[Senate Hearing 109-935]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-935
NOMINATION OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Bolton, Hon. John R., Nominee to be U.S. Representative to the
United Nations................................................. 7
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Dodd, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator from Connecticut............ 4
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Warner, Hon. John A., U.S. Senator from Virginia................. 3
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Section 5 of the New York Review of Books, submitted by Hon.
Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California.................... 55
(iii)
NOMINATION OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich,
Alexander, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. The committee meets today to consider
President Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be United States
Ambassador to the United Nations.
This is the third Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing in which Ambassador Bolton has testified since his
appointment less than a year ago. In addition, in February, he
hosted a delegation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that traveled to the United Nations. I wish that all members of
the committee had been able to make that journey to New York
with us. On that occasion, Senator Coleman, Senator Voinovich,
and I had opportunity to meet with a number of key individuals
and groups involved in deliberations on United Nations reform.
The visit was especially informative on the complexity of the
reform debate in New York and on the challenges faced by the
United States delegation.
In the spring of 2005, our committee spent several weeks
reviewing the nominee's qualifications for this post. Few
executive branch nominees have ever received more scrutiny than
Ambassador Bolton. By any measure, this was an exhaustive
review, particularly for a nominee who has been acknowledged as
highly experienced in the subject matter he would be overseeing
and who has been confirmed five times previously by the United
States Senate.
In the end, despite two majority votes on the Senate floor,
the nomination did not receive the 60 votes necessary to bring
debate to a conclusion. President Bush subsequently exercised
his authority to give the nominee a recess appointment.
We have returned to the nomination because the President
has resubmitted the nominee for our consideration. And, in
doing so, he has expressed his view that Ambassador Bolton is
important to the implementation of United States policies of
the United Nations and of broader United States roles on the
global stage.
The President has made clear that this is not a casual
appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific job.
We should recognize that the United Nations Ambassador always
is closely associated with the President of the United States
and the Secretary of State. They are responsible for what the
ambassador says and does, and they can dismiss the ambassador
who does not follow their directives. Consequently, there are
few positions in Government in which the President should have
more latitude in choosing his nominee.
As we evaluate the nominee, we should not lose sight of the
larger national security issues concerning U.N. reform and
international diplomacy that are central to this nomination.
Our Nation is confronted, as it was last year, by serious
diplomatic challenges that will have a profound effect on U.S.
national security.
At the heart of our efforts to resolve these issues is a
basic question. Can the United States build relationships and
alliances around the world that will give us the tools we need
to protect our national security? In almost every recent case,
the Bush administration has embraced a multilateral dimension
to problem solving that recognizes that we need allies.
And as we attempt to reverse the weapons programs of North
Korea, we are depending heavily on the Six-Party Talks that
involve China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. As we attempt to
stop the Iranian nuclear program, we utilize negotiations
carried out by Great Britain, France, and Germany, and we have
sought the United Nations Security Council votes of Russia,
China, and others. And throughout our experience in Iraq, we've
requested the help of countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle
East, and elsewhere to support the nascent Iraqi Government, to
help train its army, and generally to contribute to stability
in the region. As we search for ways to promote stability on
the Israeli-Lebanese border, an international peacekeeping
force is being considered as a possible solution. In
Afghanistan, we have turned some U.S. military missions over to
our NATO allies, who are increasing their contributions. In
what may be the most important strategic diplomatic initiative
undertaken by the Bush administration, the United States is
seeking a groundbreaking partnership with India.
In each of these cases, and many others, success depends on
the reserve of support that we can tap with our allies and our
friends. It depends on the willingness of other nations to
expand the options and resources that can be applied to solving
problems that threaten our security. The process of building
international relationships cannot be reserved for times of
crisis. It must be a constant preoccupation of any
administration, and it must be a core diplomatic mission of our
United Nations Ambassador.
During the last year, Ambassador Bolton has shared with us
his efforts at reforming the United Nations and his efforts to
represent our Nation in that forum. We're pleased to have an
opportunity today not only to examine his qualifications, but
also to review the status of several crucial initiatives he is
overseeing in New York.
President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of
experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and
representative at the United Nations. Given the importance of
this position, it's vital we evaluate the nominee fairly and
expeditiously. We look forward to learning how the nominee has
worked on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State
during the past year, and what he would do in coming years, if
he is confirmed.
Let me mention that the distinguished ranking member of our
committee, Senator Biden, will be with us in the hearing in due
course. He is at the White House presently attending an
important signing ceremony on the extension of the Voting
Rights Act. And when he returns obviously we'll recognize him
for the opening statement he might have presented at this
moment.
We will proceed. Senator Warner is here. And I understand,
Senator, you have come to introduce the nominee. And you're
recognized. And we're delighted to have you.
STATEMENT OF JOHN A. WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is, indeed, a privilege for me to come. And I wish to
point out I was on time. I think you started early. [Laughter.]
And--but, nevertheless, I very much wanted to join, this
morning. And I'll ask that my statement be placed into the
record----
The Chairman. It will be placed in full.
Senator Warner [continuing]. Because it was fortunate for
me to have the opportunity to listen to your carefully prepared
and well-delivered, very comprehensive statement in support of
this nominee.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator John Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, colleagues, I join you once again--
as I did on April 7, 2005--to introduce John Bolton, the President's
nominee for U.S. Representative to the United Nations with the Rank of
Ambassador.
When the President nominated John Bolton to this position last
year, the President and his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,
expressed their confidence that John Bolton had the experience and
skills to represent the United States at the United Nations and to
carry out the President's priorities to strengthen and reform the U.N.
Ambassador Bolton has clearly demonstrated by his exceptional
professional performance of his duties over the past 15 months that the
confidence of the President and the Secretary was well-placed. While
serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Bolton was
instrumental in:
Negotiating a formal Security Council statement calling on
Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment activities;
Encouraging adoption of resolutions to establish a mandate
to arrest Charles Taylor and bring him to justice; and to
ensure peaceful presidential elections in Liberia;
Leading the effort to have the Security Council take a firm
and clear stand against the recent North Korean missile
launches. This was effectively accomplished through the
adoption of Resolution 1695; and
Working with the Security Council to authorize contingency
planning for the transition of the African Union Mission in
Sudan to a U.N. operation, and to permit the entry of a joint
African Union-U.N. assessment team to Darfur.
These are just a few examples of Ambassador Bolton's effectiveness
at the U.N. I share the President's and the Secretary's confidence that
John Bolton will continue to forcefully and diplomatically represent
the United States and advance the President's goal of making the United
Nations a stronger, more effective international organization.
Given the many challenges that face the United Nations Security
Council at this time, I believe continuity of U.S. representation there
is critical. John Bolton is a key member of the President's national
security team, and the President needs him in place as the U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N. Speaking at the U.N. and before the
international media on behalf of the President and the United States,
Mr. Bolton should have the benefit of the credibility, confidence, and
support that is conferred by Senate confirmation.
Senator Warner. I would simply wish to add a personal note,
Mr. Chairman. You and I came to the Senate about the same time,
and we have often reminisced together about our--opportunities
this country has given us to observe history in the making. And
we both started in the tail end of World War II, went through
Korea and Vietnam, and today. And I would say, without any
hesitation, it is my observation that our President is faced
with a more complex framework of challenges than any President
before us in contemporary history.
We're talking here today about the continuity of his
representative to the United Nations. You very carefully and
thoughtfully outlined he is the President's choice. The
President, as well as all America and all the world, have had
the opportunity to see this fine man exercise his professional
and diplomatic skills in a very extraordinary way. And now, the
sole thing that remains is that constitutional authority of the
Senate to give its advice and consent.
I do believe, without any reservation whatsoever, that the
Senate will, and should, give that advice and consent to this
nominee, because he becomes an integral member of the
President's national security team at a time when our Nation is
faced with these many complex issues.
So, I wish you well, Mr. Chairman, as you guide this
nomination. I say to my good friend, thank you for your public
service, and that of your family, and your resolve to carry on.
Good luck.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Warner. We appreciate, as
always, the wonderful cooperation our committee has with the
Armed Services Committee that you chair. And you're most
thoughtful to come over to make a statement on behalf of the
nominee.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
The Chairman. I note the presence of Senator Dodd, and I
mention Senator Dodd specifically, because, in the absence of
Senator Biden, the Senator has asked that Senator Dodd might be
permitted to make a statement at this time corresponding to the
opening statement that I've made. And so, I'll recognize the
Senator for that purpose, and then we will recognize the
nominee.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I apologize for being a couple of minutes late coming over
to the hearing.
And welcome to my good friend from Virginia, Senator
Warner. Always a pleasure to have you come by. Both Senators
from Virginia here, sitting together this morning at the dais.
Senator Warner. I thank you, Senator Dodd. I note that this
hearing started on time, which is somewhat unusual.
Senator Dodd. That doesn't happen in the Armed Services
Committee, does it?
Senator Warner. No, no, not at all. [Laughter.]
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, when the Senate considered this
nomination last year, I strongly opposed the confirmation of
Mr. Bolton to the position of United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations on both procedural and
substantive grounds. Mr. Chairman, I remain opposed to this
nominee, and I'd like to explain why.
Before being nominated to this position in 2005, Mr.
Bolton's own statements evidenced great skepticism and disdain
for the United Nations and to multilateral diplomacy generally.
Nothing he has said or done since assuming his current position
in New York suggests he has altered his views on the United
Nations or on multilateral diplomacy generally.
Mr. Chairman, I'm not one who has made the determination
that Mr. Bolton hasn't changed his spots, so to speak, when it
comes to his views on the usefulness of diplomacy in advancing
the United States interests. Some 30 of his colleagues at the
United Nations with whom he serves have said as much. In a
recent New York Times article, one colleague characterized him
as intransigent. Another suggested that Mr. Bolton's high
ambition are coverups for less noble aims and oriented not at
improving the United Nations, but at belittling and weakening
it. A third has essentially written off working with Mr.
Bolton. I quote him. He said, ``He's lost me as an ally now,
and that's what many other Ambassadors who considered
themselves friends of the United States are saying.''
Mr. Bolton clearly has an aversion, in my view, to being
diplomatic or to building consensus for U.S. position, and that
is deeply troubling to me, particularly as we witness chaos
erupting in Iraq and the substantial commitment of American
resources and manpower being consumed to prevent full-scale
civil war there. And then I turned around to find a virtual
explosion of other international crises around the globe, and
the United States hamstrung by fewer resources and options for
responding to those crises.
When the committee considered Mr. Bolton's nomination last
year, we heard unprecedented criticism from colleagues who
served with him in the State Department. A number of them were
appointees by the current President. Among other things, he was
described by his colleagues as a bully and a bean counter. I
said at the time that Mr. Bolton's personality really--isn't
really the issue, as far as I'm concerned, at all. There are
lots of bullies in this town, and, I suspect, New York, as
well. My objection isn't that he's a bully, but that he's been
an ineffective bully and can't win the day when it comes--when
it really counts. For example, prior to a vote early this month
on the United Nations Security Council resolution intended to
sanction North Korea for its provocative 4th of July missile
launches, Mr. Bolton publicly assured anyone who would listen
that he could get support for a resolution with teeth for the
so-called Chapter VII obligations. Turns out, of course, he
couldn't. The resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council
fell well short of that.
Last September, Mr. Bolton told the House International
Relations Committee that the negotiation of an effective Human
Rights Council was a key objective of the United States, and
that it was a very high priority, and a personal priority of
his. High priority? I don't think so. There were 30 negotiating
sessions, a very critical issue, to hammer out the framework of
this Human Rights Council, and Ambassador Bolton managed to
attend only one or two of those sessions. In the end, the
United States was one of four countries to vote against
approval of the new U.N. Human Rights Council.
When the score is tallied on the effectiveness of Mr.
Bolton at the United Nations, I think he receives a failing
grade.
There is a procedural dimension, as well, to my concerns
with the nominee, as well. Last year, the administration
refused to provide this committee with documents relevant to
its deliberations concerning Mr. Bolton's conduct while serving
as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security Affairs. The Senate validated this committee's right
and obligation to receive information it determined to be
relevant by refusing to invoke closure on the nomination until
the administration honored those requests. The administration
chose not to do so, and instead made the decision to give Mr.
Bolton a recess appointment.
Specifically, documents were requested related to Mr.
Bolton's use or misuse of NSA intercepts and his practice of
advancing his own political agenda by overstating available
intelligence. That information remains relevant, I think, Mr.
Chairman, to this committee's consideration of this nominee.
And, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would publicly restate my
earlier request for that material. We are told that we must not
delay the nomination any longer. Forget about getting
additional information that is clearly relevant. ``The Senate
must confirm Mr. Bolton,'' his supporters argue, ``because of
the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, and we need his strong voice in
New York to deal with that crisis.'' I would first ask what Mr.
Bolton has done in his 12 months to avert any crisis in the
first place. What did he do to push for key provisions of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1559 to be implemented,
specifically those related to the disarming of Hezbollah?
Clearly, the answer is ``not enough,'' in my view. Had 1559
been implemented in full, Israel would not have been attacked,
and we wouldn't be waiting--or watching, rather--Lebanon being
destroyed in order to deal with the still-armed Hezbollah.
Mr. Chairman, I would then return to the point that I made
earlier; namely, that Mr. Bolton has largely burned his bridges
with his colleagues in New York, and isn't likely to be an
effective diplomat when diplomacy is increasingly becoming the
coin of the realm in protecting the advancing U.S. interests at
this very unstable moment in our history.
Mr. Chairman, the administration should put the Nation's
interests first, in my view, and nominate an individual with
strong diplomatic skills who believes in diplomacy rather than
placing his conservative agenda by continuing to push for
confirmation of an unsuitable nominee. Now, I doubt very much,
Mr. Chairman, that today's hearing is going to change any
minds, but I stand ready to listen to Mr. Bolton respond to the
questions of our colleagues and hope that the committee would
certainly give them serious attention.
And I thank the committee.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
We will have a period of questions after the nominee's
opening statement.
And I call now upon the nominee, John Bolton. We are
pleased to have you here, sir, and I ask you to proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Ambassador Bolton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have a prepared statement I'd ask be submitted to the
record, and I just have a brief summary of that.
The Chairman. Your statement will be published in full.
Ambassador Bolton. I want to thank Senator Warner for his
kind introduction this morning before he has to leave. I'm
grateful, once again, Senator, for your introducing me to the
committee.
Senator Warner. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Bolton. I'd also like to thank, Mr. Chairman,
you and your colleagues for the support that you had given me
over the course of the past year. Whether it is the attention
this committee has focused on reforming the United Nations or
the myriad of critical issues currently on the agenda of the
Security Council, your work has helped to advance important
policy goals of the United States. I thank you for your help
and look forward to continuing and strengthening our close
working relationship if I am confirmed.
As I said earlier, I thank Senator Warner. I'd also like to
thank Dr. Kissinger, who I had hoped would be here today. We do
have a letter that he was able to submit that perhaps we'll be
able to read at an appropriate point.
I want to thank my wife, Gretchen, who's here again today,
for her love and support. I want to thank my daughter, Jennifer
Sarah, who's a junior at Yale this fall, who is pursuing her
course on Grand Strategies by traveling through South America
studying the colonial policies of King Philip II of Spain. So,
she is unable to be here today.
The need for a strong and effective U.N. remains as
powerful today as ever. As President Bush has declared, ``Now
more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as it
strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of its
original promise to save succeeding generations from the
scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights,
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in
larger freedom.''
For close to a year now, I've had the privilege and honor
to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. I've also had the privilege and honor to work with a
fantastic team in our mission up in New York, and I cannot
thank them enough. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
my close working relationship with them, in addition to doing
my utmost to uphold the confidence that the President,
Secretary Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
In the time I have before you today, I would like to
discuss several of the most critical issues confronting the
U.N. and the Security Council.
Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the crisis and tragedy
unfolding in the Middle East. The United States is exhausting
all diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation. With her
recent trip to the region, and then traveling to Rome to meet
with the Lebanon core group, Secretary Rice has been very clear
that our goal is to achieve a doable solution, one that
strengthens the forces of peace and democracy in the region.
This does not mean, however, that we are ignoring the
humanitarian impact of the immediate crisis. Indeed, just 2
days ago, Secretary Rice authorized $30 million in assistance
to victims of the conflict in Lebanon. To meet the most urgent
needs, the United States has also dispatched two large-scale
medical deliveries.
The Security Council is also actively seized of the matter.
We are working closely with other members to ensure that
appropriate action is taken by the Council. Any action we take
must recognize that the current conflict is a direct result of
the terrorist acts of Hezbollah and Hamas, and their state
sponsors in Iran and Syria. Lopsided resolutions, such as the
one the United States vetoed this month, would do nothing to
promote a long-term solution, and would only prolong the
suffering of innocent civilian populations in the region.
As the Secretary has noted, we must defang Hezbollah. We
appreciate the bold and courageous action of the Arab League in
condemning Hezbollah for instigating this conflict. As I speak,
though, Hezbollah continues to operate in southern Lebanon with
impunity, defying the will of the Security Council as
established in Resolution 1559. We are working hard with others
to bring about its full implementation and the full extension
of its authority by the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese
territory. If that were done, then Israel would be less subject
to terrorist attacks, and the people of Lebanon would not be
subject to the reign of terror that Hezbollah inflicts.
We are actively considering a variety of methods on how
best to secure the implementation of Resolution 1559. Some
member states have called for an immediate and unconditional
cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, but we must ask our
colleagues, how do you negotiate and maintain a cease-fire with
a terrorist organization, one which does not even recognize the
right of Israel to exist? We're also considering the insertion
of a stabilization force into the region, while considering
important questions related to its scope and mandate.
These are all important issues currently under discussion
by the Secretary and in the Security Council. The question of
Israel's response has come up, as well. Of course, it is a
matter of the utmost concern to us, as President Bush has
stressed, that civilian deaths are occurring. It is a tragedy,
and I would not attempt to describe it any other way. We have
urged the Government of Israel to exercise the greatest
possible care in its use of force. The legitimate exercise of
Israel's right of self-defense is not the moral equivalent of
the terrorist acts of Hezbollah, but all of these civilian
deaths are tragic.
We hope that from this current crisis we can seize the
opportunity to once and forever dismantle Hezbollah, restore
democratic control by Lebanon over all of its territory, and
lay the foundations that would allow Israel to live in peace
with its neighbors.
The Security Council is also actively seized with the
proliferation threats posed by both Iran and North Korea. In
the case of Iran, we are currently in the process of
negotiating a resolution that will require Iran to end its
pursuit of nuclear weapons. Firm and decisive action by the
Council is necessary, because Iran has consistently rebuffed
the diplomatic efforts pursued by our friends and allies in
Europe.
It is critical that we succeed in these efforts. Iran's
unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a grave and direct
threat to international peace and security. This is
particularly clear in light of the inflammatory rhetoric of
Iran's leader, who recklessly calls for Israel to be wiped off
the map, and who even questions the tragic events of the
Holocaust.
I am pleased to say that we have already taken firm action
in the case of North Korea following their decision to violate
several international commitments and launch seven ballistic
missiles, including a long range Taepodong II, in the vicinity
of Japan. On July 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1695, which demands that North Korea suspend all
activities relating to its ballistic missile program, including
a return to its moratorium on test launching. The resolution
also requires member states to cease all trade in goods and
technology which might contribute to North Korea's missile or
other WMD-related programs. This resolution was the outcome of
11 days of intensive negotiations. Bear in mind, when North
Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan's airspace in
1998, the response of the Security Council was a weak press
statement. This time, however, we were able to bring along
China and Russia to support a very strong resolution, even
though they initially supported issuing yet another press
statement. The fact that both China and Russia supported the
resolution, the first one on North Korea since 1993, cannot be
lost on the North Korean leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I know that the situation in Darfur is also
of particular interest to the committee. We continue to push
hard to bring relief to the citizens of Darfur, where over
200,000 people have lost their lives and over 2 million have
become displaced since 2003. The United States remains
committed to establishing a new and expanded U.N. force in
Darfur by year's end.
Significant challenges, however, remain. Russia and China
continue to voice opposition to a resolution with a binding
Chapter VII mandate. There is also the issue of the Government
of Sudan agreeing to a U.N. force in Darfur.
Significant efforts are underway in New York and other
venues to overcome these obstacles. The U.N. Technical
Assessment Mission has returned from Sudan and is finalizing
its report to the Security Council.
In the interim, we are working with our NATO allies to
support the current mission on the ground in the form of
planning, logistics, intelligence support, and other help. As
President Bush has said, ``America will not turn away from this
tragedy. We will call genocide by its rightful name, and we
will stand up for the innocent until the peace of Darfur is
secured.''
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to the issue of U.N. reform.
The assessment I gave you in testimony before the committee 2
months ago broadly remains valid today. Some modest progress
has been achieved since the world summit last September,
including establishing a much-needed U.N. Ethics Office,
strengthening financial disclosure requirements for U.N. staff
members, protecting U.N. personnel from retaliation for
reporting misconduct, and providing needed resources for
oversight. While these reforms are important steps in the right
direction, we had hoped for more. The goal now is to identify
priority targets where progress can be made, and take the
necessary steps to demonstrate that the U.N. and its member
states are fully engaged in launching what Secretary of State
Rice has termed ``a lasting revolution of reform,'' one that
would transform the United Nations into an institution fully
capable of addressing the complex array of challenges now
confronting us all.
To this end, the United States recently joined consensus on
the adoption of several reforms relating to information and
communication technology, budget implementation, financial
management practices, and improved reporting mechanisms,
including increased public access to U.N. records.
These issues all speak to our attempts to change the
``culture of inaction,'' the phrase used by Paul Volcker before
this very committee when discussing the Oil-for-Food scandal.
To change this culture, we are working to increase the
transparency and accountability of the U.N., not just to shine
a light on the agencies or bodies which may be in need of
reform, but to allow those that do work effectively to better
advertise and market their expertise in ways that might serve
as a model for others. If confirmed, I pledge to continue
working on this important issue.
Mr. Chairman, allow me briefly to update you on where we
stand with regard to the new Human Rights Council. We are still
in the position of evaluating the Council's first session,
which recently wrapped up in Geneva. As you know, the United
States did not vote for this body this past spring, because, in
our view, it did not go far enough to differentiate itself from
its widely discredited predecessor. While we have not yet made
a decision on whether or not to run for next year's council, it
gives us considerable pause for concern that this newly
reformed body managed to adopt only one country-specific
resolution against one of the U.N.'s 192 members: Israel. That
the HRC had to call a special session to do so is even more
disturbing. This is, of course, highly disappointing, given the
abuses being carried out in countries such as North Korea,
Burma, Iran, and the Sudan, to name a few.
As I noted last May, though, despite our disappointment
that the new council is too similar to the old commission, the
United States will continue to work with democratic delegations
through our team in Geneva, which still attends its meetings to
advance our goals. My colleague, Ambassador Tichenor, and his
delegation have worked energetically to promote U.S. interests
and values there, and will continue to do so.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I want to just
mention briefly the U.N. Democracy Fund, which was one of
President Bush's initiatives. We have contributed $18 million
of the $49 million so far in that fund. We're looking to this
to develop new and different kinds of projects in the U.N.; not
to follow the same patterns as before, but to be innovative and
creative, working hard to that end.
I also want to mention the work that we've done in
connection with HIV/AIDS. We were very pleased, last month,
that First Lady Laura Bush could address the conference, the
special session on HIV/AIDS that the General Assembly had, and
she was able to confirm that the President's Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, which is a very innovative 5-year, $15
billion plan, is well underway.
Mr. Chairman, I have had the opportunity to hold direct
discussions with almost every permanent representative from
other member states at the U.N. on a one-on-one basis. During
this period, I've done my best to work with others to advance
our national interests. I do believe important advances have
been made. In cases where we would like to have seen even
further progress, we now have greater clarity on the
differences that we must still work together to resolve.
