[Senate Hearing 109-784]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-784
U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
BY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona CARL LEVIN, Michigan
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JACK REED, Rhode Island
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri BILL NELSON, Florida
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN CORNYN, Texas HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
Charles S. Abell, Staff Director
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas BILL NELSON, Florida
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN CORNYN, Texas EVAN BAYH, Indiana
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
U.S. Policy and Practice with Respect to the Use of Riot Control Agents
by the U.S. Armed Forces
september 27, 2006
Page
Benkert, Joseph A., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy (Acting); Accompanied
by Brig. Gen. Otis G. Mannon, USAF, Deputy Director for Special
Operations, J-3, the Joint Staff............................... 6
(iii)
U.S. POLICY AND PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
BY THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Readiness
and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John
Ensign (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Ensign and Akaka.
Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock,
professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff
member; Sandra E. Luff, professional staff member; Derek J.
Maurer, professional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten,
professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas,
professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional
staff member; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Benjamin L.
Rubin.
Committee members' assistants present: D'Arcy Grisier and
Alexis Bayer, assistants to Senator Ensign; Stuart C. Mallory,
assistant to Senator Thune; Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka,
assistants to Senator Akaka; and Luke Ballman, assistant to
Senator Dayton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN, CHAIRMAN
Senator Ensign. Good morning, everyone. I want to welcome
all of you here, along with Ranking Member Akaka. I would like
to congratulate Senator Akaka on his primary victory. That's
official, that's on the record, and that's not classified.
[Laughter.]
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Senator Ensign. The Readiness and Management Support
Subcommittee meets this morning to receive testimony on riot
control agents, more commonly referred to as tear gas, and
their use by our men and women in uniform.
I'm joined here today not only by Senator Akaka, but his
staff and my staff. It really has been a pleasure to work
together over the last few years, and I say that with all
sincerity, especially on issues like this that can be very
sensitive. It's important that not only Senator Akaka and I
work well together, but that our staffs also work well
together.
We are also honored to have with us today Joseph A.
Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy (Acting), and Brigadier General
Otis G. Mannon, Deputy Director for Special Operations, J-3,
the Joint Staff.
Welcome, gentlemen. I understand that later we will move
into a closed session, as our witnesses tell me that their
answers to many of the questions are classified. I appreciate
that, but, following opening statements, I would like to ask
just a few basic questions.
Our focus this morning is on the use, or apparent lack of
use, of riot control agents by our military in Afghanistan and
Iraq. I'm interested to learn from the witnesses today their
assessment of the current rules of engagement as they pertain
to the use of tear gas on the battlefield.
It is my belief that American military commanders at all
levels should be authorized to employ riot control agents
consistent with legislation passed last year by Congress in
order to save the lives of American service men and women,
coalition partners, and innocent civilians. I think we'd all
agree that tear gas can be an essential alternative to the use
of lethal weapons in combat. Contrary to the law, it is
unacceptable that our military is, under current policy, banned
from using tear gas for any purpose on the battlefield. Police
officers in any city in America can use tear gas to gain
control of chaotic situations and avoid the loss of life, and
it would seem to be merely common sense that our men and women
carrying out the global war against Islamic fascism be afforded
that same authority.
I know when I speak to Nevadans about this issue, they are
astonished to learn that our military cannot use tear gas in
the hunt for al Qaeda. I believe this is not right, and it must
change. Last year, I sponsored legislation that made clear the
policy of the United States is that riot control agents are not
chemical weapons and that the President may authorize their use
as legitimate, legal, and nonlethal alternatives to the use of
deadly force.
Further, that, as provided in Executive Order 11850, and
consistent with the resolution of ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, riot control agents may be employed by
members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes
to save lives.
My amendment also required a report on the use of riot
control agents by our military. That amendment last year was
passed into law and included in the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2006. I'm still
waiting on the report, which now is almost 3 months overdue.
It is my belief that the use of riot control agents is
wholly consistent with U.S. obligations under the laws of land
warfare and our treaty obligations, and its effectiveness in
certain situations is demonstrated routinely by law enforcement
agencies all over the world.
In my own State of Nevada, the Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department tells me that they use tear gas on a regular
basis for riot control and the extraction of barricaded
individuals. As a matter of fact, they used tear gas within the
last 2 months to flush out a barricaded subject from his home.
