[Senate Hearing 109-920]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-920
THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2006
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The Report of the Iraq Study Group
december 7, 2006
Page
Baker, Hon. James A., III, Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group............ 3
Hamilton, Hon. Lee, Co-Chair, Iraq Study Group................... 3
(iii)
THE REPORT OF THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:41 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, Graham, Cornyn, Thune, Levin,
Byrd, Lieberman, Reed, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Dayton,
Bayh, and Clinton.
Committee staff members present: Charles S. Abell, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: William M. Caniano,
professional staff member; Regina A. Dubey, professional staff
member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T.
Kiley, professional staff member; Sandra E. Luff, professional
staff member; Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member;
Elaine A. McCusker, professional staff member; David M.
Morriss, counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member;
Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Scott W. Stucky,
general counsel; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff
member.
Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes,
Democratic staff director; Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel;
Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J.
Leeling, minority counsel; Peter K. Levine, minority counsel;
and William G.P. Monahan, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Micah H.
Harris, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul,
assistant to Senator McCain; John A. Bonsell, assistant to
Senator Inhofe; Libby Burgess, assistant to Senator Roberts;
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Matthew R.
Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; Russell J. Thomasson,
assistant to Senator Cornyn; Bob Taylor, assistant to Senator
Thune; Terrence E. Sauvain, assistant to Senator Byrd;
Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Matthew Benham,
assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Luke Ballman, assistant
to Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Warner. Good morning, everyone. The committee is
very privileged to have before us this morning Secretary Baker
and Congressman Hamilton, two colleagues well known and admired
I think by every person on this committee. We commend you for
the work that you have done. This committee in the course of
its deliberations on these issues, I assure you, will take into
consideration very carefully the work and ability that you
applied to reach consensus between five Democrats, five
Republicans, and the fact that you had made available the
opportunity for all types of people--private sector, public
sector, people from abroad--to come and provide your study
group with testimony.
I believe that I have watched you carefully, as others
have, in appearances, and in your appearance yesterday before
our Senate leadership joint session you indicated that every
issue about this complex situation that is known to mankind was
considered by your group.
Now, could you advise us with regard to your time
constraints? There was some communication to Senator Levin and
myself. Could you give us that estimate?
Mr. Baker. We're scheduled, Senator Warner, to leave the
Capitol at 11 o'clock if we can.
Chairman Warner. We'll try our best to accommodate that
schedule, we'll start out with say a 3-minute question round,
so that hopefully all members can fit within that time
constraint. We have a vote that will be superimposed on that,
but the hearing will continue during the vote, and as members
come and go just in an orderly way we'll ask our questions.
So, I once again thank you gentlemen and all members of
your committee. I wish to also acknowledge my long-time friend
and colleague, Frank Wolf, who came to me with this concept 2
years ago. We worked together on it, in concert with the United
States Institute for Peace. I would hope that in your opening
remarks you would comment on the value of that organization as
it's helped you in this work. I want to thank Frank and others,
because you're more or less a creation of the Congress of the
United States. The idea came to fruition. You then, Mr. Baker,
met with the President and he indicated his concurrence in
going forward, and here we are, and you have your report.
So with that, I turn to Senator Levin for such remarks as
you have.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN
Senator Levin. Mr. Chairman, I join you first in thanking
the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group. We thank the other
members of that study group. We thank their staff for a really
very comprehensive, important report.
Yesterday was surely an extraordinary day in the history of
the Iraq war. A day which signaled the end of the
administration's ``stay the course'' policy and the beginning
of the development of a new, realistic, bipartisan, and
hopefully successful approach. First, Robert Gates was
confirmed. Dr. Gates brought to this committee and the country
a realistic view of the situation in Iraq, that after 3\1/2\
years we're not winning and that the only way to end the
violence is for the Iraqis to reach a political settlement.
Yesterday, the Baker-Hamilton Study Group issued a powerful
comprehensive plan for change in course, including calling for
an end to the open-ended commitment of American troops as a way
of pressing the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own
future. Like Dr. Gates, the Baker-Hamilton report concludes
that the violence cannot be stopped or even contained, ``if
there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about
the future of their country.''
The report calls for U.S. combat brigades to move out of
Iraq and says further that, ``By the first quarter of 2008,
subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on
the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force
protection could be out of Iraq.''
A principal reason for the Iraq Study Group, that they
called for these reductions, is as follows: ``An open-ended
commitment of American forces would not provide the Iraqi
government the incentive it needs to take the political actions
that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian
violence.'' In the absence of such an incentive, the report
says, the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those
difficult actions.
As I told President Bush yesterday at the White House, his
statement a few weeks ago that, ``We are going to stay in Iraq
as long as the Iraqis ask us to be there,'' creates the exact
opposite impression. It maintains an open-ended commitment and
removes the pressure from the Iraqis to take responsibility for
their future.
I hope the administration will accept the recommendations
in this report and will determine to change course as the best
hope of turning around this ``grave and deteriorating
situation'' in the words of the report.
Once again, I commend Secretary Baker, Congressman
Hamilton, their colleagues, and their staff for an
extraordinary bipartisan effort.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin.
Gentlemen, we'll now receive your opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. BAKER III, CO-CHAIR, IRAQ STUDY
GROUP
Mr. Baker. Senator Warner, if it's okay with the committee,
I have an opening statement. I think my co-chairman,
Congressman Hamilton does. We would submit those for the record
and go to your questions if that would be acceptable.
Chairman Warner. That's fine.
Mr. Baker. I think we should say, and Lee will probably
have something to add to this, that we note your appreciative
statements about Congressman Frank Wolf. Lee made the same
remarks yesterday at our press conference, and many other
people, Senator Warner, helped us in the preparation of this
report and in the preparation for writing this report,
including the administration, who was very supportive in
providing documents and personnel, and travel and access to
people, and things that we needed in order to do our job.
STATEMENT OF HON. LEE HAMILTON, CO-CHAIR, IRAQ STUDY GROUP
Mr. Hamilton. Senator Warner, we are mindful of the fact
that at the creation of the Iraq Study Group you were there,
you were helpful to us. We deeply appreciate that, as indeed
were other members of the Senate and the House. You're quite
right to acknowledge the initiative taken by Congressman Frank
Wolf, without whose initiative there would be no Iraq Study
Group. You're right, of course, to recognize the important role
that the United States Institute of Peace played. They gave us
marvelous logistical support, expert support, all along the
way, along with the Baker Institute, the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, and the Center for the Study of the
Presidency. They were all very helpful to us. As Jim has
indicated, we had very strong support from the administration.
We saw the people we wanted to see. They facilitated our travel
and they made the documents available we needed.
The only thing I would say about the statement that I have
submitted that we did not comment really very much in our
public presentation yesterday is that we really spend a good
bit of time on the whole question of resetting the American
military. We consider that enormously important and I know this
committee will likewise. We make some recommendations here
about how to restore the U.S. military. I know this committee
is very well-informed on that matter. We want to try to
reinforce what you will do with your leadership.
[The joint prepared statement of Messrs. Baker and Hamilton
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the
Committee on Armed Services. It is a distinct honor to appear before
you this morning, and to have the opportunity to discuss the
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report.
We want to begin by thanking Chairman Warner for his strong support
from the outset of the work of the Iraq Study Group. We also thank
Chairman Warner and Senator Levin for taking the time to meet with the
Study Group. Our work is better informed because of the wise counsel
you gave.
the situation in iraq
The situation in Iraq today is grave and deteriorating. Violence is
increasing in scope and lethality. Attacks on U.S. forces--and U.S.
casualties--continue at an alarming rate.
The Iraqi people are suffering great hardship. The democratically
elected government that replaced Saddam Hussein is not adequately
advancing the key issues: national reconciliation, providing basic
security, or delivering essential services. Economic development is
hampered. The current approach is not working, and the ability of the
United States to influence events is diminishing.
The United States has committed staggering resources. Our country
has lost 2,900 Americans. 21,000 more have been wounded. The United
States has spent $400 billion in Iraq. Costs could rise well over $1
trillion.
Many Americans are understandably dissatisfied. Our ship of state
has hit rough waters. It must now chart a new way forward.
a new way forward
No course of action in Iraq is guaranteed to stop a slide toward
chaos. Yet not all options have been exhausted.
We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by
President Bush: ``an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and
defend itself.''
We recommend a new approach to pursue that goal. We recommend a
responsible transition. Our three most important recommendations are
equally important and reenforce one another:
a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq, that
will enable the United States to begin to move its combat
forces out of Iraq responsibly;
prompt action by the Iraqi government to achieve milestones--
particularly on national reconciliation; and
new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and
the region.
u.s. forces
The United States must encourage Iraqis to take responsibility for
their own destiny. This responsible transition can allow for a
reduction in the U.S. presence in Iraq over time.
The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of
supporting the Iraqi Army, which would take over primary responsibility
for combat operations. As this transition proceeds, the United States
should increase the number of troops imbedded in and supporting the
Iraqi Army, and U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.
By the first quarter of 2008--subjected to unexpected developments
on the ground--all U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force
protection could be out of Iraq. U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be
deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid reaction
and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, and
force protection. A key mission for rapid-reaction and special
operations forces that remain would be to target al Qaeda.
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the
United States for some time to come. Yet the United States must make it
clear to the Iraqi government that we could carry out our plans--
including planned redeployments--even if the Iraqi government did not
implement their planned changes.
The United States must not make an open-ended commitment to keep
large numbers of troops deployed in Iraq.
restoring the u.s. military
We also make several recommendations to restore the U.S. military:
The new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to
build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an
environment in which the senior military feel free to offer
independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the
Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security
Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.
As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership should
emphasize training and education programs for the force that
have returned to the continental United States in order to
``reset'' the force and restore the U.S. military to a high
level of readiness for global contingencies.
As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should
appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full
functionality over the next 5 years.
The administration, in full consultation with the relevant
committees of Congress, should assess the full future budgetary
impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the
future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and
retain high-quality personnel, needed investments in
procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of
other U.S. Government agencies involved in the stability and
reconstruction effort.
milestones
A military solution alone will not end the violence in Iraq--we
must help the Iraqis help themselves.
President Bush and his national security team should convey a clear
message to Iraqi leaders: the United States will support them if they
take action to make substantial progress toward the achievement of
milestones on national reconciliation, security, and improving the
daily lives of Iraqis.
