition, it also includes $39 million for the detention and
repatriation costs of the Arizona Border Control Initiative. In
addition, 140 new Special Agents will also be hired.

INVESTIGATIONS OF ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT VIOLATIONS

Question. The Department of Justice published revised regulations
in the November 15, 2004 Federal Register that suggested that DOJ--not
ICE--will have the lead role in investigations regarding illegal arms
exports. I understand that in late December, you issued a message which
stated, in part, ``In recent weeks some media reports have suggested
that ICE may be ceding some of its authority to investigate violations
of the Arms Export Control Act, and other export laws. I am writing
today to inform you that nothing could be further from the truth.''
This seems to be another troubling example of this new Department's
willingness to cede authority to other Departments for some of the
traditional roles played by its component parts over the years. The
Secret Service had to assert its authority as the primary protector of
the currency a few years ago and the Department lost some of its lead
role in terrorist financing when former Secretary Ridge signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the former Attorney General. Even the
Department's central role in coordinating terrorist threat information
was lost--via Executive Order--almost before the ink was dry on the
President's signature of the bill creating the Department.
Please explain for the subcommittee the specific roles played by
DHS--and ICE in particular--and DOJ in arms export investigations.
Answer. For over 25 years, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), has effectively investigated violations of U.S. export control
laws. The export control laws enforced by ICE include the AECA, the EAR
(concurrent jurisdiction with the Department of Commerce), the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the
Enemy Act. ICE uses its border search authority, certified undercover
operations and U.S. money laundering statutes as additional tools to
prosecute export violators and to assist in the identification and
seizure of criminal proceeds of specified unlawful activities. As a
result, ICE has successfully investigated hundreds of significant
export violations.
ICE will continue to vigorously pursue criminal violations of the
export laws and will work jointly with the FBI in export investigations
that have a nexus to FCI.

IMPACT OF THE ICE BUDGET SHORTFALL

Question. In the fall of 2003, Congress began calling for the
Department to respond to the fact that ICE had insufficient resources
to perform its numerous immigration and other investigative duties. In
both the fiscal year 2004 and 2005 Appropriations Acts, Congress
stepped up to the plate and provided Immigration and Customs
Enforcement with more funds than requested by the President to deal
with the shortfall.
Yet even with the full acknowledgement that ICE does not have
sufficient funding, and that the shortfall has hampered its mission and
damaged the morale of its agents, the President has refused to request
supplemental funding to make ICE ``whole'' and to put it on a sound
financial footing.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement should be able to move forward,
secure in the knowledge that it has the funds necessary to robustly
investigate arms smugglers, terrorists, money launderers, child
predators, as well as enforce existing immigration laws.
However, ICE has been forced to take dramatic steps--including
freezing hiring, stopping training, and limiting travel--for more than
a year in order to live within its constrained budget. The hiring
freeze and other spending restraints remain in place nearly 6 months
into the new fiscal year. And now we are being warned that ICE faces a
funding gap of nearly $300 million this year.
Mr. Secretary, will you end fiscal year 2005 with fewer
investigators than you started with at the beginning of Fiscal year
2004? How has that reduction impacted your mission?
Answer. The pending reprogramming will give ICE the ability to end
fiscal year 2005 with at least the same, if not higher, level than
fiscal year 2004. While ICE has been working through significant
challenges during the past 2 years, at the same time, ICE has been
achieving unparalleled success in its mission areas. During fiscal year
2005, ICE will continue to work through its challenges and accomplish
its critical mission.
Question. Did you seek a supplemental to address the shortfall?
Answer. The proposed reprogramming submitted on March 12, 2005, is
sufficient to address the financial requirements of ICE.

CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE: EXPANSION AND REGULARIZATION

Question. I have long been a supporter of the Container Security
Initiative, or CSI. This program stations CBP personnel at
participating foreign seaports to target and inspect ocean-going
shipping containers prior to their being loaded on U.S.-bound vessels.
While it was initially skeptical of the program, and reluctant to
support the funds the Congress provided to begin its implementation, I
am pleased that this Administration has embraced the CSI.
The Administration seeks a modest increase of only $5.4 million for
the CSI for a total fiscal year 2006 request of almost $139 million.
During visits to some of these ports, my staff has been impressed
with the generally cooperative relationships that have been formed
between the CBP personnel and their host country counterparts. As they
work together and develop increasing levels of trust, the mutually
beneficial aspects of the CSI program to both our country and theirs
become apparent. However, the one constant refrain we heard from both
CBP and host-country officials was the fact that our people are
generally sent over on a temporary basis. They are concerned that once
the relationships have matured during the months that the CBP personnel
are at a port, they are rotated out and the ``trust-building'' process
must begin again.
Could the effectiveness of the CSI be improved by resolving this
temporary duty situation? What are you and the Department doing to
ensure that CBP personnel based overseas for CSI implementation are
able to stay at a port for a healthy period of time? Are there problems
with our State Department representatives that need to be addressed? If
so, has this been discussed by Secretary Chertoff with Secretary Rice?
Answer. CBP is transitioning CSI temporary personnel to permanent
status. This process requires DHS to coordinate with Department of
State (DOS) as required by National Security Decision Directive 38
(NSDD-38). DOS negotiates the placement of permanent personnel at
foreign duty posts and also negotiates the appropriate level of
Privileges and Immunities (P&I) that will be granted by the host
government on behalf of all United States Government agencies.
CBP is currently working with DOS to secure the placement of CSI
personnel into a permanent status with the appropriate level of P&I.
The DOS has placed a high level of priority on assisting CBP with this
initiative.
Question. Without naming any ports or countries, my staff has also
heard that some participating ports are often very reluctant to
cooperate with our requests for more robust inspection and screening of
containers. If this is indeed the case, has consideration been given to
lodging formal complaints with the host government--or even to
suspending a specific port's participation in CSI?
Answer. There are currently 35 operational CSI ports. The standard
operating procedures for these CSI ports are in part governed by a
jointly signed Declaration of Principles, in which the host government
agrees to pre-screen containers that pose a risk for terrorism.
It is also understood that due to host government sovereignty, the
final decision on container examinations is at the discretion of the
host government. However, CBP has authority to issue no load order for
those who refused inspection.
The CSI program has made significant progress in reaching agreement
with host government agencies on what constitutes a high-risk container
warranting an examination.
Challenges still exist at one CSI location with regard to common
and agreed upon definition/designation of high-risk containers
warranting examination(s).
CBP is confident that with the high percentage of CSI locations
operating very effectively that continued progress will be made in this
one location. CBP has, and continues to consult with State Department
(including the U.S. Embassy in this location) to enhance the CSI
operation.
CBP has contemplated the alternatives and is receiving full support
from all Departments and Agencies in making CSI efficient and
effective.