Whether through the remaining tenure of my appointment or
longer, if confirmed, I pledge to continue working with this
committee.
Thank you for your consideration. I'm happy to answer any
questions you our your colleagues may now have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John R. Bolton, Nominee for Permanent
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before the
committee today. I would also like to thank you and your colleagues for
the support you have given me over the course of the past year. Whether
it is the attention this committee has focused on reforming the United
Nations, or the myriad of critical issues currently on the agenda of
the Security Council, your work has helped to advance important policy
goals of the United States. Forging a strong relationship between the
United States and the United Nations, while advancing U.S. national
interests, requires close cooperation and coordination between all
branches of the U.S. Government, other member states, and the U.N.
Secretariat. I thank you for your help and look forward to continuing
and strengthening our close working relationship if confirmed.
The need for a strong and effective U.N. remains as powerful today
as ever. As President Bush has declared, ``Now, more than ever, the
U.N. must play a critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and
hopes and aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental
human rights, and to promote social progress and better standards of
life in larger freedom.''
Mr. Chairman, for close to a year now, I have had the privilege and
honor to serve as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. I have also had the privilege and honor to work with a
fantastic team at our mission up in New York. The dedication and
commitment of the staff at the U.S. mission has been instrumental in
advancing our policy goals, and I cannot thank them enough. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing my close working relationship
with them, in addition to doing my utmost to uphold the confidence that
the President, Secretary Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
In the time I have before you today, I would like to divide my
remarks into three broad categories. First, I would like to discuss the
important work we have been engaged in on the Security Council, which
is currently handling one of its busiest schedules ever in light of
recent developments in the world, notably the situation in the Middle
East. Second, I would like to provide an update on where we stand on
reforming the United Nations, discussing both the challenges and the
opportunities that lie ahead of us. Third, I would like to mention some
of the work we are doing in cooperation with the U.N. to achieve our
long-term objectives on critical policy goals like economic development
and eradicating HIV/AIDS. Following that, I would be happy to answer
any questions you or your colleagues may have on these or other
subjects.
security council agenda items
Mr. Chairman, many have remarked, and I agree, that this has been
one of the busiest times for the Security Council. Sadly, world events
do not pause for summer. Emergency meetings have become the norm. After
months of working side-by-side with other members on the council, I
believe I have established a good working relationship with them, and
if confirmed, I pledge to continue deepening those relationships, while
still advancing our national interests. Let me now turn to a few
specific subjects.
The situation in the Middle East
Mr. Chairman, we are all aware of the crisis and tragedy unfolding
in the Middle East. The United States is exhausting all diplomatic
efforts to resolve the situation. The situation is so fluid that it is
inherently difficult for me to go into specifics, given that the
Lebanon Core Group, including foreign ministers, just met in Rome.
Secretary Rice was unequivocal, though, in making clear that the United
States seeks a ``durable solution . . . one that strengthens the forces
of peace and democracy in the region.'' A truly democratic Middle East
is our best long-term hope to ensure that we achieve a lasting,
permanent peace.
While policy discussions are underway in Rome to devise a solution,
important steps are already underway to alleviate the suffering of
civilians. Just 2 days ago, Secretary of State Rice authorized $30
million in immediate humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict
in Lebanon. To meet the most urgent needs, the United States has
dispatched two large-scale medical deliveries. Each of these deliveries
contains enough medicine and supplies to meet the basic medical needs
of 10,000 people for a 3-month period. The United States will also
begin delivering other direct U.S. assistance to Lebanon, including
plastic sheeting and blankets.
The Security Council is also actively seized of the matter. We are
working closely with other members of the council to ensure that
appropriate, I stress appropriate, action is taken by the council. It
would be a disservice and only bring increased hardship to the peoples
of Israel and Lebanon if the Security Council adopted stopgap measures,
which would do nothing to address the root causes of the violence. It
was with this in mind that the United States felt it necessary to veto
a lopsided resolution, 2 weeks ago, on this matter, the first time we
had to do so in almost 2 years.
We are actively engaged in New York to identify lasting solutions
to bring about a permanent peace in the Middle East. To do so, however,
requires that we have a shared understanding of the problem. The United
States has held the firm view that the root cause of the problem is
terrorism--and that this terrorism is solely and directly responsible
for the situation we find ourselves in today. This terrorism manifests
itself, not only in the form of Hezbollah and Hamas, but also in their
state sponsors in Tehran and Damascus. We should all take note,
particularly Iran and Syria, of the important statement from the Arab
League for its courage and conviction in condemning Hezbollah for its
role in instigating this latest round of violence.
As we speak, Hezbollah continues to operate in southern Lebanon
with impunity, defying the will of the Security Council as established
in Resolution 1559. We are working hard with others to bring about the
full implementation of Resolution 1559 and the full extension of its
authority by the Government of Lebanon over all of Lebanese territory.
If that were done, then Israel would be less subject to terrorist
attacks, and the people of Lebanon would not be subject to the reign of
terror that Hezbollah inflicts.
We are actively considering the variety of proposals on the table
on how best to secure the implementation of Resolution 1559, including
the insertion of an international stabilization force. I would value
any thoughts you or your colleagues may have on this matter. For our
part, our view is that we must always keep at the forefront that the
key goal should be to disarm and ``defang'' Hezbollah, to quote
Secretary Rice.
We take note that some member states have called for an immediate
and unconditional cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah--but we must
ask our colleagues, how do you negotiate and maintain a cease-fire with
a terrorist organization, one which does not even recognize the right
of Israel to exist? The United States has no confidence that Hezbollah
would honor an unconditional cease-fire. History shows us that it would
only allow them time to regroup and plan their next wave of kidnappings
and attacks against Israel. The United States seeks an end to the
violence that afflicts innocent civilians, and for that very reason we
are working for the conditions that will make a real cease-fire
possible and permanent. Our aim is to address the underlying causes of
the violence in southern Lebanon--namely terrorism.
In considering any stabilization force, we need to consider several
questions. Would the new force be empowered to deal with the real
problem, namely Hezbollah? How would such a force deal with Hezbollah
armed components, and would it be empowered to deal with arms shipments
from countries like Syria and Iran that support Hezbollah? How would
the new force relate to the existing U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon, or
LTNIFIL, which already has been there for 28 years? Finally, would such
a force contribute to the institutional strength to the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) to help fully implement Resolution 1559?
These are all important questions currently under discussion by the
Secretary in Rome and the Security Council. The question of Israel's
response has come up as well. Of course it is a matter of great concern
to us, as President Bush has stressed, that civilian deaths are
occurring. It is a tragedy, and I would not attempt to describe it any
other way. We have urged the Government of Israel to exercise the
greatest possible care in its use of force.
Mr. Chairman, the United States remains firmly committed to working
through the Security Council, indeed through all diplomatic channels,
to finding a lasting end to the violence. We hope that from this
current crisis we can seize the opportunity to once and forever
dismantle Hezbollah, restore democratic control by Lebanon over all of
its territory, and lay the foundations that would allow Israel to live
in peace with its neighbors.
Iran
While the crisis in the Middle East is, of course, a priority at
the moment, we are effectively dealing with other major issues as well.
We are currently involved in intense negotiations on the subject of
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. We have expended considerable
diplomatic efforts through a variety of venues to try to persuade Iran
that its pursuit of nuclear weapons makes it less, not more, secure.
Iran has consistently rebuffed those efforts, most recently just last
week in Paris, which led to the collective decision of the P-5 Foreign
Ministers, plus Germany, that it is now time for the Security Council
to take action.
It is critical that we succeed in these efforts. Iran's unrelenting
pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a grave and direct threat to
international peace and security. In tandem with their pursuit of even
longer-range ballistic missiles, we must treat the threat they pose to
our friends and allies in the region and beyond with the utmost
gravity. This is particularly clear in light of the inflammatory
rhetoric of Iran's leader, who is recklessly calling for Israel to be
``wiped off the map'' and even questions the tragic events of the
Holocaust.
The discussions are still ongoing, but I am hopeful that the
council will recognize the threat Iran's program poses to international
peace and security and take appropriate action. We are doing a full
court press, both in New York and in capitals around the world, to seek
a diplomatic resolution to this matter, and we are confident that a
strong resolution from the council will be instrumental in this regard.
North Korea
Allow me to update you on where we stand on North Korea since they
launched seven ballistic missiles, including a long-range Taepo-dong 2,
in the vicinity of Japan. On July 15, the Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1695, which demands that North Korea suspend all
activities related to its ballistic missile program, including a return
to its moratorium on test launching. It also requires member states to
cease all trade in goods and technology which might contribute to North
Korea's missile or other WMD-related programs.
The administration is very pleased the council was able to take
such firm and decisive action. This resolution was the outcome of 11
days of intensive negotiations, often lasting late into the night
between the five permanent members of the council and Japan. Bear in
mind, when North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan's
airspace in 1998, the response of the council was a weak and feckless
press statement. This time, however, we were able to bring along China
and Russia to support a very strong resolution, even though they
initially supported issuing yet another press statement. The outcome of
our diplomatic efforts has been to send a clear, unambiguous, and
unanimous signal to North Korea that their provocative behavior is
unacceptable. The fact that both China and Russia supported a
resolution, the first one on North Korea since 1993, cannot be lost on
the North Korean leadership.
As called for in Resolution 1695, North Korea remains very much on
the council's agenda. This is particularly important in light of North
Korea's rejection of the resolution some 45 minutes after its passing,
where they also vowed to continue testing missiles. We believe that
Resolution 1695 highlights the important role the Security Council can
play to help buttress other diplomatic efforts, such as the Six-Party
Talks. We call upon North Korea not only to return to Six-Party Talks,
but to implement the joint statement it agreed to in September 2005. If
North Korea chooses a different path, however, it should know that the
Security Council stands ready and willing to consider further steps.
Sudan and Darfur
Mr. Chairman, I know that the situation in Darfur is of particular
interest to you. We continue to push hard to bring relief to the
citizens of Darfur, Sudan where over 200,000 people have lost their
lives and over 2 million have become displaced since 2003. This past
May, the Government of Sudan and one of the rebel groups took a large
step forward by signing the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA, if
fully enacted, establishes critical security, wealth sharing, and
power-sharing arrangements that address the long-standing
marginalization of Darfur. We believe that the DPA, along with the
deployment of a strong U.N. force, provides real hope and a way ahead
for the people in Darfur.
While we do see a way forward, significant challenges remain. We
are working within the Security Council to craft a robust resolution
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that will afford any U.N. force
the capability and the mandate to defend itself and the civilians in
Darfur. Russia and China continue to voice opposition to a Chapter VII
mandate. However, in May, the Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 1679, designed to facilitate planning for the future
deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation in the Darfur region. We
believe this to be a viable precedent for upcoming Darfur resolutions.
There is also the issue of the Government of Sudan agreeing to a U.N.
force in Darfur. Significant efforts are ongoing bilaterally and
multilaterally to achieve this. While this plays out, we continue to do
our part toward adopting a resolution, determining force requirements
and identifying troop contributing countries so that we are fully
prepared to go in and complete the mission.
The U.N. Technical Assessment Mission has returned from Sudan and
is finalizing its report to the Security Council, however preliminary
indications are that Department of Peacekeeping Operations will
recommend a U.N. force package in Darfur of approximately 15,000 to
17,000 troops to be operational on or about January 1, 2007. We prefer
to have a credible force there sooner than that and are concerned about
the interim. Therefore, while we continue to do all we can to hasten
the deployment of a new force, we are also working with our allies and
the U.N. to provide support to the existing African Union force
presently on the ground in Darfur, known as ``AMIS.'' AMIS has done all
it can to keep order by patrolling an area nearly the size of Texas
with about 7,000 troops, but they have reached the limits of their
capabilities. So until we have a U.N. force on the ground, we are
working with our NATO allies to support AMIS with immediate assistance
in the form of planning, logistics, intelligence support, and other
help.
As President Bush has said, ``America will not turn away from this
tragedy. We will call genocide by its rightful name, and we will stand
up for the innocent until the peace of Darfur is secured.'' We are
working tirelessly in New York to bring this to fruition.
Burma
Despite some initial reluctance on the part of some council
members, the United States has led the drive to make certain that the
issue of Burma does not fade from the council's attention. We are still
discussing with other members the best way for the council to address
the deteriorating situation in Burma, and how best to secure the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Her imprisonment remains a stain on the
current leadership. We will be working closely with our colleagues in
the Security Council to find a way to back up Under Secretary General
Gambari's efforts to obtain the release of political detainees,
including Aung San Suu Kyi. And, we intend to promote an inclusive and
genuine political dialog in Burma that empowers Burma's people to
decide their own future.
reforming the united nations: a status report and plan for the future
Increasing transparency: An important first step
Mr. Chairman, it has been close to 1 year since the World Summit
Outcome Document was signed by some 150 world leaders last September in
New York on the 60th anniversary meeting of the U.N.'s General
Assembly. The assessment I gave you 2 months ago, broadly speaking,
remains valid today. Some modest progress has been achieved since the
World Summit, including establishing a much-needed U.N. Ethics Office;
strengthening financial disclosure requirements for U.N. staff members;
protecting U.N. personnel from retaliation for reporting misconduct;
and providing needed resources for oversight.
While these reforms are important steps in the right direction, we
had hoped for more. It was with this in mind that that the United
States supported the approval of only a 6-month interim budget last
December. That was the right decision to focus the attention of member
states not only on how badly needed are reforms, but on the seriousness
of purpose with which we approach the subject. Now that the cap has
been lifted, we will continue to work with other member states and the
secretariat to achieve our mutually shared objectives.
The goal now is to identify priority target areas where progress
can be made and take the necessary steps to demonstrate that the U.N.
and its member states are fully engaged in launching what Secretary of
State Rice has termed a ``lasting revolution of reform''--one that will
transform the United Nations into an institution fully capable of
addressing the complex array of challenges now confronting the global
community. To this end, the United States recently joined consensus on
the adoption of several reforms related to information and
communication technology; budget implementation; financial management
practices; and improved reporting mechanisms, including increased
public access to U.N. records. The key now, of course, is to seek
effective implementation.
These issues all speak to our attempts to change the ``culture of
inaction'' described by Paul Volcker before this very committee when
discussing the Oil-for-Food scandal. To change this culture, we are
working to increase the transparency and accountability of the U.N.,
not just to shine a light on the agencies or bodies which may be in
need of reform, but to allow those that do work effectively to better
advertise and market their expertise in ways that might serve as a
model for others.
While the steps mentioned above take us in the right direction,
implementation remains a key priority. Last month I had the opportunity
to meet with the leaders of the U.N. Staff Union. They expressed some
concern that while the reforms enacted to date are a step in the right
direction, they do not go far enough, for example, to protect U.N.
staffers who actually do ``blow the whistle'' on undesirable U.N.
activities. We are working now to help ensure that these reforms are
not only enacted, but implemented as well. Interestingly, the Union
also raised the issue of transparency--an issue that we have stressed
as well on a wide-range of subjects. We concur with the U.N. Staff
Union that an open and transparent decision making process is integral
to the success of management reform, regardless of the specific reforms
adopted.
The last point about public access is part of an innovative new
approach to increasing accountability and transparency at the United
Nations, something we think will benefit everyone. Under the auspices
of a new program called ``The Transparency Initiative,'' the U.S.
mission at the United Nations is making reports published by the Office
of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) available to the public via our
Web site.
We believe making OIOS reports more readily available will
strengthen the hand of OIOS within the U.N. system. You may recall that
last May before this very committee, I raised concerns about OIOS
independence and autonomy, citing a report issued by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office. Their conclusions supported our own
determination that OIOS is potentially beholden to those it is
responsible for investigating, thereby creating an inherent conflict of
interest. This situation is untenable and only abets those who may seek
to defraud or abuse the system. But this is all the more reason to open
up OIOS reports to public scrutiny. OIOS can serve as a valuable tool
for member states to take action or push through reforms that are
sorely needed. To this end, we will also push hard to make sure that
the Independent Audit Advisory Committee is fully established to
validate OIOS' working methods and ensure OIOS' operational
independence from the U.N. Secretariat.
Fostering awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of various U.N.
agencies is a necessary and critical, though we acknowledge not solely
sufficient, first step to deepening the reform process currently
underway. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working on this important
issue.
Management reform
In terms of specific reform issues, let me begin with the one that
remains a priority for this administration--management reform. Frankly,
Mr. Chairman, we must acknowledge some difficulties ahead--difficulties
which, if confirmed, I would continue to work to overcome. Since I last
spoke to you, we have continued to see sharply divided positions
emerging on some key issues. Many members of the Group of 77, or G-77
as it is known, are resisting efforts by the secretariat to reform and
streamline basic managerial structures and practices. Bear in mind, the
reforms they are now blocking were not put forward by member states,
but by the Secretary-General himself. It bears repeating my earlier
citation of the report issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan from last
March, where he noted, ``The earlier reforms addressed the symptoms,
more than the causes, of our shortcomings. It is now time to reach for
deeper, more fundamental change. What is needed, and what we now have a
precious opportunity to undertake, is a radical overhaul of the entire
secretariat--its rules, its structure, its systems--to bring it more in
line with today's realities, and enable it to perform the new kinds of
operations that member states now ask and expect of it. . . . Such a
radically expanded range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of
the United Nations Secretariat--its rules, structure, systems and
culture. Up to now, that has not happened.''
This remarkably frank assessment included a number of specific
proposals to reform the U.N. system to increase efficiency. Recently,
the Fifth Committee, which is the member state body in the U.N. system
that handles budgetary and management-related issues, voted against
many measures that would have increased the ability of the secretariat
to implement a number of significant and genuine reforms. To be sure,
we did not agree with every single reform proposed by the Secretary-
General, but we certainly agree with his diagnosis of the problem and
support his efforts.
What was particularly interesting about the recent Fifth Committee
vote on some of the Secretary-General's proposed reforms was the way
the vote split. On one side was a group of 50 nations, including the
United States, who were pushing an ambitious reform agenda, whose
combined contributions totaled 86.7 percent of the U.N. budget. On the
other side were over 120 nations who contributed 12 percent of the
budget and chose to block these reforms. Clearly there is work that
needs to be done to bridge this divide.
Despite that vote, there has been some recent progress, including
adoption of international accounting standards and the creation of a
Chief Technology Officer for the U.N. We must acknowledge, though, it
will be an uphill battle, with a majority of member states expressing
their opposition to some of the most basic and important management
reform measures, such as giving the Secretary-General more discretion
on budget and personnel matters.
It has become apparent that some members of the General Assembly
are trying to hinder the Secretary-General from serving in his Charter
capacity as the Chief Administrative Officer of the U.N. due to their
desire not to cede any authority from the General Assembly. We agree
that the member states should have the bulk of the authority, but
believe that the Fifth Committee's micromanagement hampers the
secretariat from effectively achieving goals of member states. And when
the G-77 calls for an ``accountable'' secretariat, we hope its members
will be more concerned about ethics, oversight, and transparency, than
with preserving micromanagerial prerogatives over personnel and other
administrative matters.
Mandate review
The review of program mandates adopted by either the General
Assembly or the Security Council is another area where we are working
closely with other like-
minded nations to push ahead our reform agenda. We must acknowledge,
though, our concern about the lack of progress to date in mandate
review and express our hope that we can now begin to make more
sustained progress on this vital task, consistent with decisions of our
leaders and the Outcome Document.
We have been hard at work in this regard. Since the establishment
of the General Assembly Informal Plenary on Mandate Review at the end
of last year there have been some 20 meetings of the plenary, including
12 previous informal consultations. During these meetings, member
states tabled some 100 proposals, 40 of which were tabled by the United
States. In addition, the cochairs also circulated a paper prepared by
the secretariat, at the request of the member states, identifying a
significant number of other proposals relating to the consolidation or
reduction of reports.
Unfortunately, we are still bogged down in the ``process'' of how
to review the mandates as opposed to conducting the actual review of
live, substantive mandates. There has been a refusal by some states
since the signing of the Outcome Document to consider a review of
mandates 5 years and older which had been renewed unless certain
conditions were met. This effectively eliminates 96 percent of the
total existing mandates and is inconsistent with both the spirit and
clear decision by leaders who signed the World Summit Outcome Document
last September. We are not giving up, however, and still hope that we
can move forward to complete our review by the end of this year
provided in the Outcome Document.
Human Rights Council
Mr. Chairman, allow me briefly to update you on where we stand with
regard to the new Human Rights Council. We are still in the position of
evaluating the first special session convened with the new council,
which recently wrapped up in Geneva. As you know, the United States did
not vote for this body this past spring because in our view it did not
go far enough to differentiate itself from its widely discredited
predecessor.
While we have not yet made a decision on whether or not to run for
next year's council, it gives us considerable pause for concern that
this newly reformed body managed to adopt only one country-specific
resolution against one of the U.N.'s 192 members--Israel. That they had
to call a special session to do so is even more disturbing. This is, of
course, highly disappointing given the abuses being carried out in
countries such as North Korea, Burma, Iran, and the Sudan to name a
few. That this newly formed body would launch their work through this
kind of selective adoption of resolutions can only undermine the
council's credibility to address human rights violations.
As I noted last May, though, despite our disappointment that the
new council is too similar to the old commission, the United States
will continue to work with democratic delegations through our team in
Geneva, which will still attend its meetings to advance our goals. My
colleague, Ambassador Tichenor, has worked energetically to promote
U.S. interests and values there and will continue to do so.
humanitarian issues development
Mr. Chairman, some of the most important issues on which the United
Nations focuses do not often make headlines, but remain vitally
important. The United States has consistently made clear that we feel
there is an important and integral link between democracy and
development. President Bush, since his inaugural address, has declared
that America will stand with those who stand up for their own freedom.
This was the reason he launched the U.N. Democracy Fund. We are pleased
that the fund has grown to $49 million, with close to $18 million being
provided by the United States. As the President noted, ``the advance of
liberty is the path to both a safer and better world.''
We are also working to achieve greater economic openness and
liberalization in trade and investment flows so that all may share
fully in growing global prosperity. To help those most in need, we have
almost tripled Official Development Assistance since 2000, to $27.5
billion last year. We are pleased that after months of intense
negotiations, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution on
development that emphasizes not only the rights of countries, but their
responsibilities as well.
Of course, we all recognize that for the poor in developing
countries, the greatest need is not development assistance: it is a
job--meaningful, productive employment, ``decent work.'' It is the
experience of the United States that job creation cannot be separated
from economic growth and enhanced productivity. Other countries will
face different challenges, but fostering an environment that promotes
entrepreneurship and provides legal protection and regulatory stability
for the private sector is a necessary if not sufficient condition for
success.
The United States is working to help nations through the U.S.
Millennium Challenge Corporation, which allocates its assistance based
on criteria such as rule of law, investment in health and education,
and economic freedom. The United States also believes that job creation
must go hand-in-hand with respect for fundamental principles and rights
at work, namely, freedom of association and the effective recognition
of the right to bargain collectively, the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labor, the effective abolition of child labor, and
the elimination of discrimination in respect to employment and
occupation. The United States supports the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) Decent Work Country Programs as a valuable
contribution to broader development frameworks.
There are some types of employment we don't support, such as
exploitative child labor and forced labor. Children need to be in
school mastering the skills and knowledge they will need to be the
workforce of the future. That is why the United States has contributed
more than $295 million to the ILO since 1995 to fight the worst forms
of child labor.
HIV/AIDS
Mr. Chairman, last month the United Nations convened its special
sessions on HIV/AIDS. We were honored to have the U.S. delegation
headed by First Lady Laura Bush, who outlined the steps the United
States is taking to combat the scourge of HIV/AIDS. She was able to
confirm that the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) is
on track. This remarkable plan is a 5-year, $15 billion initiative to
combat AIDS in 120 countries around the world.