That individual was taken into custody without injury.
As much as Las Vegas uses tear gas, there have been no
deaths associated with its use. In towns and streets throughout
Iraq and Afghanistan, marines and soldiers are going house to
house in an attempt to flush out armed terrorists. In carrying
out this vital mission, structures are destroyed and people are
killed, and some of that death and destruction could be avoided
if we allowed our military to use tear gas instead of bullets.
I don't think it's unreasonable to believe that marines and
soldiers have lost their lives in situations that could have
been avoided if this important tool was at their disposal.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony before
the House Armed Services Committee, described the restriction
on the use of riot control agents as a straightjacket. He went
on to point out that our soldiers and marines are authorized to
shoot and kill people in situations where tear gas is
prohibited. This is a lethal lapse in judgment.
I don't know if the incident in Haditha, where 24 Iraqi
civilians lost their lives, would have turned out any different
had the marines there been allowed to use tear gas to flush out
the civilians. What I do know is that those marines did not
have the option of using tear gas that day, and were left only
with the lethal alternative.
We continually talk about providing our men and women in
uniform all the tools they need to accomplish their mission.
Regardless of one's personal opinion on the war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, I think we can all agree that, by restricting the
use of tear gas, this administration is not providing our
military all the tools legally available to them.
In closing, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses if
they believe the use of tear gas by our men and women in
uniform would be a plus or a minus on the battlefield. I'm not
asking you to interpret international treaties. Lawyers get
paid to do that sort of thing. I'm more interested in hearing
whether or not the marine on the ground would benefit from
being able to use this legal, nonlethal alternative.
Senator Akaka, I welcome any opening statement that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Senator Ensign follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator John Ensign
Good morning everyone.
The Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee meets this
morning to receive testimony on riot control agents, more commonly
referred to as tear gas, and their use by our men and women in uniform.
I'm joined today by my good friend and ranking member on the
subcommittee, Senator Akaka.
We are also honored to have with us today Joseph A. Benkert,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy (Acting), and Brigadier General Otis G. Mannon, Deputy
Director for Special Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff.
Welcome gentlemen.
I understand that later we will move into a closed session, as our
witnesses tell me their answers to many of my questions are classified.
I appreciate that, but following opening statements I would like to
ask a couple of basic questions I believe the answers to which are
unclassified.
Our focus this morning is on the use, or apparent lack of use, of
riot control agents by our military in Afghanistan and Iraq.
We will be interested to learn from the witnesses today their
assessment of the current rules of engagement as they pertain to the
use of tear gas on the battlefield.
It is my belief that American military commanders at all levels
should be authorized to employ riot control agents consistent with the
legislation passed last year by Congress in order to save the lives of
American service men and women, coalition partners, and innocent
civilians.
I think we'd all agree that tear gas can be an essential
alternative to the use of lethal weapons in combat. Contrary to the
law, it is unacceptable that our military is, under current policy,
banned from using tear gas for any purpose on any battlefield. Police
officers in any city in America can use tear gas to gain control of
chaotic situations and avoid loss of life.
It would seem to be merely common sense that our men and women
carrying out the global war against Islamic fascism be afforded that
same authority.
I know when I speak to Nevadans about this issue, they are
astonished to learn that our military cannot use tear gas in the hunt
for al Qaeda.
This is not right, and it must change.
Last year I sponsored legislation that made clear the policy of the
United States is that riot control agents are not chemical weapons and
that the President may authorize their use as legitimate, legal, and
nonlethal alternatives to the use of deadly force.
Further, that as provided in Executive Order 11850 and consistent
with the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
riot control agents may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in
war in defensive military modes to save lives.
My amendment also required a report on the use of riot control
agents by our military. That amendment last year was passed into law
and included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006.
I'm still waiting on the report, which is now almost 3 months
overdue.
It is my belief that the use of riot control agents is wholly
consistent with U.S. obligations under the laws of land warfare and our
treaty obligations, and its effectiveness in certain situations is
demonstrated routinely by law enforcement agencies all over the world.
In my own State of Nevada, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department tells me they use tear gas on a regular basis for riot
control and the extraction of barricaded individuals.
As a matter of fact they used tear gas within the last 2 months to
flush out a barricaded subject from his home. That individual was taken
into custody without injury.
As much as Las Vegas uses tear gas, there have been no deaths
associated with its use.
