[Senate Hearing 109-919]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-919
NORTH KOREA: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Abramowitz, Hon. Morton, senior fellow, The Century Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from Tennessee............... 35
Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Virginia................... 19
Chaffee, Hon. Lincoln, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island............ 13
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut......... 22
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin........... 29
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska.................... 9
Hill, Hon. Christopher R., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 56
Kanter, Hon. Arnold, principal member, The Snowcroft Group,
Washington, DC................................................. 39
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Lugar, Hon. Richard, U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement 1
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska................... 32
Sarbanes, Hon. Paul R., U.S. Senator from Maryland............... 16
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio................ 26
(iii)
NORTH KOREA: U.S. POLICY OPTIONS
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THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Voinovich, Alexander, Murkowski, Sarbanes, Dodd, and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. The committee meets today to
review matters related to North Korea. On July 11, the
committee received a classified briefing on North Korea from
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte and
Ambassador Joseph Detrani. We look forward to continuing our
inquiry in open session today.
On July 4, North Korea test fired a long-range missile with
the theoretical capability of reaching the United States, as
well as several shorter-range missiles. All landed in the Sea
of Japan. These missile launches by North Korea were
particularly sobering because the timing and quantity of the
launches appeared to be designed to intensify their provocative
nature and because they occurred despite significant external
pressure to refrain from such a launch.
The North Korean regime's drive to build missiles, North
Korean nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction,
continues to pose a grave threat to the Pacific region and to
the United States. We also are concerned about the transfer of
North Korean weapons, materials, and technology to other
countries or terrorist groups. Although the launches must be
seen as a setback for regional dialog, they do provide
additional clarity that could be useful in moving other states
in the region toward a more unified position on dealing with
North Korea.
Up to this point China has attempted to facilitate
discussions on North Korea while continuing to supply and
manage key energy lifelines into North Korea. It has endeavored
to preserve a historic alliance with Pyongyang while
discouraging military options or other destabilizing activities
by either side. Beijing has been particularly concerned with
preventing actions by North Korea or its neighbors that might
stimulate the flow of North Korean refugees into China.
This strategy, however, has led to severe problems for the
Chinese. The North Korean missile tests demonstrated that
China's influence over its ally is limited. China had appealed
directly to the North Korean Government to suspend the missile
tests, but Kim Jong-Il's regime disregarded these appeals.
Now, the missile launches underscored that North Korea has
its own agenda distinct from Beijing's long-term interest.
China wants to avoid instability on its borders, but few acts
could have been more destabilizing than the missile tests. If
North Korea continues on the provocative path of missile and
nuclear development, Japan, the United States, and perhaps
other nations may be compelled to reassess their military
posture in East Asia.
China has made huge economic and political investments in
the world economy because it is depending on high economic
growth rates to advance living standards and to preserve
internal political stability. To achieve these growth rates, it
needs markets for Chinese goods, investment and technology for
its industries, and energy sources to feed the growing appetite
of its populace for automobiles, air conditioning, and other
energy-intensive conveniences.
But Beijing's ability to secure these benefits of the
global marketplace will depend on continued cooperation with
the West and military stability in East Asia. To the extent
that the United States, Japan, and other nations view the East
Asian region through the lens of the unique security conundrum
created by North Korea, Chinese aspirations are likely to be
set back.
This is why Beijing is encouraged to reassess its regional
priorities. The United States should be working diligently with
China to develop options for peacefully resolving the North
Korean dilemma. These options should start with an attempt to
reinvigorate the Six Party Talks. But we should be mindful that
thus far this format has not produced lasting results.
Last week's U.N. Security Council resolution condemning the
multiple missile launches by North Korea was a significant
action. It is also important to note that individual leaders of
countries outside of the Six Party Talks are attempting to be
helpful with the North Korean challenge. For example,
Indonesian President Yudhoyono has recently sent a special
envoy to encourage resumption of the talks. The President may
follow up with his own visit to Pyongyang.
North Korea's missile launches must not distract from the
ongoing challenges faced by North Korean refugees making their
way into China, often in the hope of eventually reaching South
Korea. The Foreign Relations Committee reiterates its concern
that North Korean refugees in China be treated compassionately
and that the Chinese Government allow the UNHCR to actively
assist these North Korean refugees.
We are joined, fortunately, today by Christopher Hill,
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, who will report on his recent trip to the region.
Secretary Hill will comment on the stalled Six Party Talks as
well as the United States' response to the July missile
launches and our ongoing dialog with China.
On our second panel we will hear from Dr. Arnold Kanter,
Principal Member of the Scowcroft Group, and Ambassador Morton
Abramowitz, Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation. Dr. Kanter
and Ambassador Abramowitz will provide their assessments of
United States policy options toward North Korea. They have been
frequent visitors to our committee and we are grateful once
again to greet them today.
Indeed, we welcome all of our witnesses. We look forward to
their insights on this very important and timely subject.
Let me now turn to our first witness, Ambassador Hill. We
are very grateful to hear you and have appreciated your
testimony on confidence on occasion. We are especially pleased
that you can testify today in public so that the Congress and
the public can hear you. Will you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Hill. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
some prepared remarks that I would like to enter into the
record.
The Chairman. They will be placed in the record in full.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you. So I will now proceed with the
summary, and then I am available to any and all of your
questions. Thank you very much.
I want to thank you for this very timely opportunity to
update the committee on recent developments on the United
States' policy with respect to the DPRK, or North Korea. I will
focus my opening remarks on what we believe has been a very
strong and unanimous response of the U.N. Secretary Council on
July 15 to North Korea's July 4th-July 5th missile launches and
their ongoing nuclear programs. I will then be prepared to
address your questions on any of the many issues that we have
with North Korea.
The 15 members of the United Nations Security Council took
swift action to pass unanimously on July 15, a strong and
binding resolution, Resolution 1695, in response to North
Korea's launches just 10 days earlier of a barrage of ballistic
missiles, including a failed long-range missile. Resolution
1695 is the first U.N. Security Council resolution on North
Korea since 1993. That, in fact, reflects the gravity with
which the world views North Korea's missile and nuclear
programs, as well as the determination of the Council to speak
with one voice in condemning them.
The resolution condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK
of ballistic missiles. It demands the DPRK suspend all
activities on its ballistic missile program and return to its
missile launch moratorium, and it requires all member states,
in accordance with their national legal authorities and
consistent with international law, to prevent missile and
missile-related items, material, goods, and technology from
being transferred to North Korea's missile or WMD programs, the
procurement of such items from the DPRK and the transfer of any
financial resources in relation to the DPRK missile or WMD
programs.
In passing Resolution 1695, the U.N. Security Council
stated it was acting under its special responsibility for
international peace and security. The DPRK must now comply with
the terms of the resolution.
The administration is looking at moving forward with a
number of additional economic, counterproliferation, and
diplomatic measures in response to the launch and pursuant to
the resolution. I hope to be able to share details with you.
We will continue to step up our efforts under the
Proliferation Security Initiative to stop the movement of goods
and materials related to weapons of mass destruction. The
resolution stressed the importance of implementation of the
Joint Statement adopted September 19, 2005, by all six parties.
Resolution 1695 welcomed efforts by council members and other
states to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution
through dialog, which the United States, Japan, South Korea,
China, and Russia are pursuing through the Six Party Talks. The
resolution strongly urged the DPRK to return immediately to the
Six Party Talks without precondition.
Resolution 1695 offers the DPRK a clear choice of two
paths. One will bring the DPRK under increasing international
pressure and isolation. The other offers a peaceful and
diplomatic solution that will benefit all parties--from the
DPRK, the elimination of all of its nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs; from the other parties, energy and
economic cooperation with the DPRK, security provisions, and
steps toward normalization of relations subject to bilateral
policies.
We have in place the right approach with the right partners
to give the DPRK the basis to choose the path we believe firmly
is in its interests, the path to a better future for the North
Korean people and to a new relationship with the United States
and the entire international community. We are working with
those partners now to schedule meetings of the Six Party Talks
as soon as possible.
Those conclude my opening remarks and I look forward to
your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington,
DC
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely opportunity to update the
committee on recent developments on United States policy with respect
to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). My prepared
remarks today will focus on the strong and unanimous response of the
United Nations Security Council on July 15 to North Korea's missile
launches and to the North's ongoing nuclear weapons programs, United
States enforcement action against North Korea's illicit activities, and
what we are doing to ease the plight of North Koreans in and out of
North Korea.
the u.n. security council resolution
The 15 members of United Nations Security Council took swift action
to pass unanimously on July 15 a strong and binding resolution in
response to the DPRK's launches just 10 days earlier of a barrage of
ballistic missiles, including a failed launch, which could have been a
long range missile or an attempted satellite launch.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1695:
Condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic
missiles;
Demands the DPRK suspend all activity on its ballistic
missile program and return to its missile-launch moratorium;
and
Requires all member states, in accordance with their
national legal authorities and consistent with international
law, to prevent missile and missile-related items, materials
goods and technology from being transferred to DPRK missile or
WMD programs; the procurement of such items from DPRK; and, the
transfer of any financial resources in relation to the DPRK's
missile or WMD programs.
In passing Resolution 1695, the U.N. Security Council stated it was
acting under its special responsibility for maintenance of
international peace and security. That is a reference to the Council's
unique authorities under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, to take steps
necessary for peace and security, which provides the authority for the
Council to adopt binding resolutions. The DPRK must now comply with the
terms of the resolution.
The administration is looking at moving forward with a number of
additional economic, counterproliferation, and diplomatic measures in
response to the launch. I hope soon to be able to share details with
you.
We will continue to step up our efforts under the Proliferation
Security Initiative to stop the movement of goods and materials related
to weapons of mass destruction.
The resolution stressed the importance of implementation of the
Joint Statement adopted September 19, 2005, by all six parties.
Resolution 1695 welcomed efforts by Council members and other states to
facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution through dialog, which
the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, and Russia are pursuing
through the Six Party Talks. It strongly urged the DPRK to return
immediately to the Six Party Talks without precondition.
Resolution 1695 is the first U.N. Security Council resolution on
the DPRK since 1993. Its unanimous adoption reflects the gravity with
which the world views the DPRK's missile and nuclear programs, as well
as the determination of the Council to speak with one voice in
condemning them.
In contrast, following the DPRK's launch of a long-range missile in
1998, the UNSC a month later issued a presidential press statement,
which simply expressed its concern over the launch and noted harm to
the fishing and shipping activities in the region. Following the DPRK's
launch of a Nodong missile in 1993, there was no response from the
international community.
The UNSC response this time was fast, strong, and unanimous. It
unambiguously reflects the common will of the international community
to confront the DPRK on its nuclear and missile programs.
Resolution 1695 offers the DPRK a clear choice of two paths. One
will bring the DPRK under increasing international pressure and further
economic and political isolation from the community of nations. The
other offers a peaceful and diplomatic solution that will benefit all
parties: From North Korea, the elimination of all of its nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs; from the other parties, energy
and economic cooperation, security provisions, and steps toward
normalization subject to bilateral policies.
We have in place the right approach with the right partners to give
the DPRK the basis to choose the path we believe is firmly in its
interest, the path to a better future for the North Korean people and
to a new relationship with the United States and the entire
international community. We are working with those partners now to
schedule a meeting of the Six Party Talks as soon as possible.
illicit activities
North Korea has engaged in illicit activities for decades. The DPRK
calls U.S. law enforcement and financial regulatory measures
``sanctions'' and asserts they are blocking progress in the Six Party
Talks. The United States will continue to take law enforcement actions
to protect our currency and our citizens from illicit activities. The
measures we have taken are targeted at specific behavior. Contrary to
North Korean assertions, these actions are not related to the Six Party
Talks.
We had offered, at the last round of talks in November 2005, to
explain to the DPRK about the regulatory actions to protect the U.S.
financial system from abuse, but it did not respond to our offer until
February 2006. On March 7 in New York, a Treasury-led interagency team
met with DPRK officials.
The team described the reasons for the September 2005 designation
by the United States of a bank in Macau, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), under
section 311 of the Patriot Act as a financial institution of ``primary
money laundering concern.'' The team discussed our ongoing efforts with
authorities in Macau to resolve the issues that led to that
designation.
As stated in the Notice of Finding published in the Federal
Register on September 20, 2005, BDA had been providing financial
services for many years, with little oversight or control, to a number
of North Korean entities engaged in illicit activities, including drug
trafficking, smuggling counterfeit tobacco products, and distributing
counterfeit United States currency.
Our designation of BDA--which warns our financial institutions
about doing business with the bank--is producing encouraging results.
Macau has adopted new anti-money laundering legislation and compelled
the bank to institute more effective internal controls. United States
law enforcement and regulatory agencies are working with Macanese
authorities to resolve the concerns that led to the designation.
U.S. regulatory and law enforcement measures to protect our
financial system from abuse are not subject to negotiation. We will
continue to guard our financial system in accordance with U.S. law.
The September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the six parties
contemplates, in the context of DPRK denuclearization, discussions on a
broad range of issues, including trade and investment cooperation and
steps toward normalization.
The North Korean accounts frozen by the Macao Monetary Authority
total roughly $24 million. The DPRK's use of the Macanese action as a
pretext not to return to the talks--where benefits would dwarf what
we're talking about with BDA--raises questions about how serious the
DPRK is at this point about its commitment to implement the September
19 Joint Statement and its willingness to denuclearize.
refugees
The United States is deeply concerned over the grave humanitarian
and human rights situation that exists within North Korea and over the
plight of North Korean refugees who have fled the country.
In concert with other countries and international organizations, we
seek to promote human rights in the DPRK. Additionally, we seek to
improve protection and assistance for refugees from the DPRK and are
mindful of the important role of the ROK in this regard.
We have been working with other governments and organizations to
find ways to respond to cases of individual North Korean asylum
seekers.
We have recently resettled some North Korean refugees in the United
States. Under U.S. law and policy, in order to protect the applicants,
their families, and the integrity of the program, we do not comment on
individual asylum or refugee cases. Procedures to consider North Korean
nationals for resettlement are the same as for nationals from other
countries. We will consider any North Korean brought to our attention
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United
States Embassies and Consulates, and reputable nongovernmental
organizations. In all cases, host government concurrence is required
for refugee processing on foreign territory. We will continue to work
closely with the Congress and with the subcommittee as we pursue this
important initiative.
human rights
The Department has worked to identify concrete ways to address the
North's human rights abuses.
In August 2005, the President appointed the Special Envoy on Human
Rights in North Korea, Mr. Jay Lefkowitz. Since his appointment,
Special Envoy Lefkowitz has taken numerous actions to build
international consensus for improved human rights in North Korea and to
increase North Korean access to outside information.
Currently, the State Department and other agencies are compiling a
plan to expend funds to protect refugees and promote the freedom of
North Koreans--as called for in the North Korean Human Rights Act of
2004.
For the past 3 years, the United States has cosponsored resolutions
condemning North Korea's human rights abuses at the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights. In 2005, the United States cosponsored an European Union-
tabled resolution on DPRK human rights at the U.N. General Assembly,
marking the first time the issue had been addressed by the body. The
United States also provided $2 million to the NGO Freedom House, an
international campaign to raise awareness of the human rights situation
in North Korea. The United States has provided a grant to the National
Endowment for Democracy to support groups that monitor North Korean
human rights abuses.
In November 2005, the Secretary designated North Korea a country of
particular concern under the International Religious Freedom Act for
its systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom.
The United States has made clear to North Korea that discussion of
its human rights record will be part of any future normalization
process.
That concludes my remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Hill. Some in
the United States Government have reservations about conducting
negotiations to the ultimate degree with officials of the
present North Korean Government. They suggest that perhaps we
should wait for a change of regime in that situation, that that
would be a more promising background for this.
What comment do you have on the regime change idea, whether
that is in the cards in any foreseeable future, and whether, in
fact, the suggestion of that publicly, which I hesitate to
make, is one reason for the intransigence of the North Korean
parties to begin with?
Ambassador Hill. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are not seeking
regime change. We are seeking a change in this regime's
behavior. Ultimately, what regime North Korea has will be
determined by the North Korean people. It is not for us to
determine.
There is an argument--I have heard it too--that somehow
with a different regime, with a benign regime, with a friendly
regime, we would have an easier time negotiating this. Perhaps
that is true, but we have the regime that we have and we have
to deal with them.
We have made very clear that we have no problems dealing
bilaterally. What we are not prepared to do, however, is
torpedo or push aside the Six Party process. The Six Party
process is one where all the countries that are relevant are at
the table. We cannot have a situation where the United States
somehow tries to solve this bilaterally where important
countries, such as South Korea, are left to wait in the waiting
room to see what happens, because at the end of the day when we
do reach an agreement we will have a number of countries coming
forward and playing a role in that agreement.
For example, Russia has a lot of experience in dismantling
nuclear programs. Sir, I certainly do not need to tell you
about the efforts that we have had with Russia over the years
to do that. So we would look forward to Russia playing a very
important role in a post-settlement.
North Korea desperately needs energy and any conceivable
energy solution is going to require South Korea's major
participation. So the idea that the United States can somehow
do this bilaterally is simply not true.
I would make one other point, that this barrage of
missiles, these seven missiles that were launched, that also
validates the Six Party process. Only one of those missiles
could conceivably reach the United States. Frankly, it did not
get very far. But a number of those missiles were ones that
could conceivably reach Japan and some of those missiles could
only reach South Korea. In short, Mr. Chairman, there was a
missile there for everybody. I think just the missile launch
itself validates the process we have.
Now, of course process is not enough. You have to have
progress. But the notion that somehow we can make progress
without the Six Party process I do not think is a notion that
really can be validated or proven. I have had many bilateral
meetings with the North Koreans. I have met them in formal
rooms, I have met them in informal rooms. I have met them in
restaurants. I have met them in many different places.
The problem is not a lack of communication. The problem is
that they do not want to come to the process and make the
fundamental decision to implement the September accords. When
they do, we will have as many bilateral meetings as they want.
