[Senate Hearing 109-885]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-885
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 3; NOVEMBER 15, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism
august 3, 2006
Page
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, United States Secretary of Defense;
Accompanied by Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff; and GEN John Abizaid, USA, Commander, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 6
To Receive Testimony on the Current Situation and U.S. Military
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
november 15, 2006
Abizaid, GEN John P., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command....... 98
Satterfield, Hon. David M., Senior Advisor to the Secretary of
State and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State............ 102
To Continue to Receive Testimony on the Current Situation and U.S.
Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
november 15, 2006
Hayden, Gen. Michael V., USAF, Director, Central Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 161
Maples, LTG Michael D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 169
(iii)
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
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THURSDAY, AUGUST 3, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune,
Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson,
Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member; Derek J.
Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel;
Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Kristine L.
Svinicki, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member;
Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Michael J.
McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan,
minority counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, staff assistant.
Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L.
Rubin, and Pendred K. Wilson.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul
and Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistants to Senator McCain;
John A. Bonsell and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mackenzie M.
Eaglen, assistant to Senator Collins; Matthew R. Rimkunas,
assistant to Senator Graham; Greg Riels, assistant to Senator
Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart
C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman,
assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christine Evans and Erik Raven,
assistants to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke
Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Robert J. Ehrich,
assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to
Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee
meets this morning to receive testimony from the distinguished
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; General Peter Pace,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General John
Abizaid, Commander of the United States Central Command
(CENTCOM), on progress in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the war on
terrorism, and such other aspects as relative to your area of
operations. The committee will also look in their insights on
the ongoing crisis involving Israel, Hezbollah, Lebanon, and to
some extent, Palestine.
Secretary Rumsfeld, the committee appreciates the changes
you have made in your schedule that you have outlined to me
very carefully and we welcome you this morning.
Last week, in an historic visit the prime minister of Iraq
met with President Bush, addressed a joint session of Congress,
and spoke with military personnel at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. I
was privileged to be present at all of those events and I think
it was an extremely important chapter in the ongoing
developments in Iraq that he took that time to come over here.
He demonstrated the resolve of the Iraqi people to build a free
and stable country.
During the meeting with military personnel and their
families--and I witnessed this in a very passionate and sincere
way, he conveyed to those military people present at Fort
Belvoir and for broadcast to military people all over the
United States and the world the gratefulness in the hearts of
the Iraqi people for their sacrifices of life and limb and that
of their families in order to enable the people of Iraq to gain
a measure of democracy, elect their government, and share in
the freedom that we all have in this country.
In meetings with Prime Minister Maliki, President Bush
reaffirmed America's commitment to support Iraq's
constitutional democracy and to help Prime Minister Maliki's
government succeed.
On July 25, President Bush said: ``The Iraqi people want to
succeed. They want to end this violence.'' The President also
said that ``America will not abandon the Iraqi people.''
I am, however, gravely concerned by the recent spike in
violence and sectarian attacks, and the instability in Baghdad
and recent decisions to extend the deployment of 3,500 American
troops in Iraq and to relocate additional American forces to
reinforce Baghdad. Those were important decisions made by you,
Mr. Secretary, General Abizaid, and you, Chairman Pace. I hope
that you will share with us this morning the reasons for doing
so. I do not question the seriousness of this situation, the
need to do it, but we should have a very clear explanation,
because we had, I regret to say, expectations, largely
generated by certain reports of General Casey, about the hope
to draw down our forces in the near future. That is a question
I hope that we address this morning, because I do not like to
see the hopes of the men and women of the Armed Forces raised
and then have to be changed and the impact on their families
and indeed the confusion that results here at home when those
decisions have to be made.
But we recognize the President has said, as the Secretary
has said, that ground conditions vary and they must be the
determining factor.
Additionally, I have expressed concerns about the potential
impact of events in Lebanon and Israel and their cascading
effect on the wider Middle East region, and specifically on the
United States and coalition forces serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan. My concern is--and I have expressed this
publicly--that Israel was wrongfully attacked by Hezbollah. No
one disputes that whatsoever. They have an unequivocal right to
defend themselves. No one disputes that. But as our Nation
engages in this situation, and historically we have been an
honest broker in that region, as our Nation engages in that
conflict to try and resolve it, we must do so in a way to be
mindful of the implications on our commitments in the Iraq
theater.
The messages we send by virtue of our support to try and
bring about a cessation of this conflict are transmitted
throughout the Muslim world straight up into Iraq. It is my
fervent hope that our men and women serving in uniform and
others in Iraq will not be put at greater personal risk as a
consequence of the rhetoric that flows, the decisions that are
made, in trying to resolve that conflict. I will have further
to say about that in the question period.
In the nearly 5 years since U.S. forces initiated
operations to liberate Afghanistan from the brutal rule of the
Taliban and to eliminate al Qaeda training bases and
sanctuaries, there has been remarkable progress in Afghanistan
on the political, economic, and security fronts. The Afghan
people have spoken in favor of freedom and democracy and I am
pleased that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is
taking an increasing and very important role in Afghanistan,
and you are to be commended, Mr. Secretary, for initiating that
move together with General Jones, who has been a strong
advocate of trying to achieve that goal.
However, recent reports from Afghanistan show that the
violence is on the rise. We will learn from you, I hope, your
concern as to that area of responsibility (AOR), General, and
what the future holds in the face of a resurgence of the
Taliban forces.
While some in the West take freedom and liberty for
granted, Americans everywhere should remain so proud of the
contributions of our service men and women deployed in harm's
way. They are bringing the best hope for freedom and democracy
to Iraq and Afghanistan after decades of cruel oppression and
their sacrifices have enabled us here at home to fully enjoy
the freedoms that we have.
As the current conflict in Lebanon and Israel proceeds,
there is obvious concern that the crisis could spark a wider
war. The firebrand Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr said, ``We, the
unified Iraqi people, will stand with the Lebanese people to
end the ominous trio of the United States, Israel, and Britain,
which is terrorizing Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and other
occupied nations.'' He also said that he was ready to go to
Lebanon to defend it.
Now, we all recognize that he is just a hothead and a
firebrand, but he is a troublemaker and I hope, General
Abizaid, you can give us some assessment of the courage and the
will of the Iraqi people, under the leadership of the prime
minister, to begin a step that must be achieved, and that is
the disbanding of these private militias, notably Sadr's.
Back to Osama bin Laden. His deputy issued a worldwide call
for Muslims to rise up against Israel and join the fighting in
Lebanon and Gaza, raising again the specter of an Islamic
caliphate that I clearly remember General Abizaid discussed in
testimony before the committee last year. We hope you will
bring us up-to-date on the Osama bin Laden situation and the
ongoing activities of our forces together with others trying to
bring about this man being brought to justice or otherwise
taken care of.
In light of all these developments, the mission in Iraq and
Afghanistan is even more critical and your time with us today
is critical.
General Pace and General Abizaid, I want to express our
gratitude to both of you and the countless men and women that
you represent, for your continued service and historic efforts
of our Nation's military to bring freedom and liberty to Iraq,
Afghanistan, and to preserve it here at home.
Secretary Rumsfeld, once again the committee welcomes you.
Now, just before the committee meeting started General Abizaid
offered to meet with Senator Levin and myself, for information
of the members of the committee, and he outlined the progress
being made with the various reports examining the activities of
the chain of command relative to certain incidents in Iraq. It
is our understanding, General Abizaid, that those reports will
soon be given to you. There is a convergence of the criminal
investigation together with the chain of command investigation
under General Chiarelli. It is now in the overall commander of
the Marine Forces, General Zilmer, and then it comes to you,
and it is your hope and expectation that, working with the
Secretary, those reports can be made available to this
committee early on in September.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
very important hearing, and thank you to all of our witnesses
for being here this morning.
The American service men and women in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and other trouble spots around the world are performing their
duties magnificently. We salute them and their families. We
thank them for their unselfish service and devotion to our
Nation.
Despite their heroic efforts, the security situation in
Iraq continues to worsen. Sectarian violence is not only on the
rise, it has eclipsed the Sunni insurgency and the terrorism of
al Qaeda in Iraq in terms of the toll it has taken and the
threats to Iraq's chances of stability.
Our military leadership has identified Baghdad as the key,
what they call the center of gravity, to success or failure in
Iraq. The highly vaunted recent plan to stabilize Baghdad has
not worked, and we are going back to the drawing board and
sending more U.S. troops to the Iraqi capital. We are having
difficulty finding sufficient troops for that purpose. The fact
that the Army's Stryker brigade that is being sent to Baghdad
is being extended past its 12-month rotation date by another 3
to 4 months speaks volumes about how our military is
overextended and unable to find other units ready for immediate
reinforcement in Iraq.
While there appears to be an immediate necessity for
additional troops in Baghdad, more troops will not be the
ultimate answer. Our military leadership has repeatedly said
there is no military solution, that there must be a political
solution in Iraq.
Iraqis reaching the political compromises now is more
important and more critical to defusing the violence and
conflict in Iraq. That is why we need to clearly tell the Iraqi
political leaders that our commitment to Iraq is not open-
ended, that we will begin the phased redeployment of our troops
by the end of the year and that they must make the political
compromises necessary to avoid all-out civil war and defeat the
insurgency.
When General Casey was asked at a press conference recently
whether he still believed that there would be fairly
substantial troop reductions over the course of this year, he
said, ``I think so.'' Marine Corps General Conway testified
before us last week at his confirmation hearing to be the next
Commandant that, ``I personally believe that you will have
Iraqis who have started to look at us as occupiers and are
resisting us in some instances, whereas they would not resist
an Iraqi force doing precisely the same thing.'' He also
testified that it is critical that the Iraqis understand that
our presence is not open-ended and unlimited.
The President has assured the Nation that as Iraqi forces
stand up we will stand down. General Dempsey, our senior
general responsible for the training and equipping of Iraqi
security forces, has said publicly that, ``The Iraqi army will
be built by the end of this calendar year'' and that their army
would be, ``fully capable of recruiting, vetting, inducting,
training, forming into units, putting them in barracks, and
sending them out the gate to perform their missions.'' Congress
has been told that over 70 percent of Iraqi combat battalions
are capable of independent counterinsurgency operations or
capable of taking the lead in those operations. The Iraqi
security forces are standing up. We need to begin to stand down
with a phased redeployment starting by the end of this year.
It is time for the Iraqis to take greater responsibility
for the security of their own country. It is time to do what
the President repeatedly said he would do. Now that the Iraqis
have done a significant amount of standing up their troops,
surely by the end of this year we should begin to stand down
some of our troops.
Now, not only do the operations in the CENTCOM region have
broad implications on the future of that region, they are also
having a serious impact on our own military. Our ground
forces--the Army and the Marine Corps--are under enormous
strain due to several years of large-scale deployments to Iraq
and Afghanistan. This is because a large amount of equipment
has been left in Iraq and because the remaining equipment has
been subjected to large amounts of wear and tear, there is a
lack of readiness for Army and Marine Corps units which have
redeployed to their home bases.
It is argued that our units are more capable now because of
organizational changes and the infusion of technology and
better equipment. But that is only true if the units actually
have the equipment on hand, and only if what they have on hand
is in a high state of maintenance so that they can train for
their potential contingencies. Hypothetically, if 50 combat
units could now do what 100 units could do in the past, that
would be true only if those units are ready to do so. Over two-
thirds of the Army's combat brigades are not in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the Army's own statistics show that the vast
majority of those are not in command, or in command and
control--in other words, by the Army's own measurements are not
ready to respond to those contingencies which they must be
prepared to do by Department of Defense (DOD) war plans.
Mr. Chairman, again I thank you for calling this hearing
and I thank our witnesses, all of them, for making the
arrangements which they had to make in order to be with us this
morning.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GEN JOHN ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the
invitation to testify. Senator Clinton, thank you for seconding
the motion. I know we all agree that the American people
deserve a healthy, preferably constructive, exchange on matters
that so directly affect the lives, their lives, their families'
lives, and their country's security.
I am joined by General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; and General John Abizaid, the Combatant
Commander of the U.S. Central Command. We will be providing an
update on the global struggle against violent extremists and
certainly we will welcome questions.
In the past few weeks, in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan,
in Iraq, and now by Hezbollah, we have seen the face of the
early part of the 21st century. In this period of asymmetric
warfare, irregular warfare, one side puts their men and women
at risk in uniform and obeys the laws of war, while the other
side uses them against us. One side does all it can to avoid
civilian casualties while the other side uses civilians as
shields and then skillfully orchestrates a public outcry when
the other side accidentally kills civilians in their midst. One
side is held to exacting standards of near-perfection; the
other side is held to no standards and no accountability at
all.
This enemy has called Iraq the central front on the war on
terrorism, while some on our side seem to argue that the
outcome in Iraq is not part of that global war on terror.
Sixteen years ago this week, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded
Kuwait, killing civilians, unleashing environmental
devastation, provoking a crisis that led to Iraqi attacks on
Israel and threats to Saudi Arabia and others in the region.
Last week, by contrast, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the new
Iraqi prime minister, who was elected by the Iraqi people under
a constitution the Iraqi people wrote and ratified, came to the
United States to thank the American people for their assistance
in building a new future for the people of Iraq. He had spent
25 years in opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime, and before
a joint session of Congress he noted that if terror were
permitted to triumph in Iraq then the war on terror will never
be won elsewhere.
The enemy understands this as well. They are waging a
psychological war of attrition, planning attacks to gain the
maximum media coverage and the maximum public outcry. They want
us to believe that perseverance by us is futile rather than
necessary. They want us to focus on our casualties and losses,
not on the people causing the casualties and losses. They want
us to think about what will happen if our forces stay in Iraq,
as opposed to the consequences if our forces were to leave
prematurely.
They want us to be divided because they know that when we
are united they lose. They want us pointing fingers at each
other rather than pointing fingers at them.
I know there are calls in some quarters for withdrawal or
arbitrary timelines for withdrawals. The enemies hear those
words as well. We need to be realistic about the consequences.
If we left Iraq prematurely, as the terrorists demand, the
enemy would tell us to leave Afghanistan and then withdraw from
the Middle East, and if we left the Middle East they would
order us and all those who do not share their militant ideology
to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands from Spain to
the Philippines. Then we would face not only the evil ideology
of these violent extremists, but an enemy that will have grown
accustomed to succeeding in telling free people everywhere what
to do.
We can persevere in Iraq or we can withdraw prematurely
until they force us to make a stand nearer home. But make no
mistake, they are not going to give up whether we acquiesce in
their immediate demands or not.
Decisions about conditions for a drawdown of our forces in
Iraq are best based on the recommendations of the commanders in
the field and the recommendations of the gentlemen sitting
beside me. We should strive to think through how our words can
be interpreted by our troops, by the people of Afghanistan and
Iraq, by our 42 allies in our coalition in Afghanistan, and our
34 allies in our coalition in Iraq. We should consider how our
words can be used by our deadly enemy.
The war on terror is going to be a long struggle. It is not
something we asked for, but neither is it something we can
avoid. But I remain confident in our mission, in our
commanders, in our troops, and in our cause. I remain confident
in the good common sense of the American people. Americans did
not cross oceans and settle the wilderness and build history's
greatest democracy only to run away from a bunch of murderers
and extremists who try to kill everyone that they cannot
convert and to tear down what they could never build.
Over the past few years, I have had the honor of meeting
countless young men and women in uniform, all volunteers, who
have answered our country's call. I remember a serviceman
outside of Afghanistan who looked me in the eye and said, ``I
cannot believe that we are being allowed to do something so
important.''
Our troops represent the finest and the most professional
troops in history. I think of these remarkable people every
day. I know that everything we do in the DOD and what you do on
this committee affects them and their wonderfully supportive
families.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Pace.
General Pace. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee: it truly is an honor to be before you today
representing the incredible young men and women in your Armed
Forces. Since September 11, 2001, over 1 million young men and
women in uniform have served this country in the CENTCOM area
of operations and they have done so with incredible bravery and
sacrifice and performance that has made us all proud. Their
families have served this Nation as well as anyone who has worn
the uniform, especially those families today in the 172nd
Stryker brigade whose loved ones are not coming home when they
thought they would be coming home and who once again are
sacrificing so that we might provide the strength needed on the
battlefield.
It is now almost 5 years since September 11, 2001, and the
number of young men and women in our Armed Forces who have
sacrificed their lives that we might live in freedom is
approaching the number of Americans who were murdered on
September 11, 2001, in New York, in Washington, DC, and in
Pennsylvania.
We have come a long way in Afghanistan. We have come a long
way in Iraq and elsewhere in the war on terrorism. We have a
long way to go. We are a Nation at war. Fortunately, most of
our fellow citizens are not affected by this war every day.
Some 2.4 million Americans--Active, National Guard, and
Reserve--have the privilege of defending over 300 million of
our fellow citizens and countless millions in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and elsewhere.
Our enemy knows they cannot defeat us in battle. They do
believe, however, that they can wear down our will as a Nation.
They are wrong. How do I know they are wrong? First, this
committee and this Congress continue to provide the resources
we need to defend this Nation, and I thank you for that.
Second, our service men and women are proud of what they
are doing and they are reenlisting in record numbers to
continue to have the privilege to do what we do for this
Nation.
Third, as the Secretary mentioned in his comments, the
American people have in the past, are now, and will in the
future respond to attacks on our way of life. For 230 years we
have met the challenges. This will not be easy, this will not
be quick, and this will not be without sacrifice. But we will
persist and we will prevail.
I look forward to answering your questions today and
working together with you in the future to defend this Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
General Abizaid.
General Abizaid. Thank you, Chairman Warner, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. Thanks for the opportunity to testify
today.
A couple of days ago I returned from the Middle East. I
have rarely seen it so unsettled or so volatile. There is an
obvious struggle in the region between moderates and extremists
that touches every aspect of life. Such extremism, whether
state-sponsored by Iran or ideologically motivated by al Qaeda
and its associated movements, remains a serious danger to
global peace and stability.
My duties took me to Iraq, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and
elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, where our troops continue to
perform with great professional calm and determination under
dangerous and difficult circumstances. Of course, over the past
several weeks the media has been filled with images of war in
Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine. Indeed, U.S. forces under
CENTCOM helped evacuate nearly 15,000 Americans from Lebanon's
war zone.
While the media's eye often directs public attention to
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to remember that U.S. and
coalition forces serve throughout Central Asia, the Middle
East, and the Horn of Africa, increasing regional states'
capacity to battle extremism and keeping open the vital air and
sea links of the region.
In the broader struggle against extremism, we face complex
and potentially intersecting problems. Our strategic
imperatives are formidable. With the continuing help of our
friends, we must focus on three strategic objectives: We must
synchronize the appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military
means to defeat al Qaeda and its associated movements; we must
deter Iranian designs for regional hegemony, to include its
sponsorship of terrorist organizations and its development of
nuclear weapons; finally, we must find a comprehensive solution
to the corrosive Arab-Israeli conflict.
I fully recognize that each of these tasks is filled with
danger and enormous difficulties. I also realize that trying to
solve any of these problems will take a considerable amount of
time and effort. But failure to apply coordinated regional and
international pressure against these three problems will
further encourage extremism and could eventually lead to a
broader, even more dangerous conflict.
The arming of independent militias and the subsequent
undermining of state institutions by these militias is the
curse of the region. In many ways, interconnectedness brought
on by 21st century globalization has been turned to the
advantage by non-state actors. Globalization brings with it
great benefits, but it also accelerates the dissolution of
sovereignty in weak or corroded states. If this century is to
be dominated by non-state actors with no responsibility to the
international community, we are in for even greater dangers.
It should not be lost on us, for example, that Hezbollah
fields greater and longer-range weapons than most regional
armed forces. If left unchecked, it is possible to imagine
chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons being transferred
to militias or terrorist organizations by a state actor.
In the highly unsettled Middle East, the problem of
extremist-sponsored terror and intimidation is complicated. But
we must be willing to talk about al Qaeda's ideological designs
and face the implications of revolutionary Iran's ambitions, so
often and so clearly stated by its president.
There is no doubt that these are dangerous times for the
world, but there should also be no doubt that, with concerted
international action and the application of our own substantial
power, these dangers can be overcome.
Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional problem. Al
Qaeda and Shiite extremists form terrorist groups and death
squads to challenge the new government and undermine confidence
in a better future. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq, but,
just as in Lebanon, it arms, trains, and equips local extremist
Shiite militias to do Iran's bidding. As the primary security
problem in Iraq has shifted from a Sunni insurgency to
sectarian violence, al Qaeda terrorists, insurgents, and Shiite
militants compete to plunge the country into civil war.
Prime Minister Maliki and his new government know what must
be done and in 3 short months in office are responsibly
tackling the complex and difficult problems of security and
governance. Iraqi security forces in conjunction with coalition
forces must bring Baghdad, the center of sectarian violence,
under control. Illegal militias must be disbanded. National
reconciliation must proceed. Death squad leaders must be
brought to justice.
It is a decisive time in Baghdad and it requires decisive
Iraqi action with our clear support. Despite the many
challenges, progress does continue to be made in Iraq and I am
confident that there are still many more people in Iraq trying
to hold that country together than there are trying to tear it
apart. Our ongoing support of their efforts is essential for
their success, especially as they assume more and more
responsibility for their own security.
I know the committee wants to focus these hearings on Iraq,
but I close with the reminder that Iraq is only one part of a
broader regional struggle underway, one which requires the wise
application of all our resources. Our own troops along with
NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continue to
operate in Afghanistan. Pakistani and Saudi forces are fighting
extremists daily. Insurgencies, secular violence, and terror
sponsored by Sunni and Shiite religious extremist groups are
pervasive throughout the region. Fortunately, as in our own
society, the vast majority of the people in the region do not
want extremists to win. Our challenge is to help these moderate
forces help themselves in the struggle.
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the entire region remain dangerous
and often deadly. Our continued involvement in shaping regional
security forces and providing the framework for regional action
against extremist groups is essential for our own safety and
prosperity at home.
Finally, we must be ever mindful of the sacrifice of our
young men and women in uniform. Out of the over 1.5 million
service personnel who have rotated through the CENTCOM region
since September 11, 2001, over 3,000 have given their lives. We
owe them and their families an enormous debt of gratitude.
Today nearly 200,000 of our troops serve in harm's way. These
are incredibly dedicated and resourceful professionals. Thank
you for your continued support to these great Americans, who
willingly fight for all of us.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General, for a very
incisive and important statement that you have just made.
We are going to depart from our normal rotation here.
Senator Levin and I both serve on the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence. They are now having a meeting and the Senator
from Michigan has to go to that meeting. Therefore I will offer
you the first opportunity to initiate questioning.
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invariable
courtesies.
General Abizaid, when General Casey was asked at a press
conference recently whether he still believed what he said last
year, when he predicted that there would be troop reductions
over the course of this year, he said that he still believes
there will be such reductions this year. Do you personally
share that view?
General Abizaid. Senator, since the time that General Casey
made that statement it is clear that the operational and the
tactical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires
additional security forces, both U.S. and Iraqi. I think the
most important thing ahead of us throughout the remainder of
this year is ensuring that the Baghdad security situation be
brought under control. It is possible to imagine some
reductions in forces, but I think the most important thing to
imagine is Baghdad coming under the control of the Iraqi
government.
Senator Levin. When you say it is possible to imagine some
reduction in forces, you mean this year?
General Abizaid. It is possible, depending upon how things
go in Baghdad and how Prime Minister Maliki and his government
grab hold of the security situation.
Senator Levin. Is it important that the Iraqis understand
that our commitment is not open-ended?
General Abizaid. Sir, I think they fully understand it is
not open-ended.
Senator Levin. Some of their statements have not reflected
that full understanding. But in any event, would you agree that
it is important that they do understand our commitment is not
open-ended?
General Abizaid. I believe they do understand it is not
open-ended. They know our commitment and they know the
necessity for over time to increase their capacity against the
extremists.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the President has assured the Nation
frequently that as Iraqi security forces stand up we will stand
down. They have stood up. The majority of their combat
battalions are capable now of independent counterinsurgency or
capable of taking the lead in those operations. Should we not,
at least by the end of this year, begin to do what the
President said we would do? Since the security forces of Iraq
have stood up in such significant measure, should we not begin
to stand down as the President said we would?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are correct, the Iraqi
security forces are now up to something like 275,000. They are
headed towards 325,000 by the end of the year, unless the prime
minister makes an adjustment in those numbers, which as a new
government he has every right to do in a sovereign nation.
I guess the issue of drawdown depends on what you think
your base is. We were up at 160,000. Today--we have gotten as
low as I think 127,000. Today we are at 135,000 or 133,000, and
certainly everyone from the Iraqis, the troops, and the
President would hope that those troops could be drawn down as
conditions permit. The question, the only difference between
the way you phrase it and the President phrases it as he ends
by pointing out that he intends to succeed here and he believes
that the determinant should be the conditions on the ground, as
opposed to some timetable.
I do think the point you raise, the core of what you are
asking, is important. That is the tension that exists between
having too many troops and having it feed an insurgency. I
believe, as indicated by General Conway, and having too few so
that you do not have a sufficient number to allow the security
situation to permit the political and the economic activities
to go forward. That is a fair tension that exists there, and it
is an art, not a science. There is no guidebook that says how
to do that.
So clearly we would all hope that there could be drawdowns
on those forces as the conditions permit.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
The press reported that Iraqi President Talabani said
yesterday that the Iraqi government is confident that Iraqi
troops will take over security duties for the entire country by
the end of this year. Then he also reportedly said that the
recent increase in violence by insurgents is ``the last arrows
in their quivers.''
Now, that phrase is reminiscent of Vice President Cheney's
claim a year ago that the insurgency was in its ``last
throes.'' General Abizaid, does our intelligence on the
insurgency provide any basis for the assertion that the recent
surge in violence represents the last arrows in the insurgents'
quivers?
General Abizaid. Senator Levin, I think it is clear that
the insurgency has a lot of resiliency. It is probably going to
last for some time, even after U.S. forces depart and hand over
security control completely to the Iraqis. The question for
President Talabani, as I have discussed with him before,
whether or not over time the Iraqis can control it, and I
believe they will be able to.
Senator Levin. You do not agree, then, that it is in its
last throes or that they are shooting the last arrows?
General Abizaid. I am making no comment about what he said
about last arrows or last throes.
Senator Levin. Why?
General Abizaid. I do not see any reason to dispute what
the President says. I know that I think it is a long-term
problem for Iraq that they will be able to work through over
time.
Senator Levin. According to USA Today, the British
Ambassador to Iraq, Mr. Patey, made the following assessment.
Mr. Patey has warned that Iraq is descending towards civil war,
and he said it is likely to split along ethnic lines. He is
reported as predicting that Iraq's security situation could
remain volatile for the next 10 years.
Do you agree, General, with the Ambassador from Britain to
Iraq that Iraq is sliding toward civil war?
General Abizaid. I believe that the sectarian violence is
probably as bad as I have seen it, in Baghdad in particular,
and that if not stopped it is possible that Iraq could move
towards civil war.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up. Thank you again for
allowing me to go ahead here.
Chairman Warner. I want to go back to, Secretary Rumsfeld,
the observations I made in the opening statement. On July 17 at
about 8 o'clock, I went to the floor of the Senate. The Senate
was about to consider a resolution, an important resolution
reaffirming our support for Israel. But I said the following. I
said I was concerned that we should take into account America's
broader interests in the region as we approach this resolution.
I said specifically: ``America's operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan have taken the lives of more than 2,500 American
servicemen, over 20,000 still severely wounded, and over $436
billion of our taxpayers' money over these 3 years.'' That is
an enormous investment of this country, and the credibility of
our country in many respects rests on the conclusion of that
conflict in such a way that the Iraqi government can exercise
sovereignty and bring about a measure of freedom and democracy.
We are committed to that and I stand strongly with our
President to achieve that goal.
America's participation with other nations in achieving a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, I can think
of no problem of greater significance than our resolve to not
let Iran possess nuclear weapons.
The stability of the Lebanese government, that must
survive, that government, such that they can once again take an
even stronger grip on that nation and govern it.
There is a lot at stake with our relationships with other
nations. In a region in which our distinguished witness General
Abizaid, who spent much of your lifetime in that region, just
said, rarely have I seen it so volatile. It is subject to the
corrosive relationships coming out of the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
My concern is that as we go into this situation, and we
have an obligation to try and work as an honest broker, I hope,
in resolving the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, as we
pursue that and as our actions are interpreted by the Muslim
world--and I read some of the statements of the clerics
recently, in the last few days--I do not want to see our forces
put at greater personal risk, subject to greater intensity
brought against them by the adversaries in Iraq.
So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, as we take up our
role, hopefully as an honest broker in this, are we mindful of
the broader picture and the enormity of our investment in Iraq
as we try to do what we can to bring about a cessation of the
fighting in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, in the meetings that I
have been in with the President and the Secretary of State and
those that are intimately involved in the situation in Lebanon
and Israel with respect to the Hezbollah, there is a
sensitivity to the desire to not have our country or our
interests or our forces put at greater risk as a result of what
is taking place between Israel and Hezbollah.
I think I would suggest that it be phrased slightly
differently because there are risks, as you point out, but it
is a matter of relative risks. There are also risks, if one
thinks about it, that Iran is the principal sponsor of
Hezbollah. Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, as you posed. Iran
is the supplier of weapons to Hezbollah. The rockets that are
heading into Israel by Hezbollah tend to be in a number of
cases Iranian rockets. Clearly, to the extent that Iran were to
achieve weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and with a history
of a willingness to work intimately with a terrorist
organization like Hezbollah, there is that risk as well.
So there are a variety of risks that we face in that region
and it is a difficult and delicate situation. As I indicated in
my opening remarks, I do believe what we are seeing is really
the face of the 21st century. The wars we are engaged in and we
see are not wars between militaries only; they are wars, they
are clashes between systems, political, economic, and military.
They are being fought with asymmetric and irregular warfare,
which is very much to the advantage of the attackers.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, that situation in Iraq is
fragile. We need only look at the Baghdad situation. Baghdad
could literally tilt this thing if we fail to bring about a
measure of security for those people, tilt it in a way that we
could slide toward a civil war that General Abizaid recalled.
General Pace, I go back to the resolution of October 16,
2002, which I participated in, and my good friend to the left,
in drawing up that resolution for the Senate. It authorized the
President of the United States to use the Armed Forces of the
United States to: one, defend the national security of our
country against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; two,
enforce all relevant United Nations (U.N.) Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq.
Many of those missions set out and envisioned by Congress
when it gave this authority, namely the toppling of the Saddam
Hussein regime, have been achieved. But in the words of General
Abizaid, we are on the brink of a civil war. I do not have the
exact words before me, but I was struck by General Chiarelli's
statement the other day that in his 35 years of military
training he had really never spent a day preparing for what
faces him as our commander of forces in Iraq, sectarian
violence, civil war.
What is the mission of the United States today under this
resolution if that situation erupts into a civil war? What are
the missions of our forces?
General Pace. Sir, I believe that we do have the
possibility of that devolving to a civil war, but it does not
have to be a fact. I believe that U.S. Armed Forces today can
continue to do what we are doing, which is to help provide
enough security inside of Iraq for the Iraqi government to
provide governance and economic opportunity for their citizens.
The weight of that opportunity rests with the Iraqi people.
We can provide support. We can help provide security. But they
must now decide about their sectarian violence. Shiite and
Sunni are going to have to love their children more than they
hate each other. If they do that and seize the opportunity that
the international community has provided to them, then this
will be what we want it to be, which is a success for ourselves
and the Iraqi people. But the weight of that shift must be on
the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government.
Chairman Warner. I think we have to examine very carefully
what Congress authorized the President to do in the context of
a situation if we are faced with an all-out civil war, and
whether we have to come back to Congress to get further
indication of support.
General Abizaid, I have had the privilege of knowing you
for a long time and I really think you speak with remarkable
candor and draw on an extraordinary career of professionalism.
You spent 1 year of your career in Lebanon. Lebanon is a part
of your AOR as CENTCOM. Do you agree with the premise that in
this current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, recognizing
that Hezbollah attacked Israel, recognizing that Israel has a
perfect right to defend itself, but in so executing their
military campaign it is essential in my judgment the Lebanese
government not be toppled as a consequence of the
infrastructure that is being destroyed in the course of this
war, and can they achieve in this military operation such
degradation of Hezbollah, its command and control, its
inventory of weapons, as to result in a situation whereby a
multinational force can eventually come in, subject to some
form of a ceasefire, and begin to shore up, stabilize that
government, and allow it to take firm control over the entirety
of all aspects of sovereignty of the nation of Lebanon?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, U.N. Resolution 1559 clearly
calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of
Lebanese sovereignty all the way from its northern border to
its southern border. Had that resolution been implemented or
started to move towards implementation, the current problem
would be much less severe than it has become.
The Iranians who have armed Hezbollah with cruise missiles,
antiship missiles, missiles that can reach as far as Haifa and
beyond, have given Hezbollah a state-like existence and
capacity that is unlike any other militia anywhere in the
region. It is absolutely essential that the Lebanese government
regain its sovereignty over its own territory. It will in my
opinion need an international force to help it do that. There
are ways that, in conjunction with the international community,
Hezbollah can be disarmed over time and the Shiite people that
participate in the political life of Hezbollah can be readily
accommodated within the Lebanese body politic.
The question as to whether or not the Israelis can degrade
Hezbollah over time, degradation can take place. I think it is
also very clear to say that over time the consensus of holding
Lebanon together under external pressure starts to break down.
It is very important that Lebanon stay together as a sovereign
country. It is key to stability in the Middle East and it is
essential that that take place, and the international community
needs to move in that direction.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
General, just to first of all thank you, General Abizaid,
General Pace, thank you very much for your service. Welcome,
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think you can understand why it is so
important for your presence here, given these range of issues
that are front and center for the American people.
Let me ask you, General Abizaid, if we have difficulty with
130,000 troops in Iraq trying to disarm the insurgency, how in
the world do we think we are going to be able to get an
international force that is going to disarm Hezbollah?
General Abizaid. Senator, I think with the weight of the
international community and the right rules of engagement and
the right participation of the various parties concerned, that
over time Hezbollah can be disarmed.
Senator Kennedy. Just to come back to a point that the
chairman had mentioned about the costs in Iraq, the $400
billion total, 2,579 have been killed, 19,000 wounded, 54
casualties from my own State of Massachusetts, 70 percent of
these from improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We have been in
Iraq for 40 months and 13 days. The Korean War, 37 months.
World War I, 19 months. The Persian Gulf War, 3 months. World
War II, 42 months--VE Day, 42 months for VE Day, 45 months for
VJ Day. The Civil War was 48 months.
We have been in there now for 40 months and 13 days, with
the finest military that has ever been developed, in basically
rather a third-rate military situation. How much more do we
really expect our military can do? How much more can we demand
of them when they are out there doing such a proud and noble
job of serving our country? How much more can we demand? Why
not is this demand for political accommodation, why is that not
front and center, so that we can start to bring our Americans
home with honor?
General Abizaid. Senator, I think there is a demand for a
combination of military, political, and diplomatic activity
that moves towards a solution that brings Iraq toward
stability. I think over time it becomes less military and more
diplomatic and more political. I believe that this current
government, that is a 4-year government, has that opportunity.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Secretary, just to continue, the exact
words that General Chiarelli said just last week, ``Quite
frankly, in 33 years in the United States Army I have never
trained to stop a sectarian fight. This is something new.''
Now, we hear General Abizaid talk about the increase in
sectarian violence. How are our troops trained to deal with
sectarianism? We know that they were not trained as well as
they should have been when they first went into Iraq. They were
not trained at Abu Ghraib. How are they trained now with this
new sectarianism? How are they trained not to take sides?
Is this new addition of troops in Baghdad the beginning?
Are we going to have to have more troops to deal with this?
What are our troops told in Baghdad now to quell the violence
in this sectarianism? How are they going to not get drawn into
one side or the other with the escalation of the sectarian
violence? What is in their background, what is in their
training, what has been in their leadership, that would give
them the ability to not be involved in this, to quell the
violence and to eventually help President Maliki disarm and
dismantle the militias?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I think your point is a valid
one, that ultimately the sectarian violence is going to be
dealt with by Iraqis and it is going to be dealt with by Iraqi
security forces as a part of the solution, but it is going to
be dealt with through a reconciliation process, a political
process that Prime Minister Maliki and others in the country
are trying to design in a way that it will pull together
elements within the country and thereby reduce sectarian
violence.
I would rather have either of the generals comment on the
training, except to say that the situation in Iraq, with 18
provinces, is really quite different in different provinces. We
have forces in most provinces and the training is different for
the different circumstances that they face.
One of the things that the DOD has done is have extensive
lessons learned from what is taking place in Iraq and different
parts of the country brought back to the Joint Forces Command,
the National Training Center, and the troops are then being
trained up carefully to assure that they have the best kind of
training they can have for the circumstances that we believe at
the time they are going to find in the areas they are going to
be assigned to.
Senator Kennedy. My time is just about up. General Abizaid,
could you expand on this, are they getting in with the growth
of the sectarian violence? How do our troops get in there, not
get embroiled in the sectarian violence, whether your
estimate--is this the beginning or is this the end of the
increased numbers of troops that we are going to need over
there?
How is their background and training actually going to
quell that sectarian violence that you have identified as
escalating at the present time?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid. Senator Kennedy, the first line against
sectarian violence is the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi armed
forces know where the problem is coming from. They know how to
deal with the problem. They can recognize it easier than our
troops can.
But I would also tell you that our forces do have the
capability to precisely target the secular death squad
structure that is responsible for this activity, and more and
more over time we have become proficient at being able to
attack the secular structure of al Qaeda and we intend to use
that capability and intelligence activity that we have used
before to target the militia death squads that we are seeing
operate now in Baghdad with a certain degree of freedom.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
For the record, this is General Chiarelli's full statement.
It is July 27, 2006. He said, ``For the military, the plan is
unchartered ground. Quite frankly, in 33 years in the United
States Army I never trained to stop a sectarian fight,'' he
said. ``This is something new.'' That is the quote to which I
referred to and Senator Kennedy referred to.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses and I want to repeat at the outset my
firm belief that we can and must win in Iraq and that the
consequences of failure would be catastrophic.
General Pace, you said there is a possibility of the
situation in Iraq evolving into civil war, is that correct?
General Pace. I did say that, yes, sir.
Senator McCain. Did you anticipate this situation a year
ago?
General Pace. No, sir.
Senator McCain. Did you, General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. I believe that a year ago it was clear to
see that sectarian tensions were increasing. That they would be
this high, no.
Senator McCain. General Abizaid, we are moving 7,500 troops
into Baghdad, is that correct?
General Abizaid. The number is closer to 3,500.
Senator McCain. 3,500?
General Abizaid. Plus military police that were going there
for other duties, that are being used in the outer cordon
areas, military policemen in particular.
Senator McCain. Where are these troops coming from?
General Abizaid. The troops, the Stryker brigade is coming
down from Mosul.
Senator McCain. From Mosul. Is the situation under control
in Ramadi?
General Abizaid. The situation in Ramadi is better than it
was 2 months ago.
Senator McCain. Is the situation under control in Ramadi?
General Abizaid. I think the situation in Ramadi is
workable.
Senator McCain. The troops from Ramadi came from Fallujah,
is that not correct?
General Abizaid. I cannot say, Senator.
Senator McCain. That is my information. What I worry about
is we are playing a game of whack-a-mole here. We move troops.
It flares up, we move troops there. We all know that Fallujah
was allowed to become a base of operations and insurgency, so
we had to go into Fallujah and fight one of the great battles
in Marine Corps-Army history. Then when I was back there not
too long ago, they said, we have big problems in Ramadi.
Everybody knows we have big problems in Ramadi. I said: Where
are you going to get the troops? We are going to have to move
them from Fallujah. Now we are going to have to move troops
into Baghdad from someplace else.
It is very disturbing. If it is all up to the Iraqi
military, General Abizaid, then I wonder why we have to move
troops into Baghdad to intervene in what is clearly sectarian
violence.
General Abizaid. Senator, Iraqi troops are also being moved
into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the Baghdad area
are greater than our troops. We are in support with them in the
main operational areas, and I believe that under the current
circumstances that the Iraqi forces need to benefit from our
command and control capabilities and the systems of a unit such
as the Stryker brigade that has been moved to the south.
Senator McCain. I would anticipate putting American troops
into this very volatile situation means that American
casualties will probably go up.
General Abizaid. I think it is possible that in the period
ahead of us in Baghdad that we will take increased casualties,
it is possible.
Senator McCain. The situation in southern Iraq. I was
briefed by British military and others that there is a grave
concern about Iranian penetration throughout southern Iraq. Is
that a serious issue?
General Abizaid. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Kudz
force, intelligence agencies, arm, train, and equip what I
would call rogue Shiite groups. Yes, it is a concern.
Senator McCain. Is Basra in control of the militias?
General Abizaid. I think that the militias have greater
influence in Basra than they need to have, and that is why
Prime Minister Maliki has appointed a military officer to go
down there to get the security situation back under control.
Senator McCain. Do you have confidence in the Iraqi
Minister of Interior?
General Abizaid. I do not know the Iraqi Minister of
Interior the way I know the Defense Minister. I have no reason
not to have confidence in him.
Senator McCain. All the reports we have is that day after
day, people are running around in police uniforms and army
uniforms and they are actually militias and they are killing
people. Story after story, they say when you see the people
come in uniform it is an emergency, that people are going to be
killed.
Which brings us obviously to the state of the training, not
of the Iraqi military, but of Iraqi police and law enforcement.
Can you comment on that situation?
General Abizaid. During the period after the national
election when no governance formed, the interior ministry in
particular did not develop its forces in the way that we had
anticipated that they would or should. Military forces, on the
other hand, continued to develop well. They have continued to
perform well. But there is no doubt that police units,
especially local police units, were infiltrated in Basra in
particular, but elsewhere as well, by local militias and they
put their allegiance to the militias ahead of their allegiance
to the state.
It is vital that we turn this around.
Senator McCain. The cleric al-Sadr continues to be a major
obstacle to progress in Iraq. I believe there is still an
outstanding warrant for his arrest. Are we going to address
that issue?
General Abizaid. The issue will be addressed by the Iraqi
government.
Senator McCain. Not by us?
General Abizaid. It will be addressed by the Iraqi
government.
Senator McCain. All of my colleagues are here, so I want to
not take time. I just want to conclude. Secretary Rumsfeld, we
passed an amendment on the National Defense Authorization Act,
which I am confident will be accepted in conference, and that
requires that operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, funding for
it be included in the regular budgetary process.
We are hearing story after story about mismanagement of
funds, corruption, et cetera. We must have sufficient
congressional oversight. I hope you are making plans to include
the expenses involved in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in
the normal budgetary process and not as an ``emergency
supplemental.'' I think you should be able at this time, after
this many years involved in this conflict, be able to predict
what those costs might be.
I want to say again, we will have a showdown unless, both
within this body and with the executive branch, we start going
through the normal budgetary process to fund this conflict,
which I think all of us agree we will be involved in for a long
period of time.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. I would like to have you respond, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are aware of the amendment and
needless to say we will comply with the law. From our
standpoint, we can do it either way. It has been a matter that
has been worked out generally over the years between the White
House, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the
leadership in Congress.
The reality is that what we would have to do, as you
suggested, would be to provide the best estimates that we can
and projections and then make adjustments for them as time
actually passed, and we would be happy to do that.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Pace. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Yes, Chairman.
General Pace. Can I make one clarification, so that the
parents watching this do not believe that somehow their sons
and daughters are not properly trained to handle the kind of
violence that the sectarian violence is creating? What General
Chiarelli said is exactly true, that we do not train to
separate sectarian violence, and that is very much a
responsibility of the politicians and, as we have talked about
already, the Iraqi people need to do that.
With regard to Lieutenant Pace, who is on patrol in Baghdad
with his platoon, and the kind of violence that he is going to
come across, regardless of if it is Sunni, Shiite, or whoever,
if it is an armed group our soldiers and marines certainly are
well-trained to handle that. So there is a difference between
the kind of violence they have to handle and what would prevent
that violence, and preventing that violence is very much the
role of the political leaders in Iraq to solve, sir.
Chairman Warner. That is the purpose of this hearing, to
allow you and other witnesses to clarify these bullet
statements that come before us and the American public. Thank
you, Chairman Pace.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, in your opinion is the Mahdi Army a
terrorist organization with implicit at least support from the
Iranian government?
General Abizaid. In my opinion there are groups within the
Mahdi Army that are under the pay of the Iranian government
that are terrorist organizations. I am not sure I can say that
is necessarily true about the entire organization.
Senator Reed. As Senator McCain pointed out, there is an
outstanding warrant for Muqtada al Sadr, who is the leader of
the Mahdi Army. But his followers are prominent members of the
Iraqi government; is that correct?
General Abizaid. That is correct.
Senator Reed. So when you say the Iraqi government will
dispose of Sadr and the Mahdi Army, he in fact is part of that
government.
General Abizaid. I believe that the prime minister and his
government will take the steps necessary to get the sectarian
violence under control and do what has to be done against the
death squads.
Senator Reed. Do you have any sort of sense of the timing
of this, particularly with respect to the Mahdi Army and to
Sadr?
General Abizaid. Again, I would not characterize the target
as being either Sadr or the Mahdi Army. I would say there are
elements within the Jesh-al-Mahdi that will be targeted because
they are participating in death squad activities.
Senator Reed. With the encouragement, the permission, the
tolerance of Sadr?
General Abizaid. I could not say whether there is a
permission or tolerance or anything of Sadr. I can say that the
prime minister knows and has been very forceful about saying
that militias must be brought under control. He has a wide
range of points that go all the way from direct military
confrontation to agreement with various militias.
Senator Reed. But we will not be involved in that process?
It will be exclusively up to the prime minister and his
security forces?
General Abizaid. I would not say it would be exclusively
the work of Iraqis. It is very clear that our forces in
conjunction with the Iraqis will help target known death squad
organizations.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, the Chief of Staff of the Army
testified before the House Armed Services Committee on June 27
that $4.9 billion in funding that the Army requested for reset,
which is the repair and replacement of equipment, was denied
before the request was submitted to Congress. Did you deny this
request or did the OMB deny the request?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, the normal process is that the
Department is given a budget by the OMB, and we take that
budget and work within the Department to try to fashion a
budget that is balanced and makes sense. Then in the event
there is from time to time a need to go back to the OMB or the
President and request additional funds, we have done that.
I do not know precisely what $4.9 billion, I think you
said.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, did you go back to the
President and ask for more funds because of the critical needs
of the Army and the Marine Corps for reset?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We have certainly gone to the President
and the OMB and explained the need for reset and negotiated it
extensively with the OMB. Regrettably, there have been cuts
made by Congress every year in the defense budget. There have
been not only reductions in our budget, there have been things
that have been added in that we did not request that required
us to take money from other things. Third, there have been
things required of us that we were prevented from making
savings.
The net effect of it, if you look just today in the
authorization and appropriation bills between the House and the
Senate, it runs somewhere between $10, $15, or $20 billion,
depending on how you calculate it.
Senator Reed. So the White House did turn down your request
for additional money for reset, yes or no?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That would not be correct.
Senator Reed. So you did not ask?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I cannot say that, because we went
through an extensive discussion and negotiation and we ended up
with the budget we ended up with, which was then reduced by
Congress.
Senator Reed. Last Tuesday evening the Senate passed an
appropriation for $13 billion of additional funding for reset.
Is that money appropriate or is it in some way a waste of
resources?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is clearly needed.
Senator Reed. Why did you not ask the White House before
they sent the request to Congress for that clearly needed
money?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We did talk to the White House about it
and that is where the number came from, was from the DOD.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, what you are saying, I think,
is either you asked for the money and they said no or you
accepted a limit despite the needs that you recognized for
reset. It is one or the other?
Secretary Rumsfeld. You have lost me. At first you were
talking about----
Senator Reed. I think you have lost everyone with this
dialogue.
Secretary Rumsfeld. First you were talking about $4.9
billion, I thought. Now you are talking about the $13 billion,
$13.1 billion I think, and we have requested that of OMB and
they have requested it of Congress and Congress has put it in
the bill, as I understand it has.
Senator Reed. When did you request the $13 billion, Mr.
Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Within the last period of months,
weeks.
Senator Reed. Weeks?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, weeks.
Senator Reed. Days. Why did you not request the $13 billion
when the budget was being prepared to be sent to Congress?
Secretary Rumsfeld. When the budget was being prepared to
be sent to Congress, it would have been January of last year
for the budget that still has not been passed by Congress this
year. For the supplemental it would have been late last year,
not the beginning of last year but late last year, when those
budgets are prepared.
We gain knowledge every month that goes by, and it is very
clear the Army has a reset problem. It is also clear that the
$13 billion is needed.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, it is very clear that two-
thirds of the Army operating force, Active-Duty and Reserve, is
now reporting as unready. There is not a single nondeployed
Army brigade combat team in the United States that is ready to
deploy. The bottom line is that we have no ready strategic
Reserve, and this is a stunning indictment of your leadership.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it is an inaccurate statement.
Senator Reed. How so? Have you seen the readiness reports,
Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have.
Senator Reed. It is inaccurate to say that the readiness
reports of the Army do not indicate severe equipment shortages,
leaving many brigades of the United States as nondeployable?
Secretary Rumsfeld. If you will allow me a few minutes to
respond, it is complicated, but I would be happy to do so. I
stand with what I say. I think the characterization that you
made is not accurate. It is complicated. If one sees a chart
that shows a deterioration like this over a 5-, 6-, 7-, 10-year
period, one has to assume that the readiness of the military,
in this case the Army, has deteriorated. Now, the fact of the
matter is if you begin with a standard, a requirement, that is
X and then you show the beginning of the chart, and then at the
end you have changed your requirement because you have decided
you need different things, you have learned from the
experiences of the last period of years and you have increased
your requirements to 5X, and then you compare yourself against
5X, so if you have improved 300 percent--you were at 100
percent to begin, at 1X, and now you need 5X, you have decided
your requirement is different, and you have improved 300
percent to get there, you are still short of that requirement.
That is what shows the deterioration. The fact of the
matter is the equipment that the military has today is vastly
better today than it was 5 years ago. The readiness of our
capabilities are--if you measure them against full spectrum,
you can say they are not ready to do everything that anyone
conceivably might need to do.
On the other hand, if you ask the readiness of the forces
with respect to what they are being asked to do, ask General
Abizaid, are the forces over there capable of doing what they
are doing, equipped and trained to do what they are doing, he
will tell you yes. If you ask General Schoomaker, are the Armed
Forces of the United States considerably better today, more
capable, better equipped than they were 5 years ago, he will
say yes.
If you ask General Pace the question, is the United States
today capable of doing, fulfilling the requirements that the
country has put on them, the answer is yes.
Senator Reed. Let me take that opportunity. General Pace,
have you seen the last readiness----
Chairman Warner. Senator, wait a minute.
Senator Reed. Excuse me.
Chairman Warner. You are way over your time. Just a minute.
We need to allow the witness to fully respond to your question.
I think your question has been stated. We will have another
round and you can pursue this at that time. But I have to
accommodate other members. You are quite a bit over your time.
Has the witness had the opportunity to fully reply to the
question before him?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have. I think it would be useful just
for the context if the Senator's last question could be
responded to.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to ask my
questions, rather than have the Secretary ask my questions for
me?
Chairman Warner. Well, now, Senator----
Senator Reed. If I have given up my time, then my time is
gone.
Chairman Warner. Just a minute. We allowed you to ask your
question very fully. It was stated. It is in the record, I
think with clarity, and the Secretary was responding. We will
have a second round, at which time you can further pursue this
important subject. I recognize the importance of the subject.
Now, the Secretary has asked for General Pace to give his
perspective in response to the Senator's question.
General Pace. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Readiness is reflected in personnel, in training, and in
equipment. Any time a unit comes back from any deployment, when
I was battalion commander, the unit has people change out and
therefore the personnel numbers go down. The training as a
result of the unit coming back starts out anew into the new
cycle. Equipment is taken from what has been used and put into
depot maintenance. That is in normal peacetime.
In wartime, we are using equipment at much greater rates.
So where you have a notional unit that has 100 trucks and they
deploy and they come back, and the trucks normally would be
driven 1,000 miles in a year and they are driven 10,000 miles
in combat, you have a larger number of those vehicles that end
up being put into the depot maintenance, which for the unit
that is home then reduces their readiness based on availability
of equipment.
The units that are forward have had not only the equipment
that they went over with, but have been augmented thanks to
Congress providing the funding. For example, our up-armored
Humvees. The requirement globally when we started in September
2001 was about 2,000. That number now is up at 12,000. We have
bought up to 12,000 and we have used them in combat, and now a
number of those 12,000 are currently in depot maintenance
waiting.
So we are way over the 2,000 we started with. But now,
because of maintenance, usage, and combat losses, we are below
the 12,000 that folks are asking for today. So it is very
difficult when you turn the kaleidoscope to see all the pieces
and it does not allow itself to have a straight, easy answer.
Fundamentally, the United States Army is much more capable
today. Fundamentally, the Army that is fighting our war for us
today deployed is in tremendous shape, personnel, training, and
equipment-wise. But it is absolutely a fact that, for various
budgetary reasons, some of which are a result of actions taken
by Congress, that we do not have enough funding currently to
provide for the repair of all of the equipment that currently
sits at our depots waiting to be repaired. I believe that is
where the dialogue is about how much money is needed. That
$13.1 billion as I understand it, if approved by Congress, will
in fact allow the Marine Corps and the Army to take the
equipment that is currently stacked up at their depots, hire
the workforce, and begin the process.
But what has happened, when we have not had budgets and we
have had continuing resolutions, some of the workforce has had
to be let go. We cannot have the depots not know whether or not
they are going to be able to have the funding long-term to hire
people. We cannot go out and hire Mechanic Pace for 6 months
and then let him go and expect to hire him back again.
I would ask as we look at this, that we look at some kind
of no-year funding that is focused on the backlog of equipment
repair, that will allow the depots to consciously go out and
hire people who can stay in the workforce long enough to get
this work done.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. The Senator from Rhode Island raises a
very important question and we will further explore it in the
course of this hearing. Mr. Secretary, I am going to seek to
get documentation that I looked at where you did engage with
OMB about the need for these funds. So I think that
documentation will be put in this record.
I am advised by the cloakroom that we have two back-to-back
votes. It is my intention to go over quickly and vote in the
first vote and, Senator McCain, I would ask that you chair
because I am going to be absent for that vote. We will keep the
hearing going, colleagues, as members come and go on these
votes.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to thank
you for giving General Pace the opportunity to respond to that
question. I think that was an excellent response.
Let me just make a couple of observations if I might. I
find it really interesting. I think most of the members of this
committee have been to Iraq varying numbers of times. There are
some of them who have not been at all. When you get the
reaction, the response and the opinions that are formulated by
those who have not been there, it is totally different than
those who have really been there and understand first-hand what
is going on.
There is no better example of that than an article that was
in the paper in USA Today just this morning, that said that
only--without quoting a source, at least I did not see a
source--of the 18 provinces, only one was able to be secured
just with the Iraqis. On the other hand, Dr. Rubaire, who is a
person I have known for quite some time, at the National
Security Agency (NSA), said that right now 4 out of 18 are
under the protection and security of Iraqi security forces, and
there are 9 more that will be in a very short period of time,
which is 13 out of 18.
When you hear people who have not been there and depend on
press reports, there is no way that they can get the resolve
that our troops have. There is no way--I will share with you,
General Pace, since this is up in the Marines' area, in
Fallujah, an experience up there with this Dr. Madhi, that you
have met many times I am sure. General Madhi was actually the
brigade commander for Saddam Hussein. He hated Americans until
he started embedded training with the marines, and he learned
to love them so much that he said that when they rotated them
out that they cried. He then renamed the Iraqi security forces
at Fallujah the ``Fallujah Marines.''
Things like that that are going on, you can only get by
being there and experiencing it. Now, I came back from my 11th
trip to the CENTCOM AOR and I timed that trip so that it was
right after Zarqawi saw his demise and after the new cabinet
appointments were put into place. You hear a lot about Maliki
and so forth and perhaps even Minister Jaseem, but when you sit
down and spend quality time with them you get a different
impression than you do by looking at the media here. Certainly
Dr. Rubaie is the same way.
Minister Jaseem at that time, General Pace, said, or maybe
General Abizaid could respond to this, he said at that time
that, of the 36 brigades, 17--we are talking about the Iraqi
brigades now--17 were at level 2, or in other words were
capable of autonomous operations, and of the 112 battalions 62
were at level 2. Now, this was 2 months ago.
Do you agree with his assessment at that time of those who
are trained and equipped, Iraqi security forces, and has that
changed in the last 2 months?
General Abizaid. Senator Inhofe, I think the best way to
characterize where the Iraqis are doing well has to do with
their units that are in the lead, in the lead in the security
structure in whatever area that has been assigned to them. In
October 2004--of 2005, 1 division, 4 brigades, and 23
battalions of the Iraqi armed forces were in the lead in their
sectors. Today it is 4 divisions, 21 brigades, and 77
battalions.
That is a pretty impressive gain. I think it is really
important for people to understand that, while there are a lot
of very important warning signals that cannot be lost to us
about where sectarian violence is heading in Baghdad, the most
important point that we have to keep in mind is that the army
is holding together and that the government is committed to
bringing the sectarian violence under control.
So the question is, am I optimistic whether or not Iraqi
forces with our support, with the backing of the Iraqi
government, can prevent the slide to civil war? My answer is
yes, I am optimistic that that slide can be prevented.
Senator Inhofe. That is consistent with what we get from
the other side. I like these hearings here where we get it from
you, but also to go over there and see what they have to say
about it.
I have to say this, that I was incredibly impressed. We all
are familiar with Maliki, but Minister Jaseem and this Dr.
Rubaie, someone I had known some time before, they are very
optimistic about their level of professionalism. When you talk
to the troops, getting back up to Fallujah--I was up there
during the elections, knowing that they were actually risking
their lives. They were just rejoicing at that time. Asking them
the question, do you see the time in the future where you are
going to be able to take over your own security, they just very
enthusiastically say it is.
General Abizaid. Senator Inhofe, if I may, I just want to
say, the Iraqi soldiers are fighting, they are taking
casualties. They are fighting for their nation. They are trying
to get the sectarian violence and the insurgency under control.
They deserve an enormous amount of our respect and support.
So I think sometimes we seem to think that we are the only
forces there. We are not. There are 220,000 plus Iraqis that
are out there fighting and doing a pretty good job. Yes, there
are some problems within their organizations, but they are
maturing and they are doing better, and they will continue to
do better.
