[Senate Hearing 109-1066]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-1066
THE STAFFORD ACT: A PLAN FOR THE NATION'S EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE SYSTEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress.senate
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri MAX BAUCUS, Montana
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island BARBARA BOXER, California
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Andrew Wheeler, Majority Staff Director
Ken Connolly, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
JULY 27, 2006
OPENING STATEMENTS
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 17
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 1
Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.. 3
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois...... 6
Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana..... 5
WITNESSES
Dietrich, Deborah, Director, Office of Emergency Management,
Environmental Protection Agency................................ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Inhofe........................................... 62
Senator Jeffords......................................... 63
Senator Vitter........................................... 70
Gruber, Cory, Executive Director, National Preparedness Task
Force, Preparedness Directorate, Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Little, Tamara, S., chair, Legal Counsel Committee, National
Emergency Management Association............................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 95
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Clinton.......................................... 102
Senator Jeffords......................................... 100
Mascelli, Armond, vice president of Domestic Response, American
Red Cross...................................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Jeffords......................................... 80
Senator Obama............................................ 84
Senator Vitter........................................... 85
Pogue, Pamela, CFM, chair, Association of State Flood Managers,
State Floodplain Manager, State of Rhode Island................ 28
Prepared statement........................................... 86
Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords...... 91
Riley, Major General Don T., Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers............................................. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Clinton.......................................... 59
Senator Inhofe........................................... 50
Senator Jeffords......................................... 53
Senator Vitter........................................... 60
Shea, Robert, Acting Director of Operations, Federal Emergency
Management Administration, Department of Homeland Security..... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 41
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Articles:
New York Daily News, Sunday July 23, 2006:
Abandoned Heroes......................................... 111
Death Sentence........................................... 116
New Orleans to Close Controversial Storm Debris Landfill,
July 14, 2006.............................................. 127
NOLA.COM, Friday, April 14, 2006, Storm Debris Landfill is
OK'd, Eastern N.O. Residents Furious, by Gordon Russell.... 121
The New York Times, May 8, 2006, National Desk, A New
Landfill in New Orleans Sets Off a Battle, by Leslie Eaton. 125
Emergency Permit Letters........................................128-140
Joint Public Notice.............................................. 225
Letters from:
Bodine, Susan Parker, Environmental Protection Agency.......189-205
Kangior, Mike, executive director, Vehicle Traffic
Information Coalition...................................... 212
Nagin, Ray C., mayor, City of New Orleans...................206-211
Watson, Russell C., supervisor, Department of Interior....... 214
Woodley, Jr., John Paul, Department of the Army.............141-188
Maps:
Existing Site Conditions..................................... 220
Landfill Cross Sections...................................... 223
Location..................................................... 218
Miscellaneous Details........................................ 224
Site Excavation Grading Plan................................. 221
Stormwater Management Plan & Final Contour Grading Plan...... 222
Vicinity..................................................... 219
Report, Multihazard Mitigation Council, Natural Hazard Mitigation
Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future Savings from
Mitigation Activities.........................................228-242
Statement, Shriver, Mark, vice president and managing director of
U.S. Programs, Save the Children............................... 104
THE STAFFORD ACT: A PLAN FOR THE NATION'S EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE SYSTEM
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THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James M. Inhofe (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Inhofe, Vitter, Jeffords, Clinton, and
Obama.
Senator Inhofe. The meeting will come to order, as we
inaugurate our new hearing room.
Senator Jeffords, isn't this exciting? It must be so
exciting that no one showed up.
[Laughter.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. We appreciate all of you guys being here. I
am sorry we didn't get a chance to get down and say hello to
you and welcome you individually, but we have a policy, we
always start on time, even if I am the only one here. So now
Senator Jeffords has caught on, and he is always here too. So
we do that. I am sorry that I commented that I was asking where
Hillary was, because this is one of the few subjects where she
and I agree, and I kind of want her here.
Anyway, today the committee will be hearing from two panels
to discuss the debris removal in New Orleans post-Katrina,
progress made in disaster mitigation and preparedness
nationwide per the revisions of the Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 that we passed in this committee and on the floor, and the
adequacy of the Stafford Act authorities for future major
disasters.
I want to thank our witnesses for coming today.
During the 106th Congress, our committee reported out S.
1691, the Disaster Mitigation Act, a bill initially introduced
by myself and Senators Baucus, DeWine, Grassley, Voinovich,
Bond, Graham, and Smith. As signed into law, the Act sought to
authorized programs for predisaster mitigation and to
streamline the administration of disaster relief, and this
hearing is a follow-up to that Act to see exactly where we are
6 years later.
In fiscal years 1999 and 2000, the VA, HUD, and independent
agencies' Appropriations bill allocated $25 million for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to conduct
predisaster mitigation activities. FEMA designed the Project
Impact Program to focus its resources on creating disaster-
resistant communities, setting a goal of reducing the risk of
loss of life and loss of property--loss of life by 10 percent
and loss of property by 15 percent--by 2007.
Of course, since that time, the Nation has experienced two
major disasters: first, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which now
has jurisdiction over FEMA, and, quite frankly, FEMA hasn't
been doing as well since that time--and, second, Hurricane
Katrina. I understand that the DHS, not FEMA, handles
preparedness, but hope that the worthwhile goals established by
FEMA for preparedness have been adopted by DHS.
I will be curious to learn more about the National
Preparedness Plan and how close we are to achieving the goal of
reducing the life risk by 10 percent and the property risk by
15 percent by 2007.
We are now 2 months into the hurricane season and,
fortunately, we haven't had a real major storm. Nonetheless, we
can't let our guard down with respect to being ready for that
next major storm. Although in my State of Oklahoma, we don't
have the threat of the hurricanes, we do have quite frequently
tornadoes, and we have learned to live with them. In fact, it
was the tornadoes of 1995, which followed shortly after the
Murrah Federal Office Building bombing, that destroyed a lot of
communities in the Oklahoma City area and prompted me to draft
S. 1691.
While we can't prevent natural disasters, we can certainly
do better in preparing for them. After touring the aftermath of
the 1995 tornadoes in Oklahoma, I became a believer in
encouraging communities to take steps prior to the natural
disasters to lessen the impact. In Oklahoma, that means that
families are encouraged to have in their homes safe rooms
designed to be able to save people and have them withstand
hurricane force winds and other precautions.
Whatever the natural disaster be, be it a tornado,
hurricane, earthquake, fire, flood, communities and individual
homeowners can take steps to lessen the impact of such events.
We will be hearing today from several witnesses on the success
stories and, I suspect, some of the things that we could have
done better. Finally, following Katrina, in the Gulf States
there has been much concern about the clean up of debris,
especially in New Orleans, and I have been contacted by several
that are unhappy with the pace of the debris removal and the
disposal of the debris once it has been picked up. Given the
potential long-term health and liability issues of improperly
disposed debris, the committee will be following this issue
very closely.
Today's hearing will be our first attempt to get on the
record what is happening on this issue, but there will be
follow-up meetings. You know, one of the things--I am sure,
Senator Jeffords, you have run into the same thing. It has been
our information that there are existing landfills down there
that are not being used and, yet, new landfills are being
built. I just think we can do a better job. That is what we
will be exploring with this committee, and some of the
witnesses on the first and the second panel might be thinking
about responding to questions along those lines.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the
State of Oklahoma
Today the committee will be hearing from two panels to discuss
debris removal in New Orleans post-Hurricane Katrina; progress made in
disaster mitigation and preparedness nationwide per the provisions of
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000; and adequacy of the Stafford Act
authorities for future major disasters.
I want to thank our witnesses for coming today, and we look forward
to hearing from each of you.
During the 106th Congress, our committee reported out S. 1691, the
Disaster Mitigation Act, a bill initially introduced by myself and
Senators Baucus, DeWine, Grassley, Voinovich, Bond, Graham (FL) and
Smith (NH). As signed into law, the Act sought to authorize programs
for predisaster mitigation, and to streamline the administration of
disaster relief. This hearing is a follow-up to that Act to see exactly
where we are 6 years later.
In fiscal years 1999 and 2000, the VA-HUD and Independent Agencies
Appropriation bills allocated $25 million for the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to conduct predisaster mitigation activities.
FEMA designed the ``Project Impact'' program to focus its resources on
creating disaster-resistant communities, setting a goal of reducing the
risk of loss of life by 10 percent and reducing the risk of property
loss by 15 percent by 2007.
Of course, since that time, the Nation has experienced two major
disasters; first the 9/11 terrorists attacks which resulted in the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which now has
jurisdiction over FEMA; and second, Hurricane Katrina. I understand
that DHS and not FEMA handles preparedness, but hope that the
worthwhile goals established by FEMA for preparedness have been adopted
by DHS. I will be curious to learn more about the National Preparedness
Plan and how close we are to achieving the goal of reducing risk of
loss of life by 10 percent and reducing the risk of property loss by 15
percent in 2007.
We are now 2 months into the hurricane season, and fortunately we
have not had a major storm. Nonetheless, we cannot let down our guard
with respect to being ready for that next major storm. Although my
State of Oklahoma does not have the threat of hurricane season hanging
over our heads, we do have frequent and often very destructive
tornados. In fact, it was the tornados in 1995 which destroyed several
communities in the Oklahoma City area that prompted me to draft S.
1691. While we cannot prevent natural disasters, we can certainly be
better prepared for them. After touring the aftermath of the 95
tornadoes in my state, I became a believer in encouraging communities
to take steps prior to a natural disaster to lessen the impacts. In
Oklahoma, that means that families are encouraged to have in their
homes ``safe rooms'' that are designed to withstand tornado force winds
and resist penetration by windborne objects and falling debris.
Whatever the natural disaster be it tornado, hurricane, earthquake,
fire or flood, communities and individual homeowners can take steps to
lessen the impact of such events. We will be hearing today from several
witnesses on the success stories and, I suspect, some things we could
be doing better.
Finally, following Katrina in the Gulf States there has been much
concern about the clean up of debris, especially in New Orleans. I have
been contacted by several that are unhappy with the pace of debris
removal and the disposal of that debris once it has been picked up.
Given the potential long-term health and liability issues of improperly
disposed debris the committee will be following this issue very
closely. Today's hearing will be our first attempt to get on the record
what is happening on this issue, but we will be doing additional
follow-up.
Again, thank you to our witnesses and I look forward to hearing
your testimony.
Senator Inhofe. Senator Jeffords. &
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you for holding this hearing. For the last several Congresses I
have been interested in taking a closer look at the role of the
Stafford Act in determining how our Nation responds to
terrorist events, as well as natural disasters. I am glad that
we are finally gathered here to address this critical issue.
Before we begin, I think it would be worthwhile to remember
where we have been. Over the last 200 years, we have moved from
an ad hoc approach to disaster response to a coordinated,
orderly approach under the Stafford Act, named after my good
friend and mentor, Senator Bob Stafford. On September 11th, the
Nation was struck by a terrorist attack. A week later, as I
toured Ground Zero, I saw firsthand how the Stafford Act and
FEMA helped to reduce the impact of these events. FEMA's
response was orderly and effective.
But when the Department of Homeland Security was formed and
FEMA was brought into that Department, I believe this was a
terrible mistake, one that failed to take into account the
unique mission of FEMA in responding to natural disasters. As
we paid dearly for this mistake, then Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast last August.
There have been many legislative proposals to modify our
disaster response program, some specific to Hurricane Katrina
and some not. However, I believe the biggest risk in a post-
Katrina environment is that the flurry of legislative activity
after a disaster becomes the norm rather than the exception.
Our Nation deserves a Federal disaster response that is
coordinated, consistent, and predictable. That is why we passed
the Stafford Act, which has served us well over these many
years. As we move forward now, we must ensure that our States
and our communities know what to expect as they develop their
own emergency response plans.
As Congress determines what the next steps are, we must ask
ourselves, in the aftermath of Katrina, did we witness the
performance failure by the Federal agencies or are we missing
needed authority? Today, this committee, as the committee of
jurisdiction over the Stafford Act, is seeking to answer that
question.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and I look
forward to cooperating with you, Mr. Chairman, as we consider
the legislative changes that may be necessary to respond to our
findings today. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the
State of Vermont
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing.
For the last several Congresses, I have been interested in taking a
closer look at the role of the Stafford Act in determining how our
Nation responds to terrorist events, as well as natural disasters. I am
glad that we are finally gathered here to address this critical issue.
Before we begin, I think it is worthwhile to remember where we have
been. Over the last 200 years, we have moved from an ad-hoc approach to
disaster response to a coordinated, orderly approach under the Stafford
Act, named after my good friend and mentor, Senator Bob Stafford.
On September 11th, the Nation was struck by a terrorist attack. A
week later, as I toured Ground Zero, I saw firsthand how the Stafford
Act and FEMA helped to reduce the impact of those events. FEMA's
response was orderly and effective.
But then the Department of Homeland Security was formed, and FEMA
was brought into that Department. I believe this was a terrible
mistake, one that failed to take into account the unique mission of
FEMA in responding to natural disasters. And we paid dearly for that
mistake when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast last August.
There have been many legislative proposals to modify our disaster
response program some specific to Hurricane Katrina, some not. However,
I believe that the biggest risk in a post-Katrina environment is that
the flurry of legislative activity after a disaster becomes the norm,
rather than the exception.
Our Nation deserves a Federal disaster response that is
coordinated, consistent and predictable. That is why we passed the
Stafford Act, which has served us well over these many years.
As we move forward, we must ensure that our States and our
communities know what to expect as they develop their own emergency
response plans. As Congress determines what the next steps are, we must
ask ourselves: In the aftermath of Katrina, did we witness a
performance failure by the Federal agencies, or are we missing needed
authority?
Today, this committee, as the committee of jurisdiction over the
Stafford Act, is seeking to answer that question. I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses, and I look forward to cooperating with you,
Mr. Chairman, as we consider legislative changes that may be necessary
to respond to our findings today.
Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
If there is one Senator on this committee that has been
more sensitive to the problems, it is our good friend, the
junior Senator from Louisiana, Senator Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Jeffords. Thank you for holding this important hearing.
Obviously, it is very appropriate, very timely that we
carefully review the Stafford Act after an incident of
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which put it to the test
probably more than any other in history. So I think it is very
appropriate that we review it carefully.
Clearly, there were and is monumental debris removal in the
Gulf Coast because of these hurricanes, already 25 times more
debris hauled away than in New York after September 11th, with
much, much more work to go. In fact, the President, noting how
much more we have to go, just extended the 100 percent Federal
reimbursement of debris removal in five parishes through the
end of the year.
So that shows the magnitude of the event; that shows how
much the Stafford Act has been put to the test. I think there
are many things we can learn from this experience to update and
improve the Stafford Act, at least with large events like this
in mind.
I will submit my full statement for the record, but thank
you for this hearing so that we can make sure we take advantage
of our new knowledge and update the Stafford Act appropriately.
[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]
Statement of Hon. David Vitter, U.S. Senator from the State of
Louisiana
Thank you Chairman Inhofe and Ranking Member Jeffords for having
this very important hearing on the Stafford Act and how this
legislation could be improved to be better prepared to respond for
future disasters.
Almost 11 months ago, Louisiana and the other Gulf States
experienced the most destructive natural disaster in our Nation's
history when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. In Louisiana,
tragically, Hurricane Katrina left over 1,100 people dead with more
still missing. Hurricane Katrina represents one of the first times in
history where a major metropolitan area was evacuated and its economic
activity virtually ceased. Thousands of American families lost their
homes, their jobs, their communities, and sadly too many lost their
lives or loved ones. We must make sure this devastation absolutely
never happens again.
The Stafford Act provides the foundation for recovery and response.
I look forward to hearing today about any ideas and suggestions for
improving the Stafford Act including topics such as debris removal and
other emergency work that are very important to Louisiana's recovery.
Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Louisianans have had the challenge
of rebuilding their homes and getting their lives back together.
One of the greatest challenges Louisianans faces in a post-Katrina
world is the removal of debris which is a monumental task in itself.
There is an unprecedented amount of debris after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. We have made much progress in cleaning up the debris and have
already hauled away 25 times more than the debris in New York after
September 11, but we still have a long way to go.
Debris removal is critical to ensuring that Louisiana parishes and
cities can continue vital rebuilding and recovery work. Recently, the
President extended 100 percent Federal reimbursement of debris removal
in 5 parishes through the end of the year, which is so important to
Louisiana's recovery efforts. With the amount of debris left in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, this extension will help these parishes move
forward as they continue to clean up and rebuild.
Coordination between agencies involved and with the State and local
government is crucial to bringing results that will ensure the clean up
of debris is done effectively, safely and timely in order for
Louisianans to progress with their recovery efforts. We have a lot to
learn from Hurricane Katrina and need to do all we can to be better
prepared for future storms. I look forward to hearing from the
witnesses and thank you for all you have done to help the Gulf Coast
recover.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Vitter.
Senator Obama is here. I didn't know whether you wanted to
be recognized for an opening statement.
Senator Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Jeffords. Thank you so much for holding this hearing.
Obviously, I am deeply interested in what Senator Vitter has to
say, because he is dealing with some of the devastation in
Louisiana, and has been for the last year.
Before last summer, the Stafford Act, I think, was just an
abstract law for many of us. We had had some experiences,
obviously, with tornadoes and floods in Illinois, but nothing
compared to what happened on August 29, 2005, when Katrina made
landfall. So now it is our responsibility to determine what we
can do to ensure that the Stafford Act and the agencies that
implement it have the flexibility and resources they need to
respond to the next Katrina.
I just completed my first trip to New Orleans last week and
was astonished by what I saw. No matter how many times you hear
about it, no matter how many times you see it on the news, no
matter how many times you meet folks who have no home to return
to, nothing prepares you for the terrible reality and scope of
the devastation.
I asked the folks there how we in the Senate can help. They
had had almost a year to think about it. They had some good
answers.
One thing that they asked was that the Stafford Act
establish a magnitude of disaster above major disaster level.
They suggested a catastrophic disaster designation that could
provide the long-term resources and assistance that such a
disaster would require.
They asked for an increased Federal share in paying for
emergency work, work such as the clearance and removal of
debris and temporary restoration of essential public services.
After Katrina, homeowners were forced to pay for debris cleanup
because FEMA wouldn't foot the bill.
They asked for changes in housing assistance. Clearly, FEMA
was not equipped to address the housing needs of the displaced.
We need to fix that problem in any reauthorization of the
Stafford Act.
I also met with the community members from New Orleans
East, which has the third largest Vietnamese population in the
United States. Half of this community has returned and they are
doing their part to help revive the city, but the city placed a
landfill in the community, hastily constructed in the aftermath
of the storms. Unfortunately, they neglected to put a clay
liner in the landfill, and residents are concerned that toxic
waste will soon be seeping into the community they are so
desperately trying to rebuild. I want to know what can be done
potentially within the Stafford Act to ensure that
environmental protections are respected.
So, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing what the
witnesses have to say about this and other issues related to
the Stafford Act. Thank you very much for holding this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Senator Obama follows:]
Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing.
Before last summer, the Stafford Act was just an abstract law for
many of us. That changed on August 29, 2005, when Katrina made
landfall. Now, it's our responsibility to determine what we can do to
ensure that the Stafford Act, and the agencies that implement it, have
the flexibility and the resources necessary to respond to the next
Katrina.
I made my first trip to New Orleans last week, and I was amazed by
what I saw. No matter how many times you hear that parts of New Orleans
are still buried under tons of debris, no matter how many times you
meet folks who have no home to return to, nothing prepared me for the
horrifying reality that is New Orleans.
I asked the folks there how we in the Senate can help them. And,
because they've had almost a year to think about these things, they had
some good answers.
These folks in New Orleans asked that the Stafford Act establish a
magnitude of disaster above the ``major disaster'' level. They
suggested a ``catastrophic disaster'' designation that could provide
the long-term resources and assistance that such a disaster would
require.
They asked for an increased Federal share in paying for ``emergency
work'' work such as the clearance and removal of debris and the
temporary restoration of essential public services. After Katrina,
homeowners were forced to pay for debris clean-up because FEMA wouldn't
foot the bill.
They asked for changes in housing assistance. Clearly, FEMA was not
equipped to address the housing needs of the displaced. We need to fix
that problem in any reauthorization of the Stafford Act.
I met with community members from New Orleans East, which has the
third largest Vietnamese population in the United States. Half of this
community has returned, and they are doing their part to help revive
the city. But the city placed a landfill in the community, hastily
constructed in the aftermath of the storms. Unfortunately, they
neglected to put a clay liner in the landfill, and residents are
concerned that toxic wastes will soon be seeping into the community
they are trying so desperately to rebuild. I want to know what can be
done within the Stafford Act to ensure that environmental protections
are respected.
I look forward to hearing what the witnesses have to say about this
and other issues relating to the Stafford Act.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member for holding
this hearing.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Obama.
Let me share in my opening remarks, Senator Obama and
Senator Vitter, you weren't here, but I made kind of an off-
the-cuff remark about FEMA. Mr. Shea, I hope you will forgive
me, but I remember so well in the Murrah Federal Office
Building disaster in 1995, in my State of Oklahoma--at that
time Mr. James Lee Witt who was the Director of FEMA--it could
not have gone smoother. I often look at what is happening
today, what happened during Katrina and relate that to how well
it performed in my State of Oklahoma in 1995.
So we will go ahead and start. But before we do that, I
want to see if Senator Vitter might have some very important
person that he wants to introduce to this committee.
Senator Vitter. Absolutely. Thank you very much. My brand
new chief of staff in the Senate, Lee Vitter, is here helping
me, joining us at the hearing.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, please.
All right, in our first panel we have Robert Shea, Acting
Director of FEMA; Major General Don Riley, Director of Civil
Works for the Corps of Engineers; Deborah Dietrich, the
Director of Office of Emergency Management of the EPA; and Mr.
Corey Gruber, Executive Director of the National Preparedness
Task Force, Preparedness Directorate, at Department of Homeland
Security.
So we will take them in that order. For other members that
come in, we do close down our opening statements after the
witnesses start talking so you won't be interrupted.
We will start with you, Mr. Shea.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHEA, ACTING DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Shea. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Jeffords, and committee members Senator Vitter and Senator
Obama. My name is Robert Shea. I am the Acting Director of
Operations for the Federal Emergency Management Administration.
In preparing for this hearing, FEMA was asked to
specifically address two major issues: first, our policies and
procedures relating to debris removal after a disaster, and,
second, the impact of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. FEMA
appreciates the opportunity presented by this committee to
address these issues.
With regard to debris removal, disaster-related debris may
consist of downed trees, that is, vegetated debris; destroyed
personal property, including home contents and automobiles;
hazardous waste; construction and demolition material; or even
damaged boats and other debris that obstruct waterways. State
and local applicants must comply with environmental and
historical preservation laws when removing disaster-related
debris. Developing and executing a plan to remove and dispose
of large quantities of debris requires coordination with
numerous entities at all levels of government and, most
importantly, with the citizens of the community.
In short, State and local governments are primarily
responsible for removing disaster-related debris from their
communities. FEMA does provide funding for the removal of
eligible debris and may provide technical assistance, if
requested, by the State.
While FEMA does not directly manage State and local debris
operations, we do take an active role in providing technical
assistance and oversight. FEMA deploys debris specialists to
advise State emergency management and local officials on public
assistance eligibility, appropriate contracting procedures and
monitoring, and environmental compliance issues. This, of
course, is in conjunction with the Environmental Protection
Agency.
In addition, FEMA often requests the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to assist in providing technical assistance and to
work with the State to develop an overall debris management
plan for the disaster recovery process. FEMA may also deploy
monitors to provide oversight of debris operations to ensure
that FEMA funding is provided for eligible debris removal, to
ensure compliance with environmental regulations and
programmatic guidelines, and to reduce the occurrence of waste,
fraud, or abuse.
The Corps of Engineers and FEMA are the two primary or lead
agencies for Emergency Support Function No. 3 under the
National Response Plan.
In the cases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, widespread
destruction resulted in unprecedented quantities of debris.
FEMA estimates that Katrina and Rita resulted in a staggering
118 million cubic yards of debris, more than double the amount
of debris produced by the four hurricanes that struck Florida
in 2004 and six times the amount of debris created by Hurricane
Andrew. To truly understand the magnitude, you have to imagine
368 football fields filled with debris stacked to 190 feet high
in order to get an order of magnitude here. This amount of
debris would require approximately 6 million average-sized dump
trucks.
Senator Inhofe. State that once again, what you just now
said about relating it to a football field.
Mr. Shea. Yes. The magnitude is that it would be the
equivalent of 368 football fields with debris stacked 192 feet
high on each field. Or, another way of looking at it is every
single inch of Washington, DC, the entire city, would be
covered by at least a half a foot of debris.
To haul this amount of debris----
Senator Inhofe. Some people say it already is, but go
ahead.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Shea. That, sir, is a different issue.
FEMA has developed substantive guidance documents and
policies to assist local communities in developing and
executing debris management plans. We also offer debris
management training to State and local officials, and will
continue to look for ways to educate and help communities plan
the post-disaster removal operations. We provide technical
assistance to State and local governments in developing debris
management plans in peacetime and encourage them to hire
standby contractors prior to disasters occurring. FEMA will
always be ready to provide help at the time of a disaster, but,
for our efforts to be successful, our State and local partners
must be prepared to act quickly and responsibly.
With respect to mitigation, in addition to the authorities
the Stafford Act gives FEMA to assist State and local
governments in repairing critical infrastructure and removing
debris following a disaster, it also provides a variety of
mitigation programs and activities. A recent independent study
conducted by the Multihazard Mitigation Council at the request
of Congress concluded that every dollar spent on mitigation
saves society an average of $4. This translates into hundreds
of millions of dollars in savings each year, and it really
begins with sound mitigation planning.
The mitigation planning process is not static, it changes
and is refined over time. One of our greatest successes has
been the ability to work closely with our State, local, and
tribal partners in this effort, drawing on the experiences that
they have gained in preparing and implementing their plans over
the last several years.
This past May, FEMA invited one State from each of our FEMA
regional offices to discuss the plan update process. At this
meeting we asked the States to identify some of their successes
and perceived benefits from going through the mitigation
planning processes. These benefits fell into major categories:
improved risk assessment, interagency coordination and planning
committees, and coordination with local planning committees.
The importance of this is that it really drives that planning
process all the way through all levels of government; Federal,
State, and local.
Since the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Assistance Act
of 1993 amended the Stafford Act, the principal mitigation
activities funded under the Hazard Mitigation Grant program
include mitigation planning, acquisition of flood-prone
properties, conversion to open space----
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Shea, try to wrap up your statement. We
are going to try to confine this to 5 minutes. Your entire
statement will be made part of the record, but try to wrap up,
if you would.
Mr. Shea. I have a few more comments to make here.
These are essentially the principal activities of the PDM
program, instituted following the Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 amendments. To date, FEMA has obligated nearly $1.5
billion for planning, acquisition, and elevation activities
through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and our Predisaster
Mitigation Program, the companion. If we follow the finding of
the Mitigation Council's report, every dollar spent on
mitigation saves an average of $4. We can conclude that
mitigation grant programs have provided savings to this country
of approximately $6 billion.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee, and I look forward to answering any questions you
might have.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Shea.
General Riley.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DON T. RILEY, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL
WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
General Riley. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Major
General Don Riley, Director of Civil Works for the Army Corps
of Engineers. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
The Corps has had a longstanding and highly effective
relationship in support of FEMA under the Federal Response Plan
and now the National Response Plan. We also have major
responsibilities for disaster planning response and recovery
within our own authority under Public Law 84-99, our civil
works infrastructure missions of Flood Damage Reduction,
Navigation, and Hydropower. Furthermore, we have our inherent
responsibility to support DOD in execution of any of the
Department's disaster relief missions.
Under the National Response Plan, the Corps has primary
responsibility for Emergency Support Function No. 3, Public
Works and Engineering, and several assigned tasks in support of
other ESFs specified in the plan. Our mission portfolio during
major disaster response will typically include activities such
as provision of ice and water, debris clearance and disposal,
temporary roofing, emergency power to critical facilities, and
assistance to FEMA with provision of temporary housing.
Based on 14 years of experience in executing missions under
the FRP and NRP, the Corps believes the Stafford Act and the
NRP have the empowering authorities and tools that allow us to
be successful in performing our assigned missions. The Corps,
through our Floodplain Management Services Program, provides
advice and assistance to communities in terms of reducing their
flood risk with regard to community infrastructure. The Corps
Flood Damage Reduction Authorities also provide a broad range
of flood mitigation tools that are used in supporting State and
local flood mitigation objectives. Additionally, FEMA's
Regional Mitigation staff and Corps districts provide
mitigation services year-round to local communities and States.
Over the last 3 years, there has been a significant
increase in planning whereby the Corps, in coordination with
FEMA, has provided States with planning tools and assisted in
preparedness efforts, especially in the areas of commodities
planning, temporary power, and debris management. The Corps
will also be working closely with DHS Preparedness Directorate
to ensure that DHS programs and grants support the building of
State and local capabilities within our support function.
During the 2005 hurricane season, FEMA tasked the Corps to
take the lead for Federal debris management assistance in
certain localities in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, and
Texas. The Corps worked closely with EPA, FEMA, and other
Federal, State, and local governments to assist in these debris
removal activities.
Thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
testify, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General Riley.
Ms. Dietrich.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH DIETRICH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Ms. Dietrich. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. I am Deborah Dietrich, Director of the Office of
Emergency Management in the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response, EPA. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss EPA's
role under the National Response Plan, known as the NRP and
Agency response efforts supporting FEMA under the Stafford Act
following Hurricane Katrina. I will summarize my statement, but
I ask that my entire written statement be entered in the
record.
The magnitude of the damage from Hurricane Katrina
presented significant challenges for EPA and our partners at
the Federal, State, and local levels. As with other Federal
agencies, EPA's involvement is facilitated through the NRP.
While there is always room for improvement, we believe that the
NRP provided the framework for an effective response to the
most destructive natural disaster in the history of the United
States.
Under the NRP, EPA is the coordinator and primary Agency
for Emergency Support Function No. 10, Oil and Hazardous
Materials Response. Our primary activities under this support
function include: efforts to detect, identify, contain, clean
up, or dispose of oil or hazardous materials; removal of drums
and other bulk containers; collection of household hazardous
waste; monitoring of debris disposal; air and water quality
monitoring and sampling; and protection of natural resources.
EPA is also a support Agency for a number of other Emergency
Support Functions. For example, under ESF No. 3, Public Works
and Engineering, which addresses solid waste debris removal,
EPA provides necessary support to the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers by assisting in the location of disposal sites,
providing safety guidance for areas affected by hazardous
materials, assisting in the management of contaminated debris,
and by coordinating or providing assessments, data, expertise,
technical assistance, and monitoring.
In response to Hurricane Katrina and in coordination with
our partners, EPA performed a wide variety of tasks including:
response to more than 70 emergency situations including
hazardous material releases and oil spills; assessment of more
than 4,000 water and wastewater systems to determine viability
after the storm; environmental monitoring and sampling of
water, air, floodwater, and residual sediment resulting in more
than 400,000 analyses. EPA conducted extensive outreach through
the media and the Agency Web site, and distributed millions of
fliers to alert the public and communities about potential risk
and methods to address handling of potentially contaminated
debris. EPA also responded to FEMA's request for assistance and
rescued approximately 800 evacuees.
Removal and proper disposal of the unprecedented amount of
debris in the affected areas has been a major undertaking since
the beginning of the response. EPA has worked closely with the
Corps, FEMA, and State and local governments to assist in
debris removal activities. It is important to point out,
however, that local and State governments are responsible for
the permitting and operation of landfills where this debris is
being disposed. However, EPA has provided assistance to the
States in developing guidance regarding demolition of
structurally unsound buildings, as well as guidance for debris
burning. Along with FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps, EPA provided
assistance to the States as they developed their debris removal
plans.
As I mentioned before, the management and disposal of
nonhazardous debris is a State and local responsibility.
However, at the request of the States of Louisiana and
Mississippi, EPA assigned staff to provide support by visiting
debris disposal sites and observing waste handling practices,
including sorting and management at emergency disposal sites.
Observations of waste handling practices were reported to State
and local authorities for any appropriate follow-up action.
EPA's mission in Alabama and Mississippi is now complete,
and any remaining activities have been transitioned to the
States. In Louisiana, EPA activities are winding down and are
now focused on the collection and disposal of household
hazardous waste, landfill monitoring, and environmental
sampling. These efforts are generally occurring in the St.
Bernard and Orleans parishes.
The response to Hurricane Katrina has clearly necessitated
strong cooperation among Federal, State, and local government
agencies. We believe that the Stafford Act, the National
Response Plan, and the preparedness activities under the
National Incident Management System contributed positively to
our ability to respond to Hurricane Katrina.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to answer any questions that you or the committee members may
have.
Senator Inhofe. Your timing is perfect, Ms. Dietrich. Thank
you very much.
Ms. Dietrich. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Gruber.
STATEMENT OF COREY GRUBER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE, PREPAREDNESS DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gruber. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Senator
Jeffords. Senators, thank you very much for the opportunity to
appear before the committee and to discuss important
preparedness initiatives in the Department of Homeland
Security.
Our Nation's emergency and public safety services are quite
simply the finest in the world. Yet, without a consistent,
logical, and sustainable way to prepare for 21st century
homeland security challenges, unity of effort and measurable
operational readiness have proven to be illusive.
The Nation needs a dedicated and sustained national effort
to organize, guide investments, and strength national
preparedness. Much has been accomplished, but we know from
painful experience that there are still systemic infirmities in
our preparedness.
Secretary Chertoff and Under Secretary Foresman have made
it clear that reforms are necessary and will be accomplished
through a collaborative national effort. The Second Stage
Review and the establishment of the Preparedness Directorate in
July 2005 are rapidly integrating preparedness programs,
activities, and services to meet the needs of our most
important asset: our homeland security professionals across
this great Nation.
Building truly interchangeable homeland security
capabilities takes more than merely embracing a loosely defined
concept like ``all hazards.'' We have turned this concept into
a systematic planning methodology using a capabilities-based
framework. This meets the requirements of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8, titled ``National Preparedness.'' In
that directive, the Secretary was charged with developing a
National Preparedness Goal. The interim National Preparedness
Goal was published in March 2005, and the final National
Preparedness Goal, which underwent additional analysis and
revision as a result of Hurricane Katrina, will be published
shortly.
The mission of our Preparedness Directorate is to implement
the National Preparedness goal by preparing individuals, the
public, and private sector organizations for disasters by
defining and fostering a culture of preparedness, educating
stakeholders, strengthening prevention and resilience, and
developing the next generation of homeland security
professionals. This is a shared national mission, not simply a
Federal responsibility.
Let me address one example of how the Directorate is
approaching a key aspect of preparedness. Following Hurricane
Katrina, the President directed the Department to conduct an
immediate review of emergency plans for the Nation's major
cities. Congress subsequently tasked both the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Transportation to review
plans for all States and territories and 75 cities with
particular emphasis on evacuation planning.
The results of the Nationwide Plan Review were the most
comprehensive assessment of catastrophic planning yet
undertaken in this country. DHS is currently working with
participants in the review to improve their plans, support
training and exercise initiatives, and engage in discussions of
how to meet catastrophic challenges identified in our final
report. I would be happy to discuss this review in greater
detail, should you have questions.
To build the National Preparedness System and to respond to
recommendations in the Plan Review, the Preparedness
Directorate has established a new National Preparedness Task
Force, for which I serve as the Executive Director. The Task
Force intent is to bring together preparedness policy,
planning, exercises, evaluation, and field management assets to
create comprehensive solutions to the preparedness challenges
we have outlined.
As Secretary Chertoff stated, DHS must operate as an all
hazards, fully integrated organization. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency, our components, States and communities
across the country, must be prepared to respond and recover
from all disasters, whether caused by nature or terrorism.
While FEMA and its partners are engaged in response and
recovery, which can often be a protracted duration, the
Preparedness Directorate ensures that there is no disruption to
preparedness programs, activities and services to the balance
of the Nation.
By focusing FEMA on its core competencies of response and
recovery, and a new Directorate on preparedness, the Secretary
acknowledged the critical nature of both missions to the
Nation's homeland security.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, the President and Congress have
consistently identified the need for specific and measurable
goals for preparedness, national cooperation, application of
assistance where the need is the greatest, determination of
essential capabilities that communities need, and advanced
planning processes. HPSD-8, the lessons of Hurricane Katrina,
and the strategic requirements of the war on terrorism require
transformation of the way we approach preparedness in the 21st
century.
Thank you again for providing the opportunity to speak with
you today, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Gruber.
Let me just go ahead and start with a question to all of
you, because there is a lot of confusion not just in the
general public, but even on this panel, as to who does what,
and I would like to discuss the assignment of responsibility
for water borne debris and spills in disasters such as Katrina,
and specifically what would be the role of the EPA, the Coast
Guard, and the Corps of Engineers. Let's start with you, Mr.
Shea.
Mr. Shea. Well, essentially, FEMA has overall
responsibility based on the Stafford Act, so we are kind of the
coordination mechanism for a lot of this, including--watery
debris is the specific issue?
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that, but then that
assignment is being made----
Mr. Shea. Yes.
Senator Inhofe [continuing]. By you. Kind of clarify what
roles these agencies would play.
Mr. Shea. Once again, I think in this particular case, if
it is watery debris, typically, FEMA would turn to the Coast
Guard, but with input from the Environmental Protection Agency
and also from NOAA about their areas of expertise in removal of
watery debris.
Senator Inhofe. OK, but it would then be the Coast Guard,
if you were to assign the responsibility, to have results.
Mr. Shea. Yes. Of course, as in other cases, if State or
local government would like to shoulder those responsibilities,
we would be pleased to have them shoulder those
responsibilities.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
General Riley?
General Riley. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think two authorities
that you have given the Corps, one under the Clean Water Act,
section 404, to permit use and filling of dredged materials and
then, second, under the River and Harbors Act for navigable
water, so any discharges in navigable water. So those are our
two concerns that we have authorities to permit.
Senator Inhofe. OK.
Ms. Dietrich. Well, for EPA, we are the primary lead Agency
under ESF 10 under the National Response Plan, and FEMA looks
to us to address oil and hazardous substances. Now, we work
very closely with the Coast Guard. We actually share
responsibility with the Coast Guard under that ESF.
Senator Inhofe. But structurally, then, it goes right back
to FEMA, though, is that correct?
Ms. Dietrich. Right. For a Stafford Act response, we would
get a mission assignment from FEMA under ESF 10. The way we
divvy up our responsibilities, Coast Guard handles the coastal
area, EPA generally handles the inland area, but we work very
closely with the Coast Guard on a shared responsibility.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Any comment, Mr. Gruber?
Mr. Gruber. Sir, I would simply add that next week, the
Coast Guard is hosting a conference on maritime recovery
operations and Under Secretary Foresman will be attending. So
there is very active dialogue and efforts underway.
Senator Inhofe. All right. We will probably have
representation there.
Let's say in the event of a dirty bomb, a different type of
a problem, what agencies would be involved in the cleanup in
the contaminated debris zone, and who would be in charge and so
forth?
Mr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. Under the Stafford Act, again, basically, we
would look to the Emergency Support Function structure, and
that would include, undoubtedly, the Department of Energy for
their expertise and responsibilities, the Environmental
Protection Agency would be a key actor. I very much suspect the
Corps of Engineers would be a partner in this type of an event.
So we would have to collaborate across a number of different
governmental agencies in order to bring the appropriate
expertise to the table and to address whatever the issues were
as the result of a dirty bomb.
Senator Inhofe. So you think, then, the Corps of Engineers,
then, would be receiving most of the responsibility?
Mr. Shea. Once again, if State or local government were
unable or unwilling to do it, FEMA would then look to a mission
assignment process with the Corps of Engineers, I think, as
probably our primary mechanism, although there are independent
authorities and responsibilities that also deal in this area
with the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency.