If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward
the achievement of milestones, the United States should reduce its
political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.
diplomacy
There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. But to
give the Iraqi government a chance to succeed, U.S. policy must be
focused more broadly than on military strategy alone or Iraq alone. It
must seek the active and constructive engagement of all governments
that have an interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, including all of
Iraq's neighbors.
To gain this constructive engagement, the United States should
promptly initiate a New Diplomatic Offensive and, working with the
government of Iraq, create an International Iraq Support Group to
address comprehensively the political, economic, and military matters
necessary to provide stability in Iraq. That support group should
include Iraq, of course, and all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran
and Syria, as well as Egypt, the U.N. Security Council Perm 5 member
countries, a representative of the U.N. Secretary General, and the
European Union.
Given the central importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict to many
countries both in and out of the region, the United States must again
initiate active negotiations to achieve a stable Arab-Israeli peace on
all fronts in the manner we outline in the Report.
Altogether in this Report, we make 79 recommendations. In addition
to Military, Political, and Diplomatic recommendations, which are
equally important and reinforce each other, they cover a range of other
areas: criminal justice, oil, reconstruction, the U.S. budget process,
the training of U.S. Government personnel, and U.S. intelligence. These
recommendations are important, and will greatly increase our ability to
achieve a responsible transition in Iraq.
We agreed upon our recommendations after considering a full range
of other approaches.
We have not recommended a ``stay the course'' solution. In our
opinion, that approach is no longer viable. While we do recommend a
five-fold increase in U.S. forces training Iraqi troops, we do not
recommend increasing U.S. forces by in excess of 100,000 as some have
suggested. Additional fully combat-ready U.S. forces of that magnitude
are simply not available. We have not recommended a division of Iraq
into three autonomous regions based on ethnic or sectarian identities,
but with a weak central government. As a practical matter, such a
devolution could not be managed on an orderly basis; and because Iraq's
major cities are peopled by a mixture of warring groups, a disorderly
devolution would likely result in a humanitarian disaster or civil war.
We also did not recommend a precipitate withdrawal of troops--because
that might not only cause a bloodbath. It would also invite a wider
regional war.
The approach we recommend has shortcomings. We recognize that
implementing it will require a tremendous amount of political will and
unity of effort by government agencies. It will require cooperation by
the executive and legislative branches of government.
Events in Iraq may overtake what we recommend. For that reason, we
believe that decisions must be made by our national leaders with
urgency.
As it is now, people are being killed day after day--Iraqis and the
brave American troops who are trying to help them. Struggling in a
world of fear, Iraqis dare not dream. They have been liberated from the
nightmare of a tyrannical order, only to face the nightmare of brutal
violence.
As a matter of humanitarian concern, as a matter of national
interest, and as a matter of practical necessity, it is time to find a
new way forward--a new approach.
We believe that a constructive solution requires that a new
political consensus be built--a new consensus here at home, and a new
consensus abroad. In that spirit, we have approached our Study Group's
task on a bipartisan basis. So we are especially pleased to note that
our group offers and supports each and every one of our recommendations
unanimously.
We, of course, recognize that some people will differ with some of
our recommendations. We nevertheless hope very much that, in moving
forward, others will wish to continue to broaden and deepen the
bipartisan spirit that has helped us come together.
We would be pleased to respond to your questions.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Thank you.
I will proceed now with 2 or 3 minutes. First, Congressman
Hamilton, I've watched a number of the appearances and listened
to you yesterday. You made two strong points yesterday to the
joint leadership, and the chairmen and ranking members of
several of our committees: one, the need for a bipartisan
approach to unify as best we can Congress and the executive
branch behind such future policies as the President may
determine. Would you comment on that and once again establish
how you feel that that is a very essential element to any
success?
Mr. Hamilton. I thank the Senator for his question. We are
indeed impressed with the necessity of having a unity of effort
in dealing with an extremely difficult foreign policy
challenge. To the extent that the country is split, to the
extent that the country is divided on how to deal with Iraq, we
greatly weaken our ability to deal with the problem.
I'm impressed, as I'm sure you have been, with how much of
the political debate seems to be people kind of talking passing
in the night, as it were, and not really connecting with a
genuine substantive policy debate. Bipartisanship is absolutely
essential. What we tried very hard to do in this report, and I
don't know that we've succeeded entirely, is to put together
realizable recommendations. Given the political environment in
Washington, given the political environment in Iraq, what can
be done in both of these governments to put together an
effective policy? That's a very tough policy problem and we
tried to say that in order for this to happen it can't be pie
in the sky, it can't be idealistic; it has to be very pragmatic
as to the recommendations, and so we hope they are achievable
recommendations.
The fact of the matter is you have President Bush in office
for 2 more years. The fact of the matter is that the report
that we put before you must largely be implemented by the
executive branch. You cannot dodge that fact. It is a fact of
political life, and Congress will play an important role,
should play an important role, but Congress cannot implement
the decisions in this report for the most part. There are some
legislative matters to be addressed.
So we feel the approach of bipartisanship and unity of
effort is absolutely critical to the success of our policy.
Chairman Warner. I thank you for that. To take off on your
question on Congress, Congress having really been the impetus
that established this group, the President will now look at the
options that his internal National Security Council provides
for him, certain other perspectives that the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs will give, and then he has to synthesize this and
make these decisions.
I've recommended that somehow Congress reinvolve itself,
obviously not the whole Congress, but the leadership of
Congress. I would hope that the President would consult with
them before he finally promulgates to the public and to the
world his views.
Do you think that would be a wise idea?
Mr. Hamilton. I certainly do, and I think Congress is quite
capable of doing that. I do have some questions about your word
``synthesize.'' I think it's terribly important that we
understand that you cannot solve the Iraqi problem in pieces,
and so you have to approach it comprehensively. If you think
you can solve the problem of Iraq by manipulating the troop
levels, I think you have it dead wrong. If you think you can
solve the problem by economic reconstruction or political
action, I think that's wrong, too.
What has to be done is that all of the tools of American
power have to be integrated carefully here--political,
economic, military for sure--and to use those effectively. What
you have to have is a comprehensive approach.
Chairman Warner. Excuse me. My time is running out. I think
I concur generally with that. I used the word deliberately
because the President must take into consideration the
perspectives from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That's what
I meant.
Mr. Hamilton. That's correct.
Chairman Warner. But you concur generally that Congress
would be helpful to look at it once before, likely through the
leadership, whatever private meetings can be arranged, before
it goes out, Secretary Baker?
Mr. Baker. Yes, I do, Senator. But let me reinforce what
Mr. Hamilton has just said on two points. Bipartisanship is
critical. This is an extraordinarily difficult problem and
unless Congress comes together behind a unified approach, we're
going to have a tough time dealing with it.
Second, I hope we don't treat this like a fruit salad and
say, ``I like this but I don't like that, I like this but I
don't like that.'' This is a comprehensive strategy designed to
deal with this problem we're facing in Iraq, but also designed
to deal with other problems that we face in the region, and to
restore America's standing and credibility in that part of the
world.
So that's why we say in here that it's important. These are
interdependent recommendations we make, and we hope that when
people look at them and start thinking about implementing them
they'll think about implementing all of them and certainly at
least as many as they can.
Chairman Warner. I thank the witnesses. I just simply close
with this observation: But the President under the Constitution
has the responsibility and he has a great deal of valuable
input coming before him.
Mr. Baker. That is correct.
Chairman Warner. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
I agree with both of your comments about the need for a
comprehensive approach. Secretary Baker, I heard you yesterday
say on some radio program that the ``stay the course'' solution
is no longer viable. Would you tell us why you believe that?
Mr. Baker. We took a look at this over a period of 9
months, Senator, and the principal recommendations in here are
that we change the primary mission of U.S. forces, that we have
a new diplomatic offensive that is very extensive and
comprehensive, and that we work with the Iraqi government to
create performance milestones which we expect them to live up
to.
We condition most of our security assistance and economic
assistance when we give it to other countries. There's nothing
unreasonable, we don't think, about having some reasonable
conditionality here, particularly when you're talking about
milestones worked out by the United States in consultation with
the government of Iraq.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Your report says that American
military forces cannot stop the violence or even contain it if
there is no underlying political agreement among Iraqis about
the future of their country. Then you go on to say that an
open-ended commitment of American forces would not provide the
Iraqi government the incentive that it needs to take the
political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling
sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the
Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those difficult
actions.
I'm wondering if perhaps you or Congressman Hamilton could
give us your thinking behind that conclusion, which is a very,
very significant one and one which many of us have been
preaching here for a long time?
Mr. Hamilton. One of the things we kept asking ourselves
repeatedly through our discussions was what kind of leverage
you could assert on the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government
has not performed well. It's a weak government. If you look at
the ministries of the Iraqi government, not a single one of
those ministries are what you would call really effective, some
better than others.
Now, our approach to this point has been one of giving
assistance without conditionality, providing the troops without
any reservation of any kind. If you look at this from the
standpoint of the Iraqi government, that's a pretty good deal.
We're supplying them a lot of money and a lot of troops. We're
doing a lot of fighting. We're taking a lot of bloodshed. We're
pouring huge resources into there, and why wouldn't they be
satisfied with that? Why wouldn't they criticize our report, as
they did yesterday?
But the fact of the matter is this government has not taken
the tough steps it needs to take, the Iraqi government, on the
three key issues of national security, on the security
question, national reconciliation, and providing just the basic
services of any governing power--electricity and water and all
the rest of it.
Now, how do you get them to do it? What kind of leverage do
you have? We believe that the troop level question is one point
of leverage, and we have to say to those folks that we're just
not going to be there indefinitely. There are limits to
American patience, there are limits to American resources, and
you have to get moving and get your act together. Among the
things you have to do--and you mentioned this--is to deal with
the political problem.
Again and again the comment from the experts is that you
cannot solve this problem by military power alone. Military
power is important, but fundamentally you have to deal with the
underlying political problems of that country. Now, there's no
mystery as to what has to be done. What has to be done is that
the various elements of that country have to be given a fair
deal, a fair shake, in the political structure of the country.
If you're going to ignore 20 percent of the people in the
country, the Sunnis who have traditionally ruled the country,
they're going to be pretty upset about it and they're going to
fight and they're going to bring violence to the table, and
they feel they're being shut out of the game, and that's one of
the principal driving forces behind the sectarian violence that
is now taking place.
