[Senate Hearing 109-900]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-900
AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS: CROSS-CONTINENTAL PROGRESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida, Chairman
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cooke, Jennifer, G., co-director, Africa Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Frazer, Hon. Jendayi E., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
Department of State............................................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Holt, Victoria K., senior associate, the Henry L. Stimson Center. 33
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement. 1
Pierson, Hon. Lloyd O., Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S.
Agency for Development......................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Hon. Jendayi Frazer to written questions submitted by
Senator Richard Lugar.......................................... 45
.................................................................
(iii)
AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS
AND INSTITUTIONS:
CROSS-CONTINENTAL PROGRESS
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mel Martinez
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Martinez, Feingold, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Martinez. I call this subcommittee hearing to order
and thank all of you for coming. This is a hearing of the
Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. We want to welcome to the subcommittee hearing this
afternoon, all of you, especially my ranking member, Senator
Feingold.
Let me first thank our distinguished witnesses who have
joined us today for coming. Last month we unexpectedly had to
postpone the hearing because of the terrible storms that we had
in Florida, and I had to return home to see about those. But I
appreciate your understanding that situation and your
flexibility in rescheduling it for today, and I want also to
thank the ranking member for his flexibility and very much
thank you for coming today.
This afternoon our focus is on African organizations and
institutions, looking at cross-continental progress. By cross-
continental progress, we are talking about the positive trend
we have seen in recent years with African initiative, the
commitment and consistency of African leadership, the
development and demonstration of African resolve.
As our panelists will discuss this afternoon, this
initiative and this resolve have led to the formation of
unprecedented and historic African-led organizations and
institutions, most notably the establishment of the African
Union. In just a few short years, the AU has emerged as the
leading pan-African organization of states, comprised of all
states in Africa with the exception of Morocco.
At its core, the AU is about African leadership and African
resolve. It is about the potential and promise for African
nations to collectively increase good governance, democracy,
stability, and economic growth. The shared goals and shared
ambitions embodied in the AU are extremely valuable and
commendable. I am confident the AU will increasingly play a
leading role in addressing and advancing key priorities facing
the continent.
Equally positive are the efforts and initiatives being
advanced by the regional economic communities. Initially
established as economic bodies, several of the regional
economic communities have launched conflict resolution and
peacekeeping operations. For example, the Economic Community of
West African States has played a central mediating role in
nearly every civil war in West Africa since its creation.
An additional positive development is the innovation being
advanced by the New Partnership for Africa's Development. In
its initial years, NEPAD has successfully identified projects
and programs aimed at spurring economic growth, political-
economic integration, as well as good governance and security.
Collectively, these African-led organizations and institutions
hold great promise for the future.
Together these organizations can truly advance and sustain
good governance, democracy, stability, and prosperity. At the
same time, however, these organizations and their leadership
are encountering great challenges. Despite laudable and
commendable success, these institutions are being tested. Their
leaders are being tested. From institutional capacity to
leadership difficulties and resource constraints, there are
real hurdles.
There are also credible concerns about the apparent
multiplicity of organizations, their overlapping memberships,
and seemingly conflicting areas of responsibility. These are
hurdles and questions that require urgent attention for
continental progress and advancement to continue, and that is
what I encourage our distinguished witnesses to outline and
discuss this afternoon.
Africa is at a crucial and critical crossroads. The
challenges and opportunities are immense. I encourage our
panelists to address where things are going, where they are
working, why they are working, look at where U.S. priorities
and resources are assigned, and why, and finally outline
prospects for the future and how we can help. Long-term
sustainable success in Africa will undoubtedly depend on the
strength and resolve of African leadership and African
initiative. Our challenge is to provide the right kind of
support and the right kind of assistance, targeted in
meaningful, balanced, and welcomed areas.
Now, I would like to briefly introduce our witnesses. We
have two very distinguished panels before us. We will hear from
two administration officials, Ms. Jendayi Frazer, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Mr. Lloyd Pierson,
Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development for African Affairs.
In our second panel, we are pleased to have Ms. Jennifer
Cooke, co-director of the Africa Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. We also welcome Ms.
Victoria Holt, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center
here in Washington. We look forward to a lively discussion. We
welcome all of you, and before turning it over to our
witnesses, I would like to invite my distinguished colleague
and ranking member for his opening remarks.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first, for your
excellent leadership of the subcommittee, and second, for your
kind words about me and our work together. I will forgo a
formal opening statement because we want to hear from you. We
have four votes starting I think at 3:30.
Senator Martinez. That is right.
Senator Feingold. But let me just quickly say that I have
been on this subcommittee for 13 years. I have been a chairman
for those wonderful 18 months when we were in the majority,
ranking member the rest of the time.
I see these organizations as some of the most interesting,
exciting, and challenging aspects of work on Africa. It holds
great hope for the future, but there are enormous challenges
and this is an important subject to take up, and I look forward
to hearing the testimony and hopefully having time to ask some
questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
At this time we would call on Secretary Frazer for your
opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Frazer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you along side my colleague, Lloyd Pierson, at this
hearing to discuss our work with the African Union and
subregional organizations to advance freedom, peace and
prosperity in Africa.
It is my first Senate testimony as Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs. I am very pleased to be here,
especially on this important topic.
I have a longer written statement, Mr. Chairman, and ask
that I be allowed to submit it for the record.
Senator Martinez. Without objection.
Ms. Frazer. Thank you. I firmly believe there has never
been a more auspicious time than now to consolidate the
progress and promise of the continent. The emergence of an
activist African Union with a modern, forward-looking agenda is
one of the most important developments on the continent in
decades. We have embraced a U.S.-Africa partnership that will
allow the United States and the African Union to jointly
advance our many shared key goals, including promoting good
governance, social and economic development, combatting
terrorism, and ending and preventing conflict. Most
importantly, the African Union and some of the regional and
subregional organizations in Africa are demonstrating
increasingly effective leadership in advancing these goals.
Helping to strengthen further those organizations to
prepare them to be fully effective for the 21st century, so
they can address Africa's challenge is vital to U.S. interests.
Our cooperative efforts with the African Union and
subregional organizations generally focus on the following key
areas: First, diplomatic cooperation to prevent conflicts when
possible and to resolve conflicts that have broken out; second,
support for regional or subregional military interventions when
there is no other alternative to end violence; third,
assistance for capacity-building and institution-strengthening;
fourth, support for efforts to promote trade, economic growth
and development; and fifth, increasing cooperation in other
areas ranging from counterterrorism to disease eradication to
the promotion of good governance.
I would like to very briefly review the efforts made by the
African Union and subregional organizations, the support we
have provided, and areas of needed future focus.
The African Union and some of the subregional
organizations, particularly the Economic Community of West
African States, have joined in mitigating conflicts through
peace support operations and diplomatic missions. African
nations already provide close to 30 percent of United Nations
peacekeeping forces worldwide, with 4 African countries--
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa--among the top 10 UN
troop contributors. In peacekeeping, African forces, rather
than non-African ones, are more easily deployed in African
states.
In cases where political agreement and preparations for a
UN mission oftentimes involve months of delay, a deployment by
peacekeeping forces from the African Union or subregional
organizations like ECOWAS is often a vital response tool. The
United States supports African peacekeeping in two major ways,
through direct assistance to ongoing operations and through
programs to enhance the capacity of African peacekeepers.
The Bush administration has assisted the African Union with
operations first in Burundi and more recently in Darfur, Sudan.
We also supported ECOWAS in Liberia in 2003. In Burundi, we
supported the African Union's first operation, which was called
AMIB, contributing some $11 million to the AU mission as it
monitored peace agreements reached between the former Tutsi-
dominated government and its three main Hutu rebel groups. The
United States has provided a major share of the African Union
mission in Darfur, known as AMIS, funding over $160 million. We
have also provided over $768 million in humanitarian relief in
Darfur.
In Darfur, the AU forces have much reduced large-scale
organized violence in areas where they are deployed. Some
violence continues as a result of banditry, rebel attacks, and
janjaweed actions. But among those options that we must
consider in Darfur is clearly the possibility of increased
support by the United Nations or perhaps a transition to a UN
mandate.
We are consulting with the African Union and our partners
closely on such options. We expect to support logistics,
communications, training, and other assistance to the AU and
the regional peacekeeping standby brigades. For example, over
the past 4 years, we have provided over $11 million in
equipment to set up an ECOWAS peacekeeping logistics depot in
Freetown, Sierra Leone. Equipment from this depot has been
vital in supplying ECOWAS and UN forces in Liberia, Cote
d'Ivoire, as well as the AU forces in Darfur, and we are now
working on provision of equipment for an AU depot as well. We
are strengthening AU and ECOWAS communications capacity. The
United States has provided over $10 million worth of computer,
radio, and other communications links to help ensure that
ECOWAS member states can communicate smoothly and that the AU
forces have the radio equipment they need to be effective.
We also support the efforts of the African Union to boost
its counterterrorist capabilities. We will be working with our
African partners to encourage the provision of adequate
funding, personnel, and support to the regional
counterterrorism training at the African Union's African Center
for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers, Algeria,
and the AU's planned early warning center to counter terrorist
threats.
We are increasing our engagement with subregional
organizations based on the regional economic communities. These
regional organizations are recognized by the African Union as
pillars of a continental architecture. They play a lead role in
regional stability and will be the focus for regional African
peacekeeping brigades of the AU's African standby force. Sub-
regional organizations can apply neighborly persuasion and even
military force to stabilize a country before it slips into
conflict. An important factor in the work of subregional
organizations is leadership by a strong regional country, such
as South Africa in the Southern African Development Community,
or Nigeria in ECOWAS, two countries which combined have 50
percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. A strong lead nation seems
to ensure a more effective subregional organization, although,
at times, it may also inhibit open and thorough discussion and
examination of alternative policies. We will support
rationalizing Africa's subregional organizations to eliminate
overlapping memberships and responsibilities and reduce costs
of maintaining headquarters and staff. We will also support
efforts by the AU and subregional organizations to speed up
conclusion of the operational agreements. ECOWAS, the Economic
Community of the West African States, has one of the
continent's most effective military arms. Its deployments have
served as precursors to UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia,
Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone, with ECOWAS still retaining a
presence in both Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. In addition to the
funds contributed to the ECOWAS efforts in Cote d'Ivoire, we
contributed over $90 million to ECOWAS for its outstanding
efforts in Liberia.
In Southern Africa, we look to the Southern Africa
Development Community to continue regional economic growth,
stability, and prosperity; and we are looking at efforts to re-
engage with the SADC troika in the near future.
In East Africa, our work with Kenya and Uganda on a north-
south peace agreement in Sudan is a model for what can be
accomplished by U.S. engagement with Africa's subregional
organizations. We are also increasing our work with the AU's
New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD, and the
subregional organizations to support regional economic
integration, good governance, and prosperity throughout the
continent.
Regional economic integration is crucial to increasing
trade and investment and to breaking down barriers to trade and
investment in order to drive growth and prosperity. In fiscal
years 2002 to 2005, we have provided nearly $5 million to the
African Union and to subregional organizations to advance
regional trade and investment, to advance climate reform
practices, to develop regional financial markets, and to
provide technical assistance to increase trade and the free
flow of goods, services, and capital.
We provide over $100 million a year in funding for the
African Development Bank, which promotes economic development
and regional integration across Africa. The African Union and
the subregional organizations have made major progress in the
past 5 years. We will continue our work with the UN to help us
strengthen the AU as an institution and as a continental actor
and to support Africa's subregional organizations. We will also
work to support commitments by African governments,
organizations, and non-African partners to ensure stability,
development, and good governance.
In conclusion, our vision is that African nations and
peoples can enjoy the fruits of peace, democracy, and
prosperity and good health working through the African regional
and subregional organizations. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, I look forward to answering any of your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Frazer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I am delighted to have the opportunity to appear before you today,
in my first Senate testimony as Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, to discuss our work with the African Union and African
subregional organizations to advance freedom, peace, and prosperity in
Africa.
I firmly believe there has never been a more auspicious time than
now to consolidate the progress and promise of the continent. The
emergence of an activist African Union (AU) with a modern, forward-
looking agenda is one of the most important developments on the
continent in decades. The AU offers a considerably more dynamic vision
of the future than did its predecessor, the Organization of African
Unity. The timing could not be better, coming as it does when we have
embraced a U.S.-Africa partnership that will allow the United States
and the AU to jointly advance our many shared key goals including
promoting prosperity, good governance, social and economic development,
and combating terrorism.
Most importantly, the African Union and some of the regional and
subregional organizations in Africa are demonstrating increasingly
effective leadership in advancing these goals. Helping to strengthen
further those organizations--to prepare them to be fully effective for
the 21st century so they can address Africa's challenges--is vital to
U.S. interests.
Our cooperative efforts with the AU and subregional organizations
generally focus on the following key areas:
Diplomatic cooperation to prevent conflicts when possible,
and to resolve conflicts that have broken out.
Support for regional or subregional military interventions
when there is no other alternative to end violence.
Assistance for capacity building and institution-
strengthening.
Support for efforts to promote trade, economic growth and
development.
Increasing cooperation in a broad range of areas key to
achieving peace and prosperity in Africa, ranging from counter-
terrorism, to disease eradication, to promotion of good governance.
Let me review briefly the efforts made by the AU and the
subregional organizations, the support we have provided, and areas of
needed future focus:
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The African Union and some of the subregional organizations,
particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
have joined in mitigating conflicts through peace support operations
and diplomatic missions. African states have the capacity to staff
peace support operations: many do not realize that African nations
already provide close to 30 percent of United Nations peacekeeping
forces worldwide, with four African countries--Ethiopia, Nigeria,
Ghana, and South Africa--among the top ten U.N. troop contributors.
African states and organizations quite reasonably prefer that
African forces, rather than non-African intervention, be the first
approach to conflict response on the continent and we support that. In
fact, in cases where political agreement and preparations for a U.N.
Mission oftentimes involve months of delay, a deployment by
peacekeeping forces from the African Union or other subregional
organization is often the only response tool available.
The United States supports Africa peacekeeping in two major ways:
through direct assistance to ongoing operations and through programs to
enhance the capacity of African peacekeepers. In addition to U.S.
support for global U.N. peacekeeping operations--where the United
States currently provides 27 percent of the funding for such
operations--the United States has assisted the African Union to stand
up operations first in Burundi and more recently in Darfur, Sudan. We
also supported ECOWAS in Liberia in 2003 and Sierra Leone in 1998-2000.
In Burundi, we supported the AU's first such operation (AMIB),
which was crucial in advancing the peace process and monitoring peace
agreements reached between the former Tutsi-dominated government and
three main Hutu rebel groups. That Burundi operation transitioned into
a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which successfully paved the
way for elections that have installed a new government and Parliament.
We contributed some $11 million to the AU's Burundi effort, in addition
to the money provided in support of the U.N. operation once the U.N.
took charge. The AU did a good job in this first effort, but could not
have succeeded in this very important endeavor without donor support.
In Darfur, Sudan, the AU has taken the next big step by taking on
the daunting task of managing the deployment needed to seek peace in
Darfur. Its staff and officials clearly have learned important lessons
from their Burundi experience and their capabilities have improved.
Still, they cannot do this alone. International partners are necessary,
and the United States has shown that it is such a partner. We have put
forward a major share of the funding needed to bring peace to Darfur,
including providing over $160 million in funding to support the AU
deployment in Darfur. To date, we have provided over $768 million in
humanitarian relief in Darfur. It is vital that the AU effort succeed,
and we are helping to ensure that it does. Our logistics support for
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is key to its success, and we
will not halt our PKO-funded support.
Separately, we are providing expertise in ways that help enhance
the AU's capacity. The AU welcomes the opportunity for its staff to
develop cooperative working relationships with non-African governments
and organizations, such as the U.S. and NATO. Through NATO, we and our
NATO partners are providing training expertise and airlift that are
vital to the AU operation.
The African Union effort in Darfur has demonstrated why deployment
of African troops is a viable option. It has also underscored the need
for us to continue to work closely with the African Union to address
continuing needs related to command and control that must be addressed
to increase the effectiveness of AU interventions. The African Union
showed that its majority Muslim (three of four major troop contributors
have heavily Muslim forces--Nigeria--50 percent of its contingent,
Gambia--95 percent, Senegal--90 percent; Rwanda is only 1 percent)
forces are best suited to address the complex social and political
issues, in a context in which virtually all of the population is
Muslim. The result has been impressive: where the African Union forces
are deployed, large-scale organized violence has largely diminished. In
many cases, the African Union commanders are also engaged in mitigating
local disputes and in facilitating urgently needed humanitarian relief.
While violence continues as a result of banditry, rebel attacks, and
janjaweed actions, the African Union forces are playing a crucial role
to help bring about an end to violence. To help ensure greater peace
and stability in Darfur, we must simultaneously increase our support to
the African Union forces in Darfur (AMIS) while working closely with
the AU and other donors to press the parties to make additional
political progress and determine next steps. Among those options that
must be considered is a possible increased support role for the United
Nations, or perhaps a transition to a U.N. mandate. We are consulting
with the AU and our partners closely on such options.
The African Union's ongoing mediation of talks between the Sudanese
government and the Darfur rebels also highlights the value of the AU's
dynamic, holistic approach to conflict resolution. African Union
political offices and missions also have had some success in dealing
with crises and helping to advance development of democracy in the
region. For example, the AU is committed to sustaining the peace
process in Cote d'Ivoire, begun earlier by ECOWAS and to which, I might
add, the United States contributed over nine million dollars.
A key element of building capacity for the AU flows from our
intended support for the AU's Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the
national militaries that will make up that force. The AU plans for the
ASF to provide both a rapid deployment capability to prevent mass
violence or a longer-term force to sustain a peace agreement. Primary
to our efforts is the African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) program that provides training to African regional
organizations and national peacekeepers. ACOTA training activities will
continue with Ghana, Senegal, Kenya, Mozambique, Gabon and others,
while adding additional partner countries via funding through the
Global Peace Operations Initiative. As part of the worldwide GPOI
effort, the United States expects to provide training to at least
40,000 African peacekeepers over 5 years.
Training peacekeepers is not enough, so we will also support
logistics, communications, training and other assistance to the AU and
standby brigades. For example, over the past 4 years we have provided
over $11 million in equipment to establish and stock an ECOWAS
peacekeeping logistics depot in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Equipment from
the depot in turn has been vital in supplying ECOWAS and U.N. forces in
Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire, as well as AU forces in Darfur. The
demonstrated value of that depot has shown that it will be worthwhile
to provide equipment for the AU depot as well.