Senator Inhofe. So would the standard procedures of the NRP
be deployed, or some other system?
Mr. Shea. Right. In other words, we would use the
mechanisms available under the National Response Plan, gather
the experts together, and then pick the best course of action
based on the issues that we knew were coming to bear on that
circumstance.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Do any of the rest of you, have any comment on that?
General Riley. Mr. Chairman, I think in the Corps'
perspective, FEMA would most likely look to us for technical
expertise, if there were damaged structures, to look at the
structural integrity of those structures. They might also task
us for temporary housing or temporary roofing or debris
removal. But it would probably be limited to that unless there
was anything else to do with navigable waterways or flood
control used under our own authority.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Any other comments on that?
Ms. Dietrich. I would just agree with Mr. Shea, and I think
that we would work closely with FEMA. DOE would obviously play
an important role, particularly early in the response, in terms
of radiation contamination. I think EPA would play a role on
the longer term cleanup in such a situation.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Gruber. Sir, I might just add one point. We have tested
plans, procedures, and protocols in some of the largest
exercises we have done in the country, particularly the top
officials exercise, the second one, which had an RDD scenario.
I think Senator Obama will remember because Illinois was a
participant in that exercise. So we do test these routinely in
exercises.
Senator Inhofe. All right, thank you.
We have been joined by Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton, in my opening statement I mentioned that
you and Senator Vitter probably would have the greatest
personal interest from the experiences in your States as to the
responsibilities of various parties, and also that while we
don't always agree on issues, there is one that we did agree
on, and that is that FEMA worked a lot better in the old days
than it works now, in my limited view. But we are going to try
to correct that.
So even though we normally forego opening statements once
the witnesses start, if you have an opening statement, I would
like to have you do that at this time.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for your leadership on this, and it is a pleasure working with
you on such an important issue.
I will ask unanimous consent that my entire opening
statement be made a part of the record. I want to highlight a
few points.
We are quickly moving toward the fifth anniversary of the
attacks of 9/11, and I have personally met with many
individuals who have been severely impacted by both their
physical and mental health conditions due to what they were
subjected to during the attack and in the days, weeks, and
months after; people who were first responders who bravely
rushed in, people who were construction workers, people who
were sanitation workers, people who worked in the streets to
get the telecommunications back up so the Stock Exchange could
open, people who were transportation workers. So many people
who were there for months on an end, as well as other workers
and residents of downtown New York. I have called for and
welcome both the creation of the current World Trade Center
Worker Health Monitoring Programs and the efforts of Dr. John
Howard, Director of NIOSH, in his capacity as the Federal
Coordinator for 9/11 Health.
The Federal Government, however, has no plan to deal with
this long-term health crisis. In fact, the Daily News in New
York published a series of stories on these individuals and
about what they have suffered from, the kind of impact it is
having upon people who can no longer perform their duties as
firefighters or police offices because of the diseases that
have materialized, the decreased breathing capacity and other
ailments that have emerged since
9/11.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that these stories
from the Daily News be made a part of the record.
Senator Inhofe. Without objection.
[The referenced documents follow on page 111-120.]
Senator Clinton. You know, Mr. Chairman, I don't think we
know whether Hurricane Katrina will have long-term health
impacts. Some researchers are looking into that. But I think we
should pay special attention to long-term medical and mental
health needs. They should be tracked, monitored, and treated
after significant natural or man-made disasters. I hope that we
can look into that issue on this panel.
I have also been working with my colleague, Senator
Voinovich, because his State sent some first responders to
Ground Zero. They came home and began suffering from health
effects. So this is a problem directly related to the
experience that so many people had, trying to cope with this
overwhelming disaster.
I also am concerned about Hurricane Katrina, the subsequent
failed response that we have, unfortunately, been living with
now for nearly a year. But we just experienced significant
floods in Upstate New York and, as a result, you know, tens of
thousands of people lost their homes, lost their businesses. In
Queens we are experiencing a massive blackout. Con Ed can't
figure out what caused it. They have had a horrible time trying
to figure out how to fix it. We have seen so many businesses
destroyed, particularly food-related businesses. You know, as I
travel around, I just feel that we are not prepared to respond
to all of these problems.
You know, I think that because each of the problems that I
mentioned have national implications, whether it is our
electricity grid or the impact on our oil supply out of the
Gulf, or whatever it might be, we need to take a hard look at
what kind of Federal assistance should be available, and the
Stafford Act is our key to doing that.
Finally, I hope we can address the lessons learned from
Katrina. I have a stack of reports here--they are almost too
heavy for me to lift--that have been conducted by the House,
the Senate, the GAO, the White House, independent experts.
After Hurricane Katrina, I advocated for a single independent
commission modeled after the 9/11 Commission, because I think
we have to learn these lessons. You know, there is a tremendous
amount of wisdom in what went wrong as well as what went right.
I met with the Red Cross the other day, and they were very
candid in telling me what they thought went right and what went
wrong. But we have these disparate reports. I hope that we can
figure out how to really zero in on lessons learned.
One of the reasons that the Chairman and I have supported
trying to go back to an independent FEMA is that when everybody
is in charge, nobody is in charge. When disaster preparedness
and response is lodged in a gigantic bureaucracy, it is easy to
get lost, particularly when that bureaucracy was formed after
9/11 to deal with the incredibly dangerous problem of terrorist
attacks. So if the Stafford Act authorities need to be changed,
clarified, expanded, or even contracted, I hope we will have
the courage to make those changes. I think everyone knows the
Chairman is a pretty determined leader, and I really trust that
we will get to the bottom of a lot of this and make some of the
changes we need. &
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Clinton follows:]
Statement of Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Senator from the
State of New York &
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this critically important
hearing on the Stafford Act and the future of America's emergency
preparedness and response system.
Obviously, this Nation has experienced significant disasters
throughout our history. Just in the past 15 years alone we have seen
earthquakes in California, hurricanes and tornadoes throughout the Gulf
and plains States--even now in New York--and of course the terrorist
attacks in Oklahoma City and the attacks of September 11, 2001, that
devastated New York and damaged the Pentagon.
It is clear that with the National Hurricane Center's predictions
of a strong hurricane season this year, coupled with the new threats
faced by this Nation from terrorists, that we must ensure that the
Stafford Act provides our government with all the necessary tools to
guard against, prepare for, and respond to any disaster be it man-made
or natural.
This hearing is extremely important and timely for me.
Mr. Chairman, nearly 5 years ago, on September 11th, terrorists
murdered almost 3,000 people. 343 firefighters and paramedics and 60
police officers lost their lives. The single deadliest attack on
American soil in our history.
In the aftermath this Congress responded swiftly to provide not
only the assistance available under the Stafford Act but with other
forms of financial assistance to rebuild New York City because of the
severity of the attacks.
We have seen similar bi-partisan, bi-cameral support in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina where this Congress has acted outside of
the current Stafford Act structure to provide the kind of long-term,
rebuilding support needed for the impacted States along the Gulf
Region.
But Mr. Chairman we also have a great deal more to do not only in
the Gulf but in New York as well.
Mr. Chairman, when the Twin Towers fell in New York City there were
thousands of firefighters, police officers, first responders, workers,
and other volunteers who stood on the piles that were once buildings to
look for any survivors.
Thousands of these selfless heroes stayed for days, and weeks, as
tons of debris continued to smolder and the air around them was filled
with toxins.
As a result today, nearly 5 years after those attacks, I have
personally met with many individuals whose health continues to
deteriorate. While I called for, and welcome, the efforts of Dr. John
Howard, director of NIOSH, in his capacity as the Federal coordinator
for 9/11 issues to deal with the long-term issues in New York, the
Federal Government has no plan to deal with this long-term health
crisis.
In fact, the Daily News in New York published a story on these
individuals and about the health impact it is having upon individuals
who can no longer perform their duty as firefighters and police
officers because of diseases that have materialized, decrease breathing
capacity, and other ailments that have emerged since 9/11.
I ask unanimous consent that these stories be made a part of the
record.
Mr. Chairman I don't think we know whether Hurricane Katrina will
have the same long-term health impact but one thing is clear: we must
determine what long-term medical and mental health needs should be
tracked, monitored, and treated after significant natural or man-made
disasters.
I hope this panel will address this issue or that this committee
will look into this important issue because it is something that I have
been dealing with, along with my colleagues in the New York delegation
and Senator Voinovich, ever since 9/11 and with which we will need to
deal with in the coming years.
Mr. Chairman, there is another matter I would like to raise.
We saw the catastrophic damage caused by Hurricane Katrina and the
subsequent failed response by the Federal Government.
I am sure we will get into those issues.
But there is also a question about the types of assistance we
should be providing to individuals and small businesses.
Mr. Chairman, we just experienced significant floods in Upstate New
York as a result of the massive rain storms just a few weeks ago.
In Queens we are experiencing a massive blackout impacting
thousands of individuals and over 700 businesses.
As I traveled across these impacted areas, or speak with
individuals, business owners, and local elected officials, there is a
concern about the type and level of assistance that the Federal
Government is able to provide.
After 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, along with a few other big
disasters in our Nation's history, we passed individual pieces of
legislation to address things like business and crop losses which are
normally dealt with by low-interest loans through the Small Business
Administration.
Many of my constituents who own small businesses cannot afford to
take on any more loans especially after they have just lost their homes
and all of their possessions.
So I hope we will look at the types of Federal assistance available
to small businesses, individuals, local governments, and other
entities.
The Stafford Act is an important tool to deal with disasters in
this country and we have moved from an ad hoc approach to disaster
response to a coordinated approach.
The Stafford Act as it exists today became law in 1974 after
consideration by this committee--the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee with FEMA being created by Executive order in 1979.
So Mr. Chairman I commend you for continuing stewardship over the
Stafford Act which authorizes the President to act.
We know that the President has delegated his responsibilities to
FEMA and DHS and others could also be directly impacted and we should
look at that in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and 9/11.
This committee last amended the Stafford Act to provide for the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, P.L. 106 390, and we must make sure
current mitigation programs reflect the threats we face from severe
hurricanes and potential terrorist attacks.
Perhaps it is time we look at some grant assistance for those
communities that are not as economically strong as other communities
and who will have a much harder time recovering from such widespread
disasters.
Finally Mr. Chairman, I hope we will address the lessons-learned
from Hurricane Katrina.
I have a stack of reports here, Mr. Chairman, that have been
conducted by the House, the Senate, the GAO, the White House.
After Hurricane Katrina struck I advocated for a single,
independent Commission modeled after the 9/11 Commission--to conduct an
investigation into what went wrong and to provide a unified set of
recommendations to us about what needs to be fixed.
Unfortunately, we now have disparate reports and I am afraid we are
poised to repeat some of the mistakes of the past.
I hope we will address FEMA's existing authorities to pre-position
assets and for the President to make major disaster declarations even
without a written request from a Governor because I believe such pre-
planning and pre-positioning could help mitigate some of these large
scale disasters.
If the Stafford Act authorities need to be changed, clarified,
expanded, or contracted I hope we will have the courage to make those
changes.
I look forward to working with all of my colleagues on this
committee and to hear from this panel as we move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Clinton. I will also
tell you that in my opening statement I talked about the great
experience, the successful experience we had after the Murrah
Federal Office Building. That was James Lee Witt at that time,
what a great job he did and how coordinated things were.
Senator Jeffords, you are recognized for your questions at
this time.
Senator Jeffords. Ms. Dietrich, how is EPA ensuring that
public health and the environment are not compromised in an
effort to speed up decisionmaking related to asbestos handling
and landfill permitting, and how is EPA communicating any
potential health risk to local affected communities?
Ms. Dietrich. Well, Senator, we have worked extensively
with the States on this issue, on asbestos-containing material,
as well as FEMA and the Corps of Engineers. We have provided
technical advice and assistance to the States and other Federal
agencies. We have assisted in conducting training on how to
handle the material. In addition, both Mississippi and
Louisiana established policies or protocols of how they will
handle this material. Again, it is a program delegated to the
States, so they do have responsibility for handling this, but
we have reviewed those protocols, commented on them, and feel
that the State is doing an adequate job on handling those
materials.
In terms of communicating to the public, we have done an
extensive outreach in communication via our Web site. We have
done a tremendous amount of sampling down in New Orleans. Those
results have been posted on the Web site. We did public
announcements via radio and we handed out millions of flyers
providing information to the public, as well as cautions that
they should take in dealing with whatever situation that they
may come in contact with.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Shea, I note that in your testimony
you state that FEMA encourages reauthorization of the Disaster
Mitigation Act. Do you favor reauthorization as it is, or do
you have recommended changes?
Mr. Shea. Senator, based on our experience with that
portion of the Act, I would tell you that we feel very
confident that the authorities are strong enough to do what we
need to do. Obviously, there are limitations based on funding,
et cetera, that gate the ability to influence the built
environment, but we feel very strongly that the Act itself is
very good.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Shea and Mr. Gruber, Title VI of the
Stafford Act authorizes a comprehensive emergency preparedness
system for all hazards to be established jointly by the Federal
Government, States, and their political subdivisions. Who is
currently administering Title VI of the Stafford Act and what
actions have you taken since September 11th to improve the
preparedness of our Nation for both natural disasters and
catastrophes?
Mr. Shea. That will be the Preparedness Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security. I think Mr. Gruber would
probably be best to answer that question.
Mr. Gruber. Sir, as I said in my opening remarks, this is
clearly a shared national responsibility, but let me just
highlight a few things that I think are important to this.
First of all, the Secretary acknowledged this in the Second
Stage Review. He mentioned, in particular, that preparedness
for catastrophic planning was an extremely important priority
of the Department. We have organized a Preparedness
Directorate, dedicated, undivided attention to a sustaining
preparedness programs activities and services. We have a series
of presidential directives, of course, guidance from Congress,
that describe how to implement improved incident management.
The directive I mentioned, that is titled ``National
Preparedness,'' identified 16 major initiatives. Some of those
include establishment of a national exercise program, which we
have done; others tell us to establish a national preparedness
system. We have been working very hard, we have been working
with over 100 national associations and 1,200 representatives
from across the country to help us build a robust National
Preparedness system that supports our National Emergency
Response system.
So there is a tremendous amount of activity fully engaged
across the whole community that comprises homeland security.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
General Riley, will you elaborate on the quality control
mechanisms that the Army Corps has in place to ensure that
debris is properly separated prior to disposal in approved
landfills?
General Riley. Yes, Senator, if I could. We have the
mission from FEMA for much of it, about half of it in
Mississippi, a little bit more than half of the debris in
Louisiana. Of course, those are, as EPA testified to, certified
and permitted by the State, the landfills. At the curbside,
though, is where we begin our very initial segregation of the
different types of debris, and then we continue that on in
through the landfill and we inspect it at the landfill.
We do have EPA monitors, as well as FEMA monitors, along
with our own auditors that inspect that work. We make on-the-
spot corrections for any contractors that might haul anything
else. If there is something wrong, that the contractor is doing
wrong, they just aren't paid. But we have a great deal of
monitors, and we got monitors also from around the Federal
Government, Bureau of Reclamation, even Department of State. We
asked Department of Defense, they offered up personnel from the
Air Force to increase our ability to monitor, as well as
contract quality assurance.
In addition to that, we asked for our own criminal
investigation command to bring people on, and we have found
some work that was improper. There were indictments; there are
some people in jail for doing that work.
So it is very, very closely monitored, and I think we are
confident we have all the waste streams distributed properly
and also recycled where most appropriate. So there is a great
deal of recycling going on as well.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
I will say to Senator Obama and Senator Clinton, we will
only have one round of questions, so if you need to go over a
couple minutes, that is fine.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be
relatively brief.
Mr. Shea, based on what I saw in New Orleans, we are having
some problems getting people back into their homes. I have
heard repeated complaints that FEMA's ability to address
housing needs after a disaster of this magnitude is inadequate.
So I wanted to specifically ask you what changes you thought
could be made to the Stafford Act in order for the Federal
Government to do a better job restoring people in their homes,
making sure that we are minimizing delays wherever possible.
If you could also address specifically some concerns that I
have heard about the difficulty in getting even temporary
housing in apartment buildings, and relying on trailers instead
because there were some constraints in terms of how money could
be spent by FEMA. So if you could just address some of those
questions.
Mr. Shea. Thank you, Senator. Well, in general, I think it
would be fair to say that FEMA's traditional methods of
providing temporary housing have not worked well in the
aftermath of Katrina. I don't think there is any mystery about
that. Historically, what we have done is used mobile homes or
travel trailers as a mechanism to put people back close to
their property so they can be involved in the rebuilding
process, and largely that has gone on down in the New Orleans
area.
But because of the fact that so many people were pulled out
of that area during the evacuation processes, re-establishing
that community in general has been very challenging, and I
think it will continue to be challenging for a while yet to
come. We are very concerned about it. We are working very hard
right now to make sure that we do meet the needs of every
individual. We are in touch with them basically on a regular
basis to gage their situation and provide whatever relief we
can to them.
We are looking at ways, within the framework of the
existing law, actually, of trying to provide expedited
assistance. Amongst other things, we are increasing our
capacity to do intake registration. We now have plans in place
to go to the shelters and actually do the intake and
registration of individuals directly in the shelters. We have
mobile vans that we are now fielding to be able to put into
place to get to populations when they are cut off from other
mechanisms to be able to do it.
So I think we are largely working within the framework of
the law to address this.
The other thing I would say, as Senator Clinton indicated,
there are a variety of reports that we are still in the process
of looking at, and they include the White House, the Senate has
helped us with some guidance, the House has, the Inspector
General of DHS, the Government Accountability Office. So we are
still going through all of that and have not come up with any
final recommendations that might include changes to the
Stafford Act.
Senator Obama. Any sense of how long that review is going
to take and when you will actually have----
Mr. Shea. Well, we are working very hard on it and I
suspect by late summer, early fall we should have some
indication of where we are going with all of that. It is not as
if we are just sitting there and----
Senator Obama. No, I understand you are trying to respond
where you can, but it would be useful to us to have that
review, obviously, if there are going to be legislative changes
that are coming out of it.
I have only a brief time remaining. Let me shift gears real
quick. One of the things that I was deeply concerned about was
a disjointed mechanism for reconnecting families after a
disaster, and obviously that would apply not just in a
situation like Katrina. You can imagine the panic if there was
a terrorist attack in a city.
As far as I can tell, federally sponsored entities like the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, the
National Center for Missing Adults, the Red Cross, and the
Louisiana Family Assistance Center, they all worked on this
effort, but there wasn't much coordination and support from
FEMA.
Under Secretary Paulson, based on a conversation I had with
him, FEMA plans to rely on the Red Cross, primarily, to
undertake this task, and I am not entirely clear or comfortable
as to why FEMA doesn't have a more central role in this. Is it
going to be engaging the Department of Justice, which has
jurisdiction over the Center for Missing Adults and Missing and
Exploited Children? Is it going to be dealing with the
Department of Health and Human Services, which provides primary
support for the Louisiana Family Assistance Center, the Red
Cross?
How can we coordinate this in a more effective way? I have
some legislation that is currently being considered. It just
strikes me, with modern technology, we should be able to come
up with a better solution than what we have seen so far.
Mr. Shea. As you indicated, Senator, that is one of the
areas that we have been in deep discussion with the American
Red Cross on. They have, on their own, I think, undertaken an
upgrade of their automated data processing systems. Part of the
mechanism by which FEMA operates is we are a relatively small
Agency, and, as such, there are a variety of different issues
out there. Our main mechanism for dealing with it is to look
towards areas of expertise. As was indicated by this panel
today, when we are confronted with debris removal, we turn to
the Corps and to the Environmental Protection Agency. So we
feel pretty strongly and we spent a lot of time with the
American Red Cross to have them do this.
That is not to say that we won't explore other mechanisms.
We recently embraced an organization called Save the Children
to be able to help us with some of our mobile home parks down
there in the Louisiana area and other areas of the country. So
we are looking at mechanisms by which we can partner both with
the public sector and the private sector to be able to address
issues of the kind that you have outlined.
Senator Obama. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, but what I would like
to do is to, if I may, submit some questions for the record.
Senator Inhofe. That would be fine. I might suggest on the
second panel we do have an American Red Cross witness.
Senator Obama. Unfortunately, I can't stay.
Senator Inhofe. I see.
Senator Obama. But I would like to.
Senator Inhofe. Very good.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think you can tell from both our statements and our
questions that we have a lot of concerns. I would sort of list
a number of those for me: long-term health monitoring and
treatment; the types of assistance that are available, low
interest loans versus grants, which in some situations I think
may be called for; large-scale long-term housing after
disasters; registering numbers of individuals for assistance
for reconciling families, for doing that as well as to try to
get a better system to avoid the waste that we have now been
hearing about, just billions of dollars wasted, trailers
rotting in a field near the Hope Airport in Southwest Arkansas;
debris removal, which has been referenced; and no-bid
contracts. Those are all areas of deep concern to me.
I would ask, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to submit
additional questions in writing to try to elicit further
information from these agencies.
Senator Inhofe. Sure. Without objection. I might also add
that several other Members who are not here will be submitting
questions for the record.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Let me ask you, Mr. Shea, what FEMA's attitude is toward
creating some kind of long-term recovery entity, either within
FEMA--but given the constraints you face, I understand why that
might be difficult--or at least coordinated by FEMA so that
localities and States that are overwhelmed, as we have seen
with 9/11 and then with Katrina, could immediately set up some
kind of medical mental health tracking and treatment protocol?
Senator Voinovich and I have introduced the Disaster Area
Health and Environmental Monitoring Act, which would amend the
Stafford Act to allow the President to set up monitoring
programs in order to protect and track the health of first
responders and residents, with a priority on tracking first
responders with high degrees of exposure to known toxic
substances. Do you believe that this is an additional both
responsibility and opportunity for our disaster response
mechanism?
Mr. Shea. Senator, I guess my comment would kind of read as
follows on that. I know that under your leadership that we
began looking very hard at some issues surrounding the
implications of 9/11, and I think, frankly, part of the
experience, we have been involved in that now for well over a
year and it has been a beneficial experience, no question about
it. One of the things that is a little unnerving is that there
is no conclusions to it, so we are still struggling with that.
But we do believe that the health and safety aspects of the
Stafford Act are fairly significant and are ready to address,
should we know what the issues are to be addressed. So that is
one of the constraints on us at this moment, I think.
Senator Clinton. Well, that is an area that I would like to
work with you on further. I appreciate the fact that we did get
Mr. Howard appointed to do the work that he is now doing, and I
think that is going to be also very informational.
I wanted to ask General Riley, you know, debris cleanup has
been identified as a real holdup. I talked with Mayor Nagin
from New Orleans on Monday and asked him how the lower 9th Ward
was going, because I was there in December. He said not much
has happened. There are other places within Louisiana and
Mississippi where you get the same response. I am very
concerned about this and wonder, General, if you think we need
to make some changes in the Stafford Act or the National
Response Plan Agency activities in order to do a better job of
getting on the stick with this and getting it done more
efficiently.
General Riley. Yes, Senator, there is clearly, at 9th Ward,
a challenge, and mainly the challenge has been--well, very
quickly, the Corps was able, under FEMA's mission assignment,
to move and clear the rights-of-way, and that happened fairly
quickly. What the challenge was then is the slow return of
residents. As residents return, they will put more debris out
in the right-of-way, so we will go clean that up fairly
quickly.
The real challenge in the 9th Ward and other areas that
were heavily damaged was obtaining the right of entry signed by
the resident and the bank and the mortgage company and through
the State, FEMA, and the community, before it got to us. So the
only thing that the Stafford Act can do, I would think, would
be take away personal rights of their property. So I would hate
to see that. It is a very deliberate procedure, but its all in
the interest of protecting personal property rights. We just
don't go on their property.
Now, if there is a tree that is about to damage public
property, we can go onto private property and take care of
that. But in any other instance we defer to their personal
property rights and get a signed right of entry before we enter
on that private property to demolish a structure, for instance.
Senator Clinton. Well, General, you know, I think that
sounds real good, but what I have heard, both from New Orleans
and from some of the surrounding parishes, is that there were a
lot of contracts that were given to independent debris removal
companies, and they haven't done the job either. So, I mean, it
is like you are not doing the job because you can't get
permission, but everybody I talk to says they have been waiting
desperately now for months to get somebody to come remove their
debris. So, I mean, I think we are kind of in a circular
position here, and it doesn't add up to me.
As part of our review, I think it would be appropriate, Mr.
Chairman, to ask the Army Corps and FEMA for a breakdown of the
debris removal contracts let during Hurricane Katrina, you
know, who got them, what the dollar amounts were, who the prime
contractors subcontracted out of, because what I have been
hearing from people is that the money has just been dissipated;
it went to some, you know, prime contractor who subcontracted
to somebody else, who subcontracted to his brother-in-law, who
contracted to, you know, his uncle, and by the time it got down
to the person who was supposed to go haul the debris away,
there was hardly any money left.
So I think we need to look into this, because it may be
that we want to recommend, you know, pre-positioning material
and having contracts already on the ready and having qualified
people who can perform this function at a cost-effective rate
that saves the taxpayers dollars. So I am certainly far from
satisfied that this is an area that we have done a particularly
good job in. In fact, I think we have failed miserably in many
instances, and I think we can do better. So I think, Mr.
Chairman, this is one place we need to emphasize.
Senator Inhofe. You know, Senator Clinton, what you might
do at this point is go ahead and direct that question to one of
the witnesses for the record with a response, and find out. I
think it is a good idea.
Senator Clinton. Well, I would like to ask both General
Riley and Mr. Shea to provide us with information about the
contracts that were let with respect to debris removal after
Katrina. Will you do that, General?
General Riley. Yes, Senator, sure will.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Mr. Shea?
Mr. Shea. We will.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Let me just, for the record also, I will probably direct it
at you, Ms. Dietrich, I had said in my opening statement that
it has been called to my attention there are existing landfills
that have not been fully utilized and others are being built,
and I would like to specifically have you respond for the
record--the Satellite D landfill and the River Birch landfill,
one of which is lined, I think the River Birch, and the other
is not--as to if they are going to be used or have they been
used, or if not, why not? If you could do that for the record,
unless you have the information now.
Ms. Dietrich. I don't have that information with me today,
but I will be happy to provide that for the record.
Senator Inhofe. That is good.
OK, I think Senator Jeffords had one more question that he
wanted to ask.
Senator Jeffords. Yes.
Ms. Dietrich, I note that in your testimony you say that
EPA debris activities are winding down. I understand that there
are between 15,000 and 22,000 homes still to be demolished. How
can EPA's job be done?
Ms. Dietrich. Well, our job primarily has been to collect
household hazardous waste. I think primarily the demolition
mission will be handled by the Corps and the States. So while
we are winding down with regard to the amount of household
hazardous waste, we certainly will stay abreast of the
situation. To the degree that we are given a mission assignment
to extend on demolition, we will do so.
Senator Inhofe. All right, we are prepared to dismiss this
panel unless there is a further question.
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. All right, you are dismissed, and we
appreciate very much your participation today.
We would call up the next panel, which is Armond Mascelli,
who is the vice president of Domestic Response for the American
Red Cross; Pamela Pogue, the chair of the Association of State
Flood Managers, the State Floodplain Management, the State of
Rhode Island; and Tamara Little, who is the chair of the Legal
Council Committee, National Emergency Management Response
Association.
We welcome you to this panel. We will start with the
opening statements from the panel in the order that I
introduced you, which will start with you, Mr. Mascelli. I
would like to ask that you try to confine your opening
statement to 5 minutes, and your entire statement will be made
a part of the record.
Mr. Mascelli.
STATEMENT OF ARMOND MASCELLI, VICE PRESIDENT OF DOMESTIC
RESPONSE, AMERICAN RED CROSS
Mr. Mascelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Armond Mascelli, and I am the vice president of
Domestic Response for the American Red Cross. Thank you for
inviting me to testify before you today on the Stafford Act. I
will keep my oral remarks very brief.
This is an important hearing. Disasters have evolved and
changed in our country and so, too, as a result, must public
policy that supports our collective response and mitigation. I
want to address the issue areas requested by the committee by
providing some quick recommendations. First, we suggest that it
is essential that there is a crosswalk between the Stafford Act
and the National Response Plan. While the Stafford Act has
proven to be a fair apparatus for Federal response to recurring
disasters, we believe it is important to make sure that the
Stafford Act matches this new Federal Response Plan,
particularly in the plan's areas of catastrophic disasters.
Second, in passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
under the Stafford Act, the Congress listed six intentions or
six purposes in that Act, to include revising, broadening the
scope of the existing disaster relief programs; encouraging the
development of comprehensive disaster preparedness plans and
activities in State and local government; achieve greater
coordination, responsiveness between the Preparedness and
Relief Programs; encourage individuals and States and local
governments to protect themselves by obtaining insurance
coverage to supplement or to replace government assistance; to
encourage hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses; and
then, finally, to provide Federal assistance programs for both
public and private losses sustained by disasters.
I would suggest that all these intentions of Congress are
still valid today. While these six intentions have gotten some
traction since passage, we believe that they have not been
fully realized.
To better realize these disaster outcomes, we believe that
the Stafford Act and other acts by Congress should tie
mitigation funding and programs to goals and concrete measures.
Mitigation is important. We believe that the government sector
can play a more effective role in ensuring mitigation practices
are implemented.
Second, since the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, our
Nation has experienced a major terrorist attack, as well as a
truly catastrophic natural disaster. In light of 9/11 and
Hurricane Katrina, and with the impending threat of additional
terrorist attacks, the forecast that is set of future
destructive disaster seasons, and pandemic influenza, we
believe that the Stafford Act needs to be examined and also to
consider these type of likely disasters.
We also suggest that the committee look at the
effectiveness of the individual assistance programs under
Stafford in relation to the needs and experience of disaster
victims. This assistance can, we believe, be altered in some
ways to better support and ensure that the needs of disaster
victims are being met in a more effective and efficient manner.
I would encourage the committee to be mindful that, unlike
perhaps other Stafford Act constituents, there is not an
organized group of disaster victims with the ability to
advocate their case before Congress, particularly before
disasters happen.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, the American Red
Cross is listed in the Stafford Act. We believe this is
important because it acknowledges the unique role of the
American Red Cross, but also the importance that non-government
organizations play in disaster preparedness and response
efforts.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I
would be happy to answer any of your questions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Mascelli.
Ms. Pogue.
STATEMENT OF PAMELA POGUE, CFM, CHAIR, ASSOCIATION OF STATE
FLOOD MANAGERS, STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGER, STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Ms. Pogue. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member
Jeffords, and Senator Clinton, and other members of the
committee. I am Pam Pogue, and I am the chair of the
Association of State Floodplain Managers. I am also the State
floodplain manager for the State of Rhode Island.
The Association and its 24 chapters represent over 9,000
State and local officials and other professionals who are
engaged in all aspects of floodplain management and hazard
mitigation, including management, mapping, engineering,
planning, community development, hydrology, forecasting,
emergency response, water resources, and insurance. Many
members of our Association work right now with communities who
have been directly impacted by Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and
work with organizations that are assisting with these
rebuilding and recovery efforts.
We appreciate the invitation to share our views with you on
the improvements that need to be made to enhance the Stafford
Act and to improve disaster loss reduction in our Nation.
Disaster mitigation is critically important. Mitigation,
when practiced and implemented, is how we keep structures and
people out of harm's way. Mitigation, when institutionalized at
the State and local level, helps to keep communities survive,
despite whatever damage has been wrought. Mitigation is also
how we save the Federal Government huge expenditures in
disaster relief. For the first time, we now have a report that
quantifies the benefits of mitigation. The study was done at
the congressional request of FEMA and FEMA tasked the Institute
of Building Sciences to complete the research and report on the
final results. We now know that for every $1 invested in
mitigation, we have a $4 return. For flood mitigation it is
even higher; for $1 we receive a $5 return for every
investment.
We have established now that mitigation is a good
investment and a very smart local practice. Now we need to
examine how we can bring our mitigation programs to achieve
these critical goals for the citizens in this country. I would
like to offer the committee five recommendations towards this
end.
No. 1, additional authority is needed for the
administration of the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and
should be delegated to qualified States. With regard to FEMA
and the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, we think that it needs
to be run much more efficiently and expeditiously, and can
certainly be done by those States that are qualified. FEMA has
not initiated action to implement section 404(c), Program
Administration by States. Currently, of the States that have
FEMA-approved enhanced mitigation plans, seven States--and two
are pending--are poised to assume this additional
responsibility and authority that Congress has already
anticipated would be delegated.
Many of the communities that have very active mitigation
programs are in these same States and would greatly benefit
from their States' assuming this additional administrative
responsibility and authority. The benefit for a State to be
delegated this authority is that the duplication of efforts
that currently exists between the State and the regional
offices in reviewing and processing these grants could be
avoided.
Therefore, processing the funding from HMGP could be
expedited, the funding could be obligated and then spent in a
much timelier fashion. By delegating additional HMGP authority
to those States that are capable and eligible, FEMA is
supporting enhancement of State capacity and decreasing the
processing time, program delays, and grant costs.
The Federal Government, including FEMA, needs strong
capable State and local mitigation programs if the costs and
sufferings of disasters are going to be reduced.
The ASFPM would recommend that report language expressing
the committee expectation that FEMA is to undertake the
consultation of State and local governments, and implement
delegation of authority for the administration of the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program. The Association also recommends that
the committee direct FEMA to continue to improve the delivery
of post-disaster programs to meet the needs and demands of
States and communities, possibly within a 90-day turnaround of
receiving that grant.
No. 2, communities that refuse to participate in the
National Flood Insurance Program should not be eligible for
public disaster assistance. There are communities with
identified flood hazards that choose not to participate in the
National Flood Insurance Program, thereby allowing development
and public infrastructure in special flood hazard areas. As a
result of not being an NFIP community, the citizens of that
community are not eligible to purchase national flood
insurance. Ironically, however, these same community leaders
that choose not to join the NFIP can still apply for and
receive disaster assistance even for buildings located in flood
hazard and high risk areas.
This is poor public policy because it rewards communities
that allow at-risk development and because they know FEMA and
the public tax dollars will bail them out. It also penalizes
those communities that do the right thing because these
communities help to pay for those that do nothing.
The Association would recommend that the committee clarify
that all public assistance for any damaged public buildings and
infrastructure located in FEMA mapped special flood hazard
areas is to be withheld from communities that have declined to
participate in the National Flood Program.
No. 3, the Stafford Act authority should be expanded during
catastrophic events. The Stafford Act has proven to be
effective for most disasters; however, additional provisions
are needed to address the challenges that arise during those
events that far exceed State and local capacity that are
critically important in post-disaster recovery issues. Whether
catastrophic or even of a regional impact of some significance,
the results of natural disasters on a community is that, to
varying degrees, some routine governmental functions suffer,
such as the planning, the permitting, and inspection to ensure
adequate management of the rebuilding process.
Citizens may start to repair and rebuild before safety
inspections are done and conducted, before building permits are
issued, which put these businesses and families back into
harm's way. In addition, when an event causes these impacts,
disaster assistance may be required up to 12 to 24 months.
FEMA, DHS, has consistently denied reimbursement of costs
associated with private property damage inspections and
permitting, despite congressional findings in the Stafford Act
that because disasters often disrupt the normal function of
governments and communities, and adversely affect individuals
and families with great severity, special measures designed to
assist the efforts of those affected States in expediting and
rendering aid assistance and emergency services, and the
reconstruction and rehabilitation should be necessary for
reimbursement.
My final recommendation----
Senator Inhofe. I am counting, and I counted three.
Ms. Pogue. I know you are. I saw you and I am jumping to
the last one.
Senator Inhofe. Let's try to wind up.
Ms. Pogue. Finally, the impact of FEMA's reorganization on
the Stafford Act programs. Prior to be reorganized and
incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003,
FEMA was a lead organization. Since the mid-1990s, it had
responded to both natural and man-made events in an effective
manner. The ASFPM was concerned from the beginning that the
inclusion of FEMA into DHS would not bode well for the progress
the Nation has made in reducing our risk to natural hazards.
Unfortunately, there is mounting evidence that our concerns
have been realized. FEMA has gone from a small independent
agency with direct access to the President to just one among
many entities in a huge organization. The Nation has gone from
mitigation being the cornerstone of disaster programs to having
the word and concept nearly excised from the emergency
management lexicon. Even though assurances were made during the
legacy missions of these organizations would continue,
terrorism was and is the primary focus of DHS, which ASFP
agrees is appropriate for DHS. State and local emergency
managers, especially those in areas prone to these recurring
hazards, are lamenting the loss of the FEMA we once knew.
The following have been and continue to be specific
concerns: the transfer of specifically authorized FEMA and NFIP
funds to support other DHS functions; detailing FEMA staff out
of the mitigation directorate; not filling vacant positions
throughout FEMA, including senior leadership positions; and
extensive delays in FEMA policy decisions and guidance due to
the added layer of DHS bureaucracy.
I would like to thank the committee.
Senator Inhofe. Ms. Pogue, let me ask you a question. How
long have you been in the position you are in right now?
Ms. Pogue. As the State floodplain manager in Rhode Island
or as----
Senator Inhofe. No, in Rhode Island.
Ms. Pogue. In Rhode Island? Seven years.
Senator Inhofe. OK. So you remember what it was like
before.
Ms. Pogue. Oh, I certainly do.
Senator Inhofe. That is what I wanted to get.
In fact, I have to tell my fellow members up here that we
had structured this panel so that the first panel would be kind
of the providers and the second the customers.
I was going to admonish you, when it was my turn to ask
questions, not to be shy about your answers. I have a feeling I
don't need to do that.
Ms. Little.
STATEMENT OF TAMARA S. LITTLE, CHAIR, LEGAL COUNSEL COMMITTEE,
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Ms. Little. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Inhofe,
Ranking Member Jeffords, and Senator Clinton. Thank you for
allowing me the opportunity today to represent the views of the
National Emergency Management Association, whose members are
State emergency management directors from all States,
territories, and the District.
As the Nation continues to address the recommendations of
the various reports reviewing the preparation for, response to,
and recovery from Hurricane Katrina, careful thought must be
given by Congress.
The Stafford Act is a law that the members of NEMA hold in
very high regard. Major revisions of the Stafford Act are not
necessary, since the law provides adequate flexibility for
emergency management in our Nation. NEMA played a very active
role in the drafting of Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, and
its members implement various sections of that Act and the
Stafford Act every day.
NEMA does not support creating a separate or new system
solely to address catastrophic disasters. Not only is the
Stafford Act nimble enough to handle disasters, large or small,
but Congress can and has utilized its ability to make temporary
changes to the law as particular circumstances require. Any
revisions to the Stafford Act must be thoughtful, deliberate
,and closely vetted through stakeholder groups with proximity
to the outcomes, such as NEMA and the other members of the
Stafford Act Coalition. Policy guidelines, most recently,
strategies are often issued without notice, coordination, good
statutory or regulatory foundation, or congressional oversight.
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 was adopted to create a
predisaster mitigation program and to refine current disaster
programs that would result in cost savings for the Federal
Government. While the legislation had a very strong mitigation
focus, one example of how the Stafford Act has been sidestepped
is to examine how the State of mitigation has changed over the
past 6 years.
Amendments to the law that occurred during the
appropriations process reduced the formula for post-disaster
HMGP grant program funds from 15 percent to 7.5 percent. This
reduction prevents lessons from disasters from being
immediately incorporated to mitigation projects.
What was intended to be a program that helped fund every
State's predisaster mitigation efforts has now become a
competitive program which often favors communities with greater
ability to dedicate financial resources to grant applications,
including engineering and preservation reviews.
On a policy front, mitigation has been marginalized. While
the Department of Homeland Security was formed and terrorism
became a greater focus, mitigation activities received less
focus. The life cycle of emergency management was broken when
preparedness was moved from FEMA to create a new Preparedness
Directorate within DHS in 2005, and mitigation rated only a
mere mention in the National Response Plan.