In towns and streets throughout Iraq and Afghanistan, marines and
soldiers are going house to house in an attempt to flush out armed
terrorists.
In carrying out this vital mission, structures are destroyed and
people are killed--and some of that death and destruction could be
avoided if we allowed our military to use tear gas instead of bullets.
I don't think it's unreasonable to believe that marines and
soldiers have lost their lives in situations that could have been
avoided if this important tool was at their disposal.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, described the restriction on the use of riot
control agents as a ``straightjacket.''
He went on to point out that our soldiers and marines are
authorized to shoot and kill people in situations where tear gas is
prohibited. This is a lethal lapse in judgment.
I don't know if the incident in Haditha, where 24 Iraqi civilians
lost their lives, would have turned out any different had the marines
there been allowed to use tear gas to flush out the civilians. What I
do know is that those marines did not have the option of using tear gas
that day and were left only with the lethal alternative.
We continually talk about providing our men and women in uniform
all the tools they need to accomplish their mission.
Regardless of one's personal opinion on the war, I think we can all
agree that by restricting the use of tear gas this administration is
not providing our military all the tools legally available to them.
In closing, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses if they
believe the use of tear gas by our men and women in uniform would be a
plus or a minus on the battlefield.
I'm not asking you to interpret international treaties, lawyers get
paid to do that sort of thing.
I'm more interested in hearing whether or not the marine on the
ground would benefit from being able to use this legal, nonlethal
alternative.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want
you to know that I feel so fortunate to be working with you and
your staff, and I've enjoyed working with you on this
committee.
I also want to welcome our guests, our witnesses, to this
hearing. Because the subject matter of the hearing will involve
classified matters, we will conduct almost the entire hearing
in closed session and limit ourselves only to opening
statements at this brief portion of this hearing.
The subject of today's hearing, the military use of riot
control agents, has a history going back to the Vietnam war
era. Our military in the Department of Defense (DOD) was
involved in the creation of President Ford's Executive Order
11850 of April 8, 1975, which established U.S. policy on the
military use of riot control agents in war. That policy, which
remains in full effect today, as required by law, bans the
``first use of riot control agents in war, except in defensive
military modes to save lives.'' According to that policy, all
use of riot control agents in war ``is prohibited unless such
use has presidential approval in advance.''
Likewise, the military and the DOD were deeply involved in
the U.S. negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention and in
the process leading to Senate consideration and approval of the
resolution of ratification of that treaty. The Chemical Weapons
Convention bans the use of riot control agents as a method of
warfare, which was accepted by the executive branch, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the DOD, and the Senate, with a condition that
clarifies several circumstances in which the U.S. military
could use riot control agents in peacetime, in peacekeeping
military operations, and not as a method of warfare. It is
important to note that this U.S. policy and the Chemical
Weapons Convention obligations are in our national security
interests, because they help our military forces avoid being
attacked with chemical warfare agents and riot control agents.
Nobody appreciates that more than our military.
Last year, Congress enacted section 1232 of the NDAA for
Fiscal Year 2006 which was originally sponsored by Senator
Ensign. That provision restates the longstanding U.S. policy on
the military use of riot control agents, and it requires a
report by the President on six issues related to military use
of riot control agents. We understand that the administration
is nearly finished preparing that report, and today's hearing
will offer us a chance to learn the status of the
administration's efforts. We look forward to hearing from our
witnesses.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Akaka follows:]
Prepared Statement by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our witnesses to this hearing.
Because the subject matter of the hearing will involve classified
matters, we will conduct almost the entire hearing in closed session,
and limit ourselves only to opening statements at this brief portion of
the hearing.
The subject of today's hearing, the military use of riot control
agents, has a history going back to the Vietnam war era. Our military
and the Department of Defense (DOD) were involved in the creation of
President Ford's Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975, which
established U.S. policy on the military use of riot control agents in
war.
That policy, which remains in full effect today--as required by
law--bans the ``first use of riot control agents in war, except in
defensive military modes to save lives.'' According to that policy, all
use of riot control agents in war ``is prohibited unless such use has
presidential approval, in advance.''
Likewise, the military and the DOD were deeply involved in the U.S.
negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention, and in the process
leading to Senate consideration and approval of the Resolution of
Ratification of that treaty.