IMPACT OF LATE DUTY COLLECTION ON CRAWFISH INDUSTRY

Question. As mentioned previously, in the past, U.S. industries
like the U.S. crawfish industry have discovered only very late in the
year that millions of dollars of antidumping duties for some reason
have not been collected in their cases against Chinese imports as
required by law. And, because CBP's failure to collect these duties has
been discovered late in the year, the non-collection problem in these
cases could not be addressed in time to enable the industries to obtain
their yearly distribution of funds under the Byrd Amendment. As a
consequence, the U.S. crawfish industry, for example, last year failed
to receive at least $54.4 million it otherwise would have received in
duties paid the United States Government by Chinese importers.
It is my understanding that CBP's Office of Information Technology
(OIT) is fully capable of running an already existing program much
earlier in each calendar year, (meaning by the end of March at the
latest), which would enable both CBP and U.S. industries to learn, much
earlier, if millions of dollars in duties are not being collected by
CBP from U.S. importers of foreign, dumped products.
Why can't CBP's Office of information Technology determine by the
end of this month if there are cases in which CBP is not collecting
duties owed the United States Government and make that information
publicly available as early as possible?
Answer. CBP has responded to the revenue risk posed by the
inability to collect certain AD/CVD duties through several means, one
of which is the monitoring the AD/CVD bills and collections on a more
regular basis. For the distribution of these funds to take place
timely, it is necessary not only to monitor the timely collection of
AD/CVD duties but also to ensure our revenue collection system is
protected from possible circumvention and corporate solvency schemes
designed to enter AD/CVD goods into the U.S. market with the intention
of never paying the proper duties at time of liquidation.
On a monthly basis, CBP is performing a risk-based review of
outstanding bills for AD/CVD duties. The information has proven
effective in identifying high-risk companies for AD/CVD evasion as well
as improve the timeliness of our reviews. CBP is also focused on the
long-term issue of the company's financial solvency and their ability
to pay outstanding AD/CVD bills. The continuous bond guidelines for
imports of certain agriculture/aquaculture imports were amended in July
2004, to address just such an issue. Working with the Department of
Commerce, we are addressing the AD/CVD issues that pose the greatest
risk.

OVERTIME PAY WHILE RECEIVING TRAINING

Question. I understand that since January 2, 2002, your bureau has
not compensated CBP officers who train 6 days a week at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center. In essence, this means that hundreds of
newly trained CBP officers have had to work 6 days a week for up to 12
weeks without any compensation for overtime.
I support your ``One face at the Border'' initiative and
acknowledge that the merging of certain legacy personnel into a new
agency requires intensive training. But I think you would concur that
this should not come at the expense of basic compensation for these
professionals.
How do you plan to correct the current overtime pay problem for
these CBP officers who were trained between January 2002 and October
2004?
Answer. CBP is also concerned about equitable compensation for the
employees who were engaged in training at the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center (FLETC) on a 6-day schedule. As you are aware, the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) determined that the 6-
day schedule was a necessity post-September 11 in order to accommodate
the robust training needs of law enforcement personnel.
The Government Employee Training Act prohibits the Federal agencies
from compensating employees with overtime while its employees are
engaged in training by, in or through government or non-government
facilities (5 USC, 41). There are only a very few exceptions to this
broad legislative prohibition, and the CBP has used these, where
possible, to legally pay our employees so situated.
Chief amongst these exceptions is a different set of regulations
that applies to employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). Legacy INS inspectors, prior to conversion to the CBP Officer
position and COPRA compensation, were covered by FLSA. We were
therefore able to retroactively compensate them for the overtime worked
on the 6 day during the FLETC training; these retroactive payments were
made in December 2004. Because the agency determined that legacy
Customs Inspectors were covered by COPRA and therefore exempt from
FLSA, payment for the 6 day was not appropriate. The different outcomes
regarding payment of overtime resulted from the fact that these groups
of employees were covered by different laws at the time that the
training occurred.
The National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) challenged the agency
through arbitration concerning this issue, and the agency's legal
interpretation was sustained by the arbitrator. This is a complex
matter, and there is litigation still pending. It is also important to
note that effective October 1, 2004, FLETC returned to a 5-day training
week

CONTAINER SECURITY

Question. In December 2004, the Department unveiled a draft cargo
security strategy. This strategy stated that the Department proposes to
adopt a ``zero-tolerance policy'' regarding the arrival of weapons of
mass effect at our Nation's borders. I concur that preventing these
weapons from entering the United States should be a priority. I always
assumed that it was.
The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Homeland
Security Appropriations Act notes that over $200 million has been spent
over the past 3 years on various projects designed to secure cargo
containers entering this country. It also calls on the Under Secretary
for Border and Transportation Security to--among other things--report
to the Congress no later than February 8, 2005 on which DHS entity will
have primary responsibility for cargo container security and the
setting of shipping industry standards. To date we have not received
this report. I assume your agency was closely involved in the drafting
of this report.
How closely were you involved in the drafting of the report and can
you give us a sense of what it might recommend?
Answer. In support of the Department's cargo security strategy
proposal to adopt a ``zero-tolerance policy'' regarding the arrival of
weapons of mass effect at our Nation's borders, CBP has deployed
various types of radiation detection technology nationwide with the
ultimate goal of screening 100 percent of containerized cargo for
radiation.
CBP has provided significant input to the draft report on Cargo
Container Security, including information regarding the current status
of major CBP initiatives addressing cargo security. In providing
summary reporting, CBP outlined the desired end state; namely, securing
and improving operations at existing ports; expanding operations to new
critical international seaports and encouraging global efforts to
enhance supply chain security.
Question. Do you know when the Congress will receive the report
which is now nearly 1 month overdue?
Answer. The final report was submitted to the Committee on June 8,
2005.