The Emergency Plan works in partnership with the hardest-hit
countries--and that partnership is saving lives. When President Bush
announced PEPFAR at the beginning of 2003, only 50,000 people in sub-
Saharan Africa were thought to be receiving antiretroviral treatment.
Now, in PEPFAR's 15 focus nations, the United States has helped provide
treatment for more than 560,000 people. Even more are being reached
through America's contributions to the Global Fund, demonstrating the
variety of venues and forums the United States is working through to
help vulnerable populations. This direct medical care keeps people in
good health. It also focuses on education, not only in terms of
prevention, but in how to cope with the infection if you are living--I
emphasize living--with HIV/AIDS. That emphasis is necessary because now
millions are learning to live with HIV/AIDS--instead of waiting to die
from it.
While much work, of course, remains to be done, there are some rays
of hope where we can point to models of success. In parts of sub-
Saharan Africa, new data show Africa's ABC model of AIDS prevention has
led to dramatic declines in HIV-infection rates in young men and women.
Pregnant mothers with HIV are now being taught that their unborn
children do not have to inherit their disease.
The challenge ahead is to see that more people know how HIV is
transmitted--and every country has an obligation to educate its
citizens. As the First Lady so eloquently noted, ``This is why every
country must also improve literacy, especially for women and girls, so
they can learn to make wise choices that will keep them healthy and
safe.''
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, it has been almost exactly 1 year that I have had the
privilege and honor to serve as the Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations. I have had the opportunity to hold
direct discussions with almost every Permanent Representative from
other member states at the U.N. on a one-on-one basis. During this
period, I have done my best to work with others to advance our national
interests. I do believe important advances have been made. In cases
where we would have liked to have seen further progress, we now have
greater clarity on the differences that we all must still work together
to resolve.
Whether through the remaining tenure of my appointment or longer if
confirmed, I pledge to continue working with this committee. Your work
on has been instrumental in helping us achieve our objectives in New
York. Both the U.N. Secretariat and delegations of other member states
have a much greater appreciation of the importance the Congress--
mirroring the American people--attach to the subject of U.N. reform. As
the U.N.'s largest financial contributor, totaling some 22 percent of
the regular assessed budget, the United States has a vital stake in
ensuring that the U.N. succeeds. On issues before the Security Council,
I can not emphasize enough the positive and constructive role members
of this committee have played in helping us to advance important goals,
whether in Iran, the Sudan, or in other troubled regions of the world.
I thank you for you consideration and am happy to answer any
questions you or your colleagues may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Bolton.
We'll begin our round of questions with 10 minutes for each
member, and I'll begin the questioning.
I want to mention that a----
The committee will be in order. The committee will be in
order. The committee will stand in recess until police can
restore order.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will continue the hearing.
Let me just mention that Assistant Secretary for
International Organizations, Kristen Silverberg, is with us
today, and I wanted to acknowledge her presence. We appreciate
that.
I want to take a few moments of my time to read the letter
that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has written on
behalf of the nominee. He said, ``Mr. Chairman, when John
Bolton's nomination for the position of Ambassador to the
United Nations was before the committee, I wrote a letter,
together with a number of other former Secretaries of State,
urging confirmation. I did so, because I believe that the
President should be given wide discretion in selecting his
advisors. Since then, I've had the opportunity to observe
Ambassador Bolton perform his duties under a recess appointment
skillfully and with dedication. He has had to deal with a wide
range of issues, from Darfur to the recent resolution
concerning North Korea's missile tests. He has handled these
assignments effectively and with great articulateness. I've
observed him at a number of official functions. This enabled me
to note that his relationship with his colleagues has been
professional and mutually respectful. It would be unfortunate
if he were to be prevented from continuing these tasks,
especially as a new General Assembly is about to begin and a
number of crises, such as the Middle East crisis and the
Iranian nuclear weapons crisis, are on the verge of coming
before the United Nations. For these reasons, I respectfully
urge the committee to deal favorably with the President's
recommendation to confirm John Bolton.'' And signed, ``Warm
regards, Henry Kissinger.''
The committee will be in order. The committee will be in
order.
The committee will stand in recess until police can restore
order.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee will resume the hearing.
Ambassador Bolton, in your written testimony, you note that
in 1998, when North Korea conducted a missile launch over
Japan's airspace, the Security Council issued what you called a
``weak and feckless press statement.'' Now, following North
Korea's most recent provocative missile launches, the Council
was able to work together to adopt a resolution, No. 1695,
which condemns North Korea, calls upon it to stop all tests.
How significant is this resolution? And what can you tell us
about Russian and Chinese cooperation on the matter, and how
you obtained that?
Ambassador Bolton. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a
significant resolution, the first since 1993 to deal with North
Korea. And when we started discussions in the Security Council,
on July 5, the first business day after the launches, it was
the initial position of Russia and China that they wanted to
deal with this, again, with a press statement. And as I know
you know, and the committee knows, in the hierarchy of things
that the Security Council can do, the lowest is a press
statement; intermediate is what we call a presidential
statement that the president of the Council reads, reflecting
the views of the Council members; and then the most important,
of course, is a resolution of the Security Council.
During the course of the discussions, I think we and many
other members of the Council made it plain that circumstances
of these missile launches put us in a very different position,
that we wanted a strong and binding resolution. So, the
Russians and the Chinese moved away from the press statement
idea and agreed that they could consider a presidential
statement. Nonetheless, we persevered, because we thought it
was important that North Korea know unequivocally how isolated
it was internationally. We continued to work in these
negotiations with other members of the Council and concerned
governments in the region. And ultimately, on July 15, we did
get a unanimous Security Council resolution that, in our
judgment, is fully binding on North Korea. It demands--that's
the word the Council used--demands that North Korea suspend all
activity relating to its ballistic missile program, and it
requires--that's the word the Council uses--requires member
governments not to trade with, to supply to, or to procure from
any of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs any
materials that could be useful to them.
I think that this is a strong signal to the North Koreans.
We have been hoping and working to try and get them back into
the Six-Party Talks. Secretary Rice is in Kuala Lumpur now,
also trying to advance that region in meetings that she's
holding, and we'll know better, I think, after those
discussions, what the next step will be.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for that comment. I think
it was a significant statement, and one which, obviously, as
you've reflected, I think, modestly in your statement, has had
an impact upon North Koreans. Now, how things will progress, we
shall see. But, in terms of the United Nations aspect of this,
why, this clearly was progress over anything we have seen with
regard to the North Korean problem.
And I would just reflect anecdotally, because I know that
Senator Coleman and Senator Voinovich and I want to acknowledge
our appreciation to you for your having us at the United
Nations in February, the month that the United States presided
over the Security Council. I was honored, because you asked me
to speak to the Council, and even more honored that the Council
was all there. And I think that is in respect for you, as the
president of the Council, and in respect for our country and
for your coordination with that group. It was a pretty large
audience for the Security Council. And then you made it
possible for us to see the leaders of the so-called Group of
77, the people handling the business arrangements, which are
very infinitely complex for the U.N., vis-a-vis New York and
the real estate and all the nitty-gritty which is behind the
scenes. It is a part of your responsibility, as our Ambassador
to the U.N., but, likewise, as an American citizen working with
people in New York.
And so, I mention all of these situations, because we have
had at least some eyewitness experience in working with you
there.
Now, let me ask about Iran for a moment. Iran's influence
in the Middle East and the support for Hezbollah is
unquestionable, as we have seen in recent days. Its use of
Syria as a conduit and puppet master for Hamas is also not in
doubt. Yet we're hearing that Iran's neighbors and fellow
Muslim states are growing nervous with each Iranian attempt to
strengthen its role in the region through Hezbollah or through
whatever means. How are such concerns playing out, in your
judgment, at the United Nations as you take a look at the
membership of the Security Council that may be called upon to
take action in regard to Iran?
Ambassador Bolton. I think, Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in
my statement, the Arab League meeting, about 10 days ago,
issued a very important statement on the activity of Hezbollah
and the aggression that it conducted against the civilians in
Israel. And there is, I think, larger and larger understanding
of the fact that Hezbollah really is a surrogate for Iran, due
to its financing of perhaps up to $100 million a year or more,
and that the notion that Iran and this extensive terrorist
network it supports, together with its activity designed to
acquire nuclear weapons capability, in our judgment, and to
increase the range and accuracy of its ballistic missile force,
shows that Iran is a growing threat in the region. And this
plays out in various complex ways, but I think it has helped
us, in a number of respects, as we have considered how to deal
with Hamas and the occupied territories, and Hezbollah, how to
deal with the implementation of not only Resolution 1559, which
calls for the removal of all external influence from Lebanon,
from the arming of the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to
trying to extend the control of the democratic Government of
Lebanon over the entire territory, to implementation of
Resolution 1595, investigating the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, that many of these things
are tied together, that the growing closeness of Syria and Iran
is a problem for the region, the coordination that those two
governments have in their support for Hezbollah and Hamas, is a
problem that goes much more broadly than a problem in the
context of the Arab/Israeli concern.
The Chairman. You've touched upon the U.N. reform efforts
in which you have been heavily involved and on which you've
spoken frequently. Where is the reform business likely to go,
at this point? And what sort of timetable can you envision for
at least another significant or substantive debate to occur on
reform issues?
Ambassador Bolton. We're expecting the--what we call the
``mandate review'' that was required by the outcome document of
last September--last September's summit, adopted by over 150
heads of government, to continue this fall. There's a very
significant amount of work that needs to be done. The work that
has been done so far has not brought us very far. Despite many,
many meetings, there's not been one single mandate out of 9,000
mandates identified by the Secretariat that have been imposed
on the Secretariat over the years. Of these 9,000 mandates, not
one has been eliminated, not one has been consolidated. We've
run into considerable obstacles. But this is a high priority
for us, for a number of other countries, the group we call
JUSCANZ--not probably the best name for it, but it's Japan,
United States, South Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
which, if you string all that out, gives you the acronym
JUSCANZ--European Union and other countries. But it's been slow
going, and I think it's a measure of that culture of inaction
that former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker spoke about. But we're
continuing to press it. We will, through the remainder of this
year.
The Chairman. Just having visited with the Group of 77
leaders, as I've mentioned--during our visit in February--it
appears that at stake here for many nations, maybe as many as
100 nations, is the fact that they contribute very, very small
amounts of money, in terms of dues, to the U.N. But the current
organization offers what we would call, in local politics,
patronage--that is, jobs. At least there was an attempt made, I
suppose, to apportion these jobs around broadly. Likewise,
these mandates, they're much like congressionally mandated
reports that go on and on forever. And someone at the State
Department keeps churning out hours and hours each year,
because we can't quite ever bring it to an end. But in the case
of 9,000 of these, this, to say the least, encumbers,
considerably, the bureaucracy, efficient or inefficient as it
may be. Now, this is a monumental task. I'm wondering, is the
task not perceived in the same way by some other nations, in
addition to the United States? In other words, is there
tolerance, really, for this kind of gross manipulation of the
system to continue forever, or is that the price of having, oh,
150-plus nations aboard?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I hope it's not the price. And I
think this brings us to the question we're going to have to
continue to pursue, given the disjunction between voting power
in the General Assembly and contributions. I think when I
testified a couple of months ago, I recounted the vote that we
had first in the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, and then
in the General Assembly itself, in connection with a package of
reforms suggested by the Secretary General. These were reforms
coming out of a report he submitted, called ``Investing in the
United Nations.'' We didn't support each and every one of the
reforms, but we did support the thrust of them. The Secretary
General said, in his words, that what we needed was a ``radical
restructuring of the entire Secretariat.'' And some of the key
elements of the Secretary General's reforms, many of which we
considered to be first steps--important, but first steps--were
put to a vote, and, overwhelmingly, the G-77 outvoted the major
contributors. The vote, I think, was in the Fifth Committee of
the General Assembly, about 122 to 50. The 120-plus countries
that voted against the Secretary General's reforms contributed
something like 12 percent of the total assessed budget. The 50
countries, which included the United States, which voted in
favor of the reforms contributed 87 percent of the budget. So,
that was a--that was a pretty significant indication of the
opposition to the reform agenda.
The Chairman. I thank you very much, Ambassador.
I want to recognize, now, the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Biden. And let me just mention, Joe, I recognized
Senator Dodd to make his statement.
Senator Biden. I will----
The Chairman. But, nevertheless, I don't want, in any way,
to inhibit your participation. If you want to proceed with your
statement, please do so, and then with the question period.
Senator Biden. I understand--I read Senator Dodd's
statement. I happen to agree with it. And my statement's not
substantially different, so I'll not take the time to do that,
but I thank you.
And, by way of explanation to my colleagues and to the
Ambassador, I was at the signing of the Voting Rights Act. It's
been the only constant in my entire political career. That's
what got me involved in politics. And, quite frankly, I didn't
see how I couldn't be there. And I apologize for the tardiness.
My concerns continue to relate to substance and not so much
style, Mr. Ambassador. One of your predecessors, Mr. Holbrooke,
was no wallflower at the United Nations, but he was very
effective. He pulled off what seemed at the time a fairly near
impossible feat, and that is, while we were in arrears about a
billion dollars, he got a reduction in dues for the United
States, and helped settle that. And my overriding concern that
will overlay the questions I have relate to my continued
conviction that you--and I must admit, your boss, the President
and the Vice president, I don't think they, in this, quote,
``Year of Diplomacy,'' really think diplomacy is all that
consequential. My concern is that, at the moment of the
greatest need for diplomacy in our recent history, we are not
particularly effective at it. And it seems to me that there is
a fundamental--I was going to say lack of understanding
that's--that would be presumptuous--fundamental disagreement on
the role and necessity of diplomacy. I thought there was a
great line that Tom Friedman had in one of his articles. I
think it was the end of last week in the Times. He said, ``We
must understand that American power is most effective when it's
legitimated by global consensus and embedded in global
coalitions.'' And so, I'd like to pursue my questions in the
spirit of whether or not the value that you place in
diplomacy--you're going to be--you're playing in the biggest
diplomatic field we have; maybe not the single most important,
but you're a major, major player in this--in diplomacy. And
sometimes it seems to me that what you say and do are at odds
with even what the Secretary is saying. Let me speak to that,
quickly.
In the Financial Times last month in London, you gave an
interview, and it was asserted in the Times that you stated
that, quote, ``I'm not much of a carrots man.'' You went on to
say, ``It would be a mistake to think these negotiations,''
referring to Iran, ``are the first step toward some kind of
grand bargain.'' You went on to say, ``Our experience has been,
when there's dramatic change in the life of the country, that's
the most likely point at which they'd give up nuclear
weapons.'' Just 10 days earlier, the Secretary of State
announced that the United States was going to encourage Iran to
take a positive path, and benefits of this path would go beyond
civil nuclear energy and can include progressively greater
economic cooperation.
And so, my question is, did your statements--were they
cleared by the White House, your comments about negotiations
with Iran? Or were they as much of interest to the White House
as they were to me?
Ambassador Bolton. I think they were consistent with our
policy. I might say, I had--that was at a breakfast I had with
three reporters. And if you read the stories written by the
other two reporters, you'll see, I think, a somewhat different
take on the context in which those comments were made. What I
said was, in the context of the grand bargain, exactly what
Secretary Rice has been saying, and I said, we were offering--
we were making the offer that Javier Solana presented to the
Iranian negotiator on June 6, and that they had two roads ahead
of them, the Iranians did. One would be to accept this very,
very generous offer, in which case they could find themselves
in an entirely different relationship with the United States,
or they could reject that offer, in which case they would find
themselves increasingly on the road to international isolation.
And you can see, based on the recent meeting in Paris--again,
between Solana and Larijani--but the Iranians have simply
declined to give a clear answer. Despite every effort at
persuasion that our European allies were able to make with
them, that led to a meeting of the foreign ministers of the
five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany in
Paris the next day, recognizing that, in substance, Iran had
rejected the offer and authorizing us, in the Security Council,
to go forward with the resolution I discussed in my statement,
that would require Iran to suspend all of its uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activity. That's the
pattern that Iran has followed for over 3 years now, of
purporting to enter into negotiations, and then rejecting them.
And, you know, there was a very telling comment made by Hassan
Rohani, the former chief negotiator for Iran in the nuclear
field. He said--and this was reported, I guess, about 3 months
ago now, that Iran had used the cover of its negotiations--his
word--the cover of the negotiations with the EU-3 to perfect
their uranium conversion technology at their Isfahan plant, and
that that's why the--Secretary Rice and the other foreign
minister, in effect, said that they weren't going to allow the
Iranians to extend this discussion forever, that they wanted an
answer in weeks, not months. And when the answer came back as a
nonanswer, we were authorized to proceed in the Security
Council.
Senator Biden. Did we make a mistake joining the three
European countries in pursuing these negotiations?
Ambassador Bolton. No, this was a decision, clearly
designed to eliminate tactical differences that had existed
between us and the Europeans, that Secretary Rice authorized
right at the beginning of her tenure as Secretary of State, and
it was intended, by closing those tactical differences, in
particular, to bring about their support, if required, for
action in the Security Council. And that judgment has proven
correct.
Senator Biden. So, you think that their support is
necessary for us to be able to effectively respond to Iran's
intransigence.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think that's what's proven to be
the case. And I think we've seen, in the negotiations on the
resolution, which I regret to say we have not yet concluded,
that we have stuck very close with what we call the EU-3--
Germany, France, and Britain.
Senator Biden. But I guess my point is, do you think
sticking close to the EU-3 so we are not divided, we are not
the odd man out--do you think that is an important diplomatic
objective?
Ambassador Bolton. I think it always has been. And I think,
as I mentioned earlier, we had tactical differences with the
EU-3 previously. There were never any strategic divisions among
us on the overall objective of preventing Iran from getting a
nuclear weapons capability. There had been differences as to
how to achieve that, that's correct, and I think Secretary
Rice, over a year and a half ago now, moved to bridge those
tactical differences, and has succeeded.
Senator Biden. How important is it, on many of the things
that are on your plate now that are going to get--I think the
plate's going to get more full--how important is it that
particularly our European allies and the United States are on
the same page? Is it----
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think it can----
Senator Biden [continuing]. Consequential?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. I think it can be very
important, and something we work hard to achieve. In the
context, for example, of Lebanon, in 1559, we've worked not
only generally closely with our European allies, but
particularly closely with France, where we have, I think,
accomplished a number of things in the Security Council, not
just on 1559, but 1595, as well, that have put pressure on the
Government of Syria to fully withdraw from Lebanon, not just
its military forces, but its intelligence services, as well,
put pressure on Syria to truly recognize that Lebanon is an
independent state, to exchange ambassadors, and to move to
demarcate the border and take other steps. These are part of
the assignments that I have on a daily basis in New York.
Senator Biden. Well, one of those assignments was 1559. You
didn't negotiate it, but you inherited it. And during your
tenure heading up the Council, what steps did you take to put
on the agenda the two parts of 1559 that seemed to be totally
ignored? That is, the disbanding and disarmament of all
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of the
Lebanese army into the region along the border. Did you put
those up on the agenda?
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, there were, I think, at least two
presidential statements by the Council, one of which actually,
for the first time, mentioned Hezbollah by name as one of the
militias that was being supported by Syria and by Iran, and
also the adoption of a resolution that called on Syria to fully
exchange--to exchange full diplomatic missions with the
Government of Lebanon and, as I said, to demarcate the border.
These were several of the things we've done to carry through.
Now, a lot of what we need to do is done not just in the
Security Council. I wouldn't pretend that that's the only forum
for applying pressure to Syria and Iran, or for mobilizing
support to--in--to help the democratic government----
Senator Biden. But they didn't call for disarming of
Hezbollah. They didn't--and I may be mistaken. My understanding
is, they did not call for actual implementation of the second
two critical pieces of 1559. I mean----
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think in each case, we
reaffirmed 1559, and that's part of pressuring Syria, I think,
in connection with 1595 on the Hariri assassination, as well,
to continue the diplomatic efforts that we're able to do.
There's no U.N. force that's going to make Syria do any of
those things.
Senator Biden. No, but there is the ability, if we had,
let's say--a year ago--let's say we had pushed and worked
closely with the permanent five on the Security Council to
bring in a force to help--an international force like we're
trying to do right now. I mean, what we're doing right now is
what 1559 was supposed to do. 1559 was supposed to have three
parts--one, when the Syrian army left, everyone--you, I, all of
us knew that there would be a serious vacuum created. That's
why the next two pieces were critical. We knew that vacuum
would be filled by Hezbollah if someone didn't move in. We knew
the Lebanese army didn't have the capability to move in, and we
didn't do a thing. We just sat around with our thumb in our ear
like we thought something was going to happen, other than a--
this vacuum being filled by Hezbollah.
My question is, was there any action taken to generate the
same kind of consensus and support for bringing in what you're
trying to do right now? We're trying to get a consensus to
bring in an international force that can shoot straight, that
can sit along the Israeli border. And, I assume part of what
we're doing--I hope the heck we're doing--is coming up with
initiatives as to how we are going to help, either through the
French, through NATO, or through other means, to train up a
Lebanese army that can actually ultimately supplant that force.
So, you've got Israelis there; we want Israelis out. The
Israelis want out. There's going to have to be an international
force in its place. And there's going to have to be a Lebanese
army in the place of that. What has been done along any of
those three lines, which are being done now, the last year?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think much of the work that has
to be done to strengthen Lebanese institutions is being done on
a bilateral basis directly between the United States and
Lebanon, between the European Union and Lebanon, in order that
a variety of components of the Lebanese Government will be
stronger. I think, for example, we've done a significant
amount, both in New York and bilaterally, to strengthen
institutions of the Lebanese justice system, which are very
important in extending authority, but it was--there are a
variety of things that were done in New York specifically at
the suggestion of the Lebanese Government that were
communicated to us and France and others, that we followed
through on, that I do think have had a significant impact.
Senator Biden. Well, maybe we can come back to that. I'm
over my time. I just was suggesting--I don't want to hold you
accountable for the administration's non-U.N.-related
activities. My understanding is--and we checked--is that, for
example, the Iranians put five times as much money into Lebanon
as we did during this period. I saw precious little action
taken in any concerted way to deal with their judicial system.
But I'll come back to that later.
But I thank you very much for your time, and I apologize
for going on.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
Ambassador.
As you said, we have a crisis and tragedy unfolding in the
Middle East. And, without a doubt, this is an extremely
important area in the world--energy-rich, all the religious
areas that are important. And in addressing that, you said
that, ``We are actively engaged, in New York, in identifying
lasting solutions to bring about a permanent peace in the
Middle East. To do so, however, requires that we have a shared
understanding of the problem. The United States has a firm view
that the root cause of the problem is terrorism. And this
terrorism is solely and directly responsible for the situation
we find ourselves in today.''
You're a brilliant man. That statement doesn't make any
sense. Terrorism is a device. There's got to be something
deeper for the root cause. Can you go a little deeper?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the statement really
refers to the conflict in Lebanon now. I think the real root
cause is the absence of a fundamental basis for peace in the
region. And I think that that--that striving to get to that
point is the objective of our diplomacy now--not to simply
acquiesce in a return to the status quo ante, but to see if
there's not a way to turn the hostilities that are now going
into shifting the basis on which we really deal in the region.
And that's why we have resisted calls for an immediate cease-
fire, which has the risk of simply returning to the status quo
ante.
Nobody is under any illusions about the complexity of the
problem, but I think that we need to use the current
circumstance as a fulcrum to try and move toward a longer-term
solution. And that does require, I think, addressing very
directly, and not sweeping under the rug, the support that
regimes like Syria and Iran give to terrorist groups like Hamas
and Hezbollah.