There is some good news. Every single State and many local
governments now have plans in place to pre-identify mitigation
priorities prior to disasters if and when Federal assistance
would be available for the execution of those projects.
Additionally, some States took on the greater responsibility of
obtaining approval of enhanced mitigation plans, enabling those
States to be eligible for up to 20 percent of disaster costs
for HMGP by acting as a managing State. Currently, as Ms. Pogue
related to you, seven States, including Ohio, have received
approval of their enhanced plans. However, HMGP should be
restored to 15 percent of disaster costs for all States.
As new changes are being considered to the Stafford Act,
NEMA asks that the Senate pay particular attention to ensuring
mitigation opportunities are increased by fully funding those
programs and allowing the important changes to DMA2K to have
their intended effect, that of reducing disaster costs to the
Federal Government.
NEMA has also identified several other areas for immediate
improvement.
The reduction to the repair cap for individual assistance
was erroneously included in DMA2K and has since adversely
impacted many disaster victims. NEMA would support making a
change to raise the cap, which, adjusted for inflation, would
be over $27,000.
In addition, State and local governments need to have the
ability to utilize Federal assistance to keep State and local
personnel working, especially after a catastrophic disaster. In
cases of catastrophic disaster where entities have very limited
income sources, this is particularly important to enable
everyone to continue the important work of response and
recovery.
Hurricane Katrina resulted in numerous disaster-specific
changes in policy for debris removal. Historically, this is one
of the most problematic areas. Six years after DMA2K, the Gulf
Coast States still struggle with this issue. FEMA released,
just this week, its debris removal operation strategy, and it
is one example again of releasing a policy without good
coordination with the actual stakeholders, State and local
governments. Our current debris removal reimbursement system is
outdated and provides little incentive for State and local
governments to take over the management of debris removal.
While there is a choice of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
at their prices for up to 100 percent Federal reimbursement, or
they could choose to pay 25 percent of their own money if they
want to take over the management of debris, again, this
provides State and local governments little incentive. Thought
should be given to lowering the State and local cost-share for
debris removal if impacted communities are willing to take on
this weighty task.
We must find common ground and develop policies that remove
these obstacles and accomplish debris removal goals and
objectives without compromising the integrity and
accountability of the program.
On behalf of NEMA and its member State directors, I thank
you for the opportunity to present this statement today.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. Let me ask you the same question
I asked Ms. Pogue. How long have you been either dealing with
the States' emergency management teams or the current position
you are in?
Ms. Little. Mr. Chairman, I have been in my current
position for almost 18 years.
Senator Inhofe. OK, that is good enough.
Let me do this. You have done a great job, I think, all
three of you, when you have outlined the problems you are
dealing with. What I want to approach in my questions is a
comparison, because that is why I asked if you were around
before. So in terms of the States' response, recovery,
preparedness mitigation functions, how have they been affected
by FEMA's inclusion in DHS? I would like to get a kind of
comparison of how things were before that and after that. You
have addressed mostly what has happened after that.
Let's start with you, Ms. Pogue.
Ms. Pogue. I would be happy to address that. I have been in
hazard mitigation and this area probably for 19 years; my prior
life was as an oceanographer. But I appreciate what you are
saying.
The No. 1 impact that I notice as a State program manager
for flooding, earthquakes, hurricanes--and I also was a State
hazard mitigation officer--prior to 9/11, we had a staff in
Rhode Island of about 16 people. Of the 16 people, I would say
6 of us more or less had some authority or dealing with natural
hazards. As a result of 9/11, you are looking, unfortunately,
at the only person dealing with natural hazards for the State
of Rhode Island. But we do have 22 contractors that are dealing
with terrorism in Rhode Island.
So the one thing that the direct impact--and I know that my
State is not alone--is that there has been a tremendous
resource drain in dealing with natural hazards, but there has
been a phenomenal shift in responsibility and importance away
from natural hazards and toward terrorism.
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Ms. Little.
Ms. Little. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the other things
is that DMA2K authorized the enhanced plan program, the
managing State role, which many States embraced immediately.
Since many States and local governments currently have these
plans in place, they are ready to move in this role and to
hopefully allow mitigation programs to occur faster so that
more projects can be completed with money that is available.
Senator Inhofe. But is it fair to say that the mitigation
has been less featured since FEMA became a part of DHS?
Ms. Little. Mr. Chairman, I would say that is certainly
true.
Senator Inhofe. What do you think?
Ms. Pogue. I couldn't echo that sentiment strong enough.
Absolutely true.
Senator Inhofe. OK, what thoughts do you have, Mr.
Mascelli?
Mr. Mascelli. I have a little bit of a different
perspective in the sense that the scope, risk of disasters are
increasing at a significant rate. Look at the demographics of
our country, look at where people are settling and living, et
cetera. So certain things like mitigation become really
important, become more important than perhaps were given
attention a few years ago. If they are not addressed in an
effective way, the same as we look at response, we look at
planning, we look at some of the other components of emergency
management, then we will never get to the point where effort is
matching what the results we are looking for.
So how the Government structures and what it does is up for
the Government to decide, but the reality is the end result.
Disasters are more expensive. We are having large disasters. We
have a significant pattern of hurricanes coming up,
meteorologists tell us, over the next several years. So is all
that activity, regardless of how we structure it, actually
going to give us the benefit that we are looking for? There is
a shortfall there.
Senator Inhofe. You heard me say in my opening statement
that FEMA had set their goals to reducing risk of loss of lives
by 10 percent and property by 15 percent by 2007. What is your
feeling about whether they are going to be able to meet this
goal? If not, what changes should be made to help them do that?
Mr. Mascelli. A couple things. I would suggest that
probably the most effective mitigation activity we have had in
the country is in the State of Florida, for a number of
reasons, but one of the reasons for that is that it engaged
more people, the private sector, for example. Clearly, the
State of Florida took some actions after Andrew, for example.
Insurance companies deciding raising rates or leaving the
State, et cetera. So it ended up taking a lot of constructive
action. Statewide building codes, for example, and a number of
other things that I think we saw the benefit of that in the
four hurricanes that they had back a couple years ago.
So I think that while the Government should engage--it
needs to be local, State, Federal Government--it also needs to
engage other sectors of the economy or other sectors of the
country. Then also, too, individuals are really important. If
the message is not down to the individual citizen and the
individual taxpayer in terms of things that they should be
doing or not doing that is going to have an impact on future
disasters, then I don't think they are meeting the full
equation.
Senator Inhofe. Any other comments?
Ms. Pogue. Yes. I think one of the biggest hits as a State
person, now wearing my State emergency manager hat, has been on
our regional offices. FEMA has 10 regional offices, and I think
their workload has probably increased exponentially, and we
have a tremendous reliance on them, and yet they are strung all
over the place; they are pulled apart in 15 different
directions. You know, my hat is off to them, you know, but they
are just not there in many, many ways, even though they
absolutely want to be there. I know prior to 9/11 they were one
of our greatest resources in terms of dealing with and
addressing and implementing hazard mitigation. So I would say
even at the regional level it has taken a tremendous hit on
those folks as well.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Any comments on that?
[No response.]
Senator Inhofe. All right, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Jeffords. I would like each of the witnesses on
this panel to respond to this question: What changes should be
made in the Stafford Act to ensure the Federal Government has
the appropriate authorities to respond to all types of events,
including biological agents, weapons of mass destruction, or
epidemics in a coordinated, planned manner, given the
definitions of emergency and major disaster in the Act?
Mr. Mascelli. I know that, for example, the definition of
disaster by Stafford doesn't include pandemic, for example. I
know that when we had 9/11, in terms of applying Stafford,
looking at the explosion word and covering the 9/11. But it
seems that, as I said in my statements, the scope of the
disasters and the types of disasters we are facing as a country
is changing. If Stafford is going to be the principal mechanism
by which the Federal Government is going to respond, fund, et
cetera, then it needs to be as inclusive as possible, looking
at things like pandemic, the bioterrorism, and other types of
activities.
Ms. Pogue. I have to say, taking that to our statewide
level, we too--keep in mind that the local emergency managers
in all of our cities and towns throughout the country are
tasked with--they usually have themselves and nobody else in
terms of staff--writing a bird flu plan, a pandemic flu plan,
an emergency operation plan, a local hazard mitigation plan, an
evacuation plan. One person.
So I would have to say one of the things at the State
level, because I tend to be the bad guy, you know, wanting
these plans, is to try to separate, sort of separate and
conquer or divide and conquer. What we do at the State level,
for example, with the bird flu plan and the pandemic flu plan,
is work with the Department of Health. So we sort of sort it
out and we just sort of coordinate, rather than throwing this
at everybody, and you don't lose the actual value of the
mission.
So I think in some way, instead of throwing everything at
one particular Agency and having them try to deal with all
this, which, you know, they are pulled apart in so many
different directions, you sort of need to basically organize--
organize, coordinate, and collaborate--otherwise it is never
going to get done. The resources just aren't there.
Ms. Little. Senator Jeffords, I think the members of the
State emergency managers believe that the definitions in the
Stafford Act work fine now. They can be expanded. They are
scalable, they are flexible, as was proven both after 9/11 and
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
For Mr. Mascelli and Ms. Little, what are your
recommendations with regard to the potential creation of a
third category of declaration under the Stafford Act that would
be reserved for catastrophic events for which special rules
would apply?
Mr. Mascelli. To go back a bit, I think one of the best
things that the National Response Plan, when it was created,
did was actually look at catastrophic disasters. I, myself,
have been doing this for a fairly long time, and I know that as
soon as you talked about catastrophic, it was always put on the
shelf because it was too hard to handle, and the National
Response Plan took that head-on.
I think one of the things it showed us, and I think also
what we saw, quite frankly, in Katrina and Louisiana, as
catastrophic events are significant events that are different
by scope, magnitude, touch, feel, a whole variety of other
characteristics, than they are than the flood, hurricanes that
we normally experience--and also what we are grappling with now
in terms of all the after-action reports that are being done,
all the issues and problems that came up with Katrina, looking
at some of the issues we talked about this morning: recovery,
housing, looking at re-establishing the economy, et cetera--
that normally you don't have when you are dealing with
disasters.
So clearly, if we are still at this point, where we are not
comfortable in terms of where we are with recovery, et cetera,
for Katrina, then clearly it indicates that something needs to
be looked at in a different way and perhaps approached in a
different way.
I think also, too, again, looking at the specifics,
evacuation, and looking at some of the other issues that came
up where it did not work well, or there were problems there
that were addressed what is the normal way that we do things,
then clearly we need to look at it from a different
perspective.
So that is a long way around the block, but my way of
thinking that you need to look at catastrophic events as
different events than routine disasters.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Jeffords.
Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. I certainly agree with that,
catastrophic events are, by definition, different, and we need
a plan to deal with that.
I wanted to ask all three of you, you know, during the
1990s, we had close coordination with State and local
governments through Project Impact. Now we have the Disaster
Mitigation Act which, based on your testimony, we are not
really yet fully understanding, implementing, making sense of.
Let me ask each of you, starting with you, Ms. Little, do we
need to restore Project Impact as a model for how to coordinate
better at the State, local, and Federal levels?
Ms. Little. Senator Clinton, I am not sure that it matters
that it is exactly Project Impact, but certainly both pre- and
post-disaster mitigation are very important to reducing
ultimate government costs for disasters. If States can be
allowed this enhanced role of managing, then there will be
close coordination not only with State and local governments,
but also with the private sector, which is very important.
As long as the private sector and the citizens are also
invested in mitigation opportunities, at the funding that they
have to put in and with the funding that the Federal Government
has to put in, then it can be a complimentary and coordinated
effort in that regard. So I am not sure that it matters that
you call it Project Impact, but both post-disaster and pre-
disaster mitigation are vitally important.
Senator Clinton. Do each of you agree with that, Ms. Pogue
and Mr. Mascelli?
Ms. Pogue. I think the greatest value of Project Impact--I
was a State coordinator for Project Impact and Rhode Island won
Most Outstanding State one year--was the link with the private
sector and the business community. It is all about disaster-
resilient communities, and a community is not going to be
disaster-resilient or sustainable unless you look at the
economic impact on that community.
The greatest value to Project Impact--and I can speak on
behalf of the State of Hawaii and the State of Rhode Island--is
that we had a direct connection with our State Economic
Development Commission, our realtors, our chambers of commerce,
and our local private business people. That, more than anything
else, I think, and a lot of fantastic things came out of
Project Impact, but that, to me, is what is missing now, is a
direct connect with the business community, and they took on
the responsibility of dealing with what happens when and what
happens if, and preparing for that.
Senator Clinton. Well, I would just underscore that.
You agree with that too, Mr. Mascelli?
Mr. Mascelli. I agree in the sense that whatever we call it
or whatever it is----
Senator Clinton. It doesn't matter what we call it, right?
Mr. Mascelli. It doesn't matter. I think it is the right
attention given where mitigation is actually producing the
results we needed to produce.
Senator Clinton. Well, I have been visiting with lots of
businesses, obviously, in the last 5 years, since 9/11, and it
is surprising to me how desperate they are to get good
information. You know, big shopping center owners, other large
business interests, some of the companies that run recreational
facilities, entertainment venues, they don't know where to go
anymore, and they have been knocking on a lot of doors and,
frankly, the doors aren't opening up for them. So I think this
is an area of great importance going forward.
Ms. Pogue, I wanted to ask you, you know, we have now had
18 months of severe flooding in upstate New York. We have had
two 100-year floods and one 300-year flood, and it has been
devastating, because most of the communities up there, along
the Susquehanna, along the Delaware, you know, the Mohawk, they
are small rural communities, beautiful communities. Some of
those areas had 30-year-old flood maps. They didn't have any
idea of how best to protect themselves, and the first flood
came and they scrambled for help and, frankly, didn't get a lot
of help from the Federal Government. Second flood came and they
haven't even recovered, and now we have had this horrible
third, 300-year flood.
So what else can we do to try to provide communities with
updated and accurate floodplain maps and data, and then
coordinate them so they are better prepared facing these
disasters. Ms. Pogue?
Ms. Pogue. I think primarily what you are addressing or
what you are asking is great, because in Rhode Island we are
having the same situation. It is about risk communication. As
you probably know, the FEMA Mapping and Modernization Program,
which has been underway for about 3 years or so, will be
updating all of the flood insurance rate maps throughout the
country. New York, as a matter of fact, has one of the more
aggressive, proactive programs, which has been tremendous.
So I think that--and the concerns you are addressing I
completely empathize with because Rhode Island brags about the
fact our flood maps are probably some of the oldest in the
country. So I can completely understand what you are saying,
and we too are going to be updating all of our flood maps.
I think in addition to updating those flood maps, so people
will be better aware of where the risks more accurately are, is
getting into public education and outreach. Our Governor has
basically undertaken an initiative to get the word out, because
people do not understand flood insurance. They do not
understand how to protect themselves. There is incredible
misinformation out there.
So we are actively, actively working with FEMA which, by
the way, has a tremendous program called Flood Smart that gets
the word out. It helps business owners as well as people who
rent--who, by the way, don't know they can buy flood
insurance--as well as people who own homes how they can buy
flood insurance, where they can buy it, and what the coverage
does entail. So I think they need to understand the risk,
which, with the flood mapping program is going to happen, and
then they need to understand what they can do about addressing
that risk.
Senator Clinton. Can I ask just one more question, Mr.
Chairman?
Senator Inhofe. Sure.
Senator Clinton. I am concerned about planning and
coordination for mass evacuations. We have seen the National
Hurricane Center predicting severe hurricanes for this year and
for the foreseeable future not only in the Gulf, but along the
East Coast, and there is a particular concern about New York
City and Long Island. In fact, the National Geographic, when
they did their special on Katrina, at the very back of the
magazine there was a chart about where the next disastrous
catastrophic flooding could come from hurricanes, and New York
City and Long Island were at the top of the list.
Given our experience in Katrina and all of the confusion,
given the fact that I just read that the State is still arguing
with DHS about who is responsible for what in terms of
evacuation, you know, who has to do the planning--I mean, this
is really troubling to me--could each of you comment briefly
about how we could better coordinate and expedite the planning
for mass evacuations and what role the Federal Government,
through DHS and FEMA, could play in trying to help get us
organized to do this? Do you have any comments on that, Mr.
Mascelli?
Mr. Mascelli. Yes, ma'am. It is a very significant issue,
and I think that right now, the way that we have it structured
is evacuation tends to be a local issue, local county, local
municipality, then goes to the State. The Federal Government,
per se, has not been involved in, to a great degree, evacuation
planning.
But I think the reality is, again, looking at our
demographics, look at where we have people now living. We are
becoming more urbanized across the country and living in
coastal areas, et cetera, that the evacuations that we saw last
year, the Houston area, New Orleans, et cetera, are our future,
and clearly those evacuation activities far exceed the local
municipal capacity, county capacity, in most cases State
capacity.
So it would seem that evacuations, particularly these big
operations, are really a national issue, therefore should
involve the National Government, Federal Government in terms of
how we get at these things. Big issue. I think we are going to
be dealing with it for a while.
Senator Clinton. Ms. Pogue?
Ms. Pogue. I just completed the Statewide Hurricane
Evacuation Routing System for Rhode Island, and I will tell you
what came out of that. We had 210 meetings with our
communities. We worked with the Federal Government, meaning the
National Weather Service, and the Army Corps. We took their
coastal inundation and flood maps and storm surge maps.
The result is we have, for the first time, a digital geo-
referenced evacuation routing system for the entire State. What
it meant was not just meeting with the individual communities,
but also meeting with them in regions and getting them to
coordinate amongst one another. So we literally have, from top
to bottom, all 39 miles----
[Laughter.]
Ms. Pogue [continuing]. We have a coordinated approach to
what is going to happen and where they are going to evacuate.
So it can deal with a mass evacuation or just one particular
community within Rhode Island. As a result of that, the folks
have bought into it, they know where they are supposed to go,
because we have a heavy tourism season in August and September,
as well. But that took meeting with communities.
I have to be honest with you. In terms of the Federal
Government, you know, as a State emergency manager, I think it
is on us. I worked with the DOT very, very closely and with our
cities and towns, so they now know that it is their
responsibility. They know where we have to be. We have
preposition points that are going to be traffic choke points.
We had a detail with, quite frankly, Federal highway money, so
that was the Federal initiative there. They just did an
analysis of what we came up with, and we basically were 100
percent right on.
So I think, like debris management, it is preplanning. You
need to plan now in order to be able to deal with it then.
Senator Clinton. Ms. Little.
Ms. Little. Senator Clinton, likewise, in Ohio, we were one
of the States that accepted evacuees and were prepared to
accept evacuees from the Gulf Coast States during Katrina. We
found that our partnership with our volunteer agencies and many
other private businesses in Ohio was far more than we knew.
I think just the fact of having gone through that once and
now learning together, we coordinated very closely with the
FEMA regional office in Chicago, and with our volunteer
organizations, and several private businesses that stepped up
very quickly, and I think as we plan together we have got to
coordinate it not only with State and local government, but
with private business and our very fine volunteer partners.
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much.
Thank you for this panel, Mr. Chairman. I guess I would
just conclude by saying, to me, it is--you know, it is going to
happen at the site. You know, people have to take
responsibility for themselves, but I think we have learned that
the Federal Government has to drive this process. When it
doesn't, when it gets distracted or diverted or whatever
happens, you know, a lot of places are left on their own
without the expertise, without the experience. Frankly, that
then comes back to cost us all money, and we have loss of life
and loss of property that we could have avoided.
So I think that, again, there are some things we can do,
and clearly the Chairman and I think we can do it better than
we are doing it, and we are going to keep pushing to try to
make that happen.
But I thank each of you for your years and years of
experience. It is a wonderful panel to hear from. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Senator Clinton.
It is the policy of the committee to leave the record open
for a week. We have several Senators, including Senator Vitter,
who have questions that will be submitted for the record.
We appreciate your patience very much for your staying
here, and we are adjourned.
Ms. Little. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Statement of Robert Shea, Acting Director of Operations, Federal
Emergency Management, Department of Homeland Security
Good morning Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Jeffords, and
committee Members.
My name is Robert Shea, and I am Acting Director of Operations for
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It is an honor to
appear before this committee to discuss FEMA's authorizing legislation,
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
commonly referred to as the Stafford Act, its authorities, policies and
procedures. I am also prepared to discuss the challenges we face in
effectively removing large amounts of debris following catastrophic
disaster events.
In authorizing the Stafford Act, Congress made clear its intent for
the Federal Government to provide short-term, emergency assistance to
individuals, States and local governments and qualified non-profits to
help reduce the suffering and repair the damage that results from
disasters. Congress recognized that disasters cause human suffering,
property loss and damage, and disrupt the normal functioning of
governments and communities. When this happens the Stafford Act
provides a method of assisting the affected States to render aid and
emergency services, and to help with the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of impacted areas.
The Stafford Act created that mechanism, and while there have been
amendments, the basic provisions remain in place today. Through
Executive orders, the President has delegated to FEMA, now within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), responsibility for administering
the Stafford Act. FEMA carries out a wide range of activities under the
authorities contained in the Stafford Act, from the obvious such as
providing assistance to individuals and communities after a disaster,
to the not-so-obvious, such as updating flood maps, supporting the
monitoring and inspection of dams, training emergency managers,
developing ``rain-the-trainer'' programs, and carrying out a robust
program of predisaster mitigation.
In preparing for this hearing, FEMA was asked to specifically
address two major issues, first, our policies and procedures relating
to debris removal after a disaster and second, the impact of the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. FEMA appreciates the opportunity
presented by this committee to discuss these issues.
debris removal
I would first like to address our role and authorities under the
Stafford Act as they relate to debris removal, which is a part of
FEMA's Public Assistance Program, and more specifically, our debris
removal operations following the 2005 Hurricane Season.
Through FEMA's Public Assistance (PA) Program, State, tribal, and
local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations are
eligible to receive assistance for debris removal, emergency protective
measures and the repair, reconstruction, or replacement of disaster-
damaged infrastructure to address the impacts of a Presidentially-
declared disaster. This program is operated on a cost-share basis
whereby the Federal share of assistance is not less than 75 percent of
the eligible cost.
In order to be eligible for FEMA PA funding for debris removal, the
work must:
Be a direct result of a Presidentially declared disaster;
Occur within the designated disaster area; and
Be the responsibility of the applicant at the time of the
disaster.
In addition, at least one of the following must apply:
Removal eliminates immediate threats to human lives, public
health and safety;
Removal eliminates immediate threats of significant damage to
improved public and private property; and/or
Removal ensures economic recovery of the affected areas to the
benefit of the community-at-large.
FEMA has determined that the removal of disaster-related debris
from public property, including public rights-of-way, is eligible for
reimbursement. Debris removal from private property may be eligible on
a case-by-case basis.
Disaster-related debris may consist of downed trees (vegetative
debris), destroyed personal property including home contents and
automobiles, hazardous waste, construction and demolition material, or
even damaged boats and/or other debris that obstruct waterways. State
and local applicants must comply with environmental and historic laws
when removing disaster-related debris. Developing and executing a plan
to remove and dispose of large quantities of debris requires
coordination with numerous entities at all levels of government and,
most importantly, with the citizens of the community.
State and local governments are responsible for managing the
removal of disaster-related debris from their communities. FEMA
provides funding for the removal of eligible debris and may provide
technical assistance if requested by the State. These entities manage
the operations using their own personnel and may also contract for the
service. They are also responsible for monitoring the debris operations
to ensure that they are completed in a timely and efficient manner and
in compliance with Federal, State, and local laws.
While FEMA does not directly manage State and local debris
operations, we do take an active role in providing technical assistance
and oversight. FEMA deploys ``debris specialists'' to advise State
emergency management and local officials on Public Assistance
eligibility, appropriate contracting procedures and monitoring methods,
and environmental compliance issues. In addition, FEMA frequently
deploys U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) personnel to assist in
providing technical assistance and to work with the State to develop an
overall debris management plan for the disaster recovery process. FEMA
may also deploy monitors to provide oversight of operations to ensure
that the FEMA funding is provided for eligible debris removal, to
ensure compliance with environmental regulations and programmatic
guidelines, and to reduce the occurrence of waste, fraud, or abuse.
FEMA field staff are very experienced in these efforts, however when
exceptional expertise is required for complex environmental challenges,
we enlist the EPA for that specialized assistance.
The magnitude of large-scale debris operations in some instances
can overwhelm the State and local government's ability to perform or
contract for the work. In such circumstances, the State can request
Direct Federal Assistance under section 403 of the Stafford Act,
whereby the Federal Government assumes responsibility for removing
debris from a specific area because the local community, as
supplemented by State resources, is incapable of performing the work
itself or contracting for the service. In these situations, FEMA will
``mission assign'' the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to perform and
manage the debris mission. The Corps and FEMA are the two primary or
lead agencies for Emergency Support Function No. 3 under the National
Response Plan. The Corps' Debris Planning and Response Team and Subject
Matter Experts coordinate closely with FEMA, State and local
governments, and other Federal agencies to define requirements for the
mission. In anticipation of debris missions and because of lessons
learned during the 2005 hurricane season, the Corps has awarded stand-
by debris contracts under its Advanced Contract Initiative to minimize
any delays in beginning the work in the aftermath of the disaster. We
are also working with State governments to encourage similar approaches
at the State and local level.
In the cases of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, widespread destruction
resulted in unprecedented quantities of debris. FEMA estimates Katrina
and Rita resulted in a staggering 118 million cubic yards of debris
more than double the amount of debris produced by the four hurricanes
that struck Florida in 2004 and six times the amount of debris created
by Hurricane Andrew. To truly understand the magnitude, imagine 368
football fields with debris stacked 192 feet high or every inch of
Washington, DC covered with half a foot of debris. To haul this amount
of debris would require approximately six million average sized dump
trucks.
All of the affected Gulf Coast States, Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas requested Direct Federal Assistance for debris
removal. Although in many areas the debris mission is managed by the
Corps, many local communities also made the decision to handle their
own debris operations. For the Gulf Coast, we estimate that
approximately 46 percent of the debris was handled by the local
communities while the Corps managed the removal of the remaining 54
percent. The USACE and local debris operations are now complete in
Texas and Alabama. Currently in Mississippi, we estimate a total of 1.9
million cubic yards is remaining while over 44.64 million cubic yards
has been removed. In Louisiana, 42.9 million cubic yards has been
removed with an estimated 17.1 remaining. In total, approximately 99
million cubic yards of debris has been removed_about 83.8 percent of
the estimated total for all four States. The cost thus far is just
under $3.7 billion with a projected total cost of approximately $4.7
billion.
Just the act of removing, hauling and disposing of this quantity of
debris poses a significant challenge. USACE and the local communities
have procured and manage a large number of contractors and equipment.
But debris management is far more complex than just procuring and
overseeing contractors. It requires a coordinated effort from wide
array of government agencies at the Federal, State, and local level.
For example, a typical debris management organization includes Federal
representatives from FEMA, the Corps, and the Environmental Protection
Agency and State officials representing emergency management,
transportation, and environmental agencies, to name just a few. These
agencies coordinate with local officials to ensure appropriate
procedures are in place for handling, transporting and disposing of the
debris. A number of permits and, in some instances, waivers to State
and local ordinances are required from government agencies when
handling such large amounts and varied forms of debris, which often
includes hazardous waste. Decisions on priorities, pick-up schedules,
handling methods, transportation routes, reduction and recycling
processes, monitoring procedures, and final disposal options all
require coordination with a wide array of governmental agencies. Adding
another level of complexity is keeping the public informed on how,
when, and where debris will be picked up when operations are occurring
at a rapid pace.
Because of the sheer magnitude of devastation and the need to clear
debris as quickly as possible from the Gulf Coast, FEMA took a number
of measures to expedite the process of debris removal. For example,
immediately after the storms hit, FEMA determined, based on its review
of the magnitude and scale of the destruction, as well as a declaration
of a Public Health Emergency by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, that it was in the public interest to remove
debris from residential property in the hardest hit counties and
parishes. This decision allowed local applicants to begin comprehensive
debris operations immediately. In addition, the Corps activated its
standby contracts and procured other contracts to meet the urgent
requirement.
While we were able to stream-line some approval processes, the
conditions on the ground and the statutory and regulatory compliance
requirements presented unique challenges that affected the ability of
local and USACE operations to remove and dispose of debris quickly.
Some of these challenges are unique to this event, and arise from the
large scale destruction, or near destruction, of private residences and
commercial structures. In particular, the sheer number of structures
demolished has caused unprecedented challenges with respect to waste-
stream management and compliance with environmental regulations.
An example of the types of regulatory challenges includes the
number and location of landfills in operation which are permitted for
the types of waste generated by Katrina. FEMA may only reimburse or
assist with the removal and disposal of debris in full compliance with
Federal and State environmental regulations. Thus, debris operations
must respect existing permits and other restrictions which regulate the
amount certain types of debris per day in certain categories of
landfills. Additionally, the disposal of debris from residential and
commercial structure demolition requires compliance with regulations
regarding hazardous materials, such as asbestos. These regulations
require specific handling both in the removal and in the disposal of
these materials, permits from the appropriate local and State agencies
and, in some instances, concurrence from the Environmental Protection
Agency. These are just a couple of examples of the challenges that FEMA
and its Federal, State, and local partners face and work together to
overcome as we attempt to establish an efficient debris operation.
FEMA constantly reviews operations to identify lessons learned and
best practices. Following Hurricane Katrina, for example, FEMA
developed a number of process and policy improvements to better assist
State and local governments in their debris operations. We recently
issued a contracting fact sheet that provides local governments with
contract language and provisions to incorporate into their contracts
that will help protect them from unscrupulous contractors and poor
performance as well as optimize their reimbursement from the Public
Assistance Program. Other recently developed policy documents address
eligibility issues, such as stump removal, which removes the ambiguity
over what work FEMA will reimburse.
In addition, we revised our policies to ensure a consistent cost
share for debris operations performed both by local communities and
under USACE mission assignments. This policy also limits mission
assignments to 60 days and will encourage local communities to take
control over their recovery contracts earlier in the process. I should
note that, when warranted, this time frame can be extended.
Both FEMA and USACE are examining different methods, including
technological advancements, to improve the effectiveness of our grant
and contract monitoring processes. We are also evaluating different
monitoring techniques that have been employed in the field to develop a
strategy that assures local government and contractor accountability
without over extending our resources.
Another means of improving debris operations is to expand the
resources and tools available to State and local governments. To that
end, we established a nationwide debris contractor registry that will
allow State and local governments to identify contractor resources
either in the pre-event planning phase or in a post-disaster
environment. From this database, State and local officials will be able
to match their resource needs to those available from the registered
contractors and then solicit bids and proposals as they deem
appropriate.
We at the Federal level will continue to look for ways to improve
our support for debris management operations, but our success
ultimately relies on the ability of State and local governments to
proactively prepare for disaster response and debris operations. It is
an extremely important responsibility for local communities,
particularly those in high risk areas, to plan for large scale debris
operations and address some of the complex conditions they will be
confronted with, such as private property debris, demolition, and
environmental compliance, which I mentioned earlier. Clearly, local
governments are most familiar with their own State and local
procurement requirements, permitting processes, local contractors,
landfill operations, etc. Looking to FEMA, USACE or any other Federal
Agency to manage local debris operations or resolve many of the complex
issues inherent with debris operations is neither appropriate nor
realistic.
FEMA has developed substantive guidance documents and policies to
assist local communities in developing and executing debris management
plans. We also offer Debris Management training to State and local
officials, and will continue to look for ways to educate and help
communities plan for post disaster debris removal operations. We will
provide technical assistance to States and local governments in
developing debris management plans before an event takes place and
actively encourage them to hire stand-by debris contractors prior to
disasters occurring. FEMA will always be ready to provide help at the
time of a disaster, but for our efforts to be successful, our State and
local partners must be prepared and to act quickly and responsibly.
mitigation
In addition to the authorities the Stafford Act gives FEMA to
assist State and local governments in repairing critical infrastructure
and removing debris following a disaster event, it also provides for a
variety of mitigation programs and activities. The overriding goal of
mitigation programs and activities is to reduce the potential for
future loss of life and property within the disaster area.
In authorizing the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Congress
recognized that greater emphasis needed to be placed on identifying and
assessing the risks to States and local governments from natural
disasters; implementing adequate measures to reduce losses from natural
disasters; and ensuring the critical services and facilities of
communities would continue to function.
Congress also recognized the vitally important role that hazard
mitigation plays in reducing the physical and financial impacts of
natural disasters. Through FEMA's 10 Regional offices, FEMA's
Mitigation Division assists States and communities in incorporating
mitigation elements--such as building and design codes that address
specific risks, structural strengthening and reinforcement, and natural
hazard-focused land use planning into their decision making processes.
Sound mitigation planning and viable mitigation activities reduce an
area's potential for ``disaster'' after an event strikes. Destruction
and distress are lessened; which facilitates effective response and
promotes faster recovery.
An important component of DMA 2000 was the authorization of an
expanded Hazard Mitigation Planning requirement. I am pleased to report
that as a result of this requirement, all 50 States and more than 8,000
localities now have hazard mitigation plans in place.
Mitigation planning provides a framework and an approach within
which States, Tribes and localities reduce their vulnerability to
natural hazards, thus lessening the Nation's total disaster losses.
Developing a hazard Mitigation plan provides additional benefits as
well. It helps raise awareness of risk, position State, local and
tribal officials to take advantage of the resources available during
post-disaster recovery, and enable them to rebuild expeditiously in a
way that will mitigate future disaster losses.
State plans are the ``gateway'' to FEMA grant assistance. States
and Territories must have a FEMA approved Multi-hazard Mitigation Plan
that meets the DMA 2000 requirements in order for communities within
the State to be eligible for non-emergency assistance under the
Stafford Act. Both the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and the
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM) provide planning grants to help
fund those plans.
There are two levels of State multi-hazard mitigation plans--
Standard and Enhanced. The Standard plan meets the minimum requirements
for a State plan, and entitles States to receive HMGP funding after a
disaster. The amount of post-disaster funding available for mitigation
is equal to 7.5 percent of disaster assistance funding (Public
Assistance plus Individual Assistance). At this time, all 50 States,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American
Samoa, Guam and more than 10 Tribal governments have an approved State-
level mitigation plan in place.
The Enhanced plan allows the State to receive additional post-
disaster mitigation funding of up to 20 percent of disaster assistance
funding. The enhanced plan must meet all of the Standard plan
requirements and must document the State's proactive approach and
commitment to mitigation, and its capability to manage the increased
amount of funding that may be made available. Seven States now have
approved Enhanced State mitigation plans: Maryland, Missouri, Oregon,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington and Wisconsin. Enhanced plans for Florida
and Virginia are pending.
State-level plans lay the foundation for an overall mitigation
strategy for the communities within their jurisdiction, and make
funding available to those communities to develop and implement their
local mitigation plans and projects. More than 8,000 local
jurisdictions have FEMA-approved mitigation plans. Because many of
these plans are multi-jurisdictional plans, the total number of
jurisdictions that are covered by approved plans is approximately
13,000.
We are extremely proud of these numbers. They provide hard evidence
that all our States and thousands of local communities are taking
mitigation seriously and thinking strategically about what they can do
to reduce their losses from future natural disasters. This provides a
robust benefit in both physical and economic terms--which, of course,
was the intent of the Congress when it authored DMA 2000. A recent
independent study conducted by the Multihazard Mitigation Council at
the request of the Congress concluded that, on average, $1 spent on
mitigation saves society an average of $4. That translates into
hundreds of millions in savings every year--and it begins with sound
mitigation planning.
The mitigation planning process is not static. It changes and is
refined over time. One of our greatest successes has been our ability
to work closely with our State, local and Tribal partners in this
effort, drawing on the experience they have gained in preparing and
implementing their plans over the last several years.
This past May, FEMA invited one State from each Region to discuss
the plan update process. At this meeting, we asked the States to
identify some of their successes and perceived benefits from going
through the mitigation planning process. These benefits fell into three
major categories, which I will briefly summarize:
Improved Risk Assessment
Interagency Coordination and Planning Committees; and
Coordination with Local Planning Officials
Although FEMA is encouraged by the progress that has been made,
there is still much to be done. Natural disasters can strike anytime,
anywhere. The type of disaster, however, varies from one locality to
another, and even then differences in terrain and climate can greatly
affect the impact of the event and the types of mitigation measures
that can be used. After all, elevating your home to protect it from
floodwaters will do little good during an earthquake.
Mitigation planning helps FEMA and its State, local and Tribal
partners to accurately assess their risk. The benefits of this are
twofold. First, it helps jurisdictions that are impacted by a natural
disaster rebuild in a way that will reduce future damage. Even as we
speak, buildings across the Gulf Coast are being elevated or relocated,
so they will be safer and more resilient when the next hurricane
strikes.
Mitigation should not just be considered once a disaster strikes.
Congress recognized that by undertaking mitigation plans and projects
predisaster, we can greatly reduce the loss of lives and property
before disaster even strikes. With this in mind, the DMA 2000
authorized the creation of the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (PDM).
The PDM program recognizes that by identifying areas at greatest
risk of natural disaster and implementing effective mitigation
activities in those areas, we can greatly reduce future disaster
losses. Based on lessons learned from the PDM FY 2003 and FY 2004/2005
programs, FEMA instituted changes to ensure all funds for PDM projects
and plans are awarded as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Specifically, FEMA has established a standard application form. This
occurs through the required use of the FEMA Mitigation electronic
grants management system (e-Grants) to facilitate application
development and processing.
We have enhanced guidance materials to provide more detail on grant
requirements. We have increased offerings of extensive benefit-cost
analysis and e-Grants training, and streamlined FEMA application review
procedures, the National evaluation process, and the national technical
review process to the point where for the FY 2006 program it has only
taken 7 months from the time the application period opened in November
2005, until first awards were made in June 2006.
We also provide a more robust technical assistance program
consisting of Web and help line resources for application development,
benefit-cost analysis, environmental and historic preservation
compliance, engineering feasibility, and planning.
Since the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Assistance Act of 1993
amended the Stafford Act, principal mitigation activities funded under
the HMGP include mitigation planning, acquisition of hazard prone
properties with conversion to open space (including either demolition
or relocation of the structure), and the elevation of structures to or
above expected flood levels. These are also principal activities of the
PDM program, instituted following the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
amendments. To date, FEMA has obligated nearly $1.5 billion for
planning, acquisition, and elevation activities through HMGP and PDM.
If we follow the findings of the Multihazard Mitigation Council's
report--that, on average, $1 spent on mitigation saves an average of
$4--we can conclude that the mitigation grant programs have saved this
country approximately $6 billion.
FEMA strongly encourages the reauthorization of the DMA 2000
amendments to the Stafford Act, in order to ensure their continued
success. By planning and preparing beforehand, we ensure better
protection for our citizens, their homes and their businesses, and
greater savings for the entire Nation.
Even with the assistance authorized by the Stafford Act to help
individuals in communities, following a disaster, be it natural or
manmade, this nation's emergency response capability can be severely
tested, as has been proven by the enormous challenges the Nation faced
in recent years. From the flooding in Houston from Tropical Storm
Allison, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, back-to-back unprecedented
hurricane seasons in 2004 and 2005, and a myriad of other disasters
that have impacted this nation, we have gained many lessons learned,
and used the flexibility of the Stafford Act to expand the bounds of
the types of assistance we are able to provide. At times beleaguered,
FEMA has always pressed forward with the commitment of putting the
lives and welfare of disaster victims first.
There is much that can, and has been done to enhance FEMA's
programs and processes as we move forward, preparing not only our
Agency, but the Nation for the current season or any future disaster.