The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the use of riot control agents
``as a method of warfare,'' which was accepted by the executive branch,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DOD, and the Senate, with a condition
that clarifies several circumstances in which the U.S. military could
use riot control agents in peacetime and peacekeeping military
operations, and not as a method of warfare.
It is important to note that this U.S. policy and the Chemical
Weapons Convention obligations are in our national security interests
because they help our military forces to avoid being attacked with
chemical warfare agents and riot control agents. Nobody appreciates
that more than our military.
Last year, Congress enacted section 1232 of the NDAA of Fiscal Year
2006, which was originally sponsored by Senator Ensign. That provision
restates the longstanding U.S. policy on the military use of riot
control agents, and requires a report by the President on six issues
related to military use of riot control agents.
We understand that the administration is nearly finished preparing
that report, and today's hearing will offer us a chance to learn the
status of the administration's efforts. We look forward to hearing from
the witnesses.
Senator Ensign. Thank you, Senator Akaka.
Mr. Benkert, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Benkert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit an
opening statement on behalf of both myself and General Mannon.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. BENKERT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
(ACTING); ACCOMPANIED BY BRIG. GEN. OTIS G. MANNON, USAF,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS, J-3, THE JOINT STAFF
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Akaka, it's my
pleasure, and Brigadier General Mannon's pleasure, to appear
before you today to testify about U.S. policy and practice with
respect to the use of riot control agents by the U.S. Armed
Forces.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by recognizing your
work, Senator Akaka's work, and that of this subcommittee, on
this important issue. Like you, this administration wants to
ensure that our men and women in uniform have the full range of
options available to them to carry out their mission. Your
amendment on riot control agents in the NDAA for Fiscal Year
2006 has furthered this cause. The presidential report required
by this act is comprehensive and will be provided in the coming
weeks. We have surveyed and catalogued the regulations,
guidance, and training on riot control agents in this report.
We have obtained inputs from the military departments and from
the combatant commanders. The information that I'll share with
you today is similar to, and consist with, the information that
we've compiled for this report.
The policy governing the use of riot control agents by the
U.S. Armed Forces, as you and Senator Akaka have said, is
expressed principally in the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
and Executive Order 11850. The administration agrees with the
policy statement in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006, section
1232, colloquially sometimes called the ``Ensign Amendment,''
which says, ``It is the policy of the United States that riot
control agents are not chemical weapons, and that the President
may authorize their use as legitimate, legal, and nonlethal
alternatives to the use of force that, as provided in Executive
Order 11850 and consistent with the resolution of ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, may be employed by members
of the Armed Forces in war, in defensive military modes, to
save lives, including the illustrative purposes cited in
Executive Order 11850.''
As you are well aware, the capabilities of weapons or
weapons systems, both lethal and nonlethal, utilized by our
military, and the tactics and procedures for their use, are
inherently sensitive. Riot control agents are one of the
nonlethal weapons that our military may use, under certain
circumstances, and thus most of the issues covered by the
report will need to be addressed in the closed session.
I would also like to note that when I refer to riot control
agents in my testimony, I'm referring to chemicals not listed
in a Chemical Weapons Convention schedule which can produce
rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical
effects which disappear within a short time following
termination of exposure. This includes, for example, tear gas
and pepper spray. I am not referring to the broader class of
nonchemical, nonlethal weapons that may sometimes be used for
riot control or other similar purposes, such as foams, water
cannons, beanbags, or rubber bullets.
The DOD has issued regulations, doctrine, and training
materials providing guidance as to when riot control agents may
be used. As I've noted, the primary legal bases for these
materials are Executive Order 11850, Renunciation of Certain
Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents,
which was issued by President Ford in 1975, and the Convention
on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling, and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly
referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the
United States ratified in 1997.
I need to emphasize that the use of riot control agents
must comply with applicable law, including treaties and the law
of war. Any use must be consistent with our obligations under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, and any use must be consistent
with Executive Order 11850.
It may be difficult for many Americans to understand why
their Armed Forces can use riot control agents only in defined
circumstances when they see their local law enforcement
agencies using them effectively every day, as Senator Ensign
has noted. The United States military must operate within the
parameters of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Executive
Order 11850, which constrain the ability of our Armed Forces to
use riot control agents in offensive operations in wartime and
obviously do not apply to our colleagues in law enforcement.