It is not a problem of bilateral process.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, some have suggested that in order for
the Six Party Talks to progress, one of two things would have
to occur, maybe both. That is, that there would have to be
pressure, principally by the Chinese, who reportedly provide a
very large percentage of the nutrition and energy needs of the
country. This at least is reputed to be very substantial
leverage. Without those increments, obviously the North Korean
people would suffer. Perhaps the regime would, too. You would
be in a better position, having been closer to the scene, to
estimate that.
On the other hand, others have suggested that a package
similar to the one offered to Iran, for example, by the
European powers and the United States would be a way of
approaching this--that there are incentives in such an idea,
both in terms of economic betterment as well as some rapport
with the rest of the world, some regularization.
What do you have to say about either of those routes, and
what is likely to be the course of activity on either of those
situations?
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, we have a package and
it is the Statement of Principles from September 2005. This
lays out an entire agreement. First of all, it envisions
denuclearization, that is getting rid of their weapons, but
also very importantly, getting rid of all their nuclear
programs. We are not interested in having arguments with the
North Koreans over what is a nuclear weapons program and what
is some sort of nuclear health care program. We are interested
in getting rid of all of their nuclear programs, all their
existing nuclear programs, and they agreed to that.
The Chairman. Presumably, this requires some verification,
maybe international inspection.
Ambassador Hill. Absolutely.
The Chairman. And some idea that that has occurred.
Ambassador Hill. Absolutely, and that will be the rub. I
mean, when we get to finally implementing this we have to have
a verification mechanism that really works, and that is where I
mentioned earlier we think the Russians can play a very helpful
role in that with all the experience they have in this.
So we have got the package. The problem is we need to get
the North Koreans to implement the package. Clearly China is a
key--is an absolutely key player here. I spent--I was there
twice in the last week in connection with the U.N. Security
Council resolution. The Chinese sent a pretty senior delegation
up to Pyongyang and they waited and waited to see if they could
get a meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-Il, and it never happened.
I cannot speak for the Chinese, but I think the Chinese
were a little bothered by that. Indeed, I think they are
bothered by the fact that China has given North Korea a lot of
assistance. They have helped them with fuel, they have helped
them with food, they have helped clothe North Koreans in the
winter. Indeed, when there is a North Korean delegation coming
to China, China gives gifts to North Korea. When a Chinese
delegation goes to North Korea, China gives gifts to North
Korea.
China has been extremely generous to North Korea and they
asked for one simple thing, which was, do not fire those
missiles, and the North Koreans ignored them. So I think there
is a bit of an issue today going on between China and North
Korea.
You know, China, the Chinese, make the point that you can
choose a lot in life, but you cannot choose your neighbors. So
I mean, we do have to be respectful of the fact that North
Korea is a neighbor. But I think there is a process going on in
China today to look at where they stand with this, because
clearly, clearly China has no interest in North Korea
developing missiles or in developing nuclear technology. They
are clearly concerned about what this could mean to the region.
So I think the silver lining to this rather difficult
situation we have is an opportunity to work more closely with
China and an opportunity to work closely on our overall
interest for northeast Asia. So we are doing just that.
The Chairman. The Chinese were perhaps surprised by the
reaction of the Japanese to the missiles. The Japanese response
was very strong, and relations with Japan and China, as you
take a look at the six parties you have around the table there
with you, have been more and more fractious in the process.
Surely the Chinese are sensitive to the Japanese reaction,
which is more existential than any of the rest of us with
regard to this, plus the announcement yesterday of an 11
percent growth rate in China, with the whole future of the
country riding on the regularization of trade, which I
mentioned in my opening statement.
Is it your impression that the Chinese are sensitive to all
of the above?
Ambassador Hill. They are absolutely sensitive to all of
the above. Regrettably, North Korea does not appear to be
sensitive to any of the above. Certainly, from the point of
view of Japan, North Korea setting up missiles, several of
which could hit Japan, when Japan has its own self-limiting
rules about what kind of military it has, how much it spends on
the military, what kind of systems it should have, this entire
North Korean missile barrage began--or made more public--a
debate in Japan about whether they have enough forces to deal
with these kinds of threats to their homeland.
This in turn caused concerns in China and caused concerns
as well in South Korea. But rather than focus on the Japanese
reaction or the South Korean reaction to the Japanese reaction,
I think we should focus on what started this dance, and that is
the North Koreans. They are truly reckless. They are reckless
from a number of vantage points, and the region--how the region
works together is one such vantage point.
North Korea does not seem to understand that this is a
region with great potential and they could join in it or they
could be isolated.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I now want to recognize Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Hill, welcome. Secretary Hill, what do you
believe the North Koreans want? What is the objective?
Ambassador Hill. The North Koreans pride themselves on
being opaque and not sort of letting us understand their
thinking. I mean, often what goes on in North Korea stays in
North Korea. But the best we can tell is the North Koreans
believe that this missile launch demonstrates a certain
military prowess, it demonstrates a certain strength, and that
somehow by demonstrating this kind of strength we will be
inclined to be more concerned, more worried, and inclined to
give more concessions.
So it could be in this case a sort of misplaced sense of
how to enhance their position at the bargaining table.
Senator Hagel. But what do they want? What do they hope to
gain? What is the objective?
Ambassador Hill. Again, they have not shared that with us,
so we are left to speculate. But certainly when one looks
through the public statements that are made there, when one
analyzes what they're up to, it appears that North Korea would
like to establish itself as a nuclear power and to get us to
deal with them as a nuclear power, and to try to work with them
as a nuclear power through arms control agreements and the
like.
Senator Hagel. So in light of what you have said during the
last exchange with Chairman Lugar, where do we go from here?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think we need to make it clear
that when we say that it is unacceptable to be a nuclear power
that we really mean it. There are just too many consequences in
the region. So we know that North Korea becoming a nuclear
power is unacceptable, not only to us but to the other players
in the region, including China. So where we have to go from
here I think is to, using this resolution as a very strong--
this U.N. Security Council resolution as a very strong sign of
international resolve, I think we need to work more closely
with partners, and as we move closely with the partners and as
we try to revive a diplomatic process and as North Korea does
not respond to that, I think we need to work closely with the
partners on additional steps.
Now, we are looking at economic measures, but I think we
need to be realistic about whether our economic measures can
really get us where we want to go, because we have already
taken a number of measures. We do not have a robust trading
relationship with North Korea which we can somehow suspend and
then compel them to a different behavior. But some countries
have much more of a relationship, namely China. So I think it
is very important to work with China on a diplomatic process
such that if we do not get there we can have a common
understanding of what we do next.
We do feel that we have a common understanding that North
Korea's development of missiles and nuclear programs is
unacceptable to the Chinese and to the other Six Party
participants.
Senator Hagel. When you note additional steps--consider
additional steps--what might those additional steps be?
Ambassador Hill. Well, again, I think North Korea resists
any type of pressure. But frankly, the other approach to North
Korea, that is of being close to them and somehow showing a lot
of patience, is also not working. So I would argue that we need
to step up the pressure, but I do not think the United States
can do that alone. By pressure I mean economic pressure.
I think we need to work with our partners that we believe
have more leverage, and the Chinese do have more leverage. The
Chinese also have more concerns because North Korea is right on
their border. So I think what we need to convince the Chinese
of and work with the Chinese on is the fact that this current
situation cannot hold. It is inherently instable, unstable. So
what China needs to do is to determine whether it can carry on
a relationship with North Korea as it has in the past and
compel North Korea to make these changes that we all demand.
So I think China needs in short to begin to review its own
policies and I think that can be best done when we can work
closely with China.
Senator Hagel. You note those with the most influence on
North Korea, using trade as an example, although, as you have
correctly noted, it is limited influence. South Korea certainly
is one of those, and I would ask, in light of the collapse of
the talks between South and North Korea last week, what actions
has South Korea taken or intend to take regarding humanitarian
assistance, cutting off any food assistance, any official
actions they have taken in light of those talks?
Ambassador Hill. Well, you are correct, Mr. Senator, that
the South Koreans agreed to go forward with a ministerial.
Their minister of unification met with his counterpart in North
Korea in Pusan. They did this after considerable discussion
within their government and they decided that, because they
have always valued these North-South contacts, they did not
want to be the party that cut them off.
But they did set a different agenda, and the agenda they
set was that they wanted to discuss the missile launches and
the importance of getting North Korea back to the Six Party
process. The North Korean delegation walked out of the talks,
and the result is that the talks have been suspended. South
Korea has suspended shipments of humanitarian goods, including
fertilizer. North Korea in response, just yesterday, has
suspended the Red Cross-organized family visits. This is a
particularly cynical act because when we talk about family
visits these are families that were divided by World War II and
by the Korean War. We are talking about 85-year-olds trying to
get together to see each other, often for the last time.
So I think it really is a measurement of that regime's
cynicism that they would go after this type of interaction.
It is very interesting what is going on in South Korea
today. There is a burgeoning discussion in South Korea, among
South Koreans, about the North Korean policy, whether they
should be engaged in this type of--in this policy of reaching
out to North Korea, whether they should be insisting on more
quid pro quos.
I think it is important that the South Koreans have this
discussion, and I think it is also important that Americans
allow them to have this discussion. Obviously we have opinions
about it. Obviously we need to register our opinions with the
South Korean authorities. But I think ultimately it would be
better for all concerned if the South Koreans have their own
debate and come to their own conclusion based on a common set,
a common analysis.
So the trend right now is for South Korea to tighten up in
its relations with North Korea. And by the way, it is a very
wrenching experience for South Korea. What happened to the
Korean Peninsula in the mid-20th century is one of the great
tragedies of that century, and here we are 50-something years
later with no end in sight.
Senator Hagel. Do you know if North Korea has offered to
sell plutonium or enriched uranium to any countries,
governments, terrorist organizations?
Ambassador Hill. We know of--this gets into intelligence
matters, but I can say on the record we know of no particular
instance that they would offer to sell plutonium. We also know
that they understand that this would be a very serious matter
indeed.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe that you have adequate
flexibility, you personally, in the negotiations and Six Party
Talks, flexibility in dealing with the Chinese and with the
North Koreans, others involved?
Ambassador Hill. I wish the North Koreans gave me something
more to work with. I wish they showed that they were going to
be interested in the fifth round. I wish they could demonstrate
that they have done a little homework like the rest of us have,
to see how we would implement the September agreement.
With respect to my flexibility within our Government, I
take my directions from Secretary Rice and I think I am okay in
that regard.
Senator Hagel. So you do not feel that you need any
additional flexibility on site in order to do your job?
Ambassador Hill. What I need is for the North Koreans to
show they are serious. I think that would help skeptics in the
United States, both in and out of Government, to believe more
in the negotiating process. Sir, my problem is that the North
Koreans have given me nothing to work with.
Senator Hagel. How deeply has our financial sanctions
against North Korea impacted their economy?
Ambassador Hill. Opinions about this vary. Clearly, they
were upset and remain very upset about our actions against
them, and they have used this as the latest excuse for not
coming to the talks, the fact that we suspended our United
States banks' interaction with a bank in Macao which is known
to have a number of North Korean accounts there. They have been
very upset about that.
It appears that they have had to scramble around and look
for other ways to move their money around. To be very frank, I
would be careful, however, measuring the success of these
measures on the basis of how loudly the North Koreans complain,
because they complain about a lot of things. I think they have
certainly been disruptive, but I think we need to look to see
how we can do more in this area and also, very fundamentally,
work with partners in this area, because we cannot do this
alone.
If you look at all the partners in the Six Party process,
we have less interaction with North Korea than any of the other
partners. Indeed, today we can see the Japanese are looking at
a number of measures. I mentioned the South Koreans have done
so as well. We need all these partners doing this. I think
together we could come up with something.
But I want to emphasize too that we do need a diplomatic
process. We do need a way to put this together and to get the
North Koreans back to the table.
Senator Hagel. Secretary Hill, thank you for your efforts.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
ISLAND
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
From what I understand, there were seven launches, is that
correct, and one Taepodong 2? What exactly occurred with the
six smaller ones and then the bigger one, and how do we know?
How do we monitor them? I am just curious on the facts of what
exactly took place on July 4.
Ambassador Hill. I do not feel qualified to give a
discussion of the national technical means that we bring to
bear, bring to bear on this, and moreover I am not a rocket
scientist. But we had, I think, very adequate, I think, robust
capabilities in seeing these missiles launched. We know that
the Taepodong 2, the what we believe to be a long-range
missile, went a lot--did not go as far as any of the other
missiles, and there are signs that it barely managed to clear
land and get out to sea.
So it was--I think it is fair to say it was a failure. But
I would hasten to add that when you do missile tests, things
that are failures from the point of view of an operation, you
can actually learn from the failures. So I cannot say that the
test in and of itself was a failure. We do know that they fired
a number of shorter range missiles, including something called
the Nodong and some Scud missiles, and they appear to have
fired them into the vicinity that they wanted to fire them to,
because this is the vicinity that they warned mariners to stay
out of.
So from what we can tell, those other tests appear to have
been successful, and if you consider the fact that North Korea
had not fired missiles for some 13 years and one day fired one
off and hit the test range, I think you have to acknowledge
there is some success there. I would not necessarily like to
take a piece of equipment out that has not been used in 13
years and fire it off. Yet it appears to have been successful.
So we should not underevaluate their missile technology.
So the smaller missiles, Scuds and the like, kind of--I do
not want to exaggerate, but inconsequential really. It is the
bigger----
Ambassador Hill. Well, they are not inconsequential to our
partners in the process. Scuds are not inconsequential because
they can hit just about every part of South Korea. Nodongs are
not inconsequential because they can also hit Japan. So our
partners have to be very concerned about it. And I might add
that those both are treaty partners.
Senator Chafee. Had they been launched in 14 years?
Ambassador Hill. North Korea launched a No Dong missile in
May 1993. The 1993 launch was the last and only launch before
July 2006.
Senator Chafee. In a long time.
Ambassador Hill. In a long time, yes.
Senator Chafee. I see.
Ambassador Hill. Well, 1998 was the Taepodong 1.
Senator Chafee. 1998 was the----
Ambassador Hill. Taepodong missile, the one that flew over
Japan. But the shorter range systems, my recollection is not
since the early 1990s. I will get back to you on that
precisely. A number of years.
Senator Chafee. What would have been the worst case
scenario, that the Taepodong 2 would have traveled to the best
of its capability, which would have been what?
Ambassador Hill. Well, on the assumption that we are sort
of rooting for their missiles not to succeed, we would not want
it to--we would certainly not have liked to see a Taepodong
missile reach its full range, which could hit, reach the
continental United States in theory. Obviously, we did not see
that, nothing close.
So I guess a worst case scenario would have been that it
did that and plopped down somewhere on somebody's house.
Senator Chafee. And I am sure there is--trying to figure
this and decipher it all out--some suspicion that, is it
possible that these were planned failures?
Ambassador Hill. Well again, the shorter range missiles
seem to have hit the target range, so they seem to be tests,
and from what we can tell they achieved what they are supposed
to achieve. Clearly, this large longer range missile did not
succeed, but again I do not know what test data the North
Korean scientists were able to glean from it. So I am sort of
reluctant to term it the failure that it certainly looks like.
Senator Chafee. I guess I am wondering. You said the
Chinese had asked them, do not go ahead with any kind of
aggressive activities. Maybe this was: All right, well, we will
fire off a couple of duds.
Ambassador Hill. Well, they fired off seven missiles and I
would call that aggressive, because they were all shapes and
sizes. And as I mentioned, their missiles are capable basically
of hitting every country in the Six Party process. So I would
not say that they in any way responded positively to the
Chinese. And by the way, it was not just the Chinese. All of
the other participants asked them not to do this, told them not
to do this. And the United States, in addition to asking them
not to do this, through other countries, we asked the Chinese
to ask them not to do this. We also informed the North Koreans
directly through their mission in New York, through what we
call the New York channel, just so there would be no confusion
at all the seriousness with which we viewed missile launches.
Senator Chafee. And as you went ahead with the U.N.
resolution, how were the Chinese cooperating on that? How high
was their cooperation with what we wanted in a resolution?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think the Chinese had not done
this before, had not participated in a resolution that condemns
North Korean's behavior. So it was a diplomatic process where
we worked intensively with the Chinese on the language of this.
I would say that the Chinese earlier in the week had asked us
to hold off on the resolution because they had a diplomatic
team in the field. They had their Vice Premier Hei. He was
joined by the Six Party coordinator, Vice Foreign Minister Wu
Dawei, and they asked us to hold off.
We did. The mission went to planning Pyongyang, was not
able to get the North Koreans to come back to the Six Party
Talks or to affirm, reaffirm, their missile moratorium that
they had broken by firing these missiles. So I think when it
was clear the Chinese diplomatic mission was not able to come
back with the success they wanted, intensive negotiations, more
intensive negotiations, took place in New York and we
ultimately were able to agree on a unanimous resolution.
Senator Chafee. That would--them asking us not to delay
would signal to me that if you looked at the Chinese livid-
meter it was not that high.
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think the Chinese--again, I do not
speak for the Chinese here, but they were not at all happy with
how the North Koreans had defied them. They were not at all
happy with how their mission to Pyongyang had been treated. I
think the Chinese are well aware that as an emerging world
power it is important for them to insist on certain things and
get it done.
They had a neighbor here that depends on them every day of
the year and they asked the neighbor to do something; the
neighbor refused. So I think there is considerable concern in
China, and I think this is reflected in their joining with us
in condemning the North Korean missile launch.
Senator Chafee. From what information I have, there are
some reports that the North Koreans and the Burmese are
potentially doing some arms deals? Am I accurate in that?
Ambassador Hill. Well, Senator, this is an example of birds
of a feather. The Burmese regime is another regime that does
not seem particularly interested in joining the international
community. As you know, Burma and North Korea broke off
relations back in 1983 after the North Koreans murdered half
the South Korean cabinet at a ceremony at a Burmese temple near
Rangoon. So they have not had relations since that time.
Clearly, the Burmese junta and the North Korean regime feel
they have something in common today, so they are in discussions
and there are reports that they are going to reestablish
diplomatic relations that have been broken since the North
Koreans blew up half the South Korean cabinet in 1983 there.