AMERICA'S SHIELD INITIATIVE

Question. This Department seems obsessed with selling old wine in
new bottles. The visa tracking program known for years as ``Entry-
Exit'' became ``US-VISIT''. The Office for Domestic Preparedness became
the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness. Now the Border Patrol's Integrated Surveillance
Information System, or ISIS, has been ``re-branded'' as ``America's
Shield Initiative''--or ASI. Regardless of the new names for these old
programs, the fact remains that our borders need to be protected.
America's Shield Initiative is supposed to implement the Border
Patrol National Strategy to strengthen U.S. borders to prevent the
entry into the United States of terrorists and terrorist weapons,
smugglers and illegal aliens, narcotics and other contraband.
Our borders are under attack. The President's own experts know and
are extremely concerned about the threat terrorists pose to our
borders. In written testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee
on February 16, Deputy Secretary Loy cited recently received
information as the reason for his concern about the threat facing the
Mexican border. He called it a ``very serious situation.''
Given this threat, why does the request include only $20 million
for improved technology on our borders, when CBP staff have estimated
the full cost to be $250-300 million?
Answer. The total funding for the ASI program in fiscal year 2006
is $51 million, including $19.8 million for new investments. The fiscal
year 2006 request for ASI when coupled with investments for additional
Border Patrol Agents, helicopter replacements, enhancements to Border
Patrol facilitates and tactical infrastructure will provide CBP with a
complement of resources that will increase operational control of our
Nation's borders.

IDENT/IAFIS UPDATE

Question. The integration of the fingerprint databases created,
maintained, and used by the Department of Homeland Security and the
FBI--among other Federal agencies--continues to be a priority concern
for the Congress and the members of this Subcommittee. It is critical
that we know whether visitors to this country pose a risk to our
citizens. As you know, the 9/11 hijackers came into the country on
student and tourist visas.
Your Border Patrol agents daily compare the fingerprints of illegal
aliens apprehended at our borders against these databases. And it is
your inspectors who--at a growing number of ports of entry--compare the
fingerprints of visa holders and others wishing to enter this country
against these same databases via the US-VISIT system.
That is why I was concerned about the latest Department of Justice
Inspector General report on this subject. It stated that of the 118,000
visitors daily entering this country who are subject to US-VISIT, an
average of about 22,350 individuals are referred for secondary
inspection. According to DHS, by the end of this fiscal year, it
expects to directly check only about 800 individuals each day against
the full FBI fingerprint database known as the IAFIS Criminal Master
File. This is less than 1 percent of the 118,000 daily visitors.
Why are we checking less than 1 percent of visitors to this country
against the FBI fingerprint data base?
Answer. This response contains information considered Law
Enforcement Sensitive and has been provided to the Committee under
separate cover.
Question. According to the Justice Inspector General report, the
Justice Department will be increasing the FBI's capacity to handle
fingerprint checks from 8,000 per day to 20,000 per day by October of
this year. Will you be changing your policies so that CBP is fully
utilizing that capacity to check the criminal backgrounds of visitors
coming into this country?
Answer. DHS and Department of State have found that IDENT achieves
their counterterrorism, major law enforcement, and border management
objectives in timeframes that meet operational needs for processing at
ports of entry. Every day, DHS and DOS run checks on approximately
115,000-120,000 individuals using IDENT. These checks are returned, on
average, within 10 seconds at ports of entry for US-VISIT and within 15
minutes for Department of State. Even if IAFIS increases its capacity
to 20,000 fingerprint checks per day, it still cannot come close to the
number of transactions currently generated by the US-VISIT program.
Additionally, IAFIS returns results, on average, at best within 10
minutes, most (such as those transmitted by State) within several
hours. Currently, IAFIS does not have the capacity to meet our
operational needs for inspecting visitors. However, we are continuing
to work with the Department of Justice on finding ways to better
integrate IAFIS with our existing systems, such as the successful
integration at our Border Patrol stations.

COLLECTION OF DUTIES

Question. Again, two of the problems that CBP has exhibited with
respect to its administration of the Byrd Amendment are (1) Customs'
failure to collect duties rightfully owed; and (2) its failure to pay
duties already collected in a timely fashion to eligible U.S. companies
and their workers.
With respect to the second problem, Customs sometimes holds, in
what are called ``clearing accounts,'' duties that are collected over
many years--but for which the agency is awaiting final ``liquidation
instructions'' from the Commerce Department prior to distribution.
Often, the Commerce Department claims that such instructions have been
sent, but CBP does not know they have been sent or never receives them.
It has been proposed that one solution to this problem would be for
CBP to publish the amount of funds held in CBP's clearing accounts, by
administrative review period, so that CBP and Commerce can work
together to determine which funds should have been liquidated and be
available for distribution to eligible U.S. producers. CBP, in certain
circumstances, has provided such information to Members of Congress
upon request, but has refused to provide such information generally.
Will you commit to identifying (i.e., publishing) the amount of
funds held in clearing accounts by administrative review period?
Answer. The CBP program is designed to generate a bill and collect
the appropriate duties following the liquidation of each entry summary.
However, importers are provided the opportunity to appeal these
decisions, which may involve working with the Departments of Commerce
and Justice to ultimately collect these AD/CVD duties. During this
time, estimated duties collected on the entry summary are held pending
the final liquidation and collection of these duties before they may be
disbursed in accordance with the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act.
To ensure transactions are not inadvertently held and made
available for disbursement, CBP initiated a plan to review and
liquidate entries that may have been inadvertently held in clearing
accounts. CBP provided extensive data to Commerce regarding entries by
administrative review period that remain unliquidated. Feedback from
Commerce on this analysis allowed CBP field offices to finalize 11,000
old AD/CVD entries whose liquidation makes $12 million eligible for
disbursement.
This process also shed light on the cause of the backlog. Over two-
thirds of old unliquidated entries (10 years old or more) resulted from
a weakness in communicating liquidation instructions from Commerce to
CBP. In most instances, CBP is holding old AD/CVD entries with import
scenarios not covered by any published Commerce instructions. This is
particularly true where instructions are contingent on a complex mix of
importer, exporter and/or producer. In fiscal year 2005, CBP is
concentrating on the liquidation of all remaining AD/CVD entries
entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended.
We are committed to working closely with Commerce to ensure that
CBP promptly receives and acts upon all liquidation instructions
issued. This will enable CBP to act as promptly as possible to initiate
liquidation of the affected entries. This could potentially include a
case-by-case comparison of orders.
Question. Will you commit similarly to identifying the reasons for
the lack of liquidation in cases where liquidation has not occurred for
more than 4 years, and provide specific information with respect to
those cases showing the amounts that remain unliquidated accompanied by
an explanation of CBP's understanding of why the amounts have not been
liquidated?
Answer. The antidumping and/or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) modules
within the Automated Commercial System (ACS) do not provide information
by administrative review periods; therefore, CBP cannot track entries
this way. Although one module exists to track liquidation instructions
by review period--the Department of Commerce (DOC), who has sole
responsibility for the AD/CVD modules, has not consistently provided
this information.
A liquidation clean-up project was initiated by CBP in response to
the Office of Inspector General (OIG) audit on CBP's implementation and
management of the Continued Dumping Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA). The OIG
report expressed concern over CBP's unliquidated inventory of 1 million
entries and states ``clearing up the liquidation backlog should be a
priority given the substantial dollars involved.'' At present, CBP is
holding an ``official'' inventory of 2.2 million suspended AD/CVD
entries covering 593 cases. According to the AD/CVD duty module within
ACS only 327 of those cases are current, the rest are either revoked
(once open, but subsequently closed), terminated (investigated, but
never issued), or in some stage of investigation (prior to a decision
on issuance). CBP believes that many of these entries can be closed
out.
CBP provided extensive data to DOC regarding entries that remain
unliquidated despite the fact that their associated AD/CVD cases were
either terminated revoked or did not have instructions issued for a
specific review period. Feedback from DOC on this analysis allowed CBP
field offices to finalize 11,000 old AD/CVD entries whose liquidation
makes $12 million eligible for disbursement pursuant to the Continued
Dumping Offset Act of 2000.
The liquidation clean-up project also shed light on the cause of
the backlog. Over two-thirds of old unliquidated entries (10 years old
or more) resulted from a breakdown in the liquidation instructions from
DOC to CBP. In most instances, import specialists are holding old AD/
CVD entries with import scenarios not covered by any published DOC
instructions. This is particularly true where instructions are
contingent on a complex mix of importer, exporter and/or producer. In
fiscal year 2005, CBP is concentrating on the liquidation of all
remaining AD/CVD entries entered prior to 1995 that remain suspended.
Another reason that monies remain in the ``clearing accounts'' and are
unavailable for distribution via CDSOA are the number of protests on
bills issued by CBP. Payment of a protested bill is deferred until the
protest decision is rendered. Currently many protests of AD/CVD
liquidations are suspended pending the final decision by the Federal
Appeals Court on International Trade.