The military departments have established requirements that
personnel receive training on riot control agents before they
are authorized to carry or employ them. I would note that this
is not the typical training that recruits receive during boot
camp to teach them to protect themselves against chemical
agents, but specialized training on riot control agent
deployment.
Annual training of such servicemembers also provides an
opportunity for supplemental training in the use of riot
control agents. For example, in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Convention of 1907, military
personnel who may employ riot control agents--such as military
police--are required to receive annual instruction of the Law
of Armed Conflict, which includes the subject on the
permissible use of riot control agents when relevant to
operational duties.
I would emphasize, as I have just explained, that DOD,
military department, and combatant command directives,
doctrine, regulation, operational plans, and training materials
are consistent with U.S. law and policy on the use of riot
control agents; namely, the Chemical Weapons Convention and
Executive Order 11850. This includes authorization and approval
guidance, as well as employment procedures and practices.
Before U.S. military personnel may use riot control agents,
they must have proper authorization. Pursuant to Executive
Order 11850, presidential approval is required prior to riot
control agent use in war in defensive military modes to save
lives. Separate regulations delegate to the Secretary of
Defense advance authority to authorize a use of riot control
agents in peacetime. However, certain peacetime uses of riot
control agents have been delegated to the combatant commands
and the Chiefs of Services, such as uses at U.S. facilities and
installations for riot control, installation security, civil
disturbance, operations training, and noncombatant emergency
evacuation operations. When U.S. forces have employed riot
control agents, they have done so in accordance with U.S. and
international law, policy, and regulations, both in the United
States and abroad.
In conjunction with the preparation of the report required
by your amendment, we initiated a review of the authorities
applicable to the use of riot control agents, under various
circumstances, in light of the changing environment in which
armed conflicts are taking place. In such a dynamic
environment, the peacekeeping, law enforcement, and traditional
battlefield roles of deployed units may be present at different
times within the same theater of operations. The use of riot
control agents will be evaluated based on the particular unit
or mission involved and the particular facts and circumstances
of the mission at the requested time.
I would like to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by highlighting the
continuing validity of Executive Order 11850. Executive Order
11850, which has not been modified or rescinded since it was
issued, remains in effect.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your personal attention
to this issue. General Mannon and I would be happy to respond
to any questions you may have in the closed session.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benkert follows:]
Prepared Statement by Joseph Benkert
Chairman Ensign, Ranking Member Akaka, and members of the
subcommittee, it is my pleasure to appear before you today to testify
regarding ``U.S. policy and practice with respect to the use of riot
control agents by the U.S. Armed Forces.''
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by recognizing your work on
this important issue. Like you, this administration wants to ensure
that our men and women in uniform have the full range of options
available to them to carry out their mission. Your amendment on riot
control agents to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006 has furthered this cause. The presidential report required by
this act is comprehensive and will be provided in the coming weeks. We
have surveyed and cataloged regulations, guidance, and training on riot
control agents. We have obtained inputs from the military departments
and views of the combat combatant commanders. The information I will
share with you today is similar to and consistent with the information
that we have compiled for the report.
The policy governing the use of riot control agents by the U.S.
Armed Forces is expressed principally in the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and Executive Order 11850. The administration agrees with
the policy statement in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006, section 1232 (the ``Ensign Amendment''); namely, ``It
is the policy of the United States that riot control agents are not
chemical weapons and that the President may authorize their use as
legitimate, legal, and nonlethal alternatives to the use of force that,
as provided in Executive Order 11850 (40 Fed. Reg. 16187) and
consistent with the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in war in
defensive military modes to save lives, including the illustrative
purposes cited in Executive Order 11850.''
As you are well aware, the capabilities of weapons or weapons
systems, both nonlethal and lethal, utilized by our military, and
tactics and procedures for their use, are inherently sensitive. Riot
control agents are one of the nonlethal weapons that our military may
use under certain circumstances and thus most of the issues covered by
the report will need to be addressed in closed session.
I also would like to note that when I refer to ``riot control
agents'' in my testimony today I am referring to chemicals not listed
in a Chemical Weapons Convention schedule which can produce rapidly in
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear
within a short time following termination of exposure. This includes
for example, tear gas and pepper spray. I am not referring to the
broader class of nonchemical nonlethal weapons that may sometimes be
used for riot control or other similar purposes such as foams, water
cannons, bean bags, or rubber bullets.