Senator Chafee. Can't you get any deeper? It's just
terrorism?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think----
Senator Chafee. How about a little history of terrorism in
the region?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Yeah, I think----
Senator Chafee. Where does it go back?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. I think that that's why the
effort we want to make in Lebanon, as Senator Biden and I were
discussing, through 1559, that that--the full implementation of
1559, which is to have a democratic Government of Lebanon in
full control of its territory and to get Hezbollah, that says
it wants to act like a political party in Lebanese politics, in
fact, to do that and give up the course it's been following,
which is to have one foot in as a political party and one foot
in as a terrorist group. If Hezbollah really carried through on
the things that it said publicly about being a legitimate
political party in Lebanon and not being an armed state within
a state, then I think you'd see a very different situation
there.
That, alone, is not the solution. I don't pretend that it
is. I think you've got, in the case of Syria, an authoritarian
country----
Senator Chafee. Mr. Ambassador, this is a very complex
problem, and it's a conflagration right now. And you said the
root cause of the problem, ``we have to get to it''--that's
what you said--in order to have a permanent peace. Is there
anything deeper than ``it's just terrorism'' to the root cause
of the problem in the Middle East? These are your words.
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah. Well, I think, in addition is the
fact that some elements have still not acknowledged the right
of the state of Israel to exist. That's why the peace process
that's been going on for 30 years now is still incomplete.
There's still--Israel still has not been able to achieve full
peace agreements with many of its neighbors. And in the case of
Iran you have a government that continues to threaten to wipe
Israel off the map. That's one reason why Secretary Rice, in
the meeting in Rome, was trying to get this broader basis, to
have this wider discussion, to address the possibility of
something more comprehensive. But, as you said, these
animosities are complex. They go back a long way.
The question for us, the diplomatic question for us, is,
can we take the current circumstances, in southern Lebanon, in
particular, and not simply say, ``Let's have a cease-fire that
goes back to the situation before a month ago,'' but can we now
use this--can the other Arab states that have joined in, in
their declaration in the Arab League, expressing concern about
what Hezbollah did--can we now move this process dramatically
forward? That's why this is an opportunity, at the moment.
Senator Chafee. When we had the Ambassador to Iraq--our
Ambassador, Ambassador Khalilzad--before the committee, he said
that shaping the Middle East is the defining challenge of our
time. Do you agree with that?
Ambassador Bolton. I think it's certainly one of the most
important challenges of our time. I think--reflecting my own
background; we all have a background--the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction remains another challenge. And--but
it's the--really, the tying in of those two challenges in the
Middle East, if you look particularly at Iran, and the risk
that Iran itself poses, and the risk that failing to deal with
Iran adequately would have as an incentive for other
governments to turn to pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,
that would make that region even more volatile than it is now.
Senator Chafee. And does that shape of the Middle East
include a viable contiguous Palestinian state living side by
side in peace with Israel?
Ambassador Bolton. Absolutely. I think that is--you know,
we're focused now on the problem of Lebanon, but just before
that we had--there were difficulties in the occupied
territories, as well, and that's precipitated by the role of
Hamas, which is--itself remains a terrorist group that doesn't
recognize the state of Israel. So, that is something that I
think we hope, the administration hopes, that, as part of a--of
an effort for resolving the larger issues, we're certainly not
going to lose sight of, is very much on Secretary Rice's mind
as she traveled to the region, met with Abu Mazen, even in a
very brief trip, and was discussed in Rome, as well.
Senator Chafee. And you notice I said ``contiguous.'' What
has the United States done about that vision of a contiguous
Palestinian state?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think a lot of--a lot of our
emphasis has been--before the election of Hamas, was to try and
get--to pursue the direct negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority. They're all going to have to live with
whatever outcome they come up with, and there are a variety of
different proposals to deal with the fact that Gaza Strip is in
one place and the West Bank is in another. But I think our
interest is in not one particular way of resolving that
conflict, but of trying to help the parties find something that
would be mutually satisfactory. That has all, as with many
other things, been enormously complicated by Hamas.
Senator Chafee. I suppose--would you agree with me?--that
many of our allies, who you work with daily, would say that--
back to the root cause of our--of the problems in the Middle
East are associated with our failure to have any progress on
this viable contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in
peace with Israel?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think--I think--yeah, I think
they would, and I think--I think we would say essentially the
same thing. There's been no--there's been no lack of interest
in the United States Government, for 60 years now, in trying to
resolve this problem, but it is--it's obviously difficult.
That's why, even as the hostilities continue to--in south
Lebanon, this is a time that we need to look at broader
solutions that could well make progress on the Palestinian
front, as well. I think that's something we should very much
have in mind. I know the Secretary does as she works on the
diplomacy in the region.
We obviously have it in mind in New York, where discussions
about Lebanon occur simultaneously with discussions about the
occupied territories.
Senator Chafee. All right. I might disagree with you the
effort put behind the rhetoric to that end. But, back to the
shape. If I take you at your word it includes this concept of a
viable, contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in
peace with Israel. What else does the shape of the Middle East
look like? I mean, this is a very proactive pronouncement.
Shaping the Middle East----
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Is the defining challenge of
our time. I'm curious, what's it look like?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. I think it's very important
for the governments in the region fully to renounce support for
terrorism and to find a way to persuade them to stop pursuing
weapons of mass destruction. I think it's complicated by sales
of technology from places like North Korea and China into the
region. And I think that's one reason why the notion of
convening the core group in Rome the way the Secretary did is
very important. There are a lot of elements at play here. And
unless we're willing to look at some of these causes that lie
behind the immediate violence, we won't--the--a cessation of
hostilities here will simply postpone another violent reckoning
to a few months or so down the road. I don't think we should
accept that. I think we have to look at the possibility of the
kind of arrangement in the region that will lead to longer-term
stability instead of just fixing the immediate problem.
Senator Chafee. Well, it--once again, it's a little
frustrating trying to get an idea of what this shape looks
like. It started with a regime change in Iraq, and we've seen
our challenges associated with that, and then the failure of
the road map, and now the conflagration, as I said, in southern
Lebanon. But it's difficult to get an idea of what the
administration has in mind, and you're our witness, so I'm
asking you if you could give me some idea of what unfolds from
here.
Ambassador Bolton. Right. Well, I do think it's important,
if you look at the case of Lebanon, that, if you had--if the
steps that have been taken toward the implementation of a full,
viable democracy in Lebanon were to continue--if, for example,
in addition to having not just the free and fair election of a
Lebanese parliament, but the free and fair election of a
Lebanese President, if you had the security institutions, the
police, the prosecutors, and the courts, able to function
independently of external influence, if you had the government
exert its authority over the full reach of Lebanese territory,
I think that would be a significant step forward that would be
visible to others in the region. We know, from conversations,
that the efforts to establish a viable democracy in Iraq, and
the efforts in Lebanon, have an influence in places like Syria,
which has a literate and educated and aware populations, and
where people not just in the diaspora, but in Syria itself, are
saying, ``Well, if they can vote in Lebanon, and they can vote
in Iraq, why can't we vote in Syria, too?'' That's a powerful
influence, over time. And it's something that we should
continue to foster.
Senator Chafee. I know my time's up. One quick question.
You said that the Chinese and North Koreans are selling arms
into the Middle East. Do we have evidence of that? Chinese, in
particular?
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, this is--and especially
disturbingly in the area of ballistic missile technology,
which, in a volatile region, obviously makes things much worse.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, how high a priority do you place on getting a
peacekeeping force up and running in Darfur?
Ambassador Bolton. Very high priority.
Senator Sarbanes. This is going to be a U.N. force, is that
right? You're quoted as saying, ``We think the sooner the U.N.
takes control of the mission in Darfur, the better.''
Ambassador Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, the United States is very
substantially in arrears with respect to peacekeeping dues at
the United Nations, is that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. I wouldn't say ``very substantially in
arrears.'' I think that part of this comes from the--part of
the calculation comes from the way in which our budget cycle
operates, where we will pay the bulk of our assessments for--in
what's called the CIPA account, Contribution to the
International Peacekeeping Activities, at the end of this year,
because of the congressional and administration budget cycles,
so that as the U.N. defines arrearages, which become arrearages
30 days after the bill is paid, there are outstanding balances
which hopefully will be--when Congress is able to act on the
appropriations bill, which I'm sure they will--will be paid
before the end of this calendar year.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I have figures that indicate there
we're almost a trillion dollars in arrears on peacekeeping
operations at the United Nations.
Ambassador Bolton. I can't believe that's right.
Senator Sarbanes. A billion, I'm sorry.
Ambassador Bolton. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. Yeah, 966 million.
Ambassador Bolton. Right. I think that's, in part, due to
the nature of the budget process, as I've just described it.
Senator Sarbanes. What part of it is due to that, in your
thinking?
Ambassador Bolton. We project that at the end of fiscal
year 2006, we will have $119 million in arrears, not counting
the longstanding pre-Helms-Biden arrears of approximately $450
million. Of the $119 million, $54 million will be paid in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2007, and the remaining $64
million paid when Congress lifts the 25 percent cap on payments
to the U.N.
Senator Sarbanes. How can we go in and push for the U.N. to
assume new peacekeeping operations when we're not paid up for
our peacekeeping assessments?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the--we are attempting to
pay up for our peacekeeping assessments. The nature of the way
the assessments come in, the way the budget cycle works in the
United States, don't mesh. That's a problem with other
countries, as well. But I think the--and I don't think--I would
have to say, in my experience, that our situation with the
arrearages in the peacekeeping account has not been a factor in
the discussions in New York on rehatting the force currently in
Darfur and making it a U.N. peacekeeping mission. I think
everybody's aware of the arrearages, but I don't think that's a
factor in any of the negotiations; at least I have not
encountered it myself, and I'm not aware that anybody else has
raised it.
Senator Sarbanes. It's not just peacekeeping; we're also
behind on the regular budget, as I understand it.
Ambassador Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Sarbanes. And you don't think that sort of inhibits
your ability to function?
Ambassador Bolton. I'd have to say, quite honestly, I do
not.
Senator Sarbanes. So, you don't regard it as a matter of
high importance----
Ambassador Bolton. I didn't say that.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. To get it corrected?
Ambassador Bolton. No, I didn't say that. You asked me if I
regard--if I--if it inhibited my activity, and I----
Senator Sarbanes. Right.
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Said it did not. But we do
regard it as a matter of high importance. That's why the
President's budget requests full funding of our assessments,
and why we consider it a priority.
Senator Sarbanes. On July 24, there was a piece on National
Public Radios Morning Edition during which the reporter,
Michele Kelemen said, ``The idea of regional rotation is not
one that U.S. Ambassador John Bolton is buying.'' Would you say
that is an accurate characterization of your position?
Ambassador Bolton. That sounds like something I've said.
Senator Sarbanes. The President, on July 11, was quoted as
saying, ``We're really looking in the Far East right now to be
the Secretary General.'' What's the U.S. policy on this issue?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the President, at that
time, was speaking in response to a question about the
potential candidacy of Jordanian Prince Zeid, their permanent
representative in New York. And he was essentially saying,
that's where the bulk of the activity is. But there--that--it
reflected no change in our position that we want the best-
qualified person, wherever that person may come from. It is the
case, as was indicated in the straw poll that we took in New
York on Monday for Secretary General in the Security Council.
So far, there are only four candidates announced, endorsed by a
member government, and they are all from Asia.
Senator Sarbanes. So, you feel your statements are
consistent with the President's?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, I do.
Senator Sarbanes. When the President is interpreted, at
least in the Financial Times, as saying, ``Asia's claim
appeared to be increasingly firm after George W. Bush, the U.S.
President, last Tuesday, appeared to concede the principle of
regional rotation.''
Ambassador Bolton. Well, that's the----
Senator Sarbanes. ``We're really''----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Financial Times'----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. ``Looking in the Far
East''----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Characterization.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. ``Right now to be the
Secretary General.''
Ambassador Bolton. That was the Financial Times'
characterization. And the White House has developed and issued
press guidance that makes it clear that--what I just said, that
the President was responding to a question about Jordanian
Prince Zeid, and that our policy remained that we wanted the
best-qualified person, and that the statements are consistent.
Senator Sarbanes. When you first went up to the U.N., you
sought to delete the references to the Millennium Development
Goals from the outcome document, is that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. What I sought was to eliminate an
ambiguity that had developed over the course of years about
that term, which I'd be happy to explain here at greater
length, if you'd like.
Senator Sarbanes. When the President went to speak at the
U.N., he specifically endorsed the Millennium Development
Goals, is that not right?
Ambassador Bolton. That's exactly right. And the ambiguity
that we corrected, in fact, in the course of negotiating the
outcome document, was as follows: The Millennium Development
Goals, as they're frequently called, were originally written in
the Millennium Declaration, which was the outcome document that
came out of the 2000 Summit in New York. Those goals were
endorsed by the United States and by all the member
governments, and--that was during the Clinton administration--
and were endorsed by the Bush administration shortly after it
came into office, as well.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Millennium Declaration,
the U.N. Development Program and other U.N. agencies took those
goals and attempted to put them in quantifiable terms. Those
efforts at quantification were not endorsed by all member
governments, and specifically not by the United States. And
yet, over time there developed an ambiguity as to what one
meant when one used the phrase ``Millennium Development
Goals.''
In the negotiation of the outcome document, we made several
efforts to eliminate the ambiguity, and, ultimately, all of the
member governments accepted a definition in the outcome
document for ``Millennium Development Goals'' that said,
``These are the goals adopted in the Millennium Declaration of
2000.'' So, obviously, that was something we had accepted, and
that President Bush had previously endorsed, even before his
speech in New York last September.
Senator Sarbanes. I want to address this budget-cap issue
at the U.N., which I understand you pressed very hard for. In a
column recently in the Washington Post, Sebastian Mallaby
wrote, ``Not many reformers at the United Nations believe that
the budget threat achieved anything. To the contrary, Bolton
has so poisoned the atmosphere that the cause of management
renewal is viewed by many developing countries as an American
plot.'' In fact, the cap's now been lifted, has it not?
Ambassador Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Sarbanes. You told the committee, in May of last
year----
Ambassador Bolton. May of this year, probably.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I'm sorry, May of this
year--``I think the worst option is that the G-77 comes in, let
us say, in the next week, and adopts a resolution that says the
spending cap is hereby lifted, period.'' Isn't that pretty much
what eventually happened?
Ambassador Bolton. The spending cap was lifted without
substantial reform being achieved, that's correct. I might say,
the spending cap was developed as an idea originally that--
something that could be put in place for about 3 months because
of our hope that there would be such progress on mandate review
that that would be reflected in sufficient changes in the
budget that we wouldn't want to adopt a 1-year budget for 2006
and not have the option to change it. And that obviously didn't
work out.
Senator Sarbanes. You, of course, have seen the New York
Times article, just a few days ago, ``Praise at Home for Envoy,
But Scorn at U.N.'' That article says, and I quote it now,
``Over the past month, more than 30 ambassadors consulted in
the preparation of this article, all of whom share the United
States' goal of changing United Nations management practices,
expressed misgivings over Mr. Bolton's leadership.'' The
article quotes Peter Maurer, the Ambassador of Switzerland, who
characterized the American approach as ``intransigent and
maximalist,'' and an unnamed ambassador who is said to have
close ties to the Bush administration, remarked, ``My initial
feeling was, let's see if we can work with him, and I have done
some things to push for consensus on issues that were not easy
for my country, but all he gives us in return is, `It doesn't
matter, whatever you do is insufficient.' He's lost me as an
ally now, and that's what many other ambassadors who considered
themselves friends of the United States are saying.''
What's your response to that?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, look, I am honored to work with
the other ambassadors in New York. I think we have effective
professional relationships. I think people are motivated by
their national interests and policies. And a number of
ambassadors came up to me after that article and said they
thought it was unfortunate, because it certainly didn't reflect
their views, and they hadn't been contacted. But, look, I don't
think it's useful to respond to stories that quote anonymous
people. In my daily relationships with the ambassadors, I treat
them with respect, they treat me with respect. I think we get
the job done.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, you didn't get the reforms done,
did you?
Ambassador Bolton. We faced substantial opposition to the
reforms. I think I've described some of the reasons why. I
think we have to continue our efforts. There's no question
about that.
Senator Sarbanes. After you appeared before this committee
and made statements about forming the JUSCANZ group and working
with them, were there any objections or protests lodged with
the State Department regarding your statements about the
JUSCANZ group for its proposal on mandate review?
Ambassador Bolton. I think that a number of countries that
we discussed--that were discussed--didn't realize that there
would be as much attention to it as we had gotten, but I--as I
said to all of them later, in making amends, that what happens
in the United States is, you go into hearings in Congress, and
a lot of these things come out.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Ambassador Bolton, thank you for your service and your
willingness to run the gauntlet again through this hearing
process. I am hopeful, at the end of this hearing process, that
we'll be able to exercise our advice and consent and actually
have a vote up or down on your nomination. And I think that
sort of fairness has not been accorded to us, or to you. And
I'd hope, at the end of this, we will have an up or down vote
on the Senate floor rather than obstruction.
You have been successful in many areas in your tenure as
Ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than blame the United
States for North Korea launching missiles, I would blame,
first, North Korea, and, second, the country that has the most
influence in sustaining North Korea, and that is the People's
Republic of China. You have, and we have, worked with our
friends and allies, the Japanese, to get as strong a resolution
as we could get through without China vetoing.
Insofar as Syria is concerned, you have led an effort,
after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, to work with
other countries; with France taking the lead, to get the
Syrians out of Lebanon. The United Nations had their
resolution, which we sponsored with the French, 1559, which
still needs to be enforced.
As far as the reform of the United Nations, you tried to
get the United Nations, particularly the Human Rights Council,
to be reformed. But here we have China and Cuba on the Human
Rights Council until the year 2009. That is the sort of lack of
credibility this organization has to have such countries
actually on the U.N. Human Rights Council. And I know you tried
as best you could, and you're going to continue, and the United
States will continue in that regard.
Now, insofar as our mission in the United Nations with
regard to the current conflict in southern Lebanon and
Resolution 1559 from the Security Council, could you share with
us the challenges that you face, we face, that Israel faces,
and the realistic expectation of getting real action, action
that will have an impact on this situation in enforcing
Security Council Resolution 1559?
Ambassador Bolton. Okay. Well, there are many aspects to
it, but it seems to me the fundamental aspect is that as long
as Hezbollah continues to maintain its capacity as a state
within a state, that 1559 cannot be implemented. It's just--
it's not realistic to think that you can have an effective
government where there's a--an armed group operating within the
state functioning as if it's its own government, controlling
its own territory, using its own weapons, and functioning at
the behest, in many cases, of foreign governments. Given that
Iran, by at least some reliable estimates, contributes $100
million a year to Hezbollah, they're the paymasters, and
they're calling the tune.
And I think this is--the continued existence of Hezbollah
as an armed force, contrary to the authority of the Government
of Lebanon, is something that's a risk, obviously, not only to
our interests and Israel's, but it's just fundamentally
contrary to the interests of the Lebanese people. I said
earlier, I think, in partial response to one of Senator
Chafee's questions, that Hezbollah has a choice to make here.
If they want to be a legitimate political party, they can
operate like a legitimate political party. They--but they can't
be in a situation, as they are now, where they have ministers
in the Lebanese Government, but maintain a military capacity,
up to and including anti-ship cruise missiles, separate from
the Lebanese Government.
So, the responsibility to implement 1559 fundamentally has
to address this fact.
There are many other aspects, as I mentioned earlier.
Getting Syria to internalize the fact that Lebanon is going to
be an independent country, but it has to exchange ambassadors
with Lebanon, which you only do between two independent
countries. It has to demarcate the border and get its people--
its intelligence services out of trying to run parts of the
Lebanese Government. That is what the fact that we're in
hostilities now in southern Lebanon may give us the opportunity
to do, because of Hezbollah's terrorist attacks on Israel. We
need to seize the advantage of this opportunity. And one
fundamental change that has to come--one of the road maps we
have to follow is to get 1559 implemented.
Senator Allen. Right. We can look at all the details of
exchanging ambassadors between Syria and Lebanon. This recent
statement, though--I think everyone has to have some sense of
the global picture, the realism of this war that we're engaged
in against these radical Islamic terrorists. Al-Qaeda issues
this statement, and it shows that al-Qaeda's joining in with
Hezbollah and Hamas, and they're all joined in, with statements
that, ``This jihad will last until our religion prevails from
Spain to Iraq.'' Of course, they've also hit in Indonesia and
the Philippines, as well. He said that, ``The regimes, some
Arab regimes in the region''--referring, undoubtedly, to Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan--``are accomplices to Israel.'' And
that they're trying to get these martyrs to fight all our
enemies. This is a global war.
Now, you take Hezbollah, with these thousands and thousands
of rockets--you mentioned the phrase, ``Iran is their payment--
or their paymasters, and they're calling the tune.'' Hezbollah
is armed by Iran. Is that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. And by Syria, yes.
Senator Allen. And Syria. All right. Where does Iran get
these rockets? Do they manufacture or build them themselves, or
do they get them from some other country?
Ambassador Bolton. Some are their own; some, these--the C-
802 anti-ship cruise missiles are purchased from China.
Senator Allen. Do we know when the most recent purchases
from China were?
Ambassador Bolton. I don't know, myself. We may.
Senator Allen. Do you know if China or any other country is
presently selling rockets to Iran, or missiles?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, there's no doubt of very extensive
Chinese cooperation with the Iranian ballistic missile program.
That is one reason why, repeatedly, year after year, numerous
Chinese entities are sanctioned by the U.S. Government for
violating the provisions of our law that deal with the
transmittal of materials and technology involved with weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to terrorist states.
Senator Allen. Well, as we're dealing with Iran, in the
nuclear capabilities of Iran--clearly, China, and then,
particularly, Russia, are very important, Iran is important, as
they are the funders, the supporters, the directors of
Hezbollah. Without Iran, Hezbollah would not have the
resources, nor the armaments, to be firing these rockets, in
however many thousands they have, into Israel. Do you see them
being of--potentially of use, or more of an impediment to a
unified United Nations and unified world, precluding Iran from
potentially getting nuclear weapons?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think this is--this is something
we're trying to work with, with China on now; in particular, in
the context of the Perm-5 agreement that said that if Iran
failed to take up the offer, the very generous offer that was
made to them, that we would move to sanctions in the Security
Council. And we have not yet achieved the first step in that
resolution. But I think it's critical that China, over--as soon
as possible, frankly, internalize the same nonproliferation
objectives that we and most other developed countries have, not
because we're trying to impose sanctions on China, not because
we're trying to deny them commercial sales, but because they
need to appreciate, as we have come to appreciate, that the
sales of these kinds of technologies and weapons ultimately are
threatening to them as a destabilizing force in the world, as a
whole.
Senator Allen. Well, the reality is, these sales of--
whether it's from China or any country to Iran, as I--and Iran
funding Hezbollah--to some extent, other--potentially, other
terrorist organizations in the world. And then you have the
Secretary General, in May of this year, Secretary Annan, issued
a recommendation for a global counterterrorism strategy to be
considered by the General Assembly. Now, this should be
something that the entire world, from Spain to East Asia and
everywhere else in the world, ought to be concerned about, with
the statements that we get from Hezbollah, from Iran,
statements you hear from al-Qaeda, with the deadly intent to
carry out these martyr/radical Islamic attacks, killing
innocent men, women, and children everywhere.
Now, what is the status of these consultations on this
strategy to have a global counterterrorism approach?
Ambassador Bolton. The short answer is, consultations
continue, but the--one of the principal difficulties we have is
that we can't reach agreement on a definition of terrorism,
which makes it hard to develop a strategy. We have made many
efforts, both at the time of the summit in September and since
then, and the problem is, there are still a number of
governments that think that some kinds of terrorism are
acceptable under certain circumstances, versus our view that no
form of terrorism is ever acceptable.