So the idea here is leverage through aid, leverage through
troop levels, letting the Iraqis know firmly that they have to
move and make substantial progress in a whole variety of
areas--we spell it all out in the report--and that that has to
be done promptly. That brings up the question of time frame. I
see people talking about very elongated time frames. I don't
think you have that kind of time frame here. You're dealing
with time frames of weeks and maybe days.
Throughout our consideration of this report, we were
constantly aware that events could overtake us. Maybe they
have, I don't know, and tomorrow morning maybe they will. But
you are where you are. You have to deal with the circumstances
that you have. We've put forward a plan that we think has a
reasonable chance of success in that region if it is well
carried out.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Baker. At the same time, Senator Levin, I think it's
fair to say, and I know Lee would agree with this, that our
panel, our Study Group, understands the difference between
political will to take the actions that we want the Iraqi
government to take, and ability to take those actions. So if
you will look at the report carefully, you will see that what
we say is that if they do not make substantial progress toward
the completion of these milestones, or toward meeting these
milestones, the United States should reduce its political,
economic, or military support. It's phrased dysjunctively
because there could be, and probably will be, occasions where
they might try in good faith to meet a milestone they've agreed
to with us but not be able to, simply as a matter of capacity.
So I want to call the committee's attention to that
particular provision. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
I wish to advise the committee that the vote will be at
10:45. Consequently, I'm certain that we can conclude our
committee meeting and give every member present the opportunity
to question our witnesses.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. I want to thank the panel and especially
our two leaders for the outstanding work and effort they've
made to try to help us through this difficult dilemma which we
face, and I very much appreciate not only their present, but
past service to the country.
I do believe that General Jack Kean, who was I believe on
your panel of military advisers, said, ``Based on where we are
now, we can't get there,'' adding that the report's conclusions
say more about, ``the absence of political will in Washington
than the harsh realities in Iraq.''
I agree with him, particularly in light of your conclusions
on page 73, which say: ``Because of the importance of Iraq to
our national security goals and our ongoing fight against al
Qaeda, we considered proposals to make substantial increases in
the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course
because we do not believe that the needed levels are available
for a sustained deployment.''
My studies and figures show that they are available for
sustained deployment, at least in order to get the situation
under control, number one.
I want to tell you something that I know that you know.
There's only one thing worse than an overstressed Army and
Marine Corps, and that's a defeated Army and Marine Corps. We
saw that in 1973. I believe that this is a recipe that will
lead to sooner or later our defeat in Iraq. I don't believe
that a peace conference with people who are dedicated to your
extinction has much short-term gain. I do not believe that a
regional conference with Iran and Syria, who obviously have at
least very difficult short-term goals than the United States of
America, including a 1,000-year-old ambition on the part of the
Persians to exert hegemony in the area, are probably, at least
in the short term, going to lead to a viable solution or one
that we would agree on.
But most of all, this issue of saying that we don't support
increased number of troops because we've always known now that
there was not enough troops there. That is the overall
consensus of opinion. To say that we don't have enough troops,
but we'll threaten to have less unless you somehow react in a
way that we want you to, is a degree of impracticality. To
withdraw the troops and then still have thousands of American
soldiers embedded in Iraqi units that are of questionable value
or loyalty, I think, puts at risk a large number of American
military advisers.
I'd like to hear your response to that, but I do also want
to thank you again, with the greatest respect, for the hard
work that you and the other members of the commission did.
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Senator. Let me say one or two
things, and I know Lee will have some comments as well.
First of all with respect to the augmentation of forces, we
call for a fivefold increase in the U.S. combat forces
dedicated to the training and equipping mission. We do point
out that those forces could be--it's up to the commander in
chief, of course--available perhaps in region without bringing
them in from the United States. Or they might be brought in
from the United States.
We did receive commentary from people to the effect,
generally, that we do not have readily available combat forces
up to the level of 100,000, that if that were the policy
approach that was suggested, that would be available to go in
there for at least quite some time.
We're not suggesting a regional conference, Senator McCain,
as a solution or a panacea to this. It is really only part of a
comprehensive strategy. General Kean's comments we noted today
as well, and what I think he really was saying, at least the
way I read them, was that the training and equipping mission
would not succeed, and that's his opinion. We received opinions
to the contrary, but whether he's right or whether the others
are right, we think it's worth a try, particularly if we're
going to enhance the number and the capability of our trainers,
as is also called for in this document.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator McCain, that relates to the risk with
embedded American forces with Iraqi forces. You're absolutely
right about that, there are risks there. If you put American
forces right in the middle of this sectarian violence working
with Iraqi forces, those young men and perhaps young women too
are in a place of danger.
Now, we tried to deal with that by saying that we're going
to do everything we can by way of force protection. We will
have combat forces there to protect the embedded forces. We're
going to have all kinds of logistics and supply efforts to help
them. But there is no blinking the fact that that's a risky
mission and a different mission and we should not slide over
it, as you have not in your comments.
The comment the general made about we can't get there is a
deeply pessimistic comment, not without some basis. We
appreciate the fact that the training of Iraqi forces did not
go very well for the first 2 years. We do believe that we've
learned and, through trial and error, that our efforts over the
past year have been much better, and we believe that an
intensive effort over the next 18 months can make a difference
in this military training. We don't underestimate that task at
all.
It is certainly the case that the Iraqi units perform
better when the U.S. trainers are present, and if we accelerate
that effort we believe we can make a difference in getting
where we want to go. So this is a very, very important part of
the security arrangements in that country. Incidentally, this
embedding idea is strongly supported by the Iraqi government
itself. It obviously doesn't agree with all of our report, but
it does agree with this part of it.
Are we convinced that this is going to work? We just
believe it's the best plan possible under the circumstances,
and obviously everything we do to protect the forces that are
engaged in whatever capacity just has to be done.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Baker. Senator McCain, may I just add to what Lee has
said? We're not only increasing fivefold the combat forces
dedicated to training and calling for the best U.S. combat
personnel to be engaged in this; we're also suggesting that
they be inserted all the way down to the company level. We had
a lot of very difficult discussions about this issue you raise
about forces to be left there to protect our trainers and our
embedded U.S. forces with the Iraqi forces. It was the subject
of some dispute and debate. I think we have come up with
language on page 72 of the document, Senator, that will enable
us to maintain sufficient combat forces there in a robust
deployment that we will be able to protect our trainers. I
discussed this indirectly with General Pace, and I think he
agrees with that.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just would
like to say it should alarm us--and it's out of the scope of
your study--that with 300 million people in America and the
responsibilities we have throughout the world that we don't
have enough troops to surge in Iraq, which was your conclusion.
I do not believe it would require 100,000, but I won't waste
the time of the committee. But I think there's a disconnect
between what you're recommending and the situation on the
ground. I very much appreciate all your work.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator McCain.
I hope in the course of your dialogue here today you can
touch once again on the involvement or noninvolvement of our
troops in combat relating to sectarian violence. Speaking for
myself, I think they should not be put in positions where if
Iraqi troops decide to get involved directly in trying to fight
against the Sunni, or fight against the Shia, because of this
senseless, wanton killing for religious reasons, I do not think
they're there for that purpose.
Mr. Baker. Senator Warner, just one more thing with
reference to Senator McCain's very, very valid point. We also
call, Senator, for support of a short-term surge of forces for
the mission in Baghdad if U.S. commanders should suggest it.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
Senator Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Time does not permit me to adequately express
my respect for both of you gentlemen, and my thanks for the
work you have done for our country and that you are doing.
The theme of your report seems to be that the United States
should be moving quickly to find an end to our involvement in
Iraq and allow Iraqis to take control of their future. You
emphasize that the U.S. involvement in Iraq cannot be
permanent, and I agree. Meanwhile, the 2002 Iraqi war
resolution is outdated and does not take into account the
current situation.
In June, I introduced an amendment in the Senate with
Senator Snowe that would provide an exit strategy for Iraq that
is not based upon dates. The amendment would have sunset the
war resolution based on conditions such as Iraq taking control
of security, other countries relieving U.S. troops of their
mission to support the Iraqi Security Forces, the President
declaring the mission in Iraq to be complete, and so on and so
on. In short, this amendment would have put an exit strategy in
law, signaled the finite commitment of the United States to
Iraq, and set forth a path for U.S. troops to come home, while
avoiding the mistake of Congress's trying to micromanage
military decisions.
Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton, is it not time
for Congress to take a fresh look at the outdated use of force
resolution that was passed in 2002 without my vote? Isn't it
time?
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, we really did not express a view on
that. One of the rules we followed pretty closely throughout
the consideration of our work was not to look backwards, and we
did not look at the resolution that you refer to. I really
don't have a judgment with regard to its adequacy for the
present situation.
I saw the piece in the post by my friend Michael Lennon
today, but we did not make a judgment about that. We operated
with a very strict rule that we would not try to evaluate the
past. Our mandate was to look forward. We are where we are.
What do we do from this point on was the question we addressed,
and we really do not have a judgment about this resolution.
Senator Byrd. Secretary Baker?
Mr. Baker. I would agree with that, Senator Byrd. I haven't
studied it and we did not study it as a part of our report
because it was a past tense action.
Senator Byrd. I think you're exactly right and were exactly
right, but I ask the question again: Isn't it time--maybe you
can help us a little on this--for Congress itself, us, to take
a fresh look at the outdated use of force resolution that was
passed in 2002? Would you venture a response? Do you think it's
time?
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, I think if such a resolution were in
the form and supported strongly, which would reinforce the role
of Congress in the very grave question of sending young men and
women into harm's way, and would contribute to a unified effort
and more bipartisan support, such a resolution could play a
very, very important role in terms of strengthening American
foreign policy in the region.
Senator Byrd. That's a very helpful response.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Byrd.
Senator Byrd. Might I just elicit a response from Secretary
Baker?
Chairman Warner. Yes.
Mr. Baker. I wouldn't disagree with my co-chairman. He's
the legislative expert, Senator. I'm an executive branch
expert, or maybe not an expert, but all of my experience has
been in the executive branch. So if the distinguished gentleman
on my left says that as a legislative matter it would be
appropriate, I'll go along with that.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Byrd. Good answer. Thank you both.
Mr. Baker. Reluctantly. Reluctantly, Senator, reluctantly.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Warner. I raised a similar question to that about
6 months ago in the context of one of these hearings.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I can't think of any two people better
equipped to handle this thing than the two who are doing it. I
still work with Secretary Baker on a regular basis, and of
course I've worked under Mr. Hamilton on the House Armed
Services Committee. So I just appreciate the fact that the
right people are doing this.