The Department of Defense has issued regulations, doctrine, and
training materials providing guidance as to when riot control agents
may be used. As I have noted, the primary legal bases for these
materials are Executive Order 11850, Renunciation of Certain Uses in
War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, which was issued by
President Ford in 1975, and the Convention on the Prohibition of
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (commonly referred to as the ``Chemical Weapons
Convention''), which the United States ratified in 1997. I need to
emphasize that use of riot control agents must comply with applicable
law, including treaties and the law of war. Any use must be consistent
with our obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and any use
must be consistent with Executive Order 11850.
It may be difficult for many Americans to understand why their
Armed Forces can use riot control agents in only defined circumstances
when they see their local law enforcement agencies using them
effectively every day. The United States military must operate within
the parameters of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Executive Order
11850, which constrain the ability of our Armed Forces to use riot
control agents in offensive operations in wartime and do not apply to
our colleagues in law enforcement.
The military departments have established requirements that
personnel receive training on riot control agents before they are
authorized to carry or employ them. I would note that this is not the
typical training that recruits receive during boot camp to teach them
to protect themselves against chemical agents, but specialized training
on riot control agent deployment.
Annual training of servicemembers also provides an opportunity for
supplemental training in the use of riot control agents. For example,
in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague
Convention of 1907, military personnel who may employ riot control
agents, such as military police, are required to receive annual
instruction on the law of armed conflict, which includes the subject of
the permissible use of riot control agents, when relevant to
operational duties.
I would emphasize, as I have just explained, that Department of
Defense, military department, and combatant command directives,
doctrine, regulations, operational plans, and training materials are
consistent with U.S. law and policy on the use of riot control agents,
namely the Chemical Weapons Convention and Executive Order 11850. This
includes authorization and approval guidance, as well as employment
procedures and practices.
Before U.S. military personnel may use riot control agents, they
must have the proper authorization. Pursuant to Executive Order 11850,
Presidential approval is required prior to riot control agent use in
war in defensive military modes to save lives. Separate regulations
delegate to the Secretary of Defense advance authority to authorize the
use of riot control agents in peacetime. However, certain peacetime
uses of riot control agents have been delegated to the combatant
commands and chiefs of Services such as uses at U.S. facilities and
installations for riot control, installation security, civil
disturbance operations training, and noncombatant emergency evacuation
operations.
When U.S. Armed Forces have employed riot control agents, they have
done so in accordance with U.S. and international law, policy, and
regulations both in the United States and abroad.
In conjunction with the preparation of the report required by the
Ensign Amendment, we initiated a review of the authorities applicable
to the use of riot control agents under various circumstances in light
of the changing environment in which armed conflicts are taking place.
In such a dynamic environment, the peacekeeping, law enforcement, and
traditional battlefield roles of deployed units may be present at
different times within the same theater of operations. The use of riot
control agents will be evaluated based on the particular unit or
mission involved and the particular facts and circumstances of the
mission at the requested time.
I would like to conclude by highlighting the continuing validity of
Executive Order 11850. Executive Order 11850, which has not been
modified or rescinded since it was issued, remains in effect.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your personal attention to this
issue and I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have in
closed session.
Senator Ensign. Thank you.
Do you have anything to add General Mannon?
General Mannon. No, sir, just good morning. It's an honor
to be here, and I look forward to answering your questions in
closed session.
Senator Ensign. I just have a couple of quick questions,
and I think that you would be able to answer those in open
session. Correct me if I'm wrong on that.
But, basically, on riot control agents, you mentioned the
training. Can you just give us an idea of how long it takes to
train somebody in the use of riot control agents? How long does
it take to train a soldier or marine in the use of riot control
agents?
Mr. Benkert. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to answer this in
closed session. General Mannon, I think, could amplify this in
closed session, as well. Obviously, this will depend on the
type of units, and I think, when we get into that, we're going
to be getting into operationally sensitive material.
Senator Ensign. Okay. As far as the report is concerned, I
understand that you all feel that the report is very close to
being completed. I was told that it, maybe, is just a few weeks
away. Is that your understanding?
Mr. Benkert. We hope that's true. The report is currently
with the Secretary. You've requested a presidential report, so
then it will also need White House review.
Senator Ensign. The anticipation on the White House
review--do you have any idea about how long that will take, as
well?