Senator Allen. Thank you. My time is up, and I look forward
to, hopefully, voting for you on the Senate floor. And thank
you for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And,
Ambassador Bolton, welcome to the committee.
Mr. Ambassador, as most of my colleagues here will tell
you, I've been on this committee for 25 years, and my normal
operating procedures is to be supportive of nominees who come
before this committee. I didn't go over the numbers here, but
I'm of a mind that Presidents, as a general matter, ought to be
able to have their choices to serve in high government
positions. That's been my view. In fact, to the extent I've
ever been criticized by votes I've cast in those matters, it's
usually been because I've supported nominees that many people
on my side of the dais here have disagreed with. But I firmly
believe that generally that's the case. And I take no great
pleasure at all in disagreeing with this nomination. It's not
something that I enjoy engaging in normally, but I feel as
though I must. And I regret that it seems to me the issues that
provoked the opposition I raised a year ago are still with us
today, to some degree, and I want to go over some of them, if I
can, with you in the time we have here. Some of them may seem
like ancient history to some people, but I think they're still
very important.
There are four issues, basically. One has to go back with
the NSA intercept issue. And I realize that's a matter that was
raised a year ago. I realize it's not a matter entirely in your
control, because it's a decision made by others, other than
yourself. And I'm going to give you a chance to respond to
that. The second set of issues has to do with the matter
raised, again, a year or so ago, but has to do with the
attempts to fire analysts at the CIA. The third issue has to do
with decreasing support for the United States among our allies,
which is a more current question, and the coordination efforts
that you must maintain as an Ambassador to the United Nations
with the Department of State. Some of these issues have been
raised already by some.
The first issue, the NSA intercept issue, why do I still
bring that up? Well, I happen to believe that, as a matter of
right, this coequal branch of government, through appropriate
channels, should be able to see and make judgments about
matters involving intelligence questions. I've never suggested
that all members of this committee or all members of the United
States Senate ought to have access to that information. We have
appropriate committees and appropriate members, who ought to be
able to see this information.
Now, on 19--excuse me, 10 different occasions involving 19
individuals, you requested to see the transcript of these
intercepts. Nothing inappropriate about that at all, in your
previous position, to see them. I respect that. What I
disagreed with, that concerns me, is you also, I'm told--you
can correct me if I'm wrong here--requested to know the names
of the Americans who were part of those conversations. Now,
while it's not extraordinary to request the information, it
seems to me it was important to find that information out
through the appropriate members of this body, as a coequal
branch of government, with an Intelligence Committee, two
chairmen, who should have access to it. We went through a
lengthy process, myself, Senator Biden, and others, writing
letters to Ambassador Negroponte, to Secretary Rice and others,
trying to resolve this matter. In fact, to the point of even
suggesting we'll provide the name and you just tell us whether
or not these people were on the list or not.
Now, first of all, let me ask you whether or not--because I
think you've answered this to me, but I--but I want to be on
the--I want it to be on the public record--as I recall, you
have no objection--correct me if I'm wrong here--that the names
of these 19 individuals, U.S. citizens, be revealed to the
appropriate members of the United States Senate. Is that still
your position?
Ambassador Bolton. I have no objection. Can I just explain
what the circumstances are there? I----
Senator Dodd. Well, why don't you just answer that question
first, so we can move on, and then I'll give you a chance to
respond to it.
Ambassador Bolton. Fine.
Senator Dodd. You have no objection to those names being
revealed?
Ambassador Bolton. Personally, I do not, no.
Senator Dodd. Well, then why don't you explain what--let me
ask you this. Have you--what important--what was so important
in that information that you needed to know the names of those
individuals, in addition to the actual content of the
conversations?
Ambassador Bolton. Let me just say, as I said at the
beginning of the hearings, 15 months ago, I guess they were,
from my personal point of view, I'd have all of this in public,
because, frankly, I think if all of these--of all of these
things were out in the open, it would be a lot easier to
explain. I feel a little constrained now, even talking about
the intercept issue in public, but I will try and answer your
question to the best I can.
Senator Dodd. Well, I'm not going to ask you to reveal any
names at all. I'm just----
Ambassador Bolton. But let me----
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Curious about the----
Ambassador Bolton. No, I understand. I know you would not
do that. But let me just explain how this works, and--every
day, usually twice a day, sometimes more than that, I get
packages of intelligence material--I did, in my previous job--
as do senior officials in State and Defense and the NSC. I'm a
voracious consumer of intelligence. I read as much as I can. I
make no bones about it. I and--in my previous job--and lots of
other senior officials, see the results of intercepts. And
they're written up in various different ways. But it is the
policy of the NSA not to put in the intercepts the names of
Americans.
Senator Dodd. Correct.
Ambassador Bolton. Okay? And that includes American
entities.
Senator Dodd. Correct.
Ambassador Bolton. Companies, as well as individuals. They
follow different patterns. And I couldn't begin to explain why.
Sometimes it'll say that ``material's going on,'' and then it
will say ``a named American person.'' Sometimes it says ``a
named government official.'' Sometimes--and I've seen this for
myself--it will say ``the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations.'' Not hard to figure out who that is. But there
are times when, as you're reading along the material trying to
understand what it really means, it can be enhanced if you know
the name of the American involved. So, what I did on 10
occasions--you're quite right, 10 occasions--4 times in 2003, 3
times in 2004, and 3 times in 2005--following procedures that
are set up for precisely this purpose, made a request of the
INR Bureau of the State Department to receive the names of
the--what is called the ``minimized names.'' That's the whole
process--this is called ``minimization.'' The INR, pursuant to
procedures, passed that request along to NSA, which, pursuant
to their procedures, I believe, in all 10 cases, agreed to
provide the name.
Now, all of this has been extensively written up in
correspondence and statements by Senator Roberts, the chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, but I think what I'm trying to
make clear is, I didn't say, ``Send me all the information on
Mr. Smith,'' or, ``I want Mr. Smith--I want information about
Mr. Smith.'' You're sitting there at your desk, reading along,
and suddenly you come upon ``a named American individual,'' and
you say, ``Well, who is that? How--would that help me
understand the intelligence better?'' And it's not just that I,
or any other senior official, asks for it and we get it
automatically; you have to state a reason, it goes through INR,
it goes through NSA, and, as I say, in these cases, appears to
have been approved. Other senior officials do the same thing.
And I have to tell you, when I took this job, and I was
coming in, and getting my intelligence briefings, I was
briefed. The official giving me the briefing said, ``Now, let
me explain to you how you request a name under minimization,''
and then laughed and said, ``Well, I guess you already know
that, don't you?'' This is something that is--it's part of the
legitimate needs of the jobs involved. It is subject to check.
It's not at the individual's exclusive discretion----
Senator Dodd. I appreciate----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. By any stretch of the
imagination.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. I appreciate the answer. And
you'll appreciate, as well, that, as a member of this body
here--and, again, I'd reiterate for you here, not a request by
all 100 members of the United States Senate, but the
appropriate members of this body to be able to have access to
that kind of information. It was an issue that was raised,
obviously at a sensitive time. We have since discovered, of
course, in December of last year, a wider-spread issue
involving warrantless wiretaps that have provoked even further
discussion. But for the two members of the committee to be told
by the administration that they couldn't have access to that
same information, which you, as a member of the administration,
had, to determine--in fact, to corroborate, if you will--that
which you've just said here, was the source of significant
contention, considering your nomination. And----
Ambassador Bolton. I remember.
Senator Dodd. Of course you do. And I make the point here
again, it's still an issue, in a sense. And I think my
colleagues--while some may discount it, I think it's very
important for the United States Senate, when matters arise like
this--this matter could have been dealt with, I would point
out, if it had--along the lines you just described, I think it
might have become almost a minor issue, if in fact, your
analysis and your description of this is as it is, then
certainly it might have moved right along. The fact that there
was such resistance to it provoked a lot of concerns among
members on this side of the dais about the rationale for
seeking those names, what happened to those names. That's all
the point I wanted to make.
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, that's--I appreciate that. I just
want to follow up on one point. As I said, if it were only my
equities at stake, it would be fine with me, because I think it
would eliminate this issue. There are other equities. It's not
just my personal fortunes that are at issue here, having to do,
in part, with the relationship between the intelligence
community and Congress, and the relationship between the
Intelligence Committees of the Senate and House and the other
committees. But, as you know--you were kind enough--at one
point, I asked Senator Biden, during those discussions, if I
could come up and see him, and you joined that meeting. I
thought we had a good discussion about it. I would--nobody
would be more pleased if we could resolve the issue. But I do
think these--there are other serious considerations. I'd
certainly be willing to continue the discussions about the
question. I'd have to talk to others in the administration. I
have spoken to John Negroponte about it, and--you know, let's
see what might happen.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate that.
And, Mr. Chairman, I might make a request of you and
Senator Biden that, in light of Mr. Bolton's--Ambassador
Bolton's response here, that maybe a request of Ambassador
Negroponte about this could be one way of trying to resolve
this issue. Again, my request is not that all members of this
committee, or even necessarily the chairman or the ranking
member of this committee, but the appropriate members of the
Intelligence Committee, have access to the information to
determine whether or not it would warrant any further
investigation by the committee. And if that's the case, it
would certainly help alleviate this issue. I know you did once,
already, a year ago, Mr. Chairman. I was very grateful to you
at that time. But I might request that a similar request be
made again to see if we can't resolve this matter. I'll leave
it to your consideration.
The Chairman. Let the chair respond that we will try to
obtain this information. As the Senator remembers, there were
long arguments between committees about jurisdiction, quite
apart from the administration. And all of these powers that be
may have changed their minds. But, nevertheless----
Senator Dodd. I appreciate it.
The Chairman. I acknowledge the request, I honor it, and I
will try to make certain our record is as complete as possible.
Senator Dodd. And I appreciate that. And I just--I realize
this is going back in time, but the issue is still an important
one, in my view, in terms of the relationship between the
executive and legislative branch, in the conduct of this kind
of business.
Let me move, if I can, to another issue that came up at the
time, and it has to do with my concern. And let me say, Mr.
Ambassador, this is--of all the issues, I think this one, in my
mind, is maybe the most significant one, and a problem that I
just have, generally, and that is the issue of attempting to
pressure analysts in our intelligence agencies to produce
information that would conform to a particular point of view in
the conduct of foreign policy. And I would want to say, over
and over again here, whether this was a Democratic
administration or a Republican administration, in my view,
anyone--whoever attempts to do this, in my view, does not
deserve to be confirmed--or confirmed for any high-ranking
position. I'm just deeply concerned with this--the ability to
have solid, reliable information. And I know that it may--I
don't disagree with the arguments and disputes over this, but
when attempts are made--and it was seven high-ranking Bush
officials who strongly recommended to this committee, over a
year ago, that you not be confirmed for this position, because
of matters relating to this issue.
And one of the matters that occurred--and I raise it with
you here again today, because we didn't have a chance to raise
it during your confirmation hearing--involved the case of a
national intelligence officer for Latin America, who we'll call
Mr. Smith here. When asked about your conversation with a
senior official at the National Intelligence Council, Stuart
Cohen, you said the following at the committee hearing, ``I
also knew that in the weeks and months previous thereto dealing
with this Mr. Smith, who was the Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere, had told me and others he had very grave
concerns with Mr. Smith on a range of issues. And I think I
said to Mr. Cohen, in the course of our conversation, that,
based on what I had seen in my limited area, that I agreed with
him. And that was it. I had one part of one conversation with
one person, one time on Mr. Smith, and that was it. I let it
go,'' end of quote.
That was your testimony before this committee. The
committee subsequently found documentary evidence to the
contrary. For example, in late July of 2002, after your meeting
with Mr. Cohen, your staff drafted letters to the CIA
leadership seeking the removal of Mr. Smith and indicated in e-
mails that, quote, ``John doesn't want this to slip any
further.'' Discussion between your office and Mr. Reich's
office continued until October.
I'd ask you whether or not you stand by your earlier
testimony that your effort to seek the removal of Mr. Smith was
one part of one conversation, one time.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, let me say, as a general
proposition, I have not had a chance to go back over all the
materials generated last spring. I've been a little busy in New
York, and my memory is now 15 months older than it was then.
But I can tell you this, those letters were never sent, because
I didn't want to do that.
Senator Dodd. You didn't want to do what?
Ambassador Bolton. I didn't want to seek Mr. Smith's
removal. I had made the point that his conduct--not his
intelligence analysis, but his conduct--saying to people that
the famous Heritage speech on the ``beyond the axis of evil''
had not been cleared by the intelligence community, when it had
been. And it disturbed me that people--that--it always disturbs
me when people promulgate falsehoods, and that's what bothered
me about his conduct. Otto Reich, you quite rightly say, the
Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, had much
broader concern with Mr. Smith. I think I testified an opinion
that he was--he felt strongly about because of his area of
policy responsibility.
Senator Dodd. Did you draft the letters, or did your staff
draft the letters----
Ambassador Bolton. The staff drafted the letters, and they
were never sent.
Senator Dodd. And did you review the letters? Did you agree
with the drafts of the letters?
Ambassador Bolton. Of course. That's why they were never
sent.
Senator Dodd. So, you disagreed with them.
Ambassador Bolton. I did not want them sent, and they were
not sent.
Senator Dodd. All right. Thanks.
Let me move on to the second----
The Chairman. Senator Dodd, your----
Senator Dodd. Time up? I apologize. Then I'll come back.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was reflecting on the comments of Chairman Warner--it
seems too long ago--when he talked about the complexity of the
challenges facing the United States today and the importance of
the continuity of representation. And I do want to say, up
front, that that's important and that I think the decision
facing us is whether we confirm the nomination--the
renomination of this President. We have an acting ambassador
who is there, he's doing the job--whether we walk in, in
January, with the possibility of not having that continuity of
representation, when the issues that face us are so great, in
North Korea, in Lebanon, and in Israel, in Iran, and on and on
and on. And so, I just hope my colleagues reflect upon that.
Just a couple of questions. In the--when the G-77 rejected
the--what I saw as the modest reforms set forth by the Attorney
General, I think you said the vote was about 122 to 50. Is that
correct?
Ambassador Bolton. The General Assembly (plenary) vote
resulted in 121 in favor, 50 opposed, and 2 abstentions.
Senator Coleman. And in terms of the JUSCANZ group, did
Japan vote with us on that?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, they did.
Senator Coleman. And Canada, are they part of that group?
Did they vote----
Ambassador Bolton. Yes.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. With us on that?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, they did.
Senator Coleman. And New Zealand, did they vote with us on
that?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, they did.
Senator Coleman. And when one looks at the breakdown of the
U.N.-member contributions to the assessed budget--we're first,
Japan's second--what about Germany? Did they vote with us on
that?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, all of the European Union countries
voted with us.
Senator Coleman. So--and I--one of my concerns here, as I
listen, is, you're being held to account, or held to blame, for
the G-77 trashing reform, when, in fact, our allies, and those
who are contributing the money, were all with us. I mean, that
coalition you held together, but the nature of the U.N. is, not
everybody is with us.
I--and it's interesting, I was just listening to the
protesters, and I was reflecting on it, and I would bet that if
you asked the two protectors that we had, to cite a single
statement of John Bolton or a single action of John Bolton that
they object to, I doubt that they could do it. Their opposition
is to U.S. policy.
And perhaps the most encouraging thing I heard this morning
was from the ranking member, who said, ``I don't want to hold
you accountable for the administration action or inaction.''
And if you really look at the opposition, at times, to this
nomination, there are two things. It's--one, it's opposition to
U.S. policy, which, by the way, even amongst us, on this side
of the table, I think it's fair to say we don't always agree.
We don't always agree with this administration. But I think
what we do fundamentally agree with is the belief that the
President has the right to have his voice and his
representation, somebody he trusts, representing us at the
United Nations. That's the--to me, the fundamental question
here.
And to look at the area of U.N. reform, and to say that
somehow the failure of those nations that don't have an
interest in--and, by the way, don't have the skin in the game,
aren't funding the United Nations, that their resistance is
somehow a reflection of your failure, I--just a little bit of
history. The ranking member talked about--gave Ambassador
Holbrooke great credit for--when we had the issue with our
arrears. Was Helms-Biden in effect at that time?
Ambassador Bolton. No, that was the--the negotiation that
actually led to Helms-Biden.
Senator Coleman. And tell me a little bit about Helms-
Biden.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, it was a--an arrangement whereby
the United States essentially paid back the arrearages that had
been developed during the mid-1990s as a consequence of
congressional withholdings because of dissatisfaction with the
U.N., in exchange for lowering the United States' assessed
share of contributions to the budget.
Senator Coleman. But, in part, then, it was what I might
label playing hardball, saying, ``Congress is saying we're
going to hold back some dues,'' that led to a resolution of
this matter.
Ambassador Bolton. The hardest kind of hardball, holding
the money back.
Senator Coleman. And my question, then, would be, today,
kind of, looking at U.N. reform and the failure of the G-77 to
move forward, would it be fair to say that many folks at the
United Nations do not believe that there's the political will
in this body, in the Congress, to hold back, to do what we did
with Helms-Biden, if that was necessary to achieve reform?
Ambassador Bolton. I think many of them do have the
attitude that, ``This, too, shall pass,'' and that life will go
on. I really think Paul Volcker's insight, his characterization
of the problem, that he came to after the enormous study of the
Oil-for-Food Programme, of describing the problem at the U.N.
as being the ``culture of inaction''----
Senator Coleman. And I need--I actually asked him whether
it was a ``culture of corruption.''
Ambassador Bolton. Right.
Senator Coleman. He wouldn't go that far, but he said--and,
by the way, that ``culture of inaction,'' that was there before
John Bolton was appointed Permanent--acting as Permanent
Representative.
Ambassador Bolton. It's been there for a long time. But
it's a profound insight, because it indicates not simply
opposition to moving this box or changing this line on an
organizational diagram, it's a more--it's a more profound
difficulty that we have, and why I think that real reform, to
get to what Secretary Rice called ``the lasting revolution of
reform,'' is going to--is a difficult task.
Senator Coleman. So, help me understand. What's next for
real reform? What--if there is--if there can be any sense of
optimism, what's the next step, in terms of real reform? And is
there anything that we, in Congress, can do to assist the
efforts to achieve reform?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think we're going to continue to
pursue all three of the broad areas that we outlined:
management reform, which was the subject of the unfortunate
vote in the Fifth Committee, opposing many of the Secretary
General's management reforms; the mandate review, which is
the--I think, the principal requirement of the outcome document
in the area of U.N. reform, to look at these 9,000 U.N.
mandates and try to eliminate the ones that are outmoded,
consolidate those that are duplicative, and reprioritize what
the U.N. is--focus the priorities among other things--when you
have that many mandates, it's hard to see how you have any
priorities; and then, also, to work on continuing to strengthen
things like whistle-blower reform and the Ethics Office.
I might say, in that regard, I've met, some weeks back,
with the head of the U.N. Staff Union. I think I may be the
first U.S. Permanent Representative to meet with the head of
the Staff Union. And they had had a study commissioned of the
whistle-blower protection regulations and the Ethics Office,
because they, in effect, represent the people who are going to
be the whistle-blowers, and their conclusion was that the
regulations were weak, and the office was weak, as well.
So, that was a--that was a disturbing piece of news, but
it's--these are important priorities. We're going to continue
to work with them. I hope to have the chance to talk to the
Staff Union again and learn some more from them. I wish I had
done it earlier in my tenure, frankly, but I'm glad I did it
when I did.
Senator Coleman. But I'm still trying to understand--other
than discussion, is there any kind of leverage that we have to
actually make mandate review happen, actually to have a
strengthened Office of Investigative Services? Is there any
kind of leverage that you have, in dealing with G-77, who have
made it clear that they don't have a--an interest in
significant reform?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think that it's very important
that the--all the countries in New York know that Congress is
acutely interested in the outcome of this reform, and that it's
not just the administration, or certainly not just yours truly.
And I think that Senator Lugar mentioned earlier that you and
he and Senator Voinovich had come up, back in February, your
colleagues on the other side of the Hill have come up, as well.
I think it's important that those kinds of trips continue, and
that Congress make its voice heard that these reforms are
important to making the U.N. stronger and more effective, and
that we're not in a position where we're going to wait forever
for this to happen.
Senator Coleman. Let me just get back to that historical
point, because I think it has relevance for today. When we go
back to the clearing up arrears, is it fair to say that Helms-
Biden and the threat of--or using our financial leverage was a
critical factor in resolving that situation?
Ambassador Bolton. I don't think there's any question about
it. And I've had my own personal experiences with the use of
the--of financial resources as leverage. And it's been
effective.
Senator Coleman. Just on a personal note, because I admire
your commitment to service, Ambassador, and, kind of, going
through what you've had to go through to even be here at this
point. First, overall, your impression of the U.N. You had some
strong feelings. You knew the organization. You were involved
in it. Then, you were on the outside. Then you--now you're
there. Is there--has your impression of the U.N. changed? Has
there been anything that surprised you in the last year?
Ambassador Bolton. Not really.
Senator Coleman. I don't know whether that's good or bad,
by the way, but----
Ambassador Bolton. I think there's a lot of work to do. I
thought it on July 31 of last year, the day before the
President appointed me, and on July the 27th; today, I still
think there's a lot of work to do.
Senator Coleman. As you look to the future, understanding
all the shortcomings, understand the culture of inaction,
understand the difficulty of pulling together consensus on a
Security Council, as we look, kind of, into the crystal ball--
and if I just pick a couple of areas--Lebanon: the time is not
ripe now for negotiations, and I think you've made it clear,
and the Secretary's made it clear, that we need a--some longer-
term--the possibility of longer-term stability there. But what
role do you see the Security Council playing in dealing--
resolving the Lebanese situation at some point in the future?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the Council can have, and
should have, a--an important role in continuing to push for
full implementation of 1559 and 1680 and the other resolutions
that flow from that. And I think 1559 is an interesting
example, if I may point out. That resolution was adopted by a
vote of 9 to 0, with 6 abstentions, including Russia and China.
So, there was a case--and 9 being the absolute minimum number
of votes under the U.N. charter by which the Council can adopt
a resolution. So, that was a case where there was not unanimity
on the Council, but where the plan laid out by 1559 has been, I
think, critical in helping to shape the way ahead. There's more
work the Council can do. I think there's more work in backing
up the International Investigatory Commission that was set up
under 1595 to investigate the Hariri assassination, where we've
also granted it additional authority to cooperate with the
Government of Lebanon in investigating some 14 other terrorist
assassinations that were conducted there, hopefully to see if
there are patterns that persist among those assassinations that
may tell us more about who the perpetrators are. So, I think
the Council has a lot of work to do in the Lebanon area, and I
think it's a principal part of Secretary Rice's planning and
her negotiations, that 1559 and the Taif Agreement provide the
guiding principles.
Senator Coleman. And thank you. But I just want to,
Ambassador, in closing, I've been to the United Nations with
the chairman and Senator Voinovich, I've watched you work, I've
visited with your colleagues. I want you to know you have my
unequivocal, unhesitating support that we need to confirm this
nomination, and I hope we get a chance for an up or down vote.
Ambassador Bolton. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
Now, let me mention, before I recognize Senator Feingold,
that I've asked Senator Coleman to chair the committee. The
Chair will need to leave the hearing for a period of time,
starting at about 11:45. I presume the hearing is going to go
on for a while, and I'm grateful to Senator Coleman for his
longstanding interest in the United Nations, as well as the
Ambassador, for taking hold, at that point.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Bolton, welcome. I obviously don't have to tell
you how important the position of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
is today. We're looking to the United Nations to help us
respond to some of the biggest threats to international peace
and security, including violence in the Middle East, escalating
nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea, growing instability in
Somalia, and ongoing genocide in Darfur. We need the U.N. to
serve as a forum where we can work with other nations to
address issues that directly affect our own national security,
and to get real results. That does mean we need to reform the
U.N. to make it more effective and more accountable, but real
reform will require U.S. leadership, not just brinksmanship,
bullying, or scorn.