Additionally we are strengthening AU and ECOWAS communications
capacity. The United States has provided some $10 million worth of
computer, radio, and other communications links to help ensure that
ECOWAS member states can communicate smoothly, and that AU forces have
the radio equipment they need to be effective. On the training front,
we look forward to extending ACOTA multinational exercises to willing
regional organizations in the near future and have recently provided
support to peacekeeping training centers in Ghana and Mali.
Our ties with the African Union are growing stronger. We currently
coordinate with the AU office in New York, including on U.N. matters.
Congressional action and an Executive Order by President Bush have
placed the AU on the list of Public International Organizations,
entitled to official G visas and civil immunity for official acts, and
the AU plans to open a Washington office this year. We plan to assist
the AU in that effort as much as possible. The AU office will expedite
and enhance contacts between the AU and Congress and with executive
branch agencies. The AU also plans to have the staff of its Washington
office reach out to the African diaspora and to the business community,
and engage groups with a focus on Africa.
The Director of the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, Dr. Stephen
D. Krasner, hosted the first Planning Policy Talks with the AU on July
29, 2005 to help identify policy challenges and capacity needs. The
talks covered a broad range of topics under the headings of democracy
and governance, the Millennium Challenge Account, post-conflict
reconstruction, and counter terrorism. The talks, which we hope will
occur biannually, provide another vehicle for policy exchanges and
information exchanges on sharing how we can support capacity building
within the AU and among the member states.
We fully support the efforts of the AU to boost its counter
terrorism (CT) capabilities. The AU has developed a strategy to create
both an early warning center to counter terrorist threats and a
regional CT training center as part of their CT center's mission. We
support these goals, and are exploring ways to support these efforts
with training opportunities, resources to increase CT cooperation in
the region, and the provision of expert advice and guidance. We already
have provided some $250,000, for example, to help set up an anti-money
laundering and anti-terrorist finance assistance program in West Africa
through West Africa's Inter-Governmental Anti-Money Laundering Group.
Most important, we will be working with our African partners to
encourage the provision of adequate funding, personnel and support to
the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers.
The Department will be supporting a conference in February at the AU
Center that will draw resources from trans-Saharan countries into the
Center's mission.
SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION
As we work with the African Union and subregional organizations to
accelerate economic progress, we will support the development of
African mechanisms that help to mitigate crises before they fester and
erupt into conflict. Prevention and mitigation are ultimately far less
costly to both the people of Africa and to their partners working with
them toward a safe and free continent. The AU has several mechanisms to
address this, including eminent persons who work to mediate crises;
regional workshops on best practices in democracy and elections; and
training and deployment of AU election monitors. As a result, the
United States has the opportunity to work with the AU and subregional
organizations to bring an end to conflict on the continent.
The administration's approach to work with lead African mediators
and multilaterally with the United Nations, African Union, and
subregional organizations like ECOWAS has worked. As the member states
demonstrate buy-in, I strongly support increasing our engagement with
subregional organizations in the four distinct sub-regions of sub-
Saharan Africa--Central, Western, Eastern and Southern Africa. The
subregional organizations based on the Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) are recognized by the African Union as pillars of a continental
architecture. They play a lead role in regional stability and will be
the focus for regional African peacekeeping brigades of the AU's
``African Stand By Force.''
Sub-regional organizations can apply neighborly persuasion and even
military force to stabilize a country before it slips into conflict.
There are disadvantages, however, when affected states feel their
neighbor has taken too much interest in their internal affairs. Another
important factor in the work of subregional organizations is leadership
by a strong regional country, such as South Africa in the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) or Nigeria in ECOWAS (two
countries which combined have 50 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's GDP.)
A strong lead nation seems to ensure a more effective subregional
organization, but at times could also inhibit open and thorough
discussion and examination of alternative policies.
We will support efforts by the AU and subregional organizations to
speed up conclusion of their operational agreements, to clarify
responsibilities and reduce costs while sharpening their focus.
The activities of three of the more developed subregional
organizations illustrate issues they are tackling and the character of
our engagement and partnership:
ECOWAS--THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
Nigeria plays a lead role, with French-speaking Senegal senior
among ECOWAS's Francophone members. ECOWAS has one of the continent's
most effective military arms. Its deployments have served as precursors
to U.N. peacekeeping missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra
Leone, with ECOWAS still retaining a presence in both Liberia and Cote
d'Ivoire. President Obasanjo of Nigeria has both a role within ECOWAS
and within the African Union (as Annual Chair of the AU Assembly),
which has illuminated some policy disconnects, particularly between the
AU's Peace and Security Commission and ECOWAS, and between Nigeria and
the office of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary. In addition to the funds
contributed to the ECOWAS effort in Cote d'Ivoire, we contributed over
$19 million to ECOWAS for its outstanding effort in Liberia.
SADC--THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
South Africa, the economic powerhouse of the continent, is the
dominant player in SADC. The United States and South Africa have a
shared interest in promoting peace and stability on the continent. Our
already strong bilateral relationship is expanding to include greater
military-to-military cooperation, including planning for training for
peacekeeping operations. Our Ambassador to Botswana, where SADC has its
headquarters, also serves as the Secretary of State's Representative to
SADC and works closely with the organization. An effective SADC,
working to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the continent is
vital to U.S. national interests.
IGAD--THE INTER GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT
Somalia continues to be a significant concern for the IGAD member-
states of East Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The
government of Kenya, under the auspices of IGAD, chaired the Somalia
National Reconciliation Conference, which concluded in October 2004
following the formation of a national parliament, election of a
transitional president and formation of a transnational cabinet--
collectively known as the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions
(TFls). Although Somali parties remain divided by key issues that have
prevented further progress in establishing the TFls inside Somalia,
IGAD member states continue to play a significant role in the ongoing
political process. The international community, including the United
States, is urging Somali leaders to reach a consensus agreement on
these key issues, including how to address continued insecurity
throughout Somalia, through dialog at the cabinet and parliamentary
levels. The United States has contributed some $750,000 to IGAD's
efforts to bring peace to Somalia. There is much yet to be done, but we
will continue to coordinate our engagement in Somalia with our regional
and international partners to support the establishment of effective
governance in Somalia. IGAD also played a key mediation role in the
Sudan North-South peace process.
ENGAGING WITH AU INSTITUTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Africa is not a continent of conflicts, despair, and disease. The
bulk of the continent is not in crisis. Democratic elections are
increasingly the norm, and economic growth is at its highest levels in
nearly a decade. We are deeply engaged with African countries and
institutions to support Africa's efforts to consolidate and build on
the remarkable progress of recent years, as well as to prevent the
outbreak of new conflict. Most of the more than three billion dollars
in assistance that we provided to Africa last year supported bilateral
programs at the country level. We also are working with the AU's New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the RECs in support of
their programs to promote regional economic integration, good
governance, and prosperity throughout the continent.
The RECs have a major role to play, not only in peace support
operations, but also in promoting the regional economic integration
that is so crucial to increasing trade and investment, which will drive
growth and prosperity. In many respects the RECs have not advanced as
far on the economic front as on the peace and security front, and
further progress could be enhanced were there to be some
rationalization of the current overlapping REC structure. However, we
are seeing sustained efforts to break down barriers to trade and
investment through, for example, customs unions and trade agreements by
the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East
African Community (EAC), and others. Another example is the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Historically this was just
a monetary union made up of the countries with currencies tied to the
French Franc. In recent years, however, these countries have begun to
work together in other ways as well. In fiscal year 2003, the United
States contributed $250,000 to help the WAEMU improve its member
countries' government debt issuance practices, and in recent years,
FY2002-FY2005, we have provided nearly $5 million to the AU and to
subregional organizations--WAEMU, COMESA, and the EAC--to advance
regional trade and investment climate reform practices, develop
regional financial markets, and provide technical assistance to
increase trade and the free flow of goods, services and capital.
At the continent-wide level, we provide over $100 million a year in
funding for the African Development Bank, which in turn promotes
economic development across Africa, giving special attention to
national and multinational projects that promote regional integration.
We hope to increase our engagement with both the AU and RECs to
help build their capacity to accelerate economic growth and poverty
alleviation through strategically targeted financial and technical
support for their programs to promote trade, investment climate reform,
transparency and good governance, sound management of natural
resources, and social development.
The United States and its G8 partners have an ongoing dialog with
NEPAD and have made far-reaching commitments to develop enhanced
partnerships with those countries that demonstrate commitment to AU/
NEPAD's principles of sound economic, political, and social governance.
In addition to our many bilateral programs that support the goals and
objectives of the AU and NEPAD at a country level, we are supporting
the realization of NEPAD programs such as the Comprehensive African
Agricultural Development Plan and NEPAD's efforts to facilitate and
accelerate regional infrastructure development. Through the Africa
Partnership Forum, which includes all of the major African institutions
as well as development partners, we are developing a process to hold
each other mutually accountable for fulfillment of our many respective
commitments.
Africans themselves are also increasingly seeking to hold each
other accountable. The NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is a
bold undertaking by and for African countries to review a country's
economic, political and corporate governance in a manner based on clear
standards and criteria that reflect best practice. Nearly two dozen
countries have signed up to be reviewed, and the first two reviews, of
Ghana and Rwanda, including associated national action plans to address
shortcomings, have been discussed at high levels and should be
finalized by the end of the year.
Working with the AU through enhanced relationships, and with
stronger subregional organizations, I believe we can secure the
progress already underway. The AU and the subregional organizations
have made major progress in the past 5 years, and the United States has
made a major contribution to advancing stability and prosperity in
Africa. Yet more needs to be done. We will continue our efforts to work
with the U.N. to help us strengthen the AU as an institution and as a
continental actor, and to support Africa's subregional organizations.
We will also work to ensure that Africa and its people have a future
which is not shadowed by images of conflict, refugees and corruption,
but which, rather, is buoyed by commitments by African governments,
organizations and non-African partners to ensure stability, development
and good governance. Our vision is that African nations and peoples can
enjoy the fruits of peace, democracy, prosperity, and good health. With
your help, we will help make that vision a reality.
Senator Martinez. Madam Secretary, I thank you very much
for your remarks.
We also welcome the distinguished Senator from Illinois to
the hearing.
We want to now hear from Administrator Pierson.
STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD O. PIERSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Pierson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Feingold, Senator Obama. I have a brief opening statement I
would like to read, but a longer statement for inclusion in the
record.
Senator Martinez. Your statement will be included in the
record. Thank you.
Mr. Pierson. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear
before you once again as Assistant Administrator for Africa.
At the request of the subcommittee, I am here to update you
on our work at the United Nations Agency for International
Development to support development and peace and security
efforts in sub-Sahara Africa, in particular as they relate to
areas of democracy and governance, trade and economic
development, and security sector reform.
As the G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July
demonstrated, there is a general consensus among world leaders
to focus more attention on Africa and African development
needs. The United States has been and will remain a leader in
this effort. I believe that it is our role at USAID to work
with our African partners to hasten the advent of peace,
democracy, good governance, security, and quality of life on
the continent, as well as address major humanitarian crises
such as the potential spread of Avian influenza. Bilateral
country programming is the central avenue for U.S. assistance,
but in Africa many of the most complex development challenges
do not respect national boundaries.
Many important issues can best be solved on a regional
basis. Thus, we are giving priority to funding selected
regional programs and initiatives that have achieved impact by
addressing regional conditions. USAID programs promote and
endeavor to enhance partnerships between African leaders,
governments, multilateral development institutions, business,
universities, and other nongovernmental organizations.
We also value the principle of ownership and attempt to
build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of
countries and their peoples. One of the ways we do this is by
supporting and strengthening African subregional organizations
as well as organizations such as the New Partnership for
Africa's Development that cover all regions of Africa.
Organizations such as this are key partners and stakeholders in
the work that we do.
This past year, USAID through the President's initiative to
end hunger in Africa actively facilitated NEPAD's leadership to
organize five regional meetings along with a continent-wide
summit. The meetings engaged most African countries and over
1,000 stakeholders took part. Subsequently, the G-8 members at
Gleneagles committed to supporting the CAADP, which is the
Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program.
Other key regional organizations with whom we work include
COMESA and ECOWAS, and my written statement provides details
about the extent of our work, the work of USAID, with these
organizations. As the largest bilateral donor in sub-Saharan
Africa, we must actively collaborate with our African
counterparts in order to achieve common goals.
Mr. Chairman, I sincerely appreciate this subcommittee's
continuing interest in Africa and USAID's critical role on the
continent. I would be happy to take your questions at this
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pierson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lloyd O. Pierson, USAID Assistant
Administrator for Africa
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to have the
opportunity to appear before you once again as Assistant Administrator
for Africa to update you on our work at the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) to support development and peace and
security efforts in sub-Saharan Africa. In today's testimony, I'd like
to address the importance of African ownership of regional development
and humanitarian efforts and the critical role of African regional and
subregional organizations, in the areas of democracy and governance,
trade and economic development, and security sector reform.
As the G-8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland in July demonstrated,
there is a general consensus among world leaders to focus more
attention on African development needs. The United States has been and
will remain a leader in this effort. It is our role at USAID to work
with our African partners to support the advent of peace, democracy,
good governance and security on the continent, as well as help ensure
the conservation of Africa's natural resource base and address major
humanitarian crises such as the potential imminent spread of Avian
Influenza.
As you are aware, sub-Saharan Africa is the world's poorest region:
over half of its 700 million people live on less than $1 per day. Rapid
urbanization poses new and difficult challenges as the demographic
landscape changes and cities struggle to provide sufficient jobs and
services, particularly for the young, who can become easy targets for
extremists, criminal gangs or armed militias. The HN/AIDS pandemic has
completely overwhelmed many health systems and impoverished families.
The aftermath of lingering conflicts and armed strife have exacted a
huge toll on economic growth. And, if not averted, Avian Influenza
could have a similarly disastrous effect on the region.
Yet despite these challenges, significant progress has been made on
several fronts. The number of free democracies in Africa has almost
tripled from four to 11 over the past decade and more than half of the
remaining countries in the region are in the transition process toward
transparent and free democracy. The number of conflicts in sub-Saharan
Africa has decreased in recent years, signaling achievements in
conflict mitigation and resolution. Liberia, Angola, and Sierra Leone
have restored peace after years of civil war. And the peace agreements
in Congo and the Sudan give rise to renewed hope that an end to these
prolonged conflicts is in sight.
Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa posted its strongest level of
overall GDP growth in 8 years in 2004, topping 5 percent. Mozambique,
Tanzania, and Senegal are among countries with robust growth rates.
However average GDP per capita in Africa is still only $500, less than
one-tenth the global average of $5,510, meaning that much work remains.
During President Bush's June 10, 2005 speech, he noted that the
link between democracy and development is critical as experience has
shown that ``aid works best when certain conditions are in place such
as a commitment to just governance, respecting the rule of law,
investing in citizens' health and education, and opening up
economies.'' The number of African countries that pass the Millennium
Challenge Account (MCA) indicator test is a clear indication of the
continent's progress and potential. As you know, the MCA funds only
countries that have demonstrated a commitment to democracy and good
governance, investing in people and economic freedom. In FY06, twelve
of the twenty-three countries that are fully eligible for MCA funding,
and seven of the fifteen countries eligible for threshold assistance,
were located in Africa. Also for FY06, four of the seven new countries
selected as eligible to apply are Sub-Saharan African.
USAID programs in Africa are rooted in the President's commitments
to Africa. Funding for these Presidential initiatives is programmed to
countries where the impact is expected to be the highest. I will
briefly discuss the most significant and far-reaching of these
Presidential and Agency commitments toward the end of my testimony.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Country programming is the central avenue for U.S. assistance, but
many of the most complex development challenges do not respect national
boundaries and are best addressed on a regional basis.
Examples of regional program priorities include:
1. Programs that address cross-border problems requiring action
from several countries. For example, inter-regional trade programs to
reduce barriers to movement of goods and services across borders;
cross-border peace or counter-terrorism initiatives; and health
initiatives to stop the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS through
regional transportation channels.
2. Programs to help indigenous governmental and non-governmental
regional organizations to promote policy reforms and improve the
institutional capacity of member countries. These include programs to
improve governance, fight infectious diseases, expand trade, improve
food security, protect biodiversity, mitigate the risks of conflicts,
and address the sources of state fragility that cross national
boundaries.
3. Regional programming is also used to improve information-
sharing, technology transfer and research among neighboring countries
and support joint management of shared resources (e.g., water).
To effectively implement regional programs, efficient coordination
mechanisms are required. African regional organizations, such as the
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) are ideally suited to provide this
mechanism. Therefore, USAID seeks to improve the effectiveness of
African regional organizations to perform their missions and to work
through these organizations to target regional development objectives.
USAID programs promote and enhance partnerships between African
leaders, governments, multilateral development institutions, business,
universities, and other nongovernmental organizations. We also value
the principle of ownership and strive to build on the leadership,
participation and commitment of countries and their peoples by
supporting and strengthening African regional organizations. Regional
organizations are key partners and stakeholders in our work to improve
the lives of the continent's citizens for a variety of reasons.
First, because regional organizations are backed by national
African leadership, they provide a level of local legitimacy to
critical issues in ways that global or bilateral institutions cannot.
For example, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) have played pivotal roles in mediating conflict
and securing peace in the Sudan and Liberia.
Second, as I noted earlier, many of Africa's challenges require a
regional approach. It is essential to address the HIV/AIDS crisis
through regional mechanisms, as this disease travels freely across
borders. With this in mind, USAID is providing a grant to the West
Africa Health Organization (WAHO) to allow key personnel to receive
joint training and share critical information needed to combat HIV/AIDS
more systematically.
Third, coordination of multi-donor, multi-country initiatives is
far more efficient when carried out through a single institution that
is engaged with all relevant partners and has a significant presence in
each participating country. Each donor is thus engaged with a single
partner, rather than one or more per country; and the regional
organization is able to harmonize donor support, thereby greatly
reducing transaction costs.
For these reasons, the USAID is aligning several key programs to
support African leaders in strengthening African regional institutions.
III. STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
African regional and subregional organizations were established and
have evolved during different time periods and for distinct purposes.
As you are aware, there are organizations that encompass the continent,
such as the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), as well as those that operate within small
geographic regions, such as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA). They currently possess varying levels of capacity and do not
always coordinate their efforts.
The Africa Bureau is collaborating with regional organizations in
an effort to achieve mutual goals and objectives. We, along with other
international and bilateral donor agencies, see great promise in these
institutions as they continue to increase their capacity to bring about
peace and security, and improve the policy environment for sustainable
development in Africa. I will highlight several examples in which
African leadership and ownership of a regional initiative contributed
to the overall positive outcome.