TRAINING OF CBP INSPECTORS

Question. With the creation of the CBP Officer position along with
the ``One Face at the Border Initiative'', how does the CBP plan to
make sure that one front-line employee can essentially perform job
functions that were previously done by 3 different inspectors? Does DHS
plan to create specialty experts for various legacy Customs and INS
disciplines, or will every officer have to know every detail of both
Customs and INS laws for both the primary and secondary inspections at
the border?
Answer. We are working towards creating an agency-wide law
enforcement and national security culture, establishing unified primary
inspections at all United States ports of entry and conducting
secondary inspections focused primarily on combating terrorism and the
traditional missions inherited by Customs and Border Protection. To do
this efficiently and effectively, we have built a comprehensive
training plan to guide our efforts.
A very stringent 20-day pre-academy and 73-day basic academy
training curriculum has been developed for the new CBP Officer. This
training gives them the foundation needed to work in the primary
setting upon their return to the port, while also giving them a basic
understanding of what occurs in the secondary environments. The
ultimate goal is to train the new CBP Officer to not only be equally
competent in all of the former, individual areas of responsibility, but
also to be better able to meet the expanded mission priority of anti-
terrorism. Their Academy training is then followed by a rigorous 2-year
on the job training program with approximately 40-45 weeks (depending
on environment--air, land or sea) of structured training courses. They
are given training in stages in order to absorb it and be afforded time
on the job to perform the duties and become proficient.
A comprehensive 37 module cross-training program has been built for
those officers who previously performed an Agriculture, Customs or
Immigration function at the ports. Training is being given to those
officers on a ``just in time'' basis to perform the job they are being
asked to do. Instead, CBP has created a curriculum that builds off of
each previous module.
CBP does have several courses which are considered to be advanced
training and they would include those that involve analytical
capabilities and the counter-terrorism response units in our secondary
areas. CBP is currently exploring the possibility of having additional
areas and courses designated as specialized training classes.
Question. Explain how Customs cargo inspection expertise will not
be lost in the transition to the new CBP officer position? Will the new
CBP officer be required to thoroughly understand the massive harmonized
tariff schedule for goods being imported into the United States as well
as being responsible for thousands of pages that comprise the 400
sections of Immigration and Nationality Act, hundreds of pages of INS
Title 8 Federal Regulations and the full INS operations inspection
manual?
Answer. Currently, CBP's Office of Field Operations is developing,
in conjunction with the Office of Training and Development, three
separate Cargo cross-training modules for the air, land and sea
environments. The primary recipients of this training will be the new
CBP Officers and those legacy Immigration Officers new to the cargo
environment. The training consists of both classroom instruction on
cargo processing, and on-the-job cargo training under the supervision
of an experienced CBP Officer. The training consists of reviewing bills
of lading, processing all types of entries and conducting cargo
examinations. Officers will receive this training on a ``just in time''
basis as they are assigned to cargo primary.
The expertise on classification using the harmonized schedule still
resides with the Import Specialists. CBP Officers are introduced to the
harmonized schedule in some of our Customs Secondary training as well
as the cargo courses described above. We teach a basic understanding of
the tariff, how to locate items, and how to do a basic classification/
duty calculation. Final classification and duty calculations are done
by the Import Specialist.
It is expected that our training effort for the CBP Officer and CBP
Agriculture Specialist will be conducted over the course of many years.
CBP policy is that no officer may perform a function or a part of an
assignment without having completed the appropriate training module,
systems training and on the job training that are associated with those
duties.
Question. The Department's ``One Face at the Border Initiative''
merged over 18,000 inspectors from the Customs Service, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS), into one front line inspector position. As you know,
current legacy Customs, legacy INS and the new CBP officers carry
weapons and have arrest authority but are NOT considered Federal law
enforcement officers. With the demands of the Federal law enforcement
officer having evolved over the last decade, do you not believe that
including Federal personnel such as Customs and Border Protection
Officers, who not only protect our border from illegal drugs and
facilitate lawful trade, but must now defend against weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism and the risks that come with these added job
responsibilities, deserve the recognition and benefits that go with
Federal Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) status?
Answer. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers are, in many
important respects, law enforcement officers, because they have the
responsibility for enforcing laws, making arrests, and performing a
critical enforcement and security mission. However, the position does
not meet the current statutory definition for coverage under the
special retirement provisions, which requires the primary duties to be
either investigations of crimes or the apprehension and detention of
criminals or individuals suspected of criminal activity.
Question. The final personnel regulations greatly reduce the
circumstances where collective bargaining will occur for CBP employees.
Can you please tell the committee why the regulations prohibit
collective bargaining over basic conditions of work, such as employees'
rotation between different shifts or posts of duty, or scheduling of
days off, including even post-implementation expedited bargaining? It
appears the current procedures for bargaining over basic workplace
matters such as scheduling have not hampered the agency's homeland
security missions in any way.
Answer. The successful assignment and deployment of the right
employees and technology at precisely the right time is critical to the
accomplishment of CBP's primary mission of preventing terrorists and
implements of terror from entering the United States through and
between our ports of entry. As a result, CBP must be able to assign and
deploy employees, and to introduce the latest security technologies
without delay. To assist in the facilitation of this requirement, the
final DHS regulations provide CBP the flexibility to meet operational
needs in these areas without subjecting such managerial decision to
protracted negotiations and third party review by individuals or
organizations who may not have a full understanding of the complexities
of CBP's anti-terrorism mission and operational requirements.
However, in order to balance these operational requirements with
the interests of employees, the final regulations do provide an
important mechanism for CBP to consult with employee representatives
regarding the exercise of these flexibilities. Specifically, CBP will
continue to inform labor organizations of its policies and procedures
in these areas, to meet and discuss their views, concerns and
recommendations with regard to the procedures by which these management
flexibilities are exercised, and to attempt to reach agreement on such
procedures where possible. Furthermore, where CBP institutes
significant changes during the life of a collective bargaining
agreement affecting the working conditions of employees, the final
regulations provide for negotiations with labor organizations in those
cases where the change is foreseeable, substantial and significant in
terms of impact and duration on the whole or significant portion of the
bargaining unit.
This new framework for interacting with its labor organizations
will better support and facilitate the accomplishment of CBP's critical
national security mission, while providing a viable and streamlined
avenue for the expression and consideration of employee interests and
concerns.