Senator Chafee. Back to the key player, how is China going
to deal with that new relationship?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think it is important for us to
deal frankly and intensively with the Chinese on their
relations with countries that are on their borders. We do that,
obviously, in North Korea, and I think it is also important
that we do talk to the Chinese about their relationship with
Burma. Obviously, this is not a hearing about Burma, but if it
were I would be telling you that we are very, very unhappy with
the direction of things in Burma.
This was one of the most promising Asian countries in the
1950s and now it is about the least promising. What we do not
like to see is a situation where the Burmese are able to play
off China against India or India against the ASEAN countries or
China against Japan, et cetera, to try to divide and conquer.
We think it is important that we all speak with one voice on
Burma.
So we engaged the Chinese in this discussion and I can tell
you we will be doing more of it.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you
for your valuable service to our country.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you, and I look forward to getting
to Rhode Island in a few weeks, by the way.
Senator Chafee. I know that will charge the batteries for
the challenges ahead.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Let me say for the benefit of all Senators who are with us
who have come in, we are having a 10-minute round of
questioning because of the importance of our questions, and we
want the members to have an opportunity in this hearing to
question Secretary Hill. The fact that we have a great number
of members here I hope will lead members to be careful not to
exceed the 10 minutes if you can avoid it. We will try to be
courteous to everybody in allowing the dialog to continue, but
this is a crowded calendar today and, fortunately, now more of
a crowded podium. So we are appreciative of that.
Senator Sarbanes.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL R. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Sarbanes. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am glad we got this endorsement of Rhode Island tourism into
the record here this morning. [Laughter.]
Mr. Secretary--we are pleased to have you before us. Could
you tell us a bit about what went into getting this resolution
at the Security Council and how satisfied you are with the
resolution?
Ambassador Hill. Well, first of all, I want to be clear. I
represent East Asia Bureau, not the United States U.N., which
is run by Ambassador John Bolton. But I will tell you that----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, presumably you all were part and
parcel of the effort.
Ambassador Hill. Oh, sure, yes.
Early, soon after the missile launch, one of the members of
the Security Council, not a permanent member of the Security
Council but Japan, was very interested in taking the lead in
putting together a robust resolution. Japan worked very hard to
put together a resolution and worked very closely with us. The
resolution that was put together had some eight cosponsors of
it, that is eight countries in the Security Council,
representing different countries in different parts of the
world. The Europeans were cosponsors. We had some Latin
American countries there.
That was done the previous--that is, within 3 days of the
actual missile launch. The Chinese signaled that they were
concerned whether this resolution would be in their view
helpful to the situation, and so the Chinese asked that, given
the fact that they were going to launch a diplomatic mission to
Pyongyang to convince the North Koreans to reimpose their
missile moratorium and to come to the Six Party Talks and, most
importantly, come to the talks with a view to implementing the
September agreement, they asked that consideration of this
resolution be postponed.
So the sponsors of the resolution agreed to give China time
to do that. By the end of the week, however, with the Chinese
delegation still not having had key meetings in Pyongyang and
not having indications that the North Koreans were prepared to
come back to the talks or to reimpose the missile moratorium,
the Chinese then proposed a resolution of their own, with
different language in the resolution. At that point it became
what often happens in New York, an intensive negotiation to
come up with a resolution.
It was possible at any time that we would have two
resolutions, but I think it was strongly felt by our
leadership, by our President, our Secretary of State, that it
was valuable to have one resolution that represented the unity
of the Security Council and, frankly, the outrage of the
international community. So they worked, my colleagues in New
York, worked very hard on taking the Chinese text and the
Japanese text and putting it together in one resolution.
We believe it is a very strong resolution. We believe the
operative elements of it are to require that countries work to
exercise vigilance in not allowing North Korea the means to
develop these missile and WMD programs nor the means to
proliferate this. We believe the resolution is very robust in
terms of requiring countries to exercise vigilance, not to
allow North Korea to have the financial means to develop these
things.
In addition, the resolution calls--first of all, condemns
the North Korean action, but also very importantly calls North
Korea back to the Six Party process.
North Korea, as you know, their ambassador attended the
Security Council session. He clearly contained his enthusiasm
for the resolution and stormed out, not before he called the
Security Council some names, and I think has put North Korea in
the position now of defying the Security Council.
So we will continue to work with our partners on this. I
cannot stress enough the importance of working multilaterally
on this because the United States in and of itself, we can
protect ourselves, but we cannot solve this problem. We need to
solve this problem with the partners. So we will work
intensively with our partners and we will assess where we go
from here.
Senator Sarbanes. Have you identified the countries that
are providing assistance to the North Koreans in their effort?
In other words, the countries that this resolution is designed
to curtail in terms of their relationship with North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. Well, there are--all countries, all member
states, are required to exercise vigilance. So I think what we
want to do is work closely with countries that have the most
interaction with the DPRK, financial interaction and also
material interaction. Often those are countries that are
closest to the DPRK and we are working with them diplomatically
on this.
Clearly, we need to continue to work very much with the
Chinese, but, as you know, Japan is considering a list of very
robust sanctions which, if implemented by the Japanese
authorities, will help constrain North Korean access to
financing, to financing these programs.
Senator Sarbanes. How far apart are the countries that are
directly engaged in this effort amongst themselves in terms of
what they think the policy should be?
Ambassador Hill. The countries engaged all have--all share
the same goal, which is North Korea needs to be denuclearized,
needs to get out of this business; that North Korea needs to
reimpose its missile moratorium; and North Korea needs to begin
to join the international community. Countries, however, have
different motivations for this. I would say that in the
immediate region there is concern that if--for example, in
China there is concern that if North Korea were to go ahead and
develop a nuclear program--I mean, a successful deliverable
nuclear weapons program, that this could encourage other
countries in the region, and the Chinese frequently cite Japan
as a concern, that they do not want to see Japan go nuclear,
for example.
So I think China is very concerned about the potential of
an arms race in northeast Asia. So that is something that is a
concern that we share as well.
I think generally countries in the region want to see
northeast Asia as a region that not only exports many of the
world's exports, manufactured exports, but as also a region
that can export peace and stability, and it cannot do that
while it has this one country there producing these weapons
systems.
Senator Sarbanes. You have given us a quick analysis of the
China posture. What about South Korea, Japan, and Russia?
Ambassador Hill. I think South Korea obviously has a
complex relationship to North Korea. It goes back a couple of
thousand years during which they lived together. So it is a
very emotional issue with South Korea. I mentioned earlier that
it is one of the great tragedies of that country that 60 years
later there is this terrible division, that their country was
divided in the middle of the 20th century. So it is a major
humanitarian issue for South Korea to have its people to be
able to be together. There are people in South Korea----
Senator Sarbanes. I think I saw in the morning paper that
they have suspended the permissions to go back and forth
between the two?
Ambassador Hill. The North Koreans did that, yes. The North
Koreans did that in retaliation for the South Koreans cutting
off some humanitarian assistance. The South Koreans do not want
to have to go this route, but they understand that there is a
point at which there is behavior in North Korea that they
simply cannot, cannot countenance.
I would add, as I mentioned earlier, that there is a debate
going on in South Korea, a very active, lively debate about
what their correct policy should be to North Korea, because
there are those in South Korea who want to be supportive of
North Korea and not expecting much back, but somehow keep North
Koreans fed, to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe in
that country. There are people who feel that they should do
that without anything in return.
Then there are people in South Korea who feel that the
North Koreans have abused that, and there is an active
discussion on that, and I think that is to be encouraged. So
there are very strong emotions there.
I feel as an American diplomat it is important that South
Koreans work this out, that we not lecture them, shake a finger
at them, tell them what to do, because, A, I do not think it
will work, and B, I think it could actually do some damage to
our relationship with South Korea. So South Korea has a special
interest there.
Japan has to be very concerned about a country that is so
implacably against Japanese interests and is setting up medium-
term missile systems that Japan's own self-imposed limits on
its military could not deal with on its own. So it has actually
stimulated a discussion in Japan about the type of military it
needs. That discussion in Japan has reverberated in South
Korea, where people are worried about the Japanese reaction to
the North Koreans. It has also stimulated concerns in China as
well. So there is a lot going on there in the region right now,
but I think we need to keep focused on who started this
problem, and it is North Korea.
Senator Sarbanes. Russia you did not do.
Ambassador Hill. Russia also does not want to see an arms
race in northeast Asia. Russia--this is, the Pacific Far East,
is an area perhaps of secondary concern in Moscow, where Russia
has many European areas that they are more concerned about. But
nonetheless, we believe we share the same strategic interests
as Russia. They do not want to see North Korea become a source
of technology or a source of instability in the region.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Allen.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Thank you, Secretary Hill, for shedding light on an
increasingly worrisome, dangerous situation insofar as North
Korea is concerned.
All of us recognize that the key player as we move forward
in trying to get North Korea to comply with its agreements as
well as international standards is China. China provides the
sustenance, the support, and is a key benefactor for North
Korea. If they really did want to have an impact, they could,
or at least they are in the best position to do so. So China's
actions as this moves forward will, from my perspective and I
think from our perspective, should be that if they want to be a
credible partner they need to step up.
There are several things that concern us. Including
deploying a missile defense system as effectively as possible
to help out our allies in that region, particularly Japan and
potentially South Korea as well, but especially Japan.
Now, on the weapons front, let me follow up. Senator Hagel
posed a question to you whether there was evidence of North
Korea transferring nuclear capabilities to any country, and you
said there was not. Now, at these missile tests, though, as far
as other proliferation of arms and weapons of mass destruction,
is it not true that there was at least one or more Iranian
officials there to watch these missile launches?
Ambassador Hill. Yes, that is our understanding, and our
understanding is that North Korea has had a number of
commercial relationships in the Middle East with respect to
missiles.
Senator Allen. Well, the fact that the Iranians were there
and they have relations with them and that we know that
Hezbollah is firing rockets, not missiles but rockets, into
Israel right now, we know that Hezbollah is armed, funded,
protected, and for all intents and purposes directed by Iran,
that would be a great concern, that Iran has those
relationships militarily with North Korea; is that not correct?
Ambassador Hill. That is absolutely correct. I want to say,
though, in truth in advertising, I am the--I deal with East
Asia Pacific. I am not the point person in the Department on
missile proliferation. But you are absolutely correct.
Senator Allen. Well, they were not there just for a United
States Independence Day celebration to see the rockets and
missiles that North Korea sent off.
Ambassador Hill. It is clear North Korea has interests in
commercializing this technology. My response to Senator Hagel
was in--was to the specific question----
Senator Allen. On nuclear.
Ambassador Hill [continuing]. Of selling plutonium.
Senator Allen. Understood. Insofar as Iran, that is a
concern and they do have those relations.
Also, the Asia Times had reported recently that North
Koreans are strengthening ties to other countries. You
mentioned Burma. Venezuela has also been mentioned and stated
by Venezuelan leaders, and also Syria. What do we know about
any of the military transactions with Syria or Venezuela?
Ambassador Hill. Well, we certainly--we have certainly
tracked that and we do know that they have been engaged in
these types of talks. I am not sure I can say in this hearing
room the extent of what we know, but I can assure you we are on
that one.
Senator Allen. All right, that would be instructive for a
classified briefing I think, Mr. Chairman, at some point when
convenient.
Insofar as the resolution that was passed by the United
Nations, it was not the Japanese-proposed resolution; it was a
resolution that you have characterized as strong. However, it
was not as strong as the Japanese resolution. I will not get
into some of the classified briefings we have had on that. But
China was not supportive of the Japanese resolution.
Should North Korea continue to respond in an unpositive or
negative way to the recently passed U.N. resolution in their
reaction to this one that is less strong than what Japan had
proposed, have we, the United States, received any assurances
from China and Russia that they would agree to invoke Charter 7
mandatory sanctions on North Korea if North Korea continues?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I am not aware that we have received
assurances against the possibility that North Korea will
continue to defy this resolution. But what I can assure you of
is that----
Senator Allen. What is your characterization of North
Korea's reaction to this resolution that has been passed?
Ambassador Hill. Defiant.
Senator Allen. Right. And if it should continue?
Ambassador Hill. Should it continue, I think we need to be
very, very much in close contact with these countries about
next steps. I cannot at this point tell you whether next steps
would be a new resolution, but certainly we want to work with
these countries to make sure that they are doing all that they
can do to fulfill their obligations under this, under this
resolution, to be exerting vigilance against the North Korean
efforts to fund these programs and to develop these programs.
I think that is probably going to be the area where we work
most closely with those countries. We want to--I think it is
very important that the resolution also lays out the need for a
diplomatic track, and we will continue to work with these
countries on the way forward in the diplomatic track. But
ultimately the North Koreans are going to have to make their
own decisions on that, and it does not look as of now that they
are interested in rejoining a diplomatic track, and so we are
going to need to reassess and see what else we can do.
Sir, we have a number of options here. We do not have the
options of walking away from this problem. We have got to stick
with it. We have got to look to see what we can do with it. We
need to work with these partners. Multilateral diplomacy is not
an easy thing. Everyone has a different--everyone has a better
idea in the room. So you have to work with them. But that is
what I do for a living and that is what I will continue to do.
We are not going to walk away from this problem.
Senator Allen. Well, thank you for doing this for a living,
and I do not believe we can walk away from it. If we turn our
backs on it there will be even more danger from North Korea. I
thank you for your service. This is very trying, but very
important for our future.
Insofar as Japan is concerned, have they made any
statements or any indication that they are satisfied with the
actions of the Security Council, and what are we doing to
provide assurances to them for stronger actions should the
North Koreans continue not to cooperate? In particular, I know
this is not necessarily the portfolio of the State Department,
but the deployment of a mobile missile defense system to
protect Japan; what can you share with us on those aspects?
Ambassador Hill. First of all, we have worked very, very
closely with the Japanese through this entire crisis, extremely
closely. We have sought to assist them with various short-range
defensive systems. Again, I am not the right person to brief
you on that. I think that should come from Defense Department.
But we have been looking to--we have placed some additional
Patriot missile batteries in Japan, for example. But I
emphasize the need to talk to Defense Department on that.
I would say our cooperation with Japan has become--is
unprecedented in its positive nature. As you know, Prime
Minister Koizumi was here a few weeks ago and a lot of the
discussion had to do with dealing with this North Korean
missile threat. As you know, there has been a discussion in
Japan about the whole issue of what kind of armed forces it
should have. As I mentioned earlier, this has caused some
concern among its neighbors. We very much want to see Japan
have a better relationship with its neighbors, and we work with
Japan on that and we work with its neighbors on that.
Japan is a very close ally of ours and I think that has
been proven in the preceding weeks.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
In 1 minute, where do you see the public in South Korea?
Where do you see any public opinion shifting with, not just the
provocative launches, but North Korea's recalcitrance and
objections to the Security Council resolution?
Ambassador Hill. Well, as I mentioned earlier, I think
there is a very, very lively public debate going on. You look
at the South Korea press every day and there is a lot of
discussion about whether the government has the right policy,
policies toward this issue. I was just in South Korea about a
week ago and I would say overall the tendency, the trend there,
is going to be to probably tighten up in its relationship with
North Korea. They do this very reluctantly because I cannot
emphasize enough this is a very, very emotional issue for a
people who have been divided, a people who have really felt
that the mid-20th century divided them and humiliated them. So
it is not easy for them.
But they clearly are discussing this. It is a very lively
democracy there in South Korea, and I do not think they need me
to help them with this. I think they can work this through.
What is important to us, though, is at the end of the day
we not allow the issue with North Korea to weaken our
relationship with South Korea. On the contrary, we want to see
these tough issues strengthen our relationships there,
especially with our allies, Japan and South Korea.
Senator Allen. Thank you, and thank you for your service.
We are fortunate to have somebody of your capability and
integrity serving our country.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Dodd.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your involvement. We are
glad you stay involved, engaged in this. I think the good news
I have heard you say already--and I apologize for missing your
opening statement--is that we have got to stay engaged in this,
in this process, that we cannot sit on the sidelines and hope
somehow it resolves itself.
I happen to believe there are some opportunities in all of
this as well, to strengthen some relationships and to take us
in some improved directions with some of the parties involved
in the Pacific Rim. I guess I would like to ask you--you may
have addressed this and I apologize if in your response to
earlier questions you may have touched on some of these. But
let me--if you have, you will tell me so.
But like all of us, I guess here, we are trying to figure
out sort of what is the objective that Kim Jong-Il is seeking
with this effort. What are his goals? Is it--obviously, the
ones that come to mind, it could be deterrence. I question the
legitimacy of that, but you could make a case. Winning economic
and political concessions make a case, I suppose, for that as
well.
I suspect--and I am going to ask you to comment on some of
these; there is a question mark on the end of all of this.
Prestige at home and abroad. Where is he vulnerable in his own
country? I suspect it is the only group that may pose some
threats to him would be his own military, so scoring points
with them by doing this may be solidifying his own position at
home.
I believe you said at the outset of your comments here or
in response to a question that we are not necessarily
interested in regime change in North Korea; we are interested
in a change of behavior. I think those were your words or words
to that effect. If that is the case--and I would like to have
you make the case here--why are we more explicit? If in fact
many argue that what Kim Jong-Il is seeking here and what the
Chinese and the South Koreans and the Japanese and the Russians
cannot really offer is exactly what you have suggested in your
comments here, that the only thing the United States can offer
that others cannot is this not seeking regime change
militarily, I guess you might want to add here.
Why not be more explicit about that if in fact that may be
the piece that North Korea is seeking? I am making that as a
conclusion. I put a question mark there because I want to know
whether or not you agree with that. Other than that, then go
back to my earlier point and what are the objectives? What are
they trying to achieve here? I am sort of mystified by what
goals they hope to accomplish with all of this.
Ambassador Hill. Mr. Senator, you are not the only person
that is mystified by it. I must say I listen to a lot of North
Korean experts, and you listen to five and you get six
different explanations of it. It is truly difficult to fathom
what they have on their minds. My own sense--and again there is
no official policy on what this is, so I will just tell you my
own sense. I think they have a misplaced notion that the
tougher they are, the stronger their military, that somehow the
tougher, the more prestigious their position will be in the
world community and, more specifically, at the bargaining
table.