A. Democracy and Governance
We are beginning to see the genuine results of African regional
leadership in the area of democracy and governance. One innovative
instrument introduced by African leaders through the New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM). NEPAD was launched in July, 2001. Its mission is to ``establish
the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its
rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations''
and to ``promote sustainable development at the economic, social and
cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies.''
NEPAD falls under the African Union (AU) umbrella of regional
organizations and is both a framework and a vision for sustainable
development in Africa. As part of NEPAD, African leaders have made a
commitment to seek the end of conflicts in Africa and improve
political, economic and corporate governance to foster a better climate
for transformational development.
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is designed to monitor
progress in improving political, economic and corporate governance.
This Peer Review process began in late 2004 in Ghana, Mauritius, Kenya
and Rwanda. As of today, 24 African countries have agreed to undergo
peer review. The NEPAD Secretariat oversees the process, with
participation from African institutions such as the U.N. Economic
Commission on Africa, the African Development Bank, the Africa
Commission on Human Rights, and the Africa Institute. Representatives
from these institutions serve on Peer Review Teams assigned to the
countries volunteering for review. Though the implementation of the
review process is proceeding much slower than expected, the results of
the reviews of two countries--Ghana and Rwanda--should be made known
soon.
While recognizing that Africans have the principal responsibility
for the continent's development, African leaders look to their
development partners--primarily donor countries, multilateral
organizations and international financial institutions--to help create
a more enabling external environment for African development.
Specifically, they seek to increase Official Development Assistance
(ODA) with lower transaction costs, greater access to markets in the
industrialized countries, a reduction in the debt burden, and expanded
foreign direct investment. NEPAD refers to these African commitments
and desired changes by donors as ``mutual accountability.''
The United States has expressed its support for the commitments
that African governments have made to improve political, economic, and
corporate governance. As an active participant in the G-8 African
Personal Representatives Meetings, the United States is involved in
assessing the progress in implementing the G-8 African Action Plan.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was founded in
1979 as the Southern African Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), to
harmonize economic development among the countries in Southern Africa.
In 2001, SADC reorganized to focus on trade and finance,
infrastructure, food and agriculture, and social and human development.
USAID has supported SADC initiatives since the early 1980s in areas
such as strengthening regional transportation systems, agricultural
development through research and food security and environmental and
natural resource activities. With the end of apartheid in South Africa,
SADC has placed an increasing priority on regional economic
integration. USAID has provided assistance, particularly in the
implementation of the SADC Trade Protocol, which lays the groundwork
for a free trade area among SADC member states by 2008.
Our current relationship with SADC can best be described as
strained. In 2003, the SADC Secretariat decided to cease official
cooperation with USAID because U.S. policy and legislation restricts
assistance to Zimbabwe, a SADC member. For our part, we were
disappointed that SADC did not support our position on Zimbabwe.
However, we continued to support regional integration in Southern
Africa by working directly with the SADC technical working groups and
independent units. For example, USAID has supported the SADC
Parliamentary Forum, an autonomous unit, to promote compliance with
regional norms and standards for free and fair elections.
B. Trade and Economic Development
USAID actively supports African regional and subregional
organizations in the area of trade and economic development. For
example, USAID is playing a major role in supporting NEPAD by funding
and facilitating the implementation of the Comprehensive African
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). One of NEPAD's major
initiatives, CAADP was established by African Heads of State, who have
committed the resources and leadership of their governments to support
its implementation.
USAID's support for the African Union is channeled through NEPAD,
as just noted, to establish a CAADP process and investment plan. CAADP
is a growth-oriented agriculture program, aimed at increasing
agricultural growth rates to 6 percent per annum to create the wealth
needed for rural communities and households in Africa to prosper. The
CAADP has four key components: (1) Extending the area under sustainable
land management and reliable water systems; (2) improving rural
infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access; (3)
increasing food supply, reducing hunger, and improving responses to
food emergency crises; and (4) improving agricultural research,
technology dissemination and adoption.
We will also support AU/NEPAD's CAADP implementation through other
regional economic communities that will build the regional capacity
needed for achieving agricultural growth and increase the availability
of and access to food within regions. CAADP will enable the AU to build
a global multi-donor partnership that will align with African
agriculture resources and country and regional contexts, help African
leaders create the conditions needed to achieve a 6-percent
agricultural growth rate per year and finally break the cycle of
famine.
USAID will support the CAADP in up to six countries that are
meeting their pledges to increase support for and attention to the
agricultural sector. In addition, we will collaborate on efforts in
hunger hot spots to develop a process and plan to address the policy
and technical barriers that make countries famine prone and ultimately
integrate them into the CAADP. This past year, USAID, through the
President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), actively
facilitated NEPAD's leadership to organize five regional meetings--
along with a continent-wide summit, which was held in Accra, Ghana in
May of this year. This was a featured G-8 action promised at Sea
Island. The meetings engaged almost every African country and over
1,000 stakeholders took part. Subsequently, the G-8 members at
Gleneagles committed to supporting CAADP. NEPAD and its Regional
Economic Communities continue to look to USAID for leadership and
advice on CAADP, and we expect this initiative to yield tangible
results in the very near future.
At a subregional level, the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 to attain regional integration
through cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity
that would raise the standard of living and increase the stability of
West African countries. ECOWAS works toward creating region-wide
policies and programs in key sectors including energy, transportation
and agriculture, as well as on developing a common external tariff for
the region. ECOWAS also has been actively engaged in mitigating
conflict in the region in order to enable stronger economic ties.
In the energy sector, USAID is currently assisting ECOWAS to create
a West Africa Power Pool (WAPP) for energy trading and to build linking
lines throughout the region to integrate the fragmented national
electric power systems of West Africa, increasing access to affordable,
reliable electricity. USAID's technical assistance was a deciding
factor in the World Bank's June 2005 approval of a $350 million
adaptable program lending facility to support the WAPP. We plan to
continue our collaboration with ECOWAS to speed development of this
critical sector.
USAID is also helping ECOWAS to enhance regional economic
integration by increasing trade and reducing customs barriers. In
addition, we are currently providing financial and capacity building
support to ECOWAS in the areas of agriculture, humanitarian concerns
such as trafficking in persons, health, and organizational development,
primarily in financial management and manpower systems. Prospects for
ECOWAS' continued growth and development are good primarily because
there is widespread recognition in the region that an effective
regional organization must exist if economic and political integration
is to occur and, within the donor community, there is a willingness to
collaborate and to coordinate assistance efforts, with an emphasis on
capacity building.
In another sub-region of the continent, the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is a group of 20 African nations
which agree to promote integration through trade, natural resource and
human development for the benefit of their respective populations. The
primary objectives of COMESA are to create a Free Trade Area, establish
a Common External Tariff among member states, and to remove structural
and institutional weaknesses of member states to attain collective
sustainable development. With a combined population of 385 million and
a market of $388 billion, the COMESA region constitutes an important
potential market for the United States.
Since 1998, USAID has viewed COMESA as a key development partner,
providing approximately $25 million in assistance to support capacity
building for COMESA in the areas of (1) trade and institutional
strengthening and (2) conflict prevention, mitigation and response.
COMESA is a principal USAID partner in promoting and fostering
U.S.-Africa trade relationships. Our programs seek to help the private
sector and governments in the region understand the challenges of the
global marketplace and take advantage of the opportunities stemming
from the World Trade Organization and the COMESA Free Trade Area.
Specific areas of focus include drafting a regional approach to
biotechnology and biosafety, harmonization of telecommunications
policy, development of a common investment area, and the creation of a
regional customs bond guarantee program. It should be noted that in
2002 COMESA member states experienced an intraregional trade growth
rate of 22 percent. Finally, USAID funding is helping COMESA to develop
stronger linkages between the Secretariat and the relevant Ministries
in member states to improve capacity in financial management, human
resource development and information technology.
C. Security Sector Reform
USAID is aligning its efforts in security sector reform to
complement the extensive initiatives of the State Department and other
USG agencies. For example, USAID is working with ECOWAS to develop its
conflict prevention and mitigation mechanism, which involves setting up
a central unit at headquarters, establishing Observation and Monitoring
Centers and setting up ancillary entities for conflict resolution.
While progress toward achievement of its economic objectives has been
slower, ECOWAS has established a strong track record in its peace
keeping operations in conflict-prone areas, which substantially
improves the regional economic climate and sets the stage for sustained
growth. For example, ECOWAS had a pivotal role in brokering peace in
Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea Bissau in recent years. ECOWAS
and the African Union were instrumental in overturning the coup in Togo
earlier this year.
USAID is also working with COMESA in conflict prevention and
mitigation to provide governance skills training for parliamentarians
and civil society organizations throughout the region. Support was also
provided to the COMESA Court of Justice to adjudicate cases and
disputes at a regional level. In addition, USAID funds are being used
to design a protocol and accreditation system for private sector and
civil society organizations, along with the establishment of a Peace
Desk to advise the Secretariat on peace and security issues among
member states.
Finally, I would like to note our work with the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD). Comprised of seven member states
(Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) located
in the Horn of Africa, IGAD was established in 1986. Its focus is on
three priority areas: food security and environmental protection,
conflict prevention and management, and economic cooperation and
integration.
Although USG funding for IGAD is complicated by statutory
restrictions regarding Sudan and Somalia, both IGAD member states, IGAD
is a significant partner. Most concerns have abated since Uganda took
on the rotating Chairmanship of IGAD in 2003. Currently, we assist IGAD
in three critical areas.
IGAD provides the platform for the organization of the peace talks
for both Sudan and Somalia. Kenya has been designated by IGAD as the
member state to lead these negotiations. The IGAD Secretariat has
played a substantial role in mobilizing financing for both initiatives;
without the contribution of IGAD, these regionally led negotiations
might never have taken place.
A second major IGAD activity is the implementation of a conflict
early warning mechanism (CEWARN). From its inception in 1987, this
initiative has been financed jointly by USAID and the German Technical
Cooperation Organization. While CEWARN had no actual response
mechanism, it has the near-term potential to significantly reduce the
level of livestock theft, conflict, violence and death in trans-border
areas by providing information on causes and events that will permit
IGAD member states to intervene in local conflicts before they
escalate. If successful, this activity will help moderate conflict in a
severely conflict-prone region.
The third IGAD activity supported by USAID is the Drought
Monitoring Centre based in Nairobi. IGAD member states have assumed
responsibility for financing the operational costs of the center, which
was previously operated through the World Meteorological Organization.
The Centre's reports on drought conditions, food production projections
and forage conditions are essential for the planning of food and other
emergency assistance in the region.
Each of these regional organizations cited in this testimony has
assumed a critical coordination and technical role to advance economic
development and trade, improve conditions conducive to democracy and
good governance, and to bring about an end to violent conflict and to
secure peace in Africa. By supporting activities to increase
institutional effectiveness and improve the enabling environment in
which they operate, USAID support enables these regional partners to
fulfill the missions that their members have laid out for them.
IV. KEY PRESIDENTIAL AND AGENCY INITIATIVES FOR
STRENGTHENING REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As I noted in my testimony before you last March, over the past 4
years, USAID has significantly expanded our level of official
development assistance in Africa. Our strategy in Africa is shaped by
new thinking about the role of foreign assistance that has crystallized
since the millennium began. First, U.S. strategic and foreign policy
interests are front and center, in keeping with USG recognition that
development--along with diplomacy and defense--is one of the three
tools of foreign policy and is consistent with the joint objectives
laid out in the State Department-USAID Strategic Plan.
Second, our strategy reflects a new paradigm for foreign aid
focusing on the distinction between ``transformational development''
and ``fragile states.'' Africa has more ``top performing''
transformational states and more ``fragile'' states than any other
region. And many of the transformational development countries have
important vulnerabilities that, if neglected, may cause them to slip
into fragility.
Third, we are exercising a more directive role in USAID/Washington,
to ensure that funds are allocated to those country and regional
programs and toward those sectors and goals with the greatest
likelihood of significant impact. For its part, Washington will align
its staffing, operating expense and programmatic resources to assist
recipient Missions to achieve that impact. A significant portion of our
assistance will be channeled through six Presidential Initiatives.
The President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief provides major
funding to address the most serious effects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic;
Another health initiative, the President's Initiative on Malaria,
will expand malaria prevention and treatment programs in up to 15
African countries where the incidence is highest by 2008. USAID is the
lead managing agency of this program;
In the area of education, the Presidential Africa Education
Initiative supports training of new teachers and provides more
textbooks and scholarships for children throughout Africa;
The Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa focuses on
programs to improve the use of modem technology and increase
agricultural productivity and income for small-scale farmers, thereby
increasing food availability;
Formerly known as the Africa TRADE Initiative, the President's
African Global Competitiveness Initiative is working to improve the
trade and investment environment and promote the fuller integration of
Africa into the global economy;
The Congo Basin Forest Partnership supports efforts to conserve the
outstanding forest and wildlife resources of the Congo Basin Forest,
which is the second largest remaining tropical rain forest in the
world; and finally,
The Africa Bureau Anti-Corruption Initiative is designed to reduce
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa and to lend specific support to recent
efforts by African leaders to link good governance with sustainable
development practices.
V. CONCLUSION
As the largest bilateral donor in sub-Saharan Africa, we must
actively collaborate with our African counterparts in order to achieve
our common goal of a better quality of life for all Africans. Regional
organizations are key development actors in the countries they serve.
Their successes contribute to overall levels of peace and security, and
economic development. As they strengthen their institutional and
technical capacity, their potential impact will only increase. By
supporting discrete regional activities and by helping to strengthen
these regional organizations through training and well-targeted
technical assistance, USAID will continue to play a leadership role in
this process.
Mr. Chairman, I sincerely appreciate this committee's continuing
interest in Africa and USAID's critical role in the continent. I would
be happy to discuss these and other issues of concern in Africa with
you and members of the committee at this time.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Pierson, very much.
Senator Obama, do you have an opening statement you care to
make?
Senator Obama. Well, I just want to thank both of you for
the services you are rendering to the country, and I think that
all of us recognize that, given the enormous problems and
enormous opportunities in Africa, that it is absolutely
critical that we build up institutional capacity in these
areas, whether it is military capacity or peacekeeping capacity
through the African Union or it is various institutional
mechanisms to improve public health systems throughout the
region or mechanisms to ensure that economic development is
happening at an appropriate scale. These are all issues that
would benefit from both institutions inside each country, but
also regional approaches.
So I am just encouraged that we are thinking in those terms
and I hope that our good intentions are followed up by strong
action.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Senator.
Just a couple of questions to follow up. Secretary Frazer,
I was intrigued by your mention of the Darfur and increased
support role for the UN. I wonder if you might elaborate a bit
on the Darfur situation and what you see. You mentioned also
something about a mandate and I am not sure I understood what
you meant by that. So if you could elaborate on that aspect of
your testimony I would appreciate it.
Ms. Frazer. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
What we have seen in Darfur is that the African Union has
about 6,700 troops, the AMIS force in Darfur currently. The
sense is that you need about 12,000 forces in Darfur. The
African Union forces have played a fabulous role in deploying
quickly and also in ending the type of organized, systematic
violence. There is episodic violence that is taking place right
now, but AMIS has effectively stamped down the massive human
rights violations and killings that were going on last summer.
But what we have found is, both in terms of providing
logistical support and operational command and control, that
there may need to be some further assistance to the AMIS force
as well as to increase the troop ceiling, to actually get to
that target, about 12,000. What type of assistance are we
talking about specifically? What we have found is that when you
get beyond battalion and brigade level, you start going to
brigade and division level, and coordinating the logistics and
the operational understanding of the battlefield as a whole
requires more headquarters planning.
So the UN is able to provide that capacity, that
headquarters planning element, where the AU may be reaching the
limit of its capacity. Also, they may not have enough forces
sufficient to actually reach that 1se priority2,000 troop
ceiling in Darfur, as AU missions currently are in Cote
d'Ivoire, in Liberia, and still in Burundi and other places.
So what we are looking at is the possibility--we are
discussing this with our colleagues in the AU--the possibility
of the UN basically rehatting the forces that are there and
then expanding those troops with new troop contributors. When I
talked about a mandate change, I was talking about from an AU
mandate to a UN mandate, basically rehatting the force.
Senator Martinez. So it would be a UN force then rather
than an AU force?
Ms. Frazer. That is one of the options that is being looked
at, to try to again increase the capacity, as well as the troop
numbers. This is still under discussion.
Senator Martinez. How many troops does the AU have
currently deployed in the three or four nations that you
referenced?
Ms. Frazer. That is a good question, Mr. Chairman. I do not
have those specific numbers. In Darfur alone it is 6,700.
Senator Martinez. But it is reaching the maximum that they
can deploy probably, which prompts the need for UN
intervention----
Ms. Frazer. That is exactly right.
Senator Martinez [continuing]. At least in the sense of
command and control and technical support, I suppose?
Ms. Frazer. That is right, yes, sir.
Senator Martinez. There seem to be a lot of organizations
and hard to sometimes understand their responsibilities and
whether or not they might even be conflicting and overlapping
in terms of responsibility, objectives, and membership.
I just wonder if you could explain to us how formal the
relationships are between the various organizations, ECOWAS and
the African Union and all of these various groups that are all
participating one way or the other. What are the agreements
that govern them and how do we interact with them?
Ms. Frazer. Yes. The relationship between the subregional
organizations and the AU is rather formal. The subregional
organizations, as I said, are the constituent architecture of
the African Union and in particular, in the peacekeeping field,
the standby brigades will be based on the subregional
organizations, but they would be the standby brigades deployed
by the AU. So the relationship between, say, ECOWAS, SADC,
IGAD, and the East Africa community is rather formal. The
overlapping relationship is where you get into the monetary
unions, the economic communities, which often are broader. Let
us say the COMESA overlaps East Africa Community, as well as
the Southern African Development Community.
And they have to harmonize their rules for trade, for
example, or the Southern African Customs Union and how it fits
within the Southern African Development Community. So
harmonizing the trade rules, the tariff rules, is important
amongst these economic units. Then what started as economic
organizations have taken on more of a political and military
character or security character. The main ones are ECOWAS,
SADC, IGAD, and the East Africa Community. Our relationship is
more or less formal with those four. Our Ambassador in Nigeria
also is accredited to ECOWAS. Our Ambassador in Botswana also
is accredited to the Southern African Development Community and
serves as our liason to that organization.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
Administrator Pierson, I heard you reference Avian
influenza. How big a threat does it appear to be in the African
continent? Do we have a handle on that and what steps are we
taking to respond to a potential outbreak?