BORDER PATROL--APPREHENSIONS

Question. On average for the current fiscal year, how many illegal
aliens is the Border Patrol apprehending each week? Of those, how many
are considered to be criminal aliens or who require mandatory detention
bedspace? Of the non-criminal/non-mandatory aliens, what is the average
length of their stay in the United States in Border Patrol custody
prior to be being removed/expelled?
Answer. The Border Patrol has apprehended 457,900 illegal aliens to
date in fiscal year 2005 thru March 11, 2005, approximately 19,908 per
week.
Of the total apprehensions to date in fiscal year 2005, 6,171 were
determined to be criminal aliens (which equates to about 268 per week).
The number of mandatory detention varies widely. Often the determining
factor whether aliens are detained or released on their own
recognizance depends on available bed space. The Border Patrol would
like to detain all criminal aliens and non-Mexican apprehensions, but
currently this is not feasible. The Border Patrol does not detain any
aliens beyond 72 hours. Most detainees are turned over to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement/Detention and Removal Office (ICE/DRO) before
72 hours. ICE/DRO has advised us that aliens detained for Expedited
Removal are routinely held for 30+ days. Criminal aliens and those
required deportation hearings are held from 75-100 days.

BORDER PATROL--STATIONING OF AGENTS

Question. On average, how long does it take to identify, hire,
perform a background/suitability check and train a new Border Patrol
agent prior to their being posted on the border?
Answer. Advance recruitment for entry-level Border Patrol agents is
done on a regular basis in order to have a nationwide standing
inventory of eligible candidates who already have passed the written
and oral exams, completed pre-appointment requirements (including
background investigation, medical screenings, etc.), and are ready for
final selection. It generally takes 6 to 8 months following tentative
selection for a candidate to be added to the hiring queue for job
placement. A candidate's position in the hiring queue is based on the
written test score plus any applicable veterans preference points.
When the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) identifies specific
positions and locations to be filled, offers are extended to candidates
in the hiring queue, their starting dates are established, and their
training is scheduled. This process generally takes 2 to 4 weeks.
Within a few days of their hire, the trainees are detailed to the
Border Patrol Academy in Artesia, New Mexico for 19 weeks of basic
training. Upon completion of basic training, the agents are returned to
their home duty stations as certified, credentialed and armed agents.
Formal post-Academy training continues on the job through the remainder
of the first year.
Question. How many Border patrol agents are currently stationed on
the Southwest and Northern Borders? How many agents were stationed on
each border on September 11, 2001? Prior to 9/11, what was the average
placement of BP agents per mile on the Southwest and Northern Borders?
What are those numbers today?
Answer. There are currently 10,525 Border patrol agents stationed
on the Southern and Northern borders with 9,501 on the Southern border
and 1,024 on the Northern border. There were 9,459 Border patrol agents
on the border on September 11, 2001, with 9,124 on the Southern border
and 335 on the Northern border.
The number of agents on duty per mile varies widely based on risk
assessments, traffic patterns, deployed technology in an area and
staffing and personnel changes. For example, the evening and night
shifts typically have a higher staffing level than the day shift since
most illegal intrusion attempts occur during the hours of darkness. As
a result of these variables there is no standard average for agents on
the border at any given moment.

BORDER PATROL

Question. Please provide the cost assumptions CBP would use
regarding hiring the first year (fiscal year 2006) authorized level in
the Intelligence Reform Act (2,000) for Border Patrol agents as well as
the fiscal year 2007 annualization of those positions.
Answer. The Intelligence Reform Act presents an ambitious and
aggressive goal of doubling the size of the Border Patrol Agent cadre
over 5 years. For fiscal year 2006, the Act authorizes an increase of
almost 20 percent to the number of Agents now on-board. There are
practical limitations to the number of Agents that the Border Patrol
can efficiently and effectively absorb in a year. These limitations are
the result of the existing Border Patrol infrastructure (including
training facilities, Border Patrol stations, support personnel,
communication systems and vehicle and equipment repair and maintenance
facilities) and the numbers of agents that can be brought on annually
without undermining the organizational cohesiveness needed for a law
enforcement organization like the Border Patrol. Significant
investments in the Border Patrol infrastructure are required as a
prerequisite to, or at least concomitant with, the increase in the
Agent cadre authorized by the Act.
Assuming that the Border Patrol infrastructure receives
corresponding budgetary increases, a $697.33 million would be required
for fiscal year 2006 and $447.41 million will be required in fiscal
year 2007. This includes to costs to effectively hire, train, equip and
train each new border patrol agent. In addition, it includes costs for
support personnel, infrastructure, relocations, and the IT support
necessary to support such an increase.