Senator Inhofe. They are committed. I happened to be in
Saddam's home town when the training area was bombed by the
terrorists. About 40 of them, 41 I think it was, were either
killed or very seriously injured. Those families, those 40
families, resupplied a member of their family to replace the
one that was killed. This is the type of thing, the stories
that you do not hear.
I know my time has expired, but for the record, Senator
McCain, I would like to ask them to give us some information.
According to Chiarelli and several others, including the
Iraqis, probably one of the most serious problems, even though
it does not have a lot of sex appeal to it, is the logistics,
both civilian and military, and the problem of the
organizational structure to distribute simple equipment and
supplies is not there. I would like to get your opinions as to
what we are trying to do to correct the problem of logistical
problems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Over the past year, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
(MNSTC-I), in conjunction with Iraqi counterparts, developed two
detailed and concise action plans to improve logistics and Iraqi self-
sustainment. The first action plan for the Ministry of Defense was
finalized and approved 4 October 2006. The second action for the
Ministry of Interior was approved 6 November 2006. These plans outline
synchronized and deliberate processes for the generation of Iraqi
logistics capabilities and sequential procedures for transferring those
capabilities to Iraqi oversight, funding, management, and control.
MNSTC-I is approaching the development of Iraqi logistics
sustainment along three parallel avenues. First, MNSTC-I is assisting
the Iraqi ministries in the development of their own capabilities to
sustain themselves and transferring to them those responsibilities as
we mentor them through difficulties. This course of action is best
exemplified by the Iraqi ministries' assumption of life support and
feeding responsibilities. Second, MNSTC-I is coaching the ministries
through the more complex tasks that they are capable of self-performing
using Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case funded contracts. These
contracts allow the Iraqis to oversee, train, and control commodity and
functional areas while we provide a safety net of experienced,
established, and honest workforces to maintain sustainment while
increasing their capabilities. This course is best experienced by the
Iraqi assumption of ammunition and maintenance responsibilities. Third,
MNSTC-I is teaching higher order complex and skilled logistics
functions such as forecasting, budgeting, and contracting. This is best
exemplified by our lead in the joint partnership of developing the
military depot and police maintenance capabilities for complex repair
and the Iraqi support command contracting and commodity management
skills required to sustain a national logistics system.
Recognizing the importance of logistics, the MNSTC-I commander has
identified 2007 as the year of logistics and leaders. MNSTC-I is
working diligently to train logisticians for every level of the Iraqi
Military and Civil Security Forces. The military training mission is
training individuals at every level of the logistics system from the
service company to the depot level. The Civil Security Forces are
utilizing the training opportunities offered by the police ``re-
bluing'' initiative and local civilian logistics capabilities to expand
the effectiveness of their sustainment processes.
Both the military and police force training teams, located at every
level of the Iraqi chain of command from the ministry to the small unit
level, have been focused or assisting the Iraqis in self-sustainment
and process improvement. The MNSTC-I commander has tasked every leader
in MNSTC-I to transition from leading logistics from the front, to
leading side-by-side with our Iraqi partners, and ultimately to
assisting from behind as the Iraqis assume greater responsibility in
the planning, execution, and improvement of their logistics system.
Using self-performance, increased Iraqi participation, and FMS
reinforcement for complex task development, MNSTC-I has an aggressive
and achievable plan to transition logistics to Iraqi oversight and
management by the end of 2007.
Senator McCain [presiding]. Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Today I think
your testimony in response to questions has been very helpful.
In connection with the number of Iraqi troops who are
combat capable, out of the 250,000-plus security forces that
are there, is there any estimate of the number who would be
combat capable?
General Abizaid. Senator, for the record, the number of
trained Iraqi police, border security, and Iraqi military
forces, the number is closer to 275,000. The combat capability
within the army, I think again the best measure are those units
that are in the lead, which are 4 brigades--4 divisions, 21
brigades, and 77 battalions.
But there is a very detailed list of what unit is at what
level, that we can certainly provide to you.
Senator Ben Nelson. That would be very helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
General Abizaid. They are much improved and they continue
to improve every month.
Senator Ben Nelson. Which is part of the emphasis on
standing their military up so that we can stand ours down. The
faster and the more capable they are, hopefully then there
should be some sort of connection with the reduction of our
Armed Forces as a result of that.
In terms of the police, let us say the municipal police, do
we know what percentage or what number of the total number you
would look at as being, not combat or capably trained, but
honest and as part of the overall government, as opposed to a
militia?
General Abizaid. It is a difficult question to answer.
There are some places where the local police are exceptionally
efficient and very honest, very capable. There are other areas
where we know that they have been infiltrated by various
militias, such as in Basra, where the government and the
British forces that are down there are doing their best to
stand down those units, retrain them, and bring them on line in
a credible and capable manner.
As far as the national police forces are concerned, in
Baghdad it is clear that there are a number of battalions--
again, without my notes in front of me I would take it for the
record, but there are battalions that need to be stood down and
retrained, and Generals Casey and Dempsey are working to do
that now.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Deleted.]
Senator Ben Nelson. Do we know whether approximately 50
percent or 30 percent?
General Abizaid. I would say it is probably 30 percent.
Senator Ben Nelson. 30 percent.
General Abizaid. That is national police, which is separate
and distinct from----
Senator Ben Nelson. Municipal and-or the military.
I think the debate about whether we have a date for
withdrawal or there is an open-ended commitment--hopefully the
debate will continue. But I wonder about an approach that is
different than setting a date for withdrawal and to close any
question about whether it is an open-ended commitment, would be
better approached on setting conditions for staying with the
prime minister, with the Iraqi government. In other words,
there is a lot of slippage on how we have standing up to stand
down in terms of their military versus our military because
things change on the ground.
But do we have some idea of what our conditions for staying
are? Is there a tipping point in terms of their ability or
inability to get to a certain level so that they can deal with
sectarian violence on their own or the Sunni insurgency, to
govern themselves, but also to secure themselves?
I guess I would feel more comfortable if we could establish
some sort of metrics to know what it takes in terms of
percentage, numbers, and what it will take in terms of time so
that we can say that they are capable of not only governing
themselves with the elected government, but also in terms of
securing themselves so they can govern themselves.
I do not know who would like to take that question, but I
throw it out to all three of you.
General Abizaid. Senator, the government has been in
existence now for 3 months. They have a lot of work to do to
cement their capability to govern. It is a very difficult thing
to bring in a new government under these conditions of
sectarian violence and insurgency. I think it is very important
for people to understand, while there may be a military metric
to units in the Iraqi army that are equipped and trained and
them taking over certain battle space, there is also a very
important political aspect to this reduction of sectarian
violence, which is the various communities getting together and
agreeing upon ways to reduce the sectarian violence themselves.
It is important that there be a national reconciliation
effort and it is important that there be agreed-upon measures
to move forward with various militias that are operating
outside of government control. I think a combination of those
things will lead to less violence over time, establish the role
of the national government in Iraq, and allow us to bring our
level of forces down as appropriate.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Nelson, I would just add that
the U.S. Ambassador and General Casey have established a
committee or a commission with the new Iraqi government and the
national security officials in that government to address the
very issues that you are raising as to what are the things that
need to be done, because, as General Abizaid correctly points
out, they reach well beyond military capabilities.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your answers.
Senator McCain. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, General, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here
and for your responses to the questions. I would like to ask
General Abizaid a question. I talked to a soldier last week who
has had two deployments to Iraq and raised the question about
whether or not the objectives and the goals that we have in
Iraq are aligned with the goals that the Iraqi people have, and
that they are not. One of the reasons--it seems to me at least
if we are going to get control of the sectarian situation there
the Iraqi people have to buy into what is happening in Iraq.
His suggestion was that they have not. I know that when we
have traveled to Iraq--and I was there a couple of months back
with Senator McCain's delegation--we hear from, obviously, the
commanders and we talk with some of our troops. In most cases
we do not have a lot of interaction with the Iraqi people. But
I am just wondering if you could comment about the overall--the
interaction that we have with the Iraqi people, our troops on
the ground over there, the temperature in terms of their
willingness to be a part of a national unity government, a
democratic Iraq, and that sort of thing, relative to what we
are trying to accomplish there.
This was one soldier who says he visits with these folks
all the time and thinks that their interests and their
objectives and goals are not aligned with what ours are over
there.
General Abizaid. There are certainly people in Iraq that do
not want Iraq to come together as an independent state. There
are terrorist groups that have views that they want Iraq to
descend into a state of anarchy and chaos so they can establish
safe havens for terrorism in the region.
But I think that as I go around and I talk to Iraqi
military officers, Iraqi government officials, and people
throughout the country--and I think General Casey certainly
would echo this--the majority of the people want Iraq to come
together as a free and independent nation that is capable of
being a meaningful member of the community of nations in that
part of the world, that is not dominated by either Iranians or
dominated by Sunni extremist groups. I believe that they know
they have to fight in order to achieve that.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it ought not to be surprising,
Senator, that an American soldier would visit with Iraqis and
see that they do have a different perspective. They live in a
different part of the world, they have a different history, and
it is fully understandable.
On the other hand, 12 million of them went out and voted,
and they went out and fashioned a constitution and then
ratified it. It is there for the world to see. They have been
voting in increasing numbers. So while you are right and
General Abizaid is certainly right that there are Baathists who
want to take back the country, there are Shiite who would like
to dominate it to the detriment of the Sunnis, the fact of the
matter is that 12 million Iraqis went out and voted for that
constitution, and that is not nothing. It is something
important.
Senator Thune. I appreciate General Abizaid's comment,
which I have heard you make previously as well, that the forces
that want to hold the country together and see it succeed
outnumber and are greater than those that want to see it fail.
But I just wanted to get your assessment of the on-the-ground,
average Iraqi on the street type of view of what is happening
there, because it seems to me at least that that is a key
component in starting to turn over information on some of the
bad guys who are committing the violence there and really
making this thing work.
One other question has to do again with the borders and how
are we doing with respect to Iran and Syria? Foreign arms serve
as the lifeblood of the insurgent groups. Does the Iraqi
government see that as a threat to their sovereignty and are
they stepping up and doing some of the work to protect the
borders and make sure that a lot of the arms that are coming in
are cut off?
What is your assessment of that? I have asked a lot of
questions of your colleagues who have been in front of this
committee about IEDs, for example, and where are they getting
the materials to make these IEDs. It seems at least a lot of
that is coming from some of these other countries. I know it is
impossible, with the length of the borders and everything else,
to completely shut it off, but are there efforts being made to
regulate and control the materials that are coming in that are
being used to inflict casualties on our troops?
General Abizaid. Yes, Senator, there is a lot of effort
building a border force. The border force is effective in some
areas, less effective in others. The Iraqi armed forces also
back up the border forces. The Syrian border remains the
primary conduit for foreign fighters. I think those numbers
remain less than 100 or so that are transitting back and forth.
The vast majority of the munitions that are used inside
Iraq come from inside Iraq. There are certainly smuggling
routes that Iranian Revolutionary Guard Kudz Force people are
using to bring in IEDs into the south and into some of the
northern portions of Iraq, that have been used, and it is clear
that that has taken place.
Senator Thune. Were those weapons caches that were
discovered this last week, has it been determined whether those
were leftovers from the previous regime or are those that have
come in, that have flooded in from other countries?
General Abizaid. Sir, I would have to see the specific
report. There are weapons caches found every day.
Senator Thune. All right.
General Pace. Sir, to help with that number, we have had
420,000 tons of ammunition captured and destroyed in some over
14,000 locations in theater. So it is a huge cache location,
and we find them every day.
Senator Thune. Thank you. I thank you for your outstanding
service to our country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Senator McCain. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Mr. Secretary, we are glad you are here. In your opening
statement you referenced the common sense of Americans. I think
it is fair to say that that collective common sense
overwhelmingly does not either understand or approve of the way
you and the administration are handling Iraq and Afghanistan.
Under your leadership there have been numerous errors in
judgment that have led us to where we are in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We have a full-fledged insurgency and full-blown
sectarian conflict in Iraq. Now, whether you label it a civil
war or not, it certainly has created a situation of extreme
violence and the continuing loss of life among our troops and
of the Iraqis.
You did not go into Iraq with enough troops to establish
law and order. You disbanded the entire Iraqi army. Now we are
trying to recreate it. You did not do enough planning for what
is called phase 4 and rejected all the planning that had been
done previously to maintain stability after the regime was
overthrown. You underestimated the nature and strength of the
insurgency, the sectarian violence, and the spread of Iranian
influence.
Last year Congress passed the United States Policy in Iraq
Act, which I strongly supported. This law declares 2006 to be a
year of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with
Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a
free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for
the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq.
However, we appear to be moving in the opposite direction,
with the number of U.S. troops in Iraq scheduled to increase,
not decrease. That is the only way I think you can fairly
consider the decision with respect to 172nd Stryker brigade.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we return to our States for the August
recess, our constituents have a lot of questions and concerns
about the current state of affairs in both Iraq and
Afghanistan. I do not need to remind any of us that we continue
to lose our young men and women, 120 from New York alone.
Besides the U.S. losses, violence does seem to be
increasing. From January to June of this year, there were
14,338 Iraqi civilian casualties, at least as far as anyone can
count. In May and June alone, more than 5,000 deaths and 5,700
injuries. In a July 22 article in The New York Times, General
Abizaid was quoted as saying: ``2 months after the new Iraqi
government took office, the security gains that we had hoped
for had not been achieved.''
Then there was the big ballyhooed announcement of forward
together and the commitment by the new Iraqi government to
secure Baghdad. Two months into that, it is clear it is not
working and we are now putting in more American troops and,
following the lead of Senator McCain's line of questioning, we
are moving them from other places that are hardly stable and
secure.
In Afghanistan, your administration's credibility is also
suspect. In September 2002 you said the Taliban are gone. In
September 2004, President Bush said the Taliban no longer is in
existence. However, this February Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) Director Lieutenant General Maples said that in 2005
attacks by the Taliban and other anti-coalition forces were up
20 percent from 2004 levels and these insurgents were a greater
threat to the Afghan government's efforts to expand its
authority than at any time since 2001. Further, General
Eikenberry made a comparable comment with respect to the
dangers that are now going on in Afghanistan and the failure to
be able to secure it.
Obviously, I could go on and on. A recent book, aptly
titled ``Fiasco,'' describes in some detail the decisionmaking
apparatus that has led us to this situation.
So, Mr Secretary, when our constituents ask for evidence
that your policy in Iraq and Afghanistan will be successful,
you do not leave us with much to talk about. Yes, we hear a lot
of happy talk and rosy scenarios, but because of the
administration's strategic blunders and frankly, the record of
incompetence in executing, you are presiding over a failed
policy.
Given your track record, Secretary Rumsfeld, why should we
believe your assurances now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. My goodness. First, I tried to make
notes and to follow the prepared statement you have presented.
First of all, it is true there is sectarian conflict in Iraq
and there is a loss of life, and it is an unfortunate and
tragic thing that is taking place. It is true that there are
people who are attempting to prevent that government from being
successful, and they are the people who are blowing up
buildings and killing innocent men, women, and children, and
taking off the heads of people on television, and the idea of
their prevailing is unacceptable.
Second, you said the number of troops were wrong. I guess
history will make a judgment on that. The number of troops that
went in and the number of troops that were there every month
since and the number of troops that are there today reflected
the best judgment of the military commanders on the ground,
their superiors, General Pace, General Abizaid, the civilian
leadership of the DOD, and the President of the United States.
I think it is not correct to assume that they were wrong
numbers. I do not think the evidence suggests that, and it will
be interesting to see what history decides. The balance between
having too many and contributing to an insurgency by the
feeding of occupation and the risk of having too few and having
the security situation not be sufficient for the political
progress to go forward is a complicated set of decisions, and I
do not know that there is any guidebook that tells you how to
do it. There is no rule book, there is no history for this. The
judgments that have been made have been made by exceedingly
well-trained people, the gentlemen sitting next to me, the
people on the ground in Iraq. They were studied and examined
and analyzed by the civilian leadership and by the President
and they were confirmed.
So I think your assertion is at least debatable.
The idea that the army was disbanded I think is one that is
kind of flying around. My impression is that to a great extent
that army disbanded itself. Our forces came in so fast. It was
made up of a lot of Shiite conscripts who did not want to be in
it and thousands, or at least many hundreds of Sunni generals,
who were not about to hang around after Saddam Hussein and his
sons and administration were replaced. The work to build a new
army has included an awful lot of the people from the prior
army and it has benefited from that.
Third, the assertion that the government rejected all the
planning that had been done before is just simply false. That
is not the case. The planning that had been done before was
taken into account by the people who were executing the post-
major combat operations activities.
The comments about Baghdad I will possibly let General
Abizaid comment on. The goal is not to have U.S. forces do the
heavy lifting in Baghdad. There are many more Iraqi forces in
Baghdad. The role of the U.S. forces is to help them, to
provide logistics, to assist them as needed, and to create a
presence that will allow the Iraqi security forces to succeed,
and then as our forces step back allow the Iraqi security
forces to be sufficient to maintain order in the city.
I cannot predict if it will work this time. It may or it
may not. It happens to represent the best judgment of General
Casey, General Chiarelli, and the military leadership, and
General Abizaid and General Pace and I have reviewed it and we
think that it is a sensible approach, as General Abizaid
testified earlier.
As for Afghanistan, I do not know who said what about the
Taliban are gone, but in fact, the Taliban that were running
Afghanistan and ruling Afghanistan were replaced, and they were
replaced by an election that took place in that country. In
terms of a government or a governing entity, they were gone and
that is a fact.
Are there still Taliban around? You bet. Are they occupying
safe havens in Afghanistan and other places--correction, in
Pakistan and other places? Certainly they are. Is the violence
up? Yes. Does the violence tend to be up during the summer and
spring, summer and fall months? Yes, it does, and it tends to
decline during the winter period.
Does that represent failed policy? I do not know. I would
say not. I think you have an awful lot of very talented people
engaged in this and the decisions that are being made are being
made with great care, after a great deal of consideration. Are
there setbacks? Yes. Are there things that people cannot
anticipate? Yes. Does the enemy have a brain and continue to
make adjustments on the ground, requiring our forces to
continue to make adjustments? You bet. Is that going to
continue to be the case? I think so.
Is this problem going to get solved in the near-term about
this long struggle against violent extremism? No, I do not
believe it is. I think it is going to take some time. I know
the question was some wars lasted 3 years, some wars lasted 4
years, some wars lasted 5 years. The Cold War lasted 40-plus
years. This struggle against violent extremists who are
determined to prevent free people from exercising their rights
as free people is going to go on a long time and it is going to
be a tough one.
That does not mean that we have to spend the rest of our
lives as the United States Armed Forces in Iraq. The Iraqis are
going to have to take that over. We cannot want freedom more
for the Iraqi people than they want for themselves. Senator
Thune mentioned earlier about that issue.
I would point out the number of tips that have been coming
from Iraqi people have been going up steadily. They are at a
very high level and it does suggest to me that the Iraqi people
do want to have a free country, as I mentioned because of their
voting patterns.
So I would disagree strongly with your statement.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Secretary, I know you would and I know
you feel strongly about it, but there is a track record here.
This is not 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, when you appeared before
this committee and made many comments and presented many
assurances that have, frankly, proven to be unfulfilled.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, I do not think that is true. I
have never painted a rosy picture. I have been very measured in
my words, and you would have a dickens of a time trying to find
instances where I have been excessively optimistic. I
understand this is tough stuff.
Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous
consent to submit for the record a number of the Secretary's
former comments. Also, may we keep the record open for
additional questions?
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Chairman Warner [presiding]. The record will remain open
until the close of business today for all members to contribute
additional questions.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Pace. Senator, may I go on the record, sir?
Chairman Warner. Yes, of course.
General Pace. Thank you, sir. I think it is very important
that I as Chairman, having been Vice Chairman since October 1,
2001, having been part of the dialogue, having worked closely
with General Franks, General Casey, General Abizaid, all the
Joint Chiefs: The numbers of forces that have been requested up
the chain of command have been thoroughly discussed, the pros
and cons or the balance, what was needed, how we might provide
it, the equipment, the tactics of the major operations, all of
those things have come up through the Joint Chiefs. We have
given our best military advice.
The collaborative nature between our leaders here in
Washington and those in the field is as thorough and complete
as I can imagine. I have personally been part of each of those
decisions and I want to go on record as saying that I along
with the Joint Chiefs have been, continue to be, part of the
decision process, and everything to my knowledge that we have
ever asked for with regards to equipment or personnel has been
provided to us.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Again, I have listened to this very important colloquy, but
I do believe, Mr. Secretary, having followed this, as is my
responsibility, these many years, I think both Secretary
Rumsfeld, your predecessor General Myers, and you, General
Pace, have always made statements which were in balance and
definitely indicating the seriousness of the conflict and the
fact that it is going to be a long and a drawn-out one. Our
record has many entries in it to the effect that the President
and the Secretary of Defense have relied upon the advice of the
senior military commanders in structuring those force levels.
We will be happy to include in the record some material of
our own on that point. I think, given the number of questions
coming about the record, we will hold the record open until
close of business on Friday.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank sincerely each of you for your service to
our country. I know that all of you live with enormous demands
of your positions and the conditions around the world. With
respect, we and more importantly the American people deserve to
be told, I think more candidly perhaps than we have so far, why
the Iraqis remain incapable of succeeding in Iraq and, since
our success is predicated on their success, what we and they
are going to do about it.
Secretary Rumsfeld, you said in your remarks that you
remain confident in the good common sense of the American
people, and I agree with you that confidence is well-placed.
The American people can tell the difference between succeeding
and failing. They perceive, I think correctly, that the Iraqis
are failing in Iraq and that our courageous troops continue to
bear the brunt of the Iraqi failures, and that the realities
there overall are getting worse, not better.
I believe that all of you are mistaken to cast the failures
in Iraq as a test of our citizens' will and resolve. I think it
is unfair to the American people to do so.
I respectfully disagree with your assertion, General Pace,
that most Americans are not affected by this war every day.
Most of them lived through September 11, 2001, as you did and
we did. They remain profoundly affected by it. They accepted
the President's assertion that the United States invasion of
Iraq was essential to protect our national security, that
Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, as the President and the Vice
President said, that immediately and urgently threatened the
United States.
The American people continued to support the war even after
no WMD were found, even when their sons and daughters and
husbands and wives, as you said, General, over a million of
them, have been sent halfway around the world, risking their
lives, giving their lives, to carry out the orders of their
commander in chief.
It is not their will, the will of the American people, that
is being tested. It is their tolerance for failure. Over 2,600
Minnesota National Guard's men and women are now serving in
Iraq. They are away from their families for 18 months. Some of
them will never return alive. They come from 80 of Minnesota's
87 counties. They are the best and the brightest in their
communities. So it is not just their families, but it is entire
communities that are affected by their absences.
So those families and their fellow citizens deserve to know
when the Iraqis are going to be able to take over
responsibility civically, militarily, and security so that they
can come home when the victory that they achieved when they
toppled the Saddam Hussein regime is secured.
I have attended, as all of my colleagues have, I am sure,
far too many funerals and wakes in Minnesota, where hundreds
and even thousands of grateful and grieving citizens attend.
Every one of those funerals is a leading news story in all of
the statewide media.
So the people of Minnesota and I believe this country are
asking us, both you and us, their leaders, to tell them what is
really going on there, not with political spins from either
side of the aisle, but the truth, the basic facts: What is the
situation in Iraq? Why is it seemingly getting worse, not
better, as evidenced, as others have said, by the need to bring
more U.S. troops into the capital city of Baghdad? What is our
strategy? What is our strategy for reversing that slide? What
is the solution to getting the inability of the Iraqis--I
remember being with General Petraeus in Iraq in December 2004.
He talked candidly there about how it was the most difficult
situation he had ever faced in his career trying to train these
forces to stand up, not to the American Army, but to their
fellow citizens, to these insurgents, some terrorists, but we
are told again and again, at least in most of the briefings,
95-plus percent of the violence is generated by indigenous
Iraqis.
So their standing up--their inability to stand up to their
fellow citizens has caused, according to the reports that I
have read, some 850,000 Iraqi citizens to flee the country
because they cannot even go to work every day, cannot go to
school, without basic security.
Again, by the indicators that I can look at, they are
mixed, but predominantly this is a failed effort by the Iraqi
people and it continues to be. When are we going to see some
indications of their ability to succeed, and if not what are we
going to do about it? Mr. Secretary, I will ask you and then
others to respond.
General Abizaid. Senator Dayton, thank you. I disagree. I
believe the Iraqis are capable of succeeding. I believe they do
want to succeed. I believe they are honorable people who want
to live a better life and have security for their children,
just like we do.
These forces of extremism are strong. They are very
ruthless. They are well-connected, not only inside Iraq but
globally, and they present a formidable force that has to be
dealt with.
We are not operating in the region in some sort of a
battlefield where the enemy does not exist. The enemy exists in
Iraq. It exists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Jordan, and in Lebanon. You name the location in the region and
they exist there.
People say the war started on September 11, 2001, but you
can make a case for the war having started in October 1983 when
Hezbollah destroyed the Marine barracks and killed over 200
American marines that were stationed there. You could say the
war played itself out to a certain extent at a lower level in
Somalia, where we stayed there for a short period of time and
then left. You could say that throwing a few Tomahawk land
attack missiles (TLAMs) at this enemy created the circumstances
by which we had to end up facing this enemy with greater force
and greater perseverance and greater patience and courage than
we had been able to muster before then.
This is a very serious problem that requires the
application of our national might and will along with that of
the international community to face down the extremist threat,
whether it is sponsored by Iran or whether it comes from al
Qaeda, or we will fight one of the biggest wars we have ever
fought.
WMD may not have been found in Iraq, but this enemy is
trying to develop WMD. We know that from just looking at any
unclassified Web site you want to look at. They are working at
it day after day and they want to use it against us, and we can
simply not walk away from this enemy until the people in the
region have the capacity to deal with it themselves, and they
want to do that.
We have to shape the environment that allows them to help
themselves. It is a slow process. When I think of how long it
took us to win the American Revolution and then to solidify our
own independence and freedom through the Constitution and
eventually through our own Civil War, this is not an easy task.
This is a very difficult task.
I think we should give the people in the region credit for
wanting to live a better life and achieve greater security and
stability. We have to help them if we are going to keep our own
children safe from the greater dangers that lurk out there.
Senator Dayton. General, I do not say this is about walking
away from the enemy. I think it is a very unfair
characterization. I can say I voted against the resolutions to
set a timetable to begin to drawdown troops. I have gotten a
lot of heat back home. So be it, because I agree the military
command needs to decide what force level is necessary to carry
out the mission that they are assigned by their Commander in
Chief, and I am not going to second-guess that.
But I express the concern that the force level is going to
remain there indefinitely because of the incapacity of the
Iraqi society. I recognize that, after living 25 years under a
severe dictatorship, that it takes some time. But we heard
testimony last week from Iraqis that the health ministry is
more corrupt than it was under Saddam Hussein. The amount of
electricity in Baghdad we are told is 8 hours a day. I was
there with the Chairman in July 2003. As you well know, sir,
being there, when you get 115 degree temperatures and no air
conditioning and no running water and no sanitation and no
refrigeration, you have a crisis on your hands. People, as I
said earlier, cannot go to work without fearing and they are
fleeing.
So again, you cannot paint it all one way or the other, but
it seems to me that the incompetence, the corruption, and the
incapacity of the Iraqi forces, despite our 3 years of the best
training forces we have capable--when you can train Americans
in 8 weeks of basic training to go over and perform, to me it
is inexplicable that after 3 years they cannot take more
responsibility than they have so far.
Again, if you extrapolate from those 3 years so far to a
decade, the prediction that we would have to have a sizable
force level there for a decade is a moderate, even an
optimistic prediction. I mean, are we going to be there for a
decade or 2 decades at this kind of force level in order to
hold that country together?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly no one anticipates having
forces in Iraq at these levels in a decade, and the Iraqi
security forces, as I say, have gone from zero, they have been
trained and equipped up to 275,000. They are going to complete
325,000 by the end of this year. I do not know what the new
government will say is the appropriate number. Maybe that
number, maybe something more.
But then the support systems and the strengthening of the
ministry will be required as that is occurring. I think that
your characterization is going to prove to not be correct.
Senator Dayton. I am sorry; which characterization, sir?
Secretary Rumsfeld. That they could be there up to a
decade.
Senator Dayton. I hope it is not. That is not my
characterization. It is that of others.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Mr. Chairman, something came to my
attention that I would like to just comment on. We were
discussing the reset costs early on.
Chairman Warner. In the interim I have gotten some material
to put in the record that documents it. But I think it is
important----
Secretary Rumsfeld. Good. I would just like to say----
Chairman Warner.--that we at this point continue our
colloquy on that, and that that part of your response be
inserted in the record.
Please.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The reset costs have
historically been in supplementals, not in the original
budgets. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2007
contained $50 billion request for a supplemental allowance or a
bridge fund. This bridge fund is intended to partly cover
fiscal year 2007 reset costs. I say partly because we fully
expect to request additional supplemental funds in the spring,
as we have in prior periods.
Reset costs have always been funded in supplementals. The
$13.1 billion in the Stevens amendment as I understand it is an
advance payment on reset costs that would be covered in the
spring supplemental.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. I have done this research and
we will put this in the record. I am going to address a
document dated August 2 from the Executive Office of the
President, and it reads as follows. It clearly in my judgment
supports your statement that you have been in constant
consultation with the OMB on this important issue. This
document reads in part, and I will put the whole document in
the record: ``The administration welcomes the committee's
strong support for our troops fighting in the war on terror.
The funds provided are critical to continuing operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan while keeping our military well-equipped
and ready to respond. The administration urges the Senate to
fully support the procurement request to provide full funding
for Afghan and Iraqi forces to enable them to assume full
responsibility for their own security and fully fund our
coalition support, to ensure timely reimbursement of critical
partners.''
Now, this is right on point: ``The administration supports
the Senate's acceleration of $13.1 billion into the bridge that
would have been requested next year in the spring supplemental,
bringing the total level of bridge funding in this bill to
$63.1 billion. This action will facilitate the needed resetting
of the Armed Forces to continue their important missions and
provide needed certainty to military planners. This additional
funding is necessary to accelerate planned efforts to repair or
replace war-damaged equipment''--the point that you addressed,
General Pace. ``In particular, these funds address Army and
Marine Corps depot and unit maintenance requirements and
procurement needs, including Abrams, Bradley, Apache, and other
helicopters, tactical vehicles, trailers, generators, and
bridge equipment.''
This is a document that I will also insert, which states
the OMB funding levels, and they were followed by the
Appropriations Committee in that amendment. So that will be
placed in the record as I stated, and I thank the Secretary for
bringing that to our further attention and clarifying it.
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Chairman Warner. I will also put in a memorandum that I
have had prepared giving the chronological history of this
funding.
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Chairman Warner. I see that we are now joined by several
colleagues. Senator Dayton having finished his testimony,
Senator Chambliss, you are now recognized.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. As always, General
Pace----
Chairman Warner. Excuse me, Senator Chambliss, the
colleague to your left has indicated to the chair that he has
to depart to preside over the Senate.
Senator Graham. At noon, but I can defer.
Senator Chambliss. Well, go ahead. That is fine with me.
Chairman Warner. I thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. It just speaks well of Georgia, that is all
I can say, just nice people in Georgia.
Senator Chambliss. This will cost him, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Graham. It will. I know I am going to pay a heavy
price for this.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming, and I think it is
important to be here and publicly talk about the war and what
is going right and what is going wrong. But let us do
Insurgency 101. The political situation in Iraq, Mr. Secretary,
I think has dramatically improved. We have a government
constituted, made up of all three groups. People voted in high
numbers. That is something we should be proud of.
I was with Senators Chambliss, Cantwell, and Biden on
December 15, the national voting day. It was something to
behold. So I would like to put on the record that the Iraqi
people are very brave. They went to vote that day with people
shooting at them, and they voted in larger numbers than in our
primary in South Carolina. So the Iraqi people really have
sacrificed a lot to get to where they are at now and I would
like to see them get this process completed on their terms, not
the terrorists' terms.
But when it comes to the Sunni insurgents, how many do we
believe there are and who is their leader?
General Abizaid. I think the number of Sunni insurgents is
consistent with the intelligence estimates of at the bottom
side around 10,000, up to around 20,000. There is no distinct
group that is in charge of it.
Senator Graham. What is their goal?
General Abizaid. It all depends on which group it is from
within the Sunni insurgency. If it is the former Baathists, it
is to come back to power. If it is al Qaeda, it is to establish
chaos so that they can achieve a safe haven in the region. Then
there are other various groups within the Sunni community, that
keep violence on the table because they feel that it is the
only thing that they have to negotiate with against the other
communities' advantages that they see that have grown at their
own expense.
Senator Graham. On the Shiite side, what is the goal of the
Shiite insurgency and how many do we think they are?
General Abizaid. Senator, I think it is not quite what I
would call a Shiite insurgency.
Senator Graham. What would you describe it?
General Abizaid. I think there are Shiite extremist groups
that are trying to ensure that the Iraqi government as voted
fails and that they become ascendant, and you see this within
parts of the Jesh-al-Mahdi under Muqtada Sadr.
Senator Graham. How many people are in that camp?
General Abizaid. I think that those numbers are difficult
to quantify because there are parts that are in various militia
groups and there are other parts that are actively working
against the government. But I think the number is in the low
thousands.
Senator Graham. Al Qaeda, after Zarqawi's death how would
you rate their capability and their makeup in terms of numbers?
General Abizaid. Al Qaeda is significantly depleted. I
think their numbers are less than 1,000. I think they are a
tenacious and cellular group that needs continued work, but we
are making good progress against them and we will continue to
make good progress against them.
Senator Graham. The reason I bring this question up is when
you add up all the numbers we are talking maybe less than
30,000 people, 40,000 people. The question for our country and
the world at large is how can we let 40,000 people in a nation
of--how many million in Iraq?
General Pace. 25, 26 million.
Senator Graham. 25 million. Why cannot 200,000 armed people
working together contain 30,000 or 40,000?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A couple of comments. One, it is a
country the size of California, I suppose, and it is a heck of
a lot easier to go around killing innocent men, women, and
children and hiding without uniforms and not in any organized
military activity which another military could go address--
Senator Graham. That goes to the point, it seems to me,
that if the 25 million were united against the 40,000 that they
would not put up with this. So it seems to me that the country
is not united, because if you had 25 million people minus
40,000 that were on one side of the ledger versus the 40,000
this thing would come to an end overnight.
There is something more going on in Iraq at a deeper level
from a common sense perspective for this violence to be
sustained so long and grow, not lessen. What do you think that
something is?
General Pace. Sir, I think you are fundamentally correct
that if the Iraqi people as a whole decided today that, my
words now, they love their children more than they hate their
neighbor, that this could come to a quick conclusion. Many,
about 4,500 to 5,000 per month, are currently feeding tips to
their government and to our Armed Forces about potential
aggressive movements.
We need the Iraqi people to seize this moment. We provided
security for them. Their armed forces are providing security
for them and their armed forces are dying for them. They need
to decide that this is their moment.
Senator Graham. Well said. The question for the American
people I think as we go forward: Will they ever seize this
moment any time soon? I would like each of you to give me an
evaluation as to whether or not the 25 million less 40,000 will
seize this moment any time soon, and what is the general view
of the average Iraqi on the street about our military presence
and the role that we are playing in their future? Are they more
supportive or less supportive of us being there now than they
were a year ago? I would stop there.
General Pace. Sir, I think they will seize the moment. I do
not know how soon that will be. I think the Iraqi people need
to get to the point where the amount of pain they are
inflicting on each other goes beyond their ability to endure. I
do not have, based on my upbringing, an understanding of how
much they can endure or how their society accepts that kind of
violence.
But clearly there is a point in time where the amount of
violence that they are inflicting on each other is going to
reach the point where they are fed up with it and they stand up
to be counted. I cannot tell you when that moment is, but I do
know that Prime Minister Maliki and his team, his cabinet,
those who have been elected as part of their parliament, are
the leaders of that nation and are standing up to this
challenge and are working with their people to get to that day.
Senator Graham. Has the Iraqi public turned against us or
are they still with us?
General Pace. I think they would like us to leave, but not
before it is time. I think that they are still with us, but
they would like, as we would like, to have foreign troops off
their soil.
Senator Graham. Mr. Secretary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is an interesting question. I think
back over the several years and the situation has evolved
unquestionably. The Kurds were and remain very supportive of
our presence, concerned that we would leave. The Shiite in many
instances were pleased with the opportunity to assert their
majority over the country that was provided by our presence.
The Sunni clearly were powerfully against our presence.
More recently, the Sunnis see the role of the Shiite, they
see influence of Iran, and they are less powerfully against our
presence. The Kurds remain where they are and the Shiite, if
one talks to the elected leader of the country, who represents
the Shiite coalition, it is very clear in his mind that it
would be very harmful to him and to his administration and to
the country were we to leave precipitously. So it is something
that has evolved.
General Abizaid. Senator, I would certainly agree with the
way General Pace characterized it. We took a society like this
and we turned it like this [indicating], and now it is moving
like this, and there is a tremendous amount of friction
associated with those moves. It is a society that must either
move towards equilibrium or towards breakup.
Senator Graham. What do you think will happen?
General Abizaid. I think it will move towards equilibrium.
Senator Graham. How long?
General Abizaid. I think it will move towards equilibrium
in the next 5 years. That does not mean that we need to keep
our force levels the way they are, but I am confident that the
Iraqi security forces, with good governance, coupled together,
will bring the country towards equilibrium because the
alternative is so stark. They have had the experience of
Lebanon. All you have to do is go ask the Lebanese how long a
civil war will last and you will know that you must move
towards equilibrium.
Senator Graham. Thank you all.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. General Abizaid, the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
report last month stated that corruption is costing $4 billion
per year. The U.S. Comptroller General, David Walker, testified
that 10 percent of Iraq's refined fuels and 30 percent of its
imported fuels were being stolen.
Can you explain in your strategy how it is tailored to
prevent the corruption and theft of the investments and the
Iraqis' own resources as we get into the reconstruction?
General Abizaid. Senator, clearly corruption is endemic in
this part of the world. It was very heavily part of Saddam's
society. It continues to be part of the current Iraqi society,
but I believe that there are many forces within Iraq that
recognize the problem, that the good governance that will
emerge from representative government and accountability will
over time move this in a positive direction.
I think that corruption in this part of the world is one of
the great corrosive influences that causes extremism to
flourish and in order to be successful against the extremists
governments must be held more and more accountable, and I
believe this Iraqi government will be held accountable by their
people over time.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I would add one other thing, Senator
Nelson, if I might. One of the real problems in my view has
been the fact that historically the Iraqis have been paying a
very small fraction for their fuel of what the market price is.
So as we all know, it ought not to be a surprise, if you can
buy it at that price you can immediately take it across the
border and sell it for a higher price, and that has been a
problem because the government has been--is now in the process
of raising the price towards the market price, has not gotten
there, but is in that direction.
But in the mean time, it is very damaging and it does lead
to corruption.
Senator Bill Nelson. The SIGIR's report stated the
deteriorating security situation has had a particularly
deleterious effect on the establishment of our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), only five of which have begun
operations in Iraq. They went on to tell how the concept, the
PRT concept, had worked well in Afghanistan and it was thought
to be a key component in the Iraq reconstruction strategy.
So General Abizaid, in your discussions with the Iraqi
government and our State Department, what is your thinking in
the strategy to implement the PRT in every province to aid in
the transition?
General Abizaid. The PRTs are the strategic responsibility
of the Ambassador and I think it is too soon to say that they
have not been successful. I was in Mosul the other day and I
talked to the PRT up there and it was clear to me that they
were making good progress, that they had good access to the
Iraqi provincial leadership. In other parts of the country, the
vast majority of the country, by the way, which is fairly
secure and fairly stable, the PRTs will over time gain more
access and become more efficient.
Certainly in those areas around Baghdad where the sectarian
violence is extreme it is difficult for the PRTs to do the
work. But I am confident that the strategy that the Ambassador
has adopted to move the PRTs forward will be successful,
especially provided that the other agencies of the U.S.
Government, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
State Department, et cetera, provide their manning in those
teams and give them the strength that they are capable of
giving it.
Senator Bill Nelson. How committed do you think Maliki is
to disbanding the militias?
General Abizaid. Sir, I have talked to him personally about
it. General Casey talks to him almost every day about it. He
has conveyed time and time again that he is committed to it. I
believe that to be the case.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are the prospects that people
like Sadr and Hakim and Hashemi will disband their militias?
General Abizaid. I think that the prospects of the militias
over time disbanding are good.
Senator Bill Nelson. What is that time frame?
General Abizaid. I am not sure I could say. I think the
Prime Minister is in the middle of working with his cabinet--he
has only been there for 3 months--to figure out how he is going
to move towards militia disbandment. In Afghanistan it has
taken us a long time to move in that direction. It is a long
process, depending upon how dangerous the militia is to the
state. Those that are benign or that are working in conjunction
with the state to provide some additional security do not need
to be disbanded right away. Those that are sponsoring death
squads need to be dealt with immediately.
Senator Bill Nelson. Is that the key, the disbanding of the
militias, to the preventing of the sectarian violence that you
testified to from going into all-out civil war?
General Abizaid. Senator Nelson, I said in my opening
statement that militias are the curse of the region and they
are. Whenever non-state actors have the attributes of the
state, yet bear no responsibility for their actions, it brings
the region into very unpredictable directions, as you see
Hezbollah moving with regard to inside of Lebanon. So it is
very important that militias be controlled, but it is not
something that can be achieved easily overnight. But it is
something that has to be accomplished.
Senator Bill Nelson. Are they the biggest part of stirring
up the sectarian violence that you testified about?
General Abizaid. In my opinion, yes.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Colleagues on my side, Senator Chambliss
had begun his questions when he had to be interrupted. I would
like now to recognize you for your full time.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again to all three of you, thank you for your service and
your great leadership. General Abizaid, General Pace, when you
see your troops on the ground just let them know how much we
appreciate the great job they continue to do. I am always very
humble to be in their presence.
Let me give you my quick assessment. It is more complex
than the way I am going to lay it out there, but here is what I
see having happened in the 3-plus years that we have been
involved in this conflict. We started out with a basic ground
war, which we moved very quickly toward Baghdad. Then we began
to face the nonconventional enemy out there and the IEDs and
the vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) became
a major factor. They are still a major factor, but the fact is
that we are not seeing that type of conflict directed towards
the American soldier now as much as we had been in the past.
So it is pretty obvious we have done something right, both
in the original ground war as well as our defense against the
enemy from an IED standpoint. I do not think we talk about that
enough, and I want you to comment on that.
But now we are in kind of another phase, where the violence
is primarily being directed toward the Iraqi people, a lot of
intimidation, a lot of threats, and they are not just idle
threats. They are being carried out. We are seeing gangland-
style executions. We are seeing literally gangs of individuals
numbering from 12 to 25 coming in and, for example, going into
the Olympic committee meeting and taking hostages, an entirely
different type of reaction.
When Senator Levin said that Mr. Talabani said that this is
their last quiver, I am not sure whether it is their last
quiver or not, but it is pretty obvious that we have done some
things right and we have forced them to change their tactics.
Now, obviously we cannot talk about, in an open hearing,
what we are doing relative to this new type of tactic. But can
you comment on that type of assessment and can you talk about
some of the things that we have done right relative to the
IEDs, and what are we doing relative to this new type of
offensive that is coming from the insurgents?
General Abizaid. Senator, I think it is very clear to us
that, if you look at the recent experience that the Israelis
are having as they operate in Lebanon and you look at how other
armed forces, say Pakistani armed forces, operate in their
northern territories, that asymmetric warfare is here and with
us and it is the warfare of the 21st century, where the enemy
seeks to attack the weaknesses of their opponent and where they
will attempt to win media victories as opposed to military
victories.
It should go without saying that in 5 years of war we have
never lost a major engagement to the enemy anywhere in the
region. Yet there is considerable loss of confidence because
the enemy is so agile and capable in purveying the notion that
the situation is not winnable.
Certainly the IED fight has been a difficult fight and it
is a fight that we see not only in Iraq, but we see it in
Afghanistan, and in Pakistan. We see it in southern Lebanon,
you see it in other places such as in Egypt, where they are
using IEDs occasionally there as well. Their tactics,
techniques, and procedures are shared. We are learning a lot
about it. We have gotten pretty good about it and I think in a
closed session we could talk to you about some of the great
successes we have had.
With regard to other situations with tactics, techniques,
and procedures that the enemy have applied across the battle
space, I think we will continue to adjust. Again, I am very
confident that our forces are not only capable but very
effective against what the enemy has put against us.
Senator Chambliss. Senator Graham was talking about the
fact that it is difficult for the American people to understand
why 40,000 military insurgents cannot be controlled by 127,000
or whatever, Mr. Secretary, you said we had over there now,
plus the Iraqi army. I think the numbers in Lebanon of
Hezbollah insurgents is probably very insignificant,
particularly compared to the force. As long as they are moving,
hostile, and agile, as you refer to them, General Abizaid, it
is pretty obvious that does present significant problems.
Lastly, let me just say that Senator Graham referred to our
trip over there in December. We met with eight members of the
Iraqi Election Commission, all of whom happened to be Sunnis,
and every one of them made the comment, unsolicited on our
part, about the presence of the American soldier. The comment
was that, do we want to see the American soldier leave, and if
you ask the Iraqi people that today they would say sure. But if
you ask, do you want the American soldier to leave today, the
answer would be overwhelmingly no.
I think that is borne out in a newspaper story today where
there are a number of quotes here in the Washington Times from
Iraqi citizens with regard to the troops, General Abizaid, that
you put into Baghdad to run the militia out of the various
neighborhoods, and the fact now that these Iraqi citizens are
quoted as saying that for the first time in months that they
are able to come out of their homes now, to reopen their shops,
and for commerce to once again be present within the city of
Baghdad, speaks volumes about the American soldier, and there
are nothing but compliments about the job that the American
soldiers are doing.
It still goes back to the fact that they do want us to
leave, but they do not want us to leave until the job is done.
So I hope that the Iraqi leadership is right that by the end of
the year that they are able to take over control of the entire
country, but in the mean time it is pretty obvious that our
troops are doing the right things over there today under your
leadership.
So with that, thank you. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your presence here today. General
Abizaid, I would be interested in your opinion. Some observers
have commented that there remain unresolved political questions
for the Iraqis involving their constitution, division of oil
revenues, that sort of thing, and that this is in significant
part fueling the insurgencies and the continuing conflict. I
would be interested in your opinion about whether you think
that is true and, if so, what you think we can do to keep the
pressure on the Iraqis to resolve their remaining political
disputes.
General Abizaid. Senator, as General Casey has said to me
on numerous occasions, this conflict has gone from essentially
insurgency to a discussion within the internal Iraqi groupings
about the distribution of power, resources, and future control.
You can approach it one of two ways. One way is by violence,
the other way is by compromise.
It is my opinion that the forces of compromise will
eventually understand that violence gets them nothing and that
the compromise is absolutely essential, just like we had to
determine that in our own constitutional mechanisms after our
own independence. So do I think that they can compromise? I
think there will be a period of violence. I think that people
are looking at very severe violence in Baghdad now that can be
brought under control, and that the constitutional discussion
they know has to be one of compromise, national reconciliation,
and sharing of resources.
If you look at their neighborhood, I think they have all
come to the conclusion that an Iraq that is not united and
independent will be one that will be dominated by unfriendly
neighbors in a way that will be very bad for the Iraqi people,
and I believe they are determined to hold the country together,
to stabilize the country, to compromise their way through it.
But I think it will be a violent period and one that will
ultimately lead to stability.
Senator Bayh. So your opinion is that these unresolved
political disputes are contributing in a material way to the
ongoing----
General Abizaid. Certainly they do contribute, but I
believe that this is part of the resolution process.
Senator Bayh. Perhaps I can ask both you and the Secretary,
if he thinks it is appropriate--maybe this is going on behind
the scenes, but what is keeping them from getting on with this
business of revisiting the constitutional disputes that
basically were put off until after the last election? That
would be number one.
Number two, Mr. Secretary, perhaps this is appropriate for
you: Some other commentators have opined that perhaps something
similar to what happened in Dayton to help resolve the Balkans
conflict would be appropriate to try and bring this to some
political closure so that we can deal with this and move on.
What do you think about that?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, it is a fair question: What is
keeping them? They have gone from an election in January of
last year to the drafting of a constitution, to a referendum on
the constitution in October of last year, to an election on
December 15 of last electing these people under the new
constitution, to a relatively long period of some months,
longer than we have with an election in early November and then
finally getting our cabinet put in place some time in February
or March here.
They are doing it for the first time and it is a permanent
government, and the issues are tough. Some of them were
reasonably intractable. For example, we urged them to not put
sectarian unskillful ministers in the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior, and the Prime Minister-designate fought
it and fought it and fought it, received a lot of pressure from
people to put political people in there in a way that did not
have the competence and did not have--and might have been
sectarian. He prevailed, he ended up getting people that he
accepted as being nonsectarian and competent. Time will tell,
but it showed a lot of courage, but it took time.
The issued you raised about the constitution were set
aside. They kicked the can down the road just like we did. We
still did not have women voting, we still had slavery with our
original Constitution. So it is not as though those things come
out perfectly formed in the first 5 minutes. It takes some
time, and they are going to have to work on them.
The Dayton process idea, I do not know the answer. All I
know is that our Ambassador Zal Khalilzad, is in fact trying to
serve, along with the British officials, a facilitating role in
encouraging things to move faster, because time hurts. People
are being killed while that time is being taken and there is no
question about that.
But my impression is that our Ambassador is doing a very
skillful job, with the assistance of coalition countries and
General Casey, trying to facilitate the different groups
working out some darn tough issues.
Senator Bayh. It is understandable why they would not get
all of these things resolved in the first effort and some were
postponed. But if, as I think we all agree, this is fueling the
insurgency, I guess what we are looking for, Mr. Secretary,
would be a greater sense of urgency and perhaps something of a
higher profile nature like a Dayton-like process would assist
the Ambassador with his efforts to really focus the minds of
the participants as well as the world on, look, we need to get
this done and the sooner the better, because some of the trend
lines here, frankly, are not positive.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Certainly the President and the
Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador and Chief of
Mission, who worry through those issues, are aware of that
possibility and I am sure they are considering it.
Senator Bayh. General, back to you for one moment. You
mentioned that, and several others have mentioned, we can argue
about the semantics of what constitutes a civil war, but that
it is a real possibility if things do not go as we hope. If it
does come to that, which side are we on?
General Abizaid. I do not think it is a civil war because
the institutions of the center are holding, and I believe that
before we start talking about what we are going to do if there
is civil war that we do everything in our power to prevent it
from moving that way, and I do not believe that Iraq will move
towards civil war as long as we apply the necessary military,
diplomatic, and political actions necessary to bring the
Baghdad situation under control in the short-term.
General Pace. Senator, if I may, both General Abizaid and I
have been asked if it was possible that this could lead to
civil war, and the answer is yes, it is possible. Speaking for
myself, I do not believe it is probable and I do not believe it
is probable for the exact same reasons that General Abizaid
just stipulated, which is that the government is holding, the
army is holding solid and is loyal. When they had the Golden
Mosque bombing, it was the army, the Iraqi army, that went into
the streets and helped keep calm. So I do not expect this to
devolve into civil war.
Senator Bayh. We all hope that is right, General. But if it
takes a course that is not as optimistic as we would all like
to see here and it does come to civil war--the reason for my
question essentially, if it does come to that, then what is our
role in the country? Many people would say we would not have a
role. That is why I asked you which side would we be on. We
would be put in a very difficult situation where we would not
want to take sides, but the Iraqis themselves would have chosen
up sides and at that point the mission would become much
different.
Mr. Secretary, my last question, back to you again on the
Dayton.
Chairman Warner. Just a minute, Senator. I think you have
posed a question in your preliminary comments. Is it, or do you
wish to go to your last question?
Senator Bayh. My last question, assuming we have--I have a
couple blue cards here.
Chairman Warner. I want to make sure the panel had adequate
opportunity to answer.
Senator Bayh. Let me pose it as a question, then. If it
does come to that, do we have a continuing mission in Iraq? If
the Iraqis themselves have not been able to hold the center and
they have chosen up sides along sectarian lines, at that point
do we have a continuing mission in Iraq or not?
Chairman Warner. That will be your last question, but let
us give the panel--it is directed to whom? All three?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am reluctant to speculate about that.
It could lead to a discussion that suggests that we presume
that is going to happen and both General Abizaid and General
Pace have offered their comments on that. Our role is to
support the government. The government is holding together. The
armed forces are holding together. We are functioning in a very
close relationship with that government in providing them
assistance in achieving their goals.
We have seen what happens when governments pull apart,
militaries pull apart. We saw it in Lebanon and it is not a
pretty picture. Obviously, that would be a set of decisions
that the President and Congress and the country would address.
But I think that beyond that it would be not my place to be
discussing it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think that
disposes of the question unless either of the other witnesses
want to add any views.
If not, Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One discussion that we have had here and had some votes--I
think the last vote we had was on the question of whether we
should set a firm date for pulling out regardless of the
situation in Iraq. It was voted down 83 to 16 or something to
that effect.
Senator Warner made a reference, General Abizaid, to the
fact that the emotional reactions to the Lebanon situation
could make the situation more difficult perhaps for our
soldiers in Iraq. I would like to ask a little bit of a
different question. It would be, what kind of reaction, what
kind of impact would there be with regard to the Islamic
extremists in the Middle East--and you are a student of that
region. You have spent time in that region as a young person.
You speak Arabic and you have been with us conducting this Iraq
war from the beginning. What kind of impact would result if we
were to precipitously withdraw?
Would it mollify the extremists? Would it make them say,
well, the United States is a nicer place and we do not have to
be so aggressive now? Or would they likely be emboldened and
empowered and more aggressive?
General Abizaid. Emboldened, empowered, and more
aggressive.
Senator Sessions. In your opinion, would a failure in Iraq
embolden and empower these radical extremists?
General Abizaid. Yes, it would.
Senator Sessions. In your opinion, would setting a fixed
date regardless of the situation in Iraq for a withdrawal
embolden or empower the extremist forces?
General Abizaid. Embolden.
Senator Sessions. General Pace, this is a matter we have
discussed. Fortunately it has had very little support in the
Senate. But there is a political election coming up and people
float this idea that we should just pull out. You have heard
General Abizaid's comments. He has been in the region for years
and been leading this effort. Would you agree with his
comments?
General Pace. Sir, I agree with each of General Abizaid's
responses to each of your questions.
Senator Sessions. As Senator Warner has said for some time,
we have asked much of our Nation. We have asked much of our
soldiers. They have gone willingly. Almost without any single
objection, they have gone and served in harm's way to carry out
a policy that this Senate and this Congress has voted for, the
American people ratified with the reelection of President Bush.
It was an issue in that election.
Do you not think we owe it to them to continue to work in
every way possible to make the sacrifice of those who have gone
before be successful, General Pace?
General Pace. Sir, I was in Afghanistan last Thursday and
Friday. Our troops there are so proud of what they are doing.
We do owe them and their families the continued support of this
Nation and especially those who have sacrificed their lives
that we might live free.
Senator Sessions. I just hope that we put an end in this
political season to any suggestion that we may just
precipitously withdraw without regard to the circumstances
there.
General Abizaid. Senator Sessions, what I would like to say
is the troops that serve in the region are not afraid of what
is happening there. They would be afraid of what would happen
if we just precipitously left there.
Senator Sessions. I heard that repeatedly. On the
anniversary of the Army, I was with the Army to celebrate that
day recently and this young guy told me: Senator, we want to be
successful.
General Pace, you made reference to the reenlistment rate.
I am told that our reenlistment rates of National Guard units
that deploy to Afghanistan or Iraq and return exceed that of
units who have not gone. Do you think that bespeaks of the
military's belief that they are doing something that is
worthwhile and meaningful?
General Pace. Sir, I think it does. I think that our troops
know what they are doing. They get it. They are proud of what
they are doing and, as General Abizaid said, the main question
they ask is, do the American people support what we are doing?
When we point to the numerous ways in which the American people
support it, including what this Congress does to provide
resources, it reinforces with them the goodness of what they
have dedicated their lives to do.
Senator Sessions. We have people say, well, we are spending
too much on this war, and then they come forward and say, well,
you did not spend enough, you did not have enough equipment.
Let us talk about that a little bit, General Pace. I am
familiar with just one depot, Anniston Army Depot. I know that
they are vigorously and aggressively hiring new people to reset
the equipment.
I was also aware that we did not have enough money
apparently in this budget to meet the high challenges that we
were facing with the reset. The DOD blessed the Army's concern
in that. It was made known to Congress. We just added another
$13 billion and another amendment by Senator Dodd that would
allow another $6 billion, allow another $6 billion to meet that
challenge.
First I will ask you, do you think we are going to, with
those funds, will be able to meet that reset problem?
General Pace. Sir, the money that was just--the $13.1
billion will meet the current Marine Corps and Army backlogs at
the depots. It will allow for hiring of the additional shifts
of skilled workers to get the job done. That is why I mentioned
before that as best Congress can provide a no-year funding
stream that the depots can depend on, so they can go out and
hire workers who know they will have a job for the foreseeable
future, we can start working off this backlog, sir.
Senator Sessions. I think you are exactly right and I am
glad we have taken steps on that, and if we need to do more I
believe this Congress will meet your demands.
One more thing. With regard to readiness, I was in an Army
Reserve unit and they rated us whether we were ready or not in
the 1970s and 1980s. If you do not have all your vehicles, you
are not rated ready. When a unit comes off any major
deployment, particularly coming off a combat deployment, is it
not inevitable, I think you indicated, that you will not be
rated ready?
One of the complicating factors for an effort like we are
undergoing in Iraq, it seems to me, is units take their
equipment with them and it is cheaper and smarter to leave that
equipment over there for the next unit that replaces them.
Therefore when they get back they may not have the full
complement of equipment they need to be rated in your strict
standards of readiness as ready.
General Pace. Sir, you are exactly right, and the reset
money has been in the supplementals. The money for the Reserve
and National Guard to build the 28 fully-manned, trained, and
equipped brigades that the Army has stipulated they need is in
the baseline budget to the tune of $21 billion over the next 5
years.
Senator Sessions. General Pace, you have been at this quite
a number of years. Would you say that we are moving to have the
best-equipped, most ready military the world has ever seen, at
least this Army in peacetime before this war started, and as we
go forward are we not better equipped and moving to a way to
have our Guard and Reserve have the kind of equipment they have
never had before?