Mr. Pierson. It potentially is a major threat, Mr. Chairman
Approximately 3 weeks ago all of our mission directors and
regional mission directors in Africa were on a conference call
with me and the director of the veterinary services for the
Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome. What he told us at
that time--this was approximately 3 weeks ago--that Africa was
at very high risk and there was the potential, particularly in
East Africa, that Avian flu could hit within a 2-week period.
That 2-week period has gone. There are no cases of which we
are aware at this time. But what it did emphasize to us is the
urgency of how we had to approach the problem. The migratory
pattern of the birds as we understand put the East Africa area
at the highest risk immediately. On a longer term, West Africa
is potentially, what we are told, within a 6-month period.
The President has made Avian flu a very large priority. It
is the number one priority for the Administrator of USAID. We
have asked all--we have met with all of the African ambassadors
in Washington, emphasizing the importance of preparation for
Avian flu.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, sir. My time is up.
Distinguished ranking member, we turn it over to you for
your questions.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Frazer, clearly the AU demonstrated incredible
ability and was vital in bringing steadiness in Burundi. What
can we learn from that accomplishment that would help us
address the terrible human rights abuses in Darfur and are
there any shortcomings of the AU's approach that we ought to be
careful to avoid?
Ms. Frazer. Thank you for that question. Indeed, in
Burundi, the AU again took a leadership role. They deployed
early. They had tremendous challenges in terms of financing.
The United States helped to finance them with about $10
million, but over time what we ended up doing was exactly what
is being looked at as an option for Darfur, which is eventually
we blue-hatted the force in Burundi and it became a UN force,
and that was partly to help to sustain that force. So I think
that that model is also a model that we used in Liberia, in
which the ECOWAS forces were able to deploy quickly into the
crisis. These mainly were Nigerian forces, but there also were
Ghanaian, Senegalese, and others, and over time we again blue-
hatted them and brought in international forces to help sustain
that mission. So I think that that is a lesson learned and a
model both from Burundi and Liberia that applies very well to
Darfur. Of course, the operational area is much larger in
Darfur than was the case in Burundi, so the logistical
challenge is much greater. So the importance of trying to build
the capacity of the AU's headquarters--right now it is
important for us to, as we said, look at blue-hatting that
force, but it is also over the long term necessary to build
that institutional capacity within the AU itself.
Senator Feingold. In the examples you gave, were the AU
force supplemented by international, other national forces, or
did they displace the African forces?
Ms. Frazer. In the case of Liberia they were supplemented.
In the case of Burundi, it is basically the AU forces that
stayed there and they were paid for as a UN force. But in the
case of Liberia they were supplemented. Also in the case of
Liberia, we found again this issue of headquarters planning
support.
Actually, in the case of ECOWAS, the United States played a
role putting military advisers into ECOWAS headquarters to give
them that planning capability. So what we need to do over the
long term is provide that capacity internally.
Senator Feingold. When do you think the time frame would be
for having this happen in Darfur, the blue-hatting that you are
talking about?
Ms. Frazer. Well, as I say, it is being discussed as one of
the options. But if you look at the time line for UN
deployments, the advantage of the AU and regional forces is
that they can deploy rather quickly, but the time line for a UN
force, where the Untied Nations Peacekeeping Office (DPKO)
would have to actually get involved in coming out, doing an
assessment, then doing the planning at UN headquarters, it
would not be any earlier, I would think, than mid-2006.
Senator Feingold. Would you talk about your sense of U.S.-
AU relations? What is the status of the expected AU office in
Washington here and will the U.S. appoint an ambassador to the
AU?
Ms. Frazer. I think our relations are excellent with the
AU. We consult frequently with them. The United States, as you
know, deployed troops to AMIS. We airlifted some of those
troops to Darfur. So we have a very good diplomatic and
operational relationship. We are expecting the AU office to
open in Washington. We are looking forward to that. We have
discussed it with Chairman Konare, as well as President
Obisanjo, the chairperson of the AU right now. As for the
United States appointing an ambassador, that is certainly under
strong consideration by the administration, to appoint an
ambassador to the AU to increase that strong positive
relationship.
Senator Feingold. When do you think the Washington office
of the AU will open?
Ms. Frazer. Any day. We are working with them right now to
open that office. They have agreed to do it.
Senator Feingold. OK. How are we helping on the border of
Ethiopia and Eritrea? UNMEE has said that we are on the cusp of
warfare there and I understand the AU hopes to have a
preventative force, I think it is called the Africa Standby
Force, ASF, in this region by next year. How quickly can this
nascent ASF establish stability and where do the AU forces come
into play here?
Ms. Frazer. On the Eritrea-Ethiopia border, Senator
Feingold, I have been focusing my attention on getting UNMEE
back up and running. As you know, President Isaias has grounded
UNMEE. We think it is critical that UNMEE be allowed to
operate, and I have been really concentrating my attention on
trying to get that mission back up and operating. So I am not
certain about the time line for an AU force or specifically
what role an AU force would play on that in terms of the
boundary.
I think the important thing is to concentrate on the UN
mission that is already there, that has the legitimacy, that
has the mandate.
Senator Feingold. Keep me informed, if you could, of
whatever developments there are in that regard. You obviously
noted that prevention and mitigation are important in assuring
that tension does not erupt into a conflict here. Are we
engaged in political diplomacy to prevent Ethiopia and Eritrean
conflict?
Secretary Frazer. We are, with Kofi Annan. He has talked
often with Secretary Rice on this issue. We feel that it is
extremely important to move towards demarcating the boundary.
We believe that it is also important to get both countries to
reduce the tensions between them, and we think it is extremely
important, as I said, to get UNMEE up and operating again. So
we are working with the UN. We have had conversations at a high
level both with Ethiopia, Prime Minister Meles, as well as with
Eritrea. So there is definitely quite a lot of diplomacy taking
place right now to try to lower the tension.
Senator Feingold. There have been very disturbing
allegations, on another front, about the activities of
peacekeeping forces in Africa. Reports have described evidence
of rape and sexual abuse by peacekeepers and staff members in
Congo, for example, and have suggested that such abuses are too
often tolerated. What role has the United States played in
supporting regional military training to ensure that
peacekeepers do not engage in these kinds of abuses?
Ms. Frazer. We certainly have--in our African Contingency
Operations Training Assistance program, we certainly engage in
human rights training. We have supported the development of
codes of conduct in places like Mali. We support the work of
UNDP, UNDPKO, and others also to try to develop these codes of
conduct, that even soldiers can carry in their pockets. So this
is integrated into our training programs. We also have to hold
those who have committed these crimes accountable, and I think
that the UN and UNDPKO are definitely focused on that.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Martinez. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Let me just see if I can close the loop here
on the Darfur situation. Is it my understanding then that blue
helmets--that the United States is currently and actively
working with the United Nations to get UN troops to supplement
the AU in Darfur?
Ms. Frazer. No, Senator Obama, that would be going too far
at this point. What we are doing is consulting with the African
Union about various options for increasing the capacity of the
AMIS force. One of the options is the possibility of blue-
hatting them with the UN.
Senator Obama. OK. But the AU forces as I understand it--
several months ago there was talk about ramping up to 12,000.
That does not seem to be possible any time soon, am I correct?
Ms. Frazer. That is correct. That is exactly right.
Senator Obama. What also seems to be accurate is that with
the 7,000 or so AU troops that are currently there we do not
have--we have sufficient coverage to essentially bear witness
and perhaps stop some of the most egregious activity; we do not
have the capacity to cover an enormous region, and so what is
frequently happening then is that activities outside of the
site of AU forces may intimidate populations. They are all
displaced. There does not seem to be any prospect at this
point, given the strength of forces there, that we are going to
be able to actually start moving people back to their homes
from the settlements that have developed. Is that accurate?
Secretary Frazer. I think I would answer it in this way. We
are working on three fronts. The most important front--and I am
leaving this evening, going to Darfur to meet with SLM leaders.
The most important front is to try to get a political solution.
That ultimately is what will allow people to return home to
create an environment of peace and safety and security, through
a political negotiation. So we are working very hard on that
track. The second is to continue to put pressure on all parties
to adhere to the ceasefire, because frankly even 12,000 troops,
given the size of the area, will not be able to stop all
incidents of violence.
Senator Obama. Fair enough.
Ms. Frazer. So we really do need to get a commitment out of
the government of Sudan, out of the SLA, the JEM, and force the
government to control the activities of the janjaweed to adhere
to their ceasefire. Then yes, indeed, on the final front, we
need to increase the number of monitors. The important point
here is we can do a lot now even with the 6,700. Part of that
is for the AU to clarify the mandate of those forces. It seems
to be that some units----
Senator Obama. Sorry to interrupt, but is that a problem of
the AU clarifying the mandate or is that us forcing Sudan's
hand in order to clarify the mandate?
Ms. Frazer. No, I think that what I was saying is that it
is the AU. It is the AU mandate. Some units of the AU, the AMIS
force, understand that they can protect civilians, for example,
and that is within their mandate to do. Others think that they
have to stand back and do nothing and just observe and report.
Senator Obama. Yes, but are they not also constrained by
what the Sudanese government is willing to grant them; there
has been a consistent issue of whether the mandate is too weak,
and that we should be forcing the Sudanese government's hands
even as the parallel negotiations are taking place with the
rebel groups and the Sudanese government, that we also have
somewhat hamstrung the AU? So it is not entirely a mistake on
their part to assume that there is some ambiguity to that
mandate.
Ms. Frazer. No, I think there is a mistake on their part. I
think that that has been a discussion here, but it is my
understanding that the AU mandate is quite clear and they do
have the capacity under their mandate to protect civilians, but
that that word has not gotten out to the units uniformly.
Senator Obama. OK.
Ms. Frazer. So part of it is absolutely clarifying that
mandate to the various units. Some units, national units, act
one way; others sit back. We need to make sure that the force
commanders out there----
Senator Obama. So I just want to be clear. Under your
understanding, under the existing mandate that exists, they can
protect civilians against janjaweed and the Sudanese government
has authorized such intervention?
Ms. Frazer. That is right.
Senator Obama. That is your understanding?
Ms. Frazer. That is right. Part of the problem for the AMIS
forces in protecting civilians is getting the equipment that
they need, which is why we are trying to get the armored
personnel carriers in there, because then they can have greater
mobility and security for themselves. So we do need to increase
their capacity. But in terms of the mandate, it is my
understanding that they have the sufficient mandate to protect
civilians.
Senator Obama. When I met with the AU countries at the UN,
part of--speaking to the resource issues that you are talking
about, obviously they were hoping, I think, for more money from
the UN and from the United States. My general view is I want to
make sure that money is well spent and that there is
accountability and transparency in terms of how that money is
spent. Having said that, it does seem that these forces that
are deployed are real strapped. So my question is what are we,
either as the U.S. Government or through various UN bodies or
through NATO or other mechanisms, what kinds of support are we
giving them in terms of airlifts, food supplies, equipment, and
so forth?
Secretary Frazer.We have spent about $160 million and we
have set up 32 base camps for the AMIS forces. So we have been
a major contributor to them. We obviously also airlifted the
Rwandan forces into Darfur. So we continue to support them
materially. We have contractors out there working very closely
with them. So I think that we are supporting them and if they
need additional support we will look at how we can do that with
the resources, if we can get the resources.
Senator Obama. My time is up. Let me just say this. The
administration generally has been better on this issue than a
number of European countries. I have said that to Secretary
Rice and I have said that to Ambassador Zoellick. I still do
not get a sufficient sense of urgency at the highest levels on
this issue. There is a lot of stuff going on in the world and I
recognize that our foreign policy apparatus is rightly busy
with Iraq and Afghanistan and the situation in the Middle East.
But I have to say that I am getting a sense of drift right now
in terms of the policy in Darfur. My hope would be that we
start ramping up activity, including putting more pressure on
other countries to get involved in this issue, because right
now we have an enormous number of people who have now for a
year, year and a half, been living in camps, and there is a
crisis that is going to explode at some point if we do not
catch it now.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Frazer.Senator Obama, if I might, I understand
exactly what you are saying, and I think that we do feel the
urgency. Ambassador Zoellick, our Deputy Secretary, has been
there four times. He just returned. I have been there three
times in the last month, or I am going tonight, so it will be
three times in one month that I am going out to Darfur. I can
assure you that this is getting the highest level attention
from President Bush, Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary Zoellick,
myself and others, Andrew Natsios and others. So we do need to
fix this. But as I said, a lot of attention has to be focused
to support the AMIS force, but also to really push hard for a
political settlement, which is why I am getting on a plane
tonight.
Senator Obama. Absolutely. That is not just true in Darfur,
that whole political settlement issue.
Secretary Frazer.Yes, sir.
Mr. Pierson. Mr. Chairman, may I also add----
Senator Obama. Please.
Mr. Pierson [continuing]. To what the Assistant Secretary
has said in terms of urgency? By far the majority of time,
effort, and money in the Africa Bureau at USAID is spent on
Sudan-related issues. In this past fiscal year, approximately
$850 million got strong bipartisan support, but approximately
$850 million has been spent in Sudan by the United States, both
in terms of humanitarian assistance and development assistance
in the south. That number we expect to go up in the next fiscal
year.
We do understand your comments, sir, but I will assure you
I think both from the Department of State, throughout the
administration, and USAID, we view those problems, as well as a
number of issues in Africa, that we are trying the address them
on a very urgent manner. I have been to Darfur, I have been to
the South, and when you see the suffering there and understand
some of the complexities of the issues, you can only come away
thinking of it in terms of human life and you have to deal with
it urgently.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time and I
am not trying to get the last word here, but I just want to
say, a lot of the activity you are talking about has to do with
the North-South issues. Those are important and we want to
preempt additional problems--and obviously Garang's death
increased those problems. So we have been dealt a bad hand. You
guys personally, I know, have been putting time into this issue
and I very much appreciate it. But the spotlight is not being
shown on this right now. There is not sufficient discussion in
my view, not simply in the press, but in the UN. We are not
pressuring our allies more vigorously to get involved and
engaged in this process. So I know it is tough, and I know you
personally have been committed to this issue, but we need to
ramp it up.
Senator Martinez. My intent was to perhaps delve a little
longer with this panel, but we are going to move along to the
second panel. I want to thank you both for being here. Madam
Secretary, I want to wish you very great success in your trip
today. I know how important that is. I know with Secretary
Zoellick's continued, repeated visits that it is hard to
conceive of how we could be adrift. I think you have shown
great interest and concern. So I commend you and wish you well
on your trip this evening.
Secretary Frazer.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Martinez. We want to at this time, because of the
vote upcoming, move to the second panel and welcome them to the
table. Thank you. For our second panel we have Victoria Holt, a
senior associate of the Henry L. Stimson Center here in
Washington, and Jennifer Cooke, co-director of the Africa
Program at CSIS. We welcome you both and thank you both for
being here. The last time we went from right to left, so this
time we will go from left to right and, Ms. Cooke, we will hear
from you first for your opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER G. COOKE, CO-DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Cooke. Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, I am
grateful to you for the opportunity to speak today on the
important subject of African regional organizations. I am going
to concentrate my remarks primarily on the launch of the
African Union and how best the United States can assist it. I
will give a brief summary of my written remarks.
Senator Martinez. Your full remarks will be made a part of
the record. That is fine.
Ms. Cooke. As we heard from Secretary Frazer, the formation
of the African Union in 2001 signaled a new determination among
key African leaders to take greater responsibility for shaping
the continent's future. Most significantly, these leaders
consciously committed the AU to play a more proactive role in
ending Africa's conflicts and in setting credible new norms for
economic and political governance.
This shift is still early and in its fragile stages and we
should not be surprised if it is a little uneven and if it
takes time to really consolidate itself. But it is already
beginning to generate some early promising returns. It is being
called upon to play a lead role in some of the continent's most
formidable crises, among them Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania,
and of course Darfur.
Mr. Chairman, as the AU's new role has unfolded it has
become increasingly clear that U.S. interests in Africa are in
close alignment with and indeed interdependent with those of
the African Union. We see this in Darfur, but also well beyond
Sudan. Over the last decade there has been a dramatic rise in
U.S. interests in Africa, in counterterrorism, energy, HIV-
AIDS, answering the threat of genocide, promoting democracy,
and ending chronic wars. There is increasing bipartisan
consensus in Congress, in successive administrations, within
the American public, to help address Africa's challenges and
encourage and support promising trends. But to meet these
rising U.S. national interests, we need competent, like-minded
partners on the continent. The African Union is just such a
partner. It is not without uncertainty, it is not without
problems, but it is nonetheless a promising partner. It has
embraced many of the same values and goals that animate U.S.
policy.
Mr. Chairman, it is in the U.S. national interest to
support the Nation's sense of collective African
responsibility. This goal should be a long-term priority of
U.S. foreign policy. For the United States to be successful in
this arena, however, it will need to take three steps to build
more systematic, reliable, bipartisan U.S. engagement. A
critical first step is for the United States to appoint a fully
accredited U.S. Ambassador to the African Union. I was pleased
to hear that this is under discussion. I think this is an
excellent idea. The United States has taken this step with
other regional organizations, to the considerable benefit of
U.S. foreign policy interests. Such an appointment will help
ensure consistency of U.S. approach. It will signal the
seriousness with which we take the AU and it will allow a
single focus point for U.S. engagement, both on immediate
priorities and on longer-term goals. It is not a costly step,
nor is it premature. If anything, it will provide additional
oversight over the multiplying streams of U.S. assistance to
the AU.
A second critical step is for the U.S. to define a
realistic, dynamic strategy of long-term engagement with the
AU, tied, importantly, to reliable baseline year to year
funding. The United States should be looking out at least a
decade in this engagement and begin setting targets for
support, either in absolute dollar amounts, or as a percentage
of international support. Currently U.S. support to the AU is
ad hoc, it is crisis-driven and it is very uneven and
unpredictable from year to year. We need to fix this. To help
the AU to work more closely with our European partners, we need
to be more predictable in this.
Priorities for our support should include targeted training
and flexible support to build mediation capacities,
strengthening regional peacekeeping capacities--and we have
heard some on that; I think we will hear more from Victoria--
encouraging norms on governance and economic stewardship, both
in our bilateral relations and in supporting emerging AU
mechanisms, and helping strengthen AU action and consensus on
infectious disease and environmental stewardship. In all these
areas, the United States has special expertise to contribute.
Third, the United States has to respond more effectively to
the ongoing emergency in Darfur. Beyond the evident
humanitarian costs of the conflict, the current intervention is
an early test of AU commitment, capacity, and credibility of
future efforts. We cannot allow this mission to fail. The
administration is to be commended for the critical high-level
attention it has given to this crisis, but U.S. leadership
should push for an expanded U.S. peacekeeping role in Darfur.