WAR ON DRUGS--HISTORICAL

Question. During the 1980s, there was a major focus on the ``War on
Drugs'' on the Southwest Border. Additional resources were provided to
the Border Patrol and then-Customs Service to engage in this fight.
Please provide the total number of Border Patrol agents and Customs
Service personnel (per year 1980-1990) as well as the number of those
personnel in each agency who were dedicated to the Southwest Border.
Answer. Shown below is a chart reflecting the number of Border
Patrol agents and the number of those agents assigned to the southwest
border.

BORDER PATROL AGENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year ending Nationwide
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980.................................................... 2,329
1981.................................................... 2,240
1982.................................................... 2,227
1983.................................................... 2,339
1984.................................................... 2,333
1985.................................................... 3,023
1986.................................................... 3,238
1987.................................................... 3,180
1988.................................................... 4,074
1989.................................................... 3,857
1990.................................................... 3,778
------------------------------------------------------------------------

CBP does not have access to personnel data for the 1980-1990
timeframe because the former U.S. Customs Service converted to the
United States Department of Agriculture's Personnel System in 1992.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye

IMMIGRATION OFFICERS IN LOCAL USCIS OFFICES

Question. Being able to talk to knowledgeable immigration officers
in local USCIS offices is an important customer service, especially for
elderly or illiterate USCIS customers. Although InfoPass provides a
free, easy and convenient alternative to waiting in line, InfoPass has
caused confusion for a number of Hawaii customers who were turned away
at the local USCIS office because they did not know how to use
InfoPass. The InfoPass program assumes that all immigrants are
literate, have access to a computer, and are able to type on a computer
keyboard. How is USCIS addressing this problem to enable access for
elderly or illiterate customers with limited computer access and
limited ability to use the Internet?
Answer. USCIS encourages customers who need information about
citizenship and immigration benefits and services to begin with our
website, or call the toll-free customer service number. That is because
many times they can get the information or assistance they need without
having to make a trip to one of our offices.
InfoPass is designed to let customers who do need in-person service
make an appointment to reduce the time they may otherwise have to wait
to be served once they arrive. USCIS prioritizes customers with
appointments to try to ensure that they do not have to wait for
service.
However, we recognize that not all customers have access to the
Internet. We do continue to offer very basic services, such as forms
and standard materials, to customers who do not have an appointment. If
it is determined that a customer needs a service that we provide by
appointment, we will look to see if one is available that day. If not,
and the customer indicates they simply do not have the Internet access
to be able to make an appointment, we will help them make their
appointment for another day.

LIFE ACT

Question. I am aware that the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act
(LIFE Act) was enacted into law in 2001 to reduce the separation of
immediate family members of U.S. citizens who are waiting abroad for an
immigrant visa. The CIS Service Centers were taking approximately 8-12
months to process immediate relative (form I-130) visa petitions. The
LIFE Act created a new K nonimmigrant category that allows a spouse or
child of a U.S. citizen to enter as a nonimmigrant on a K-3/K-4 visa to
reunite with her family, and then apply for lawful permanent residency
while in the United States.
A U.S. citizen can file a K (form I-129F) visa petition for a
spouse or child with the National Benefits Center once he files an
immediate relative (form I-130) visa petition and receives a notice of
receipt from a Service Center. In most cases, the U.S. citizen
petitioner files both the I-130 and I-129F, assuming that the I-129F
will be processed faster, due to the USCIS' announced policy to
implement the LIFE Act. However, petitioners are finding that the
National Benefits Center is slow to adjudicate K visa petitions and is
taking approximately 7 months. Currently, three of the four Service
Centers are processing immediate relative (form I-130) visa petitions
faster than the National Benefits Center is taking to process the I-
129F visa petitions (California Service Center=60 days; Vermont Service
Center=3 months; Texas Service Center=6 months).
The slowness of K-3 processing suggests that the K-3 program is not
working as it was intended, which is to expeditiously reunite U.S.
citizens with their spouses and minor children. Furthermore, U.S.
citizens submitting K visa petitions waste valuable time and money
($165 for each petition) when the program fails to provide them with
the service and benefits that were intended by Congress. What steps are
being taken to effectively implement the K visa program?
Answer. USCIS recently made a processing decision that caused the
situation that we are now facing with Immediate Relative visa petitions
and the processing of spousal nonimmigrant visa petitions.
In reviewing our relative visa petition process, USCIS decided that
the Service Centers should focus their efforts on relative visa
petitions submitted by U.S. Citizens. As a result of these efforts, the
Service Centers have done an outstanding job and have decreased
processing times for this type of relative visa petitions dramatically.
At the same time, the National Benefits Center (NBC), which
processes the K-3 visa petitions, has continued to process K-3
nonimmigrant spousal cases as quickly as resources will allow. The NBC
is currently in the process of acquiring more adjudicative staff to
focus on this workload. In the short term, NBC will realign existing
staff, including utilization of overtime funds, to reduce the pending
workload and achieve currency.
Lastly, it has come to the attention of USCIS that if an applicant
has both an approved I-130 petition and an approved K-3 petition at the
same time, some local State Department Consulate offices make the
decision to give the I-130 petition more weight than the K-3 petition.
This decision has an impact on the Affidavit of Support and Medical
requirements the petitioner must meet before State will issue an
immediate relative visa associated with the I-130. USCIS will work with
the Department of State to review this situation and identify a remedy
to ensure that both types of visa categories are processed effectively.

F2B PREFERENCE VISA PETITION

Question. When a petitioner, who originally filed an F2B preference
visa petition, becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen, his petition is
automatically given F1 status. For those who file petitions for
relatives in the Philippines, they are penalized by becoming citizens
because their beneficiaries' waiting period is extended by several
years.
Section 6 of the Child Status Protection Act allows a petitioner to
opt out of converting to F1 status. The bill was enacted into law
several years ago, but those individuals who applied to opt out are
still waiting for the Attorney General to implement Section 6. The
National Visa Center has informed petitioners that there is no
timeframe for when this review will be completed. Can you please
comment as to when can we expect this issue to be resolved?
Answer. USCIS is in the process of writing a regulation to codify
the Act. We hope it will be published by this summer. In the interim,
USCIS has issued a policy memo to provide guidance on adjudicating
requests tendered pursuant to Section 6 of the CSPA.