General Pace. Sir, we are today the best-equipped, manned,
trained, battle-hardened that we have ever been. With your
continued support in Congress, we will be able to maintain the
equipment and replace the combat equipment that has been lost.
It takes upwards of 36 months from the time you lose a
helicopter in combat until the time the replacement helicopter
comes on line. That does not mean that people are not trying to
do the right thing or that the system is not working. It just
takes that amount of time for that kind of equipment to be
identified as lost, put into the budget process, funded,
contracted, and built.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rumsfeld. It argues, Senator Sessions, for the
possibility of Congress looking at the idea of a reset fund.
That is to say, if you want to shorten that period of time, the
time it takes for the analysis as to what has been lost or
degraded, the time that Congress takes to consider and weigh
it, the time it takes to place the orders and have the contract
validated, and then the time it takes to produce it, which is,
as General Pace said, it can be up to 3 years, if you had a
reset fund that Congress approved and it was only for those
purposes, the funds could then be drawn down in a much shorter
period of time. Depots could plan their hiring earlier and you
would have the ability to shorten that.
I guess I have not talked to the OMB about this, but inside
the DOD we have been talking that there has to be a way to
shorten that time period, and one of the ways would be for
Congress to act more rapidly on budgets than happens each year.
Another way would be for Congress to approve a reset, and
another way would be for us in the DOD to find a way to try to
cut in half the period of time it takes to actually let a
contract and go through that whole procedure.
If the three of us did those things, it is conceivable we
could abbreviate that period and solve some of the problem
General Pace is talking about.
Senator Sessions. General Pace, just briefly, the idea that
was stated earlier about a number of our brigades not being
ready, in your opinion does that misrepresent the status of our
capability at this time? Would it cause someone to have a
higher degree of concern than is warranted? I know we want to
do better. We want every unit to be ready. But is it not
inevitable that as units transition off combat that there will
be a period when they do not meet your high standards of
readiness?
General Pace. Sir, there will be a period like that. Our
readiness reporting system has been accurately reported to
Congress as is required every quarter. We have been talking
about the need to repair equipment now for about the last year
to 18 months. So it is not wrong to say that we have equipment
deficiencies and that we need to spend the money to do that.
That is an accurate use of the data that is available.
But if you say to me would I rather have 100 percent of the
2,000 up-armored Humvees that I thought I needed in 2001 or 50
percent of the 12,000 up-armored Humvees that I say I need
today, and which Army is better, I would tell you that,
although my reporting system would tell you I am now at 50
percent and therefore command, control, communications, and
computers (C4), that the Army I have built is three times
better with regard to Humvees.
You can multiple that toward hundreds of thousands of end
items. That is why it is really a kaleidoscope, and to try to
have a discussion that just lays out exactly precisely what the
readiness ratings are lends itself to misinterpretation and
misunderstanding.
Senator Sessions. Well said.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Could I say one other thing?
Chairman Warner. Oh, yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I am sorry. I apologize.
Chairman Warner. No, that is all right.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think it is important that we be
careful how we describe the capabilities and the readiness of
the U.S. Armed Forces. We have multiple audiences and Iran
listens and North Korea listens and other countries listen, and
it is important to be precise, it is important to be accurate,
and it is important to not leave an impression that might
entice someone into doing something that would be a mistake on
their part, because we have enormously capable Armed Forces.
Chairman Warner. Mr. Secretary, I associate myself with
your remarks. You are absolutely right. Unfortunately, some of
the remarks have come from your Department from very high-
ranking officials in connection with this budget process. So we
are trying to do our very best with that.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, Senator Sessions has done an excellent job
of pointing out the pitfalls of an abrupt withdrawal on a set
timeline from Iraq. But I want to talk to you about my concerns
about what our exit strategy does seem to be. It is premised on
the ability of Iraqi troops to assume full responsibility for
the security of their country. Over and over again we have
heard the phrase that as Iraqi forces stand up, our troops will
stand down. We have heard that time and again.
Our troops are the best-equipped, the best-trained, the
best-led in the world, and I am enormously proud of them and I
have the utmost confidence in their ability to handle any
mission. Yet sectarian violence is worse than ever in Baghdad
in particular, and I wonder about the validity of a strategy
that says that less capable troops that are not as well-
equipped, trained, and led as the best troops in the world can
handle the security of this country.
If the upswing in violence has occurred despite the
presence of the best troops in the world, it does not give me a
lot of confidence in our underlying strategy, and it suggests
to me that what we need is a political rather than a military
solution.
General Abizaid. Thanks, Senator Collins. I believe you
have to have a combination of political action and military
action that moves towards a lessening of the sectarian
tensions. But I would try to make people that are listening to
this understand that there is no better troops to deal with the
sectarian problem than well-led Iraqi troops that are loyal to
the government. They do not want their nation to fall apart.
They have a much better intrinsic view of what is happening.
They have instincts about what goes on within their own culture
that, as well-trained and as well-equipped as we might be, we
do not have.
So I would never sell the Iraqi armed forces short on their
ability to make a difference. But the Iraqi armed forces must
be well-led by their military leaders. The military leaders
must be well-connected with the political leadership and they
must share a common vision of where Iraq is headed.
Again, I will emphasize that Prime Minister Maliki and his
current government is only 3 months old. I believe they very
much share a vision of a unified Iraq where the armed forces
will impose its will upon the people of Iraq and defeat the
insurgency and the groups that are sponsoring sectarian
violence, especially the terrorists.
I think that what General Casey has embarked upon, which is
a very artful form of trying to gauge the capabilities of the
Iraqi armed forces and at the same time bring down our forces
so that the Iraqis will do more to defend their own turf, is
one of the most difficult strategies that any wartime commander
has ever had to execute. I think he is doing it enormously
well, and there will come times in the campaign, such as the
current period, where the sectarian violence is showing us a
level of concern which means that we have to take the time to
apply the military pressure necessary, and that Zal Khalilzad
will help apply the political pressure necessary, to get it
back on the right path.
Again, I do not want to be mischaracterized by what I have
said here today. I am very confident that can be done.
Senator Collins. The prime minister, one of his very first
initiatives was the new national security plan. I realize it
has only been 3 months since he has been in office, but that
plan does not seem to have been effective in quelling the
upsurge in sectarian violence. Do you think that it is too soon
to judge that plan or has it failed?
General Abizaid. Senator, it is a great question. I do not
think that the plan has failed. I think what you are seeing is
an adjustment to a plan that was not working with the speed
that we had hoped. So General Casey and his commanders are
adjusting the plan and they are doing it in conjunction with
the Iraqi commanders.
Of course, the enemy is attempting to really make the
sectarian divide become the decisive point at a point in time
where the Iraqi government has not quite gotten itself together
yet. I am very confident that over time you will see that the
Iraqi forces in conjunction with our forces, primarily with the
Iraqis at the lead, will bring the sectarian problems under
control.
Senator, nothing in the Middle East moves in a straight
line. Things get worse, they get better. The question is
whether or not the trend line is a trend line that can lead to
success, and my belief is so far the answer is yes and it will
continue that way.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. You go ahead, Senator. Go ahead.
Senator Collins. Mr. Secretary, yesterday I chaired a
hearing at which the SIGIR testified. He described massive cost
overruns, schedule delays, half-completed projects for which
the money had run out. It was not a pretty picture. It seems
that everything in Iraq is costing more than was anticipated by
a considerable amount and, as many of us have discussed,
earlier this week the Senate added $13.1 billion in emergency
spending to replace the worn-out equipment that we have
discussed this morning.
The chairman mentioned that we have spent some $437
billion, I believe, over the last 3 years. I think the current
spending rate is $2 billion a week. There has been an enormous
cost to this war and an enormous impact on the Federal budget.
Looking ahead to next year, what are your projections for
the spending on the war?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Iraqi reconstruction is something
that the Department of State works on and requests funds for.
You are quite right, there have been a number of inspector
general reports about open investigations into fraud and
corruption and the like. There also are a number of projects
that, because of security problems, have cost a great deal more
than had been anticipated. As we know, a number of them are
instances where the insurgents have actually gone in and blown
up something that had been halfway built, and we have seen that
happen.
I do not have a number that I can give you. I know the OMB
can.
Senator Collins. I am not talking about the reconstruction
projects, which I realize are under the State Department
largely and USAID. I am saying for the DOD, as you look ahead
to the next year. Many of us believe that the spending for the
war needs to be part of the regular budget and not just dealt
with in emergency supplementals. So I am asking you to look
ahead because we as a Congress need to budget more accurately
for the cost of the war and we can only do that based on your
projections.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I understand. We do not know yet what
we will get for this year's budget and we do not know what the
supplemental will be. We do know that we are in the process of
preparing the budget for next fiscal year, and that it will be
presented by the President in January. But I can try to get
back to you for the record to give you something that the
Comptroller's office at the Pentagon would take out as a
discrete piece for the DOD's portion, if that would be helpful.
Senator Collins. That would be. I am just trying to get a
sense, Mr. Chairman, of whether we can expect indefinitely
approximately $2 billion a week from our budget to be spent on
this war.
[The information referred to follows:]
Given our current force levels and stability conditions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, about $2 billion a week is a good estimate of our
immediate war-related spending, but I certainly would not expect that
funding level to continue ``indefinitely'' because force levels and
stability conditions certainly will change at some point.
Chairman Warner. Senator, that is a question that is
constantly in the minds of the American people and it is an
important one. As you well point out, the success of our
ability to bring about a democracy in this country requires a
certain amount of infrastructure rebuilding, and that has to be
done at a constant level and make some progress.
But as the Secretary said, we take two steps forward and
all of a sudden we look around and have to take a step backward
because of the internal disruption.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
I would like to, before calling on Senator Talent, and then
I want to ensure that the Senator from Rhode Island has an
opportunity to speak, but our panel of witnesses must appear
before the whole Senate at 2 o'clock sharp and consequently
within the period of roughly 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock they have
other obligations. So it is my hope to conclude this session
here in a matter of 10 minutes or so.
Senator Talent, your time is now recognized.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all three of you for your service. I was
going to say----
General Pace. He will be right back, sir.
Senator Talent.--in absentia General Abizaid in particular
for being in that crucible for years.
Chairman Warner. He got a telephone call.
Senator Talent. I understand entirely, Mr. Chairman. I will
direct my questions at the Secretary anyway.
Mr. Secretary, I agree with an awful lot of what you said
in your opening statement. I think it is important to remind
people about what this is about. I agree this is an existential
struggle and that is how they view it, a struggle for
existence. I agree that there are no conceivable accommodations
with them that would cause them to stop attacking us. Just we
do not have the choice of them not attacking us. They are going
to attack us. We therefore have to fight the war.
I also agree that the war in Iraq, the mission in Iraq, was
a good strategic option and maybe the only strategic option. I
have always said that mission was to remove Saddam, who was an
organic threat, and replace him with a multi-ethnic democracy
that would be an ally in the war on terror.
I also agree that we are making progress towards that end.
If we are talking about whether the circumstances are such that
we can withdraw, we are talking about whether the mission has
been completed. I think we need to understand that. As long as
the terrorists are prepared to concentrate to the extent they
are in Iraq, we cannot guarantee that it is going to be a
pacified country. But we are getting closer to the point where
the Iraqi government can sustain itself with less American
help. So I do think there has been progress and I am pleased
about all that.
What I want to ask you about, Mr. Secretary, is this. Given
that we are involved in this war and in this existential
struggle, how can we be in a situation where we are allowing
the budgets that you think you need to be reduced by the OMB
year after year? I refer to the budget reduction in the fall of
2004, $30 billion over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP),
in the fall of 2005, $32 billion over the FYDP, April of this
year indications there would be another 2 percent cut.
I am concerned that we may see a cut in the fall of this
year, and these cuts are coming from the OMB. Now, we are in an
existential struggle. I just do not think--you referred
appropriately, I think, that we have to be concerned about the
message we are sending. I am concerned that these budget cuts
coming from people who are not warfighters are sending the
message that we are weakening, that we are not prepared to bear
the cost of this.
Before you answer, I will just make one other point with
reference to something Senator Collins said. Yes, this is a
difficult struggle. We have spent over $400 billion in 3 years.
Our gross domestic product (GDP) in that period of time has
been $36 trillion, so we are spending about what, 1.2 percent
of our GDP on this? Given the importance of this struggle to
the country, we are fighting it, it seems to me, at a cost that
this economy can afford. We are so strong and I think sometimes
that we forget that.
So if you would address that I would appreciate it. This is
what is frustrating me. We need to give you what you think you
need, not what the bean counters at OMB think you need.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator, you are experienced. You know
how this town works. Let me say that I agree with you that the
United States of America spending 3.8 percent of the GDP on our
entire national security is a relatively small percentage of
the GDP. When I came to Washington in the Kennedy and
Eisenhower era, we were spending 10 percent of the GDP. Thirty
years ago when I was Secretary of Defense for President Ford,
we were spending, I think, 5 percent of the GDP. Today we are
down to 3.8 percent of the GDP.
That is, this country can afford to spend what is
necessary. You have mentioned the OMB. Let me talk about
Congress for a minute. This year, if you take the House and the
Senate, the authorization and the appropriation committees, and
drop a plumb line through all of it, we are looking at
somewhere between $15 to $20 billion that we will not have to
spend on the things we need to spend it on.
If you look at the time it takes to pass an authorization
and to pass an appropriation bill, the delays that are incurred
and the gyrations that the Services have to go through to try
to cash-drawer what they are doing, take money from this and
spend it on that, the inefficiencies, the inability to plan
ahead, the inability to get the depots to hire the people they
need in advance because we do not have this depot--correction,
the reset fund that I mentioned might be a way to help solve
this problem--it is a combination of cuts. I guess the Senate
Appropriations Committee wanted to cut something like $9
billion this year.
Then it is the Member adds, all the things that have been
added on top that we--without money, simply things that we need
to spend on that we do not want. Then a series of things that
we have offered to not do--a second engine for the Joint Strike
Fighter, a 12th carrier that we do not believe we need because
it costs too much to repair it--and we are being forced to do
those things.
Then we came in and said, we can save money doing a series
of things with respect to health care and a variety of things,
and we were told, you may not do that. The combination of all
of that is big dollars and it hurts.
Senator Talent. Mr. Secretary, you are looking here at two
committee members who offered and got passed an amendment
raising the top line for defense and that was reallocated away.
So I could not agree with you more about it. I just think all
of us who understand, who have sat on these committees or been
in your chair or the chair of the Generals there and know what
we need, have to find a way to insist on getting what we need.
I would encourage you very strongly, because it is just--
you mentioned Congress and I am not trying to--I am just saying
it is harder for those of us here who understand this to hold
this if we are getting cuts from the administration that the
economic and the budget people are recommending.
I do not think there is any way we can lose this war unless
we lose it. I think you are saying the same thing in general
terms and I agree with you completely. Let us just agree not to
let this happen, and I certainly will do my part. The chairman
certainly has done his part and I know Senator Reed has as
well.
So I wanted to make that point. Mr. Chairman, I see my time
is up too and I know we are under time constraints.
Chairman Warner. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Talent.
Thank you very much.
Senator Reed, I had indicated that you would have an
opportunity for a follow-up question.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Pace, you are familiar with the current readiness
reporting of the Army and the Marine Corps, but particularly
the Army?
General Pace. Yes, sir, I am.
Senator Reed. Would you dispute the conclusion of former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry that two-thirds of the Army's
operating force, Active and Reserve, is now reporting as
unready, and the conclusion of General Schoomaker in response
to this question from Mr. Skelton, ``Are you comfortable with
the readiness levels of nondeployed units that are in the
Continental United States?'' General Schoomaker's reply:
``No,'' he is not comfortable?
General Pace. I think that the readiness reporting system
as it is constructed has been accurately described that the
number of brigades in the United States Army whose equipment
requirements have changed dramatically over the last 5 years
are being accurately described. I absolutely agree with General
Schoomaker in his comments about additional funding needed to
buy back combat losses, to buy back the reset.
All those things are absolutely accurate, Senator. All I
want to make sure we understand is that the system itself is
reporting pure math, but as one example again, the pure math is
based on in 2001 needing 2,000 up-armored Humvees, in 2006
needing 12,000, and therefore the capacity of the Army to wage
war is significantly greater than it was, even though the
reporting system, properly utilized, is highlighting places
where we need to put more money.
Senator Reed. General, I can recall when General Abizaid
and I were lieutenants together in the 504th Parachute Infantry
Regiment. I will just speak for myself. We took this reporting
system very seriously because we understood, and I think you
do, that soldiers and marines, as good as they are, need
equipment to fight. We presumed that the leadership, both
uniformed and civilian, in the DOD, took those reports
seriously also and that they were not requiring us to report on
equipment which was really tangential to the needs of the unit.
In fact, we all recall where individuals were relieved
because they could not maintain adequate levels of readiness
under the current reporting system at the battalion level. But
it does not appear that takes place at the national level,
because you have a readiness crisis. We have tried to address
it with $13 billion last Tuesday, noting that this document was
submitted Wednesday, a day late and $13 billion short.
Chairman Warner. Let the record show that the document that
you are referring to is the one that I introduced, the OMB
document.
Senator Reed. So I think the signal that you are sending to
those lieutenants, sergeants, and captains is that this
reporting system is either illogical and nonsensical or it is
being disregarded at the highest levels, because it was not the
DOD that was asking for this money to the President--forget
OMB; to the President. It turned out that, I think, within the
Army there was such concern about their troops that they went
around you all and approached Congress. I think that is a sad
commentary on the leadership of the DOD.
This may not be a question but a comment, but I am
particularly incensed with some of the suggestions that this is
all just kind of some subjective evaluation we do, and the
readiness reporting has no real impact in the world, and also
the suggestion that if we talk about readiness, particularly
when it is in a crisis like this, we are somehow giving unfair
advantage to our adversaries.
But I recall in 2000 when then-Governor Bush stood up and
said the President of the United States, if he called on his
DOD, they would have to report two divisions not ready for duty
based upon the reporting system. How many divisions will we
have to report that way to that question today based on the
reporting system, General Pace?
General Pace. First of all, sir, we are not doing divisions
any more. We are doing brigades, as you have already----
Senator Reed. I know that.
General Pace. About two-thirds of the brigades, as you
pointed out, would report C3 or C4.
Senator Reed. Not ready for duty.
General Pace. I will stand by my comments. First and
foremost----
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
General Pace. Sir, may I finish?
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
General Pace. Thank you.
We do take with great integrity and responsibility the
readiness reporting system. That is exactly why for every
quarter, as required, we report to Congress the exact accurate
reporting for readiness. I am saying that we do need more
money. I am not disputing that at all, sir. We do need more
money, for all the reasons I have articulated.
All I was trying to point out, Senator, is that the way
that the system functions, the time it takes to build a new
helicopter, for example, the fact that in combat we are
learning and as a result of learning we have changed our
requirements--we currently have 40,000 armored vehicles in Iraq
that did not even exist 5 years ago.
Sir, all I am saying is that we are providing for our
soldiers and marines on the ground the finest equipment ever
fielded. We are using it up at rates faster than we budgeted
for and therefore to use the readiness system to identify, as
you have, the requirement for more funding is absolutely
correct. I am just trying to make sure that everybody listening
to this conversation understands how you can go from 2001 with
2,000 vehicles, 2006 with 12,000 vehicles, and not have all
12,000 vehicles and still feel better about our Army's capacity
to get the job done.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. May I say to my colleague from Rhode
Island, General Schoomaker is visiting with me on this issue
this afternoon at 4 p.m. I would be pleased to have you join
us. I have invited Senator Levin. He is likewise going to join
us. It may well be that he will wish to put his comments on the
record of these proceedings today in the section relating to
your questions.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
One last question and then we will conclude this, I think
an excellent hearing. Last week President Bush and Prime
Minister Blair agreed to seek a U.N. resolution calling for the
creation of a multinational force to help the Lebanese
government extend control in southern Lebanon. I strongly
support those initiatives by our President and, given that that
country, Lebanon, is in your area of operations, given your
long experience, first I would like to have your assessment of
what is the capability of the Lebanese army today and what
training and equipment would they require for the mission of
their government to go out and begin to maintain control, given
the assumption that there will be a multinational force
eventually put together.
So if you could include your assessment of the size and the
capability of such force that would be needed to fulfill the
commitments that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made
to our respective nations and the world.
General Abizaid. Senator, certainly I do not want to let
any of my comments get in the way of the diplomacy that is
going on right now. It is very important that the diplomats do
their work.
The Lebanese armed forces is a professional armed force. It
has one of the most educated officer corps in the Middle East.
It is a small force for Middle Eastern standards of about
50,000 or so, and it needs significant upgrade of equipment and
training, capability that I believe the western nations, in
particular the United States, can assist with.
We recently, before the current difficulty started, visited
the Lebanese armed forces, did an assessment of where they
happen to be in readiness. We saw that they needed some
significant spare parts. I think we have made our desires known
through the DOD as to how we could help them immediately. I
think there will be need for other assistance to the Lebanese
armed forces because it will never work for Lebanon if over
time Hezbollah has a greater military capacity than the
Lebanese armed forces. The Lebanese armed forces must extend
the sovereignty of the nation throughout the country. I believe
that they can do that in assistance with the international
community and with a robust peacekeeping force or peace
enforcement force, depending upon what the diplomats decide is
the right equation.
I would say that I served with the U.N. Interim Force in
Lebanon back in the mid-1980s and it was not capable of really
enforcing peace and security in the region. So whatever force
goes in has to have robust rules of engagement.
Chairman Warner. Robust rules?
General Abizaid. Robust rules of engagement, very clear and
unambiguous mandate, and clear cooperation from the Lebanese
government and any other parties.
Chairman Warner. Could you further define your professional
definition of ``robust rules of engagement''? That was the
second part of my question.
General Abizaid. Robust rules of engagement means that the
commander has the ability to effect the mandate that has been
given to him by the international community, to include the use
of all available means at his forces' disposal, and I think in
the case of southern Lebanon he will have to have capabilities
that are just not minor small arms, but would include all arms.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
My distinguished colleague from Minnesota, I indicated the
hopes to have a second round. We have had some, but the
intervention of two votes precludes a further second round of
questions by members. But I invite you to provide for the
record your question. It will be open until tomorrow close of
business.
I would like to say in conclusion, Secretary Rumsfeld,
General Pace, General Abizaid, that this has been a very
thorough and constructive hearing and I thank each of you for
your participation and forthrightness in your responses.
The hearing is now adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
troop levels in iraq
1. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, what do you believe are the most likely ramifications of a
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by a date certain? What effect
might setting a timeline for withdrawal have?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are calls in some quarters for withdrawal
or arbitrary timelines for withdrawals. The enemies hear those words as
well. We need to be realistic about the consequences. If we left Iraq
prematurely, as the terrorists demand, the enemy would tell us to leave
Afghanistan and then withdraw from the Middle East, and if we left the
Middle East they would order us and all those who do not share their
militant ideology to leave what they call the occupied Muslim lands
from Spain to the Philippines. Then we would face not only the evil
ideology of these violent extremists, but an enemy that will have grown
accustomed to succeeding in telling free people everywhere what to do.
Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would also send a
message across the world that America is a weak and unreliable ally.
Setting an artificial deadline to withdraw would send a signal to our
enemies that if they wait long enough, America will cut and run and
abandon its friends.
General Pace. First, a set date for American withdrawal would
provide something the enemy could anticipate. It would give them light
at the end of the tunnel, a date for which to wait, prepare, and then
claim victory. Second, it would set a limit for American commitment to
the Iraqi government. There should not be a time limit for our support
of a new democratic government in Iraq. Third, a set date for
withdrawal would not be based on the actual situation, which is fluid
and uncertain. Force reductions should be conditions-based so that we
are adjusting troop levels to the realities on the ground. Lastly, a
set date may limit or inhibit international donor commitment and
investment.
General Abizaid. Early withdrawal of American troops will endanger
the stability of Iraqi security force (ISF) institutions, the Iraqi
political process, and establishment of Iraqi civil institutions. Our
objectives were developed to be conditions-based within a timeframe
reflected in the Joint Campaign Plan in agreement with our coalition
partners, and in line with our mandate from the United Nations.
However, a fixed timeline for leaving Iraq would lead terrorists to
believe that they could win by waiting for our departure. It would also
signal a lack of coalition patience and will, and would play directly
into the intentions of terrorists and foreign fighters who seek to
destroy the ability of the Iraqi people to forge their own national
identity. Our enemies know that they cannot defeat us militarily. To
succeed, they will focus on the battle of perceptions, which they plan
to win by encouraging the coalition's withdrawal before Iraq is ready
to stand alone.
2. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, could you describe the new strategy for Baghdad, one that
reportedly involves the deployment of several thousand additional
troops to the city and the adoption of the so-called ``oil spot''
strategy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The Baghdad Security Plan, named Operation
Together Forward, is not an ``oil spot'' strategy but is designed to
improve the security situation in Baghdad by increasing checkpoints,
curfews, and enforced weapons bans in focused areas within the city.
Security forces are also conducting targeted operations against
terrorist cells and death squads.
Security forces are moving from neighborhood to neighborhood
identifying and eliminating violent forces, securing weapons caches,
and restoring basic civil services. As the situation improves, security
forces will transition to policing and emergency response operations.
In addition to stepping up security operations, the Government of
Iraq, with Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) support, is working with
the local District Advisory Councils to employ local labor to rebuild
neighborhood markets and restore essential services. As of September
22, Iraqis have spent more than 11,000 man-days cleaning up and
restoring essential services. The Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committee approved 15 reconstruction projects totaling $9.2 million.
Fourteen projects are in the Doura District which, until recently, was
one of the most violent districts in Baghdad.
General Pace. The concept of the plan is to assert increased
control over the populace by conducting increased checkpoints, curfews,
and enforced weapons bans in focused areas within Baghdad. Security
forces are also conducting targeted operations against terrorist cells
and death squads. They are conducting systematic neighborhood by
neighborhood operations to identify and clean out violent forces,
identify and secure weapons caches, and identify and restore basic
civil services. Ultimately, this operation will restore the confidence
of the Iraqi people in the ISF, which will also assist in lowering the
levels of violence. As the situation improves, security forces will
transition to steady state policing and emergency response operations.
The positive reaction to the ``clean-up Baghdad streets'' initiative,
in which Iraqi and coalition force troops were cleaning the streets
together, is an excellent example of the `nonkinetic' effect aspect of
the Baghdad Security Plan.
The Government of Iraq, with MNF-I in support, is working very
closely with the local District Advisory Councils in the areas of
operations by employing local labor from the community to clean and
rebuild parts of the neighborhood markets and repair and restore
essential services. To date, more than 11,000 man-days of employment
have been executed by Iraqis for projects directly related to cleaning
up and developing the areas where operations are focused. On 24 August,
the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee voted unanimously
to support the Baghdad Security Plan with Economic Security Funds; 15
reconstruction projects totaling $9.2 million were approved. Fourteen
projects are in the Doura District, until recently one of the most
violent districts in the city. One project is in the Ghazaliya, Al
Mansour District. Included are the following:
- Four road projects (to include an asphalt overlay of all
residential city roads);
- Two water projects;
- Four sewer projects (to include completion of a sewer
network that will connect approximately 2 million residents to
the waste water treatment plant);
- Four school projects (to include construction of one
primary, one secondary, and one high school); and
- One project to supply essential service equipment.
General Abizaid. The ``oil spot'' strategy is a counterinsurgency
effort based on fixing parts of the country across all lines of
operation such as security, government, and economic in order to return
basic services such as sewage, water, electricity, education, trash,
medical, and transportation. As life returns to normalcy in these ``oil
spots'' the citizens dislocate themselves from the insurgency as they
come to realize that the insurgency is a destructive force while the
host nation government gains legitimacy. It is the legitimacy of the
government which is the key in any successful counterinsurgency. Other
areas around this ``oil spot'' will then want to enjoy those benefits
and as the theory goes the ``oil spot'' begins to spread as oil does on
top of water.
The security of Baghdad is without a doubt very important to the
successful outcome of this campaign. In order to displace the local
citizens from the insurgency and in order to boost the legitimacy of
the Government of Iraq we have started Operation Together Forward.
Operation Together Forward is designed to regain those areas that were
hardest hit by the insurgency. Those objective areas within Baghdad are
first cleared by coalition and ISF--house by house, building by
building. Next is a hold phase with ISF in the lead the citizens and
the local government begin to help not only clean up the objective but
also to re-open businesses and commerce. The last phase is the build
phase whereupon the local citizens will build upon the successes in the
security, economic, and government lines of operations. We are still in
the clear stage of this operation.
3. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, where will these additional troops come from? If we are
redeploying U.S. troops from outside Baghdad, won't we need to replace
those troops with additional forces?
Secretary Rumsfeld. It is important to remember that Iraqi troops
are also being moved into Baghdad. The number of Iraqi troops in the
Baghdad area is greater than our troops. We are supporting them in the
main operational areas. They can benefit from our command and control
capabilities and the systems that a unit such as the Stryker brigade
brings to the fight.
Levels of violence and terrorist activities drive decisions to
reallocate U.S. forces inside Iraq. MNF-I commanders normally do not
reallocate troops to areas experiencing moderate levels of enemy
activity. Moreover, the capability of the local ISF is a deciding
factor as to whether to reallocate U.S. forces. Before any U.S. combat
unit is reallocated, U.S. commanders must be confident that the
departed area will not backslide into increased violence.
General Pace. After being relieved by the 3rd Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) in MND-N, the 172nd
SBCT was extended for up to 120 days and repositioned to support the
main security effort in Baghdad. Since their replacement (3rd SBCT,
2ID) was part of a normal Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) force rotation,
no additional forces were required to backfill. That said, commanders
in the field continue to evaluate conditions on the ground and make
recommendations and requests for force adjustments as conditions
warrant.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
4. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, President Talabani has stated that Iraqi forces will assume
security duties for the entire country by the end of this year. How
does this square with the increased U.S. troop presence in Baghdad and
the continuing presence of coalition troops throughout Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Coalition commanders expect ISF units will have
the security lead in all of Iraq by March or April 2007. The ministries
and the joint headquarters, with coalition support, are expected to
take the lead by the end of 2007. However, we believe that our
partnership with these institutions will be required for some time into
the future. However, our assessments are conditions-based; unforeseen
improvements or setbacks could affect the ISF's scheduled assumption of
the security lead. The enemy will have an affect on the timeline.
General Pace. Given the current security situation on the ground,
the level of training and equipping of ISF, and the development of the
leadership core of ISF, we estimate that all Iraqi territory will be
under ISF lead by the end of 2007. The ministries and the joint
headquarters are expected to be in the lead with coalition support by
the end of 2007. However, a partnership with these institutions will be
required through at least the first peaceful transfer of power in 2010.
These assessments are conditions-based, and unforeseen improvements or
setbacks may affect the ISF's scheduled assumption of the security
lead. The enemy will always get a vote.
General Abizaid. Coalition force requirements are determined
through a conditions-based process, factoring in the presence and
activities of the terrorists and insurgents in an area as well as the
strength and capabilities of Iraqi army and police forces in area.
These factors ultimately determine the level of coalition force
requirements in an area. Each area has its own unique circumstances.
President Talibani noted the significant capabilities of the ISF and
the fact that Iraqi army and police forces have assumed responsibility
across Iraq, responsibilities that will increase through the remainder
of the year. In many areas, however, Iraqi forces will still require
coalition forces to help back them up. Additionally, until the Iraqi
logistics system is fully established, Iraqi forces will require
coalition support to provide some key resources until the Iraqi system
is able to provide these requirements. Additionally, there are some
areas where the terrorist and insurgent presence requires additional
security force presence. Baghdad is currently one such area where
additional coalition forces are required until additional ISF can be
deployed.
5. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, it seems clear that even today, more than 3 years after our
invasion of Iraq, we do not have sufficient troops to control the
country or help the Iraqi government impose its authority. We are
talking about redeploying thousands of troops from around Iraq to
Baghdad. More troops will be deployed to Ramadi, possibly coming from
Falluja. Have we had since our invasion, and do we have today,
sufficient force levels in Iraq? If you believe we do, what do you
believe will be the turning point in this war, since additional troops
seem to be unnecessary?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The number of troops that went in, and the
number of troops that were there every month since, and the number of
troops that are there today reflected the best judgment of the military
commanders on the ground, their superiors, General Pace, General
Abizaid, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense (DOD) and
the President of the United States.
The Iraqis will determine the ``turning point'' in the war when
they view their security situation tenable, their political process as
legitimate, and their economic future as hopeful. For its part, the
Government of Iraq needs to resolve the difficult issues of national
reconciliation, militias, oil revenue sharing, federalism, and de-
Baathification. They must address these issues in a way that does not
exacerbate sectarian tensions.
General Pace. It is impossible to provide a discreet ``turning
point'' because the turning point must happen in the minds of the
Iraqis. Iraqis, including minorities, must view the political process
as legitimate and effective and Iraq's economic prospects as sufficient
and equitable for themselves, their families, and their tribe or sect.
Effective political and economic reform is central to a lasting
reduction in violence, to a far greater extent than solely increasing
U.S. troop numbers. The Government of Iraq must resolve the difficult
issues of national reconciliation, including de-Baathification reform,
militias, oil revenue sharing, and the nature of Iraqi federalism. They
must address these issues in a way that does not exacerbate sectarian
tensions. Additionally, the Government of Iraq must deliver basic goods
and services and a program to increase economic opportunities to
provide a counter to crime and militias.
The 172nd SBCT was temporarily extended. This unit is the
coalition's most experienced unit, with the most mobile and agile
systems, in support of the main security effort in Baghdad at a
decisive time. With the rest of the elements of the plan to protect the
population in Baghdad, this unit's deployment gives coalition forces a
potentially decisive capability to affect security in Baghdad in the
near-term. Commanders in the field will continue to evaluate our force
structure and recommend changes as conditions warrant. We continually
assess future force requirements with the Iraqi government. Decisions
about coalition troop levels are conditions based and tailored to the
overall situation in Iraq. We continue to transition and transfer
additional responsibilities to the ISF. The people of Iraq continue to
meet the political milestones they have established. As these and other
conditions are met we assess the capabilities here and make
recommendations as to the levels of troops needed in the coming months.
We are committed to ensuring Iraq's security forces are trained,
equipped, and organized in a manner that will allow them to provide
security and stability on their own. They are making progress and our
partnership program should help develop their capabilities even more.
Adjustments to the coalition troop levels are conditions-based and not
based on a timeline. Those conditions include continued political
development, ISF development, and the transition of security
responsibilities from coalition forces to ISF. Coalition forces remain
in a support role.
General Abizaid. I believe we have had and currently have
sufficient troops in Iraq. While the number of U.S. forces has varied
from as many as 185,000 to as few as 120,000 depending on rotation
cycles, there are still 23,000 coalition troops in Iraq, and most
importantly we now have trained and equipped over 300,000 Iraqi
soldiers and police, and an additional 100,000 forces in the ministries
as well. The increasing number of ISF is the most telling number as it
is integral to the Government of Iraq bearing ultimate responsibility
for Iraq's security.
As decisive as our joint military operations are, particularly our
efforts to secure Baghdad, the turning point in this war will be when
the majority of Iraqis believe in and support their elected government
in the difficult tasks ahead. The year-old Iraqi Constitution calls for
approximately 55 enabling or implementing acts to make it operative,
including such significant and broad areas as judiciary development and
economic reform. Passing and enforcing this legislation will be a key
indicator of progress for the new Iraqi government and this campaign.
iraqi militias
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, with the death of Zarqawi and the capture of several of his
lieutenants, how would you assess the threat posed today by al Qaeda in
Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Killing Zarqawi did not destroy al Qaeda in
Iraq. Its capacity, however, has been diminished. Although al Qaeda is
a tenacious organization, we are making progress against them and we
will continue to make progress. Sectarian violence was always Zarqawi's
strategy. Violence creates fear and targets innocent civilians in an
attempt to derail democracy.
General Pace. [Deleted.]
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, has Moqtada al Sadr's militia become problem number one for
the Iraqi government and the coalition, and what are our current plans
to deal with his and other independent militias?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Article 9 of the Iraqi constitution prohibits
the formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed
forces.
Nevertheless, the problem of illegal armed groups and militias
requires both kinetic and political solutions. Coalition forces will
assist the Iraqi government in addressing illegal armed groups by
reintegrating individuals into the ISF, disarming them, and
demobilizing them. Indeed, the two primary objectives of the security
operations in Baghdad are rapidly reducing sectarian violence by de-
legitimizing the illegally armed groups and establishing the ISF as the
dominant security presence.
Once Iraqi citizens have more confidence in their security forces,
they will be less likely to rely on militias. Improvements in the
capabilities of the ISF are steady as seen in Baghdad neighborhoods
cleared as part of Operation Together Forward.
The Iraqi government is also encouraging the organization of
popular committees. The committees, like neighborhood watches, assist
Iraqi police and Iraqi army by providing information on threats in the
neighborhood. The unarmed popular committees should provide information
to be acted on by the security forces.
General Pace. The recent increase in sectarian violence is the
number one problem for the Iraqi government and the coalition; that
said, any group associated with terror, murder, or extreme violence is
equally detrimental to a free and democratically-elected Iraqi
government. Those groups will be pursued and brought to justice by
Iraqi and coalition forces. In that Iraq is a sovereign nation, current
plans to deal with security in Iraq require close coordination with
Iraqi government and associated ISF. An example of this is Operation
Together Forward, in which coalition forces are working closely with
Iraqi counterparts to reduce murders, kidnappings, assassinations,
terrorism, and sectarian violence in Baghdad.
General Abizaid. Preventing sectarian violence from escalating into
civil war is the coalition's highest priority. Sadr's Jaysh-al-Mahdi
militia is a contributor to sectarian violence but only part of the
overall problem. Sunni and Shiite extremists at both ends of the
spectrum are increasingly locked in retaliatory violence, contesting
control of ethnically mixed neighborhoods in order to expand their
existing areas of influence.
The challenge for the coalition is to support the government in
breaking the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence while allowing the Prime
Minister to consolidate the Shiite and Sunni constituency he needs in
order to be able to exercise power. An effective disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program for militias and illegal
armed groups is essential to meeting security requirements that will
have long-term implications for economic development and foreign
investment. Integrated with the effort to disarm the militias is the
Prime Minister's ``National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,''
which he presented to the Iraqi Council of Representatives in June.
This 24-point initiative was aimed at reconciling past inequities,
rallying Iraqis around a principle of equality devoid of sectarian
divisions, firmly establishing the basis of national unity via a
democratic political process, and creating conditions for Iraq to
assume a leading role regionally and internationally. The National
Reconciliation Project is intended to open dialogue, reduce sectarian
tensions and violence in Iraq, and increase commitment to the
democratic process and the new National Unity Government.
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, the police obviously pose a problem for stability and safety
in Iraq. Are there plans to eliminate infiltrators from the police
ranks, and distance the police from militia control?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There are some places where the local police
are exceptionally efficient and very honest. There are other areas
where we know that they have been infiltrated by various militias, such
as in Basra, where the government and the British forces that are down
there are doing their best to stand down those units, retrain them, and
bring them on line in a credible and capable manner.
As far as national police forces, there are battalions that need to
be stood down and retrained. We are in the process of doing that now.
The Iraqis are building Internal Affairs and Inspector General
units in the police ranks, a move that will ensure that police respond
to the legitimate chain of command.
General Pace. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), in conjunction with
coalition forces, is conducting a unit-by-unit inspection of the Iraqi
national police. While this inspection is focusing on equipment
accountability and training level proficiency, it is also providing a
platform to conduct retraining of policemen on basic professionalism
and anti-corruption methods. This inspection is also providing ministry
and coalition leadership the opportunity to rid the police of those
members whose militia affiliations take precedence over loyalties to
the nation. While this inspection has been ongoing for more than a
month, the retraining and revetting of police will continue for the
foreseeable future.
General Abizaid. During his 31 July speech to Parliament, MOI
Bolani acknowledged there are disloyal and corrupt elements that had
infiltrated the police and government and in less than 3 months in
office, has shown himself to be decisive in removing infiltrators and
criminals from police ranks. Within MOI, Internal Affairs (IA) is
leading the effort to eliminate militia and terrorist infiltrators
through the implementation of an aggressive MOI employee vetting
process using the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS)
combined with criminal record checks. The AFIS is also being integrated
into the police cadet screening process which involves the collection
of personal information and biometric data, to include fingerprints.
Over 7,000 ``hits'' have been referred to the IA Directorate based on
known criminal connections. In addition to the AFIS screening process,
the MOI staff has taken the initiative to conduct an internal audit of
all personnel to ensure that every employee meets the initial entry
criteria.
iran's influence in iraq
9. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, what role is Iran playing today in southern Iraq and more
widely throughout the country?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The primary security problem in Iraq has
shifted from a Sunni insurgency to sectarian violence. Al Qaeda
terrorists, insurgents, and armed Shiite militants supported by Iran
also compete to plunge the country into civil war. The Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Qods Force arms, trains, and equips rogue Shiite
groups. These Shiite militias do Iran's bidding and exert an improper
and undue influence from Basra to Baghdad. Prime Minister Maliki is
concerned and has appointed a military officer to go to the south to
get the security situation back under control.
General Pace. [Deleted.]
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, if Iran's influence were somehow eliminated, what concrete
effect would that have on violence in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Iran talks about stabilizing Iraq but in
reality, it arms, trains, and equips Iraqi extremist Shiite militias to
do its bidding. Eliminating Iran's influence would likely result in
less Shiite extremism and sectarian violence. Moreover, Sunni
resistance probably would diminish along with their fear of a Shiite-
dominated Iranian-sponsored government that discriminates against
Sunnis. Stability would increase.
General Pace. First, although it is difficult to predict with
concrete certainty, most likely there would be a reduction in funding,
guidance, morale, and material support to Iranian parties, resulting in
a reduction of Shiite extremism and sectarian violence. There would
also very likely be a reduction in the sectarian motivated violence and
a reduction in the Sunni resistance that is based on fear of a Shiite-
dominated government that discriminates against Sunnis and is a proxy
of Iran. There would likely also be an increase in stability as these
factors that drive conflict are eliminated.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
violence in iraq
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, what, if any, events do you think will bring down the level of
violence in Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. National reconciliation could reduce the
factors leading to violence by resolving those outstanding issues among
Iraq's major factions. Dismantling militias and extragovernmental armed
groups and reintegrating them into society would permit the Iraqi
government to control the sole use of force which should also reduce
violence. Finally, reforming the MOI and the Iraqi Police Service will
also increase stability in Iraq.
General Pace. First, national reconciliation promises to resolve
the outstanding issues between the major factions in Iraq. This should
greatly reduce many of the drivers of the violence. Second, the
successful reduction of militias and extra-governmental armed groups,
which includes a fully implemented disarm, demobilize, and
reintegration program, should reduce violence and allow the Iraqi
government to retain the monopoly on the use of force. Third, MOI and
Iraqi Police Service reform, development, and supervision will also
reduce violence in Iraq.
General Abizaid. While individual events can cause an escalation in
the level of violence, only a sustained campaign can reverse the trend.
The campaign in Iraq will bring down the level of violence by
generating capable, non-sectarian security forces with the capacity to
counter internal threats and to deny the passage of foreign fighters
and their support across Iraq's borders. An effective democratically
elected government of national unity will provide security and
essential services, removing the need to rely on local militias for
protection and other support. Finally, provincial elections and
constitutional reform will reinforce equities between Iraqis and their
country's future prosperity.
iraqi army
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, to build a truly national Iraqi army, it is necessary to build
units of mixed ethnicities and religions (Shiite, Sunni, Kurds)--not
simply an army comprising homogenous units. How far have we gone toward
the goal of building mixed units so far, and what steps are we taking
to accelerate it?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We are committed to creating an Iraqi military
that reflects the ethnic and religious diversity of Iraq, with units
loyal to the nation and not to sectarian interests. Although competence
and merit are the deciding factors when selecting recruits,
(particularly leaders), the ISF are developing so they generally mirror
the demographic makeup of Iraq. Sectarian lines remain drawn, however,
in those units recruited along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shiite, or
Kurdish over-representation within those units reflecting the areas
where the units were formed.
The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee,
uses the normal transitions to continue to diversify the senior
leadership in the Iraqi army. This continuing process strives to ensure
that the Iraqi army is led by competent leaders who are representative
of the nation.
General Pace. We do not track soldiers by ethnicity--they are all
Iraqis. Historically, we have seen that the Iraqi army does a much
better job in recruiting multiple ethnicities than the Iraqi police.
The Government of Iraq is committed to ensuring ISF represent the
population, both ethnically and geographically, to enable the Iraqi
people to build and maintain confidence in their security forces. A
representation of the Iraqi populace would ideally consist of 60
percent Shiite, 20 percent Sunni, and 20 percent Kurd force.
General Abizaid. The senior Iraqi military and political leadership
share our views on the requirement to build units of mixed ethnicity
and religions. It is important to note that the Iraqis are taking the
lead to properly integrate their army and to ensure they do everything
possible to make each division representative of the population at
large and not a collection of units that represent different ethnic,
religious or geographical areas. Recruiting efforts are focused at
providing an equal opportunity to everyone to join the military. In a
recent visit to Iraqi army units, Prime Minister Maliki stressed that
when Iraqis join the military they must forget about the town or
province they came from and must forget about the circumstances under
which they joined and focus on representing Iraq as a whole. This has
been a recurring theme for the Iraqi army and it fits well into the
Prime Minister's plan for reconciliation. During recent missions, the
Iraqis have sent Mobile Recruiting Teams out into areas of the country
where no teams were previously sent, in an effort to extend
opportunities for service to the nation. The Iraqis, with coalition
partners in support, have made a genuine effort to extend the
opportunity for service to all ethnic and religious groups in the
country. They also monitor the distribution of soldiers who complete
initial entry training to ensure ethnic diversity continues as the
units build and sustain. The coalition understands the importance of
diversity and will continue to provide overwatch and advice to our
Iraqi partners. Currently, the Iraqi army units and their leaders are
largely representative of the population of Iraq.
13. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, there have been reports that large numbers of Iraqi troops are
deserting and that there is corruption among the troops. In one report,
only half of an entire unit was actually present in an operation. In
some places, Iraqi troops have gotten caught with bombmaking materials
or allowed insurgents to attack U.S. convoys by looking the other way.
These activities are fueling distrust for Iraqi soldiers. What is being
done to fix these problems and how do we ensure that it will not happen
in the future? How is this going to affect transfer of command to the
Iraqis and how do we guarantee that once the transfer occurs, they will
be able to prevent corruption themselves?
Secretary Rumsfeld. There have been several cases of unit-wide
corruption and malfeasance but we do not see a wide-spread problem.
Coalition force partners and ISF embedded transition teams conduct
monthly assessments, to include unit leadership and loyalty. ISF units
cannot assume a security lead until they are assessed as ready. Multi
National Security Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I) along with the
Government of Iraq and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Training Mission-Iraq, developed and fielded an Iraqi Army Training
Command that resembles the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). TRADOC implements training at all levels within the Iraqi
army. Part of TRADOC's curriculum focuses on professionalism and
loyalty, especially for the officers and noncommissioned officers.
We do not believe that the few incidents of anti-coalition activity
will affect the transfer of command to the Iraqis. Regarding
corruption, the Iraqi Public Integrity Commission is conducting
internal audits of senior government employees' incomes, and will
investigate any suspicious findings.
General Pace. While there have been a few cases of unit-wide
corruption and malfeasance, we do not believe that it is a widespread
problem. Units are assessed monthly in several areas, and are not
allowed to move forward to a security lead posture until they are
assessed as competent to do so. Coalition force partner units, in
conjunction with ISF embedded transition teams, routinely assess ISF
unit leadership and loyalty. Multi National Security Transition Corps-
Iraq (MNSTC-I) has, in cooperation with the Government of Iraq and the
NATO Training Mission-Iraq, developed and fielded an Iraqi army
Training Command that resembles the U.S. TRADOC. This command oversees
and implements training at all levels within the Iraqi army. Some of
this training is centered on professionalism and loyalty, especially
for the officers and noncommissioned officers.
We do not believe that these few cases of anti-coalition complicity
will affect the transfer of command to the Iraqis. In fact, we have
already transferred control of the Iraqi air force, navy, and Iraqi
ground forces command (with one Iraqi army division), and will transfer
another division later in September. The Iraqi Public Integrity
Commission is conducting internal audits of senior government
employees' incomes and will investigate any situation that exhibits
suspicious activity. These procedures represent another step in
fighting corruption from two angles--administratively and financially.
General Abizaid. The Iraqi army is a developing institution. From
essentially nothing in the summer of 2003, the Iraqi army has grown
rapidly to meet Iraq's security requirements in the fight against the
terrorists and insurgents. In many areas of Iraq, they have assumed the
security lead in this fight and performed admirably--most notably in
securing the voting process for the Constitutional Referendum and
National Elections in late 2005, to the fight against the terrorists
and insurgents across Iraq today. In a complex environment such as
Iraq, the rapid buildup of the ISF has been remarkable. Challenges are
expected in these conditions and the Iraqi government and military
leaders are directly addressing these issues with the support of
coalition forces. Iraqi leaders are working hard to place the right
leaders in their units to provide dedicated, professional leadership.
Our embedded transition teams are also making a great contribution to
this effort and demonstrate on a daily basis how professional military
leaders execute their missions. Desertions and other actions are an
issue in Iraq, but the facts are that the leadership--especially the
Iraqi leadership--is directly dealing with these issues. Every day, the
Iraq army improves. The transition of operational responsibility to the
Iraqi army is a conditions-based process. We will take each step as
conditions are right to transition responsibility. Our training teams
will remain with their Iraqi partnered units after transition and will
continue to provide that direct support. Additionally, the Iraqis take
great pride in this transition of responsibility and we look to the
Iraqi government and military leaders to continue to provide direct
support to ensure issues of performance and corruption are dealt with
appropriately.
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, I understand there are small soldier-teams supervising and
training Iraqi forces. What feedback do you have from them regarding
the capabilities of Iraqi troops, and how would you rate the success of
these teams?
Secretary Rumsfeld. More than 1,200 U.S. soldiers and leaders are
embedded with Iraqi army and Iraqi police units. To the degree that one
can generalize about Iraqi troops, the embedded trainers describe them
as brave and aggressive soldiers. The trainers' monthly reports measure
the staffing, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics,
equipping and leadership of their partnered Iraqi units. These reports
play a major role in determining when Iraqi provinces are ready to be
released to Iraqi control. Iraqi units, specifically their leadership,
benefit from the presence of these teams. The transition teams are a
great success story, and are key in assisting Iraq to achieve security
self-reliance.
General Pace. We currently have more than 1,200 soldiers and
leaders embedded with both Iraqi army and Iraqi police units throughout
Iraq. We receive feedback from these teams monthly, which encompasses a
large part of the overall assessment that determines when Iraqi
provinces are released to Iraqi control. The feedback we receive from
these teams is as dynamic as the environment in which they exist. What
we are seeing is that Iraqi units are benefiting from the presence of
these transition teams, specifically within the leadership of Iraqi
units. These transition teams have been a great success story, and are
key in Iraq achieving self-security reliance.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
afghanistan
15. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, what accounts for the recent upsurge in fighting in southern
Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The insurgency views the ongoing transfer of
authority in Afghanistan as an opportunity to test NATO's will. The
increased violence against coalition, International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), and Afghan national security forces is intended to
intimidate our allies and cause them to question their commitments in
Afghanistan. As Operation Mountain Thrust demonstrates, however, we are
on the offensive and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
General Pace. [Deleted.]
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
16. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, now that the NATO has taken over operations in southern
Afghanistan, please describe how NATO operations will interact with
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations. Do the missions and the
rules of engagement (ROE) for NATO and OEF differ, as several NATO
officials have suggested?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Both ISAF and OEF share the same vision and the
same endstate--a safe, free, and self-sufficient Afghanistan. Both
share the same general lines of approach: a reconstruction and
stabilization effort with the military creating a safe and secure
environment for civilian relief agencies, international organizations
and--most importantly--Afghan government agencies rebuilding the
country. There are differences in the missions traceable, to the
different powers of NATO versus autonomous nations in a coalition, and
to different national capabilities and constraints. However, combat and
stabilization operations in the field have shown that both forces are
compatible on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This cooperation will only increase when the remaining OEF troops
in the east fall under ISAF command this fall. The U.S. Deputy
Commander of ISAF for Security will be charged with ensuring
coordination.
General Pace. OEF and the ISAF do have different ROE, as would be
expected for any NATO operation involved in the same country as a
coalition operation. However, this has precedent for success with many
previous NATO operations, which include Balkan operations in the 1990s
and Operation Active Endeavor maritime forces operating in proximity of
other naval vessels. It is not an issue to have two forces operating
together with different ROE but it is critically important that those
forces have good procedures in place to provide deconfliction. NATO
operations will interact with OEF operations in much the same way as
they have been doing for the last couple of weeks in Operation Medusa.
Operation Medusa concluded offensive operations on 13 September 2006
and was accomplished by ISAFs operating in southern region of
Afghanistan with OEF forces integrated into the operations. In this
example, the OEF forces were SOF in their foreign internal defense
role, but it serves as a good example of how well these two operations
can work together. Thorough planning was conducted to ensure
deconfliction procedures are integrated into NATO procedures as they
operate in the region south. The primary deconfliction occurs through
the Deputy Commander (DCOM), Security billet in the headquarters of
Commander, ISAF. DCOM Security will be a U.S. general officer
indefinitely and is currently being executed by Major General Freakley,
who is also Commander, JTF-76 as the 10th Mountain Division Commanding
General. With his ``dual-hat'' role as DCOM Security and CJTF-76, he
has responsibility for deconflicting ISAF operations with OEF
operations. The DOD and NATO continue to work on the effectiveness of
this deconfliction to ensure it is set up for success for the long-
term.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
17. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, could Pakistan be doing more to crack down on Taliban and al
Qaeda operating from Pakistani territory?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Pakistan is a key ally in the war on terror. We
work closely with Pakistan to improve its military capabilities,
particularly in the critical Pakistan-Afghanistan border regions. There
are approximately 80,000 Pakistani troops currently assigned to this
region. Furthermore, the Government of Pakistan recently announced a
new three-pronged strategy in the federally administered tribal areas,
which combines political, economic, and military initiatives. These
initiatives are designed to yield long-term results. We will
continually assess their effectiveness. Simultaneously, we will
continue to impress on Pakistan our desire to see results in cracking
down on al Qaeda and Taliban in the border region.
General Pace. Pakistan is a key ally in the war on terrorism and
cooperates closely with the U.S. military in the ongoing fight along
the Afghan-Pakistan border. The U.S. Government and DOD continue to
look at ways to help improve Pakistani military capabilities in order
to enhance their effectiveness in war on terrorism efforts in the
border regions. President Musharraf recently unveiled a new strategy
for efforts in the federally administered tribal areas, which includes
a comprehensive approach involving political, economic, and military
initiatives. Since these initiatives are just underway and many will be
long-term efforts, it is too early to measure the effectiveness of the
new Pakistan strategy. Of course we would like to see better results in
cracking down on al Qaeda and Taliban in the border region. We continue
to work closely with the Pakistan government and military to improve
the effectiveness of the Pakistan effort.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
18. Senator McCain. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, has the United States and the international community provided
enough attention and resources to Afghanistan to ensure that it does
not slide backward?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The situation on the ground in Afghanistan is
dynamic and requires both the United States and our international
partners to continually review our initial assumptions and refine our
strategy. The DOD, along with the interagency, is conducting a review
of the situation in Afghanistan to ensure that the necessary
requirements are correctly identified and appropriately resourced. The
United States is fully committed to the security, stability, and
reconstruction of Afghanistan. We and the international community are
helping Afghanistan to rebuild and assisting the Afghans to establish a
credible and self-sustaining government.
General Pace. The United States is leading the international
community in conducting a comprehensive strategic review of all aspects
of DOD efforts in Afghanistan to ensure that it does not slide
backward. This comprehensive strategic review, led by the NSC and in
close coordination with the interagency, will reprioritize U.S. and
coalition efforts to achieve the permissive environment vital to
achieving our goals in Afghanistan. Although initial efforts were well
thought out and appropriately resourced by the United States and
international community, the reality on the ground has changed in
Afghanistan and we must adapt to this new reality. I think we must keep
in mind that not only are we fighting a counterinsurgency, but we are
also rebuilding a nation, one of the poorest on Earth. Of course the
U.S. Government and the international community could always do more,
but right now, from a military viewpoint, I believe we are providing
enough attention and resources to prevent a backward slide.
General Abizaid. Resource levels in Afghanistan are based on the
needs of the ground commanders and their assessment of the threat. I
continue to review and adjust resources as necessary in order to
achieve success.
The center of gravity in Afghanistan is decreasingly military and
increasingly within the domain of governance and economic development.
Therefore, resource requirements are shifting. The enemy is focused on
winning the battle of perception, so we must counter any perception
that our commitment to Afghanistan is in any way wavering. Continued
development of the Government of Afghanistan and success in stabilizing
the country require uncompromising commitment and consistent
international cooperation. Afghanistan will continue to require both
U.S. and international community resources to maintain development of
the Afghan national security forces, counternarcotics assistance,
infrastructure, and border security. The London Compact of 2006
provides the framework for the international community to help the
Afghans create a legitimate government. As NATO assumes control of
security and stability operations, I will maintain a close relationship
so as to advise and support with regard to NATO's requirements. The
strength and capability of the Afghan government is growing rapidly.
Coalition forces provide the shield behind which the
accomplishments of the past 4\1/2\ years can be made permanent.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
national guard
19. Senator Collins. General Pace and General Abizaid, it has been
widely reported in the press and through senior National Guard
officials' testimony before Congress that the war in Iraq has badly
depleted the National Guard's domestic store of vehicles, weapons, and
communications gear--leaving National Guard units with one-third the
equipment needed to meet homeland security and homeland defense
requirements.
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Steven
Blum, has repeatedly stated that in September 2001, the National Guard
had 75 percent of its needed equipment ``on hand.'' Today, that number
is 34 percent.
Maine's National Guard certainly is not immune to this severe
equipment shortage. My State's Adjutant General has informed me that
the Army National Guard (ARNG) in Maine is currently experiencing a
lack of vehicles--primarily Humvees and crew-served weapons--and I am
concerned with the amount of suitable equipment available to deploy
overseas, conduct training, or respond to a domestic emergency.