We will continue to engage with State emergency management officials,
our Federal counterparts, including the Department of Defense, and non-
government organizational partners to maximize communication and
coordination for all-hazard disaster preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation activities. We are building within FEMA a twenty-first
century competency in operations, logistics, procurement and
communications to speed much needed equipment, aid and commodities to
States affected by disasters. We will also continue to strengthen our
mission effectiveness and operational efficiency and establish measures
and benchmarks, so we are held accountable for our performance. FEMA
will also benefit from the continued integration into the Department of
Homeland Security, where the Agency has gained access to many valuable
resources that strengthen our ability to respond to disasters of any
kind.
It is important to note that in a disaster of unprecedented
proportions, FEMA's debris operations, mitigation programs, and indeed
all areas of assistance service delivery are under scrutiny by the
general public and Congress. We realize that for the individuals and
communities picking up the pieces of their lives, we must be able to
efficiently and effectively meet their needs. FEMA is looking closely
at its authorities and the various after action reports, and we look
forward to working with Congress on suggested and recommended changes
to the Stafford Act and related authorities.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee, I
will respond to any questions you have.
Statement of Major General Don T. Riley, Director of Civil Works, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers
introduction
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Major General Don
T. Riley, Director of Civil Works for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE). Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
concerning the Corps' disaster-relief missions under the Stafford Act.
The Corps has a long standing, highly effective relationship in support
of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the former Federal
Response Plan (FRP) and now the National Response Plan (NRP). We also
have major responsibilities for disaster planning, response and
recovery under our own authority (Public Law 84-99), our Civil Works
infrastructure missions (Flood Damage Reduction, Navigation, and
Hydropower) , and our inherent responsibility to support the Department
of Defense in execution of any of the Department's disaster relief
missions as required. I will address my comments this morning to our
role in support of FEMA under the Stafford Act and National Response
Plan.
Under the National Response Plan, the Corps has primary
responsibility for Emergency Support Function No. 3, Public Works and
Engineering, and several assigned tasks in support of the other
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) specified in the Plan. Our mission
portfolio during major disaster response will typically include
activities such as provision of ice and water, debris clearance and
disposal, temporary roofing, emergency power to critical facilities,
and assistance to FEMA with provision of temporary housing.
Based on 14 years of experience in executing missions under the FRP
and NRP, I believe the Stafford Act and the NRP have the empowering
authorities and tools needed to be successful in performing our
assigned missions. Response to Hurricane Katrina was a tremendous
challenge for USACE and all responding Federal and State agencies given
the catastrophic nature of the mission workload and many limiting
factors that impacted the initial response. However, a look at the
overall mission execution tells us that more water and ice were
delivered faster than ever before, and the debris mission, which has a
magnitude several times that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (the previous
record in terms of mission magnitude), has also seen achievement in
terms of debris removed in the 9 months since the event, that exceeds
any previous hurricane mission experience. Many lessons learned have
been documented that can only be gained through such an experience.
These lessons learned have led to improvements to our operational
procedures and training. One area that needs more attention is how we
transfer this knowledge back to the local governments so they too can
benefit from these lessons learned, plan more effectively, and
eventually be better prepared to manage more of their own recovery
operations. This transfer of knowledge is needed throughout all USACE
NRP missions that include commodities, temporary power, roofing,
temporary housing, and debris. One solution we are developing with FEMA
is to have, as part of the overall Federal concept of operations and
initial mission assignments, a requirement to work with the local
governments covered by the declaration to provide a localized plan for
each mission that is based on the actual response details gained from
the event. This concept will help transfer the knowledge gained and
leave the local governments with a proven operational plan. The
National Incident Management System provides for this integration of
Federal, State and local planning and operations, so the authorities
and plans are already in place to facilitate this improved
coordination.
Pre-event preparedness, to include enabling mitigation actions,
based on lessons learned and best practices, is critical to minimizing
post event damage and to reduce the number of citizens that become
victims. The mitigation program and the lessons learned process are two
methods used to assist in determining which actions a community should
perform. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers through their Floodplain
Management Services Program, provides advice and assistance to
communities in terms of reducing their flood risk with regard to
community infrastructure. The Corps Flood Damage Reduction authorities
provide a broad range of Flood mitigation tools that are used in
supporting State/Local flood mitigation objectives.
The life-cycle lessons learned process consists of: planning;
exercising the plan (through exercise or a real event); evaluating the
successes and opportunities for improvement; documenting best practices
and developing corrective actions; revising the plan to include the
best practices and implementing the corrective actions. Mitigation and
lessons learned are tied to routine pre-event meetings and post-event
processes. FEMA's Regional Mitigation staff and USACE Districts provide
mitigation services year round to local communities and States. A forum
used to highlight preparedness is the FEMA Regional Interagency
Steering Committee (RISC) meeting. RISC meetings are usually conducted
quarterly and attended by representatives from all Federal ESFs and
States within the respective FEMA region. In addition, several States
conduct annual hurricane exercises and conferences where Federal, State
and local interests and concerns for specific geographic areas are
raised.
Over the last 3 years, there has been a significant increase in
planning. USACE, in coordination with FEMA, has provided States with
planning tools and assisted in preparedness efforts, especially in the
areas of commodities planning (quantities required and distribution
point set-up), temporary power, and debris management. These planning
tools, briefings, and actions taken were developed as a result of
lessons learned from past disasters. While there is always room to
improve and more communities to get involved, these efforts have
resulted in some coastal States improving their preparedness posture.
The Corps has authority under PL 84-99 to plan and prepare for our NRP
missions in coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/
FEMA, other Federal agencies and State and local agencies. The Corps
will also be working closely with DHS Preparedness Directorate in the
future to insure that DHS programs and grants support the building of
State and local ``Public Works and Engineering'' capabilities. For
example, State and local capabilities to manage debris operations vary
widely. With more emphasis on comprehensive debris planning, State and
local governments would be much better prepared to manage these types
of operations on their own. There are also requirements for State and
local governments to assess generator needs at critical facilities and
to prioritize possible temporary power requirements in advance of an
emergency. Some States have made progress in this area, but there is
still much work to be accomplished. With additional planning and
coordination, the intergovernmental team will be better prepared to
respond more quickly to temporary power needs at critical facilities.
We will continue to aggressively pursue a lifecycle of improvements to
our mission preparedness based on lessons learned from each disaster
event, working closely with these key partners.
In reference to the on-going debris mission from FEMA, we have been
following an acquisition strategy based on the concept of geographic
set-asides under the Stafford Act as a follow-on strategy to our
initial emergency contracting process put in place to handle the
unprecedented amount of debris resulting from the effects of Katrina--
as a result of both wind and flood. Our first attempt to use this State
set-aside authority under the Act was in Mississippi. Our goal was to
use the Act to generate contracting opportunities at the prime level
for Mississippi disadvantaged, small and large businesses. Competition
was limited to Mississippi companies only. Although the subject of a
GAO protest, we eventually prevailed as the GAO held that our concept
of using geography was valid. I'd also like to take this opportunity to
thank the GAO for reviewing the protest using their expedited
procedures. As a result we were able to get their ruling in 65 days
versus the more normal 100 days. We are disappointed that we were not
able to implement the Act in Mississippi after receiving the favorable
GAO ruling. Circumstances and time conspired against us as the
Mississippi debris removal efforts are projected to be completed by the
end of this month. In reference to the State of Louisiana, we are
pursuing a similar geographic-based acquisition strategy in using the
Stafford Act and recent revised language in 42 U.S.C. 5150 signed by
the President on April 20, 2006, removes all doubt that geographic set-
asides may be used when appropriate.
The Corps of Engineers performed unprecedented debris operations in
order to address the historic debris quantities and waste streams
generated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In the State of Louisiana,
the Corps performed debris segregation, processing, handling,
recycling, treatment, and disposal, as required, per waste stream in
order to maintain timeliness and compliance with applicable
regulations. Additionally, the Corps developed debris working groups,
comprised of Federal, State, and local representatives, to provide a
basis for daily input to debris planning and execution. Representatives
from the Corps, the contractors, FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Centers for Disease
Control, and Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality provided
various field oversight roles as well as providing feedback to the
working group on a daily basis concerning needs, status, and
communications. After nine months of debris management, the following
waste streams and quantities have been segregated and removed within
the State of Louisiana.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Waste Stream Quantity Disposition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vegetative...................... 8.2 M cubic yards. Reused
Consolidation & Demolition...... 14.5 M cubic yards Disposed
White Goods..................... 800,000 items..... Recycled
Household Hazardous Waste....... 1.4 M items....... Treated, Disposed
Electronic Waste................ 489,000 items..... Recycled
Asbestos........................ 136,000 cubic Disposed
yards.
Tires........................... 95,000 items...... Recycled
Residual Solids................. 24,300 cubic yards Disposed
Small Motorized Equipment....... 150,000 items..... Recycled
------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the process to manage all these waste streams can never be
perfect, the Corps is pleased to have diverted so much debris from
inappropriate placement in a landfill, which is the basis for so many
concerns.
FEMA is the Primary Agency under the National Response Plan for
Emergency Support Function No. 3 recovery activities, to include
Federal debris support. During the 2005 Hurricane Season, FEMA tasked
USACE to take the lead for Federal debris management assistance in
certain localities in Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama and Texas. EPA
has worked closely with USACE, FEMA, and State and local governments to
assist in these debris removal activities. For example, EPA assisted
the States in developing guidance regarding demolition of structurally
unsound buildings as well as guidance for debris burning. Along with
FEMA and the USACE, EPA also provided assistance to the States as they
developed their debris removal plans.
The Corps of Engineers takes pride in being a Learning
Organization. We have learned that every event is different. Our goal
is to immediately provide the urgently required immediate relief
services to the impacted populations. We recognize that in urgent
situations, mistakes can and do occur. There is also opportunity for
unscrupulous individuals to take advantage of the system. We work to
strike a balance between expeditiously providing relief to those in
need and limiting the opportunities for malefactors. Our solution is to
immediately deploy Corps internal auditors, teamed with the Defense
Contract Audit Agency and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command,
to oversee all emergency response efforts (both Corps and contractors'
operations) to help detect early in the process actual or potential
mistakes, help mission managers comply with their fiscal stewardship
responsibilities, and detect instances of fraud, waste, or abuse.
Corrective actions are implemented immediately to address problems or
weaknesses identified by these teams. We have learned that by doing so,
we not only improve our processes, but avoid unnecessary or wasteful
expenditures, and become more efficient. I welcome the reviews
conducted by external audit and investigative activities as they are
also a valuable tool to help us identify potential vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in processes and procedures.
As noted earlier in this statement, part of being a Learning
Organization is implementing actions to correct our mistakes and
strengthen our weaknesses. Several years ago the Corps instituted a
formal procedure, our Remedial Action Program, to capture lessons
learned and adjust our processes for future events. Simply put
(although this is not a simple process) for each emergency event we
prepare After Action Reports, which include issues and weaknesses
identified from all sources during our response efforts. We attempt to
correct or strengthen our procedures and adjust supporting Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs). Personnel are trained on the new
procedures and then we conduct exercises, which help us determine
whether the corrective actions were effective. Where necessary, the
procedures and SOPs are adjusted and placed in readiness for the event.
We then start this process all over again.
In the future to be best prepared we may need to think beyond our
traditional assistance methods. The critical missions of commodities
distribution, providing temporary power, temporary housing and debris
management require skills not often maintained by local governments.
They are, however, maintained by some State governments and by FEMA,
the supporting ESFs and within the private sector. Individuals with
these skills can be pulled together, both pre- and post-event, to
develop plans for the specific communities in those specific areas. The
result could be a local community with planned distribution points,
critical generator requirements pre-identified, debris clean-up planned
and more quickly performed, and temporary housing sites pre-identified
allowing for quicker construction and occupation by displaced citizens.
summary
To close, I would like to thank you once again, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing the Corps of Engineers the opportunity to appear before this
committee to discuss our activities in support of FEMA under the
Stafford Act. Many Corps personnel have served our Nation by helping in
the response to natural disasters in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, or elsewhere in the Nation or the world. We are proud
to do so. I would be happy to answer any questions Members of the
committee may have. Thank you.
______
Responses by Don T. Riley to Additional Questions from Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Please discuss the assignment of responsibility for
water borne debris and spills in disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.
What is the role of the EPA, the Coast Guard, or the Corps of
Engineers?
Response. Multiple agencies have responsibilities and/or
authorities related to the removal of debris, to include waterborne
debris, following a disaster. After an incident occurs, representatives
from these agencies come together in the Joint Field Office to develop
disaster specific debris removal plans. The following is a list of
agencies and a description of their responsibilities and authorities
related to the management of waterborne debris:
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.--When direct Federal assistance is
required under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act) for the removal of eligible waterborne
debris, FEMA can mission assign the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) to provide this assistance.
Sections 15, 19, and 20 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899,
authorize USACE to remove sunken vessels or other obstructions from
navigable waterways under emergency conditions. A navigable waterway is
one which USACE operates and maintains for navigation, as authorized by
Congress. The Corps would remove a vessel using its emergency
authorities only if an owner, operator or lessee cannot be identified
OR said owner, operator or lessee cannot effect removal in a timely and
safe manner.
USACE is authorized under Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (PL
84-99) to provide assistance for debris removal from flood control
works (structures designed and constructed to have appreciable and
dependable effects in preventing damage by irregular and unusual rises
in water level). This type of assistance requires that an applicant be
an active participant in its PL 84-99 Rehabilitation and Inspection
Program at the time of the disaster.
DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).--Under the Stafford
Act, FEMA has the authority to provide debris removal assistance, to
include waterborne debris, to eliminate immediate threats to lives,
public health and safety; eliminate immediate threats of significant
damage to improved public or private property; or to ensure the
economic recovery of the affected community to the benefit of the
community-at-large.
The waterborne debris must be the direct result of the disaster and
located in the disaster area; and, the applicant must have legal
responsibility to remove the debris.
The assistance is usually cost-shared at no less than 75 percent
Federal and 25 percent non-Federal. In some circumstances, FEMA will
provide up to 100 percent funding for a limited amount of time.
FEMA reimburses applicants to remove eligible debris or can provide
direct Federal assistance through a mission assignment to another
Federal Agency upon request of the State when it has been demonstrated
that the State and local government lack the capability to perform or
contract for the requested work.
FEMA can provide direct Federal assistance for the removal of
waterborne debris through a mission assignment to another Federal
Agency upon request of the State when it has been demonstrated that the
State and local government lack the capability to perform or contract
for the requested work.
Environmental Protection Agency.--Under the National Contingency
Plan (NCP), EPA is responsible for providing pre-designated Federal On-
Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) to conduct emergency removal of oil and
hazardous materials.
EPA has responsibility for the inland zone and the delineation
between coastal and inland is by mutual agreement with the United
States Coast Guard and the geographic limits are indicated in Area
Contingency Plans.
Hazardous material removals are conducted using the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act fund (CERCLA),
otherwise known as Superfund.
Under CERCLA and the Clean Water Act, EPA has the authority to
respond to actual or potential discharges of oil and actual or
potential releases of hazardous substances, pollutants and contaminants
that may endanger public health or the environment.
Response actions may include containment, stabilization,
decontamination, and disposal. Debris may be mixed with, or contain,
oil or hazardous materials that are subject to these EPA response
authorities.
Oil removals are conducted with funding from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund.
United States Coast Guard (USCG).--USCG has the responsibility to
keep waterways safe and open under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act
(33 U.S.C. 1221), but there is no specific language stating that the
USCG is responsible for debris removal from waterways. However, the
USCG has been tasked in the past to assist in waterways and marine
transportation system recovery.
The USCG may also be assigned Stafford Act missions to assist in
the removal of debris in waterways.
Under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the USCG, along with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is responsible for providing
pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) to conduct
emergency removal of oil and hazardous materials.
USCG is responsible for the coastal zone and the EPA is responsible
for the inland zone. The delineation between coastal and inland zones
is by mutual agreement between the USCG and the EPA and the geographic
limits are indicated in Area Contingency Plans.
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), otherwise known as Superfund, and the Clean
Water Act, USCG has the authority to respond to actual or potential
discharges of oil and actual or potential releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants and contaminants that may endanger public health
or the environment.
Response actions may include containment, stabilization,
decontamination, and final disposal. Debris may be mixed with, or
contain, oil or hazardous materials that are subject to these USCG
response authorities.
USDA/Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS).--NRCS'
Emergency Watershed Protection Program (EWP) is authorized by section
216 of the Flood Control Act of 1950, PL 81-516, 33 U.S.C. 701b-1; and
section 403 of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1978, PL 95-334, as
amended by section 382, of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996, PL 104-127, 16 U.S.C. 2203.
Debris clean up must be for either runoff retardation or soil
erosion prevention that is causing a sudden impairment in the watershed
creating an imminent threat to life or property. Typically, this
includes debris within channels but could also include debris in close
proximity to a channel or situated where the next event could create an
imminent threat to life or property. There is no size limit to the
watershed except that EWP assistance is not eligible for coastal
erosion restoration.
Assistance is funded through specific Congressional appropriations.
Public and private landowners are eligible for assistance but must
be represented by a project sponsor (a State or political subdivision
thereof, qualified Indian tribe or tribal organization, or unit of
local government).
Sponsors are responsible for the local cost share and the
installation of work.
Work can be done either through Federal or local contracts.
NRCS can provide assistance when the President declares an area to
be a major disaster area or when an NRCS State Conservationist
determines that watershed impairment exists.
Question 2a. In the event of a terrorist attack involving a ``dirty
bomb'' or nuclear device, what agencies would be involved in the clean
up of contaminated debris?
Response. Under the NRP, it is expected that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) would declare an incident involving a dirty
bomb or nuclear device as an Incident of National Significance (INS).
It also is likely that the President would issue a Stafford Act
declaration to provide Federal assistance to State and local
governments. Under this scenario, DHS would coordinate the overall
Federal response; FEMA would be responsible for tasking Federal
agencies to assist with the response under the Stafford Act. Under the
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRP, different Federal
agencies are assigned as the ``Coordinating Agency'' for different
types of nuclear/radiological events. The Coordinating Agency, in
general, assists DHS in managing the overall radiological aspects of
the response.
For radiological terrorist incidents, the Coordinating Agency would
be:
(1) The Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of Energy
(DOE) for terrorist incidents involving their facilities,
materials, or weapons:
(2) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for terrorist
incidents involving material or facilities licensed by the NRC
or an Agreement State; or
(3) The DOE, for terrorist incidents not covered by the
categories above. For this category, the role of Coordinating
Agency transitions to EPA for the environmental cleanup phase.
Multiple Federal, State and local agencies would be involved in the
clean up of contaminated debris. The following federal agencies would
have significant roles:
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).--Under the National Response
Plan, EPA has the lead for the environmental cleanup phase of recovery
operation.
FEMA.--Under the National Response Plan, Emergency Support Function
No. 3, Public Works and Engineering, FEMA is the Primary Agency for
Recovery, to include debris/contaminated debris management.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.--FEMA may mission assign the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to execute contaminated debris management
responsibilities.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).--FBI would have crime scene
responsibilities and would be involved in evidence that may be a part
of the debris field.
Department of Transportation (DOT).--DOT would have
responsibilities related to the transportation of contaminated debris.
Department of Energy (DOE).--DOE would provide scientific and
technical support and would be involved with the relocation and storage
of radiological/nuclear material.
Department of Labor/OSHA.--OSHA would be involved with the
protection of worker safety and health, prevention of injuries and
illnesses and compliance inspections and investigations.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).--HHS would be
involved with public health and safety related to debris removal
operations.
Question 2b. Who is in charge?
Response. The National Incident Management System would be used on
the ground as the framework for managing the overall operations, to
include the management of the contaminated debris operations. The
system is flexible and scalable and incorporates ``unified command''
concepts when multiple agencies and jurisdictions are impacted.
DHS is overall coordinator of the Federal support to incidents of
national significance and the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of
the National Response Plan lays out Federal responsibilities for a
radiological/nuclear response.
Question 2c. Are the standard procedures of the NRP going to be
deployed, or will other procedures be used?
Response. The NRP superseded the Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan and is now the core operational plan for national
incident management, to include radiological and nuclear incidents.
The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex of the NRP lays out
responsibilities the management of the overall radiological/nuclear
response.
Question 3a. What revisions to the Stafford Act would you recommend
in light of our experience after a catastrophic disaster like Katrina?
Response. The Stafford Act has the authorities and tools USACE
requires to execute missions, even for a catastrophic disaster like
Katrina.
Question 3b. Are long-term recovery policies and authorities
sufficient? What are the limits and strengths of the existing recovery
policies?
Response. FEMA sets the policies for Stafford Act related recovery
activities. Policies that seem reasonable during a small or even a
major disaster may not be fair or reasonable during a catastrophic
disaster. For example, many of the ``normal'' debris eligibility
policies early on after Katrina made landfall were enforced, but
gradually policies were relaxed to take into account the catastrophic
nature of this event. Not having catastrophic policies in place early
on led to some inefficiencies in managing the debris operations and
inconsistencies in how policies were implemented. Additional
catastrophic planning and exercises are needed to determine issues and
develop courses of action that will be used to address recovery
policies for a catastrophic incident.
Examples of policy decisions that were ``relaxed'':
Decisions to modify cost sharing policies to allow for full
Federal funding of debris removal operations over and extended
period.
Decisions to allow the removal of trees that were killed as
a result of being exposed to salt water.
Decision to allow for the removal of ``commercial'' debris
that posed a hazard if another tropical storm impacted the
area.
Decisions to allow the removal of ``commercial debris'' in
certain urban areas.
Decisions to allow contractor to remove debris from private
property in some areas under certain conditions.
Decisions to allow the removal of spoiled meat from private
processing and cold storage facilities.
______
Responses by Don T. Riley to Additional Questions from Senator Jeffords
Question 1a. Can you elaborate on your response to this question
posed during the hearing: In response to some questions I posed to the
Army Corps in a letter regarding the pace of debris clean-up, the Corps
identified the following hurdles: the slow pace of residents returning,
asbestos regulations, proximity of landfills, and limits on the amount
of debris certain landfills may accept. What is your Agency doing to
eliminate those hurdles for the Gulf Coast and to prevent them from
becoming hurdles in future disasters?
Response. USACE is continuing a partnership with EPA regarding
asbestos regulations and contaminated debris removal and disposal. This
partnership will help leverage the strengths of both agencies to better
respond in the future. USACE has no authorities to influence the pace
of returning residents, proximity of landfills, or the limits on
amounts of debris a landfill may accept. The permitting of landfills
and their acceptable daily limits is the responsibility of State
Agencies. These parameters change with every event. USACE does support
local planning efforts by providing models and parameters for locating
and sizing temporary reduction sites.
Question 1b. Are you working with local communities and States to
establish pre-existing debris clean-up contracts?
Response. USACE provides support to local governments by providing
example scopes of work and assisting in reviewing contract scopes.
USACE has a public intergovernmental web site to transfer planning and
modeling information to local governments. This site provides key
planning information for commodities, emergency power and debris. In
addition USACE is often tasked by FEMA following a disaster to provide
technical assistance to State and local governments for debris contract
reviews and operational guidance.
The Corps of Engineers is working with local communities in
Mississippi to help develop scopes of work for debris contracts to
finish the debris cleanup in Mississippi. FEMA is working with the
State and the local communities to assist them in making sure they are
reimbursed for debris costs under the FEMA programs. The Corps has no
specific authority or funding to assist the locals or State in
developing debris cleanup contracts for future events_however, the
technical assistance being provided will also be valid for future
debris contracts.
Question 1c. Are you reviewing the debris contracts issued during
Katrina to evaluate contracting procedures?
Response. Yes, USACE has received 27 recommendations from Army
Audit Agency and have plans to implement most of these recommendations
by June 2007.
Question 1d. Are you considering legislative recommendations
regarding the debris-handling mission?
Response. No legislative recommendations are being considered for
handling the debris management mission. USACE has a robust corrective
action program and we are actively addressing issues, developing
courses of action and improving our operating procedures.
Question 2a. Chef Menteur 404 permit.--Under what authority did the
Army Corps grant its emergency authorization to begin operation of the
Chef Menteur landfill without a Clean Water Act section 404 permit?
Response. The Corps granted emergency authorization for the
operation of the landfill in accordance with an existing general permit
(NOD 20) for emergency activities that was issued in accordance with
Corps regulations (see 33 CFR 325.5(c) and 325.8(b)). The Corps
regulations are issued under the authority of section 404 of the Clean
Water Act, sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and
section 103 of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972. All National Environmental Policy Act and public notice
requirements were met.
Division engineers have the authority to approve special processing
procedures in emergency situations (33 CFR 325.2(e)(4)). In response to
the emergency situation resulting from Hurricane Katrina, the
Mississippi Valley Division approved emergency permit procedures on
September 3, 2005, and December 22, 2005.
Question 2b. What is the duration of an ``emergency authorization''
and where is it defined?
Response. The terms of General Permit NOD-20 require the project
proponent to submit to the Corps within 30 days of emergency
authorization either a restoration plan or a permit application to
maintain the work. In the case of the Chef Menteur landfill, the
project proponent submitted an application to maintain the work. The
emergency authorization is valid until a permit is issued or denied or
until such time the emergency no longer exists. The emergency
procedures for the Corps regulatory program are generally defined at 33
CFR 325.2(e)(4), but the specific terms of emergency authorizations are
at the discretion of the division engineer.
Question 2c. Has the Army Corps ever issued similar emergency
authorizations elsewhere in the country, and if so, please describe the
permitting activities including the location, purpose, and duration of
emergency authorization, and final decision to issue/not issue a
permit.
Response. The Corps has established emergency permitting procedures
in many areas of the country, to respond to a number of emergency
situations. Emergency permitting procedures have been approved to
respond to hurricanes, floods, large-scale accidents (e.g., airliner
crashes), and other catastrophic events. These procedures facilitate
rapid responses to situations where activities regulated by the Corps
are necessary to reduce unacceptable hazards to life, significant
losses of property, or immediate, unforeseen, and significant economic
hardships. The Corps regulations have contained provisions for
emergency procedures for at least the past 35 years, and we cannot
provide a complete list of these emergency authorizations.
Question 3. How do you respond to the Fish and Wildlife Service
opinion that the use of the Chef Menteur landfill could result in
persistent contamination of groundwater, surface water, and wetlands?
Response. For the Chef Menteur landfill, the Corps permitting
authority is limited to authorizing discharges of dredged or fill
material into waters of the United States to construct the landfill and
its infrastructure. In the State of Louisiana, the lead Agency
regulating the operation of landfills is the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ). According to LDEQ, the Chef Menteur
landfill is currently lined by a layer of at least 10 feet of compacted
clay, which is substantially thicker than the thickness of constructed
clay liners that are required by LDEQ for this type of landfill. The
clay layer at the Chef Menteur landfill will impede the movement of
contaminants from the landfill to adjacent groundwater, surface water,
or wetlands.
Question 4a. Implied in the Corps' use of the term ``emergency'' in
your letter granting permission to begin operation of the Chef Menteur
landfill site without a wetlands permit in April of 2006 was an urgent
requirement to provide a location for debris disposal. I understand
that the Congressional Research Service currently estimates that there
are about 44 million cubic yards of debris in Louisiana. According to
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), immediately after the
storm, there were estimates that up to 250,000 homes may have to be
demolished. Today, that number stands somewhere between 15,000 and
22,000. GAO also reports that only about 1100 of those demolitions have
occurred. My question goes to the use of the term ``emergency''. How
much debris has been placed in the Chef Menteur landfill site since
your authorization to proceed was granted in April, 2006?
Response. 800,000 cubic yards.
Question 4b. Given the slow pace of home demolition, why didn't the
Corps choose to go through the normal permitting process prior to
beginning delivery of debris to Chef Menteur?
Response. Debris from the demolition of homes is just one source of
the debris that was going to the Chef Menteur landfill. Debris
resulting from homeowners gutting and rebuilding their homes, as well
as vegetative and other storm debris resulting from Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita and removed from the streets, was also brought to the
landfill. As long as this debris remains on neighborhood streets and
curbsides, it presents an environmental and safety hazard.
Question 5. How does the Corps justify its emergency permitting
action given the assertion by the Fish and Wildlife Service that a
culvert provides a direct connection between this unlined landfill,
accepting some hazardous materials, and surrounding water bodies that
are home to the region's commercial fisheries and 340 species of birds
at the Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife Refuge? Please respond to each
of the points in that letter, particularly the concern that placing
construction and demolition debris in an unlined landfill located in a
wetland could result in leaching and resultant persistent contamination
of groundwater, surface water, and adjacent wetland habitats.
Response. Prior to the use of this site, the Corps conducted a
jurisdictional determination on the property. It was determined that
the project footprint consisted of borrow pits which had hydrologic
connection to the Maxent Canal through an existing culvert. This
hydrologic connection was severed prior to any emergency dumping.
The Fish and Wildlife Service's concern about placing construction
and demolition debris at this site will be addressed, since the
landfill will have a clay liner that is approximately 10 feet thick.
The thickness of this clay liner exceeds the standards required by
LDEQ, which is responsible for establishing construction standards for
landfills in the State of Louisiana. LDEQ also regulates the operation
of landfills. LDEQ has determined that the liner at the Chef Menteur
landfill will prevent any leaching of contaminants into adjacent
waters, including groundwater. In a letter dated May 19, 2006, the Fish
and Wildlife Service stated that if the landfill is properly lined, it
should be authorized to receive construction and demolition debris, as
well as vegetative debris.
Question 6a. Conflict of Interest at Chef Menteur.--How did the
Army Corps protect against a conflict of interest being both the
``applicant'' so to speak as being a potential user of the Chef Menteur
site as well as the permitting Agency prior to issuing your emergency
authorization?
Response. There is no conflict of interest. The roles and
responsibilities of permit applicants and users are substantially
different. Waste Management of Louisiana, LLC is the permit applicant.
If the Chef Menteur landfill is not available, then alternative
landfills would have to be used by the Corps for the disposal of debris
during the recovery effort. The Corps is reviewing the permit
application for the Chef Menteur landfill under all applicable laws,
regulations, and guidance, as we would any other proposal that requires
Department of the Army authorization. The affiliation of any potential
users of this landfill has no bearing on the Corps' review of the
permit application. There are no requirements or restrictions on the
applicant to only accept debris from the Corps. The Corps office that
deals with debris removal is separate from the Corps office working on
the permitting issues. The Recovery Field Office and the New Orleans
District's Regulatory Branch have different and independent
responsibilities.
Question 6b. Did you consult with EPA, or ask them to review or
participate in your decision to waive this permitting requirement to
fulfill their oversight responsibilities under section 404 or to avoid
the appearance or the reality of conflict of interest.
Response. We did not waive permitting requirements. We issued an
emergency authorization and we are presently evaluating a permit
application to maintain the work for the construction of the landfill.
This emergency authorization satisfies section 404 permit requirements
until the standard permit process can be completed. In this case, the
authority to issue a section 404 permit lies solely with the Corps. The
emergency authorization was necessary to facilitate recovery from the
disaster.
EPA has delegated its authority to regulate the operation of
landfills in Louisiana to LDEQ. As a result, there was no need to
consult directly with EPA on the emergency authorization. We are
coordinating with EPA on the final permit application.
Question 7. What analysis of environmental impacts at the Chef
Menteur site has the Army Corps conducted since April, and what have
you found? What is your timeline for completion of this evaluation?
Response. On April 28, 2006, a public notice was issued to solicit
comments on the section 404 permit, which would authorize the
construction of the landfill. The comment period was 30 days. All
comments received in response to the public notice, including the
comments from the Fish and Wildlife Service, were forwarded to the
applicant for his response or rebuttal. The applicant submitted his
responses and we are now reviewing his submittal.
On May 24, 2006, a site visit was made with EPA to assess habitat
quality.
We are currently performing an environmental assessment and public
interest review of the project. We anticipate completing our evaluation
and making a final decision in 90 to 120 days. However, our decision on
the permit is contingent on LDEQ completing its environmental
assessment for the operation of the landfill.
Question 8. Given that Mayor Nagin has decided not to renew or
extend his Executive order regarding his temporary suspension of the
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, what is the status of the Army Corps
404 permit process? Do you plan to suspend your activities on this
permit until the necessary local permits are received? If not, why not?
Response. Once the City withdrew their authorization, Waste
Management could no longer operate the landfill. As a result, there was
no need for us to suspend our emergency authorization. We will continue
to evaluate the permit application, to make a decision on whether to
issue or deny the permit. If local authorization for the landfill is
granted in the future, then a Corps permit decision would have been
made.
Question 9a. In an article by Gordon Russell, April 14, 2006, in
The Times Picayune, entitled Storm debris landfill is OK'd, the
following statement appeared. ``Asked whether the Corps had requested
that DEQ approve a new facility, (Sid Falk, identified as the debris
manager for the Army Corps) Falk said, ``Absolutely''. Did the Army
Corps, either officially or unofficially request that the Louisiana DEQ
approve the Chef Menteur landfill for use, and if not, please explain
the statement in this article.
Response. The Corps Louisiana Recovery Field Office did ask LA DEQ,
in the interest of efficiency to permit additional landfills in the New
Orleans area. Debris removal operations had been constrained by daily
quantity limits imposed on the Gentilly landfill for receipt of
construction and demolition (C&D) debris. We were also seeking
alternatives for the receipt of asbestos containing waste material
(ACWM) in closer proximity to demolition operations in the city of New
Orleans. The only alternative receptors for C&D and ACWM in the New
Orleans vicinity are the Hwy 90 and Riverbirch landfills, respectively,
located in west Jefferson Parish, which is more distant from debris
removal and demolition operations, entails traversing heavily populated
communities and crossing the Mississippi River via the Huey P. Long
Bridge, which is a marginally adequate roadway for debris hauling
equipment. There have been several incidents of truck rollovers at the
traffic circle at the base of the bridge on the west bank. The current
estimate of demolition numbers in the City of New Orleans is 15,000
structures. Approximately 5,000 structures have been identified by the
city for demolition, which represent hazards to public safety. The city
has received another 2,000 property owner requests for demolition.
There are approximately 80,000 structures in the city that were damaged
by flooding. It is highly speculative what number of these structures
will eventually be identified for demolition. The limited availability
of landfills poses the risk of operational failure if, for any reason,
the sites become unavailable.
Question 9b. How is the Corps preventing a conflict of interest as
both the permitting Agency and a party interested in the future use of
the landfill as a debris disposal site?
Response. There is no conflict of interest. The Corps is neither a
proponent nor opponent of any permit proposal. The Corps is reviewing
the Chef Menteur landfill site under all applicable laws, regulations,
and guidance, as we would any other proposal that requires Department
of the Army authorization. The affiliation of any future users of this
landfill has no bearing on the Corps' review of the permit application.
There are no requirements or restrictions on the landfill operator to
only accept debris from the Corps. The Corps office that deals with
debris removal is separate from the Corps office working on the
permitting issues. The Recovery Field Office and the New Orleans
District's Regulatory Branch have different and independent
responsibilities.
Question 10. During the hearing, Senator Inhofe asked a question
regarding the responsibility for removal of watery debris. Mr. Shea
answered that FEMA is responsible based on the Stafford Act. Section
407 of the Stafford Act states: ``The President, whenever he determines
it to be in the public interest, is authorized--(1) through the use of
Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, to clear debris
and wreckage resulting from a major disaster from publicly and
privately owned lands and waters; and (2) to make grants to any State
or local government or owner or operator of a private nonprofit
facility for the purpose of removing debris or wreckage resulting from
a major disaster from publicly or privately owned lands and waters.''
Under this authority, it seems clear that the President could designate
any Federal Agency to take the lead for debris removal. Do you agree?
Response. Yes, the President could designate any Federal Agency to
take the lead for debris removal.
Question 11. Do you believe that there should be an enhanced
Federal role in major disasters or in catastrophic events for debris
clean up that creates an authority for the Federal government to
conduct debris clean up without the request of a local government?
Response. No. The local government must be included as a partner in
the response operations. All levels of local government will and do
play critical roles in debris operations. Cooperation is key to an
efficient and effective recovery. A Federal take-over would create a
hostile environment that would only create more tension in an already
tense environment and have a negative impact on both the responders and
victims.
Question 12. Please describe whether Corps personnel and
contractors are segregating waste or if homeowners responsible for
placement of their debris at the curb are performing this segregation.
Please elaborate on your quality control mechanisms.
Response. From the inception of the response, USACE identified
numerous waste streams requiring segregation, collection, processing,
staging, recycling, and disposal in order to maintain compliance. These
waste streams include the following:
Municipal solid waste
Vegetative Debris
Construction and Demolition Debris
Small motorized Equipment
Asbestos
Electronic Waste
Household Hazardous Waste (HHW)
White Goods
Tires
The following flow diagram illustrates waste stream management
USACE incorporated for the response.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Waste is being separated by both the homeowners and Corps
personnel/contractors.
j. Homeowners had the option of placing household hazardous waste
at curbside and having either a USEPA or Mississippi Department of
Environmental Quality (MDEQ) hazardous materials (waste) pickup crew
pick up the waste. Likewise, if Corps personnel or contractors
encounter hazardous materials (waste) in the process of debris removal
or demolition, they could likewise move the hazardous materials (waste)
curbside for USEPA/MDEQ pickup. In instances where hazardous materials
(waste) were encountered and the situation was such that the Corps or
Corps contractors needed assistance in managing the material during
actual debris pickup or demolition, the USEPA / MDEQ was available to
provide onsite assistance. One example was an outbuilding that had
collapsed on the contents, which happened to be swimming pool
chemicals. The USEPA provided onsite assistance during the demolition
of this structure to help avoid a release and to be onsite to respond
to a release should that have occurred.
k. Waste is further segregated at the Corps temporary debris
reduction sites (TDRS). Vegetative debris is segregated from
construction/demolition debris, white goods, electronics, and any
household hazardous waste that might have made it to the TDRS. The
various waste streams are managed in a manner consistent with State and
Federal regulations and guidance.
l. Corps QA personnel are involved in debris management from the
actual location where the debris is picked up to management of the TDRS
facilities where the waste is further processed, segregated, and sent
for final disposal or reuse. USACE provides hundreds of Quality
Assurance representatives and the USACE contractor provides hundreds of
Quality Control representatives in order to maintain debris management
standards and requirements throughout the response. In addition to
USACE and USACE contractors, there are numerous Agency representatives
from US EPA, State DEQ, CDC, NIOSH, OSHA, FEMA, etc who provide
operational, regulatory feedback concerning daily debris management,
from cradle to grave. Corrective measures result from this robust,
daily, and wide spread visibility for debris management.
m. USEPA/MDEQ had QA inspectors that visited the waste generation
points, the TDRS facilities, and the final disposal sites to ensure
compliance with State and Federal regulations. Meetings were usually
held weekly between these regulatory personnel and Corps debris
environmental personnel. There was frequent contact by phone and e-mail
between the Corps and EPA/MDEQ.
n. USACE Vicksburg District augmented debris/waste management QA by
involving MVK personnel with specific training, experience, and
expertise in waste management. These personnel provided day-to-day
technical assistance to the debris mission to help ensure all waste
streams were managed in a manner consistent with State and/or Federal
regulations and guidance.
Question 13. Do you agree that it would be a step backwards if the
Federal government returned to the ad hoc, disaster-by-disaster
approach to providing disaster aid to States, localities, and
individuals that existed before the Stafford Act?
Response. Yes, the National Response Plan works and returning to a
``ad hoc'' approach would be counter-productive.
Question 14a. Until Hurricane Katrina, there were a very limited
number of times during which the Congress diverted from normal
procedures under the Stafford Act in the wake of a disaster. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Congress has enacted a significant
number of legislative changes to the Stafford Act that modify the
manner in which disaster assistance is provided, and many more
proposals are pending. This was a catastrophic disaster worthy of
special action, but it is unlikely to be the last of its kind,
particularly with the changes we can expect as climate change occurs.
What are your recommendations with regard to the potential creation of
a ``third category'' of declaration under the Stafford Act that would
be reserved for catastrophic events, for which special rules would
apply?