This request has to come from the AU if it is going to fly
within the Security Council. We need to urge AU leadership to
put a direct and persuasive request to the Security Council to
partner with the AU in Darfur.
The United States should also work to place greater
diplomatic pressure on the parties to the conflict, potential
regional spoilers, and international stakeholders. President
Bush, for example, has a prime opportunity this week to signal
to the Chinese government the importance he attaches to Darfur
and to ask China for greater cooperation in resolving the
crisis there. We also need to ensure, though, that in
responding to this crisis we do not undermine efforts to build
enduring AU capacities. U.S. support will be critical to the
African Union's future and the African Union's success will be
important to advancing U.S. stakes in Africa.
The administration is to be commended for its current
support to the AU and to the negotiations in Darfur, but to
build a long-term reliable partner, the United States can do
more and should build an approach that is coherent,
predictable, institutionalized, and well-led at a senior level.
Supporting the trend towards African ownership and
responsibility warrants such an approach.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, I want to thank you for
your attention and for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooke follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Cooke, Co-Director, African Program
Center for Stragetic and International Studies
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Martinez, and members of the subcommittee, I am grateful
to you for the opportunity to appear here today to speak on the very
important subject of the African Union. I will concentrate my comments
on the launch of the African Union and how best the United States can
assist it.
In 2001, the transformation of the Organization for African Unity
into the African Union signaled a new determination among several key
African leaders to take greater responsibility for shaping the
continent's future. Most significantly, these leaders consciously
committed the AU to play a proactive role in ending Africa's conflicts
and in setting credible new norms for economic and political
governance. They stirred the AU to come out openly in opposition to
military and other forms of egregious misrule, to fight corruption, and
to embrace the principle of self-criticism and peer review.
This shift was a conceptual and political watershed. It emerged
from the 1990s when a proliferation of African crises--in Somalia,
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, and others--
wreaked untold misery on African populations, while the OAU stood on
the sidelines, quiescent and utterly ineffectual, shielded by its
founding principles of the sanctity of state sovereignty and non-
interference. With the formation of the African Union, and a parallel
initiative, the New Economic Partnership for African Development
(NEPAD), a new consensus began to emerge around the paradigm of human--
versus state--security, and the collective responsibility of Africans
to protect that security. This has translated into a far greater
willingness by African leaders to mediate conflicts among their
continental neighbors and to begin to lay down standards of good
governance, economic stewardship, and meeting basic needs in health,
education, and other social services.
These steps led to the creation in 2003 of the AU Peace and
Security Council, plans for the eventual creation of a continent-wide
African Standby Force, and the ambitious embrace of a lead role by the
AU in both brokering a peace settlement and putting in place a major
peace operation in the Darfur region of Sudan. At the same time, the AU
has assumed responsibilities for ending internal conflict and misrule
in Burundi, Togo, Mauritania, and Cote d'Ivoire. On a parallel track,
the AU is moving forward with a newly formed African Peer Review
Mechanism to evaluate governance among states that volunteer for
review.
This pivotal change is still at an early, fragile stage. The new
norms are an aspiration. They are often violated, as the case of
Zimbabwe shows only too clearly. Implementation of the change is
uneven, and the AU remains heavily dependent on external support. The
institutional architecture envisioned for the AU is ambitious and
broad, and yet at the moment these ambitions remain largely a
framework, with neither depth nor capacity. Nor has the AU fully sorted
out how it will relate to the multiplicity of other African
institutions and initiatives, many of which overlap: the regional
economic communities, the African Inter-Parliamentarian Union, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, and others. Action
often depends on the inclination of key personalities within the AU,
and on occasion, rivalry for influence hampers effectiveness.
We should not be surprised that it takes time for a new regional
body such as the African Union to launch itself. It took many years for
other comparable regional bodies in Latin America, Asia, and Europe to
acquire institutional capacity and build confidence both within and
without their respective regions. The AU experience will not be
fundamentally different. It is equally important to note that the
advent of the AU has generated high expectations within Africa and in
the international community and has begun to generate some early
promising returns. Indeed, the AU is already being called upon to play
a lead role in some of the continent's most formidable crises.
Mr. Chairman, as the AU's new role has unfolded, it has also become
increasingly clear that U.S. interests in Africa are in close alignment
with--indeed interdependent with--those of the African Union. That
intersection is most poignantly seen in Darfur, but also reaches well
beyond Sudan. Over the last decade there has been a dramatic rise in
U.S. strategic interests in Africa: in combating terrorism, ensuring
steady and reliable energy supplies, combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic,
preventing mass atrocities and answering the threat of genocide,
promoting democratization, and ending Africa's chronic wars that
undermine hope for economic growth and development within an expanding
global economy. There is increasing bipartisan consensus, in Congress,
in successive administrations, and among the American public to help
address the challenges that Africa faces and to encourage and support
promising trends and initiatives.
To meet these rising U.S. national interests in Africa requires an
effective U.S. policy that looks out into the future and that
identifies competent and like-minded partners on the continent. The
African Union is just such a key emergent partner, not the sole option,
and not one without uncertainty and problems, but nonetheless an
important and promising partner. It has embraced many of the same
values and goals that currently animate U.S. policy, and is showing
early progress. Conversely, the African Union's continued future
progress rests to a significant degree on its success in building
effective external partnerships, most importantly with the United
States and the European Union.
For these reasons, it is in U.S. national interests to support the
nascent sense of collective African responsibility embodied in the
African Union and to work assiduously to build a strong, enduring
partnership with the AU. That goal should be a long-term priority of
U.S. foreign policy.
For the United States to be successful in this arena, however, it
will need to take three steps to build a more systematic, reliable, bi-
partisan, and long-term U.S. engagement with the African Union.
1. A critical first step is for the United States to appoint a
fully accredited U.S. Ambassador to the African Union. The United
States has taken this step with several other regional organizations
(NATO, OAS, ASEAN, EU) to the considerable benefit of U.S. foreign
policy interests. Such an appointment to the AU, with adequate
authority and staff support, will help ensure consistency of U.S.
approach, signal the seriousness of U.S. purpose, and allow a single
focal point for U.S. engagement on both immediate priorities and the
longer-term challenges that the AU will face. This is not a costly
step, nor is it premature. If anything, it will provide additional
valuable oversight of the multiplying streams of U.S. assistance to the
AU.
2. A second, critical step is for the United States to define a
realistic, dynamic strategy of long-term engagement with the AU, and to
tie that strategy systematically to consistent, reliable baseline
funding. The United States should be looking out at least a decade in
this engagement and begin setting targets for support, either in
absolute dollar amounts or as a percentage of support requirements.
Currently U.S. support to the AU is ad hoc, crisis-driven, vulnerable
to raids from other budget lines, and uneven from year-to-year. If the
U.S. is to be credible and reliable in assisting the AU to acquire key
new capacities, it needs to break consciously with current practices.
Sectoral priorities for financial and technical support should include:
i. Helping build the AU's capacity to resolve conflicts
though targeted training and support of mid-level mediators,
expanding the competence of negotiating teams beyond the
senior-most echelons; and strengthening regional peacekeeping
capacities, notably the planned African Standby Force;
ii. Helping to standardize and strengthen emerging norms on
governance and economic stewardship; and
iii. Helping strengthen approaches to chronic and infectious
diseases (to include HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria) and the
environment. In all of these areas, the U.S. has special
expertise to contribute.
3. Third, the United States must respond more effectively to the
ongoing emergency in the Darfur region in Sudan. This will require (as
outlined below) heightened U.S. leadership to facilitate an expanded
U.N. peacekeeping role in support of the AU in Darfur and greater
diplomatic pressure on the parties to the conflict. It will also
require special care that the U.S. response to this immediate crisis
does not weaken the U.S. resolve to build enduring AU capacities over
the long-term. The United States should not mortgage the AU's future to
finance its current, urgent emergency requirements. The United States
and the EU alike suffer from this malady, and each needs somehow to
learn how simultaneously to balance meeting immediate urgent
requirements like those in Darfur while also addressing the AU's long
term capacity requirements.
THE IMMEDIATE CHALLENGE: CRISIS IN DARFUR
The United States should use all its persuasive power to encourage
the African Union to partner with the United Nations and request an
alignment of AU and U.N. forces in Sudan, and, together with the
international community, to pressure the Government of National Unity
in Khartoum to acquiesce.
The most immediate and pressing challenge for the African Union is
the crisis in Darfur. Beyond the evident humanitarian costs of the
conflict, the current security operation and mediation efforts under
way are an early test of AU commitment and capacity. Success of this
mission is critical, not only for the people of Darfur, but for the
longer-term prospects of AU interventions. And right now that
intervention is in crisis.
The world's first priority there must be to fix the security
situation, which is disintegrating into an increasingly diffuse mix of
banditry, retaliation, and breakdown of command and control both within
the fragmenting rebel movements and on the government side. There can
be no progress on political mediation until there is some restoration
of order, some control over cross-border trafficking in arms and
support, an effective clamp-down on Eritrean, Libyan and Chadian
meddling in the conflict, and heightened pressure on Khartoum. This is
clearly beyond the AU's current capacity.
The United States has committed $167 million to the AU mission in
Darfur. And as Deputy Secretary Zoellick stated earlier this month, in
areas where they have deployed, security has improved. But the African
Union itself, currently with just over 6,000 troops on the ground, has
acknowledged that it will be near impossible to get 13,000 troops
deployed in any reasonable timeframe. The recent kidnappings and
killings of AU troops and continued insecurity in Darfur are proof that
the African Union at this stage, despite commitment and commendable
performance, does not have the capacity to fulfill this daunting task.
At this point, our best and most realistic option would be for the
U.N. Security Council to enlarge the ambit of its Sudanese peacekeeping
operation, to allow support for the AU mission in Darfur. It simply
makes no sense to have 10,000 U.N. troops in Sudan, mandated to monitor
and support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
parallel to an AU force in Darfur, but forbidden from intervening in
that area of the country that most needs security. But for the Security
Council to take this step to merge the two missions, the request will
need to come--directly and persuasively--from the African Union itself.
A merger of this kind need not undermine or detract from the
accomplishments, responsibility, or command structure of the AU forces
on the ground, but rather will signal a mature acknowledgement of what
is required to uphold the responsibility to protect.
The United States and other key players should lend political
support to AU mediation efforts in Abuja by assigning senior, empowered
advisers and mediators to the talks; by making available quick and
flexible financing for training and technical assistance; by exerting
diplomatic pressure to minimize the role of potential regional
spoilers; and, in consultation with AU mediators, by continuing to
build unified, international pressure on both the rebel groups and on
Khartoum to make demonstrable progress in fulfilling their promises and
negotiating in good faith.
The Darfur negotiations in Abuja will be stalled unless there is a
change in the security situation on the ground. That said, since
negotiations began last year, the AU mediation team has improved
dramatically in competence, organization, operational capacity, and
openness to external assistance. The African Union's Special Envoy for
the Darfur Talks, former Tanzanian Prime Minister Salim Ahmed Salim,
has proven an adept and able leader, and according to those involved in
the negotiations has made a real difference. If the AU, with U.N.
assistance, can exert a modicum of control over the security situation
in Darfur, the AU talks, with focused multilateral support may be able
to make some headway in reaching a negotiated settlement. But here too,
they will need substantial support from the international community.
The division between the two factions of the SLM is both a threat
to security and an obstacle to peace negotiations. Neither the U.S. nor
the AU can dictate who should represent the SLM at the peace
negotiations. However, until they resolve their internal differences,
our only option is to recognize a de facto situation of two parallel
movements. In the light of this, it is essential that the U.S. make
clear that hostilities between the two factions are unacceptable. The
African Union should not be tasked with sorting out the thorny question
of SLM representation when the peace talks begin. Rather, the U.S. and
other international partners should adopt a common position and do
their utmost to ensure SLM agreement in advance.
MANY CRISES, LITTLE CAPACITY, MIXED RESULTS
Darfur is currently the most pressing challenge that the African
Union's peace and security architecture faces, and the one that for
many reasons has garnered the most international attention. But the
organization has interceded in a number of other African crises and
today continues to grapple with multiple complex crises. And for the
foreseeable future, it will not lack for crises. The situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, rising tensions between Ethiopia and
Eritrea (and within Ethiopia itself), a deteriorating situation in
Chad, and the failed state of Somalia, are among the situations where
the African Union will likely be expected to play an increasingly
active role.
Even in Darfur, notwithstanding the enormity of the catastrophe and
the momentous international attention generated, the African Union
mediation effort was slow in starting, initially disorganized, and
divided on how much external involvement would be acceptable. Darfur
and other interventions that have received much less international
attention and support have illustrated the critical need for longer-
term capacity building and institutionalization. A number of the most
senior envoys in these efforts have been outstanding statesmen, and
highly effective. But at more junior and mid-level echelons, there is
often a lack of mediation, administrative, or managerial experience and
capacity, making it difficult for the organization to prioritize, to
manage external assistance, or adequately plan. The majority of AU
interventions remain heavily contingent on the inclination of the most
powerful AU leaders, most notably President Obasanjo of Nigeria and
President Mbeki of South Africa, and the organization has not yet fully
sorted out its relationship with regional organizations like SADC and
ECOWAS in determining which body should intervene in given situations.
Finally, the African Union should not be expected to shoulder the
responsibility for Africa's most intractable conflicts alone. In many
of these conflicts, only a strong concerted multilateral effort will be
able to generate the pressures and incentives necessary, with the AU as
a key--or ideally a leading--negotiating presence.
Some examples from previous AU interventions point to the potential
and actual gains from AU initiatives along with the need for greater
international support to them.
Burundi--African Union engagement in Burundi was considered an
important first test of the organization's commitment and capacity to
promote peace and security in Africa, and by most accounts the AU's
role was crucial in consolidating the Burundian peace process, as well
as bolstering the organizations confidence in carrying out its new
mandate. However, a number of considerations should be kept in mind.
First, the AU intervention in Burundi was driven largely by the
personal leadership of then AU chair Thabo Mbeki, who saw the
deployment as an opportunity to demonstrate the new AU commitment to
the responsibility to protect. South Africa provided the majority of
the AU troops.
Second, the African Union was not alone in the process. The Arusha
Accord of 2000, a first major breakthrough in Burundi's peace process,
called for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, but absent a comprehensive
cease-fire agreement the U.N. would not authorize the mission. The AU
peacekeeping operation therefore, deployed in April 2003, was conceived
and implemented as an interim, bridging force. The 3000-plus AU troops
were absorbed into a larger U.N. force of 5,650 little over a year
later in June 2004, in direct response to a request from the AU. The
transition from an AU to U.N. force was smooth, with the AU command
structure left largely intact, and troops on the ground re-hatted as
U.N. forces.\1\
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See Kristiana Powell, The African Union's Emerging Peace and
Security Regime, Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria, 2005.
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Third, while the African Union mission paved the way for the U.N.
deployment by bringing a modicum of security while cease-fire
negotiations were underway, it by no means had the capacity--in
numbers, equipment, or financial capacity to implement the robust
mandate required--including protection of civilians, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration. The process might have floundered
badly had not the U.N. come in with the manpower, equipment, resources,
and experience to get the job done. The African Union mission was
blessed with the excellent negotiation skills and staying power of AU
envoy Mamadou Bah, backed by senior South African leadership, but
crucial to the mission's success was the close collaboration with, and
generous support from, the United States, the UK, and the United
Nations, all of which invested significant diplomatic and financial
resources in the effort.
Togo--Among the most striking shifts since the establishment of the
AU has been that coups within member states, once a fairly regular and
unremarkable occurrence in the African context, are now deemed
unacceptable and generally provoke a strong condemnatory reaction from
the AU membership. When President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, died in
office after ruling the country for 38 years, the military appointed
his son Fame Gnassingbe as president and pushed the national assembly
to amend the constitution retroactively to make the move technically
legal. The African Union acted quickly, labeling the move a coup and,
with unanimous endorsement of the AU Peace and Security Council,
imposed diplomatic, travel and arms sanctions on the Togolese state.
Bowing to pressure by the African Union and regional leadership,
Gnassingbe announced that Presidential elections would be held, and
lifted, albeit partially, a ban on political activity.
The Togo example is not an unqualified success. Although the AU
forced an electoral process, the elections were deeply flawed and
political participation in Togo remains severely constrained. The
African Union has yet to come to terms with the limits of national
sovereignty, and so far has been loath to offer frank assessments of
even the most blatantly shoddy election processes. Nor does the AU have
the capacity or staying power to exert high-level, long-term follow-up
pressure and attention in these instances.
Mauritania--When a coup in Mauritania in August 2005 unseated
President Ould Taya, an unpopular autocrat, the African Union quickly
condemned the move and suspended the country's membership from the
organization. Although the AU did not push to have Taya re-installed,
it has insisted on a timetable for elections and a transfer to civilian
rule. The Mauritania coup illustrates a broader concern of how the
United States can support the goals and the norms that the African
Union is attempting to set. There is some conjecture that the United
States' fairly uncritical embrace of Taya on counter-terrorism
operations fueled popular discontent, since Taya used that engagement
to legitimate his rule and sideline dissenters. This illustrated the
broader point of how U.S. engagement with African leaders needs to be
carefully calibrated to reinforce the governance norms that the African
Union is seeking to promulgate. In coming years, the U.S. will need to
grapple with how to integrate short-term security concerns with the
longer-term challenges of democratization and popular participation.
Zimbabwe--Finally, Zimbabwe reveals most clearly the African
Union's limitations. The AU--as well as much of the rest of the world--
has relied almost exclusively on South African President Mbeki for a
political solution to Zimbabwe's crisis, and Mbeki, for political and
philosophical reasons, has been so far unwilling to take meaningful
action. The AU is paralyzed; although some individual states--Senegal,
Kenya, Ghana--have voiced cautious disapproval of Zimbabwean leader
Robert Mugabe, many are loath to criticize an elder statesman and
former front-line leader. Further, Mugabe has fairly skillfully
appealed to populist sentiments in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa
by portraying the opposition as merely a front for Western neo-colonial
interests. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan's naming of Special Envoy
Anna Tubaijuka to report on the mass housing demolitions in spring 2005
nudged Mbeki to name former Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to
mediate between Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC. But
President Chissano was rebuffed by Mugabe, and ZANU-PF has only
intensified its efforts to silence the opposition.
Public opinion may be shifting in South Africa the housing
demolitions, which were broadcast on South African television, were
starkly reminiscent of apartheid-era tactics--but the international
community cannot rely on quick AU action. The United States and others
will need to continue to seek common ground with the African Union,
both in perception of the problem and in looking toward solution. But
this should not stymie consideration of other options, for example,
broadening bilateral and U.N. pressures through additional
investigations and rapporteurs. The United States will need to prepare
for the worst case scenario in Zimbabwe, a possible collapse of the
Zimbabwean state, which would demand close cooperation between African
states and international partners to address.