I have two questions. The first one is, if I could get an
answer for the record because it would take too long, but I
have not agreed quite often with some of the things of Senator
Levin, some of the positions he's taken, but one that I have
agreed with is we need to budget this stuff and not have it
depend on these emergency supplementals. I notice the 79
specific recommendations. We have not gotten into that, and I'd
like to do that. Some of the things that you're doing, I think,
I'm glad you're talking about, and that is this 5-year
limitation on reset. I had occasion to be to the Army logistics
centers and see the lines, and I recognize that's going to be a
very expensive thing and we need to address that.
Also on the train and equip. I've been more impressed than
some of the rest of the people on this committee over the
quality of training that we're giving these people. I was in
Afghanistan. I've had 12 trips over there to the area of
responsibility (AOR), and I saw the way that they are taking up
their training, their abilities, and I think maybe a lesson
could be learned in Iraq.
But I've also seen the equipment that they're using, up in
Fallujah during one of the elections. I saw them carrying
around this old Russian stuff. Most of it didn't work. So we
have to get them the right equipment. You acknowledge this in
the report, but again this is a very expensive thing, and I'd
like to get something for the record on where we might go in
addressing that and preparing ourselves fiscally for the
future.
Mr. Baker. On budgeting, Senator--and Lee's the one to
answer this question, but on budgeting we have a specific
recommendation about the question of supplementals in here.
Senator Inhofe. I know you do.
Mr. Baker. We say the costs for the war should be included
in the President's annual budget request starting in fiscal
year 2008.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir, I understand that. I'm talking
about amounts, so we can get an idea of what that's going to
be. I applaud the fact that you've included that.
But one thing that was not in the report, when you talk
about the advisory teams and the drawdowns that will be taking
place or the redeployment, you talk about the ground forces,
and I was a ground guy, so I have a prejudice in that
direction. But nothing is really said about the air support.
Right now, the only places outside of Iraq that we have that
capability would be in Qatar, Bahrain, and maybe Kuwait.
But as we're drawing down, we also are going to lose some
of our capability to take care of our F-16s, our A-10s, and
other equipment that's going to provide ground support. Now, I
would like to see that added as a component of the ground
deployment, and I wondered if you had any comments about
whether or not you took that into consideration, and if not
where we should go with that?
Mr. Hamilton. That's totally consistent, Senator, with
everything we heard. I think we used the word ``support.''
Perhaps we weren't specific enough in some respects. But air
support is clearly needed in large quantities, maybe needed in
even larger quantities if we go to this embedded idea. So that
equipment has to be available and the people have to be trained
for that.
I want to say that, with regard to your comment on the
quality of training, I think was quite appropriate, and I just
emphasize that I really do think we've made improvements here
in training. It took us a while. I think we were a little slow
to learn on it, but we're getting it right, I believe. It's
terribly important that we do.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much for your service.
Chairman Warner. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Thanks to both of you for the contribution that you've made
to the decisions that the President and Members of Congress now
have to make about what to do in Iraq. I want to make two quick
points and ask a question. I think perhaps the most significant
thing you've done is to set an example for us, that five
Democrats and five Republicans sat and reasoned together about
what we should do in Iraq to succeed, because you have stated
your understanding quite clearly of the importance of how our
involvement ends in Iraq, how important it is to end it
successfully.
Too much of our debate here about Iraq has been carried out
in partisan press conferences, and that has to end and I think
you've created an example for us as to how to do that.
The second point is that I must say, notwithstanding what
the media has said, I find that large parts of the report are
not that different than the course--it's not ``stay the
course,'' but than the policies that we have been following. In
the cases where you have made a choice, I want to compliment
you and say I think you've made some right choices.
For instance, you have rejected the idea of a deadline by
which we must remove all of our troops from Iraq because of
what's at stake there. You have rejected the idea of a time
line to begin withdrawal of troops. You have said, ``All combat
brigades not necessary for force protection could''--I
emphasize, ``could''--``be out of Iraq by the first quarter of
2008.''
In fact, as you said, Secretary Baker, the report does
recommend a surge in our forces there now to try to grab hold
of the situation, particularly in Baghdad. So I appreciate that
you have expressed that consensus, because these are ongoing
debates here.
The question is this, and let me just say that I totally
support the idea of a regional approach, an international
conference. I believe that the United States is strong enough
never to fear to sit down and talk to anyone. But if I may say
respectfully, others have described this commission as composed
of realists. You haven't described yourself that way. I'm
skeptical that it's realistic to think that Iran wants to help
the United States succeed in Iraq. They are, after all,
supporting Hezbollah, which gathers people in a square in
Beirut to shout ``Death to America.'' They are giving
sophisticated IEDs to the militias which are killing Americans
every day in Iraq.
So to say that, as you do, that Iran should stem the flow
of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's security and
territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi Shia
groups to encourage national reconciliation--why is there any
reasonable belief that the Iranians should do any of the things
that you think they should do? If they do, won't they ask us an
unacceptable price, which is to allow them to go ahead----
Mr. Baker. Develop nukes?
Senator Lieberman. Exactly.
Mr. Baker. Yes. Senator, thank you. That's a very good
question and let me answer it this way. First of all, we
specifically exclude any linkage to the nuclear proliferation
issue. We say that should not be taken up in any discussion we
might have with Iran.
You're saying why should we approach them? There are two
reasons in my opinion. One, we did so in Afghanistan and, guess
what, they helped us. Now, you're quite right, they probably
would much prefer to see us stay bogged down in Iraq. But
approaching them in the context, Senator, of pulling together
all of Iraq's neighbors to put the finger on each one of them
and say, you can do this, you can do that, you can do this, and
they can all do a better job of not stirring, fomenting
trouble, or they can do a better job of trying to assist. Some
of them are actually trying to assist.
But if we ask Iran to come and they say no, we and the
Iraqi government, and they say no, then we will hold them up to
public scrutiny as the rejectionist state that they have proven
to be. Now, we're not naive enough to think that in this case
they may want to help. They probably don't. The President
authorized me to approach the Iranian government. I did so, and
they in effect said: We would not be inclined to help you this
time around.
Fine. What do we lose by saying we're getting all of Iraq's
neighbors together, we want you to come, and if they say no we
show the world what they're all about.
Syria is a totally different issue, a totally different
proposition, and I didn't understand you to say what makes you
think we could get something out of Syria. What makes me think
that is we have it, I have it, back in 1991 after 15 trips
there, at a time when they were a state that sponsored
terrorism. But we talked to them and we made them change 25
years of policy.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, I agree with that. So I appreciate
your answer. There's obviously a lot to gain from getting most
of the neighbors who have common interests to ours in not
seeing Iraq collapse and go into chaos. I'm just not convinced
that the Iranians do, and I single out the Iranians. I
appreciate the fact that you just said that--I don't want to
put words in your mouth--that the Iranians probably won't want
to assist us.
Mr. Baker. We say it in the report, Senator. It's in the
report. We say we've approached them; based on our limited
contact we suspect they will not come. But what do we lose by
approaching them, in the same way that this same administration
has approached them with respect to Afghanistan?
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First let me echo the thanks of my colleagues on this
committee for your study, for your dedicated work. We really
need a bipartisan approach to developing a new strategy for
Iraq since the current strategy clearly has not been
successful.
I appreciate your blunt assessment of where we are, your
description of Iraq as a situation that is grave and
deteriorating. It's very realistic. I do share some of the
concerns that have been expressed here this morning about some
of the specific recommendations. Like my colleague from
Connecticut, I must say that, while I'm always open to our
country talking with anyone, I'm very skeptical that Syria,
which has been the source, or the path for foreign fighters to
get into Iraq, and Iran, which has provided munitions and IEDs
that have killed or maimed so many of our troops, are really
going to be partners in the solution.
For my question, however, I want to go back to the issue
that Senator McCain has raised. Under your proposal we would
have American advisers, both civilian and military, embedded in
Iraqi units all over Iraq, down to the company level, as you've
said. That means that thousands of Americans are going to be in
units all over Iraq. If we withdraw all of the combat brigades,
as you have recommended, except those necessary for force
protection, how can we really ensure that we're going to have a
sufficient number of troops for force protection? It seems to
me that's going to require a massive effort if we're dispersing
our advisers.
I like the embedding concept. I think we should do more of
it. But I'm just wondering as a practical matter whether that
isn't an invitation to attack American troops that are one by
one in small units.
Mr. Hamilton. We're not at all satisfied with the present
exposure of American forces and we want to make some changes.
As we say in the report, the options in front of you aren't
very good. You want to get out in a way that is responsible.
America has a lot of interests there and that's why we reject
the idea of a precipitous withdrawal. But we think the best
course forward is the embedded approach; absolutely not risk-
free.
We spent a lot of time in wording those sentences involving
that in the report, and I think you'll see that we made quite
an allowance for the necessity of having the forces in place to
protect Americans who are embedded. That's what we mean by
force protection, and it involves a lot of aspects and it
includes having some American combat forces there, such as
Special Operations Forces and rapid reaction teams so that you
can move in quickly when a problem breaks out.
That will have some risks to it, and there will be some
American casualties there, but not like I think we're now
suffering.
Mr. Baker. Combat brigades, Senator, dedicated to force
protection.
Senator Collins. It just seems to me that you're going to
have to have a substantial combat presence in order to protect
those advisers.
Mr. Hamilton. I think you will have to have substantial
capabilities to protect those advisers, and obviously any
American, every American Member of Congress, I'm sure wants to
do whatever is necessary to protect those people. But you have
to be candid here and the candor part of it is, when you put
these men into Iraqi units they're very exposed, and you have
to do everything you can to protect them, but it's not risk-
free.
Mr. Baker. The Pentagon, of course, is coming up with its
own study here in connection with where we go from here with
Iraq. I don't know this for certain, Senator, but I think they
have done some looking at this business of how many combat
brigades they might need for force protection if we beef up the
training, equipping, and advising mission.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. It's an
excellent question.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
extraordinary work and the work of your colleagues.
This issue of troop levels, of surging troops, I think is
an important one, and I think it rests on some basic questions:
How many troops would be necessary, how long must they stay
there, and for what purpose would they be sent into Baghdad in
particular? Baghdad as I understand it is a city of about 6
million people. In your deliberations did you have a notion of
how many additional troops would be necessary to make an
impact?
Mr. Hamilton. In Baghdad?