Response. If a third category of disaster is created, recommend
that the threshold for declaring a catastrophic event be very clearly
defined so that this category is not misused.
Question 14b. What specific provisions of the Stafford Act would
you recommend modifying in such a category?
Response. For a catastrophic event, there should be a relaxation of
rules related to debris eligibility and there should also be a
relaxation of cost sharing requirements for the communities that are
already devastated.
Question 15a. The Stafford Act, and the Nation's disaster response,
is focused on preparedness and response. There is very little long-term
recovery authority in the Stafford Act. Do you believe there is a role
for the Federal government in this area that should be more developed?
Response. Many departments have programs and authorities that can
assist with long term recovery. It would be helpful to have a mechanism
defined for organizing and coordinating these authorities and programs
for major and catastrophic disasters.
Question 15b. Is there currently authority for the Federal
Government to perform long-term recovery operations?
Response. Many agencies already have authorities that can
contribute to long-term recovery efforts.
Question 15c. Do you believe that any Federal role should be
limited to long-term recovery from catastrophic events?
Response. The role of the Federal Government should be scalable,
depending upon the magnitude of the event and the extent of damage.
Question 16. During the hearing, you agreed to provide information
regarding debris removal contracts for the record. Please provide a
breakdown of the debris removal contracts let during Hurricane Katrina,
who received them, what the dollar amounts were, who the prime
contractors subcontracted out to and what accounts for the difference
in dollar per pound removal in the original contract and the final
subcontractor.
Response. There are currently five contracts awarded to support the
physical pickup of debris within Louisiana and there were 606
subcontractors who are or have supported this mission: Contractor:
Ashbritt, Inc., Dollars obligated to date: $28,253,000; Contractor: ECC
Operating Services, Dollars obligated to date: $421,000,000;
Contractor: CERES Environmental Services, Dollars obligated to date:
$384,000,000; Contractor: Phillips & Jordan, Inc., Dollars obligated to
date: $496,000,000.
In Mississippi, two contracts were utilized for Hurricane Katrina.
The initial contract was the ACI contract, Contract No. DACW29-03-0009-
AshBritt, Inc. This was an IDIQ contract. Vicksburg District could
utilize up to $45M in contract capacity. Total obligated to date under
the ACI contract was $42,740,000.00.
Contract W912P8 0905-D-0025, awarded to AshBritt, Inc. is an IDIQ
contract. Contract capacity is $1B. To date we have obligated
$720,204,076.61.
Large scale debris operations require literally thousands of pieces
of equipment and multiple crews. The only way to rapidly assemble these
resources is by bringing together numerous subcontractors. The Corps is
not only paying for the removal of the debris, but also is paying the
Prime Contractors to establish the management structure to rapidly
assemble vast numbers of personnel and equipment to accomplish the
missions over an extremely large geographical area.
______
Responses by Don T. Riley to Additional Questions from Senator Clinton
Question 1. FEMA estimated at the end of June that Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita would generate 33 million cubic yards of debris
including curbside, private property, and demolition debris. Those
numbers were generated using estimates of 15,000 homes to be
demolished, and current estimates have grown to include about 22,000
homes to be demolished. About 1100 demolitions have been conducted to
date.
Under the National Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Function
No. 3, the Army Corps of Engineers is delegated the responsibility for
debris removal. The Army Corps has the responsibility of removing
debris from public rights of way. In a declared emergency under the
Stafford Act, local governments decide if they want to pick-up debris
through their own contracting and be reimbursed through the Stafford
Act or if they will request that the Army Corps perform this mission
for them. Local governments must grant permission for the Army Corps to
enter private property to remove debris in cases where the owner is not
available.
The Army Corps cites the slow pace of residents returning, the
identification of applicable asbestos regulations and permitted
landfills located nearby, and limitations on the amount of debris
certain landfills may accept as hurdles to expediting debris clean-up.
Debris clean-up has been identified as a hold-up in Katrina
recovery. Is the Nation's debris clean-up and handling mission up to
par, what changes, if any, need to be made in the Stafford Act/National
Response Plan (NRP)/Agency activities?
Response. The National Response Plan and Stafford Act are up to par
as it relates to the debris mission and USACE has no recommendations at
this time for changes. The system successfully brought together
Federal, State and local governments to collectively manage the removal
of debris. The job did seem overwhelming at times, given that the scope
of the damage from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was unprecedented, with
some 90,000 square miles of land significantly impacted (an area larger
than Great Britain) and the storms generating enormous volumes of
debris. Over 120M cubic yards of debris eligible for Federal assistance
was generated by the winds and coastal surges. That is nearly six times
more debris generated by Hurricane Andrew.
Tremendous progress has been made in removing debris over the past
year. The Corps is responsible for the removal and disposal of debris
in 54 counties in 4 States totaling 57M cubic yards. In first 7 months
the Corps removed over 45M cubic yards of this debris (approximately 80
percent). In comparison, the Corps was responsible for the removal of
15M cubic yards of debris after Hurricane Andrew in the first 8 months
after the storm made landfall.
Question 2. I would like the Army Corps and FEMA to provide me a
breakdown of the debris removal contracts let during Hurricane Katrina
including who or what entities got what dollar amounts, to whom did the
prime contractors subcontract out for and for how much, and what
accounts for the difference in dollar per pound removal in the original
contract and the final subcontract. I think we must get a handle on
debris removal contracts.
Response. There are currently five contracts awarded to support the
physical pickup of debris within Louisiana and there were 606
subcontractors who are or have supported this mission: Contractor:
Ashbritt, Inc., Dollars obligated to date: $28,253,000; Contractor: ECC
Operating Services, Dollars obligated to date: $421,000,000;
Contractor: CERES Environmental Services, Dollars obligated to date:
$384,000,000; Contractor: Phillips & Jordan, Inc., Dollars obligated to
date: $496,000,000.
In Mississippi, two contracts were utilized for Hurricane Katrina.
The initial contract was the ACI contract, Contract No. DACW29-03-D-
0009-AshBritt, Inc. This was an IDIQ contract. Vicksburg District could
utilize up to $45M in contract capacity. Total obligated to date under
the ACI contract was $42,740,000.00.
Contract W912P8-05-D-0025, awarded to AshBritt, Inc. is an IDIQ
contract. Contract capacity is $1B. To date we have obligated
$720,204,076.61.
Large scale debris operations require literally 1000's of pieces of
equipment and multiple crews. The only way to rapidly assemble these
resources is by bringing together numerous subcontractors. The Corps is
not only paying for the removal of the debris, but also is paying the
Prime Contractors to establish the management structure to rapidly
assemble vast numbers of personnel and equipment to accomplish the
missions over an extremely large geographical area.
______
Responses by Don T. Riley to Additional Questions from Senator Vitter
Question 1. The Corps is the lead Agency on debris removal. What is
the status of hurricane debris removal (percentage completion)? When do
you expect to be finished with this work?
Response. The status of the hurricane debris removal (percentage
completion) is depicted in the attached presentation.
It is difficult to offer any projections of when the work might be
complete since there are many determining factors over which we do not
have control.
Question 2. Could you compare the debris policy exercised in
Mississippi to that applied in Louisiana? Is Mississippi utilizing
landfills that are unlined to dispose of lead and asbestos, etc?
Response. While implementation of Federal, state, and local
requirements can vary from state to state, the USACE debris policies
are the same irrespective of location. Wastes must be segregated,
collected, transported, recycled, treated, and disposed of in
conformance with applicable Federal, State, and local requirements.
Lined landfills (Type I, II) are designed and constructed to
capture leachate generated from the breakdown of wastes. USACE disposed
of wastes requiring lined landfills where appropriate. For example,
USACE disposed of municipal solid waste in a Type I, II lined landfill
while acting under direct Federal assistance to DHS FEMA and for the
City of New Orleans. Additionally, US EPA used Subtitle C landfills
with liners and monitoring provisions to manage disposition of
hazardous wastes, as required.
The construction and demolition (C&D) waste stream resulting from
demolitions or identified from curb-side collection can be disposed of
in Type III landfills, which are equipped with low permeability soils
at the landfill base that can minimize release of leachate, if any. The
standards for this base layer are less than that provided by a liner as
C&D media do not break down creating leachate concerns for the
subsurface as are found in Type I landfills.
Pre and post Katrina solid waste regulations do not require
asbestos containing materials (ACM) be disposed of in a lined landfill
because asbestos fibers do not break down and create leachate. However,
many Type I, II landfills that are permitted to accept ACM are lined to
address leachate concerns from other sources.
The sources of lead in C&D waste streams may include lead-based
paint, lead pipes, lead in solder, etc. Prior to hurricane recovery,
solid waste regulations in the State of MS and LA provided for lead-
based paint adhered to C&D to be classified as a C&D waste stream.
Thus, C&D debris with adhered lead-based paint can be appropriately
disposed of in a Type III landfill. For clarification, USACE was not
tasked with removal of lead-based paint chips per se. Such a response
would require analysis of paint chips for lead to determine appropriate
waste classifications, treatment requirements, if any, prior to
disposal. The lead contained in C&D media subject to disposal in Type
III landfills is not expected to be chemically altered enough to create
leachate concerns.
Though I would have liked to have seen more parishes receive the
extension of the 100 percent Federal share for debris removal, I do
appreciate that the President extended the 100 percent cost share for
many of the hardest hit parishes. Now, almost a year later, we have
already hauled away more than 25 times more than the debris in New York
after September 11, but we still have a long way to go. Right after the
storm, local government leaders were told one thing and then another on
how debris removal would work. First, they were told that, if they
chose the Corps for the debris work, 100 percent of the cost share
would last until the work was done. Then, FEMA corrected that to say
that was not the case and that the cost share for the Corps work would
be the same as if the parishes had chosen their own contractors. As you
might guess, many local leaders chose the Corps, even though they
believe the contractors of their choice might have been cheaper or
faster with the debris removal.
Question 3. In the future, how will the Corps coordinate better
with FEMA to ensure this sort of confusion does not happen in future
disaster? Clearly, confusion of this sort only delayed vital debris
removal work.
Response. There was a great deal of confusion over cost share,
however USACE has no role in setting, changing, or communicating cost
share information to the state and local governments. USACE will
continue to train response personnel to direct all cost share questions
to a FEMA representative.
Question 4. I understand there are a few landfill facilities used
for disposal even though the USACE, EPA and FEMA knew that the facility
did not have a Federal Clean Water Act permit for discharge of
contaminated stormwater or a 404 permit required by USACE regulations
as well as other environmental concerns. What steps has the Corps taken
to ensure environmental compliance and safety?
Response. MVN has issued a Cease and Desist (C&D) order to Hamps
Landfill, which is located adjacent to Old Gentilly Landfill. Hamps is
adhering to the terms and conditions of the C&D. We are presently
working with Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to resolve
the legal issues. We know of no other landfill that is operating
without a Department of the Army permit.
__________
Statement of Deborah Y. Dietrich, Director, Office of Emergency
Management, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am
Deborah Dietrich, Director of the Office of Emergency Management in the
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss EPA's role
under the National Response Plan (NRP) and Agency response efforts
under the Stafford Act following Hurricane Katrina.
The magnitude of the damage from Hurricane Katrina presented
significant challenges for EPA and our partners at the Federal, State
and local levels. EPA has a long standing and positive relationship
with FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the U.S. Coast
Guard and other Federal agencies, as well as our partners in State and
local government. As with other Federal agencies, our involvement is
facilitated through the NRP. While there is always room for
improvement, we believe that these relationships provided the basis for
an effective response to the most destructive natural disaster in the
history of the United States.
Under the NRP, EPA is the Coordinator and Primary Agency for
Emergency Support Function (ESF) No. 10-Oil and Hazardous Materials
Response. Our primary activities under this support function include:
efforts to detect, identify, contain, clean up or dispose of oil or
hazardous materials; removal of drums and other bulk containers;
collection of household hazardous waste; monitoring of debris disposal;
air and water quality monitoring and sampling; and protection of
natural resources. EPA is also a Support Agency for a number of other
Emergency Support Functions.
For example, under ESF No. 3-Public Works and Engineering, which
addresses solid waste debris removal, EPA provides necessary support to
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) by assisting in the location
of disposal sites, providing safety guidance for areas affected by
hazardous materials, assisting in the management of contaminated
debris, and by coordinating or providing assessments, data, expertise,
tecludeal assistance, and monitoring.
In response to Gulf Coast hurricanes, and in coordination with our
partners, EPA performed a wide variety of tasks including: response to
more than 70 emergency situations including hazardous materials
releases and oil spills; assessment of more than 4,000 water and
wastewater systems to determine viability after the storm;
environmental monitoring and sampling of water, air, floodwater and
residual sediment resulting in more than 400,000 analyses. EPA
conducted extensive outreach through the media and the Agency Web site
and distributed millions of flyers to alert the public and communities
about potential risk and methods to address handling of potentially
contaminated debris. EPA also responded to FEMA's request for
assistance and rescued approximately 800 evacuees. Over the months
since Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, more than 1,600 EPA employees from
across the country participated in the response. At the height of
activities, approximately 245 EPA employees and 1,400 contractors and
support personnel were deployed.
Removal and proper disposal of the unprecedented amount of debris
in the affected areas has been a major undertaking since the beginning
of the response. While the USACE has the federal lead responsibility
for debris removal under the NRP, EPA has worked closely with USACE,
FEMA, and State and local governments to assist in debris removal
activities. For example, EPA assisted the States in developing guidance
regarding demolition of structurally unsound buildings as well as
guidance for debris burning. Along with FEMA and the USAGE, EPA
provided assistance to the States as they developed their debris
removal plans.
EPA collected more than 4 million unsecured or abandoned containers
of potentially hazardous wastes and facilitated the recycling of more
than 630,000 electronic goods. We have also assisted in the proper
handling and recycling of more than 380,000 large appliances. These
collections included curbside pick-up as well as the operation of
emergency collection sites.
The management and disposal of non-hazardous debris is a State and
local responsibility. However, at the request of the States of
Louisiana and Mississippi, EPA assigned staff to provide support by
visiting debris disposal sites, and observing waste handling, including
sorting and management practices at emergency disposal sites.
Observations of waste handling practices were reported to State and
local authorities for any appropriate follow-up action.
EPA's mission in Alabama and Mississippi is now complete and any
remaining activities have been transitioned to the States. In
Louisiana, EPA activities are winding down and are now focused on the
collection and disposal of household hazardous waste, landfill
monitoring, and environmental sampling. These efforts are generally
occurring in the St. Bernard and Orleans parishes. Work is expected to
be completed in October 2006.
At EPA, following the events of September 11, 2001, we introduced
an Agency wide National Approach to Response designed to improve our
readiness for incidents of national significance. As part of this
initiative, we provided an ICS training and exercise program for
emergency response personnel and others, which allowed our personnel to
organize into Unified Command with the U.S. Coast Guard and States very
early in our response under ESF-No. 10. The Agency also implemented a
response support corps (to include staff beyond our responders)
allowing us to identify staff in advance who could use their skills and
expertise in the response. In the area of information technology,
improvements to systems regarding formatting, review and storage of
laboratory data facilitated the process we used to analyze data quickly
so that information about potential risk can be provided to the public
and responders. Overall, we believe this approach contributed
significantly to our Katrina response efforts.
conclusion
The response to Hurricane Katrina has clearly necessitated strong
cooperation among the Federal, State and local government agencies. We
believe that the Stafford Act, the National Response Plan and the
preparedness activities under the National Incident Management System
contributed positively to our ability to respond to Hurricane Katrina.
EPA has recently participated in the review of the NRP and we will
continue to work with our Federal, State and local partners to address
the Nation's preparedness for future catastrophic events.
______
Responses by Deborah Y. Dietrich to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Please discuss the assignment of responsibility for
water borne debris and spills in disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.
What is the role of the EPA, the Coast Guard, or the Corps of
Engineers?
Response. Water borne debris.--In accordance with the National
Response Plan (NRP), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has
the overall responsibility of mission assigning Federal agencies to
assist with the response under a Stafford Act declaration. The NRP
assigns primary responsibility for managing debris to the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) and FEMA, including waterborne debris. USACE
provides direct field assistance in removing debris, while FEMA
provides financial assistance to applicants who otherwise have the
legal authority to remove the debris. USACE may remove water borne
debris with its own resources or, if needed, request that other
supporting Federal agencies to assist. (Some support agencies, such as
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation
Service also have direct statutory responsibility for providing
financial assistance for the removal of certain water borne debris.)
USACE may call upon the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), for example, to assist
with the removal of marine debris and wrecks from waterways and
navigable channels. During Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Navy's
Supervisor of Salvage also assisted with vessel salvage efforts. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) typically does not assist in the
actual removal of non-hazardous marine debris, but may provide
technical advice and assistance to other Federal agencies as well as to
state and local governments regarding appropriate debris management.
Waterborne spills.--Under the NRP, FEMA is responsible for mission
assigning Federal agencies to assist with the response under a Stafford
Act declaration. The NRP assigns primary responsibility for cleaning up
oil spills and discharges of hazardous materials into the environment
to EPA for the inland zone and to USCG for the coastal zone. EPA and
USCG may call upon their support agencies (such as the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration) for assistance. Under this authority,
during Hurricane Katrina, both EPA and USCG removed hazardous materials
(e.g., drums, tanks) from inland and coastal waterways.
Question 2a. In the event of a terrorist attack involving a ``dirty
bomb'' or nuclear device, what agencies would be involved in the
cleanup of contaminated debris? Who is in charge?
Response. Under the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
would declare an incident involving a dirty bomb or nuclear device as
an Incident of National Significance (INS). It also is likely that the
President would issue a Stafford Act declaration to provide Federal
assistance to State and local governments. Under this scenario, DHS
would coordinate the overall Federal response and appoint a Federal
Coordinating Official (FCO), on behalf of the President, to work with
the State Coordinating Official (SCO) to identify requirements and then
coordinate the Federal support activities. Under the Nuclear/
Radiological Incident Annex of the NRP, different Federal agencies are
assigned as the ``Coordinating Agency'' for different types of nuclear/
radiological events. The Coordinating Agency, in general, assists DHS
in managing the overall radiological aspects of the response.
For radiological terrorist incidents, the Coordinating Agency would
be (1) The Department of Defense (DoD) or Department of Energy (DOE)
for terrorist incidents involving their facilities, materials, or
weapons; (2) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for terrorist
incidents involving material or facilities licensed by the NRC or an
Agreement State; or (3) The DOE, for terrorist incidents not covered by
the categories above. For this category, the role of Coordinating
Agency transitions to EPA for the environmental cleanup phase.
For a dirty bomb or nuclear device incident falling under category
3, DOE would first assist DHS and FEMA in coordinating the overall
Federal radiological response, then the Coordinating Agency role would
transition to EPA for the cleanup phase. During the cleanup phase, EPA
would continue to work with the assistance of NRP agencies, including
DOE. EPA would also respond in the initial phase, but in a support role
to DOE, DHS, and FEMA. The NRP assigns responsibility for managing
contaminated debris, in particular, to the USACE for providing direct
field assistance, and to FEMA for providing financial assistance. It is
expected that both DOE and EPA would work closely with USACE and FEMA
to appropriately manage contaminated debris. USACE and FEMA could also
request the help of other debris management support agencies under the
NRP as needed.
Question 2b. Are the standard procedures of the NRP going to be
deployed, or will other procedures be used?
Response. The NRP is always in effect and it applies to all
incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response; however, the
implementation of NRP coordination mechanisms is flexible and scalable.
DoD, DOE, and NRC may have more detailed standard operating procedures
that would apply specifically to radiological terrorism incidents
involving their materials and facilities.
Question 3a. What revisions to the Stafford Act would you recommend
in light of our experience after a catastrophic disaster like Katrina?
Are long-term recovery policies and authorities sufficient?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on Stafford Act
revisions nor conducted an analysis of existing recovery policies.
Question 3b. What are the limits and strengths of the existing
recovery polices?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on Stafford Act
revisions nor conducted an analysis of existing recovery policies.
______
Responses by Deborah Y. Dietrich to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. In response to some questions I posed to the Army Corps
in a letter regarding the pace of debris clean-up, the Corps identified
the following hurdles: the slow pace of residents returning, asbestos
regulations, proximity of landfills, and limits on theamount of debris
certain landfills may accept. What is EPA doing to eliminate those
hurdles for the Gulf Coast and to prevent them from becoming hurdles in
future disasters?
Response. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took
reasonable steps to address environmental concerns in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Where State agencies felt that flexibility in the
application of the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAP) might be helpful, EPA exercised that enforcement
discretion by providing No Action Assurances in both Louisiana and
Mississippi to ensure that procedural provisions of these regulations
would not impede progress while still protecting the environment. While
the process for No Action Assurances required coordination and
collection of information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
and States, it was conducted at the same time that other policies and
procedures were being established by State and local authorities
including those addressing access to private property. Major demolition
activities were not ready to begin prior to the issuance of the No
Action Assurances.&
The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ is the
permitting authority for construction and demolition (C&D) debris
landfills. Early in the response operation, in response to questions
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the USACE, LDEQ
determined that there was sufficient capacity for the various debris
streams resulting from the damage caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. This information was provided to the USACE debris coordinator
during the debris coordination meetings that have been occurring on at
least a weekly basis since September 2005. These meetings involve
various parties but principally, FEMA, State Debris Coordinator, USACE,
LDEQ, EPA, and a variety of other representatives (Parish and local).
Landfill proximity and capacity issues have been clearly articulated.
In January 2006, FEMA issued a letter to the USACE limiting the amount
of C&D waste hauled to the Gentilly landfill. LDEQ, in cooperation with
EPA and USACE, performed a comprehensive analysis of the issues
affecting the Gentilly landfill's capacity to accept C&D waste and
found considerable additional capacity in the landfill. LDEQ has
assured EPA and FEMA that, based on full utilization of the Gentilly
landfill, sufficient capacity exists to handle the hurricane related
debris.
In addition to coordination with the USACE during Hurricane Katrina
response efforts, EPA and USACE have since met on several occasions to
discuss future debris management operations. EPA will continue this
coordination with USACE in an effort to do everything possible to
achieve timely and efficient operations in future responses.
Question 2. How many people do the EPA and the state of Louisiana
have dedicated to oversight of debris separation activities at
landfills or elsewhere in the state, how often and for what period of
time are they posted at individual landfills and what type of
verification has EPA conducted of state monitoring procedures?
Response. EPA has had as many as four individuals monitoring 13
landfills twice each week. As progress is made and the number of
landfills receiving C&D debris decreases, the level of EPA's staff will
reflect this progress. EPA's actions are in support of the LDEQ's
hurricane response efforts. To date, EPA has conducted more than 500
landfill observation visits. In addition to its normal landfill
oversight, LDEQ maintains a constant presence at five of the higher
profile landfills receiving C&D debris.
Question 3. How is EPA exercising its authority under section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act to review the Army Corps wetlands
permitting action with regard to the Chef Menteur site--for example,
were you involved prior to the issuance of the emergency authorization
to begin work, what extra oversight have you dedicated to debris
sorting at the site, has the EPA considered vetoing the permit, and
what is your involvement in the ongoing permitting action?
Response. As described above, EPA has conducted site observations
at the Chef Menteur site twice weekly, and LDEQ has an individual
present at the site each day. As of the week of August 14, 2006, the
Chef Menteur site stopped receiving C&D debris.
It is our understanding that the emergency section 404
authorization for the Chef Menteur site is covered under New Orleans
District General Permit 20 (NOD-20) ``Emergency Permit Procedures for
the States of Louisiana and Mississippi within the Boundaries of the
Mississippi Valley Division.'' Therefore, EPA Region 6 did not have an
opportunity to review a specific emergency 404 authorization for the
Chef Menteur site in advance. Region 6 staff did review the draft 404
permit, proposed by USACE on April 28, 2006, and visited the site on
May 24, 2006. The Region 6 permit reviewer transmitted comments to
USACE on May 30, 2006, recommending that a liner (clay or other similar
material) be considered. There reviewer also questioned the applicant's
plans for management of stormwater runoff. These comments did not rise
to the level that would trigger a formal objection to the proposed 404
permit. Region 6 staff discussed the liner concern with LDEQ staff on
June 28, 2006. LDEQ staff provided information regarding the existence
of a natural clay liner at the site (boring samples taken in 1995
indicated the area had an average of 10 feet of clay soils). As a
result of this discussion, Region 6 sent a June 30, 2006, communication
to USACE stating that a liner was not required. EPA's concerns about
stormwater runoff have been addressed by the requirements of LDEQ's
Fifth Amended Declaration of Emergency and Administrative Order, dated
March 31, 2006, which established effluent limitations and monitoring
requirements for discharges of landfill wastewater from a construction/
demolition debris and woodwaste landfill and for non-contaminated
stormwater discharges from such landfills.
Question 4. Can you describe EPA's analysis and conclusions, if
complete, regarding each of the issues raised in the Fish and Wildlife
Service letter raising concerns about the Chef Menteur site,
particularly the concern that placing construction and demolition
debris in an unlined landfill located in a wetland could result in
leaching and resultant persistent contamination of groundwater, surface
water, and adjacent wetland habitats.
Response. Under the Clean Water Act, as the section 404 permitting
authority, USACE is responsible for considering and responding to
comments by other Federal agencies (as well as the public, in general)
on their proposed permits. Therefore, it is not EPA's practice to
conduct analysis on the issues raised by other agencies (such as the
Fish and Wildlife Service) on section 404 permits proposed by USACE.
EPA's response to Question 3 above provides additional information
related to this issue.
Question 5. I have been informed that your Agency reviewed the
draft permit for the Chef Netherlands fill in May, provided comments,
and that the Agency's issues were resolved. Yet, the Fish and Wildlife
Service believes that use of this landfill could result in ``persistent
contamination of groundwater, surface water, and wetlands.'' Please
describe what your Agency's concerns were, how they are the same or
different than those of the Fish and Wildlife Service, and how they
were resolved.
Response. Both EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service commented
on the need for a liner. Comments associated with EPA's review of the
draft permit for the Chef Menteur landfill were discussed in our
response to Question 3 above.
Question 6a. The EPA has issued a ``no action assurance'' letter
for the state of Louisiana with regard to asbestos handling
requirements. Can you describe which element of asbestos regulations
are waived by this letter?
Response. On February 24, 2006, EPA agreed to grant additional
flexibility to Louisiana based on the issues associated with response
efforts to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. More specifically, EPA
reiterated that on February 3, 2006, EPA issued a No Action Assurance
for the asbestos NESHAP, 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart M, to allow residences
that are subject to a government-issued demolition order based on the
residence being (1) structurally unsound but not necessarily in danger
of imminent collapse, or (2) moved off of its foundation, to be treated
as though the demolition order is based on a determination that the
house is structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse.
In addition, EPA further extended the February 3, 2006, No Action
Assurance to residences that are subject to government-issued
demolition orders because they are uninhabitable for other
environmental reasons (e.g., from excessive flood damage). Under this
No Action Assurance, as under the February 3, 2006, action, such
residences maybe treated as though they are subject to government-
issued demolition orders based on a determination that they are
structurally unsound and in danger of imminent collapse and thus
subject to section 61.145(a)(3) of the asbestos NESHAP regulation.
Also, EPA extended the applicability of this discretion to include more
than the LDEQ and the USACE, adding that it also applies to local
governments or persons operating at their direction. These
flexibilities are restricted to residences affected by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. It does not apply to residences with greater than
four units and is only in effect until February 3, 2007.
Question 6b. Which elements still apply?
Response. Such residences as mentioned above are subject to the
requirements of 40 C.F.R. section 61.145(a)(3) which requires that such
sources comply with 61.145(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)(iii), (b)(4) [except
(b)(4)(viii)], (b)(5) and)(4) through (c)(9). Generally, these sections
require notice to proper authorities of the demolitions, updates to the
notices as the situation may change, updates as early as possible,
detailed information about the demolitions, (e.g., location,
description of the process) and adequate wetting of the structures to
minimize emissions. Proper disposal, consisting of all the elements in
40 C.F.R. Section 61.150 and 61.154, including no visible emissions or
other, alternative barriers to access by the public and other
recordkeeping, is also required.
Question 6c. How is your Agency ensuring on-the-ground compliance
with this letter?
Response. Through a delegation of authority, LDEQ has primary
authority to implement and enforce NESHAP asbestos standards. LDEQ,
with the support of EPA, has completed several activities to help
monitor compliance. EPA initially participated in approximately 100
joint inspections, with LDEQ as the lead, of various landfills in
Louisiana. These inspections were only a portion of the total number of
inspections EPA participated in, as EPA tracked total inspection
activities. In addition, joint training workshops were held on NESHAP
requirements. The workshops were attended by USACE, FEMA, and various
contractors. Also, in quarterly meetings of upper level management from
LDEQ and EPA, highlights of the past quarter are raised and discussed.
Periodic conference calls continue with representation from EPA,
LDEQ, USACE, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
FEMA, and various contractors. These calls include discussion on the
requirements of the Federal regulations.
Question 6d. What is the current status of the Louisiana Department
of Environmental Quality's compliance with the terms of EPA's letter?
Response. To the best of our knowledge, LDEQ is currently in
compliance with the terms of EPA's letter. EPA continues to work
closely with LDEQ to assure proper implementation of the asbestos
NESHAP. EPA conducts frequent conference calls and responds to
questions as they arise.
Question 7a. The EPA's no action assurance letters on asbestos
states that the Agency reserves the right to revoke or modify the no
action assurance letter it provided for the state of Louisiana with
regard to asbestos requirements if, ``. . . such action is necessary to
protect public health or the environment.'' What data will EPA be
collecting that will permit the Agency to make this determination in a
timely manner?
Response. To monitor proper observance of the No Action Assurance
letters, EPA is reviewing the results of inspections mentioned in the
response to Question 6c above and any available air monitoring data.
Periodic conference calls with LDEQ, USACE, OSHA, FEMA, and various
contractors also include discussions on LDEQ's use of the No Action
Assurance and the requirements of the Federal regulations.
Question 7b. Will EPA continue monitoring activities during housing
demolition?
Response. Yes. EPA will continue to assist with monitoring
activities through participation in joint or independent site
inspections and periodic conference calls.
Question 8a. During the hearing, I asked a question regarding the
degree to which EPA'sdebris mission can be completed, given that there
are somewhere between 15,000 and 22,000 homes left to be demolished.
Can you elaborate on which activities related to debris that EPA plans
to abandon in the next 6 months, which activities EPA has already
ended, and which activities EPA plans to continue through the
completion of all planned demolitions?
Response. EPA remains committed to continuing activities associated
with the hurricane response effort. EPA's current efforts include: air
monitoring, landfill observation, Murphy Oil oversight, and household
hazardous waste collection and disposal. Working with FEMA, EPA will
continue to support Louisiana in its recovery efforts until the
activities are completed or when a state, local, or another Federal
Agency assumes the responsibility.
Question 8b. Will air-monitoring activities continue throughout
home demolition?
Response. As indicted in the response to Question 8a above, EPA's
air monitoring efforts are ongoing and will continue until this
activity is transitioned to a state, local, or another Federal Agency.
Question 9. During the hearing, Senator Inhofe asked a question
regarding the responsibility for watery debris removal. Mr. Shea
answered that FEMA is responsible based on the Stafford Act. Section
407 of the Stafford Act states: ``The President, whenever he determines
it to be in the public interest, is authorized (1) through the use of
Federal departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, to clear debris
and wreckage resulting from a major disaster from publicly and
privately owned lands and waters and (2) to make grants to any State or
local government or owner or operator of a private nonprofit facility
for the purpose of removing debris or wreckage resulting from a major
disaster from publicly or privately owned lands and waters'' Under this
authority, it seems clear that the President could designate any
Federal Agency to take the lead for debris removal. Do you agree?
Response. The authority in section 407 of the Stafford Act is given
to the President. Section 321 of the Stafford Act says, ``. . . [T]he
President may exercise, either directly or through such Federal Agency
as the President may designate any power or authority conferred to the
President by this chapter.'' The President in Homeland Security
Presidential Decision Directive/HSPD-5 required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop the National Response Plan (NRP), which
provides ``the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and
operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident
managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and
responsibilities.'' [HSPD-5 (16)(a)]. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), of which FEMA is a component, coordinates Federal
operations and resources. Under Emergency Support Function (ESF)-3-
Public Works and Engineering Annex_USACE is the primary Agency for
debris removal.
Question 10. In response to the question, ``How will you ensure the
proper handling and disposal of RCRA Subtitle C hazardous waste that is
mixed with solid waste or household hazardous waste'', which I posed to
the Army Corps in a recent letter, the Corps responded that EPA is
responsible for handling and disposing of hazardous waste during this
response. Please describe how you are ensuring that RCRA subtitle C
hazardous waste is properly handled.
Response. Under EPA's ESF-10 mission assignment under the NRP, EPA
was responsible for the removal of accessible drums, tanks, and other
containers of hazardous materials. That material was characterized and
disposed of in permitted disposal facilities. USACE, under ESF-3, was
responsible for debris disposal, including the demolition of unsafe
structures and the resulting debris, and the proper segregation of
hazardous materials from the debris. EPA, under our support to the
affected states, provided additional oversight of USACE's debris
operation, both in the field and at the emergency disposal sites. In
support of USACE's mission, EPA disposed of hazardous materials
segregated from the debris piles by USACE.
Substantial resources, time, and personnel are applied to the
segregation of debris. These efforts span all stages of the process.
Following is a summary of related activities:
EPA distributed a large number of flyers to citizens, volunteers,
and contractors which educate them on the proper separation procedures;
EPA conducted oversight of curbside collection;
EPA posted signs at landfills;
Landfill towers review incoming loads;
Landfill spotters observe the disposal of material;
Landfill machine operators visually inspect the material as they
position it in the landfill; and
EPA conducts Landfill Observations to review the landfill waste
handling procedures.
Question 11. In your letter to me responding to questions relating
to debris handling, the EPA cited a Mississippi case where the
Mississippi DEQ shut down a site when monitors discovered potential
adverse impacts to surface water as evidence sofa monitoring system at
work. Please describe what role EPA had in this case, if any, and how
the Agency is ensuring that this level of vigilance is present at each
landfill throughout the Katrina-impacted area.
Response. EPA's primary role at the D.W. Laney landfill, and at all
of the other and fills, was to monitor and report violations related to
waste segregation. The landfill monitors made notes in their daily
inspection forms regarding observations of potential impacts to both
ground water and surface water. Based on these field observations, EPA
recommended to Mississippi DEQ that, because of the potential for
ground water and surface water contamination, we did not think that
this was a suitable site for a construction and demolition (C&D)
landfill.
Question 12a. Asbestos.--How is EPA verifying that the conditions
pertaining to removal and wetting of asbestos-containing materials
prior to demolition as well as handling during disposal are being
followed?
Response. EPA has delegated to the states the responsibility for
implementing NESHAP asbestos standards, including oversight and
enforcement of these standards. EPA'srole is to support the states and
provide assistance when requested. EPA has assisted in development fade
of policies and has provided training. EPA has also assisted the states
by visiting landfills to observe waste handling practices and
suggesting improvements for handling debris.
Question 12b. Specifically, how many inspections at landfills in
Louisiana has the EPA conducted, is EPA relying primarily on state
inspections, and if so, what mechanism is the Agency using to verify
that state inspections are actually occurring?
Response. EPA is observing activities at the landfills and has
conducted more than 500 observation visits. EPA monitors some landfills
used for C&D debris for waste segregation. This effort is described in
more detail in response to question 10.
LDEQ has delegation of NESHAP asbestos standards and requires
compliance with NESHAP. LDEQ, with the support of EPA, has completed
several activities to help monitor compliance. EPA Region 6 enforcement
initially participated in approximately 100 joint inspections, with
LDEQ as the lead, of various landfills in Louisiana. These inspections
were only a portion of the total number of inspections in which EPA
participated; EPA tracked the total inspection activities. In addition,
joint training workshops were held on NESHAP requirements. The
workshops were attended by the USACE, FEMA, and various contractors.
Also, periodic conference calls help EPA monitor compliance of NESHAP
requirements.
Question 13. Do you agree that it would be a step backwards if the
Federal Government returned to the ad hoc, disaster-by-disaster
approach to providing disaster aid to states, localities, and
individuals that existed before the Stafford Act?
Response. In EPA's view, the Stafford Act provides appropriate
authority for disaster assistance.
Question 14a. Until Hurricane Katrina, there were a very limited
number of times during which the Congress diverted from normal
procedures under the Stafford Act in the wake of a disaster. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress has enacted a significant number
of legislative changes to the Stafford Act that modify the manner in
which disaster assistance is provided, and many more proposals are
pending. This was a catastrophic disaster worthy of special actions,
but it is unlikely to be the last of its kind, particularly with the
changes we can expect as climate change occurs. What are your
recommendations with regard to the potential creation of a ``third
category'' of declaration under the Stafford Act that would be reserved
for catastrophic events, for which special rules would apply?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on Stafford Act
revisions.
&Question 14b. What specific provisions of the Stafford Act would
you recommend modifying in such a category?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on Stafford Act
revisions.
&Question 15a. The Stafford Act, and the Nation's disaster
response, is focused on preparedness and response. There is very little
long-term recovery authority in the Stafford Act. Do you believe there
is a role for the Federal Government in the area that should be more
developed?
Response. EPA believes that existing legislation is adequate.
Question 15b. Is there currently authority for the Federal
Government to perform long-term recovery operations?
Response. The NRP addresses Long-Term Recovery and Mitigation in
ESF-14. ESF-14 provides a framework for the Federal Government to
provide support to State, regional, local, and tribal governments, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector designed to
enable community recovery from the long-term consequences of an
Incident of National Significance. This support consists of available
programs and resources of Federal departments and agencies to enable
community recovery, especially long-term community recovery, and to
reduce or eliminate risk from future incidents, where feasible.
Question 15c. Do you believe that any Federal role should be
limited to long-term recovery from catastrophic events?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on the Federal role
regarding long-term recovery.
Question 16. What are the criteria for an ``enhanced C&D landfill''
per the June 29, 2006 Louisiana DEQ Emergency and Administrative order,
how are they different from the Subtitle D criteria for C&D landfills
under existing EPA regulations, were they approved by EPA, and what
were the terms associated with any approval granted? Please provide any
relevant documentation for the record.
Response. EPA has reviewed the expanded definition of a C&D
landfill under the State's Emergency Declaration with EPA's current
definition found in 40 CFR 257.2. We find that the State's expanded
definition is comparable to EPA's definition.
The State issued its Sixth Amended Declaration of Emergency and
Administrative Order on June 26, 2006 (Order). On page 7, section 2(d)
the Order states that, ``For the purposes of this Order, construction
and debris shall be the materials indicated in Appendix D of this
Declaration.'' Appendix Provides (in pertinent part) that the following
hurricane generated debris maybe disposed of in a C&D landfill:
Nonhazardous waste generally considered not water-soluble,
including but not limited to metal, concrete, brick, asphalt, roofing
materials, sheet rock, plaster, lumber from construction or demolition
project, and other building or structural materials;
Furniture, carpet, and painted or stained lumber contained in the
demolished buildings;
The incidental admixture of construction and debris with
asbestos-contaminated waste. (incidental asbestos-contaminated debris
that cannot be extracted from the demolition debris); and
Yard waste and other vegetative matter.
Appendix D provides that the following materials shall not be
disposed of in a C&D landfill:
``White goods and putrescible waste.''
The EPA definition for C&D landfill is found in 40 CFR 257.2 which
provides that a C&D landfill cannot accept RCRA hazardous waste or
industrial solid waste. The State's Appendix D wastes listed above do
not include these kinds of waste. EPA's definition goes on to say that
a ``C&D landfill typically receives any one or more of the following
types of solid wastes: road work material, excavated materials,
demolition wastes, construction/renovation waste and site clearance
wastes.'' The types of waste identified in the State's Appendix D list
seem consistent with what EPA identifies as material typically sent to
a C&D landfill. EPA recognized in a 1995 report entitled ``Construction
and Demolition Waste Landfills'' that various states are receiving a
variety of materials in C&D landfills and identifies the various types.