What kind of risk is incurred by having so few resources stateside,
and what type of vulnerability does this expose for State National
Guard troops in responding to domestic crises?
General Pace. At this time last year, the ARNG was just completing
its largest deployment since World War II. Approximately 17 brigades or
brigade equivalents were deploying, deployed, or preparing to deploy.
Equipment on hand, available to the Governors to respond to natural
disasters, in the 54 States and Territories was at about 26 percent.
Yet, the ARNG was able to deploy around 50,000 soldiers, equipped to
the Gulf Coast in support of fellow citizens during hurricane Katrina.
Since last year, equipment has been coming out of reset and returning
to the States and we are now at around 39 percent as a national
average.
The Army in coordination with the ARNG has completed an analysis of
equipment required along the coast from Texas to Maine, and in the
islands (Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and Guam) to support
possible hurricanes. The Adjutants General of these States/Territories
provided their requirements through the National Guard Bureau to the
Department of the Army. All components of the Army have provided
equipment or pledged unit capabilities to respond to these possible
hurricanes. The States are confident that there is enough equipment on
hand or through the use of the additional capabilities and Emergency
Management Assistance Compacts to respond. Maine did not request any
additional equipment for hurricane response.
Maine has received 67 percent of their Table of Organization and
Equipment requirements. They do not have all of this equipment on hand.
The whereabouts of their equipment is as follows:
31 percent of their authorized equipment is nondeployed and
currently available (5 percent substitute items) national
average is 39 percent.
31 percent of their authorized equipment is deployed or in
reset (Maine should get 5,141 pieces back from reset in fiscal
year 2007).
5 percent of their authorized equipment has been left in
theater (Department of the Army and ARNG are working payback
plans for equipment left in theater).
Critical Dual Use Equipment: Maine is at 60 percent and
national average is 53 percent.
Maine is scheduled to get 68 pieces of new equipment in
fiscal years 2007 and 2008 (includes 20 medium trucks and 15
trailers for medium vehicles).
Of Army's total new procurement allocations over fiscal years
2007 and 2008, ARNG will receive 24 percent of night vision
devices, 32 percent of Single Channel Ground Airborne Radio
System (SINCGARS) radios, and 71 percent of Medium Tactical
Vehicles.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops and the
equipment needed to meet operational requirements in the Central
Command AOR. As the proponent for manning and equipping the National
Guard to meet their full spectrum of missions, the National Guard
Bureau is best suited to respond to this query.
troop levels in iraq
20. Senator Collins. Secretary Rumsfeld, the DOD Office of
Inspector General (OIG) announced several months ago that it is
conducting an audit to see if U.S. troops deployed to Iraq have the
equipment they need. The ongoing audit is supposed to determine whether
units were provided with required equipment before they deployed,
whether modifications made to equipment satisfy unit requirements, and
the impact decisions on equipment repair have when units are
redeployed, according to the IG's office.
What is the status of this audit and can you share any interim
findings with the committee at this time, particularly regarding the
equipment available to units as they prepare to deploy from the United
States to Iraq?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The OIG has initiated two separate audits
regarding the equipment provided to troops deployed to Iraq. The first
audit is nearing completion and the second was just recently announced.
On November 17, 2005, the DOD OIG announced the Audit of Equipment
Status of Deployed Forces within U.S. Central Command. The objective of
the audit is to determine whether units deployed to Iraq have been
equipped in accordance with mission requirements. Specifically, the
audit is evaluating whether units were provided the required items of
equipment and whether the equipment modifications satisfied mission
requirements. The audit is still ongoing and final results are not
available. The OIG expects to issue a final report by the end of the
year.
On August 30, 2006, the OIG announced the Audit of the Inspection
Process of the Army Reset Program for Ground Vehicles for Units
Returning from OIF. The objective of the audit is to evaluate the
Army's reset program for ground vehicles to determine the effectiveness
of the technical inspection process for those units that are completing
their tours in support of OIF. The audit team plans to start the
project in September and travel to Iraq during the first quarter fiscal
year 2007.
haditha
21. Senator Collins. General Abizaid, on November 19, 2005, a
Marine convoy in the Iraqi town of Haditha was hit by a roadside bomb.
One marine and 24 Iraqi civilians, including women and children, were
killed. Allegations surfaced in February 2006 that the marines may have
killed the Iraqi civilians in reprisal.
Two investigations were then opened to review this tragic incident.
The Naval Criminal Investigative Service is conducting one
investigation, and Major General Eldon Bargewell, USA, recently
completed a separate, independent report into whether marines attempted
to cover up the incident or if commanders were negligent in failing to
initially investigate. While General Bargewell's report is not yet
public, he reportedly submitted his findings to General Chiarelli on
June 16, 2006.
As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have asked
Senator Warner, the chairman of the committee, to hold a public hearing
on the Haditha incident at the earliest possible date. He has assured
me that such a hearing will be held in the coming weeks.
I believe congressional oversight is essential to ensure that our
Armed Forces investigate accusations of this nature in an appropriate
manner. These serious allegations of misconduct are deeply troubling,
although the vast majority of our troops in Iraq continue to perform
their duties with the utmost respect, restraint, and courage.
What strikes me as curious is the lapse of time between the
incident and subsequent investigations. Although marines initially
reported that civilian casualties resulted from an IED explosion,
photographs taken by the exploitation team conflicted with this report.
The photographs clearly showed that the victims were killed as a result
of gunshot wounds.
According to a June 1 Washington Post article, the exploitation
team's reporting chain lay outside that of the other marines--who were
members of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines--and went up through
military intelligence channels directly to the 1st Marine Division's
intelligence director. Had the exploitation team reported accurately
what it witnessed, it would have presumably set off alarms and prodded
military commanders to immediately investigate.
I understand that you are currently reviewing General Bargewell's
report on the Haditha incident. Are you able to share what his
investigation revealed about the exploitation team actions or
inactions? Are you aware of any exploitation team reporting policies
changed as a result of this incident?
General Abizaid. The United States Central Command is unable to
share any details of the Major General Bargewell AR 15-6 Investigation.
That investigation was previously forwarded to U.S. Marine Forces
Central Command and this headquarters will transmit a copy of the
investigation to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recommend appropriate coordination with the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Marines.
troop readiness
22. Senator Collins. General Pace and General Abizaid, General
Pace's answer to Senator Reed talked about the components of readiness.
Just this week, USA Today reported that the Army has begun training the
oldest recruits in its history . . . ``the result of a concerted effort
to fill ranks depleted during the Iraq war.''
Just 5 months after the enlistment age limit was raised from 35 to
40, the Army raised it to just under 42. The Army has also lowered the
minimum physical requirements needed to pass basic training.
Another article earlier this year described one strategy being
employed by General Thomas Bostick, USA, Commander of all Army
recruiting efforts. The article referenced many new and varied
incentives being used to attract potential recruits in what has been a
tough environment during the last several years.
The ARNG, Reserve, and Active-Duty Forces all fell short of their
fiscal year 2005 recruiting goals. While the Army has reached many of
its recruiting targets this year, some could argue that this occurred
in part due to the fact that the goals were lowered. The press report
indicates that recruiters sent 2,697 fewer Active-Duty recruits to
basic training from October to December than they did during that
period in 2004.
More troublesome is the fact that General Bostick admitted that
more than 10 percent of the recruits during these 3 months had scores
on the aptitude test that were ``near the bottom of the scale--more
than double the annual 4 percent limit set by the DOD.''
Does the recruiting shortfall, combined with lowered benchmarks,
indicate trouble for our force and ability to re-supply the ranks?
General Pace. At this time, we do not see any significant
challenges with our ability to resupply the ranks with high quality men
and women needed to support our deployed forces.
Although challenges remain in this tough recruiting environment,
our superb recruiters in the field and the great support of Congress
have made for recruitment success during fiscal year 2006. The Active
Army and the ARNG are postured for mission success as we near the end
of the fiscal year. Predictions for the Army Reserve are somewhat less
optimistic. However, with high missions the last 2 months and continued
strong resourcing and efforts, the fiscal year 2006 accession mission
is achievable. In fact, the Army Reserve has already recruited more
soldiers this year than they did in all of fiscal year 2005.
As of the end of July 2006, the Army has met its Active recruiting
goals for 14 consecutive months and has recently announced that they
will meet their annual recruiting goal of 80,000. The Army Reserve and
the National Guard are just behind (99 percent) their mission goals
through the month of July. Additionally, a major contributing factor to
the overall health of the force is that retention rates remain high
across all three Army components.
The Army accessed higher numbers of lower mental category soldiers
early this fiscal year. However, through the end of July they remain at
3.8 percent, under the DOD goal of 4 percent for Test Category IV
accessions (those scoring between the 10th and the 30th percentiles on
the Armed Forces Qualification Test). They are committed to achieving
mission success while maintaining this DOD standard.
At this point, there is no indication that the increase in this
area will have any effect on overall unit readiness. In fact, attrition
in the training base remains at all-time lows; a remarkable feat in
light of the increased rigor of basic training.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
recruiting and training requirements, the Service Chiefs are best able
to fully respond to this query.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
counterdrug--u.s. military support
23. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, in January 2005 a group of 35
NGOs wrote to Secretary Rice recommending that coalition forces:
(1) focus intelligence collection efforts on identifying
major traffickers;
(2) cease all payments to traffickers; and
(3) assist in the destruction of laboratories and
interdiction of imports of precursor chemicals and exports of
narcotics.
Are the forces under your command doing any of this?
General Abizaid. The United States Central Command has supported
the lead nation and lead U.S. Government agencies responsible for the
counternarcotic mission in Afghanistan with intelligence support and
has provided assistance, within our existing means and authorities, to
those lead agencies to identify and destroy laboratories, and interdict
the movement of narcotics. Regarding the group's second recommendation,
forces under my command are not authorized to make payments to
traffickers. Since counternarcotics is primarily a law enforcement
mission, the United States Central Command is actively supporting
Department of State (DOS) International Narcotics and Law (INL), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), international, and Afghan efforts to
build an Afghan capability to effectively address the threat posed by
the illicit narcotics trade. Since 2004, Congress has provided, and the
DOD has expended, approximately $470 million for counternarcotics
programs in Afghanistan and the surrounding region. These programs are
training Afghan counternarcotics police forces, providing
infrastructure and equipment for the police and border security forces,
purchasing equipment to improve command and control, building an Afghan
counternarcotics intelligence capability, assisting the Government of
Afghanistan in their public information campaign, and leveraging
interagency intelligence capabilities in the fight against drugs. We
are also providing operational support as directed by the Secretary of
Defense in support of the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Action
Plan.
24. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, do the United States and ISAF
have a unified operational plan to deal with eliminating drug
cultivation and trafficking--activity which essentially funds the
Taliban and al Qaeda? More specifically, are we doing enough to
interdict cross-border flows of narcotics?
General Abizaid. Reducing drug cultivation and trafficking in
Afghanistan are missions of U.S. Government and international aid and
law enforcement agencies. However, the ISAF does have sufficient ROE
which allow these forces to assist with the drug threat in Afghanistan.
We are confident that ISAF will continue to provide adequate support to
these organizations in the poppy elimination and countertrafficking
tasks. Regarding our efforts at stopping the cross-border movements of
narcotics, U.S. military forces are currently not actively engaged on
the border to interdict drugs. However, DOD is aggressively assisting
the Government of Afghanistan, DOS, and the DEA to build an Afghan
capacity to interdict narcotics and precursor chemicals. Additionally,
while Afghanistan is the source of much of the world's opium, we
recognize that this opium must transit the region to reach its
worldwide market. As a result, we are also working with other regional
partners to improve their capacity to interdict narcotics as they move
across national boundaries.
counterdrug--strategy
25. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you believe that we are
doing enough with our allies in the Middle East, including the Gulf
States, to interdict drugs flowing out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Aside from the many capacity-building programs
DOD executes within Afghanistan in support of DOS, INL, and DEA
requests, DOD also executes programs throughout the surrounding region
in those countries that serve as the main transit zones for Afghan
narcotics. DOD has programs in support of the governments of Pakistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Oman, Djibouti,
Ethiopia, and Kenya in an effort to better interdict drug flows from
Afghanistan.
DOD also participates in the Central and South Asian
Counternarcotics and Security Working Group. This group of
representatives from Central and South Asian countries meets regularly
to examine strategies that promote regional stability and enhance their
capability to defeat narcotics trafficking in the region.
Despite relative improvements in their capabilities to date,
Afghanistan will require continued long-term assistance from the United
States and the entire international community to fully handle its own
narcotics issues.
26. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld, do you see an opportunity
for us to work with the Gulf States, with Pakistan, and even--despite
our tremendous differences with the government--Iran, to stem the flow
and thereby stem the drug proceeds to Taliban and al Qaeda? If so, how
would you ensure that this opportunity is seized--that we develop a
multinational, cross-border drug interdiction strategy?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As previously mentioned, our programs focus on
those countries that serve as the main transit zones for Afghan
narcotics. Pakistan is one of these countries, and the amount we spend
on support to counternarcotics efforts in Pakistan is second only to
what we provide in Afghanistan when compared to the rest of the region.
The Afghan drug trade also has seriously affected Iran, and Iran
has a strong interest in combating the drug flows from Afghanistan
through their country. There is little opportunity at the present time
for DOD to work directly with Iran on this issue, but the United
Kingdom and the Government of Afghanistan may be in a better position
to develop counternarcotics relationships with Iran.
counterdrug--provincial reconstruction teams role
27. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, do the Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have an explicit counterdrug mission?
General Abizaid. Although the PRTs do not have an explicit
counterdrug mission, the PRTs do coordinate with and support Afghan,
U.S., and other international efforts to provide alternatives to poppy
cultivation. For instance, the PRTs support the Afghan Poppy
Elimination Program (PEP) teams in their efforts to provide education,
alternative crops, and jobs for Afghans involved in the cultivation of
poppy. Both DOS/International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and
United States Agency for International Development provide significant
support to these PEP efforts.
28. Senator Levin. General Abizaid, are the PRTs helping build
infrastructure and providing alternative livelihoods at a rate, and in
a fashion, that leads you to believe we may be able to achieve reduced
levels of poppy cultivation in the future?
General Abizaid. The PRT program is a great success and is key to
stabilizing Afghanistan. There are 23 PRTs operating and they allow the
Afghan government to expand reconstruction and outreach efforts and
security. PRTs are a catalyst and their presence brings security to the
area where it operates and serves to enable reconstruction and
development. I believe their support is absolutely critical to develop
the infrastructure and markets required to provide the Afghan farmer
with a licit means to make a living and to the establishment and
sustainment of enduring alternative livelihood programs, which in time,
will favorably impact poppy cultivation.
afghanistan--nato capacity
29. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Abizaid, I
understand that the current plan is to turn responsibility for
Afghanistan over to NATO by the end of the year. Are there conditions
that will determine whether NATO takes control of the east, where U.S.
troops are concentrated now?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Stage IV transfer of authority for Regional
Command East is conditions-based. We are working with NATO, coalition
members, and the Government of Afghanistan to ensure that the ISAF
Commander has the forces and assets available to succeed in his
mission, and to ensure a seamless transition.
General Abizaid. We have already completed transition of three of
the four regional commands to NATO. Each transition decision was
determined by established criteria. The decision to execute transfer of
authority (TOA) of Regional Command-East (RC-E) to the NATO ISAF is
based on a set of 12 major operational and tactical criteria, as well
as a strategic evaluation. These criteria have been agreed upon by both
the United States and NATO. They are not simply focused on RC-E, but
rather encompass an evaluation of ISAF operations throughout
Afghanistan. The decision involves estimations of the effectiveness of
current and planned ISAF operations throughout the regions; the level
of cooperation they have achieved with the Government of Afghanistan; a
determination on whether NATO has sufficient combat enabling
capabilities such as emergency medical evacuation support; coordination
of detainee operations; agreement on execution of ROE; and NATO's
ability to operate and support the PCTs.
TOA execution will not take place until the United States, through
the Secretary of Defense, and NATO, through the NATO Advisory Council,
agree that all of the criteria have been satisfied, and the strategic
conditions are determined appropriate.
30. Senator Levin. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Abizaid, what
will be the ongoing U.S. role? Will the troop commitment remain at the
same levels, and if not, what matrices are you using to determine
whether we need to increase, decrease, or change the composition of the
U.S. troop contribution?
Secretary Rumsfeld. With regards to Stage IV, the ongoing U.S. role
in Afghanistan will be two-fold. First, as a member of NATO, the United
States will be the single largest contributor of forces and
capabilities to ISAF. Second, we will retain a strong national
capability to support counterterrorism missions and to continue our
role in training and equipping Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),
a mission that is essential to our long-term strategy in Afghanistan.
U.S. force numbers will continue to be determined by conditions and
requirements. As the ANSF develop the capability to provide for
Afghanistan's security, the requirement for U.S., NATO, and coalition
troop contributions will decrease.
General Abizaid. The United States will continue its significant
role in the security and development of Afghanistan during and after
the transfer of authority to NATO. U.S. forces are deployed throughout
Afghanistan, in support of OEF and NATO ISAF. While the bulk of combat
forces will be under ISAF, the support enablers for those units will
remain under national command. Additionally, we will continue operation
of nine PCTs under ISAF.
The Counterterrorism Task Force, as well as development of the
ANSF, to include the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National
Police, will remain the responsibility of the United States in
partnership with the Government of Afghanistan.
U.S. force levels will be predicated on conditions on the ground as
observed and evaluated by U.S. Central Command, and with the
concurrence of the Government of Afghanistan. Our troop commitment is
perceived by the Government of Afghanistan as a direct reflection of
our confidence in President Karzai's administration and our national
commitment to the development of Afghanistan.
risk assessment
31. Senator Levin. General Pace, in February of this year, you
provided this committee with a classified assessment of the risk of
executing our National Military Strategy (NMS). The classified risk
assessment you provided to this committee earlier this year does not
appear, in my judgment, to be consistent with the readiness statistics
the Army and the Marine Corps have provided to this committee in recent
months.
Do you stand by that risk assessment today?
General Pace. Yes. I remain confident that the Armed Forces can
accomplish the objectives of the NMS. The 2006 Biennial Review of the
NMS provided an assessment of the current security environment and the
capacity of the Armed Forces to accomplish the objectives of the NMS.
This assessment is updated through a continuous risk assessment process
in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders review
the risks associated with accomplishing the objectives of the NMS and
recommend appropriate actions to address these risks. I will not
hesitate to notify the committee should my judgment change on the risk
of executing our NMS.
32. Senator Levin. General Pace, what level of risk exists today if
our military were called on to execute a mission, requiring a
substantial number of ground forces, somewhere in addition to the
operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan?
General Pace. While our Armed Forces are engaged in a variety of
activities, including significant operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
we fight as a joint team--ground, air, and naval forces working
together. This joint approach provides the Nation with an exceptionally
flexible and capable military. Our joint team is fully capable of
responding to changing circumstances and situations throughout the
world and prevailing against any threat--decisively.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
corruption in iraq
33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, the July 2006, Quarterly and
Semi-Annual Report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction states that corruption has become wide-spread in Iraq,
so much so that, according to the report, it ``threatens to undermine
Iraq's democracy.''
Prior to this report, to what extent were you aware of how rampant
corruption had become in Iraq? Also, what steps have you taken or do
you plan to take to counteract fraud and corruption?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Corruption was omnipresent in Saddam's society
and it continues to be a part of the current Iraqi society. It is one
of the causes that leads to extremism. In order to be successful
against extremists, governments must be held accountable. Such
accountability will emerge in Iraq with the good governance created by
representative government. For our part, we are helping the Iraqis
develop anti-corruption agencies such as the Board of Supreme Audit and
the Commission on Public Integrity.
middle east conflict
34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, if the U.N. were able to
successfully negotiate a permanent cease-fire between Israel and the
Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, a number of European countries, including
France, Italy, and Poland, have indicated a willingness to contribute
forces in order to help maintain the peace. What role do you imagine
that U.S. forces would play in the deployment of an international
peacekeeping force?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The United States is considering how it can
best support an international peacekeeping force in Lebanon. That
support could take the form of logistics, communications, and other
assistance.
troop levels
35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Rumsfeld, the President has asserted
the need for more troops in Iraq in order to help stem the ongoing
violence and insurgency. Just last week, you approved a request to
extend the deployment of the Army's 172nd SBCT. Given that Lieutenant
General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, has recently
asserted that two-thirds of the Active Army's National Guard's brigades
are not ready for war, I am very concerned about our military's ability
to fulfill its worldwide mission. More specifically, to what extent has
the large scale deployment of troops to Iraq limited our ability to
respond to a threat from North Korea?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The DOD has refined its Force Planning
Construct to focus on three objective areas: homeland defense, war on
terrorism and irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns. We are
continuously assessing the force sizing and capability mix required by
the operational commitments associated with our worldwide mission.
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have stressed military personnel and
equipment, particularly of the ground forces. We are seeking ways to
reset the force and are reassessing the overall size of our military
forces.
The United States must maintain the ability to conduct and win
conventional campaigns, and we remain fully committed to fulfilling our
historic responsibilities of mutual defense on the Korean peninsula to
deter and, if required, defend against the threat from North Korea. The
United States has encouraged all parties involved to resume the Six-
Party Talks that provide a multinational discourse on achieving a
peaceful resolution to the North Korean weapon issue. Moreover, U.S.
Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea have been working with the South
Korean military to increase capacity to deter aggression and further
prospects for lasting peace.
The increased operational tempo and resulting readiness concerns
have impacted the risk associated with other commitments, and we are
continuously analyzing risk and prioritizing U.S. military activities.
The Chairman is specifically charged with formally assessing the
National Military Risk and will provide that annual assessment to
Congress in 2007.
iraqi security forces
36. Senator Akaka. General Pace and General Abizaid, the latest
Executive Summary Report to Congress regarding the United States policy
in Iraq asserts that Iraq's Ministry and Defense and MOI forces
``continue to increase in size and capability and are increasingly
taking over lead combat responsibility from coalition forces'' yet
rather than drawing down our troops we are increasing the numbers
deployed and extending the tours of the men and women already there.
To what extent did the report overestimate the progress of the ISF?
Also, what more needs to be done in order to make the transition to a
more limited mission and to prepare the ISF to be able to take over
responsibility?
General Pace. Effective political and economic reform is central to
a lasting reduction in violence, to a far greater extent than the
number of Iraqi or coalition troops. The Government of Iraq (GOI) must
resolve the difficult issues of national reconciliation, including de-
Baathification reform, militias, oil revenue sharing, and the nature of
Iraqi federalism. They must address these issues in a way that does not
exacerbate sectarian tensions. Additionally, the GOI must deliver basic
goods and services and a program to increase economic opportunities to
provide a counter to crime and militias.
Before the Samarra shrine bombing in February 2006, we anticipated
that insurgent attacks would decline. The bombing ignited sectarian
tensions that have necessitated adjusting U.S. troops to assist the ISF
in quelling the violence. Accomplishment of 325,000 individually
trained and equipped ISF is just a step in the process. Our ability to
reduce the number of coalition forces depends on the overall capability
of ISF, capacity of the GOI and its institutions, and GOI ability to
provide essential services.
We are seeing progress as Iraqi units go from formation to being
able to operate side-by-side to being in the lead. We are just now
beginning to see more ISF being able to operate independently without
coalition support. We anticipate we will begin to reduce our footprint
as ISF become more capable and enemy activity can be handled solely by
the ISF.
The MNF-I Commander is the best judge of when forces can be
redeployed. He has a process to make those decisions and we base our
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense based on his judgment.
Finally, the enemy gets a vote on when we withdraw forces.
General Abizaid. The August Report to Congress did not overestimate
the progress of the ISF. Rather, the report accurately stated the
progress the coalition is making in developing the ISF. By the end of
2006, the 325,000-person ISF will be trained and equipped. In just
under a year's time, the Iraqi army has grown from 23 battalions in the
lead conducting security operations, to 88 battalions in the lead.
Iraqi units designated as ``in the lead'' are capable of planning
and executing counterinsurgency and security operations today. These
units can and do conduct independent operations, however most of these
units still require support from the coalition, particularly in the
areas of logistics and sustainment. Where our initial focus in
developing the ISF was on creating, equipping, and training the units,
our focus is now shifting to developing the ISF's capacity to sustain
itself. One of our key efforts is to assist the Government of Iraq in
developing policy, planning, and budgeting capabilities in the
Ministries of Defense and Interior. These efforts will allow the ISF to
continue assuming more of the security responsibility for Iraq, thus
permitting coalition forces to transition to a supporting role.
iraq reconstruction
37. Senator Akaka. General Pace and General Abizaid, the DOD
reported that it is working closely with Iraq and international donors
to maximize international reconstruction assistance. What impact do you
believe that the recent violence between Iraq and Hezbollah forces in
Lebanon will have on the ability of the Iraqi government to garner
further international support?
General Pace. The International Compact with Iraq is a joint Iraqi/
U.N. initiative to garner increased international support for Iraq. The
Government of Iraq commits to reforms, while donor nations pledge
assistance to help Iraq meet its commitments. As the co-lead U.S.
Government agencies, the Departments of State and Treasury are better
positioned to comment on the impact on the Compact of the recent
fighting between Hezbollah and Israel.
General Abizaid. Recently, the struggle within Iraq has
transitioned from violence directed against coalition forces to
violence between ethnic and sectarian groups, mainly Sunni and Shiite,
seeking to control Baghdad and the distribution of political and
economic power. Continued sectarian violence will ultimately serve as a
deterrent to further international support. In order to set favorable
conditions for garnering international support, Prime Minister Maliki
has initiated key programs to resolve issues leading to sectarian
violence. These key programs include the National Reconciliation and
Dialog Plan, the International Compact for Iraq, the Iraq
Constitutional Review Process, and the Baghdad Peace Initiative.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
afghanistan
38. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, on July 21, Lt. Gen. David
Richards, the head of NATO's International Security Force in
Afghanistan, the man now in charge of coalition military operations in
the south, described the situation in Afghanistan as ``close to
anarchy,'' and said that we are ``running out of time'' if we are going
to meet the expectations of the Afghan people.
Reports indicate that Operation Mountain Thrust has been successful
in killing more than 600 suspected Taliban in the run-up to the recent
handover of operations in the south to NATO forces. Considering that
we've had a significant troop presence in Afghanistan for over 4\1/2\
years, it's disturbing that there has been a comeback of the Taliban in
the south. Were you wrong when you said ``the Taliban are gone''? What
has gone wrong in Afghanistan?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Five years ago, Afghanistan was ruled by the
Taliban and provided a safe haven for the terrorists who planned
September 11. Today, the Taliban are no longer in power. The Afghans
have a democratically elected President and National Assembly leading
the international community's reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, ANSF
are fighting insurgents alongside U.S., coalition, and NATO ISAF
forces. Challenges remain, including violence, narcotics, and the lack
of infrastructure, but it will take time and international
participation to completely address the damages caused by close to 30
years of war.
39. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, given that the lead coalition commander has described the
situation as ``close to anarchy,'' how does the current plan to turn
this around differ from the earlier game plan? What are our ``lessons
learned''?
Secretary Rumsfeld. A cornerstone of our strategy in Afghanistan is
the coordination of aggressive combat operations with reconstruction
and development efforts. We have found that in areas where this
coordination is implemented effectively, the perception of government
control is bolstered and the local populace is disinclined to lend its
support to insurgent elements. Successfully pairing the removal of
insurgents with reconstruction efforts will prove to the Afghans that
it is the government, not the insurgency, which will provide the
security and economic stability that is needed for Afghans to prosper.
General Pace. One of the larger lessons learned at this stage in
our mission is the strategic importance of redevelopment. Within the
broad category of redevelopment, three areas are most prominent and
appear to be the most cost-effective. Our strategic review strives to
incorporate our lessons learned and place great emphasis in these three
areas: roads, power, and rural development.
In areas that the central Government of Afghanistan and the ANSF
and alliance can access via roads, the insurgency is far less likely to
hold sway over the local area. Simply put, where the roads end, the
Taliban begins. Power increases in priority based on the broad-based
expectation from the Afghans that they should have power. Power also
gains them access to alliance information operation efforts via radio
and television. Rural development is the ability to stimulate economic
activity through efforts aimed at supporting farmers getting their
produce to markets. Taken in combination, we are striving to create an
environment where Afghans from outlying areas maintain a greater
connection with the central government through the ability to grow,
transport, and market goods to areas beyond the immediate village. With
a greater belief in the ability of the central government to provide,
we are hopeful that Afghans who earlier tolerated or even supported the
insurgency see a greater benefit to themselves and their families to
support the central government. If so, they will no longer provide any
support and may start to actively oppose the presence and activities of
insurgents.
The south of Afghanistan is the historical home of the Taliban and
the area where most of the violence is occurring. We have adapted our
strategy there to more broadly coordinate kinetic and nonkinetic
activities. This summer we have conducted a series of major operations
in the south and achieved significant successes against the Taliban.
One of the most important components of our effort is that once the
kinetic activity is complete and we gain control of an area, we then
begin intensive nonkinetic civil-military operations to solidly control
and maintain it.
General Abizaid. U.S. Central Command's strategic vision for
Afghanistan has not changed since the beginning of OEF. We remain
committed to a fully self-reliant Afghanistan with a representative
government that is committed to national development, respect for the
rule of law, and that rejects international terrorism. It is an
Afghanistan that is capable of providing for its own security,
controlling and governing its territory, implementing economic
development policies, and eliminating the production of illegal drugs.
We are conducting a variety of military and non-military operations
to counter the recent resurgence of Taliban rejectionist forces in
Southern Afghanistan. Much of this resistance is occurring as NATO and
the Government of Afghanistan expand control into those areas; areas
where we have had a very small presence over the past 4 years. As they
expand, they will naturally encounter areas where the populace is
unaccustomed to a national government and will provide some level of
resistance until the population accepts that the Government of
Afghanistan is serving their interests.
troop readiness
40. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, General
Abizaid, at the August 2, 2006, DOD press conference, Secretary
Rumsfeld stated, ``One of the problems we've seen is that in the
readiness charts that are used, we see apples and oranges; we see a
standard on the left side for some years back, and then a standard
that's different on the right side.'' Secretary Rumsfeld went on to
say, ``. . . a third aspect of that that General Pace and I have been
probing is you can say, `Ready for what,' and if they're ready for the
task they're doing, that's what you want. Or you could put a standard
that says, `Are they ready for any conceivable task that might be
asked,' and if that's the standard, then you get a different set of
numbers.''
If you change the readiness standard, doesn't it make sense to
measure against the new standard?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, we should measure our readiness against
the new standard, and are in the process of changing our readiness
reporting system to do exactly that. Our legacy reporting system, the
Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), simply measures the
amount of assets assigned to a unit. This measure does not account for
the mission the unit is tasked to perform, the capabilities of its
equipment, or the experience of the people. These legacy system
measures can be very misleading. A unit can be ``unready'' simply
because it did not deploy with all of its equipment, even if that
equipment is not needed for the mission. Likewise, units undergoing
transformation to a modular configuration can become ``unready''
overnight because of newly authorized organizational structures and
equipment. Our new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) allows us
to see true mission requirements as well as unit assets on hand.
General Pace. Yes. To meet this new standard, the DOD is
transitioning readiness reporting to a capabilities-based readiness
assessment focused on a unit's ability to perform specific mission
essential tasks (MET) while integrating this additional information
with our legacy resources-based readiness assessment of personnel,
equipment, supply, training, and ordnance. The integration of MET data
requires establishing conditions and standards for the tasks and
dissemination of the new requirements procedures across the DOD.
The DOD is in the process of developing new policy guidance to
address the improved standards. In addition, the new standard requires
information technology systems and training to accompany the process.
The new DRRS is making significant progress toward supporting the new
readiness reporting model. We need appropriate testing and validation
for the DRRS system prior to full implementation.
General Abizaid. The new DRRS is intended to identify and implement
reporting standards across the DOD. The DDRS Office is responsible for
developing and establishing this system within the DOD. As the
proponent responsible for this new readiness measurement system, the
DRRS Implementation Office is best able to fully respond to this query.
41. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, aside from the fact that changing standards apparently is
causing issues with the readiness charts, how long is reasonable for
units to not be ready as they reset?
Secretary Rumsfeld. As the Army resets, it is refurbishing some
assets, modernizing others, and creating the new Brigade Combat Team
structure. As one would expect, these processes take some time to
complete. Generally speaking, it takes about 9 to 12 months to complete
this process. We are very interested in making sure this conversion
happens expeditiously.
General Pace. The amount of time necessary for a unit to reset
varies according to individual Service reset procedures, the type of
unit, length of deployment, equipment availability, and other issues.
There is no single answer or template for all units on how quickly they
reset. Each Service maintains a structured process to provide combat
ready forces. For example, the Army uses an Army Force Generation model
with force pools of `Reset/Train,' `Ready,' and `Available' forces as a
framework for the structured progression of increased readiness. In
this model, Army Active component units require 9 to 12 months in the
`Reset/Train' Force Pool before the unit can be certified to move into
the `Ready' Force Pool. An Army Reserve component unit will typically
spend 36 to 48 months in the `Reset/Train' Force Pool before it can be
certified to move into the `Ready' Force Pool. Currently, these time
frames are compressed due to high operational tempo of ongoing war on
terrorism operations. The sustained strategic demand has placed
tremendous strain on the Army's people and equipment that have been
employed in the harsh operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Case-by-case assessments are made by senior commanders within each
Service, and rolled up into top-level reporting forums. This process
ensures that deploying units are trained and equipped to support the
full spectrum of operations outlined in our NMS.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
establishing individual Service reset requirements, the Service Chiefs
are best able to fully respond to this query.
42. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, how far in front of the next deployment is sufficient to
ensure units have the equipment and personnel they need to accomplish
their assigned mission?
Secretary Rumsfeld. We try to maximize the time available to man,
equip, and train our units for the mission at hand. To date, we have
been able to provide most units with the appropriate personnel and
equipment in time to conduct a Mission Readiness Exercise prior to
deployment. The ``lead time'' necessary for these actions vary
considerably depending on the mission and unit assigned.
General Pace. This answer varies by the type of unit, the deployed
mission assignment, and the requirements associated with that assigned
mission. We make every effort to have the equipment and personnel
necessary to train for assigned missions in place before units commence
their pre-deployment training cycles. Optimally, these training cycles
range from 120 days to 20 months prior to deployment. Currently, these
times are compressed due to high operational tempo and demand.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
establishing individual Service personnel and training requirements,
the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query.
43. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, how does that timeline mesh with the units' training timeline?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Training timelines are tailored to account for
the lessons learned from previous deployments, the experience of the
unit and personnel involved, and current events in theater. In the
preponderance of cases, there is time available to allow units to
become fully trained for their assigned missions.
General Pace. Training timelines are built into Service pre-
deployment cycles and vary by individual unit missions. The consistent
policy across Services is that every effort is made to ensure
appropriate enablers are in place for units commencing their pre-
deployment training. In a traditional operational cycle, training
commences from 120 days to 20 months prior to deployment and would
enable forces to train to a full-spectrum capability. The current high
operational tempo has resulted in shortened training timelines and, in
some cases, has required the focusing of training enablers on deployed
missions.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
establishing individual Service personnel and training requirements,
the Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query.
44. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, what standard of personnel and equipment on hand is required
for units to participate in the collective training prior to
deployment?
Secretary Rumsfeld. The unit commander makes the decision on
whether his unit can perform collective training with the personnel and
equipment on hand. Collective training is a continuum, and starts with
smaller units of organization and builds to include multiple
organizations and command staffs. Generally speaking, the unit will
have appropriate personnel and equipment in place to conduct the
mission rehearsal exercise.
General Pace. The goal is to ensure there is an adequate amount and
type of equipment on hand to support the realistic training objectives
required for deployment. Those specific numbers vary by the type of
unit, assigned mission, equipment on hand, training level of personnel,
and other variables. Two specific examples follow:
The Army mans units to 85 percent and equips them to a level
determined by a Force Feasibility Review as required to start
collective training. The Army's goal is to increase equipment and
manning to 100 percent prior to the unit's deployment.
Certain Navy units, such as the Naval Mobile Construction
Battalions, train with stateside equipment and systems that are
identical to those that are used when deployed overseas. They remain
fully capable to participate in collective training prior to
deployment.
The intent is to ensure units have enough personnel and equipment
to fully participate in pre-deployment training events as they ramp up
to peak readiness for deployments and wartime taskings.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
establishing individual Service train and equip requirements, the
Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query.
45. Senator Clinton. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Pace, and General
Abizaid, is it possible to train to standard if you do not have
comparable equipment on hand to train with?
Secretary Rumsfeld. Yes, the majority of training can be
accomplished with similar or substitute items. Ideally, units will have
comparable equipment for the mission rehearsal exercise, but some of
this equipment may only be available in theater (e.g., up-armored High
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles). Accordingly, training with
these specific pieces of equipment will only take place upon deployment
in a non-combat, training environment in theater. The Udari range in
Kuwait is used specifically for this in-theater training.
General Pace. With approved equipment substitutes, our personnel
train to standards every day. Military processes exist that ensure
equipment substitutes are similar enough in form, substance, and
function to be adequate for realistic and reasonable training. In those
cases in which units do not organically possess adequate equipment, we
ensure that equipment or a suitable substitute is provided to the unit
during its training for deployment.
Additionally, many of our military systems rely on simulators and
embedded training systems. Quite often, a large percentage of the
initial training is actually conducted on these simulators, so there is
no loss of capability associated with the usage of these systems.
We will continue to do our best to ensure the needs of the units
getting ready for their next rotation are met to ensure they are at the
peak of readiness prior to deploying.
General Abizaid. As the combatant commander, the Service force
providers continue to provide me with highly qualified troops to meet
my operational manpower requirements. As the title X proponents for
establishing individual Service train and equip requirements, the
Service Chiefs are best able to fully respond to this query.
[Whereupon, at 1:06 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND U.S. MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:28 a.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain,
Roberts, Sessions, Collins, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn,
Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E.
Benjamin Nelson, Dayton, Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
John H. Quirk V, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Derek J.
Maurer, professional staff member; Elaine A. McCusker,
professional staff member; David M. Morriss, counsel; Lucian L.
Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff
member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; Kristine L. Svinicki,
professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member; and Richard F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N.
Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel;
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, minority
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Micah H.
Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Sandra E. Luff,
assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul and Richard H.
Fontaine, Jr., assistants to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell,
assistant to Senator Inhofe; Libby Burgess, assistant to
Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator
Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew G. Brake,
assistant to Senator Graham; Arjun Mody, assistant to Senator
Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; Mieke Y.
Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator
Akaka; William K. Sutey and Alea Brown, assistants to Senator
Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke
Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant
to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee will
meet today to receive testimony on the current situation in
Iraq as well as Afghanistan and to discuss strategy options for
the future. The hearing will be conducted with two panels. It
was a challenge to arrange this hearing and our schedules, and
I thank you, Senator Levin, for assisting me in making this
come about.
I congratulate you on the recognition that your colleagues
have given you and that you will become chairman the first of
the year.
Senator Levin. If I could intervene, Mr. Chairman, as
always we are going to need your help, support, and advice,
because we have been doing this together for many years.
Chairman Warner. Twenty-eight years the Senator and I have
been working together. We came together to the Senate.
As I look back on my own modest career and association with
the U.S. military, I value above all events in my life the
association over these many decades with the men and women of
the Armed Forces. General Abizaid, I say to you, as I have come
to know you very well over the past 3-plus years in meetings
here, in Washington, and in this committee room, and both of us
in fatigues in far parts of the world where you have commanded
our forces with an extraordinary degree of professionalism. You
have been at the point of one of the most challenging chapters
in the military history of this country.
Speaking for myself, and I do believe a number of my
colleagues, you have discharged that professionalism, not only
to your own credit, but to the credit of the men and women of
the Armed Forces in your command and all those who have served.
We thank you, sir.
The committee also welcomes Ambassador David Satterfield,
Special Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq, on his first
appearance before this committee. Ambassador Satterfield has a
distinguished background. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission
at the embassy in Baghdad from May 2005 until July 2006, where
we saw him in visits that Senator Levin and I made to the area.
We thank you for your work and service to country. I have had
the opportunity, as has Senator Levin, to visit with you on a
number of occasions. I think you are an extraordinary
professional and you tell it like it is, and we anticipate you
will do the same this morning.
Last month when Senator Levin and I returned from Iraq, in
press conferences we both described the situation as we saw it.
I used a phrase that was given to me by a Marine sergeant in
the darkness as we were departing the Al Anbar Province. I
turned to him and said: ``How do you think things are going?''
He said: ``Senator, I simply say that Iraq is going sideways.''
I saw personally the forward progress in many areas in
Iraq, but I also witnessed and learned of other areas sliding
backwards. So I think that sergeant's appraisal was pretty
accurate. That was about 4 weeks ago is my recollection.
My views and that of my colleague Senator Levin and other
Senators expressed in that timeframe I think, and say with
modesty, resulted in a substantial increase in the
introspective study within all levels of the executive and
legislative branches of our Government. I draw your attention
to press reports this morning where the President has formally
launched a sweeping internal review of Iraq policy yesterday,
pulling together studies underway by various Government
agencies, according to U.S. officials. I understand, Ambassador
Satterfield, in your opening remarks you will address that
subject further.
It is interesting to note that World War II began on
December 7, 1941. The European theater conflict concluded with
the German surrender in May 1945 and operations in the Pacific
theater ended in August 1945. I remember the period well. I was
a young sailor in the following year of that war. Accordingly,
I note that on November 26, 2006, this year, but a few days
away, our involvement in Iraq will surpass the length of this
historic World War II period.
In October 2002, Congress approved a joint resolution
authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces of the United
States to, ``One, defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and two,
enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council
resolutions regarding Iraq.''
With regard to this resolution, I make two observations.
First, I observe that the resolution at that time--and I had a
hand in drafting it--addressed the Iraq of Saddam Hussein,
which is now gone and no more a threat to us. Today our Nation,
together with our coalition partners, is engaged with a
government of Iraq which we helped create and was freely
elected by the people of Iraq. We are helping this Government
to assume the full reins of sovereignty and eventually become a
member of the coalition of free nations fighting international
terrorism. That has been our goal, certainly this Senator's
goal, and hopefully will continue to be our goal. But we need
to revise our strategy to achieve that goal.
Second, I note that the current United States Security
Council Resolution on Iraq, No. 1637, will expire on December
31, 2006. We anticipate the coalition of nations and the
Government of Iraq will work with the United Nations Security
Council on a follow-on version of this resolution. Having just
spoken with Ambassador Satterfield, I learned there have been
developments overnight and he will specifically refer to them
in his opening statement.
Again, currently all levels of the executive branch, now
confirmed by the President, that have a responsibility for our
Nation's security are in the process of reexamining the
strategy and means to achieve a goal, to continue our support
for the Government of Iraq. In addition, in Congress as well as
the executive branch we have the potential benefit of views
coming from the private sector, particularly from the Baker-
Hamilton Iraq Study Group.
With that said, we as Congress, and particularly the Senate
through our Committee on Armed Services, have to consider at
least five developments between today and late in December.
First, this very important hearing today. This is a most
appropriate and timely way to perform the committee's first
step in our thorough review of this situation.
Second, our committee, as the White House forwards the
nomination of Robert Gates to the Senate, will provide Dr.
Gates with an opportunity to share his views on the future
strategies in Iraq.
Third, the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group will submit
their report. Depending on the timing of their report, Senator
Levin and I will renew our invitation to members of that group
to come before our committee and to give us a briefing.
Fourth, General Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has undertaken an independent study among his own
military analysts. Likewise, I have spoken to him desiring that
he and such colleagues as he wishes come before the committee
and provide us with the advice that he will be giving to the
President.
Finally, the committee will benefit from the overall
dialogue between the Government of Iraq, our coalition
partners, and other nations as the Security Council resolution
progresses, that is the revised one.
We have been informed that the Government of Iraq is
interested in influencing how that follow-on resolution will be
drawn up and, Ambassador Satterfield, you showed me this
morning copies of a communication that related to those
recommendations by the Government of Iraq to the Security
Council, and you will cover that important subject.
As we go through this process as a committee, indeed as a
Senate, we must be ever mindful of the daily loss of life, and
life of not only our brave forces, men and women, but of those
of our coalition partners and indeed the many, many innocent
citizens of Iraq who every day, every hour of every day, are
losing their lives.
Fortunately, the American people know and deeply appreciate
that our Nation's men and women in uniform and their coalition
partners are performing courageously, selflessly, and with the
highest degree of military professionalism. The American people
honor deeply, reverently the sacrifices of the families of our
servicemembers.
I am personally concerned about the challenges of two
sovereign nations, Iraq and the United States, exercising
command and control, directly, as in the case of the United
States from President Bush down to the privates, and likewise
Prime Minister Maliki through his forces. This poses a very
challenging situation and we are endeavoring to bring about the
increased security and stability of Iraq for the people of Iraq
through the coordination of those two independent sovereign
nations' forces.
For example, I found the events in late October in Sadr
City especially complex. On October 25 Iraqi special forces and
U.S. forces launched a combined joint raid in Sadr City. That
was a step, in my judgment, in the right direction. We put
tremendous emphasis, General, on the importance of bringing
about a degree of security in Baghdad and this was an integral
part of that operation. However, on October 31, U.S. troops
complied with orders from U.S. commanders, those commanders
reacting to Prime Minister Maliki's direction, to abandon
certain checkpoints, particularly in Sadr City.
I would like to know if that situation in any way increased
the danger to any of our Armed Forces in the performance of
their military mission and was that a reflection of what we
expect to come, or can we have a clear sense of confidence in
the coordination between the two military forces in the days
and months to come as they continue to try and help the Iraqi
people?
In closing, I urge my colleagues as we proceed through the
steps outlined above to carefully study all of the material
that we develop in this committee and elsewhere and then reach
individual and collective recommendations for the Senate and
indeed for the President on the future strategy in Iraq.
The committee welcomes our first panel and looks forward to
your very important testimony. Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this
important hearing, which is just the most recent example of
your steady, thoughtful, and fair leadership of this committee.
I join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning.
Last week, the American people delivered a clear, indeed a
dramatic, message to the administration, to Congress, and to
the Iraqi Government that ``stay the course'' is not a strategy
for success in Iraq. It was a message heard around the world.
The American people don't accept the President's recent
assessment that, ``absolutely we're winning'' in Iraq, nor
should we.
The American people have said forcefully that they are
impatient with Iraqi leaders who will not make the political
compromises required to blunt the sectarian violence and unite
the Iraqi people. They are impatient with Iraqi Government
leaders who have not disbanded the militias and death squads
that are a plague on Iraqi society. They have lost patience
with the Iraqi leaders who will not condemn Sunni-Shiite
enmity, tribal rivalries, and ethnic hatred.
America has given the Iraqi people the opportunity to build
a new nation at the cost of nearly 3,000 American lives and
over 20,000 wounded. But the American people do not want our
valiant troops to get caught in a crossfire between Iraqis, if
Iraqis insist on squandering that opportunity through civil war
and sectarian strife.
We were assured by the President over a year ago that, ``As
Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.'' Even though the Pentagon
claims that almost 90 percent of the Iraqi security forces
(ISFs) are now trained and equipped, our troop level remains
about the same. We were momentarily hopeful when the Iraqi
leaders signed a four-point agreement on October 2 to end the
sectarian violence. That turned out to be another false hope.
Recently, Ambassador Khalilzad announced that Iraqi
officials had agreed to a timeline for reaching benchmarks to
confront the sectarian militias, to implement a reconciliation
program, to share oil revenues, and to recommend changes to the
constitution. Prime Minister Maliki repudiated that timeline
the next day, providing additional evidence that the Iraqi
political leaders do not understand that there is a limit to
the blood and treasure that Americans are willing to spend,
given the unwillingness of the Iraqis themselves to put their
political house in order.
Our uniformed military leaders have repeatedly told us that
there is no military solution to the violence in Iraq and that
a political agreement between the Iraqi sectarian factions
themselves is the only way to end the violence. Just last month
at his October 25 press conference President Bush said that,
``In the end the Iraqi people and their Government will have to
make the difficult decisions necessary to solve these
problems.'' In the end, we are 3\1/2\ years into a conflict
which has already lasted longer than the Korean conflict and
almost as long as World War II.
We should put the responsibility for Iraq's future squarely
where it belongs, on the Iraqis. We cannot save the Iraqis from
themselves. The only way for Iraqi leaders to squarely face
that reality is for President Bush to tell them that the United
States will begin a phased redeployment of our forces within 4
to 6 months. That is not precipitous. It is a responsible way
to change the dynamic in Iraq, to stop the march down the path
to full-blown civil war on which the Iraqis are now embarked.
Yes, some U.S. troops would need to remain in Iraq for the
limited missions of counterterrorism and training of ISFs and
to provide logistical support and force protection. Yes, we
should also convene an international conference to support a
political settlement and to provide resources for Iraq's
reconstruction.
We are grateful to our witnesses for their service to our
Nation. We are especially grateful and united in support of the
brave troops who are serving us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. We look forward to our witnesses' best judgment on
the issues and we and other groups that have been outlined by
our chairman will be grappling with these issues in the weeks
and the months to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
We will now proceed to hear directly from you, General
Abizaid, followed by Ambassador Satterfield.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN P. ABIZAID, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND
General Abizaid. Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of
the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
I refer the committee to my August 3 opening statement, where I
outlined the broader strategic dangers to United States'
interests in the Middle East. Indeed, the dangers outlined in
that statement--al Qaeda's extreme ideology, hegemonistic
revolutionary Iranian ambitions, and the corrosive effect of
continued Palestinian-Israeli confrontation--represent major
dangers to international peace and security for decades to
come.
American regional and international deployment and security
policies must be articulated and coordinated to confront these
problems. Despite our current focus on the struggle underway to
stabilize Iraq, the interests of the international community
still require the confrontation and defeat of al Qaeda's dark
ideology, the containment of Iranian expansionism, and progress
towards Arab-Israeli peace. In the current atmosphere in the
region, with the use of powerful non-state militias, the
development of weapons of mass destruction, and the acceptance
by some of terror as a legitimate tool of normal discourse,
American leadership in diplomatic, economic, and security
elements of power is essential to protect the international
order.
How we confront these problems and empower forces of
moderation in the region to resist them will define our future.
Today over 200,000 men and women of the Armed Forces are
deployed in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations
(AORs). They protect the flow of global commerce. They confront
terrorists. They work hard to stabilize young, unsteady yet
elected governments in Iraq and Afghanistan. They support
stability by increasing regional security capacities of our
partners and our friends in the region.
Well over 1.5 million Americans have served in the region
since September 11, 2001. Many have given their lives and even
more have suffered life-changing injuries. Whatever course our
Nation chooses in the years ahead, we must be ever mindful of
the sacrifice and courage of our troops and the debt we owe our
veterans and their families. We must also remember that
hundreds of thousands of coalition and partner forces fight
directly or indirectly with us in the broader region.
Today the committee will no doubt focus on the way ahead in
Iraq, and rightfully so. Yet we must be mindful of increasing
threats from Iran, as evidenced by its recent military
exercise, which was designed to intimidate the smaller nations
of the region. We must also be mindful of the real and
pervasive global threat presented by al Qaeda and its
associated movements. Failure to stabilize Iraq could increase
Iranian aggressiveness and embolden al Qaeda's ideology. It
could also deepen broader Sunni-Shiite fissures that are
already apparent throughout the region.
The changing security challenges in Iraq require changes to
our own approach to achieve stability. Let me remind the
committee, however, that while new options are explored and
debated, my testimony should not be taken to imply approval of
shifts in direction. It is my desire today to provide an update
on current security conditions in Iraq and elsewhere and
current thinking about the way ahead on the security lines of
operation. I remain optimistic that we can stabilize Iraq.
I just departed Iraq, where I visited with General Casey
and his senior commanders. On the Iraqi side, I had meetings
with the prime minister, the defense minister, and the interior
minister. Over the past 4 weeks, levels of sectarian violence
are down in Baghdad from their Ramadan peak, but they remain
dangerously high. The Iraqi armed forces, while under sectarian
pressure, continue to perform effectively across Iraq. Our
focus against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) continues to take a toll
on Iraqi AQI members and foreign fighters. Operations against
selected targets on the Shiite death squad side also have had
good effect, and our understanding of these complex
organizations continues to improve.
Sunni insurgent attacks against ISFs and the Multi-National
Force remain at high levels and our forces continue to
experience attacks from armed Shiite groups, especially in the
Baghdad region. In the north, significant progress is being
made in transitioning security responsibilities to capable
Iraqi forces. Currently around 80 percent of the sectarian
violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad.
Nonetheless, security transitions continue in most of the
country.
Iraqis and Americans alike believe that Iraq can stabilize
and that the key to stabilization is effective, loyal,
nonsectarian ISFs coupled with an effective government of
national unity.
In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders, it is
clear that they believe Iraqi forces can take more control
faster, provided we invest more manpower and resources into the
coalition military transition teams, speed the delivery of
logistics and mobility enablers, and embrace an aggressive
Iraqi-led effort to disarm illegal militias. This is
particularly important with regard to the Jaysh al-Mahdi
elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and
elsewhere.
As we increase our efforts to build Iraqi capacity, we
envision coalition forces providing needed military support and
combat power to Iraqi units in the lead. Precisely how we do
this continues to be worked out with the Iraqis and with our
own staffs, but we believe that ultimately capable, independent
Iraqi forces loyal to an equally capable independent Iraqi
Government will set the conditions for the withdrawal of our
major combat forces.
Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to
achieve an end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its
neighbors, an ally in the war against extremists, respectful of
the lives and rights of its citizens, and with security forces
sufficient to maintain order, prevent terrorist safe havens,
and defend the independence of Iraq.
At this stage in the campaign, we will need flexibility to
manage our force and to help manage the Iraqi force. Force caps
and specific timetables limit that flexibility.
We must also remember that our enemies have a vote in this
fight. The enemy watches not only what we do on the ground, but
what we say and do here at home. Also, Prime Minister Maliki
and his team want to do more. We want them to do more.
Increased Iraqi military activity under greater Iraqi national
control will only work, however, if his government embraces
meaningful national reconciliation. His duly elected legitimate
government deserves our support and his Armed Forces, backed by
ours, deserve his full support.
While I know the committee has a wide range of interests,
including developments in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Lebanon, and the Horn of Africa, I will defer comment on those
subjects in order to take your questions.
In closing, thank you for your support of our great
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the field. Their
still unfinished work keeps us safe at home. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Abizaid follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN John P. Abizaid, USA
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee: Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. I refer the committee to my
August 3 opening statement where I outlined my broader strategic
dangers to United States interests in the Middle East.
Indeed the dangers outlined in that statement; al Qaeda's extremist
ideology, hegemonistic revolutionary Iranian ambitions, and the
corrosive effect of continued Palestinian-Israeli confrontation
represent major dangers to international peace and security for several
decades to come. American, regional, and international diplomatic and
security policies must be articulated and coordinated to confront these
problems. Despite our current focus on the struggle underway to
stabilize Iraq, the interests of the international community still
require the confrontation and defeat of al Qaeda's dark ideology, the
containment of Iranian expansionism, and progress toward Arab-Israeli
peace. In the current atmosphere in the region, with the use of
powerful non-state militias, the development of weapons of mass
destruction, and the acceptance by some of terror as a legitimate tool
of normal discourse American leadership in diplomatic, economic, and
security elements of power is essential to protect the international
order. How we confront these problems and empower forces of moderation
in the region to resist them will define our future.
Today, over 200,000 men and women of the Armed Forces are deployed
in the Central Command area of operations. They protect the flow of
global commerce; they confront terrorists; they work hard to stabilize
young, unsteady, yet elected governments in Iraq and Afghanistan; and
they indirectly support stability by increasing regional security
capacities of our partners and friends in the region. Well over 1.5
million Americans have served in the region since September 11, 2001.
Many have given their lives, and even more have suffered life-changing
injuries. Whatever course our Nation chooses in the years ahead, we
must be ever mindful of the sacrifice and courage of our troops and the
debt we owe our veterans and their families. We must also remember that
hundreds of thousands of coalition and partner forces fight directly or
indirectly with us in the broader region.
Today the committee will no doubt focus on the way ahead in Iraq
and rightfully so. Yet we must be mindful of increasing threats from
Iran as evidenced by its recent military exercise, which was designed
to intimidate the smaller nations in the region. We must also be
mindful of the real and pervasive global threat presented by al Qaeda
and its associated movements. Failure to stabilize Iraq could increase
Iranian aggressiveness and embolden al Qaeda's ideology. It could also
deepen broader Sunni-Shiite fissures throughout the region. The
changing security challenges in Iraq require changes to our own
approach to achieve stability. Let me remind the committee, however,
that while new options are explored and debated, my testimony should
not be taken to imply approval of shifts in direction. It is my desire
today to provide an update on current security conditions in Iraq and
elsewhere and current thinking about the way ahead on the security
lines of operation. I remain optimistic that we can stabilize Iraq.
I just departed Iraq, where I visited with General Casey and his
senior commanders. On the Iraqi side I had meetings with the Prime
Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Interior Minister. Over the
past 4 weeks, levels of sectarian violence are down in Baghdad from
their Ramadan peak. The Iraqi armed forces, while under sectarian
pressure, continues to perform effectively across Iraq. Our focus
against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) continues to take a toll on Iraqi AQI
members and foreign fighters. Operations against selected targets on
the Shiite death squad side also have had good effect, and our
understanding of these complex organizations continues to improve.
Sunni insurgent attacks against Iraqi security forces and Multinational
Forces remain at high levels, and our forces continue to experience
attacks from armed Shiite groups, especially in the Baghdad region. In
the north significant progress is being made in transitioning security
responsibilities to capable Iraqi forces. Currently around 80 percent
of the sectarian violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of
Baghdad. Nonetheless, security transitions continue in most of the
country.
Iraqis and Americans alike believe that Iraq can stabilize and that
the key to stabilization is effective, loyal, non-sectarian Iraqi
security forces coupled with an effective government of national unity.
In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders it is clear
that they believe Iraqi forces can lake more control faster, provided
we invest more manpower and resources into the coalition military
transition teams, speed the delivery of logistics and mobility
enablers, and embrace an aggressive Iraqi-led effort to disarm illegal
militias. This is particularly important with regard to the Jaysh al
Mahdi elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and
elsewhere. As we increase our efforts to build Iraqi capacity, we
envision coalition forces providing needed military support and combat
power to Iraqi units in the lead. Precisely how we do this continues to
be worked out with the Iraqis as ultimately capable independent Iraqi
forces, loyal to an equally capable independent Iraqi Government, will
set the conditions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces.
Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to achieve an
end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally
in the war against extremists, respectful of the lives and rights of
its citizens, and with security forces sufficient to maintain order,
prevent terrorist safe havens and defend the independence of Iraq. At
this stage in the campaign, we'll need flexibility to manage our force
and to help manage the Iraqi force. Force caps and specific timetables
limit flexibility. We must also remember that our enemies have a vote
in this fight. The enemy watches not only what we do on the ground but
what we say and do here at home. Also, Prime Minister Maliki and his
team want to do more; we want them to do more. Increased Iraqi military
activity under greater Iraqi national control will only work however if
his government embraces meaningful national reconciliation. His duly
elected, legitimate government deserves our support and his armed
forces, backed by ours, deserve his full support.
While I know the committee has a wide range of interests, including
developments in Central Asia, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Lebanon, and the
Horn of Africa, I will defer comment on those subjects in order to take
your questions. In closing, thank you for your support of our great
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the field. Their still-
unfinished work keeps us safe at home.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General.
Ambassador Satterfield.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Levin, members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify
today.
The situation in Iraq is very serious. The Iraqi people as
well as Iraqi and coalition forces have suffered through months
of extreme brutal bloodshed. The insurgency and al Qaeda terror
are responsible for the major U.S. casualties taken. They
remain lethal challenges above all to the Iraqi citizens
themselves.
It is increasingly clear that al Qaeda's strategy to
undermine the Iraqi Government by sowing sectarian conflict has
created and fuels today a dangerous, indeed a strategically
threatening, cycle of violence. Some Iraqis have turned to
armed militias and other extragovernmental groups to provide
security, while others have seized upon a security vacuum to
pursue local political power, criminal aims, or narrow
sectarian interests. Sustained sectarian violence, the
associated rise in armed militias and other extragovernmental
groups are now the greatest threat to a stable, unified, and
prosperous Iraq.
Sectarian differences in Iraq have long historic roots, but
coexistence has been the rule in Iraq until the past 10 months,
when, pushed too hard by al Qaeda's targeted attacks, sectarian
violence has now emerged and continues to be fomented by al
Qaeda violence to create the violent conflagration we see
today.
If the increasing presence and activity of armed militias
with a sectarian identification are not dealt with, then indeed
Iraqi national identity will erode and hope for a united Iraq,
a peaceful, stable Iraq, will over time diminish. This outcome
in Iraq is unacceptable. It would undermine U.S. national
interests in that country and in the broader region and it
would lead to a humanitarian disaster for the Iraqi people.
The goals of the United States in Iraq remain clear. We
support a democratic Iraq that can govern itself, sustain
itself, defend itself, and be an ally in the war against
terror. While our goals do not change, we are constantly
reviewing, adapting, and adjusting our tactics to achieve them.
The President has asked his national security agencies to
assess the situation in Iraq, to review options, to recommend
the best way forward. The Iraq Study Group to which you
referred, Mr. Chairman, will have its own recommendations. They
will be duly considered. We look forward to their
recommendations. As the President has said, our goal is success
in Iraq, and we look forward to pursuing, including with the
bipartisan leadership of Congress, the best means to accomplish
that.
At the Department of State (DOS), we have adapted over the
past year by significantly increasing our staffing levels in
Baghdad and at our vital Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
located throughout Iraq. Over twice the number of DOS employees
and a significant number of other civilian agency staff are now
present in these sites, some of which encounter daily incoming
fire. This is a hazardous undertaking, but it is a vital
undertaking for the sake of our interests in that country and
for the sake of developing Iraqi institutions, Iraqi democracy,
and projecting our own ability to shape events on the ground in
a way that supports success.
We have also changed in the DOS our fundamental assignments
process. Filling positions quickly and with the most qualified
officers at posts which are in critical threat, which are
unaccompanied, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, is now the DOS's
number one priority. We are pleased to be able to inform the
committee that the rate of volunteerism by qualified officers
for these positions has steadily increased. We are very pleased
at the support being expressed and we will continue to devote
our own resources to ensuring that we provide our best to these
challenging posts.
Mr. Chairman, Iraq's future is dependent upon the
performance and the commitment of three pillars of actors:
first and foremost, the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people;
second, the United States and our coalition allies; and third,
the international community, in particular Iraq's neighbors.
All of these groups need to work together to help make progress
in Iraq possible.
Progress has to occur along three critical strategic
tracks--political, security, and economic--if a stable, united,
peaceful Iraq is to emerge. As the President, Ambassador
Khalilzad, and General Casey have all stated, it is essential
that, we the United States, work with the Government of Iraq to
set out measurable, achievable goals and objectives on each of
these tracks. In short, the Iraqis themselves need, with our
help but with their lead, to articulate and then achieve
clearly defined goals on a clearly defined timeline.
On the security track, our focus is on transitioning more
control and responsibility to the Iraqis, as General Abizaid
has stated. Prime Minister Maliki wants this and so do we.
While I will leave further details to questions to General
Abizaid, we are in the process of transitioning more command
and control to Iraqi commanders, to divisions, to battalions.
We have already moved Muthanna and Dhi Qar Provinces to
provincial Iraqi control and we expect to move the rest of
Iraq's provinces to that status over the months to come.
We are working very closely, Mr. Chairman, with Iraq's
leaders to produce a set of security goals and objectives that
ensure the transition in that critical area is as smooth and
seamless as possible. We are working with the Iraqi Government
as well, and very successfully, on renewal of the United
Nations mandate for coalition forces in Iraq. I am pleased to
be able to tell the committee that in a letter sent yesterday
to the President of the Security Council, the Iraqi Government
explicitly reaffirmed both its desire for such a renewal and
underscored the transitional nature of that extension. The
Iraqis want more control. We want to give it to them. We hope
the United Nations will in the days ahead approve that
resolution.
On the political track, we are very pleased that the Iraqi
presidency council agreed in mid-October to a detailed set of
political goals and objectives. The Iraqi Government has
already made some progress on these goals. It has passed a
regions formation law, an investment law, and it has said just
last week that it would introduce legislation that would
reinstate thousands of former Baath Party members as part of a
fundamental reform and revision of the de-Baathification
process. These are hopeful signs that Iraq's leaders can find
convergence, can find a middle ground on which to proceed.
But I want to underscore, much more work remains and the
time for that work is now. Prime Minister Maliki has
appropriately focused his attention on pursuing national
reconciliation. There are numerous requirements for any
national reconciliation process to be successful, all of which
must be pursued simultaneously and rapidly. First, ISFs with
coalition support must achieve security conditions under which
Iraqis can feel free to make the difficult choices necessary to
pursue a national compact, a political reconciliation deal.
Second, the Iraqi Government must reach out and engage all
those willing to abandon violence and terror, including former
members of the Baath Party, while credibly threaten to combat
those insurgents and terrorists who remain wholly opposed to a
reconciled democratic Iraq.
Third, Iraqis must establish a robust process aimed at
disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) members of
armed groups into normal Iraqi society. For this to be
successful, such a DDR process has to require agreement on an
amnesty plan that comprehensively gives militants incentives to
return to civilian life.
Fourth, Iraqis must pursue, and they must complete, a new
modern and comprehensive national hydrocarbon law, both to
ensure that the country remains united as well as to spur much-
needed international investment that can only come, will only
come, when Iraq's laws are fully established and clear to all.
On the international economic track, the Government of Iraq
is moving forward aggressively. Iraq and the United Nations
announced on July 27 they would jointly lead efforts to launch
a new International Compact with Iraq. Such a compact will
provide a new framework for mutual commitments between Iraq and
the international community, particularly those in Iraq's
neighborhood, in bolstering Iraq's economic recovery.
The goal of the compact is simple. It is for Iraq's
Government to demonstrate to the international community, to
the world, private and public sectors, its commitment to
implementing needed social, political, and economic reform.
Iraq will commit to reforming its main economic sectors--oil,
electricity, agriculture--and to establishing the laws and
building the institutions necessary to combat corruption,
assure good governance, and protect human rights, and in return
the international community will provide the assistance
necessary to support Iraq's needs over the next 5 years.
With the compact, Iraq is reaching out to the world. I am
pleased to report that the world is beginning to reach back,
though more commitment is certainly needed, particularly from
Iraq's neighbors.
This compact is nearly complete. On October 31, Kuwait
hosted a preparatory group meeting where a final text was
neared. The compact we hope can be completed before the end of
this year. Iraqis will be asking their friends and neighbors to
consider what Iraq has pledged to do and what Iraq is doing and
will ask them to come forward with concrete pledges, and we
will help.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to support
the Government of Iraq as it moves forward on the tracks that I
have outlined. But I want to make one point very clear. Each of
these tracks--security, political, and economic--is
inextricably inseparably linked one to the other. While all
must move forward together, a failure or significant setback in
any one area will certainly affect progress in the others.
Militias cannot be effectively confronted and demobilized in
the absence of a larger political reconciliation agreement.
Political reconciliation cannot survive if the government
cannot agree on the distribution of oil revenue, if it cannot
create jobs. Iraqis cannot modernize their economy or draw
foreign investment if there is violence in the streets.
We believe that a successful path forward can still be
forged in Iraq. As the transition continues to full Iraqi
Government control, we will stand firmly behind the Iraqi
Government. They have much work to do in the weeks and months
ahead to resolve differences and reach compromises on issues
that will determine their country's future.
The fate, the interests of our two countries, and beyond
our two countries of the region and the world, are intertwined.
Success is critical. Failure is unacceptable.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador David Satterfield
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before your
committee today.
The situation in Iraq is very serious. The Iraqi people, as well as
Iraqi and coalition forces, have suffered through several months of
extreme, brutal bloodshed. The insurgency and al Qaeda terror are
responsible for the majority of U.S. military casualties and remain
lethal challenges to Iraqis. It is increasingly clear that al Qaeda's
strategy to undermine the Iraqi Government by sowing sectarian conflict
has created a dangerous cycle of violence.
Some Iraqis have turned to armed militias and other extra-
governmental groups to provide security, while others have seized upon
this security vacuum to pursue local political power or narrow
sectarian interests. Sustained sectarian violence and the associated
rise in armed militias and other extra-governmental groups are now the
greatest strategic threat to a stable, unified, and prosperous Iraq.
Sectarian differences in Iraq are like tectonic plates.
Historically, they have been stable. However, if pushed too hard they
can lead to tremors and, ultimately, to a devastating earthquake. While
average Iraqis want nothing more than sanctuary from violence and a
normal life, if they believe that the only source of security is their
local sectarian militia, sectarian plates will shift, Iraqi national
identity will erode, and hope for a united Iraq will crumble.
Such an outcome in Iraq is unacceptable. It would undermine U.S.
national interests in Iraq and in the broader region. It would lead to
a humanitarian disaster for the Iraqi people.
The goals of the United States in Iraq remain clear. We support a
democratic Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself,
and be an ally in the war against extremists. While we have not changed
our goals, we are constantly reviewing, adapting and adjusting our
tactics to achieve them.
At the Department of State, we have adapted over the last year by
significantly increasing staffing levels at our Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) sites located throughout Iraq. Fifty-five
State employees are currently on the ground working from U.S.- and
coalition-led PRTs (up from 21 State employees at PRT locations in
February 2006) providing support to local Iraqi officials and
communities to improve governance on the grassroots level. Many of our
PRT staff are operating at great physical risk, particularly at PRTs
located in Anbar province and in Basrah. State has also changed its
Foreign Service assignments policy. Filling positions quickly and with
the most qualified officers in critical threat, unaccompanied posts,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, is now the Department's number one human
resources priority. Fill rates for U.S. Mission Iraq for Summer 2007
are farther along now--just 3 weeks into the assignments cycle--than
they were in February for summer 2006. As of last Friday, we had 101
out of 194 available positions mission-wide, committed--that is 52
percent.
three pillars/three tracks
Iraq's future is dependent upon the performance and commitment of
three pillars of actors: first and foremost is the Iraqi Government and
people. Second, is the United States and the coalition; and third, the
international community, in particular, Iraq's neighbors. All these
pillars need to act together to help make progress in Iraq possible.
Progress must occur along three key tracks--political, security,
and economic--for a stable, united, peaceful Iraq to emerge. As the
President, Amb. Khalilzad, and General Casey have all stated, it is
critical that we, the United States, work with the Government of Iraq
to set out measurable, achievable benchmarks on each of these tracks.
In short, the Iraqis need to set and then achieve clearly defined
goals.
security
On the security track, our current focus is on transitioning more
control and responsibility to the Iraqis. Prime Minister Maliki wants
this, and so do we. While I will leave the details to General Abizaid,
we are in the process of transitioning more command and control to
Iraqi commanders, divisions, and battalions. We have already moved
Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces to ``Provincial Iraqi Control'' and
expect to move the rest of Iraq's provinces to that status over the
next 16-18 months.
We are working closely with Iraqi leaders to produce a set of
security benchmarks to ensure that the transition is as smooth and
seamless as possible. We are also working with the Iraqi Government on
renewal of the United Nations (U.N.) mandate for Coalition forces in
Iraq for another year. In its letter sent yesterday to the security
council, the Iraqi Government explicitly reaffirmed both its desire for
such a renewal and the transitional nature of the extension. The Iraqis
want more control and we want to give it to them. We hope the U.N. will
approve the resolution.
political
On the political track, we are pleased that the Iraqi Presidency
Council agreed in October to a set of political benchmarks. The Iraqi
Government has already made some progress. It passed a regions
formation law, an investment law, and last week said it would introduce
legislation that would reinstate thousands of former Baath officials as
part of the de-Baathification process. These are hopeful signs that
Iraq's leaders can find middle ground.
However, much more work remains. Prime Minister Maliki has
appropriately focused his attention on pursuing national
reconciliation. There are several requirements for reconciliation to be
possible and the Iraqi Government must pursue all simultaneously.
First, the Iraqi security forces with coalition support must help
achieve security conditions under which Iraqis will be more comfortable
making the difficult choices needed to pursue political reconciliation.
Second, the Iraqi Government must reach out and engage all those
willing to abandon violence and terror, including former members of the
Baath Party, while credibly threatening to combat those insurgents and
terrorists who remain wholly opposed to a democratic Iraq.
Third, they must establish a robust process aimed at disarming,
demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) members of armed groups into
normal Iraqi society. To be successful, the DDR process will require
agreement on an amnesty plan that gives militants incentives to return
to civilian life.
Fourth, the Iraqis must pursue and complete a national hydrocarbon
law both to ensure that the country remains united as well as to spur
much-needed international investment that will come only when Iraq's
laws are firmly established and clear to all.
economic--international compact
In the economic track, the Government of Iraq is moving forward
aggressively. Iraq and the United Nations announced on July 27 that
they would jointly lead efforts to launch a new International Compact
with Iraq. The Compact will provide a new framework for mutual
commitments between Iraq and the international community, particularly
those in Iraq's neighborhood, in bolstering Iraq's economic recovery.
The goal of the Compact is for the Iraqi Government to demonstrate
to the international community its commitment to implementing needed
social, political, and economic reforms. Iraq will commit to reforming
its main economic sectors -oil, electricity and agriculture--and to
establishing the laws and building the institutions needed to combat
corruption, assure good governance and protect human rights. In return,
the members of the international community will provide the assistance
needed to support Iraqi efforts to achieve economic and financial self-
sufficiency over the next 5 years.
In short, with the Compact, Iraq is reaching out to the
international community for help. I am pleased to report that the world
is beginning to reach back, though more commitment is needed,
especially from Iraq's neighbors.
The Compact is nearly complete. On October 31, Kuwait hosted a
preparatory group meeting where members moved closer to a final Compact
text. They intend to complete the Compact before the end of the year.
Between now and then, the Iraqis will be asking their friends and
neighbors to consider their goals and reforms, and to come forward with
concrete pledges of assistance. We are urging Iraq's neighbors, in
particular, to step forward and support Iraq's future.
conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we will continue to support the
Government of Iraq as it moves forward on these three tracks. However,
I want to make one point very clear. Each of these tracks--security,
political, and economic--is inextricably linked to the other. While all
must move forward together, a failure or setback in any one area
hinders progress in the others. Thus, militias cannot be effectively
demobilized in the absence of a larger political reconciliation
agreement. Political reconciliation cannot survive if the government
cannot agree on the distribution of oil revenue and create jobs. Iraqis
cannot modernize their economy and draw foreign investment if there is
sectarian violence in the streets.
We believe that a successful path forward can still be forged in
Iraq. As the transition continues to full Iraqi Government control, we
must stand firmly behind the Iraqis. They have a lot of work to do in
the coming months to resolve their differences and reach compromises on
issues that will determine their country's future. The fate and
interests of our two countries are, for better or for worse, now
intertwined.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for a very
carefully and well-delivered statement, quite informative about
the situation.
We will now proceed with a first round of questions,
limiting to 6 minutes each for each Senator. I will open,
General Abizaid, with you.
On August 3 you appeared before the committee and you
stated as follows, ``I believe the sectarian violence is
probably as bad as I have seen it in Baghdad in particular, and
if it is not stopped it is possible that Iraq could move to a
civil war.'' Using that as a baseline, would you restate that,
add to it, or amend it?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, I am very encouraged by my
most recent trip in that, while sectarian violence remains high
and worrisome, it is certainly not as bad as the situation
appeared back in August. There is more confidence being shown
in the Iraqi Government, more independent action on behalf of
Iraqi units, and in many of the neighborhoods where
particularly U.S. forces are operating, a lot of the sectarian
violence is down. It is still at unacceptably high levels. I
would not say that we have turned a corner in this regard. But
it is not nearly as bad as it was back in August, and I am
encouraged by that.
Chairman Warner. I made reference to the World War II
period for the following reason. The United States mustered,
trained, and sent to the foreign battlefields from a force, a
total force at home and abroad, of 16 million soldiers,
sailors, airmen, and marines. That is extraordinary, stop to
think about it. Two major battlefronts and eventually victory
was obtained on both fronts.
We are now approaching the same timeline. We have trained
some 300,000 Iraqis. My understanding, there is a desire to
raise that number and train more. Yet we are still as you come
before us today, although you express greater optimism than
August, confronted with an extraordinary situation of civil
disruption, the inability of the government to fully exercise
the range of sovereignty.
How do you explain that in simple terms to the American
people?
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, as we moved into January of
this year it appeared to all of us that in light of elections
there was optimism for being able to move forward with a
national unity government. The attack on the mosque in Samarra,
the inability of a government to form, the arguments of the
various sects, and then the increase in sectarian violence made
it very clear that optimism was not going to be seen in any
terms of facts on the ground or reduction of U.S. troops. As a
matter of fact, when we look at the troop size today, we have
15 brigades. At this point we had hoped to be well below that,
somewhere between 10 and 12.
I think it is very clear that had we let the sectarian
violence continue without applying the necessary military
action and political action on the part of the Iraqi Government
that things would have moved in a very bad direction. Like in
any campaign, there are ups and downs. There are battles that
go your way and battles that do not go your way. The period
from February to August was a deterioration of the security
situation brought about by severe sectarian tensions.
I believe everybody that has looked at that within Iraq
understands how devastating it can be if allowed to continue.
With the new government showing more experience and more
confidence, and with Iraqi forces in particular tied to a
government that shows confidence in them, I believe that we can
move forward, although the work ahead will be tough.
Chairman Warner. Do you have rising confidence in the
ability of the Iraqi forces to continue to assume more and more
responsibility for the military operations?
General Abizaid. I have confidence that the Iraqi army is
up to the job, providing the Iraqi Government shows the
confidence in its own army and gives support to its own army to
take the lead the way that they should. That has yet to be
demonstrated, although today, for example, with Iraqi Ministry
of Interior (MOI) and Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces moving
in to the Sadr City area to deal with the people that had
perpetrated the kidnappings yesterday, I thought that they
showed initiative and decisiveness that they will need to show
in the days ahead. It was a good sign, but there needs to be
more of it.
Chairman Warner. General, I mentioned in my opening
statement that I am concerned about the ability of two
sovereign nations exercising a chain of command from their
respective leaders, our President and the prime minister, down
to the troops, that they can effectively operate these joint
operations. Sadr City seemed to some of us to pose a greater
challenge than we anticipated to that problem.
Could you give us your own professional judgment on the
current ability to jointly operate so as not to put at risk
either our forces, U.S. and other coalition, or the Iraqi
forces, and what do you look to the future, particularly if
this United Nations (U.N.) resolution has modifications in it
giving greater authority as I understand it, Ambassador
Satterfield, to the prime minister of Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, if I could just
comment on the resolution. The resolution's text as proposed is
very similar in all key elements to the existing mandate for
the Multi-National Forces.
Chairman Warner. We saw earlier statements to the effect
that he wanted more authority.
Ambassador Satterfield. It is essentially the same
authority. In our own dealings with the prime minister and his
military commanders, we are discussing the transition to
greater Iraqi control. But that is outside the context of the
mandate.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Will you provide for the committee today that communication
that you referred to?
Ambassador Satterfield. We will certainly provide the
letter from the prime minister to the Security Council.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you.
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, in the past 6 weeks we have
had increasing success with joint Iraqi-U.S. forces moving into
Sadr City, precisely targeting death cells and death squad
leadership and taking them out. I believe that this will
continue. It needs to be worked in consultation with the Iraqi
Government. But I am confident that the command and control
arrangements are adequate for the current period, but they must
be codified as we move ahead with Iraqi units taking more and
more leadership in combat operations.
Chairman Warner. By codified, what do you mean?
General Abizaid. I think we need to have some very clear
understanding of who moves forward, with what type of units,
who has the lead, and as we anticipate moving into the next
phase of the campaign it becomes pretty clear to us that Iraqi
forces will be in the lead and that we will move forward to
assist them when they need our additional combat power.
There will also be American military transition teams
embedded with Iraqi units and it is our opinion that those
military transition teams need to be substantially increased
and given the capacity to operate more robustly with the
Iraqis. Exactly what those arrangements need to be needs to be
a subject of discussions and agreements between our staff and
the senior Iraqi staffs.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the three pillars that were
essential and you referred to the region and the responsibility
within the region to bring to bear with respect to forces, not
military but deployment and otherwise, of the surrounding
nations. There are individuals and groups considering that that
would embrace some contact with both the Syrian Government and
Iranian Government. Can you advise the committee as to the
current thinking on those options as a part of a plan to bring
in the greater community in the region to hopefully bring about
the stabilization of the strife in Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, there is a vital
role, an ongoing role, for the region to play in stabilizing
Iraq. The Gulf states, our critical Arab partners in Egypt,
Jordan, and elsewhere, have contacts with both the Iraqi
Government and with elements of the Sunni community that are
very important. We have been working closely with them to try
to mobilize the greatest concerted effort to press those sides
which are engaged in violence to stop and to provide support
for the Iraqi Government. But more needs to be done.
Political support for the new Iraq, for a democratic post-
Saddam Iraq, economic support, particularly in the form of Gulf
state debt forgiveness, need to move forward, and the time to
move is now. Our friends in the Gulf, in particular, speak and
we listen to them when they express concern over the extension
of negative Iranian influence in Iraq, the growth of al Qaeda
and Islamic extremism in Iraq. These are valid concerns. We
share them. We need their support in helping to confront these
growing concerns, and the best way to do that is through active
engagement, not isolation, not fence-sitting, on the part of
these regimes.
Mr. Chairman, your question about engaging the negative
actors in the region--Syria and Iran--is a very significant
one. With respect to Syria, we do not believe that the issue
involving Syria's negative behaviors towards Iraq, Hezbollah,
Lebanon, Iran, or Palestinian radical groups is a question of
lack of dialogue or lack of engagement. We believe the Syrian
Government is well aware of our concerns and the steps required
to address those concerns. But Syria has made a series of
choices and the last choice, the most significant and negative
choice, was during the Lebanon war, when Syria cast its lot, as
it remains today, with Iran, with Hezbollah, with forces of
violence and extremism. When that changes, we will of course
respond. The problem is not one of dialogue or engagement.
With respect to Iran, we are prepared in principle to
discuss Iranian activities in Iraq. The timing of such a direct
dialogue is one we still have under review.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. So in summary, you
would say at the present time negotiations with those two
countries are not on the table?
Ambassador Satterfield. We are prepared in principle for a
direct dialogue with Iran. The timing of that dialogue is one
that we are considering.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, you indicated in your statement that the changing
security challenges in Iraq require changes to our own approach
to achieve stability. What changes are you referring to?
General Abizaid. Primarily referring to the need to
increase our commitment to our military transition teams, to
increase the number of people that are on each of these teams,
to ensure that they are as robust as they need to be to give
the Iraqis the capability to take the lead. I believe that that
is essential for being able to change from us being in the lead
to Iraqis being in the lead.
Senator Levin. You also say that new options are being
explored and debated. Is one of the options that is being
explored additional U.S. forces going to Iraq?
General Abizaid. We have every option on the table and we
will present them to the chain of command.
Senator Levin. Including that?
General Abizaid. To include that.
Senator Levin. Including an announcement of a plan for
possible reduction of forces some time down the road? Is that
also on the way----
General Abizaid. Yes, Senator, it goes all the way from
increasing our U.S. forces, our U.S. combat forces, all the way
down to withdrawing our U.S. combat forces.
Senator Levin. Are some of them down the road, in some
planned way?
General Abizaid. Right, and repositioning of forces in
different ways, et cetera.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Ambassador, you testified that it is critical that we work
with the Government of Iraq to set out measurable, achievable
benchmarks on the three tracks that you mentioned--political,
security, and economic. Apparently there were some benchmarks
and timelines that were said by Ambassador Khalilzad to have
been agreed upon by the Iraqi leaders. He made that
announcement, then the next day Prime Minister Maliki rejected
what apparently the Ambassador thought had been accepted.
Were we surprised Prime Minister Maliki rejected those
timelines?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator Levin, the Iraqi Government
has articulated a sense of goals and objectives on the
political process and they have been actively engaged in
articulating with the U.N. a very detailed set of goals and
objectives on the economic side. On security, the discussions
between our two sides continue. With respect to timelines,
there is a timeline embedded in the political process outlined
by the Iraqi Government, as well as on the economic steps now
in the process of finalization.
Similarly on security, we think it is valuable, very
valuable, for the Iraqis to articulate, certainly with our
input, where they intend to move, how they intend to move, and
over what timeline on security goals, as General Abizaid has
outlined. But all of these processes are very much in train.
Senator Levin. Apparently there was a specific document
which Ambassador Khalilzad was referring to when he said that
certain timelines and benchmarks had been agreed upon. Is that
true? Is there a document?
Ambassador Satterfield. There is a document on political
benchmarks that is a document articulated and published by the
Iraqi Government in mid-October.
Senator Levin. Did we present a different timeline and set
of benchmarks to them from the one you just referred to?
Ambassador Satterfield. No, Senator. I think whatever
confusion may have been reflected in Prime Minister Maliki's
remarks has been resolved. I would not overplay the
significance certainly at this point of those comments. We are
very closely working on benchmarks and goals and objectives on
the security process.
Senator Levin. So there was no document which we said that
the Iraqis had agreed to, which in fact Prime Minister Maliki
said had not been agreed to?
Ambassador Satterfield. No, Senator.
Senator Levin. There is no such document?
Ambassador Satterfield. I do not think that was the
substance of the prime minister's remarks.
Senator Levin. All right. But that is not my question. My
question is: was there a document?
Ambassador Satterfield. They have not repudiated any agreed
document, no, sir.
Senator Levin. Was there a document presented, which was
not accepted?
Ambassador Satterfield. No, sir. There are documents in
discussion.
Senator Levin. Recent reports have been published about the
ISFs being infiltrated by Shiite militias implicated in
sectarian death squads, and there has been some evidence that
has been true now of the Iraqi army. General, a recent, very
devastating report in the New York Times last Sunday implicated
the division commander of the Fifth Iraqi Army Division in
Diyala Province of a campaign to drive the Sunnis out of that
province. His actions reportedly led American officers to
require that the general clear all operations with them, even
though on July 3 there had been a transfer of lead authority to
the Iraqis.
Are you familiar with that specific report?
General Abizaid. I am familiar with the article that
appeared in the New York Times.
Senator Levin. Is that accurate?
General Abizaid. It is not completely accurate, no.
Senator Levin. Is it essentially accurate?
General Abizaid. There is certainly concern that in some
units there is infiltration by sectarian groups.
Senator Levin. Did the events that were described there
occur?
General Abizaid. Did the events described in the article
occur?
Senator Levin. Did the event that was described there in
that article occur?
General Abizaid. I cannot really say that the article is
exactly accurate. I can say in that division there were
sectarian problems that were brought to the attention of our
chain of command and were brought to the attention of the Iraqi
chain of command.
Senator Levin. Was there a list of people that the Iraqi
general wanted us to arrest and detain?
General Abizaid. Wanted us, Americans, to arrest and
detain?
Senator Levin. Right.
General Abizaid. I do not know that that is true.
Senator Levin. Do you believe, General, that Prime Minister
Maliki will move against the Sadr militia?
General Abizaid. I think he must move against the Sadr
militia if Iraq is to become a free and sovereign and
independent state.
Senator Levin. You believe he will?
General Abizaid. I believe he will and he will use the
Iraqi army to do so, and he will use political activity to
ensure the disarmament of the Jaysh al-Mahdi. I believe he must
do that; otherwise the Jaysh al-Mahdi starts to become the
curse of Hezbollah, except on an Iraqi scale as opposed to a
Lebanon scale.
Senator Levin. I can ask this of either of you--do we
believe that the grand ayatollah can influence Sadr's behavior?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, Ayatollah Sistani has
significant influence in Iraq, an influence that extends well
beyond Najaf and well beyond the Shiite community alone. He has
been a sustained and consistent voice for moderation, for calm,
and against sectarian violence. But he is challenged, as all
moderates in Iraq are challenged, by the militias, by their
sectarian violence, by the campaign of terror that foments and
sustains that violence.
Certainly the Ayatollah has a vital role. It is a role we
very much hope he will continue to play.
Senator Levin. Could he just declare a truce to sectarian
violence or deliver a religious fatwa against that violence?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I believe there will need
to be concerted action by the political leadership of Iraq and
by ISFs in order to bring about a meaningful drop and sustained
end to sectarian violence.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: that
Iraq is the central battlefront in the war on terror? General?
General Abizaid. I agree with that.
Senator Graham. Ambassador?
Ambassador Satterfield. It is a central battlefront. It is
not the only battlefront.
Senator Graham. Who would be the biggest winners and losers
in a failed Iraqi state? General?
General Abizaid. Al Qaeda and Iran.
Senator Graham. Ambassador?
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Was General Shinseki correct when you look
backward that we needed more troops to secure the country?
General Abizaid?
General Abizaid. General Shinseki was right that a greater
international force contribution, U.S. force contribution, and
Iraqi force contribution, should have been available
immediately after major combat operations.
Senator Graham. So both of you believe that more troops
would have been helpful, that we are in the central battle, one
of the biggest battles in the war on terror; is that correct?
Both of you believe that, that this is a central battle in the
war on terror, Iraq?
General Abizaid. The central battle is happening in Iraq.
That is by the definition of our enemies, and the question is--
--
Senator Graham. Well, and you agree with their definition?
General Abizaid.--do we need more troops? My answer is yes,
we need more troops that are effective, that are Iraqi.
Senator Graham. Do we need more American troops at the
moment to quell the balance?
General Abizaid. No, I do not believe that more American
troops right now is the solution to the problem.
Senator Graham. Do we need less American troops?
General Abizaid. I believe that the troop levels need to
stay where they are. We need to put more American capacity into
Iraqi units to make them more capable in their ability to
confront the sectarian problem----
Senator Graham. So it is your testimony that we do not need
any change in troop levels to get this right?
General Abizaid. It is possible that we might have to go up
in troop levels in order to increase the number of forces that
go into the ISFs, but I believe that is only temporary.
Senator Graham. If we withdrew troops to Okinawa, would
that be a good idea?
General Abizaid. No.
Senator Graham. If we withdrew troops to Kuwait, would that
be a good idea?
General Abizaid. Not at this stage in the campaign.
Senator Graham. People in South Carolina come up to me in
increasing numbers and suggest that no matter what we do in
Iraq the Iraqis are incapable of solving their own problems
through the political process and will resort to violence and
we need to get the hell out of there. What do you say?
General Abizaid. I say the Iraqis are capable of fighting
for their country, solving their political problems, and
bringing their country towards stability with our help and
support.
Senator Graham. Having said that, do you see it possible to
get political solutions to these difficult problems the Iraqis
are facing with the current level of violence?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we see the need for action
both on the political front and on the security front. The
current levels of violence work against a political resolution
and the failure to move forward a political process, a
reconciliation process, feed and sustain those levels of
violence.
Senator Graham. Would you agree with this statement, that
if the current level of violence is not contained or reduced
dramatically the chance of a political outcome being successful
in Iraq is almost zero?
Ambassador Satterfield. There is no question that if levels
of sectarian violence, if the growth of militias are not
addressed and brought down significantly, that the chances of a
political resolution are significantly diminished.
Senator Graham. Having said that, our troop posture will
basically stay the same?
General Abizaid. Senator, our troop posture needs to stay
where it is as we move to enhance the capabilities of the ISFs,
and then we need to assess whether or not we can bring major
combat units out of there due to the increased effectiveness of
the ISFs. My belief is that the Iraqi army, which has taken
casualties at three times the rate of our own troops, is
willing to fight. They need to be led properly by their own
officers and they need to be supported by their own government.
The government needs not to support the sectarian militias.
They need to disband the sectarian militias.
Senator Graham. Why is the government not supporting the
army--why are they supporting the militias over the army? That
would be my last question.
General Abizaid. I believe that the government understands
that they must support the army over the militias.
Senator Graham. Why are they not doing it?
General Abizaid. I believe they are starting to do it.
Senator Graham. No further questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
General Abizaid, the Shiite control the Government of Iraq
at the moment and there seems to be, at least in my view, a
conscious process of ethnic cleansing going on. Would you
ascribe to that view?
General Abizaid. There are certainly areas in Baghdad where
Shiite death squads have moved in and tried to move Sunni
families out of there by threatening them, murdering them, or
kidnapping them.
Senator Reed. Do you see that as something more than just
coincidental, but organized and systematic?
General Abizaid. I think it is organized by some of the
Shiite militia groups, yes, I do.
Senator Reed. It seems also to me that the Shiite
Government recently passed legislation creating a super-region
which would encompass the Kurdish area in the north, making it
autonomous. In effect, what seems to be happening or could be
happening is that the Shiite plan, the government plan, is that
they will end up with an oil-rich region in the south, much as
the Kurds have in the north, that on the edges between Shiite
and Sunni communities there is some deliberate action of ethnic
cleansing going on and that that rationale might explain why
there is not a lot of activity directed at disbanding militias,
cooperating with United States forces, sharing intelligence,
doing lots of things.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, in fact that has not
happened. The manner in which the issue of moving forward on
the constitutional provisions for the formation of federal
regions was handled shows not a dominant Shiite unilateral
agenda, but rather cross-sectarian alliances, in which Shiite
in the political process expressed very different views on what
ought to be the course forward, in which Sunnis participated
very much in a decision, along with Kurds, that put off for 18
months any step by provinces to take advantage of the
constitutional provisions to form a federal region.
We see this as a positive, not a negative outcome.
Similarly, we have seen significant progress made on a national
hydrocarbon law, which would provide for national distribution
of revenues on a fair and equitable basis, which would reflect
both local and national needs, and those are both encouraging
signs.
Senator Reed. Is it encouraging that there are significant
revenues that they are not committing to reconstruction
efforts? Tal Afar is one example among many where they are not
committing their own resources to do what everyone argues has
to be done.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, there are very significant
Iraqi resources which are available and which need to be moved
into Iraqi reconstruction, development, and growth. We are
working with the Iraqis, as is the international community, on
focusing them on the need to move those resources through
better budget execution, through other means, to get them to
the fight where they are needed.
Senator Reed. General Abizaid, how much time do you think
we have to bring down the level of violence in Baghdad before
we reach some type of tipping point where it accelerates beyond
the control of even the Iraqi Government?
General Abizaid. I think it needs to be brought down within
the next several months.
Senator Reed. 90 days, 60 days?
General Abizaid. 4 to 6 months.
Senator Reed. 4 to 6 months.
You have said that your view is that the Iraqi Government
and Maliki are committed to do that. The $300 billion question
is when?
General Abizaid. I think he is ready to do it now.
Senator Reed. What is holding him up, is he ready to do it
now?
General Abizaid. I believe he has moved in a direction with
national police reform, which has been a major problem, with
dismissing officers that are showing sectarian values as
opposed to national values, with committing the armed forces to
independent operations that are necessary to quell the
sectarian violence, in a way that leads me to believe he is
going to continue to be doing more. I talked to him about it
just 2 days ago.
Senator Reed. It was reputed, and I think in that
conversation, General, that you said he must disband the Shiite
militias and give the United States proof that they were
disbanded. Is that accurate?
General Abizaid. I would not say that is exactly accurate.
I said he must disband the Shiite militias, absolutely.
Senator Reed. Did you give him a notional timeframe of
months?
General Abizaid. I said very soon.
Senator Reed. Very soon.
Ambassador Satterfield, do you think it is in the interests
of the regional parties, including Iran and Syria, to have a
destabilized Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. It is certainly not in the interest
of any state in the region committed to peace and stability to
see a destabilized, violent Iraq. Iran and Syria have both made
their intentions very clear. Their role has not been
constructive and, while their rhetoric supports stability in
Iraq, their actions do not.
Senator Reed. So you feel that they have a deliberate
national policy of continuing to destabilize or attempt to help
destabilize Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. Their actions certainly reflect
that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. We must move along.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the things I believe we should talk about to get a
really effective effort in Iraq is for all of us to understand
who is responsible for what. I know our military has been
carrying a heavy, heavy burden. They have suffered casualties
and performed magnificently in my view. But some people seem to
think they should be responsible for everything there.
Ambassador Satterfield, let me ask you, with regard to the
management of the infrastructure, the electricity and water,
the educational improvements, the relations with governments,
the Government of Iraq, the reconciliation process, oil, law
and order, is that the DOS's responsibility?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, it is the Iraqis'
responsibility first and foremost, and we have to make that
very clear. It is their country. They are responsible for their
own fate. The consequences of their choices are very
significant for us, extremely significant. But they, at the end
of the day, must be seized with responsibility for all the
sectors that you referred to.
Now, our mission in Iraq and our mission back here, the
U.S. Government's mission, are closely interrelated. I have
never seen an example of closer military-civilian cooperation,
of a fully joint undertaking, than our embassy in Baghdad and
our PRTs. Indeed, those PRTs are extensions of classic civil-
military operations, with investment from the civilian
community to augment our military's resources.
But at the end of the day, our efforts, whether in Baghdad
or in the field, are supportive of what must be an Iraqi lead.
Senator Sessions. You stated that well. It is up to the
Iraqis. But with regard to our effort to encourage them to
achieve a common goal of a stable and peaceful and prosperous
Iraq, these areas of responsibility are really the
ambassador's, the DOS's, are they not?
With the military as a supportive role, or are we confused
about who is responsible?
Ambassador Satterfield. We are not confused at all,
Senator. It is a joint mission. All of the key issues that you
have raised, and they are all critical, have elements which
reflect both our military input, and our civilian input, not
just from DOS, but from other Government agencies represented.
But we act in tandem.
Our strategic plans are jointly developed. Our benchmarks
and timelines--and we do have them--are jointly arranged and
reviewed and they are jointly executed.
Senator Sessions. It is good that you are working well
together. I hear that when I am in Iraq, both from the
uniformed people and the people. But are you confident that the
DOS, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, the other
Departments of this Federal Government, are contributing to
this effort as their capability exists sufficiently when
compared to DOS and the military?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, this is a very important
issue for the President and for Secretary Rice, and we are very
pleased, particularly over the last 6 months, at the outpouring
from other agencies apart from the DOS and the DOD to provide
qualified civilians to the fight in Iraq, including in those
very dangerous, very exposed PRTs.
Senator Sessions. With regard to an issue that I spent most
of my professional career dealing with crime, both of you, I
would like your comments. I have heard from a parent who I have
confidence in that his son, a soldier there, that they are
apprehending dangerous people that are being released far, far
too quickly. When we were there on my last trip to Iraq, we met
with military people. They expressed great frustration that
they are taking risks to arrest people and they are being
released promptly.
I believe it was Robert Kagan writing in Atlantic Monthly
talked about Mosul and he met with the mayors in that whole
region, and after the pleasantries ended the first thing they
complained about was too many of the people that had been
arrested being released from the prison. That was their number
one complaint.
I will just tell you as someone who knows a little bit
about the crime thing, people have to have some stability. You
noted it in your comments, Mr. Ambassador. Some Iraqis have
turned to armed militias and other extragovernmental groups to
provide security, while others have seized upon the security
vacuum to pursue local power.
I guess what I am saying to you is, are you confident that
you have enough prison spaces, that we are adequately
adjudicating those who are involved in these bad activities,
and do you recognize the importance of that to creating a
stable Iraq?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, there are two issues here
that you allude to. The first is how we, the U.S. Government,
the U.S. military, handle our own detention process in terms of
releases, and we do have a high level of confidence in that
process.
But there is another area in which we do not have a similar
level of confidence, and that is how Iraqis are proceeding to
establish the rule of law, a transparent and effective judicial
process. I will take that to a very simple point. The Iraqi
Government must establish consequences for bad actions, whether
those actions are abuse of human rights or financial
corruption, both of which sap the fabric of Iraqi society and
the Iraqi state. Much more needs to be done.
Now, we are helping. We have an aggressive program to
provide physical capacity, physical infrastructure, prisons,
corrections officers. But that capacity is only as good as the
judicial process that supports it on the Iraqi side. For a
combination of reasons, including intimidation and threats,
there are significant challenges ahead which we and the Iraqis
need to continue to address.
But I would like to follow up on an earlier comment you
made and express particular appreciation to the Attorney
General for the support that the Department of Justice has
offered us in Iraq and in our PRTs. It is a very robust and an
absolutely critical presence. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. One of my assistant U.S. attorneys
volunteered from the Department of Justice and is over there
today. But that is a critical element, is creating a system of
law, and that includes, sir, guilty people not being released.
That is really a serious problem in this kind of culture.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Before proceeding to Senator Bill Nelson, I will ask the
indulgence of the committee.
[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the hearing was recessed and the
committee proceeded to other business, then reconvened at 12:45
p.m.]
Chairman Warner. Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, I trust you. I must say that I come to
this hearing with a great deal of skepticism because prior to
this hearing there has been a great deal of obfuscation by the
witnesses in front of this committee as to what the truth is,
and I trust you, and you have been to me the most forthcoming
witness as you have appeared in front of this committee over
the course of time.
Now, I want to pick up on what Senator Graham was asking
you about in the stability and the degree of the number of
forces that we need. I draw attention to an article yesterday
in USA Today in which, talking about Anbar Province, where we
have had 40 Americans killed there in October. Marine General
Zilmer says that he has enough troops to train Iraqis, but he
does not have enough to defeat the insurgency. Then Marine
General Neller says many police in Anbar Province have not been
paid for 3 months.
Now, how do we reconcile that, if it is true, with your
response to Senator Graham?
General Abizaid. First of all, Senator, it is true. I was
out talking to General Zilmer and his commanders just 2 days
ago, and there is a problem in Al Anbar Province and there is a
big problem with pay getting to the police in Al Anbar
Province, and it has to do with on the one hand, the immaturity
of the Iraqi Government, and on the other hand, suspicions
within the national police organization that people in the
Sunni areas are in particular not being paid in order to
advance a sectarian agenda.
We have discussed this with the Minister of the Interior.
He understands what the problem is. They must be paid. But what
those officers said is a problem is in fact a problem. On the
other hand----
Senator Bill Nelson. The question is, our troop strength to
get the job done, since this is a critical area for terrorism
in the world.
General Abizaid. Al Anbar Province is critical, but more
critical than Al Anbar Province is Baghdad. Baghdad is the main
military effort. I told the marines when I was out there that
the main effort is clearly Baghdad. They understand that. That
is where our military resources will go. On the other hand, I
would tell you that the al Qaeda activity, which is highest in
Al Anbar Province, is being very robustly challenged by our
Special Operations Forces and our Marine Forces and we are
having what I would call very good success out there.
Senator Bill Nelson. Both are critical. But the question
is, because I am asked this question all the time, do we need
more troops or should we withdraw? I say I want to leave it to
the commanders, like General Abizaid. You have stated to
Senator Graham that you do not need a change in the troops
right now. But the commentary coming out of Anbar by General
Zilmer and General Neller would indicate otherwise.
General Abizaid. I understand that. I have talked it over
with those commanders out there. I think our main effort is
where it has been designated, which is in the Baghdad area. It
is where it needs to stay. I think that we have made progress
in Baghdad. We are going to continue to make progress in
Baghdad, and that we do need more troops and the more troops we
need are Iraqis.
The Iraqis understand that. They have increased the size of
their armed forces. They have gone out to recruit more police.
I believe that the 300,000-plus armed Iraqis, in addition to
our current force strength, give us the opportunity to put the
Iraqis in the lead, provided the Government of Iraq will get
behind their armed forces. I believe that is a good bet.
Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Let me ask you on the opposite
side of the question, because I get this all the time: ``We
ought to withdraw; we ought to have a phased withdrawal.'' Can
you tell us in your professional military opinion what does
that involve? You have to consider the tactical questions, you
have to consider the logistical considerations. Clearly you
just cannot pick up and walk out. You are talking about plans
over some period of time understanding that any kind of phased
withdrawal depends on political, economic, and military
conditions, what are the essential questions that you as a
commander would need to have answered in order to set that
timetable?
General Abizaid. Clearly, the number one question we need
if someone were to say withdraw is when. You have to understand
that moving 140,000 troops from combat positions out of the
country and then dealing with their withdrawal and all of the
logistics apparatus that is entailed is a considerable
endeavor.
We would have to know what the policy conditions and
constraints are, what the rules of engagement would be during
this period. It is an extremely complex and difficult
operation.
I would also tell you, Senator Nelson, just to make sure
that we are completely communicating here, I did release the
Marine Expeditionary Unit that is under my control to the
marines in Al Anbar Province and it has already started its
deployment up in the area to help address some of General
Zilmer's concerns, with General Casey's concurrence of course.
Senator Bill Nelson. That is useful information.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. General Abizaid, is Al Anbar Province under
control?
General Abizaid. Al Anbar Province is not under control,
Senator.
Senator McCain. Yet we have enough troops to take care of
the problem, which you say Baghdad is the primary area. Would
it not make sense to say it might be well to get both Baghdad
and Al Anbar Province under control before we have another
battle of Fallujah and lose many more lives because the
insurgents have taken control of a good part of Al Anbar
Province?
General Abizaid. Senator McCain, I believe that the marines
have done an excellent job in securing the key areas of Al
Anbar Province, Ramadi, and Fallujah. They are the three most
decisive areas. I believe that you cannot have a main effort
everywhere and that the preponderance of military activity
needs to go into the Baghdad area.
Senator McCain. I do not understand that tactic, General.
You just told Senator Graham that General Shinseki was right
that we did not have enough troops there after the initial
military operation. Is that correct?
General Abizaid. I believe that more ISFs that were
available would have made a big difference. I believe more
international forces would have made a big difference.
Senator McCain. Would more American troops have made a
difference?
General Abizaid. I think you can look back and say that
more American troops would have been advisable in the early
stages of May, June, and July.
Senator McCain. Did you note that General Zinni, who
opposed the invasion, now thinks that we should have more
troops? Did you notice that General Battiste, who was opposed
to the conduct of this conflict, says that we may need tens of
thousands of additional troops?
I do not understand, General, when you have a part of Iraq
that is not under our control as Al Anbar Province is, I do not
know how many American lives have been sacrificed in Al Anbar
Province--but we still have enough and we will rely on the
ability to train the Iraqi military, when the Iraqi army has
not sent the requested number of battalions into Baghdad.
General Abizaid. Senator McCain, I met with every
divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, and
General Dempsey. We all talked together, and I said: ``In your
professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American
troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve
success in Iraq?'' They all said ``no.''
The reason is because we want the Iraqis to do more. It is
easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe
that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more,
from taking more responsibility for their own future. They will
win the insurgency, they will solve the sectarian violence
problem, and they will do it with our help. If more troops need
to come in, they need to come in to make the Iraqi army
stronger. That is my professional opinion.
Senator McCain. General Battiste also says that if there
were congressional proposals for troop withdrawals, he says,
``terribly naive.'' Do you agree with that comment?
General Abizaid. Under the current circumstances, I would
not recommend troop withdrawals.
Senator McCain. So we have sufficient number of forces to
clear insurgent sanctuaries, hold the territory with a
combination of coalition and Iraqi forces, provide sufficient
security in Iraq, so that economic reconstruction and political
activity can take place, to arrest the momentum of sectarian
death squads, disarm militias, to train the Iraqi army, and
keep an American presence in Iraqi units, and place U.S.
personnel in Iraqi police units? We have sufficient troops to
carry out all those tasks?
General Abizaid. We have sufficient troop strength, Iraqi
and American, to make those tasks become effective.
Senator McCain. Was it encouraging when in broad daylight
that yesterday or the day before, that people dressed in police
uniforms were able to come in and kidnap 150 people and leave
with them and go through checkpoints, General? It is not
encouraging to us. It is not encouraging to those of us who
heard time after time that things are ``progressing well,''
that we are making progress, et cetera, because we are hearing
from many other sources that that is not the case. I am, of
course, disappointed that basically you are advocating the
status quo here today, which I think the American people in the
last election said that is not an acceptable condition for the
American people.
So I regret your position that, apparently against the
recommendation of most military experts that we do not have
sufficient troops--Al Anbar Province is a classic example of
that--that you still are continuing to hold this position when
numerically most of the attacks, most of the kidnappings, most
of the others, continue to be on a rise in Baghdad itself,
where, as you say, the majority of our effort takes place.
I respect you enormously. I appreciate your service. I
regret deeply that you seem to think that the status quo and
the rate of progress we are making is acceptable. I think most
Americans do not.
General Abizaid. Senator, I agree with you. The status quo
is not acceptable and I do not believe what I am saying here
today is the status quo. I am saying we must significantly
increase our ability to help the Iraqi army by putting more
American troops with Iraqi units in military transition teams,
to speed the amount of training that is done, to speed the
amount of heavy weapons that gets there, and to speed the
ability of Iraqi troops to deploy.
It is a very difficult thing to do. Senator, I believe in
my heart of hearts that the Iraqis must win this battle with
our help. We can put in 20,000 more Americans tomorrow and
achieve a temporary effect, but when you look at the overall
American force pool that is available out there, the ability to
sustain that commitment is simply not something that we have
right now with the size of the Army and the Marine Corps.
We can win with the Iraqis if we put our effort into the
Iraqis as our first priority, and that is what I think we
should do. I do not think that is status quo. I think that is a
major change.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator McCain. Could I just say in response, Mr. Chairman.
You say we need to do all these things--train the Iraqis. I do
not know where those troops come from, number one; and many of
us believe that, this may not be a long-term commitment, but at
least a commitment to bring Baghdad under control, and that is
not happening today, and that is in my view where you and I
have significant disagreement.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, when you were confirmed by this committee
you signed a questionnaire on June 14, 2003, that said yes to
the question ``Do you agree when asked before any duly
constituted committee of Congress to give your personal views,
even if those views differ from the administration in power?''
I guess I would ask you if think you have been true to that
commitment?
General Abizaid. Yes, I do.
Senator Dayton. Since I have not been campaigning for
reelection in the last month, I had a chance to visit Iraq and
also to read a couple of the books, State of Denial and Fiasco,
about the past circumstances there. In State of Denial, there
is a reference to you and Jay Garner where you turned,
according to the book, to the policies on de-Baathification and
disbanding the army. ``Garner told Abizaid: `John, I'm telling
you, if you do this it is going to be ugly. It will take 10
years to fix this country and for 3 years you will be sending
kids home in body bags.' Abizaid did not disagree. `I hear
you,' he said. On the video screen, Abizaid argued that they
needed to bring back officers from Saddam's army.''
That same contradiction is reflected in the other book as
well, where Garner says: ``We planned to bring the army back.
Having an operating Iraqi army was a key element of the U.S.
military planning. Abizaid was all for it, Tommy Franks,
McKearnan.''
I cannot find anywhere where you told this committee, sir,
that you opposed the policy of either de-Baathification or the
policy of disbanding the Iraqi army. In fact, in March 2005
when Senator Reed asked you specifically about de-
Baathification, you did not indicate your disagreement with
that policy.
General Abizaid. De-Baathification issues are very, very
serious and the degree to which the depth of de-Baathification
has gone affects reconciliation of the Sunni community. I
believe that if we go too deep, and that we initially went too
deep, that it made it harder for reconciliation.
Senator Dayton. Is it accurate or inaccurate, these
accounts that say that you at the time of Mr. Bremer's order on
de-Baathification disagreed strongly with that policy? Did you
express that disagreement before this committee or any other
committee of Congress?
General Abizaid. I would have to go back and check my
testimonies on what I said and what I did not say. But I do
know that I was never interviewed for the book. I do not know
what other people said and I have not read the book. So you
will forgive me for not commenting about it.
Senator Dayton. In State of Denial, you are quoted as
saying to Richard Armitage: ``We've got a really bad situation
over here,'' you told him in frustration one day in the summer
of 2004. ``Can't win it militarily.''
Then in March 2005, before this committee you said that:
``The strength of the Iraqi insurgency is waning as a result of
momentum from elections,'' and you predicted that ISFs would be
leading the fight against insurgents in most of Iraq by the end
of 2005.
Then in one very widely reported comment in March 2006,
according again to State of Denial, you were in Washington to
testify before this committee. You painted a careful but upbeat
picture of the situation in Iraq. Afterward--this is reading
from the account--``He went over to see Congressman Murtha, the
73-year-old former marine who had introduced a resolution the
previous November calling for the redeployment of troops from
Iraq as soon as practicable, in the Rayburn House Office
Building.''
``According to Murtha,''--you--``Abizaid raised his hand
for emphasis and held his thumb and forefinger a quarter of an
inch apart from one another and said: `We're that far apart.'
''
Is that, Representative Murtha's account of that meeting,
an accurate representation?
General Abizaid. Senator Dayton, if you would look at my
testimonies before this committee, I have never once said we
should withdraw from Iraq precipitously, and I believe that is
completely different from what Congressman Murtha believes. So
as far as being on the record for what I said versus what
people said I said, I would say my record is pretty clear.
Senator Dayton. So you disagree with Representative
Murtha's account of that meeting?
General Abizaid. I agree that I have been doing this for a
long time and I agree that the situation in Iraq has changed. I
was very comfortable up until about February of this year that
we were moving in a direction that was exactly as I said, where
the Iraqis would move to the front, defeat the insurgency, and
achieve stability. The sectarian violence that took place has
been, quite frankly, a clear indication of how difficult this
project is and how steadfast we need to be in order to make it
work.
Senator Dayton. I do not question for a minute the
sincerity of your and our shared desire to win this conflict. I
guess the accounts in these books--when I was traveling over
and meeting with some 2,600 Minnesota National Guard men and
women who are putting their lives on the line every day, as you
meet with those individuals too, I do not recall in this
committee you or any other leading general or military
commander saying anything that substantially differed with the
official administration policy as articulated by the President,
the Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense.
I, frankly, while finding that I could not entirely believe
their comments, always believed here in this committee that I
could believe and trust what you were saying and what other
leading generals were telling us. I find here--and again, I do
not know whose accounts to believe, but I find here consistent
contradictions of those upbeat statements and statements of
agreement with in particular the Secretary of Defense about
these major decisions.
It is being pursued here again today, the question of troop
strength. Again and again, these books attest that you, sir,
and the other military commanders, at least some of the others,
believed that we needed more troops. I do not know what to
believe, sir, when I hear these contradictions.
General Abizaid. What you can believe is that when we
evaluate what needs to be done on the battlefield, we make our
recommendations, we have our debate, we make our decisions, and
then we move on.
Senator Dayton. But this commitment you made at the time of
your confirmation says that you will express your personal
views to this committee even if they disagree with the
administration. I do not, in my view, believe, sir, that you or
others have done that if these accounts are accurate.
General Abizaid. I have given you my best judgment. I stand
by the record. I think the record is pretty clear. If you want
to infer that the Woodward book is correct, feel free to do so.
But I cannot say that it is.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
Senator Dayton. Thank you very much, General.
Chairman Warner. I wish to be recorded on the record that I
have been at every one of these hearings and have had the
privilege to chair them. I think you have been very
forthcoming, and I opened this hearing with a very pragmatic
statement you made on August 3, which was heard not only
throughout this country but around the world.
Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Ambassador, in your testimony you noted that we need to
move forward on three tracks--security, policy, and economics.
The solution in Iraq depends not just on a military approach,
but on an economic and political success as well. In that
regard, the lack of adequate Sunni participation in the
political process and in the governing bodies presents a major
challenge to the long-term stability of Iraq.
The power imbalance is particularly acute in Baghdad, where
the mayor's office, the governor's office, and the provincial
council are all entirely in Shiite hands. Now, one way to
remedy that imbalance is through additional elections. Yet I am
told that provincial elections, which might help to remedy that
power imbalance, have once again been delayed. I believe they
were supposed to have occurred in September of this year. They
were then postponed to March of next year, and now I am told
that they are being postponed again until the fall of 2007.
That delay effectively perpetuates the lack of power for
the Sunni population. What are we doing to try to remedy the
imbalance politically, because we are never going to have a
stable and peaceful democratic Iraq if the Sunnis feel that
they are excluded.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, Iraq has had two
extraordinary elections, the constitutional drafting process
and the referendum for the constitution, in which the
overwhelming majority of Iraqis participated, including Sunnis.
That was a major step forward. The council of representatives
reflects, we think, in a fair and accurate fashion the balance
of demographics within Iraq, and the reality is that in Iraq,
as in many other states, demographics do shape the way voting
patterns trend.
But that does not diminish from the fact that at a
provincial level, at a local level, including in Baghdad, there
do need to be new free elections held with full Sunni
participation. The Sunnis largely boycotted those initial
elections. They have come in at the national level. They now
need to come in at the provincial level.
We want to see local elections take place as soon as
possible and there has been no decision to postpone elections.
There are several legislative steps and there are some
organizational measures in which international organizations
are involved and Iraqi nongovernmental organizations are
involved that need to be put in place. But we believe the
government is committed to moving forward with provincial
elections as rapidly as possible. Frankly, I would hope that
could still take place early in the new year.