So I think they feel that the bigger the missiles, the
stronger their position. I think--I do not agree that they are
looking for nuclear deterrence. I really do not agree with the
notion that somehow they live under a sort of imminent threat
of a U.S. attack and that is why they need these super-weapons,
to protect themselves from our attack.
We have told them over and over again publicly, privately,
wherever, that we are not interested in attacking or invading
North Korea.
Senator Dodd. Have we said that to them directly?
Ambassador Hill. We have said that. And if you look at the
September statement, it is there in black and white. So they
know this.
I think what they are looking for in having a nuclear
capability is prestige value, and I am sorry to say, frankly, I
think it is also a way to kind of intimidate their neighbors.
They look around, they see neighbors that are much more
powerful than they are. To understand the dynamics of North-
South relations, in 1960 North Korea was well ahead of South
Korea. In 1970, North Korea was well ahead of South Korea. And
now North Korea has a per capita GDP that is minuscule compared
to South Korea.
History has already happened. It is over. And you can
imagine if there is a trauma there, you can imagine how they
feel about that. So how do they catch up? They catch up with a
sort of super-weapon.
So I really think it is a misplaced sense of how to be
strong. What we have to do is to be a little tough in response,
and I think we need to make very clear that we are not going to
allow them to become a nuclear state. You know, they look at
some other examples in the world and say, well, we allowed
country X to become a nuclear state, and so why do you not
allow us? We are not going to allow North Korea to acquire
these types of weapons.
I think the sooner they understand that, the better. We
have put together the Six Party process with the Six Party
Agreement and anything they should want in the world is
contained on those two and a half pages. It is all there. If
they want energy, it is there. If they want security
assurances, it is there. If they want bilateral recognition, it
is there through a process.
By the way, there will be a process. If we ever get to the
point of normalizing our relations, we will have to address
some issues that they do not like, for example human rights.
But they are just going to have to understand that the rest of
the world has its human rights record. Our human rights record,
as well, gets inspected and they are just going to have to get
used to the fact that if they are going to join the world they
have got to play by the rules.
Right now they have a sense of somehow there is this North
Korean exceptionalism, that rules are for someone else, not for
them. So I think we have to be a little tough on this point.
But if they are willing to work with us, we have got an
agreement that will really offer them a way back into the
international community.
Senator Dodd. But we are not going to let them--you say we
are not going to let them acquire weapons. Do they not already
have them?
Ambassador Hill. They have--what we know is they have some
missile technology and we know that those short- and medium-
term missiles seem to work. We know that they have plutonium.
We do not know whether they have been able to put the plutonium
into some sort of explosive device they have never tested. But
we know they have the raw material, that is plutonium. We do
not know whether they have put it into a----
Senator Dodd. Could it be enough to maybe do six or eight?
I have heard the report they have enough material to produce
six or eight.
Ambassador Hill. You talk to analysts and you will get
different points of view, but in that order of magnitude, yes.
What is a little discouraging, frankly speaking, is
throughout our negotiations in the Six Party, on these
principles in September, they kept this Yongbyon reactor
operating. So this Yongbyon so-called graphite-moderated
reactor, it was not there to produce electricity. It is there
to produce plutonium byproduct. And they kept that going the
whole time.
Then at the end of this process when the United States
announced certain measures that we were taking against some of
their illicit activities, their financial illicit activities,
they said they will boycott the rest of the talks unless we
stop that. My point is, if they can go ahead and produce
plutonium through the talks, surely we have the right to
protect ourselves against illicit activities, and that is what
we continue to do.
Senator Dodd. I do not want to--the reason I say do they
not already have it is because we heard from John Negroponte
testifying publicly that he believes in fact they do have this,
they do have this capacity.
Ambassador Hill. I am sorry? Capacity?
Senator Dodd. Weapons, nuclear weapons capability.
Ambassador Hill. We know they have plutonium. We do not
know that they have taken the plutonium and through an
explosion caused a nuclear--or have the capability of causing a
nuclear explosion. Now, people who know this kind of stuff say
that the trick is in producing the plutonium and after that it
is relatively easier.
But what we know is that they have produced plutonium, and
we do not know beyond that how much they have been able to turn
it into a device or miniaturize it and put it onto a missile.
Senator Dodd. But they are getting--if not there, it is
your view that they are pretty close to doing that?
Ambassador Hill. I do not know how close they are. I just
know that they are developing missile technology on the one
hand and they are harvesting plutonium on the other end, and
clearly they are looking to fill in the middle, and I do not
know how far they have gotten. But frankly, I do not think we
should be waiting around for that to happen.
Senator Dodd. Let me if I can--let me ask you quickly about
the Chinese, because here there have been some who have
suggested that the Chinese ought to listen to us, that this
could be a defining moment in the relationship with China. I
understand that. Are we listening to the Chinese? It seems to
me here, of all the players outside of ourselves, the critical
country regarding this effort here is China, for all the
obvious reasons, I think some of which you have articulated
already.
It seems to me that we ought to be listening to the Chinese
because they may have the key to this issue, and I wonder if
you might expound on that a bit.
Ambassador Hill. I think the Chinese are the key players
and it is no accident that they are the host of the entire Six
Party process. I completely agree with you they are the key
players and they probably know the most about the North
Koreans. They have certainly seen them the most. They have the
most connections. They have economic connections, political
connections, they have military connections. They know a lot
about them.
I think they have also had a long relationship with North
Korea, some 60 years, and they are--in China policies do get
changed, but it takes a while for things to change there. The
nature of my discussions with the Chinese tends to be they ask
me for more patience and I ask them for less patience. We have
to come to a sort of agreement, a sort of work plan on how we
can move ahead.
I feel we had an important week last week. The Chinese
asked for a delay in the Security Council. We gave them a
delay. Their diplomacy did not work. They came back to the
Security Council. They worked with us and we came up with one
unanimous resolution. I thought that was very valuable, but in
and of itself it is not going to solve this problem. We have
got to keep working with the Chinese and find other ways to
work together.
Senator Dodd. But they are being cooperative?
Ambassador Hill. I'm sorry?
Senator Dodd. They are being very cooperative in your view?
Ambassador Hill. I think they understand that this problem
is not going to go away with patience. This problem is going to
require us to be aggressive in dealing with it. So I have a
very good relationship with my counterpart there and I really
feel that if you look at the waterfront of United States-
Chinese relations, a complex relationship if there ever was
one, this is an area where we can work together, and I think if
we can solve this one we are going to be able to solve a lot of
problems.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to congratulate you, Ambassador
Hill, for the outstanding job that you are doing. You have had
great patience and persistence. You have been very restrained
in your rhetoric and, even though we have been taking some
criticism because we have stuck with the Six Party multilateral
approach to this, we stayed the course, and I think that your
great success at the Security Council is something that is a
highlight of this year in terms of foreign policy.
One of the things that puzzles me is the incentives for the
Chinese to use its influence to get North Korea to comply with
this resolution that has been passed. Now the spotlight is on
the enforcement, compliance. I would be interested to know, in
terms of incentives, is if the Japanese talking about perhaps a
preemptive strike or changing their constitution or developing
a nuclear weapon capability had much influence on their
decisionmaking?
Ambassador Hill. When I was in Beijing last week, there was
frankly in private discussions, there was a lot of criticism of
Japan, and clearly the Chinese have expressed a great concern
about Japan. I took it as my mission to continue to focus them
on the problem, which is not Japan but rather North Korea, and
I think they got the point.
Senator Voinovich. I know that the relationships between
China and Japan are not as good as they should be, although
economically they are doing a lot of business with each other.
Are we doing anything to encourage the Japanese to prevent
Prime Minister Koizumi visiting that shrine to the veterans of
the war? Then there has been some--I know I have met with some
Chinese and they have complained about the history books are
not really capturing what really happened during the Second
World War.
Ambassador Hill. There is a--this is an ongoing issue
between Japan and China, between Japan and South Korea.
Memories are very long in Asia and this is something that, we
would like to see these historical issues resolved. We think,
though, that with respect, for example, to Japan and South
Korea, these are two democracies, two allies of ours, and we
think they ought to be able to solve this without advice from
us.
Senator Voinovich. So you are letting them work it out?
Ambassador Hill. We are letting them work it out.
Senator Voinovich. How much are the Chinese paying to the
United States--in terms of their relationship with us, one of
the things is that, how much influence do we really have with
them, and then the other side of it that I worry about because
I have been involved in normal trade relations--not normal
trade relations, but intellectual property rights violations
and the fixing of their currency, this concept that we need
them so badly on North Korea that we may be compromising in
terms of some of the other issues that are very important to
the United States. Could you comment on that?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think we have a very broad, very
robust agenda with the Chinese, which as you intimate includes
a lot of issues that are in the economic area. Certainly from
our vantage point or from my vantage point, I do not see any
effort to go slow in those areas so that we can get more from
them in the North Korean issue.
We are not asking China to do anything in North Korea that
we do not think is in their interests to do. Clearly, as I
mentioned earlier, to have North Korea develop nuclear weapons
is a serious problem for us all, especially for China and for
the region. So I would say that the Chinese very much value our
relationship, and what we are trying to do is broaden that
relationship, that we are not just dealing with China on an
issue of North Korea and then the economic issues, but we are
engaged with China on a lot of issues around the world. We are
talking to them about problems in Africa, we are talking to
them about Burma, we are talking to them about a lot of issues.
So I think the Chinese want to work with us on that, and
they understand the depth of our concerns on North Korea. We
have made it abundantly clear that we have got to solve this
one. We do not just have to sit around and talk about this one.
We need to solve it.
So I think they are incentivized on North Korea. I think
what we need to understand is--and I hate using this word
because I sound like a typical State Department person, but it
is complex. It does go back years. I think we need to
understand the relationships with China and relationships with
North Korea. There are a lot of them. So changing Chinese
policy on North Korea is not just going to be the result of one
meeting where they slap the side of their head with the palm of
their hand and say: Okay, now we get it; we will change. It
does not work that way. We need to work with them on this.
Senator Voinovich. Do you think that they have got some
tools in their box that they still have not used to restrain
North Korea's nuclear ambitions and the erratic behavior?
Ambassador Hill. I would like to believe that they do.
Again, we do not tell them what to do, tell them how to do it.
But we make clear to them that ultimately we need results in
this area.
Senator Voinovich. You mentioned the long relationship and
how difficult it is to change that relationship. But has their
concern about the destabilized North Korea and the possibility
that they would get a tremendous number of people coming into
China had anything to do with their being a little bit
reluctant maybe to push as hard as they should?
Ambassador Hill. I agree that is one of the issues. But
frankly, I do not think the current situation is all that
stable, either. While I am sympathetic to the idea that they
are concerned about 20 million people streaming over the Yalu
River, I think they should also be concerned, maybe more
concerned, about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
So it is one of the issues, but I think that problem really
can be controlled and, frankly, I think the issue of weapons of
mass destruction is a much more destabilizing problem than the
so-called collapse of North Korea scenario. What we have made--
what we have also made clear to the Chinese is we are not
interested in taking some kind of strategic advantage from some
change in political relationships in the Korean Peninsula.
We want to work with China. We understand their security
concerns and we are not interested in taking advantage.
Senator Voinovich. Has the issue of Taiwan come into these
talks at all, or negotiations?
Ambassador Hill. No. Taiwan does not come up directly in
the context of these negotiations or in the sense of any kind
of tradeoffs of any sort. China knows our position on Taiwan
and we know their position.
Senator Voinovich. The last thing I would like to say is I
think that we have been very fortunate that we have had
responsible people in the United Nations, in the Security
Council. I have had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Oshima,
Kenzo Oshima, who I was very impressed with, and I think that
we should pat the Japanese on the back in terms of their being
willing to come to the table and compromise, because they are
the ones that really have the most at stake immediately. I
think that their cooperation and help should be recognized by
all of us and we ought to let them know we are appreciative of
it, and I think it underscores the fact that now that
resolution is passed we are going to do everything we can to
make sure that the North Koreans comply with it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
very important hearing. Secretary Hill, thanks to you for
joining us today. I want to add my voice to the others in
thanking you for your continued service in our Government. I
know that you are working on these issues day in and day out
and I appreciate your professionalism and your dedication.
I also appreciate the work that the men and women in the
State Department are doing, both here and throughout the world,
and I hope you pass on this committee's appreciation for their
efforts in some of our country's most difficult tasks.
I think we all agree that North Korea remains one of the
greatest challenges to our country's foreign and national
security policy. It is clear that approaches to date have not
been successful. It is also clear that we are all interested in
contributing to an approach that will work.
That said, Mr. Secretary, I remain concerned that our
policy in North Korea has been dormant for too long. It appears
to me and others that we have been waiting on the sidelines,
hoping, almost passively, that conditions will turn our way. We
have been distracted by Iraq, so much so that it took North
Korea's launch of seven missiles before we got fully engaged
again.
North Korea should be at or near the top of our foreign
policy agenda. We need to figure out a way to get North Korea
back into the international fold. Unfortunately, we cannot do
that if we signal that our true desires are regime change and
if we refuse to consider other options.
This is not really a partisan issue as much as a true
policy challenge. While some of us may differ in approach, we
are all interested in learning about what the United States
Government and the international community can do to get North
Korea to change its behavior. And I am glad you are here to
shed some light on that, and I have been listening to some of
the questions you have already answered.
I would like to follow up on the chairman's comments and
questions and talk a little bit in more detail about direct and
formal diplomatic engagement with North Korea. What are, if
any, the negative aspects of opening a direct and formal
diplomatic dialog with North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. Well, we are prepared to have a direct
formal diplomatic dialog in the context of the Six Party Talks.
That is, we are not prepared to improve our relations with
North Korea or to have this direct dialog while they are
boycotting the Six Party Talks, because we believe that at the
end of the day if this problem of nuclear weapons, of weapons
of mass destruction, is going to be resolved, it is going to
have to be resolved in the Six Party process. If they are
prepared to do that, we are prepared to sit down formally,
bilaterally, and work through our bilateral issues, which
include human rights concerns and other issues as well.
So we are--so if they are back in the talks and if they are
prepared to implement the September statement, one of the
provisions is to have a bilateral process and we will implement
that. We are prepared to implement every word in that
agreement.
Now, to begin this process while they are boycotting the
Six Party process is really to run the risk that they would
essentially render the Six Party process moot and that they
would try to resolve this just with the United States. In fact,
as the missile launches confirmed, this is not just a threat to
the United States. It is a threat to the region.
Senator Feingold. So your main concern that I have heard
here about direct talks is that it would undermine the Six
Party Talks?
Ambassador Hill. If it is done in the context where they
are boycotting the Six Party Talks, yes.
Senator Feingold. Say a little bit more about--could you
just speculate a bit about what positive outcomes could come
from direct engagement with North Korea? I understand the
negative is that it could undermine the broader talks, which
sounds like you say that without the Six Party Talks it will
not work. But are there some positives that could come out of
directly engaging with North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. You mean while they are boycotting the Six
Party Talks?
Senator Feingold. Yes. I just want you to speculate on
that.
Ambassador Hill. I do not believe there are. Because the
positives could be, let us say, to put aside misunderstandings.
But we have channels for getting information to them. For
example, on the missile launches we went directly to them
through their operation in New York. So I do not think it is a
problem of misunderstanding.
Then what I would like to emphasize is last summer in
Beijing during the Six Party process I met with them numerous
times. At one point I tried to keep track of that, and I met
with the North Korean delegation almost as many times as I met
with the South Korean delegation and the Japanese delegation. I
met with them in formal meeting rooms in the actual convention
center at the Diaoyutai Complex. I invited my colleague, my
North Korean colleague, to private dinners outside the complex.
He invited me.
Senator Feingold. This was all in the context of the Six
Party Talks, right?
Ambassador Hill. But these were--no one else was there. It
was just Americans and North Koreans. You recall even 2 years
ago Secretary Powell met with his North Korean counterpart at
the ASEAN meeting.
We have had a number, we have had numerous bilateral
meetings. So I do not think the problem is having another
bilateral meeting. I think the problem is that they have not
made the decision to implement the September agreement, because
if they are prepared to implement that we are prepared to sit
down with them bilaterally and go through any range of issues.
So my concern is, I just do not think this is really the
problem.
Senator Feingold. I understand that. But what it sounds to
me is that if they refuse to return to the Six Party Talks for
the next 2 years and continue to build weapons, the most we
will do are these sort of informal contacts or talking with
them when they basically shoot off some missiles. It sounds
like we are going to be at a pretty low level of contact with
them. Is that a likelihood?
Ambassador Hill. Well, if they refuse to return to the Six
Party Talks it is because they do not want to denuclearize, and
when they do not want to--it is not like they are going to
denuclearize if they meet with us after the Six Party. They are
not telling us that if we do away with the Six Party Talks they
will denuclearize. On the contrary, they have said they support
the Six Party Talks.
So the fact they are not going there means that they are
not interested in fulfilling the things that we want to be
fulfilled. So I am not sure what it is we are supposed to talk
to them about.
Senator Feingold. How do you know that, though, given how
difficult they are to understand?
Ambassador Hill. I have met with them many times. I have
talked to them. I have sat down with them. There is no
indication whatsoever that they are interested in pursuing
this.
Senator Feingold. I know you are not in charge of the Iran
policy, but I would like to talk a little bit about how we are
handling the nuclear standoff with Iran and what it means for
North Korea. In your opinion, are there any ramifications or
lessons or impacts that our current policy on Iran is having on
North Korea? Is North Korea watching our policy in Iraq and
Iran and other places, and in your mind what is it sort of
taking from that?
Ambassador Hill. Well, I think the North Koreans are
watching that policy. They have watched our India policy, for
example. They do read the newspapers. So I think what we have
done in Iran we have already done in North Korea. We have a
multilateral approach in North Korea where we are prepared to
deal with them bilaterally in the multilateral approach.