EPA's definition recognizes these broad categories of waste.
While EPA's solid waste rules do not directly address asbestos
waste, EPA notes that a C&D landfill that receives asbestos waste
meeting the definition of 40 CFR part 61, Subpart M, must meet the
National Emission Standard for Asbestos found in 40 CFR 61.154.
Question 17. Has EPA reviewed every type of waste, i.e., solid or
hazardous, for which procedures were modified by this emergency order,
and if so, did the Agency find that the handling of such waste is
consistent with Federal requirements?
Response. EPA has reviewed types of solid waste for which
procedures were modified by the emergency order. The response to
Question 16 above addresses consistency with Federal requirements in
handling of such waste.
Question 18. Please describe how the ``enhanced'' C&D landfills
comply with the Federal standards under the Asbestos National Emissions
Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)(40 CFR 61.150) for
disposal of this type of waste material?
Response. Louisiana's C&D landfills may be ``enhanced'' to comply
with Federal asbestos NESHAP requirements so that these C&D landfills
could accept the anticipated large volumes of debris from the
hurricanes. They would be ``enhanced'' in that they would add certain
precautions required of NESHAP landfills to ensure that the asbestos is
handled in accordance with Federal regulations. The improvements maybe
minimal, as many of these landfills already have several of the
precautions outlined in 40 C.F.R. section 61.150. They may need to add
signage or fencing, or ensure that debris is properly covered. The
enhancements will vary from landfill to landfill depending on the
degree of current compliance.
Question 19a. Over the last 200 years, the Nation has moved from an
ad hoc approach to disaster response in Congress, to a coordinated,
reliable response. The premise has formed the cornerstone of the
Nation's disaster response since the 1960s and early 1970s. Under the
Stafford Act, the Federal Government may provide assistance upon
declaration of a major disaster or an emergency. A Governor must
request a major disaster declaration, and it is limited by section 102
to: ``. . . natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado,
storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm or drought), or
regardless of cause, any fire, flood or explosion, in any part of the
United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.'' An emergency is defined by section 102 as ``any
occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President,
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States.'' I am concerned that there is a hole in the
authorities provided under the Stafford Act--the response authorities
of the Federal Government that are available in a major disaster may
not be available in all types of terrorist events that might only meet
the current definition for an emergency declaration. Would the release
of a biological agent that does not involve an explosion meet the
criteria to even consider a major disaster declaration, and if your
answer is yes, please explain? Are there any EPA authorities that could
be or are planned for use in this type of an event?
Response. DHS is responsible for determining whether the release of
a biological agent that does not involve an explosion meets the
criteria for a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act. Under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA), EPA has authority to respond to releases or substantial
threats of releases of pollutants or contaminants that may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
Biological agents may fall within the definition of pollutant or
contaminant in Section 101(33) of CERCLA. EPA used this authority in
the Capitol Hill anthrax response.
Question 19b. Do you believe that organizations like the American
Red Cross can plan for a response to an epidemic or biological attack
without certainty about what assistance the Federal government will
provide?
Response. NGOs and volunteer organizations collaborate with first
responders, governments at all levels, and other agencies and
organizations providing relief services to sustain life, reduce
physical and emotional distress, and promote recovery of disaster
victims when assistance is not available from other sources. The
American Red Cross is a primary agency within ESF-6--Mass Care,
Housing, and Human Services. In addition, the American Red Cross is
listed as a supporting agency under the NRP for:
ESF-3--Public Works and Engineering;
ESF-5--Emergency Management;
ESF-8--Public Health and Medical Services;
ESF-11--Agriculture and Natural Resources;
ESF-14--Long-term Community Recovery; and
ESF-15--External Affairs.
Question 19c. Do you believe it is a good idea for State and local
governments to divert resources from emergency response potentially
days after an event to attempt to move legislation through Congress
that meets their needs?
Response. EPA has no position on State and local governmental
legislative efforts.
Question 19d. What changes should be made to the Stafford Act to
ensure that the Federal Government has the appropriate authorities to
respond to all types of events, including biological agents, weapons of
mass destruction, or epidemics in a coordinated, planned manner?
Response. EPA has not developed a position on Stafford Act
amendments.
__________
Responses by Deborah Y. Dietrich to Additional Questions from
Senator Vitter
Question 1. EPA plays a supporting role to the Corps in debris
removal. While I recognize that CD waste is a state responsibility
under Subtitle D of RCRA,there are concerns about asbestos, lead,
solvents, cleaners, fuel, fertilizer and many other hazardous
substances being co-mingled in the debris. At what point is there a
Federal responsibility to review this disposal policy?
Response. As you indicate, the permitting and oversight of solid
waste landfills in primarily a state responsibility. Federal law
addresses solid waste management generally, but permitting and direct
regulation of solid waste landfills are primarily state
responsibilities to be conducted pursuant to the state law. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle D establishes a
framework for the management of solid waste that is not hazardous
waste. As directed by Subtitle D, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) promulgated the minimum criteria for states to use in
defining solid waste management disposal practices and in determining
whether a facility is a prohibited ``open dump.'' EPA also issued
criteria for municipal solid waste landfills that receive hazardous
waste from households or small quantity generators and other types of
non-municipal solid waste landfills that receive small quantity
generator wastes. RCRA Subtitle D does not, however, specifically
provide EPA with permitting authority over these solid waste landfills
that receive hazardous waste from households or small quantity
generators.
EPA has oversight authority over the delegated hazardous waste
programs in states. We have seen no evidence that RCRA hazardous wastes
have entered a construction and debris (C&D) landfill. EPA also has
authority under RCRA section 7003 to take necessary actions including
issuing orders, in situations that may present ``imminent and
substantial endangerment'' from the handling of solid or hazardous
waste. Landfill operations are being monitored by the states and we do
not believe that current circumstances warrant EPA taking action under
section 7003.
With respect to the co-mingling of waste, debris sorting is
conducted by contractors for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
and, in areas where USACE is not involved, by contractors for the local
government. Whether debris is sorted at curbside or at staging areas
prior to recycling depends upon contractor operations, as specified in
the relevant USACE or local government contract. Debris is generally
sorted by waste type (e.g., white goods, construction debris,
vegetative debris, or household hazardous waste).
Finally, with respect to the co-mingling of asbestos, the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ has been delegated the
responsibility for the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants (NESHAP) requirements under the Clean Air Act by EPA.
Question 2. I understand there are a few landfill facilities used
for disposal even though USACE, EPA and FEMA knew that the facility did
not have a Federal Clean Water permit for discharge of contaminated
stormwater or a 404 permit required by USACE regulations as well as
other environmental concerns. What steps has EPA taken to ensure
environmental compliance and safety?
Response. EPA is not aware that any landfill facilities are
operating without proper section 404 authorization. USACE has lead
responsibility to enforce section 404 permitting compliance.
In terms of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) stormwater discharge permitting requirements, LDEQ has informed
us that some facilities are covered under the State's emergency
declaration with the requirement to follow the provisions identified in
LDEQ's general permit for construction and demolition debris landfills.
The general permit is based upon EPA rules (40 CFR 445, Landfills
Effluent Limit Guidelines). Should the emergency declaration expire,
then the facilities would be required to seek and obtain coverage under
the C&D landfill general permit. In terms of section 404 permitting
requirements, USACE is the permitting authority. Some facilities may be
covered by USACE's emergency authorization process. For instance, it is
our understanding that the emergency section 404 authorization for the
Chef Menteur site is covered under New Orleans District General Permit
20 (NOD-20) ``Emergency Permit Procedures for the States of Louisiana
and Mississippi within the Boundaries of the Mississippi Valley
Division.''
__________
Statement of Corey Gruber, Acting Executive Director, National
Preparedness Task Force, Department of Homeland Security
introduction
Good morning Chairman Inhofe and Senator Jeffords. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss important
preparedness initiatives within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
Our Nation's emergency and public safety services are quite simply
the finest in the world. They safeguard our institutions, communities,
and critical infrastructure around the clock, and respond heroically
when we face sudden challenges from the forces of nature or assaults by
the action of man. Yet without a consistent, logical and sustainable
way to prepare for 21st century homeland security challenges, unity of
effort and operational readiness have proven to be elusive. Our
homeland security enterprise has truly extraordinary capacity, but it
suffers from a prevailing tendency to prepare in isolation_as if each
community, State, or Federal department is ``playing its own
ballgame.'' Unsystematic and insufficiently collaborative activities
have exacted a severe penalty in uneven performance and repeated and
costly operational miscues_often at the expense of the most socially
vulnerable segments of society. Today's culture of preparedness
requires reexamining our understanding of risk based on threat,
vulnerability, and consequence; what it means to be prepared, and how
we collaborate across a large, divided, decentralized and highly
diversified enterprise.
The Nation needs a dedicated and sustained national effort to
organize, guide investments in, and strengthen national preparedness.
Preparedness is both a process and an effect. As a process it provides
intergovernmental, nongovernmental and private sector partners with the
opportunity to collaborate on specific patterns of preparatory actions
that contribute to our collective operational readiness. As an effect
it contributes to risk reduction through mitigation and to operational
effectiveness by planning, training, equipping, exercising and
evaluating our ability to prevent, protect from, respond to or recover
from threatened or actual terrorist attacks, major disasters or other
emergencies.
Americans are by nature problem solvers. We rarely pause to look
back and see how much we have accomplished. Homeland security
preparedness is a good example. Not long ago it was uncommon for
professionals from multiple disciplines in the same community to sit
down to jointly plan or to participate in an exercise. No more. We are
`resetting our habit switches.' In a few short years we have trained,
equipped and exercised hundreds of thousands of front line responders
and made concerted efforts to improve planning and explore new means of
collaboration. We are turning a corner as a prepared Nation.
Yet while much has been accomplished, we can never be ``good
enough.'' We know from painful experience there are systemic
infirmities in our preparedness. We fully understand that preparedness
is a quest_not a guarantee. Even the most ready community cannot fully
anticipate surprise. But while preparedness cannot guarantee success,
inadequate preparedness is a proven contributor to failure. Many
problems have been the subject of disaster research for decades, but
absent dedicated and undivided attention to preparedness, they remained
under-emphasized or neglected. Others were unveiled in the shocking
immediacy of 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina. They shook our familiar
patterns of behavior, and perceptions of risk_profoundly affecting the
status quo culture of preparedness.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads a national
preparedness partnership with our fellow Federal departments and
agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, nongovernmental
organizations and the private sector. Secretary Chertoff and Under
Secretary Foresman have made it clear that reforms are necessary, and
will be accomplished through a collaborative national effort. The
Second Stage Review and establishment of the Preparedness Directorate
are rapidly integrating preparedness programs, activities and services
to meet the needs of our most important asset_the homeland security
professionals across this great Nation_and to build and apply the
processes, products and technology necessary to deal with all manner
and magnitude of threats and hazards. These efforts are integral to our
national resilience and are a key component of the Nation's active,
layered defenses.
George Orwell said: ``Life is a race between education and
catastrophe'', which is an apt description for emergency preparedness.
We are in a perpetual contest with nature and at war with a determined
adversary. History demonstrates that following catastrophic events like
the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, the attack on Pearl Harbor, or at
the advent of a generational conflict like the Cold War, the national
culture of preparedness acquired a ``new set of eyes.'' Our
predecessors adjusted their thinking, reformed their approaches and
recalibrated the culture of preparedness. We have been doing the same,
through immediate measures in the aftermath of major events as well as
by instituting deliberate and methodical efforts to answer four
fundamental questions that are necessary to our national preparedness:
What types and magnitude of threats and risks do we face?
What level of performance will we demand from our homeland
security capabilities?
What are the most cost effective means for providing required
capabilities with the needed performance levels for the threats and
risks we specified?
What resources are available?
The answers to these questions frame a national risk-balancing,
hedging strategy. We must balance two portfolios of risk: the forces of
nature and the predations of man. Nature is non-adaptive and morally
neutral. Major events are often characterized by seasonality and some
degree of warning and even predictability. We have familiarity and
experience in our favor. Terrorism engages us in a deadly contest of
competitive learning. We face a patient and adaptive foe whose attacks,
while less frequent, are characterized by surprise and are part of a
deliberate strategic campaign.
Both nature and terrorists have the potential to inflict
catastrophic levels of harm. Each of these portfolios of risk has an
inherent degree of impenetrable uncertainty. Balancing risk and
uncertainty with available resources requires hard choices and
prioritization. We are doing that by gaining an ever-increasingly
sophisticated understanding of risk, by distributing resources in a
manner that provides a hedge against uncertainty (as in the case of
base allocations of grant funds) and by building agile capabilities. We
owe our first line responders and citizens no less.
Building truly interchangeable homeland security capabilities takes
more than merely embracing a loosely defined concept like ``all
hazards.'' We have turned this concept into a systematic planning
methodology using a capabilities-based framework to meet the
requirements of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8,
``National Preparedness.'' HSPD-8 establishes national policies to
strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It charged
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of
other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation
with State, local, territorial, and tribal governments to develop a
National Preparedness Goal.
The Goal and its associated tools define capabilities that address
the full range of homeland security missions, from prevention through
recovery. It adopts an all-hazards and risk-based approach to
preparedness. In acknowledging that the Nation cannot prepare fully for
every possible contingency, the Goal builds interchangeable
capabilities and strikes a balance that weighs risks against available
resources.
To compensate for uncertainty, the Goal provides a set of National
Planning Scenarios representing a range of threats and hazards that
warrant national attention. The National Planning Scenarios identify
common assumptions and provide the foundation for the identification of
capabilities and tasks to guide nationwide planning regarding potential
vulnerabilities and consequences (or impacts) of major events. Analysis
of the range of potential impacts is essential for defining
requirements, both in terms of capacity (how many are needed) and
proficiency (how well must they be able to perform). These requirements
must be matched to available resources in emergency operations plans
(for the near-term) and in preparedness strategies (for the long-term).
Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal officials supplement
this approach with hazard identification and risk assessments that
provide additional data on their specific threats and hazards,
vulnerabilities and consequences. As a result, officials can tailor the
approach to differences in the risk and resource base across the
Nation.
The Goal defines what it means for the Nation to be prepared in
terms of a national vision, capabilities, and priorities. It identifies
the process and priorities for arriving at the destination; it does not
dictate the specific path. It is up to Federal, State, local,
territorial, and tribal officials, working collaboratively with the
private sector, non-governmental organizations, and individual
citizens, to determine how to achieve the Goal. To assist officials in
that endeavor, the Goal establishes a Capabilities-Based Planning
process supported by three planning tools: the National Planning
Scenarios, a Target Capabilities List (TCL), and a Universal Task List
(UTL). Target Capabilities (the TCL) provide a common reference system
for intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private sector
preparedness, and the comprehensive task library (the UTL) provides a
common language.
Preparedness ultimately is the responsibility of each individual
government, consistent with their authorities and available resources.
This includes coordinating preparedness activities among partners
operating within their jurisdictional borders, as well as across
jurisdictional and geographic borders when dictated by identified
hazards and risk assessments. Preparedness should be coordinated using
the same multi-agency coordination entities used for operations, as
described in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This is
the essence of the concept for implementing the Goal, particularly the
national priority to Expand Regional Collaboration.
Preparedness is an integral component of the NIMS. NIMS states that
individual Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal governments
are responsible for implementing a preparedness cycle in advance of an
event and including the private sector, non-governmental organizations,
and individual citizens as appropriate. A preparedness cycle may be
summarized as follows:
Plan,
Organize and Staff,
Equip,
Train,
Exercise, Evaluate, and Improve.
As I have highlighted, preparedness is not just an administrative
function within the Department of Homeland Security. It applies to each
office and component within DHS, across the Federal interagency
community as well as our State, local, territorial, tribal and private
sector partners, and to our most critical team members_the American
people. The job of the Preparedness Directorate is to achieve
integration and synchronization of these efforts within DHS, and to
improve coordination with our Federal, State, and local partners. It is
a shared national mission, not simply a Federal activity.
preparedness directorate mission
The mission of the Preparedness Directorate is to prepare
individuals and public and private sector organizations for disasters
through defining and fostering a culture of preparedness, educating
stakeholders, strengthening prevention and resilience capabilities and
developing the next generation of homeland security professionals.
To achieve a broader and truly national preparedness, the
Department and our State, local, tribal, and private sector partners
must coalesce, integrate, and synchronize many disparate initiatives
while preserving critical missions, cultures, and identities of
individual organizations. Therefore, integration, synchronization, and
communication become the foundations to our national preparedness
efforts.
building a national preparedness system
One of the key roles of the Preparedness Directorate is building
our national preparedness system, which allow us to better answer the
question, ``What risks should we prepare for and how well must we
prepare?'' Given the range of roles and responsibilities of DHS, we
must ensure that homeland security capabilities are internally coherent
and collectively competent, and are organized within a fully integrated
and adaptable national preparedness system.
A fully integrated national preparedness system will result in:
Strategic and operational flexibility that accommodates risk and
uncertainty;
A capabilities-based framework that organizes the Nation to act
in concert, and with the speed and operational effectiveness required
for effective prevention and response; and
The means to measure readiness by an individual entity or at
various levels of government.
This national preparedness system will improve the Nation's
homeland security and fully leverage the domestic all-hazards emergency
response system for natural hazards and other emergencies.
State, local, tribal and private sector partners are not an adjunct
to the development of a national preparedness system. Instead, they are
integral to the development of a functional and successful system_
bringing partnership commitment and participation to sustain and
achieve sufficient preparedness capacity to ensure the Nation can
effectively deal with catastrophic events. The Nation depends on the
resources of State, local and tribal governments, as well as the
capacity of our nongovernmental and private sector partners to provide
the majority of homeland security capabilities.
Some of the critical initiatives supporting this system are:
Finalizing national and regional risk assessment methodologies to
identify the types and magnitudes of risks we face;
Encouraging capability-based planning that supports
synchronization both vertically (across levels of government) and
horizontally (across agencies at each level of government);
Providing risk-based allocation of Federal assistance to State and
local governments and other funding recipients and targeted towards
building adaptable and interchangeable target capabilities, including
capabilities that strengthen citizen resilience;
Finalizing a system of preparedness measures to assess national,
regional, and local preparedness.
Several of these initiatives are well underway in DHS and other
Federal agencies. The Preparedness Directorate serves as the architect
for this ``system of systems'' approach to fully integrated national
preparedness.
nationwide plan review
Following Hurricane Katrina, the President directed DHS to conduct
an immediate review of emergency plans for the Nation's major cities.
Congress subsequently tasked DHS and the Department of Transportation
(DOT) to review plans for all States and territories and 75 of the
Nation's largest urban areas, with particular emphasis on evacuation
planning.
The Nationwide Plan Review, the most comprehensive assessment of
catastrophic planning yet undertaken in this country, was designed and
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security in conjunction with
all 56 U.S. States and Territories and 75 of the Nation's largest urban
areas. The assessment consisted of two phases and was conducted in just
over 6 months.
The two-phase methodology consisted of a self-assessment by States
and urban areas of their own emergency operation plans, followed by an
expert peer review. Both phases focused on whether emergency operations
plans were sufficient for managing a catastrophic event. The Phase 1
Report, issued February 10, 2006, was compiled using self-assessment
data received from States and urban areas. For Phase 2, Peer Review
Teams comprised of 77 former State and local homeland security and
emergency management officials visited every State and 75 urban areas
to review and validate the self-assessments. In total, the Phase 2
teams spoke with 1,086 public safety and homeland security officials
and reviewed 2,757 emergency operations plans and related documents.
The Phase 2 Report reflects findings from both phases of the Nationwide
Plan Review.
Planners and emergency management officials at all levels of
government are working to strengthen plans and formalize mutual aid
agreements. Existing plans and capabilities serve the Nation well for
the events most commonly experienced in the United States. However, the
review found that disaster planning for catastrophic events in the
United States suffers from outmoded planning processes, products, and
tools. Plans are not coordinated in a systematic fashion, and are not
expansible for the scope of catastrophic events that could potentially
occur. The Review outlines 15 initial conclusions for States and urban
areas and 24 for the Federal Government. Most focus on the need to make
specific improvements in plans and to modernize national planning
efforts.
The conclusions for States and urban areas should not be a
surprise, and include the need for coordination of planning across
jurisdictions and levels of government; improved evacuation planning;
concerted attention to special needs populations; planning for
continuity of operations and continuity of government; assuring a
robust and resilient command structure; enhanced patient tracking;
improved resource management; and strengthened operational and public
communications.
The conclusions for the Federal Government focus the benefits of a
shared national homeland security planning system; strengthening
collaboration and coordination; improving emergency communications;
creating incentives for planning and planning excellence; strengthening
regional planning capabilities; and better implementing capabilities
based planning. More work remains on how to translate such conclusions
into concrete action.
While the results were mixed, the report acknowledges that many
States and urban areas have initiatives well underway that are on the
right trajectory, and are already modernizing and strengthening
existing catastrophic plans. Completing the Review allowed us to
establish the first ever baseline of the status of the Nation's plans.
DHS is working with States and urban areas to improve plans, support
training and exercise initiatives, and engage in discussions on how to
meet the catastrophic planning challenges identified in the final
Report. Plans are the centers of gravity that guide and unite national
efforts in response to catastrophic disasters. Planning modernization
is a priority for the Department.
the national preparedness task force
To build the National Preparedness System and respond to the
recommendations of the Nationwide Plan Review, the Preparedness
Directorate has established a new National Preparedness Task Force, for
which I serve as the Executive Director. The Task Force will bring
together DHS preparedness policy, planning, exercise, evaluation, and
field management assets to create comprehensive solutions to the
preparedness challenges I have outlined.
As an enabling element of the Preparedness Directorate, the Task
Force will oversee integrated national preparedness efforts to ensure
coordinated strategic partnering and development of standard
preparedness doctrine. Preparedness policy, doctrine, planning,
exercises and expertise are critical enablers for our operational
components and our intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private
sector partners. This reflects the vision outlined in HSPD-8. The
Department requires a lead preparedness integrator to support national
preparedness transformation. This function will be accomplished within
the Preparedness Directorate to promote synchronization and integration
of national preparedness initiatives and requirements. The Task Force
will link requirements with emerging technology, doctrine, and
operational requirements, techniques, and procedures to ensure the
integration, interoperability, and operational effectiveness of the
Nation's homeland security capabilities.
The President and Congress have consistently identified the need
for specific and measurable goals for preparedness, continuous national
collaboration, application of assistance where the need is greatest,
determination of essential capabilities that communities need, and
advanced planning processes that ensure plans are adequate and feasible
and achieve required synchronization. HSPD-8, Hurricane Katrina, and
the strategic requirements of the war on terrorism have demonstrated
the need for transformation in how we achieve national preparedness.
The Task Force is empowered to drive transformation by enhancing
homeland security preparedness through new combinations of concepts,
capabilities, people, and organization that exploit the Nation's
advantages and protect against our vulnerabilities by building and
sustaining national resilience.
prep relationship with fema
As Secretary Chertoff has stated, DHS must operate as an all
hazards, fully integrated organization. He said this when he announced
our Second Stage Review one month prior to Katrina, and our experiences
since then have only reinforced our belief in this approach. The
Federal Emergency Management Agency--and States and communities across
the country must be prepared to respond to and recover from all
disasters, whether caused by nature or terrorism. While FEMA and its
partners are engaged in response and recovery, which can often be of
protracted duration, the Preparedness Directorate ensures that there is
no disruption to preparedness programs, activities and services to the
balance of the Nation.
The need for undivided attention to preparedness is especially
acute given the characteristics of the homeland security community. The
homeland security mission is exceptionally interdependent and
interrelated, yet the community is loosely coupled, dispersed and
decentralized, with rigidly divided responsibilities, distinct
interests and cultures and a highly diversified administrative
apparatus. Given these factors, preparedness requires unwavering focus
and attention.
The Nation's homeland security operational tempo moves through a
series of ``crests and troughs.'' This is best illustrated by the cycle
of activity associated with preparations for hurricane season. We
concentrate preparedness activities to ensure readiness for an upcoming
season (the ``crest''), and then reconstitute our capabilities when and
if operational tempo allows (the ``trough''). In the past, the Nation
has tried to ``time'' hyper-readiness with ``crests'' and conduct
preparedness activities when and if the operational tempo provides
relief. Our operational tempo has intensified due to natural cycles of
severe weather activity, and because we are engaged in a global war on
terror. Trying to prepare a nation in episodic bursts of activity that
suffer frequent and protracted interruptions is difficult and
ultimately unsustainable. This is why the Department has established a
Directorate that commits its undivided attention and a dedicated focus
to the Nation's preparedness and operational readiness.
By focusing FEMA on its core competencies of response and recovery,
and a new Directorate on preparedness, the Secretary acknowledged the
critical nature of both missions to the Nation's homeland security. We
have not taken FEMA out of the preparedness business, nor have we taken
preparedness out of FEMA. We have created a centralized engine for
coordinating the multitude of preparedness activities within DHS, and
to better plan for coordinating with other Federal, State, and local
departments and agencies. Our department's operating components, such
as FEMA and the Coast Guard will continue to perform their agency-
specific preparedness activities to ensure operational preparedness.
In addition to working closely with DHS' other operating components
and its response and recovery partners across all levels of government,
FEMA is intricately linked with the Preparedness Directorate. The
Preparedness Directorate handles grants, training, exercises,
infrastructure protection, and medical preparedness, among other key
activities. Consolidating these programs and activities in a single
Directorate is yielding considerable synergy which benefits FEMA as
part of a single, all-hazards department. The Administration recognizes
that there are other means of integrating these efforts, and is working
with Congress on how those could be implemented effectively.
close
In closing, Mr. Chairman, the President and Congress have
consistently identified the need for specific and measurable goals for
preparedness, national cooperation, application of assistance where the
need is greatest, determination of essential capabilities that
communities need, and advanced planning processes that ensure plans are
adequate and feasible and achieve required synchronization. HSPD-8
``National Preparedness,'' Hurricane Katrina lessons learned, and the
strategic requirements of the war on terrorism all support
transformation of our national preparedness. We must change our
practices and doctrine to reflect our 21st century challenges, to
exploit the Nation's strengths and protect against our vulnerabilities
by building and sustaining national resilience.
This Nation has successfully faced comparably daunting challenges
throughout its history. The men and women of the Department of Homeland
Security and their counterparts across government and in
nongovernmental organizations and the private sector are acting to
correct systemic infirmities in our preparedness and the specific
shortcomings that were revealed in preparations for and the emergency
response to Hurricane Katrina. Our undivided attention to the Nation's
preparedness gives us a set of new eyes' to methodically probe for root
causes and understudied problems and look at the people, processes,
products and technology that comprise this increasingly sophisticated
and effective homeland security enterprise.
Thank you once again for providing me the opportunity to speak with
you today and for your continued support to the Department.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
__________
Statement of Armond Mascelli, Vice President of Domestic Response,
American Red Cross
Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Jeffords, and Members of the
committee, my name is Armond Mascelli and I am the Vice President for
Domestic Response at the American Red Cross. I am pleased to appear
before you today, and I commend you for your leadership in taking a
close look at the Stafford Act in an effort to better prepare the
Nation for the next major disaster.
For 125 years, the American Red Cross has been America's partner in
prevention, preparedness and response to all disasters. Chartered by
Congress in 1905 to provide assistance in the time of disaster and to
mitigate suffering caused by disaster, the American Red Cross continues
to realize this mandate today.
The Red Cross, a nationwide network of more than 800 community
based chapters, eight regional service areas and 35 blood services
regions, is governed by volunteers and supported by the generous
donations of the American people. With 1 million volunteers and more
than 30,000 employees, the Red Cross trains nearly 12 million people in
lifesaving skills and assists U.S. military families. The Red Cross
also is the largest supplier of blood and blood products to more than
3,000 hospitals across the Nation.
The Red Cross is effective because it relies on a local network to
offer support and provide services to those who are affected by
disasters. Simply put, we exemplify neighbor helping neighbor.
To better meet the challenges of ever growing major and
catastrophic disasters, we continue to build upon the strength of our
local network. We are also reaching out to and partnering with others
in the nonprofit, charitable, and faith-based communities like never
before. Additionally, we are improving coordination efforts with
Federal, State and local officials.
Each year, the American Red Cross responds to more than 70,000
disasters. The vast majority of these disasters are single family home
fires. We stand ready to support the first responders in times of
disaster, and in addition, provide support for those that find their
lives disrupted by disaster.
Individual client assistance has always been at the forefront of
the Red Cross response, and in providing this assistance, our first
priority is to ensure that those affected by disaster have a safe
shelter and are provided with the basic necessities of life such as
food, toiletries, bedding and first aid. Our second priority is
assisting them as they take their first steps on the road back to
recovery. Meeting these immediate emergency needs helps to bridge the
gap between a disaster occurring and resources offered by Federal and
State governments--the very assistance that is provided to individuals
through the Stafford Act.
I also want to take this opportunity to explain the role of the
American Red Cross in the National Response Plan (NRP). In addition to
being a service provider, the Red Cross has a primary responsibility as
the lead for an emergency support function in the National Response
Plan. We also have supporting responsibilities in six other emergency
support functions.
The primary role that we play in Emergency Support Function No. 6
(ESF6) is mass care, housing, and human services. We are the primary
agency for coordinating mass care while DHS/FEMA has primary
responsibility for housing, and human services. In other words, the Red
Cross coordinates Federal resources in support of State and local mass
care efforts.
In our coordination role, we process requests from State and local
authorities or other non-governmental organizations (with State
concurrence) for Federal assistance through the appropriate FEMA
channels. This is accomplished by a process where the Red Cross ESF6
liaison completes an Action Request Form (ARF) detailing the specific
Federal assistance required. The ARF is forwarded to the FEMA Human
Services Branch Chief, where if approved, it becomes a mission
assignment for tasking.
The American Red Cross itself does not mission assign, nor are we
mission assigned under the NRP. We provide this expertise as a
contribution to our Nation and its people in need. It is important to
re-emphasize that State and local authorities decide their respective
priorities for Federal mass care assistance. This is consistent with
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) upon which the NRP is
based--that all incidents should be handled at the lowest possible
organizational and jurisdictional level. We do not have directive
authority over any other Federal Agency or non-governmental
organization.
In our ESF6 primary role, we also relay mass care information (like
shelter counts and population) from various field locations to higher
headquarters for appropriate action.
The limited interpretation of our coordination function, which
includes the processing of ARFs for Federal assistance and the flow of
mass care-related information, is sometimes misunderstood. As a member
of the International Federation of the Red Cross movement, our
fundamental principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence
could be jeopardized if we take on the role or appearance of a Federal
Agency.
In our Preparedness and Response Department, we have created a
special office for Federal response, headed by a vice president,
dedicated to integrating Red Cross response efforts with FEMA, DHS,
HHS, CDC, HUD, DOD, DOT and other agencies that wish to engage us in
discussions, briefings, planning sessions, and exercises.
While I realize that the NRP may fall outside of the jurisdiction
of this committee, I believe it is important to share this information
with you as later in my testimony, I will be urging the need for the
National Response Plan and the Stafford Act to work together
seamlessly. As both a signatory to the National Response Plan, with
mandated primary responsibilities, and as a direct service provider to
victims of disasters, ensuring this continuity between the Nation's
plan and the legislation that allows for Federal assistance to disaster
victims, is vital as we all work toward the same goal--assisting those
devastated by disaster.
stafford act
The American Red Cross is mentioned in the Stafford Act, and we
believe this is important. It is important for all levels of government
to understand the role and importance of nongovernmental organizations
in disaster preparedness, response, and relief in the United States.
As requested by this committee, I will address four major areas for
possible reforms of the Stafford Act. The first is debris cleanup;
second, I will address preparation and mitigation efforts by
individuals and communities; third, I will discuss our organization's
views regarding the Stafford Act's authorities during catastrophic
events, including terrorist attacks and the threat of pandemic flu; and
finally, I will provide general recommendations for the committee's
consideration.
Debris Clean-Up
The American Red Cross does not provide or engage in debris clean-
up in the wake of large-scale disasters, however, ensuring that debris
is quickly and efficiently removed has a very big impact on the well
being of our clients and on our ability to provide assistance to those
in need. While the Red Cross strives to provide assistance, in many
cases starting with evacuation sheltering and feeding operations,
recovery cannot begin to take place until individuals and families are
allowed to return to their homes, assess damages, and to plan and
proceed with their very personal recovery. In addition, speedy action
contains and reduces potential public health and safety problems.
The wake of Hurricane Katrina is a perfect example. With more than
90,000 square miles of damage--the size of Great Britain--the American
Red Cross had shelters opened for more than 4 months. Our typical
sheltering operations last only a few days. Individuals and families
often arrive at our shelters when evacuation orders are in effect and
leave not long after a storm passes. During traditional responses, Red
Cross workers will offer assistance in a client's home; helping them to
assess their needs and allowing us to provide very individualized
assistance.
Hundreds of thousands of people, however, were not allowed to
return home following Katrina, forcing our Nation's responders to
remain in response mode, and preventing individuals from beginning
their long road of recovery. The quicker things can be restored, the
quicker people can proceed to re-establish in their communities.
Preparation and Mitigation
First and foremost, since Congress passed, and the President signed
into law, the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000, mitigation and
preparedness efforts have gotten some traction, however they have not
necessarily seen their full potential. I urge this committee to review
the findings of the DMA as intended by the Congress, and recommend that
consideration be given to whether or not those findings have been
addressed adequately.
The American Red Cross works with individuals, communities, States
and the Federal Government to help our Nation, and our citizens, be
prepared for any disaster that comes their way. Red Cross programs are
configured to disaster risk, that is, we design programs for
individuals and families to prepare for natural disasters that are
conducive to their geographic areas. As we rely on the neighbor helping
neighbor philosophy, we encourage local communities to become more
aware of potential hazards that could adversely impact their regions
and prepare accordingly.
The Red Cross firmly believes in the importance of preparedness and
has developed numerous tools and resources offered in a number of
different languages to help families prepare for any unexpected
disasters, from a house fire to a hurricane.
Over the past several years, organizations that help to prepare
communities, as well as local, State and Federal Governments, have made
efforts to streamline our messages on preparedness. Studies have
indicated that having a single message helps individuals better
understand what they need to do to protect themselves and their loved
ones during times of disaster.
The private sector also has had an impact on improving mitigation.
For instance, most mortgage lenders require that homeowners maintain
and obtain some level of homeowners insurance. For most Americans,
insurance is a personal risk assessment, but now that mortgage
companies require such insurance, this has gone a long way to help
those who do experience disasters.
Recently, the President has directed the Department of Homeland
Security to create a better national Emergency Alert System, to include
sending emergency alerts to cell phones, Internet sites, and hand-held
computers. In addition, the President directed that the system extend
from use in a nuclear attack to include other disasters such as
terrorist attack, natural disasters, or other hazards to public safety
and well-being. During a disaster, every second counts. We believe this
is a good move on behalf of the Administration to enhance the ability
of individuals to respond to impending threatening incidents.
Yet, there is more that can be done to help improve mitigation and
preparedness efforts.
Despite these efforts by the American Red Cross and others, the
message on preparedness needs to be better articulated to the American
people. There are steps that each and every person should take to help
ensure they are better prepared for any disaster that may come their
way, including:
Get a Kit.--Every household should have prepared and ready to go a
disaster kit that includes enough food and supplies to last each family
member for three days. This could be an old knapsack or backpack with
water, basic first aid supplies, any critical documents (such as
photocopies of driver's licenses), necessary medicines, a change of
clothes, and a small amount of cash. This kit should be replenished as
necessary to ensure that food, water, and medicines are fresh. This
should be the one thing that anyone needing to leave in a hurry can
grab to take with them. In addition, families should consider any
special needs, including those of loved ones as well as their family
pets.
Make a Plan.--This plan should incorporate such things as where an
individual and their loved ones would go in the event of a disaster,
how they would communicate with a friend or loved one to let someone
know where they are and that they are safe, particularly when critical
infrastructure like phone lines are down.
Be Informed.--Either by your local Red Cross or another
organization that offers critical trainings on making a disaster plan,
a communications plan, and first aid/CPR. Knowing what to do during a
time of disaster is critical to ensuring one's safety and the safety of
their loved ones.
More than 800 chapters of the Red Cross in communities across this
Nation stand ready to help their neighbors become better informed and
to provide guidance on making a plan and steps for building a kit.
Catastrophic Events
While the Stafford Act appears to work well for major natural
disasters including floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes, it does not
incorporate other disasters, such as manmade disasters, bio/chemical
disasters, or pandemic situations. Moreover, there appears to be some
questions as to the applicability to the special circumstances of
catastrophic disasters.
We suggest that if there is going to be one Federal resource for
individuals to receive assistance after disasters, it must be
comprehensive and flexible enough to accommodate all disasters. While
in response to large scale disasters, particularly after 9/11, Congress
quickly acted to provide assistance to families of those impacted, it
could be more efficient for agencies that support the Federal response
to have Congress address potential needs in advance of an incident.
I encourage the committee to consider, if possible, making the
Stafford Act more flexible to provide for responding to disasters other
than just natural disasters, allowing it to be nimble and to adapt to
unanticipated human needs or other national priorities.
General Recommendations
There are a number of more general recommendations on reform of the
Stafford Act that I would like to provide the committee for
consideration.
Congress should restore the post-disaster mitigation program at
the 15 percent level of disaster costs for the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP). HMGP grants are used for such things as rebuilding at a
higher building code level, for purchasing repetitive loss properties,
and for projects that will prevent or minimize the next disaster. We
believe that every dollar spent on mitigation, is a dollar well spent.
Congress must adequately address the cap on disaster repair for
the Individual and Family Grant program. The American Red Cross, as
well as many other organizations and emergency management officials,
believe the current cap of $5,000 should be raised to a more effective
and realistic level.
Congress should reinstate the Mortgage and Rental Assistance
Program. The Mortgage and Rental Assistance Program was eliminated in
the DMA. However, Congress utilized the program for recent catastrophic
disasters such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and
Hurricane Katrina. The program allows for disaster victims to receive
Federal assistance to pay for mortgage and rental costs when displaced
from their homes in a major disaster. The program should be reinstated
and allowed to be used for future disasters.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Jeffords, and Members of the committee, I
thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share my thoughts
and recommendations for changes to the Stafford Act.
The American Red Cross has a long history of our work to better
prepare our Nation's citizens for any disaster, and to help them
respond when disaster strikes. I am pleased to have had this
opportunity to be here today, and would be happy to answer any
questions that you might have.
______
Responses by Armond Mascelli to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. What are your recommendations with regard to the
potential creation of a ``third category'' of declaration under the
Stafford Act that would be reserved for catastrophic events, for which
special rules would apply?
Response. I believe it is imperative that there be a cross-walk
between the Stafford Act and the National Response Plan (NRP) to ensure
that the mechanism for Federal disaster assistance melds with the Plan
for Federal response to major incidents. The National Response Plan
contains an annex dedicated to catastrophic incidents. We believe the
Stafford Act must be flexible enough to facilitate all the support
needed during a catastrophic response as addressed in the Catastrophic
Annex of the NRP. If it does not, then there should be changes to the
Stafford Act to ensure that all necessary support is available during a
response to a catastrophic incident.
Question 2a. Recovery.--Do you believe that there is a role for the
Federal Government in long-term recovery of areas hit by disaster?
Response. The American Red Cross has been America's partner in
prepare dness and response to disasters for the past 125 years. In more
than 800 Red Cross chapters across the United States, we provide
lifesaving trainings for communities and individuals. Working closely
with partners at all levels of government and in the private and for-
profit sectors, we educate individuals in disaster preparedness and
encourage all individuals to be prepared.
Question 2b. Is there existing authority for this function?