BEYOND CONFLICT: ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR GOVERNANCE
Perhaps the greatest role the African Union can play over the long-
term is addressing the root causes of conflict, most importantly in
setting norms for good governance, economic management, environmental
stewardship, and investment in health and education. This will be a
long and gradual process, but one that is well-worth supporting. A
number of promising initiatives are today in their infancy.
The innovative African Peer Review Mechanism, for example, measures
participating states' performance against political, economic, and
corporate governance standards. To date, 23 countries have signed up
for peer review; two of these reviews have been completed and several
more are under way. Countries initially undergo a self administered
internal review, followed by an outside assessment. A final report,
including plans for corrective measures is discussed among AU heads of
state, and countries volunteering for review.
The Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and other Related
Infectious Diseases of 2001, was an important symbolic achievement.
African leaders collectively acknowledged the exceptional threat HIV/
AIDS poses to development, political stability, food security, and
social cohesion, and pledged to set a target of allocating 15 percent
of annual budgets to their countries health sector.
Other proposed measures include a continent-wide early warning
system, intended to link regional early warning reporting with the AU
Peace and Security Council; an African Productive Capacity Initiative
intended to strengthen African industrial capacities and regional
integration; and a post-conflict reconstruction commission. Today, it
is difficult to guess which of these initiatives will eventually
flourish, but the United States and international community can work
with the AU leadership as the organization sets priorities and crafts
longer-term strategies.
U.S. support will be critical to the African Union's future. And
the African Union's success will be important in advancing rising U.S.
stakes in Africa. The administration is to be commended for its current
support to the AU and to the negotiations in Darfur. However, to help
build a long-term, reliable partner, the United States can do more, and
should build an approach that is coherent, predictable,
institutionalized, and well-led at a senior level. Supporting the trend
toward African ownership and responsibility warrants such an approach.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for bringing attention to
these important issues and for the opportunity to speak with you today.
Thank you.
Senator Martinez. Thank you very much.
Ms. Holt, we will hear from you now. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF VICTORIA K. HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER
Ms. Holt. I too will summarize my remarks, so I hope that--
--
Senator Martinez. The full remarks will be made a part of
the record. Thank you very much.
Ms. Holt. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, it is
a pleasure to be here. I know we are a bit short on time, so I
thought I would hit some high points.
First, I will just put peacekeeping in context, look
specifically at Africa and then make some recommendations as
you look forward to your agenda for the coming year. First,
congratulations, I think this is a very important issue. I
think it is important for two reasons. The U.S. cares deeply
about its own security and its national interests, and that is
one reason we look at peacekeeping in Africa. We care about
failed states. We care about ungoverned spaces. But we also
have a humanitarian urge in this country and peacekeeping can
serve that as well.
Just a quick reminder, what is peacekeeping, before I talk
about it in the Africa context? It is an effort to move violent
conflict into political expression. It is not the answer to
everything. It is not the equivalent of going in and fighting a
war. But when it is done right it can be a very useful tool.
What we have seen, which is quite impressive, is African
leadership coming to take this on on their own continent in
greater numbers, particularly with the African Union and with
ECOWAS. But before I talk specifically about them, I should
point out that peace operations and stability operations have
grown worldwide. We see American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the Balkans. We see a military stretched beyond an area
that we have seen before. So as a result, I think we also look
at African leadership because Africa has been the host to more
peacekeeping in the last few years than any other continent.
Eight of the 16 UN operations today are in Africa. Seventy-five
percent of UN peacekeepers now are working there. Some of these
missions are large and complex.
So what does that mean in the context of the African Union?
Well, since 2002 it has taken on, as we have already heard, two
new peacekeeping operations, first in Burundi and now in
Darfur. ECOWAS has had a longer history of peacekeeping through
the 1990s, but has also taken on ambitious operations--Sierra
Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia--most recently. But we should
not mistake their willingness, their personnel, and their speed
of deploying troops, as well as their understanding of the
regional issues and the willingness to live in difficult
situations, which are all vastly important and critical, with
the capability that we usually equate with successful
operations. So just a note of caution.
Headquarters of both ECOWAS and AU are roughly two dozen
people. This is a vast improvement over 5 years ago, when you
might have found one or two people there. But this is why it
matters. We need to think about how we help them with planning
and management. We know well that their member states cannot
financially support them at this time. We know also that they
need logistics and transportation and many of basically what I
call surround-sound, particularly the handoff to what the UN
calls peace-building. We want rule of law to last. They need
better expertise in how to convey that. For a long time, that
is going to be reliant on the UN to come in and help them with
that kind of work.
In general this is a good news story. I think that an
excellent leadership effort has been going on. But I do not
think this is a situation where at this point we can see them
take on missions that we usually equate with the capabilities
of the UN, and in some cases, NATO and the European Union, if
not MNFs.
One more note on the UN and then I will move to U.S. policy
options. One thing we could really do to assist better
coordination, this sort of ``all boats rise'' approach, which I
think would benefit us, is if we enabled the United Nations to
work better with the African Union, ECOWAS, and with SADC and
IGAD, as they emerge more into peacekeeping. What do I mean?
The UN is designed to support UN operations. They do not have a
mechanism currently, formally, to work with these regional
groups. They were able to do it in Darfur, basically by using
another device, a special political mission. But it would do us
well to think about this and have a few people whose job it is
to work with these organizations, to help them plan and then
help with the inevitable handoff, which we may see in Darfur,
but we have already seen in Liberia, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire and
other places; it could be smoothed out and work better. We
would all benefit from that.
Real quick on U.S. policy: The United States, in general,
does not do peacekeeping in Africa, certainly not since the
last large mission in Somalia. So our strategy tends to be to
support other actors. We do this through training, we do the
support to operations, we do this through support to regional
organizations and through paying our assessments to the UN and
voting on the Security Council.
Two accounts that you need to look at that support all of
this. The voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account in the
State Department is around $200 million this year.
Appropriators cut about $20 million out of it. That houses all
of our Global Peace Operations Initiative and other training.
It houses our bilateral support to operations and it hosts all
of our bilateral support to ECOWAS and the AU, which is great
work. But I worry that we need at least $75 million for our
support to Darfur for this year, so we already start out with a
bit of a shortfall. Our dues to the UN certainly has caused
some sticker shock up here. We are looking at over a billion
dollars being required for the coming year. If State was candid
with you, they would say that is about $500 million short, what
you just sent them, for what they are actually going to need.
It is fair of us to ask hard questions about these peacekeeping
budgets, but we vote for them on the Security Council. And if
they work, then we will have a better chance of success, both
on the peace-building piece and going in correctly. So I need
to flag those two accounts to you and to suggest thinking
about, in the coming year, how we can make those programs work
better.
Finally, in addition to the UN mechanism and funding, I
have to mention Darfur briefly. I agree that there is mission
mandate language that talks about civilian protection. It is
much like the language in most of UN peacekeeping operations.
But the AU cannot do this without stronger political leadership
and potentially a deterrent that can back them up. I think we
have heard some good options in testimony in full committee. I
do worry that Deputy Secretary Zoellick is correct, that Darfur
remains a tinderbox and that we do need to look at the security
question if we are going to get to a political solution.
Finally, it is never popular for Congress to ask for more
reports, but I might suggest to the subcommittee it would be
very helpful if you could ask the administration, particularly
State, to come back to you and bring together these various
programs that they are presenting. We did not touch on
counterterrorism today, but much of the training we are going
to be doing in Africa will overlap with peacekeeping. We have
varied accounts, and excellent people working in the
administration on this, but particularly as you start out the
new year, it might be nice to have this in one place to help
guide your discussions as we look at both our interests in
security and our humanitarian concerns in Africa.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victoria K. Holt, Senior Associate,
the Henry L. Stimson Center
Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, members of the committee, it
is an honor to testify before you today on the role of African
leadership and organizations in regional conflict management and peace
operations. I applaud the committee's attention to this topic, and hope
this discussion will draw needed attention to African-led endeavors, to
our interests in the region, and to how the U.S. and international
actors can better address and leverage success.
OVERVIEW: AFRICAN SECURITY AND PEACE OPERATIONS
First, let me offer some context. The world has increasingly turned
to peace operations as tools to help support transitions from armed
conflict to sustained peace. Today we see thousands of forces deployed
worldwide, from Afghanistan to Haiti, from Iraq to the Sinai. As more
civil wars end, regional crises calm, and democratic efforts look for
support, peace operations are often the tool of choice for the
international community. They are often sent to help prevent state
failure, to support post-conflict reconstruction and to address aspects
of humanitarian crises. Many of these multinational missions are large
and complex, led as coalitions or by NATO, but increasingly by the
United Nations and African actions.
Africa has seen dramatic growth in peace operations over the last 6
years, hosting more peacekeepers than any other region. The United
Nations currently leads eight such operations on the continent: in
Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the Western
Sahara.\1\ Over 30 African nations contribute personnel to these
missions, and in most cases, make up from one-quarter to one-half of
U.N. forces.\2\
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\1\ In September 2005 the U.N. reported 68,513 peacekeepers
deployed worldwide, with 53,702 in Africa. Peacekeepers include troops,
military observers and civilian police. These numbers do not include
civilian staff in the field or at U.N. headquarters.
\2\ Data from the United Nations as of 30 September 2005.
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With the increased demand for security providers, the spotlight has
also moved to African organizations and their efforts to manage
regional crises. We see new African engagement in resolving conflicts,
promoting democratic regimes, and strengthening multinational efforts.
Fueled by ambitious leadership and prompted by multiple conflicts, the
African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) are developing greater capacity to tackle issues of regional
peace and security. Both groups have deployed troops and led new
peacekeeping missions, as seen in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Darfur and
Liberia. Other organizations are more focused on conflict resolution,
such the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (MAD), with its
efforts in Somalia and Sudan.
More than a decade after the Rwandan genocide, the crisis in Sudan
again brings international attention to the questions of intervention
and peace operations. Which African groups have the will and mechanisms
to plan, deploy, manage, and sustain peace operations effectively? What
is their relationship to the United Nations and other multinational
organizations? What role can and should the United States play?
My testimony looks at three areas related to African security and
peace operations.\3\ First, I will consider the emergence of African
organizations in leading peace operations. Second, I will look at how
these African organizations and their operations fit within the context
of international efforts, especially those of the United Nations.
Third, I will consider U.S. goals and how our policies support these
efforts in Africa, including the situation in Darfur with the AU, and
offer some options for Congress.
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\3\ This statement draws on my work at the Henry L. Stimson Center,
including a study conducted with support from the U.S. Institute of
Peace, African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: U.N.
Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS (2005).
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Second, let me argue that these issues are very important to the
United States. As Americans, we view peace operations as serving U.S.
strategic and security interests through preventing state failure,
increasing stability, and moving conflicts into lively political
expression rather than deadly armed warfare. We also view peace
operations as a means to address our deep-felt concern for addressing
humanitarian crises and supporting human rights, part of our commitment
to act well in the world. These goals are inter-related, and serve both
immediate and longer-term aims such as supporting democratic reforms
and reducing terrorist havens, enabling trade and economic opportunity,
and strengthening regional security and healthy governance.
Defining Peace Operations--A Tool For What?
Peacekeeping missions are intended to provide temporary security
and enable political efforts to take hold for sustaining peace. Such
missions range from military observers overseeing disputed border
areas, as in the U.N. mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea, to more complex
operations involving disarmament of forces and establishment of the
rule of law, such as in Liberia. These operations should be married
with concurrent peacebuilding efforts that continue after the troops
have left.
Peace operations are never assured of success, however. Each
mission is deployed with cautious optimism that a conflict can be
brought to a conclusion--that peacekeepers will help the shift to a
sustained peace--but the result ultimately rests with local actors.
Even after international forces deploy, crises can remain challenging,
as seen dramatically in Sudan and the DRC where conflict continues and
keeps millions displaced, vulnerable and at risk of death. Peacekeepers
should not be sent to wage war or substitute for political engagement,
yet they often operate under difficult conditions, in dangerous
neighborhoods with tenuous peace agreements, and with too little back-
up. When peace operations are not married with political support from
member states, their jobs become even more difficult, especially for
the nations volunteering troops and police. Peacekeepers put their
lives on the line, as seen by the 86 U.N. personnel who died this year.
AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACE OPERATIONS
Matching Political Will and Operational Capacity
African leadership has helped bring a new era of engagement in
security and support for peace efforts. Leaders such as Olusegun
Obansanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Alpha Konare of
Mali have played public roles to bring the African Union and other
initiatives into the forefront, in contrast to the criminal actions of
Charles Taylor of Liberia and Charles Mugabe of Zimbabwe. Many others
have contributed to peace efforts, such as Nelson Mandela's engagement
with Burundi, as well as countless leaders who work in national roles
or serve as envoys, diplomats and military leaders.
As African nations develop greater capacity for peace operations,
two multinational organizations stand out: the African Union and the
ECOWAS. Both have adopted formal mechanisms with wide-ranging peace and
security responsibilities, unparalleled in Asia, South America or the
Middle East. Other regional organizations, such as the South African
Development Community (SADC) and IGAD, can play a significant role in
conflict resolution but are not yet able to deploy peace operations.
The African Union. The African Union was born from the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) in 2002. With 53 founding members (all African
nations except Morocco), the AU is headquartered in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia. It has more authority to intervene in matters related to
peace and security than its predecessor, which valued non-interference.
The AU Constitutive Act embraces international cooperation, but also
sets out an AU role ranging from mediation to forceful intervention.
The AU has an ambitious agenda on the continent, and has already
deployed two peace operations. In April 2003, the AU launched a mission
in Burundi which would grow to over 3,300 peacekeepers, led by South
Africa with troops from Mozambique and Ethiopia. The objective was to
uphold the cease-fire agreement, support disarmament of armed forces,
assist in establishing stability, coordinate with the U.N. and
facilitate humanitarian assistance. More observers were supplied by
Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia. The AU mission in Burundi
was established with the understanding that mission leadership would
pass to the U.N. Indeed, the AU relied heavily on outside support from
the U.N. and Western countries (including the U.S. and the United
Kingdom) for logistics and funding. While there was cooperation among
these actors, it was improvised, and the AU transitioned its mission to
the U.N. in 2004.
Building off its success in Burundi, the African Union launched its
second mission in Darfur in 2004. This mission was much more ambitious,
with the aim of monitoring a cease-fire agreement in an area equivalent
to the size of Texas, where conflict and a humanitarian crisis
continued at a level considered genocide by the United States. Today
that mission has grown to nearly 7,000 personnel, benefiting from both
willing African nations and major financial, logistical and operational
support from the West and other developed states. Even as it has
succeeded at many tasks, the AU faces fundamental problems.
In addition, the African Union is also developing the African
Standby Force (ASF), a force designed to be made of multidisciplinary
contingents on standby in five regions of Africa. By 2010, the ASF
forces are to be ready for swift call-up for missions ranging from
observation to intervention against genocide. ECOWAS has endorsed a
Standby Force, but has yet to develop specific doctrine or policies to
support it. IGAD is slated to coordinate development of the Eastern
African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and SADC is moving to create a
standby brigade. Progress is slow, and coordination across the regions
is challenging, reflecting the uneven distribution of support for the
ASF and capability in regional groups.
ECOWAS. Made up of 15 West African states, ECOWAS is the most
advanced regional organisation in Africa in terms of peace operations.
Based in Abuja, Nigeria, ECOWAS put boots on the ground during the
1990s in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, with mixed reviews.
ECOWAS' security-related responsibilities were further outlined in its
1999 Protocol. They include resolving internal and interstate
conflicts, strengthening conflict prevention, supporting deployment of
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions. ECOWAS has
also deployed peacekeepers to Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 and Liberia in
2003.
ECOWAS forces deployed to Liberia in July 2003 with troops from
Ghana, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria, backed up by U.S. Marines, and later
by U.N. personnel and the multinational group, the Standby High
Readiness Brigade. The ECOWAS forces made a strong impact, stabilizing
the country even as they faced deployment delays, equipment shortages
and limited communications and information systems. The mission later
transitioned to U.N. leadership, with ECOWAS forces being ``rehatted''
as U.N. troops.
Common Challenges. With these operations, African organizations can
be misunderstood as having more capacity than they actually possess.
Certainly progress is clear: the AU and ECOWAS have adopted frameworks,
increased their headquarters staff, built better planning capacity, and
worked with member states and outside partners to organize, deploy and
manage peace operations. But both organizations face substantial
hurdles.
The AU and ECOWAS have deployed troops, but they are not self-
sustaining and require outside logistical support. They face
fundamental gaps in their planning and management capacity to lead
peace operations. Their headquarters staff total a few dozen
professionals; the most skilled are taxed by the requirements of their
(often multiple) responsibilities. The AU and ECOWAS are reliant on
external sources to finance their operations, since they lack
sufficient funding from their member states. Ambitious plans for
coordinating peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are still in the
early stages of being operationalized.
In short, there is striking contrast between the AU and ECOWAS
willingness to deploy troops and their capacity to plan and support
such deployments. For these African organizations to play a stronger
role in peace operations, they require baseline capacities: management
and planning, financing, logistics and transportation, command and
control, skilled and available personnel, and clear leadership. The AU
and ECOWAS would also benefit from clearer concepts of operations,
mandates, leadership qualifications and doctrine for their missions, as
well as from more development of deployable police and other personnel.
Outside Partners. Donor governments are looking to support
successful efforts in Africa, and have offered bilateral support
directly, through regional venues (e.g., the European Union, or EU) and
via the G8 process, to leverage African national, regional and
continent-wide capacities.\4\ The G8 nations are pledged to their 2002
Africa Action Plan, an ambitious effort to provide bilateral funding
and support peace and security tools in Africa, especially the ASF and
added forces for peace operations.
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\4\ The G8 includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia,
the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Outside partners can address some needs (e.g., logistics and
transportation support). Other areas require development of skills
within the organizations (e.g., command and control, leadership) and
support from member states. Support from the West includes military
training, such as the recent French-led RECAMP exercises, which
involved 1,800 troops from 12 African nations, as well as training
programs run by the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States.
ECOWAS and the AU have had difficulty responding to outside offers
of assistance, however, and often partner countries can be unsure how
to approach them. Bilateral donors could improve their impact with
better coordination of competing bilateral efforts to train and equip
African forces, which can lack coordination, be duplicative, and not
focus on where real gaps exist. A headquarters data base and tracking
system to handle incoming offers of financial, material and personnel
support could be useful for partner countries, African organizations
and the United Nations.