So I am not sure there is anything there that is happening
in Iran that they feel that they, that the North Koreans feel
they do not already have. The only other issue is they seem to
have this notion that because they are further along in
developing weapons of mass destruction that somehow they should
get more from us. And I am not sure we can really buy into
that, buy into that logic.
So while the situation, while it does come up, I think they
understand what the real issues are on the table.
Senator Feingold. In your opinion are there any sort of red
lines that if North Korea crossed them China, Russia, and South
Korea would agree to cut off all aid and trade to the regime?
Ambassador Hill. It is of course hard to say in advance. I
think a North Korean nuclear test, which would be a real
confirmation of a successful nuclear program, where they have
taken the plutonium that we know that they have had and in
effect weaponized it, I think that test would be regarded with
extreme seriousness by these partners, extreme seriousness. So
while I cannot identify precisely what they would do, I can
assure you they would not be indifferent.
Senator Feingold. What then in your opinion is likely to be
Kim Jong-Il's next move? Is there a chance that he will try to
launch another series of missiles or, worse, as you just
alluded to, conduct a nuclear test? What is your guess?
Ambassador Hill. Well, predicting his behavior is a bit of
an occupational hazard. But I think we need to be prepared for
the idea that he will want to show what is in his view more and
more strength. I think the problem is that the more he does
this kind of thing the more he loses sympathy. I mean, he does
not have any support, but he does have some sympathy among some
of the Six Party partners.
Frankly, I think to the extent there was any reservoir of
goodwill toward the North Korean regime, I think that reservoir
is fast becoming empty, and I think actions of that kind, which
are the sort of actions that he takes, would be inclined to
drain it still further.
I would like to see him find a way to get back to the Six
Party process. It is clearly the way to go and we are certainly
on the lookout for signs that he is prepared to do that. But I
think in that regard this is probably not a good week.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. I pass to Senator Murkowski.
The Chairman. Very well. Senator Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Alexander.
Secretary Hill, thank you for your time this morning. Thank
you for all that you are doing, obviously quite tireless in
your efforts as we try to deal with North Korea. It has been
interesting sitting through your testimony this morning. You
have been asked to speculate about a lot of things: What is Kim
Jong-Il going to do next? Why did he do it? That was my
question to you this morning: Why did he--why did he launch?
The Chinese have been telling him no. Everyone has been
telling him no. Why did he do it? I think when those missiles
were launched on the Fourth of July, we here in this country
took it very personally, that you would send these our way on
our Independence Day.
But you indicated in your testimony earlier, I think you
said, you used the phrase ``there was a missile there for
everybody.'' So it was not necessarily--and I am speculating
now--it was not necessarily just directed at the United States
to send us a message, but to the Japanese, to South Korea, to
China, to the neighborhood in general, everyone within
proximity, and I think to the world.
I am going to be leaving this hearing this morning not any
more entirely sure why he did it. But I think that is part of
our problem. We cannot understand the actions, if you will, of
Kim Jong-Il and why he does what he does. That makes your job
as the chief negotiator that much more difficult.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you. I would add one other
explanation, which is domestic. I suspect that he has elements
in the leadership, perhaps in the military, that feels they
need to somehow show their own strength and perhaps to some
extent that was another reason.
From the point of view of diplomacy, from the point of view
of getting North Korea's way in the world, it makes no sense. I
mean, he has really galvanized unity against him, and I think
the Security Council resolution, which he probably did not
predict, a unified resolution of that kind that included China
using a word like ``condemns,'' very strong word, I suspect he
miscalculated.
So often when someone miscalculates it is kind of difficult
to understand their reasoning because clearly their reasoning
was flawed.
Senator Murkowski. Hopefully, he understands that it was
flawed as well.
Nobody has really discussed the upcoming ASEAN Regional
Forum that is going to be held in Malaysia next week. That is
being viewed by many as our first opportunity to kind of have
others engaged with the Six Party Talks to come together and
put the pressures that will be needed to have North Korea come
in and talk. I know that Secretary Rice is hoping to meet with
the North Korea Foreign Minister. I have read reports that the
prognosis for this and whether or not we are going to achieve
any success is perhaps not very optimistic at this point.
I would ask your opinion as to whether you think we are
going to have any success in Malaysia. I had a meeting with the
foreign minister from Thailand and I know he met with Secretary
Rice. He offered his assistance as well. How can we utilize
others to kind of bring North Korea around? So if you can
address what we can expect in the next couple weeks?
Ambassador Hill. I think it is very important for North
Korea not to get mixed messages. Again, there will be people
with their own views of how to solve this, but I think the
Security Council really gives an excellent template to how
people should think about this issue. So the ASEAN meeting is a
first opportunity really to get together with the Six Party
countries, but also with countries in the broader Asia Pacific
region, to deal with what is truly a threat to security in the
overall region.
Indonesia for example, like Thailand, has been very
interested in trying to use its good offices to solve this. So
we look forward to talking to the Indonesians about how they
see the situation. As the chairman mentioned, the Indonesians
have a special envoy to North Korea who recently went there.
It was interesting that Indonesian President Yudhoyono
postponed his visit to North Korea because he did not want the
visit to appear to be a mixed signal. But you are quite correct
that a number of these Asian countries are very concerned about
this, because it does affect the overall prospects in the
region.
But let me just say one other thing about the meeting in
Kuala Lumpur. We will look at this as an opportunity to consult
with partners on the way forward in North Korea undoubtedly,
but we also look at it as an opportunity to work with our ASEAN
countries on furthering Asian integration and on really
strengthening the bonds between the United States and these
other Asian countries. We have a great interest in the success
of ASEAN. We have a great interest in the success of the
broader region in Asia, and we cannot allow North Korea,
difficult problem that it is, to crowd out or to drown out
these other issues.
So I know Secretary Rice looks forward to having good
discussions with her Malaysian hosts, but also other countries
from Southeast Asia. So it is going to be a very, very busy
agenda. Indeed, as you know, Secretary Rice has a lot on her
plate right now, especially with this very difficult situation
in the Middle East. I will be going to ASEAN a couple days
earlier, so I will be hitting the road again this Sunday to get
moving on this.
So we look at ASEAN or these meetings in Kuala Lumpur
really as a very strong way where the United States can work
with all of our Asian partners.
Senator Murkowski. There was an article in the Wall Street
Journal a couple weeks ago using the terminology ``the threat
perception gap'' as it relates to North Korea and how other,
the surrounding nations, South Korea, Japan, China, view, have
viewed, and currently view North Korea. It was an interesting
observation about what they called the disconnect between how
the United States views the threat of North Korea and how South
Korea, who has been sitting literally in the crosshairs of
North Korea as the neighboring country for 50 years, and a
recognition that there is more at stake than just being within
missile range from South Korea's perspective.
The concern may be that--and this is the reference in the
article--that it is not the nuclear capability or the missiles
themselves, but the South Koreans fear a United States
overreaction could drive Pyongyang further into the Chinese
camp, thus ruling out any reunification. Can you kind of speak
to that dynamic that we are dealing with with South Korea?
Obviously they are very concerned about North Korea's actions,
but they have other issues that they are intimately tied with
with their neighbor to the north.
Ambassador Hill. I think you are absolutely right. North
Korea's behavior has often been described as reckless,
including by myself. One of the reasons it is reckless is the
effect it has on the overall region. Clearly it could ignite an
arms race and that is in no one's interest.
South Korea does have a very special relationship to North
Korea. You cannot discount 2,000 years of history. So when
South Korea looks at North Korea, no one really knows the
future. I mean, whether there could be a unified state at some
point or some other. No one really knows the political
arrangements. But what the South Koreans want is that the
political arrangements on the Korean Peninsula should be
determined by the Korean people.
So there is concern in South Korea about the idea that
North Korea's economy could become more and more organically
linked to China and that if South Korea is not present that
North Korea could sort of look more and more like something
that is really more a part of China. So that issue does come
up.
But I hasten to add that the South Koreans value their
relationship with China, so they do not want to make this some
sort of major wedge issue with China. They want to work with
China. South Korea knows the importance of China to the region.
China wants to work with South Korea, but people do think about
these sorts of things.
So when we look at sometimes what South Korea is doing in
North Korea--and I know from the point of view of when we are
here in Washington and we look at this, we wonder why they are
doing it. There are different reasons why they are doing it,
some of which are not readily apparent to us. So I think when
one approaches these issues one does have to approach them with
a certain respect for the thousands of years of history that
have gone on before them, and it behooves us all to think these
through a little.
Senator Murkowski. I appreciate that.
I am going to ask you to engage in just one more question
of speculation. Is North Korea perhaps trying to wait out the
Bush administration to see if they get something better in the
next round?
Ambassador Hill. Well, there has been speculation about
that. I like to think that from the United States' political
side that they have heard messages from both our main political
parties that make it clear to them that they should not think
that they can get a better deal.
I must tell you, I am less concerned about their thinking
that they are going to get a better deal from someone than I am
concerned about whether they really want a deal in the first
place. You know, these nuclear programs, this effort to acquire
nuclear weapons, this did not just start in this administration
or in the Clinton administration. This goes way back. So I am
concerned about that.
I mean, our Six Party process, I do believe, is the right
format. But it does not offer any refuge for those in need of
instant gratification. That is, you really have to work this
through and, dare I say it, accept some of the advice I get
from the Chinese to be patient. But I really think it is the
right process.
Senator Murkowski. We appreciate all your good work and I
thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Alexander.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I only have one question. The United States is helping
Japan today, I believe, install missiles on land and in the sea
to defend against--that might intercept missiles coming in; is
that correct?
Ambassador Hill. I think some of these missile systems were
envisioned some months ago, so one has to be a little careful
with the time lines. But certainly we work carefully with the
Japanese on these kinds of defensive systems, yes.
Senator Alexander. Well, my larger point is that the
nuclearization of North Korea has consequences beyond the
immediate consequences. It seems to me that we are pretty good
in Washington at seeing the immediate consequence of our
actions. If we decide that we would like to topple Saddam
Hussein, we can imagine that and we can do it. We are not as
good at imagining what might come next.
As we think about North Korea's nuclear plans, I think of
China in that respect. China is a distinguished country with a
long history and a long memory, and you said they counsel
patience. But I wonder how much of your diplomacy has to do
with helping China think about what steps two, three, and four
are of the consequences of a nuclear-armed North Korea, and if
so what are some of those steps?
If we were to look ahead and to try to explain to China, if
North Korea continues and were to acquire nuclear weapons and
arm its missiles with those, what would the consequences be
that China should think about that affect China over the next
5, 10, 15 years?
Ambassador Hill. Well, what I often try to do with the
Chinese--and look, I want to be very clear. I am not any
smarter than they are. I mean, I do not give them some special
insights that they were not able to come up with on their own.
They have some very talented people across the table.
But I do try to focus them on one resounding fact, which is
the United States one way or the other is not going to accept
North Korea with weapons of mass destruction. We are just not
going to accept it. The Chinese say they are not going to
accept it either, and I say to them: Fine, and that is a good
beginning because we have a common outlook.
In not accepting it, though, I think we need to make,
continue to make clear to the Chinese, that the current
situation is not in equilibrium. This is not going to hold.
That is, this is not stable, to have this country, North Korea,
continuing to develop these things, and it is not stable for
some of the reasons that you alluded to. It is beginning to
cause a certain arms race in the region. It is beginning to
cause certain tensions within the region, as we have seen
between South Korea and Japan.
So in short, in bureaucracy you often have problems that if
you leave them alone, lo and behold, they get better. This is
not one of these problems that is going to get better if we
leave it alone. We have really got to be engaged in it and
really work it.
So I do try to kind of lay out to the Chinese my views of
what could happen if we work this and the bad things that could
happen if we try to pretend this issue is getting better on its
own. China has a view that somehow in the long run North Korea
will develop its economy and that as they develop and as they
interact with the world they will realize they do not need the
weapons. I do not see that happening right now.
Senator Alexander. Does China not worry about the
possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan?
Ambassador Hill. They do. They do, and I think, frankly
speaking, I think the North Korean missile launch brought some
of these concerns about Japan, which by the way are concerns
that we do not necessarily share, but certainly it brought some
of these concerns that the Chinese have into sharper focus.
My effort in Beijing was to keep focusing the Chinese on
the culprit here, which is North Korea, not Japan.
Senator Alexander. Well, why would China not think that at
least a rearmed Japan would not be the inevitable consequence
of a nuclear-armed North Korea?
Ambassador Hill. I think they--I think they understand that
interplay. I think the Chinese believe that the North Koreans
need to be encouraged to join the international community and
they need to see the value of being a member of the
international community, and when these sort of megatrends
finally set in that somehow North Korea will realize that these
nuclear weapons do not have a role to play in that and will
therefore want to give up the nuclear weapons.
I do not believe that those are time lines that we can
necessarily live with, and I think in the mean time we have
these issues as you describe, with an arms race in northeast
Asia.
Senator Alexander. What are the possibilities that a
nuclear-armed North Korea would produce a nuclear-armed South
Korea?
Ambassador Hill. I think how the South Koreans regard their
own defense is, like in Japan, something that they discuss.
They discuss it quietly now, but I think we could look ahead to
a very bad scenario where North Korea develops nuclear weapons,
Japan has to look very hard at that, and South Korea will also
look hard at that. So I think there is a lot at stake, which is
why I think we have got to stick with this until we solve it.
Senator Alexander. Well, I do not disagree with that. It
seems to me that in this case that it is hard for me to see--
China is a very thoughtful and careful-thinking country about
its foreign policy and it would seem to me that the prospect of
a rearmed or even nuclear-armed Japan and a nuclear-armed South
Korea--it is hard for me to see how in any set of circumstances
that is in the interest of China. It also seems to me it is
inevitable if North Korea has nuclear arms.
Ambassador Hill. I think the Chinese support for a U.N.
Security Council resolution condemning the North Koreans is an
indication that China is kind of coming around in its thinking.
China has traditionally had concerns about North Korean
stability. They also have their own concerns that they have had
a longstanding relationship with North Korea, to change that
relationship could involve a lot of changes within
relationships, be their political, economic relationships with
North Korea. But also, it can also feed back into China's own
internal issues.
So China does not change the policy lightly. But I think
the more it sees of what is going on, that is the very negative
trends that we outlined to them and that they in their very
sober moments realize are happening, I think we can expect to
gain more support, and I'd like to think this Security Council
resolution is an indication of that. For me, I take an
optimistic note from it that we should continue to work on this
issue with China.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Alexander.
Yes, one more question.
Senator Dodd. Just one more. I realize we are holding
things up, but I gather you--well, I will not put words in your
mouth, but you seem less than optimistic about the possibility
of some sort of an arrangement or deal here with North Korea,
with all of us trying to wrestle with what their intentions
are, what their goals are. I wonder if you might just go back
to thinking about the Agreed Framework, where for 8 years
anyway the plutonium program was frozen in North Korea. Now,
there was obviously the problem in 2002 with Assistant
Secretary Kelly. We discovered the enriched uranium program
that they had, they argued was not part of the Agreed
Framework, we obviously argued it was, and so things broke
down.
But what is the problem with going back and trying to
recreate the conditions in 1994 that produced the Agreed
Framework? And is there not a possibility there that there is a
deal? If there was something that produced that kind of deal,
albeit not perfect and there were problems, clearly problems in
2000-2001, there were certainly some advantages North Korea saw
in 1994 that caused them to freeze the plutonium program, which
was clearly in our interest and the interest of those who want
to see a disarmed North Korea.
Ambassador Hill. Well, my concern has always been that if
we go in the direction of a freeze we will never get at the
root of the problem. They have produced some plutonium. We need
the kind of transparency from the North Koreans that they never
offered us in that context. We need to be able to get all of
this fissionable material.
I am concerned if we go the route of the freeze we will
never get at the root of the problem.
Senator Dodd. Put aside the freeze for a second. What are
the conditions that produced that agreement? You can change
the----
Ambassador Hill. It was a different time in history, but it
involved a lot of tough negotiation and they ended up with this
Agreed Framework, which included providing these rather
expensive so-called light water reactors, that is providing----
Senator Dodd. We never provided them, really, did we?
Ambassador Hill. No, it took 10 years to--we set up a
bureaucracy for dealing with them.
Senator Dodd. In your view could that have been a problem
and why this thing might have failed, because the light water
reactors were never forthcoming?
Ambassador Hill. My understanding of the negotiating
history of this is the real failure had to do with the fact
that we uncovered evidence that North Korea was making
clandestine purchases of HEU, highly enriched uranium,
equipment, and of course that type of equipment, that is the
sort of nightmare breakout scenario where they could produce a
lot more than just a few kilograms of plutonium.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Secretary Hill, I join my colleagues in their commendation
of you for the extraordinary work you do on behalf of our
country and peace in the area. We wish you every continuing
success. We thank you for spending this time with us today
responding in so forthcoming a way to all of our questions.
Thank you.
Ambassador Hill. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The chair would like to call now our
distinguished second panel of the morning.
[Pause.]
Our second panel will include the Honorable Arnold Kanter,
Principal Member of the Scowcroft Group in Washington, DC; and
the Honorable Morton Abramowitz, a Senior Fellow with the
Century Foundation in Washington, DC.
May I ask that there be order now in the committee room so
that we may proceed with the testimony of these distinguished
witnesses. I will call upon you in the order that you were
introduced. First of all, Dr. Kanter, would you please proceed
with your testimony. Your statement and that of Ambassador
Abramowitz will be placed in the record in full and you may
proceed in any way that you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. ARNOLD KANTER, PRINCIPAL MEMBER, THE
SCOWCROFT GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kanter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear today to provide my assessment of the
recent North Korean missile launches and their implications for
United States policy. I would like to note at the outset that I
am here today in a personal capacity and I do not represent
anyone's views with the possible exception of my own.
Let me start by stating my two principal conclusions.
First, while undeniably provocative, the military threat posed
by the North Korean missiles depends far less on the missiles
themselves than on whether they are armed with nuclear weapons.
Or to put the matter a different way, the central security
issue has been, is, and remains whether North Korea has a
nuclear program, and we should not allow their missile launches
to divert or dilute our attention from that central issue. It
follows that our responses, including our military responses,
to this North Korean provocation should be guided accordingly.