Response. We respond to more than 70,000 disasters each year and
while the majority of these disasters are single family home fires, we
also respond to large scale incidents, such as hurricanes, tornadoes,
floods, and manmade events. Last year in response to Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the Red Cross provided shelter for more than
500,000 evacuees; provided more than 65 million hot meals and snacks;
and cared for the emotional and mental well being of those impacted by
the hurricanes.
Question 2c. Should any expanded role should apply to all disasters
or be limited to catastrophic events?
Response. After a disaster strikes, the Red Cross endeavors to
provide for the immediate emergency needs of those affected. We provide
assistance that helps to bridge the gap between a disaster occurring
and when longer-term assistance begins. We are the agency that helps
get disaster victims closer to the road of recovery.
While we support efforts that intend to aide in an individual or
family's recovery, we do not take a position on the role of the Federal
Government in long-term disaster. We work closely with government at
all to help communities prepare, and to help communities respond to
disaster. The services we provide are client-focused, intended to
ensure that the most basic emergency needs of disaster victims are
met--food, shelter, mental well being, family tracing, and first aid.
Question 3. How do you believe the administration of the
preparedness functions of the Stafford Act have been or will be
impacted by the division of responsibilities between the so-called
Preparedness Directorate and FEMA?
Response. As I indicated in my written statement, and in my answer
to question No. 1, it is our belief that there be a cross walk between
the Stafford Act and the National Response Plan (NRP) to ensure that
the mechanism for Federal disaster assistance melds with the Plan for
Federal response to major incidents.
From the Red Cross perspective, we look at the incidents of risk
that are increasing at significant rates. For instance, the
demographics of where individuals are living in our Nation_many more
coastal properties and residents. When we look at the scope of
disasters we respond to, particularly the much larger incidents,
mitigation becomes increasingly important. If mitigation is not
addressed in an effective way, just as other components of emergency
management, then responses will suffer.
How the Federal Government structures this is really up to the
Congress and the Administration to decide, but we would strongly
recommend that mitigation efforts increase.
Question 4a. Until Hurricane Katrina, there were a very limited
number of times during which the Congress diverted from normal
procedures under the Stafford Act in the wake of a disaster. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Congress has enacted a significant
number of legislative changes to the Stafford Act that modify the
manner in which disaster assistance is provided, and many more
proposals are pending. This was a catastrophic disaster worthy of
special action, but it is unlikely to be the last of its kind,
particularly with the changes we can expect as climate change occurs.
What are your recommendations with regard to the potential creation
of a ``third category'' of declaration under the Stafford Act that
would be reserved for catastrophic events, for which special rules
would apply?
Response. Building on the answer provided in question No. 1, it is
very important that the Stafford Act and National Response Plan are
coordinated. It is fair for all preparedness and response agencies to
believe that Katrina is not the only catastrophic event we will be
faced with.
Question 4b. What specific provisions of the Stafford Act would you
recommend modifying in such a category?
Response. The Stafford Act has proven to work well for major
natural disasters, including floods, hurricanes, and tornados, however
it does not incorporate other disasters, such as manmade disasters,
biological or chemical disasters, or pandemic situations. The Stafford
Act should be made more flexible to provide for these types of
disasters, and again, there should be a crosswalk between the NRP and
the Stafford Act to ensure that the Stafford Act can adequately
facilitate the support required by the NRP, including financial, and to
ensure that responsibilities are aligned with authorities. Much to this
point, consideration should be given to ensure that the needs are
clearly identified.
While Congress has acted to make quick changes to Federal responses
in the past, we would urge that Congress endeavor to incorporate
changes that provide flexibility to Federal disaster response, allowing
it to be nimble and to adapt to unanticipated human needs or other
priorities.
Question 5. In your opinion did the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
work and what changes should be made to address what, if anything did
not work?
Response. In my written and oral statement, I shared with the
committee some thoughts on the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.
Primarily, in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the intent of
Congress, as reflected in the legislation, was to:
revise and broaden the scope of existing disaster relief
programs;
encourage the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness
and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations by the
States and by local governments;
achieve greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster
preparedness and relief programs;
encourage individuals, States, and local governments to protect
themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace
governmental assistance;
encourage hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
disasters, including development of land use and construction
regulations; and
provide Federal assistance programs for both public and private
losses sustained in disasters.
While these intentions have raised awareness and improved upon
overall preparedness, they have not been fully realized. In order to
better realize these desired outcomes, we believe that the Stafford
Act, and other actions by Congress, should tie mitigation funding and
programs to goals with concrete measurements. Mitigation is important,
and we believe that the government sector can play a larger role in
ensuring mitigation practices are implemented--part of this is to
restore the post-disaster mitigation program for the Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (HMGP).
Additionally, FEMA's Rental Assistance Program should be separated
from the $25,000 cap on other individual assistance programs. More
flexible use of funds under the cap for home repair should be
considered as well. And finally, the use of trailers as the only de
facto Long Term Recovery strategy for housing should be reconsidered.
Funding may be better used for home repairs, or as direct assistance to
victims to purchase sustainable properties instead of trailers. Also,
more aggressive look at commercial housing options and access to
existing federally owned housing stock in and near disaster affected
areas.
Question 6. The report entitled, ``Natural Hazard Mitigation
Saves'', issued in 2005 found that mitigation is most effective when it
is carried out on a comprehensive, community-wide, long-term basis, as
opposed through single, unrelated projects. Can you describe your views
on how FEMA has implemented that finding since 2005 and any
recommendations you may have on policy or legislative changes that
should be made to fully implement that recommendation?
Response. Since there are two questions referencing the 2005
report, ``Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves,'' let me take this
opportunity to offer one response to both inquiries. We share your
interest in working with FEMA to respond to recommendations contained
in this report. As the American Red Cross continues to advocate for
preparedness, we support any efforts of the local, state and Federal
levels that attempt to address matters in a unified approach well
before any disasters take place. Certainly, FEMA is in the best
position to offer insight into the agency's actions and provide
recommendations for future policy or legislative changes.
Question 7. Since the report on mitigation, entitled ``Natural
Hazard Mitigation Saves'' was issued in 2005, what actions has FEMA
taken to enhance the mitigation programs it administers? Specifically,
how has FEMA implemented the findings that: mitigation is most
effective when it is carried out on a comprehensive, community-wide,
long-term basis, as opposed to through single, unrelated projects?
Response. No response.
Question 8a. Over the last 200 years, the Nation has moved from an
ad hoc approach to disaster response in Congress, to a coordinated,
reliable response. This premise has formed the cornerstone of the
Nation's disaster response since the 1960s and early 1970s. Under the
Stafford Act, the Federal Government may provide assistance upon
declaration of a major disaster or an emergency. A Governor must
request a major disaster declaration, and it is limited by section 101
to: ``natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm,
high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, eartquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm or drought), or regardless of
cause, any fire, flood or explosion, in any part of the United States,
whcih in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient
severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this
Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local
government, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the
damange, loss hardship, or suffering caused thereby.'' An emergency is
defined by section 101 as ``any occasion or instance for which, in the
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert
the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.'' I am
concerned that there is a hole in the authorities provided under the
Stafford Act_the response authorities of the Federal Government that
are available in a major disaster may not be available in all types of
terrorist events that might only meet the current definition for an
emergency declaration.
Would the release of a biological agent that does not involve an
explosion meet the criteria to even consider a disaster declaration,
and if your answer is yes, please explain.
Response. You are correct in noting that we have experienced a
significant shift in disaster response from an ad hoc approach to a
formalized, systematic process. The Stafford Act remains an effective
resource when the Federal Government steps in during major disasters.
Question 8b. Do you believe that your organization can plan for a
response to an epidemic or biological attack without certainty about
what assistance the Federal government will provide?
Response. Nevertheless, as the conversations about disaster
response evolve to include biological incidents, it is equally
important for the Stafford Act to recognize such acts. In fact, the
Stafford Act must be crystal clear in what it covers as there is not
time for differing interpretations when disaster strikes. As we all
know, there have been recent instances where Congress has had to act
quickly to make changes to, or provide additional resources, allow a
more robust and quick response. While we commend the Congress for their
swift action during times of major disasters, we also recognize that
this is a good time to imagine ``bigger''_and to ensure that the
Stafford Act, as well as the NRP, has the ability to respond to many
different scenarios, from hurricanes to catastrophic events, to
bioterrorism, pandemics and manmade incidents.
Question 8c. Do you believe it is a good idea for state and local
governments to divert resources from emergency response potentially
days after an event to attempt to move legislation through Congress
that meets their needs?
Response. The American Red Cross supports any initiatives
advocating preparedness. We continually share information on how
families, organizations and businesses can better prepare before a
disaster. This is cornerstone of our mission. As the Nation continues
to discuss how best to plan and respond to an epidemic or biological
attack, the American Red Cross will actively participate in these
discussions. Moreover, ensuring that a collaborative local, state, and
Federal response to large scale disasters are in place long before
disaster strikes is a sure way to allow agencies at all levels to
prepare. Being prepared is important; however, looking beyond our
current scope of disasters and becoming better prepared is essential.
Question 8d. What changes should be made to the Stafford Act to
ensure that the Federal Government has the appropriate authorities to
respond to all types of events, including biological agents, weapons of
mass desctruction, or epidemics in a coordinated, planned, manner?
Response. Specific to the Stafford Act, we believe that changes
should be made that would allow more flexible to provide for all types
of disasters. We also believe there should be a cross-walk between the
NRP and the Stafford Act to ensure that the Stafford Act can adequately
facilitate the support required by the NRP, including financial, and to
ensure that responsibilities are aligned with authorities.
Question 9. Can you describe the mechanisms that the Red Cross has
in place to ensure that funds donated to disaster victims by the public
are properly used and tracked?
Response. Following the influx of generous contributions to the
American Red Cross in wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the American Red Cross implemented new and robust fundraising
practices called DonorDIRECT, which stands for D(onor) I(ntent),
RE(cognition), C(onfirmation), and T(rust). This new initiative
expanded Red Cross efforts to educate donors about the Red Cross
General Disaster Relief Fund and instituted a new system of affirmative
confirmation and acknowledgement to ensure all disaster-related
donations are directed as intended.
The Red Cross Donor DIRECT fund-raising system was established to
verify donor intent and ensure donors understand how the Red Cross
assists victims of disasters. This system includes educating donors
while soliciting or accepting the donation. Donors also receive an
acknowledgement after their contributions have been received that
reconfirm their intent and the purposes for which their contributions
will be used. These acknowledgements also instruct donors on what to do
if they have any questions about the use of their contributions.
As an independent nonprofit organization that relies on the
generosity of the American public to fulfill our mission, the American
Red Cross is fully committed to maintaining the trust and support of
our donors. Donated funds designated for specific relief efforts will
be spent on Red Cross services that support the victims of these
disasters. Among other things these funds help meet the emergency needs
of disaster victims, including food, shelter and counseling. The Red
Cross is committed to honoring the intentions of its donors and will
use all designated funds accordingly.
As good stewards of donated dollars, the American Red Cross has a
standard practice of informing the public when sufficient funds have
been raised to cover the costs associated with the response to a
disaster. Nevertheless, if more than enough funds are raised, the Red
Cross has policies in place to ensure donor intent is honored by
devoting those funds to disaster relief, recovery efforts, and disaster
preparedness in the affected areas.
______
Responses by Armond Mascelli to Additional Questions from Senator Obama
Question 1. The Federal Government and localities relied on the Red
Cross for a variety of emergency responses in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, from family reunification issues to the evacuation
of special needs populations. Is the Red Cross capable of handling
these tasks on a regular basis?
Response. The American Red Cross has been the Nation's premier
partner in preparedness and response to major disasters for the past
125 years. We work closely with government at all levels, in addition
to our partners in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. While there
are several mandates the American Red Cross is tasked to do by the
Federal government during times of major disasters, there were areas
where we fell short in our response to Hurricane Katrina. We have spent
a considerable amount of resources to ensure that our response to a
disaster the size and scope of Katrina is better executed and that we
reach more people more quickly.
I want to take a moment, however, to address and add clarification
to the two areas you specifically mentioned. The American Red Cross
does provide family reunification services, which we refer to as
``family tracing.'' In most disasters, infrastructure is temporarily
damaged, so most family members have the ability to communicate fairly
quickly after a storm by using landlines or cell phones. Katrina was
the exception. Communications systems were so severely damaged that
individuals went weeks without being able to connect to their loved
ones.
Also, during most disasters, we provide family tracing services as
part of our individual case work. If the Red Cross receives a request
from a family member, Red Cross volunteers will locate the missing
family member and ensure their safety, as well as provide a message
from a concerned loved one. This is not to be mistaken for search and
rescue, which is the efforts of local, state, and Federal first
responder agencies.
When it became evident that families would not be returning to
their homes for weeks and maybe even months, dozens of ad hoc Web sites
sprung up allowing individuals to register as ``safe'' and allowing
concerned family members a mechanism of searching the world wide web to
find the location of their loved ones. The American Red Cross created
such a Web site and encouraged disaster evacuees and survivors to
register either on the Web site or by calling a 1-800 number. Three
days after Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, more than 60 people
from various technology companies offered to help. Within 2 days after
that, these generous individuals increased Red Cross networking
capacity by 400 percent.
To expand our efforts, the International Committee of the Red
Cross' Family Linking system was adapted. Red Cross technology partners
were able to create a site that functioned much like the search engines
of MSN and Google. The site searched the Internet, collected links to
other sites that offered similar services, and consolidated them,
enabling families to more easily check on loved ones in the registry.
The American Red Cross ``Safe and Well'' Web site was the result of
this effort. Accessible through redcross.org, the Safe and Well Web
site allows disaster victims to select and post standard messages that
they are well and will be in contact. Those worried about a missing
loved one can check the registry and read posted messages. There is
also a phone-based service for those who cannot access the Internet.
As this is a voluntary registry, we have created a system that will
work collaboratively with any Federal agency to share the information
available on our Safe and Well Web site.
Regarding evacuating individuals with special needs, the American
Red Cross does not evacuate any individuals from affected areas,
regardless of whether or not they are individuals with special needs.
Evacuation orders are given by local officials and carried out by local
emergency management. The American Red Cross does provide shelters in
safe areas. In fact, the majority of sheltering operations are
evacuation shelters.
Red Cross shelters are ``congregate'' shelters, meaning they are
set up for individuals who have the ability to live independently.
Special needs shelters, which exist for those with special medical
conditions or other special needs who are unable to live independently,
are operated by the local health administration and/or emergency
management. The American Red Cross is not equipped to provide medical
assistance or care beyond general first aid.
Hurricane Katrina, however, proved to be a challenge. Many Red
Cross sheltering operations were doubling as medical centers_a
challenge we have never faced before. With so many individuals needing
assistance, we could not turn away those with special needs. That said,
while there were many good stories of cooperation that allowed several
shelters to provide pharmaceutical medication and provide care to those
with special needs, there were as many instances where Red Cross
volunteers may have acted ``by the book'' and did not welcome
individuals with special needs into a ``congregate'' shelter.
We appreciate Congressional attention to this topic because it is a
major area of vulnerability for agencies that provide for immediate
emergency needs. To better prepare for the 2006 hurricane season, and
those beyond, the American Red Cross has partnered with several
organizations representing individuals with disabilities that have
expertise in the specialized needs of people with disabilities.
[Describe the partnerships in place and list some orgs]. . .
Question 2. What changes do you suggest to the Stafford Act to help
Federal, State, and local governments better work with the Red Cross in
a disaster?
Response. While we believe that the Stafford Act provides the
framework for the Federal Response, and overall is solid, there are
some specific programmatic areas we would like to have considered. In
particular, we believe that FEMA's Rental Assistance Program should be
separated from the $25,000 cap on other individual assistance programs.
There should also be more flexible use of funds under the cap for home
repair. Furthermore, the use of trailers for long-term recovery should
be reconsidered. Funding could be better used for home repairs, or as
direct assistance to victims to purchase sustainable properties instead
of trailers.
Furthermore, we believe that it is essential that there be a cross-
walk between the National Response Plan and the Stafford Act. This must
include aligning responsibilities with authorities, including
financial. While the Stafford Act has proven to be a fair apparatus of
Federal response, we believe it is important to make sure that the
Federal resources match the Federal plan.
Question 3. FEMA has indicated that the Red Cross will take on the
primary role of coordinating missing family services in future
disasters. How does the Red Cross plan to work with states, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), the
National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA) and other non-profit agencies
to better coordinate and centralize these services? And what level of
resources is the Red Cross committing to prepare for this task?
Response. The American Red Cross and FEMA have discussed the Red
Cross role in family tracing and we have worked with FEMA to ensure
that the mechanism we have in place, the ``Safe and Well'' Web site,
will allow for information to be shared with FEMA during times of
disaster. As this is a voluntary registry, the information on the Web
site will be made available to Federal agencies. Furthermore, we
welcome the opportunity to share this information with organizations
such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and the
National Center for Missing Adults as both agencies perform a vital
service in helping to reconnect missing loved ones.
Question 4. What support have you received from FEMA and other
government entities specifically on the issue of helping displaced
persons find their families after a disaster? What support do you think
is required to implement a more centralized and coordinated family
locator system in the future?
Response. We do not receive assistance from the Federal Government
for performing these services, nor have we requested any Federal funds
for this purpose. We recognize family tracing services to be a national
priority, particularly during times of disaster, and we remain
committed to the ``Safe and Well'' Web site that we have created.
______
Responses by Armond Mascelli to Additional Questions from Senator
Vitter
Question 1. How could the Stafford Act be improved to reduce
bureaucracy and red tape for volunteers and other medical professionals
who are working to help with response?
Response. As both questions relate to volunteer medical
professionals, let me answer both inquiries with one response.
First and foremost, we agree that getting immediate and appropriate
medical care following a disaster is an essential component in disaster
response. The Red Cross stands ready in administering first aid to
victims. However, as our shelters are not set up to offer more complex
medical treatment, we appreciate the time and commitment given by
volunteer doctors and nurses who sometimes travel a great distance to
offer help.
Nevertheless, as in the specific case presented in the second
question, modifications to the Stafford Act will not resolve the issue
of temporarily prohibiting volunteer medical professionals from
practicing in a disaster area until they acquire the proper
credentialing and clearance. The Stafford Act is an important tool when
the Federal Government becomes involved in disaster response while the
states have oversight and authority of licensing medical credentials.
Moreover, this particular issue is outside the Red Cross's scope of
influence. From our understanding, such matters are usually addressed
by reciprocity agreements arranged by participating states or the
Department of Homeland Security's National Disaster Medical System.
Question 2. During Hurricane Katrina, there are volunteers who were
from Louisiana and have credentials however may have not had the
paperwork with them and had to jump through hoops just to help out. The
first 12-24 hours is the most critical for disaster response. How can
the Act be improved? How can the process be streamlined to get
authorizations and approvals in an emergency in as little time as
possible?
Response. As both questions relate to volunteer medical
professionals, let me answer both inquiries with one response.
First and foremost, we agree that getting immediate and appropriate
medical care following a disaster is an essential component in disaster
response. The Red Cross stands ready in administering first aid to
victims. However, as our shelters are not set up to offer more complex
medical treatment, we appreciate the time and commitment given by
volunteer doctors and nurses who sometimes travel a great distance to
offer help.
Nevertheless, as in the specific case presented in the second
question, modifications to the Stafford Act will not resolve the issue
of temporarily prohibiting volunteer medical professionals from
practicing in a disaster area until they acquire the proper
credentialing and clearance. The Stafford Act is an important tool when
the Federal Government becomes involved in disaster response while the
states have oversight and authority of licensing medical credentials.
Moreover, this particular issue is outside the Red Cross's scope of
influence. From our understanding, such matters are usually addressed
by reciprocity agreements arranged by participating states or the
Department of Homeland Security's National Disaster Medical System.
__________
Statement Pamela Mayer Pogue, CFM, Chair, Association of State
Floodplain Managers, Inc., State of Rhode Island
introduction
The Association of State Floodplain Managers is pleased to provide
comments and recommendations to the committee. This testimony is based
on our experiences and observations about the functioning of the hazard
mitigation planning and grant programs that are authorized by the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act). We appreciate your recognition of the importance of
these programs to the Nation's efforts to improve resistance to natural
disasters.
The Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc. (ASFPM), and its
24 Chapters represent over 9,000 State and local officials and other
professionals who are engaged in all aspects of floodplain management
and hazard mitigation, including management, mapping, engineering,
planning, community development, hydrology, forecasting, emergency
response, water resources, and insurance. Many of our members work with
communities impacted by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, or work
with organizations that are assisting with the rebuilding efforts. Many
of our members are designated by their governors to coordinate the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and many others are involved in
the administration of and participation in FEMA's mitigation programs.
To learn more about the Association, please visit http://
www.floods.org.
A recently released report, ``Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves'',
was prepared in response to a Congressional request that FEMA fund an
independent study to assess the future savings of various types of
mitigation activities (online at http://www.nibs.org/MMC/
mmcactiv5.html). The conclusions state that ``a dollar spent on
mitigation saves society an average of $4'' and ``FEMA mitigation
grants are cost-effective, often leading to additional non-federally
funded mitigation activities, and have the greatest benefits in
communities that have institutionalized hazard mitigation programs.''
In a post-Katrina world, we logically have a need to reflect on our
Nation's current policies and programs, make a good faith effort to
determine where such policies and programs are deficient, and act on
those findings. The four hurricanes in Florida in 2004 and hurricanes
Dennis, Katrina, Rita and Wilma in 2005 could very well signal a trend
towards increasingly violent weather episodes. Indeed, our Nation's
climatologists and meteorologists have indicated that we are likely in
a cycle of increased weather activity characterized by more frequent
and intense storms. Unfortunately, this comes at a time in our Nation's
history where there has been a historic migration to our coastlines
which are the most likely areas to be impacted from these changes.
Before 2004, a number of major coastal storms were considered
outliers--freak events of extremely low probability--including
Hurricane Camille in 1969 (Mississippi) and Hurricane Andrew 1992
(Florida). However, most people today would hardly see such an event as
uncommon and, in fact, many coastal communities and property owners are
preparing for such major storms.
Luckily, our Nation has a tremendous capability or respond to,
recover from, and mitigate against these disaster events, and the
Stafford Act is an important part of this system. The Congress and this
committee are at the epicenter of this discussion, with an opportunity
to make policy changes that can have importance and relevance far into
the future. The ASFPM is encouraged that the committee has taken the
initiative to look at the Robert T. Stafford Act and improve upon it.
Thank you for inviting us to offer ASFPM's views. As requested,
this testimony addresses:
a. Whether communities and individuals are doing more to prepare
for natural/other disasters, and are they implementing mitigation for
the negative long-term impacts of such events? Have we made progress on
mitigation since the passage of DMA 2000? What changes are needed in
DMA 2000 and other areas of the Stafford Act to encourage mitigation
actions?
b. Stafford Act authorities and adequacy for catastrophic events
such as Katrina, and for response to terrorism-related events such as
the use of weapons of mass destruction, bioterrorism.
c. Ten general recommendations for improvements to the Stafford
Act.
d. The Impact of FEMA's Reorganization on the Stafford Act Programs
ASFPM: Senate Hearing on Stafford Act (July 27, 2006).
community and individual preparation for disasters and is enough being
done to mitigate the effects, especially after passage of the disaster
mitigation act of 2000
On balance, the amendments to the Stafford Act enacted as the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) have had a positive effect
on encouraging and supporting mitigation at both the state and local
levels, although its effectiveness clearly has been impeded by the loss
of FEMA's independent status and lack of focus on mitigation within the
Department of Homeland Security.
It is important to realize that mitigation plans called for in the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 that modified the Stafford Act are not
emergency response plans, they are focused on how a community
incorporates hazards into its development and permitting process and on
other actions that may be taken to reduce future disaster losses. All
states have met the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
and have adopted plans, including seven states that have developed and
adopted enhanced plans (qualifying them for a larger amount of post-
disaster mitigation funding). Many communities have prepared plans to
meet the requirements of DMA 2000, and many are in the planning
process. These plans may identify specific mitigation projects, but
usually they lay out broader objectives that support identification of
specific projects when funding becomes available.
FEMA has adopted regulations that require state mitigation plans to
be revised every 3 years (every 5 years for local plans). Given the
long-term trends in disaster expenditures (especially for damage to
public infrastructure and facilities) and the merits of incorporating
data about hazards into long-term plans and programs at the State
level, it is appropriate that State mitigation plans explicitly address
these issues.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee direct that, as part of
the 3-year review of State mitigation plans, States shall:
a. Examine State land use, planning, zoning, and building code
requirements (or lack thereof) to identify opportunities to strengthen
such requirements or to adopt such requirements that are determined to
be appropriate given the frequency of occurrence of hazard events and
the extent and severity of the resulting damage. It ASFPM: Senate
Hearing on Stafford Act (July 27, 2006) should be explicit that some
amount of grant funds made available for planning may be used by states
that identify as a priority the implementation or strengthening of land
use, planning, zoning, and/or building codes to reduce future losses.
b. Examine the type, nature, and severity of damages that qualify
for Public Assistance in order to identify feasible approaches to
reduce such losses in the future, with particular attention to costs
associated with the repair of public facilities, roads and bridges,
public utilities, and parks and recreational facilities.
stafford act authority for catastrophic events
The Stafford Act has proven to be effective for most disasters;
however, additional provisions are needed to address the challenges
that arise during events that far exceed state and local capacity to
respond. An event may be catastrophic on a regional level--as evidenced
by Hurricane Katrina--or an event may be catastrophic on a localized
level--as evidenced in many decimated communities in the past 30 years.
When an event causes that degree of damage, some routine government
functions suffer, such as planning, permitting, and inspection and the
pre-existing level of local staffing and resources is not sufficient to
ensure adequate management of the rebuilding process. The consequence
of this shortfall is that often citizens start repairing and rebuilding
before safety inspections are conducted and building permits are
issued--putting businesses and families back in harm's way. In
addition, when an event causes such impacts, disaster assistance
(financial and technical) throughout post-disaster recovery may be
required for as long as 12 to 24 months.
FEMA/DHS has consistently denied reimbursement of costs associated
with private property damage inspections and permitting, despite the
Congressional finding in the Stafford Act that ``because disasters
often disrupt the normal functioning of governments and communities,
and adversely affect individuals and families with great severity;
special measures, designed to assist the efforts of the affected States
in expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency services,
and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of devastated areas, are
necessary.'' The community suffers as a whole when inappropriate
development occurs immediately after a disaster.
The ASFPM recommends that, to address FEMA's policy position,
Congress should explicitly provide for reimbursement of costs incurred
by communities to perform damage inspections, administration of codes
and ordinances, and permitting of repairs and reconstructions when the
damage to public and private property exceeds the capacity of the local
agency responsible for those functions.
The ASFPM recommends that when an event causes catastrophic
damage, whether regionally or locally, reimbursement of the costs to
respond, inspect and permit should be eligible for a period of time of
at least 12 months to 24 months, or necessary to guide the community's
post-disaster rebuilding and recovery process.
nine general recommendations for improving the stafford act
C-1. Delegation of additional authority for HMGP to qualified
states. FEMA has not initiated action to implement sec. 404(c) Program
Administration by States (42 U.S.C. 5170c). All States have hazard
mitigation plans prepared pursuant to sec. 322; seven have instituted
programmatic enhancements necessary to qualify for approval of
``enhanced mitigation plans'' which qualify them for additional HMGP
funding. The enhanced plan states are poised to assume the additional
responsibilities and authority that Congress anticipated would be
delegated. Although many states are unlikely to seek delegation,
especially those that experience relatively few disasters, having one
or more of the more active states assume administration of HMGP would
yield significant benefits, including faster processing of grant
applications and awards and obligation of the program funds. Many of
the communities that have very active mitigation programs are in these
same states and would greatly benefit from their states assuming
additional administrative responsibilities and authority. The Federal
Government, including FEMA, needs strong and capable state and local
mitigation programs if the costs and suffering of disasters is to be
reduced.
The ASFPM recommends report language expressing the committee
expectation that FEMA is to undertake consultation with state and local
governments and implement delegation of authority for administration of
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program by a certain date.
C-2. Demolish and rebuild as a mitigation measure. Since hazard
mitigation programs have been in effect, much has been learned about
what works and what does not work. New mitigation options are
continually being discovered and old mitigation ideas are constantly
being evaluated for effectiveness. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of
2004 for the first time specifically cited a newer hazard mitigation
option--``demolition and rebuild.'' This option is based on the premise
that some buildings are not structurally sound enough to be raised up
onto a higher foundation, and some buildings are more expensive to
elevate than to rebuild. In addition, elevating older buildings
generally does not result in disaster-resistant buildings because they
may not meet current codes for high winds, earthquakes, snow loads, and
fire resistance (or energy efficiency). Demolition and rebuild allows
replacement with a building of approximately the same size and
function. This mitigation measure has been tested in several states and
is welcomed by communities that want to retain their neighborhoods and
improve their housing stock, and by property owners (even though they
often have to commit more of their own funds for this type of project).
Despite the success of those projects, FEMA has declined to approve
demolish and rebuild projects under the mitigation grant programs
authorized by the Stafford Act (except in those communities included in
disaster declarations for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). This is
an uneven and unjustified restriction on a successful mitigation
measure.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee direct FEMA to include
``demolition and rebuild'' (currently referred to as ``mitigation
reconstruction'') among mitigation activities eligible under the
mitigation grant programs authorized by the Stafford Act. Demolition
and rebuild should be an eligible activity when it is consistent with a
community's overall goals, when it encourages safe and livable housing,
and when it is determined to be feasible and cost-effective.
C-3. FEMA should formalize the ``expanded planning'' concept. FEMA
should be directed to formalize and regularize the ``expanded
planning'' concept now underway in Mississippi and Louisiana. Under
this concept, communities with approved mitigation plans can use some
of the HMGP funds that are normally set aside for planning (up to 7
percent of HMGP) to refine/define projects, do engineering (e.g.,
determine if house is sound enough to elevate), prepare Benefit: Cost
Analyses, and develop mitigation project applications. Even communities
that have an approved mitigation plan rarely have nicely defined
projects ``on the shelf'', and they need support to get concepts from
the ``big picture'' mitigation plan phase to where they're ready to
submit applications.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee should direct FEMA to
formalize and institute its policy that allows use of certain Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program funds set aside for mitigation planning to be
used by States to help communities define projects, develop data,
conduct analyses, determine cost effectiveness, and develop
applications.
C-4. Integrate mitigation into public assistance projects. FEMA has
adopted a policy and maintains a list of pre-approved mitigation
measures that can be funded under the Public Assistance Program as part
of repair for public buildings and infrastructure projects. Despite the
presence of this policy, States and communities consistently report
that FEMA Public Assistance staff (and its disaster employees and
contractors) do not always fully embrace mitigation and reduction of
future damage as part of the purpose when reviewing projects that
otherwise are eligible for disaster assistance, such as public
buildings, infrastructure and critical facilities. FEMA should be
reminded that Congress views hazard mitigation as an integral component
of disaster response and recovery work that is undertaken as part of
FEMA's Public Assistance programs.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee express its expectation
that FEMA, as a part of its public assistance program, shall ensure
that its employees and contractors have the necessary guidance and
training to identify, assess, formulate and approve feasible and cost
effective mitigation measures for public facilities and public
infrastructure.
C-5. Minimum funding for Pre-Disaster Mitigation Technical
Assistance. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation program (PDM) authorized by
Sec. 203 of the Stafford Act is a (42 U.S.C. 5131 et seq.) a national
competitive grants program managed by FEMA and creates a program that
is subject to annual appropriations. After 3 years of this competition,
it is abundantly evident that most of the successful applicants have
received significant technical assistance to identify projects, develop
benefit: cost analyses, and prepare the applications. Thus, many
applicants with fewer resources, especially in states that are unable
to meet the demand for technical assistance, are less likely to be
competitive, despite the merits of their mitigation projects. For those
states that have not received HMGP funding in over a decade, or two,
PDM funding is the sole source of mitigation planning and project
money. Additionally, PDM funding allows the flexibility for states and
communities to address multiple natural hazards in a single project or
planning initiative.
The Stafford Act provides for a minimum allocation to each state
(this provision has been overridden in previous appropriation acts
which specifically precluded allocations; the House Homeland Security
Appropriations bill for FY07 was amended on the House floor to strike
language that waived the State-based allocations).
The ASFPM urges the committee to support the provision of a
minimum allocation to each state to build long-term State capability in
hazard mitigation programs in order to support communities and other
eligible recipients of mitigation funding. Further, the committee
should clarify that a portion of those allocations may be used to
provide technical assistance for the planning, project identification,
and application development for the PDM grant program.
C-6. Continue to improve administration and delivery of HMGP. Now
that many of the Nation's high risk communities have predisaster
mitigation plans (and a list of pre-identified mitigation projects),
they need to have faster access to post-disaster mitigation funding
(HMGP). It is common for decisions on applications to be made more than
12 months after a declaration, which leaves communities and property
owners in an uncertain environment. Especially for proposed projects
that involve private property, an effective and timely program is
critical to limit owner investments in repairs of properties that are
scheduled for floodplain buyouts. Most states perform a significant
amount of review and forward eligible applications with recommendations
for funding. FEMA should not take several more months to perform much
of the same work.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee direct FEMA to continue
to improve delivery of post-disaster mitigation programs to meet the
needs and demands of states and communities that have demonstrated a
commitment to mitigation by adoption of mitigation plans. It would be
reasonable for the committee to urge that FEMA strive to approve grant
applications within 90 days of receipt.
C-7. Communities that refuse to participate in the National Flood
Insurance Program should not be eligible for Public Assistance under
the Stafford Act. Currently, if a community with an identified flood
hazard does not participate in the NFIP and thus declines to manage
development in areas of known flood risk, its citizens cannot purchase
flood insurance and they are ineligible for certain individual disaster
assistance. Ironically, the community leaders who make the decision to
not participate in the NFIP can still apply for and receive certain
public assistance even on facilities that are located in floodplains
(other than public buildings). This is not good public policy--it
rewards communities that allow at-risk development because they know
FEMA will bail them out (with taxpayer funds). And it penalizes
communities that do the right thing because they help pay for those who
do nothing.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee clarify that all public
assistance for any damaged public buildings and infrastructure located
in FEMA-mapped special flood hazard areas is to be withheld from
communities that have declined to participate in the National Flood
Insurance Program.
C-8. Restore HMGP to 15 percent as a mitigation incentive. The
demand for post-disaster mitigation funding always exceeds the
available funding. Now that more communities have developed predisaster
mitigation plans and as the success of mitigation measures throughout
the country is highlighted, that demand will only increase. Restoring
HMGP to the 15 percent formula (replacing the current 7.5 percent)
would significant enhance reduction of future damage at times when
communities and property owners are most aware of the benefits--after a
damaging event.
The ASFPM recommends that the formula for HMGP be restored to 15
percent.
C-9. Authority to increase Federal contribution for hazard
mitigation projects. Under section 404 (42 U.S.C. 5170c), the Federal
share of hazard mitigation projects is limited to 75 percent. Under the
Public Assistance there are circumstances when the magnitude of a major
disaster is so significant that the Federal contribution to repair and
recover can be increased to 90 percent. It is appropriate that the same
flexibility be authorized for the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.
The ASFPM recommends that the committee provide that when the
cost-share for Public Assistance is changed, the same change shall
apply to HMGP.
the impact of fema's reorganization on the stafford act programs
Prior to being reorganized and incorporated into the Department of
Homeland Security in 2003, FEMA was a lean organization. Since the mid-
90s it had responded to both natural and man-made events in an
effective manner. In fact, the ``new'' FEMA--as part of DHS--is
untested in the area of man-made disasters such as a terrorism event.
Why was the agency that effectively handled the Murrah Building bombing
in Oklahoma City, the World Trade Center attack in New York City, and
innumerable natural disasters quickly reorganized? Also between the
mid-90s and 2003, FEMA had built excellent relationships with states
and communities; was able to quickly respond to disasters and decide on
policy matters regarding its programs; had a true multi-hazard focus;
and had developed a successful track record to accomplish its mission.
The ASFPM was concerned from the beginning that the inclusion of
FEMA into DHS would not bode well for the progress the Nation has made
in reducing our risk to natural hazards. Unfortunately, there has been
mounting evidence that our concerns have been realized. FEMA has gone
from a small, independent agency with direct access to the President to
just one among many entities in a huge organization. The Nation has
gone from ``mitigation'' being the cornerstone of disaster programs to
having the word (and concept) nearly excised from the emergency
management lexicon. Even though assurances were made that legacy
missions of organizations would continue, terrorism was and is the
primary focus of DHS (which ASFPM agrees is the appropriate mission for
DHS). State and local emergency managers, especially those in areas
prone to recurring natural hazards, are lamenting the ``loss'' of FEMA
and are increasingly vocal about the need to restore FEMA to its
previous state.
The following have been and continue to be specific concerns:
transfer of specifically-authorized FEMA and NFIP funds to support
other DHS functions; detailing FEMA staff out of that directorate; not
filling vacant positions throughout FEMA, including senior leadership
positions; and extensive delays in FEMA policy decisions and guidance
due to an added layer of DHS bureaucracy. In 2004, the ASFPM Board of
Directors passed a resolution that FEMA should be taken out of DHS and
reinstated as an independent agency.
ASFPM urges the committee to work to restore FEMA as an
independent agency with direct access to the President. Barring that,
the committee should (1) Monitor FEMA/DHS to ensure that Disaster
Relief Funds and NFIP funds are not spent inappropriately; and (2)
Empower FEMA to have enough independence to carry out programs
effectively and efficiently.
conclusion
The ASFPM has been a long-time supporter of FEMA's hazard
mitigation programs and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act. Today, we once again stand at a crossroads--
in the aftermath of a catastrophic disaster with an opportunity to
refine the Nation's policies for managing disasters of any magnitude.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide our thoughts on these
important issues. The ASFPM and its members look forward to working
with you as we move towards a common goal of reducing the impacts from
natural disasters.
______
Response by Pamela Pogue to Additional Questions from Senator Jeffords
Question 1a. Is there a role today for Federal Government in long-
term recovery of areas hit by disaster?
Response. The role of the Federal Government in post-disaster long-
term recovery is critical. When a community is impacted by the damage
to businesses and private property owners, in addition to public
infrastructure, it is understandable that the rebuilding process can
quickly become overwhelming. It is at that time that building code and
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) standards should be
implemented, yet frequently, local officials succumb to the political
emotional turmoil immediately following the disaster event. If the
political and emotional pressures were not enough, the other major
challenge faced by local officials in the wake of the disaster is the
lack of resources and staff to assist in the post-disaster and
rebuilding process.
FEMA plays a critical role in supporting local communities in
implementing the NFIP minimum building standards during the recovery
phase and supporting them in not allowing reconstruction rules to be
waived. This also provides the best opportunity to promote mitigation
in post-disaster recovery planning and redevelopment.
In addition to supporting sound redevelopment practices in local
communities after a disaster event, the FEMA role is also critical in
coordinating efforts such as ensuring that Public Assistance funding
used to rebuild public infrastructure work are done in a manner
consistent with sound mitigation practices. Additionally housing that
must be rebuilt should also implement mitigation and additional
resources and funding can be leveraged with State Community Development
Block Grant (CDBD) programs. FEMA staffing and expertise can lead the
efforts in coordinating these important rebuilding efforts in order to
ensure that a community redevelops where it is safe and sustainable.
Question 1b. Is there existing authority for this function?
Response. The FEMA role in post-disaster and long-term recovery is
authorized under the auspices of the Stafford Act. Additionally,
Congress should look into providing funding and resources to states and
local government to allow them to hire personnel with the expertise to
manage long-term recovery over an extended period of time necessary to
complete all Federally-funded projects.
Question 1c. Do you believe that any expanded role should apply to
all disasters or be limited to catastrophic events?