II. LINK TO INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
How do African regional organizations and operations fit within the
context of international efforts?
African organizations are taking on a role in peace operations
where few other multinational organizations act. NATO and the EU, for
example, have only recently become active in Africa, with NATO support
to the AU mission in Darfur and the EU authorizing a peacekeeping
operation, Operation Artemis, led by the French to help stabilize the
town of Bunia in the DRC in the summer of 2003. The primary
organization with a role in Africa is the United Nations.
The Prominence of Africa in U.N. missions. Africa dominates the
U.N.'s peace operations agenda. Seventy-five percent of U.N.
peacekeepers today are in Africa. The United States and other members
of the Security Council have approved an unprecedented number of
complex, Chapter VII peacekeeping operations since 2003, adding African
operations in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, and most recently,
Sudan. The Security Council has also tripled U.N. forces in the DRC
since 2000.
The U.N. manages nearly 80,000 personnel around the world with a
headquarters staff of about 600 people in the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). While overstretched, the U.N. still has
more political leverage and organizational reach to support peace
operations and run multiple efforts simultaneously than any other
organization. The U.N. has programs related to relief, development,
health, and peacebuilding, for example. No African group has this
breadth or the ability to yet leverage peacebuilding efforts, which are
needed to sustain post-conflict security and support rule of law. This
role continues to require U.N. engagement.
UN Collaboration with Regional Efforts. With the U.N. peacekeeping
budget at about $4 billion (and growing), the benefit of collaboration
between African organizations and the U.N. is clear. Some progress has
been made. The United Nations has held high-level meetings on regional
cooperation; the Security Council has identified Africa as a priority;
and varied U.N. initiatives have looked at collaboration. Last year the
Secretary General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
urged improving U.N. relationships with regional groups, developing a
10-year effort to support African regional capacities, and considering
the provision of U.N. stocks and funding, to African-led operations.\5\
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\5\ A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the United Nations,
December 2004, page 85. The Panel suggested collaborations ranging from
information exchanges to co-training of civilian and military personnel
to the use of NATO to help train and equip regional organizations.
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The U.N. has helped match countries offering troops for African-led
operations with countries that can provide airlift to deploy troops,
and assisted with mission planning. For the AU mission in Darfur, the
U.N. Secretariat provided unusually strong mission planning support
after the Security Council approved that role via a unique U.N. special
political mission.
So far, however, collaboration is ad hoc. The United Nations is
designed and funded to focus on U.N. operations rather than those led
by other multinational groups--even when such missions are authorized
or welcomed by the Security Council--which makes collaboration more
difficult.
Getting Serious: Create a Plan. The U.N. needs two tools. First,
the U.N. needs a strategy for providing support to regional
organizations such as the African Union. Second, the U.N. needs a
mechanism to trigger support and a means to provide it consistently.
This is straightforward. The strategic vision already is the
working notion of many U.N. member states: create an international
architecture of capacity for peace operations, and adopt an ``all boats
rise'' approach to regional groups who are willing to take on missions
relative to their capacity. The Security Council already has a trigger
that could be brought to life: citation of Chapter VIII of the U.N.
Charter, which recognizes the role of regional actors. Finally, the
means is fairly simple: add a few personnel to the U.N. Secretariat
whose job it is to plan and work with regional organizations
effectively.
There are plenty of areas ripe for better collaboration. The U.N.
could help facilitate improving AU and ECOWAS headquarters capacity,
with a focus on mission planning and support. Other areas include: use
of logistics sites (such as the U.N. Logistics Base at Brindisi and
African depots); development of the African Standby Force capacities;
integration of participation in the U.N. Standby Arrangements System, a
data base of national capacities of member states; design of pre-
deployment training; systems for hand-offs between African-led and
U.N.-led operations; sharing of lessons learned; use of early warning
and analytical information in Africa; harmonization of national
training and doctrinal materials; identification of command and control
issues; and coordination of funding.
In many areas, the continuing U.N. effort to modernize and reform
its peacekeeping capacity is instructive. As U.N. missions have grown
in numbers, size and complexity since 1999, the U.N. has scrambled to
fill shortages in available, well-trained military and civilian
personnel, funding, ready equipment and logistics. Lessons could also
be learned from NATO, the EU and other member states.
III. U.S. LEADERSHIP AND POLICY ISSUES
The United States and other developed states are deciding how best
to support peace operations and related efforts, as well as allocate
resources to African-led efforts, the U.N. and other multinational
operations, and their own initiatives to address such conflicts and
transitions to peace.
U.S. Approach. Since the end of the cold war, the United States'
only major peacekeeping role in Africa has been in Somalia. The U.S.
remains very cautious about participating in peace operations. With
more attention after 9/11 to preventing state failure, helping prevent
terrorism, and post-conflict reconstruction, U.S. policy has focused on
supporting other actors to conduct and manage peace operations. There
are four major approaches:
Training African Forces. The U.S. has trained African
military forces, primarily through the African Contingency
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which began
in 2002 and followed the earlier African Crisis Response
Initiative. That program is expected to expand as part of the
new Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aims to
train roughly 75,000 troops worldwide, with two-thirds in
Africa.
Bilateral Support to Operations. The U.S. has provided some
bilateral assistance to African-led multinational operations in
Africa, such as support to ECOWAS forces in Cote d'Ivoire,
providing airlift to help Ethiopians deploy with the AU into
Burundi, and offering contracted support for AU forces in
Darfur today.
Direct Assistance to African Organizations. The United
States has provided some support to regional multinational
organizations, such as funding a U.S. advisor at ECOWAS
headquarters.
Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations. As a member of the
Security Council, the U.S. supports U.N. peace operations and
pays a percentage of the U.N. peacekeeping budget.
All of these programs are solid approaches to security challenges.
But the State Department is chronically faced with difficult choices
about resources due to its limited funding. U.S. budgets for these
programs have not kept pace with the dynamic growth in African-led
efforts, U.N. operations, and the need to accelerate support to such
efforts. One exception is GPOI, which may bring substantial new
resources to bear in the region, especially if it supports regional
organizations and their operations, as well as training. Even so, the
United States is unlikely to play a major role in this area of African
security without more support for these programs.
U.S. Programs & Funding. Within the State Department budget, two
accounts before the committee resource the current U.S. approach and
deserve support:
The Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account,
requested at $196 million for fiscal year 2006 (FY06), is the
primary source of U.S. support to regional efforts and
organizations worldwide. Funding for the African Regional
account is requested at about $41 million, to provide support
to African operations, regional initiatives and African
organizations, an amount insufficient to meet U.S. interests in
this area. Also requested within this account is $114 million
in funding for the Global Peace Operations Initiative, with
activities in Africa including the ACOTA program, for training
of African forces.
The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
(CIPA) account, requested at $1.036 billion for FY06, provides
the U.S. share of contributions for UN-led peace operations.
The request is less than the $1.3 billion projected as needed
for the coming year--before taking into account the U.N.
mission in Sudan, new or expanded missions. This budget lacks
room for initiatives that invest in capacity-building and long-
term reform efforts, which limits the U.S. ability to promote
such reforms at the United Nations or within specific missions.
To avoid new arrears for operations we support, Congress also
needs to lift the ``cap'' on payment of our U.N. peacekeeping
share, and realign our funding with the U.N. assessment rate we
negotiated and agreed to pay.
Enough Support? When one considers all these two accounts are
trying to accomplish in Africa, they are an excellent investment. Even
in a time of limited budget resources, however, this funding is less
than needed to meet our interests in the continent most faced with
post-conflict operations. The PKO Africa Regional funding could easily
be doubled for good use, such as providing some of the $50 million
needed to support the AU in Darfur, which many in Congress have sought
to provide. The U.S. would also benefit and maximize its impact if the
State Department office for the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization was fully supported and funded (which it is not).
The administration is also increasing U.S. training for counter-
terrorism activities in Africa, first through the Pan Sahel Initiative
and more recently through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism
Initiative. Both programs offer training to African militaries in areas
that include skills useful for peace operations. At the same time, the
U.S. has cutoff our International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funding to some African countries, including South Africa,
further reducing our military-to-military relations and preventing
their leaders from participating in peacekeeping seminars hosted by the
U.S. War Colleges and related programs. This is counterproductive to
our goals.
See the Bigger Picture. As Africa draws greater U.S. resources and
attention, a better strategic vision is needed to many disparate
programs and objectives. This committee does not benefit from a single
source of information on the varied U.S. efforts, put in the context of
parallel international efforts. To understand where U.S. policy is
leading us, this committee would be well-served to ask for a
comprehensive review of U.S. security assistance in Africa, of U.S.
funding for peacekeeping efforts and related U.S. counter-terrorism
accounts, as well as the rationale for these programs, and hopefully,
how they are coordinated and working together toward a shared strategic
vision.
Sudan. In Sudan today we see an on-going crisis in Darfur, where
the U.S. declared that genocide has occurred. Roughly two million
people have been forced from their homes. The international community
has supported deployment of peacekeepers in Darfur by the African
Union, recognized as the only force likely to be acceptable to the
government of Sudan.
By all accounts, the AU has achieved a great deal, providing eyes
and ear on the ground and carrying out important work to report on
cease-fire violations, offer presence and deter violence in the areas
they are deployed, bolstered by Western support and funding. Yet the AU
force is primarily an observer force with some deterrent ability. Their
mandate gives them only a limited ability to intervene on behalf of
civilians and offer them protection. Even as the AU operation grows to
nearly 7,000 personnel, the force is too small and ill-equipped to
effectively cover the area of Darfur. The peacekeepers there are
hampered without greater mobility and communications. In short, the AU
force is not a force prepared or equipped to help bring stability to a
region with ongoing conflict and a tremendous humanitarian crisis.
The U.S. has argued strongly for peace in Sudan and in Darfur, and
backed up the AU troops with funding and logistical support. We see
renewed political attention with Deputy Secretary Zoellick's recent
trip to Darfur. The U.S. supported a U.N. team to work with the AU to
develop its plans, including Americans with experience and practical
expertise. The U.S. has helped keep world attention on the crisis and
organized with others governments to identify financial and materiel
needs of the African Union. But no matter how much support the U.S.
offers the African Union--and we could offer much more--the AU mission
is fundamentally ill-suited to act as much more than a monitoring force
in the region.
In short, the AU can do extremely well but still fail to solve the
larger problem of violence against civilians in the region. No one
wishes to see the AU fail, especially in a mission where it has staked
its credibility. Until a political settlement takes hold, the AU force
needs to be backed up by a credible deterrent against continuing acts
of violence by the Janjaweed, the Government of Sudan and the rebels.
These measures would also support humanitarian efforts, including the
return of refugeesiind those displaced by the war to their homes. This
job requires the mobility, command and control, support and credibility
of a well-trained coherent military force.
Many options have been offered. Proposals include doubling the AU
force and backing it up with better equipment, transportation,
communications, and a credible military deterrent; creation of a no-fly
zone to deter and police incursions; stationing of a rapid reaction
force able to respond on short notice to attacks; and development of a
NATO bridging force to support the AU better. Such options require
action by the Security Council, clearly not an easy task. Nevertheless,
the Council could use expansion of the current U.N. peacekeeping
mission in Sudan to address the situation in Darfur. Otherwise, we need
to be honest that the AU will continue to be limited in what it can do
in Darfur. Where else in the world would we ask a new multinational
organization with little experience to lead a mission that would be
challenging to NATO?
A few trends are clear. There is genuine growth in African
ambitions and willingness to deploy peacekeeping forces. There is
greater multinational engagement in Africa, especially through the
United Nations, which needs to be developed further. And there is
increased support from developed states and the U.S. to support African
capacity-building. The challenge is to support and leverage this
political energy into tangible results.
Strengthen U.S. Tools. The United States has a vital role to play
in Africa and in peace operations. We will benefit from increasing our
funding of U.S. initiatives, especially those supported through the
State Department's PKO and CIPA accounts, to train, support, and
enhance African peacekeeping missions. We can and should offer
political and materiel resources to Africa organizations and
operations, to support lead countries and leaders in Africa, and to the
U.N. and other multinational efforts to build capacity and a better-
working international capacity. The U.S. also should take a leadership
role in strengthening the capacity and effectiveness of the AU mission
in Darfur.
Understand U.S. Strategy and Policy. This committee could benefit
from a central source of information on the funding and programs in
Africa in this area, since programs are spread across offices and even
Departments. The committee should request a review of U.S. security
assistance to Africa, including support for regional capacities,
training and bilateral aid for peace and stability operations. This
review should be put in the context of U.S. strategy toward Africa, to
help consider policy options.
Create a Mechanism to Enable Better U.N. Collaboration with
Regional Groups. U.N. mechanisms to work with regional organizations
are still in their infancy. Even citation of Chapter VIII by the
Security Council does not trigger U.N. collaboration. This should
change. The U.N. needs a strategy and formal means of providing support
to organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS on a consistent
basis. To identify these areas of potential support, the United States
should urge the U.N. to conduct a full assessment of how it could work
more effectively with African organizations in the early planning and
startup phase of an operation; during the initial deployment and as
forces ramp up; and, when appropriate, during hand-offs of leadership
from regional to U.N. peace operations. U.N. member states should agree
to use Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter to trigger real support to
regional peace operations authorized by the Security Council. On a
case-by-case basis, the Council could also direct the use of assessed
funding through the United Nations to support these missions.
Thank you.
Senator Martinez. Well, thank you both for excellent
remarks and very insightful comments. I think you have hit on a
lot of key issues. With the time we have remaining, what we
might just do is have a quick round, each of us, and we might
repeat it again to make sure each of us gets a few questions.
Ms. Holt, I want to just follow up with you as to whether
you--and I do not think you discussed this specifically, but
the African Standby Force, that concept. Please speak to that
if you would.
Ms. Holt. The African Standby Force is an idea that is the
backing up of the African Union. The African Union is now going
to be taking on missions that range all the way from mediation
to intervention against genocide. Their concept is to create a
standing force within Africa based in each of the five regions
within Africa. It is ambitious. They wish to be operational by
2010. At this point ECOWAS is probably the most advanced. They
have endorsed an idea for a standby force within the region.
The last time I looked at their proposal it was about 6,000
troops. IGAD I think may be involved with EASBRIG, the eastern
task force; and SADC in the South, I have heard that they are
moving forward. But the reality is that these troops right now
are not sitting at home ready to go.
I do think there is a question of connectivity between each
of the regions and the African Union itself and the
headquarters. So I think it is still evolving. I think it is
something that the G-8 has endorsed with its Africa Action
Plan, that the United States is also supportive of. But I think
we are going to have to make a better connection between our
training of troops, their headquarters capacity, and how they
work within the continent to see this come to the fore.
Senator Martinez. Let me see. I am going to let you get a
question or two in. I think we are going to be called any time,
and then I will come back.
Senator Feingold. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
To either of you or both of you, what obstacles are there
to AU intervention in a political crisis? Does the AU have to
wait for states to formally request intervention to restore
peace and security or gain member consensus before restoring
peace and stability in a crisis? What role does NEPAD's
voluntary African peer review mechanism evaluation play into
intervention? I just want a sense of how that works.
Ms. Cooke. Sure. I think currently one of the limitations
of the AU is that intervention in particular crises is still
hinged to a large extent on the inclination of particular
leaders, so that when Mbeke decides or Obisanjo decides they
can really drive that intervention. But if there is not that
kind of high-level leadership, it is often much slower to come
together. That said, there are many energetic African leaders
and Cunairy, who is the current chair of the AU commission, is
a superb statesman, former president of Mali, and I think we
can see more activism there. However, it does go to the issue
of institutionalizing and kind of setting standards for
intervention and so forth. The Africa peer review mechanism,
which grew out of NEPAD, which is part of or under the auspices
of the AU, but it is somewhat parallel, does not play much of a
role in these mediation efforts.
This is a mechanism to which countries voluntarily submit
or join. They first undergo an internal review of their
governance standards, then open it up to the broader group,
come up with a policy for redressing whatever their weaknesses
may have been. It is a voluntary system so far. Two countries
have undergone the review. Twenty-three have signed up for
voluntary review.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Ms. Holt.
Ms. Holt. I would just concur with Ms. Cooke's statement.
Maybe just to add, if you mean intervention in the more
military sense, theoretically at least the African Union can
intervene, particularly in the case of genocide. It is the (h)
clause in their Constitutive Act. But it recognizes that to do
so it would probably ask a member state to lead an
intervention, and obviously we have not seen this yet on the
continent. So I would just flag that as something still to be
developed. I cannot offer more than that on that point.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. They have called us to a vote, but I want
to just ask one last question if I may. Thank you, sir, for
your participation. The interaction between NEPAD and AU, can
you just deal with that and if you can in brief moments help me
a little bit with that.
Ms. Cooke. Sure. NEPAD grew up--it was kind of the brain
child of three or four key African leaders--President Mbeke of
South Africa, President Obisanjo of Nigeria, President
Boutaflica of Algeria, and President Wadd of Senegal. It grew
up at the same time that the Organization of African Unity was
reinventing itself as the African Union. So initially it was
not meant to be part of the African Union, but the two have
merged and it is somewhat under African Union leadership. So I
think it is all part of this momentum of kind of taking greater
responsibility that happened within the AU. NEPAD is another
expression of that. The two are more closely merged than they
were originally.
Senator Martinez. One of the things we did not get to
today--and I would love to have enough time for us to --first
of all, I want to thank you both. You have done a great job and
you have really added to our discourse greatly. So I appreciate
your insights and your great knowledge and I wish we had more
time to expand on all of this. But one of the things I wanted
out of this hearing is for us to discuss all the good things
that are happening. Unfortunately, we have talked too much
about, still like always we do, about some negative aspects of
it. But there is much going on that is good. I know that
progress is being made in the fight against AIDS and I know
that our government has played I think a leading role in the
world. I was also pleased recently to have had an opportunity
to talk with Prime Minister Blair and his great interest, right
before Gleneagles, and his commitment to renewed effort. I hope
we could on the next occasion talk about economic development,
about growth, about ownership opportunities, about business
creation, about trade and things of that nature. I would hope
it would come to a day when a hearing like this would be held
and we would talk about how the AU is managing all of the trade
agreements that are being made between the countries. So
anyway, with that hope and that bright future, I thank you for
your participation today and look forward to coming together
again another day to talk some more about this topic.
Thank you very much and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Response of Hon. Jendayi Frazer to Written Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. Why hasn't a permanent ambassador been named to Ethiopia?