My second point is that the North Korean missile launches
have produced effects that paradoxically have been positive, I
repeat, positive, from the perspective of United States
diplomatic and security objectives. I think the challenge that
we face is to seize and exploit the opportunity that the North
Koreans have unintentionally created for us.
Let me explain how I have reached these conclusions. As we
have already heard this morning, no one is quite sure what Kim
Jong-Il had in mind with these missile launches. If one of the
things that he had in mind was to get our attention, then that
certainly worked. But it worked in a way that almost surely was
unintended and unsought by Pyongyang. Indeed, it is hard to
avoid the conclusion that, whatever the North Korean plan may
have been, it has backfired on them and it has produced results
that serve our interests much more than it serves theirs.
North Korea's open defiance of widespread calls not to
launch the missiles has produced near-universal condemnation by
the international community and has left North Korea even more
isolated diplomatically. A closely related result is that those
missile launches have had a commendable unifying effect on our
negotiating partners in the Six Party Talks, and Saturday's
U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea was a critical
test of this renewed unity of purpose and I think the test was
passed.
The fact that the key members of the Six Party Talks were
able to come together to pass unanimously not only a tough
resolution, but I think it is worth emphasizing here a tough
binding resolution, demonstrated that these members could and
would submerge their differences over priorities, over tactics,
and so forth to come together and stay focused on the North
Korean threat.
So I think that the Saturday vote was enormously important.
Having said that, I need to quickly add that I think this
renewed unity of purpose could prove to be quite fragile, and
its fragility could well be tested and could well be tested
soon. If the North Koreans follow through on their threats to
conduct more missile launches, then the differences that were
compromised among Security Council members in the July 15
resolution could well re-emerge.
Another test will be how the U.N. member states now proceed
to implement the resolution. If we, the Japanese, whomever,
rush to implement its provisions in such an expansive way that
China, South Korea, and Russia believe that the result amounts
to and is intended to amount to de facto regime-threatening
economic sanctions, then I think the unity that was forged on
Saturday could well erode and ultimately could vaporize.
In many ways, the most important result of the missile
launches has been to move North Korea off the back burner and
back onto the front page. It has not only produced that result;
simultaneously, these launches have created a more favorable
environment by fueling a broadly negative international
perception of North Korea as an irresponsible, reckless actor.
Now, I know that the committee fully appreciates not only
the importance but also the urgency of the North Korea issue
and I do not propose to replow that ground. I also share the
skepticism, dare I say deep skepticism, that many have about
whether there exists any plausible set of security, economic,
and political inducements that will ultimately persuade North
Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions.
But, that said, it is really hard not to be struck by the
fact that while we have been insisting that Pyongyang needs to
make a strategic choice, a choice between nuclear weapons and
becoming a prosperous and secure member of the international
community, the reality is that the North Koreans face few if
any incentives to make what will be a very hard choice, and
moreover they face few if any penalties for refusing to choose.
Instead, North Korea continues to have it both ways, a
little bit like my mother. They continue to produce material
for nuclear weapons and at the same time they continue to
receive economic assistance and investment, particularly from
China and South Korea.
I think their missile launches and the ensuing
international response have put us in a better position to make
North Korea make that choice. Now, I think the outlines of what
is required to exploit this opportunity are familiar. On the
one hand, North Korea needs to be persuaded that it will pay a
steadily increasing price for its continued defiance, and I
think that the public embarrassment that Pyongyang has caused
both Beijing and Seoul increased the chances that they will now
be more willing to make clear to North Korea that its continued
stonewalling will not be cost-free.
On the other hand, the United States not only needs to
persuade North Korea that we are serious about delivering on
our promises and commitments in the September 19 statement; in
some ways as important or more important, we also need to
persuade our negotiating partners about our good faith so that
they will use their leverage on Pyongyang to get it to return
to the talks and get it to negotiate seriously.
How then should the United States proceed? I believe there
are two principal and closely related tasks. First, we need to
seize this moment and seize the initiative. Second and equally
important, we need to work hard to maintain the current unity
of purpose about North Korea that has emerged. Among other
things, I think this means removing, working to remove
obstacles to resumption of the Six Party Talks. These are not
obstacles so much as they are North Korean excuses and
acceptance by others of North Korean excuses for refusing to
return to the talks.
In this connection, I think that the issue of direct United
States-North Korean talks is or at least ought to be a red
herring and we ought to take it off the table, not only to deny
the North Koreans the excuse but also to deny needless
friction, to avoid needless friction among the five, and I
think a clear reiteration and an appropriately flexible
interpretation of what is the current United States position,
one that you heard Ambassador Hill give this morning, namely
that it is prepared to engage with North Korea bilaterally in
the context of the Six Party process, ought to do the trick.
The Treasury Department's investigation of money-laundering
by the Banco Delta Asia in Macao is a more difficult problem.
Some may wish the United States had not decided to move against
the Macao bank, but we have and, having done so, we should
pursue the matter as a tightly-focused investigation and one
that is completed as expeditiously as possible. We need to do
this both to rebut accusations by Pyongyang and to assuage
concerns among our Six Party partners that this investigation
really is a de facto set of economic sanctions against North
Korea that we intend to remain in place indefinitely.
My bottom line is simple: The stars are in better alignment
than they have been for a long time and the challenge for U.S.
policy is how best to capitalize on the opportunity that has
been presented.
Let me close by expressing my appreciation again for this
opportunity to present my views to the committee. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kanter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Arnold Kanter, Principal Member, The
Snowcroft Group, Washington, DC
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee today
to provide my assessment of the recent North Korean missile launches
and their implications for Unites States policy options with respect to
North Korea. I would like to note for the record that I am appearing in
a personal capacity, and that the views I am expressing are my own.
I have two principal points:
First, while undeniably provocative, the military threat
posed by North Korean missiles depends far less on the missiles
themselves than on whether they are armed with nuclear weapons.
Put differently, the central security issue is and remains the
North Korean nuclear program, and we should not allow their
missile launches to divert or dilute our attention from that
central issue. Our responses, including our military responses,
to this North Korean provocation should be guided accordingly.
Second, the North Korean missile launches have produced
effects that paradoxically have been largely positive from the
perspective of United States security and diplomatic
objectives. The challenge we face is to seize and exploit the
opportunity that the North Koreans have unintentionally
created.
Let me explain how and why I have reached these conclusions.
As with almost everything that North Korea does, its motives for
launching multiple missiles on July 4 are, at best, unclear. The
military results have been mixed. Although the North Koreans may have
acquired useful data from the apparent failure of Taipodong 2, the
missile's destruction shortly into its flight must have been
embarrassing to Pyongyang, and will do nothing to increase the
confidence of North Korea's would-be missile customers in the product
that Pyongyang is marketing. That said, the North Koreans did
demonstrate a capability to do multiple launches in a relatively short
period of time. In doing so, they also underscored their ability to
threaten Japan and South Korea--including the United States military
forces and nationals in those countries--as well as China--with
ballistic missiles. But I conclude that the direct and immediate
significance of the North Korean missile launches lies less in their
military effects than in their political effects, both intended and
unintended.
The political effects of the North Korean missile launches likewise
have been mixed. If they were designed to get attention, it certainly
worked, but almost surely in a way that was unintended and unsought by
Pyongyang. (As a corollary, I would note that we should be careful
neither to give too much credit to Pyongyang's ability to play a weak
hand, nor be too sanguine about its ability to avoid serious
miscalculations.) Indeed, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that
whatever the North Korean plan may have been, it has backfired on them
and has produced results that serve our interests.
North Korea's open defiance of widespread calls not to launch the
missiles produced near-universal condemnation by the international
community, and left it even more isolated diplomatically. China and
South Korea have been particularly embarrassed. As a result, they
probably are less inclined and--in terms of their own politics--
probably less able to provide the support and economic assistance to
Pyongyang that, intentionally or not, have facilitated North Korea's
stonewalling. Closely related, the North Korean missile launches have
had a commendable unifying effect on our negotiating partners in the
Six Party Talks by narrowing differences between the United States and
Japan on the one hand, and China and South Korea on the other, and by
highlighting that it is North Korea, not the United States, that is the
problem and obstacle.
Saturday's U.N. Security Council resolution on North Korea was a
critical test of this renewed unity of purpose. A Chinese veto of the
Japanese resolution, and/or a United States veto of the Chinese-Russian
resolution would have been a huge self-inflicted wound. Conversely, the
fact that key members of the Six Party Talks were able to come together
to pass unanimously a tough, binding resolution not only underscored
Pyongyang's intensified isolation, but also demonstrated that they
could and would submerge their differences over priorities and tactics
to stay focused on the North Korean threat.
Make no mistake: This renewed unity of purpose is quite fragile.
Moreover, it could well be tested again--and in the near future. If the
North Koreans follow through on their threat to conduct more missile
launches, the U.N. Security Council will have no choice but to confront
the issue of how--and how forcefully--to respond. In that event, the
differences that were papered over and compromised in the July 15
resolution will reemerge. Another test will be how U.N. member states
now proceed to implement the resolution. If the United States and/or
Japan implements it in a way that China, South Korea, and perhaps
Russia regard as overly aggressive and expansive--amounting to broad-
gauged, regime-threatening economic sanctions by another name--then the
unity that was forged on Saturday could well erode and potentially
vaporize.
In some ways, the most important result of the missile launches has
been not only to move the North Korea issue off the back burner where
it has been pushed by other priorities and back onto the radars of
senior policy makers, but to have done so in a way that also has fueled
a broad-based and broadly negative international perception of North
Korea and its irresponsible behavior. The challenge for U.S. policy is
how best to capitalize on the opportunity that has been presented.
I know that everyone on the committee appreciates not only the
importance but also the urgency of the threat presented by the North
Korean nuclear issue, and I do not propose to replow that ground. I
also share the skepticism--even the deep skepticism--that many have
about whether there exists any plausible set of security, economic, and
political inducements that would persuade the North Koreans to abandon
their nuclear weapons ambitions.
That said, it is hard not to be struck by the fact that while we
insist that Pyongyang needs to make a strategic choice between nuclear
weapons and becoming a prosperous and secure member of the
international community, the North Koreans currently face few, if any,
incentives to make that very hard choice, and confront few, if any
penalties, for their failure to do so. Instead, they continue to have
it both ways: Continuing to produce material for nuclear weapons while,
at the same time, continuing to receive economic assistance and
investment, particularly from South Korea and China. Their missile
launches and the ensuing international response create a new and
potentially promising opportunity at least to make North Korea choose--
and make clear--the path it will take.
The outlines of what is required to exploit this opportunity are
familiar. On the one hand, North Korea needs to be persuaded that it
will pay a steadily increasing price for its continuing defiance. The
public embarrassment that Pyongyang has caused Beijing and Seoul
increases the chances that they will now be more willing to make clear
to North Korea that its continued stonewalling will not be cost-free,
while the July 15 U.N. Security Council resolution provides the
international authority for them to do so.
On the other hand, the United States not only needs to persuade
North Korea that we are serious about our commitment to a diplomatic
solution, and about delivering on our promises of security assurances
and economic benefits. In some ways more important, we also need to
persuade our negotiating partners about our own good faith so that they
will use their leverage on Pyongyang to get it to return to the talks
and negotiate seriously.
To outline these conditions is to make the current Perm 5 + Germany
approach on Iran an almost irresistible metaphor, and perhaps even a
model, for a strategy toward North Korea, including with respect to
some specifics, e.g., an analogous approach on the issue of civil
nuclear power.
How, then, should the United States proceed? I believe there are
two primary and closely related tasks. First, we need to seize the
moment and the initiative. Second, and equally important, we need to
work hard to maintain the current unity of purpose about North Korea
that has emerged. This means making clear that, as in the case of Iran,
we will be prepared to respond to North Korea's legitimate concerns
provided our partners are prepared to join with us in taking tougher
measures if North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear weapons
ambitions. It also means working to remove obstacles to a resumption of
the Six Party Talks or, more precisely, North Korean excuses for
refusing to return to the talks.
In this connection, let me note that the issue of direct United
States-North Korean talks is--or at least ought to be--a red herring,
and we should take it off the table in order both to deny the North
Koreans the excuse and to ensure that it is not a point of friction
among the five. A clear reiteration and an appropriately flexible
interpretation of the current United States position that it is
prepared to engage with North Korea bilaterally in the context of the
Six Party Talks should be sufficient.
The Treasury Department's investigation of money laundering by the
Banco Delta Asia in Macau is a more difficult problem. Some may wish
that the United States had not decided to move against the Macau bank,
but we have. And having done so, there are legitimate law enforcement
concerns that now need to be addressed, if only because it is hard to
argue that the United States should and will turn a blind eye to money
laundering and other serious currency violations in exchange for a
North Korean agreement to return to the Six Party Talks. However, the
United States should pursue the matter as a tightly focused
investigation, and one that is completed as expeditiously as possible,
so as to rebut accusations by Pyongyang--and to assuage concerns among
our Six Party partners--that these are de facto economic sanctions
against North Korea that will remain in place indefinitely.
Let me close by again expressing my appreciation for the
opportunity to present my views to the committee.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Kanter.
We would like to hear now from Ambassador Abramowitz.
STATEMENT OF HON. MORTON ABRAMOWITZ, SENIOR FELLOW, THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Abramowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
inviting me to discuss our North Korean problem with you today.
I have tried to step back, tried to shut out some of the
rhetoric, and focus my remarks on whether there is a diplomatic
approach that could achieve a principal American foreign policy
objective, the verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear
weapons capabilities. I personally doubt it, but I have tried
to see whether there is such an approach.
In light of time constraints, I am going to avoid
speculations on what has happened and proceed to my specific
suggestion, which is quite parallel to Dr. Kanter's.
While the six power forum is still a potentially useful
forum, there has been a lack of negotiating content in the Six
Party forum, in great part because of our profound strategic
differences in approach to North Korea with two countries who
have great stakes in this issue: China, North Korea's best
friend, and South Korea, our treaty ally.
China has not proven to be the deus ex machina who would
bring North Korea around by persuasion or economic pressures to
resolve the nuclear issue, as many predicted when the Six Party
Talks began. China has many common interests with the United
States on the Korean Peninsula, but it has also many other
interests at play in North Korea, and it has simply not been
willing to subordinate those to United States purposes.
The same has been true in spades of South Korea. This
differing view with China and South Korea on how to manage
North Korea has allowed Pyongyang to escape the consequences of
bad behavior and has made a negotiation with Pyongyang
difficult, if not impossible.
More specifically, both countries do not want North Korea
to have nuclear weapons. That is clear. But they do not share
the American sense of its primacy as an issue.
Second, they do not want to join in bringing concerted
pressures to bear on the North, fearing it would create serious
tensions and potentially affect the peace, stability, and
economy of the peninsula.
Third, while we freeze Pyongyang out except for some
humanitarian assistance, they provide sizable economic
assistance, effectively undermining any bargaining position.
Fourth, they believe that we have been insufficiently
forthcoming in our negotiating proposals to the North.
Finally, they want us to talk to the North in any forum,
bilateral, multilateral, and they of course do so themselves.
These differences have been mostly papered over by constant
to-ing and fro-ings and the usual diplomatic rhetoric. The
missile tests, however, have clearly had an impact on both
countries and throughout the region. China is embarrassed by
North Korean behavior and angry at its refusal to listen to
their entreaties. It also fears that North Korean action will
have damaging regional implications, notably causing Japan to
reassess its defense requirements.
China, surprisingly, even supported a U.N. Security Council
resolution censuring North Korea, although Beijing has refused
to adopt punitive measures at this time.
In South Korea there is ferment. The government's soft
approach to North Korea has been increasingly publicly
questioned and Seoul, also surprisingly, has suspended some
assistance pending North Korea's return to the Six Party Talks.
North Korea is unhappy with its isolation and is sputtering
badly. It could well isolate itself further by cutting off
projects with South Korea in an effort to scare Seoul into
becoming more accommodating.
These changing perspectives may open--I say may open--
greater opportunities for diplomacy that could bring closer
together the postures of the United States, China, and South
Korea toward North Korea, which is an indispensable requirement
for any serious negotiations with North Korea. The first part
of this diplomatic effort must be to try to bridge the gulf
with Beijing and Seoul. We might well want to wait to see if
there is any further thought from Pyongyang's isolation and its
unhappiness with China and South Korea. But it is an
appropriate time, although hardly the most politically
appropriate time in Washington, for the United States to craft
a new approach that might get real Chinese and South Korean
support to seriously test the proposition that there may be
some package of security assurances, political measures, and
economic bait that would cause North Korea to put aside its
nuclear ambitions and stop throwing missiles around.
That means going further than the statement of principles
agreed to last September by the six powers and putting forth a
negotiating position beyond expecting the North to accept a
Libyan-like approach to eliminating their nuclear weapons.
North Korea is profoundly absorbed with the United States.
Obviously, the elements of a negotiating package must be worked
out within the U.S. Government, which can be enormously
difficult, given the reported sharp differences within the
administration.
We would expect China and South Korea to make clear to
Pyongyang that a fair deal has been presented. We would try to
secure commitments from both countries on what they are
prepared to do if North Korea spurns such a new approach.
Whether their commitments would be worth anything if North
Korea balked is a risk we would have to take.
Departing even further from American political reality, I
believe that any new negotiating approach should be accompanied
by some dramatic measure to show our willingness to negotiate
not only to North Korea but to our two principal partners as
well, such as an offer to begin negotiations immediately to
establish diplomatic relations.
Mr. Kanter has talked about the problem of resuming
negotiations. I agree with his presentation.
In summary, let me say we have no credible red lines for
North Korea beyond their not attacking South Korea and Japan.
Nor as far as I can tell do we have any concerted policy for
dealing with North Korea as a state, besides talking to them
about nuclear weapons and perhaps modifying some conduct. Every
principal party to this issue is tired of the North Korean
regime. They all would like it to go somehow or other. But only
China and South Korea want to do something about that regime.
China has been trying to turn it into a mini-market China.