1-800 CUSTOMER SERVICE NUMBERS

Question. I have heard from number of comments by USCIS customers
that when they dialed the 1-800 customer service numbers, they received
misinformation that led to sometimes fatal errors in their immigration
application, because the customer service person is reading a script
but is otherwise inexperienced in immigration procedures. Please
comment on this customer service problem.
Answer. All contract customer service representatives must take a
USCIS approved course, and pass a USCIS approved exam, before they can
answer phone calls. The course and exam are designed to ensure that
representatives have an understanding of the terms and language of
immigration, and can find the appropriate materials to convey
information or offer services to a caller, before they assist
customers.
USCIS' commitment to the accuracy and quality of the assistance we
offer is reflected in the fact that we require contractors to monitor
each representative randomly twice a day to measure their performance
against a set of customer service standards. We also have an
independent company monitor calls against those standards. USCIS also
uses a secret shopper program to test and evaluate performance against
a set of future benchmarks for where we want to be in terms of service
provision, and each month conduct a random phone survey of callers to
get feedback about their experience.
However, as with any verbal interchange we recognize that customers
may not recall in its entirety a precise explanation or conversation,
may misunderstand an explanation, or that, for all our controls, a
representative may not convey the correct or complete answer. We also
understand that customers searching for information about citizenship
and immigration benefits, which can lead to life changing events, and
work to improve our process to ensure that we are giving them all the
options and information. One of USCIS' goals is to give each customer
more control over the process, and to give them broader direct access
to the scripts and other materials which we have available. Thus, we
plan to put all of the scripts that we use to answer customer questions
on our website so that customers can do their own research, and can
print the information to be able to review it rather than just hearing
it explained to them. In fiscal year 2005, USCIS plans to release
additional standardized fact sheets and brochures, again to give
customers direct access and something they can take with them. We plan
to make this information available on our website, and in addition will
make them available at our local offices, by phone, and through
community partners.
______

Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick J. Leahy

PORTS OF ENTRY IN VERMONT

Question. I understand there are a number of ports of entry in
Vermont that will be overhauled in the next 5 years. What is the
current schedule for construction at the each of the major ports in
Vermont? What, if any, requests has DHS made to GSA for planning or
construction projects in Vermont? Of all the border crossings
nationwide, what is the typical length of highway before the actual
border that is deemed part of the port? How far along the highway do
the longest 5 extend into the United States?
Answer. CBP has requested GSA to consider the Ports of Entry at
Derby Line (I-91), Richford, and Norton, Vermont for construction in
fiscal year 2007. In addition, CBP has requested GSA to begin design in
fiscal year 2007 for Richford (Route 139) and Beebe Plain, Vermont with
construction to follow in fiscal year 2009.
In regards to the typical distance between the land ports of entry
(LPOE) and the international boundary, there are several key factors
carefully considered to ensure the safe passage of traffic and the
trade while maintaining safety for CBP Officers and the public.
Key factors used to determine the LPOE location relative to the
international border are:
--Line of Sight.--An adequate line of sight (direction, slope,
elevation, and obstacles) must be maintained between
operational functions at the LPOE. The distance between the
LPOE and the international border should be minimized to ensure
that activity in the area is effectively observable.
--Alignment of Vehicles.--The alignment of passenger vehicles and
commercial trucks preparing to enter through Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPM) and License Plate Readers (LPR) on the way to
the primary inspection booth is critical. The distance required
for safe vehicular alignment leading up to the LPR/RPM is 40
feet for passenger vehicles and 90 feet for commercial trucks.
--Obstacles.--There should be no obstacles (buildings, vegetation)
located between the LPOE and the international border that
would impede the operational effectiveness of the port or
degrade safety and security for the CBP Officers and traveling
public.
The vast majority of our LPOEs boundaries begin within 100 feet or
less of the international border. We do have several locations where
the distance is greater as a result of environmental wetlands or other
considerations that precluded construction closer to the border. At one
location in Minnesota we are planning to be approximately one-half mile
from the border but will address security requirements through the use
of video monitoring systems. It is standard CBP policy to maintain a
clear line of sight between the operations within the LPOE and the
international border to ensure that our officers monitor all traffic
entering and departing the United States.

BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINTS

Question. I have received many complaints and concerns from my
constituents about the checkpoint that has been established on
Interstate 91 in Vermont. One of my constituents, a naturalized citizen
who lives in Vermont and works in New Hampshire, has been stopped
repeatedly and questioned about his legal status. Other constituents
have expressed concern that racial profiling is occurring at the
checkpoint. (A) Is there anything you would be willing to do to prevent
naturalized citizens from being stopped repeatedly at this checkpoint,
such as offering a frequent traveler card? (B) What measures do your
officers take to avoid racial profiling?
Answer. Border Patrol traffic checkpoints are operated in
accordance with the Constitution of the United States; governing
judicial rulings; and the Immigration and Nationality Act, Section
287(a) (8 U.S.C. Section 1357). The principal court case that affirmed
Border Patrol authority to conduct traffic checkpoints was U.S. v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Additional case law references: U.S. v. Gordo-Marin, 497
F.Supp. 432 (S.D Fla. 1980), and U.S. v. Maxwell, 565 F.2d 596 (9th
Cir. 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border Patrol traffic checkpoints, such as the proposed permanent
facility on Interstate 91, are a critical component of CBP's
multilayered border security strategy. The Border Patrol maintains over
50 such traffic checkpoints nationwide. Traffic checkpoints have been
established to restrict the criminal elements' ability to use our
highway system to further their entry into the United States. In
addition, enforcement operations around the checkpoints target those
attempting to avoid inspection by circumventing the checkpoints
themselves, further enhancing homeland security. CBP has had
discussions regarding the integration frequent traveler technology like
NEXUS and PALS into the design of the permanent Interstate 91
checkpoint to ensure that regular highway users are impacted to the
minimum extent possible.
The Border Patrol does not condone racial profiling, in fact during
basic training Agents are instructed on how to perform their duties
without profiling certain classes of people. Any and all allegations of
racial profiling are taken seriously and are reported to the Office of
Inspector General for investigation.

LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT CENTER

Question. In your testimony, you mention that the Law Enforcement
Support Center's workload increased by 12 percent last year. A number
of the employees who are making this increase in productivity possible
are temporary employees who have worked for the LESC for up to 4 years,
with the expectation they would have the opportunity to become
permanent employees. What are your plans to convert these temporary
employees to permanent positions?
Answer. Law Enforcement Technicians (LETs) serving under term
appointments have contributed significantly to the overall success of
the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC). ICE recognizes that the
workload of the LESC is a permanent one and shares the view that the
staff should be permanent as well. It has been the practice of the LESC
to convert term appointments to career appointments as permanent
vacancies become available. It has also been the practice of the LESC
to regularly extend term appointments up to their maximum duration.
However, LESC term LETs are serving under term appointments that have a
maximum duration of 4 years under Federal personnel rules and cannot be
further extended. The majority of LETs serving under term appointments
will not reach their 4-year limit until the spring and summer of
calendar year 2006. Only one will reach the 4-year limit in calendar
year 2005. The remainder will not reach their 4-year limit until
calendar year 2007. As term appointments approach their expiration
dates, ICE will explore all available options consistent with Federal
personnel rules, budgetary considerations and good management to retain
these valuable employees.

DEBT MANAGEMENT CENTER

Question. The ICE Debt Management Center is an integral part of the
financial stability of the bureau. Responsible for collecting debts
owed to the agency, the center is an important part of balancing the
books at ICE. Has the bureau wide hiring freeze affected the ability of
this debt management center and all other financial offices perform
their duties? Have you considered providing some flexibility from the
hiring freeze for offices with financial responsibilities? As these
offices loose individuals from normal attrition, it seems ironic that
the offices with responsibilities to correct the financial situation
Answer. As with all of ICE Financial Management operations, the
Debt Management Center is committed to fully addressing all of its
financial management responsibilities in a timely manner. If approved
by Congress, the ICE reprogramming proposal will provide additional
support to the Debt Management Center (DMC), and the DMC, along with
ICE's Office of Financial Management is closely monitoring ongoing
operations to ensure that essential and critical financial management
requirements are completed in a timely manner.
The ICE OFM has gone through a re-engineering process, finalized in
December 2004. The re-engineering format allows the OFM to address
audit and financial statement activities (abnormal balances, suspense,
cash reconciliation, trading partners, reconciliation of unliquidated
obligations, and analysis) as well as specific financial transactional
activities for our customer base (Debt Management Center, Dallas
Finance Center, financial system support of FFMS and Travel services).

LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAMS

Question. I have supported and helped to obtain funding for Legal
Orientation Programs for immigration detainees, with the view that the
immigration system works better for all parties when detained aliens
are informed as to whether they have a legitimate legal case to stay in
the United States. Congress appropriated $1 million for orientation
proceedings in fiscal year 2003, but DHS has still not transferred that
money to the Executive Office for Immigration Review so the proceedings
can take place. Can you tell me when that money will be transferred,
and why it has taken so long?
Answer. ICE has provided $3 million to the Executive Office of
Immigration Review (EOIR) for the Legal Orientation Program covering
services in fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005. The funding was
provided in increments of $1million at the following times:
$1 million to EOIR in late July 2002 (fiscal year 2002).
$1 million to EOIR in February 2004 (fiscal year 2004).
$1 million to EOIR in February 2005 (fiscal year 2005).
As indicated above, the first $1 million was issued very late in
fiscal year 2002. EOIR used this fiscal year 2002 funding to award a
contract for legal orientation program services that were provided
throughout fiscal year 2003. EOIR continued to provide legal
orientation services based on funding provided in February 2004, and
currently provides legal orientation program services with an
additional $1 million provided in February 2005. There have been no
gaps in providing legal orientation program services because of lack of
funding.

CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES FUNDING

Question. The President's budget proposes a 50 percent cut in the
amount of directly appropriated funds for the Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS), from $160 million to $80 million. Congress
has already substantially cut the direct appropriations you receive. At
the same time, the President has proposed a guest worker program that
would significantly increase the CIS workload. (A) Why is the President
proposing a 50 percent cut in an agency whose workload he wants to
increase dramatically? (B) Are you at all concerned that a system of
immigration services that is supported almost entirely by user fees--
including the expansion of ``premium processing'' fees paid to ensure
faster processing--will be unfair to immigrants of lesser means?
Answer. The fiscal year 2006 Budget includes $1.854 billion for
USCIS ($80 million appropriated; $1.774 billion fees), an overall
increase of $79 million, or 4 percent over the fiscal year 2005 level.
The fiscal year 2006 Budget is the final year of the President's 5-year
plan to achieve a 6-month cycle time standard for all immigration
benefit applications, including a total of $100 million to support
backlog elimination efforts as well as improvements in application
processing. This would bring the 5-year total for this aggressive
initiative to $560 million. Backlog elimination funds are reduced by a
total of $80 million. $60 million associated with a one-time increase
in the fiscal year 2005 USCIS budget, and $20 million for Digitization
efforts appropriated by the Congress, but not specifically requested in
the President's budget. The fiscal year 2006 Budget will allow USCIS to
eliminate the backlog by the end of fiscal year 2006.
USCIS is committed to meeting the President's backlog elimination
goals. The key to processing temporary worker petitions quickly and
efficiently is simplicity in the design. Establishing a program that
involves a high degree of employer/government partnership, thorough
background checks, and electronic registration and information sharing
among participating Departments is critical. Based upon the legislation
that Congress passes, USCIS will use fees to support applicant
registration, processing and documentation.
While Federal guidelines require full cost recovery of services
provided, USCIS does have the ability to waive fees on a case-by-case
basis. Any applicant or petitioner who has an ``inability to pay'' the
fees may request a fee waiver. In determining ``inability to pay,''
USCIS officers will consider all factors, circumstances, and evidence
supplied by the applicant including age, disability, household income,
and qualification within the past 180 days for a Federal means-tested
benefit.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator Cochran. We are going to continue to review the
budget request for fiscal year 2006 for the Department of
Homeland Security. Our next hearing will be on Wednesday, March
9, in Room 124 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. At that
time the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and
Response, Mr. Michael Brown, and the Acting Director of the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness, Mr. Matt Meyer, will be here to discuss the
budget request for the programs under their jurisdictions.
Until then, the subcommittee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., Wednesday, March 2, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]