Senator Collins. I certainly hope so. I think it is
absolutely essential.
General, are any of the Iraqi army battalions operating
independently, without U.S. support, at this point?
General Abizaid. There are a large number of Iraqi
battalions, 91 to be, in fact that are in the lead. But they
have embedded U.S. training teams. Again, this is one of the
key and important changes that we are recommending, that we
make those teams more robust.
Senator Collins. I know we are making progress and that
obviously has been the cornerstone of our strategy in Iraq, is
to transfer security. I realize that there are additional army
battalions every day that are taking the lead in operations,
but are there any that are able to operate without support from
the U.S., without embedded advisers, at this point?
General Abizaid. That would operate completely
independently?
Senator Collins. Right.
General Abizaid. No, we are not doing that at this time.
Senator Collins. Do we have a timetable or a goal for
having a significant number of Iraqi battalions operating
without U.S. support? The reason I am pressing you on this is
obviously our ability to start withdrawing our troops in large
numbers depends on the ability of Iraqi army troops to operate
without significant support.
General Abizaid. We want to speed the transition. The
transition ultimately is Iraqi units independently operating in
the field under Iraqi command. But it requires more heavy
weapons, more deployable types of equipment such as trucks, the
ability to move around the battlefield, and more logistics. We
need to speed this process.
When we can arrive at the point where Iraqi forces under
Iraqi command can operate without U.S. military transition
teams, it is hard to really say where that will be, but it is
some months away. I think you will start to see some divisions
very capable of independent operations, especially down in the
south and up in the north, very soon.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Collins. Thank you, and thank you for your service.
Chairman Warner. For the information of colleagues, Senator
Levin and I have conferred. The witness team before us has to
appear before the House, but we will hopefully have sufficient
time for each member present now to ask their questions within
a 5-minute timeframe. I thank the indulgence of the committee.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
General and Ambassador, thanks for your service to our
country. General, you said earlier that the status quo in Iraq
is not acceptable. I think everyone agrees with that, and my
hope is that we have a window of opportunity and really
responsibility now, after the election to find a bipartisan
consensus for being supportive of the efforts of our troops and
our diplomats there to achieve success, because it is critical
to our security to achieve success there, I believe.
You know that there has been a range of suggestions, from a
congressionally-mandated forced withdrawal by a deadline, to
what is now being described as phased redeployment, which I
take it to be a general withdrawal but not a date yet by which
it will happen, to the increasing of our troops there. I want
to ask you a few questions about some of those alternatives.
If Congress ordered the beginning of a phased redeployment
of American forces out of Iraq to occur within the next 4 to 6
months, what do you believe, General, would be the effect on
the sectarian violence in Iraq?
General Abizaid. I believe it would increase.
Senator Lieberman. Why do you believe it would increase?
General Abizaid. Because we are at this point right now
where building capacity and confidence in the ISFs, along with
building confidence in the Iraqi Government, needs to come
together in order for them to be able to start taking the lead.
It is very important that we keep our troop levels at the right
level.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
General Abizaid. Despite discussions between Senator McCain
and I, it is not that we are absolutely not considering force
increases. We will, but it seems to me that the prudent course
ahead is keep the troop levels about where they are, increase
the number of forces that are with ISFs to make them better,
more confident, and in conjunction with our colleagues on the
diplomatic side move towards governance policies that will seek
reconciliation.
Senator Lieberman. Understood. So most importantly, you
have told me that if we began, if Congress ordered a phased
redeployment out of our troops in the next 4 to 6 months,
sectarian violence would increase. If Congress ordered a phased
redeployment of American troops out of Iraq in the next 4
months, what effect do you think that would have on the Maliki
Government? Ambassador?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, it would be interpreted as
a withdrawal of U.S. support. It would encourage even greater
hedging behaviors by all actors in Iraq as they begin to
negotiate for position, and that would be in an unhelpful, not
helpful, direction after the fact.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answer.
Some of those who are recommending a phased redeployment
begin in the next 6 months I think have essentially given up on
our effort in Iraq. But I think others quite sincerely believe
that it may be the only way we can convince the Maliki
Government and the ISFs that they have to take over. I take it
by your answer that you profoundly disagree with that
conclusion?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the U.S. presence in Iraq,
our activities there, whether civilian or military, are gauged
against specific missions. Those missions reflect our best
assessment of dynamics in Iraq and outside Iraq. Adjustments in
either of our presences in Iraq of any kind up or down, or
changing in missions, that is part of a concerted strategy that
thinks through the knock-on consequences of what we do, is one
thing and that is something we are committed to examining and
reexamining.
But a declaration that affects presence without linkage in
a strategic sense to consequences and other issues we believe
would be harmful.
Senator Lieberman. I agree with both of you that a
congressional mandate to begin a withdrawal from Iraq in a time
certain would be a disaster for the Iraqis and more directly
for the United States.
Let me ask you the other part of the question, picking up
on what Senator McCain and Senator Graham asked you. General, I
want to ask you: You have said that the military transition
teams, the Americans embedded with the ISFs, are probably
having a very significant positive effect on those forces and
that our forces embedded with the Iraqis should be, I believe
you said in your initial testimony, significantly increased.
How can we do that without increasing the overall number of
American troops in Iraq? In other words, I fear that the only
other way to do it is to pull our troops out of other danger
areas, like Anbar Province, and then they will fall into more
chaos.
General Abizaid. I cannot say for sure that we can do it
without having to increase our overall troop levels. But I
believe that there is a way to make the transition teams more
robust from within the existing force structure inside Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. I hope that you will take a look and not
hesitate to most directly ask the Commander in Chief to give
you authority to send more troops in if you really feel that
the embedding--and I do strongly feel--that the embedding is
working best to enable the ISFs to take over. It may be that a
short-term increase in our forces there embedded with them will
be the best way for us to more quickly get to a point where we
can actually draw down our forces.
A final quick question----
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator. We are quite a bit
over, and I appreciate that.
Senator Lieberman. I will save it.
Chairman Warner. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. General, thank you for your service. Mr.
Ambassador, thank you for being here today.
With regard to the previously asked question by the Senator
from Connecticut, they talk about 4 to 6 months. General Casey
is now estimating it is 12 to 18 months before ISFs are ready
to take control of the country, and I guess I would ask you,
General, what your confidence level is in that latest
assessment?
General Abizaid. General Casey and I just had the
discussion the other night about increasing the pace of
transition to bring that 12- to 18-month period forward. I
cannot exactly say how many months we could bring it forward.
We are doing the staff work right now to make sure we
understand how to do it. But it is important for the committee
to understand and the people that are watching this to
understand that we have not ruled anything out, that all the
options are on the table.
But I think it is very clear that we have to do more to
speed the transition, to get the Iraqis in the front, because
the Iraqis being in the front is the key to victory.
Senator Thune. A lot of the discussion today has focused on
troop levels and I guess my follow-up question to that would
be, you talk about speeding that up. If getting additional U.S.
troops there, if the purpose is to get the ISFs trained and we
can accomplish that more effectively and more quickly by
embedding additional U.S. troops for that purpose, does that
help you speed it up, that 12- to 18-month timeframe?
General Abizaid. Additional U.S. troops, sir, in that
period? Right now we have three more brigades than we had
planned to have in Iraq and I think, as does General Casey,
that the force structure is adequate to move Iraqi transition
forward at greater speed. But look, again I cannot tell you for
sure that there will not be some increase required, as I
answered to Senator Lieberman's question.
Senator Thune. I guess I was following up on that question
as well, because that question has been asked a lot today about
troop strength, whether or not the current levels are
sufficient. But if the objective can be more effectively
accomplished by getting more U.S. troops embedded with the ISFs
in the short-term, if that enables us to eventually get our
troops home in a shorter timeframe, that would seem to make
some sense. I guess that is what I was getting at.
You recently met with, and there are some documented
statements in the press recently by, Prime Minister Maliki
wanting the United States to speed transfer of security
operations to the Iraqi army and to relegate U.S. forces to
bases. The defense minister has rejected that idea, saying his
forces are not ready. Can you give us some insight into what
the conflict is between the two leading officials there in
Iraq?
General Abizaid. I think there is some concern on the part
of the defense minister that they are not ready to move as fast
as the prime minister would like them to move. But I talked to
both the defense minister and the prime minister and they both
want to speed the pace of transition, and the question is what
is the best way to do that? Again, I think making our
transition teams more robust is the right way to do that.
Now, the other thing I would like to say, you have to
understand that as we move towards more and more sovereignty in
Iraq that the Iraqis have a view about more U.S. troops coming
on their territory as well. I have asked them several times
about how they would view a major increase in American troops
in order to help with the security situation for a short period
of time, and they are not very much in favor of that. They
believe it undermines their gaining greater and greater
authority and responsibility.
Senator Thune. Is it possible that in your efforts to
establish the stability and to get rid of or stem the rising
sectarian violence, that while this permanent professional and
trained police force is being developed, have you explored the
possibility of bringing in some trained police units that might
be contributed on a temporary basis from other Arab Muslim
countries in the region, like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or
some of the Gulf countries where you would be having primarily
Shiite-manned units donate?
General Abizaid. Senator, I would defer that to Ambassador
Satterfield, but I would tell you, Senator, that there have not
been any real contributions in that regard from the neighboring
states that have been forthcoming.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, Jordan hosts a training
facility which has proved vital to the efforts to build Iraqi
forces. But in terms of direct contributions of Arab security
forces, whether police or other, I do not think that is a
likely prospect, and it is not for any failure on our part to
solicit. I do not think the willingness exists.
Senator Thune. So that has been asked. It seems like some
of those countries, particularly neighboring countries, have a
real stake in making sure that this transition occurs.
Ambassador Satterfield. That stake is unmistakable. They do
and it is a very significant one. But as General Abizaid said,
we have seen little if any willingness to provide the kind of
direct support, Senator, that you have referred to.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, let me add my appreciation for your
service. You are certainly in a period of time and an era that
will be recorded, so I appreciate what you are attempting to
do. Mr. Ambassador, thank you.
I have said for a long time that--and I think I am hearing
this today--when people are asked are we winning the war, that
the answer is: We cannot win the war. The Iraqis have to win
their own war. I have been asked, can we help quell the
sectarian violence? The answer is: Perhaps provide support in
that effort, but we do not even understand the 1,000 years-plus
differences between these two groups.
So I agree with the embedding of military personnel, ours,
in their military personnel. I agree, and I have heard it so
many times that we are going to stand up their troops to stand
down our troops. I understand the symmetry that goes with that
and I think that is what you are saying, General Abizaid,
perhaps better than I have.
But the continuing question will always be, how quickly are
we moving, what is the progress, and what remains to be done.
That is why I have been for 2 years asking if we can have
conditions for staying, in other words measurable goals and
outcomes that you can identify in advance and then measure
success toward that.
Is that similar to what we are hearing in terms of
benchmarks? Because I wrote a letter last September to
Secretary Rumsfeld to follow up on that hearing that we had at
that time, to follow up on the joint U.S.-Iraqi committee being
established to address issues that I and the other members have
raised regarding ISFs reaching levels that allow them to
address sectarian violence and the insurgency. I asked as well
whether there are any metrics or measurements that might exist
to demonstrate the number of personnel and time required for
Iraqis to secure and govern themselves.
I guess my question first is, what are our measurable
goals? Is it standing up their troops? Is it weeding out the
militias that are in the police force, forces around the
country? Does that include also weeding out the militias and
the sectarian differences in the military? If that is the case,
then standing up and standing down is one phase of it, but the
other phase is how soon can we weed out these elements that are
obstructionist to the goals that we have?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the critical elements of
any set of goals and objectives and any timeline in Iraq today
are on security, confronting sectarian violence, starting in
Baghdad, confronting the growth of militias, starting in
Baghdad, moving forward a political process that focuses on
reconciliation and on consequences for gross abuses of human
rights and financial crimes, growing Iraqi capacities on
budgeting so they can use their resources to sustain
themselves, and attracting foreign investment.
Senator Ben Nelson. That is on the economic side----
Ambassador Satterfield. Those are the key goals. No, those
are on political and security as well, Senator. As General
Abizaid and I have both said, the timeline is a diminishing
one. What is critical here is whether there is a national
agenda or a sectarian agenda being pursued on sectarian, on
governance, on economics, whether the government can move in
enough time to preserve and exploit the convergence that we
believe still exists between Sunnis and Shiite before that
convergence diminishes to the point it cannot be----
Senator Ben Nelson. The coexistence, the policy of
coexistence.
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. On a scale of 1 to 10, how certain are
you that we are going to be able to help them do that or are
they going to be able to do that on their own?
Ambassador Satterfield. I am very certain we can help them
do that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Ten, nine?
Ambassador Satterfield. Very certain we can help, but the
question is will they take the difficult decisions. We support
Prime Minister Maliki. The President has made that very clear.
We believe he is a national leader, but leaders have to do more
than simply say the right things. They need to do the right
things.
Senator Ben Nelson. We are trying to move away from a cycle
of dependence and that is why I understand what is being said.
Ambassador Satterfield. Absolutely.
Senator Ben Nelson. I agree with that. But also, I am
concerned about what is required for independence in terms of
standing up troops and getting the prime minister in a position
where he can lead. On a scale of 1 to 10, what do you think the
chances are that he is going to be able to lead?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, significantly more
progress on each of the areas I described needs to be made by
the Iraqis.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Abizaid, no officer in the United States Army has
faced a greater challenge than what you have before you today
and what you have had for the last several months. You have not
only done it professionally, in a professional way, you have
done it in a very admirable way. We continue to be very
impressed with the men and women who serve with you and serve
under you.
Let me see if I have this straight in my mind, though,
General, when we talk about additional troops. I hear you
saying that we do need additional troops if we are going to be
able to control the sectarian violence, but that the number of
troops that we need to add to the current level of force
structure that we have there should come from the Iraqis rather
than coming from the United States, and I can appreciate that.
But if that is correct, if I am hearing you right, we have
been at this for 4 years now and we were training raw recruits
and we were training men and I assume some women in the Iraqi
army who had no military experience. I have been there several
different times and have seen those troops being trained and I
have heard General Petraeus and General Dempsey talk about the
fact that these people had never held a gun, they did not know
how to shoot a gun. So certainly there has to be a timeframe
which they have to go through to where they reach the ability
to be able to fight and defend their country.
But we have been at it 4 years now. We take kids straight
out of high school, we train them for 6 months, a year, I am
not sure what the time period is now, and we send them to Iraq
and ask them to fight. So what have we got to do to get the
Iraqi army over that hump, General, to get them to the point to
where they can take control? Because obviously it has taken us
a lot longer than what we thought. What do we have to do to get
them over that military hump for them to start being able to
defend themselves without us?
General Abizaid. First of all, Senator, I think that
sometimes here in the United States we tend to believe that
every Iraqi unit is not doing their duty. That is not true.
Most Iraqi units are doing their duty. Most Iraqi units are
going into the field and fighting for their country. No doubt
that there are difficulties in some Iraqi units and in the
national police there are more difficulties.
But what really needs to be done at this stage in the
campaign is bring confidence to the army and the police that
they can count on their government to back them up. You ask
what the difference is between the United States soldier and
the Iraqi soldier. The United States soldier swears an oath to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies foreign and domestic, and when he or she
goes into combat they know that they have your support, the
support of the American people, the support of the President of
the United States, and that there is not some sectarian militia
somewhere that will challenge their actions.
Iraqi soldiers have looked to the sectarian militias,
especially the Jaysh al-Mahdi, and asked themselves, will they
be backed up in the event of a showdown and do they have the
capacity to deal with them with regard to force size, force
capability, and combat actions? We need to make sure that the
Iraqi army is the paramount force in the country to defend the
country, so that people will not turn towards the militia for
their support.
But it is a difficult thing to do because, especially on
the Shiite side, they have long looked to their militias to
give them protection. We have to change a way of thinking and
it takes time. It is long, it is hard, it is difficult. But I
believe that we can do it and we can do it by increasing our
capacities to make their forces more robust and more capable.
Senator Chambliss. Your point is well made, that they have
to have the support of the government. So, Mr. Satterfield,
that leads me to my basically same question to you. We have
been at this for over 4 years now. This government has been in
place, the current government has been in place, almost 12
months now. What do we as the United States Government have to
do to get the Maliki Government over the hump to where those
soldiers do have the confidence that they are going to have the
force of that government stand behind them the same way that
our troops have?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, this government has been
in position just about 6 months exactly. But that is enough
time for the government to take the lead, and that is what they
need to do. Our policies need to be focused, as they are now,
on putting them into the lead, on making clear to them that
without their decisions, difficult as they are--we fully
understand the pressures that are brought to bear on this
government from within and from outside--that without their
decisions on critical areas to back their forces in a national
nonsectarian sense, to confront militias in a comprehensive
manner, Sunni and Shiite, all Shiite militias, and to move
forward on governance, on reconciliation, without those
decisions this government cannot succeed, our help cannot be
enough to make it succeed. The international and regional
community's assistance, were it to come, would not be enough.
The government must lead. That is our message.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
I have to say to both of you that I respect the difficult
task you have coming before this committee and attempting to
explain the situation in Iraq, which by any metric that I am
aware of is not improving. In fact, the testimony to follow
you, which will be in the next panel, particularly by
Lieutenant General Maples from the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA), very clearly sets out that the DIA assesses the
conditions for further deterioration and in fact lists how the
overall attacks have gone up. They are up in October, up on our
soldiers, up on the ISFs, up on civilians. That the kind of
benchmarks which Senator Nelson and Senator Chambliss and
others of us have reported in the past just seem to recede
further and further on the horizon.
Hope is not a strategy. Hortatory talk about what the Iraqi
Government must do is getting old. I have heard over and over
again, the government must do this, the Iraqi army must do
that. Nobody disagrees with that. The brutal fact is it is not
happening.
With respect to the kind of insurgency that we clearly are
confronting, which in many ways is perhaps the most complicated
that I am certainly aware of as you go back and look at other
counterinsurgencies, we do not have a military force that is
creating a secure environment and we do not have a government
that is putting forth political programs and reforms that
engender confidence in the population to support the government
rather than seeking security behind militias and other
nongovernmental forces.
So from the perspective of those of us sitting on the other
side of the table and on both sides of the aisle, what I have
heard today is that from General Abizaid that all options are
on the table, but the Maliki Government does not want more
troops. What I have also heard is that withdrawal by our troops
would create even more disruption and sectarian violence, but
that a phased redeployment putting conditions that can be
enforced by actions taken by the American Government, which
apparently are the only actions we have any control over, would
not be a good idea.
So we are really left with very few strategic options than
the continuation of hope on behalf of the Maliki Government to
take control of a situation that is deteriorating.
General Abizaid, one of the ideas that has been proposed by
a number of different sources is some kind of partition. Now, I
understand the complexity of that, the difficulty of that. But
is there any strategic argument to be made in favor of a
partition that would at least give us territory that along with
the Kurds, for example, could be controlled? That is the first
question.
Ambassador Satterfield, the political decisions that have
to be made keep getting kicked down the road by the Maliki
Government. We have had testimony now for 4 years about what
must be done and it does not get done. I see very little
indication that there has been a resolution within the Iraqi
Government that they want the sectarian violence to cease
because people are still jockeying for positions.
In such a conflict it is unlikely to get to any political
resolution until one or all sides decide that the killing
should stop, that they are not going to get a greater advantage
from pursuing violence than by pursuing political progress.
So with respect to partition, with respect to the political
benchmarks, can you offer us more than the hope that the Iraqi
Government and the Iraqi army will step up to the task that
confronts them, and give us perhaps more strategic benchmarks
or conditions that we can look to and set forth those
conditions so that we can judge whether there is progress being
made going forward?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, with respect to partition,
I would like to be very clear on this. Partition in Iraq could
only be achieved at an expense of human suffering and bloodshed
and force dislocation that would be both profound and wholly
unacceptable, I believe, to the American people. It is wholly
unacceptable to this administration. The mixed communities of
Iraq are found throughout the country. There is no easy map
that can be drawn, no easy political decision that can be
taken, that would not involve death and suffering to achieve
partition.
But more important than my views is that very few in Iraq
wish to see partition as an outcome. Even the Kurdish
leadership, who enjoy a federal status within Iraq, do not want
to see partition. They view that as a threat to their interests
because of the instability that it would produce on their
borders. This is simply not an option. It is not a practical
option, it is not a moral option.
With respect to your comments, which I respect, on the need
for some greater degree of certainty, not hope--and I agree
with you, hope is not a strategy--on moving the political
process forward, we still believe Prime Minister Maliki is
capable of effectively being a national leader. We still
believe there is a sufficient degree of minimal convergence on
the critical issues of ending sectarian fighting, confronting
militias, dealing with al Qaeda, to make our continued best
assistance, best help, warranted.
If that changes, then of course our basic assessment
changes with it. But it continues to be our fundamental
assumption.
Senator Clinton. General?
General Abizaid. Senator Clinton, I believe that partition
is not viable for Iraq. I cannot imagine in particular how a
Sunni state could survive. I believe it would devolve into an
area where al Qaeda would have a safe haven, where they would
export their terror to the surrounding countries. I believe
that the Shiite state would be decidedly subject to the
domination of Iran, and that that would not be good for the
region. It would start to move the region into Sunni-Shiite
tensions that the region has not seen for a long time.
With regard to hope not being a method, Senator, I agree
with you, and I would also say that despair is not a method.
When I come to Washington I feel despair. When I am in Iraq
with my commanders, when I talk to our soldiers, when I talk to
the Iraqi leadership, they are not despairing. They believe
that they can move the country towards stability with our help,
and I believe that.
This has been a very hard and difficult process and over
the length of time we have learned some hard lessons. We have
not misled people. We have learned some hard lessons. I believe
that we can take the Iraqi armed forces, increase our level of
commitment to them, continue to deliver the type of security
force that our current troop levels give us, and in the period
of the next 6 months clearly have a better understanding about
the possibilities for success.
But all of us that are involved in this thing believe we
can be successful. It is not a matter of professional pride. It
is a matter of seeing that the enemy cannot win. There will be
some hard things on the horizon. They will have to do something
in Al Anbar Province. We will have to commit forces to deal
with the Jaysh al-Mahdi. Each of those things will be battles
in and of themselves that we can win if we set the right
political and military conditions, and I sincerely believe we
can do that.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Ambassador, General Abizaid. Again,
thank you for your service. As our chairman has pointed out,
American troops have been battling there longer than they
battled in World War II. They have shown extraordinary courage.
They have done everything they have been asked to do. I think
the real challenge is to try to honor their valor, is to get
the policy correct. That is what you are all attempting here,
recognizing the history and the current situation.
General, I must say I was interested in your response about
the progress that is being made immediately, because those who
have talked about some phased redeployment immediately get
accused of having either the words ``cut and run'' or a
``bloodbath'' associated with their names or with their
positions on it.
We have seen the United Nations reports that more than
6,500 Iraqis were killed in July and August, an increase of
1,000 over the number killed in the previous 2 months. As
Senator Clinton pointed out, General Maples this afternoon is
going to talk about the overall attacks increase. The bottom on
page 3 of his opening statement he talks about sectarian
violence, a weak central government, problems in basic services
are causing more Iraqis to turn to sectarian groups, militias,
and insurgents for basic needs, imperiling Iraqi unity.
The total number of Americans that are being killed or the
casualties: August, 65; September, 71; and October, 106.
The CENTCOM report on civil conflict on October 18 shows
the colors here, right on the border of chaos in Iraq. These
are all your figures or the Pentagon's figures or U.N. figures,
the Pentagon's own report.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Kennedy. So when we hear talk about some kind of a
phased redeployment that we are going to have a bloodbath, many
think there is a bloodbath going on today.
Let me ask you specifically: There were the series of
benchmarks which the administration had supported and the
Maliki Government had indicated that they support. As a matter
of fact, the Maliki Government indicated in their joint press
release the Iraqi Government--this is the joint statement of
Maliki and the U.S. Ambassador--the Iraqi Government has made
clear the issues that must be resolved, with timelines, to take
the positive steps for the Iraqi people. That is, sharing the
wealth, disbanding the militias, continuing on, which you have
outlined here.
Why is it all right for the administration to say, we will
take a timeline with regards to what you have to do here, we
will take a timeline on that, and then be so critical of others
who say we also need to have a timeline in terms of the phased
redeployment of American troops? Can you tell me that?
Then maybe you could make a comment about what happened
yesterday in a major city, where a series of automobiles go on
down and into the education department, take out hundreds of
different students, teachers, and then bring them back through
the checkpoints. Now, how, when we are talking about the
progress that is being made, let alone the difficulty of the
American Forces of trying to stop violence against Sunnis and
men being labeled sympathetic to the Shiites, or if they do not
stop it to being labeled sympathetic to the Shiites, the Sunnis
on the one hand or the Shiites on the other. What is really the
basis of, in terms of all of these reports and the actions that
have been taken, evidently timelines for the Maliki Government
to take--why is it all right for them to take timelines for
progress in this if you are not to say that these timelines are
going to be enforced, or are they going to be enforced, and
when they meet these timelines we are going to be able to have
the kind of phased redeployment of American troops?
General Abizaid. Do you want to take the timeline?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, our comments here do not
reflect a necessary advocacy for or rejection of increases,
decreases, timelines, or transition times. That is part of an
overall strategy towards Iraq. It is a strategy that we are
reviewing now. What we are saying is to review military force
levels, force dispositions in isolation from other aspects that
affect that strategic goal of stability, self-sufficiency in
Iraq, is mistaken.
There needs to be a very careful look at how one addresses
the military component, the political component inside and
outside Iraq, to get more progress, because progress right now
is not satisfactory, not at all, towards success. We do not
want military levels or dispositions viewed in isolation, and
to take a step in isolation would not I think have a positive
impact on any of our goals or any of our interests in Iraq.
General Abizaid. As far as the incident yesterday, we have
certainly tried to understand what happened there. People
arrived in the education ministry area dressed in ISF uniforms,
police uniforms, I believe. They said that they were there for
an official purpose. They started to arrest people. I believe
they took 70 out. Of course, that is of great concern, that
people would impersonate national security personnel and kidnap
people. This has been a problem that we have had now for
several months.
On the other hand, I would tell you that the reaction of
the ISFs under the direction of the prime minister, the
interior minister, and the defense minister was decisive, that
people were released, that other people that participated in
the crime were arrested, and that some of the key police
commanders were dismissed. So again, what happened is not a
good thing. The fact that the government responded in an
appropriate manner I think is encouraging.
Senator Kennedy. Just before my time expires, General, is
this the area that American troops had been withdrawn from as a
result of the request of Sadr? Are these checkpoints that were
in the general area of where the school was?
General Abizaid. No, no, Senator.
Ambassador Satterfield. Not at all.
Senator Kennedy. Were there any American troops in that
region, in that immediate area?
General Abizaid. There are American troops in the Karada
area, but it is a big city. I cannot say that American troops
were in the vicinity when that happened. If they were in the
vicinity and people came in and they appeared to be legitimate
ISFs, we may have asked the question, but it is hard to say
what we would have been able to do.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Talent, and to be followed by Senator Akaka and
then Senator Bayh and then the hearing will be concluded.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I wanted to go into the question of embeds with General
Abizaid and I know it has come up in the hearings. Are we
embedding at platoon and company levels? If not, do you have
plans along those lines? It seems to me that this is where they
may be the most effective. How soon can we get them into the
Iraqi army at those levels?
General Abizaid. The embedding teams that we have in the
battalion level I think is about 10 to 15 personnel each, and
the idea is to increase the size of those forces. Again, I
cannot tell you exactly how it would be done because the staffs
are working on that. But the idea is to get down as far as we
can.
I would not want to say what the size of units that might
be that would go, or embeds might be, that go into the company
and the platoon level. But clearly we need to have more ability
to help with much more robust teams, and I think making the
teams at the battalion level bigger will certainly be able to
get down into the company level at least.
Senator Talent. So there are plans definitely as you
increase the size or the number of embeds at battalion level to
reach down into the company levels?
General Abizaid. In some areas, especially in the Marine
Corps areas, they are working at the company level, through the
battalion level, as I understand it.
Senator Talent. I just think this is a battle of, in a
sense, noncommissioned officers, and the lower we can get them
into the Iraqi force structure the more effective they are
quite likely to be. Do you agree with that in general?
General Abizaid. I agree with that absolutely, as do our
commanders in the field.
Senator Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Talent.
Senator Akaka.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General and Ambassador, thank you for being here. General,
I want to express my pride in our Armed Forces and what they
are doing in Iraq and other places in the world as well. We
have just completed last weekend ceremonies and memorials for
our veterans as well as for those who are in active service in
our country, and I am very proud of our leadership and what
they are doing.
There are some things that have been mentioned here by you,
that we put the pressure on the Iraqi people to govern
themselves. Let me ask, Mr. Ambassador, General Abizaid
testified that we need to get Iraqi troops to do more and
instead of putting in more of our U.S. troops, and by doing
that we would encourage the Iraqi troops as well as their
government to stand up to what they are facing there.
We have been talking about the military. Ambassador, I am
looking at the civilian side of this. Should we be cutting back
on our aid and assistance programs there? As was mentioned,
there are several tracks there. Besides security and political,
there is also economic. My question also includes what are we
doing there now in these other than military areas? Rather than
U.S. officials, U.S. contractors, and U.S. money doing the work
of the Iraqi Government, should we not stand down and have them
stand up to it?
How do we get the Iraqi Government to do their job? That is
my question. Let me just say, for example, Senator Sessions
described a catch-and-release justice system that has become a
swinging door for death squads. So my question to you is how do
we get the Iraqi Government to do their job?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, your questions on the
economic side are very well-taken, and the whole thrust of our
policy in terms of how our money is spent, what we are doing
with our projects over the past 17 months, has been precisely
to put Iraqis in the lead and to shift away from U.S.
contractors to Iraqi contractors, something we have done at a
very dramatic pace.
It is to build capacity, not buildings, in Iraq. It is to
give the Iraqis the tools that they will need to lead
themselves in terms of economic development and delivery of
essential services. This is exactly the line on which we will
continue.
As we look at capacity development, we do assess what you
raise and what the General has raised on the military side: Are
you fostering a culture of dependency or are you building self-
sufficiency? We try to tailor our programs and constantly
readjust what we are doing to avoid dependency and to build the
capacity and self-sufficiency on the part of the Iraqis,
because they must assume the lead in terms of caring for their
own people and addressing their own national lead.
On your general question, how do we get the government to
lead, it is a combination of putting them in the lead, if you
will, taking off the wheels, letting them make decisions. When
Prime Minister Maliki asserts a desire to have greater lead,
when he takes decisions, as he did with respect to the
checkpoints around Sadr City, that is positive because he is
taking decisions and the responsibility for those decisions.
Will all of them be decisions we would have taken? No, that is
not the case. We will disagree with some of them.
But as long as they move broadly in the direction of
national unity, of confronting violence, of prosecuting the war
on terror, those are decisions which Iraqis should take and we
should encourage them to continue to make. That is a positive
development.
It is how we work with Iraqi leaders to allow them to take
the lead in a constructive sense that we are both about here
and our own strategy has to be focused on in the time ahead.
Senator Akaka. General Abizaid, I have been concerned about
the people, about the Shiites and the Sunnis who believe that
we are not providing adequate security. My question to you is
what steps are we taking to ensure the Iraqi people feel that
they are receiving fair and impartial treatment? How are we
going to curb sectarian violence if the Sunnis and Shiites do
not believe we are working adequately to address this matter?
General Abizaid. Senator, I believe the key to success in
Iraq is to make a nonsectarian armed forces that is loyal to
the central government, that is effective on the battlefield,
and that supplants the militias. That is the key to moving Iraq
forward. A government of national unity plus an armed forces
that respects the rights of its people and represents all of
its people will stabilize Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
General Abizaid. I believe they can do that with our help.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, thank you for your presence today
and thank you for your service to our country. There are strong
differences of opinion about what to do with Iraq, but no one
questions your sincerity or your service to the country. I just
want to say that up front.
General, my first question is for you. You mentioned that
you agree with something that the President has said from time
to time, that Iraq is the central front in the war on terror.
You referenced something that he also says from time to time,
that our adversaries say that it is the central front in the
war on terror, therefore it must be so.
Is it not possible that our adversaries define it as the
central front in the war on terror because that serves their
interests, not ours? Is it not possible that al Qaeda defines
it as the central front because they know our expenditure of
resources there detracts from our ability to stabilize
Afghanistan and that the Iranians know we cannot serve as a
robust enough deterrent to them as long as we are in presence
the way we are in Iraq?
So my question, General, and I must say I am a little
troubled by the fact that we let our adversaries define what is
in the national security interest of the United States, is that
not a dangerous place to be?
General Abizaid. Senator, when you look at the broader
fight, the fight against al Qaeda, which is not just a fight in
the CENTCOM AORs, it is a fight that is global, but where you
see where the most military activity takes place, where the
most suicide bombers are fielded, where the most al Qaeda
troops are fighting, it is clearly inside Iraq where the most
foreign fighters flow to. It is inside Iraq. So in the fight
against al Qaeda, our number one battlefield is inside Iraq.
Senator Bayh. But my question is why are we letting them
define the battlefield for us? Might it not be in their
interest to have us there, but not in ours?
General Abizaid. The enemy, al Qaeda will fight us wherever
we are. If we are in Iraq they will fight us in Iraq. If we are
in Afghanistan they will fight us in Afghanistan. If we are in
the United States they will fight us in the United States. That
is what they intend to do, and our intention is to keep them
from fighting us in the United States.
Senator Bayh. My second question, gentlemen, and it is for
both of you, but General, I will start with you again. I think,
General, you indicated you are optimistic about our ability to
stabilize Iraq, and I think you had, Ambassador, some faith
that we could accomplish that objective. Let me ask you both,
and it was following some of your answers: What would it take--
what would shake your faith and optimism? What would make you
pessimistic about our chances?
General Abizaid. Certainly what would make me very
pessimistic is if the Government of Iraq fails to disarm the
illegal militias. That would be my number one concern.
Senator Bayh. Let me follow up on that, General. The last
time you were before the committee you indicated, and I think
you indicated again today, that what is driving the insurgency
are unresolved political disputes among Iraqis in large part.
We have some outsiders to be sure, but that really it is for
Iraqis to get a hold of this situation.
We just had an election in our country in which the
American people expressed less than total confidence in the
effectiveness of our own Government. We look at the functioning
of the Government in Iraq and I have to tell you that too often
they appear to be operating as members of their tribe or their
sect or their ethnic group first, rather than as Iraqis first.
They say the right things, but when the going gets tough
and they have to make the hard decisions, they retreat into
their corner and they are just not able to find that common
ground. I find that troubling. Why should we have confidence in
their ability to reconcile those differences in the face of
their behavior?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you pose a very good
question, and there are key indicators on the negative. The
abandonment of any efforts to construct a national dialogue,
the pursuit of exclusively sectarian agenda by Shiite and by
Sunnis, the rejection of our assistance and our presence as no
longer relevant to those sectarian agendas or contradictory to
those sectarian agendas, all of which would be marked by a
continued rise in militia presence, a continued rise in
sectarian violence and force displacement, that would indicate
that indeed hope for success had largely vanished.
But we do not see ourselves at that point. More
importantly, we do not see Iraqi leaders at that point today.
But the critical challenge we all face, the Iraqis who are
committed to a moderate outcome and us, is that the space that
still exists, the political space for convergence, for
reconciliation, be acted upon before it vanishes.
Senator Bayh. My final question, gentlemen, would be simply
this. We all want them to succeed. We all want them to be able
to stabilize their country, with the assistance that we have
provided them. Too often they seem unable or unwilling to do
that. So my question to both of you, and my time has expired,
is: Is there anything else we can do to move them in the
direction of making the hard decisions that only they can make?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, the President has asked
for a review by all national security agencies of exactly what
the challenges are, how best using our resources and assets,
current or potential, in Iraq, outside Iraq, how the region
factors in, how we can best move forward toward success. It is
exactly the question you pose, how best can we get the kind of
progress in the areas where progress is needed now in Iraq, and
on a timeline that is relevant and meaningful to what is
happening in that country.
Senator Bayh. My final observation, it is a question that
is just hanging in the air. With all of our assistance, all of
our blood and treasure and sacrifice there, at some point we
have to ask ourselves the question: do they have it in them to
forge one country in a common destiny or is that beyond their
capabilities?
General Abizaid. Let me answer that. I have been dealing
with the Iraqis for a long time. Yes, they have it in them.
They can forge one country. They are fighting and dying for
their country. They can overcome these problems. But it is not
an easy thing to do, just like it was not an easy thing for us
to forge our own destiny after the revolution. We had a lot of
fighting and a lot of difficult times ahead of us after that
period.
Iraq is a young country. It is a country that is different
from any other country in the Middle East and it is a country
that can make a difference in the Middle East. I believe that
we must stick with them until such time that they show us that
they cannot do it.
As far as those of us that have been fighting--and I do not
include myself; I include the commanders and troops in the
field--those among us who fight bet on the Iraqis, and as long
as they are confident, I am confident.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bayh. Thank you for service, gentlemen.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, General Abizaid, for that
concluding comment. I think that summarizes very well your own
professional and personal feelings, and you have devoted much
of your life to hoping that this conflict can be resolved along
the lines that you so stated.
Thank you again for excellent testimony. Ambassador
Satterfield, this was your first appearance before this
committee. I believe your reputation as a man who will testify
straight and to the point and precise will be known by many
committees and you will be inundated with invitations. You have
done a wonderful job. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you.
Senator Bayh. To his great misfortune, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Abizaid. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one word?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
General Abizaid. Thank you, sir. I know you are stepping
down as the chairman. Those of us that have served with you,
God bless you for your service to the Nation. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I thank you very much, General. We are
adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
troop levels in iraq
1. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, in a
November 15, 2006, New York Times article, General Anthony C. Zinni,
USMC (Ret.), former head of U.S. Central Command, argued that any
substantial reduction of American forces in Iraq over the next several
months would be more likely to accelerate the slide to civil war than
stop it. Speaking of Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, General Zinni said,
``You can't put pressure on a wounded guy. There is a premise that the
Iraqis are not doing enough now, that there is a capability that they
have not employed or used. I am not so sure they are capable of
stopping sectarian violence.''
Instead of taking troops out, General Zinni said it would make more
sense to consider deploying additional American forces over the next 6
months to ``regain momentum'' as part of a broader effort to stabilize
Iraq that would create more jobs, foster political reconciliation, and
develop more effective Iraqi security forces (ISFs).
Do you agree that a substantial reduction of American forces over
the next several months would be ineffective in pressuring the Iraqi
Government to ``do more'' and may even be counterproductive? Please
explain.
General Abizaid. I agree that a substantial reduction of American
forces would be ineffective in pressuring the Iraqi Government to do
more and would be counterproductive. The current troop levels are
needed for controlling the sectarian violence and applying the
resources required to accelerate ISF capacity and capability for taking
the lead in security operations. ISFs are continuing to make
significant improvement, but more training, equipping, and reforming
parts of those forces are still required. Iraqi leaders are actively
seeking more control, and as conditions are met, we are transferring
more security responsibilities to them. In time, the Iraqis loyal to
the national government will demonstrate the ability to conduct
independent operations. However, more security responsibility for ISFs
will only work if there is commitment to use of these forces as
instruments for national unity.
Ambassador Satterfield. The Department of State (DOS) defers to the
Department of Defense (DOD) on troop levels. At the same time, the
President laid out a revised military approach when he addressed the
Nation on January 10 and announced his new strategy, `The New War
Forward,' in Iraq. U.S. force strength adjustments continue to be made
in support of ISFs with the aim of assisting the Iraqi people in
gaining control of the security situation. However, a change in
military force strength will not reduce violence by itself.
Stabilization of Iraq also requires political and economic solution
that includes action by Iraq's political, religious, business, and
civic leaders. We will continue to work closely with and support Prime
Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government particularly to foster
political reconciliation.
2. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, do
you agree that we should deploy additional forces as one component of a
broader effort to stabilize Iraq? Please explain.
General Abizaid. I have stated that all options are on the table
subject to conditions and requirements that may develop. We will do
whatever is required to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but
temporarily surging American forces to decrease sectarian violence will
not provide a sustainable effect by itself, and may have a longer range
negative impact if conducted unilaterally rather than as part of an
overall, integrated effort that includes economic and governance
enhancements. Based on discussions with my commanders in Iraq,
additional American forces, by themselves, would increase Iraqi
dependence, shift the focus away from transitioning security
responsibility, and fail to solve the broader issues of extremism which
actually fuels the violence. A sustained increase in force levels is
required for stabilization in Iraq; but these increases must ultimately
come in the form of ISFs that can defeat the insurgency and deal with
sectarian violence, and must also be matched with efforts from
nonkinetic means of support as well. Additional troops, if sent, should
reinforce success of the Iraqi army by providing operational training
and mentorship through the employment of transition teams. A strong,
nonsectarian Iraqi army will provide the foundation for success by
ultimately defeating the insurgency and extremists, stabilizing the
country, and allowing the Iraqi Government to embrace meaningful
national reconciliation.
Ambassador Satterfield. Military efforts, while a critical part of
the solution, will not by themselves reduce violence. Stabilization of
Iraq also requires a political and economic solutions that include
Iraqi political, religious, business, and civic leaders. U.S. force
strength adjustments and employment decisions continue to be made in
support of ISFs to ultimately assist the Iraqi people in gaining
control of the security situation. The President laid out a revised
military approach when he addressed the Nation on January 10 and
announced his new strategy, `The New War Forward,' in Iraq. The DOS
defers to the DOD on troop levels.
3. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield,
there are many who believe that we face a number of tasks in Iraq: to
clear insurgent sanctuaries and hold the territory with a combination
of coalition and Iraqi forces; to provide sufficient security in Iraq
so that economic reconstruction and political activity can take place;
to arrest the momentum of sectarian death squads; to disarm militias;
to train the Iraqi army and keep an American presence in Iraqi units;
and to place U.S. personnel in Iraqi police units. Do you agree that we
need to do these things? Please explain. Do you believe that we have,
today, sufficient force levels in order to accomplish all these tasks?
Please explain.
General Abizaid. These tasks certainly need to be accomplished in
Iraq, but not necessarily completed exclusively by the United States or
our coalition partners. For example, a key task for the Iraqi
leadership and their security forces is taking on the militias and
death squads. In the last 3 or 4 months the Prime Minister, and his
ministers, in particular the Minister of Defense and the new Minister
of Interior, have shown a desire to move against the militias, death
squads, and extremists that foment sectarian violence. They know
dealing with illegal armed groups is largely their task, and that
sectarian violence can be fatal to Iraq if it's not checked.
Stabilizing Iraq will continue to require Iraqi sacrifice, courage, and
responsibility, along with the support of the United States and our
allies. As I have stated, this very well may require more troops, but
they must ultimately be ISFs to have a lasting impact.
We now have trained and equipped over 325,000 Iraqi soldiers and
police; and at the Prime Minister's request we are adding an additional
37,000 personnel so as to ultimately exceed 362,000 members in the
ISFs. The increasing number of personnel is critical to the Government
of Iraq's plan for self security. In addition, the quality of their
forces is also constantly improving. Over recent weeks, we have
witnessed substantial improvement in ISF responsiveness, command and
control, and ability to address unlawful activity. Still, the
government must get behind its army and give it confidence that it can
operate independently of a sectarian agenda. Again, all options remain
on the table. Sending more American troops into Iraq to help stabilize
the situation and to embed transition teams in Iraqi units to help
build organizational capacity is a possibility. In doing so, we would
accept the risk of delaying full transition to Iraqi security control
at a point in the campaign where Iraqis increasingly in the lead is
both desired and necessary.
Ambassador Satterfield. The DOS defers to the DOD on troop levels.
However, all of the actions mentioned above constitute elements of U.S.
strategy and tactics in Iraq. An oft overlooked issue with regards to
troops in Iraq is how to calibrate all elements of national power and
resources over time to enact the various political, economic, and
security related tasks.
Each track is inextricably linked to the other. While all move
forward together, a failure or setback in any one area could hinder
progress in the others. This is why the President announced an increase
of not only troops, but also civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) in his ``new way forward.''
troop withdrawal in iraq
4. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, some
members of the Senate have proposed what they refer to not as a
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, but rather what they call a
``redeployment'' or an ``over-the-horizon force'' that would, in their
minds, continue to exert military influence on Iraq after withdrawal
from much of the country. The idea seems to be that U.S. forces would
remain on bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kuwait, or elsewhere in the region
and support the Iraqis with ``rapid reaction forces.'' I'd like to ask
several questions about the wisdom of such a proposal.
How could we supply a huge forward operating base in the Kurdish
region if we abandon all of Iraq to the south? Would the Turks be
likely to allow us to supply it from their territory or would we be
forced to fly in all required supplies?
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
Ambassador Satterfield. DOS defers to the DOD.
5. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, if a
quick reaction force is based in Kuwait, how would the forces get to
Iraq when needed--after all, it is a several days drive by military
convoy from Kuwait to Baghdad. Would progress not be arrested by
improvised explosive devices (IED) and a lack of any ground-level
intelligence from U.S. forces? Please explain.
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
Ambassador Satterfield. DOS defers to the DOD.
6. Senator McCain. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, if a
force based in Kuwait or Kurdistan instead flies to engage in combat in
Iraq, would it not need to secure an airstrip, establish an interim
base, transport fuel and supplies, and so on? If that is the case, how
quickly would such a force in fact be able to deploy? Would it ever be
relevant for tactical emergencies? Even for higher level emergencies,
would it be at all feasible to move in large quantities of heavy
equipment by air?
General Abizaid. Iraq does not play a role in the U.S. Integrated
Global Defense Posture and there is no requirement for enduring bases
in Iraq, to include the Kurdistan region, after the Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) mission is completed. Any post-OIF presence in Iraq would
be the subject of bilateral/multilateral agreements between the U.S.
Government, or any other nation's government, and the Government of
Iraq.
Reliance upon forces based in Kuwait or only a few locations in
Iraq such as Kurdistan would occur when coalition forces have
transitioned to strategic overwatch. At that point the Government of
Iraq would be responsible for sustaining its defense forces,
maintaining domestic order, and reacting to tactical emergencies.
Coalition forces would be postured to support Iraq in response to
threats of a strategic nature, where strategic warning would be
provided. Prior to shifting to a posture of strategic overwatch,
coalition forces would establish agreements with the Government of Iraq
regarding the use of specific facilities in Iraq in order to facilitate
rapid response to support operations. Should there be a requirement to
deploy by air coalition forces would conceivably utilize secure
facilities maintained by ISFs.
Ambassador Satterfield. DOS defers to the DOD.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
military supplies
7. Senator Sessions. General Abizaid, I have recently been informed
that soldiers serving in the 272 MP Company, currently stationed at
Forward Operations Base Whasi Quwa, Afghanistan, are operating on
minimal rations with some receiving only one meal per day. What is the
current ration cycle for these troops? Is there a supply problem in
Afghanistan or Iraq? Are we limiting rations, water, or other supplies
to our soldiers in theater?
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
______
Question Submitted by Senator John Ensign
counterdrug
8. Senator Ensign. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield,
given the many problems in Afghanistan associated with the cultivation
of poppies there, would it be worth instituting a program similar to
what the United States did in Turkey in the 1980s whereby we purchased
the poppies to keep them off the open market? Please elaborate on the
pros and cons of undertaking such a program for Afghanistan.
General Abizaid. The DOD role in counternarcotics is to support the
DOS and lead Federal drug law enforcement agencies in the execution of
the U.S. Government's international counterdrug program. The Office of
the National Drug Control Policy determines U.S. policy on drug control
programs based on the President's guidance. If U.S. policy for the
counterdrugs/counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan changes to include
licit uses for the Afghan poppy crop, the DOS and DOD will coordinate
on the appropriate role of the DOD based on current legal authorities.
Afghanistan today in no way resembles Turkey in the 1980s. For
example, there are concerns with the Government of Afghanistan being
able to extend its influence very far from Kabul. A strong central
government is an absolute necessity to provide the type of security
required to license and monitor licit opiate suppliers. Absent this
level of security, opium will end up in the hands of traffickers.
Additionally, legalizing some cultivation would undermine the use of
moral and religious persuasion to deter growing. Legalizing any amount
of the opium market in Afghanistan would send the message that there is
something legitimate to growing poppy. This is absolutely contrary to
the message that President Karzai is sending to the Afghan people.
Finally, the world demand for licit opiates represents approximately 5
percent of the poppy growth in Afghanistan. Distinguishing between the
licit and the illicit crop would be very difficult, if not impossible.
By example, both Peru and Bolivia have unsuccessfully dealt with the
problem of licit versus illicit coca cultivation for years.
Ambassador Satterfield. Proposals to legalize and license the
cultivation and production of opium poppy in Afghanistan or to buyout
the crop do not present any advantages. Such suggestions are infeasible
and counterproductive.
In 1981, the U.S. Government issued a final rule specifying the
source of narcotic raw materials (it is commonly referred to as the
``80/20 rule''). The rule states that Turkey and India must be the
source of at least 80 percent of our narcotic raw materials (used for
medical and scientific purposes), and that 20 percent could come from
other suppliers. This rule was established based on traditional import
amounts and on a U.N. resolution which called on member states to
support traditional sources that have been reliable suppliers and have
taken effective measures to curtail diversion. To participate in the
licit opiate market, countries must meet strict requirements to ensure
that their licit opium industries are tightly controlled and regulated
to prevent slippage onto the black market (the International Narcotics
Control Board (INCB) monitors these programs).
Proponents of similar programs in Afghanistan argue that different
schemes to legalize and license the cultivation and production of opium
poppy would reduce the amount of opiates entering the illicit market
and create a legal economy for impoverished Afghan farmers. A European
nongovernmental organization (NGO), the Senlis Council, has also touted
the legalization and licensing as a means to meet increased demand for
opium-based pain medications in the third world. Similarly, some have
suggested that the Government of Afghanistan and the international
community should simply buyout the Afghan opium poppy crop. These
suggestions are not viable and although they have been discussed by the
U.S. Government, the Government of Afghanistan, and the international
community, they have been rejected and would prove detrimental to our
efforts to control poppy cultivation.
Proposed programs to license the cultivation and production of
opium poppy in Afghanistan for medicinal purposes are infeasible. As
mentioned earlier, proponents argue that legalizing opium in
Afghanistan could help meet increased demand for pain medications in
the third world (which are needed to address the increased need of
people suffering from HIV/AIDS and cancer). However, the INCB--whose
job it is to maintain the balance between the supply and demand for
narcotic raw materials--believes that world demand is currently
satiated.
If Afghanistan's huge supply of opium were to be introduced into
the licit market, prices would crash making the already more profitable
black market even more attractive to Afghan farmers. The only practical
effect would be that opium ultimately destined for the black market
would have the veneer of legality, making our efforts to control
cultivation and production that much more difficult.
Shortages in the third world and developing countries are
unfortunate, but the issue is not supply. It is a lack of proper
economies and systems of distribution. Increasing the supply of one
drug without addressing the overarching distribution, licensing, and
financial impediments to availability will not solve the larger
problem, which is not created by a shortage of opiate raw materials.
Furthermore, we believe current world stockpiles of raw materials could
meet the increased need if it weren't for the aforementioned
impediments.
In addition, Afghanistan does not have the means to ensure that
production under a licensing system would not be diverted onto the
black market. Afghanistan would have to have the necessary structures
in place to license opium farmers, plan crop size, monitor growth,
prevent diversion, and control harvesting. They do not have the ability
to do so because of financial, security, and other impediments such as
a lack of infrastructure. Given that Afghanistan's inability to extend
the rule of law in poppy growing regions has resulted in an explosion
of the current crop, it is unlikely that a licit opiate industry which
relies on legal controls could work. Even in India (the only major
licit opium producer to manually harvest opium gum from poppy--the
method Afghan farmers use), where the level of development is higher
and opium cultivation is tightly controlled and monitored, it is
estimated that between 20 to 30 percent of the crop is diverted to the
illegal production of dangerous drugs.
The latter suggestion to simply buyout the opium poppy crop is
flawed for several reasons. First, if we ensure a market for opium
poppy, more Afghans will grow in order to take advantage of a
guaranteed source of income, creating a surge in planting. Only 12
percent of Afghanistan's population is currently engaged in poppy
cultivation and this suggestion would increase the number of Afghans
growing poppy and participating in the drug trade. Second, such a
program would prove prohibitively expensive. The crop is currently
worth $755 million to Afghan farmers per year (more than $2.8 billion
total). By way of comparison, Afghan trust fund commitments are only
$80 million after 2 years. We do not see a commitment by the
international community to expend the funds, or permit the more robust
eradication measures needed to make a buyout program a realistic or
sustainable option to limit opium production.
There are no shortcuts to fighting opium production in Afghanistan.
Both economics and the practicality of such systems in Afghanistan
argue against proposals to license or buyout Afghanistan's opium poppy
crop. Based on many years of experience in other nations and an
appreciation for Afghanistan's historical and cultural context, the
U.S. Government supports a mix of deterrence, prevention, and
alternatives in order to bring this problem under control and allow
rule of law to flourish. The Government of Afghanistan itself strongly
opposes the legalization of opium poppy as does the INCB and U.S.
Government.
______
Question Submitted by Senator Lindsey Graham
troop levels
9. Senator Graham. General Abizaid, in your testimony before the
Senate Armed Services Committee you indicated that we could not
increase troop levels in a meaningful way in Iraq and be able to
sustain that force for any length of time given the size of our own
forces. Please quantify with specifics the increase we would we need in
the Army and Marine Corps in order to increase U.S. military forces in
the Iraq theater and be able to sustain that force (assuming rotations
continue on the current timetable).
General Abizaid. If the commanders in the field believe that they
need more troops, then they will recommend both the size and type of
force necessary. If such an increase exceeds the existing force
structure, then it is the Services' responsibility in their role as
force providers to determine what, if any, force structure increases
are required.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy
nongovernmental organizations
10. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, American NGOs are on
the front lines in Iraq promoting and supporting democracy, and they
deserve full support of this country. Despite their significant
contribution and the enormous risks their employees take by working in
Iraq, the administration has made no long-term commitment to provide
funding for their work in Iraq. Is there a plan to fund these
organizations in the long-term? Don't they deserve a commitment from
our Government that is matched by adequate resources?
Ambassador Satterfield. Building democracy in Iraq, the Middle
East, and the world at large has been one of the main goals of this
administration. The Department has funded a wide range of democracy
programs, and we recognize the significant contributions and enormous
risks these groups and their employees take by working in Iraq. In
particular, however, program costs in Iraq, including program costs for
democracy building, have changed overtime, especially as the need for
security has changed. This has caused a number of companies and
organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, to reallocate funds
for security expenses, reducing the amount they have been able to spend
on other parts of their programs. The Department will continue to work
with the organizations involved in promoting democracy, and our other
contractors and grantees, to ensure that essential U.S. Government
policy objectives are met.
iraqi refugees
11. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, the war in Iraq has
created hundreds of thousands of refugees who, virtually unknown to the
rest of the world, are seeking sanctuary in Syria, Iran, Lebanon,
Jordan, and other neighboring countries. More than 3 million Iraqis are
refugees in neighboring countries or are internally displaced. One
thousand are being forcibly displaced each day and an estimated 40,000
are leaving Iraq each month and hundreds of thousands of others are
teetering on the edge of displacement. It is likely that neighboring
governments such as Jordan and Syria will increasingly restrict Iraqi
refugees' ability to enter, stay, and gain access to social services.
Iraqis are being forced to leave their communities because of
threats, assassinations, kidnappings, armed conflict, forced
displacement, and generalized violence driven by sectarian agendas.
Countless other Iraqis fear persecution because of their political
views, ethnic affiliation, or affiliation with the United States.
The President's report to Congress on proposed refugee admissions
for fiscal year 2007 indicates that the U.S. program is once again open
to receiving new referrals of vulnerable Iraqi cases from the United
Nations Higher Commissioner for Refugees. The President's proposed
regional ceiling for refugees from the Near East and South Asia
(primarily vulnerable Iraqis, Afghans, and Iranian religious and ethnic
minorities) is 5,500. In fiscal year 2006, the United States admitted
only 202 Iraqi refugees for resettlement.
I believe the United States has a duty to assist Iraqi refugees who
can't return home, particularly the ones who are facing persecution
because of their affiliation with the United States. What efforts has
the administration made to convince Jordan, Syria, and other countries
to keep their borders open to Iraqi refugees?
Ambassador Satterfield. The United States is very concerned about
the situation facing Iraqi refugees and we are working to ensure that
their assistance and protection needs are addressed appropriately. We
recognize how very important it is for neighboring countries to keep
their borders open to Iraqi refugees, and we believe the best way to
ensure this is by providing humanitarian assistance through our
international partners to Iraqis both inside and outside Iraq. The
United States is assisting Iraqis who, at present, are unable to
voluntarily return to Iraq. We fund United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and NGO programs for the most vulnerable Iraqis in
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and because needs are increasing, we hope to
expand these programs in 2007 if we receive additional funding. We have
accepted 466 vulnerable Iraqi refugees into the U.S. resettlement
program since fiscal year 2004 and are expanding our capability. These
protection and assistance programs are designed to serve all Iraqis
facing a well-founded fear of persecution. Refugees who have worked
with the United States will have equal access to protection and
assistance in the region. We are working to obtain significantly
greater access for those who face persecution because of their work for
us to the U.S. resettlement program and to immigration into the United
States.
Both Jordan and Syria have been generous hosts of Iraqis. We are
working with these governments and UNHCR to relieve some of the
humanitarian burden and help these countries keep their borders open to
asylum seekers.
12. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, does the DOS plan to
increase assistance to neighboring countries burdened with the high
number of Iraqi refugees?
Ambassador Satterfield. The United States is very concerned about
the situation facing Iraq refugees and we are working with our
international partners such as UNHCR and several NGOs, as well as host
governments, to ensure that their assistance and protection needs are
addressed appropriately.
The DOS indeed hopes to increase assistance to host countries
neighboring Iraq. We recognize the increasing demands vulnerable Iraqis
are placing on host countries. We want to ensure that Iraqis do not
overburden the public services of neighboring countries by increasing
humanitarian assistance so that these countries can continue to offer
refuge to Iraqi asylum seekers. We hope to generously respond to
UNHCR's 2007 appeal to significantly expand their protection and
assistance activities for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,
Egypt, and Turkey. We also plan to expand existing NGO programs that
identify and assist the most vulnerable refugees in Jordan and Syria as
well as IDPs in Iraq if we receive additional funding.
13. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, how can the United
States better assist Iraqis displaced internally to obtain adequate
food and shelter and other humanitarian needs?
Ambassador Satterfield. We are assisting many internally displaced
persons through U.S. Government funded programs that deliver
humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable families and individuals. Many
of the newly displaced inside Iraq have joined extended families, and
we want to ensure that they can successfully integrate into their host
communities until they can return to their homes. For this reason, we
also consider it a priority to look beyond immediate relief commodities
to ensure that water, sanitation, health, and education services in
hosting communities are not overburdened. Our programs are designed in
such a way that we can quickly respond to emerging needs as they arise.
14. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, given the human
suffering caused by this massive Iraqi refugee crisis, isn't it just
and proper that the United States dramatically increase the number of
Iraqis it takes in for resettlement drawing on all priority categories?
Ambassador Satterfield. The United States Refugee Admissions
Program (USRP) is committed to considering for resettlement all Iraqi
refugees referred to us, either as individuals or in groups, by UNHCR.
Our embassies may also refer an Iraqi case for consideration. In
addition, Iraqis with close family members in the United States may be
eligible for the USRP family reunification program. To address growing
assistance and resettlement needs among Iraqi refugees, we fund UNHCR's
general budget for the near east region, and provide extra targeted
funds specifically to support resettlement activities in the region.
These funds will help address humanitarian assistance needs of this
growing population and will boost UNHCR's capacity to register and
refer to us and other countries vulnerable Iraqi cases in need of third
country resettlement.
15. Senator Kennedy. Ambassador Satterfield, can't you draw on the
20,000 unallocated reserve to increase the 5,100 target for the near
east and south Asia?
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes. There is no specific limit on how many
Iraqis can be included in the program. The current Presidential
Determination on Refugee Admissions in fiscal year 2007 permits the
admission of 70,000 refugees allocated by regions with 5,500 for the
near east and south Asia. The 5,500 was developed as a planning figure
for the region. If necessary, and if sufficient funding is available,
we can draw on the unallocated reserve numbers.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
troop levels in iraq
16. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield,
Secretary Rumsfeld has indicated that more U.S. forces will be needed
to provide security in Iraq. At this point in time, how can more troops
best be utilized to contain the escalation of attacks by insurgents?
General Abizaid. [Deleted.]
Ambassador Satterfield. The DOS defers to the DOD on troop levels
and on the military aspects of the President's new strategy, ``The New
Way Forward'' in Iraq. However, together with the additional troops
will be increased civilian efforts to support moderates and improve the
performance of government at the national, provincial, and local
levels, thereby weakening the extremists. Iraq. Specific questions this
plan should be addressed to the DOD.
17. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, is
or will the Iraqi Government assist in this effort or are they
preventing U.S. military forces from truly getting the violence under
control? For example, the U.S. forces were told to remove check points
in Sadr City by Prime Minister Maliki.
General Abizaid. I believe the Iraqi Government and Prime Minister
Maliki are committed to bringing down the level of violence. I believe
Prime Minister Maliki has moved in a direction with national police
reform, which has been a major problem, with dismissing officers that
are showing sectarian values as opposed to national values, with
committing the armed forces to independent operations that are
necessary to quell the sectarian violence, in a way that leads me to
believe he is going to continue to doing more.
In the past 6 weeks we have had increasing success with joint
Iraqi-U.S. forces moving into Sadr City, precisely targeting death
cells and death squad leadership and taking them out. I believe this
will also continue.
Ambassador Satterfield. Solutions to the growing violence in Iraq
must be the result of concerted decisions by the Iraqi political
leadership and ISFs. Prime Minister Maliki has repeatedly stated his
desire for increased control over ISFs. As the Iraqi Government assumes
more security responsibility, operational decisions will be made by the
sovereign leaders that may not be the best course of action from a U.S.
perspective.
Prime Minister Maliki's decision regarding Sadr City check points
clearly indicates his desire to take action. The President laid out a
revised military approach when he addressed the Nation on January 10
and announced his new strategy, `The New War Forward,' in Iraq. The
President has made it clear that America's commitment is not open-ended
and will hold the Iraqis to clear security, political, and economic
benchmarks and milestones.
emergency hotline
18. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, it
is my understanding that there are some Iraqis that believe we are to
blame not only for the attacks but also for planting IEDs at night
while we impose curfews. What efforts are underway to better our
standing within various communities, especially since we have spent a
pretty penny on a campaign encouraging Iraqis to call the hotline in
cases of emergency?
General Abizaid. First, the National 130 Tips Hotline has never
been branded as an emergency number, but a tips line. The Iraqi
public's confidence will not be won through advertising alone, but
through effective and timely responses to their calls. We have
developed two documentaries explaining the process of what happens when
a call comes in. In addition, we have added the tag line at the end of
commercials telling viewers if they can't get through to keep trying. I
can assure you, people are still calling. When Iraqis are in a
situation where they feel they are in immediate danger, they can call
other emergency operations centers that have the mission of effecting
coordination with local police stations and emergency response units,
as the Tips Hotline is focused on terrorism related reporting. The
types of reports received by Tips often require surveillance and
operational planning prior to any police or military action taking
place. Any time that you visit the Tips facility, the phones are always
ringing off the hook. Based on our most recent polling data, the
significant majority of Iraqis understand the purpose of the hotline
(73 percent), and are motivated through the advertising campaign to
utilize the hotline number (88 percent). A growing confidence in the
program is apparent with a majority of the populace (83 percent)
confident in the hotline's operation. At the same time, record numbers
of tips received have been set. During a visit to the Tips Operations
Facility, one New York Times reporter noted, and this was ultimately
published in the newspaper, that he had calculated one telephone call
every 2 seconds during his stay there. The message is getting out to
the Iraqi public, which continues to call in ever increasing numbers.
Ambassador Satterfield. While we do not maintain a public hotline
for emergencies as part of our outreach efforts, the DOS, Embassy
Baghdad and our PRTs have devoted a great amount of energy and
resources to reaching Iraqis of all ages and backgrounds through our
efforts to both assist Iraqis in the safeguarding and rebuilding of
their country, as well as communicating and interacting directly with
Iraqis through our various public diplomacy programs. PRTs, in
particular, build relationships with local government officials and
community leaders throughout Iraq and help them improve their self-
governance.
Outreach, to the media and others, is a critical component of our
public diplomacy efforts in Iraq. Whether in the form of the support
for an Iraq Web site or Iraq-focused publications or the DOS and our
embassies engagement with Arab and regional press, often in Arabic, we
are all purposefully engaged in outreach to promote our objectives in
Iraq. In addition to interviews and press briefings, our outreach to
the media includes digital video conferences, chat rooms, and other
important initiatives.
The DOS has increased outreach to Arab and regional media with
appearances by Secretary Rice and other senior department officials to
communicate U.S. policy. During the fall quarter, NEA/PPD Director
Alberto Fernandez conducted 118 interviews, 101 in Arabic, discussing
Iraq and other regional issues.
Embassy Baghdad has also stepped up media events and greatly
facilitated engagement with international, pan-Arab, and Iraqi media.
Ambassador Khalilzad now gives weekly interviews with Arab media
outlets and the embassy spokesman often travels into the Red Zone to
meet key media contacts. The embassy also holds regular roundtables for
Iraqi press to provide background on economic and infrastructure topics
in which the United States is playing a substantial role, e.g.,
transportation, energy, and government capacity development.
Educational and cultural programs in Iraq, from Fulbright to
international visitors programs to cultural preservation, have also
played a significant role in strengthening positive perceptions of the
U.S. role in Iraq with the Iraqi people. Iraq's International Visitors
Leadership Program, for example, is the third largest in the world,
after China and Russia. The Fulbright Student Scholarship Program in
Iraq is now the largest in the Middle East/North Africa region. There
are numerous other exchange opportunities currently administered by our
embassy which cater to Iraqis of various backgrounds, ages, and
expertise. These include, but are not limited to: various scholarship
programs; youth exchange programs; educational institutes; language
programs; and professional training opportunities.
Our public diplomacy efforts also include a variety of other
programs which engage Iraqis directly on the ground. In view of the
problems that American officers have in moving around Baghdad and most
of the rest of Iraq, the programs are limited in scope and size but we
nevertheless continue to expand our outreach efforts to the maximum
capacity security and other restrictions allow. These programs include,
but are not limited to: American corners; DVC outreach in academic and
other professional areas; book publishing; improvement of universities;
and media communications projects.
19. Senator Akaka. General Abizaid and Ambassador Satterfield, this
hotline was suppose to help provide our forces with information
regarding the insurgents--however, when many Iraqis did call, they were
unable to get through. I understand that the program has gotten better
with regards to operators answering the phone but what have we done to
win back their confidence of this program?
General Abizaid. First, the National 130 Tips Hotline has never
been branded as an emergency service number; it has always been a tips
hotline. The intent of the hotline is to provide a 24-hour, 7-day a
week phone-in reporting service that empowers Iraqi citizens to provide
information to the Government of Iraq and coalition forces on terrorist
and criminal activity. Often hotline tips require surveillance and
operational planning before any police or military action can occur.
We gain confidence in the program when the Iraqi people see good
results from their calls. We have developed two documentaries
explaining the process of what happens when a call comes in. In
addition, we have added the tag line at the end of commercials telling
viewers if they can't get through to keep trying. I can assure you,
people are still calling. Any time that you visit the tips facility,
the phones are always ringing off the hook. Based on our most recent
polling data, the significant majority of Iraqis understand the purpose
of the hotline (73 percent), and are motivated through the advertising
campaign to utilize the hotline number (88 percent). At the same time,
a growing confidence in the program is apparent with a majority of the
populace (83 percent) confident in the hotline's operation. This tells
us that the message is getting out and we are on track.
The Iraqi confidence level is also apparent in the recent and
significant increase in tips/actionable tips received. This increase is
based on several factors. First, management and leadership presence:
The Iraqi Ministry of Interior designated a Brigadier General as on-
site manager. Since his arrival in September 2006, this officer has
reinforced to his subordinates the importance of correctly responding
to calls in a timely manner. The hotline workers/operators now have a
better understanding of the importance of the calls they receive,
process, and disseminate, as the lives of many Iraqis depend on their
actions.
Second, life support improvements. Coalition assets have been
addressing some life support requirements such as water provision,
communications hardware and infrastructure repairs, and maintenance, to
mention the main ones.
Third, institutionalizations of best practices, creation of
standard operating procedures, and a formal training program have
resulted in the optimization of Tips Hotline Program operations. The
growing interest in Tips is a welcomed sign. If the facility had new
state-of-the-art equipment and a professional dedicated staff of IT
technicians, the response and data processing time would be
significantly improved. Any assistance you can provide in this area
would be welcomed.
Fourth, appropriate work ethics and a sense of esprit-de-corps have
been instilled within the workforce.
Finally, the presence of coalition advisors reassures the Iraqi
operators that theirs is an important operation. The combined
implementation of these five variables has resulted in an upward trend
of actionable reports that are sent to both coalition and ISF elements.
Tips program is undergoing a transition process that will result in
full Government of Iraq control of Tips operations by June 2007.
Ambassador Satterfield. Iraqi citizens are becoming more
comfortable making direct contact with the National ``Tips'' Hotline
because of the anonymity it provides. National Hotline calls are at an
all time high in part as a result of Iraqi citizens use of the call
center for personal emergencies in the absence of a trustworthy 911
type of emergency services alert center. The Multi-National Forces-Iraq
command reports over 2,800 calls received in December, 300 more than
the previous month. The hotline continues to provide tips that lead to
significant captures and weapon seizures. Specific questions regarding
this Multi-National Force-Iraq program should be addressed to the DOD.
iraqi death squads
20. Senator Akaka. Ambassador Satterfield, it is my understanding
that, even within the Iraqi Government, there are different approaches
regarding how to curtail the violent attacks conducted by insurgents
and/or death squads. Are we working with the Iraqi Government to try
and alleviate these tensions?
Ambassador Satterfield. Dealing with sectarian violence by death
squads, insurgents, and illegally armed militias is the greatest
challenge Iraq faces. A military solution alone will not reduce
violence. A reduction in sectarian violence will require a
comprehensive political solution that includes Iraqi political, civil,
and religious leaders working together to implement reconciliation
initiatives, economic policies, security-sector reform, and federalism.
By implementing such policies, the government would move itself into a
position to better influence groups that instigate violence, and
persuade those who try to use violence for political gain that their
objectives are better served through the political and national
reconciliation processes. Prime Minister Maliki continues to oversee
efforts by the Government of Iraq to deal with these issues. The United
States will continue to closely advise and assist the Government of
Iraq as it continues to establish and implement the political solutions
necessary for success. Ultimately, these solutions are--and must
continue to be--Iraqi solutions carried out by Iraqis.
[Whereupon, at 2:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND U.S.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:41 p.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Roberts, Sessions, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn,
Levin, Kennedy, Lieberman, Reed, and Dayton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk; and
John H. Quirk V, security clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Sandra E.
Luff, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, professional
staff member; Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member;
David M. Morriss, counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional
staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean
G. Stackley, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky,
general counsel; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff
member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard
F. Walsh, counsel.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel;
Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N.
Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse,
professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel;
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel; Michael J. McCord,
professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, minority
counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Micah H.
Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul
and Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistants to Senator McCain;
John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Libby Burgess,
assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch Galloway II, assistant to
Senator Sessions; Mark Winter, assistant to Senator Collins;
Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G.
Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Arjun Mody, assistant to
Senator Dole; Bob Taylor and Stuart C. Mallory, assistants to
Senator Thune; Sharon L. Waxman and Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistants
to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assisant to Senator
Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard
Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka;
William K. Sutey and Alea Brown, assistants to Senator Bill
Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Luke
Ballman, assistant to Senator Dayton; Todd Rosenblum, assistant
to Senator Bayh; and Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator
Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good afternoon. The Senate Armed Services
Committee resumes its sequence of hearings on the current
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. Part one of the hearing was
excellent this morning. The committee received, as it expected,
the very frank and candid assessments from General Abizaid and
Ambassador Satterfield.
In part two of the hearing the committee will receive
testimony from General Michael Hayden, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Lieutenant General Michael
Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Both
of them have appeared before Congress, but this is General
Hayden's first appearance in his capacity as Director of the
CIA.
The panel's appearance here today is very important. The
relationship between intelligence and policymakers has been the
subject of discussion over the past few years. In the session
this morning I described five events that will converge in the
next few weeks and months to help formulate the views of
Congress, most particularly the Senate, on such changes as we
may deem as necessary, the five being: this series of hearings;
followed by, presumably in the first week of December, the
hearing with Bob Gates, nominated to be the new Secretary of
Defense; followed by a hearing with the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and his report; then hopefully we will have the Jim
Baker of the Iraq Study Group, with Lee Hamilton, testify; and
lastly, I think very valuable work is now underway to extend
the U.N. resolution under which our forces are operating in
Iraq today that expires on December 31, 2006.
Senator Levin.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
continuation of this very important hearing. It is critical
that we have the independent and objective testimony of our
Directors of the CIA and DIA to help us understand the
situation in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We look forward to that
testimony and in the interest of time I will not present a full
statement.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
General Hayden.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, USAF, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Hayden. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, Senator
Levin, members of the committee:
The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of
Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, when combined with our
determined pursuit of al Qaeda worldwide, essentially
inaugurated a new era of both risk and opportunity for our
country in its engagement with much of the Muslim world. We are
now face-to-face with whole societies that are in profound and,
frankly, volatile transitions and whose fate will directly
affect our fate, whose fate will directly affect the security
of the United States.
With American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the
United States leading the global war on terrorism, we are now
actors to an unprecedented degree in supporting states,
including Iraq and Afghanistan, which are attempting to create
and sustain a stable new order. Arrayed against this endeavor
are significant new forces. They are political and
ethnosectarian forces that, frankly, were previously hidden or
subordinated, and are now competing to shape the identity of
these states.
Now, some of this competition is taking place within a
legitimate political and democratic process. But in other cases
we have radical groups like al Qaeda and its affiliates
sponsoring terrorists, insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere, that seem to be able to preempt governments and
eclipse the moderate actors in the region. Then at the regional
level you have opponents of the United States like Iran seeking
to capitalize on the instability of this transitional period to
expand their own influence and, frankly, to contest the vision
we have for this region.
With these trends in mind, let me begin by focusing on
Afghanistan, where we have made some important progress in the
face of some substantial challenges. Afghanistan's future
depends heavily on the international community's willingness to
continue to deliver concrete resources to the Afghan
Government. It depends equally on international willingness to
help protect that government from the Taliban and other
extremists who are waging a bloody insurgency, especially in
the south and east of that country.
Now, neither of these tasks are simple. Neither of them are
going to be completed soon. But the past few years have been a
story of success for the Afghan Government and people, as well
as the international community. That country has made
remarkable political progress. The international community and
the Afghan Government under the leadership of President Karzai
have built some national level political institutions--a new
constitution, an elected president, a democratically elected
parliament. These are remarkable achievements when you hold
them up against the backdrop of the ruinous decades of war that
Afghanistan experienced before 2001.
But the successes of the last few years have not lessened
the need for international involvement in this country. It has
only provided the foundation upon which we can now build. Now
we need to bolster the Afghan Government's ability to provide
sound governance at all levels of government.
Ambassador Neumann recently said that this effort will take
a long time, and if you ask my view it will take at least a
decade and it will cost billions of dollars. I will add one
more time that the Afghan Government will not be able to do it
alone. The capacity of the government needs to be strengthened
to deliver basic services to the population, and of course that
begins with security.
These problems span Afghanistan, but they are especially
prevalent in rural areas. Quality-of-life for millions of
Afghan citizens, spread across a desolate land in isolated
villages, has not advanced very much, and in many areas the
Afghan Government is simply nowhere to be found.
This situation will get worse if it is not addressed. Right
now more than half of the Afghan population is under the age of
19. That means millions of young Afghans will enter the labor
force over the next decade, adding to an unemployment rate that
is already hovering around 40 percent. I think we all know that
the illicit drug trade is a significant hurdle to the expansion
of the central government's authority and it undercuts the
international community's and the government's efforts to
rebuild the economy. It fuels provincial and local corruption.
According to the International Monetary Fund, the Afghan opiate
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 was $2.5 billion, roughly
a third of what the country's licit GDP was.
The key to making progress is security. There are simply
not enough properly trained, equipped, well-paid security
forces and, even though the Afghan National Army continues to
become larger, stronger, and more experienced, progress has
been slow and there has been a lot less progress made in
constructing an effective Afghan national police.
The Taliban has clearly built momentum over this past year.
The level of violence that they have inflicted has increased
significantly. The group has clearly become more aggressive.
The Taliban almost certainly refocused its attacks in an
attempt to stymie the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
(NATO) efforts in southern Afghanistan.
Kabul's ability to provide sound governance to these kinds
of areas will be key to preventing the Taliban and other
extremists from intimidating the population into acquiescing
with its activities. Kabul needs help because it lacks
capacity, not because it lacks will, and not because it lacks
popular support. I have spoken with President Karzai. He
understands this and he recognizes his government's
responsibilities.
Now Iraq. It provides another example of how the forces of
change are reshaping the Muslim world. The deep fissures that I
know you have talked about earlier today with General Abizaid
and Ambassador Satterfield, they are among the groups fighting
in Iraq and were not created by the coalition's overthrow of
Saddam's dictatorship. Throughout Iraq's modern history there
has been a Sunni minority ruling with the support of the
military, and Saddam made this worse. His cult of personality
tragically reinforced this pattern by using extreme violence to
suppress the vast majority of Iraq's inhabitants. He killed
tens of thousands of Kurds and Shiite in a short period from
1988 to 1991, brutally suppressing Shiite and Kurdish revolts.
He ruled during his last years with violent repression and by
favoring a small elite within the Sunni community centered on
his hometown of Tikrit. He deliberately diverted resources to
his power base, deprived much of the rest of the country of
economic and educational opportunities, and in the case of the
Shiite majority, basic religious liberty.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) completely upended the
Saddamist state and his version, its version of Iraqi society
in every respect--political, social, and economic. OIF
instituted a sea of change in the way Iraq is governed. The
dissolution of the Iraqi military, the Baath Party, swept away
the tools that a small group in power had used to terrorize
Iraq, and the subsequent vacuum of authority gave vent to deep-
seated hatreds that had simmered for years beneath the surface
in a totally brutalized society.
The Shiites today now focus on assuring that Iraq's new
government reflects the will of the majority Shiite population,
making sure that the Baathists never regain power. I know many
of you have visited Iraq. I have too recently. This fear of a
return to Baathism is almost palpable among Shiite elites.
Sunnis, on the other hand, view the Shiite as Iranian-
controlled and the current government as predatory, or at least
many Sunnis do. The Kurds for their part want to keep and
strengthen the substantial autonomy they have exercised for
more than a decade.
We need to note, though, that the Shiite and the Kurds and
some Sunnis have crafted a democratic constitution that can
provide the structure to allow Iraqis to settle their
differences peacefully. For this to happen, Iraqi leaders of
all stripes--Shiite, Sunni, Kurd--are going to have to flesh
out that document with some of the activities that Ambassador
Satterfield talked to you about this morning and do it in a way
that all parties accept as legitimate.
We are all acutely aware that Iraq today is far from
peaceful. Let me say that no single narrative is sufficient to
explain all the violence we see in Iraq today. There remains in
Iraq today an active insurgency. There remains in Iraq today a
broad and vicious al Qaeda offensive targeting us and innocent
Iraqis. In Iraq today there is criminality and lawlessness on a
broad scale. In Iraq today there are rival militias competing
for power.
Since the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra last
February, violence between Arab Shiite and Sunnis has grown and
grown to such an extent that sectarian violence now presents
the greatest immediate threat to Iraq's stability and future.
Any Iraqi leader, no matter how skillful, is going to be hard-
pressed to reconcile the divergent perspectives that I have
mentioned, divergent perspectives that Shiites, Sunnis, and
Kurds bring to the table and also, unfortunately, very often
bring to the streets, and to deal with that against a backdrop
of an intentional al Qaeda campaign of almost satanic terror.
To strengthen the common ground that all Iraqis can share, the
government of Prime Minister Maliki will have to overcome
formidable obstacles. Internal divisions, power struggles among
the Shiite, make it difficult for Shiite leaders to take the
actions that actually might ease Sunni fears. Radical Shiite
militias and splinter groups stoke the violence, while brutal
Sunni and al Qaeda attacks make even moderate Shiite question
whether it is possible to reconcile.
The Iranian hand is stoking violence and supporting even
competing Shiite factions. Even if the central government gains
broader support from Iraq's various communities, implementing
the reforms needed to improve life for all Iraqis will be
difficult. Current violence is eating away at the state's
ability to govern. The security forces are plagued by
sectarianism. They have maintenance and logistics problems.
Ministerial capacity, limited ministerial capacity, is limiting
progress on key issues. The civilian bureaucracy is buffeted by
inefficiency and partisan control.
Only if the Iraqi state asserts its authority across the
board can the government in Baghdad begin to turn its goals
into concrete realities. As I mentioned earlier, complicating
these historic forces, difficult enough in their own right, is
the pernicious effect of al Qaeda's presence in Iraq. Despite
Zarqawi's death, al Qaeda continues to foment sectarian
violence, seeks to expel coalition forces. An al Qaeda victory
in Iraq would mean a fundamentalist state that shelters
jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terror throughout
the region and against our own Homeland.
Let me talk just for a minute, Mr. Chairman, more broadly
about al Qaeda. It sees its war against us as a continuation
from their perspective of decades, perhaps century-old,
struggle to defend Islam from political and cultural domination
by a Judaeo-Christian alliance that they now perceive as being
led by the United States and Israel. Since bin Laden declared
war on us in 1998, al Qaeda has focused primarily on attacks
aimed at weakening and punishing the United States and its
immediate allies. They see us as the main obstacle to realizing
their vision of an extreme fundamentalist social and political
order throughout the Muslim world.
Although the group has suffered significant losses since
their attacks on our Homeland, it has shown resilience and it
remains thoroughly dedicated to mounting new attacks on our
Homeland and on our interests abroad. Understanding al Qaeda is
essential to defeating it. With regard to the central
organization headed by Osama bin Laden, in the face of our
substantial success against it the group's cadre of seasoned,
committed leaders has allowed it to remain fairly cohesive, it
has allowed it to remain focused on its strategic objectives,
again despite having lost a number of veterans over the years.
Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri continue to play a crucial
role. They inspire jihadists and their very presence promotes
unity. Their demise would not end the threat, but it probably
would contribute to the unraveling of the central organization.
The loss of a series of al Qaeda leaders since September 11 has
been substantial, but it has also been mitigated by what is,
frankly, a pretty deep bench of low-ranking personnel capable
of stepping up to assume leadership positions.
Though a number of these people are new to the senior
management, they are not new to jihad. My point here, Senator,
is this threat has taken a long time to build; it will take
some time to unravel it. These new leaders average over 40
years of age and 2 decades of involvement in global jihadism.
The second critical factor is their physical safe haven
along the Afghan-Pakistan border. That safe haven gives them
the physical and even psychological space they need to meet,
train, plan, and prepare new attacks. Many locals in that
region have ties to al Qaeda dating back to the 1980s wars
against the Soviets and rooting them out from that region is
complicated by rugged terrain and a local culture that is
intensely suspicious of and at times hostile to outsiders,
including their own government's forces.
A third important factor is Osama bin Laden's extremist
ideology and strategic vision, which continues to attract
recruits, inspire like-minded groups, help our enemies weather
setbacks. In addition to planning attacks of its own, al Qaeda
supports terrorist activities by other groups and seeks to
encourage Muslims worldwide to take up the cause. It spreads
its propaganda through taped statements, some of them with very
high sophisticated production values.
As a western nation, we have limited tools to counteract
that kind of propaganda. We need to make sure our own message
is clear, but we also need to work with our Muslim allies.
Finally, I need to emphasize that the asymmetric nature of
al Qaeda's style of warfare gives it certain advantages. Our
open societies present an almost endless source of targets and
the enemy has demonstrated its ruthlessness through a
willingness to attack the innocent.
Mr. Chairman, in all aspects of today's global struggle,
and the three pieces I have mentioned--Iraq, Afghanistan, and
al Qaeda--are all intricately and intimately interrelated--we
are dealing with deep historical forces and it will require
patience and wisdom as well as just power to deal with them.
This will unfortunately be a long struggle.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Michael V. Hayden, USAF
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: The overthrow of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and of Saddam Husayn in Iraq as well as
our determined pursuit of al Qaeda worldwide have inaugurated a new era
of risk and opportunity for the United States in its engagement with
much of the Muslim world. We are now face-to-face with whole societies
which are in profound and volatile transitions and whose fate will
directly affect the security of the United States. With U.S. forces
deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the United States leading the
global response to the threat of terrorism, we are now actors to an
unprecedented degree in supporting states--especially Iraq and
Afghanistan--which are attempting to create and sustain a stable new
order.
Against this endeavor significant new forces are
arrayed. Political and ethno-sectarian forces previously
subordinated are now competing to shape the identity of states.
Although some of this competition is taking place within the
legitimate democratic process, in other cases radical Islamic
groups--including terrorists and insurgents in Iraq and
Afghanistan--are able to preempt governments and eclipse more
moderate actors.
At the regional level, opponents of the United
States--like Iran--are seeking to capitalize on the instability
of this transitional period to expand their own influence and
contest the vision sustained by the United States and its
allies.
afghanistan
With these trends in mind, let me begin by focusing on Afghanistan
where we have made important progress in the face of substantial
challenges.
Afghanistan's future depends heavily on the international
community's willingness to continue delivering concrete resources to
the Afghan Government. It depends equally on international willingness
to help protect the Afghan Government against the Taliban and other
extremists who are waging a bloody insurgency in the south and east of
the country.
Neither of these tasks will be simple, and neither will be
completed soon, but the past few years have been a story of success for
the Afghan Government and people, as well as the international
community. The country made remarkable political progress through the
completion of the 2001 Bonn Accord--the political roadmap for
rebuilding the country. The international community and the Afghan
Government, under the leadership of President Karzai, have built
national-level political institutions--including a new constitution,
legitimate presidential elections, and a democratically elected
parliament.
These are all remarkable achievements given the
ruinous decades of war Afghanistan experienced prior to 2001.
The success of the past few years hasn't lessened the need for
international involvement in the country--it has only provided a
foundation upon which to build. Now, we need to bolster the Afghan
Government's ability to provide sound governance at all levels of
government. Ambassador Neuman recently said the effort would take a
long time--in my view, at least a decade--and cost many billions of
dollars. I would add that the Afghan Government won't be able to do it
alone.
The capacity of the government needs to be strengthened to deliver
basic services to the population--especially security. The problems
span Afghanistan, but they are especially prevalent in rural areas. The
quality-of-life for millions of Afghans--spread across desolate land
and isolated villages--has not advanced and in many areas the Afghan
Government is nowhere to be found.
The social situation will get worse if it is not
addressed. Right now, about 55 percent of the Afghan population
is under the age of 19; millions of young Afghans will enter
the labor force over the next 5-10 years, adding to an
unemployment burden that is already hovering around 40 percent.
The illicit drug trade is a significant hurdle to the expansion of
central government authority and it undercuts efforts to rebuild the
economy. The drug trade also fuels provincial and local corruption.
According to the International Monetary Fund, the Afghan opiate gross
domestic product (GDP) in 2005 was $2.6 billion--roughly a third of the
country's $7.3 billion licit GDP.
Key to making progress is bolstering security. Even in areas of the
country where the insurgency is not active, security is falling short.
There are not enough properly trained, equipped, or
well-paid security forces. Even though the Afghan National Army
continues to become larger, stronger, and more experienced,
progress has been slow and little progress has been made in
constructing an effective Afghan National Police force.
The Taliban has built momentum this year. The level of violence
associated with the insurgency has increased significantly and the
group has become more aggressive than in years past. The Taliban almost
certainly refocused its attacks in an attempt to stymie the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) efforts in southern Afghanistan.
Kabul's ability to provide sound governance and badly
needed aid to these areas will be key to preventing the Taliban
and other extremists from intimidating the population into
acquiescing in its activities.
Kabul needs help because it lacks capacity--not
because it lacks political will or lacks support. President
Karzai understands this and recognizes his government's
responsibility.
iraq
Iraq provides another example of how the forces of change are
reshaping the Muslim world. The deep fissures among the groups fighting
in Iraq were not created by the coalition's overthrow of Saddam's
dictatorship. Throughout Iraq's modern history, a Sunni minority ruled
with the support of the military; Saddam's cult of personality
tragically reinforced this pattern by using extreme violence to
suppress the vast majority of Iraq's inhabitants. Saddam killed tens of
thousands of Kurds and Shiite in the short period from 1988, when he
launched the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, to 1991, when he
brutally suppressed Shiite and Kurdish revolts:
Saddam ruled during his last years through violent
repression and by favoring a small elite within the Sunni
community from his home region of Tikrit--to the dismay of
other Sunnis.
Saddam deliberately diverted resources to his
powerbase, depriving much of the rest of the country of
economic and educational opportunities, and in the case of the
Shiite majority, basic religious liberty.
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) completely upended the Saddamist
state and Iraqi society. In every respect--political, social, and
economic--OIF instituted a sea change in the way Iraq is governed. The
dissolution of the Iraqi military and the Baath party swept away the
tools that a small group in power had used to terrorize Iraq, and the
subsequent vacuum of authority gave vent to deep seated hatreds that
had simmered for years in a brutalized society:
The Shiite now focus on assuring that Iraq's new
government reflects the will of the majority Shiite population
and making sure the Baathists never regain power. This fear of
a return to Baathism is almost palpable among Shiite elites.
Sunnis view the Shiite as Iranian controlled and the current
government as predatory. The Kurds, for their part, want to
keep and strengthen the substantial autonomy they have
exercised since 1991.
It is also noteworthy, however, that the Shiite and
the Kurds, with some Sunni participation, crafted a democratic
constitution that could provide a structure to allow Iraqis to
settle their differences peacefully. For this to happen, Iraqi
leaders--Shiite, Sunnis, and Kurds alike--will need to flesh
out the document through extensive legislation in such a way
that all parties, and particularly the Sunni public, accept as
legitimate.
We are all acutely aware that Iraq today is very far from peaceful.
No single narrative is sufficient to explain all the violence in Iraq
today. There remains in Iraq today an active insurgency; a broad al
Qaeda offensive targeting use and Iraqis; criminality and lawlessness
on a broad scale; rival militias competing for power. Since the bombing
of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra last February, however, violence
between Arab Shiite and Sunnis has grown to such an extent that
sectarian violence now presents the greatest immediate threat to Iraq's
stability and future.
Last year violence was mostly limited to Sunni
insurgent attacks on coalition and Iraqi targets, but now
Shiite militia attacks against Sunnis and coalition forces are
an integral part of the pattern of violence.
The Kurds live in a fairly homogeneous region under
self-government. Yet in the seamline where Kurds, Arabs, and
others meet, we see worrying signs--such as a recent surge in
violence in the city of Kirkuk--that the legacy of Iraq's
repressive past continues to shape both the Arab/Kurd and the
Sunni/Shiite fault lines in Iraqi society.
Any Iraqi leader, no matter how skillful, would be hard pressed to
reconcile the divergent perspectives that Shiite, Sunnis, and Kurds
bring to the table--and also to the streets. To strengthen the common
ground that all Iraqis can share, the government of Prime Minister
Maliki will have to overcome several formidable obstacles:
Internal divisions and power struggles among the
Shiite make it difficult for Shiite leaders to take the actions
that might ease Sunni fears of domination. Radical Shiite
militias and splinter groups stoke the violence, while brutal
Sunni attacks make even moderate Shiite question whether it is
possible to reconcile the Sunnis to the new Shiite-dominated
power structures. The Iranian hand is stoking violence and
supporting even competing Shiite factions.
The Sunnis are even more divided. Many see violent
opposition as the only way to overcome the democratic rules
that, due to demographic realities, place a ceiling on Sunni
political influence.
Even if the central government gains broader support from Iraq's
communities, implementing the reforms needed to improve life for all
Iraqis will be extremely difficult. Iraq's endemic violence is eating
away at the state's ability to govern. The security forces are plagued
by sectarianism and severe maintenance and logistics problems;
inadequate ministerial capacity is limiting progress on key issues; and
the civilian bureaucracy, buffeted by corruption, inefficiency and
partisan control, is not currently up to the challenge of providing
better services to the Iraqi people. Only if the Iraqi state asserts
its authority across the board can the government in Baghdad begin to
turn its goals into concrete realities.
Complicating these historic forces is the pernicious effect of al
Qaeda's presence in Iraq. Despite Zarqawi's death, al Qaeda continues
to foment sectarian violence and seeks to expel coalition forces. An al
Qaeda victory in Iraq would mean a fundamentalist state that shelters
jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terrorist operations
throughout the region--and in the United States.
Turning next to al Qaeda . . .
Al Qaeda sees its war against the West as the continuation of a
decades, perhaps centuries-old, struggle to defend Islam from political
and cultural domination by a Judeo-Christian alliance now led by the
United States and Israel. Since Osama bin Laden declared war on the
United States in 1998, al Qaeda has focused primarily on attacks aimed
at weakening and punishing the United States and its immediate allies.
The group sees the United States as the main obstacle
to realizing its vision of an extreme fundamentalist social and
political order throughout the Muslim world.
Although the group has suffered significant losses
since September 11, it is resilient and thoroughly dedicated to
mounting new attacks on the U.S. Homeland and our interests
abroad.
Understanding the source of al Qaeda's resilience is key to
defeating it. With regard to the central organization headed by bin
Laden, that resilience stems from several factors:
First, the group's cadre of seasoned, committed leaders has allowed
it to remain fairly cohesive and stay focused on its strategic
objectives--despite having lost a number of important veterans over the
years.
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to play
a crucial role in inspiring jihadists and promoting unity.
Their demise would not spell the end of the threat, but
probably would contribute to the unraveling of the central al
Qaeda organization.
The loss of a series of veteran al Qaeda leaders since
September 11 has been mitigated by the group's ``deep bench''
of lower-ranking personnel capable of stepping up to assume
leadership responsibilities. Although a number of individuals
are new to senior management in al Qaeda, they are not new to
jihad: they average over 40 years of age and nearly 2 decades
of involvement in jihad.
A second critical factor is the group's physical safehaven in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. This safehaven gives al Qaeda the
physical--and psychological--space needed to meet, train, expand its
networks, and prepare new attacks.
Many locals have ties to al Qaeda dating back to the
1980s war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Rooting out al Qaeda elements there is complicated by
the rugged terrain and a local culture that is intensely
suspicious of--and, at times, overtly hostile to--outsiders,
including government security forces.
The safehaven not only gives al Qaeda and the Taliban
a venue for terrorist plotting, but also serves as a jump-off
point for its guerrilla forays into Afghanistan.
A third important factor is Osama bin Laden's extremist ideology
and strategic vision, which continue to attract recruits, inspire like-
minded groups, and help our enemies weather setbacks and reconcile
themselves to a long struggle.
In addition to planning attacks of its own, al Qaeda
supports terrorist activities by other groups and seeks to
encourage Muslims worldwide to take up the cause of violent
jihad.
Al Qaeda spreads its propaganda through taped
statements--sometimes featuring relatively sophisticated
production values--as well as books and websites.
As a western nation, we have limited tools to
counteract this propaganda. We need to make sure our own
message is clear and we need to work with our Muslim allies.
Finally, it's important to note that the asymmetric nature of al
Qaeda's style of warfare gives it certain advantages.
Our open society presents an almost endless source of
targets, and the enemy has demonstrated its ruthlessness
through a willingness to attack civilians--including other
Muslims--a preference for spectacular, high-casualty
operations, and its own adherents' desire for martyrdom.
As September 11 showed, even a handful of committed
attackers, with relatively modest resources, can inflict
terrible damage.
Mr. Chairman, in all aspects of today's global struggle, we are
dealing with deep historical forces and it will require patience and
wisdom as well as power for us to deal with them. This will be a long
struggle.
Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, General.
General Maples.
STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Maples. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,
members of the committee. I thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today. I have submitted a statement for the
record and I have shortened that statement for my opening
statement, but would be more than pleased to address the
contents of my statement that I have submitted.
Chairman Warner. Both statements will be submitted into the
record.
General Maples. Thank you, sir.
The testimony that I am about to present represents what we
know and judge to be the state of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan and is the product of the dedicated men and women
of the DIA. Many of them today are executing their missions in
remote and dangerous areas in Iraq and Afghanistan. I thank
them for their service and the exceptional work that they are
doing for our Nation.
I would also like to thank you for your continued support
of them and for your continued support of the DIA.
In Iraq, the conflict is unquestionably complex and
difficult. The fight to define post-Saddam Iraq has been
primarily an intra-Arab struggle to determine how power and
authority will be distributed. Iraqi nationalists, Baathists,
former military, angry Sunni, jihadists, foreign fighters, and
al Qaeda provide an overlapping, complex, and multipolar Sunni
insurgent and terrorist environment. Shiite militias, Shiite
militants, and extensive criminal activity further contribute
to violence, instability, and insecurity.
We have seen some recent developments that give us hope for
progress. They include the verdict against Saddam Hussein,
efforts to address problems associated with the
deBaathification, increased cooperation between Sunni Arab
tribes and the government in al Anbar Province, arrest warrants
for Ministry of Interior personnel accused of abuses, and the
expulsion of rogue elements from al-Sadr's movement.
We note the continued development and increased capability
of Iraqi security forces (ISFs) and the police. The ISFs will
meet manning, training, and equipment milestones and improved
unit capabilities. Nevertheless, the ISFs will remain dependent
on coalition support. It will also be essential that ISF
leaders reject militia influence and instill discipline in
their formations to gain legitimacy with the population.
The conflict has changed in character, in scope, and the
dynamics and is increasingly a sectarian struggle for power and
the right to define Iraq's future identity. The perception of
unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear and
hardening sectarianism which is empowering militias and
vigilante groups and reducing confidence in government and
security forces.
Despite ongoing Iraqi government and coalition operations
against terrorists, Sunni Arab insurgent groups, and Shiite
militias, violence in Iraq continues to increase in scope,
complexity, and lethality. The Sunni Arab-based insurgency has
gained strength and capacity despite political progress and
security force developments.
Attacks by terrorist groups like al Qaeda in Iraq account
for only a fraction of the insurgent violence. Yet the high-
profile nature of these operations have a disproportionate
impact on the population and on perceptions of stability. Al
Qaeda in Iraq has capitalized on the current cycle of sectarian
violence. Its strategy has fueled by appealing to perceptions
that its operations are defending Sunni interests. Al Qaeda in
Iraq also poses a threat outside Iraq as it is the only
terrorist group in the country with known aspirations for
external attacks.
Baghdad remains the center of the conflict as Shiite and
Sunni Arabs fight for territorial control and political
influence. Sectarian attacks constitute most of the violence in
the mixed ethnicity areas in and around the capital, while the
coalition remains the primary target in the Shiite south and
the Sunni west. Recent coalition and ISF operations in Baghdad
have achieved limited success. In August levels of violence
temporarily decreased, primarily in Sunni Arab neighborhoods.
However, as armed groups adapted to the coalition presence and
the ISFs were unable to exert authority once coalition forces
moved on, attacks returned to and even surpassed pre-
operational levels.
The Iraqi government is making progress, but is likely to
remain fragile owing to different challenges, lack of
experience and capacity, mistrust, and constitutional
constraints. Iraqi government officials continue attempts to
achieve national reconciliation, but attacks against civilians,
a key driver of ethnosectarian conflict, continue to increase.
Sectarian differences limit the effectiveness of government
as groups maintain a hard-line stance on contentious issues.
Shiite militias are a growing impediment to stability. The
Ministry of Interior and the police are heavily infiltrated and
militias often operate under the protection or approval of
Iraqi police to attack suspected Sunni insurgents and Sunni
civilians.
DIA judges a coalition presence is the primary counter to a
breakdown in central authority, which would have grave
consequences for the people of Iraq, stability in the region,
and U.S. strategic interests. No major political figure in Iraq
has endorsed the notion of civil war or partition and most
political and religious leaders continue to restrain their
communities. Moreover, DIA judges that Iraqi Arabs retain a
strong sense of national identity and most Iraqis recall a past
in which sectarian identity did not have the significance that
it has today.
Although leaders across the political spectrum who are
participating in the government continue to talk and search for
a positive way forward, the challenges to bringing stability
and security with a cohesive, unified, and effective government
remain significant.
Turning to Afghanistan, in Afghanistan the Taliban-led
insurgency, aided by al Qaeda, is incapable of directly
threatening the central government and expanding its support
networks and areas of influence beyond strongholds in the
Pashtun south and east. Despite having absorbed heavy combat
losses in 2006, the insurgency has strengthened its
capabilities and influence with its core base of Pashtun
communities. If a sustained international military and Afghan
security presence throughout the volatile Pashtun south and
east is not established alongside credible civilian
administrations, central government control over these areas
will be restricted.
In 2007, insurgents are likely to sustain their use of
visible, aggressive, and lethal tactics. Al Qaeda remains
committed to reestablishing a fundamentalist Islamic government
in Afghanistan. In 2006 al Qaeda appears to be attempting to
reinvigorate its operations from safe havens in the Afghan-
Pakistan border region.
Since 2001 the Afghan Government has successfully
established national level political institutions by drafting a
new constitution, holding a legitimate presidential election,
and creating a democratically elected national assembly.
However, local government institutions receive limited
resources from Kabul and struggle to provide effective
governance. Unrealized expectations at local levels are likely
contributing to an erosion of support for the government.
Nevertheless, President Karzai remains the most powerful
political figure in Afghanistan and retains the widest support.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee,
thank you again for this opportunity to discuss with you our
assessment of the current security situations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Our Nation is engaged in a long war against
terrorism and violent extremism. Providing support to our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians engaged in
fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global
war on terrorism is our first priority. Thank you for your
continuing support.
[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]
Prepared Statement by LTG Michael D. Maples, USA
introduction
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
The testimony I am about to present represents what we know and judge
to be the state of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and is the
product of the dedicated men and women of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA). These outstanding military and civilian intelligence
professionals provide our warfighters, defense planners, and national
security policymakers with information and knowledge essential to our
efforts around the world, but especially to operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Many of them are executing their missions in remote and
dangerous areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. I thank them for their service
and the exceptional work they are doing for our Nation. I would also
like to thank you for your continued support of the DIA.
iraq
We have seen some recent developments that give hope for progress.
These include the verdict against Saddam Hussein, efforts to address
problems associated with de-Baathification, increased cooperation
between Sunni Arab tribes and the government in al Anbar Province,
arrest warrants for Ministry of Interior personnel accused of abuses,
and the expulsion of radicals from Muqtada al-Sadr's movement.
We note the continued development and increased capability of the
Iraqi security forces (ISF) and police. The ISF will meet manning,
training, and equipment milestones, improving unit capabilities.
Nevertheless, the ISF will remain dependent on coalition support. It
will also be essential that ISF leaders reject militia influence and
instill discipline in their formations to gain legitimacy with the
population.
The economy has seen moderate growth despite the security
situation, with continued improvement in basic services, economic
reforms, and institution-building.
The conflict is unquestionably complex and difficult. The fight to
define post-Saddam Iraq has been primarily an intra-Arab struggle to
determine how power and authority will be distributed. Iraqi
nationalists, ex-Baathists, former military, angry Sunni, Jihadists,
foreign fighters, and al Qaeda provide an overlapping, complex and
multi-polar Sunni insurgent and terrorist environment. Shiite militias
and Shiite militants, some Kurdish Peshmerga, and extensive criminal
activity further contribute to violence, instability, and insecurity.
The U.S. presence obscured the true nature of this fight between
and among competing groups for power as observers focused on insurgent
attacks and rhetoric directed at the United States. Today, DIA assesses
the conditions for the further deterioration of security and
instability exists within this ongoing, violent struggle for power.
Although a significant breakdown of central authority has not occurred,
Iraq has moved closer to this possibility primarily because of weak
governance, increasing security challenges, and no agreement on a
national compact.
The conflict has changed in character, scope, and dynamics and is
increasingly a sectarian struggle for power and the right to define
Iraq's future identity. Overall attacks averaged approximately 180 per
day in October 2006, up from approximately 170 the previous month, and
70 in January 2006. Daily average of attacks against ISF in October
more than doubled the number reported in January, approximately 30
compared to 13. Daily average of attacks on civilians in October was
four times higher than reported in January, approximately 40 compared
to 10. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere
of fear and hardening sectarianism which is empowering militias and
vigilante groups, hastening middle-class exodus, and shaking confidence
in government and security forces. Sectarian violence, a weak central
government, problems in basic services, and high unemployment are
causing more Iraqis to turn to sectarian groups, militias, and
insurgents for basic needs, imperiling Iraqi unity.
Despite ongoing Iraqi government and coalition operations against
terrorists, Sunni Arab insurgent groups, and Shiite militias, violence
in Iraq continues to increase in scope, complexity, and lethality. The
Sunni Arab-based insurgency has gained strength and capacity despite
political progress and security force developments. Nationwide,
insurgents still conduct most attacks against the coalition and ISF and
retain the resources, capabilities, and support to sustain high levels
of violence.
Attacks by terrorist groups account for only a fraction of
insurgent violence throughout Iraq, yet the high-profile nature of
these operations and the tactics they use have a disproportionate
impact on the population and on perceptions of stability. Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI), formerly led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and currently headed
by Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is the largest and most active of the Iraqi-
based terrorist groups. AQI's targeting strategies have not changed
significantly in the wake of al-Zarqawi's death on June 7, and attacks
against Iraqi government targets and coalition forces continue apace.
In addition, AQI is one of the most visible perpetrators of anti-Shiite
attacks in Iraq--a hallmark of its strategy since 2003--and has
capitalized on the current cycle of sectarian violence by increasing
perceptions that its operations are defending Sunni interests. AQI also
poses a threat outside Iraq, as it is the only terrorist group in the
country with known aspirations for external attacks, including possibly
against targets in Europe and the U.S. Homeland. Because of his
involvement with al Qaeda-linked terrorists since the early 1980s, Abu
Ayyub may have increased ties to al Qaeda senior leaders; these could
enhance AQI's external attack capabilities. AQI operates with relative
freedom in Iraq's Sunni-dominated territories, and as long as this
remains true, the group will pose a threat to Iraq's internal stability
and to Western interests abroad. Ansar al-Sunna, the second-most
prominent terrorist group in Iraq, also poses a threat to Iraqi
stability and has longstanding ties to AQI and external al Qaeda
elements.
Baghdad remains the center of the conflict as Shiite and Sunni
Arabs fight for territorial control and political influence. Sectarian
attacks constitute most of the violence in the mixed-ethnicity areas in
and around the capital, while the coalition remains the primary target
in the Shiite south and Sunni west.
Recent coalition and ISF operations in Baghdad have achieved
limited success. In August, levels of violence temporarily decreased,
primarily in Sunni Arab neighborhoods. However, as armed groups adapted
to the coalition presence, and the ISF was unable to exert authority
once coalition forces moved on, attacks returned to and even surpassed
preoperational levels. Among a range of factors, the government's
reluctance to conduct operations in Shiite militia strongholds also
decreased the effectiveness and potential for success of the Baghdad
efforts.
The Iraqi government of Prime Minister Maliki is making progress
but is likely to remain fragile owing to very difficult challenges,
lack of experience and capacity, mistrust, and constitutional
constraints. Iraqi government officials continue attempts to achieve
national reconciliation, but attacks against civilians, a key driver of
ethno-sectarian conflict, continue to increase. Political leaders'
inability to resolve key issues such as federalism, de-Baathfication,
amnesty for insurgents, and militia integration also contribute to
continued Sunni Arab discontent, fueling support for terrorist and
insurgent groups. Sectarian difference limit the effectiveness of
government as groups maintain a hardline stance on contentious issues.
Shiite militias are a growing impediment to stability. The Ministry
of Interior and the police are heavily infiltrated by members of the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRIs), Badr Corps and
Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi. The Jaysh al-Mahdi often operates
under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain, torture,
and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and innocent Sunni civilians. Sadr
continues to refuse any discussion of disbanding his militia. Some
clandestine Jaysh al-Mahdi cells likely operate outside Sadr's direct
guidance and conduct operations against the coalition.
The Iraqi economy has experienced moderate growth despite the
security situation, which continues to impede and increase overall
costs of reconstruction. However, the inability to realize significant
improvements in the oil and fuels sector and in electricity production
and distribution creates drag on the economy while undermining the
average Iraqi citizens' support for the central government and the
coalition.
DIA judges the continued coalition presence as the primary counter
to a breakdown in central authority, which would have grave
consequences for the people of Iraq, stability in the region, and U.S.
strategic interests. No major political figure in Iraq has endorsed the
notion of civil war or partition, and most political and religious
leaders continue to restrain their communities. Moreover, DIA judges
that Iraqi Arabs retain a strong sense of national identity and that
most Iraqis recall a past in which sectarian identity did not have the
significance it does today. Although leaders across the political
spectrum who are participating in the government continue to talk and
search for a positive way forward, the challenges to bringing stability
and security with a cohesive, unified, and effective government remain
significant.
afghanistan
In Afghanistan the Taliban-led insurgency, aided by al Qaeda, is
incapable of directly threatening the central government and expanding
its resilient support networks and areas of influence beyond
strongholds in the Pashtun south and east as long as international
force levels are sustained at current levels. Nonetheless, DIA judges
that, despite having absorbed heavy combat losses in 2006, the
insurgency has strengthened its capabilities and influence with its
core base of Pashtun communities. Violence this year is likely to be
twice as high as the violence level seen in 2005. Insurgents have
significantly increased their use of suicide operations. If a sustained
international military and Afghan security presence throughout the
volatile Pashtun south and east is not established alongside credible
civil administrations, central government control over these areas will
be substantially restricted. In 2007, insurgents are likely to sustain
their use of more visible, aggressive, and lethal tactics in their
continued effort to undermine the willingness of the international
community to support military and reconstruction operations in
Afghanistan and to highlight the weakness of the central government.
Al Qaeda remains committed to reestablishing a fundamentalist
Islamic government in Afghanistan and has become increasingly
successful in defining Afghanistan as a critical battleground against
the west and its regional allies. In 2006, although the Taliban
continues to drive the insurgency, al Qaeda once again appears to be
attempting to reinvigorate its operations in the country from safe-
havens in the Afghan-Pakistan border region. These efforts are
characterized by an evolution in al Qaeda's increasingly cooperative
relationship with insurgent networks. Without a fundamental,
comprehensive change in the permissiveness of the border region, al
Qaeda will remain a dangerous threat to security in Afghanistan and to
U.S. interests around the globe.
Since 2001, the Afghan Government has successfully established
national-level political institutions by drafting a new constitution,
holding a legitimate presidential election, and creating a
democratically elected national assembly. However, local government
institutions receive limited resources from Kabul and struggle to
provide effective governance. The Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police are also struggling to promote security, particularly
in the volatile south and east. They remain hindered by a shortage of
skilled personnel, tribal and ethnic rivalries, and corruption. Nearly
5 years after the Taliban's fall, many Afghans expected the situation
to be better by now and are beginning to blame President Karzai. These
unrealized expectations are likely contributing to an erosion of
support for his administration. Nevertheless, President Karzai remains
the most powerful political figure in Afghanistan and retains the
widest body of support. He will need concrete successes in the months
ahead to convince Afghans his administration still has momentum and to
provide an effective counter to Taliban advances.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee, thank you
again for the opportunity to discuss with you our assessment of the
current security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our Nation is
engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent extremism.
Providing support to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines engaged
in insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism
is our first priority. Thank you for your continuing support for the
men and women of the DIA.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for
excellent opening statements.
I would start with a question and I will direct it to both
of you. There are discussions today, and I think it is
important that discussions be held and they are being held at
all levels of our executive branch here today, on the very
subjects that each of you have covered. Part of those
discussions relates to looking at the possibility of having
some form of negotiations with both Syria and Iran. My question
to you is what can you advise us with respect to the viability
of persons or an entity of government in each of those
countries that can, in a responsible way, engage in such
discussions should they be undertaken?
General Hayden?
General Hayden. Senator, that is a difficult question and
one on which a lot of things will hinge. If I can just perhaps
characterize what we view to be the issues in Iraq to the west
and to the east--Syria and Iran. As I said in my opening
statement, an awful lot of the issues in Iraq are inherent to
the structures of Iraqi society and their history. That said,
the problems there are made worse by activities done by Iraq's
neighbors, particularly Iran. I mentioned specifically in my
comment that the Iranian hand appears to be powerful and I
would offer the view it appears to be growing. Iranian
ambitions in Iraq seem to be expanding.
With regard to Syria, it is sometimes hard to judge the
distinction between incompetence and malevolence with regard to
what goes on in Syria that may affect the situation in Iraq.
Clearly both governments could do more. That I think is clear.
If our dialogue with them could convince them to do more and
convince them that their interests are not served by a
fracturing of Iraq, then I would say that might be useful.
Again, it is a complex question. It is fraught with other
policy considerations. Talking to Iran about Iraq cannot be
isolated, I believe, from the broader nuclear question. Talking
to Syria about Iraq cannot be isolated from Lebanon, Hezbollah,
and the Palestinian territories. So there are a lot of things
to balance there.
Right now, the positions of both governments are not
useful, particularly the Iranians. But an awful lot of what is
going on in Iraq is endemic to the circumstances in Iraq,
Senator.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I believe that we do have a regional
issue that needs to be addressed, and I believe that there are
activities that are currently undertaken by both of those
countries, Iran and Syria, that have an adverse impact on what
we are trying to achieve in Iraq. The activities range and have
been discussed in the past in terms of support for militias
within Iraq and also the transiting of foreign fighters and
members of al Qaeda. So that territory and activities that are
conducted in those two nations are having a significant impact
on the conflict.
Your question was the viability of discussions with persons
in those two countries and I believe that in both cases the
governments of those two countries are very centralized and
that the control of the central governments in each of those
cases would have an ability to impact the activities going on
within their countries and to influence the outcomes in Iraq as
well.
Chairman Warner. A question to both of you. I detect, and I
am just going to speak for myself, there is a strong resolve
both in the executive branch and Congress as we work our way
through a matrix of options here with regard to possible
change, substantial change in strategy. There is a resolve to
try very hard to continue to seek the goal of enabling the
government in Iraq to fully grow in strength and size and
influence such that it can exercise the full range of
sovereignty, and that includes of course their own personal
security, of their nation.
But should that fail despite the best attempts by ourselves
and other nations, what would you project as being the
consequences, General Hayden, as it relates to the region and
indeed that part of the world?
General Hayden. Yes, Senator. I would judge it
catastrophic, first of all for the people of Iraq, because I
think it would plunge them even deeper into chaos and the road
out of it would be longer and more steep. With regard to the
region, it would be almost as bad as it would be for the people
of Iraq, because I think you would see a fracturing of Iraqi
society along some of those seam lines that I suggested
earlier. The temptation of neighbors to intervene may become
irresistible, and, of course that could prompt other sorts of
activity.
With regard to us, failure in Iraq, failure to create a
viable Iraqi state, I think would embolden the worst of our
enemies, certainly al Qaeda. It would provide them with a safe
haven rivaling the one they had in Afghanistan prior to October
2001. I think it would also embolden other adversaries in the
region, particularly Iran, whom I would suggest to you right
now, not totally warranted, seems to be conducting a foreign
policy with a feeling of almost dangerous triumphalism. I think
that would make it even worse. So I do not see any happy
outcomes that would come from our not being successful.
Chairman Warner. You certainly did not suggest there would
be any happy outcome. I think you very carefully summarized
your own professional opinion.
Now, General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I would make four points. The first is
that we would embolden the jihadist movement throughout the
world. They would see this as a victory and would move on to
other areas that would threaten our national interest.
The second is, it would establish Iran, I believe, as a
regional power. That would not be in the best interest of the
United States.
The third is, I think there would be a great economic
consequence potentially to this as well, most specifically from
the threat to the production of oil and the impact that would
have on economies.
The fourth point I would make is that I think it would also
bring about instability in other countries in the region.
Chairman Warner. My last question, again to both of you.
The most difficult challenge in many respects in the Afghan
situation--and you indicated a decade, General, if I understood
you, to bring about a stabilized country in terms of internal
security such that their economy can begin to prosper and care
for their people. But therein requires a resolution of this
drug situation, which by any reasonable estimate is better than
half of their gross national product, which is permeating
throughout not only that region, the ill effects of it, but
much of Europe, who apparently receive a lot of the drugs.