Ambassador Bolton, I opposed your nomination last year
because of your hostility toward the United Nations. Concerns
that you had pursued a personal policy agenda while holding
public office that led me to question whether you were really
the best person to advance U.S. interests at the U.N. And it
gives me no pleasure to say that your record over the last year
has not sufficiently put those concerns to rest. It's not just
a question of being tough, it's a question of achieving U.S.
objectives. We need that kind of leadership now more than ever.
It is simply not enough to blame all of our failures at the
U.N. over the last year on bureaucratic inefficiency or
organization ineptitude. We need an Ambassador at the U.N. who
can deliver results.
And my first question, Ambassador, is, sort of, taking a
look at the record over the last year at the United Nations, I
tend to see, time and time again, a failure to build consensus
on a number of important issues. Let me just mention a few,
some of which my colleagues have already mentioned: A World
Summit outcome document that failed to include a single
reference to nuclear nonproliferation or a definition of
``terrorism''; a flawed Human Rights Council; lack of
significant progress on management reform; a divisive budget-
cap deadlock, slow progress toward an effective Security
Council on Iran; a watered-down resolution on North Korea. Let
me ask you why we should have confidence that you will have
more success in the future, particularly as we're facing an
almost perfect storm of international crises that we're looking
to the U.N. to help us address.
Ambassador Bolton. In part, Senator, I would take issue
with your assessment of the outcomes in some of the areas that
you've mentioned. I think the resolution on North Korea
unanimously adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 1695
was a significant step--first resolution in 13 years on North
Korea. I think we are going to get the resolution on Iran, and
I think it will be a significant step forward to make mandatory
the requirement that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities. I think that the negotiations that we
engaged in, in the outcome document, substantially improved
that document, and the fact that there were no provisions in it
on arms control and disarmament was due to some fundamental
disagreements that existed, and it certainly takes more than
one to disagree.
There is a process of--that's required to get the reform
that we want undertaken, and that does require a significant
amount of effort. I think it's significant that, while the
scandals of the Oil-for-Food Programme, for example, had a
profound influence on this country, in Congress and in public
opinion, that was difficult to get the attention of many people
to the need for sweeping reform that was revealed by the Oil-
for-Food Programme.
I think when we had examples of procurement fraud and U.N.
peacekeeping activities, when we looked at the continuing
extent of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers,
we ran into opposition with even having the Security Council
investigate those matters.
So, I don't, believe me, take full credit for successes at
the U.N. I'm fully aware that a lot of the work that goes into
those successes takes place in Washington and through our
embassies in other capitals. But neither is the case, I think,
that it's accurate to say--when you have the accumulated
inertia that we see at the U.N., and the need to overcome that
culture of inaction, that whatever success, or lack, that we
have to date is entirely attributable to me, one way or the
other.
Senator Feingold. Well, and I think that's fair. But the
question is whether the approach and the emphasis and the tone
that you take assists us in getting those resolutions, or does
not. And that's my main concern.
And, just as a point, the North Korea resolution, did--as
you well know, did not include Chapter VII sanctions, something
that you indicated was crucial.
Ambassador Bolton. No, I--actually, I did not indicate
that. What I indicated, and said to the press and said in all
the negotiations, that we wanted a binding resolution on--a
resolution that would bind North Korea. And it's our judgment
that that's exactly what it does. There is a lengthy and, some
would say, theological debate about how one does that in a
Security Council resolution. I think the conclusion we reached
is that you look at the entire language of the resolution, and
that--our conclusion was--and the conclusion of our friends--
and I include, specifically there, Japan, which was, of all the
Council members, in addition to the United States, most
concerned that that resolution bind North Korea--that we
concluded that it did.
Senator Feingold. Well, that surprises me a little bit. I--
it sounds like a little bit of--like an after-the-fact
characterization. But let me move on.
Senator Coleman alluded to this. Lately you've been quoted
in the press talking about the pressure building in Congress to
withhold contributions from the U.N. At this time, when we're
working with the U.N. on a number of global crises, do you
think the United States should pay its obligations to the U.N.?
Ambassador Bolton. It is unequivocally the position of the
administration to pay our assessed contribution, but I've
worked in and studied the U.N. for roughly 25 years now, and
I've seen, in the mid-1980s, in the mid-1990s, the
dissatisfaction levels in Congress grow to the point where our
assessments were withheld. And I think there is enormous
dissatisfaction. I think it's one of the reasons why we have
tried to persuade others of the urgency of U.N. reform, so that
we don't find ourselves in that situation again.
Senator Feingold. But, having said that, do you think the
United States should pay its obligations to the U.N.?
Ambassador Bolton. As I said about 30 seconds ago, yes, I
do.
Senator Feingold. All right. Getting a U.N. peacekeeping
mission into Darfur has been a high-level U.S. priority. And I
just want to ask why you didn't travel with other Security
Council members to Darfur when they went to Sudan earlier this
year. Is this some indication of the importance of the issue to
you? If you could say a bit about that.
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, I had, long before the timing of
that mission was scheduled, made a personal commitment in the
United Kingdom. A lot of people had gone to a lot of effort to
put that in place, and I didn't feel that I could break the
commitment, as a matter of my personal word. Instead, I sent
the--our alternative representative to the Security Council,
Ambassador Sanders, who was with the delegation through its
entire trip in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Chad.
Senator Feingold. You're saying it was a personal
commitment of a business nature, not a----
Ambassador Bolton. No, no, of--well----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. It was not a personal
commitment, in the sense of your own family.
Ambassador Bolton. Right, that's correct.
Senator Feingold. All right.
On June 19 of this year, you told the press that you did
not see the need for an expanded United Nations mission in East
Timor, despite the severe breakdown of the new nation's
security forces that took place in April and May. And the next
day, the United States voted for a Security Council resolution
requesting a report on the role for the United Nations in
Timor, taking into account the current situation, the need for
a strengthened presence of the United Nations.
How would you characterize this apparent discrepancy
between your statement to the press and the later official U.S.
position?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, the--I don't know what you're
quoting from, but I know there was a--there were statements, at
the time, that the U.N. had left East Timor prematurely. And
I--in response to a question, I said I didn't think that the
current difficulties in East Timor had anything to do with the
reason for the earlier U.N. presence in East Timor, which was
the independent struggle from Indonesia, and made the comment
in response to that kind of question. So, I think it was
addressing the historical circumstances, but was not--it was
not related to the current situation, where we are actively
consulting with Australia and other key countries to determine
exactly what the appropriate U.N. response is to the outbreak
of violence in East Timor.
Senator Feingold. Well, other questions today have had to
do with the importance that our Government be consistent in its
message. So, this has--this issue about East Timor relates to
that concern. And can I----
Ambassador Bolton. If you could show me the quotation,
Senator, I'd be happy to take a look at it again.
Senator Feingold. Are you talking about your quotation?
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah.
Senator Feingold. I will be happy to get that for you.
But, first, I want to do a follow-up question. I understand
that East Timor will be a focus of the Security Council in
August to discuss the report findings and determine the
possible need for a larger U.N. presence. If the report calls
for an expanded U.N. force, would you support it? And what do
you consider to be the appropriate role for the international
community in East Timor?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I'd have to--I'd have to look at
the entire report and, obviously, consult within the
Government. I don't make these decisions on my own. I follow
instructions from Washington. As I said to you a moment ago,
we've been in very close touch with the Australians,
particularly their permanent representative, who is a former
minister of defense of Australia, to be sure that our policy is
closely coordinated with that government, given their troops on
the ground. And I would expect that we would want to stay in
very close touch with them and align our policies. And I would
expect that's what will happen.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. First of all, welcome back to the
committee. And I wanted to thank you for your service at the
United Nations.
You serve at one of the most challenging, critical, and
fragile times in our Nation's history. I think our President
has more on his international plate than maybe any President
since FDR. We're confronting serious national security and
humanitarian challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan. I think Senator
Feingold did a good job of defining what we're confronted with.
We're now in the midst of a crisis in the Middle East, where
Israel is battling with Hamas and Hezbollah. A cease-fire is
being contemplated, and all that goes along with it. And
Israel's relations with Lebanon is at an all-time low.
And, last but not least, I think that we need to understand
that we have a war against Islamic extremists who have hijacked
the Quran to make people believe the jihad against us and
people that share our values is consistent with the Quran. And
yesterday I was really pleased that Prime Minister Maliki made
a point that suicide, killing of women and children, is not
consistent with Quran, and that freedom, rule of law, human
rights was consistent with the Quran.
And I would think that all of us should be praying to the
Holy Spirit that he enlightens our President and other world
leaders at this time to make good and wise decisions.
Mr. Chairman, my position regarding Mr. Bolton's
stewardship at the U.N. is outlined in an opinion piece that
appeared in the Washington Post last week. I would also be
happy to speak to any of my colleagues about the time I've
spent talking to John Bolton in person and on the phone, and
also the telephone conversations that I have had with John
Bolton's colleagues on his performance at the United Nations.
And, I think, for members of this committee to rely on a
recent article in the New York Times as the basis for judging
his performance is not fair, and I would suggest that they pick
up the phone and talk with his colleagues at the U.N., as I
have.
And, again, I'd be glad to share those conversations that I
had with these people that work with you, Mr. Bolton, with the
members of this committee.
Now, you've served as Ambassador since August of last year.
You've faced a very difficult atmosphere at the U.N. Anybody
representing the United States at the U.N. has got a tough job.
I congratulate you on the success that we had on the compromise
resolution on North Korea, with Russia and China. I think it
was significant. In fact, this committee had a wonderful
presentation by Chris Hill--was it last week or the week
before?--about how significant that resolution was in getting
Russia and China to go along with it.
My first question is, what is your opinion on the chance
that the P-5 and Germany will be able to agree on a strong
resolution that will deal with Iran's defiance of the
International Atomic Energy, the International Arms Control
Regime, and the United Nations?
Ambassador Bolton. Senator, I'm optimistic we're going to
reach agreement. I had hoped we would have reached agreement
more quickly, but, in part because of the hostilities in
southern Lebanon, it's been a busy time, and we've had to
juggle a number of things. But this is a priority, because we
contemplate in the resolution that when we make the suspension
of uranium enrichment activities mandatory, we're going to give
Iran a brief grace period within which--yet again, to give them
another opportunity to accept that they're going to have to
suspend their uranium enrichment activities--after which we
will return, as our foreign ministers have already agreed, to
the question of Security Council sanctions. So, we're eager to
get this in place. There's yet time for the Iranians to respond
affirmatively to the very generous offer we've put forward.
But, in any event, it is important to get the uranium
enrichment activities suspended, or at least order Iran to
suspend those activities promptly.
Senator Voinovich. I would suggest that that's a good
example of the multilateral approach that we've been following
in the United Nations, and one that you have been participating
in. I think one of the concerns that everyone had was that you
might go up there and do your own thing and didn't understand
how important consensus was. And I think that you've been very,
very active in working on consensus to get things done in the
United Nations.
The other question that I have is the--tell me about the
status of reforms now. Senator Coleman made some reference to
that. The budget cap has been lifted. And the cap was lifted by
consensus in late June. We disassociated with consensus with
Japan and Australia. And, specifically, what is the status of
the management reforms that Kofi Annan proposed in his report
entitled ``Investing in the United Nations''? And I think it's
important for everyone to understand that what he recommended
pretty much mirrored with what George Mitchell and Newt
Gingrich suggested. It mirrored what Paul Volcker had suggested
after he did his investigation into the Oil-for-Food scandal.
The proposals were blocked by the G-77. And now that the budget
cap's lifted, is there still hope that we can achieve the
reforms in this proposal and streamline the organizations as
its procurement policies--and its procurement policies?
Now, 50 countries opposed the G-77's resolution to block
the Annan management proposal. So, that's pretty significant,
that they were--they wanted to see those proposals go forward.
The question now is that--now the cap is lifted--what kind of
cooperation are we going to get from these 50 people--
countries--to move forward with these reforms that are
absolutely necessary if the United Nations is going to be
successful?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think for many of the 50
countries that voted with us on the management reforms, there
was a great deal of disappointment that when we came to the
expiration date for the expenditure cap, June 30, that we did
not have any progress, any real progress in the mandate review
area, and that we were stymied on the management reform front.
We all said--we had a meeting with the G-77 a few weeks before
that date; Japan, the United States, and Austria, which was
then president of the European Union--and we all said
essentially the same thing to the G-77. We wanted to see the
cap lifted, by consensus, but we wanted substantial progress in
management reform by June 30, and we wanted a road map to the
end of the year as to how we were going to finish the mandate
review.
And the state of play now is that the expenditure cap has,
in fact, been lifted, but we do not have--we did not make
substantial progress, and we're still going to have to work on
the way ahead.
I think it's very important that we continue to make a
maximum effort, although the expenditure cap is lifted. When we
were in the final days of deliberation, one ambassador from a
Latin American country very close to the United States said,
``You know, look, the expenditure cap was necessary. We need an
incentive to push ourselves along here. But we're going to have
to now try and do it without the expenditure cap.'' And I think
the--you know, the question remains unanswered whether we'll be
successful.
Our commitment, and I think the commitment of the JUSCANZ
countries and the European Union and the major contributors as
a whole, is to continue this effort.
Senator Voinovich. So that there is a strategy to continue
to push this. I know that the European Union did not go along
with disassociating, as you did, but----
Ambassador Bolton. Right.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I understand, from talking
to some of them, that they are still very much in favor of
reform.
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, they are. And I think that
commitment is even stronger now, in a sense, because when they
did dissociate, there wasn't any coinciding success that they
could point to. So, the importance of achieving some of these
objectives remains very high for them, for exactly that reason.
Senator Voinovich. Is there anything that this committee
can do to be helpful to you? I know, once, we talked about the
possibility of getting resolutions passed in various
parliamentary groups indicating how concerned we all were about
the fact that reforms have been stymied.
Ambassador Bolton. I think that's the kind of idea that
would still be worth pursuing, if members of the committee are
interested in doing it. You know, I've had occasion, when
parliamentarians from other countries visit, and the--their
permanent reps invite me and others to come and speak to the
visiting delegation. I've been impressed, with a number of
these visiting delegations of parliamentarians, how strongly
they feel about U.N. reform, too. And they're concerned about
where their contributions are being--how they're being spent
and whether they're being spent effectively.
So, I think, at the level of people who are actually
elected by citizens, this concern is quite widespread, and I
think it would send an important signal. I'd welcome any
activity that the committee might be willing to undertake, or
individual members, in that regard.
Senator Voinovich. I understand that Mark Wallace is doing
a great job up there. I know we've met----
Ambassador Bolton. He is, indeed.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. I met with Mark. I was
impressed. And, in fact, I understand he has put on a lot of
weight attending----
Ambassador Bolton. Diplomatic lunches and dinners,
absolutely. [Laughter.]
Senator Voinovich. Yeah. And I just want to make it clear
that, from what I understand, that you and your staff have made
an attempt to do more outreach, which is one of my
recommendations, to get out there and meet these folks. And I
want to express my gratitude for these efforts. I'm very
pleased to hear that there is more communication and outreach
going on at the United Nations, and I really sincerely hope
that it will continue.
Last, but not least, mandate review. The G-77 has expressed
its opposition to the review of almost 96 percent of the
organization's mandates, and also seems to oppose any kind of
deadline for conducting the review. I have personally spoken to
the Canadians and the Pakistanis, who cochair the Committee on
Mandate Review. I feel pretty bad that the Canadian is leaving.
I was very impressed. I spent over a half an hour with him, a
really top-notch person, and probably some setback that he's
walking away and--will a Canadian take his place?
Ambassador Bolton. It has been decided by the president of
the General Assembly that he'll be replaced by the Irish
permanent representative. And he has already begun his work.
Senator Voinovich. Do you want to comment on those
negotiations? And what chance do you think that--that we're
going to make progress?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, the point that you made is a good
example of some of the difficulties that we've had. In the
outcome document in September of last year, the language we
negotiated said that the mandate review would examine all
mandates older than 5 years, and--that's what it said, all
mandates older than 5 years--on the theory that that was a
manageable undertaking, not really realizing, then, it would
encompass something like 9,000 mandates. But the G-77, after we
agreed to that, interpreted that language as saying all
mandates older than 5 years that have not been renewed within
the last 5 years. And, because General Assembly resolutions
tend to repeat themselves and reaffirm other resolutions, it
turned out that 93 percent of the mandates older than 5 years
had been reaffirmed within the last 5 years, which means, if
you bought the G-77 interpretation, 150 heads of state----
Senator Voinovich. Well, can I ask you something? Why is
the G-77 doing what they're doing? Explain it to us.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think it's--I wish I could give
you an answer that covered it completely, but I think, in part,
because the way--there's a level of satisfaction with the way
things are going that says, ``We don't really have a problem
here, we don't really need to change, we're satisfied with the
way things are, we're a little worried about what the
differences might be.'' We have made the argument to them that
if we could make the U.N. stronger, more effective, more
transparent, more efficient, that, in a way, it would be a
strong inducement to the United States to turn to the U.N. more
often for problem solving, but that the failure to make these
reforms happen is an impediment to us doing that. So that,
ironically, what we see is that many of the people--many of the
governments most critical of the United States for not turning
to the U.N. more often are exactly the governments that are
standing in the way of reform.
We've tried to make the point that reform is in everybody's
interest. This is not just a U.S. priority. This should be a
priority for everybody, as it was on the management side with
the Secretary General. And it's--I think the point is correct,
and I think we need to keep making it, because I'm hopeful
we'll be persuasive.
Senator Coleman. Senator Voinovich, your time is expired.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Bolton, for being here--Mr. Ambassador.
I just want to talk about this particular argument that
we're having over this nominee and whether to confirm him,
because I think it's important to note that Senator Voinovich
has changed his views, but he didn't--he voted to bring this
nomination to the floor, so it really hasn't changed, in terms
of this committee's vote. I just--unless others have changed.
And I really haven't talked to anybody else.
And I also want to make a comment about this argument that
Senator Coleman makes about continuity. And I have to say this
as clearly as I can. I think this argument is reflective of a
very weak and subservient Senate, because, regardless of who is
the President, be it a Republican or a Democrat, what kind of
message are we sending?
Senator Dodd, in a very respectful and clear way, pointed
out that the issues a lot of us had are still there. Now, maybe
Mr. Bolton would help us get the information we need, but, as
of this point, he's--maybe he's trying to; it's beyond his
ability to deliver--but the fact is, this administration wants
this particular candidate confirmed. We still haven't gotten
the answers to our questions. The problems prevail. And now
we're going to have another debate now. So, here's the message:
continuity. Continuity. So, it sends to any future, and
certainly to this administration--and, again, whether
Democratic or Republican--``Simply pick whoever you want, and
then come back in a few months and argue continuity.'' I mean,
what does this say about the balance of powers and the
separation of powers? So, it goes beyond Ambassador Bolton.
He's just a particular person now that's caught up in this
situation.
I want to talk about Iraq, because I'm very troubled by so
many things that are happening there, in addition to the
problems on the ground.
When you were asked by Senator Chafee, ``What's key to
reshaping the Middle East?'' you--I thought you had a good
answer. Your first response was, ``We need countries there that
are with us in the war against terror. They have to renounce
terrorism.'' And that goes, certainly, to what President Bush
said right after 9/11, quote, he said, ``All nations, if they
want to fight terror, must do something. A coalition partner
must do more than just express sympathy, they must perform.
You're either with us or against us in the fight against
terror.'' Now, let's remember that, because it's a very clear
statement and a very forceful statement.
Now we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars in Iraq,
sacrifices are enormous, more than 19,000 now wounded, many of
them severely wounded, and past 2,500 dead. And we have as your
stated goal that all our allies in the world with whom we're
going to even have relationships, let alone give tens of
billions of dollars, hundreds of billions of dollars to, have
to renounce terror. And we have the prime minister saying about
the situation in Lebanon today--he called actions of Israel
against Hezbollah, quote, ``beyond a catastrophe. It violates
everything the international community can be based on.'' And
he said he couldn't find any justification for what Israel is
doing. And, further, ``We call on the world to take quick
stance to stop the Israeli aggression,'' which our President
has said very clearly what Israel is doing--and we all, I
think, agree; I haven't heard anyone disagree--taking on
Hezbollah is defending yourself. And we all agree that
Hezbollah is a force for terror.
So, now we have this situation. And it's not as if this is
just someone with whom we have relationships--this is someone
who appears before a joint session and asks us for more and
more money to rebuild, et cetera. The monthly cost of the war
has gone up to 8 billion. The estimated number of insurgents
has gone from 3,000 to 20,000. Insurgent attacks have gone from
5 a day to 90 a day. Incidents of sectarian violence, which the
prime minister never really referred to, have gone from 5 per
month to 250 per month. And Iraqis optimistic about the future
have gone down from 75 percent to 30 percent. And the prime
minister can't use the word ``Hezbollah.'' Now, some members
met with him in private, and I think, reading between the
lines, he--he never said ``Hezbollah.''
Now, Tony Snow, the President's spokesman, when asked about
it, said something to the effect of, ``Well, he's not our
puppet.'' That's true. But then, why do we have to give them
tens of billions of dollars? Did the President's words mean
anything when he said, ``You're either with us or against
us''----
And then it goes further than that. That's mild compared to
the other part of the government, the speaker of the parliament
over there in Iraq, who the President thought he had a nice
relationship with. And I'll quote from an article in the Review
of Books that I'll make part of the record, if I might, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Without objection.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
[The information previously referred to follows:]
Section 5 of the New York Review of Books
While I was in Iraq in June, American forces killed Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi and, on the same day, Iraq formed its government of national
unity. President Bush greeted these developments with unusual restraint
and announced he was convening a two-day Camp David summit to review
his Iraq strategy. Any hopes that there would be a serious rethinking
of Iraq policy were dashed when it turned out that the summit was
really a ruse so that Bush could fake out his own cabinet by appearing
on a videoconference from Baghdad when they expected to see him at the
presidential retreat for breakfast. The President was so impressed with
his own stunt that he had the White House press office put out the word
that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had only five minutes' notice
of his arrival, not understanding that this undercut both Maliki and
Bush.
On his return, Bush held a press conference during which, it
seemed, he could barely contain his enthusiasm. In response to a
question about progress in providing electricity, producing oil, and
controlling violence, he swerved into a discussion of his encounter
with the speaker of Iraq's parliament, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani. The
President didn't seem to recall his name but readily remembered his
religion:
The Sunni--I was impressed, by the way, by the Speaker--Denny
Hastert told me I'd like him; Denny met with him. And I was impressed
by him. He's a fellow that had been put in prison by Saddam and,
interestingly enough, put in prison by us. And he made a decision to
participate in the government. And he was an articulate person. He
talked about running the parliament. It was interesting to see a person
that could have been really bitter talk about the skills he's going to
need to bring people together to run the parliament. And I found him to
be a hopeful person.
They tell me that he wouldn't have taken my phone call a year ago--
I think I might have shared this with you at one point in time--and
there I was, sitting next to the guy. And I think he enjoyed it as much
as I did. It was a refreshing moment.
The incurious White House press corps never asked the obvious
question: Why had the United States jailed al-Mashhadani? According to
Sunnis and Shiites at the top levels of government in Iraq, al-
Mashhadani was a member of, or closely associated with, two al-Qaeda-
linked terrorists groups, Ansar Islam and Ansar al-Sunna. The first
operated until 2003 in a no man's land high in the mountains between
Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran while the second has been responsible for some
of the worse terrorist attacks on Iraq's Shiites and Kurds. The Iraqis
say they gave the Americans specific intelligence on al-Mashhadani's
affiliations with those groups and his actions in support of
terrorists.