Senator Reed. In Baghdad, if that was the only area we
decided to be proactive.
Mr. Hamilton. I think we're impressed that the operation in
Baghdad has not gone well and has not met our expectations, and
that the Iraqi forces that were assisting us there have not
performed all that well. I don't know that we have, Senator
Reed, an exact estimate. The figure that Jim and I just
mentioned to one another is 20,000. I think that was the figure
that might be available in country pretty quickly to help in
Baghdad.
Mr. Baker. General Corelli's Reserves are about 20,000 in
Kuwait and Germany, as I understand it.
Mr. Hamilton. Now, I know you've talked to the commanders a
lot, but it's not crystal clear to me that the commanders
believe that additional forces will help all that much.
Senator Reed. My impression is that if you're going to take
this road, the force has to be substantial in size and you have
to be prepared to be there for not 2 or 3 months as a
demonstration, but probably longer than that, which again
raises the issue of how such a force can be supported in size
over the time.
It also raises the other issue, too, which is for what
purpose. The strategy that's being pursued there now, the
clear, hold, and build strategy--and I think your report
alludes to this--has become the clear, hold, and wait strategy,
where military forces are on the ground, but not the
complementary reconstruction, political governance aspects. I
think your report goes to the point, unless we're able to do
all of this together simultaneously, in a coordinated fashion,
none of it will work.
Mr. Hamilton. That's right.
Senator Reed. So that begs the other question of, let's
assume we're going to plus-up our forces in Baghdad, for just
one example, by 50,000 troops. I think we have to ask the other
question: How many more civilian personnel, how much more
reconstruction money, how is it delivered? That has to be part
of the equation because to simply talk in terms of troops
misses the whole essence of this operation, which is it's a
political dynamic and an economic dynamic, as well as a
military one.
Mr. Hamilton. I think you make a very good point. I don't
want to understate this, but the clearing aspect is not the
tough part. Now, you may sustain casualties there and obviously
that's the most serious consideration, but we have the ability
to clear, no doubt about that. The real question is can we
hold? What has happened is that we have not been able to hold,
and the very forces that you've pushed out filter back in
again. Holding is very manpower-intensive. You would normally
look to the police to help, but the police have been the most
disappointing in terms of performance in Iraq, the various
Iraqi police forces.
Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you once again for your strong leadership
and your commitment to freedom and to the American people. We
indeed owe you a debt of gratitude and we do thank you very
much.
Going back to what Senator Lieberman was talking about with
reference to the Syrians and the Iranians, I happen to like
your approach to some sort of coalition approach to these two
countries, and I'm not sure that we can ever achieve any sort
of total peaceful resolution in that part of the world without
the involvement of a number of those countries, and
particularly in Iraq with regard to the Syrians and the
Iranians.
However, you correctly point out in your report that the
Iranians and the Syrians are providing financial assistance,
they're providing training, they're also weaponizing to a
certain degree the insurgents. Before we ever get to the point
of a coalition group sitting down at a table or entering into
any sort of diplomatic negotiations, should we not receive some
sort of overt act from the Syrians and the Iranians relative to
a public commitment to stopping the violence, and to ceasing
their support of the insurgent activity in advance of any kind
of diplomatic overture?
Mr. Baker. Senator, the two countries, in our report, we
approach them differently. With respect to Iran, we're not
suggesting direct bilateral negotiations with Iran on a wide
variety of issues, and particularly not the nuclear issue. We
are suggesting that, with respect to Syria, in terms of
progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict, going back to the Madrid
conference of 1991 and the two tracks, one on Palestinians, one
Lebanese-Syrian, we think we ought to try and reenergize that.
That's a different proposition.
On September 18, Secretary Rice attended a meeting of the
International Compact for Iraq, which is an economic grouping
of regional countries, and sat there in the meeting with the
Iranian foreign minister. So I don't know that preconditioning
it in terms of inviting them to some sort of a regional meeting
to improve the situation in Iraq is necessary. I don't know
that we lose anything by saying to them, you want to be part of
the solution instead of part of the problem? If they say no,
fine; everybody in the world knows the attitude that they take
and we haven't lost a thing, particularly given the fact we've
already sat with them as recently as the 18th of September.
With respect to Syria, I think it's different, Senator. I
think there are some opportunities there, that it is in the
national interest of the United States to explore the peace
process.
Chairman Warner. Senator Nelson, I inform my colleagues the
vote has started.
Mr. Hamilton. Excuse me.
Chairman Warner. Please go ahead.
Mr. Hamilton. We've had more than a little pushback on the
Syrian and Iranian question because it's a tough one.
We understand that the road to peace lies through Baghdad
in Iraq and you don't get peace unless a lot of things happen
there. But we also believe that what you do in the region can
be reinforcing of what steps are necessary to take in Iraq, and
that Iraq's neighbors have to play a role in all of this. Syria
and Iran have very great influence over events within Iraq,
particularly Iran, but also Syria. I just don't think you can
avoid that.
Now, it is quite true that the Iranians have not been all
that helpful, as a matter of fact just the opposite, in Iraq
today. But we do not think it's in the Iranian interest for
American policy to fail completely and to lead to chaos in that
country. It is important to take a look at Iran itself. Iran is
not a homogeneous population. Only slightly more than 50
percent of its population is Persian, and what they are really
worried about is a flow of refugees into that country, which
would be highly destabilizing.
So Iran has some interests here that we must not forget. Of
course, they live in a very dangerous part of the world and
they have huge security interests. It is quite possible--we
don't know that this is probable, but it is possible--that you
can put together some incentives and disincentives that can
attract them. As Jim has repeatedly pointed out, you don't have
much to lose here. Things are not going in a very good
direction right now, and why not take some chance here in
involving these countries?
Chairman Warner. Secretary Baker, do you want to add?
Mr. Baker. I want to just direct your attention if I could,
Senator Chambliss, to the bottom of page 56, the top of page
57, with respect to the issues we would raise with Syria, if we
could reenergize the peace process to deal with the Arab-
Israeli conflict. You'll find in there we would ask everything
of them. We're going to want their full cooperation in these
assassinations in Lebanon, stop screwing around in Lebanon,
implement U.N. Security Council 1701.
But there's one thing that, if we were able to bring Syria
around--and you know, they're a Sunni Arab state. I think they
want to resume good relations with their Sunni Arab neighbors,
and I think they would much rather be on a normal relationship
basis with the United States than they would their marriage of
convenience with Iran. What could they do for us and what could
they do for our ally Israel? They could--if we could bring
Syria back, we could stop the flow of arms to Hezbollah,
because they are the transit point, and that would cure
Israel's Hezbollah problem.
Second, they have the ability in my opinion to get Hamas to
recognize Israel's right to exist, which would give Israel a
negotiating partner on the Palestinian track, something that
Israel badly wants.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I note the vote is on, but we will be able to meet your
deadline and all Senators if we keep it short. I will now turn
to Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, and thank you to both of
you. Your success in government has been extraordinary. Thank
you again for your contribution. Secretary Baker, about the
only thing that I disagree with your success in the past is the
34 days that you spent in Tallahassee, Florida.
Mr. Baker. 37, Senator.
Senator Bill Nelson. 37 days in Tallahassee, Florida in
November and December 2000. [Laughter.]
I want to point out that Associated Press has moved a story
today that the prime minister of Israel said he disagreed with
your recommendation of linkage of efforts to stabilize Iraq
with the new moves to end Israel's conflict with its neighbors.
Your report recommends negotiations toward the Syrian-Israeli
peace agreement that would include Israel's return of the Golan
Heights, Syria, ending its support for the terrorist groups,
agreeing to full normalization with Israel, and ending its
attempts to dominate Lebanon.
Are you suggesting that the war in Iraq cannot be resolved
unless Israel and the United States reach an accord with the
Golan Heights? I know you're talking about a comprehensive--if
it's true, does it mean that the conflict in Iraq could be
extended indefinitely by rejectionist hard-liners in conflicts
that have long predated this Iraq conflict?
Mr. Baker. I'm not sure you can say that, Senator. But let
me mention one other thing that's in there that we recommended
in connection with the Golan Heights. We don't suggest that if
Syria does all these things you've outlined and that we have
outlined here that there should be a peace agreement between
Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights without a United States
security guarantee. That's a very important point and should
not be left out.
The reason we have the suggestion for a new diplomatic
offensive in this document is because we think we need to have,
as Congressman Hamilton has said, a comprehensive strategy to
deal with the problems of Iraq and the problems of the region.
I don't think there's anybody we talked to that did not raise
this issue of our engagement on the Arab-Israel peace process,
and every one of them said without exception you need to become
re-engaged in a very vigorous way on this issue.
Senator Bill Nelson. So too with the proposed two-state
solution. The prime minister of Israel has said he wants to
negotiate with Mahmoud Abbas. What do you recommend if Hamas
says no dice?
Mr. Baker. I recommend that we bring Syria across and get
them to get Hamas to acknowledge Israel's right to exist, so
Israel would have a negotiating partner on the Palestinian
track. That's exactly one of the main reasons for engaging
Syria. If we can't do it we can't do it, but we don't lose a
darn thing by trying.
Mr. Hamilton. Senator, there are a lot of moderate Arabs
that you have to appeal to in order to solve the Iraqi problem.
All of them are friends of ours--the Saudis, the Jordanians,
the Egyptians, the Kuwaitis, the Gulf States. It goes on and on
and on. Now, in order to appeal to the moderate Arabs--and this
is hugely important in our relationship with Islam and the
Islamic countries, 1.3 billion Muslims in the world--in order
to appeal to that group, you have to be able to show that we
are serious about dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is
absolutely essential.
Now, you used the words, I think, are we requiring that we
reach an accord? No, we're not requiring that and I don't think
it's required. What is required is that the United States re-
energize this process. We're not going to solve it. It's been
here for a number of decades. We're not going to solve it
quickly. So it's not so much a question of solving the problem.
It is a question of the United States as the principal power
being sensitive to this and trying to do what we can to move
towards a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Without
it, we have no credibility, we have no legitimacy, with the
moderate Arabs, who are key for us.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you both on behalf of our country. I think the
biggest contribution you've made is to explain to us the state
of affairs in Iraq as they are, and we may not agree on
solutions for it, but that's a beginning point, and we've never
really had a consensus until you came along. Things are not
good.
Based on your review of our situation, not only just in
Iraq but of our own military, do you think Congress would be
well-advised to consider growing the Army and Marine Corps?