How long has it been? When will the President name a permanent
ambassador for Ethiopia? Has our ambassador to Ethiopia ever been a
non-Foreign Service experienced official?
Answer. The White House remains engaged in identifying a chief of
mission candidate for Ethiopia.
While the majority of past U.S. ambassadors to Ethiopia have been
career Foreign Service Officers, there have been three non-career U.S.
ambassadors to Ethiopia: Joseph Simonson served 1953 to 1957; Edward M.
Korry served 1963 to 1967; and E. Ross Adair served 1971 to 1974.
Ambassador Brazeal departed Ethiopia on September 3, 2005. Since
that date, Ambassador Vicki Huddleston, a retired career member of the
Senior Foreign Service with the rank of Career Minister, has very
capably represented the U.S. Government in Ethiopia as Charge
d'Affaires.
Question. Although electoral advances have been made since the last
election the brutality remains and the reform of the country's
institutions is weak.
What are the determinant factors in U.S. policy toward Ethiopia
with regard to the war on terror, cooperation on the Eritrean border
dispute, economic, social, and political reform?
Answer. United States national security and national interests
guide U.S. policy determinations on Ethiopia. Major U.S. objectives
with regard to Ethiopia include countering any terrorist threats in the
region; enhancing regional peace and stability; promoting
democratization, rule of law, and respect for human rights; supporting
economic prosperity; and providing humanitarian assistance to mitigate
human suffering. Helping the people of Ethiopia address the effects of
HIV/AIDS is also a key U.S. interest, as Ethiopia is one of 15 focus
countries for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
These objectives are interrelated and one objective does not supercede
others.
In all of these sectors, U.S. interests guide the policy formation
process. The pursuit of each of these objectives reinforces the other
by helping create an environment that supports a stable Ethiopia,
prevents the conditions that breed and provide safe haven for
terrorists, and builds our partnership with the Ethiopian government in
addressing common threats. Our policy formation, however, must factor
in how our objectives fit with Ethiopia's objectives, how much leverage
the United States holds with Ethiopian decisionmakers, and in what
areas we may be most able to achieve progress at any given time.
Ethiopia has been an active and receptive partner in the global war
on terrorism. Our common objectives enable the United States to work
closely with Ethiopia in pursuit of countering the terrorist threat in
the region and building local capacity in support of that objective.
Ethiopia is an active participant in the African Contingency Operations
Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, and is one of the continent's
major contributors to multilateral peacekeeping operations.
With regard to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, the United States and
Ethiopia agree broadly on the need for long-term regional stability,
but may disagree on the tactics in pursuit of that end. We recognize
that the parties themselves have determined that the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission's (EEBC) decision shall be final and binding, and
that it is incumbent on the parties to reach a lasting solution to the
border standoff. Bilaterally, and through the United Nations, we have
called on Ethiopia to start the implementation of demarcation, by
taking the necessary steps to enable the Commission to demarcate the
border completely and promptly and without preconditions. The
Government of Ethiopia has affirmed that it will pull back troops
deployed near the Ethiopian-Eritrean border to positions held in
December 2004, as called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1640.
Prime Minister Meles has also publicly pledged Ethiopia's full
cooperation with the United Nations Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE), the peacekeeping mission monitoring the Temporary Security
Zone along the border.
The United States has encouraged Ethiopia to take steps to
liberalize its economy since the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front government came to power in 1991. There has been some,
albeit slow, progress on the economic front--robust economic growth
rates, progress in the investment climate, improved revenue collection,
etc.--as a result of our economic assistance programs and U.S. and
international advisors. We have been able to assist the Ethiopians to
strengthen and diversify their economy.
Our interests in the areas of social and political reform include
protection of human rights, fostering press freedoms, opening of
political space for dialog, and the expansion of educational and health
services.
While the dynamic and open campaign period in the run-up to the May
2005 elections showed promise, irregularities with the conduct and
vote-tallying portion of the elections highlighted the fragility of
this progress. Nonetheless, the opposition made tremendous gains as
evidenced by the numbers of elected to Parliament. The post-election
political violence and harassment of opposition leaders and supporters
stand out as issues of particular concern in policy formulation
deliberations. We are strongly encouraging the Government of Ethiopia
to respect the human rights of all its citizens and to work with the
opposition to ensure stability and an inclusive government.
The breadth of U.S. engagement with a country such as Ethiopia is
great and factors in policy determination are complex. U.S. relations
with Ethiopia have entered their second century and it is a
relationship that the United States values. The United States and the
people of Ethiopia share many common objectives and values and there
are significant areas of mutual interest on which we can collaborate.
In each of the realms of policy consideration noted in this question,
however, there are areas for improvement. Some are greater than others,
but these are areas in which we continue to engage. The United States
continuously re-evaluates this relationship and neither takes it for
granted nor stands by it at all costs. As such, we continue to engage
the range of stakeholders in Ethiopia and within the United States. We
value the input and perspective of each of these stakeholders and
appreciate the Congress's close attention to this complex relationship.
Question. Is the U.S. policy one of advising the opposition to wait
until the next elections to challenge for control of the legislature
and executive?
Answer. Active political debate and representation of the range of
positions is key in a democracy. United States policy is that the
opposition, as well as the governing party, should pursue their
political efforts through legal and constitutional means. All political
parties should participate actively in the political process, but
resorting to violent actions is unacceptable. The United States has
consistently called on Ethiopian opposition parties to take up their
elected seats in parliament and in the regional councils to represent
the will of the public that voted for them. It is incumbent on these
individuals to represent an active and vocal alternative voice to the
governing party. The United States has also called for the Government
of Ethiopia to release political detainees and to ensure that detained
opposition leaders be accorded timely due process in accordance with
the constitution.
The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia certified the final
results of the May 2005 parliamentary elections. While there were
significant irregularities in the conduct and compiling of results from
these elections, the Carter Center's election observation team has
stated that the majority of the results were credible. While the May
2005 elections were far from perfect, they do represent a milestone in
Ethiopia's progress toward democratization. For the first time in
history, average Ethiopians truly believed that they had a choice in
their national leadership, opposition parties were able to campaign in
cities and the countryside, large public demonstrations were permitted,
and all parties were able to convey their platforms through the media.
As a result, the total opposition representation in parliament
increased from 12 seats in 2000 to 174 seats in 2005. If any party
objects to these results, the United States encourages them to pursue
their complaints through established legal channels.
Beyond this, the United States persists in pressing the Ethiopian
government to open political space to allow the opposition to play a
meaningful and active role in parliament, to enhance the transparency
and capacity of the National Electoral Board, to end detentions of
opposition supporters, and institutionalize the democratic gains
evidenced in the campaign period. This can only happen successfully
through the full and active participation of opposition parties in this
process.
Question. What assistance is the U.S. prepared to offer for
Ethiopians? What assistance will be made to those building on
democratic gains? What assistance will be directed to the governing
regime?
Answer. The United States has been very active in coordinating with
the international community regarding assistance to Ethiopian governing
and opposition parties to support the democratization process.
Collective statements by the United States and other members of the
international community calling for non-violence, encouraging the rule
of law, and confirming the goodwill of both the Ethiopian government
and opposition aided both sides to reach out to the other in the
aftermath of the parliamentary elections to stem the violence and
restore order.
Since the release of the final results of the May 2005 elections,
by lending its good offices, the United States has played a key role in
bringing the government and opposition together to bridge their
differences in resolving the political stalemate. Because of this
active diplomacy, the government and opposition came together for talks
in late-September and early October, and a period of peaked political
tension passed. U.S. encouragement resulted in major portions of the
Ethiopian opposition taking their seats in parliament as an active
alternative voice to the governing regime. Active U.S. engagement has
also succeeded in the appointment of an independent commission to
investigate the political violence of June and November 2005. We
continue to push the Ethiopian government to accord expeditious due
process to opposition leaders under arrest and to reach out to the
opposition to move forward with reconciliation.
The United States has also coordinated with the broader
international community in identifying assistance to support the
democratic gains that these talks have achieved. The United States,
working through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
is currently providing assistance to new members of parliament on
parliamentary procedure and legislative drafting to build their
capacity to serve as strong representatives of their constituents.
Following U.S. consultations with European partners, the international
community has offered expert assistance from established parliamentary
democracies on parliamentary rules of procedure to assist both the
Ethiopian government and opposition in reviewing a major impediment to
active opposition participation in parliament--rules changes governing
the tabling of agenda items in parliament.
The U.S. Government is currently examining its fiscal year 2006
resources to determine the most appropriate use of technical and
financial assistance to widen political space in Ethiopia. The U.S.
Embassy in Addis Ababa stands prepared to provide media training and
capacity building for both state-run and private media institutions in
Ethiopia. Additionally, the United States is willing to provide
technical assistance in any efforts by the Ethiopian government and
opposition to develop new media laws and a media code of conduct.
Finally, the United States stands prepared to resume assistance to
the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute,
and/or IFES, in the event that they are permitted to return to
Ethiopia. These organizations have the unique qualifications to provide
technical assistance to the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia on the
administration of elections, to civil society organizations on election
observation, and to political parties to promote capacity development.
Question. The European Commission and the Carter Center have
denounced recent elections in Ethiopia that were flawed by intimidation
of opposition supporters, beatings, and killings of opposition
candidates, and rigged ballot counting. Our own IRI and NDI and IFES
observers were expelled prior to the election. Despite similar
circumstances in Ukraine where a new election was called for by the
international community, Ethiopia has not been encouraged to do so.
Is there a double standard here in not encouraging similar steps?
Why or why not? What message is being sent to Ethiopia and the region?
Answer. There is no double standard. While the expulsion of NDI,
IRI, and IFES was regrettable and protested by the United States, the
Carter Center was able to field election observers to follow the May 15
parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the Carter Center was able to
keep observers in place throughout the election complaints review
process and the August 21 elections in the Somali region and re-runs of
contested seats.
The Carter Center has not denounced the May 2005 parliamentary
elections in Ethiopia. While the Carter Center did highlight concerns
and cases of intimidation and electoral irregularities, it also stated
that these elections ``offered Ethiopian citizens a democratic choice
for the first time in their long history.'' While the Carter Center did
note that some results based on the complaints review process lacked
credibility, it noted that the ``majority of the constituency results .
. . are credible and reflect competitive conditions.'' The United
States believes that the Carter Center's assessment accurately reflects
the conduct of this election.
The campaign period and many aspects of the May 2005 elections did
show significant improvements over previous Ethiopian elections.
Opposition candidates had an unprecedented ability to campaign actively
and convey their messages through state media, and the record turnout
and heavy pro-opposition vote show that the public truly felt that it
had a choice in these elections. Certainly, irregularities were noted
throughout the process, and these are issues that should be addressed
by the Ethiopian people and political parties as the country further
entrenches its democratic gains. The United States has encouraged
candidates for office to challenge the election results which they
dispute through existing legal channels and rejects pursuit of
unconstitutional means as an acceptable strategy.
Question. The Meles regime has been in power for 14 years and
during this time there has been little economic progress in Ethiopia.
Should the U.S. make economic aid contingent on land reform,
privatization of nationalized businesses, and elimination of communist
style economic policies?
Answer. Since the early 1990s, Ethiopia has pursued a market-
oriented economic development strategy. It has eliminated
discriminatory treatment of the private sector in areas such as taxes,
credit, and foreign trade, and worked to simplify bureaucratic
regulations and procedures. Ethiopia has participated in World Bank and
International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs that
promoted reforms in macroeconomic policies and procedures, including
public expenditure reviews, conservative management of the money
supply, tax reforms, and customs and civil service reforms. Over 220
properties have been privatized since 1994, worth $405 million, though
the privatization effort has slowed since 2001. In 2003, Ethiopia
formally applied for membership to the WTO.
While Ethiopia remains one of the world's poorest countries, the
economic assistance that the United States provides to Ethiopia is
contributing to the country's efforts to prevent famines and to promote
economic stability and prosperity. The United States continues to
encourage economic sector reforms by providing economic assistance that
contributes to establishing an environment conducive to private sector
led economic growth. With U.S. Government assistance, progress has made
in the areas of reforming tax administration and operations, reducing
the number of days to register a business, and improving land tenure
security through land certification.
Other major non-humanitarian U.S. assistance programs focus on
improving community level primary health care and primary education,
especially for girls and mothers, fighting HIV/AIDS, increasing food
security for households, enhancing agricultural productivity, capacity
development for local government transparency, increasing exports and
jobs, and counter-terrorism assistance. The U.S. emphasis on project
support, rather than budget support, ensures that economic aid is
targeted to bring about specific results on the ground.
Despite its macroeconomic challenges, Ethiopia has seen some
notable economic progress in recent years. The Ethiopian economy grew
by 11.6 percent in 2004. In September, a British publication rated
Ethiopia first among African countries for cost effectiveness for
foreign direct investment, noting the country's inexpensive labor and
suitable infrastructure. The economy's dependence on agriculture has
decreased notably. Industry grew by 5.1 percent per year between 1992
and 2004, while the service sector achieved a real growth rate of 6.8
percent per year during this period. Ethiopia has even begun attracting
international investors away from other African countries in areas such
as floriculture. The Ethiopian government introduced a value-added tax
in January 2003, which has broadened the tax base and increased
revenues. To attract foreign investment, Ethiopia has reduced the
minimum required level of investment from $500,000 to $100,000 for
foreign firms and lifted minimum capital requirements altogether for
those exporting over 75 percent of their output.
The Government of Ethiopia is actively engaged in supporting
Ethiopia's participation in the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) and has undertaken a number of programs and policies to promote
exports, including a government credit facility, provision of serviced
land, and tax incentives. The U.S. Government is working to support
Ethiopia's participation in AGOA through outreach/promotion efforts and
technical assistance to the private sector.
Greater economic reforms are certainly necessary for Ethiopia to
achieve its full development potential--whether it be continued land
reform to allow land to be used as collateral for investment, private
sector involvement in telecommunications, opening the country to
foreign financial institutions, or privatizing more state owned
enterprises. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of economic assistance--which
promotes a healthy population and workforce, bolsters basic literacy
and numeracy, ensures safe births, fights HIV/AIDS, promotes the
adoption of improved agricultural production methods, provides
assistance to chronically food insecure households, provides technical
assistance for small-scale agricultural marketing, and greater
transparency and good governance--would harm the Ethiopian people and
do little to enhance economic progress.
We believe that continued bilateral and multilateral pressure on
the Ethiopian government to adopt economic reforms and liberalize its
economic and investment regimes for the country's own best interest
will yield the greatest results toward broad-based poverty reduction
and economic prosperity.
Question. What steps are the State Department and Bush
administration taking or prepared to take to pressure the Meles regime
to restore the rights of minority parties in Parliament?
Answer. Senior United States officials have met regularly with
Ethiopian government officials to seek fair and constitutional
treatment of minority parties. Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Nicholas Burns has specifically urged Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi to reach out to and work with the opposition.
Regarding the restoration of the rights of opposition parties in
parliament, our Charge d'Affaires in Addis Ababa, and senior State
Department officials have met numerous times with Prime Minister Meles,
the Speaker of Parliament, and other Ethiopian officials to press for a
reversal of the parliamentary rule changes made in July that imposed
new constraints on opposition participation in debate. Prime Minister
Meles has responded that he is willing to explore this matter; the
subject currently stands as an agenda item for on-going government-
opposition talks.
Ambassador Huddleston and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Don
Yamamoto have encouraged the Speaker of Parliament to set aside at
least one committee chairmanship for the opposition to fill. The
Speaker has expressed openness to this suggestion.
With our encouragement the Speaker of Parliament has agreed to
permit an opposition whip to participate in deliberations on setting
the parliamentary agenda along with the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front's whip and the Speaker.
Recent parliamentary debates have shown that those opposition
members of parliament who have taken their seats have had an
opportunity to participate in debates on agenda items.
With respect to minority parties outside of parliament, there has
been little progress. While representatives from all parties from which
candidates were elected have taken their seats, a significant portion
of MPs-elect from the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) have
continued to boycott parliament. In early November, the Ethiopian
government detained senior CUD officials for advocating a change in
government through extra-constitutional means. CUD officials have
complained since August that their supporters were being harassed by
government and security officials, that their leaders were being
followed, that the government had shut down various CUD offices in
rural areas, and that thousands of CUD supporters were being detained
by the police. The United States has taken every opportunity to
investigate these allegations and protest such actions to the Ethiopian
government. We have called for the government to release all political
detainees, and either charge and accord due process to, or release,
detained CUD officials. We have called for the Ethiopian government to
cease all harassment of opposition officials and supporters. We have
called on all parties to abide by the rule of law.
We will continue to push the Ethiopian government to permit
opposition parties to actively participate in all legal political
activities, to extend greater access for these parties to state-
operated media, and to open the political space for opposition
representatives to play meaningful leadership and minority roles in
parliament and the regional councils to which they were elected.
Question. Has the Ethiopian government investigated the June 8,
2005 killing of civilians who were protesting? Why not?
Answer. After persistent pressure by the United States, including
the specific request by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Nicholas Burns to Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, the Ethiopian parliament
voted on November 14 to establish an independent commission to
investigate the election-related violence of June 8 and early November.
Parliament approved the appointment of eleven commissioners nominated
by the Prime Minister on December 6. The commissioners include
religious, academic, business, and judicial leaders. The commission is
charged with preparing a report detailing the number of deaths, the
amount of property destroyed, and whether there were violations of
constitutional or human rights. The commission has 90 days in which to
produce its report.
Question. Is the State Department doing anything to press for an
investigation of the killing of civilians and the imprisonment of
thousands of political prisoners?
Answer. After persistent pressure by the United States, the
Ethiopian parliament voted on November 14 to establish an independent
commission to investigate the election related violence of June 8 and
early November. Parliament approved the eleven nominated commissioners
on December 6. Senior State Department officials have protested the
detention of thousands of demonstrators and opposition supporters in
meetings with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and senior Ethiopian
government officials in Addis Ababa and in Washington. We have called
on the Ethiopian government to immediately release all political
detainees. We have urged the Ethiopian government to charge those
detainees whom it refuses to release, accord them full due process, and
allow for access to counsel, family and international observers. The
vast majority of those detained during and in the aftermath of the
public demonstrations of early November have now been released.
Prime Minister Meles publicly announced on December 13 that
approximately 3,000 individuals would face charges in connection with
anti-government protests that occurred in November.
We continue to monitor the detention of opposition leaders closely
and to press for access to them by representatives of the international
community. Senior U.S. officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto and Charge d'affaires
Vicki Huddleston, have met with immediate family members of detainees
to hear their concerns. Embassy officials will attend the December 16
court hearing of detained opposition leaders, at which we expect the
Government to announce formal charges.