None of this seems to have mattered to a president who is as casual
in his approach to national security as his defense secretary. At the
same press conference Bush repeated that ``the American people have got
to understand that Iraq is a part of the war on terror.''--July 12,
2006
Senator Boxer. Just this month, this is the President
speaking, ``The Sunni--I was impressed by the way--by the
speaker. Denny Hastert told me I'd like him. Denny met with
him, and I was impressed with him, and I found him to be a
hopeful person. They tell me that he wouldn't have taken my
phone call a year ago. I think I might have shared this with
you at one point in time. And there I was sitting next to the
guy, and I think he enjoyed it as much as I did. It was a
refreshing moment.''
Now, this was a refreshing moment with this particular
individual, and I'm going to get his quotes in a minute. Here
it is. This pleasant person, who Denny Hastert liked, who the
President enjoyed and it was refreshing, said, ``I personally
think whoever kills an American soldier in defense of Iraq
should have a statue built for him in that country. We know
there was a corrupt regime in Saddam,'' he says, ``but a regime
should be removed by surgery, not by butchering. The U.S.
occupation is butcher's work under the slogan of democracy and
human rights and justice.''
So, this policy in Iraq, which my colleagues on the other
side--and not all of them; most of them--always equate with the
central war on terror, has leaders in Iraq who won't condemn
Hezbollah, and, worse yet, condemn the country that's leading
the fight against Hezbollah, and call our soldiers
``butchers.'' And it's no wonder we have a hard time winning
support around the world, because our words don't mean
anything.
Now, Mr. Bolton, this has nothing to do with you. I'm not
putting this on you. As a matter of fact, I'm saying to you,
you've got a tough job here. But I don't know how we say that
``you're with us or against us on the war on terror,'' and then
we sit quietly by and have a congressional address by someone
who's--part of his government called our soldiers ``butchers,''
19,000 of whom are coming back deeply wounded, a third of whom
are coming back seeking treatment for mental health problems,
2,500 will never come back. Our foreign policy is hollow. And
it just doesn't pass the test.
And I want to change the subject from Iraq, because I want
to ask you about Darfur, because I can't pin any of what I said
on you, and I don't intend to.
I want to talk to you about Darfur, because I know you
believe it's a tragedy going on over there, and I'm sure that
you have said--and I just want to make sure you have said--that
it is, in fact, a genocide--would you agree with that?
Ambassador Bolton. I did earlier this morning, yes.
Senator Boxer. Thank you for that. I think that's very
important.
Well, I want you to help me with something, since we
haven't ever really worked together. Maybe this gives us a
chance. We heard that you had another engagement, and you
couldn't go over to an important conference. And I've seen the
list of who went from other countries. Most of them sent their
number-one, like you would have been the number-one, or their
number-two. We sent number-three. But I'll put that aside,
because I want to tell you that many of us have been calling
for a special envoy. And Senator Murkowski--Lisa Murkowski and
I got together and thought--we need emissaries. This would be
short of an envoy, this would be people who would just care
about this issue from morning, noon, to night, go around the
world, get this issue before the world, get countries to step
up to the plate and give their contributions, help put pressure
on other countries. It would really help you do your work,
because, as you said, we're having trouble getting our policy
through.
So, quickly let me tell you what we did. We sent a letter
to the President on May 30. This was a bipartisan letter--Lisa
Murkowski and myself. ``Genocide in Darfur has resulted in an
estimated 400,000 deaths, displacement of 2.5 million people.
We share your view, Mr. President, that America cannot turn
away from this tragedy. Two of Dr. Martin Luther King's
children, Bernice King and Martin Luther King III, have
generously embraced the idea of serving your administration in
a way that would heighten worldwide awareness of the tragedy,
compel foreign governments to increase aid, and bring hope to
those who are suffering. We appreciate Deputy Secretary of
State Robert Zoellick's tireless efforts to address this
crisis. It is our hope that Bernice and Martin, as U.S. special
emissaries, can complement the important work being done.''
I was so excited with this. So, that was May 30. So, we get
a letter back several months later. Do you have a copy of that
letter? Because I put it somewhere. Thank you. On June 13. So,
that was fine. Three weeks later. Although I had personal
conversations with people to try and move it ahead. And this is
what it says, ``On behalf of the President, thank you for
recommending Bernice King and Martin Luther King for
appointment as U.S. special emissaries to Darfur. So that we
have the appropriate background and contact information, please
have Mr. and Ms. King complete the presidential personnel
application located at www.whitehouse.gov. We appreciate your
recommendation. We are always searching for people,'' and so
on.
So, I am perplexed at this. It seems like it's being
treated as if it's just some other application by someone who
wants to intern at the White House. So, I went up on
www.whitehouse.gov, and I came back with, you know, 10 pages.
And I can tell you that Lisa Murkowski and I really wanted this
to happen, and we were excited about it. Would you help us
here? Would you see if you can contact Lisa Wright, Assistant
to the President for Personnel, and see if perhaps we can get a
little bit of a higher-level interest in what we think--Senator
Murkowski and I--is a good idea to show the world how important
it is. Martin Luther King's children, I think, would send a
very strong signal.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I will certainly do that, and also
talk to the people at State to whom that letter probably should
have been directed. Obviously, it didn't get to the right
place. But I appreciate your interest in the subject. And it's
a serious one. We do take it extremely seriously, and I will
pursue this letter.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman. Thanks, Senator Boxer.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir.
Ambassador Bolton, welcome back. I'm very proud to have
staunchly supported your nomination by President Bush, and I
continue to do so. I'm more reassured now, not only by the need
for continuity, which I think is an important circumstance, but
really, more important than that, by what has been your
performance.
I think, first of all, you have been a resolute and clear
spokesperson to advance the President's foreign policy. And, at
the time, we have only one President, we have only one foreign
policy. It is this President's foreign policy. And you have
been an astute and strong advocate for that.
Second, I also want to commend you for your very strong
efforts and your performance on the issue of United Nations
reform. It is, indeed, necessary for the world. We need a
strong United Nations. And your efforts in that regard,
incomplete as they are, but ought to be commended for the way
in which you've handled that.
And, third, I want to, again, commend you for your
performance and the way that you've conducted yourself
personally. I think you've been someone that I think our Nation
can be proud of in the way in which you have handled yourself.
And I think many of those who question many things about you
personally, questions that I didn't share, should be now more
than laid to rest by what has been, I think, a sterling
diplomatic performance by you in the time that you've been in
the United Nations.
Let me ask you, now, on substance, a couple of questions.
One is on the issue of the Middle East, that very troubled
region. And I know that in one of the new things for which
perhaps some would suggest your confirmation might not be
appropriate is the issue of United Nations Resolution 1559.
Perhaps you could enlighten us by a little bit of the history
of that resolution--when it came about, was it under your
tenure that it was negotiated, or, if not, what you've done, in
terms of advancing that, while, at the same time, what
difficulties are there in the implementation of 1559? In other
words, is it the blame of the United States Representative to
the United Nations that that resolution has failed in its
implementation? Or are there other actors and players who would
have a greater share of responsibility for its failure in
implementation over the last year or two?
Ambassador Bolton. Thank you, Senator. The 1559, as I think
I mentioned, was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0 to 6--Russia,
China, and Algeria, which was then a member of Security
Council, being three of the countries that abstained. So, what
that indicated was that it passed only very narrowly, but in
response to the outcry over the assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, and the determination of--
expressed in demonstrations in Beirut and elsewhere, that the
Lebanese people wanted to have a--that wanted to have an
independent government, independent of Syria, independent
democratic government.
The difficulties that have attended the implementation-in-
full of 1559 have been largely because the Government of Syria
has not complied with the resolution, case after case after
case. They have withdrawn, almost entirely, their military, as
1559 required, but there are many other aspects where they've
not, and it has been a continued subject of our efforts, both
in the Security Council and elsewhere, to push for 1559 being
fully complied with. And I would also, there, link Resolution
1595, which is the--created the Independent International
Investigatory Commission to help the Lebanese Government
investigate the Hariri assassination, another situation where
the Government of Syria has failed to comply fully.
So that our efforts, both in the Security Council and
elsewhere, have largely focused on this intransigence on the
part of Syria, their unwillingness to go ahead, because to do
so would mean they would have to give up their control over
Hezbollah. Hezbollah would have to make the choice that it
would be a legitimate political party, give up its military
capability, and thus dramatically reduce, if not eliminate,
Syrian influence inside Lebanon.
So, to the extent that countries like Iran, in particular,
continue to support Syria in its intransigence, and to the
extent that other members of the Perm-5 aren't fully on board,
that remains a problem.
But I think this is one of the areas where, incomplete
though it is, this is a representation of what can be done in
the Security Council with American leadership and with the
close cooperation of our allies, particularly France, and also
with the United Kingdom.
Senator Martinez. Just one more comment on the Middle East.
You were also asked about shaping of the Middle East, words
that were not used by you, but which I'm sure we all share in
the desire to shape the Middle East. And would it not be
essential, for there to be a future peace in the Middle East,
for all the actors and players to recognize Israel's right to
exist in peace?
Ambassador Bolton. That's an absolute fundamental. And it
was on the basis of that acknowledgment, that recognition, that
Israel was able to achieve peace with both Egypt and Jordan
over a long number of years. Syrian occupation of Lebanon
prevented reconciliation with Lebanon, and Syria itself
remains, at least among those states bordering Israel, the
principal holdout. But certainly one of the objectives I think
we should all be seeking here, given the turmoil in southern
Lebanon, is that we come to a situation where the
implementation of 1559 and the extension of full control over
Lebanese territory by a democratic government provides the
basis on which Lebanon and Israel can reach a peace agreement.
That would leave us with Syria among the directly-bordering
countries, but also, obviously, with Iran, which, at a
distance, remains implacably opposed to Israel, their president
having recently called for Israel to be wiped off the map.
But these are all important steps in getting to that
ultimate objective.
Senator Martinez. In the interest of my time remaining, I
want to just simply mention my commendation and congratulations
to you for your role in the very important resolution of the
Security Council passed under your leadership condemning North
Korea, in a 15-to-0 vote, which I think, in today's climate and
in recent history, to do that, I think, is a major
accomplishment, and I commend you for your success in that,
which I think also should be a proud part of your performance
at the U.N.
Speak, if you will for me, on the issue of humanitarian
assistance to the people of Lebanon. We all are saddened by the
destruction and the human suffering there, as we are by the
suffering in Israel, as well, particularly in the city of
Haifa, where we see destruction and death and maiming and
sadness. How will we collaborate on that? And if you've already
touched on that, maybe I'll just move on to something else.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, two things. We have authorized the
provision of some $30 million in assistance, but, more broadly,
we're now working in New York, in the Security Council, and in
the region--Secretary Rice has been leading this, as well--to
establish conditions under which humanitarian assistance can be
provided to Lebanon through humanitarian corridors, such as has
been suggested by the U.N. Secretariat, accepted by Israel,
obviously accepted by Lebanon, as well. We need to--having
achieved the political agreement on this, need now to implement
it, and we're working on that, both in New York and in other
agencies of the U.S. Government, as well, to get that
humanitarian assistance in, even as the hostilities continue.
Senator Martinez. The Human Rights Council of the United
Nations was reshaped. I know we were not happy with the
outcome. Can you tell us your vision of what would be an
appropriate Human Rights Council, what it is that we're trying
to achieve in a Human Rights Council, and what is the outlook
for true reforms of this body that could really include an
agenda that's vigorous and that perhaps does not include in the
membership some of the very culprits of the most serious human
rights abuses in the world?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, it was the failure of the
resolution, that created this new Human Rights Council, to
really achieve the central objective that we sought, which was
reshaping the membership of the council, that led us to vote
against it. We did not think that the resolution creating the
new council really did enough to keep some of the worst abusers
of human rights off the council. And not just the worst
abusers, but countries that didn't really share the commitment
we and many other developed countries had to using the Human
Rights Council as an effective instrument on a country-specific
basis.
We did not achieve the objective of getting a requirement
that members to the council be elected by a two-thirds vote of
the General Assembly. We did not--we were not able to persuade
others that it ought to be an automatic disqualification
against serving on the Human Rights Council for any country
under Security Council sanctions for human rights violations or
support for terrorism. We could not persuade a majority of the
countries to accept even that.
And I think the consequence of those decisions, and a
variety of others, meant that the mechanisms for selection of
members to the new council were not going to be sufficiently
different from the old commission. That's why we voted against
it.
We do--we are continuing to work on human rights. We've
tried to work, even though not a member of this council, to try
and make it a success. I've noted in my prepared remarks that
we're disappointed at the early returns. We're going to
continue to work, but we've not made a decision, ourselves,
whether to try and seek election to the new council next year
or not.
Senator Martinez. I see my time is up. I just want to thank
you for your continued desire to serve. And having sat in those
chairs while members of the Senate come and go, I understand
what a long morning it can be, so I appreciate your time and
your willingness to serve our Nation.
Ambassador Bolton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. Did the resolution regarding North
Korea that Senator Martinez referenced include economic
sanctions under Chapter VII?
Ambassador Bolton. Under our definition, not sanctions, as
directed against the economic activity broadly in North Korea,
but it did contain two requirements on all member governments,
that they not cooperate in any way with the--not only the North
Korean ballistic missile program, but also its nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons program--that governments
neither supply those programs nor procure from those programs.
That is a form of sanctions, but it was mostly intended not
for--not to impose economic pressure on North Korea, but to cut
off those weapons programs from outside assistance.
Senator Nelson. Did the United States initially try to get
the Chapter VII sanctions?
Ambassador Bolton. We did not. Those were basically--those
provisions, plus the requirement that North Korea suspend all
of its ballistic missile activity, were the principal
objectives we started out with. And we achieved those.
Senator Nelson. Japan, however, was asking for economic
sanctions, meaning that the resolution did not meet the goals
that the Japanese initially sought.
Ambassador Bolton. One of their original thoughts--I mean,
this was--you have to--I'm sure you do remember, in the July
5--indeed, during the day on July the 4--our time, July 4; July
5 in the Pacific--I was on the phone probably a dozen times
with my Japanese counterpart, trying to share information with
him about these ballistic missile launches as they took place.
And he and his government were considering a variety of things,
as was our Government. So, we looked at a whole range of
things. When we went in--when we went in----
It's a little distracting.
I suppose, Senator, when----
Senator Nelson. I've seen a lot of things interpose----
Ambassador Bolton. I'm not responsible for this, I might
say. I'm not responsible for this. [Laughter.]
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Interpose between the
questions and the witnesses, but I've never seen this.
Ambassador Bolton. This is a form of transparency, I
suppose. [Laughter.]
Senator, we--the--being, obviously, serious----
Senator Nelson. But I'm glad that's not right over here.
[Laughter.]
Ambassador Bolton. Well, it's right in the middle. I
suppose that's the best it could be.
Senator Coleman. Senator Nelson, we'll have the witness--
we'll have the Ambassador respond to this question, and then
we'll suspend for a couple of minutes, so we get a sense of
what's going on here.
But, Ambassador Bolton, you can finish your response.
Ambassador Bolton. No, we--it's certainly the case,
Senator, we considered a number of possible options, and, in
close consultation with Japan, came to the conclusion that we
would proceed with a resolution along the lines that they took
the lead on.
Senator Nelson. This is not going to distract me, if it's
all right with you.
Ambassador Bolton. I'm fine, Senator. [Laughter.]
Let's go.
Senator Coleman. As long as we can keep the buckets coming,
we can----
Senator Nelson. All right.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. The hearing can proceed.
Senator Nelson. Well, those two buckets will catch most of
it, so let's continue. [Laughter.]
Going back to the same matter--on July the 14, the day
before the Security Council acted, you said that the United
States continued to insist on a resolution under Chapter VII,
which would have made the sanctions mandatory for the U.N.
member states.
Ambassador Bolton. But, Senator, I would just say, before
we get rained out. [Laughter.]
The purpose of a Chapter VII resolution is not necessarily
only sanctions. Chapter VII is the chapter of the U.N. charter
that deals with the Security Council's special responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. And
resolutions under Chapter VII are deemed binding on all
members.
That's what we wanted, and it's our judgment that's what we
achieved, even though there's not a specific reference to
Chapter VII in the text of the resolution, because you have to
look at the entire text of a resolution, not necessarily a few
specific words.
Senator Nelson. Well, I just want to clarify the record
here, because on that day you stressed the importance, and I
quote, ``of a clear, binding Chapter VII resolution. That
remains our view, and the view of Japan.'' You then went on to
warn that, quote, ``If there is to be a veto, there comes a
time when countries have to go into that chamber and raise
their hand,'' end of quote.
Do you want to square that with what happened here?
Ambassador Bolton. Right. The final text of the resolution
does not include a reference to Chapter VII, as such. There's
no question about that. But it was our judgment, the judgment
of the French, the British, the Japanese, and other
delegations, that, in fact, you don't need to use those precise
words to get a binding resolution. And that's how we construe
it, and we made that explanation--we went through that analysis
in our respective explanations of the vote.
Senator Nelson. All right.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to broach one more subject, and
then I'll stop. I appreciate the fact that you have been here
for a long time.
Two months ago Russia and China blocked action in the U.N.
against Iran's nuclear program, and in deference to the Russian
and Chinese concerns, the United States and the European Union
agreed to give diplomacy another chance, even though Iran has
clearly been stalling for time.
Administration officials have stated that Russia and China
had promised to back some of the limited U.N. measures against
Iran if Tehran declined to negotiate. You said, and I quote,
``If the Security Council can't deal with something like the
Iranian nuclear weapons program, then it's hard to imagine what
circumstances the U.N. charter contemplated the Council would
be involved in.'' Everyone, of course, remembers the timeline.
In early March, the issue was referred to the U.N. Security
Council by the IAEA. The July 12 deadline for Iran to stop
enriching uranium came and went with no response. The Iranians
said that they will respond by August 22.
Many of us have been calling for Security Council action on
Iran for a long time, and your work at the U.N. Security
Council is an integral part of the international effort to end
Iran's nuclear program. Secretary Rice was able to get the
Chinese and the Russians to support an international offer of
incentives and disincentives, but it appears that there isn't
any progress on a meaningful resolution at the U.N. Security
Council. This Senator believes that a resolution that asks the
Iranians to stop enriching uranium, but that has no teeth is
meaningless.
You have the reputation as being the tough guy who can
solve these issues, and yet it seems like the Russians and the
Chinese are getting their way with you. So, if you could please
respond--is the U.S. going to settle for a resolution on Iran
that does not include sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N.
charter?
Ambassador Bolton. Senator, what the foreign ministers of
the five permanent members and Germany agreed to in Paris a
couple of weeks ago was a two-step process in the Security
Council. The first step would be a resolution that would make
mandatory the requirement that Iran suspend all of its uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities, and give the
Iranians some period of time--let's say a month--within which
they had to come into compliance with the resolution. That was
step one.
Step two, if the Iranians failed to do that, then the next
step would be to go to economic sanctions, which we would have
to discuss at that point.
We are, I judge, very close to agreement on a resolution
that would embody the first step. In fact, Tuesday night we had
agreement among the five permanent representatives in New York.
Obviously, we had to go back to our capitals to get final
approval on it, and--but we thought we had it, and it turned
out, yesterday, we did not. I'm hoping that we can either wrap
that up today--depending on how long your hearing goes on, we
might be able to wrap it up today, or certainly Ambassador
Sanders is continuing to work on it. But I think we're very
close on that first resolution, the first of the two steps.
But it is very important that we make it clear to Iran and
to all U.N. members that that requirement for suspension of
uranium enrichment activities be binding. And that is our
intention. That's the intention of the--what we call the EU-3
countries. And we're very, very firm in that resolve.
Senator Nelson. I hope that you reach an agreement quickly
because, in the meantime, Iran continues to reprocess uranium.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, it's--there's no doubt the
Iranians, over the last 3 years, have used diplomatic
negotiations as a cover under which they have advanced their
mastery over the entire nuclear fuel cycle. And I think that's
one reason why we do feel a sense of urgency about that, that
it's important we try and get the maximum pressure we can on
Iran if they choose not to accept this very generous offer that
the EU-3 and the rest of us have made to them. It's an
extremely serious problem. There's just no doubt about it.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Bolton, I want you to get tough with
the Chinese and the Russians.
Ambassador Bolton. I will be pleased to carry out that
instruction, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bolton, sorry for the distraction here.
Ambassador Bolton. It's coming in my direction, too.
Senator Obama. I will--I'll try to make my questions brief.
I know you've been here----
Senator Nelson. Let's hope it's rainwater and not something
else. [Laughter in observation of a water leak from the
ceiling.]
Senator Obama. Okay, thank you for pointing that out,
Senator Nelson. [Laughter.]
With that encouragement, let me proceed.
You know, last year, Mr. Bolton, we had a hearing in
October, and we talked a little bit about the use of voluntary
financing, as opposed to mandatory assessments, as a tool to
extract cooperation at the U.N. And you mentioned two examples,
UNPD and UNICEF, as being effective organizations, in part
because they function as voluntary agencies. And, you know,
when we start talking about our budget requests, last year they
had cut funding for these two programs, despite the fact that
you had pointed out that they were effective because
voluntary--or voluntarily financed. And you said, and I'm
quoting here, ``I certainly intend to get into it in the next
budget cycle. I think it can give us a lot of assistance and
provide argument for other countries to show that this is not
simply a charade behind which we want to reduce budgetary
contributions, but a way in which we want to more sensibly
contribute to agencies that are effective.''
I'm looking at the fiscal year 2007 budget request. You've
been in New York a year, so presumably you've had something----
I just felt something coming down on me. Let me scoot over
here. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Bolton. You can come over and sit with me,
Senator. [Laughter.]
Senator Obama. Yeah, exactly.
But here's the thing. This year's budget request seems to
contain a similar result, which is a cut to UNICEF and UNPD.
So, I'm wondering if you can explain that and how you're
thinking about it. And I'm going to move way down here.
[Laughter.]
Go ahead.
Ambassador Bolton. Well--although my last name is Bolton,
it's spelled ``ton'' and not ``ten.'' I was not director of OMB
at the time. And, you know, there are a lot of factors that go
into budget decisions. And it's simply--it's a fact of life, in
budget decisions, that you can't meet all of your priorities.
But I would say that the question of assessed, versus
voluntary, contributions as a mechanism of funding, and of
possible greater utility to the United States, is still
something that we're looking at. We have not devoted--we have
not concluded our review in that regard, in part because we've
been consumed with the mandate review and the management reform
processes. But these remain important areas of concern for us.
Senator Obama. Well, I guess the problem that I have--and
we had this exchange before--the broader context of the debate
between mandatory and voluntary dues has to do with the degree
to which we feel that we are exerting leverage over an
organization that we think is sometimes dysfunctional and the
possibility of earmarking, essentially, our dollars to areas
where we feel we've got some confidence. But isn't it important
to our diplomatic efforts on the reform--on the U.N. reform
issue, that we recognize that--well, let me ask the question
this way. If we are consistently cutting our budget at the same
time as we are demanding reforms, aren't we, to some degree,
undermining our leverage precisely at a time when we'd like to
expand it? It seems to me that it actually hampers or
hamstrings your ability to gain credibility with the other
potential partners in reform.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think one of the things that we
are doing is expanding our voluntary contributions in some
other areas. For example, in the U.N. Democracy Fund, which is
a new initiative, an initiative of the President's, we've
supplied $18 million out of the $49 million that are currently
in the fund, and we've put up additional money in the area of
HIV/AIDS and the U.N. AIDS Program, which is essentially
voluntarily funded. So, the record may not be entirely perfect,
I grant you that, but, in several critical respects, we have
increased our voluntary funding along the lines that you
suggest.