Mr. Baker. I personally do, but then I'm a former marine.
Mr. Hamilton. I do as well.
Senator Graham. We may have to draft you back into the
Service here.
Mr. Baker. There's no such thing as a former marine. Let me
correct the record. I am a marine.
Senator Graham. You're always a marine. Once a marine,
always a marine.
Mr. Baker. That's right.
Senator Graham. I'm glad you're on our side, then and now.
Mr. Baker. That's right.
Senator Graham. Now, to me the heart of the matter is, we
can differ about how to go forward and that's okay, nothing
wrong with having different opinions. I get asked all the time,
gentlemen, on the streets of South Carolina and every other
place in the country I go to: Are we in the middle of a bunch
of people who could never solve their problems no matter how
much we help them? So the question is, based on your assessment
of the situation, are the Iraqi people capable of forming a
democracy with the right assistance?
Mr. Baker. I think so.
Mr. Hamilton. Our whole premise of the policy is that they
are.
Senator Graham. Okay. The second question is----
Mr. Baker. Excuse me. The whole premise of our policy
suggestions in our report is that they are.
Senator Graham. That's important for the country to hear,
because a lot of Americans don't believe that. Do you agree
with that?
Mr. Hamilton. I think I do agree with it. Your judgment on
that would be better than mine. Now, I don't want to pretend to
you that I don't have doubts.
Senator Graham. I don't mean to--well, I think we all have
doubts. We probably have doubts about our own democracy. The
Civil War was started in my State. We had a lot of doubts
there, and I'm glad we resolved them in favor of the Union.
Mr. Hamilton. There are a lot of pundits writing now about
how the Iraqi government will never be able to get their act
together and the whole situation is hopeless. That's not
exactly a policy. We are where we are. We have to deal with
this. You have a democratically-elected government.
Senator Graham. But you both believe, after having analyzed
the situation, that there's reason to believe with the right
assistance they can pull this off?
Mr. Baker. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. Yes, we believe that. The ``if'' clause you
used is hugely important.
Senator Graham. That's where the debate is, and I don't
want to monopolize more than my time.
Last question. If you asked the 10 members of the
commission the question, is Iraq the central battle front in
the war on terror, what answer would you have received?
Mr. Baker. I'll answer for myself, Senator. In my view it
may not have been when we first went in, but it certainly is
now.
Senator Graham. The outcome affects the overall war on
terror?
Mr. Baker. It certainly does.
Senator Graham. Mr. Hamilton?
Mr. Hamilton. I would strike the word ``the'' and use
``a''. It is a central front. Look, al Qaeda today is an
important part of the violence, but not as important as
sectarian violence. It is a central front in the war on terror,
but to make it the central front overstates it.
Senator Graham. Well said.
Chairman Warner. Thank you very much.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much again, gentlemen, for
your service to our country once again. I think you can tell
from the tenor and content of the questions that we're
searching for the best way to implement a series of policies
and actions that might possibly move us forward.
As I listen to you and as I reviewed the report, I'm
basically hearing two overriding suggestions: one, that we have
to engender the will and assist the capacity of the Iraqi
government to take the political and economic actions necessary
to stabilize itself, and our biggest stick in order to do that
is to make it clear we are not there unconditionally, we are
not going to be babysitting a civil war, we are not going to
take sides in sectarian violence. Is that a correct statement,
number one?
Mr. Hamilton. I think it's a correct statement, but it's
not the only leverage we have, the troop level. I think the
conditionality of aid is another leverage. I also think if you
play it right the regional diplomacy which Jim has been talking
about can be used very effectively as leverage on the Iraqi
government.
But you're right, we think you have to encourage the Iraqi
government to act, and the military troop level is a very
important part of that.
Senator Clinton. But let me follow up and ask about our own
Government, because you have a series of recommendations that
are both comprehensive and challenging. The idea of a
Goldwater-Nichols process that would get us where we need to
be, that took decades. We know it was contentious. It made
significant changes. We don't have time for that.
You have other recommendations that talk about engaging the
entire United States Government, using all the tools at our
disposal. We've now heard from the Iraq Study Group, but we
need the White House to become the ``Iraq Results Group.'' That
is very frustrating for some of us. We don't understand the
misjudgments and missteps that have been taken in the last
years.
What advice can you give us as to the role that Congress
can play to try to help create the conditions that our own
Government will muster both the will and capacity to act along
the lines that you've recommended, and that I think we in
general agree need to be pursued?
Mr. Baker. Senator Clinton, I think if Congress were to, in
addition to praising this report, which many Members of
Congress have and for which we are grateful, say this is a good
basis for going forward and unifying the country behind a
single approach to this difficult problem of Iraq, that would
help, I think, the executive branch in its deliberations.
They just received the report yesterday, just like you just
got it yesterday, and we've heard differing views here with
respect to many of the recommendations. If Congress could come
together behind supporting, let's say utopianly, all of the
recommendations of this report, that would do a lot toward
moving things downtown in my opinion.
Mr. Hamilton. Congress is a co-equal branch of Government.
I frankly am not that impressed with what Congress has been
able to do. I think Congress has been extraordinarily timid in
the exercise of its constitutional responsibilities on the
question of warmaking and conducting war.
Now, the answers here are not easy, but in a word I think
very robust oversight is necessary. I think it's been lacking.
I think it has not been a strong performance by Congress. What
can you do to most assure success of the policy? I would say
very vigorous, robust oversight. Many of the problems that you
mention that have occurred we did not examine because we
thought they are out of our mandate. I think they could have
been corrected with vigorous oversight.
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Chairman Warner. Thank you.
I feel I must make an observation here. Yes, Congress is
very impressed with your report. But we, the Congress, I do not
know the extent to which we will be able to share the
President's internal review of his own security who will come
up with a framework of points. So we have to be cautious as we,
I'm sure, endorse what you have done, but at the same time I
don't know to the extent we will have before us the full realm
of the options that have been shown to the President, namely
from his own internal staff, as well as from the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs.
So before Congress rushes in, I'm just hopeful we can have
all points.
Mr. Baker. Thank you, Senator, but could you say this is
good until something better comes along?
Chairman Warner. I'll let your question stand unanswered.
Thank you, dear friend. I know you too well.
Senator Cornyn.
Senator Cornyn. Gentlemen, let me add my word of thanks. I
think you've rendered a great service to the country. Clearly
now, or at least by the time the process of the Pentagon and
the State Department and within the executive branch itself in
addition to your good work, it'll be clear that this situation
has been analyzed without regard to ideology, without regard to
partisan affiliation, without regard to the consequences of the
next election, but in the interests of the country.
I think the second service that you've rendered is to point
out that this is not just about Iraq, that the debate seems to
be, how do we fix Iraq. You've made clear that Iraq cannot be
viewed in isolation and I think rendered a service in making
that point.
There have been some, of course, during the course of the
debates in Congress and during the recent election who have
said that we need to have a phased withdrawal from Iraq. The
irony of that to me is that we all agree we need to bring our
troops home as soon as we can. The question is whether it's
based upon domestic political considerations or based upon our
national security interests.
I've always scratched my head and wondered why it's
appropriate to threaten the Iraqis that unless they shape up
we'll ship out, when in fact if we ship out before Iraq becomes
more stable it remains an ongoing threat of a failed state
which will provide opportunities for terrorists to regroup and
to continue their assaults against the United States, not to
mention the chance, the likelihood, of Iranian expansionism in
the area.
I have really two questions, if I can ask them quickly. One
is, Secretary Baker, you've been good to point out and your
report points out on page 52 that the President has authorized
you to approach the Iranians about their likely participation
in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq, and they've
indicated to you they would be unlikely to participate. Did I
get that correct, sir?
Mr. Baker. That's correct.
Senator Cornyn. There are some who've criticized the
President for not agreeing to talk to Iran. But from what
you've told us here today, the President has authorized you to
do so and they've indicated their disinclination.
Mr. Baker. Further to that, Senator, the President
authorized his Secretary of State to attend a meeting with the
Iranian Foreign Minister in the International Compact for Iraq
on September 18. Furthermore, with respect to Afghanistan he
authorized his administration to approach the Iranians to help
us in Afghanistan and they did.
Senator Cornyn. You've been around this city a lot longer
than I have, but sometimes these positions appear to be
caricatured in a way that isn't justified by the facts. I
appreciate your pointing that out.
Mr. Baker. Before you ask the second question, may I just
say something about the ``shape up or ship out''? We had to
walk a fine line here between being overbearing in that regard
and giving the Iraqis the message that we can't just stay there
forever if they're not willing to take some political actions
that they need to take.
So the sentence was very carefully crafted. You can look at
it at your convenience, but it says if they do not make
substantial progress on these milestones, the United States
could reduce its military, political, or economic support. So
it's not a case of shipping out necessarily. The President will
have the latitude to determine what he wants to do by way of
reduction in support.
Senator Cornyn. My last question is, you recommend that the
United States talk to al-Sadr. At one point there was an arrest
warrant out for al-Sadr. Why do you recommend that we talk to
him rather than arrest him and bring him to justice?
Mr. Hamilton. Because he's a very important leader in the
country. We had described to us again and again that the most
important politician in the country was Sistani, who's a
clergyman. If you really want to influence events in Iraq, you
go to the Grand Ayatollah and his principal people. That's the
nature of the society.
Now, we have tried to speak to Sadr and he won't talk to
us. We tried to speak to Sistani. He won't talk to us either.
So it's not that we haven't tried. But the point here is, I
think, that the religious leaders in this country are hugely
important, not just as religious leaders, but as political
leaders too.
The only person I know that talks to either of these
gentlemen is the U.N. representative in Baghdad, and even his
contact has been limited. So we recognize, number one, their
importance; number two, the difficulty of talking to them; and
number three, we think it would be good if we could talk to
Sadr.
Mr. Baker. Senator, that arrest warrant, you're right, but
it was quite some time ago, and it was rescinded after Bremer
left.
Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Warner. Senator Dayton, would you indulge me? I
wish to go vote.
Senator Dayton. Yes.
Chairman Warner. Then Senator Levin and Senator Thune will
resume.
I want to reiterate, Mr. Secretary, my profound gratitude
for your report. It's important. But if Congress is going to be
a partner to work through this, you can understand that before
we come forward with such recommendations as we wish to make
we'd like to hear from our President about his own internal
review.
Mr. Baker. Absolutely. I understand that, Senator.
Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. Then have some input. Now, practically
we're going to be out of here in about 48 hours, not to return
until the first week in January. So this poses a challenge.
Mr. Baker. Absolutely.
Chairman Warner. But I'm sure a number of us could come
back and work with the administration. I know my colleague has
indicated his willingness to join me.
Senator Levin. With the President, indeed we made that
point. The chairman made it to the President. He indicated he's
more than willing to involve that part in the process and to
receive our reaction before something is just announced. Not
just the two of us. I'm saying the reaction of leaders of
Congress.
Chairman Warner. I just ask one observation that perplexes
me greatly. I've been back and forth, maybe not as many times,
certainly not as many times as you have, Mr. Secretary Baker
and Congressman Hamilton, to that part of the world in my 28
years in the Senate and then 5 years before that when I was in
the Navy secretariat. Throughout history, the Sunni and the
Shia have found the ability to live together in peace. To a
certain extent, that's being done in the peripheral states. Now
we see a mass exodus to Jordan, primarily Sunni but undoubtedly
some Shia, living in peace. We do not hear of any instance of
this sectarian violence to speak of in the bordering states.
What is the root cause for this thing suddenly to erupt in
Iraq like a volcano, where they lived in Iraq prior to our
intervention, which I support that intervention, intermarried,
lived side by side? What is the root cause that has caused this
volcanic sectarian violence, wanton, senseless killing of each
other?
Mr. Baker. Senator, this is the first time to my knowledge
that you've ever had a state that has been dominated by one of
those ethnic groups, in this case the Sunnis, who represented
only 20 percent of the population, but who have ruled over, in
a fairly ruthless way, the remaining 60 percent of the
population that is Shia. I think that's part of the problem.
Another part of the problem, quite frankly, are the efforts
of al Qaeda in Iraq and people like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who
set about specifically to foment sectarian violence as the best
way to advance al Qaeda in Iraq and to bring down the
government that the United States had established in Iraq.
Chairman Warner. I thank you both very much, and I must
depart for the vote at this point in time. But you've made a
remarkable contribution and it just shows how within our
private sector there are those who are willing to receive the
call to come back and perform admirable public service and
valuable public service.
Mr. Baker. Senator Warner, thank you. I want to add my
appreciation to that of Congressman Hamilton. I remember the
day we rolled out the announcement of the Iraq Study Group on
March 15 of this year. You were kind enough to be our host on
that occasion. Without you or Congressman Wolf, and perhaps a
few others, there would not have been an Iraq Study Group. So
thank you, sir.
Chairman Warner. I thank you with a great sense of humility
for that recognition.
Senator Dayton.
Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, both for your service. Some cynic was
quoted as saying that in Washington when the situation is
hopeless people turn to a commission. If you could help me
translate your description of the situation in Iraq as grave
and deteriorating into that vernacular, if you put hopeless on
a scale of one and complete success a ten, where are we in Iraq
today, just a number?
Mr. Hamilton. I think we reject the idea that the situation
is hopeless.
Senator Dayton. So it's not a one. Where are we on that
spectrum from hopeless to successful?
Mr. Hamilton. Oh, my mind doesn't think in those
quantitative terms, I guess, Senator. I think where we are is
that the situation is just very difficult, that political
leaders have the responsibility in this country to let people
know how difficult that situation is. We tried to spell that
out in the assessment to some degree.
But we also said that if we take the right steps we can
improve it, and that's where we are in terms of public policy,
to try to take the right steps now. Nobody can assure success
even if we take the right steps, but you can certainly secure
failure if we don't take those steps.
Senator Dayton. I understand. This leads into my next
question, which is: To get to the point where your
recommendations can take hold and be successful, it seems that
we're going on the spectrum there from, I don't know, a three
to an eight or so. I guess others have posited this question,
but realistically in the timeframe you've described is that
feasible? Conversely, is there a tipping point in a rough
timetable where if the situation remains grave and
deteriorating it does become hopeless?
Mr. Hamilton. There certainly is that point and we're
perilously close to that point, and that's why we emphasize
here very, very, great urgency in action by ourselves as well
as by the Iraqi government.
Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman, I'll let our distinguished
visitors move on.
Senator Levin [presiding]. Thank you.
Has Senator Nelson had an opportunity?
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes.
Senator Levin. We're past the 11 o'clock hour. We thank you
for not just your contribution to this Nation and hopefully to
the success in Iraq, but your patience. Thank you. We are
adjourned.
[The Iraq Study Group Report follows:]
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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Question Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
phased redeployment
1. Senator Levin. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, for some time I,
along with Senator Jack Reed, have urged President Bush to tell Iraqi
political leaders that the United States will begin a phased
redeployment of American forces within the next 4 to 6 months so as to
induce those leaders to make the political compromises that are
required for the political settlement, which in turn is essential for
ending the insurgency and the sectarian violence now plaguing Iraq. Our
proposal recognized that a residual force would be needed for some
period of time dedicated to training Iraqi security forces, conducting
targeted counterterrorism missions, and providing logistical support
and force protection.
The Iraq Study Group recommends that ``by the first quarter of
2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on
the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection
could be out of Iraq.''
Do you believe that our proposal is consistent with the
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group?
Mr. Baker. The Iraq Study Group does not address the question of a
phased redeployment. It opposes a precipitate withdrawal of troops. The
Iraq Study Group argues that the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq
should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take
over the primary responsibility for combat operations. While these
efforts are building up and as additional Iraqi brigades are being
deployed, U.S. combat troops could begin to move out of Iraq, subject
to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground. It
argues that the United States will maintain a significant force in Iraq
in order to provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government;
fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq; train, equip,
and support Iraqi security forces; and deter destructive interference
in Iraq by Syria and Iran.
Mr. Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group report does not address the
question of a phased redeployment of U.S. forces. It recommended no
timetable or deadline for troop withdrawals, which are left to the
commander in chief.
At the same time, there are common elements in the proposal put
forward by Senators Levin and Reed and the proposal by the Iraq Study
Group. They are not inconsistent. They offer a basis for a responsible
transition.
______
Questions Submitted by James M. Inhofe
drawdown asymmetry between ground and air forces
2. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, there is much
discussion in your report about how and when to redeploy our ground
forces, which is obviously of extreme importance, but nowhere have I
seen detailed discussion on the disengagement of our air forces.
I recognize that Iraqi air forces will not be able to assume
responsibilities for air missions in the near future, but I am troubled
by the lack of analysis on the implications of a long-term air presence
in Iraq.
When we redeployed ground forces in 1991 after Operation Desert
Storm, our Air Force remained deployed in the region and has maintained
a constant air presence there for the last 15 years.
Many assume our air presence after the eventual redeployment of
ground forces will be similar to the years after Operation Desert
Storm. While there are similarities, we need to ensure we understand
the differences.
The no-fly zones were part of an international standoff between the
U.N. and Saddam Hussein. They were flown in support of a U.N.
resolution and had international legitimacy. The objectives were
achievable through air power alone.
Today we are dealing with an Iraqi government that wants to be seen
as independent of U.S. influence, and we will need its permission to
employ air power in pursuit of counterinsurgency objectives or we will
undermine the government of Iraq's legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis and
hence our long-term goals.
The situation in Iraq today is an insurgency. The ability to
achieve counterinsurgency objectives by air power alone is limited and
would require close coordination with ground forces. Once coalition
ground forces redeploy, we are also left with serious dilemmas
regarding the rules of engagement for employing air power.
Specifically, are we going to allow Iraqi forces access to joint
fires (air power employing ordinance) only if they have a U.S./
coalition joint tactical air controller as part of their advisory team?
Mr. Baker. This was not an issue that the Iraq Study Group
addressed in great detail. However, on page 72, the report states: Even
after the United States has moved all combat brigades out if Iraq, we
would maintain a considerable military presence in Iraq and with our
powerful air, ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and
Qatar, as well as increased presence in Afghanistan.
Mr. Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group did not address your question in
any detail.
Given that air power is a critical part of the support mission for
U.S. forces in Iraq, the Iraq Study Group would support a continuing,
robust presence for U.S. air power in Iraq and the region.
3. Senator Inhofe. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, if yes, then unless
we leave hundreds of these advisory teams for the duration of our air
presence, we will leave significant sanctuaries for insurgents to hide.
If we employ air power under the control of an Iraqi controller, or
independently of any controller at all, the effects would be too
indiscriminate, especially in urban areas where the air power would be
most needed.
We also need to consider basing. No-fly zone operations were flown
from bases outside of Iraq. If we keep bases inside Iraq, there will be
significant force protection issues.
If we attempt to utilize bases outside Iraq, then we must contend
with ramp space, fuel shortages, and facilities that are already
overloaded. Furthermore, we must consider the national caveats placed
on our air forces regarding the types of missions we could fly from the
remaining bases.
If we move these assets outside of Iraq, then we will pay a higher
bill in flight hours, tankers, and maintenance to get the assets to the
fight.
What consideration did your panel give to the disengagement of air
forces, and what recommendations do you have for dealing with the
drawdown asymmetry between ground and air forces?
Mr. Baker. This was not an issue that the Iraq Study Group studied
in great detail. We would leave such decisions to U.S. military
leaders, depending on the situation on the ground.
Mr. Hamilton. We did not address the question of air power in
detail.
We would defer to others on the nature of the air assets that
should remain, and where they should be based, consistent with the
principle outlined in the Iraq Study Group report that training should
become the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
police and criminal justice
4. Senator Thune. Mr. Hamilton, on page 78 of the report under
Police and Criminal Justice the Iraq Study Group wrote: ``The problems
in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are profound. The ethos
and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission to protect
and serve all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do not embrace
that mission.'' In recommendation 50 you state that ``the entire Iraqi
National Police should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where
the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.''
Do you believe that the current organization of the police is
responsible for their failure to effectively combat the insurgency and
how will placing them in the Ministry of Defense affect the long-term
mission of the police which is not primarily a military one but a
domestic one?
Mr. Hamilton. The reason for recommendation 50 is that the Iraqi
National Police is comprised of heavily armed units engaged in
commando-style operations. That mission fits better under the Ministry
of Defense.
Moreover, U.S. advisers have greater access in the Ministry of
Defense than they do in the Ministry of the Interior. Units under the
command of the Ministry of Defense perform better than those under the
Ministry of Interior.
It is our belief that a reorganization of this kind can be helpful
as part of the comprehensive reforms necessary to create professional,
well-trained, non-sectarian Iraqi security forces.