Who is doing what, and what must be done if it is not being
done to begin in a reasonable period of time eliminate that
aspect of the restoration of the nation of Afghanistan?
General Hayden. Sir, I think you characterize the problem
quite correctly. It is a massive portion currently of the real
GDP of Afghanistan, and unfortunately that may not be by
explicit choice, but many people in Afghanistan are pushed into
that as the only viable economic opportunity they might have.
So I would suggest to a first order rebuilding the
infrastructure and providing the people of Afghanistan with
alternative means of livelihood, be it farming, extraction
industries, and the like. That will require some investment on
our part.
I have talked to the Afghan leadership in a recent visit.
They understand this. But it is almost the devil's own problem,
Senator. Right now the issue is stability and a powerful anti-
drug program going into, say, Helmand Province, which is
probably the worst province there is right now in terms of
opium production. Going in there and attacking the drug trade
actually feeds the instability that you want to overcome. That
is not a reason for not doing it. It just makes it even more
challenging.
Senator, there are a few other notes I would add, but
perhaps in closed session I could add some of the other
activities.
Chairman Warner. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I would agree with General Hayden. The
real issue is the conflict that you have in terms of the
economics at the local level and what alternative crops, what
alternative means of subsistence you could provide to the local
populace. Attacking the problem directly in terms of the drug
trade at the same time would undermine the attempt to gain
popular support in the same regions--a real conflict, I think.
In terms of your question, there is a program that is going
on in terms of ground eradication and there are several
institutions that have been put together by the government of
Afghanistan in order to try to begin to address the drug
problem. There are related issues, of course, associated with
drugs. It goes into corruption, it goes into support to the
Taliban. So there are a number of issues that are associated
there.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin, I wonder if we might
recognize Senator Reed to recognize a distinguished group of
visitors we have here.
Senator Reed. Mr. Chairman, I notice that we have some West
Point cadets here, who are probably here----
Senator McCain. I object. [Laughter.]
Senator Reed.--who are probably here to observe my
classmate, General Maples, who is a much more positive role
model. I am pleased that you are here, and just listen to what
General Maples says and you will learn a great deal.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. I wonder if you are willing to give us a
hint as to your age, as to when you were in West Point?
Senator Reed. When I was in West Point?
Senator Levin. Yes, what years?
Senator Reed. 1967 to 1971. I know General Maples looks
much younger, but this job ages you a lot. [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Congratulations to you. It is great to have
you all here, cadets.
General Maples, you have said in your statement that
violence in Iraq continues to increase in scope, complexity,
and lethality, and that the Sunni Arab-based insurgency has
gained strength and capacity. Has that been true over the last
few months?
General Maples. Sir, it has been true over the last few
months. We saw in the summer the violence levels starting to
increase substantially. We certainly saw that, and in my
statement for the record I provided some statistics that showed
the levels of violence that we saw, particularly in the August,
September, and October timeframes. Post-Ramadan we have seen a
slight decrease in the levels of violence, but we are only
about halfway through the month right now. We are seeing a
bigger difference this month than we did see in the last 2
months.
Senator Levin. What is your current assessment of the
course that we are on? Are we on a course of success currently
in Iraq?
General Maples. A very difficult question because it is a
very complex issue. There are many variables that will
determine our success or failure in Iraq. I would say that I
think we are making progress in terms of ISFs, which I think
are key. But we need to empower them to a greater degree. We do
have to disarm the militias. I think there are many areas of
the country that we still need to gain control of, and I think
that there are a number of problems that are associated with
reconciliation between the parties that need to be addressed
directly.
So it is a very tough course ahead of us.
Senator Levin. Can you give us an assessment as to the
current course, as to whether or not on balance, it is leading
upwards, sideways, or downwards?
General Maples. Sir, I think we are making progress, but
the progress is slow right now. I think we still have the
opportunity for success, but it will be a very difficult
process to get us to where we want to be, both from a security
standpoint and from a political standpoint, in Iraq.
Senator Levin. Is a political settlement by the Iraqis
essential in your judgment, if failure is to be avoided in
Iraq?
General Maples. Absolutely. I believe that in fact the
parties have to be brought together and it has to be a
political approach and the government of Iraq has to be in the
lead in doing that.
Senator Levin. What are the pressure points on that
government to do that? Why have they so far not reached
settlement over resources, over power, over the militias? We
have now had 3\1/2\ years of losses there. What can be brought
to bear? What pressure can be brought to bear on the political
leaders to make them carry out compromises that you just
described they need to make?
General Maples. Sir, I think continuing with the prime
minister is certainly essential to this process. I think his
recent move to realign his cabinet to bring in leaders who he
has greater faith in, who can make a difference, is a
substantial move forward. I believe that there are a number of
matters related, as I mentioned, to reconciliation, in
particular with respect to the Sunni Arab population, that need
to be addressed.
Senator Levin. They need to be, but what is going to press,
what is going to produce the change in the political leadership
to accommodate each other? They have not done it so far. They
came up with an October 3rd agreement which was supposed to end
the sectarian violence. They have not carried out their
commitment to make constitutional changes, or at least consider
them, that they were supposed to have considered long ago. What
will change this dynamic so that their political leaders can
make a settlement which you acknowledge is essential if we are
going to have success in Iraq?
General Maples. Sir, I think that is a policy decision that
is under review right now. But very clearly I think we have to
use probably a combination of approaches towards the leadership
in Iraq. I think that enabling is very important. I think that
being forceful in where we are trying to go and what we are
trying to achieve is also very important. In that line, I
believe that we have to make it known to the leadership in Iraq
that there are expectations that need to be followed through
on.
Senator Levin. If they are not?
General Maples. Sir, that would be a decision that would be
reached elsewhere.
Senator Levin. General Hayden, in your testimony you have
indicated that since the bombing of the mosque in Samarra last
February, violence has grown to such an extent that you assess
sectarian violence is now the greatest threat to Iraq's
stability in the future.
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Is that the current situation?
General Hayden. Yes, sir, it is. To be clear, it is the
greatest immediate threat and it is the one that has to be
overcome in order for us to begin to deal with all the others I
mentioned. I suggested one single narrative does not explain
it. It is a really tough and complex problem.
Senator Levin. Do you agree that a political settlement by
the Iraqis is essential if there is going to be a chance of
success in Iraq?
General Hayden. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Levin. Do you have any assessment as to the
direction, the current direction, as to whether it does not
change, as to whether it leads to success or not?
General Hayden. Clearly, as General Abizaid suggested this
morning, the Iraqi government has to step up to some
responsibility. I believe specifically he mentioned the army is
gaining in capability. It needs the political leadership from
the central government in order to carry out its tasks.
Senator, if I could just offer one additional thought, I
know it is commonplace to say how complex, and so on, it is. We
are asking these individuals, these new leaders in Iraq, to
overcome their own personal histories. You have Sunnis who have
never been in this circumstance, Shiites who have never been in
this circumstance, and each of them thinking the other presents
an existential threat to them. It is going to require, as
General Maples suggested, all the tools we have to motivate
them to make decisions that are clearly in their best interests
for the long-term.
Senator Levin. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Generals, for being here, and thanks for your
outstanding service. Let me give you a couple of proposals,
General Hayden and General Maples. One is that we announce that
in 4 to 6 months we are going to start removing troops from
Iraq. What do you think of that idea, General?
General Hayden. Senator, it is difficult for me to predict
what that means with the situation being so volatile. I would
attach it to a strategy. As I said this morning, things are
changing. There may be places when we should be pushing where
we have been pulling, running when we should be walking. But I
would not want to just say, if we change this then what else
would happen. I would rather work it from the other way around:
what is the effect we are trying to create?
Senator McCain. General Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I believe that the coalition forces
right now are the element that is keeping Iraq together and
that their presence is important for that factor alone. Four to
6 months from now, I do not know. There are so many things that
need to happen, so many things that will happen, in the next 4
to 6 months. But the impact of removal of the forces I think
will lead us to a greater level of violence perhaps in Iraq
than what we are seeing now.
General Maples. How about we partition Iraq into three
different nation states? What do you think of that idea?
General Maples. Sir, I think that is particularly
problematic. In particular, I would see a problem in the
western part of Iraq. As you partition that, the lead in the
western part of Iraq would fall to jihadist groups. That would
give them the base to conduct the kinds of external operations
that they have said that they want to conduct.
General Hayden. Senator, I do not even know how you would
do it, given that a third of the population is in mixed urban
areas. I just do not know how a partition could work.
Senator McCain. You mentioned, General Hayden, as did
General Abizaid this morning, it is time for the government to
step up. What do we think when an American soldier is
kidnapped, our military sets up checkpoints and barricades Sadr
City, and then the prime minister orders us to stop that? Is
that not a bit dispiriting?
General Hayden. Senator, I am looking at it from a
distance, so I do not know the tactical situation. On the face
of it, I understand the question and I understand the response.
We are dealing with a sovereign Iraqi government. We want them
to step up. We want them to be independent, but independent in
a way that expresses an Iraqi government rather than a
government that is anchored in one of the factions.
Senator McCain. The suspicion is that this is the case, and
that is obviously very disturbing.
General Maples, is Anbar Province under control?
General Maples. No, sir, I do not believe it is.
Senator McCain. What about Ramadi and Fallujah
specifically?
General Maples. I think we have greater control in those
two cities.
Senator McCain. But in the province in general?
General Maples. In the province in general, I would say
not.
Senator McCain. How would we fix that problem, since it has
been in and out of control four or five times in the last 3\1/
2\ years that I know of?
General Maples. Sir, I think it is going to take a
combination of additional security forces. I think it is going
to take leadership out of the tribal sheiks who are in that
province. I think we need to interdict those elements that are
influencing activities in Anbar Province from external sources
to Iraq.
General Hayden. Senator, I would reinforce one point----
Senator McCain. I am sorry, go ahead.
General Hayden.--that General Maples brought up, and that
is convincing the local sheiks, the local tribes, that their
interests are not coincident with the interests of al Qaeda.
Senator McCain. We are not doing that now, right, General
Maples? We are not doing that now?
General Maples. Sir, there are some efforts that are
underway with the tribal sheiks. In fact, there have been some
recent successes along that line.
Senator McCain. So do you expect us to gain control of
Anbar Province any time soon?
General Maples. No, not over just the two successes. It is
going to take a combination of things for us to gain the
control.
General Hayden. Senator, if you look at that tactic, which
I agree with, it shows the complexity of the problem. To the
degree you empower the tribal sheiks to do that in al Anbar,
what have you done to the authority and the sovereignty of the
government in Baghdad?
Senator McCain. This of course brings me full circle, a
sufficient number of troops. I will not belabor you with that
any more.
How would you describe, General Hayden and General Maples,
today, in light of this really striking event of the kidnapping
of 150 people in broad daylight in Baghdad today? When
something like that happens it really is an attention-getter,
obviously. Go ahead, General.
General Hayden. Sir, I think one of the words I thought you
were going to come up with was ``inexplicable.'' Our station in
Baghdad has a strong view on this. Their view of the
battlefield is that it is descending into smaller and smaller
groups fighting over smaller and smaller issues, over smaller
and smaller pieces of territory. That event could probably best
be explained by circumstances that are well beyond our view at
the national level. That is the product of the lack of
governance and somewhat of the chaos that we are seeing there
now.
Senator McCain. Of course, the thing that is so disturbing
is they were dressed in police uniforms apparently. Did you
ever think about maybe just disbanding the police and using the
military instead, instead of police? That is the case in some
countries, where the army does all that kind of work.
General Hayden. Sir, I do know if you just look at the
tactical situation, we are using the Iraqi army for functions
that are police functions in other areas.
Senator McCain. Is it most disturbing that--I understand
the al Qaeda effect and I appreciate both of your comments. But
is it not most disturbing that what seems to be a rising level
of violence, of sectarian violence?
General Hayden. Absolutely frightening. There are
historical forces that have been unleashed by what I referred
to earlier, Senator, as the satanic level of violence al Qaeda
has inflicted on particularly the Shiite population.
Senator McCain. Another probably uninformed comment. In
Turkey many years ago we bought up the opium crop, the poppies.
Have we thought of that?
General Hayden. I have not been privy to any of those
discussions.
General Maples. I am not aware.
Senator McCain. Because it certainly is pervasive today and
it could turn it into a narco-state. But a lot of us are in it
together, that is the good news, right?
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. Could I ask, of those
that are being killed out here in this violence, what percent
of those are foreigners? General Maples or General Hayden?
General Maples. In terms of foreign fighters?
Senator Kennedy. Yes, the fraction.
General Hayden. It is a small fraction, Senator.
Senator Kennedy. I had heard figures of 2 or 3 percent. Is
that about the figure?
General Hayden. That is probably about--maybe slightly
higher, but not much.
Senator Kennedy. So the foreign fighters represent 2 or 3
percent and the rest of those that are involved in the fighting
are the sectarian fighters? I am just trying to get some sense
about who is involved in these.
General Hayden. I would agree that the rest of the fighters
are from Iraq. Sectarian as opposed to al Qaeda may be a
distinction that would be important to make.
Senator Kennedy. What do you say are the 2 to 3 percent?
Are they the leaders of the 97 percent of the rest, or are they
foot soldiers?
General Hayden. Two categories, Senator. A significant
portion of the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq is foreign and an
overwhelming percentage of the suicide bombers are foreign, so
they have an impact well beyond their numbers.
Senator Kennedy. So the ones, the 2 to 3 percent, that
includes the suicide bombers?
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. So we have the suicide bombers that are
part of it. But the rest of it therefore is the sectarian
killings or conflict?
General Hayden. Again, it is fighters----
Senator Kennedy. Indigenous effectively to Iran?
General Hayden. The fighters are from Iraq.
Senator Kennedy. Iraq, rather, indigenous effectively to
Iraq.
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Iraqis against Iraqis?
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Kennedy. Sunnis against the Shiite and the other
groups.
Now I am going to direct your attention to the National
Intelligence Estimates (NIE). The last one was done on Iraq and
was completed in July 2004, 2 years ago. August 3, the Senate
approved an amendment that I offered with Senator Reed to the
Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations mandating an
updating of the NIE. This is to include the overall
intelligence assessment. This includes the prospects for
controlling sectarian violence, the civil war prospects, the
ethnic, religious, and tribal divisions, the prospects to
disarm and demobilize the militias, likelihood of the
government success in response to the Sunnis, a wide range of
different kinds of requirements that you are all too familiar
with.
On August 4, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
agreed to task the Intelligence Community (IC) to prepare it.
They had said there had been numerous developments in Iraq
since the last NIE in mid-2004, to include three political
transitions. DNI believes it is timely to prepare an updated
estimate giving the options and questions concerning Iraq.
Two days ago we received a letter from the DNI informing us
the National Intelligence Council, working with the IC, has
been finalizing the terms of reference for the NIE and is
beginning, it uses the word ``beginning,'' to work on the
report, beginning to work on it.
Is there any way that you can explain why the IC is
dragging its feet on a new assessment of Iraq? We have the
President now announcing that he is going to have his own
assessment. You have the Hamilton-Baker Commission doing its
assessment. We have a new Secretary of Defense coming in that
will want the best in terms of intelligence. Why is there such
dragging of the feet effectively in developing the NIE, which
was so important really in terms of the community and the
policymakers' decisions about Iraq policy?
General Hayden. Senator, I am going to go first and then I
am sure General Maples will have a comment, because we both sit
on the board that approves the NIEs.
I would not, in all fairness, characterize it as dragging
our feet. In fact, in terms of how NIEs are crafted, this one
is more or less on a pretty fast track. I recognize the need
for your committee, the rest of Congress, the Baker-Hamilton
Commission, and others to have the benefit of the IC's
thinking. That is happening in parallel. I can tell you, for
example, that much of my remarks have been crafted on our
participation in the working groups that are already under way
to craft the final NIE. So although the final product, I am not
sure when Ambassador Negroponte projected it, but if the final
product is in January it does not mean that the thinking that
has gone into that product will not be available, portions of
it, a lot of it, prior to that date.
Senator Kennedy. General Maples, anything?
General Maples. Sir, no.
Senator Kennedy. Just to add, these are the critical times,
as we have been pointed out--major discussions in the Nation,
the elections, new Secretary of Defense, the Baker-Hamilton
Commission making recommendations, the President doing his own
kind of assessment on this. It is against the background, as
has been talked about in the hearing, of these seizing of the
Department of Education.
I returned after our hearing just at about 2 o'clock and
turned on CNN. CNN said 50 more bodies were found, bullet-
ridden bodies, today. The Minister of Education has just
resigned because of this, what is happening. There is a sense
of urgency that is out there. This does provide the best in
terms of the IC for the policymakers. To the extent that you
can give a greater sense of urgency in the preparation of it, I
think the country would be well-served.
General Maples. Understand, Senator, and we certainly will.
Our analysts are already engaged in helping to prepare that. I
have reviewed the terms of reference as well and made suggested
changes to that, to the terms of reference. We certainly
understand how significant this is to the Nation.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you very much for your service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inhofe [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.
This morning I did not attend. I could not attend because I
was chairing a hearing at the same time, and so I have more of
my thoughts really that would be more appropriate for the first
panel. Let me just try this on you. I think when it is
suggested, as we have heard it suggested many times, that we
change our strategy in Iraq and bring a lot of our troops down
to Kuwait, have them deployed then to go back up there to put
out fires. General Abizaid felt this would not work.
You both agree with him on this, his answers?
General Hayden. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. The other thing that came up this morning--
and I was not here, but they told me about it--was the idea of
increasing our embedding. Now, a minute ago we were talking
about Fallujah. I had occasion to be there three or four times,
during all the elections, I might add. When General Madhi was
in charge there, a guy, a general who really did not like
Americans to start with, until we started, they started their
embedded training with the Marines--and you can remember the
story, that he said when they rotated them out they all got
together and cried. They became very close.
They thought that was a very successful program. Now, that
is kind of a model in my mind of embedded training. When you
say you might want to increase embedded training, are you
talking about increasing the ratio of our troops or coalition
troops or increasing the whole numbers to get more embedded
training?
General Maples. Sir, I believe the proposal is to increase
the size and the capability of our military transition teams
that are embedded with ISFs. I do believe that that is
important to build greater capability for the ISFs in the near-
term.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with that. I just returned from my
12th trip to that region and I was in, mostly in Afghanistan
during this time, with a rather larger group. As you will
recall, General Jones had a group of the private sector over
there, and we went to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams to
see what the successes are.
General Jones has a way of showing what has happened in
Afghanistan. I think that is very good. He uses this chart that
hopefully some of our members up here have seen and of course
you are very familiar with.
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Senator Inhofe. His observation is, and I agree, when you
look at the tasks--he had counternarcotics--the U.K. was
supposed to be doing that--judicial reform, that was Italy with
the lead; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, that was
Japan; training police forces was Germany. But our function was
to train the Afghan National Army (ANA).
I would have to only give us a good grade on that. I do not
think any of the other four pillars are being done and being
done right. I was over there when we first turned over the
training of the ANA to the Afghans and I saw a great deal of
pride and I thought they were really doing the right thing.
Do you agree on those five functions that we have done a
pretty good job, that we are the only ones by comparison who
have done a good job, compared to what the other nations have
or have not done?
General Hayden. I know our formal assessment is that the
ANA is the best national institution in the Afghan Government.
Senator Inhofe. I certainly think that General Jones agrees
with that. He even made comments that really the military
function is more over than some of the other functions.
General Hayden, I wrote down that you said you understand
that understanding al Qaeda is the key to defeating it. What do
we least understand right now about al Qaeda?
General Hayden. Actually, Senator, I think we know a lot,
and obviously this is a work in progress and every day we
understand it better. I think we understand the hierarchical
structure that attacked us in 2001, and because of that we have
attacked it and been very successful. We are building our
understanding of what the President last October called those
groups affiliated with al Qaeda and how they are connected. We
now have underway--and this may be the long-term project and
the one that is ultimately the war-winner--how do you
understand the ``inspired by al Qaeda.'' Those are the groups
that do not have a formal connection. You do not see the
movement of people or money or supplies. You see the movement
of ideas. How do you identify that and how do you counteract
it?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Maples, you said that Prime Minister Maliki must
dismember the militia. I look at someone like al-Sadr and I
would assume that is one of the major militias that he would be
talking about. You said in your statement that they are
confused between them and the police. How are you going to
correct that? Maybe what was suggested by Senator McCain might
not be a bad idea, just get rid of the police and then at least
everybody knows. Is that something you----
General Maples. Sir, I think there are major reforms that
are needed in the Ministry of Interior and with the Iraqi
police, and I think many of those actions are underway right
now. But I think we have a significant problem with the Iraqi
police, and as a result of that we have a problem with
security, and local residents then turn to local groups,
whether they be a watch or a militia, to provide that security
and basic services for them. That is what we have to overcome.
If the ISFs, and I think they probably are, are our best
means to achieve that, by continuing to build their capability
and their capacity to establish security, it will enable us to
start having less of a reliance on watches and militias.
Senator Inhofe. I agree with that, and that reminds me that
on several trips over there in talking to our military as well
as their military and some of their leaders they have stated
that if we get to the point where we have what would be
comparable to 10 divisions of trained and equipped ISFs, which
would be about 325,000, that we would then be in a position to
start looking at the possibility that they would be able to
take care of their own security.
I know you cannot--it is a trap to walk into something to
say so many, it has to be a specific number and that would
equate to 10 divisions. But we are getting close, and every
time I go over there and I see the quality of the training is
so much better than you hear it is on the media--do you think
we are getting closer now to the point where in terms of shear
numbers, if we had them trained properly that that might be
getting close to the numbers that we need for providing their
own security?
General Hayden. Senator, I will defer to General Abizaid
and General Casey for the fine print, but yes. All the metrics
in terms of training are all headed in the right direction.
Senator Inhofe. If we had even thought that we would be
this close--I understand right now the number is some 312,000.
General Hayden. Beyond the raw military capacity, these
armed men have to think of themselves as Iraqi rather than some
other identity, and they have to be responsive to a government
that identifies itself as being a unity government for Iraq.
Senator Inhofe. A couple weeks ago when I was in
Afghanistan--Mr. Chairman, this will be my last question--there
is this perception, this reality I guess, that al Qaeda is,
getting back to Afghanistan, having a much larger presence
there and they do that in terms of using their three favorite
techniques: the improvised explosive device (IED), the rocket-
propelled grenades, and suicide bombs. They have escalated just
rather abruptly, which leads me to believe that there is a
greater presence.
Some believe that a lot of those are coming actually from
Iraq. Any military group is finally going to wear down over a
period of time and there are several who are speculating that
might be happening and that is why many of them are coming home
and you are seeing a larger presence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan
than we used to. Do you have any thoughts on that?
General Maples. Sir, I have not seen any direct linkage to
Iraq. We have seen from an al Qaeda standpoint increased al
Qaeda activity, particularly in the eastern provinces, in
Afghanistan.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, yes, I know that is true.
Thank you very much.
General Hayden. Sir, I would just add that the connective
tissue between the fight in Iraq and the fight in Afghanistan
is al Qaeda. Although we may not see arms or individuals
transitting from west to east, certainly the tactics and the
lessons learned in Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. When I was last
in Iraq in October, I got the impression from some of our
American commanders that the ISFs were not sharing all the
intelligence they had with respect to the situation on the
ground, the militias, insurgents. Is that an accurate
assessment, General Hayden, General Maples?
General Maples. I think we are receiving intelligence from
the ISFs. I do not know that their intelligence systems are
mature enough at this point that we are receiving all the
intelligence that they could provide to us. I know that at the
national level with my counterpart that we need to develop some
capacity and procedures with him. In fact, I have invited him
to come back and to work those issues with us, to see if we
cannot develop increased intelligence-sharing.
I think that they have a lot of information that would be
very valuable to us. We need to establish the means of our
forces receiving that intelligence.
General Hayden. Senator, my relationship with my
counterpart could serve as a model for what we want to do
inside the Iraqi Ministry of Defense with our DOD forces. The
sharing is direct, intimate, and immediate.
Senator Reed. Do you have evidence of systematic ethnic
cleansing in parts of Iraq? General Maples, General Hayden?
General Maples. I have not seen necessarily systematic
ethnic cleansing in that term. But I do think there have been
directed attacks in multi-ethnic neighborhoods with an intent
to probably drive families out of those neighborhoods. So
whether I would categorize it as ethnic cleansing, I am not
sure. But clearly there are attempts to gain advantage from a
territorial standpoint as a result of the sectarian violence
that is going on.
Senator Reed. General Hayden, is that your impression?
General Hayden. Yes, sir. I would not characterize it in
such broad terms as ethnic cleansing. Clearly, at the local
level there are attempts to move populations out of
neighborhoods. We see that. To say that is a part of a broader
plan of orchestrated and synchronized activity, I think that
would be too far.
Senator Reed. Recently in October the assembly passed
legislation that Ambassador Satterfield pointed out would take
18 months to go in effect, that would allow essentially super-
regionalization of the country. Do you think that is a positive
development?
General Hayden. All the devils are in the details with
regard to that, Senator. I know the Shiites, many Shiites, have
that as an idea, but even they argue among themselves. Is it
three provinces? Is it nine provinces? And so on. We have a
wondrous federal experiment and we still have a centralized
government with a national identity. We cannot rule out that
possibility in Iraq. But that is not the same as partition.
Senator Reed. Does it not complicate things a bit when you
see that the most successful part of Iraq is the Kurdish area,
which is virtually autonomous, which has its own militia, the
Peshmerga, which has been operating to provide security, which
is economically thriving? Is it not difficult then to argue
that you really have to have a national non-militia force, that
you cannot rely upon this regionalization?
General Hayden. I understand the argument quite well.
Again, I know you are not arguing for partition, which is
something quite different.
Senator Reed. No, I am not.
General Hayden. But there can be formulas that create
different sharings of power between the national government and
regional governments.
Senator, I add one other thing that the Kurds had, though.
They had more than a decade of running up to this in relative
peace to get themselves organized for what is going on. That is
not the Shiite or Sunni experience.
Senator Reed. I agree with you, General. I think, though,
that one of the conclusions that everyone reaches here, that
ultimately this is about politics--it has been described as a
sectarian struggle for power by General Maples. You have
described it as an existential struggle, where Sunnis feel that
they are going to be displaced, Shiite have been displaced. Now
they are first, I would suggest that in these existential
struggles it is hard to compromise, particularly within a
generation.
What are the objectives of the Shiites? You must make
estimates if you want to break it down to Maliki and his
government and Hakim and Sadr. Is it to retain power at all
cost and suppress the Sunni? Is it to work out a better modus
vivendi with the Sunni? What is your estimate?
General Hayden. Senator, I am going to answer your
question, but I want to preface it. I have asked this question.
I have asked our station officers, and they have come back with
a statement first of all that I will share with you: Do not
assume a detailed rational planning process here on the part of
any of these groups.
Senator Reed. Been there, done that. I agree with you.
General Hayden. The first rule, and it appears to motivate
all Shiites no matter what the torque inside the Shiite
movement, is to preserve Shiite unity. With Shiite unity, they
are an absolute majority in the country. So that is one.
The second, maybe less rational, more intuitive, is what I
suggested to you earlier, this almost palpable fear that the
Baathists will return. Right now it colors almost all of their
political decisions.
Senator Reed. General?
General Maples. I would agree with what General Hayden
said. It is a struggle for power, even within groups, within
the Shiite community right now, and the struggle that we see
going on between Sadr and the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq and who is really going to prevail on the
Shiite side.
I think it is on the Sunni side a lack of acceptance of
their position in the new Iraq and a desire to return to power
and to share in both influence and resources of Iraq.
Senator Reed. I think both of you gentlemen have provided
very good insights. Listening to your final points, which I
tend to agree with, it is no wonder to me that our requests,
our blandishments, our suggestions, that Maliki accommodate the
Sunnis and the Sunnis who cooperate more tend to be falling on
deaf ears, and that discussions of new arrangements for oil
distribution and sharing fully in power, et cetera, all the
things, and going after the militias, which seem to be their
last sort of sense of protection in a very terrible place,
those reports and those aspirations seem to be a bit somewhat--
well, not based on anything that you have suggested to me in
terms of the dynamic at work in Iraq today as being realistic.
General Hayden. Senator, I will speak for myself personally
and let Mike add. I have met with the leadership. Like all of
us, they are products of their personal histories. But like
most of us, these are pretty noble individuals trying to do the
right thing. So that is where we are.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank both of you for your service to your country and the
countless hours you have given to this important issue for
United States policy, world policy, and world peace.
I will go straight to a concern I have, and I think we have
to confront it. I think we can make real progress in this area,
but I do not believe for some reason we are making sufficient
progress. That deals with the arrest and release of people who
we have evidence are connected to terrorist activities. We
heard it in our last trip Senators Warner, Levin, Pryor, and I
attended and we got a real passionate concern about it.
I guess you would both agree that one of the things our
soldiers are doing is identifying and apprehending dangerous
people. Nothing could be more discouraging than to be
successful in capturing someone of significance and then have
them released prematurely. If someone in the United States were
involved, for the bombing of that building here, that
individual would be executed. This is a serious thing, for
somebody to be involved in an activity in a nation that kills
innocent men, women, and children. There is no more horrible
crime, if the nation has a system of law.
So when I ask about this lawfulness and the ability to
apprehend and deal with this in this state of extremity that
Iraq is in. Frequently people tell me we are trying to
establish a rule of law. First, I would suggest that it is an
unlawful society when people can be captured and bomb and kill
and then be released prematurely. That is unlawful in itself.
First, do you think that is a problem? If so, how can we
improve it? What do we need to do now to get this thing moving?
Because I have been talking about it for over 3 years. General
Maples?
General Maples. Sir, I will start. I believe it is a
problem, and it is a problem that we hear from our soldiers who
go to great efforts to apprehend individuals who are involved
in activities, only to see them back on the streets again. We
hear that.
Senator Sessions. Now, is this a result of American
procedures or Iraqi failures?
General Maples. Largely due to, as you mentioned, the rule
of law and having a functioning judiciary within Iraq.
Senator Sessions. Well now, how critical is this to the
overall success? Because I believe it was General Abizaid in
his opening statement, or maybe the Ambassador, that indicated
that one of the reasons for the rise in the militia is the fact
that people do not feel safe, that somebody blows up their
family, their neighborhood, their sect, and nobody gets
apprehended, so now some militia are coming along and just
killing a bunch of people in retaliation.
Is that not kind of what we mean by sectarian violence,
General Hayden?
General Hayden. Yes, sir, that is it. It begets the
circumstances you describe. For that individual, that is an
incredibly logical decision to protect his family.
Unfortunately, it leads to very horrible things for the society
when most of the nation does that.
Senator Sessions. I do not think it is that difficult to
fix this thing. I think they need to have in Iraq some clear
laws, if you are caught with possession of IED paraphernalia,
that ought to be a minimum of 20 or 30 years without parole or
death penalty if you can tie them to the event, and some clear
laws like that. We need to treat those cases somewhat
differently than we do an Internal Revenue Service case in the
Southern District of New York. This is a life and death
situation in Iraq. Making a mistake can have deadly
consequences.
For example, the Marine Times publication said that one
individual known as ``The Beheader'' had been released, a known
beheader. Another one was a bomber who had been captured, been
active in bombing, and as a result of some period of time he
was released. They had already found his signature back in
another city where he was undertaking bombing again.
How can we get this--if this is a problem, as you suggest
it is, how can we raise this up and do something about it?
General Hayden. Senator, I will just add to what General
Maples said earlier. This is fundamentally an issue of
capacity-building inside the Iraqi government--a functioning
court system, a functioning national police and orderly
processes.
Senator Sessions. Let me ask you, do you think the people
that are trying to help the Iraqis set up a functioning court
system are focused on a model of a court system in the United
States and are not focused on the kind of model that is
necessary to protect innocent men, women, and children in Iraq?
Because it is quite a different thing.
General Maples. Sir, I am not sure the answer to that one.
We would have to take that question and get back to you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Defense Intelligence Agency has not assessed the model of a
court system being developed in Iraq nor what model might be most
appropriate for the Iraqi judicial system and the Iraqi people. The
Department of Justice may be better able to address this question.
Senator Sessions. I hope you will because it is
discouraging to me and I think we are at a point where some
action needs to be taken, and we need to recognize that the
same degree of judicial protections that we provide in a non-
violent case in the United States may not be what is necessary.
Some sort of military commission or something in which the
central government can come in and try these people promptly,
give them a fair trial, and if they are guilty take substantial
severe action against them.
General Maples. Senator, I think you are right. You also
mentioned a very strong set of counterterrorism laws to take
into consideration where we are in Iraq today, and that is very
important to the Iraqi government.
Senator Sessions. We have in the United States, if you are
caught with an explosive device or an illegal firearm, you are
guilty of a serious offense whether you ever used it or not.
They could craft some laws that would make some of these
seizures and arrests of people very easy to prosecute, I would
think.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of you gentlemen for what appears to be very
candid testimony today. Both of you, as did our previous panel,
rejected some of the alternatives in strategy that have been
posited. But it also seems that the conditions you described
reflect a current strategy that needs to be rejected just as
emphatically for the results it has produced.
General Maples, you talk about overall attacks averaging
180 a day in October of this year, up from 170 the previous
month, up from 70 in January; average daily attacks on
civilians, October four times higher than were reported in
January; a perception--I think it is also a reality--of
unchecked violence, creating an atmosphere of fear and
hardening sectarianism; the Ministry of Interior and the police
heavily infiltrated by members of al-Sadr's organization, the
inability to realize significant improvements in the oil and
fuel sector and electricity production, undermining the average
Iraqi citizen's support for the central government and the
coalition, which I concur after being in southern Iraq 2 weeks
ago visiting with Minnesota National Guard troops. The mayor of
al-Batha came and, while he was appreciative of what the
Minnesota guardsmen and women had been doing to help rebuild
his city, he said that the electricity there was less than it
had been under Saddam Hussein's rule.
So given the rejection of the other alternative strategies
and given I think not only the failure but the continued
deterioration of conditions under the existing strategy, is it
fair to say we have no good option presently available to us or
in the foreseeable future in Iraq? Would each of you comment on
that, please?
General Hayden. Senator, clearly that is what all the
discussions are about in the multiple fora that the chairman
mentioned. I would say, and I think it was mentioned earlier
today and I will repeat, there are some things that have been
going on that have been very positive. We do have a
democratically elected government in Iraq. We have a
functioning constitution. We have functioning organs of
government at the national level--the prime ministership, the
presidency, and a council of representatives. We have armed
forces that are building both in numbers and capacity. Some of
the things we have been doing to create the circumstances, the
conditions for success, are correct.
I do not think any of us are pleased with where we are now.
I think all of us are concerned by many of the metrics by which
we would measure ultimate success and hence the time now for
this serious look, this serious reassessment, what is working,
what is not, how we must adjust. The burden on General Maples'
organization and my organization is to bring to each of these
discussions the clearest possible view of the situation. I
tried to emphasize in my comments today: not just the current
situation. This reality has a history and we need to understand
that as well if we are going to be successful.
I think someone suggested earlier we have to find the right
leverage points.
Senator Dayton. Thank you.
General?
General Maples. Sir, I do believe that we still have
opportunities to stabilize the situation in Iraq and to move
forward. As General Hayden says, our responsibility is to try
to present as clear a picture as we can of what our assessment
is of the conditions in Iraq, the dynamics that are in Iraq,
and also most importantly to identify opportunities. I think
that that is particularly important for us to do as we go
through strategy reviews that we are going through right now.
Senator Dayton. General Hayden, a week ago in the
Washington Post, David Ignatius wrote what was actually a very
complimentary article overall about your leadership, and I
thank you for that. He does say, however, that, referring to
Baghdad, the CIA station there, he says: ``Younger CIA officers
are said to be frustrated with the cautious approach as they
watch U.S. soldiers fighting and dying and see Iraq slipping
away.''
Is that an accurate statement about the perceptions of
younger CIA officers in Iraq, whether you agree with it or not?
Do they see Iraq slipping away?
General Hayden. I can give you a more detailed answer in
closed session.
Senator Dayton. All right, I will take that.
General Hayden. I have visited with our folks. I have
talked to our analysts. I have reflected their views in my
comments here. But I can go into greater detail, Senator, in
closed session.
Senator Dayton. All right, let us leave it at that. That is
fine. Thank you.
On to Afghanistan. There again, both of you have described
a mixed situation, but one where the insurgency, General
Maples, you say has strengthened its capabilities and
influence, the violence is likely to be twice as high this year
as in 2005. You reflect the strength of the illicit economy
there and the lack of sufficient options in the licit economy.
I remember meeting with President Karzai shortly after he took
office in January 2002 and he pleaded with us, a group, a
bipartisan group of Senators, for sufficient international
financial support to enable him to make the progress necessary.
He described the lack of funding for local government leaders
to be able to show progress.
In your assessment, has the international community, while
it has been forthcoming, provided sufficient resources? Are
more international financial resources necessary to enable him
to be successful? Either of you?
General Hayden. Clearly the NATO troop contribution,
particularly the major troop contributing nations, have taken
on something, frankly, out of the historical norm for NATO. If
you have talked to General Jones you understand all the work
that went into getting national capitals to agree to that.
There are NATO soldiers now dying and being wounded in areas of
Afghanistan that we have not been for a long time, and that is
one of the causes for the increased fighting and the increased
casualties. They are establishing a presence in districts where
neither the government nor the coalition have been for years.
So that clearly deserves credit where credit is due.
You are right about what President Karzai says. I think he
has the right objectives. I think he has the right concept and
he desperately needs assistance in order to build that capacity
outside of Kabul, outside of the national government, at the
province and district level, so that his government has a
presence everywhere it needs to have a presence.
He has the will. He has the support. He needs assistance to
do it, though.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank
you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
I would like to pick up on what Senator Sessions was
talking about. I could not agree more. Until there is some
downside to getting involved in killing Americans and
disrupting this emerging democracy, people are going to
continue to do so, and we have to create downsides that are
well known and severe.
But let us start with Afghanistan. General Hayden, have you
talked to the attorney general in Afghanistan personally?
General Hayden. With the attorney general of Afghanistan?
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Hayden. No, Senator, I have not.
Senator Graham. Would you do me a favor and try to have
yourself or some senior member of your organization visit him,
because once you visit him, you are overwhelmed with the level
of alleged corruption, that the institutions of government over
there are corrupt to the core because of the drug money and
this man is swimming upstream. The average prosecutor in
Afghanistan makes $90 a month.
General Hayden. I have not met the attorney general. I have
met with President Karzai and other senior members on the
security side. The president is quite clear he recognizes that
problem as well. We have a senior leader of the agency who will
be there next week and we will make sure he talks to him.
Senator Graham. The attorney general will tell you that
part of the problem is President Karzai. So I do appreciate
your talking with him. But he suggested that $250 a month could
really transform things. I do appreciate your visiting and
getting back with me.
About Iraq, what is the total number, give or take 5,000,
of the insurgency foreign fighters?
General Maples. Sir, the number I have is about 1,300
foreign fighters in Iraq right now.
Senator Graham. Okay. How many people in Iraq?
General Hayden. More or less, 25 million or so.
Senator Graham. So you have 25 million people, you have
1,300 foreign fighters, give or take a few hundred. How many
native insurgents are there that take up arms and kill people?
General Hayden. Insurgents, that is a term of art for us.
That would largely mean----
Senator Graham. People who are trying to defeat democracy,
yes.
General Hayden. Now you are widening the circle. If you use
insurgents, those who are opposed to the coalition presence--
what do you think, Mike?
General Maples. It depends on how we count the militias as
a part of all this.
Senator Graham. People who are using violence to disrupt
progress in Iraq.
General Hayden. If that is your definition, Senator, it is
tens of thousands.
Senator Graham. How many?
General Hayden. Tens of thousands.
Senator Graham. Tens of thousands? 100,000?
General Hayden. Again, Senator, I am sorry. I do not mean
to dodge the question. But what portion of Jaysh al-Mahdi, the
militia under Sadr, is under his control and therefore on a
particular given day not attacking us; what are not and are out
of control and are in essence lawless--that is why I think
General Maples and I are a little reluctant to give a firm
number.
If you are talking about the insurgents in Anbar, those who
are opposed to the allied presence, largely the Sunni, low five
figures is the number I would give you. I am not trying to
dodge you. I just do not----
Senator Graham. What number did you pick?
General Hayden. 10,000 or so.
Senator Graham. 10,000.
General Hayden. That is a pretty wide circle, people who
are mad at us. That is not full-time fighters.
Senator Graham. So less than 20,000 between them and the
foreign fighters. Now, on the Shiite side, how many people are
the problem in terms of using violence? We do not know, have no
idea?
General Maples. It is difficult to say. I would say that in
terms of active within the militias you have probably a range
of 20,000 to 30,000 if you combine all of that. But you have
many more who are involved in the support mechanisms and
providing support to both militia and to the insurgents as
well, on the Sunni side as well.
Senator Graham. Okay. What percentage of the Iraqi people
buy into our view of Iraq being a democratic functioning
government?
General Hayden. That is hard to estimate, Senator. I am
sorry.
Senator Graham. Is it a majority?
General Hayden. I think a majority of the people of Iraq,
an overwhelming majority of the people of Iraq, want to live in
a pluralistic society, want to live in a unified Iraq, want to
live in a peaceful Iraq.
Senator Graham. So a majority, overwhelming majority of
people, share the goal of a unified Iraq, not a partitioned
Iraq.
General Hayden. Unified, pluralistic, and peaceful.
Senator Graham. Why are they not doing better?
General Hayden. That is a wonderful question, Senator. Tom
Friedman asked that question in an article in the New York
Times 2 or 3 weeks back. He talked about the absence of the
center. The longer this goes on, the less controlled the
violence is. The more the violence devolves down to the
neighborhood level, the center disappears and normal people
acting not irrationally end up acting like extremists.
Senator Graham. Finally, would you agree that there are
three groups in Iraq. There is a small minority who have taken
up arms for religious or ethnic purposes to destabilize the
government. Some of them are foreign in nature. The second
group are very brave people who are volunteering to be the
judges and the lawyers and they are getting assassinated. The
third group is the overwhelming majority who are keeping their
powder dry because they are afraid to come forward. Is that
fair?
General Maples. Sir, I think that is probably a pretty fair
statement. I think there are a relatively small number who are
actively engaged in the conflict. I think you are exactly
right, there is a small number that is trying to provide the
leadership and bring the country together.
Senator Graham. Why do we not as a nation throw everything
in the world that we have at this small group so that the
majority will come forward? Why are we treating this in such a
police action fashion if it is indeed the central battlefront
on the war on terror that will dictate the region for years to
come and humanity as we know it? Why are we having this stupid
debate about number of troops if we do believe that it is the
central battlefront in the war on terror and bring aid to the
people who are trying to fight and change Iraq? Why are we
stuck on a troop level that is not working?
General Hayden. Sir, obviously--and I think General Maples
has said the same thing--that is a policy question, not exactly
in either of our job descriptions.
Senator Graham. What is your advice?
General Hayden. I would offer the view that, again as I
tried to state in my opening comments, a lot of the issues here
are driven by deep historical forces that have been unleashed
by the toppling of the Saddam regime. At the end of the day,
Senator, this has to be won by the Iraqis.
Senator Graham. Is it your advice as CIA Director that this
is the central battlefront in the war on terror?
General Hayden. Our enemy believes it to be so and has said
so.
Senator Graham. Do you believe it to be so?
General Hayden. It is an absolutely critical battlefront in
the war on terror.
Senator Graham. Would it be your advice to this committee
to throw everything this Nation has into winning this battle?
General Hayden. I would advise the committee to do
everything within our power to use our power wisely to win this
battle. Again, Senator, what I was trying to articulate before:
At the end of the day, an American face will not be present on
victory here. It must be an Iraqi face.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman, would you indulge me?
Senator Lieberman. Of course.
Chairman Warner. I think we should also explore--that is a
very important line of questions. Time and time again we are
told by well-informed witnesses that the presence of U.S.
troops engenders a lot of the fighting, and if we are to
increase the numbers the perception is we are there to stay, we
are there to be permanent conquerors or however they want to do
it, and this could begin to increase the numbers of the persons
antagonistic against us.
Is that not part of the equation of thinking that has to be
looked at in the context of raising our troop level?
General Hayden. Senator, earlier I said not one narrative
explains the war, and it depends on which narrative you want to
lay out as to how much our troop presence generates opposition.
For that one narrative about opposition to foreign occupation,
which has been a powerful narrative, an American face on
security carries with it its own costs and its own
countervailing pressures.
I would also say that the American presence there gives
life to al Qaeda propaganda that they misuse and misrepresent
to the larger Arab world. The more they can put an American
face on the activity in Iraq, the more they are served by it.
General Maples. Sir, I think it is a valid point in some
factions that the U.S. presence is the issue that they are
trying to deal with, and removing the coalition is exactly what
they would like to achieve, but not for the same purposes that
we want to achieve it. Their purpose in removing the coalition
is to enable their own objectives, and here I largely refer to
al Qaeda in Iraq. I think in some cases the Shiite, that is the
case also, so they can further their own goals.
General Hayden. What has happened, Senator, in the last 6
to 10 months--and I heard this alluded to this morning--is that
you had that violence there that was generated by al Qaeda. You
had that violence there that was generated by just opposition
to our presence. That has remained. That has not gone away.
What has been added to it is the Iraqi on Iraqi violence that
the sectarian divisions have created, and hence my comment
earlier, not one plot line describes this.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks.
Senator Levin. Would my good friend yield for one
additional question? You have been very generous.
Senator Lieberman. In the spirit of bipartisanship that I
espouse, how could I say no? [Laughter.]
Senator Levin. Just a comment also on Senator Graham. You
have both testified, have you not, that a political settlement
is the only way to achieve success, a political settlement
between the Iraqi factions is the only way to achieve success
in Iraq? Have you not testified to that?
General Hayden. Senator, that is absolutely correct. I will
add one caveat. Without sanding off the edges----
Senator Levin. Add all the caveats you want.
General Hayden.--you put on there, there is a certain level
of security required to create the conditions for a political
settlement.
Senator Levin. I understand that.
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. With that one condition, that a political
settlement is essential, it is the key to a success in Iraq?
General Maples. I agree.
General Hayden. I agree.
Senator Levin. I thank our friend, who always espouses what
we all aspire to, which is bipartisanship.
Chairman Warner. The chair will very generously give you an
added minute.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, sir. You have a big heart.
Thank you. This series of discussions, Senator Graham,
Senator Warner, Senator Levin, has been most interesting. I
appreciate your answer because obviously this will not be
solved without an Iraqi political settlement, but if there is
no security there will never be a political settlement, nor
will the economy have an opportunity to rebound. So it has to
be all of that together.
These are tough questions--I was thinking about it--because
in one sense we do hear, as you said, that the presence of
American forces makes some Iraqis angry. But on the other hand,
General Hayden, how are we going to get that center to come
together and stand up against the extremists if there is no
security? Right now I think we are critical to that security,
because the Iraqis cannot handle it on their own.
I did want to ask in that regard--incidentally, I thought
you were both very compelling in response to Chairman Warner's
initial questioning, I believe, about the consequences of a
failure in Iraq for us. We have a lot on the line here. So we
tried to talk a little bit about how do we succeed. I believe
you both indicated that you felt that the military transition
teams, that is the Americans embedded with the ISFs, were one
of the most successful things happening there now in terms of
our involvement. Am I right about that?
General Hayden. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. General Abizaid said that today, too.
Therefore would it be fair to assume that--and we talked about
this today, too--that the more that we can do, the more likely
we are sooner to get the Iraqis to a point where they can take
over from us on the security front and we can begin to lessen
the number of American troops we have there?
From an intelligence point of view--I am not trying to get
you into policy here--I do not see how we can increase the
number of American troops embedded with the ISFs, which seems
to be working now, without increasing the total number of
American forces in Iraq, because if we are taking them from
elsewhere is that not going to leave that elsewhere, like Anbar
Province, subject to catastrophe or at least chaos?
In other words, based on intelligence, on that question,
the narrow question of increasing the number of American troops
embedded, would you say we need more American troops there?
General Maples. Sir, it really depends on the analysis by
the command of the troop-to-task ratio that they have to have.
They have to lay out the tasks they have to accomplish and how
many troops will be required to successfully accomplish those
tasks.
Senator Lieberman. I understand, you are not prepared to
answer.
General Maples. Senator, I am reluctant, but I will give
you perhaps a factor that will be used, that is very important.
As you do that, you actually increase the combat power of the
Iraqi unit that you have stiffened, so to speak, with the U.S.
presence.
Senator Lieberman. Exactly.
General Maples. So you may actually be able to buy a great
deal more of combat power and buy down the political cost of
our presence.
Senator Lieberman. Exactly, because our troops are in those
cases within the Iraqi forces and they become a force
multiplier for the Iraqis. We will come back to that.
I want to ask you about Iran, because you both talked about
Iranian activities in Iraq being significant and growing. Can
you talk a little bit more about that? What are they doing? How
many Iranians would you say are in Iraq now and what are they
up to?
General Hayden. Sir, I can give you more details in closed
session. There is a significant Iranian presence in Iraq. I do
not want in any way to say that all of that is in any way
illegitimate. Much of that would be the presence that any
neighboring state with interests in Iraq would have. But as
time has gone on, the amount of Iranian involvement with the
Shiite militias of all stripes, which has been quite a new
development, the provision to them--let me just say this in a
general way--the provision to them of capabilities that have
been used against the coalition has been quite striking.
I will admit personally, Senator, that I have come late to
this conclusion, but I now have all the zeal of a convert as to
the ill effect that the Iranians are having on the situation in
Iraq.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, absolutely. I appreciate your
saying that. I would like to go into it further in closed
session.
Let me give you a statement and then ask you both to
respond to it, which is that in Iraq, Iran has absolutely the
opposite goals that we have. Our goal is to help the Iraqis
form a free, unified, stable, multi-ethnic government. The
Iranians want just the opposite. They benefit from the chaos
now and in fact if the whole thing fell apart they would
probably come in, either directly or through the Shiite
militias, and control a big part of Iraq.
True or false?
General Hayden. Tough, tough question for an Iranian
policymaker. The chaos there aids and abets them in their
broader ``relationship,'' that word in quotes, with the United
States. Their perception is it punishes us, it ties us down, it
makes us less capable of doing other things. That is their
perception, I believe.
On the other hand, I can see this happening in the Iranian
equivalent of our National Security Council, Senator. On the
other hand, I do not think they want Iraq to fracture. I think
they want it to be unified. A democratic Iraq will be an Iraq
in which the Shiite have a reasonably strong voice.
Senator Lieberman. This is a really interesting question,
because I guess the question is, because we know that Iraqi
Shiites are different from the Iranian Shiites. Obviously the
Iranians are Persians, the Iraqis are Arabs, but they have a
theological difference, too. So would they really want a
unified democratic, presumably pro-American, Iraq? I ask all
these questions and I am going to ask you to respond, General
Maples, because I am concerned as we begin to raise the
possibility of talking directly with Iran about Iraq, because I
think I worry that we have very different ambitions there, very
different goals.
It is one thing to talk to the other Sunni Arab countries
to play a larger role--the Saudis, the Egyptians, the
Jordanians, the Gulf countries--because they have similar and
in fact anti-Iranian views, General, but I never would hesitate
to talk to anybody because, thank God, we are a strong enough
country to talk. But I would be real skeptical about anything
good coming out of the talks with the Iranians, particularly
now after the Europeans have spent 3 years negotiating with
them on their nuclear program and they have not done anything.
You had a great phrase. It was a ``triumphal''--what did
you call it?
General Hayden. ``Dangerous triumphalism.''
Senator Lieberman. The Iranians are beginning to show a
dangerous triumphalism about their role in the Middle East.
They are beginning to think of themselves as dislodging us, and
that is bad news for the region and for the world, and of
course for us.
General Maples, did you want to respond, and then my time
is up.
General Maples. Sir, our assessment is that Iran would like
to have a stable government in Iraq, but they clearly want it
to be Shiite-led.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Do you have a question, Senator Levin? I
thought I would ask just one.
I was particularly struck with your observation that the
de-Baathification, or exactly how you phrased it, is still a
very formidable deep concern among the Iraqi people, which
contributes to their insecurity and their fear to step forward
as individual citizens and try and take more responsibility in
their neighborhood and other foras. Am I correct in that?
General Hayden. Sir, I think what you are saying is that I
would say the course of de-Baathification is a current, vibrant
issue for the present government.
Chairman Warner. Do you concur in that? General?
General Maples. I do, sir. I think the fear is a return of
the Baathists to power. On the other side, the fact that the
former Baathists are disenfranchised and have no ability to
contribute is an issue on the Sunni side.
Chairman Warner. Let me ask this question. Assuming that--
and in no way do I infer by the question that any measure of
due process should be denied Saddam Hussein. But we have
followed this rather extraordinary exercise of their concept of
due process. A sentence of death has been pronounced.
Presumably the appellate process and other things will take
place.
If after the flow of due process in an orderly way he is
hung or otherwise put to death, would that help alleviate this
serious problem of fear that the Baathists might return?
General Hayden. I cannot rule out that it could, Senator. I
will say that the capture of Saddam--at that time, if you
recall, the issue there was Sunni violence. It was far less of
Shiite violence. It was all the provocations from al Qaeda and
so on. The capture of Saddam did not in and of itself reduce
Sunni violence at that time. So I would say perhaps it is a
possibility, but not a sure thing certainly.
Chairman Warner. Do you have any views, General?
General Maples. Sir, I would expect that, particularly from
a Shiite viewpoint, right now that carrying out a sentence
would probably not eliminate the fear of a return of Baathists
to control of Iraq.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Gentlemen, we have had an excellent hearing. We will now go
into closed session in SH-219. We are adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator John Ensign
counterdrug
1. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Maples and General Hayden,
given the many problems in Afghanistan associated with the cultivation
of poppies there, would it be worth instituting a program similar to
what the U.S. did in Turkey in the 1980s whereby we purchased the
poppies to keep them off the open market? Please elaborate on the pros
and cons of undertaking such a program for Afghanistan.
General Maples. Widespread poppy cultivation in Afghanistan remains
a difficult problem for the Afghan Government and the international
community. DIA judges a program of purchasing opium to keep it off the
open market ultimately would likely increase rather than reduce the
amount of illicit opium available for the drug trade.
Supporters of a program to buy opium from farmers at farm-gate
prices (the price paid to farmers at the time of harvest) argue all of
the opium could be purchased for the amount spent to eradicate less
than a tenth of the 2006 poppy crop. These supporters also believe
Afghanistan would be competitive with other countries in producing
licit opium for the pharmaceutical industry. In addition, supporters
argue the poppy crop could be more easily reduced if it were regulated;
noting those farmers with cultivation permits would not defend illicit
producers.
DIA assesses a farmer compensation program would be very costly for
donors and the licit opium market. The program would be difficult to
enforce owing to geography, instability, and corruption and it would
encourage farmers to expand cultivation.
Buying all of Afghanistan's illicit opium would require a
major financial investment. The United Nations estimates the
farm-gate value of Afghanistan's 2006 opium production to be
$760 million. Unless international donors are willing to
subsidize an expensive annual program to purchase and destroy
the entire crop, a compensation program of this magnitude could
be financed only through licit sales of pharmaceutical opiates.
The influx of additional opium most likely would flood the
medical market, which probably is not flexible enough to
accommodate Afghanistan's production while competing with
prices drug traffickers offer.
Afghanistan's geographically dispersed poppy cultivation and
labor-intensive harvesting process would complicate efforts to
prevent diversion of licit opium to higher paying drug markets.
A lack of government security forces and insurgent influence in
areas of elevated opium production would impede access to
farmers. Widespread official corruption would also hinder
efforts to regulate the industry.
Creation of a compensation program would provide a strong
incentive for many new farmers to begin planting poppies and
for many existing poppy farmers to increase their cultivation
because poppies still would be much more profitable than other
licit crops. Afghan farmers could substantially expand poppy
cultivation beyond the 3 percent of arable land currently used,
thereby increasing the cost of compensation.
General Hayden. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
afghanistan
2. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Maples, I understand that we
are losing ground in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Taliban is gaining more
influence and authority while Karzai's government is losing the hearts
and minds of the people. What efforts are being done to address this
matter?
General Maples. The Afghan Government and the international
community have made efforts to address the threat posed by declining
popular support for President Karzai's administration. DIA judges root
causes of decreasing support for the central government include fear of
a resurgent Taliban, doubts that the Afghan Government can defend
against this threat, concerns about endemic government corruption, the
slow pace of reconstruction, and the lack of economic opportunities.
The international community and the Afghan Government are addressing
each of these factors.
Efforts to Improve Security. With the support of other
members of the international community, the United States is
training and equipping the Afghan National Army as well as
other elements of the Afghan national security forces. However,
these forces remain challenged by resource shortages, high
attrition rates, corruption, and tense relations among security
forces. NATO's International Security Assistance Force also
conducted a series of counterinsurgency operations this year
aimed at denying insurgents safe-haven and freedom of movement
in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Gains made this summer and
fall, however, have largely been offset by robust insurgent
recruitment and propaganda efforts.
Efforts to Improve Governance. The Attorney General of
Afghanistan is in the process of conducting a campaign aimed at
addressing corruption within the government. DIA believes this
campaign will help restore some confidence in the legitimacy of
the administration. In addition, President Karzai has taken
steps to replace corrupt or ineffective governors, including
reassigning the former Governor of Herat, Ismail Khan, whom
many saw as a divisive figure. However, this effort remains
limited by the lack of educated, capable, and trustworthy
political leaders.
Development and Reconstruction Efforts. The United States,
with support from the international community and
nongovernmental organizations, has worked to extend
reconstruction and development assistance to garner popular
support. This includes establishing provincial reconstruction
teams that engage with the local people to provide development
projects: paving of the Ring Road around Afghanistan and
numerous community aid projects. Unfortunately, the unstable
security situation, particularly in the south and southeast,
has slowed some of these efforts. Finally, the U.S. Agency for
International Development's Alternative Livelihoods Program,
designed to accelerate economic growth in Afghanistan's
principal poppy-producing provinces and at-risk areas, has
shown progress in irrigation development, road construction,
cash-for-work, and agricultural assistance. Despite these
efforts, the continued dearth of alternative economic
opportunities may have contributed to record poppy cultivation
in 2006.
iraqi death squads
3. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Maples, did our efforts to
train Iraqi personnel as law enforcement and military create recruits
for the death squads that have been tormenting many Iraqi communities?
General Maples. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]