South Korea hopes by large-scale assistance to make them
dependent and transform that regime over time. That may all be
a triumph of hope over reality.
America's policy toward the North seems to be hold its nose
and wait for them to implode, which is possible, or for China
and South Korea to see the light and join us in putting serious
pressures on North Korea. Maybe we will witness some internal
cataclysm. I believe that is the way the North Korean state
will end. But waiting for that to happen is not a policy, and
that still leaves the nuclear issue, and we all know there is
no good option for the nuclear issue. Force would be violently
opposed by South Korea, which has the most to lose.
Pressure and isolation requires unity with China and South
Korea. Maybe North Korean actions will stimulate our friends to
further action. But U.N. resolutions guarantee nothing.
That leaves diplomacy and whether we want to try to
seriously pursue it. We should not forget that North Korea is
not an 800-pound gorilla. Far from it, it is a failed state
that is dependent very much on foreign handouts, which will one
day be on the trash can of history. But before that happens, it
can cause us great harm, and the United States should not be
afraid of dealing directly with Pyongyang on this issue.
Moreover, if we were to decide to try tougher measures and
even force, it makes good sense to put ourselves in the best
international position to do it by having gone the extra mile
diplomatically.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Abramowitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Morton Abramowitz, Senior Fellow, The
Century Foundation, Washington, DC
Thank you for inviting me to discuss our North Korean problem with
you today.
I will focus my remarks on whether there is a diplomatic approach
that could achieve a principal American foreign policy objective: The
verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities.
First, some unverifiable observations:
I believe there is little possibility of reaching an
agreement to eliminate North Korea's nuclear weapons capability
that would satisfy both the United States and North Korea, if
only because of the difficulties of verifying North Korea's
compliance. It is also hard to have much confidence in their
honoring any agreement.
North Korea may have badly miscalculated the reactions of
China and South Korea to their missile tests on July 4 and 5,
but I conclude at this point, given the international political
risks to them for such actions, that Pyongyang has probably
given up on the Bush administration as a negotiating partner
and considers it an unrelenting enemy. Senior leaders believe
they must have a serious nuclear delivery capability to give
them greater deterrence and a more powerful negotiating
position. They will wait for another American administration 2
years down the pike. This does not preclude their returning to
the Six Party Talks.
Some North Korea watchers suspect they may carry out a
nuclear weapon test so that any new administration will face an
unambiguous nuclear weapons capability. The latter is highly
conjectural. We are ignorant of the state of their weapons and
of the highest level political debates in Pyongyang. China,
their most important patron, would be strongly opposed to any
nuclear weapons test; although we do not know what China's red
line is on North Korea's nuclear weapons. We also may well be
witnessing some deterioration in their public relations. In
some quarters the missile firings are seen as also a message to
China.
This reading of North Korea may be wrong. However, we cannot
determine their willingness to negotiate a deal to eliminate their
nuclear weapons capabilities by intelligence analysis or intuition or
exhortation. It will have to be done--if at all--by diplomatic
exploration.
The American generated Six Party initiative to negotiate the
elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons has been useful in
bringing together the major powers of East Asia for the first time to
talk collectively about a major security issue in the area. It has
generated some sense of purpose at least among the five. But after 3
years, the talks have produced one joint statement of principles; a
useful document, but only a first step.
There has been a lack of negotiating content in the Six Party
forum, in great part because of our profound strategic difference in
approach to North Korea with two countries who have great stakes in
this issue--China, North Korea's ``best friend,'' and South Korea, our
treaty ally. China has not proven to be the deus ex machina who would
bring North Korea around by persuasion or economic pressures to resolve
the nuclear issue as many predicted when the Six Party Talks began.
China has many common interests with the United States on the Korean
peninsula, but it also has many other interests at play in North Korea
and has not been willing to subordinate those to United States'
purposes. The same has been true in spades of South Korea.
The differing view with China and South Korea on how to manage
North Korea has allowed Pyongyang to escape the consequences of bad
behavior and has made a negotiation with Pyongyang difficult, if not
impossible. More specifically:
They do not want North Korea to have nuclear weapons but do
not share the American sense of its primacy as an issue.
They do not want to join in bringing concerted pressures to
bear on the North, fearing it would create serious tensions and
potentially affect the peace, stability, and economy of the
peninsula.
While we freeze Pyongyang out except for some humanitarian
assistance, they provide sizable economic assistance,
effectively undermining our bargaining position.
They believe we have been insufficiently forthcoming in our
negotiating proposals to the North.
They want us to talk to the North in any forum, bilateral or
multilateral, and do so themselves.
These differences have been mostly papered over by constant to-ings
and fro-ings and the usual diplomatic rhetoric.
The missile tests, however, have clearly had an impact on both
countries and throughout the region. China is embarrassed by North
Korean behavior and angry at its refusal to listen to their entreaties.
It also fears that North Korean action will have damaging regional
implications for East Asia, notably causing Japan to reassess its
defense requirements. China, surprisingly, even supported a U.N.
Security Council resolution censuring North Korea, although Beijing has
refused to adopt punitive measures at this time. In South Korea the
government's ``soft'' approach to North Korea has been increasingly
publicly questioned, and Seoul, also surprisingly, has suspended some
assistance pending North Korea's return to the Six Party Talks. North
Korea is unhappy with its isolation and sputtering badly. It could well
isolate itself further by cutting off projects with South Korea in an
effort to scare Seoul into becoming more accommodating.
These changing perspectives could open greater opportunities for a
diplomacy that might bring closer together the postures of the United
States, China, and South Korea toward North Korea, an indispensable
requirement for any serious negotiations with North Korea.
The first part of any new American diplomatic effort must be to try
to bridge the gulf with Beijing and Seoul. We might wait to see if
there is any further fall-out from Pyongyang's isolation and its
unhappiness with China and South Korea. But it is an appropriate time--
although hardly the most politically opportune one in Washington--for
the United States to craft a new approach that might get real Chinese
and South Korean support to seriously test the proposition that there
may be some package of security assurances, political measures, and
economic bait that would cause North Korea to put aside its nuclear
ambitions and stop throwing missiles around. That means going further
than the statement of principles agreed to last September by the six
powers and putting forth a negotiating position beyond expecting the
North to accept a Libyan-like approach to eliminating their nuclear
weapons. Obviously the elements of a negotiating package must be worked
out within the U.S. Government, which can be enormously difficult given
the reported sharp differences within the administration.
We would expect China and South Korea to make clear to Pyongyang
that a fair deal has been presented. We would try to secure commitments
from both countries on what they are prepared to do if North Korea
spurns such a new approach. Whether their commitments would be worth
anything if North Korea balked is a risk we would have to take.
Departing even further American political reality, I believe that
any new negotiating approach should be accompanied by some dramatic
measure to show our willingness to negotiate not only to North Korea
but to our partners as well--such as a visit by Secretary Rice to
Pyongyang or an offer to immediately begin negotiations to establish
diplomatic relations.
There is also the problem of resuming negotiations. North Korea has
insisted on bilateral negotiations. The United States insists that
bilateral meetings can only continue to take place within the
multilateral forum. That is a rather remarkable posture, and makes the
Six Party Talks the only multilateral negotiation, that I am aware of,
in which the United States insists that it alone will hold bilateral
talks with one of the parties only when the multilateral meeting is on.
The North Koreans would probably have accepted that, but now insist
that before they go back to the Six Party Talks, the United States
rescind the financial sanctions it has recently imposed to stem a
variety of North Korean illicit activities. There must be an early
resolution of this issue or some face-saving way found for Pyongyang to
return to negotiations.
We have no credible red lines for North Korea beyond not attacking
South Korea and Japan. Nor, as far as I can tell, do we have any
concerted policy for dealing with North Korea as a state besides
talking to them about nuclear weapons. Every principal party to the
issue is tired of the North Korean regime, but China and Korea want to
do something about it. China has been trying to turn it into a mini
market-oriented China. South Korea hopes that by large-scale assistance
to make them dependent and transform the regime over time. Maybe all
that is a triumph of hope over reality. America's policy toward the
North seems to be to hold its nose and wait for them to implode or for
China or South Korea to see the light and join us in putting serious
pressures on North Korea. Hopefully there will be some surprise
internal cataclysm--not to be dismissed that washes the regime away.
Waiting for that to happen is not a great basis for policy.
That still leaves the nuclear issue. And we all know there is no
good option. Force would be violently opposed by South Korea which has
the most at stake. Pressure and isolation requires unity with our
friends. Maybe North Korean actions will stimulate our friends to
further action, but U.N. resolutions guarantee nothing. That leaves
diplomacy and whether we want to try to seriously pursue it. We should
not forget that North Korea is not an 800-pound guerrilla. Far from it.
It is a failed state dependent very much on foreign handouts, which
will one day be on the trash heap of history. But before that happens
it can cause great harm and the United States should not be afraid of
dealing directly with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue. Moreover, if we
were to decide to try tougher measures and even force, it makes good
sense to put ourselves in the best international position to do it and
have gone the extra mile diplomatically.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador
Abramowitz, for some important suggestions and some new
insights in our hearing.
We will have another 10-minute round of questions, and
maybe more if Senators wish to do that.
Let me just mention, historically, Dr. Kanter, I can
remember questions were raised about the missiles in 1993. At
least that was my recollection, because you were heavily
involved in policies with North Korea and South Korea back in
those days.
That seems like a long time ago, and for the Japanese it is
a return to this situation, which was very serious then, and
very serious for General Luck as he took a look and had, as I
remember, a graphic about the percentage or some sort of
scoring as to the likelihood of North Korean aggression against
South Korea, with our troop emplacements very close.
So the history goes on for quite a while and we have been
involved in this for a quite a while. Attempts were made in the
Clinton administration, which have been mentioned today, as
well as in this administration. But let me just ask, after all
is said and done, as both of you have said one way or another,
China and South Korea have developed and maintain very
different agendas with regard not only to the North, but with
regard to the rest of the world. The political leadership
really in South Korea has changed a great deal, with the under-
35 group or others coming into it. A recent poll that the
committee saw of South Koreans under the age of 24, China was
perceived as by far the best friend of South Korea, and we were
in a tie, that is the United States, with North Korea in terms
of the regard of young people, young voters in South Korea.
Now, that is quite a change from older people who feel they
might have been rescued by the United States at some point. It
is a very different perspective of history. How the politics of
this is going to play out in South Korea is very, very,
difficult, it seems to me, for anybody to fathom.
The complexity of the Chinese relationship I think both of
you have indicated. The nuclear issue is important. All things
considered, China would prefer that North Korea got over the
idea of developing these weapons, but for the Japanese, as I
termed it earlier, it is sort of an existential event. The
North Koreans have the range and it is a question whether they
can hone and machine nuclear capacity into a nose cone and
create extraordinary damage.
Now, the United States shares this likewise. You can make a
case that the tests were of intense interest to Japan and
certainly of great interest to us. Do they in fact have the
range? The Rumsfeld Commission a while back thought that they
might. They were really on the threshold of all of this.
You ask, well, if they have that much range why are not the
Chinese and the South Koreans or even the Russians that
concerned about it? Well, why indeed? But in fact there are
other objectives here.
Now, is it reasonable to anticipate, as we have with the
Six Party Talks, that even if these recent shots have created
more consternation among all the allies--and, as you have said,
Dr. Kanter, may have created an opportunity here, sort of
pushed everybody much closer together--is it not a fact that
the agendas of these parties are still so varied and so far
apart that your second conclusion, that this unity might be
fragile, is the more likely conclusion of what is going to
occur?
In other words, from your experience of all of this, what
is there in this that might lead to some degree of unity among
all the parties, and I finally include the United States?
Mention has been made, without our going into it a great deal,
of debate within our own administration as to whether regime
change, use of force, other items, are really what we ought to
be about, sterner stuff, as opposed to endless negotiations,
waiting around for months at a time for somebody to come to the
table.
You may or may not have been parties to these
conversations, but we had Ambassador Hill today at least giving
a pretty unified front, that everybody seems to be on board,
and I think we all pray that is so.
Comment, if you will, on any of these musings.
Ambassador Kanter. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First on the question
about whether this new-found unity will be sustainable over
time, as I did indicate, I think it is fragile. But I think it
is--depending upon what the parties now do, the chances are
better that the unity of purpose can be preserved and pursued
or, alternatively, depending upon what the parties do, it could
just fly apart.
I do not think that South Korea and China have different
agendas with respect to North Korea compared to us. It is
rather that they have different priorities among the same set
of objectives than we do and different risk tolerances, because
they could imagine really bad things happening to them if, in
their view, too much pressure is applied on North Korea, and
from our point of view either those bad things will not happen,
are not as likely to happen to us, they will not be as bad, or
we believe they are not as likely to happen.
So it is a matter of kind of differing risk assessments and
different priorities.
What I think the missile launches have done and the U.N.
resolution has done is the following. I think it has made it
more likely, far from a certainty, that Seoul and Beijing will
now contemplate, to be blunt, putting some pressure on North
Korea. Not publicly, not overtly, not loudly--quietly,
indirectly, denying that it is pressure. We all remember the
interruption of fuel supplies for 3 days a few years ago from
China that was attributed to technical problems in the
pipeline. I would take that again in a minute.
Given the position that Pyongyang has put Seoul and Beijing
internationally and I would say also to some extent
domestically, I think that there is the possibility that they
will be more willing to behave this way now, in a low-key
manner, but hopefully effective.
It can fly apart, however. This unity of purpose can fly
apart either if I am wrong and Seoul and Beijing essentially
continue their current view that what we need is more time and
more patience and pressure is counterproductive. If they
continue that view as though nothing has happened, then the
opportunity will be squandered.
Conversely, if other member states rush to implement the
U.N. resolution in a very robust way, giving Seoul and Beijing
no time to reconsider and maybe begin to move quietly behind
the scenes, that too will squander the moment. So I think what
we need to hope for is that Seoul and Beijing will recalibrate
their strategy and that the rest of us will give them enough
time for that to happen.
The Chairman. Let me just follow up with one thought
because you have touched upon the Macao bank situation. Once
again, within our own administration this may have been
coordinated: State, Defense, NSC, and Treasury in this
particular case. The North Koreans have complained about the
transactions that they have being disrupted. Now, as I
understand it, the Treasury's objective--and maybe this is
generally true of the administration--was to stop
counterfeiting and the passage of illicit moneys, perhaps from
weapons sales or from whatever else. But nevertheless, it seems
to have been effective, at least in Macao. Some have suggested
why not try it elsewhere? In other words, if this seems to get
the attention of the North Koreans, it certainly is better than
armed conflict and striking the missiles on the runway before
they go off, or something of this sort.
Now, you have mentioned, however, that one problem with
this may be once again in our relations with the Chinese and
the South Koreans, that we have just been calibrating, that
somehow or other that may disrupt the major game, the Six Party
Talks and their effectiveness, the unity of purpose here.
Elaborate a little bit more on your analysis of Macao and/
or the spread of what might be considered a type of banking or
transaction sanctions that, given the general poverty of the
North Korean state, its lack of revenues from abroad and so
forth, the importance of its sales and recouping the gains, why
this is not a good thing to sort of continue, to keep the
attention of the North Koreans centered on the problem?
Ambassador Kanter. First with respect to the Macao bank,
however we got to where we are on that matter, we are there now
and it is essentially a matter of law enforcement. I do not
think the United States can put itself in the position of
suggesting we will turn a blind eye to violations of law in
order to lure the North Koreans back to Six Party Talks. That
is just not a tenable position. So I think we need to see this
investigation through.
Having said that, I agree that we have gotten the North
Koreans' attention, but I am not sure that we have done so in a
productive way. But much more to the point, as I indicated, one
of our key objectives now is to maintain this unity of purpose,
and the actions against the Macao bank have had exactly the
opposite effect.
As Ambassador Hill said earlier this morning, I do not
believe that there is anything the United States can do itself,
can do unilaterally, to bring enough pressure on North Korea to
really change its strategic calculus. If we found ourselves in
a situation--and the U.N. resolution, I should say, gives ample
room for this--whereby the other members of the Six Party
Talks, all of whom of course are member states of the U.N.,
joined together in a cooperative effort, that would be a quite
different proposition.
But a unilateral expansion of these financial
investigations and sanctions I think is unlikely to have the
desired effect on North Korea and is likely to be
counterproductive with respect to our objective of trying to
enlist the other members of the Six Party Talks together with
us on our diplomatic approach.
The Chairman. Ambassador Abramowitz, you have suggested
that it may be a time for what you characterize as a new
approach, something well beyond the principles that were
established in negotiations last September that Ambassador Hill
mentioned earlier today. Many, at least in the press, have
suggested, often starting with economic benefits to the
country--it is a poor country. Obviously, we have talked today
about the sustenance that comes from China, to some extent from
the South Koreans, in terms of food and nutrition, basic energy
to keep people alive.
But the thought of some, is that well beyond a sustenance
level, we try to think about normalization, a country that
might begin to engage in trade, maybe in tourism, people coming
and going, this sort of thing. Whether or not the North Korean
Government permits this sort of thing or that type of regime
they have now is sort of hard to tell.
But can you give some outline, just some spurt of the
imagination of others that might be thinking of a new program
of this sort?
Ambassador Abramowitz. Well, I think, going back to your
previous question and relating it to what you just asked, I
think what we do over the next 3 or 4 months will be critical
to determining the type of reaction we get from China and South
Korea. I think it is important in the first instance to show
that there is a potential for serious negotiations. After the
principles were issued, the United States, presumably because
of problems in Washington, issued its own unilateral statement,
in effect saying: You have to clean up your nuclear act and all
associated activities before in effect anything else comes into
play.
I do not think North Korea can accept that sort of policy.
So there have been always two issues in this negotiation which
have not really been discussed. The first is who goes first,
who goes second, what do they do, what are the acts. That is
still way up in the air. I have no idea what the U.S.
Government position is on that.
The second is verification, and verification can be used in
all sorts of ways, whether to try to get an agreement or try to
sink an agreement, and I do not know where the U.S. Government
is on that.