Mr. Benkert. Sir, I can't predict that. I expect a couple
of weeks, but I can't predict how long it will take.
Senator Ensign. But you're within a very short period of
time of sending it over to the White House?
Mr. Benkert. That's correct.
Senator Ensign. Okay.
I think that's all I have. I think we'll move now to closed
session, unless you have anything else, Senator Akaka?
Senator Akaka. No questions at this session.
Senator Ensign. Okay. We are adjourned; we will now move to
closed session.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John Ensign
NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES
1. Senator Ensign. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, what nonlethal
technologies in development are at a technology readiness level that
they could be deployed in the area of responsibility within 6 months?
Mr. Benkert. [Deleted.]
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
URGENT NEEDS STATEMENTS SYSTEM
2. Senator Ensign. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, what
capabilities have been identified by the warfighters through the Urgent
Needs Statements System and have they been addressed by the acquisition
community?
Mr. Benkert. [Deleted.]
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
RIOT CONTROL TECHNIQUES
3. Senator Ensign. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, what are the
current techniques being utilized within the prison system in Iraq to
quell riots and prevent injuries?
Mr. Benkert. [Deleted.]
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Ensign. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, what systems are
in development that could assist those managing prisons with
Multinational Corps-Iraq?
Mr. Benkert. [Deleted.]
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT USE
5. Senator Akaka. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, last year there
were international accusations that the U.S. military had used chemical
weapons in Fallujah. These incorrect accusations were based on the
legal U.S. military use of white phosphorous in combat operations in
Fallujah. If the U.S. military were to use riot control agents
routinely in offensive operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, requiring
them to wear gas masks and causing temporary incapacitation of
civilians, could that cause a significant negative reaction among the
local population or the international community? For example, could it
make it harder to win the ``hearts and minds'' of the Iraqi population,
or provide insurgents and jihadists with a powerful propaganda tool to
portray the U.S. military as using poison or gas on innocent Iraqi
civilians?
Mr. Benkert and General Mannon. The U.S. military may use riot
control agents consistent with Executive Order 11850 and the Chemical
Weapons Convention. It is possible that accusations of U.S. violations
of the Chemical Weapons Convention would be made if the U.S. military
were to use riot control agents in circumstances that were not
``defensive military modes'' under E.O. 11850.
OPERATIONAL IMPACT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENT USE
6. Senator Akaka. General Mannon, if U.S. military forces were to
use riot control agents routinely in offensive operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, would it require our forces to carry and wear additional
equipment that could hinder their mobility and operational flexibility?
For example, would it require them to carry and wear gas masks during
riot control agent operations, in addition to all the other equipment,
weapons, body armor, and communications gear they carry into combat? If
so, could carrying and wearing the gas mask (and any additional riot
control agent equipment required) impede their operational mobility or
ability to communicate effectively in tactical operations?
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
DESIRABILITY OF FOREIGN USE OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, from a military
and a policy point of view, would we want hostile military forces to
use riot control agents against our military forces? Would that be in
our interest? Or would it be better if hostile military forces did not
use riot control agents against our military?
Mr. Benkert and General Mannon. We would not want hostile military
forces to use riot control agents against our military forces. However,
if this occurred, our Armed Forces are trained to operate in such an
environment.
RIOT CONTROL AGENT AUTHORITIES AND CAPABILITIES
8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, with respect to
riot control agents, do U.S. military forces have all the authority and
capability necessary, consistent with U.S. policy, law, and treaty
obligations?
Mr. Benkert and General Mannon. Combatant commanders currently have
all of the authorities they have asked for regarding the use of riot
control agents consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention and
Executive Order 11850.
VIEWS OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS
9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Benkert and General Mannon, as a general
matter, did the combatant commanders express the view that there would
be a high utility to the use of riot control agents in a manner that
would not be consistent with U.S. policy?
Mr. Benkert and General Mannon. [Deleted.]
ALTERNATIVES TO RIOT CONTROL AGENT USE
10. Senator Akaka. General Mannon, section 1232(b)(2)(D) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law
109-163) requires a ``summary of the views held by combatant commanders
of United States combatant commands as to the utility of the use of
riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces when compared with
alternatives.'' What alternatives were considered, and did they include
other nonlethal weapon alternatives?
General Mannon. [Deleted.]
[Whereupon, at 10:24 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]