Senator Obama. Just to follow up on the issue of reform,
there have been some reports that we have allied diplomats,
countries that at least say they're interested in reform, that
would indicate that there are still concerns that you have a
tendency to produce amendments and demands at the 11th hour,
pushing to reopen negotiations that have been painfully
concluded, World Summit outcome development--World Summit
outcome document, Human Rights Council. And I'm just
wondering--maybe you've already commented on this, but I'm just
curious as to why we're getting those reports. Is it your
assertion that these are simply recalcitrant countries that
don't want reform or--what do you think accounts for that?--I
mean, when you've got 30 ambassadors, all of whom say they
share the U.S. goals of management reform, expressing some
misgivings about your leadership.
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, 30 anonymous ambassadors. You
know, I did mention, before you came in, that----
Senator Obama. And I apologize. I haven't been here the
whole time, so----
Ambassador Bolton. I understand entirely.
Senator Obama [continuing]. I don't want to----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. That a number of
ambassadors came to me after that article appeared and said
they thought it was outrageous, that they couldn't understand
why the reporter hadn't talked to them. But I don't--you know,
I don't think that's the measure. I respect the other
ambassadors. I deal with them on a professional basis. I think
they deal with me on a professional basis.
I would like to just comment on one point, though, and
that's this notion that--about coming in at the last minute
with amendments and whatnot. You mentioned the outcome document
in the--from the September summit. And, you know, that was a
situation, when I came in, where the United States had been
pressing a large number of amendments, for quite some time,
very similar to the amendments that I circulated. But because
of the way the negotiations were being conducted, those
amendments were not being accepted. The real change that I made
was moving away from the so-called facilitator process, where
you, sort of, submit your amendments and hope the facilitator
writes them in, to a process of direct international
negotiation.
And I'd ask--Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I just
want to read one paragraph from a letter written to Chairman
Lugar by Thomas Schweich, who's currently the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Matters. Tom Schweich was at USUN when I arrived,
on August 1. He's a former chief of staff to Senator John
Danforth, who was the Permanent Representative before me, and
he--it's a nice letter. I'm only going to read one paragraph
that deals with the outcome document.
Senator Obama. Go ahead.
Ambassador Bolton. As I say, Schweich was there from--Tom
Schweich was there from the time Senator Danforth arrived until
I arrived, and stayed on until he came down to the Department.
And the letter from Tom Schweich says, and I quote, ``While
Ambassador Bolton received a good deal of media criticism for
allegedly trying to,'' quote, ``change the deal,'' close quote,
``at the last minute with respect to the terms of the outcome
document drafted for the World Summit on U.N. Reform in 2005,
this criticism is without merit. In fact, Ambassador Bolton did
nothing more than make public and transparent a lengthy series
of objections that the State Department had raised and had been
negotiating for several months prior to Ambassador Bolton's
arrival. I had been personally and directly involved in those
negotiations.''
So, the--you know, that's where this started with the
outcome document. You know, some reporters said 400 amendments,
some reporters said 700. I don't know how many there were, but
they were essentially elaborations of changes to this document
that were--had been advocated by the United States long before
my arrival.
What I found--the change that I did make was that we
abandoned the so-called facilitator process, where the
facilitator listens to all the delegations and takes
suggestions in, and then does his or her best to reflect what
they think the direction of the negotiations is going. I felt
that was inadequate. I did not think the United States was
getting the best outcome from the facilitator method. And I
asked, and there was widespread support for, and we did then
move to a model, direct government-to-government negotiations,
which is how the final outcome document was ultimately
produced.
Senator Obama. Having been there for a year--and here,
I'm--this is sort of an open-ended question--what do you think
is the single biggest impediment to the lack of progress that's
been made, in terms of some of the reforms that have been
discussed?
Ambassador Bolton. I think that Paul Volcker really had an
important insight--and I had mentioned this earlier, but I
think it bears repeating--when he said to this committee last
year that he thought that the basic lesson he drew from his
lengthy investigation into the Oil-for-Food scandal was not
just the problems that existed in the Oil-for-Food scandal, but
that the--but that those problems emanated from practices and
policies deeply embedded in the U.N. itself, and that reform
required not just addressing the more superficial aspects of
the Oil-for-Food scandal, but involved addressing more
fundamental aspects of the U.N., as well. And for him, the
central--the underlying foundation of that problem was what he
called the ``culture of inaction.''
And I think that until we really are able to make progress
on that, that many of the specific reforms that we propose will
really not have a lasting difference. They are important to
pursue. We will continue to pursue them. But when Secretary
Rice called for a ``lasting revolution of reform''--you know,
I've joked with people that it's not often you hear a Secretary
of State call for revolution--but it is important in this
context. Reform is not something you do on one day, and then
you say, ``Well, we're finished with that. Do we move on to
something else?'' You have to have making the organization more
effective and more efficient a constant priority. And I think
that is a view I've developed over 25 years of watching and
participating in U.N.-related matters. And the past year has
only confirmed that in my mind. I think that's the most
fundamental obstacle we face, as identified by Paul Volcker.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman, how--am I out of time?
Senator Coleman. Your time has expired, Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Okay. Could you--I know that I'm the last
guy, and it's raining in here, but can I ask one last question?
Senator Coleman. Absolutely.
Senator Obama. Mr. Bolton, sorry to keep you, but I did
want to ask specifically about the situation in Darfur. And I
know that somebody else has already asked the question. And let
me stipulate that the administration has done more than our
European allies. And this administration's record has shown
genuine concern for the situation there. Having said that, we
still see a continuing deterioration of the situation. Bob
Zoellick's not going to be playing the leadership role that he
was playing. We don't seem to be making much progress with the
Chinese, Russians, or Sudanese in standing up a U.N. force.
Fighting between the main factions has been intensified, and
there doesn't seem to be any strong follow-up on DPA.
So, I'm wondering, specifically what is your office doing,
at this stage, to move us off the status quo, which I fear may
end up deteriorating even further and resulting in a situation
that, if we're not already ashamed of what's happening there,
we'll be even more ashamed of?
Senator Coleman. This will be the last response.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I agree that the Darfur peace
agreement is in jeopardy. I think it's in jeopardy for a
variety of reasons having to do with the politics in the
region, the attitude of the Government of Sudan and a variety
of other factors. And that, to us, underlines the importance of
rehatting the African Union force, the AMIS mission, in Sudan
as rapidly as possible, because if the protections that a new
U.N. force can provide do not get into place quickly, and if,
in the interim, however long that interim is, we don't
strengthen the existing AMIS capabilities, that will increase
the risk that the DPA will break down. I don't think there's
any question about that.
We have faced intransigence on the part of the Government
of Sudan in--despite decisions by the Council on Peace and
Security of the African Union, despite repeated decisions,
despite the decision of the African Union in the Summit
recently in Banjul, despite commitments made by the Government
of Sudan previously, they continue to say they will not accept
a U.N. force in Darfur. That has ripple effects with potential
troop-contributing countries that worry about the situation
into which their troops would be deployed. It has ramifications
in the Council when people are reluctant to move up with the
kind of expedition that we need to within the Secretariat, and
how quickly they're able to proceed. It's a situation we worry
about. My office, the Military Staff Committee Office, the
uniformed officers who serve at USUN, with support from the
Pentagon, which has sent up logisticians and planners to help
out, have been pushing this at--with the greatest possible
force. But the difficulties remain, and we are quite concerned
if we don't expedite this, we're going to face difficulty.
Senator Obama. I know my time is up. I--let me just say
that I know that you have a lot on your plate. I would like to
see some sense of urgency and focused attention. We know Sudan
is going to be recalcitrant and intransigent. And so, precisely
for that reason, I think it's important that we use some of our
diplomatic skills and apply them to pressure some of the others
who are supporting Sudan. And I'm not sure we've used all our
diplomatic cards on this one.
Senator Coleman. The Senator's----
Senator Obama. Thank you----
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Time has----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Expired. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you. I know all the comments that have
been made about the flood here, so I won't make any more.
I apologize for being delayed. We had a markup in the Small
Business Committee. As ranking member, I had to be there.
I heard a few of the questions, from my office, and
obviously, I don't want to go over territory that's been well
covered, Mr. Ambassador, so I want to just have a chance to be
able to pursue a few things with you.
I did hear, I think, in answer to one question from
somebody--I think it was from the chair--that your views about
the U.N. itself have not changed. And so, I'd just be curious
to, sort of--what are those views, at this point? I mean, there
was a lot of debate here, as you recall, about what those views
were, and I'd just be curious to know what conclusions you've
drawn about the U.N., at this point in time.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think his question was, what did
I find at the U.N. that I had not expected? And I think my
response was ``very little,'' because I've studied and worked
in U.N. matters for 25 years. And I'm sure there are things I
don't know, but I've worked in the area for a long time.
My views are, as I said in my opening statement in April of
last year, that we are committed to a strong and effective
United Nations; to do that, it requires substantial reform;
that it can be an effective adjunct of American foreign
policy--I think it's been demonstrated in a variety of areas
that we've discussed here today in the context of Lebanon,
North Korea, and Iran; and that that's why we're exerting the
efforts that we are to--within the Security Council on a
variety of substantive policy matters and on the question of
U.N. reform.
Senator Kerry. Well, you say that to be effective it
requires reform. What is the principal reform that is required
for the U.N. itself to be effective with respect to Iran or
with respect to North Korea or Lebanon? What reform would make
a difference to that effectiveness?
Ambassador Bolton. I'm not sure that reform, as such, would
have a difference there. That is more a question----
Senator Kerry. Isn't that the policy?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. In the Security Council
of--policy--of reach policy agreement among the 15 members of
the Council, and particularly the Perm-5.
Senator Kerry. And isn't it fair to say that we're, sort
of, the odd person out on most of those policies?
Ambassador Bolton. I wouldn't say that, no.
Senator Kerry. Well, with respect to North Korea--let's
look at that for a minute. Russia and the South Koreans were
unwilling to join us, isn't that correct, with respect to the
sanction effort? Tough----
Ambassador Bolton. That's clearly not correct, because they
did. And, in fact, we worked very closely with the Russians in
the negotiation, 11 days of very intense negotiation to get
Resolution 1595, and worked very closely with the Republic of
Korea's mission to the U.N. to get their agreement to the
resolution, as well.
Senator Kerry. Well, I beg to differ with you, Mr.
Ambassador. They didn't get on board a tough Chapter VII
resolution, did they? That was our position.
Ambassador Bolton. They got on board a resolution which is
binding, as our judgment is binding, under Chapter VII, that's
correct.
Senator Kerry. They didn't get on a tough chapter VII
resolution, did they?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes, they did.
Senator Kerry. Chapter VII.
Ambassador Bolton. They did.
Senator Kerry. They did?
Ambassador Bolton. We believe this resolution is binding
under Chapter VII. It does not contain the words ``Chapter
VII,'' but our conclusion is, based on the entire wording of
the resolution, that it imposes binding constraints on North
Korea, and other----
Senator Kerry. Well, every----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. And other member
government--that's the interpretation of Britain, France, and
Japan, and the other four cosponsors, as well.
Senator Kerry. Prior to the adoption, speaking to reporters
on July 6, you said, quote, ``I think it's important that the
Security Council speak under Chapter VII to make a binding
resolution.'' Is that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. That's correct.
Senator Kerry. Then, on July 14, just a day before they
acted, you said you continued to insist on a resolution under
Chapter VII which would make any sanctions mandatory. You
stressed the importance of a, quote, ``clear, binding Chapter
VII resolution. That remains our view, and the view of Japan.''
You went so far as to warn that ``if there is to be a veto,
there comes a time when countries have to go into that chamber
and raise their hand.'' That's not what happened, is it?
Ambassador Bolton. As I said before, it's our judgment this
is a mandatory----
Senator Kerry. Well, it's a judgment----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Resolution.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. But it's not the way it's
viewed by the other parties.
Ambassador Bolton. It's viewed that way by Japan, England,
and France.
Senator Kerry. Well, it's not--the Russians certainly
aren't prepared to join in it, nor are the----
Ambassador Bolton. They voted for it.
Senator Kerry. But apparently not with the same
understanding. I mean, Assistant Secretary Hill's testimony
before this committee last week said that the administration's
strategy on North Korea is shifting from failed negotiations to
sanctions. And since you don't have Russia, you don't have
China, and you don't have South Korea on the binding
resolution, how are you going to do that?
Ambassador Bolton. I think we do. You know, what it--what
the resolution says, Senator, is, the Security Council
demands--that includes Russia and China--the Security Council
demands that the DPRK suspend all activity related to its
ballistic missile programs. Demands. And you know what North
Korea did? You know what they thought of that resolution? They
sat there in the Council chamber and, after we voted to adopt
it, they rejected it and got up and walked out of the Council
chamber. I think that resolution had a clear effect on North
Korea.
Senator Kerry. What was the effect?
Ambassador Bolton. That they understand how isolated they
are. And you'll note that, as reported in the papers the other
day, the Government of China has begun to take steps with
respect to North Korean banking, the--which is consistent with
operative paragraphs----
Senator Kerry. But----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
resolution that require--``require'' is the word we used--the
Security Council requires that all U.N. member governments
cease their procurement from, or supply to, any of North
Korea's programs relating to ballistic missiles or weapons of
mass destruction.
Senator Kerry. Well, let's come back, to be precise,
because this is a precise world we live in. It is accurate--I
have the resolution right in front of me--it says ``demands
that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic
missile program.'' But it doesn't impose Chapter VII sanctions.
Ambassador Bolton. We didn't seek to impose Chapter VII
sanctions.
Senator Kerry. Well, how are you going to achieve this if
you're not going to have sanctions, if you don't have the other
countries prepared to have the sanctions? The reason you
don't----
Ambassador Bolton. Because the first----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Have sanctions is, they weren't
prepared to do it, isn't that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. No, because that was not part of our
original resolution. The first step here was to pass this
resolution, which----
Senator Kerry. You're telling me they would be prepared to
impose sanctions?
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Which is--you know,
Senator, we had consultations with Japan and the United Kingdom
and France about how to approach this resolution. And, as I
mentioned earlier today, there were a variety of different
steps that we could have taken. It was our judgment that the
best way to proceed was along the lines that are now embodied
in Resolution 1695. That is certainly not to say that the
Council might not take other steps in the future. But the steps
we sought to take, we have now taken, unanimously.
Senator Kerry. Well, I--you're losing me, a little bit,
because--I mean, North Korea defied the world's request not to
test an intercontinental missile. You are the ones who said you
wanted sanctions, but were unable to get Russia and others to
sign on to that concept.
Ambassador Bolton. Senator, we said we wanted what we got.
Senator Kerry. Well, the most that you seem to want is to
go back to a Six-Party Talk that isn't in existence.
Ambassador Bolton. No, no, no, quite the contrary. We said,
expressly----
Senator Kerry. Are you prepared to go to bilateral talks?
Ambassador Bolton. Quite the contrary. We said, expressly,
that what we wanted from North Korea was not simply a return to
the Six-Party Talks, but an implementation of the September
2005 joint statement from the Six-Party Talks, which would mean
their dismantlement of their nuclear weapons program.
Senator Kerry. But this has been going on for 5 years, Mr.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Bolton. It's the nature of multilateral
negotiations, Senator.
Senator Kerry. Why not engage in a bilateral one and get
the job done? That's what the Clinton administration did.
Ambassador Bolton. Very poorly, since the North Koreans
violated the agreed framework----
Senator Kerry. But they----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Almost from the time it was
signed. And I would also say, Senator, that we do have the
opportunity for bilateral negotiations with North Korea in the
context of the Six-Party Talks, if North Korea would come back
to them.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Ambassador, at the time--Secretary Perry
has testified before this committee, as well as others--they
knew that there would be the probability they would try to do
something outside of the specificity of the agreement, but the
specificity of the agreement was with respect to the rods and
the inspections and the television cameras and the reactor
itself.
Ambassador Bolton. Senator, the agreed framework requires
North Korea and South Korea to comply with the Joint North/
South Denuclearization Agreement, which, in turn, provides no
nuclear weapons programs on the Korean Peninsula. So, it was
not limited only to the plutonium reprocessing program.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Ambassador, the bottom line is that no
plutonium was reprocessed under that agreement. No plutonium
was reprocessed until the cameras were removed, the inspectors
were kicked out, the rods were taken out, and now they have
four times the nuclear weapons they had when you came on watch.
Ambassador Bolton. Because the North Koreans----
Senator Kerry. The question here is--I mean, a whole host
of people have testified before this committee and others--I
mean, my objection is that--I mean, if you look at the policy--
it's across the board, and we're not going to resolve it here
now, obviously, I understand that----
Ambassador Bolton. I guess that's right.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. But--well, there is another
good reason to think about this.
It's hard to pick up the newspaper today, it's hard to talk
to any leader anywhere in the world, it's hard to travel abroad
as a Senator and not run headlong into the isolation of the
United States and the divisions that exist between us and our
allies on any number of different issues. Now, it is very hard
to sit here and say that the Six-Party Talks have been a
success.
Ambassador Bolton. I don't believe I've said that.
Senator Kerry. I know. I didn't suggest you have. But what
I'm trying to get at is the policy foundation itself. Why
insist on a Six-Party Talk process, which it seems to me never
joins the fundamental issues between the United States and
North Korea, which go back a long, long time, over Republican
and Democratic administrations?
Ambassador Bolton. I think the reason for that is that the
disagreement is not fundamentally a bilateral disagreement
between North Korea and the United States, it's a disagreement
between North Korea and everybody else about their pursuit of a
nuclear weapons capability. And the aspect of the Six-Party
Talks that we think was most important was not negotiating over
the head of South Korea, which was the consequence of the
agreed framework, but bringing in all of the regional
partners--South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China--to address
this question collectively, since it was in all of our interest
to do so.
Senator Kerry. Well, most of the people that I've talked to
have spent a lot of time in various thoughtful institutions
thinking about these issues--a career--believe that what North
Korea wants more than anything is an assurance that the United
States of America isn't going to have a strategy similar to
Iraq directed at them. Most people have suggested that if there
were to be some kind of bilateral discussion to get at the
issues between the two of us, you'd have far more opportunity
to get at the nuclear issue than you do through these standoff,
nonexistent Six-Party Talks that produce nothing over 5\1/2\
years. Why is the administration so unwilling to talk to Syria,
for example--I mean, even to, you know, pursue these issues? It
doesn't seem as though this non-talk approach is getting you
very far.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, first, the Six-Party Talks have
not been going on for 5\1/2\ years. Second, one of the
principal reasons----
Senator Kerry. No, because no talks were going on for the
first couple of years, and then the Six-Party Talks were a
cover for not dealing with bilateral talks. I understand.
Ambassador Bolton. The principal reason that we haven't had
Six-Party Talks in 10 months is because North Korea won't
accept China's invitation to come to the talks. But we have
made it clear to them repeatedly that they could have, and they
have had, bilateral conversations with the United States in the
context of the Six-Party Talks. So, the question as to why the
Six-Party Talks have not proceeded here, I think, lies sparely
in Pyongyang.
Senator Kerry. Well, the world and North Korea are getting
more dangerous as you resist the notion of engaging in any kind
of bilateral effort as an administration--not you, personally--
--
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah, but----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. I guess----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Senator----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. But I include----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Senator, it--really, it's
hard to understand how you can't look at the notion of
conducting the bilateral conversations in the Six-Party Talks
and not say that North Korea has an opportunity to make its
case to us.
Senator Kerry. Sir, with all due respect, what I've seen
work and not work over the course of the years I've been here
depends on what kind of deal you're willing to make or not make
and what your fundamental policies are. If you're a leader in
North Korea looking at the United States, and you've seen the
United States attack Iraq on presumptions of weapons of mass
destruction that didn't exist, if you announce a preemptive
strategy of regime change, if you are pursuing your own new
nuclear weapons--bunker-busting nuclear weapons--and you're
sitting in another country, you would have a perception of
threat that makes you make a certain set of decisions. And
historically throughout the cold war that drove the United
States and the then-Soviet Union to escalate and escalate and--
first one did, then the other--in fact--in fact, in every
single case, we were the first, with the exception of two
particular weapons systems, to develop a nuclear breakthrough
first. They followed. Until, ultimately, President Reagan, a
conservative President, and President Gorbachev, said, ``We're
going to come down,'' in Reykjavik, ``to no weapons.'' So we
reversed 50 years of spending money and chasing this thing.
I would respectfully suggest to you that North Korea is
sitting there making a set of presumptions. And unless you
begin to alter some of the underlying foundation of those
presumptions, you're stuck. The problem is, we're stuck, too,
as a consequence. And a lot of us feel very, very deeply that,
you know, the Six-Party Talks have never been real, and never
been a way of achieving this goal. And as long as we're on this
course, we're stuck.
Senator Coleman. The Chair would note that it's been
extremely generous. Senator from Massachusetts----
Senator Kerry. No, that's fine.
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Is the final----
Senator Kerry. I'm--maybe you'd like to----
Senator Coleman [continuing]. Is the final witness----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Respond to that, Mr.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think that the effort that has
been made is to give North Korea the opportunity to make the
choice to come out of its isolation, to give up its nuclear
weapons programs, and to enjoy the kind of life that the people
in South Korea enjoy. You know, there's a great map, Senator--
I'd be--I'm sure you've seen a copy of it--of the Korean
Peninsula at night. And South Korea is filled with light. North
Korea is black. It looks like South Korea is an island. That's
what that regime has done to its people. We could----
Senator Kerry. Sir, I know what a terrible----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. We----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Regime it is.
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. We could give them----
Senator Kerry. I understand that.
Ambassador Bolton. We have tried to give them the chance,
through the Six-Party Talks, to end that isolation. And----
Senator Kerry. Well, with all----
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. As I say, for 10 months,
they haven't even been willing to go back to Beijing.
Senator Kerry. I have to tell you something. About 3 years
ago, or 4 years ago--I can't remember precisely when--the North
Koreans were casting about here in Washington asking people,
``Who do we talk to?'' They were looking for a deal. And the
administration just blanked them. There was no willingness to
do this. This is pre- going to the Six-Party Talks. Then we get
to the Six-Party Talks, and we've gone through a series of
evolutions since then.
So, with all due respect, a lot of folks think there is a
different course. You don't. The administration doesn't. But I
think it's important to talk about it, and I think it's
important to lay it out there.
Ambassador Bolton. And we have.
Senator Kerry. Similarly, on 1559, which called for the
disarmament of Hezbollah, that was not a priority for the last
year, and we are where we are.
Ambassador Bolton. I would disagree. It was not a priority.
But I'm not sure----
Senator Kerry. Well, can you tell me what you did at the
U.N.--to put it on the front-burner agenda?
Ambassador Bolton. I think, really, at this point, I'd just
refer you to my earlier testimony, where I talked about a
number of resolutions and presidential statements that we have
adopted to put more pressure on Syria, both with respect to
1559 and 1595, which I think is another quite important
resolution pursuing the Hariri assassination. And I think that,
in fact, the issue of Lebanon, generally, is probably the best
example of U.S. cooperation with France in a matter in the
Security Council that we've had in recent years.
Senator Kerry. The--well, again, we can debate, and we're
not going to here, so I'll let that go.
Thanks, Mr.----
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Senator Kerry. The Senate does
have a tradition of unlimited debate, but we will bring this
hearing to a close.
Mr. Ambassador, diplomats have to operate in all sorts of
environments, all sorts of conditions. You've done that through
your career. You've obviously demonstrated the capacity to do
it today.
We will keep the record open until the close of business
Friday, July 28.
With that, this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]