I believe to try to bring the position of the United
States, South Korea, and China together, we will have to over
time develop a position that offers something concrete to the
North Koreans, whether they accept it or not. I do not know
whether we can develop that position.
We have been going on saying we have got these great
principles, they have agreed to denuclearize, but nothing more
has happened. So the question is why has nothing more happened.
We have got to ask ourselves that.
In that regard, let me make an observation about the United
States. We seem to act as if what we say today is what is
important and what we said for the last 4 years does not count.
We
wonder why do you fellows remember this? First of all, the
administration broke with the Clinton policy. It broke with the
policy of engagement. That was the policy of the Clinton
administration, rightly or wrongly. It called North Korea a
rogue state. It declared it was an evil country. Part of the
axis of evil, it said we should get rid of it: regime change.
We invaded another country which was part of that axis of evil.
So now we expect North Korea to say: Oh, wonderful, you are
a friendly country. I think we have to recognize that--I am not
making a case for North Korea; obviously it is a terrible
state--I am making a case for how do we get to an agreement,
and I believe our rhetoric in the past has been very
detrimental, first with our allies and second in getting North
Korea to a serious negotiation. Whether they will do so or not
I do not know.
Sorry for the lecture.
The Chairman. Well, it is an important recitation of
history.
I would say that we appreciate very much Ambassador Hill
coming before the committee in public session to try to give an
idea of our position. As you say, one could historically trace
our position back through several permutations--the axis of
evil, the three countries, the regime change, and so forth.
In my earlier question I raised this issue of regime
change, are we on that track? Not necessarily, apparently. The
thought has been that maybe that regime will atrophy and decay
or maybe military powers inside the regime will rumble around.
This is given some credence from time to time, that the great
leader is not all by himself there, that he has some
constituents to satisfy, albeit at very high levels.
But having said all of that, for the moment the
administration's point of view is that we are going to insist
upon the Six Party Talks. However, as Ambassador Hill says, he
talks all the time to North Koreans, but within context, not
behind the backs of anybody. Now, from time to time the Chinese
and the South Koreans, as I listen to them, say: We do not care
if you talk behind our backs; we as a matter of fact think you
ought to be talking all the time to everybody. Maybe something
will break in the process. Maybe we are not quite so rigorous
about the desire for Six Parties and so forth.
On the other hand, from our standpoint we do not want to be
undermined if we come to some agreement with the North Koreans
and suddenly the South Koreans and the Chinese think that is a
bad idea and they are really not going to help us enforce that,
particularly when it comes to verification. As you just
mentioned, it is a very serious objective. Ambassador Hill, as
you heard today, rejected the thought of a freeze. We have been
there before and that can be violated and so forth.
Now, we get back then to what we have been skirting around
all day: Well, what if the United States said we are just
simply tired of this, there are certain places here and we can
bomb them or we can destroy them, and the South Koreans, as you
all pointed out, say, well now, hold on. You already have
troops in South Korea, so you are going to be vulnerable; but
we are going to be vulnerable in a very big way. This becomes
really monumental for us. Regardless of what happens with the
Chinese, the South Korean reaction is very, very strong on
this, and we have to be thoughtful about that. Even as we are
concerned about our agenda, the decimation of another country,
particularly an ally with whom we have treaties, has to be very
important, quite apart from what might happen to the Japanese.
The North Koreans have already demonstrated the possibilities
there.
So we keep circling around between rocks and hard places.
For the moment, it would appear to be we are back to insisting
on the Six Party Talks. As Dr. Kanter said, probably we cannot
recant whatever is occurring in Macao because we are talking
about law enforcement there. Some have even suggested that this
is a milder way of handling the sanctions problem, of putting
some pressures. We already have the PSI program and the attempt
to cut off nuclear shipments by North Korea and the attempt to
hold that down to a dull roar and deprive North Korea of some
income from these acts of mischief, as we see them.
But I think we are all probing with each other today as to
what would be in a package that is even slightly attractive,
that begins to get movement here, because absent that it would
appear that we will all need a lot of patience, that we are
there for quite a while sitting around the Six Powers.
Dr. Kanter, do you have a good thought?
Ambassador Kanter. As Ambassador Hill said, the clock is
ticking. The problem we have is that this is not an issue that
gets better with time. In fact, it is an issue that only gets
worse with time.
The Chairman. Why do you say that? Why would it get worse?
Ambassador Kanter. If for no other reason than that North
Korea continues to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons while
nothing else happens, and so they will have more plutonium
tomorrow than they have today, they have more today than they
had yesterday.
Whatever the uncertainty about how many nuclear weapons
North Korea has, there is far less uncertainty about the
material they have for nuclear weapons and the accumulation of
that material. So as time goes on and not much time goes on, we
face the prospect of not only a nuclear-armed North Korea, but
a North Korea that is an exporter of nuclear weapons. And given
their list of customers for the other stuff they sell, that is
a very chilling prospect indeed.
So I do not think that that--it seems to me that there is
no way for any neglect of this issue to be benign.
Now, in terms of what can we do, I think Ambassador
Abramowitz put his finger on something that is probably worthy
of some exploration. We have the statement of principles, but
then we have rather divergent views on how these principles are
implemented and, perhaps most important, divergent views about
the sequence in which things happen.
The Chairman. In other words, the follow-up statement by
others in our government after Ambassador Hill.
Ambassador Kanter. Right.
The Chairman. And of course, I would just state for the
record, other countries then around the table also came forward
with their interpretations.
Ambassador Kanter. As was inevitable.
The Chairman. Yes.
Ambassador Kanter. I would think that it would be useful,
if it has not already been done, for the United States to have
at least internally a view of how they see the process
unfolding, not only most desired but some alternatives that are
more or less acceptable, and which things are unacceptable. So
that if and when the Six Party Talks are resumed, we will have
done our homework.
I do not see--I personally do not see any realistic
prospect of an outcome whereby the North Koreans do everything
before anyone else does anything. That is, I think there is
going to have to be some sequencing and some phasing. The
formula that some members of the Six Party Talks have used to
capture this idea is: ``Word for word, action for action.'' But
it gets the idea of tit for tat in a positive sense. It seems
to me that is a concept that we need to, we the United States,
need to engage, if only for internal planning purposes in
anticipation of a resumption of talks.
If there is such a process, it seems to me sort of a
physical inevitability that North Korea would have to freeze
before it dismantles its nuclear weapons programs. Just sort of
the logic of a process means that there will be a point at
which there will be a freeze. And if there is some sort of
step-by-step reciprocity to get to this point, we will find
ourselves in a situation in which, at that moment at least,
there has been a freeze in exchange for some consideration from
the other parties.
The trick will be to ensure that that is not the end of the
process and indeed that that process is reversible if it looks
as though from a North Korean perspective that is the end,
because that would be unacceptable.
But just as I think that we can make too much of the issue
of direct talks and somehow get diverted from a substantive
problem to a symbolic issue, I believe we can make too much of
the concept of a freeze and get diverted from hard thinking
about how we get from where we are to where we want to be.
The Chairman. Let us say we obtained a freeze and the six
powers or the other five powers came forward with an idea, not
unlike our cooperative threat reduction program with Russia,
that we buy the fissile material, that we have a buyout of all
of this and you sort of take it off the table. Plutonium is not
as useful as uranium perhaps for other nuclear industries
around the world, so that the resale value of the plutonium may
be somewhat less.
But is there any potential with the North Koreans for a
buyout of their program?
Ambassador Kanter. One answer I think is we will not know
until we try. It seems to me any such arrangement, however, not
only would require one to hold one's nose very, very hard, but
it would have to be accompanied by real confidence that the
plutonium that was being bought is all the plutonium that there
is, and----
The Chairman. Not production going on.
Ambassador Kanter [continuing]. And that there is not new
plutonium being produced, so there is this sort of unending
stream, because at the end of the day this would not be a
commercial transaction; it would be a rather distasteful
buyout.
Finally, it would be incomplete because, however and
however successfully one deals with the plutonium program, that
still leaves the uranium program.
The Chairman. I think you put your finger on it. You hold
your nose, and with some it would be more than that. They would
say: There you go again, rewarding all the perfidy of the North
Korean state.
But we keep going around and around this point, and that
is, leaving aside the buyout idea, even if we talked about
trade or investment or some way of changing the lives of the
North Koreans and so forth, some would say this is what comes
if you violate agreements. If in fact you play it the wrong way
long enough, why, you make it more and more expensive and you
do better at the end of it. We have got to have lessons here
with regard to world-type strategy, and one of them is not that
there is a reward for this.
So you keep getting back again to who goes first and who
gets rewarded and the nature of the package and so forth. It is
hard to evade the thought that some will accuse whoever is
making such a proposal of rewarding bad behavior.
Ambassador Kanter. There are virtually certain to be those
accusations. But at the end of the day we have to choose among
the alternatives that are available rather than the world we
wish we were in.
The Chairman. As opposed to war or the loss of several
hundred thousand South Koreans or various other grim
alternatives.
Ambassador Kanter. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Ambassador Abramowitz.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Dr. Kanter has very, very well
expanded what needs to be done. I would just like to make an
observation, which may be unfounded. It is sort of like an
intelligence analysis of our Government, not the North Korean
Government. Getting them to put down a detailed negotiating
package is an existential moment in this government, and I do
not know whether they will be able to do it. I simply do not
know whether they will be able to do it.
But I would urge you, if you feel so inclined, to do what
you can to force the government to explain to this committee
their thinking in detail, because without that sort of package
we are just spewing forth rhetoric. We have to move beyond the
rhetoric, and I do not see that happening. I believe to the
extent that this body is willing to see whether there can be
any progress along these lines, I think it is important to make
the American Government put down what is in a negotiating
package which is more than: You commit suicide and then we will
talk.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate the counsel. I would maybe
use different words, such as ``we would encourage'' or
``advise,'' as opposed to having any ostentatious coercive
ability with regard to all the elements of our administration.
But clearly one of the purposes of our hearing today and our
engaging the two of you and our negotiator, Chris Hill, in this
conversation is to try to bring, from more than isolated press
accounts or persons making comments, some concerted focus. I
think our hearing has achieved that, and it will not be the
last in the series, whether it is behind closed doors or in
front of closed doors, because this is a very, very huge
problem facing the United States of America. I think all of our
citizens understand that and they really want public officials
to be wrestling with this and coming to the sort of
conclusions, existential or not, so that we do make progress.
Well, I thank both of you for assisting that process and we
look forward to seeing you again many more times.
Ambassador Abramowitz. Thank you.
Ambassador Kanter. Thank you.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Additional Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record by Senator
Joseph Biden
Responses of Hon. Christopher R. Hill
Question. The U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution
1695 condemning North Korea's missile tests, urging North Korea to
return to the Six Party Talks, and calling on all member states to
curtail cooperation with North Korea's missile development programs.
What are the next steps needed to get the Six Party Talks back on
track? Will you call a meeting of the ``five''--the United States,
China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia--to consider how to get North
Korea back to the table?
Answer. UNSCR 1695 ``strongly urges'' the DPRK to return
immediately to the Six Party Talks without preconditions and expresses
the support of the UNSC for that negotiating forum. The United States
has repeatedly expressed commitment to the talks and our intent to
fully implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement. We continue to
consult with our partners in the Six Party process and in the region on
ways to move forward. In Kuala Lumpur, ministers of all Six Party
participating countries were invited to attend a Six Party meeting
without preconditions, but unfortunately, the North Koreans chose to
decline the invitation. Instead, on July 28, the other five parties met
together with Canada, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and New Zealand.
The United States and its partners remain ready to attend a Six Party
session, but there is no immediate plan for a meeting. Nor has China,
as host of the Six Party Talks, announced plans to reconvene the fifth
round.
Question. Everyone knows that even if North Korea abandons its
pursuit of nuclear weapons, we will still have many serious differences
with the Government of North Korea. Some believe we must resolve those
differences before normalizing relations. Others believe we should
follow a step by step approach, normalizing diplomatic relations early
and then working to address issues such as human rights, regional
security, and trade, much as we did with China.
a) What is the administration's position on normalization of
relations? What are our conditions?
b) All of our European allies except France have established
diplomatic relations with North Korea. Are they wrong to do so?
Answer. The September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of Principles
provides a path toward normalization of relations between the United
States and the DPRK, and between the DPRK and Japan. According to the
Joint Statement, normalization of relations will be ``subject to . . .
respective bilateral policies.'' The United States has made clear, both
publicly and privately, that any normalization process would include
discussion of matters of concern to the United States, such as the
human rights situation in North Korea.
The United States and Japanese commitments in the Joint Statement
to take steps to normalize relations with the DPRK, subject to
bilateral policies, and indeed the various other commitments of the
United States and its partners expressed in the Joint Statement, were
made in the context of the DPRK's commitment to abandon all nuclear
weapons and existing nuclear programs and to return, at an early date,
to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The United States cannot fulfill its
commitments until the DPRK returns to the negotiating table and makes a
serious effort to implement the aspects of the Joint Statement related
to denuclearization.
We are aware that many European Union countries have diplomatic
relations with, and embassies in, North Korea. Sweden, which has an
embassy in Pyongyang, serves as Protecting Power for the United States
in North Korea. The United States neither encourages nor discourages
countries to establish or break diplomatic relations with other
countries.
Question. South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan have all held
summit meetings with North Korea. All talk directly to North Korea in
order to advance the Six Party Talks. All have asked us to talk
directly to the North. Only the United States refuses to talk directly
with North Korea. Our objection to bilateral talks seems to be based
mostly on the fact that North Korea wants direct dialog. Why does the
administration continue to oppose direct dialog? Must direct dialog
undermine the Six Party process, or could it complement those talks, as
all of our allies suggest?
Answer. As I said in my July 20 testimony, the United States is
prepared to have a direct, formal diplomatic dialog in the context of
the Six Party Talks. But the United States is not prepared to improve
our relations with North Korea or to have direct dialog while Pyongyang
is boycotting the Six Party Talks. The United States continues to
believe that the best means of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue
is through the multilateral, Six Party process.
Question. In July, 2002, North Korea launched limited market-based
economic reforms.
a) What is your assessment of these reforms?
b) Do you think the United States should encourage or discourage
the North from pursuing economic reforms?
c) In the long term, do you believe economic reforms and opening
will bolster, or undermine, the authority of Kim Jong-Il?
Answer. North Korea began to undertake limited economic reforms in
July 2002; these included measures in areas such as farm reform,
monetary and fiscal policy (a currency devaluation was undertaken), and
wage and price adjustments. In addition to these specific reforms, the
DPRK has established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along its
northwestern border with Russia at Rajin-Seonbong (established in 1991)
and on the DPRK-PRC border at Sinuiju City (established in 2002). North
Korea announced Sinuiju as an ``international financial, trade,
commercial, industrial'' zone, operating free of central government
interference for a period of 50 years. The Kaesong Industrial Complex
(KIC) near the border with South Korea is also a special economic
project. NGO and other reporting suggests fledgling market activity
inside North Korea, although actions by the regime to reassert the role
of the government's public distribution system (PDS) periodically
inhibit the development of the market.
Periodically, the DPRK expresses a desire to become more attractive
to foreign direct investment (FDI). But much more progress on economic
reforms will be necessary to create favorable conditions for a
significant increase in FDI. The DPRK has sent delegations to Eastern
Europe, Switzerland, and Singapore to study alternative economic
development and market strategies. In January 2006, Kim Jong-Il visited
industrial cities in China's southern provinces, possibly to study the
results of economic reforms that were first tried in China's own SEZs
near Hong Kong in the 1970s and 1980s. DPRK officials appear to be
greatly impressed with China's ability to carry out economic reforms
while retaining ``socialism with Chinese characteristics.'' But the
organizing principle of the DPRK state remains hereditary central
control and a ``military first'' policy as a priority. This means that
any economic reforms undertaken by the DPRK presumably have been deemed
advisable by Kim Jong-Il, according to his own political calculus,
under which regime survival seems to be the paramount goal. Kim Jong-Il
appears very reluctant to open his system effectively as would be
necessary to encourage widespread private sector activity and create an
environment conducive to substantial foreign investment.
The United States view is that the interests and welfare of the
North Korean people could benefit dramatically if Pyongyang embarked on
broad market-oriented reforms such as we have seen in China and
Vietnam.
Question. When President Bush came into office, North Korea
reportedly had enough plutonium to produce one or two nuclear weapons.
Over the past 4\1/2\ years, North Korea has reportedly expanded its
stockpile of fissile material by at least 400 percent. Moreover, its
Yongbyon reactor produces spent fuel from which the North can extract
plutonium, and it reportedly has a clandestine program to produce
highly enriched uranium.
a) Please tell the American people what is the current unclassified
estimate of how many nuclear weapons North Korea may possess? Do you
agree with the recent estimate by the International Institute of
Strategic Studies that North Korea may have enough plutonium to
manufacture a dozen nuclear bombs?
b) Can North Korea mount a nuclear warhead on one of its ballistic
missiles?
c) What is the status of North Korea's unfinished 50 megawatt and
200 megawatt nuclear reactors? Has North Korea begun to work on these
reactors?
d) What is the current unclassified estimate about the status of
the North's efforts to produce highly enriched uranium?
Answer. This question asks about specific intelligence estimates
and is best referred directly to the intelligence community for
response.
Question. What is the Department's view of the North Korea
Nonproliferation Act?
Answer. The administration considers the Iran-Syria
Nonproliferation Act an important tool in our efforts to stem
proliferation. We are still formulating a position on this specific
legislation, and I will notify you as soon as we have a definitive
interagency position. However, we clearly support the goal of the draft
bill--halting North Korean proliferation. Indeed, the administration
now is looking at a broad range of additional specific measures,
including sanctions and other economic pressure to deal with DPRK
weapons, missiles and proliferation programs, and we'll need to see how
the legislation would mesh with the package we will move forward. But I
certainly support the goal of identifying and penalizing those that
trade in proliferation-sensitive material to North Korea. We have in
place and under consideration a number of additional USG measures
directed at achieving that result.
We understand that the bill, S. 3728, passed the Senate on July 25.