The Ministry of the Interior will still have responsibility for
traditional policing activities, which are carried out by the Iraqi
Police Service, and the Iraq Study Group outlined several
recommendations for reform of that Ministry.
reconciliation
5. Senator Thune. Mr. Hamilton, in other areas of the report the
group emphasizes the importance for Iraq to follow through with the
reconciliation program. The reconciliation between Sunni and Shia is, I
believe, at the heart of stabilizing Iraq. Further, I believe it is
also the driving factor which is keeping the police from being more
effective against sectarian militias and the insurgency as a whole. For
some time I have been concerned with the development of the Iraqi
police force. While there have been some successes such as increased
visibility on the streets and some signs of increased respect among the
people, my concerns lie with the loyalty and quality of the police. In
your consultations with Iraqi officials, what steps did you find they
were taking to break a recruit's ties to a militia or tribal loyalties?
Mr. Hamilton. It is our understanding that the Minister of the
Interior is taking important steps to identify and begin removing
members of the police force with criminal records.
It is unclear what specific actions the Minister of the Interior is
taking against police force members who have ties to militias, unless
they also have criminal records.
al qaeda
6. Senator Thune. Mr. Baker, the role of al Qaeda in Iraq is
nefarious and single-minded. Their goal is to destabilize the
rebuilding process and create a failed state which would serve as a
breeding ground for recruitment of young men to their extremist
ideology. No one in the international community, especially in the
Middle East, benefits from Iraq as a failed state. While conducting
your research what did you discover about how the Iraqi people view al
Qaeda in Iraq?
Mr. Baker. Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the
violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts:
suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant
religious targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraq-run and
composed of Sunni Arabs. Al Qaeda is a fact of life. As one Iraqi told
us, ``Al Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonalds.''
7. Senator Thune. Mr. Baker, do they see them as an outside force
impeding progress?
Mr. Baker. The response of Iraqis to al Qaeda varies. Some, like
the tribal leaders in al Anbar province, are actively working against
al Qaeda efforts. On the other hand, some Sunni leaders view branches
of al Qaeda as resistance rather than terrorism.
8. Senator Thune. Mr. Baker, what has been the reaction of other
states in the Middle East to al Qaeda in Iraq's effort to derail the
rebuilding process by fomenting conflict between the Sunni and Shia
populations?
Mr. Baker. The countries neighboring Iraq are concerned about the
type of sectarian violence that has erupted between Sunni and Shiites
spreading to their populations. Many fear Shia insurrections--perhaps
fomented by Iran--in Sunni-run states. Such a broader sectarian
conflict could open a Pandora's box of problems--including the
radicalization of populations, mass movement of populations, and regime
changes--that might take decades to play out.
role of saudi arabia and jordan
9. Senator Thune. Mr. Baker, what role are Saudi Arabia and Jordan
playing to engage the Sunnis in Iraq to convince them to dialogue with
the Shias in Iraq?
Mr. Baker. Saudi Arabia and Jordan should be a participant in
regional and international diplomatic efforts to help bring about peace
and stability in Iraq. Both countries can assist the national
reconciliation process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to
participate. The Saudis, especially, could use their Islamic
credentials to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and
build broader support in the Islamic world for national reconciliation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
stability in iraq
10. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report states,
``The situation in Baghdad and several provinces is dire. . . . U.S.
military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, are making
exceptional and dedicated efforts--and sacrifices--to help Iraq. Many
Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices for a better
future. However, the ability of the United States to influence events
within Iraq is diminishing.'' Should President Bush elect not to
implement the recommendations of the report, is it your belief that the
stability in Iraq would continue to deteriorate?
Mr. Baker. The President has implemented some of the essential
elements of the report, including the decision to make the training of
Iraqi troops the essential or primary mission of U.S. troops. He has
decided not to implement others, for the time being. As we frequently
state, there is no silver bullet for Iraq. It is possible that even if
the President implemented all of the Iraq Study Group's
recommendations, the situation would continue to deteriorate. However,
the Iraq Study Group believes that its recommendations, taken together,
represent the best chance for success in Iraq.
Mr. Hamilton. The President has decided to implement some elements
of the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, and not others.
As we said at the outset of the report, the situation in Iraq is
grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success,
but the prospects can be improved.
11. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, in the report, it
states ``The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is
diminishing. Time is running out.'' In your best estimate, when will
time run out?
Mr. Baker. That is a hypothetical question that I cannot answer
with specificity. But at the present, it is critical that the United
States concentrate its diplomatic, economic, and military powers on
this important region of the world.
Mr. Hamilton. We do not know when time will run out, but we do know
that the situation is deteriorating.
Therefore, we believe the need for action in Iraq is urgent.
12. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report
recommends that the ``United States, working with the Iraqi government,
should launch the comprehensive new diplomatic offensive to deal with
the problems of Iraq and the region. This new diplomatic offensive
should be launched before December 31, 2006.''
However, this offensive requires not only for the United States to
work with the Iraqi government, but also neighboring countries,
including Iran and Syria, that have a critical stake in the stability
of Iraq, to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national
reconciliation in Iraq.
How important is the inclusion of countries such as Iran and Syria
in this new offensive, given the Bush administration's strained
relations with them?
Mr. Baker. Both Iran and Syria can and do play major roles in
developments in Iraq. The Iraqi borders with those two countries are
porous. They allow destabilizing elements into Iraq such as arms and
foreign fighters. It is possible that Iran may reject offers to take
part in a new diplomatic offensive. However, the United States should
offer Iran that opportunity. If Iran declines, the world will view its
rejectionist attitude towards Iraq. Syria is more likely to take part
in such discussions, though it will take tough diplomacy by the United
States. With both Iran and Syria, the United States should use
incentives and disincentives. Neither of those countries wants a
chaotic Iraq, in our view.
Mr. Hamilton. The inclusion of Iran and Syria is critical to the
success of diplomatic efforts to support peace and stability in Iraq.
Iran and Syria border Iraq. They have influence in Iraq. The can
contribute in important ways to stability or instability in Iraq. Their
exclusion from regional diplomacy will undermine the success of
diplomatic efforts.
afghanistan
13. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, while the group's
main concern was addressing the situation in Iraq, as stated in its
report, there are other areas of concern that must also not be
overlooked, in particular the situation in Afghanistan and the renewed
threat posed by the Taliban. If Iraq continues to require greater U.S.
military involvement, do you believe that the situation in Afghanistan
would deteriorate?
Mr. Baker. We must not lose sight of the importance of the
situation inside of Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the
Taliban. As the United States develops approached towards Iraq and the
Middle East, it must give priority to the situation in Afghanistan.
Mr. Hamilton. It is critical for the United States to provide
additional political, economic and military support for Afghanistan,
including resources that might become available as combat forces are
moved from Iraq.
14. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report
recommends that ``If the Iraqi government does not make substantial
progress toward the achievement of milestones on national
reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should
reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi
government.'' Am I correct to assume that it is the group's
understanding that without incentives for the Iraqi government to stand
up and make substantial progress toward national reconciliation,
security, and governance, that stability of Iraq is in jeopardy?
Mr. Baker. Incentives are one tool that the United States should
employ in order to encourage the Iraqi government to make the changes
required to improve national reconciliation, security, and governance.
Mr. Hamilton. The violence in Iraq will not end without national
reconciliation. Unfavorable trends in Iraq are likely to continue
unless the Iraqi government makes substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation and governance.
The United States must pressure the Iraqi government to act. Making
assistance conditional on Iraqi performance is a way to apply that
pressure.
15. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, the report
recommends that the Iraqi National Police and Border Police should be
transferred to the Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi Police Service
should become a true police force. However, the group also states that
U.S. authorities do not know with precision the composition and
membership of the various police forces, nor the disposition of their
funds and equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers
participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and
ammunition for use in sectarian violence. What mechanisms should be in
place to ensure that participants do not use their knowledge and
position to further advance sectarian violence?
Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton. The Ministry of the Interior needs to
undertake substantial reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best
practices.
The Ministry of the Interior needs to gain control of policing
funds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizational
discipline.
All officers need to be vetted, retrained, retrained, and closely
supervised.
The presence of U.S. and international expert advisers is crucial
to the success of reform efforts.
Those who are no longer part of the police force need to
participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
program.
16. Senator Akaka. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, it is my
understanding that various countries, including Iran, are already
discussing current relations with the Iraqi government. What role
should the United States play as the discussions are ongoing?
Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton. The United States should be a
participant in regional and international diplomatic efforts to help
bring about peace and stability in Iraq.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
oil trust
17. Senator Clinton. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, you recommend that
Iraq's oil revenue should accrue to the Federal Government and be
shared on the basis of population instead of on the basis of geographic
regions. For several years, I have advocated an oil trust plan for
Iraq, based on the Alaskan Permanent Fund, which would take the profits
from Iraq's oil sector, invest it, and distribute the dividends to
every Iraqi so that all of Iraq has an incentive to keep their oil
flowing and at the same time, help the economy grow and keep regular
Iraqis from joining the insurgency by putting more money in their
pockets.
Instead, oil distribution remains unsettled. Guaranteeing every
Iraqi a share of the oil revenues at the individual level is one way to
try to begin to move beyond the impasse--and to give Iraqis some reason
to believe we aren't there for oil; we aren't there to support big oil;
and to give the Iraqis also some reason to feel positive about their
national government. How do you think such a plan would be received?
Mr. Baker. There is some merit to the plan that you propose.
However, it would be difficult to do because the Iraqi government does
not have a banking system to distribute the revenues.
Mr. Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group examined such plans with great
interest.
The Iraq Study Group agrees that such a plan has the potential to
give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief natural resource.
However, there is no institution in Iraq at present that could
properly implement such a distribution system for oil revenues. It
would take substantial time to establish, and would have to be based on
a well-developed state census and income tax system, which Iraq
currently lacks.
In addition, oil revenues have been incorporated into state budget
projections for the next several years. If oil revenues are removed
from the state budget and distributed to the general population,
alternative sources of revenues would need to be identified.
18. Senator Clinton. Mr. Baker and Mr. Hamilton, do you believe
that such a plan would help national reconciliation?
Mr. Baker. Yes, if the plan were accepted by all factions of the
Iraqi government.
Mr. Hamilton. Yes. Such a plan, if implemented efficiently and
effectively, could help national reconciliation.
Alternative sources of revenues for the Iraqi state budget would
also need to be identified.
[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee adjourned.]