Response. Any expanded role should apply to all disasters.
Regardless of the size of a disaster, it can generate damage that may
have social, economic and even environmental impacts to a community
over the long term. The disaster can continue to generate long-term
recovery issues and projects that need top be developed, implemented
and managed. Recognize also that each state may manage a disaster
differently based on the governmental framework. Also understand that
when a catastrophic event occurs, it supercedes the available state
capacity and more than likely FEMA will be called upon to provide
additional resources and staff to supplement state staff.
Question 2. The report entitled, ``Natural Hazard Mitigation
Saves'', issued in 2005, found that mitigation is most effective when
it is carried out on a comprehensive, community-wide, long-term basis,
as opposed to through single, unrelated projects. Can you describe your
views on how FEMA has implemented that finding since 2005 and any
recommendations you may have on policy or legislative changes that
should be made to fully implement that finding?
Response. There has not been enough time since the release of the
National report to accurately evaluate FEMA's progress on implementing
its findings. However, FEMA's efforts which preceded the 2005
Mitigation Report, namely the implementation of the 2000 Disaster
Mitigation Act certainly deserves mention. Since the implementation of
2000 DMA, all 50 states have FEMA-approved state hazard mitigation
plans, which identify the natural hazards that impact their state, and
also an inventory of mitigation projects that can be funded to address
those disasters that may impact areas within their state.
While the federally-mandated state mitigation planning initiatives
are very critical efforts aimed toward pre-identifying mitigation
projects and programs, there continue to be shortfalls in getting
mitigation funding out to states and communities to implement
mitigation projects due to the restrictive nature of what FEMA deems to
be an eligible mitigation project. Unfortunately, FEMA's own evolving
body of policies and rules are making hazard mitigation projects more
difficult to implement. New and innovative mitigation techniques such
as demolish-rebuild (or ``Mitigation Reconstruction'') are not allowed.
This is one of many examples that demonstrate FEMA's restrictive
policies on changing scope of work and inflexible timeframes as items
that cannot be funded under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP).
Second, the study conclusions indicate that FEMA should do more to
count benefits in their models for benefit-cost analysis. Expanded
environmental benefits such as the acquisition of open space and
preservation of habitats that may also counter negative impacts from
storm surge and flooding are not counted at present. Many local and
regional mitigation projects in which several different sources of
funding have been leveraged are not funded due to the minimization of
the value of benefits currently used in the FEMA benefit-cost analysis.
Often this results in projects that communities have tried to submit
for funding to address the FEMA repetitive loss structure list, but due
to the limitations in the FEMA BCA formula these projects are deemed
ineligible.
Question 3a. How do you believe the administration of the
preparedness functions of the Stafford Act have been or will be
impacted by the division of responsibilities between the so-called
Preparedness Directorate and FEMA?
Response. This will result in a very severe negative impact. Over
the last 25 years emergency management has evolved into a very critical
and inseparable four stage cycle: preparedness, response, recovery and
mitigation. All are interconnected and must work in concert in a
comprehensive fashion for a community to be truly resilient to natural
disasters or manmade events. The success of recovery can depend upon
how well people were prepared for the event and how effectively the
community had been implementing mitigation over the long term in order
to minimize the damage from disasters. Even the recovery time and
expense can be dramatically curtailed depending upon how well a
community implemented sound mitigation projects and practices. Each
stage in the emergency management cycle is interdependent and will
impact the success and effectiveness of every other phase of emergency
management.
Question 4a. Until Hurricane Katrina, there were a very limited
number of times during which the Congress diverted from normal
procedures under the Stafford Act in the wake of a disaster. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Congress has enacted a significant
number of legislative changes to the Stafford Act that modify the
manner in which disaster assistance is provided, and many more
proposals are pending. This was a catastrophic disaster worthy of
special action, but it is unlikely to be the last of its kind,
particularly with the changes we can expect as climate change occurs.
What are your recommendations with regard to the potential creation of
a ``third category'' of declaration under the Stafford Act that would
be reserved for catastrophic events, for which special rules would
apply?
Response. This makes sense. Catastrophic disasters such as Katrina
or a major earthquake in the New Madrid seismic zone require special
planning, exercises, operations and recovery resources and expertise.
For example, when a catastrophic event occurs, state and local
governments need additional staffing resources for extending periods of
time to adequately oversee long-term recovery. A non-Federal 25 percent
match is most likely too high when a local economy is 80 to 100 percent
destroyed or when a local state economy is severely impacted. In such
scenarios special rules extending timeframes and perhaps even waiving
or reducing non-Federal match would apply.
Question 4b. What specific provisions of the Stafford Act would you
recommend modifying is such a category?
Response. This would take careful thought and consideration which
might require a task force or study group of stakeholders to analyze
this in greater detail.
Question 5a. The Stafford Act, and the Nation's disaster response,
is focused on preparedness and response. There is very little long-term
recovery authority in the Stafford Act. Do you believe that there is a
role for the Federal Government in this area that should be more
developed?
Response. The role of the Federal Government in long-term recovery
is very critical. The most important role that Congress can help to
support is to clearly articulate and provide additional authority under
the Stafford Act for an expanded Federal role in mitigation, both pre-
disaster and especially post-disaster to further support the long-term
recovery efforts. Long term recovery should include efforts to
implement mitigation planning, projects and programs as a means to
further reduce future impacts from disaster events in the area
impacted. As the national report recently released on the costs and
benefits of mitigation indicates, mitigation yields a 4:1 benefit-cost
ratio on investments, and therefore needs to become an integral part of
the recovery process. This can best be accomplished by providing clear
authority to the Federal Government under the auspices of the Stafford
Act.
In addition to providing greater authority for the Federal
Government to implement mitigation in post disaster recovery, another
measure that Congress should pursue in addressing how to improve the
Federal role in post disaster recovery operations is to expand the
scope of the operations of the Emergency Management Agencies Compact
(EMAC). Currently EMAC only addresses response operations during and
immediately following a disaster. EMAC operations should be extended in
time and scope. For example, EMAC should continue into the post
disaster operations for a pre-defined window of time and related to
recovery and reconstruction in scope. This would allow state and local
officials severely impacted by a disaster to call on experts in other
states to assist by supplementing state and local staffs in critical
post disaster recovery operations such as permitting and making
substantial damage determinations.
Question 5b. Is there currently authority for the Federal
Government to perform long-term recovery operations?
Response. Yes, very limited, but needs to be improved by a more
defined role for mitigation.
Question 5c. Do you believe that any Federal role should be limited
to long-term recovery from catastrophic events?
Response. The role of the Federal Government in long-term recovery
should not be differentiated between catastrophic and a ``regular''
disaster. The Federal role should be more clearly defined and
strengthened in all post-disaster events, regardless of size for long-
term recovery operations.
Question 6. In your opinion did the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000
work and what changes should be made to address what, if anything did
not work?
Response. As a result of DMA 2000 all 50 states have hazard
mitigation plans and many local hazard mitigation plans are now
Federally approved. This is significant because all of these plans, per
the DMA 2000 planning criteria, identify natural hazards risks and
vulnerabilities within the states and communities; describe the impact
of potential damage estimates; outline all relevant state and local
hazard related laws, policies and programs addressing hazard
mitigation; and identify hazard mitigation projects to be funded to
address the natural disaster risks and vulnerabilities that may impact
the state and/or local community. Prior to DMA 2000, this information
did not exist. While these plans need to be improved over time, updated
and modified as disasters occur, it was a solid first attempt in which
critical information now exists that will ultimately help community
plan for and implement mitigation in order to reduce the damages from
natural disaster events. However, communities are much more educated
about mitigation and how their jurisdiction may be impacted by natural
disaster and what they, as officials, can do to address those potential
impacts.
Yet, despite the state and local mitigation planning outcomes now
available on a national basis, DMA 2000 has not made implementing the
mitigation projects as now identified in the State and Local Hazard
Mitigation Plans any easier. If anything, acquiring funding for
mitigation project has become even more restrictive and difficult. When
a disaster occurs, mitigation projects have now been pre-identified in
detail through the hazard mitigation plans, therefore is should be
easier to allocate Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funding to
implement these projects. However, applying these funds has become more
restrictive, the funding to do so has been cut by 50 percent (from 15
percent to 7.5 percent) and the mandated benefit-cost formula which now
has to be applied is archaic, and does not accurately reflect the costs
or benefits of the projects. Changes need to be made to the benefit-
cost formula to accurately depict more benefits which are currently not
being counted.
Another change that needs attention is the disconnect between cost
share percentages in FEMA funding programs when public facilities and
infrastructure qualify for both PA (Public Assistance) and HMGP, This
occurs when PA qualifies for a kick up to a 90/10 cost share and HMGP
is left at 75/25. Authority should be provided to sync the two for the
purposes of matching up mitigation on eligible facilities. These match
requirements should be consistent in order to encourage mitigation when
rebuilding expensive public facilities and infrastructure.
Additionally, to make sure that all states receive some mitigation
funds, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program should allocate a portion of
its funds each year to states for mitigation planning and community
resilience building. Although DMA 2000 would permit this as written,
the FEMA regulations steer the funds to the competitive grant program.
Question 7. There is much discussion about the level of funding to
be provided through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program under which
states are authorized to receive up to 15 percent of the funds to be
provided in response to a major disaster for the purposes of hazard
mitigation measures. In recent years, this number has been reduced to
7.5 percent through appropriations action. Why do you believe that we
really need to raise HMGP back to 15 percent? Does predisaster
mitigation do a better job?
Response. Pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation funding should
not be confused. There is a very significant difference between the
two. Post-disaster mitigation occurs immediately after a disaster event
at a time when a property owner and/or community is most likely to
understand and therefore desire to have their property mitigated, such
as elevated, moved and/or acquired. Funding is available and once the
damage has occurred there is not opportunity for complacency or
disbelief that ``it won't happen to them.'' The greatest opportunity to
implement mitigation is immediately following a disaster. In a
predisaster environment, not only is funding less available, but
convincing property owners who have been repetitively flooded and that
are in high risk areas that they need to implement mitigation measures
is very difficult. At that period of time, conceiving that there may be
potential damage to their property is not a high priority. Yet, in a
post-disaster situation their world revolves around becoming ``whole
again.'' Also understand that predisaster mitigation projects tend to
focus on public facilities primarily because it is difficult to get
property owners to become involved as they do not think anything will
happen to them. Even for public facilities, it can be difficult on a
sunny day to gain local government approval for the cost share due to
strained local budgets.
As significant, there are many states, such as Rhode Island (where
I am the State Floodplain Manager) that have not had a disaster
declaration in over 15 years and therefore have not had any HMGP
funding available to implement mitigation projects, yet their risks are
still extremely high. Unfortunately, mitigation programs such as FMA
and PDM have not served these states well as the restrictions are
severe enough that any mitigation projects that have been proposed have
been deemed ineligible (either because of benefit-cost criteria not
being met or because there are not enough repetitive loss properties to
acquire FMA funding). In the case of Rhode Island, the state has been
denied funding for FMA projects because the repetitive loss properties
do not meet the funding criteria (again the antiquated benefit-cost
formula), yet there is old, outdated public infrastructure that
repeatedly gets damaged by flooding, and has a greater impact on an
entire community as opposed to one repetitive loss homeowner, but does
not qualify for FMA funding. Even though Rhode Island has implemented
hazard mitigation planning concepts since the early 1990s, has a FEMA-
approved State Hazard Mitigation Plan and nearly 93 percent of its
communities have FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Plans, it has received
the least amount of mitigation funding in the country. Yet the risks,
vulnerabilities and potential damage costs (per the FEMA HAZUS model)
are as severe as other states and some of the largest communities in
other areas of the country.
It should also be mentioned that setting up a national competition
for PDM funding is inherently unfair on smaller states that have
minimal staffing (one person for all of mitigation and NFIP in Rhode
Island) when competing against the gigantic staffs of HMGP richly
funded larger states with enormous staffing capability.
When comparing and contrasting pre- and post-disaster recovery
funding, particularly mitigation Congress needs to keep in mind the
financial long-term benefits of mitigation. By applying mitigation
funding damages will be reduced from disasters. As the national report
produced by the National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) reports,
investment in mitigation returns a 4:1 benefit, 5:1 specific to
flooding. Therefore, cutting any funding opportunities for mitigation
will ultimately drive up the costs for Federal Disaster Relief.
Decreasing post-disaster mitigation funding is absurd as there is no
greater opportunity to replace a damaged structure through mitigation
and therefore minimize future damage. Funding for predisaster is
critical to those states that while as susceptible to disaster, have
not yet been hit but are still trying to implement mitigation so that
when they are impacted by a disaster damages can be minimized to the
greatest extent possible.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation funding would serve more people more
effectively if a portion of PDM funds were allocated to states to
support mitigation planning updates and to facilitate development of
community resilience. Other agencies addressing manmade disasters are
better equipped to address those types of concerns.
__________
Statement of Tamara S. Little, Chair, Legal Counsel Committee, National
Emergency Management Association
Thank you Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Jeffords, Senator
Voinovich, and distinguished members of the committee for allowing me
the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record on the
Stafford Act and recommendations for improving the law. I am Tammy
Little, the Assistant Attorney General assigned to the Ohio State
Emergency Management Agency. In my statement, I am representing the
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), whose members are the
state directors of emergency management in the states, territories, and
the District of Columbia. Currently, I am in my fifth term as the Chair
of the NEMA Legal Counsel Committee. I have over 17 years of experience
in emergency management, specifically in legal issues. I am also a
certified assessor and assessor team leader for the Emergency
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and a member of the EMAP
Assessor Training Subcommittee.
state of the stafford act
As the Nation continues to address the recommendations of various
reports reviewing the preparations for, response to, and recovery from
Hurricane Katrina, careful thought must be given to how Congress
approaches the Stafford Act. As you know, the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Recovery Act was enacted ``to provide an orderly
means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the
suffering and damage from such disasters by: . . .'' revising and
broadening the scope of disaster relief programs; encouraging
comprehensive disaster preparedness; achieving greater coordination and
responsiveness of disaster preparedness and relief programs;
encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect
themselves through insurance; encouraging hazard mitigation measures to
reduce disaster losses; and providing Federal assistance programs for
both public and private disaster losses.
The Stafford Act is a law that the members of NEMA hold in very
high regard. Major revisions are not necessary since the law provides
flexibility for emergency management in this country. NEMA played a
very active role during the last major rewrite of the Act, which
resulted in the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2K). NEMA's members
implement various Stafford Act provisions routinely within their states
and often serve as their Governor's state coordinating officer as
outlined in section 302 of the Act. State emergency management
directors are responsible for carrying out the preparedness,
mitigation, response, and recovery functions outlined in the Act at the
state level and coordinating those functions with their Federal and
local counterparts.
NEMA does not support creating a separate or new system solely to
address catastrophic disasters. Not only is the Stafford Act nimble
enough to handle disasters on a large and small scale, but Congress can
and has utilized its ability to make temporary changes to the law
particular circumstances warrant. Any revisions to the Stafford Act
must be thoughtful, deliberate, and closely vetted through stakeholder
groups with proximity to the outcomes, such as NEMA and the members of
the Stafford Act Coalition. NEMA's members firmly believe that the
Stafford Act has served state and local governments well and that the
most persistent problems exist because of inconsistent application of
the Act and its accompanying regulations. Policies, guidelines, course
materials, and most recently strategies are issued without
coordination, a good statutory or regulatory foundation or
Congressional oversight. While the Stafford Act is flexible and
scalable, it is still the authority for emergency management in the
Nation.
For many years, NEMA has provided leadership of a coalition of over
15 national associations that serves to share information on the
Stafford Act and to protect the act from major revision without input
from those stakeholders. The Coalition agrees on a few basic points:
Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) should be fully funded and continually
authorized; the Post-Disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
formula should be restored to 15 percent of disaster costs; and the
Repair Cap for Individual Assistance must be increased.
mitigation and the stafford act
When DMA2K was signed into law, the intent was to create a Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Program; create an Interagency Task Force on Pre-
Disaster Mitigation; set criteria for an increased Federal share for
hazard mitigation measures and allow states to administer the program
directly; define management costs eligibility; outline assistance for
repair of structures; and update the individual assistance program.
Congress made the changes at that time to address a growing need for
mitigation assistance before disasters occur and to make refinements to
disaster programs that would result in cost-savings for the Federal
Government after disasters.
While the legislation took a strong mitigation focus, one example
of how the Stafford Act has been side-stepped is to examine how the
state of mitigation in our country has changed over the last 6 years.
Amendments to law that occurred during the appropriations process
reduced the formula for the post-disaster HMGP program from 15 percent
of disaster costs to 7.5 percent. In effect, mitigation opportunities
were cut by 50 percent since FY 2004. What was intended to be a program
that helped to fund every state's predisaster mitigation efforts, has
now become a competitive program which favors communities with greater
ability to dedicate financial resources to grant applications,
engineering, and preservation reviews before a grant application is
even considered. On a policy front, mitigation has been marginalized.
When the Department of Homeland Security was formed and terrorism
became a greater focus, mitigation activities received less focus.
Mitigation was initially deleted from early drafts of the National
Response Plan and has even less focus in the most recent revisions. The
lifecycle of emergency management (preparedness, response, recovery,
mitigation) was broken when preparedness was moved from FEMA to create
a new Preparedness Directorate within DHS in 2005.
There is some good news that came out of DMA2K. Every single state
and many local governments now have plans in place to pre-identify
mitigation priorities prior to disasters and have identified which
measures may be put in place through PDM and HMGP if a Federal
financial assistance is made available. Additionally, some states took
on greater responsibility of writing and obtaining approval of
``enhanced mitigation plans'' that enable states to be eligible for up
to 20 percent of disaster costs for post-disaster HMGP by acting in a
managing state role for mitigation grants. Currently, seven states have
been approved for enhanced plans (two are pending Federal review), but
no state has received 20 percent for HMGP post-disaster to date. Ohio
had its enhanced mitigation plan approved in May 2005.
As new changes are being considered to the Stafford Act, NEMA asks
that the Senate pay particular attention to ensuring mitigation
opportunities are increased by fully funding the programs and allowing
the important changes made in DMA2K to have the intended effect_
reduction of disaster costs to the Federal Government.
administrative costs
A critical issue facing states regarding the Stafford Act right now
has less to do with Stafford Act revisions than with proper reading and
interpretation of the current law. Even prior to Hurricane Katrina,
accepted uses for the administrative allowance provided by section 406,
such as personnel, overtime, and travel for states related to the
administration of disaster assistance grant programs have been
questioned and rejected. The administrative allowance and management
costs for state and local governments are vital to the success of these
disaster grant programs and are clearly set forth in the law. This is a
significant problem for states in recent disasters and must be
resolved. FEMA should follow the plain language of the statute and
regulations.
Congress created a mechanism under the Stafford Act to compensate
grantees and sub grantees involved in the Hazard Mitigation and Public
Assistance Grant Programs for the administrative expenses they incurred
related to the assistance programs. That mechanism is found in
406(f)(1) and (f)(2), of the Act, which provides a grant equal to the
flat percentage of the final eligible costs as defined under the Act.
FEMA regulations directly relating to 406(f)(1) and (f)(2) mirror
the Act and do not impose any restrictions upon the use of those funds.
The supplemental regulations, 44 CFR 206.228 and 206.439, state that
the funds provided to the State or the sub grantees for their
administrative costs are, in fact, correctly referred to as an
allowance. Several memoranda, audit reports, and draft policies have
resulted in FEMA's current policy that the statutory administrative
allowance provided to the states can only be used for the three items
identified in the Stafford Act even though they are presented as
examples. This is simply an incorrect reading of the plain language of
the statute and regulation. Federal statutes cannot be changed by
policies, memoranda or audit reports and Congressional oversight is
necessary to remedy this practice by FEMA.
suggested changes to the law
As the Congress examines changes necessary to the Stafford Act,
NEMA has several areas identified for immediate improvement.
1. HMGP
The fiscal year 2003 appropriations omnibus package included
language to change the formula for HMGP from 15 percent of disaster
costs, to 7.5 percent, which has caused degradation of post-disaster
mitigation opportunities. Reducing by half the available funding
through the disaster relief fund prevents lessons learned from
disasters from being immediately incorporated into mitigation projects
to prevent future losses of life and destruction of property. HMGP
grants are used for such things as rebuilding under more current
building codes, purchasing repetitive loss properties, and for other
projects that will prevent or minimize the impacts of the next
disaster. Mitigation lessons are particularly important to the Gulf
Coast as rebuilding begins. Cost-benefit analysis is currently a
requirement for predisaster mitigation programs and the recently
released independent study from the National Institute of Building
Sciences' Multi-Hazard Mitigation Council concludes that for every
dollar invested in mitigation, four dollars of Federal benefits accrue_
clearly demonstrating that mitigation funds are a sound investment. In
a purely competitive grant program, lower income communities, often
those most at risk when a natural disaster strikes, will not
effectively compete with more prosperous communities. Also, disasters
graphically and vividly expose the need for and value of mitigation
projects. Less funding means that not only do disaster victims have a
harder time recovering economically and socially, but they remain
vulnerable to future disasters. We must not lose future opportunities
to initiate projects to enhance our communities and reduce future
disaster costs. There are not enough mitigation dollars available to
address all of the vulnerabilities that exist in this country, but the
post-disaster HMGP should at least be restored to the 15 percent of
disaster costs prescribed by DMA2K, allowing more communities to
participate in important disaster cost reduction projects. That was the
original intent of the Stafford Act, as amended by DMA2K.
2. Fixing the Cap on Disaster Costs
A reduction to the Repair Cap for Individual Assistance was
erroneously included in DMA2K and has since adversely impacted many
disaster victims. The limitation prevents disaster victims from
returning to their homes when repair costs exceed the allowable costs,
until other funds can be used to make adequate repairs to make the home
inhabitable. NEMA supports a technical amendment to DMA2K included in
the House passed version of H.R. 3181 from the 108th Congress that
would address the $5,000 cap on disaster repair or replacement for
Individual Assistance. FEMA supports making a change to raise the cap
to the previously accepted amount of $15,000 for repair or replacement
assistance adjusted for inflation to over $27,000.
Rental assistance should be paid up to a maximum of 18 months at
fair market value, with the ability to extend when deemed necessary by
the FEMA Director. The provision change would allow for significant
cost savings by keeping families out of federally provided housing
while repairs are made to minimally damaged homes.
3. Regular-time and Over-time Issues Related to Disasters
State and local governments need to have the ability to utilize
Federal assistance to keep state and local personnel working after a
disaster. Changes to legislation (44 CFR 206.228 (a)(4)) must clarify
that regular time and overtime costs can be paid for vital emergency
and disaster support functions through general Federal assistance. In
cases of catastrophic disaster, where entities have no further income
source, this is particularly important to enable local governments to
continue operations related to response and recovery. Also, there are
cost benefits to having local or state officials trained in building
inspections, health and safety inspections, debris removal, and other
fields to respond during disaster response operations.
4. Pre-positioning of Resources Must be an Eligible Expense for all
Emergency Management Programs and Grants
State and local governments must be able to utilize funds from
emergency management grants such as the Fire Management Assistance
Grants (FMAG) and others to pre-position, purchase and stage supplies,
resources, and equipment prior to a disaster when warning is given.
Having the supplies on the ground reduces response times and costs
after the disaster occurs.
5. Reinstate the Mortgage Rental Assistance Program
The Mortgage and Rental Assistance Program was eliminated in the
DMA2K. Despite its elimination from the Stafford Act, Congress
authorized the program for recent catastrophic disasters such as the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina. The program
allows for disaster victims to receive Federal assistance to pay for
mortgage and rental costs when displaced from their homes in a major
disaster. The program should be permanently reinstated and allowed to
be used for future disasters as it helps when a disaster causes
widespread unemployment but housing stock is maintained. Mortgage
rental assistance is critical for community resilience.
6. Declaration Process
NEMA members report that the disaster declaration process has been
slower in some cases since FEMA became a part of DHS. Congress should
not make changes to the law that will slow the process down, but rather
look at ways to ensure disaster declarations may be considered as
expeditiously as possible. Other provisions need clarification too. The
Stafford Act defines the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer and
the law must be followed by DHS. The PFO concept being implemented by
DHS is not authorized in law. Additionally, while the declaration
process is being considered, Congress may wish to consider revising the
definition of ``major disaster'' to address a biological or chemical
terrorism event or even a pandemic influenza outbreak since those
incidents may not be considered under the current definition.
7. Mass Evacuation
The Stafford Act does not provide for cost reimbursement for states
and localities outside the declared disaster area. While handled during
Hurricane Katrina with individual state emergency declarations for
states taking in evacuees, the need for mass evacuations into other
cities, counties and states will continue to be necessary in
catastrophic events. Further, the new FEMA Interim Recovery Policy will
allow states to seek reimbursement for expenses, through mutual aid.
This process must be addressed by legislation to make clear that
emergency declarations should be made by FEMA, as the change to policy
will mean an additional burden on assisting states and may cause some
states to reconsider participation in mutual aid missions.
8. Post-Storm Assessments
Post-storm assessments are vital data collection tools used to
capture perishable hurricane related intelligence such as evacuation
survey data, decision tools, shelter issues, and hazards vulnerability.
A formalized funding process with consistent funding sources for
assessments must be identified. Currently, FEMA is pursuing this
information on an ad-hoc basis and allowing FEMA to utilize the
Disaster Relief Fund is an authorized use in the Stafford Act. However,
legislative changes may be needed to encourage FEMA to take advantage
of these opportunities to learn from disasters and improve
preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation with solid data.
stafford act regulatory and policy changes
NEMA has specifically looked at some Stafford Act related issues
that do not require changes to the law. Significant need exists for
streamlining and simplifying national policy decisions on response and
recovery. These policy decisions must be made by educated and
enlightened Federal experts in a timely manner during the response and
recovery phases and such expertise needs to be built and maintained at
the Federal level in support of the state and local activities for
recovery.
Some of the changes that must occur on the regulatory and policy
levels by FEMA include:
Uniform, systematic, written, guidance in a clear, timely and
meaningful manner that does not vary from region to region;
Timely notice and training to field personnel and state officials
on new or updated guidance and policies;
A process to approve state management costs within 60 days of a
request;
Clear concise guidance on submission content and evaluation
criteria specific to state management costs;
Administering the Other Needs Assistance Program to address
ethnic and cultural diversity issues in accordance with the approved
state plan for Other Needs Assistance; and
Utilizing the State Disaster Mental Health plans as the basis
for approving the immediate services grant.
debris removal
The committee specifically asked for the witnesses today to address
debris removal issues. Hurricane Katrina resulted in numerous disaster
specific changes in policy for debris removal. Historically, debris
removal is the single issue in a major disaster that creates the most
problems and also opportunities for abuse. You will recall the issue of
the concrete slab removal in Oklahoma that initiated some of the
changes in DMA2K, yet the Gulf Coast states are still struggling with
these issues. In fact, FEMA is releasing new debris removal this week
as part of larger policy guidance on what will be and what will not be
covered in the future.
Our current debris removal reimbursement system is outdated and
provides little incentives for state and local governments to take over
the management of debris removal. The choices are to use the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers at their prices at up to 100 percent Federal
reimbursement or to have to pay a 25 percent cost share if state and
local governments want to take over the management of the project. Most
state and local governments can utilize public works systems in place
and mutual aid to get the job done--often cheaper than the Corps.
However, there is no incentive. Thought needs to be given to lowering
the state and local cost share for debris removal if the impacted
communities are willing to take on these tasks themselves.
Additionally, some local governments managing the process in the Gulf
Coast have reported the desire to recycle materials removed, yet the
Federal Government gets any financial credit for such actions instead
of the state or local government completing the work.
Careful thought must be given to the issue of debris removal on
private property in emergency situations. Community and homeowners
associations properties are not always afforded Category assistance in
the early days of an emergency and this assistance varies by disaster
and location. In these cases, the associations often maintain the
streets and roadways on the private property. Debris removal on private
property bubbled up again in the 2004 Hurricane season in Florida and
Alabama as the response began in the emergency phase.
We must find some common ground and develop policies that remove
the obstacles that prevent us from accomplishing debris removal goals
and objectives without compromising the integrity of the program and
provide acceptable levels of accountability.
conclusion
With the Nation poised to implement reforms to make our emergency
response system stronger, improvements are needed in our disaster laws.
I offer NEMA to the committee as a technical resource as you develop
legislation and debate the issues mentioned before you today. I thank
you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate
your partnership. I hope we can work together to ensure the Stafford
Act is strengthened and protected.
______
Responses by Tamara Little to Additional Questions from
Senator Jeffords
Question 1. During the hearing, in response to my question
regarding any changes to the Stafford Act that might be required to
ensure that the Federal Government has the appropriate authorities to
respond to all types of events, including biological agents, weapons of
mass destruction, or epidemics in a coordinated, planned manner, given
the definitions of emergency and major disaster in the Act, you
indicated that NEMA does not believe that any modifications are
required. Given that major disaster declarations are limited to natural
disasters or ``fire, flood, or explosion, regardless of cause'', please
describe under what legislative authority you believe the Federal
Government would respond to a terrorist event that involved the release
of an airborne agent without the use of an explosive device.
Response. Since the hearing, our Legislative Committee has looked
closely at the definition of major disaster and we believe that the
definition should be modified to include act of terrorism and chemical
or biological event. However, the Public Health Emergencies Act should
also be triggered in any event impacting health, as the Stafford Act
does not address some of the public health tools that will need to be
put in place after such an event.
Question 2. What are your recommendations with regard to the
potential creation of a ``third category'' of declaration under the
Stafford Act that would be reserved for catastrophic events, for which
special rules would apply?
Response. NEMA does not support creating a separate category for
catastrophic events. A clear definition of catastrophe must be
developed by Federal, State, and local practitioners before any
legislation can be written, because otherwise every event will result
in impacted states seeking a catastrophic declaration.
Question 3. Do you believe that there is a role today for the
Federal Government in long-term recovery of areas hit by disaster,
whether there is an existing authority for this function, and whether
you believe that any expanded role should should apply to all disasters
or be limited to catastrophic events?
Response. There is definitely a role for the Federal Government in
long-term recovery especially with major catastrophic disasters like
Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Andrew, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
North Ridge and Loma Prieta earthquakes. FEMA has statutory authority
for assistance with recovery work, but in these cases other Federal
agencies like Housing and Urban Development, Labor, and others will
have to play a role. FEMA's role in mitigation and looking at how to
rebuild to mitigate future disasters must be continued. States should
have the lead though. Congress has the ability to broaden this
authority for these catastrophic events, but this should not apply to
each and every disaster.
Question 4. The report entitled, ``Natural Hazard Mitigation
Saves'', issues in 2005 found that mitigation is most effective when it
is carried out on a comprehensive, community-wide, long-term basis, as
opposed to through single, unrelated projects. Can you describe your
views on how FEMA had implemented that finding since 2005 and any
recommendations you may have on policy or legislative changes that
should be made to fully implement that finding?
Response. NEMA supports the 2005 report and the cost-benefit ratios
produced in the report for mitigation. FEMA has yet to implement that
finding and they are currently working with State hazard mitigation
officers to develop guidance for a unified hazard mitigation grants
system that will address the comprehensive approach. At this point, we
are working closely with FEMA. The only policy change that must be
considered is a way to make eligible at the front end of the grant-
making process the administrative costs for technical reviews,
engineering reviews, and historical preservation that are currently
outlayed in order for an application to be considered.
Question 5. Has the administration of preparedness functions of the
Stafford Act been impacted by the division of responsibilities between
the so-called Preparedness Directorate and FEMA? Do you believe it will
be impacted in the future?
Response. FEMA currently retains the Stafford Act authorities in
law. While NEMA remains concerned that preparedness functions have been
separated from response and recovery functions, the larger issue is how
the Stafford Act is administered in a larger department where
additional layers of bureaucracy can slow down disaster declarations,
policy and other changes to the Stafford Act. The FEMA Director, as the
key Stafford Act administrator, must have the ability to work directly
with the President during times of disaster to prevent these delays.
Question 6. Some believe that the use of pre-existing debris
removal contracts at either the local, State, or Federal level could
speed debris clean-up post-disaster. Please describe any experience
that states have had using pre-existing debris contracts and whether
they have expedited clean-up at a lower cost.
Response. The NEMA President from Alabama reports that most Gulf
Coast states are utilizing this approach in the current year, though
fortunately the contracts have not had to been exercised because of the
lack of storms.
Question 7. Do you believe that there should be an enhanced role in
major disasters of in catastrophic events for debris clean-up that
creates an authority for the Federal Government to conduct clean-up
without the request of a State or local government?
Response. Under no circumstances, does NEMA believe the Federal
Government should have the right to take away the authority of State
and local governments to request assistance on their own or control the
state's own response and recovery operations. Federal assistance should
be just that_Federal assistance.
Question 8a. Until Hurricane Katrina, there were a very limited
number of times during which the Congress diverted from normal
procedures under the Stafford Act in the wake of a disaster. After
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Congress has enacted a significant
number of legislative changes to the Stafford Act that modify the
manner in which disaster assistance is provided, and many more
proposals are pending. This was a catastrophic disaster worthy of
speciation action, but it is likely to be the last of its kind,
particularly with the changes we can expect as climate change occurs.
What are your recommendations with regard to the potential creation
of a ``third category of declaration'' under the Stafford Act that
would be reserved for catastrophic events, for which special rules
would apply?
Response. NEMA does not support creating a separate category for
catastrophic events at this time. A clear definition of catastrophe
must be developed by Federal, State, and local practitioners before any
legislation can be written, because otherwise every event will result
in impacted states seeking a catastrophic declaration. Congress has the
ability to make changes to the Stafford Act based on individual needs
for each disaster.
Question 8b. What specific provisions of the Stafford Act would you
recommend modifying in such a category?
Response. NEMA strongly recommends addressing the repair and
replacement cap and updating the cap to address the current need. NEMA
also calls on Congress to restore the 15 percent formula for post-
disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for all states.
Question 9. Section 603 of the Stafford Act specifies that
preparedness functions shall be carried out by the Director of FEMA.
Section 430 of the Homeland Security Act specifies preparedness
authorities for the Office of Domestic Preparedness within DHS dealing
with terrorism. DHS has apparently transferred preparedness functions
away from FEMA, which appears to conflict with the statutory
requirement in section 603 and to exceed the authorities granted under
the Homeland Security Act. Please explain.
Response. You are correct, both FEMA and ODP (or the Office of
Grants and Training now) have statutory authority. However, DHS
submitted a plan to Congress last summer as the Second Stage Review for
DHS that created a Preparedness Directorate and moved the preparedness
functions away from FEMA. Congress agreed with those changes in the FY
2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bill and the new plan was shortly
implemented. A key emergency management official, George Foresman, was
appointed as the Preparedness Under Secretary and he is making strides
to link preparedness with response and recovery within DHS, however we
are watching this issue carefully.
Question 10. Title VI of the Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to assist
states in negotiated interstate emergency preparedness compacts. Who is
responsible for this function, section 611 (h) of the Stafford Act,
under the new organization, and what actions have been taken in the
Gulf States to improve the utilization of mutual aid compacts?
Response. We are currently working with both FEMA and the
Preparedness Directorate, since the issue could impact natural
disasters or other disasters. For Hurricane Katrina and Rita, the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) has fulfilled over 2174
missions with 49 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin
Islands and Puerto Rico providing assistance in the form of 65,919
civilian and military personnel and equipment assets to support the
impacted states. The estimated costs of this assistance may exceed $829
million. EMAC is currently completing an After-Action report on state-
to-state mutual aid and we will be happy to share those results with
you once the report is final. In the meantime, NEMA formed an Advisory
Group of a variety of State and local emergency response associations
and State and local governments to explore some of the issues that need
attention, such as sharing information on the EMAC system with elected
officials and emergency response disciplines.
Question 11. In your opinion, did the Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 work and what changes should be made to address, what if anything
did not work?
Response. Overall, every State now has a comprehensive mitigation
plan on the books and many local governments also did. However, the
change in HMGP that followed DMA2K changed the approach to mitigation
splitting the difference, rather than looking at enhancing all
mitigation opportunities. NEMA strongly recommends addressing the
repair and replacement cap and updating the cap to address the current
need. NEMA also calls on Congress to restore the 15 percent formula for
post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for all states.
Question 12. There is much discussion about the level of funding to
be provided through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) under
which states are authorized to receive up to 15 percent of the funds to
be provided in response to a major disaster for the purposes of hazard
mitigation measures. In recent years, this number has been reduced to
7.5 percent through the appropriations action. Why do you believe that
we really need to raise HMGP back to 15 percent? Does predisaster
mitigation do a better job.
Response. Effective mitigation requires a balanced and
comprehensive approach. Predisaster mitigation has been doing a good
job of providing mitigation opportunities to communities that have not
experienced disasters. The program is based in prevention activities.
However, the program is slanted to give more opportunities to larger
more wealthy communities and states, because so many administrative
costs are required on the front end of the application process.
However, we strongly believe that post-disaster opportunities are being
lost because of the formula cut to HMGP. A 100-year flood or storm like
Hurricane Katrina provides unique mitigation opportunities to take the
lessons learned and apply them when rebuilding. It is also easier to
get community buy-in after a major disaster for the program, since
there is a cost-share. In the long-term mitigation saves in disaster
costs outlayed by the Federal Government.
Question 13. Can you give me a sense of how mitigation is working
in this country right now and how it can be improved? What specific
changes can Congress make to put mitigation on the right track?
Response. FEMA is looking at a unified mitigation grants system,
which will be a great opportunity to look at mitigation holistically.
Continued Congressional oversight to ensure State and local input into
policy changes is helpful, but NEMA also calls on Congress to restore
the 15 percent formula for post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program for all states.
Note: Questions 14 and 15 are duplicate questions for 4 and 9,
respectively.
______
Responses by Tamara Little to Additional Questions from Senator Clinton
Question 1. Some questions have been raised regarding contracting
procedures at both local and Federal levels. Some believe that pre-
existing debris removal contracts reduce overall disaster clean-up
costs and speed the pace of removal. On September 15, 2005, the Army
Corps awarded four fixed price contracts for debris removal in the
areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. Each of these contracts has a
value of up to $500 million each, with the option of an additional $500
million. Each contract requires the contractor to submit a
subcontracting plan with the goal of including the following
participation: 73.5 percent for small business, 3 percent for Service-
disabled veterans, 3.2 percent for Small HUB-Zone concerns, 10.6
percent for Small Disadvantaged business, and 11 percent for Small
Women-owned business. The Corps issues an open announcement for these
contracts through the Army Corps of Engineers, Memphis Web site. The
Corps shortened the time available to respond to the announcement in
light of the urgent need for debris removal services; however despite
the shortened time period, the Corp received 22 proposals.
Do you believe that there should be an enhanced role in major
disasters or in catastrophic events for debris clean-up that creates an
authority for the for the Federal Government to conduct debris clean-up
without the request of a local government?
Response. Under no circumstances, NEMA believes the Federal
Government should have the right to take away the authority of State
and local governments to request assistance on their own or control the
state's own response and recovery operations. Federal assistance should
be just that--Federal assistance that works cooperatively with State
and local governments at their request.
Question 2. Some believe that the use of pre-existing debris
removal contracts at either the local, State, or Federal level could
speed debris clean-up post-disaster. Please describe any experience
that states have had in using pre-existing debris contracts and whether
they have expedited clean-up at a lower cost?
Response. I cannot speak from my experience in Ohio on this issue,
however, the NEMA President from Alabama reports that most Gulf Coast
states are utilizing this approach in the current year, though
fortunately the contracts have not had to been exercised because of the
lack of storms. Bruce Baughman of Alabama reports that most State and
local governments are capable of doing and managing some of the work
themselves, however there is a larger cost-share and a disincentive to
doing that work. State and local governments would rather retain
control of the process in some cases though.
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